MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE 303 COMMITTEE 11 MAY 1966

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00159R000200060062-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2006
• Sequence Number: 62
• Publication Date: May 12, 1966
• Content Type: MFR

Approved For Release 2008/07/08: CIA-RDP75BOO159R000200060062-6 25X1
NSC review completed
12 May 1966
NRO review(s) completed.
S B T: Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 11 May 1966
P S02n hero 3ostow, Ambassador Johnson, Ho Vance, and
Admiral L'.aborrn
25X1
and ibis o Albert Wheelon
1e A tide ranging"4iscussion took place on various aspects of
ddaling with the possible deployment of OXCARTO
2 It became apparent that although the target breakdown for
North Vietnam was well suumarized statistically, a qualitative analysis
.of these targets had not been attempted. The acceptability of the fact
that 11 targets would remain uncovered had, also not been determined.
3. General Taylor felt that a statistical and qualitative
analysis should also be done for the South China targets in order to
obtain a more complete.pictureo General Taylor also made the point
that we were addressing (in the proposed deployment of OXCART) the
question of surprise attack by China rather than tactical improvements
in the war in Vietnam.
4, , Mr. Rvstow raised the question of whether, if the decision,
were made to bomb POLL in North Vietnam, this would have the corollary
effect of raising our requirements for observation. Mr. Vance thought
the answer was yes General Taylor felt that the bombing of POL in
North Vietnam was not a consideration in the deployment of OXCART.
against that'need the increased risk discussed
"but pointed out that you would, have to weigh
in :para' 5 of SNIE 10-2-66. "A P 1
.U. S. Course of Action.".-
ction. ":
Also present were General Maxwell D. Taylor,
Also
I I I Y+ n ~'t }1 i
MOR I/i n F
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ode
7. Ambassador Johnson raised the question: Why do we make
the'decision now if the-recommendation is for a September deployment?
Admiral Reborn underlined the fact that he had always stuck to the
30 day stretch as the safest time factor for a deployment. General
Taylor raised the question: If we are going to make a covert deploy
,aunt is there any other better time than right now? Will there ever
.be a more propitious time?
8e Ambassador Johnson made the point that the principals had
not sufficiently addressed themselves to cover and contingency prob
lems. The elaborate cover plans-were to a'.certain extent. self delu-
sory. It was one thing for. the pilot to have memorized a set story
but. quite another for the U.S. Government to know exactly how'it felt
and what.it was going to say.
90 The Executive Secretary queried whether the camera complex
now available was not far superior to that maintained in existing
systems. The retort was, yes, there was a marked improvement in
resolution in the OXCART system.
100 The Executive Secretary indicated a major factor in the
deployment decision would be the negotiations with foreign govern
agents for emergency landing rights. He particularly cited Japan
d
b
or
assa
with its traditional proprietary interest in Okinawa. Am
Johnson said this was a puzzler, and he wanted to think and discuss
the Japanese aspects with his colleagues.
: 11. General Taylor reminded the principals that they should
not forget to address themselves. to the basic question: Is now the
best time for deployment?
12. What then, in conclusion, did the meeting decide? First,
there would be a qualitative judgment on the target question in regard
to Worth Vietnam and a statistical and. qualitative judgment on the
..target problem in South China, r~'' Second, the
principals would do their homework on just what posture the USG would
take (i.e. contingency statements) in'regard to deployment of OXCA1T
.and its planned uses. Third, Ambassador Johnson would explore the
problems surrounding deployment to Okinawa that might arise with Japan.
When the aforementioned problems have been assessed, then the Committee
would be in a . betters pooition to pose the entire problem to higher
authority..
Motributidn
Hr., Vance ? C OP Y Y" c - SA L
.Admiral Reborn , ;i
} }. t -
Dated: 12 1Vlav 1966
ID
Approved For Release 2008/07/08: CIA-RDP75B00159R000200060062-6