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STAT Approved For Release 2005/05/20 : CIA-RDP75600380R000300020001-0 Next 6 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/05/20 : CIA-RDP75600380R000300020001-0 FORT WORTH, X TE - Approved For Release 2005/05/20: PRESS E - 48,759 S - 54,317 MAR 9 -ors ? CIA-RDP75600380R0003000200 EA? sir a ;111 i By DON KIRKMAN Scripps-Howard Science Vi lier WASHINGTON ? The United States during the Vietnam War ? may have inaugurated a grim new phase of warfare that, if unchecked, could result in nations using earthquakes, tidal waves, hurricanes and drouths as weapons of ; destruction, according to a prestigious scientific organization. In a letter to President Nixon, the 4500-member I: Federation of American Scientists said there's good evidence American military strategists used weather modification in Laos in an he warned, millions of people, including innocent persons not involved in the war, could be killed or in- jured. DR. HERBERT Scoville Jr., FAS secretary ? and former deputy director of the Central- Intelligence Agency ( C I A ) under Presidents Eis-'eTtriower and Kennedy, said he is convinced man is reaching the point where he can control the weather and other forces of . nature for warfare and "this can be terribly devastating." attempt to turn the Com- munists' Ho Chi Minh supply trail into a quagmire. Although Defense Dept. officials, including former secretary Melvin R, Laird, have denied the charges, the 'FAS said portions of the Pentagon Papers show American planes seeded clouds over Laos in a series of missions dubbed Operatio.i Pop Eye that began in Operation Pop Fe represents the first use of . weather modification t,r; war weapon, said t, AS spokesman Dr. Gordon .1, F. MacDonald of Dart eealit I University. If nations use the vast forces of nature as weapons, D1-0 anrare As an example of how vulnerable to famine a nation is, Dr. MacDonald noted the Soviet Union in the last two years has suffered a major drouth because its rainfall was below normal and poorly distributed. D r. MacDonald said. Russian scientists and of- ficials are worried about the use of weather modification as a weapon and recently voiced their concern at an informal meeting with American scientists at Dartmouth. In the grim future the scientists foresee, enormous earthquakes and tidal waves could be triggered by planting and exploding a series of bombs along a major earthquake fault. Additionally, the scientists predict the day is coming when man will be able to steer hurricanes toward a target and cause enormous damage. The United States already has carried out a series of hurricane cloud seedings off Puerto Rico that have shown some ability to control the huge storms, Dr. MacDonald said. . Worse yet, he added, is the possibility scientists even- tually may be able to control rainfall over large areas, raising the possibility of causing rain shortages and drouths which could lead to famines. IN ITS LETTER to the President, the FAS called for en investigation and "complete public disclosure" of how the United States used weather modificetion in Indochina during the war. Dr. MacDonald seid the FAS also favors an in- ternational treaty panning the use of weather modification and geophysical events (earthquakes, etc.) as weapons. The FAS also would like to see the United States unilaterally ban A htt tWO techniques as weapi as, then invite the rest of tile world ? to follow its exam,)1e. The United States did exactly that when it banned chemical and biological weavns a few years ago, Dr. MacDonald noted. Approved For Release 2005/05/20 : CIA-RDP75600380R000300020001-0 Approved For Release 2005/05/20 : CIA-RDP75600380R000300020001-0 nscE4B341 1972 (14) NEWSLETTER r SPECIAL ISSUE ON FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS SECRET INTELLIGEN(7E THE INTELLiGFNCE COMMUNITY: TIME FOR REV:FW? The intelligence communit r and its budget, pose many to.. ems of traditionalconcern to the Federation of Ames- icanScientists: povernmental reform, morality, proper use of high technology, and defense expenditures. In ale last'quarter century, intelligence agencies have prolifer- ated, The United States has established an agency which goes- beyond intelligence collection and, periodically, inter- feres, in the internal affairs of other nations. Technology suited to the invasion of national and personal privacy has been developed apace. And the $4 to $6 billion being STAIPnut for intelligence rnig 71 r t we e tert h.-----1"'Tre -TW=DIC-Ti s ."unreviewed" part of the defense bud et. i Twenty-five years after the passage of the National Se- curity Act of 1947, it seems a good time to consider the 4-problems posed by these developments. Of least concern in terms of its. budget but of over-riding significance in its international political impact, is the Di- rectorate of Plans of CIA, within which clandestine polio- - cal operations are mounted. This is the 1177IscIM? ST this. newsletter. More and more, infortne o servers que .A-7,777 clandestine political operations ought to b continued- on a "business. as usual" basis. In the absence - of an investigation, a secret bureaucracy----which started. in the Office of Strategic Services during a hot war and which grew in the CIA during a cold war?may simply continue to practice a questionable trade. Clandestine "dirty tricks" have their costs not only )(abroad but at home, where they are encouraged only too - easily. And is not interference in the affairs of other nations wrong? - Two decades ago, as the cold war gained momentum, one of America's greatest political scientists, Harold D. Xasswell, wrote a comprehensive and prophetic book, "National Security and Individual Freedom." He warned of the "insidious nnenace" that a continuing crisis might "undermine and eventually destroy free institutions." We would see, he predicted: pressure for defense expendi- tures, expansion and centralization of Government, with- holding of information, general suspicion, an undermining of press and public -opinion, a weakening of political parties, a decline of the Congress, and Of the. courts. Today, with the Cold War waning, it seemsin order to reexamine our institutions, goals and standards. Which 4, responses . to the emergency of yesterday can we justify -' zthiay? n The National Security Act Of 1947 created the Centra) Intelligence Agency and gave it overall responsibility for coordinating the intelligence activities of the several rele- vant government departments and agencies interested in st.wh -matters. Today, a quarter century later, CIA is re- 7 to have a buet of about $700-mill7777.77- . 1.70," aiirL a searf at perhaps 18_000 people, or about 8,000 more than the Department of State! (This n.d- van-i..zzprg in size gives CIA an edge in interdepartmental meetings for which, for example, others may be too rushed fully 'prepare or not be able to assign a suitable person.) Time National Security Act authorized CIA to: (1kr perform for the benefit of the existing intelligence n.c;.encies such additional services of common concern as i;le. National Security Council determines can he wore 'ectivels aco.implished centrally; mm st:eii other functions and duties rehired !,1 4ligence alleci:ing the national seeurit.\,, as ;he Na- mai Security Council ina:;/ from time to time direct.- alics added) S1AT These clauses clearly authorize clandestine intelligence collectionnrit-They are also ed 10 iustifv clandestine po- 6 litical operations. Hawever, overthrowing governments. a secret wars, asSassination, and fixing elections areeeer- 1 tainly not done "for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies" nor are they duties "related to intelligence." Someday a court may rule that poli authorized. r In any case, at the urging a len Ili es, t e. National Security Council issued a secret directive (NSC 10/2) in 1948, authorizing such special operations of all kinds- 10provided they were secret and-small enough to be pausibly deniable by the Government. Even this authority has been exceeded since several im- possible-to-deny operations' have been undertaken: the i( U-2 flight, the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Iranian Coup, the Laotian War, and so on. a The National Security Act gave- the CIA no "police subpoena, law enforcement powers; or internal security, functions . ."'But another secret Tx ment evident) did STAT sngaize In ome.sttc operations related to its job. was under this / ?P4--a uthority that such organizations, as foundations, educa a tional or anizations and private voluntar ?roups were invo ve w ational Student Association revelations (1966). The "white" part of CIA is, in a sense, a cover for the "black" side. CIA supporters and officials invariably em- phasize the intelligence, rather than the inanipulation function of CIA, ignoring the latter or using phrases that gloss over it quietly. The public can easily accept the de sii ability of knowing as much as possible. But its instincts oppose doing abroad what it would not tolerate at home.. And it rightly fears that injustices committed abroad may begin to be tolerated at home: how many elections can be fixed abroad before we begin to try it here? The .last election showed such a degeneration of traditional Ameri- can standards. The. present Director of Central Intelligence, _Richard Helms, is working hard and effectively at presenting an image of CIA that will not offend. In a recent speech, he mid: I) 14, at tit- time o "The same objectivity which makes us useful to our government and our country leaves us uncomfortably aware of our ambiguous place in it. ? . We propose tc adapt intelligence to American society, not vice versa.' Even construed narrowly, this is no easy job, and adapt- ing clandestine political operations to American ideals may well be quite impossible. At the time of the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy eavt: serious consideration to breaking CIA into: two ieces: (111-7717.777M, conduct ooerations and the other woulc just collect intelligence. The dangers weie only too evident. to Kennedy of letting operations be condue:ed bv those who were accumulating the information. Allen Dulles in- sisted ori a united operation, arguing that separation wank be inefficient and disruptive. But there are ninny argu-? frents en both sides and the issue deserta s tiontinuina consideration. In particular, there is something to he said for cleeidinp now not to let Mr. Helms be succeeded by .mother Dep- uty Director for Plans (i.e. clandestine oper,nions). This CIAv,ns u ldi,coe itself eisnryliisne tend inqituti,-)nali,i, ill,- notion that h,l,;the ore:mnizers o. activities - rather than thos.e wh hm t;:ehnical intelli,r,k-:e Indeed, tl-?,7re is much to be said for a tradition at b omit- (C7,717 rel.XT RTE Approved For Release 2005/05/20 : CIA-RDP751300380R000300020001-0 Approved For Release 2005/05/20 : CIA-RDP75600380R000300020001-0 '013 I12..ITELLIGE1;CE CC-MOM: TIME FOR RIVIEW7 cl.;101315.10 sidees to manage CIA. ? The unprecedented secrecy concerning CIA's budget - also deserve re-examination. It is being argued, in a citi- STATsuit, that it is unconstitutional to hide the appro ria- tions -ok' CIA in the budgets of ?trier -e, iartments because ? ? ? ? ? e ection 9, Clause I. Approved For Release 2005/05/20 : CIA-RDP75600380R000300020001-0 tritterIttfiLlatiltirital CCVIIPT17.Z7: literature really shows only one other.triumoh in penetrat- ing !Soviet secrecy with spies:. the obtaining of a copy of the secret speech by Khrushehey dipoimeing Stalin. Bet this speech was being widely circulated to cadre and Eastern European sources. tajjen Dulles, on television, called. this "one of the Main coops of the time I was [at CIAl.? Compared to the Soviet Union, the ondenleveloneet world looks easy to penetrate and manipulate. The Gov- ernments ace relatively unstable and the societies pro- vide more scope for agents and their maneuvers. While the underdeveloped world leads itself better to clandestine operations, these operations are much harder to instify. We are not at war?usually, not even at cold wnr--- wich the countries in the underdeveloped would. And they rarely if ever rose a direct threat to us. whether or not they trade or otherwise consort with Communists. Today. fewer and fewer Americans see the entire world as '2, _struggle between the forces of dark and light?a struegle in which we must influence every corner of the globe. In tacit agreement with this, CIA Director l-lelms re- cently said: ."America's intelligence assets (Sic), however, do not exist solely because of the Soviet and Chinese threat, or against the contingency of a new global conflict. The United- States, as a world power; either, is involved or may with little warning find itself involved iT, a wide range and variety of problems which require a broad and detailed base of foreign intelligence for the policy makers." . . Thus, where the Office of. Strategic Services (OSS) of World .War II was justified by a hot war, and the CIA by a cold war, the present justification for intelligence activi- ties in the underdeveloped world springs ever more only from America's role as a "great power." Cr Moreover, the word "assets" above is significant.. If in- formation were all that were k. A issue, a strong ease could be made for getting needed information when you need it, through open sources, embassies and reconnaissance. But if clandestine political manipulation is at issue, then one requires . long-standing penetration of institutions of all kinds .-and a great deal of otherwise unimportant infor- mation necessary to plan and hide local maneuvers. Political Control of Agents in the Field '1- Because political operations are so sensitive and, po- tentially so explosive, it is imperative that the agents be under strict control. But is this really possible? To each foreign movement of one kind or another?no matter how distasteful CIA will assign various operatives, if only to get imormation. In the process, these operatives must ingratiate themselves with the movernent. And since they are operating in a context in which subtle signals are the rule, it is inevitable that they will often signal the move- ment that the United States likes it, or might support it. r Indeed, the agents themselves may think they are tior- STNTetly interpreting U.S. policy?or what they think should be?in delicate maneuvers which they contro lilt-What, for example, did it mean when CIA agents Cambodian plotters that they would do "everything possi- ble" to help if a coup were mounted. (See Isimladensnia 7itintirer, April 6, 197'2, "CIA iFtielit, -fare.d. in Sihanouk G4.nit,a.e.") li No one who has ever tried to control a hereeticriteti will .he insensitive to the pr,-;.73c-rris to which these t1-,'?as - give 1?;"fl. '-:. hcse pi(obleros wolAd ITt.,: ril-a7.:;ati,:aNy 6irninished, hot--,z1zer, if CIA i?ii:.:T? tCStriCtZ"1 to j;-0%),Tr-rItjf,' thcring and ,,,re. 1-4-,own to tri... Ille novr:F.:,,s wrazi41 then cease to look to CIA for peliey signals. Alternative ll/rills tc41 CIA ? What alternative positions might be considered toward CIA involvement abroad? There are these alternative pos. sq)iEties: I. Prohibi: CIA overatioas and ocents fro.,;4 ''--' reir!er- r$,!.,4oped wor(d: This would 1,v, .t,,e ativaotsit ei nos- r,443i'EN7S LIKE FREEDOM OF ACTION after thewar of his negotiations for the sur- of the Gergnan forces in North Italy, Dulles cautiously sogentsted: "An intelligence officer in the field is supposed to keep his home office informed he doing. That is quite tree, but with s,aine reserentiiins, as he may overdo it. if, for es:nripie. Oij tno morn or asks too often for instructions, he is likely to get some he doesn't reiista, and is he may well find headquarters trying to .4.ike over the whole cornInet :of the operplion, Only a mann on the snot can really pass judgment on the deteils as contrasted with the policy decisions, which, of course, belong to the boss at headquarters." Laites sithled, "It has always amazed me bow desk perst.mtel :I.h,iissa;Tds of wiles away seem to acquire wisdom, and snecial knowledge about local field conditions which im assume goes deeper than that available to the mini on the snot." Mt-nest withoot exception, Milks ?7,14 other OSS onerators feared the burden of a nigh- level decision that might cramp their freedom of isetion. --1?. Harris Smith. OSS The Secret History of A n7er- ka's First Central Intelligence Agency, University of Colifo7wia Press, 1972, pg. 9. st, tecting America's reputation?and that of its citizens doing lonsiness there?from the constant miasma of suspicion of CIA involvement in the internal, affairs of other coun- tries. Open sources would continue to supply the U.S. with gIn'is of its intelligence. Furthtir intelligence in the under- developed world could be collected by State Department officials through embassies. This policy would enforce the now-questionable supremacy of the State Department in dealing with the Nations involved. Arguments against this policy include these: the area is too important to U.S. interests to permit such with- drawal and the credibility of the withdrawal would be bard to establish, at least in the short run. 2. Permit covert activities, in the underdevelo ,ed world only for in ormattaiL not ninniputation:This policy would -prevent the fixing of elections, the purchase of legislators, ? private wars, the overthrow of governments, and it would go a long way toward protecting the U.S. reputation...for non-interference in the affairs of other countries.10ne might, for example, adopt the rule suggested by Harry Howe Ransom that secret political operations could he used only as an alternative to overt military action in a situation that presented a direct threat to U.S. security. Of course, the mere existence of a covert capability for espionage would leave the U.S. with a capability for manipulation; the same agents that are secretly providing iriformation could secretly try to influence events. But theta: is still a large gap between buying "assets" for one purpose end for the other. Also, large scale operations would not be conducted rider this rule. According to some reports. the committee, enaired b General MaXiN V Bay of Pigs CeiSO e, recommended to President Kennedy (wito atmarently agreed) that the CIA be limited to opera- Hors retyirinik military equipment no larger -6r more than side arms.--weapons wnich eouldThe earned seitne i.ont relevant rewesentatives of Ccngress he .7f.;,;N:7l7[:?d ti;r:jor- any clandestine operations beyond Mose - refit ti.;,..ed fir- Llteffigence collection, are unaertaken: It is eit disoutc, between the Executive and whether and when the Executive Branch ioty tinderioke operations affecting U.S. Encino polie %yid-nod consulting Consiress. 11 a clanc!,?:stint political operation is important enough to take the aleseys high risks of exposure, it should be important enoula :-70i1S1.11t These consultations can procii!ce a r1,::w pct.- on the pro!)lcm---which can be all important. The (COI-3=i= -x11.1. PAGE) Approved For Release 2005/05/20 : CIA-RDP75600380R000300020001-0 Approved For Release 2005/05/20 : CIA-RDP75600380R000300020001-0 IIITELLIGET2 CCAFIZTUITY t TINA FOR PiEV.I.1 ChailitrAil of the Senate Foreign Relations-Coramittee was one -oZ the few who predicted accurately the political 'chin- aequences of the Bay of Pigs operation. STAT 4. Require that the ambassador be advised of covert operations in the nation to which he is accredited. Monito )IZO/lCr! with Congressional g t : Under the Ken- nedy Administration, after the Bay of Pigs, a .lettcr went to all embassies affirming the authority of the Ambassador over the representatives of C.I.A. But this authority is variously interpreted and might be periodically clarified and strengthened. One method of policing the order would litteolve occasional visits by Congressmen or Congressional staff who would quiz the Ambassador to be sure that he lattenv at least as much as did they about local covect activities. Another control would require that Assistant Secretaries of State knew about the covert activities in their region. in these cases, political oversight and political . perspective would be injected into operations that would -otherwise be largely controlled by an intelligence point of view. CIA BECOMINC-i A BURDEN? While the institutional forms of political carol ppear effective and sufficient, it is really the vtA of the political oCkials who trust exert control that is imoortant and that has most often been lacking. Even vrlien the control is tight and effective, a orore iniaortant ettlestion may concern the extent to v+ttich CIA information and policy judgments affect political decisions in foreign affairs. ? Whether or not political control is being exercised. the more serious question is whether the very t xist- enee of an efficient CIA causes the U.S. Goverrnnent to rely too much on clandestine and illicit aetivities, I-sack-alley tactics, subversion and what is 'known in official jargon as "dirty tricks." Finally regardless of the facts, the CIA's reputation in the world is so horrendous and its role in events so exaggerated that it is becoming a burden on Amer- ican foreign policy rather than the secret weapon it was intended to be. .0- The New York Times, April 25, 1966 Improper Use of Force STATone morally and politically important imperative seem clear: Ado it and announce a rrn 1 ainst murder o ,-ture. There are repeated and persistent reports that this tette do-es not exist. There was the murder by a green becet. There. is the Phoenix program irivolving widespread assas- sination of "Vietcong agents"?many of which, it is re- ported, were simply the victims of internal Vietnamese rivalries. Some years ago, the New York Times quoted one of the best informed men in Washington as having asserted that "when we catch one of them [an enemy agent, it becomes necessary "to get everything out of them and we dolt with no holds barred." - ? There is also this disturbing quotation from Victor Marchetti, formerly executive assistant tO the Deputy Director of CIA: "The director would come back from the White HOuse and shake his head and say 'The President is very, very upset about .____?__. We agreed that the only solution was _____ But of course that's impossible, we can't be responsible for a thing like that.' 'The second man would say the same thing to the third man, and on down through the station chief in some country until somebody went out and and nobody was responsible." (Parade Magazine, "Quitting the CIA," by Henry Anent) ? ? . Problems oil Clandestine Domestic Operations After the 1966 revelations that the Central Intelligence Agency had been financing the National Student Associa- tion, a variety of front organizations and conduits were unravelled which totaled about 250. The CIA gave its money directly to foundations which, in turn, passed the secret funds along to specific CIA-approved groups, organ- izations and study projects. These, in turn, often supported haliteiduals. The organizations included National Educa- tion Association, African-American Institute, American Newspaper Guild, International Development Foundation, and many others. . II The way in which these organizations were controlled was subtle and sophisticated in a fashion -apparently char- acteristic of many clandestine CIA operations. Thus, -,/7!i1e distinguished participants' in the Congress for Cul- tural Freedom and editors of its IllliaZine. EnCOWder, eVi- 6:.ntly believed that i. e organizations were doing only la what came naturally,' he CIA official who set the entire covert program in motion, Thomas W. Braden, saw it this way: ' "We had placed one agent in a Eurepe4:eiseti orenniz.a- tion of intellectuals called die Congress for Cumiral Freedom. Another Agent became an editor of En- counter. The agents could not only propose vei.l.-tit.eil- -tiltiniat terogiares to the official leaders of theeren:...ne dons- but they could also suattest ways and t.':'9,,?: iff solve the inevitable budgeter) otottlems. ? ii. the needed money could be oefained ftten oundations"? (Saturday Evening Post 5 / 20 1967 Speaking Out, page 2) President Johnson appointed a panel beaded by then Undersecretary of State Nicholas deB. Katzentkiitth to review this aspect of CIA operations. The other panel member; were HEW Secretary John Gardner (a former OSS employee) and CIA Director Helms. The panel was to study the relationship between CIA and those "educa- tional and private voluntary organizations" which operate abroad and to recommend means to help assure that such organizations could "play .their proper and vital role." The Panel recommendations were as follows: 1. It should be the policy of the United States Govern- went that no Federal Rn_dileV shall orovik any awert financial assistance or support direct or indirect 40 am' of the nation's educational or private voluntary ctivanizations. The (12vernment reromody develop and estab- lish 2 ritiblie-private mechanism to a I les pnly for overseas activities or organizations which are a analzed deseninte in ti national interestLpublic supports t f On March 29, 1967, President Johnson 'said he ac- cepted point 1 and directed all Government agencies to implement it fulley: He said he would give "serious con- sideration' to fi'oint77-lauTapparently never i.mplemeni) When these operations were first proposed by Braden, Allen Dulles had commented favorably on them, noting: . "There is no doubt in my mind that we are losing the cold wan" Twenty years later, though we are no longer in any risk of "losing the cold war," some would like to continue despite the regulations. At least:one influential former CIA official's thinking was simply to move to deeper cover. And sympathy for filIS approach probably goes very deeply into the so-called "Establishment." For example, when the National Student Association scandal broke, those who ran the liberal, now defunct, Look Magazine, were so incensed at general ex- pressions of outrage that they wrote their first editorial in thloty yeant(1) defending the students. In such an annos- phare one must expect liberal (much less conservative) fonedations and banks to cooperate whole-heartedly with the CIA whatever the cover. Tat any case, what could such deeper cover be? in the commercial establishments or profit-inakimi, ciezen;z[nons are eaempt from the ban. 'Hence, stoth or taitlithit the acquiescence of the officials. of the corp-any tetents might be placed in strategic positions. It also that orE,anizations which seemed to he volun- -nn-n netua.11y incerpitrated in such a way as to lac eroate?tahlog. Other tto7,tiltilities include enrichitietmdi %,"ICAT MT.? rtrt= ? ) Approved For Release 2005/05/20 : CIA-RDP75600380R000300020001-0 STAT Approved For Release 2005/05/20 : CIA-RDP75600380R000300020001-0 THE INTELLIGENC.E COTCWITY ; TIME ?CH REVIEW? viduals he throwing business their way anti having thest CIA CHANGING PERSONALITY? individuals support suitable philtinthropic enterprises. There are still sensitive. nrop?ressil?T men in thu To the extent that these arrangements touch voluntart . but they arc becoming scarcer .hy the moment. The organiiiiiitions. they pose the sante problems which CICatec AgenosIs career trainees no longer come f-orn the Phi the distress in 1966. In short, the policy approved by brei- Beta ranks of Ilarrvat?cl, -Vale, or Berkeltn. The dent Johnson was sensible when it proscribed "direct 01 Agency is widely regarded on cnilege campuses as the principal si,?mbol of all that is svrnrrn with our nation. "For the world as a w'hole," wrote Arnold Toynbee recently, "the CIA hes 1114),,V Fecotne the bogey that communism has been for America. \\ her-. ever there is trouble, violence, suffering, tragely, the rest of us are now quick to stisoect lhc Cl. has a hand in it." Millions of college stmlents ant! )()Iom professionals, the future "powet? elite" oF the United States, would accept that judgment. ? R. Harris Smith, OSS The Secret History of Amer- ica's First Central Intelligence Agency,. University of California Press, 1972, pg. 382. indirect'' support. Moreover, in the coining generation, we can expect a continuation or the existing trend toward whistle-blowing. The CIA's reputation and its ability to keep secrets can he expected to decline. Even the most "indirect" support may eventually become known. All of these deep cover arrangements are made much easier by the intelligence community's so-called "alumni association." These are persons who are known to the community through past service and who are willing to turn a quiet hand or give a confidential favor. Sometimes, much more is involved. Examples from the past include these. A high official of CIA's predecessor?the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)?becomes head of the CIA- financed National Committee for a Free Europe. Another becomes an official of the CIA-funded American Friends of the Middle East. A Deputy Director of State Depart- ment Intelligence becomes President of Operations and Policy Research,. Inc., a CIA conduit which financed "studies" of Latin American electoral. processes. (This official is simultaneously well placed to arrange studies of elections as the Director of the American Political SLience Association!). ? Thus, a large and growing domestic network of persons trained in dissembling, distortion, and human manipula- tion, may be growing in our country. And the use of these kinds of skills may also be growing more acceptable. During the Republican campaign for President, a memo- randum went out to Republican college organizers which urged them to arrange a mock election and gave what ?seemed to be pointed hints about how to manipulate the 'election. . This kind of thing produces a suspicion and paranoia that divides Americans from one another. It makes them ask questions about their associates, colleagues, secre- taries and acquaintances?questions that arc destructive of the casual and trusting atmosphere traditional in Amer- ica. (Already, unbelievable numbers of persons seem to assume that their phones are tapped and their mail read.) As the public senSe of cold war dissipates, the American distaste for secret organizations can be expected to grow. The occasional disclosure of any "dirty trick" or politica manipulationsponsorsd by CIA will certainly deepen thi \ sense of unease. In the end, as now, many of the best an most sophisticated college graduates will not be willirn to work for the CIA. And professional consultants will be discouraged as well. The result can change the character of the Agency in such a way as to further threaten Ameri- can values. in contrast to CIA's reputation for competent nurmalk One method, in the American tradition, for kcepinn CIA disinterested analysis, DlA and the inteiligenne services ...--- honest would be s?uhl' -.I crest or-acaliSLaLlialumili.c Pose real questions of redundancy, waste sc.iivice bia,. of the intelligence community (and those who areserviccc Zap1 hanialeja, it Both of the Appropriations Committees of Congress by intellinance in the Government). This ptiblic interest . ' tc are convinced that there is such waste in Defense De- partment Intelligence. In 1971, the House Committee reported: The committee feels that the inteiligence one:ration of the Department or Defense hits grown I.:evonti the actual needs of the Department and is 110W reccit. ing an in- ordinate share of the fiscal resources of the Department. R o edundancy is the watchwrd in many intelagenee op- erations. The sante information is sought and obtained by various means and by various ornanirations. Co- nralination is iss:s effective than it should be. Far more sel?nriar is collected than is essientini. Mane iii; is col !ected which sannot be evaluated iti a reason d?0lenath of titre and is therefore wasted. NOV ;PtCl!`,!vg c means have become available and 'have. been ireorporated into the program without c t offsetting reduti. ins i?? old Procedures. In July, 1979. the I'Liiij Chair,;,1,1 of th,:. In any case, as the distaste for CIA grows, CIA has ? moral obli atio os ? not wish to be tarnished by association with it. country, it is reported, CIA ut fur ' ba.tiLaithZa knowledge:. But what tf-Thir Were c iscovere ? vious.y, .A cot ?nlitly risk the reputations of persons it wanted to use, or manipulate. by trying to help them secretly.. TWO SOURCES OF POSSIBLE WASTE Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA): . The Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence agencies:. provided such parochial and biased intelligence estimates in the late fifties that they were removed in 196l from the United States Intelligence Board (US) and replaced by a new supervisory organization; the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). DIA's job was to coordinate all of the Defense Department's intelligence'resoureea and analyses. Allen Dulles had feared that CIA and DIA might become ; rivals and competitors; apparently_ this. has become the case. By 1964, DIA had: merged the intelligence publica- tions of the armed services into publications of its own: launched a "Daily Digest" that competed with the CIA's -Central Intelligence Bulletin:" supplanted J-2, the in- telligence staff of the Joint Chiefs; replaced the services in providing "order of battle" information and had bas- ically reduced the services to the role of collecting raw intelligence. A number of informed observers have neverthelesi suggested that DIA serves no useful purpose and that its functions could well be taken over by CIA. Others. \vitt Pentagon experience, have noted that there is no way te prevent the military services from having intelligence branches and?that being the case--DIA is necessary tc sit on them and coordinate their conclusions. In any case. STAT group would, as do so ninny others, offer its testunon Congress on matters of interest to it?in this case, inn:l- inter-ten. "lhc testimony might be given in public or in exca- itive session, as appropriate. And constructive suggestions ,111,1 Critijtinh could be made. Such an organization would have a credibility and au. thority that no other group can have and a general knowl- ctine of the relevant intelligence problems facing. the nation and public. It goes without saying that no one in thi.. one...mit:ore-in, or eommuniciiting with it. would viol:::, oaths, associated with information. 1 1:cfier.ttioli of American Scientists' strategic weapons coin iniricc is art example if the feasibility and lcnitirman In, a Melt a group of persons, well grounded hi strati teaie arms problcirK can. without violating aa v rules con - ectaimi soch information, make informed end usitral oriaioinaseinents. Niany persons !h:: iencsiensr enitocsed :his sintaantioa. 1, Rit,1,0,1 Approved For Release 2005/05/20 : CIA-RDP75600380R000300020001-0 TAT STAT Approved For Release 2005/05/20 : CIA-RDP75600380R000300020001-0 iCi'CC.VitNIJNITT TINE FOR EWEN'? MR. SYMINGTON% As a iongfant member of the Cominitice On Foreign Rehitions, as an ad hoc mem bier of the Appropriations Committee and the tank- ing Member of Armed Services, I respectfully plead -with ray coiintg0VS to :Mow me to receive in executive session enougn inteiligence info:mation to in torn form an intelligent judgment oti matters which so viially affeci'. oar security; nod so I can vote in com- mittee and on the iloor a; the Senate on the basis of the facts. There have been several cases tchere / hove not been able to do that in the past. In my opinion, this lad( oi disseminated information has cosi the country a great deal oii treasure and a num- ber of American lives. ? . . ---,- from Congressional Record-Sena . November 23,1971, S-I95 Report on Defense Department problems Gilbert Fi huida. told a press conference: "I believe that the Pentae suffers from to much intelligence. Thee can't use wh hey get because there is so much collected. It wot almost be better that they didn't have it because i difficult to find out what's important." Ile went on suggest diffusion of responsibility, too much detail wor and too little looking ahead in the live-to-fifteen ye range. ? National Security Agency (NSA): In 1952, a Presidential directive set up the Nation Security Agency as a?separate agency inside the Defen Department. NSA's ,basic duties are to break codes other Nations, to maintain the security of U.S. codes, at to perform intelligence functions with regard to electron and radar emissions, etc. In I956,?it had 9,000 employee .Today, it is thought to-have 15,000 and a budget well oy rbillion. ? i, In August 1972; an apparently well-informed form mployee of NSA wrote a long memoir for Rampar agazine. The article summarized the author's. Clain y saying: , ". . . NSA knows the call signs of every Soviet?airplan the numbers on the side of each-plane, the name of tl - pilot in commana..the precise longitude arid-latitude t every nuclear submarine; . the.. whereabouts of near( every Soviet VIP; the location of every Soviet missi base: every army division, battalion and companv?i ? weaponry, commander and deployment. Routinely th NSA monitors all Soviet military, diplomatic and con . mercial radio traffic, including Soviet Air Defense, Tat tical Air, and KGB forces. (It was. the NSA that foun Che Guevara in Bolivia through radio communication intercept and analysis.) NSA cryptologie experts sec to break every Soviet code and do so with remarkabl success. Soviet scrambler and computer-generated sig nals being nearly as vulnerable as ordinary ?voice ant manual morse radio transmissions. Interception, o Soviet radar signals enables the NSA to guage quite pre eisery the effectiveness of Soviet Air Defense units Methods have been devised to "fingerprint" ever human voice used in radio transmissions and?distinguis them from the voice of every other operator. Th AL!eliCy'S Electronic Intelligence Teams (ELINT) ar capable of intercepting any electronic signal transmitter anywhere in the world and; from an analysis of th intercepted signal, identify the transmitter and phss notify reconstruct it. Finally, after having shown int size and sensitivity of the Agency's big ears, It-isnimos sunerfitious to noint out that NSA monitors and records every trans-Atlantic telephone call." A July 16, New York Times report noted that "ex- nsive independent checking in Washington with sources and out of Government who were familiar with in- lligence matters has resulted in the corroboration of anV of ;the article's] revelations." Exports had dewed wever. the plausibility of the assertion that the st.,Phisti- red codes of the Soviet Union had been broken. El CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF THE te in te in ho ea INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY In each I louse of Congress, the Armed Services and the Appropriations Committees have a subcommittee that is supposed. in principle, to oversee CIA. In the !louse of Repeesenteti yes, even the names of the Appropriations subcommittec members are secret. hi the Senate, ;he five senior members of the Aopropliations Coninnoce form a WHAT DRIVES INTELLIGENCE? We are going to have-to take a harder look at intel- ligence requirements, because they drive the intelli- gence process. In so doing they create demands for resources. There is a- tendency for requirements?. once stated?to acooire immortality. One requirements question we will ask ourselves is whether we should maintain a world-wide dnta base. collected in advance, as insurance against the con- tingency that we may Med Some of this data :in a par- ticular situation. Nitwit of this information can lie acquired on very short notice by reconnaissance means. As for the remainder, we are going to have to accept the risk of not having complete information on some parts of the world. We haven't enough re- sources to cover everything, and the high priority missions hate first call on what we do have, -- Hon. Robert F. Froehlke. Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, June 0, 1971 before Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. House of Representative,s, subcommittee on Intelligence Operations. The subcornmitee of Armed Services on CIA has, not met for at least two years?although Senator Symington, a member of the subcommittee, has sought to secure such a meeting. In '1971, Senator Stennis and Senator Ellen- der?then the Chairmen of the full Armed Ser?-tices ancl Appropriations Committees (as well as of their CIA sub- committees) said they knew nothing about The I -. financed war in Laos?surely CIA's biggest operation.! (Congressional Record, November 23, 1971, pg. S19521- S19530.) The Congressmen are understandably reluctant even 0 know about intelligence operations, Without publicity, ind public support, there is a limit to their influence over 'he events about which they hear. And if they cannot appeal to their constituency, the knowledge of secrets only makes them vulnerable to the smear that they leaked a secret or mishandled their responsibilities. Approximately 150 -resolutions haNie been offered in the Congress to control' th&-CIA and/or other intelligence functions. The most common resolution has called far a Joint Committee on Intelligence, and there is much to be said for it. Such a renewal of Congressional authority to review such matters might strengthen Congressional o sight. Two more recent effnrts hi-oh , --------- s ? C Stuart Symington have tried different tac4.-.)ne resolu- tion called for a Select Committee on the Co7)Fdination of U. overnment activities aoroa :_ sue a committee would have authority over CIA and DOD foreign activities tr'il=cular. Another aPProach called for firnitine att. U.S " telli ence exiomditures of all kinds to $4 billion. Senator 1' ord ase (Rey.; N. .) has soug t to cont ol the CIA by offerin resolutions that simply appl i o " n %genes' o t e U.S. Government. cse resolutions em- body existing restraints on DOD which CIA was circum- venting: e.g., he sought to prevent expenditure of funds for training Cambodian military forces. In short, Senator Case is emphasizing the fact that CIA is a statutorily de- signed agency. which Congress empowered, and which Congress can control. _. . . ?tigress las not only given the Executive branch a blank check to do intelligence but it has not even insisted on seeing the results. The National Security Act of 1947 requires CIA to "correlate and evaluate intelligence relat- ing to the national security and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the ,*)vern- mem . . ." (italics added). As far as the legislative branch of "gosernment" is concerned, this has not been done. "*--On July 17, 1972, the Foreign Relations Comrnittee re- 1 ' ported out art amendment (S. 2224) to the National Se- curity Act explicitly requirim2 the CIA to "inform fully and currently, by means of regular and soCCial .tt.! orts the Committees on Iiorto n Relations and Arno. 'se:sit:es 1 - of both Houses .tnd to make special reports in rcsponst. ? to their requests: The Committee proposal, sponsored by Senator JOhn Sherman Cooper, put special emplEnis upon the existing precedent whereby the Joint Atomic Energy Committee gets special reports from DOD on atomic l.i-`?!" mtelligenee mtormation. rei Approved.For Release 2005/05/20 : CIA-RDP75600380R000300020001-0