WARNING INTERVIEWEES OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00793R000100370003-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 17, 2003
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: June 8, 1973
• Content Type: MF

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OGC Has Reviewed OGC 73-1035
8 June 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel
SUBJECT: Warning Interviewees of Their Constitutional
Rights
1. You requested the opinion of this Office as to whether
the recent United States Court of Claims decision (No. 534-71,
16 Feb 1973) of Kalkines v. U., U.S. requires that the Office of Security,
when interrogating employees, grant them immunity from subse-
quent criminal prosecution based on their answers or the fruits
thereof. After a detailed review (OGC 73-1032) of Kalkines, the
case law on which it is based, the subsequent case law, and the
United States Code, it is our opinion that the Agency is not required
nor has the legal authority to grant immunity and, therefore, may
not grant it.
2. During the period of late 1971 and early 1972, this
Office conducted a detailed review of the Agency's interviewing
procedures, particularly with respect to warning an interviewee
of his Miranda rights. We find nothing to indicate that the proce-
dures established as a result of that review and in use today should
be changed.
3. While an employee may be interrogated, if he refuses
to answer claiming the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, he must not be required to waive the privilege under
threat of dismissal. To do so would allow him to claim infringe-
ment of his constitutional rights in a subsequent criminal prosecution
or dismissal action. As is the current practice, when a situation
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arises in which an employee refuses to answer under a claim of
possible self-incrimination, the interrogations should stop and
the matter should be referred to this Office for a determination
of how to proceed.
STATINTL
cc: D/Security
Inspector General
Distribution:
Original ,,Addressee
4"- CRIMES
1 - JED Signer
1 - Chrono
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SUBJECT: Warning Interviewees of their Constitutional Rights
1. The Director of Personnel requested the opinion of this
Office as to whether the recent United States Court of Claims decision
(No. 534-71, 16 Feb. 1973) of Kalkines v. U.S. requires that the Office
of Security, when interrogating employees, grant them immunity from
subsequent criminal prosecution based on their answers or the fruits
thereof. After reviewing Kalkines, the case law on which it is based,
the subsequent case law, and the United States Code, it is our opinion
that the Agency is not required nor has the legal authority to grant
immunity and, therefore, may not grant it.
2. As the Director of Personnel noted, a series of recent
decisions has created a dilemma for most government employers.
This dilemma is created by the restrictions that the courts have
placed on statements or the fruits thereof that have been elicited
from employees who are suspected of wrongdoing.
3. Some government bodies have the statutory authority to
dismiss an employee if he fails to answer questions about his respon-
sibilities or if he is convicted of certain criminal activities. Thus,
until recently, the practice was to question the suspected employee
about the wrongdoing. If he failed to answer he could be dismissed.
If he incriminated himself or if his statements led to his incrimination,
that evidence could be used against him in criminal proceedings and,
if convicted, he could be dismissed. In 1967, the Supreme Court
severely restricted this procedure in their decision of Garrity v.
New Jersey, 385 U. S. 493.
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4. In Garrity, police officers were being questioned about
fixing traffic tickets. They were warned that they were entitled to
remain silent and that any information that they gave might be used
against them in a future criminal prosecution. They were also told
that if they refused to answer they would be subject to removal from
office. They made certain statements, no immunity was granted as
there was no applicable immunity statute, and, subsequently, some
of their statements were used to convict them for conspiracy to
obstruct the administration of the traffic law. The Supreme Court
held that the statements could not be used to convict the police officers
and reversed the convictions stating at 385 U. S. 497 that:
The choice given petitioners was either to
forfeit their jobs or incriminate themselves. The
option to lose their means of livelihood or pay the
penalty of self-incrimination is the antithesis of free
choice to speak out or remain silent.... We think
the statements were infected by the coercion inherent
in this scheme of questioning and cannot be sustained
as voluntary under our prior decisions.
5. Shortly after Garrity, another case, Gardner v. Broderick
392 U.S. 273 (1968), came before the Supreme Court. In Gardner, a
policeman refused to waive immunity when brought before a grand jury
investigating alleged bribery and police corruption. Because of his
failure to waive immunity, he was dismissed pursuant to the New York
City Charter. The Court found that the dismissal was improperly made,
stating at 392 U. S. 278 that the policeman
... was discharged from office, not for failure
to answer relevant questions about his official
duties, but for failure to waive his constitutional
right.
The Court concluded by stating at 392 U.S. 279:
It is clear that petitioner's /the policeman's/
testimony was demanded before the grand
jury in part so that it might be used to pros-
ecute him and not solely for the purpose of
securing an accounting of his performance of
his public trust. If the latter had been the
only purpose, there would have been no reason
to seek to compel petitioner to waive his
immunity.
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Thus, the provision of the New York City Charter, which
required the employee to waive his immunity or be dismissed,
was declared unconstitutional.
6. Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n.v. Commissioner _
of Sanitation, 392 U. S. 280 (1968) /hereinafter cited as Sanitation I/,
was a companion case to Gardner. In Sanitation I, twelve employees
of the Department of Sanitation of New York City refused to testify
in administrative proceedings for the investigation of corruption and
another three refused to sign waivers of immunity in grand jury pro-
ceedings conducted for the same purpose. Pursuant to the same
authority as in Gardner, all the employees were dismissed. The
Court found that the dismissals were improperly made stating at
392 U. S. 283 "/t/hey were dismissed for invoking and refusing to
waive their constitutional rights against self-incrimination". How-
ever, the Court added at 392 U. S. 284:
. if New York had demanded that petitioners
/the dismissed employees/ answer questions
specifically, directly, and narrowly relating
to the performance of their official duties on
pain of dismissal from public employment
without requiring relinquishment of the bene-
fits of the constitutional privilege, and if they
had refused to do so, this case would be entirely
different. (emphasis added).
Furthermore, the Court stated:
... public employees are entitled, like all other
persons, to the benefit of the Constitution, in-
cluding the privilege against self-incrimination...
At the same time, petitioners, being public em-
ployees, subject themselves to dismissal if they
refuse to account for their performance of their
public trust, after proper proceedings, which do
not involve an attempt to coerce them to relinquish
their constitutional :rights.
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Thus, this case stands for the principle that an employee cannot
be coerced to relinquish his privilege against self-incrimination
as guaranteed by the fifth amendment of the Constitution by threat
of dismissal from his job.
7. After the decision in Sanitation I, the employees were
reinstated. New hearings were held in which the city granted
immunity to the employees from subsequent criminal prosecution
based on the use of their answers relating to their duties. The
employees again refused to answer and they were again dismissed.
In Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n. v. Commissioner of Sanitation,
426 F. Zd 619 (2d Cir. 1970) cert. denied 32 L. Ed. 2d 349 (1972-)' /hereinafter
cited as Sanitation II/, the court upheld the dismissal stating at 426
F.2d 626, that:
To require a public body to continue to keep
an officer or employee who refuses to answer
pertinent questions concerning his official con-
duct, although assured of protection against use
of his answers or their fruits in any criminal
prosecution, would push the constitutional pro-
tection beyond its language, its history or any
conceivable purpose of the framers of the Bill
of Rights. (emphasis added).
Further, at 426 U. S. 627, the court stated-
... public employees do not have an absolute
constitutional right to refuse to account for
their official actions and still keep their jobs;
their right conferred by the Fifth Amendment
itself, as construed in Garrity, is simply that
neither what they say under such compulsion
nor its fruits can be used against them in a
subsequent prosecution.
Thus, it is clear from Sanitation II that one way, not necessarily
the only way, to assure that the employee is not required to
relinquish his entitlement to the benefits of the constitutional
privilege is to grant him immunity from prosecution based on
his statements or the fruits thereof.
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8. In cases subsequent to Sanitation I, the federal district
courts and courts of appeals seem to be 'construing its rationale
very narrowly. Some cases have held that the employee has the
immunity protection while others have ignored the question altogether.
In Luman v. Tanzler, 411 F. Zd 164 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied 396
U.S. 929 (1969), a Florida policeman was suspended and state criminal
charges were filed against him. The police authorities then proposed
to hold an administrative hearing regarding the suspension. The police-
man sought to have the hearing continued in view of the pendency of the
criminal charges, which arose out of the same activity that gave rise
to the suspension. The court denied granting an injunction to prevent
the hearing, reasoning, that under Sanitation I, the policeman cannot
be discharged for refusing to testify even though there was a depart-
ment regulation which authorized dismissal. for failure to testify
because Sanitation I forearmed the policeman with the fact that he
could not be discharged for refusing to testify and, thus, he did not
face the choice of self-incrimination or job forfeiture. The court
concluded that the departmental regulation could not be applied
against the policeman. Thus, a hearing could be conducted, but
the policeman would be free "... to admit, to deny or to refuse to
answer...." without fear of dismissal. Therefore, notwithstanding
the regulation, the court held that if the policeman refused to answer
he could not be dismissed pursuant to the departmental regulation
solely for failure to answer.
9. In Clifford v. Shoultz, 413 F. 2d 868 (9th Cir. 1969) cert.
denied 396 U. S. 962 (1969), the court held that an employee of a
Government contractor could be denied his security clearance for
failure to answer questions related to personal beliefs and activities.
The employee did not claim that the questions were self-incriminating,
but failed to answer because he claimed the questions were ". .. in-
competent, irrelevant, and immaterial. IT The court stated at 413
F. 2d 875 that Gardner and Sanitation I held that:
... a public employee may be discharged from
his job if, without being required to waive im-
munity, he refuses to answer questions specif=ically, directly and narrowly relating to the
performance of his official duties. An employee's
invoking of his constitutional privilege would not
in such a case be a bar to his dismissal from
public employment.
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Therefore, the employee, not having claimed the questions were
self-incriminating, lost his security clearance for not answering.
10. In Grabinger v. Conlisk 320 F. Supp. 1213 (N. D. Ill.
1970), aff'd, 455 F. 2d 490 (7th Cir. 1972), two Chicago police
officers were suspended for refusing to obey the direct order of
their superior officer to submit to a polygraph examination with-
out benefit of counsel. The court stated the police officers were
not requested, prior to their refusing to take the polygraph ex-
amination, to waive any immunity or their privilege against self-
incrimination. The court added at 320 F. 2d 1218:
The net of Garrity, Broderick and Uniformed
Sanitation Men is that if a public employee
refuses to testify as to a matter concerning
which his employer is entitled to inquire, he
may be discharged for insubordination, but
if he does testify his answers may not be used
against him in a subsequent criminal proceeding.
The court found that the police officers "were not compelled to
waive their constitutional right against self-incrimination as a
condition of their employment". This case seems to say that
the policemen were on notice that their statements could not be
used in a subsequent criminal prosecution because of the holding
in Garrity. The holding did not require a positive grant of im-
munity before the policemen could be dismissed for failure to
submit to the polygraph.
11. In Bowes v. Commission to Investigate Allegations
of Police Corruption, 330 F. Supp 262 (S. D. N. Y. 1971) four New
York City policemen attempted to enjoin the commission from
issuing subpoenas compelling police testimony. The court held
that the subpoenas should issue because no action had been taken
against the policemen--they 'had not been put in the position of
having to make the choice of remaining silent or losing their jobs.
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..W imsv
12. In Biehunik v. Felicetta, 441 F. 2d 228 (2nd Cir. 1971),
cert. denied 403 U. S. 932 (1971), a number of policemen attempted
to enjoin the police commissioner from compelling their appearance
in a lineup under pain of dismissal. The court cited Gardner and
Sanitation I as holding at 441 F. 2d 231 (note 3) that:
... dismissal of /a/ public employee for refusal
to answer 'questions specifically, directly and
narrowly relating to the performance of his
official duties' /is/ not barred by /the/ fifth
amendment.
The same court (the Court of Appeals, Second Circuit), which had
only a year earlier decided Sanitation II, explained that the lineup
was clearly and highly relevant to the legitimate end of assuring
that the policemen were performing their assigned tasks in a trust-
worthy manner. The fact that the lineup may eventually result in
a subsequent criminal matter did not dilute the potential usefulness
of the lineup in administering disciplinary measures. The court
concluded that to prohibit the lineup would unduly hamper the police
officials in their difficult task of supervising and maintaining a
dependable and trusted police force. Any prohibition would have
little compensating gain to the policemen's individual rights. Accord-
ingly, the injunction was not issued.
13. In Boulware v`Batta lia, 344 F. Supp. 889 (D. Del. 1972),
a number of policemen were questioned by their superiors about their
participation in a conspiracy directed against another city official.
Later, they were given a formal departmental hearing, found guilty
and penalized. The court in reviewing this action, citing Garrity,
Gardner and Sanitation I, stated at 344 F. Supp. 906 that:
Although the Supreme Court has held that a govern-
ment entity cannot utilize the threat of dismissal to
obtain a waiver of Fifth Amendment privileges, nor
dismiss an employee for failure to waive such rights,
it has held that the dismissal of a public employee,
who has not been required to waive Fifth Amendment
rights, for refusing to answer questions relating to
the performance of his official duties is not violative
of nor /does it/ place an impermissible burden upon
that individual's exercise of his privilege against
self-incrimination.
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The court upheld the disciplinary action stating that no criminal
prosecutions were commenced as a result of the hearings, which
were departmental and therefore, civil in nature. The court, at
344 F. Supp. 901, stated:
... the mere prospect of later criminal prosecution
does not preclude the maintenance of civil disciplinary
proceedings in which the Constitution mandates the
provision of the full panoply of rights afforded to
those actually involved in such criminal investiga-
tions and prosecutions. To hold otherwise would
prevent agencies such as the police from effecting
internal disciplinary proceedings in any instance
where the basis for disciplinary action also involved
possible criminal prosecution... .
'14. The most recent decision in this line of cases is the
Court of Claims' case of Kalkines v. U. S. There, a Bureau of
Customs employee was being questioned about his accepting a
payment from an importer's representative in return for favor-
able treatment on valuation of a customs entry. He failed to
answer and was dismissed pursuant to the authorities in the
Customs, Customs Personnel, and Treasury Manuals for failure
to answer questions relating to the performance of his duties.
During the period in which the Bureau of Customs was questioning
the employee, the U.S. Attorney's Office was conducting a criminal
investigation of the same matter. The court stressed the import-
ance of this investigation stating:
The most important fact bearing on the
propriety of Mr. Kalkines' conduct at the inter-
views /at the Bureau of Customs/ is that, for
all or most of the time, a criminal investigation
was being carried on concurrently with the civil
inquiry... .
Relying on Garrity, Gardner and the two Sanitation cases, the court
held that the Government, knowing that the civil proceeding was being
conducted concurrently with the criminal proceeding, did not duly
advise the employee of his options and the consequences of his choice
and therefore, the employee was not adequately assured of protection
against use of his answers or their fruits--granted use immunity--in
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any criminal prosecution. The employee's failure to respond to
the customs agents' questions was excused because the
... agents' gave the employee very good reason
to be apprehensive that he could be walking into
a criminal trap if he responded to potentially in-
criminating questions....
15. In summary, then, Garrity held that if an employee
is confronted with the choice between the loss of his job because
he remains silent and self-incrimination, any statements or the
fruits thereof may not be used against him in a subsequent criminal
prosecution. Sanitation I and II held that if granted immunity from
subsequent criminal prosecution based on their statements, em-
ployees could be dismissed for failure to answer questions about
their jobs. However, subsequent cases in the federal courts have
not relied on the Sanitation doctrine to the extent that granting
immunity is the only method of preventing self-incrimination.
Therefore, we can conclude that those cases have not held that
granting immunity is a prerequisite for subsequent dismissal.
Kalkines held that the Government, having knowledge of a con-
current criminal investigation, did not take sufficient steps to
properly insure that during a. civil investigation the employee
was informed that any statements he made would not be used
against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution.
16. Agency employees are not entitled to the same dis -
missal procedural rights that most governmental employees are
entitled to, because the Agency's authority for dismissing its
employees is substantially broader than the dismissal authority
of most other governmental bodies. Section 102(c) of the National
Security Act of 1947, as amended, states:
_ Notwithstanding the provisions of section 652
/now 7501/ of Title 5, or the provisions of any other
law, the Director of Central Intelligence may, in his
discretion, terminate the employment of any officer
or employee of the Agency whenever he shall deem
it necessary or advisable in the interests of the
United States.... (emphasis added).
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Black's Law Dictionary illustrates that discretion
/w/hen applied, to public functionaries, .. .
means a power or right conferred upon them by
law of acting officially in certain circumstances,
according to the dictates of their own judgment and
conscience, uncontrolled by the judgment or con-
science of others.
Thus, the Agency employee can be dismissed at the discretion of
the Director and no formal grounds for dismissal are required to
be established. In both Sanitation (I and, II) and Kalkines; the employers
had to show cause for dismissal--the failure of the employees to
answer as to their duties as required by law. Therefore, one
could make the argument that, as a consequence of Section 102(c),
the Agency employee is not put in the position of having to make
the Garrity choice because even if he gives a satisfactory ex-
planation, he may still be dismissed at the discretion of the DCI.
However, it is our opinion that as a practical matter the Agency
employee is in a much more tenuous position than that of the
normal government employee. The Court described the choice
that the policemen in Garrity were forced to make as a choice
"between the rock and the whirlpool". The choice for the Agency
employee is even more hazardous because he can be dismissed
even if "grounds" do not exist.
17. As the Agency employee is given a more difficult
choice than in the cases discussed above, it seems clear that
any statement made by him during an interrogation or the fruits
thereof cannot be used against him in a subsequent criminal
prosecution in view of the holding in Garrity. Therefore, the
employee is granted use immunity notwithstanding the Agency's
failure to formally notify him of this immunity. The question
that remains then is, must the Agency grant immunity to the
employee prior to interrogating him in order to be able to dis -
miss him subsequent to that interrogation?
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18. Section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of
1947 provides "... that the Agency shall have no police, sub-
poena, law-enforcement powers or internal -security functions....
Accordingly, when the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (P. L.
91-452) was passed, although it granted the cabinet and military
departments and 14 specific agencies of the Government the authority
to grant immunity, it contained no immunity granting authority for
the Agency. Lacking statutory authority to grant immunity, the
Agency cannot grant it. In Sanitation II, the court noted there was
no statute conferring immunity in Garrity, yet the court found that
the employee could not be criminally prosecuted based on his state-
ments or the fruits thereof. In effect, then, the court, using the
authority of the fifth amendment, held that the employee is auto-
matically granted use immunity when compelled to answer under
pain of dismissal. As the Agency in any of its interrogations
would not require the waiver of immunity as in Sanitation I the
Agency employee is automatically protected by Garrity. Our
internal investigations would be very similar to those in Grabinger,
Biehunik and Boulware, none of which required further immunity
granting statements. Following the procedures described below,
we can not envision the circumstance under which an Agency em-
ployee would be in a situation similar to that in Kalkines, in which
the employee is being questioned by an Agency interrogator, who
has knowledge of a concurrent criminal investigation by the U. S.
Attorney's Office.
19. Based on the very narrow construction that the district
courts and courts of appeals have given to Sanitation I, the fact that
the Supreme Court has denied certiorari in many of these cases,
and the fact that composition of the Supreme Court has changed
drastically since the time of Sanitation I it is our opinion that if
an Agency employee brought an action against the Agency for im-
proper dismissal, the court's decision as to whether he had been
legally dismissed will be heavily influenced by the procedure used
in the dismissal. Notwithstanding, it is our opinion that the Agency
should continue to interrogate as we do today. In late 1971 and
early 1972, this Office conducted a detailed review of the Agency's
interviewing procedures, particularily with respect to warning the
interviewee of his Miranda rights. We can find nothing that indicates
that the procedures established as a result of that review and in use
today should be changed. It is our understanding that those inter-
rogation procedures are as follows:
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a. If independent evidence suggests that an
employee may be guilty of criminal activity, the
interrogator is to consult this Office prior to inter-
rogation, at which point a determination is made, in
accordance with the procedures approved by the DDCI
(OGC Memorandum, 64-1784, dtd 10 Jun 64), as to
whether the matter should be referred to the Depart-
ment of Justice for criminal prosecution.
b. In those situations in which independent evi-
dence is not conclusive in showing that the employee is
guilty of criminal conduct interrogations are conducted.
If at any time during the course of the interrogation
information is developed that leads the interrogator to
even remotely suspect that the employee may be guilty
of engaging in criminal activity, the interrogator inter-
rupts the proceeding and reads the Miranda rights state-
ment to the employee. If the interrogator has reason to
question whether an activity or situation constitutes a
violation of the criminal laws he is to stop the questioning
and consult this Office. Based on the holding in Sanitation I,
which said that the employee must not be required to
relinquish his constitutional privilege against self-incrimi-
nation, it is our opinion that while an Agency employee
may be interrogated, he may not be threatened with dis-
missal for failure to waive the privilege during that inter-
rogation. Therefore, if an employee refuses to answer
based on possible self-incrimination, the interrogator
must not require the employee to waive the privilege
under threat of dismissal. To do so would allow him
to claim infringement of his constitutional rights in a
subsequent criminal prosecution or dismissal action.
As the Agency lacks authority to grant immunity, we
cannot follow the procedure of Sanitation II of granting
immunity to require the employee to answer under pain
of dismissal. When a situation arises in which an em-
ployee refuses to answer under claim of possible self-
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incrimination, the interrogations must stop and the
interrogator should immediately refer the matter to
this Office for a determination of how to proceed.
If reasonably conclusive, information is developed
during the interrogation that suggests that the employee
is guilty of criminal. activity the interrogator should
consult with this Office for a determination, as outlined
in paragraph a above, as to whether the matter should
be referred to the Department of Justice.
o?? :JED:cap
-Original - CRIMES
1 - JED Signer
1 - Chrono
STATINTL
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EDITED BY JOSEPH YOUNG
GOVERNMENT COLUMNIST -- WASHINGTON (D.C.) STAR-NEWS
PUBLISHED IN WASHINGTON, D. C. * DIRECTED TO FIELD PERSONNEL
Vol. 22, No. 35
April 16, 1973
Copyright ? 1973 by FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' NEWS DIGEST, INC.
Washington, -D.C.
DECISION DISMAYS AGENCIES-'I'hc U.S. Court of Claims has issued a decision causing considerable
dismay among federal and postal officials.
The ruling was that government employees suspected of wrongdoing in connection with their job
cannot be fired for refusing to answer questions about their actions unless they are promised the
answers would not be used against them in any criminal prosecution for their acts.
Thus, agencies arc to a quan ry when it comes to, such cases as to what kind of action to take.
Only in cases where it promises such immunity, and the employee still refuses to answer questions
can the government fire an employee and still retain its option to prosecute him on criminal charges.
If employees are not promised immunity, then they cannot be fired until after they arc prosecuted
and found guilty of a criminal offense. This could take years.
Federal personnel rules require employees to answer questions regarding their job conduct, with
failure to do so subjecting them to firing. But the Court of Claims ruled that employees don't have to
answer such questions unless they arc told the question would not be used against them in any criminal
proceeding.
The case involved a Bureau of Customs employee who was fired for refusing to answer agency
investigators' questions regarding an alleged bribe. The U.S. Attorney ultimately dropped the case.
The Court of Claims found the employee was illegally fired because he wasn't promised that any
answers he gave would not be used against him in any subsequent criminal proceeding.
The court held that to require federal employees to answer questions that would lead to criminal
prosecution against them would violate their constitutional protection against self-incrimination. Ct.Cl.
No. 534-71.
STILL ALIVE Still alive is the suit by the National Association of Internal Revenue Employees
challenging President Nixon's action last year in delaying the October 1, 1972 federal white-collar pay
raise to Jain, 1, 1973. Nixon contended the economic stabilization act gave him the right to postpone
the pay raises.
NAIRE lost the case in federal district court and is now appealing the case to the U.S. Court of
Appeals Court here. If by some chance NAIRE wins the suit, federal white-collar employees would get a
three-month 5.14 percent retroactive pay raise. And it would also set up another pay raise next Oct. 1
instead of the Jan. 1, 1974 salary increase budgeted by Nixon.
TURNABOUT-Several weeks ago Postmaster General E. T. Klassen said he supported giving postal
workers the right to strike if their unions quit running to Congress to get extra benefits.
however, when the Ilouse Postal Facilities subcommittee held hearings last week on legislation to
give postal workers the right to strike, Klassen had changed his mind. Ile said he opposed the right to
strike for postal workers.
Klassen APsi r gr1 kR tn2Q9 lgtQr li cl&PAPsM-PWq$L3Mt1AWM. although he said he
might change his mind at a later date.
 STAT
^ UNCL'SSI FILtDprovednr 4odL6Y2003/12/02: CIA-RDI 7 -0LMJR"%170003-6 ^ SECRET
FORM
3-62
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
FROM:
Director of Personnel
EXTENSION
NO.
5 E 56 HQ
DATE
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
RECEIVED FORWARDED
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
TL General Counsel
This
s problem comes up
each time OS
ets into interro
a
g
g
-
tion of employees. Is this
recent ruling sufficient basis for
3.
OGC to advise OS that henceforth
employees who are being asked
questions that could be self-
4.
incriminating should be advised th
their answers will not be used
a
ainst th
if th
i
b
5.
g
em
ere
s su
sequen
prosecution.
STA
6.
7'
Harry B. Fisher
Director of Personnel
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
Approved For Re
ease 20
3/12/02
CIA-RD
75-00793R000100370003-6
610 EDITIONS
^ INTERNAL fl UNCLASSIFIED
^ SECRET ^ CONFIDENTIAL 1K F IDNI Y
STAT
t
NTL