ESTIMATING THE NATURE AND THE MAGNITUDE OF THE EXTERNAL THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00662R000300160002-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 28, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 17, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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ESTIMATING THE NATURE AND THE MAQNITUDE OF
T F CTERNAL TI i 'AT TO NATIONAL ySECURITY
NOTE: The following memorandum pretends to be no more than a preliminary sketch of
a vast subject about which Amerioans, at least, have no generally accepted body of
doctrine. Bearing the purpose of our discussion in mind a compromise has been struck
between two possible lines of a proaoh, and like many compromises the result may
compound the infirmities of both alternatives. For many problems it is convenient
to have a.comprehensive check list of all factors entering into any estimate of
national strength. For the specific problem of estimating the nature and magnitude
of the Soviet threat -. and accomplishing this without benefit of "classified"
information -- it may be useful to propose a selection of elements with the most
direct bearing on the problem at hand.
PRELIMINARY
1. In the most comprehensive sense security can be taken to mean freedom from
loss or fear of losing what is highly valued. In this sense security does
not mean exemption from any loss or expectation of losing, but implies
rather that activity of a certain positive scope is permitted to continue.
Following this line of thought national security is often spoken of as security
from and security for. Negatively, it is freedom from war or loss of inde-
pendence. When there is peace and the outlook for peace is bright, there
is security; and also when there is freedom from external dictation. Posi-
tively, national security is freedom to pursue the more abundant life by
peaceful means.
2. The split between the Soviet and the non-Soviet world creates a continuing
state of insecurity in which it is essential to maintain high levels of
defense expenditure. To recognize the continuing cleavaagge does not imply
that all-out war is the "inevitable" outcome of the crisis, or that the only
effective instruments of national defense are military. On the contrary we
hold that war is "evitable", not "inevitable"; and we rely upon diplomatic,
economic, and psychological as well as military instruments for the success
of our defense.
Our-policy perspective can be characterized as follows in the present crisis:
First, we desire to deter the Soviet leadership from aggression.
Second, we hope to induce the decision makers of the SU to put aside their
policies of aggress o3n, and agree to the reduction of armaments within the
framework of the UN, including arrangements for thorough and continuing
inspection. (We regard arms`Oontrol pot as the goal but the precondition-of
an epoch in whici the vast potentialities of r4odern science and technology
will be applied for the good of all.)
Third, if all else fails we must be-prepared to re~Rgj aggregsigR and to
liquidate the aggressors; regimes, replacing them with governments able and
willing to cooperate peacefully in the world community.
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At every step the choice of appropriate policy depends upon estimating the
nature and magnitude of the threat confronting us currently and pros ctive~. .
In appraising the threat, it is necessary to estimate the intention of_ov ee,
decision makers, and the ca abilities at their disposal. This c is for an
analysis of the factors determining current and future Soviet policy as it
affects our security.
A. What are the current intentions of Soviet decision makers concerning
the security of the US?
1. Is the aim to prepare as rapidly as possible for an all-out
aggression?
2. re the aim to achieve dominance by measures short of all-out
aggression?
3. Is the aim to achieve security without achieving dominance?
(or some. combination of the foregoing)
B. What current capabilities are at the disposal of Soviet policy affect-
ing the security of the US?
1. Are these capabilities sufficient to accomplish aim one above?
2. Are they sufficient to accomplish aim two?
(Aim three is more a matter of intention than capability)
C. What factors account for the current intentions and capabilities of
Soviet policy? (An assessment of dominant and subordinate factors
in the equilibrium of policy making and execution.)
1.
What factors originating inside the SU are or have been important?
(Domestic and foreign policy:
psychological)
political, economic, military,
2.
What factors originating outside the SU have been important?
a. What has been the impact of US policy?
(Domestic and foreign: political, economic,, military,
psychological)
b.? What has been the impact of the policy of other powers
than the US, notably Britain, France, Italy, West Germany?
(Domestic and foreign: 'pclitf:cal, economic, military,
psychological)
(Recall that the effect of one power upon another may be
direct or indirect through other powers)
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D. What are the future intentions and capabilities of Soviet policy
affecting US security (mid-range, long range?)
1. What factors originating inside the SU will be important?
(Note that this is a matter of assessing the future impact of
factors operating currently, and of new factors expected to
emerge.)
2. What factors orginating outside the SU will be important?
a. What will be the impact of potential US policies?
(This is the point at which it is appropriate to consider policy
alternatives that have already been recommended, and to seek
to invent new solutions.)
.b. What will be the impact of. the potential policies of other
powers than the US?
5. A continuous exercise of judgment is necessary if estimates of the nature and
magnitude of the Soviet threat are to be kept current. Plans must be sub.
ject to more or less perpetual review and revision as our expectations change.
It is necessary to devise strategies with-all contingencies in view, extend-
ing from the most unfavorable to the most favorable possibilities.
The range of contingencies may be clarified somewhat if we subject the most
extreme potentialities to examination.
Conti ern A postulates that the hostile and uncooperative intentions of
the Soviet leaders will continue despite our efforts to odify them: and
that every effort will be made to build up the capabilities of the Soviet
world to the point where an all-out offensive against the US and Western
Europe will succeed in breaking our resistance. Even this contingency
does not assume that all-our war will necessarily come. The postulate is
that the capabilities of the Soviet world will in fact be built up to some.
where near the peak of their potential; and that only estimates made when
the crisis has intensified to this degree will determine whether the Soviet
leaders launch the offensive. If the Soviet leadership begins at such a
point to relinquish the aim of preparing a full-scale assault, the situation
will then coincide with one of the contingencies we have called B.
Contin enc 1B,-by contrast, postulates that the effective intentions of the
Soviet leadership can be changed short of all-out war to the direction of
increasing cooperation and abating the world crisis of insecurity. The
chief possibility to be explored is the impact on Soviet intentions if we
do in fact clearly begin to out-arm, slat-develop, out.-consumes out-persuade
and out-negotiate the Soviet world.
b. We are assuming in what follows that the leadership of the SU remains per-
sistently hostile and seeks to gain preponderating offensive strength
sufficient (a) to induce Western Europe and the US to yield to an ultimatum
without resisting; or (b) to inflict a devastating. blow upon the capability
of the West to resist.
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We deal later with the "realism" of this postulate concerning the inter
tions of the Soviet leaders. For the !sent the task is to answer the
question: What In Zbe MAXJ=
enemy
might laungh noN, and at &11 ? We then consider potential
policies of'national defense capable of frustrating this intention.
7. One preliminary question must be disposed of. Is it likely that the ene
will be able to attack with we s of unheard destructiveness?---
s ruc veness so,
we are re of any rational basis for arriving at an estimate of the
military peril to our national security.
Without attempting to close debate on this topic we may nevertheless
offer the following comment: It is unlikely that great surprises are
in store for us. Or for that matter, for the enemy. Both sides have
access to the same stook of basic 'scientific and engineering principles,
and allowing for the fact that solutions usually differ somewhat in effi-
ciency and timing, the identical problems are likely to receive similar
answers at" about the same time. Our confidence in this view is strength-
ened by our knowledge of the history of moderninventions.
In making our calculation of weapon type in the hands of the enemy we
are justified in assuming that he will have at his disposal the.best
weapons that we ourselves possess. The question of weapon type now
becomes quantitative in the sense that if the same volume of talent
and facilities is directed toward research and development, comparable
results can be expected.
8. We therefore consider first the scale of Soviet capabilities for aggression.
A limiting factor. is the magnitude of the outlay necessary for consumption.
What per, oavita rates of consumption shall- assume?
Comment: Only token concessions need be made in the future beyond the
levels now prevailing in the Soviet Union.
What volume of Manpower will, be available for the armament pro gram?
stimatso are available of the recent and prospective growth of the Soviet
population, and of production and productivity to major lines. (We shall
not summarize these figures here, since our chief purpose is to consider
the ,kj.nds of knowledge and judgment relevant to our central problem).
Perhaps the most useful simplification of the complex elements entering
into long-term military-strength are o and productivity. In
this' simplification reso oe are left onto the equation. It is
evident t atiover short per s resource shortages may limit an armament
program. But this factor is to some extent counteracted by stockpiling,
and over longer period by substitution. The resource factors affecting
the Soviet Union can be dealt with in detail, of course, by creating
"models" of the future, describing all "flows" and "stocks" at present
and future dates. However, it is not certain that the assumptions intro-
duced piecemeal into such models are any more reliable than the assumptions
introduced all at once in the "heroic simplification" made above.)
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In order to estimate the weight of the offensive it is necessary to
subtract the-outl for defensiv =P-0-00-0 . We therefore ask: What
proportion o Soviet outlay currently goes to the pre ara on
of offense?
Even in the absence of classified information, we may nonetheless hope
to arrive at an approximation based upon "open" sources and expert Judgment.
Is it like that this ProRRrtion will be Increased or diminished in
the next few years?
Comment: These projects will probably not be reduced but, if anything,
increased. Soviet leaders are well aware of the present inferiority of
the Soviet economy as a whole in relation to the US, and of the great
importance of narrowing the gap as rapidly as possible.
Moreover, the Soviet leadership has a tradition of conspiracy and surprise;
and surprise on a global scale. can come from the development of uncon-
ventional weapons. Dees the conception of a "knock-out blow" appeal to
the imagination of Soviet leaders? If it were poseible to prepare and
administer a staggering blow to the American economy, the Soviet elite
might gain in several ways. The US threat might be removed for a few
years. And Soviet leaders may imagine that the unity of America would
be so much impaired by a great disaster that the nation would never
recover.
A factor favoring offense is the low regard in which human lives are
held in Soviet power struggles. 1111resumably Soviet leaders are prepared
to keep civilian protection at a minimum.
The coat of weapons that must be made effective at great distances is
great, and can be expected to become greater. as technology develops.
In sum, the Soviet Union is likely to possess the same unconventional
weapons that we have, and to devote an increasing proposition of their
military outlay to research and development projects connected therewith.
It is nec to tr late the' a a Ate weight of offens ve strength
into me ful categories of -ootentiaLdestructiveness. This calls for
the postulation of a balance amo offensive n which, in the judg-
ment of experts, is capab e.o doing t e most damage to the US. We also
postulate that these weapons are aplied acc riling to the beat plan (in
the same sense).
Since military journals and testimony'bgfore Congressional Committees
contain studies of the problems?involved;?it is possible to make
assumptions which are."respectable' in professional military circles,
without the benefit of classified information.
9. We are now in a a ti n to''consider
02 'magnitude of the counter-
sive against the Soviet Union in a comparatively short tieriod of time
after the attack.
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-6-
Observe that at this point we are not evaluating the likelihood that
Soviet intentions will in fact be sustained through the exertions nec-
essary to bring Soviet capabilities to the peak. (As we shall indicate
later, internal factors may prevent this; or our own policies may succeed
in heading off these.extreme developments.). Nor are we estimating the
probability that if the peak of Soviet capability is approached, Soviet
leaders will actually mount an all-out offensive, The immediate point
is that since these contingencies are conceivable, we must give them
weight.
If we are targets for a vast initial aggression, severe damage may be
done to our forces in being and to our system of production. How much
lo ea can we wisely risk? Clearly we must be able to launch a powerful
counter-attack instantly, and to sustain this-attack from stocks for a
reasonable time until we are able to support the operation from current
production.
hb-at "la period" shall we select between the tial to aes and the
attaining of a level of current production capable of supporting our
orrens ve
Some general policy considerations can be mentioned which bear on this
question. It is important to bring the war to a successful conclusion
at the earliest moment. The sacrifices of modern warfare are so enormous
that they ought to be endured no longer than necessary. These sacrifices
involve every basic value. There is life itself; and there are the
liberties and moralities of civil society, all of which are endangered
by a garrisoned existence.
Another overriding policy is that at all times we intend to keetional
forces in being and our stocks at the lowest point consistent with i
safety. There is such a thing as "dys-preparation" for defense, which
consists in activities ordinarily regarded as strengthening national de_
fense, but whose side-effects nullify their contribution to national
security.
"Dys-preparation" can take the form of putting too much reliance upon
military weapons rather than upon an integrated and balanced program in.
which economic, political, and psychological policies play their full
part. Excessive concern with piling up arms can result in the accumu-
lation of obsolete equipment and the dissipation of resources. Potential
allies can be alienated if they conclude that we are, in fact, "war-mongers"
provoking the Soviet Union. Cleavages may' develop inside our own body
politic.
Cracks may also appear in our national unity as a result of diminishing
or stationary levels of consumption. Disunity may be fostered as the
centralization of power in national and military hands brings about the
restriction of our traditional freedoms. police measures flourish in a
climate of fear and suspicion; and may eventually bring a full garrison-
police state into existence.,
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(Perhaps the chief inference to be drawn from the foregoing considera-
tions is the reminder that there is no such thing as total security, and
that we must be prepared to take calculated risks.)
In deciding how great these risks should be, we need to take into account
the rate and duration of the offensive aot o on our t that will des-
ro the canabill&Z o the ov a non for organized resistance.
it is essential to select the ea on combination and the strategic plan
which has the support of expert opinion, T e_ major possibilities have
been discussed in professional journals and Congressional Hearings.)
(We have already called for estimates of the defensive strength of the
Soviet Union. Obviously many of these defenses must be destroyed before
the main target centers of the SU are exposed to destruction.)
When we have estimated the rate and duration of our counter--offensive,
according to weapon type and scale, we can make the translation into
production requirements (in the aggregate, manpower at given rates of
productivity).
It is reasonable to:accept as a calou.at risk the.prospect of losing an
amount of productive ea o t that. t11
ee in our handl the oamlbili
of reachiwg er few Months,, level out t enabling us to u rt
the counts enaive that we b69 W
an en g e a ession was undergone.
Comment: Shall we assume "a few months" take six months, or longer?
Before settling upon any figure, it will be necessary to draw a compre-
hensive piotcr..e of the burdens which are disclosed by alternative calcu.
lations. Clearly, the shorter the "lag" (or "overtake") period, the
higher the level of readiness that must be maintained in the form of forces
in being and of stocks. If an "overtake" period is stretched out, our
level of readiness may be too low to deter-the enemy from aggression; and
if the aggression occurs, our loss of forces and of productive capacity
may be so grave that counter-offensive action, on a sufficient scale, is
ruled out for years (if, indeed, it will be possible at. all). Note, too,
that the effectiveness of our counter-e:oves may be handicapped by an ex-
cessive diversion of resources into defensive preparations, greatly delay-
ing our success, and prolonging the crisis.
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To the extent that we attach probability to Contingency A, we reconcile
ourselves to vast military outlays, since enormous expenditures are n.:ec-
.essary if a deterring influence is to be exerted upon Soviet leaders at
the crucial time when they are nearing the peak of their capability. vie
postulate in Contingency P that the effective intentions of the Soviet
leadership will be changed, if at all, when they are clearly out-armed
and that this can happen. only after great efforts have been made,
Because Contingency A assigns a. great role to the military instruments of
policy, there is grave danger that all considerations of statesmanship
will be lost sight of by those who attach importance to A. This might
end in disaster for American policy.
It is probable that our chances of successful armament programs will be
seriously compromised if we act as though we were only interested in
"hardware" arguments in world politics. Our policies of economic develop'
ment will not only contribute to long range fighting potentials; they
will, if properly correlated with diplomacy and propaganda, contribute
to that political. unification of rulers and ruled which is so important
In a long struggle for survival. Puch a spectacle of growing unity on our
side -- coupled with evidence of total strength --a can influence the
expectations of the Soviet elite in directions favorable to pacific
adjustment,
As indicated above, if Contingency A is realized without culminating
in all-out war, this will be because Soviet leaders eventually change
their effective intentions (on the basis of expectations which they come
to accept). Contingency j3 specifies a future in which Soviet intentions
are more malleable from an earlier time. The crisis does not reach the
gravity which has been postulated as Contingency A.
10, We now change our postulates and assume that Soviet leaders change their
hostile and non-cooperative intentions after a few years. A comprehensive
study of this contingency would.require a detailed evaluation of significant
internal and external factors likely to be in.play. In this discussion a
few will be touched upon briefly.:..4e begin with a few "doctrinal" and
"structural" factors,
One of the principal i erns factors is the.natureand rigidity of Poviet
Doctrine, as presently and prospecitvely conceived and.applied by the
Soviet leadership. Is the' doe insunambiguous in predicts inevitable
victory in ark elt-war?
Comments The Marxtst-Leninipt-Stalinist doctrine is,full of ambiguity.
While the victory of the "prole'tariat"'over the' capj.~alist class" is
predicted, doctrinal support can be found for ~everal versions of how the
outcome is to be brought about,
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According to some statements, the proletarian state is sure to be the
target of hostile encirclement by capitalistic states intent upon its
liquidation. Sooner or later, therefore, the enemies of the SU will resume
the struggle -- broken off in 1921 - to crush the "fatherland of the
proletariat" by force. On the other hand, some doctrines support the view
that the world triumph of the proletarian revolution will be achieved in
another way. The forecast is that the capitalist world is torn by rivalries
which prevent it from uniting effectively in time to crush the ever-strength-
ening center of world communism. In this sense, "peaceful co-existence" is
feasible: The capitalist world decays 'while the productive forces at the
disposal of socialist and communist states are augmented.
In view of the inconsistencies in Bolshevik doctrine as interpreted by various
authorities it appears that a considerable range of choice is left to'the
decision-makers of the soviet world in adapting doctrine to policy.
How much weight is to given to the deliberate sustaining of foreign crisis
as a means of retaining dictatorial rower? This is standard technique in
tyran.a and dictatorial systems.
Comment: It is unlikely that this factor will lead to "adventurism" on the
part of Soviet leaders. They are. continually cautioned by the "code" against
giving. way to adventurism, which is dismissed as a form of sentimentality in
politics.
Fegardless of conscious purpose, is not the position of the Soviet leadership
likely to. develop "intolerable tensions"? Hence even the "peacefulness of
being at war" will be welcome.
Comment: This interpretation .exaggerates the disagreeable features of the
situation occupied by the dictators. It is true there is tension; but there
are compensating privileges. Moreover the "tension level" of individuals in
a group does not oscillate in. unison. (Je.cannot assume they will "blow up"
at the same moment.) There are many channels short of war for the relief of
stress: "wine, women, and'song",'psychosomatic infirmities, extra hard work, etc.
Among the factors in the future of Soviet development we must evaluate the
"normalization" of erisisb
Comment: It has been suggested that human"beings change their conceptions
of "normality" as crisis continues, and that plurelizing'tendencies gradually
find expression. Despite "war,sbares" the more continuation of the crisis
indicates that the scares have'b~enexaggerated. Hence there is,some relaxation
of the will to sacrifice for long-run aims, coupled with greater concern for
immediate enjoyments (including more "privileges" for the family, profession,
neighborhood, and other oonstituet . groups: of Soviet society). Scientists and
engineers may be expected to become adept in'pursuing their theoretical ina-
terests in the name of defense; "science as usual" often flourishes behind
the prevailing militmW of phrase. (Even the military becomes accustomed to
projects of research and. development instead of fighting.) Such activities
serve as psychological equivalents of war, and cater to the subtle cere-
monialization of military life. All this makes it.easy to defer "pushing
the button" and exchanging the risks of total war for the relative security
of perpetual crisis.
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Would the effect of the sudden death of the principal Soviet figure create
situation in which foreign militant would seem to b a necessey means
of maintaining unity?
Cogent: The Stalin-Trotsky split gave the Communists a serious warning
concerning the consequences of any failure to provide for a smooth succession.
We cannot assume that whatever arrangements have been made will necessarily
prevent a bitter struggle inside the top circles of the Party; or even a
struggle that goes beyond the Party. However, the seriousness of the deci-
sion to launch an all-out conflict is well recognized; and the loss of a
central figure is more likely to create a.sense of weakness than an exag-
gerated feeling of strength.
Is it likely that the hyperrouspiciousneas which characterizes the Soviet
leaders will prevent them from a ar ng the zone of operation?
Comment.- The"polioe mentality" of despots is exaggerated in the Soviet case
by the importance of political police experience as a ladder to top positions,)
The Stalinist Politburo is composed of a mrJority of persons who have hold
political police jobs.
Although it cannot be denies that suspiciousness is a factor working against
peaceful cooperation, it must be pointed out that extreme suspiciousness
works in contradictory ways (in common with moat`, highly emotional attitudes).
IS, on the one hand, there is a tendency to exaggerate the malevolence of
the enemy, there is a tendency to doubt the available estimates of one's
own strength.
Is it likely that the.1 orance and parochialism of the to elite in the
Soviet Union will foster an aggressive and militan attitude by encoura in
an exaggerated idea of t e we es o the rest of E he world?
Comments This appears to be a valid point, if we are to judge from most.of
the known examples of how ignorance and parochialism contrast with a more
cosmopolitan outlook. In pre-war Japan, for instance, the leaders of the
Kwantung Army were more militant and self-assured than the more widely
travelled admirals of the Japanese Navy.' We know that one of the most strik-
ing changes in the composition of the Soviet top letdership has been the
transition from experienced cosmopolitans to the home-grown product, innocent
of long associi tion with :,lectern .Europe.
The point has added weight when, we :remember that intelligence agents tend
to supply their principals with what they think the chief wants to hear. It
is likely that Soviet agents abroad are unwilling to paint a rosy picture
of the outside wpr.d ? for fear of being diebeli~-ved and disciplined.
Is an_exaggerated estimateofthe strength of ' the Soviets 4neauraged by the
ing and n eras .
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Comment: Whatever may be the sense of reality displayed by individual
intellectuals, it is likely that as a group they are more critical than
non-theoretical colleagues. The atmosphere of the Politburo under Lenin
was intellectually vigorous and highly controversial. We know that the
writers of books and articles have almost disappeared from this crucially
important organ of Soviet policy.
May it not. becomes went to the Soviet lead rs that more freedom would
strengthen rather than weaken the Soviet world?
Comment: The Soviet leaders will undoubtedly try to probe beyond the simple
fact of capitalist production if it continues to outstrip Soviet output. It
may become increasingly apparent to them that free labor rnd management is
superior to the labor and managerial force of a police state. Studies of
Soviet costs of supervision (including, of course, the disciplinary bureau-
cracy) will doubtless disclose a much higher figure than for capitalist
regimes.. Furthermore, it may be evident that the hyper-centralization of the.
Moscow regime breeds unnecessary trouble, .nd generates "titoism" among the
many cultures inside the Soviet orbit.
Is it not likely that wer changes in the Soviet world will be b evolutionaryy
adjustment in the direction of wider sharing of Dower? If so, the riling groups
may undergo transformations which are not entirely visible until they occur;
and the dilution of the present extreme concentration of power may reduce the
conspiratorial outlook and the militancy of the regime.
Comment: This is a reasonable forecast, even though the present police state
is likely to be well informed in advance of conspiracies directed against it,
and to defend itself to the limit. There is evidence of the continuing strength
of tendencies to "dilute" the fanticism (the ideological purity) of the rul-
ing group. The strength of these tendencies is reflected in the "purge cycle"
of Soviet politics, which is a phenomenon also observed in other tyrannies
supported by parties with large men}berehips. Party members try to bring
relatives and friends into the Party, often with little regard to doctrinal
purity; and a "purge" is a defensive gesture by the central party leaders
testifying to the importance of such devolutionary factors. Territorial,
ethnic, and other lines of cleavage are likely to. be strengthened in this way.
Is not tDj long-term tendency in an industrializi societ to increase the
strength of pluralizing forces?
Comment: Such a society increases the role played,,by managers and engineers;
and such social formations are more literate and alert than the peasantry.
They exert unremitting individual (and to some extent, organized) pressure in
order to enlarge--their "privileges" (which are store important in the Soviet
set-up than money income). Fob instance, the pressure is continually directed
toward improved medical, recreational, housing, and educational facilities.
It is necessary to estimate whether these . pluralizing forces set up super-
centralizing tendencies as a means of defense on the part of the active
members of the political elite. But we may hazard the forecast that changes
in the. composition of Soviet society will reflect themselves directly in the
political system, with a net pluralizing effect.
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11 8o f r as the impact of external factors is concerned it is important t1j
evaluate the overall ossibility of modifying Soviet intentions in a
cooperative direction if it becomes apparent that the non-Soviet world is
out -arming., ou eveloping andout-consuming Soviet world,
As a starting int we must make some judgment of how the to members of the
Soviet regime estimate their own strength,
Comment: Soviet leaders probably continue to regard themselves as backward
and weak when compared with the US, and the more industrialized parts of
Europe. It is probable that the adamant resistence of Soviet delegates to
the inspection of arms stems from this sense of weakness. ("Will not such
an inspection invite a capitalist attack in order to take advantage of the
present weakness of the regime?")
The inference is that the SU is in no position to concede the inspection
point, even today. Hence the diplomatic initiatives open to the Soviet
government should they engage in a flurry of diplomatic activity >
would remain short of what is essential for disarmament. Any strong Soviet
proposals at the present stage, therefore, must be.advanced with the ecpectap
tion that they will not be accepted, or if accepted, that they will be
sabotaged at the administrative level.
This does not imply that at least some resumption of peaceful contact is-out
of the question. There are many assets available for bargaining purposes,
particularly the threatened investments and trading relations of the old
empires (especially British).
Further, we must ask whether the Soviet leadership is disposed to recognize
unwelcome facts and adjust their policies to them, or whether Soviet leaders
are likely to deny unwelcome developments and to engage in desperate adventur-
ism?
As said above, Communist leaders have developed a body of maxims and prece-
dents during their seizure and consolidation of power. These "operational
rules" put an enormous amount of emphasis upon the potency of material factors
in politics and society. They also permit a wide range of tactical improvisa-
tion whenever even their own policies..appear to be endangeripg their power
position. Absence of sentimentality is one of the main features of the
"operational code" of the Politburo. (The reference ; is, to'the analysis by
Leites.) The "code" includes the idea that the most disagreeable contin-
gencies should be frankly faced, and dealt.with by tactics of retreat if
necessary, .
Soviet leaders are disciplined to think in terms of material production,
and may-beexpected to give close attention to such trends. Should the US
forge ahead as rapidly as indicated above, it is safe to forecast that the
political consequences will be d1 scounted well in advance. If the Soviet
leaders act rationally within their own doctrine, they will recognize that
in isolation they are heading toward relatively greater weakness. Tactically,
it will be incumbent upon thaw to emerge from isolation and to seek to
develop a more favorable balance of power within the framework of limited
UN cooperation. Otherwise, they face the likelihood of being confronted at
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some future date with an ultimatum to disarm and open up to inspection.
And this would represent a drastic loss of power, which they may be able
to avoid.
It is not necessary to predict the doctrinal justification of such a Soviet
line.' As indicated above, there is ample support for the theory of peaceful
co-existence.
(We may also recall that in the past the spokesmen on behalf of militant
ideologies have sometimes succeeded, when halted by outside forces, in
transforming themselves into less sectarian leaders.)
l2. Obviously the foregoing points do not exhaust the contingencies to be taken
into account in a thorough investigation of the nature and magnitude of the
threat to our national security. Having outlined two sets of contingencies,,
A and B, it may be worth reiterating that the problem of policy is to engage
inaa continuing exercise of judgmbnt in which all contingencies are inte..
grated with one another in the light of policy objectives and of available
knowledge of how significant conditioning factors have operated in the paste
Clearly, the act of assessing the "realism" of the postulates set up in any
theoretical model tells for.evaluation in the light of the entire context,
The task of estimating the threat is more than an exereise in forecasting.
The process is likely to stimulate creative ideas about the paths open to
policy;"and these alternatives may gain enough support to affect the future
in ways compatible with fundamental goals.
(,!s a slight indication of these possibilities: If the foregoing interpreta-
tion of the factors that may influence Soviet policy is sounr, part of our
opportunity is to facilitate the process. We have suggested why the Soviet
leaders,, if they come to believe that the non-Soviet world is outdoing them,
will be amenable to the relaxation of the "cold war". It may be that timely
proposals will expedite this result. For example, it may sooner-or later
be feasible to suggest that the "citadel principle" be applied to the problem
of reducing armament. By this term is meant that certain areas of a power
are reserved from inspection by the UN, At the some time, all the rest of
the territory is thrown open to such inspection. The "citadel principle"
is no final solution, since the "reserved" area is a continuing source of
anxiety abroad. But the opening up of any territory would constitute an
important step toward creating a yet more favorable atmosphere for complet-
ing the process of crisis reduction, and building a more secure'-world
community.)
Feturning, finally, to the general questions concerning Soviet intentions
and capabilities (Section #L. above), we note once more the significance
of our own policies in affecting the.outcome. (Section i4. see D.2.a.
above) In part,'dur estimate of the nature :and magnitude of the Foviet
threat depends upon the estimate that.we make of the impact of.U. S. poli-
cies upon the Soviet world (directly and indirectly through other countries).
The Soviet leadership appraises the impact upon Soviet strength of our
domesti as well as foreign policies, end of our acts ity in all spheres of
policy diplomatic, economic, military, psychological,
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A further word may be said about the four-fold division of policy which
has again been referred to a~pve. It is used mainly because it hes
received a degree of acceptant y even though terminology varies, a e.
definitions are not always clear'N(I prefer to operate with .a system of
analysis in which policies are clan ied according to eight categories
of "values" so defined that any set of "policy making and executing
activities, actual or potential, can be described and compared according
to the principle of maximization. But the present brief memorrindum would
be overloaded with "definitions without exemplification" if this system
were introduced.)
As a check list of national policy, therefore, we adhere to the four-fold
division previously mentioned. Each division can be analyzed according
to objectives, distinctive means, and Mllied means:
Diplomatic policy aims at agreements among leaders; the distinctive means
is negotiation; allied means are economic, military, and psychological.
Economic policy aims at affecting production end consumption; the distinctive
means are resources; allied means are diplomatic, military and psychological.
Military policy aims at effects upon intentions and capabilities involving
force; the distinctive means are the armed forces and the specialized instru-
ments of coarcion; allied means are diplomatic, economic and psychological.
vc ologLc policy aims at influencing the attitudes of large groups; the
distinctive instruments are the media of communication; allied means are
diplomatic, economic and military.
In the decision making process adjustments are made among long, middle and
short range objectives within each sphere, and among the spheres. To some
extent these adjustments occur on the basis of expectations concerning the
nature and magnitude of actual and potential threats. The making of such
estimates is part of the continuing exercise of judgment in the formulation
and execution of national policy.
In a free society official perspectives need to be subject to active, well-
intentioned and informed review by private citizens. Pome sort of continuing
review --- well-intentioned or not -M- is unavoidable in any case. The task
at hand is to consider the potentialities for the making of an unofficial
review that is unquestionably well-intentioned, and is as well-informed as
possible under the circumstances.
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