PROPOSED CIA POSITION ON A DCID 15/1

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00662R000200110016-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 3, 1999
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: September 14, 1953
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2000/06 A -RDP75-00662R000200110016-4
$egur ty information
/y Siiple4er
MMDRANDUNT FORA Director ef -:entral intelligence
SUBJECT Proposed Cie -..elmition on DCID 15/1
MI:FERENC (A) Letter to Acting Director of Central Intelligence
from the 3pecia1 Assistant for Intelligence,
Departmert ef tat*, 28 August 1953
(B) Departecet of tate eraft of a -.,,reposed DCID 15/11
17 Aueuet 1953 (Tab 0
To present and, explaia a proeesed Clk position in regard to a DCID
15/1 and to provide a draft etreotive representing this position,'
B. recto Beerini on the :Iroblem,
14 MOM 1 stater Vett the Director of Central Intellieence hall
?erfara for the benefit of the eeirtinc Intelligence ueoleies tea
servioos of common concern le the Eational Security Coenoil deter:eines
can be mare efficiently accoreliseed centrally. ey implication in LOUD 3,
the production of econelic ietellieeece on the 5ev1et 'ace is of common
concern to the intellieence epecies. Research in depth on the Soviet
econowi in its entirety care in view of (YR, be more efficiently aocemplinned
centrally, and therefore leeecaley fall* to CIA (Tab B).
2, ASCII) 3 states teat wee iUieie agenoy may call upon other
appropriate agencies far intellieeece which does net fall within its own
field of dominant interest eed ewe mon requests ehell be eade upon the
agencies in aecordence with their oroduction capabilities end dot/Anent
interest. There is no implication in that Directive that the Department
of State ar the Nilitary Services nave dominant interest in the soolomic
intelligenee field. Furthereore, the Department of State, as an exaeple,
cannot undertake the depth ot reeearch required to meet the needs of other
intelligence, agencieu in those fields whioh are allocated to the
'Department of State in its draft preposal (Tab A).
3. NOM 3 further stetac that the Director of Central Ietelligence
will seek to einimiee the neceseity for any agency to develop intelligence
in fields outside ite dominent interests. It is understood that the
research oreenizations ef CJA were, in part, established to aseise the
Director of Central Intellieenee in providing intelligence eroductien Jai
areas not of dominant intoreet te individual irtUigence ageeeies.
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4. With reference to DC-1) 3/4, the assignment of uroduction
responsibility in the field of economio intelligence is not comoarable
with the problem of allocatine such responsibility in the field of
scientific and technical ietellieence. DCID 3/4 divides responsibility
in the scientific and tecnnical Ziold between the Department of Defense
and the CIA, allocatine those e&jects that are clearly of direct military
importance to Defeese and assicniag the subject of fundamental research
on the basic sciences ad medicine to CIA. The various subjects requiring
research in the field of economic intelligence are so interrelated (as
noted in Tab B) the any artiacial eeparabion af research responsibility
would reduce the efficiency ,a.4 (ffectivenors of the total researc!1 effort.
5. AB a reeult of the recogition over two years ago of the paucity
of economic intelligence research aa the soviet Bloc, ORR, as a matter of
common concern, shifted its reseerce effort from world-wide coverage to a
concentration on the Soviet Bice, and greatly strengthened this effort.
As of January 1953, doing full time
research. sthe SovliT-17574-715755ii./7miRT7anniti7Hkd 29, including
king on NIS; the Deperteent of the Army had 31; the Department
had 151 and the Department of the Air Force had 219 (see
chart, Tab B). It is understood that the relative proportions have eat
changed significantly since that time.
C. Diacuesion.
le At the present tine, CIA has in its Office of Research and Reports
the broadest research program D3 :,11e Soviet Bloc and the largest number of
personnel engaged in such researce within the intelligence community. The
only other sizable organization coaductine such research is in the
Department of the Air Force. harewer? this Air Force effort is primarily
cerned with target intellieenco, and the emphasis ie on the production
of specialized studeee in supeort of war plans. The Air Force has been
drawing increasingly upon the reeoarcos of CIA as this Agency has developed
competence in the field of Soviet Bloc economic research.
2. The Department of State eroposal for a DOID 15/1 (Tab A) is
unrealistic in the lizht of t:ie Department's present and foreseeable
research capabilities. On 111e oeier hands the am proposal for a MID 15/1
Tab C) reflects the existing capabilities to produce economic intelligence
on the Soviet Bloc and the lack of any dominant interest in the field by
either the Deperteent of State or the Alitary Services. In essence, the
CR proposal states that 014 will produce, as a matter of comma concern,
the bulk of the economic intelligence on e'ae Soviet Bloc and that other
agencies may supplement this or their departmental needs as necessary.
3. The ORR proposal ia couched in such terms as not to specify the
numbers of people which other agoicies require in the discharge of their
depertmental responsibilitiee for Soviet Bloc economic intelligence, ner
does it attempt to allocate i ijid fashion the epecific areas in which
other agencies may do suah research.
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Se,ority information
That neither the Department of State nor the Alitary Services
have dominant interest or erinery respoesibilities for the eroductioa
of economic intelligence on the .oviet bloc.; that this intelligence
production ie a matter of exam= conaera nd owl be most efficiently
accomplished eentrally in CIA, because it requires research in depth
and an integreted approach to the entire economic structurel that the
Departrlent of State eroposal deer not abide by the intent of INECID 3
to minimize the necessitr fov alv agency to develop intenigenca
production oapabilities in fielOs clutside its dominant interest; are,
that other elonoies sc>aid ie 03110nie intelligence
produotion on the oviet rri ace(1 by CIA in ordor to meet their
departmental noda.
Fri
That, if a UCID 15/1 in to 1,f, oonsidered at th.ia ti, te DCI
accept the draft proposal containtad iA Thb C as te poeition of this
Agency.
OAD/RR/OEGuthetees
11 September 1953
Distribution'
2 - DWI
1 - Ex. Reg
1 - Ch/C/RR
1 - C
2 -
ROBERT AMORY, Jr.
JepAty Director/Intelligence
Approved For Release 200 CIA-RDP75-00662R000200110016-4