LETTER TO THE HONORABLE JOHN C. STENNIS FROM RICHARD HELMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00380R000100060154-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 30, 2004
• Sequence Number: 154
• Publication Date: January 7, 1972
• Content Type: LETTER

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DRAFT --Jan. 1972
The Honorable John C. Stennis
Chairman, Senate Armed
Services Committee
Washington, D. C. 20510
My dear Mr. Chairman:
This is in reply to your request for our recommendations concerning
S. 2231, a bill "To require that appropriations be made specifically to the
Central Intelligence Agency. "
S. 2231 amends current law and proposes substantial changes in the
process by which sums are made available to this Agency for its functioning
by:
(a) requiring a single line item in the United States budget
in the name of this Agency showing proposed appropriations,
estimated expenditures and other related data;
(b) requiring a specific lump-sum appropriation act for
CIA, and
(c) prohibiting any expenditure by CIA of funds appropriated
to any other department or agency starting 1 July 1972.
As you know, the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 provides
the basic authority for financing this Agency without impairing security.
During the. Senate consideration of that Act, the Chairman of the Armed
Services Committee explained:
'1. . . Ours will perhaps be the only Government having a
law providing for such an activity. Other governments simply
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appropriate a disguised sum of money, without any authority of
law, to handle the whole matter through some government official.
We are writing the whole law out. I regret we cannot proceed in
any other way. If the Senate knew about the details, it might be
willing to do as other countries do, but we do not do business that
way. We are not doing what other countries do. We are throwing
every possible democratic safeguard around it as we go along."
[95 Cong. Rec. 6955 (1949) (remarks of Senator Tydings). ]
In line with this concept, the budgetary and appropriation process for
funding the Agency parallels the procedures followed for other agencies in
the Executive Branch, with certain exceptions authorized by law to protect
intelligence sources and methods. The annual request for funds for the
Agency is not specifically identified in the United States Federal budget.
These funds, nevertheless, are contained in the totals submitted to Congress
in that budget and the specific amount requested by the President for the
Central Irtelligence Agency is made known to the appropriate committees of
the Congress as classified material. 'fhe specilcs of the Agency's annual
budget are also made known to the appropriate committees of the Congress
and each year Agency witnesses testify in detail before these committees.
The amount of the President's budget request for CIA that is eventually
approved is contained in an appropriation bill although the CIA portion
is not specifically identified as such.
The Agency's budget consists of programs which are inextricably
involved with intelligence sources and methods and committees of Congress
have for some time been handling it in a manner specifically designed to
protect against unauthorized disclosure. Providing security for the Agency's
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budget was one of the principal objectives of the Certral Intelligence Agency
Act of 1949 and any change, affecting as it does intelligence sources and
methods, is deserving of the closest scrunity.
One of the stated premises of S. 2231 is that the mere existence of
an appropriation act for CIA, even as a single line item, will lead to a
public determination on the amount of Federal resources to be allocated to
CIA. It would not be difficult to endorse this desirable objective were it
not for the fact that it does not appear to be achievable without unacceptable
diminution and degrading of the sources and methods of intelligence on which
we so heavily depend. If a public judgment is to be reached on the amount
of resources to be allocated to this Agency, i ,a-,; s p e c?i f i c ,public,
analysis of this Agency's programs and resource requirements would be
requited so that an informed judgment could be reached. Without such detail it is
difficult to perceive how CIA's programs and requirements coul4,either be
evaluated on their merits or compared with other Federal programs with which they
presumably would be competing for funds.lbvRver, making such detail public would
be in complete conflict with present law and practice and destructive of the very
intelligence sources and methods that are, have been, or are to be funded.
Another stated premise of S. 2231 is that publicising the Agency's
budget would not communicate useful information to potential adversaries.
We. are not sure what portions, if any, of the Agency's budget have been
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identified or accurately estimated by potential adversaries to whom this
information would be useful against the interest of the United States.
However, the precise total (assuming the figures are believed) may aid in
verifying estimates in hand and in filling in critical gaps in information.
A third premise of the bill is that the public debate over money
appropriated for other agencies is unrealistic if the money is actually
intended for CIA. As you know, funds approved for the Agency by the
Appropriations Committees of Congress are included in, and constitute a
small portion of, appropriations for the Department of Defense. Therefore,
the current process, if anything, affects the appropriations of the Depart-
ment of Defense and does not affect the programs and activities of any
other department or agency of the Federal Government.
In view of the foregoing, I must recommend against favorable
consideration of S. 2231 by your Committee on the basis that its enactment
would have the effect of nullifying provisions in existing law which directly
and effectively assist in fulfilling existing statutory responsibility for
protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure
as set forth in the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U. S. C. 401) and the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U. S. C. 403).
The Office of Management and Budget advises there is no objection
to the submission of this report from the standpoint of the Administration's
program.
Respectfully,
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Director