JOURNAL - OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL THURSDAY - 23 AUGUST 1973

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00380R000200010041-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 6, 2003
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: August 23, 1973
• Content Type: NOTES

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A0M NI T AR T E-liff3..la
Journal - Office of Legislative Counsel Page 3
Thursday - 23 August 1973
6. 4-t GL ) Col. Seymour Shwiller, Technical
Consultant, join o ee on Atomic Energy, called and asked if I
could tell him whether the newspaper reports regarding Mr. Colby's
intentions regarding national estimates were accurate. I told him that
in general the newspapers were inaccurate and assured him that
Mr. Colby did not intend to eliminate the preparation of National Intelligence
Estimates. I briefed him further on this subject using the employee bulletin
item as an aide-n-rrncire. Shwiller said he was glad of these reassurances.
Shwiller expressed regret that it had been such a long time since
the last Agency briefing of the Joint Committee. I told him that I knew
from conversations with George Murphy, Deputy Director of the Joint
Committee, that the Chairman had delayed the Agency briefing at the time
of Mr. Schlesinger's appointment in order to give him an opportunity to
get accustomed to his new job as DCI and that the subsequent change in
Directors had been a consideration in the Committee's timing of a briefing.
I pointed out, however, that I knew Mr. Colby stood ready to appear before
the Committee whenever they desired a briefing. Shwiller said he expected
this would develop by the middle of October.
7. - RJK) Delivered to the Senate Armed Services
Committee staff our corrections to the half galleys of Mr. o y s co irrn
hearings of 2, 20, and 25 July along with an additional statement which Colby
submitted for the record.
8. RJK) Delivered to Virginia Skeen, on the staff
of Representative Ken Hechler (D. , W. Va. ), a map of Central America,
as she had requested.
9. I I- RJK) Delivered to the offices of Representatives
Jonathan Bingham . , N. Y. , Lester Wolff (D. , N. Y. ), and Senator Mike
Mansfield (D, , Mont.) in wbach their?~names were mentioned.
Acting Legislative Counsel
cc:
O/DDCI
Ex. Sec.
Mr. Houston
Mr. Thuermer
DDI DDM&S
DDS&T EA/DDO
tiAL ONLY
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10 July 1973
STATEMENT BY WILLIAM E. COLBY
I have been informed that there have been two communications
STAT
STAT
STAT
to the Committee from citizens questioning my qualifications for this job.
The first is by
who cites a series of various
documents that he says he was associated with while he was in the CIA.
I have had a search made for these documents, and frankly I have not
been able to find them all. I think, however, I can answer
assertions that I am an uncontrollable agent, that I slanted intelligence,
submitted misinformation and permitted U. S. funds to be used in rigging
the 1961 election in Saigon
in forwarding intelligence which called the shots against the government of
Vietnam as well as those which indicated that it was doing a good job.
I was quite meticulous
A number of the references provided byl
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are individual STAT
reports reporting various malfeasances, trickery in elections, and so
forth, which were forwarded under my personal authority. At the same
time I had a positive feeling toward the government of South Vietnam
under President Diem, and I really do consider the overthrow of President
Diem one of the real disasters that occurred in our history out there.
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I
systems things would have been better. I had a slightly different feeling
that the Diem government was about as good a government as you were
going to get in Southeast Asia and that the real problem was the
Communist effort against it. ' This was an honest difference of opinion.
I give
full credit for the sincerity of his views. I ask the same
for my own. I did not conceal any information at any time in what was
forwarded to Washington. Although I submitted my own views, I will
take full responsibility for them. I propose to continue to make a choice
between the various possible interpretations and to take responsibility for
assuming a position that one situation is more likely than another. I
think that is what I am required to do as an intelligence officer.
The second communication which the Committee forwarded to me
is a letter from a Committee for Action Research on the Intelligence
Community which asks for a chance to present certain considerations
against me, largely dealing with the Phoenix program in South Vietnam.
They cite two possible witnesses, a
I testified before the House Committee on Government Operations
in July 1971 on the Phoenix program and my testimony was followed by
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;; i
had the feeling that if we had promoted democratic
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The Committee's conclusions after
hearing all of the testimony were included in their report. Concern about
the Phoenix program was expressed in the report and it was recommended
that the Secretary of Defense fully investigate allegations of crimes
committed by U. S. military personnel in South Vietnam against civilians
suspected of Viet Cong activities. The detailed allegations b
a subcommittee witness who had served in military intelligence
and CIA activities in Vietnam are contained in the hearing record.
The Defense Department investigated those allegations and submitted
in a letter to Chairman Moorhead on 2 November 1972 a brief memorandum
entitled "U. S. Assistance Programs in Vietnam." The memorandum states
in part:
"With respect to the recommendation on page 59 of the Committee
report, the Department of Defense completed an extensive and impartial
investigation on March 14, 1972, into the allegations made by
1 -1
during the hearing held August 2, 1971 by the Foreign Operations and
Government Information Subcommittee.
"This investigation, which failed to uncover evidence to support
allegations, revealed numerous disparities between statements
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he made while testifying before the Committee and the factual evidence
produced in the course of the investigation.
"It should be made a matter of record that on two occasions
during investigative interview refused to identify specific
persons, facts or offer precise information involving the alleged incidents
which would assist investigative efforts. This reluctance to give specific
information was also evident during the hearings of August 2, 1971. Since
an investigation has already been conducted and in view of the unsupported
and imprecise allegations made by
many of which are
inaccurate, nor can be proved or disproved, it is the opinion of the
Department of Defense that no useful purpose would be served by further
inquiry into this matter. "
I might add one additional comment which I think brings
allegations into better focus. The Phoenix program was essentially
instituted during the summer of 1968 and began to work during the fall and
on into the succeeding years.
was a military intelligence
officer. He was not assigned to the Phoenix program as a Phoenix adviser.
He alleges that he had certain connections. It is a little hard to determine
served in Vietnam from September 1967,
to December 1968. In other words, his service essentially was before the
Phoenix program really got rolling in any degree.
? As I testified in the Committee's open hearing, the Phoenix program
was an effort to bring some order into the fight on the Government's side
4
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between the Communist apparatus and the government of South Vietnam.
I think that various of the things tha alleges might
have happened. I have no judgment on that, but we did issue instructions,
as I indicated in my testimony, that the Phoenix program was not to be a
program of assassination and we issued instructions and directives out of
the MACV headquarters, which I drafted, that not only were Americans
not to participate in any such activities but they were to make their
objections known at that time and they were to report the fact that they
took place. I did receive some reports of this nature during the Phoenix
program and I took them up with the government of South Vietnam whom I
found to be receptive to the problem. I frankly think that
allegations are not well founded.
With respect to
he alleges that he was in a
briefing with me in the spring of 1969 and says than his account of. that
meeting is in conflict with my allegation that the Phoenix program was
not a systematic program of, assassination. I don't recall any such briefing.
I received many briefings and he may well have been in a briefing with me.
I believe that I conducted the Phoenix program throughout with a
rejection of the idea it be a program of assassination. I knew there were
people killed, there is no question about it, and I have testified publicly
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that most of these were killed in a perfectly natural combat situation in
a war, that there were some abuses that did take place, but I certainly
reject the idea that it was a systematic program of assassination.
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