FAS NEWSLETTER DECEMBER 1972 'THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY; TIME FOR REVIEW?'

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 13, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1972
• Content Type: CIAPER

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FORT WORTH, X TE
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S - 54,317
MAR 9 -ors ?
CIA-RDP75600380R0003000200
EA? sir a ;111
i
By DON KIRKMAN
Scripps-Howard Science
Vi lier
WASHINGTON ? The
United States during the
Vietnam War ? may have
inaugurated a grim new
phase of warfare that, if
unchecked, could result in
nations using earthquakes,
tidal waves, hurricanes and
drouths as weapons of
; destruction, according to a
prestigious scientific
organization.
In a letter to President
Nixon, the 4500-member
I: Federation of American
Scientists said there's good
evidence American military
strategists used weather
modification in Laos in an
he warned, millions of
people, including innocent
persons not involved in the
war, could be killed or in-
jured.
DR. HERBERT Scoville
Jr., FAS secretary ? and
former deputy director of the
Central- Intelligence Agency
( C I A ) under Presidents
Eis-'eTtriower and Kennedy,
said he is convinced man is
reaching the point where he
can control the weather and
other forces of . nature for
warfare and "this can be
terribly devastating."
attempt to turn the Com-
munists' Ho Chi Minh supply
trail into a quagmire.
Although Defense Dept.
officials, including former
secretary Melvin R, Laird,
have denied the charges, the
'FAS said portions of the
Pentagon Papers show
American planes seeded
clouds over Laos in a series
of missions dubbed Operatio.i
Pop Eye that began in
Operation Pop Fe
represents the first use of
. weather modification t,r;
war weapon, said t, AS
spokesman Dr. Gordon .1, F.
MacDonald of Dart eealit I
University.
If nations use the vast
forces of nature as weapons,
D1-0
anrare
As an example of how
vulnerable to famine a nation
is, Dr. MacDonald noted the
Soviet Union in the last two
years has suffered a major
drouth because its rainfall
was below normal and poorly
distributed.
D r. MacDonald said.
Russian scientists and of-
ficials are worried about the
use of weather modification
as a weapon and recently
voiced their concern at an
informal meeting with
American scientists at
Dartmouth.
In the grim future the
scientists foresee, enormous
earthquakes and tidal waves
could be triggered by
planting and exploding a
series of bombs along a
major earthquake fault.
Additionally, the scientists
predict the day is coming
when man will be able to
steer hurricanes toward a
target and cause enormous
damage. The United States
already has carried out a
series of hurricane cloud
seedings off Puerto Rico that
have shown some ability to
control the huge storms, Dr.
MacDonald said.
. Worse yet, he added, is the
possibility scientists even-
tually may be able to control
rainfall over large areas,
raising the possibility of
causing rain shortages and
drouths which could lead to
famines.
IN ITS LETTER to the
President, the FAS called for
en investigation and
"complete public disclosure"
of how the United States
used weather modificetion in
Indochina during the war.
Dr. MacDonald seid the
FAS also favors an in-
ternational treaty panning
the use of weather
modification and geophysical
events (earthquakes, etc.) as
weapons.
The FAS also would like
to see the United States
unilaterally ban A htt tWO
techniques as weapi as, then
invite the rest of tile world ?
to follow its exam,)1e. The
United States did exactly
that when it banned chemical
and biological weavns a few
years ago, Dr. MacDonald
noted.
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nscE4B341 1972 (14)
NEWSLETTER r
SPECIAL ISSUE ON
FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS SECRET INTELLIGEN(7E
THE INTELLiGFNCE COMMUNITY: TIME FOR REV:FW?
The intelligence communit r and its budget, pose many
to.. ems of traditionalconcern to the Federation of Ames-
icanScientists: povernmental reform, morality, proper
use of high technology, and defense expenditures. In ale
last'quarter century, intelligence agencies have prolifer-
ated, The United States has established an agency which
goes- beyond intelligence collection and, periodically, inter-
feres, in the internal affairs of other nations. Technology
suited to the invasion of national and personal privacy
has been developed apace. And the $4 to $6 billion being
STAIPnut for intelligence rnig 71 r
t we e tert
h.-----1"'Tre -TW=DIC-Ti s
."unreviewed" part of the defense bud et.
i
Twenty-five years after the passage of the National Se-
curity Act of 1947, it seems a good time to consider the
4-problems posed by these developments.
Of least concern in terms of its. budget but of over-riding
significance in its international political impact, is the Di-
rectorate of Plans of CIA, within which clandestine polio-
- cal operations are mounted. This is the 1177IscIM?
ST this. newsletter. More and more, infortne o servers que
.A-7,777 clandestine political operations ought to b
continued- on a "business. as usual" basis. In the absence
- of an investigation, a secret bureaucracy----which started.
in the Office of Strategic Services during a hot war and
which grew in the CIA during a cold war?may simply
continue to practice a questionable trade.
Clandestine "dirty tricks" have their costs not only
)(abroad but at home, where they are encouraged only too
- easily. And is not interference in the affairs of other
nations wrong? -
Two decades ago, as the cold war gained momentum,
one of America's greatest political scientists, Harold D.
Xasswell, wrote a comprehensive and prophetic book,
"National Security and Individual Freedom." He warned
of the "insidious nnenace" that a continuing crisis might
"undermine and eventually destroy free institutions." We
would see, he predicted: pressure for defense expendi-
tures, expansion and centralization of Government, with-
holding of information, general suspicion, an undermining
of press and public -opinion, a weakening of political
parties, a decline of the Congress, and Of the. courts.
Today, with the Cold War waning, it seemsin order to
reexamine our institutions, goals and standards. Which
4,
responses . to the emergency of yesterday can we justify
-' zthiay? n
The National Security Act Of 1947 created the Centra)
Intelligence Agency and gave it overall responsibility for
coordinating the intelligence activities of the several rele-
vant government departments and agencies interested in
st.wh -matters. Today, a quarter century later, CIA is re-
7 to have a buet of about $700-mill7777.77-
. 1.70," aiirL a searf at perhaps 18_000 people, or about
8,000 more than the Department of State! (This n.d-
van-i..zzprg in size gives CIA an edge in interdepartmental
meetings for which, for example, others may be too rushed
fully 'prepare or not be able to assign a suitable person.)
Time National Security Act authorized CIA to:
(1kr
perform for the benefit of the existing intelligence
n.c;.encies such additional services of common concern as
i;le. National Security Council determines can he wore
'ectivels aco.implished centrally;
mm st:eii other functions and duties rehired !,1
4ligence alleci:ing the national seeurit.\,, as ;he Na-
mai Security Council ina:;/ from time to time direct.-
alics added)
S1AT
These clauses clearly authorize clandestine intelligence
collectionnrit-They are also ed 10 iustifv clandestine po-
6 litical operations. Hawever, overthrowing governments.
a secret wars, asSassination, and fixing elections areeeer-
1 tainly not done "for the benefit of the existing intelligence
agencies" nor are they duties "related to intelligence."
Someday a court may rule that poli
authorized. r
In any case, at the urging a len Ili es, t e. National
Security Council issued a secret directive (NSC 10/2) in
1948, authorizing such special operations of all kinds-
10provided they were secret and-small enough to be pausibly
deniable by the Government.
Even this authority has been exceeded since several im-
possible-to-deny operations' have been undertaken: the
i( U-2 flight, the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Iranian Coup, the
Laotian War, and so on.
a The National Security Act gave- the CIA no "police
subpoena, law enforcement powers; or internal security,
functions . ."'But another secret Tx
ment evident) did
STAT
sngaize In
ome.sttc operations related to its job. was under this
/ ?P4--a uthority that such organizations, as foundations, educa a
tional or anizations and private voluntar ?roups were
invo ve w ational Student
Association revelations (1966).
The "white" part of CIA is, in a sense, a cover for the
"black" side. CIA supporters and officials invariably em-
phasize the intelligence, rather than the inanipulation
function of CIA, ignoring the latter or using phrases that
gloss over it quietly. The public can easily accept the de sii ability of knowing as much as possible. But its instincts
oppose doing abroad what it would not tolerate at home..
And it rightly fears that injustices committed abroad may
begin to be tolerated at home: how many elections can
be fixed abroad before we begin to try it here? The .last
election showed such a degeneration of traditional Ameri-
can standards.
The. present Director of Central Intelligence, _Richard
Helms, is working hard and effectively at presenting an
image of CIA that will not offend. In a recent speech, he
mid:
I)
14,
at
tit- time o
"The same objectivity which makes us useful to our
government and our country leaves us uncomfortably
aware of our ambiguous place in it. ? . We propose tc
adapt intelligence to American society, not vice versa.'
Even construed narrowly, this is no easy job, and adapt-
ing clandestine political operations to American ideals may
well be quite impossible.
At the time of the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy eavt:
serious consideration to breaking CIA into: two ieces:
(111-7717.777M, conduct ooerations and the other woulc
just collect intelligence. The dangers weie only too evident.
to Kennedy of letting operations be condue:ed bv those
who were accumulating the information. Allen Dulles in-
sisted ori a united operation, arguing that separation wank
be inefficient and disruptive. But there are ninny argu-?
frents en both sides and the issue deserta s tiontinuina
consideration.
In particular, there is something to he said for cleeidinp
now not to let Mr. Helms be succeeded by .mother Dep-
uty Director for Plans (i.e. clandestine oper,nions). This
CIAv,ns u ldi,coe itself
eisnryliisne tend inqituti,-)nali,i, ill,- notion that
h,l,;the
ore:mnizers o. activities
- rather than thos.e wh hm t;:ehnical intelli,r,k-:e Indeed,
tl-?,7re is much to be said for a tradition at b omit-
(C7,717 rel.XT RTE
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'013 I12..ITELLIGE1;CE CC-MOM: TIME FOR RIVIEW7 cl.;101315.10
sidees to manage CIA.
? The unprecedented secrecy concerning CIA's budget
- also deserve re-examination. It is being argued, in a citi-
STATsuit, that it is unconstitutional to hide the appro ria-
tions -ok' CIA in the budgets of ?trier -e, iartments because
? ? ? ? ? e ection 9, Clause
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tritterIttfiLlatiltirital CCVIIPT17.Z7:
literature really shows only one other.triumoh in penetrat-
ing !Soviet secrecy with spies:. the obtaining of a copy of the
secret speech by Khrushehey dipoimeing Stalin. Bet this
speech was being widely circulated to cadre and Eastern
European sources. tajjen Dulles, on television, called. this
"one of the Main coops of the time I was [at CIAl.?
Compared to the Soviet Union, the ondenleveloneet
world looks easy to penetrate and manipulate. The Gov-
ernments ace relatively unstable and the societies pro-
vide more scope for agents and their maneuvers. While the
underdeveloped world leads itself better to clandestine
operations, these operations are much harder to instify.
We are not at war?usually, not even at cold wnr---
wich the countries in the underdeveloped would. And they
rarely if ever rose a direct threat to us. whether or not
they trade or otherwise consort with Communists. Today.
fewer and fewer Americans see the entire world as '2,
_struggle between the forces of dark and light?a struegle
in which we must influence every corner of the globe.
In tacit agreement with this, CIA Director l-lelms re-
cently said:
."America's intelligence assets (Sic), however, do not
exist solely because of the Soviet and Chinese threat,
or against the contingency of a new global conflict. The
United- States, as a world power; either, is involved
or may with little warning find itself involved iT, a wide
range and variety of problems which require a broad
and detailed base of foreign intelligence for the policy
makers." .
. Thus, where the Office of. Strategic Services (OSS) of
World .War II was justified by a hot war, and the CIA by
a cold war, the present justification for intelligence activi-
ties in the underdeveloped world springs ever more only
from America's role as a "great power."
Cr Moreover, the word "assets" above is significant.. If in-
formation were all that were k. A issue, a strong ease could
be made for getting needed information when you need it,
through open sources, embassies and reconnaissance. But
if clandestine political manipulation is at issue, then one
requires . long-standing penetration of institutions of all
kinds .-and a great deal of otherwise unimportant infor-
mation necessary to plan and hide local maneuvers.
Political Control of Agents in the Field
'1- Because political operations are so sensitive and, po-
tentially so explosive, it is imperative that the agents be
under strict control. But is this really possible? To each
foreign movement of one kind or another?no matter how
distasteful CIA will assign various operatives, if only to
get imormation. In the process, these operatives must
ingratiate themselves with the movernent. And since they
are operating in a context in which subtle signals are the
rule, it is inevitable that they will often signal the move-
ment that the United States likes it, or might support it.
r Indeed, the agents themselves may think they are tior-
STNTetly interpreting U.S. policy?or what they think
should be?in delicate maneuvers which they contro
lilt-What, for example, did it mean when CIA agents
Cambodian plotters that they would do "everything possi-
ble" to help if a coup were mounted. (See Isimladensnia
7itintirer, April 6, 197'2, "CIA iFtielit, -fare.d. in Sihanouk
G4.nit,a.e.") li
No one who has ever tried to control a hereeticriteti
will .he insensitive to the pr,-;.73c-rris to which these
t1-,'?as - give 1?;"fl. '-:. hcse pi(obleros wolAd ITt.,: ril-a7.:;ati,:aNy
6irninished, hot--,z1zer, if CIA i?ii:.:T? tCStriCtZ"1 to j;-0%),Tr-rItjf,'
thcring and ,,,re. 1-4-,own to tri... Ille novr:F.:,,s wrazi41
then cease to look to CIA for peliey signals.
Alternative ll/rills tc41 CIA ?
What alternative positions might be considered toward
CIA involvement abroad? There are these alternative pos.
sq)iEties:
I. Prohibi: CIA overatioas and ocents fro.,;4 ''--' reir!er-
r$,!.,4oped wor(d: This would 1,v, .t,,e ativaotsit ei nos-
r,443i'EN7S LIKE FREEDOM OF ACTION
after thewar of his negotiations for the sur-
of the Gergnan forces in North Italy, Dulles
cautiously sogentsted: "An intelligence officer in the
field is supposed to keep his home office informed
he doing. That is quite tree, but with s,aine
reserentiiins, as he may overdo it. if, for es:nripie.
Oij tno morn or asks too often for instructions,
he is likely to get some he doesn't reiista, and is
he may well find headquarters trying to .4.ike
over the whole cornInet :of the operplion, Only a mann
on the snot can really pass judgment on the deteils
as contrasted with the policy decisions, which, of
course, belong to the boss at headquarters." Laites
sithled, "It has always amazed me bow desk perst.mtel
:I.h,iissa;Tds of wiles away seem to acquire wisdom, and
snecial knowledge about local field conditions which
im assume goes deeper than that available to the
mini on the snot." Mt-nest withoot exception, Milks
?7,14 other OSS onerators feared the burden of a nigh-
level decision that might cramp their freedom of
isetion.
--1?. Harris Smith. OSS The Secret History of A n7er-
ka's First Central Intelligence Agency, University of
Colifo7wia Press, 1972, pg. 9.
st,
tecting America's reputation?and that of its citizens doing
lonsiness there?from the constant miasma of suspicion
of CIA involvement in the internal, affairs of other coun-
tries. Open sources would continue to supply the U.S. with
gIn'is of its intelligence. Furthtir intelligence in the under-
developed world could be collected by State Department
officials through embassies. This policy would enforce the
now-questionable supremacy of the State Department in
dealing with the Nations involved.
Arguments against this policy include these: the area
is too important to U.S. interests to permit such with-
drawal and the credibility of the withdrawal would be
bard to establish, at least in the short run.
2. Permit covert activities, in the underdevelo ,ed world
only for in ormattaiL not ninniputation:This policy would
-prevent the fixing of elections, the purchase of legislators,
? private wars, the overthrow of governments, and it would
go a long way toward protecting the U.S. reputation...for
non-interference in the affairs of other countries.10ne
might, for example, adopt the rule suggested by Harry
Howe Ransom that secret political operations could he
used only as an alternative to overt military action in a
situation that presented a direct threat to U.S. security.
Of course, the mere existence of a covert capability for
espionage would leave the U.S. with a capability for
manipulation; the same agents that are secretly providing
iriformation could secretly try to influence events. But theta:
is still a large gap between buying "assets" for one purpose
end for the other.
Also, large scale operations would not be conducted
rider this rule. According to some reports. the committee,
enaired b General MaXiN V
Bay of Pigs CeiSO e, recommended to President Kennedy
(wito atmarently agreed) that the CIA be limited to opera-
Hors retyirinik military equipment no larger -6r more
than side arms.--weapons wnich eouldThe earned
seitne i.ont relevant rewesentatives of Ccngress he
.7f.;,;N:7l7[:?d ti;r:jor- any clandestine operations beyond Mose
-
refit ti.;,..ed fir- Llteffigence collection, are unaertaken: It is
eit disoutc, between the Executive and
whether and when the Executive Branch
ioty tinderioke operations affecting U.S. Encino polie
%yid-nod consulting Consiress. 11 a clanc!,?:stint political
operation is important enough to take the aleseys high
risks of exposure, it should be important enoula :-70i1S1.11t
These consultations can procii!ce a r1,::w pct.-
on the pro!)lcm---which can be all important. The
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IIITELLIGET2 CCAFIZTUITY t TINA FOR PiEV.I.1
ChailitrAil of the Senate Foreign Relations-Coramittee was
one -oZ the few who predicted accurately the political 'chin-
aequences of the Bay of Pigs operation.
STAT 4. Require that the ambassador be advised of covert
operations in the nation to which he is accredited. Monito
)IZO/lCr! with Congressional g t : Under the Ken-
nedy Administration, after the Bay of Pigs, a .lettcr went
to all embassies affirming the authority of the Ambassador
over the representatives of C.I.A. But this authority is
variously interpreted and might be periodically clarified
and strengthened. One method of policing the order would
litteolve occasional visits by Congressmen or Congressional
staff who would quiz the Ambassador to be sure that he
lattenv at least as much as did they about local covect
activities. Another control would require that Assistant
Secretaries of State knew about the covert activities in their
region. in these cases, political oversight and political
. perspective would be injected into operations that would
-otherwise be largely controlled by an intelligence point of
view.
CIA BECOMINC-i A BURDEN?
While the institutional forms of political carol
ppear effective and sufficient, it is really the vtA of
the political oCkials who trust exert control that is
imoortant and that has most often been lacking.
Even vrlien the control is tight and effective, a orore
iniaortant ettlestion may concern the extent to v+ttich
CIA information and policy judgments affect political
decisions in foreign affairs. ?
Whether or not political control is being exercised.
the more serious question is whether the very t xist-
enee of an efficient CIA causes the U.S. Goverrnnent
to rely too much on clandestine and illicit aetivities,
I-sack-alley tactics, subversion and what is 'known in
official jargon as "dirty tricks."
Finally regardless of the facts, the CIA's reputation
in the world is so horrendous and its role in events
so exaggerated that it is becoming a burden on Amer-
ican foreign policy rather than the secret weapon it
was intended to be.
.0- The New York Times, April 25, 1966
Improper Use of Force
STATone morally and politically important imperative seem
clear: Ado it and announce a rrn 1 ainst murder o
,-ture. There are repeated and persistent reports that this
tette do-es not exist. There was the murder by a green becet.
There. is the Phoenix program irivolving widespread assas-
sination of "Vietcong agents"?many of which, it is re-
ported, were simply the victims of internal Vietnamese
rivalries. Some years ago, the New York Times quoted one
of the best informed men in Washington as having asserted
that "when we catch one of them [an enemy agent, it
becomes necessary "to get everything out of them and we
dolt with no holds barred." -
? There is also this disturbing quotation from Victor
Marchetti, formerly executive assistant tO the Deputy
Director of CIA:
"The director would come back from the White HOuse
and shake his head and say 'The President is very, very
upset about .____?__. We agreed that the only solution
was _____ But of course that's impossible, we can't
be responsible for a thing like that.'
'The second man would say the same thing to the third
man, and on down through the station chief in some
country until somebody went out and and
nobody was responsible." (Parade Magazine, "Quitting
the CIA," by Henry Anent) ?
? . Problems oil Clandestine Domestic Operations
After the 1966 revelations that the Central Intelligence
Agency had been financing the National Student Associa-
tion, a variety of front organizations and conduits were
unravelled which totaled about 250. The CIA gave its
money directly to foundations which, in turn, passed the
secret funds along to specific CIA-approved groups, organ-
izations and study projects. These, in turn, often supported
haliteiduals. The organizations included National Educa-
tion Association, African-American Institute, American
Newspaper Guild, International Development Foundation,
and many others. .
II The way in which these organizations were controlled
was subtle and sophisticated in a fashion -apparently char-
acteristic of many clandestine CIA operations. Thus,
-,/7!i1e distinguished participants' in the Congress for Cul-
tural Freedom and editors of its IllliaZine. EnCOWder, eVi-
6:.ntly believed that i. e organizations were doing only
la
what came naturally,' he CIA official who set the entire
covert program in motion, Thomas W. Braden, saw it this
way: '
"We had placed one agent in a Eurepe4:eiseti orenniz.a-
tion of intellectuals called die Congress for Cumiral
Freedom. Another Agent became an editor of En-
counter. The agents could not only propose vei.l.-tit.eil-
-tiltiniat terogiares to the official leaders of theeren:...ne
dons- but they could also suattest ways and t.':'9,,?: iff
solve the inevitable budgeter) otottlems. ?
ii. the needed money could be oefained ftten
oundations"? (Saturday Evening Post 5 / 20 1967
Speaking Out, page 2)
President Johnson appointed a panel beaded by then
Undersecretary of State Nicholas deB. Katzentkiitth to
review this aspect of CIA operations. The other panel
member; were HEW Secretary John Gardner (a former
OSS employee) and CIA Director Helms. The panel was
to study the relationship between CIA and those "educa-
tional and private voluntary organizations" which operate
abroad and to recommend means to help assure that such
organizations could "play .their proper and vital role."
The Panel recommendations were as follows:
1. It should be the policy of the United States Govern-
went that no Federal Rn_dileV shall orovik any awert
financial assistance or support direct or indirect 40
am' of the nation's educational or private voluntary
ctivanizations.
The (12vernment reromody develop and estab-
lish 2 ritiblie-private mechanism to a I les
pnly for overseas activities or organizations which are
a analzed deseninte in ti national interestLpublic
supports t f
On March 29, 1967, President Johnson 'said he ac-
cepted point 1 and directed all Government agencies to
implement it fulley: He said he would give "serious con-
sideration' to fi'oint77-lauTapparently never i.mplemeni)
When these operations were first proposed by Braden,
Allen Dulles had commented favorably on them, noting: .
"There is no doubt in my mind that we are losing the cold
wan" Twenty years later, though we are no longer in any
risk of "losing the cold war," some would like to continue
despite the regulations.
At least:one influential former CIA official's thinking
was simply to move to deeper cover. And sympathy for
filIS approach probably goes very deeply into the so-called
"Establishment." For example, when the National Student
Association scandal broke, those who ran the liberal, now
defunct, Look Magazine, were so incensed at general ex-
pressions of outrage that they wrote their first editorial in
thloty yeant(1) defending the students. In such an annos-
phare one must expect liberal (much less conservative)
fonedations and banks to cooperate whole-heartedly with
the CIA whatever the cover.
Tat any case, what could such deeper cover be? in the
commercial establishments or profit-inakimi,
ciezen;z[nons are eaempt from the ban. 'Hence, stoth or
taitlithit the acquiescence of the officials. of the corp-any
tetents might be placed in strategic positions. It
also that orE,anizations which seemed to he volun-
-nn-n netua.11y incerpitrated in such a way as to lac
eroate?tahlog. Other tto7,tiltilities include enrichitietmdi
%,"ICAT MT.? rtrt= ? )
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THE INTELLIGENC.E COTCWITY ; TIME ?CH REVIEW?
viduals he throwing business their way anti having thest
CIA CHANGING PERSONALITY?
individuals support suitable philtinthropic enterprises.
There are still sensitive. nrop?ressil?T men in thu
To the extent that these arrangements touch voluntart
. but they arc becoming scarcer .hy the moment. The
organiiiiiitions. they pose the sante problems which CICatec AgenosIs career trainees no longer come f-orn the Phi
the distress in 1966. In short, the policy approved by brei- Beta ranks of Ilarrvat?cl, -Vale, or Berkeltn. The
dent Johnson was sensible when it proscribed "direct 01 Agency is widely regarded on cnilege campuses as
the principal si,?mbol of all that is svrnrrn with our
nation. "For the world as a w'hole," wrote Arnold
Toynbee recently, "the CIA hes 1114),,V Fecotne the
bogey that communism has been for America. \\ her-.
ever there is trouble, violence, suffering, tragely, the
rest of us are now quick to stisoect lhc Cl. has a
hand in it." Millions of college stmlents ant! )()Iom
professionals, the future "powet? elite" oF the United
States, would accept that judgment.
? R. Harris Smith, OSS The Secret History of Amer-
ica's First Central Intelligence Agency,. University of
California Press, 1972, pg. 382.
indirect'' support. Moreover, in the coining generation, we
can expect a continuation or the existing trend toward
whistle-blowing. The CIA's reputation and its ability to
keep secrets can he expected to decline. Even the most
"indirect" support may eventually become known.
All of these deep cover arrangements are made much
easier by the intelligence community's so-called "alumni
association." These are persons who are known to the
community through past service and who are willing to
turn a quiet hand or give a confidential favor. Sometimes,
much more is involved. Examples from the past include
these. A high official of CIA's predecessor?the Office
of Strategic Services (OSS)?becomes head of the CIA-
financed National Committee for a Free Europe. Another
becomes an official of the CIA-funded American Friends
of the Middle East. A Deputy Director of State Depart-
ment Intelligence becomes President of Operations and
Policy Research,. Inc., a CIA conduit which financed
"studies" of Latin American electoral. processes. (This
official is simultaneously well placed to arrange studies
of elections as the Director of the American Political
SLience Association!). ?
Thus, a large and growing domestic network of persons
trained in dissembling, distortion, and human manipula-
tion, may be growing in our country. And the use of these
kinds of skills may also be growing more acceptable.
During the Republican campaign for President, a memo-
randum went out to Republican college organizers which
urged them to arrange a mock election and gave what
?seemed to be pointed hints about how to manipulate the
'election. .
This kind of thing produces a suspicion and paranoia
that divides Americans from one another. It makes them
ask questions about their associates, colleagues, secre-
taries and acquaintances?questions that arc destructive
of the casual and trusting atmosphere traditional in Amer-
ica. (Already, unbelievable numbers of persons seem to
assume that their phones are tapped and their mail read.)
As the public senSe of cold war dissipates, the American
distaste for secret organizations can be expected to grow.
The occasional disclosure of any "dirty trick" or politica
manipulationsponsorsd by CIA will certainly deepen thi
\
sense of unease. In the end, as now, many of the best an
most sophisticated college graduates will not be willirn
to work for the CIA. And professional consultants will be
discouraged as well. The result can change the character
of the Agency in such a way as to further threaten Ameri-
can values. in contrast to CIA's reputation for competent nurmalk
One method, in the American tradition, for kcepinn CIA disinterested analysis, DlA and the inteiligenne services
...--- honest would be s?uhl' -.I crest or-acaliSLaLlialumili.c Pose real questions of redundancy, waste sc.iivice bia,.
of the intelligence community (and those who areserviccc Zap1 hanialeja, it
Both of the Appropriations Committees of Congress
by intellinance in the Government). This ptiblic interest
.
' tc are convinced that there is such waste in Defense De-
partment Intelligence. In 1971, the House Committee
reported:
The committee feels that the inteiligence one:ration of
the Department or Defense hits grown I.:evonti the actual
needs of the Department and is 110W reccit. ing an in-
ordinate share of the fiscal resources of the Department.
R o
edundancy is the watchwrd in many intelagenee op-
erations. The sante information is sought and obtained
by various means and by various ornanirations. Co-
nralination is iss:s effective than it should be. Far more
sel?nriar is collected than is essientini. Mane iii; is col
!ected which sannot be evaluated iti a reason d?0lenath
of titre and is therefore wasted. NOV ;PtCl!`,!vg c means
have become available and 'have. been ireorporated
into the program without c
t offsetting reduti. ins i?? old
Procedures.
In July, 1979. the I'Liiij Chair,;,1,1 of th,:.
In any case, as the distaste for CIA grows, CIA has ?
moral obli atio os ?
not wish to be tarnished by association with it.
country, it is reported, CIA ut fur ' ba.tiLaithZa
knowledge:. But what
tf-Thir Were c iscovere ? vious.y, .A cot ?nlitly risk
the reputations of persons it wanted to use, or manipulate.
by trying to help them secretly..
TWO SOURCES OF POSSIBLE WASTE
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA): .
The Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence agencies:.
provided such parochial and biased intelligence estimates
in the late fifties that they were removed in 196l from the
United States Intelligence Board (US) and replaced by
a new supervisory organization; the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA). DIA's job was to coordinate all of the
Defense Department's intelligence'resoureea and analyses.
Allen Dulles had feared that CIA and DIA might become ;
rivals and competitors; apparently_ this. has become the
case.
By 1964, DIA had: merged the intelligence publica-
tions of the armed services into publications of its own:
launched a "Daily Digest" that competed with the CIA's
-Central Intelligence Bulletin:" supplanted J-2, the in-
telligence staff of the Joint Chiefs; replaced the services
in providing "order of battle" information and had bas-
ically reduced the services to the role of collecting raw
intelligence.
A number of informed observers have neverthelesi
suggested that DIA serves no useful purpose and that its
functions could well be taken over by CIA. Others. \vitt
Pentagon experience, have noted that there is no way te
prevent the military services from having intelligence
branches and?that being the case--DIA is necessary tc
sit on them and coordinate their conclusions. In any case.
STAT
group would, as do so ninny others, offer its testunon
Congress on matters of interest to it?in this case, inn:l-
inter-ten. "lhc testimony might be given in public or in exca-
itive session, as appropriate. And constructive suggestions
,111,1 Critijtinh could be made.
Such an organization would have a credibility and au.
thority that no other group can have and a general knowl-
ctine of the relevant intelligence problems facing. the nation
and public. It goes without saying that no one in thi..
one...mit:ore-in, or eommuniciiting with it. would viol:::,
oaths, associated with information. 1
1:cfier.ttioli of American Scientists' strategic weapons coin
iniricc is art example if the feasibility and lcnitirman
In, a Melt a group of persons, well grounded hi strati
teaie arms problcirK can. without violating aa v rules con -
ectaimi soch information, make informed end usitral
oriaioinaseinents. Niany persons !h::
iencsiensr enitocsed :his sintaantioa.
1, Rit,1,0,1
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TAT
STAT
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iCi'CC.VitNIJNITT TINE FOR EWEN'?
MR. SYMINGTON% As a iongfant member of the
Cominitice On Foreign Rehitions, as an ad hoc mem
bier of the Appropriations Committee and the tank-
ing Member of Armed Services, I respectfully plead
-with ray coiintg0VS to :Mow me to receive in executive
session enougn inteiligence info:mation to in torn
form an intelligent judgment oti matters which so
viially affeci'. oar security; nod so I can vote in com-
mittee and on the iloor a; the Senate on the basis of
the facts. There have been several cases tchere /
hove not been able to do that in the past. In my
opinion, this lad( oi disseminated information has
cosi the country a great deal oii treasure and a num-
ber of American lives. ? . .
---,- from Congressional Record-Sena
. November 23,1971, S-I95
Report on Defense Department problems Gilbert Fi
huida. told a press conference: "I believe that the Pentae
suffers from to much intelligence. Thee can't use wh
hey get because there is so much collected. It wot
almost be better that they didn't have it because i
difficult to find out what's important." Ile went on
suggest diffusion of responsibility, too much detail wor
and too little looking ahead in the live-to-fifteen ye
range. ?
National Security Agency (NSA):
In 1952, a Presidential directive set up the Nation
Security Agency as a?separate agency inside the Defen
Department. NSA's ,basic duties are to break codes
other Nations, to maintain the security of U.S. codes, at
to perform intelligence functions with regard to electron
and radar emissions, etc. In I956,?it had 9,000 employee
.Today, it is thought to-have 15,000 and a budget well oy
rbillion. ? i, In August 1972; an apparently well-informed form
mployee of NSA wrote a long memoir for Rampar
agazine. The article summarized the author's. Clain
y saying:
,
". . . NSA knows the call signs of every Soviet?airplan
the numbers on the side of each-plane, the name of tl
- pilot in commana..the precise longitude arid-latitude t
every nuclear submarine; . the.. whereabouts of near(
every Soviet VIP; the location of every Soviet missi
base: every army division, battalion and companv?i
?
weaponry, commander and deployment. Routinely th
NSA monitors all Soviet military, diplomatic and con
. mercial radio traffic, including Soviet Air Defense, Tat
tical Air, and KGB forces. (It was. the NSA that foun
Che Guevara in Bolivia through radio communication
intercept and analysis.) NSA cryptologie experts sec
to break every Soviet code and do so with remarkabl
success. Soviet scrambler and computer-generated sig
nals being nearly as vulnerable as ordinary ?voice ant
manual morse radio transmissions. Interception, o
Soviet radar signals enables the NSA to guage quite pre
eisery the effectiveness of Soviet Air Defense units
Methods have been devised to "fingerprint" ever
human voice used in radio transmissions and?distinguis
them from the voice of every other operator. Th
AL!eliCy'S Electronic Intelligence Teams (ELINT) ar
capable of intercepting any electronic signal transmitter
anywhere in the world and; from an analysis of th
intercepted signal, identify the transmitter and phss
notify reconstruct it. Finally, after having shown int
size and sensitivity of the Agency's big ears, It-isnimos
sunerfitious to noint out that NSA monitors and records
every trans-Atlantic telephone call."
A July 16, New York Times report noted that "ex-
nsive independent checking in Washington with sources
and out of Government who were familiar with in-
lligence matters has resulted in the corroboration of
anV of ;the article's] revelations." Exports had dewed
wever. the plausibility of the assertion that the st.,Phisti-
red codes of the Soviet Union had been broken. El
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF THE
te
in
te
in
ho
ea
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
In each I louse of Congress, the Armed Services and the
Appropriations Committees have a subcommittee that is
supposed. in principle, to oversee CIA. In the !louse of
Repeesenteti yes, even the names of the Appropriations
subcommittec members are secret. hi the Senate, ;he five
senior members of the Aopropliations Coninnoce form a
WHAT DRIVES INTELLIGENCE?
We are going to have-to take a harder look at intel-
ligence requirements, because they drive the intelli-
gence process. In so doing they create demands for
resources. There is a- tendency for requirements?.
once stated?to acooire immortality.
One requirements question we will ask ourselves is
whether we should maintain a world-wide dnta base.
collected in advance, as insurance against the con-
tingency that we may Med Some of this data :in a par-
ticular situation. Nitwit of this information can lie
acquired on very short notice by reconnaissance
means. As for the remainder, we are going to have to
accept the risk of not having complete information
on some parts of the world. We haven't enough re-
sources to cover everything, and the high priority
missions hate first call on what we do have,
-- Hon. Robert F. Froehlke. Special Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, June 0, 1971
before Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. House
of Representative,s,
subcommittee on Intelligence Operations.
The subcornmitee of Armed Services on CIA has, not
met for at least two years?although Senator Symington,
a member of the subcommittee, has sought to secure such
a meeting. In '1971, Senator Stennis and Senator Ellen-
der?then the Chairmen of the full Armed Ser?-tices ancl
Appropriations Committees (as well as of their CIA sub-
committees) said they knew nothing about The I -.
financed war in Laos?surely CIA's biggest operation.!
(Congressional Record, November 23, 1971, pg. S19521-
S19530.)
The Congressmen are understandably reluctant even
0 know about intelligence operations, Without publicity,
ind public support, there is a limit to their influence over
'he events about which they hear. And if they cannot
appeal to their constituency, the knowledge of secrets only
makes them vulnerable to the smear that they leaked a
secret or mishandled their responsibilities.
Approximately 150 -resolutions haNie been offered in
the Congress to control' th&-CIA and/or other intelligence
functions. The most common resolution has called far a
Joint Committee on Intelligence, and there is much to be
said for it. Such a renewal of Congressional authority to
review such matters might strengthen Congressional o
sight.
Two more recent effnrts hi-oh , ---------
s ? C
Stuart Symington have tried different tac4.-.)ne resolu-
tion called for a Select Committee on the Co7)Fdination of
U. overnment activities aoroa :_ sue a committee
would have authority over CIA and DOD foreign activities
tr'il=cular. Another aPProach called for firnitine att.
U.S " telli ence exiomditures of all kinds to $4 billion.
Senator 1' ord ase (Rey.; N. .) has soug t to cont ol
the CIA by offerin resolutions that simply appl i o " n
%genes' o t e U.S. Government. cse resolutions em-
body existing restraints on DOD which CIA was circum-
venting: e.g., he sought to prevent expenditure of funds
for training Cambodian military forces. In short, Senator
Case is emphasizing the fact that CIA is a statutorily de-
signed agency. which Congress empowered, and which
Congress can control.
_. . .
?tigress las not only given the Executive branch a
blank check to do intelligence but it has not even insisted
on seeing the results. The National Security Act of 1947
requires CIA to "correlate and evaluate intelligence relat-
ing to the national security and provide for the appropriate
dissemination of such intelligence within the ,*)vern-
mem . . ." (italics added). As far as the legislative branch
of "gosernment" is concerned, this has not been done.
"*--On July 17, 1972, the Foreign Relations Comrnittee re-
1 ' ported out art amendment (S. 2224) to the National Se-
curity Act explicitly requirim2 the CIA to "inform fully
and currently, by means of regular and soCCial .tt.! orts
the Committees on Iiorto n Relations and Arno. 'se:sit:es
1 - of both Houses .tnd to make special reports in rcsponst.
? to their requests: The Committee proposal, sponsored by
Senator JOhn Sherman Cooper, put special emplEnis upon
the existing precedent whereby the Joint Atomic Energy
Committee gets special reports from DOD on atomic
l.i-`?!" mtelligenee mtormation. rei
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