AIR RECONNAISSANCE OF SOUTH CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00159R000200070017-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 5, 2009
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: September 25, 1969
• Content Type: MF

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 Approved For Release 2009/11/05: CIA-RDP75B00159R000200070017-5
THE WHITE HOUSE HANDLE VIA 8YEMAN
TOP SECRET/BYEMAN WASHINGTON CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY
September 25, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John Mitchell
Mr. David Packard
Mr. U. Alexis Johnson
Mr. Richard'Helms
Following the discussions on drone reconnaissance over
South China in the 303 Committee on September 23, 1969, Dr.
Kissinger asked that I prepare a me.,iorandum for the President
setting forth the respective views of the Committee members.
Dr. Kissinger also asked that I afford each of the
members an opportunity to see the memorandum before it goes
forward in order.to be sure each member's view is fairly
presented.
I attach a copy of the proposed memorandum to the
President and ask that you give me your. concurrence, comments
or suggestions for changes at your early convenience.
Frank M. Chapin
01 oJi4
BYE 106,265-69
Copy--=L-of 5 copies
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MEMORANDUM
TOP SECRET/BYEMAN
., THE WHITE HOUSE
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: Air Reconnaissance of South China
14 NDL.E VIA "~EMAri
CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY
On March 22, 1969, you approved resumption of aerial reconnaissance
over South China which had been suspended since March 27, 1968.
This authority was limited to. overflights by the 147 H/T drone and
all missions were subject to prior approval by the 303 Committee on
a monthly basis..
Since that time, for a variety of reasons, including the altered
situation following'the EC-121 shootdown:off of North Korea, your
trip to Southeast Asia and the easing of trade and travel restric-
tions with Communist China, no drone missions have actually been
flown over South China.
The question of authorizing four 147 H/T drone overflights of South
China during October has been the subject of considerable deliberation
in recent meetings of the 303 Committee.
No drone penetrations deeper than 200 miles across the Chinese
Communist border are proposed. The risk of a shootdown of the new
improved version of the 147 H/T drone is considered slight, but the
Chinese will clearly know their territory is being overflown for the
first time in 18 months.
The Department of Defense strongly desires these four drone
overflights to obtain priority tactical intelligence on military
units, installations, logistics lines and equipment in the areas
of South China bordering North Vietnam, Laos and Burma. While some
intelligence has been obtained from satellite reconnaissance,
Defense consider.s that its basic tactical intelligence holdings on
Chinese Communist activities in the border areas are seriously
depleted and urgently need updating.
CIA agrees with and supports the Department of Defense requirement
for updated priority tactical intelligence but notes that drone
overflights of South China will not add substantially to outstanding
strategic intelligence requirements in that 4rea.
BYE 106,265-69A
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TOP SECRET /BYE-i,Lkl\'
HANDLE VIA LYEMM?AN
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The Department of State opposes resumption of the drone overflights
at this time for the following reasons:
a. It is not persuaded that the intelligence requirements
and prospects of successful collection override the
political considerations.
b. The normal heavy cloud cover in the area which precludes
obtaining much successful satellite photography also
mitigates against productive photographic drone missions
even though the drones are much more flexible in their
scheduling.
Hence, the options resolve into two:
Authorize resumption of drone overflights of South China
for tactical intelligence collection purposes; specifically,
four overflights in October 1969.
BYE 106,265-69A
Copy of 5 copies
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c. Politically, the Administration has repeatedly publicly
expressed its desire for more friendly relationships
with Communist China and has taken steps to ease trade
and travel restrictions- Resumption of overflights
after an 18 month stand-down and following the expressions
of desire for better relations might be interpreted by the
Chinese as a sudden harsh reversal in the U.S. attitude
toward them.
The Attorney General and I support the Department of Defense and CIA
view that drone overflights of South China should be resumed in order
to collect priority tactical intelligence. The United States has
continued to fly U-2 and other peripheral intelligence collection
flights along Communist China's coastal areas during the drone stand-
down period. We believe the Chinese will recognize that the drone
overflights are an extension of this activity designed to collect
tactical intelligence on their activities related to Vietnam, Laos,
Thailand and Burma. We do not believe the Chinese would be seriously
concerned about tactical collection in these border areas, as they
surely would be in the case of overflights of their strategic
installations in other areas.
The Committee is in agreement that the 147 H/T drone is a valuable
vehicle for obtaining the type of military tactical intelligence
desired. Manned U-2 or SR-71 overflights would be considerably
more provocative than drones; Satellite reconnaissance has failed
to fill the need.
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TOP SECRET/BYEMAN
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b. Deny authorization for drone overflights and forego
tactical intelligence collection except for that which
can be obtained by satellite reconnaissance.
,APPROVE: Option a.
Option b.
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