Transportation Vulnerability of the Communist Far East

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00662R000100060043-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 29, 1998
• Sequence Number: 43
• Publication Date: March 14, 1951
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 20M7r: CIA-RDP75-029,62R0001
Assistant Director,
Chief, S/TR? qin
Transportation VUlnerability of the Communist Far Bast
It is believed that the Soviet Union would have great difficulty in
supporting military operations anywhere in East and Southeast Asia because
the industrial regions of the USSR. are separated from areas of potential
hostilities in the Far Bast by transportation.routes of unusual length and
limited capacities, which are vulnerable to military action. (As a matter
of fact, in the improbable event that both the USSR and the US were to give
absolute top priority to the movement of supplies into these areas, the US
could move more equipment Into any controlled area of the Far East than the
USSR oould move across Siberia to any area in the Far East, with the pos.
sible exception of Vladivostok. It is unlikely, however, that any of these
areas will witness hostilities to which tither power would be willing to
allocate the major portion of its industrial and military resouroes.)
The only large traffic artery across Siberia to the Far Bast in the
Trans-Siberian railroad, which would be essential in virtually any pro-
tracted Soviet-supplied military operation of consequence in East or South-
east Asia. According to present military estimates, this line could handle
22,500 tons per day of through wartime traffic from the Western USSR to
Vladivostok. The precise basis for this estimate is not known. It is be-
lieved, however, that the principal limiting factor on the Trans Siberian
line oonderns the quantity of rolling stock which the USSR has allocated
to Trans-Siberian traffic, rather than the capacity of the facilities them-
selves. Consequently, there may be a considerable flexibility upward in
the capacity of this line. For example, it is currently estimated that,
barring major combat damage, traffic over the Trans-Siberian could be in.
creased perhaps as much as 25 percent if the requisite rolling stock were
provided. Sinoe there is a substantial capacity in the USSR for the pro-
duction of rolling stock and locomotives, the capacity of the Trans.-Siberian
railroad could be built up -without disrupting traffic elsewhere in the Soviet
Union. Within limits, the USSR could increase capacity on this line immedi-
ately by withdrawing rolling stook and locomotives from the remainder of
the Soviet network, in which case a ten percent increase in Trans-Siberian
capacity, for example, might be attained by the withdrawal of only about
one percent of the total rolling stock and locomotive inventoriee elsewhere.
(Rail capacity into Vladivostok could also be augmented by several thousand
tons daily by use of the Manchurian railroad system, provided the shipments
originated in Manchuria. On the assumption of an effective naval blockade,
no appreciable supplies could be waterborne to the Vladivostok area.)
To other areas of potential hostilities to the South and Southwest
of Vladivostok, Communist transport capabilities progressively decrease
and any diversion of traffic through Manchuria from the Trans-Siberian
route to these areas would proportionately decrease the capacity for move-
ments to Vladivostok.
14 March 1951
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A
TOE PER DAY*
(Based on Yranspo`Aation
Corps information)
Viadi vostok
22,600
North Korean border
12,600
Tientsin-Pe ing
12,000
Shanghai.Nankihg
3,000
Canton
3,000
Liuohow
2,000
OTE# These oapacitiee would not permit delivery of
the indicated quantities to more than one destination
at any given time. Furthermore, they are not intended
to be precise computations, but are included merely to
indicate the approximate magnitude_ of the various, caps.
cities in question.
? The oepaoity of the Trans.Siberian railroad far excesda that of the
rail +Donne? iona to the Menchuzian-North Korean border and the Trans.
Siberian is therefore not a oontrolling factor in the ability of the USSR
to move supplies to this area. There is no direct rail connection from
the: Vladivostok area into North Korea. By using a circuitoue route from
Vladivostok via1tutanchiang, however, as well as the rail lines from the
Trans-Siberian through Manchuria to the North Noreen border, a total rail
capacity of an estimated 12,500 tons would be available. This could be
augmented by movements in minor quantities through the blockade in small
coastal vessels from the Vladivostok area. From the same source areas,
approximately the same quantity of supplies could be alternatively trans..
ported over the rail line through itukden south into the Tientsini.Peiping
area,
ov ante further south, the restricted capacity of the Chinese
from Tientsin to the Shanghei-Nankins area would limit rod
3,000 tons per day. irk aadttiorial 5,000 tons could be placed
by the use of Yangtze river craft from the &Mow-rail termi
eiping.Nankow railroad. Fufhtermore, unless the assumed
blockade of the China coast wore completely effective, this tonnage could
be supplemented somewhat by small vessels in long-haul movemetts (upwards
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of 1,0 lee) along the coast from Tientsin south or tr Canton and
Bong on north. Up .to 3.000 tons of supplies could be plaoed into the
Canton area from the north over the B. ow-Canton railroad0 possibly
supplemented by some traffic moved by coastal shipping which might elude
a blockade..
The nearest usable railhead for the support of hostil ties in north-
ern judo-China which has through rail connections is boated at Liuchow.
approximately 200 miles from the Indo-Chinese border. The Hankoe-Liuehow
rail line has a maximum capacity of about 2.000 tons per days whioh prob.
ably exceeds existent overland transport capabilities from the reilhead
to forward oombat areas aoross the border. (Although there is another
rail line leading south toward the Indo-Chinese border from Kunming. this
line does not extend en appreciable distance above Kunming and does not
connect with the remainder of the Chinese rail network.) It is likely
thet small additional quantities of supplies could be moved along the
coast by sea for military operations in northern /lido-Chins*
For operations further west in the Burma arca, it ie estiea
bout BOO tons per day could be truoked TroTekunming over the Bunn&
the only important supply route in this area. It is unlikely, however.
that such a volume of goods could be moved overland from Soviet or Man
ohurien sources as far as ?Cunning. /u the Assam arse, mormovor, the
mountain passes are several hundred miles AITSVP from the nearest Chinese
road system end through traffic from the Soviet Union across Tibet would
be limited to a maximum of 100 tone daily. Still further west, for pos-
sible operations intogn_fland India, the communications from the MB
through Sinkiang and iwarep vrAUlly- useless for any appreciable
volume of traffic on a sustained beide. Although supply movements could
theoretioally be made across caravan routes in this area, in most of
which motor transport is not poseible, the difficulties would be so great
that the volume of goods whioh could be moved would probably not reach
IGO tons per day*
Although motor trn.port routes in South China leading to South Asia
are of little economic importance, their military eignifioance is dispro-
portionate to the relatively small volume of oode whioh can be moved over
them. This stmas from the fact that they constitute the only means of
transportation (except air) across China's southern border, there being no
trans-border rail oonneotions. Tho Chinese Communists, in faot, have asp.
pended oonsiderable effort to improve end expand road transport in this
area, presumably for military purposes.
Logistical operations by rail from the USSR to same ues of Eset
Asia could be eupplemented somewhat by truck movements. There are, for
example. five highweys oroseing the Soviet-Manchurian border whieh have
an estimated aggregate capacity of 1800 tons per dey. Two other highwaye
from the USER, through Ulan Bator and Manohouli respectively. could de-
liver an additional 200 tone1 with the possibaity that this ospaoity
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eould be materially increased by difficult d time-oonsuming improve-
meats involving the allocation of major military personnel and material
resources. The only other border crossing usable by motor vehicles is
the route from Alma Ata to Lanohow in central China over which, accord-
ing to a British estimate, as much as 400 tons a dm could be trucked.
This quantity of goods, however, would not normally affect the logistic
situation in any areas of potential hostilities, since these areas have
no practical overland transport connections with Lanchow.
With a sufficiently high priority, a concentrated airl&ft operation
could be organised from remote regions of the USSR to virtually any area
of potential hostilities in the Far East. On a shorter haul and with
pre-arranged fuel supplies, it is estimated that a fleet of 300 Soviet
twin-engine transport aircraft could deliver about 3350 tons per month,
for example., from Peiping to the tunming area. k sustained long-range
airlift operation, however, would be virtually prohibitive for the USSR,
in view of the number of aircraft which would have to be allocated for
the operation, *a well as the serious problems connected with fuel supply
Only through movements of supplies from major sources in the Soviet
Union have been disoussed above and the problem has therefore been con-
sidered only in its broadest tonna. Regional and local supply operations
could be conduoted by various improvised means, ranging from shorter-haul
airlifts down to extensive use of human and animal carriers. The fore.
going discussion, furthermore, does not reflect the possibilities of
stockpiling military equipment in the Par Past prior to hostilities, nor
probable damage to facilities and installations during hostilities.
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