TRANSPORTATION VULNERABILITY OF THE FAR EAST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00662R000200170029-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 16, 2000
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: March 14, 1951
• Content Type: MEMO

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STANDARD ROHM NO.
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Office Memorandum ? UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
TO Chief, D/S, O/RR
FROM . Chief, S/Tr, 0/RR
SUBJECT: Transportation Vulnerability of the Far East
Ref : Letter from to the Assistant Director,
O/RR, dated 7 February 1951.25X1A5a1
I, General Implications of Communist Transportation Limitations in the Far East
The major theme of the reference letter is that the Soviet Union would
have great difficulty in supporting military operations anywhere in East
and Southeast Asia because the industrial regions of the USSR are separated
from areas of potential hostilities in the Far East by transportation
routes of limited capacities, which are vulnerable to military action. The
letter's emphasis on the unusual length and vulnerability of these routes
is well-founded. (As a matter of fact, in the improbable event that both
the USSR and the US were to give absolute top priority to the movement of
supplies into these areas, the US could move more equipment into any con-
trolled area of the Far East than the USSR could move across Siberia to
any area in the Far East, with the possible exception of Vladivostok. It
is unlikely, however, that any of these areas will witness hostilities to
which either power would be willing to allocate the major portion of its
industrial and military resources.)
II. Aggregate Soviet Logistic Ca abilities in East and Southeast Asia
The only large traffic artery across Siberia to the Far East is the
Trans-Siberian railroad, which would be essential in virtually any pro-
tracted Soviet-supplied military operation of consequence in East or South.
G,2 east Asia. According to present military estimates, this line could
4;i,, handle 22,500 tons per day of through wartime traffic from the Western
el-USSR to Vladivostok. The precise basis for this estimate is not known.
*,Or., Transportation Branch believes, however, that barring major combat gage,
~y,e at this capacity could be increased as much as 25 percent by the provision of
Ji'&dditional rolling stock and locomotives. This increase might be achieved
d~/'S leV gradually from Soviet railway equipment prmduction without disrupting
0rl~st~,,,r0 traffic in other areas or immediately by withdrawals from other lines, with
j consequent effect on their operations (Rail capacity into
,liYf could be augmented by several thousand tons daily by use of the Mar hurian
1'' i,{s railroad system, provided these shipments originated in Manchuria. On the
ywrl` assumption of an effective naval blockade, no appreciable supplies could
be waterborne to the Vladivostok area.)
i~ ri i4 ?n .ono
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To other areas of potential hostilities to the South and Southwest
of Vladivostok, Communist transport capabilities progressively decrease
and any diversion of traffic through Manchuria from the Trans-Siberian
route to these areas would proportionately decrease the capacity for
movements to Vladivostok.
Estimated Through Rail Traffic Capacities from the
Western USSR to the Far East
TONS PER DAY*
(Based on Transportation
Corps information)
Vladivostok
North Korean border
Tientsin-Peiping
22,500
12,500
12,000
Shanghai-Nanking 3,000
Canton 3,000
Liuchow 2,000
*NOTE: These capacities would not permit delivery of
the indicated quantities to more than one destination
at any given time. Furthermore, they are not intended
to be precise computations, but are included merely to
indicate the approxirmto magnitude of the various capa-
cities in question.
The capacity of the Trans-Siberian railroad far exceeds that of the
rail connections to the Manchurian-North Korean border and the Trans-
Siberian is therefore not a controlling factor in the ability of the USSR
to move supplies to this area. There is no direct rail connection from
the Vladivostok area into North Korea. By using a circuitous route from
Vladivostok via Mutanchiang, however, as well as the rail lines from the
Trans-Siberian through Msnchuria to the North Korean border, a total rail
capacity of an estimated 12,500 tons would be available. This could be
augmented by movements in minor quantities through the blockade in small
coastal vessels from the Vladivostok area. From the same source areas,
approximately the same quantity of supplies could be alternatively trans-
ported over the rail line through Mukden south into the Tientsin-Peiping
area.
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For movements further south, the restricted capacity of the Chinese
rail line from Tientsin to the Shanghai-Nanking area would limit rail
traffic to 3,000 tons per day. additional ,000 tons could be placed
in this area by the use of Yangtze river craft from the Hankow rail
terminus on the Peiping-Hankow railroad. Furthermore, unless the assumed
blockade of the China coast were completely effective, this tonnage could
be supplemented somewhat by small vessels in long-haul movements (upwards
of 1,000 miles) along the coast from Tientsin south or from Canton and
Hong Kong north. Up to 3,000 tons of supplies could be placed into the
Canton area from the north over the Hankow-Canton railroad, possibly
supplemented by some traffic moved by coastal shipping which might elude
a blockade.
The nearest usable railhead for the support of hostilities in north-
ern Indo-China which has through rail connections is located at Liuchow,
approximately 200 miles from the Indo-Chinese border. The Hankow-Liuohow
rail line has a maximum capacity of about 2,000 tons per day, which prob-
ably exceeds existent overland transport capabilities from the railhead
to forward combat areas across the border. (Although there is another
rail line leading south toward the Indo-Chinese border from Kunming, this
line does not extend an appreciable distance above Kunming and does not
connect with the remainder of the Chinese rail network.) It is likely
that small additional quantities of supplies could be moved along the
coast by sea for military operations in northern Indo-China.
For operations further west in the Burma area, it is estimated that
about 500 tons per day could be trucked from Kunming over the Puma Road,
the only important supply route in this area. It is unlikely, however,
that such a volume of goods could be moved overland from Soviet or Man-
churian sources as far as Kunming. In the Assam area, moreover, the
mountain passes are several hundred miles removed from the nearest Chinese
road system and through traffic from the Soviet Union across Tibet would
be limited to a maximum of 100 tons daily. Still further west, for pos-
sible operations into Nepal and India, the communications from the USSR
through Sinkiang and Tibet are virtually useless for any appreciable
volume of traffic on a sustained basis. Although supply movements could
theoretically be made across caravan routes in this area, in most of
which motor transport is not possible, the difficulties would be so great
that the volume of goods which could be moved would probably not reach
100 tone per day.
Logistical operations by rail from the USSR to some areas of East
Asia could be supplemented somewhat by truck movements. There are, for
example, five highways crossing the Soviet- Manchurian border which have
an estimated aggregate capacity of 1600 tons per day. Two other highways
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from the USSR, through Ulan Bator and Manchouli respectively, could de-
liver an additional 200 tons, with the possibility that this capacity
could be materially increased by difficult and time-consuming improve-
ments involving the allocation of major military personnel and materiel
resources. The only other border crossing usable by motor vehicles is
the route from Alma Ata to Lanchow in central China over which, accord-
ing to a British estimate, as much as 400 tons a day could be trucked.
This quantity of goods, however, would not normally affect the l6gistic
situation in any areas of potential hostilities, since these areas have
no practical overland transport connections with Lanchew.
With a sufficiently high priority, a concentrated airlift operation
could be organized from remote regions of the USSR to virtually any area
of potential hostilities in the Far East. On a shorter haul and with
pre-arranged fuel supplies, it is estimated that a fleet of 300 Soviet
twin-engine transport aircraft could deliver about 3,150 tons per month,
for example, from Peiping to the Kunming area. A sustained long-range
airlift operation, however, would be virtually prohibitive for the USSR,
in view of the number of aircraft which Wculd have to be allocated for
the operation, as well as the serious problems connected with fuel supply.
Only through movements of supplies from major sources in the Soviet
Union have been discussed above and the problem has d erefore been con-
sidered only in its broadest terms. Regional and local supply operations
could be conducted by various improvised means, ranging from shorter-haul
airlifts down to extensive use of human and animal carriers. The fore-
going discussion, furthermore, does not reflect the possibilities of
stockpiling military equipment in the Far East prior to hostilities, nor
probable damage to facilities and installations during hostilities.
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On the other hand, so far as is known, no agency in
Washington is seriously attempting to follow individual
Chinese Communist ship movements. Adequate coverage of
Chinese Communist traffic by this office would require
personnel increases and considerably expanded collection
arrangements. In fact, comprehensive coverage of Chinese
shipping would probably not be possible, since the majority
of the traffic along the China coast is carried by large
numbers of vessels of under 1,000 tons which are not sub-
ject to adequate surveillance. During the hostilities in
Korea, for example, it has not been possible to follow ship
movements satisfactorily, even though the US has naval
forces operating in the area on a combat basis. On the
other hand, it would probably be possible to detect large
concentrations of shipping along the China coast.
As the reference letter points out, much of the ship-
ping in the China trade flys the flags of Western nations.
There is abundant evidence, however, that a substantial
portion of such tonnage is actually Chinese Communist-owned
or controlled. Consequently, these ships could be promptly
re-registered if their present nominal nationalities proved
embarrassing to the Communist owners.
B. Trans-Siberian Railroad
Present estimates of the capacity of the Trans-Siberian
railrcad have already been indicated. This office is con-
tinuing its research on the strategic significance of this
line and will devote available manpower resources to the
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study of every aspect of Trans-Siberian rail facilities and
operations, as the future expanded personnel of the Branch
permits.
It is believed that the principal limiting factor on
the Siberian line concerns the quantity of rolling stock
which the USSR has allocated to Trans-Siberian traffic,
rather than the capacity of the facilities themselves. Con-
sequently, there may be a considerable flexibility upward in
the capacity of this line. It is currently estimated, for
example, that traffic over the Trans-Siberian could be in-
creased perhaps as much as 25 percent if the requisite roll-
ing stock were provided. Since there is a substantial capa-
city in the USSR for the production of rolling stock and
locomotives, the capacity of the Trans-Siberian railroad
could be built up without disrupting traffic elsewhere in
the Soviet Union. Within limits, the USSR could increase
ca,>acity on this line immediately by withdrawing rolling
stock and locomotives from the remainder of the Soviet net-
work, in which case a ten percent increase in Trans-Siberian
capacity, for example, might be attained by the withdrawal
of only about one percent of --.he total rolling stock and
locomotive inventories elsewhere.
C. North-South Communications in China
25X1X4
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D. Road Communications of China with Indo-China, Thailand,
Burma and India.
Although motor transport routes in South China leading
to South Asia are of little economic importance, their
military significance is disproportionate to the relatively
small volume of goods which can be moved over them. This
stems from the fact that they constitute the only means of
transportation (except air) across Chinats southern border,
there being no trans-border rail connections. The Chinese
Communists, in fact, have expended considerable effort to
improve and expand road transport in this area, presumably
for military purposes.
E. Caravan Routes from the West
Knowledge of the current status of these routes is
virtually nil. Available information on these routes is
limited to data no later than 1946.
It is agreed that the normal and most economic means
of supplying oil to the Communist Far East is by tanker.
It is not correct, however, to consider long rail hauls
of petroleum as wholly uneconomic. During World Afar II,
for example, oil was moved regularly by train from the
mid-continent area of the US to New York. It is estimated
that the Soviet Union is currently moving substantial
quantities of petroleum to the Far East across the Trans-
Siberian railroad. In a wartime situation, moreover, the
Soviet Union would presumably be subject to an effective
naval blockade and normal economic considerations would
not apply.
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It is also agreed that oil transportation would be a
difficult problem for the Communists if war in the Far
East should spread through Southeast Asia. This would
result, however, from damage to the Chinese railroads
rather than from the economics of rail transportation of
petroleum. The Communist requirement for oil in Southeast
Asia would probably not be great because mechanized and
air operations would be sharply limited by factors other
than the oil supply. Even with damage to the Chinese rail-
roads, moderate quantities of oil would reach the area,
since rail capacities could be supplemented by overland
movements and possibly even by emergency airlifts of short
duration. Furthermore, stockpiling of oil would almost
certainly take place prior to hostilities.
IV. Development of Tastical Concepts
25X1A5a1
The tactical concepts which sug-vests be developed
on the basis of our knowledge of the Communist transport situation in
the Far East are the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
the appropriate military services. Likewise, specific plans of
action, including attacks on Communist transportation systems in the
Far East, are no doubt under development by the armed forces. The Air
Force, for example, has long studied Soviet transportation from this
point of view and has organized a large fund of target information on
installations and facilities along the Trans-Siberian railroad, as well
as on the Chinese rail system. The Navy undoubtedly has also developed
detailed plans for possible blockades of the China coast and the USSR,
as well as for attacks against Chinese and Soviet ports, shipping and
other transport targets. Although the contribution which CIA can make
in the tactical field is obviously limited, there will undoubtedly be
instances in which the research undertaken by Transportation Branch
within its mission could be of value to other agencies in connection
with tactical planning.
V. Measures Necessary for the Fulfillment of Transportation Branch Mission
In order to achieve the depth and scope of research v+hich Y r.
25X1A5a1 feels is necessary, in which this Branch heartily concurs,
aggressive action in various directions will be necessary. A number
of requirement directives of major importance and broad scope have
already been issued by this Branch. The Navy Department, for example,
has been asked to act upon a comprehensive collection program .for
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expanded intelligence reporting on several' aspects of Soviet maritime
affairs. Almost four months have elapsed, however, since Transporta-
tion Branch submitted its requirements, and almost three months since
OCD made these requirements known to the Navy. Since no reply has
yet been received, the prospects for adequate fulfillment of these
important intelligence requirements by the Navy do not appear favor-
able.
An investigation has been undertaken with OCD of the feasibility
of establishing machine records in that Office, based upon Lloyd's
register of shipping. Such statistical records would greatly facili-
tate our analysis of the patterns of Communist and non-Communist
shipping to and from Orbit ports. Steps are also being taken to sur-
vey and determine the availability to OO/C of qualified sources on
Soviet Orbit transport matters, with a view to maximum exploitation
of such sources by..detailed technical interrogation and possibly on
an external research basis. Branch analysts are reviewing the extent
of the data available on Orbit transportation and will initiate
additional collection directives as the need becomes apparent.
Proper reporting, analysis and research on transportation matters
would require not only expanded collection facilities in the field,
but also a substantial increase in the personnel of this Branch.
Although the Branch will aggressively continue to avail itself of
present reporting facilities through requirement directives, it does
not appear likely that the responses thereto will prove satisfactory,
particularly in cases necessitating extensive field collection action.
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