PROFICIENCY OF EGYPTIAN AIR FORCE AND AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00380R000200050087-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 11, 2001
• Sequence Number: 87
• Publication Date: July 13, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

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13 July 1973
--the Egyptian air force and air defenses
have expanded considerably in terms of
men, equipment, and capabilities since
the 1967 war.
--the USSR was almost totally responsible
for the Egyptian buildup up to July 1972,
when the Soviets withdrew from Egypt.
--the current Soviet contribution is at a
.much lower rate, and thus the Egyptians
will not be able to expand their force
ignificantly in the future unless that
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SUBJECT: Proficiency of Egyptian Air Force and
Air Defense Personnel
1. The massive influx of Soviet equipment and
Soviet training programs since 1970 have provided Egypt
with a large air force and air defense system. Some
Egyptian units have demonstrated a high degree of
proficiency.
2. Assessment of the performance of the Soviet
equipment provided to Egypt is not nearly so difficult
as judging the quality of the men who operate that equip-
ment. The Egyptians have shown competence in operating
some of the most modern Soviet aircraft and equipment,
but for the most part they have done so in circumstances
that have been essentially unhampered by enemy forces.
How well the Egyptians would do in combat with the
Israelis simply cannot be judged confidently from the
evidence available. We are able to detect what the
Egyptians are using and how frequently they exercise,
but are seldom able to discern how well they are doing
or by what standards.
3. We are reasonably confident of certain basic
assessments, however.
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The Soviet Contribution
4. Egypt's air force and air defense personnel
are the best of the Arab nations primarily because of
the extensive training programs conducted by the
Soviets in Egypt and the USSR. Since the Soviet exodus
in July 1972, the Egyptians have assumed responsibility
for their own training, including that conducted by
operational units.
5. Soviet presence in Egyptian training and
operational units was pervasive from 1970 to mid-1972.
Over 1,000 Soviets were involved in a training or
advisory capacity to air force and air defense units.
(Some of the 6,000 Soviets in Soviet air defense units
based in Egypt also provided on-the-job training to
Egyptians.) Soviet advisors were present in virtually
every echelon of the Egyptian military, including
Soviet general officers in Air Defense Headquarters.
Some 400 Soviet instructors taught at Egyptian SAM and
AAA training centers. Soviet advisors also were
assigned to combat units. For example, two Soviets
were assigned to each Egyptian SA-2 battalion and some
20 Soviet pilots assisted two Egyptian MIG-21 brigades.
Generally, Soviet training programs in the USSR and
Egypt were extensive, intensive, and practical.
6. The net result of the Soviet effort was to
improve the quality of the Egyptian pilots considerably
since 1970.
--In the year preceding the 1970 ceasefire
and before the massive Soviet effort to
improve air defenses, the Egyptians lost
30 aircraft for every Israeli aircraft
destroyed in aerial combat. Given the
current magnitude and quality of all
Egyptian air defenses, it is doubtful the
Israelis could duplicate that ratio today.
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7. The departure of the Soviets with their
relatively disciplined training has had an adverse
effect on Egyptian capabilities, but that effect is
difficult to quantify. The few hundred Soviets remaining
and the large number of trained Egyptians will permit
the air force to retain its competence for some time,
however.
8. Two examples of decreases in Egyptian capability
have been noted since mid-1972. First, a Soviet team
in Egypt indicated in February 1973 that equipment was
deteriorating because of poor maintenance. Second, the
number of SU-7 and SU-17 training sorties has decreased
by 60 percent. No new pilots are being trained for
these aircraft, suggesting that the Egyptians may have
decided not to use the 120 aircraft of these types in
their inventory.
Pilot Training
9. Unlike US pilots, Egyptian pilots receive
little combat training in their formal flight schools.
Combat training generally is the responsibility of the
operational unit, and the proficiency of the individual
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pilot depends on the amount and type of training in
his unit. Data on that training are limited, and
assessments necessarily are based on extrapolation
from a few units.
flights of Israeli aircraft at medium and low altitudes.
10. Most of Egypt's fighters are MIG-21s. In one
MIG-21 brigade, pilots fly an average of 12 to 15 hours
a month, a rate comparable to that of Soviet pilots.
This is less than half the 30 hours a month flight
time to ed b 25X6
US fighter pilots.
11. The type of training conducted and the
proficiency levels achieved vary from unit to unit,
but only a small portion of flight time is dedicated
to realistic aerial combat. The most frequently
observed exercises are simulated intercepts of small
Air defense exercises involving a
coordinated response by all elements of the force,
including SAMs, fighters and AAA units, generally are
held twice a year.
12. Increased training over the last year has
improved the capabilities of Egypt's MIG-21 pilots in
ground attack. Some of these pilots have demonstrated
a high level of proficiency in toss-bombing and low
level attacks. This new emphasis on ground attack by
MIG-21s probably was precipitated by the decrease in
SU-7 and SU-17 training.
Problems in the Air Force
14. Despite the Soviet assistance, the air force
still has significant shortcomings:
--Many of Egypt's 480 combat pilots are
young officers trained since 1967 and
lack combat experience.
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--There is a shortage of experienced unit
commanders.
--The ratio of pilots to operational combat
aircraft is only 1.3 to 1 25X6
--Although the Soviets provided some of their
later model fighters, structural defects
and poor Egyptian maintenance have cut
aircraft in-commission rates to 50 percent
in some units and caused a large number of
accidents.
SAM Crew Proficiency
15. Little evidence is available on the current
proficiency of SAM crews. Prior to the Soviet withdrawal,
Egyptians were sent to SAM schools in the Soviet Union
and on their return were assigned to Soviet units based
in Egypt. The Egyptians received three months of
on-the-job training from the Soviet crews before they
assumed responsibility for the sites. Air defense
exercises integrating SAM units with other elements of
the force are held regularly. However, a Soviet team
sent to Egypt earlier this year reported that the equip-
ment was deteriorating because of poor maintenance by
the Egyptians. The launch crews for the sites probably
are losing their proficiency as well. This was
demonstrated late last month when the Egyptians fired
at a flight of Israeli aircraft and failed to achieve
any hits.
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