INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE NARCOTICS PROBLEM HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY SECOND CONGRESS FIRST SESSION JULY 7, 8, 9, AND 30, 1971

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00380R000300070003-3
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• Document Page Count: 227
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 18, 2005
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: July 30, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE
NARCOTICS PROBLEM
HEARINGS
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1971
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402- Price $1.00
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
THOMAS E. MORGAN, Pennsylvania, Chairman
CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, Wisconsin WILLIAM S. MAILLIARD, California
WAYNE L. HAYS, Ohio PETER H. B. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey
L. H. FOUNTAIN, North Carolina WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD, Michigan
DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida J. IRVING WBALLEY, Pennsylvania
CHARLES C. DIGGS, JR., Michigan H. R. GROSS, ;[owa
CORNELIUS E. GALLAGHER, New Jersey EDWARD J. DERWINSKI, Illinois
ROBERT N. C. NIX, Pennsylvania F. BRADFORD MORSE, Massachusetts
JOHN S. MONAGAN, Connecticut VERNON W. THOMSON, Wisconsin
DONALD M. FRASER, Minnesota JAMES G. FULTON, Pennsylvania
BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, New York PAUL FINDLEY, Illinois
JOHN C. CULVER, Iowa JOHN BUCHANAN, Alabama
LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana SHERMAN P. LLOYD, Utah
ABRAHAM KAZEN, JR., Texas J. HERBERT BURKE, Florida
LESTER L. WOLFF, New York SEYMOUR HALPERN, New York
JONATHAN B, BINGHAM, New York GUY VANDER JAGT, Michigan
GUS YATRON, Pennsylvania ROBERT H. STEELE, Connecticut
ROY A. TAYLOR , North Carolina. PIERRE S. ptt PONT, Delaware
JOHN W. DAVIS, Geoigla
MORGAN F. MURPHY, Illinois
RONALD V. DELLUMS, California
ROY J. BULLOCK, Staff Administrator
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE
BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, New York, Chairman
WAYNEL. HAYS, Ohio PETER H. B. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey
CORNELIUS E. GALLAGHER, New Jersey JAMES G. FULTON, Pennsylvania
JOHN S. MONAGAN, Connecticut PAUL FINDLEY, Illinois
LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana J. HERBERT BURKE, Florida
GUS YATRON, Pennsylvania JOHN BUCHANAN, Alabama
ROY A. TAYLOR, North Carolina SHERMAN P. LLOYD, Utah
MORGAN F. MURPHY, Illinois GUY VANDER JAGT, Michigan
JOHN J. BRADY. Jr., Staff Consultant
CLIFFORD P. IIACKETT, Subcommittee Staff Consultant
DORA B. MCCRACKEN, Staff Assistant
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CONTENTS1
LIST OF WITNESSES
Wednesday, July 7, 1971: page
Minish, Hon. Joseph G., a Representative in Congress from the State 48
of New Jersey------------ ------------------- 19
Murphy, Hon. Morgan F., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Illinois ---_--__ 19
Rangel, Han. Charles B., a Representative in Congress from the State
of New York -------------------------------------------------- 2
Rodino, Han. Peter W., a Representative in Congress from the State
of New Jersey------------------------------------------------- 24
Steele, Hon. Robert H., a Representative in Congress from the State
of Connecticut-------------------------------------------------
Thursday, July 8, 1971 :
Hughes, Hon. John H., New York State senator, chairman, New York
State Joint Legislative Committee on Crime, Its Causes, Control, 83
and Effect on Society____________________ -----------
McKenna, Jeremiah B., Assistant Counsel, New York State Joint Leg-
islative Committee on Crime, Its Causes, Control, and Effect on 98
Society ------- ---------------------- 51
Scheuer, Han. James H., a Representative in Congress from the State
of New York----------------------------------------------------
Staats, Hon. Elmer B., Comptroller of the United States------------- 114
Tartaglino, Andrew C., Assistant Director for Enforcement, U.S.
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Department of Justice__ 66
Wellman, Harvey R., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
for Narcotics Matters------------------------------------------- 69
Friday, July 9, 1971:
Davies, Rodger P., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near
Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State ------------ 154
Green, Hon. Marshall, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and 148
Pacific Affairs------------ --
Hillenbrand, Hon. Martin J., Assistant Secretary of State for European 151
Affairs --------------------------------------------------------
Rossides, Han. Eugene T., Assistant Secretary of Treasury (Enforce-
---------------------------------------------
ment/Operations) ------- 127
July 30, 1971:
Biaggi, IIon. Mario, a Representative in Congress from the State of 184
New York ----------------------------------- -
Roush, Hon. J. Edward, a Representative In Congress from the State 169
of Indiana----------------------------- -----------------------
Sisk, IIon. B. F., a Representative In Congress from the State of
California ----------------------------------------------------- 167
MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Narcotics fact sheet, submitted by Hon. Peter W. Rodino---------------- 4
"GI's in Vietnam Say Test for Heroin Addiction Can Be Beaten," Article
from the New York Times. June 2-i. 1971, by Ivor Peterson------------ 30
Economic assistance commitments for selected countries, fiscal year 1971
(estimates) and fiscal year 1972 (proposed), two tables submitted by 37
Hon. Charles B. Rangel----------------------------------------------
USIS report of press conference of Ambassador Carl W. A. $churmann
on June 18, 1971 at Geneva, Switzerland, entitled "U.N. Fu:1d Against
Drug Abuse Plans Global Action to Meet :Menace"-------------------- 57
1 An index to these hearings appears on p. 221.
'III)
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Table on narcotics arrests in Bedford-Stuyvesant section of New York Page
City from 1960-70 -------------------------------------------------- 84
Statement prepared by the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs on
its enforcement efforts ----------------------------------------------- 89
Drug use in New York State, chart showing estimate of ----------------- 91
Causes of death in New York City (ages 15 to 35), 1960 ------------------ 93
Heroin deaths in New York City, 1950-69 ------------------------------- 94
New agencies of New York State government created to reduce Crime,
1959-70 ------------------------------------------------------------95
Narcotics control expenditures by New York State, 1963-72---------------96
Narcotics arrests in Bedford-Stuyvesant section of New York City,
1963-70 ------------------------------------------------------------- 99
Violent deaths in Bedford-Stuyvesant section of New York City, 1959-69__ 102
Narcotics law changes, 19:i1-69----------------------------------------- 110
Opium and the poppy plant, background on ----------------------------- 111
Concurrent Resolution No. 141 of the New York State Legislature, passed
on May 13, 1971, Albany, N.Y------------------------------------------ 112
General Accounting Office staff paper-"Observations and Data Concern-
ing Illegal Entry of Narcotics," May 21, 1971--------------------------- 118
Drug seizures by fiscal year, 1969-71, chart by Bureau of Customs, Depart-
ment of theTreasury ------------------------------------------------ 137
STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Baring, Hon. Walter S., a Representative in Congress from the State of
Nevada ------------------------------------------------------------- 191
Begich, Hon. Nick, a Representative in Congress from the State of Alaska_._ 191
Carney, Hon. Charles J., a Representative in Congress from the State of
Ohio --------------------------------------------------------------- 193
Collier, Hon. Harold R., a Representative in Congress from the State of
Illinois ------------------------------------------------------------- 194
Delaney, Hon. James J., a Representative in Congress from the State of
New York---------------------------------------------------------- 195
Derwinski, Hon. Edward J., a Representative in Congress from the State of
Illinois--------------------------------------------------------------- 197
Eilberg, Hon. Joshua, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Pennsylvania --------------------------.----------------------------. 197
Fascell, Hon. Dante B., a Representative in Congress from the State of
Florida -------------------------------------------------------------- 199
Forsythe, Hon. Edwin B., a Representative in Congress from the State of
New Jersey---------------------------------------------------------. 199
Gibbons, Hon. Sam M., a Representative in Congress from the State of
Florida _ 200
Horton, Hon. Frank, a Representative in Congress from the State of New
York ---------------------------------------------------------------. 201
Ichord, Hon. Richard, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Missouri ---------------------------------------------------------- 203
Link, Hon. Arthur A., a Representative in Congress from the State of
North Dakota-------------------------------------------------------. 204
Mailliard, Hon. William S., a Representative in Congress from the State of
California ---------------------------------------------------------- 204
Mitchell, Hon. Parren J., a Representative in Congress from the State of
Maryland -------------------------------- -------------------------- 206
Moss, Hon. John E., a Representative in Congress from the State of
California ----------------------------------------------------------- 207
Murphy, Hon. John M., a Representative in Congress from the State of
New York----------------------------------------------------------- 208
Seiberling, Hon. John F., a Representative in Congress from the State of
Ohio ---------------------------------------------------------------- 209
APPENDIX
Letter from the Deputy Attorney General concerning policies and admin-
istration of the U.S. attorney's offices in New York State as they affect
the Federal narcotic and dangerous drug laws ------------------------- 215
Bills and resolutions concerning drugs referred to the Committee on
Foreign Affairs------------------------------------------------------- 216
Analysis and summary of bills and resolutions concerning drags ---------- 218
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INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE NARCOTICS
PROBLEM
WEDNESDAY, JULY 7, 1971
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met at 1:30 p.m., in room 2200, Rayburn House
Office Building, Hon. Benjamin S. Rosenthal (chairman of the sub-
committee) presiding.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. The subcommittee will be in session.
The Subcommittee on Europe meets today to begin a series of hear-
ings on the international aspects of the world narcotics problem.
The purpose of these hearings is to analyze in detail the problem
and to consider various legislative proposals which have been referred
to the subcommittee. This legislation-in various designs-seeks to
prohibit the illegal production of, and international trafficking in,
narcotics.
Drug abuse is increasing at home and around the world. Of particu-
lar concern is the rapid rise in the use of opium-based drugs, particu-
larly heroin, in the United States. Adding to this problem is the alarm-
ing increase in heroin addiction within the U.S. military forces in
South Vietnam where the best estimates show that as many as 25,000
to 40,000 U.S. servicemen are addicted to heroin.
The worst part of the problem is that the United States is a victim
country. It produces no opium or heroin, yet it is the principal market
for the illegal producer.
To solve this problem, the United States must have the cooperation
of the opium-producing countries. We cannot correct this situation
ourselves. And the international aspects themselves are but one part of
this exceedingly complex question of drug addiction.
We must be willing to devote more resources, human;.and material,
to fight the illegal international traffic in heroin. Some argue that to do
this we must be willing to exercise economic and political pressure, in-
cluding the imposition of economic sanctions, where necessary to stop
these countries from growing poppies.
Others argue that success can best be achieved through the extension
of economic assistance which would help opium-producing countries
to find suitable alternate crops which will pay the farmer to stop
growing poppies.
Unfortunately, opium is often produced in remote areas that are be-
yond the effective political and administrative control of the govern-
ments concerned. It may be that a cutoff of economic and military
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assistance to these countries would be counterproductive. The subcom-
mittee hopes to be able to find some answers to this perplexing
problem.
Last week we were all heartened to hear that Turkey had agreed
not to produce opium after 1972. This is a significant step in the over-
all battle. to stop the illy gal international traffic in heroin. Prime
Minister Nikat Erim and the Government of Turkey are to be com-
mended for making this decision. Although this decision was a long
time in coming, we welcome it, nonetheless.
But Turkey is not the only source of heroin. An increasing amount
of heroin is being smuggled into the United States from the Far East-
principally from poppies grown in Laos, Thailand, and Burma. We
therefore must look also to those countries for help in solving this
problem.
Our first witness today is my distinguished colleague from New
Jersey, the Honorable Peter W. Rodino. Mr. Rodino ought to be
publicly commended, and is by this Member cf Congress, for his dis-
tinguished record and attention to this problem. Ile has been the lead-
ing Member in the House of Representatives in directing our attention
and our energies to finding an answer, both legislative and otherwise,
to this vexing and growing problem in the United States.
Mr. Rodino, we are pleased to have you with us.
We know you have a statement, and we would be pleased to hear it.
STATEMENT OF HON. PETER W. RODINO, JR., A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Mr. RODINO. Thank you very much,Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I appear before you today to urge immediate con-
sideration of my bill, H.B. 1539, to suspend, in whole or in part, eco-
nomic and military assistance to any country which fails to take appro-
priate steps to prevent narcotic drugs from illegally entering the
United States.
I want to commend you, Mr. Chairman, and members of your com-
mittee, for holding long overdue hearings on this bill and various other
proposals designed to attack the problem of hard drug addiction at
its source-the poppy fields of the Near and Far East.
Before proceeding further, I wish to applaud the recent action of
the Turkish Government in banning all opium production after 1972.
This development is extremely gratifying, and in the President's words,
I hope sincerely that "this step will provide an example which will
soon be followed by other nations."
Since Turkey has been a prime producer of illegal opium and the
major supplier of heroin which is imported into the United States,
the ban, which was announced just one week ago, will undoubtedly
alleviate to some extent the heroin crisis in this country. Despite this
significant achievement, however, I appear today with feelings of
frustration and impatience with the efforts of this country to eradi-
cate the scourge of heroin. After 10 years of high-level negotiations
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Turkey has finally agreed to ban opium production=but only upon
the condition that they will be allowed to harvest their opium crops
in 1971 and 1972.
While I am encouraged by the imposition of this ban, I can feel no
sense of elation or relief. Any feeling of optimism is tempered by the
fact that Turkey has merely reduced to four the number of opium-
producing provinces for the next growing season instead of elimi-
nating them altogether.
To the people of America, this will mean that for two additional
years we will sacrifice five individuals a day, three from New York
City alone, to the heroin plague. In addition, untold thousands of in-
dividuals will become addicted to heroin during this 2-year period.
It is entirely conceivable that, unless Turkey restricts illegal opium
production in 1971 and 1972, the number of addicts in this country
in 1972 may approach one-half million. Therefore, it is necessary for
the United States to insure that the Turkish poppy farmers will not
be permitted to stockpile their opium during ~ this grace period and,
once this ban is completely effectuated, our (;covernment should take
every possible measure to guarantee that opium is not thereafter pro-
duced in Turkey ; and that those other countries which produce illegal
opium do not continue to receive U.S. assistance.
While it has been generally estimated that 80 percent of the heroin
consumed in the United States originated in Turkey, recent reports
indicate an increase in the production, processing, and exportation of
heroin from the Far East. For example, in announcing Turkey's ban
last week, President Nixon stated that presently 60 percent of the
heroin in this country was originally produced in Turley. In. fact,
John E. Ingersoll, the Director of the Bureau of Xarcotics..and Dan-
gerous Drugs, stated before a House Appropriations Subcommittee
that "an estimated 1,300 tons of illegal narcotic's is now.illegally pro-
duced in the Far East each year."
Consequently, although Turkey's ban will decre'ase'the4supply of
heroin in the United States, it will not entirely eliminate the illegal
exportation of hard drugs to this country.
We cannot afford to allow other opium-producing countries to fill
the vacuum created by Turkey in 1972. We must not allow illicit
traffickers to find new opium fields, to set up new routes to the United
States and to continue the exploitation of our young people.
A story which appeared in the New York Times last Friday, July 2,
seriously questioned the impact of Turkey's ban on the U.S. drug prob-
lem. It was stated in this article that Turkey's action does not consti-
tute a "resolution to the problem. but only one attack." The reporter
reached these conclusions after observing that :
Afghanistan, Iran, Burma, and Laos produce opium poppies, that their polic-
ing techniques are less than adequate, and that the United States has little
reason to believe it will be able to work out arrangements in the near future
with these nations as it has with Turkey.
For this reason, I urge enactment of H.R. 1539, which will serve as
an inducement to other countries to follow Turkey's lead in banning
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opium production. It was a long time in coming, but now that Tur-
key's ban has been adopted, we cannot relax. We must strive to give
notice to all opium-producing countries of the world that the United
States will not tolerate the vicious devastation and destruction of
American youths.
None of us, I am sure, need to be reminded of the severity of the
drug epidemic that has engulfed this country. Nor do I feel it is nec-
essary to recite an endless litany of drug abuse statistics to illustrate
the magnitude and scope of this problem. 1 or example, we are all
aware that there are 250,000 heroin addicts in this country ; that these
addicts must steal between $8 and $10 billion worth of property to
support their habit; and that drug overdose is the primary cause of
death for individuals between the ages of 1S and 35 in New York City
alone. These figures have filled the editorial pages of our newspapers
and have saturated the Congressional Record for many- months.
Since I feel that insistent repetition of additional facts will serve
no useful purpose at this time, I would ask that a narcotics factsheet
which I have prepared be included in the hearing record.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(The factsheet referred to follows:)
NARCOTICS FACTSHEET
1. Number of heroin addicts.
Total, United States ------------------------------------------- 250, 000
Selected areas:
New York City------------------------------------------------- 103,000
Washington, D.C-----------------------------------------------
16,880
Chicago, Ill----------------------------------------------------
9,000
State of Connecticut ---------------------------------------------
2. Deaths due to heroin overdoses (1970).
Daily rate (per day) :
Total -----------------------------------------------
2,000
New York City--------------------------------------------------
By area:
3
New York------------------------------------------------------
1,050
Washington, D.C.----------------------------------------------
84
Vietnam (per month) --------------------------------------------
18
3. Opium production (1970) (in tons)
Fotal -----------------------------------------------------------------
1,050-1,200
1,200-1,650
Turkey----------------------------------------- ----------- ------------------
130
100
India
750
175-200
Far East (Burma, Laas, Thailand, -----------
--- --------
1,000-1,300
4. Opium (heroin) imported and consumed in United States.
Total amount imported (tons) :
Legal (opium) -----------------------------------------------------
150
Illegal (heroin)--------------------------------------------------
3-4
Amount of heroin intercepted by Customs' officials (percent)
10-15
Source of illegal heroin in United States :
Percent by country or area :
Turkey ------------------------------------------------------
80
Mexico ------------------------------------------------------
15
Far East Triangle (Laos, Thailand. Burma) --------------------
5
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5. Comparative costs in distributive chain for Turkish raw opium needed to
produce 1 kilo (2.2 pounds) of heroin.
Wholesale price to Turkish Government----------------------------- $165
Wholesale price for same amount on Turkish black market ------------ 350
Wholesale price to smugglers after morphine base derived from equiva-
lent amount of opium has been converter) into 1 kilo of heroin------__ 3, 500
Wholesale price of 1 kilo of heroin in the United States________________ 10. 000
Street price of 1 kilo of heroin in United States (purity of 2.5 percent) __ 400,000
6. Development of retail price of heroin in the United States. 1969 (from the
World Heroin Report-Special Study Mission-House Foreign Affairs
Committee).
U.S. dollars
per kilogram
Price to farmer for opium (in Turkey)___________ _________________________________
,25
Wholesale price for heroin (Marseilles)___________________________________________
5,000
Border price for heroin (New York)_______________________________________________
10,000
Wholesale price for heroin (New York) ----------------------------------------------
22,000
Retail price for heroin (New York) ------------------------------------------------
220,000
U.S. dollars
per kilogram
of raw opium
equivalent
____________ _
$500
1,000
2,200
22,000
Note: When raw opium is converted to morphine and heroin, the volume is reduced by a ratio of 10 to 1.
7. Opium production in Turkey.
Opium producing provinces in Turkey :
1967-68 --------------------------------------------------------
21
1970-71 --------------------------------------------------------
7
1971-72 --------------------------------------------------------
4
1972-73 --------------------------------------------------------
(1)
Farmers engaged in opium production--------------------------------
70,000
1 To be announced on June 30, 1971.
8. Heroin addiction in South Vietnam.
Number of addicted U.S. servicemen in Vietnam---------------- 30,000-40,000
Vietnam veterans-addicts who have returned to United States-------- 50, 000
Daily cost to support average habit:
In Vietnam-----------------------------------------------------
$8
In United States------------------------------------------------
80
Source of heroin (percent) :
Laos -----------------------------------------------------------
50
Burma, Thailand, and Hong Kong--------------------------------
50
9. Cost impact of drug abuse (including cost of property stolen to support
drug habit) $8-$10 billion.
10. Allocation of funds for drug abuse control programs.
FEDERAL FUNDS (ALLOCATED AS FOLLOWS DURING FISCAL YEARS 1969-72)
fin millions of dollars]
Law enforcement---------------------------------------------------
22.3
39.3
48.7
71.9
Treatment and rehabilitation_________________________________________
28.5
38.5
78.5
84.5
Education and training----------------- -----------------------------------------------
2.0
10.0
17.3
19.2
Research and other support ------------------------------------------
15.1
17.3
21.9
22.6
New York State annual expenditures:
Million
Rehabilitation programs________________________ ------------------
$100
Treatment programs----------------------------------------------
so
Public welfare assistance to drug addicts--------------------------
50
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11. Law enforcement statistics.
Federal:
Drug-related arrests (1965) ------------------------------------- 50,000
Drug-related arrests (1969) -------------------------------------- 233,690
Percentage increase for all drug violations (1965-70)------.------ 500
New York City :
Narcotics arrests (1960)---------------------------------.------ 1,841
Narcotics arrests (1969)--------.-------------------------.------ 18,489
Narcotics arrests (1970)----------------------------------.------ 26,799
Percentage increase for felony narcotic arrests (1960-70) --------- 1,355
12. Recent efforts to alleviate heroin problem.
U.S. Bureau of Customs instituted inspection of incoming parcels sent from
South Vietnam. Inspections resulted in 248 narcotic seizures from March 1,
1971 through April 24, 1971. In addition, procedures calling for thorough in-
spection of returning servicemen have been established.
South Vietnamese Government, on April 15, 1971, launched a national cam-
paign to prevent the importation of illegal narcotics from Laos, Thailand
Burma and Hong Kong.
13. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs--seizure statistics) (1970).
United States : Percentage increase
Drug-amount: over isss
Heroin-427 pounds------------------------------------------- 205
Cocaine-197 pounds------------------------------------------ 197
Marihuana-17,402 pounds----------------------------.-------.- 97
Europe and Middle East :
Drug-amount :
Heroin-156 pounds------------------------------------------ -----
Opium-850 pounds --------------------------------------------- -----
Morphine base-858 pounds-----.----------------------------.- -----
Mr. RoDINO. Certainly, most of us are cognizant of the urgency of
the drug crisis. Therefore, it is now imperative that we recognize the
need for immediate and meaningful action by the Congress.
Because I recognized this need early last year, I introduced H.R.
17883, to authorize the President to suspend foreign assistance to any
country which failed to cooperate with the United States in limiting
the exportation of illegal narcotic drugs tot his country. Because of the
severity of this situation and in an effort to obtain immediate consid-
eration of this proposal, I introduced it as a floor amendment to the
foreign assistance appropriations bill on dune 4, 1970, approximately
a year ago today.
However, this amendment was subject to a point of order and after
advising my colleagues that I would not cease my efforts in this area
until strong and effective action was taken by the Congress, I with-
drew it.
Because of my deep concern, T then wrote to the chairman of the
Foreign Affairs Committee on .June 29, 1970, urging hearings on my
proposal. In that letter I stated that :
Narcotic addiction and the crime it produces are among our most serious do-
mestic problems (and) it is imperative that we have the full cooperation of
foreign governments in curbing the illegal production and processing of heroin,
cocaine and morphine. I believe that my proposal would be a significant step in
obtaining that cooperation.
Despite this request and the urgency of the situation, hearings were
not held.
On July 9. 1970, I introduced another bill, H.R. 18397, which. super-
seded H.R. 17883 and added a provision authorizing affirmative as-
1 In addition, BNDD, in cooperation with French authorities, seized 893 pounds of
heroin in 1970.
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sistanee to those countries which cooperate with the United States'
efforts to stem the illegal flow of hard drugs.
In addition to these legislative efforts, I have continuously endeav-
ored to arouse the interest of the President and the State Department
in this matter. I have made numerous personal contacts and have writ-
ten many letters to administration officials respecting the magnitude
of the drug abuse problem in this country. The replies were generally
disinterested and unresponsive.
Mr. ROSENTIIAL. Who was disinterested and who was unresponsive?
Mr. RoDINO. Officials of the State and Justice Departments and the
Executive Office of the President. In their responses-both in written
replies and oral conversations-they did not directly address them-
selves to the action I proposed, which was to utilize continuing efforts
by the State Department and other diplomatic channels. The atten-
tion and support of individuals in the administration generally was
not forthcoming.
Mr. Chairman, it is only today that this hearing is being held under
your direction by the House Foreign Affairs Committee. I am pleased
with this, but I feel that this kind of action might have been taken a
year ago and many more lives might have been saved and less people
might have been addicted.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. I read one newspaper story quoting Police Com-
missioner Murphy of ew York City, who said that "negative diplo-
matic repercussions would not have been an intolerable price to pay
for doing something in this field."
Do you agree with that? In other words, what Mr. Murphy was
saying is that indeed there might have been diplomatic waves and
we might have paid a diplomatic penalty. But the penalties we paid
at home for sitting on the sidelines for the last 5 years were far
more severe.
Mr. Ronzwo. Absolutely, I agree with him, Mr. Chairman, because
every day, as I stated, there are five deaths from heroin. Every day
we have more addicts. Every day there is a greater supply of heroin
coming into the country and the problem mounts and mounts and the
longer we delay the more difficult the problem is to cope with.
I don't believe that any bill is going to solve the total problem or
eliminate the problem completely. But if we are able to get at the
source, if we were able to get the cooperation of all of the agencies of
Government, and if we were able to get our leading administration
ut, then I believe, Mr. Chairmani,
officials and the President. to speak out,'
we would have been far ahead of the game.
May I continue?
In November 1970, as the U.S. delegate to the North Atlantic As-
sembly and as vice-chairman of its Scientific and Technical Commit-
tee, I emphasized the need for the effective international control of
narcotic drugs in a report which I presented to the Assembly.
As a result of my initiative, a working group was established to
study and prepare a report on the international control of narcotics.
On May 24 of this year, I submitted the U.S. contribution to this
joint report. I intend to present this report. along with specific recom-
mendations, to the Assembly at their meeting in Ottawa, Canada, in
September. At this meeting the Scientific and Technical Committee ex-
pects to develop a multi-nation proposal which will be submitted to
the full Assembly for its consideration and approval.
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During the entire time that I have earnestly pursued domestic and
international solutions to the heroin problem, I was repeatedly urged
by the State Department not to make waves-that effective measures
were being taken through diplomatic channels. And, of course, Mr.
Chairman, I know there were others who were doing so assiduously
themselves.
Mr. RoSENTHAL. In your judgment, were effective measures taken?
Mr. RoIINO. I believe measures were being taken, but the only kind
of measure I believe effective was to cut off the supply completely.
Turkey has now agreed to ban the production of opium but not
until they have harvested their crop in 1972. Even this I don't
understand.
The bill, H.R. 1539, which is being considered by this subcommittee,
represents the third thrust of my three-pronged plan, which I recom-
mended to the President on October 22 of last year. Unfortunately, 8
months ago, the only response to this letter was a perfunctory ac-
knowledgment by a White House assistant.
With the permission of the subcommittee, I would like to briefly
review the present status of this plan. First of all, on January- 22,1971,
I introduced H.R. 1540, which is entitled "the Narcotic Addict Reha-
bilitation Act of 1971." This proposal, which provides that any person
known to be an addict would be placed under the medical supervision
and control of public health officials, has been the subject of hearings
held by the Judiciary Committee during the 91st and 92d Congress.
It was 2 weeks ago today that I appeared before a Judiciary Subcom-
mittee with respect to H.R. 1540 and, at that time, I emphasized the
need for immediate and effective legislative action to abate the drug
pandemic.
The second aspect of my plan advocates the strict enforcement of
our drug control laws amainst the pusher. By using public health
officials to supervise the addicts, law enforcement officials, armed with
the provisions of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Con-
trol Act of 1970 and the Organized Crime Control Act, would be able
to conduct vigorous crackdowns on the drug pusher.
Lastly, as I have indicated, the third thrust of my three-pronged
attack on hard drugs is contained in H.R. 1539, which is the subject
of these hearings.
Although I have strenuously supported a domestic program of
treatment and rehabilitation, the primary responsibility and concern
of this Government should be the elimination of the illegal supply of
hard drugs at the source.
In fulfilling this responsibility, it will be necessary for our Govern-
ment to reassess our relationships with those countries which persist-
ently refuse to curtail the illegal production of opium.
As Representatives Murphy and Steele stated in their recent report :
We must be willing to devote more resources, human and material, to fight
the illegal international traffic in heroin, including the exercise of economic and
political pressures where necessary. If that means the imposition of economic
sanctions or the exercise of political initiatives, we must be willing to follow
that course of action. We are fighting to save generations of young Americans
from the scourge of heroin. As in any war, we must bring all of the weapons
available to the point of decision.
Certainly, if Turkey, whose agricultural economy has been somewhat
dependent on poppy farming for centuries can stop production, then
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we have a right to expect the full cooperation of all opium-producing
countries which are receiving America's assistance.
Since the number of heroin addicts and drug-related deaths are in-
creasing at an exponential rate, we cannot be concerned with the poten-
tial adverse reactions of foreign governments to proposals such as mine
or others. Similarly, we should not be concerned with placating foreign
governments or modifying our proposals to suit them.
Instead, we should be concerned only with those measures which are
acceptable to the American people-to the parents whose sons and
daughters are dying each day o f drug overdoses.
Ve need only recall the words of Mr. John E. Ingersoll, the Director
of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs to the United Nations
Commission on Narcotic Drugs, last September 28. He said :
... I speak for over 200 million human beings who are alarmed, distressed, and
even outraged about a calamitous problem they did not create and which they
cannot solve alone. They do not understand why the nations of the world cannot
bring to an end the waste and devastation that drug abuse, particularly opiate
addiction, is causing our people. There is growing unity of opinion among the
various and diverse segments of our population : illicit narcotics must go !
Indeed, it is now time for Congress to speak for these distressed
Americans. With this in mind, I have devised a proposal which I feel
would be satisfactory to the American people and at the same time
would not jeopardize our foreign relations with opium-producing
countries.
I originally introduced this proposal as H.R. 18397 on July 9, 1970,
II.R. 1539, which is presently proposal
the subcommittee, is identical to
last year's proposal.
Briefly, the bill would impose economic sanctions on foreign govern-
ments upon a determination by the President that the government of
such a country has failed to take appropriate steps to prevent narcotic
drugs produced or processed, in whole or in part, in such country from
entering the United States. The sanction may involve the suspension
of all or part of the economic and military assistance provided to such
a country.
In addition, my bill would authorize the President to utilize such
agencies and facilities as he may deem appropriate to assist foreign
countries in their efforts to prevent the unlawful entry of narcotic
drugs into the United States. This will enable the President to take
personal charge of his national offensive to eliminate the illegal inter-
national traffic in heroin.
As I stated before a judiciary subcommittee 2 weeks ago: "It is
indeed distressing and dismaying that our Government has not real-
istically responded to the drug crisis." It is my belief that the Presi-
dent, under this bill, will be empowered to commit the necessary
resources to "the national war on drug abuse." This would be in
accordance with his recent, statement that he intends to "concentrate
the resources of the Nation in a crusade against drug abuse."
Mr. ROSENTHAL. Do you think the President would act, assuming
the bill were passed or became an amendment to the Foreign Assistance
Act?
Mr. RODINO. I believe it would become incumbent upon the President
to take action.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. Since 1946 to the present time, we have granted
about $5.7 billion to Turkey. Why is it during all of this period of time
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that we didn't have sufficient influence or leverage, considering the
amount of those grants, to do something about it? Why couldn't we
convince the Turkish Government all during,,- this period of time of the
severity of the problem and need for action? Mr. Roniwo. Mr. Chairman, that is a question I have been asking
myself. And I am sure that many, many Americans who are concerned,
many Americans whose children have become addicted, many Ameri-
cans whose children have died; and many parents who have deep con-
cern about whether or not their children will become addicted, have
asked this very question as to why we continue assistance to countries
which presumably and outwardly cooperate with us, but yet produce
this terrible supply of narcotic drugs.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. What kind of solution is best, Mr. Rodino?
I share your concern, but I wonder what good it would have done-
if the only realistic solution, as you say, is to cut off the production,
eliminate the sources of supply-for us to have cut ourselves off from
'Turkey? That would not have eliminated the source of supply. Turkey
is still there and she is still producing poppies. What. has occurred
over a period of time is that we have, without cutting ourselves off
from Turkey, persuaded her that there are serious international reper-
'ussions from the illegal transportation of drugs.
Mr. Ronirro. Mr. Frelinghuysen, while we were trying to persuade
Turkey, we were building up numbers of addicts.
Mr.'FRELINGHUYSEN. Of course, and that is still going on. But you
are not stopping that process by eliminating a, single source.. There are
sources in other parts of the world.
Mr. RODINO. My bill would eliminate the sources in any country that
is getting foreign assistance and I think the 17 nited States--
Mr. FrtELTNoiiuYSEN. It would eliminate foreign assistance to those
countries; it doesn't eliminate the sources. You would forbid any aid
going to Southeast Asia under your arrrendment, but is tliat solving
the problem? I doubt it very mwth.
The source of supply would still be there.
Mr. RODINO. We would. assume the countries would cooperate with
us and not grow the poppies.
Mr. FRELINGrruYSEN. I think you are kidding yourself. This isn't
a problem for their young people. The fact that it may be a problem
for our young people isn't going to influence `hem. In other words, I
think you are, perhaps, naive in suggesting that withholding of foreign
aid is going to be the l ey to stopping the production of poppies.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. Let inc see if I can interject something.
It would seem to me if I were a recipient country of $5. i billion, I
might be willing to forego a $3 million a year crop.
Mr. RoDiNO. I am sure if we were to cut off that flow of foreign aid
to these countries, Mr. Frelinghuysen, we would certainly get immedi-
ate results in better cooperation and in getting at the source if they
are actually interested. And I am sure, as the chairman has pointed out,
when you consider the amount of nnonev that has been received. by
these countries, then, Mr. Frelinghuysen, I am sure that these countries
are not going to spite themselves and continue to supply.
Mr. FRELTNG7rtTYSEN. Flow can you be so confident? Why would this
bring a country around? There are serious implications. We would be
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writing off any responsibility to Southeast Asia because that is a
source of supply of drugs.
Mr. RoDINO. Mr. Frelinghuysen, the big concern is our youth. And
I think when you consider the fact that we now have thousands and
thousands of addicts and when we have had so many deaths, I think
that should be our primary concern.
Mr. FnELINGHUYSEN. Don't emotionalize it, Mr. Rodino. Of course it
is our primary concern, but this isn't resolving the problem.
My son is just back from Vietnam. I realize the nature of the prob-
lem. But it isn't resolving the problem to say we are not going to give
any aid to Southeast Asia because they grow poppies. They don't real-
ize what it is doing to our young people. I would guess that your sug-
gestion would not do anything except slam the door in our own face.
It would not reduce the basic source of supply, which you say is your
aim.
Mr. ROSENTIIAL. Why don't you o ahead with your statement?
Some people have different views. MY, own view is if we had done it
5 or 6 years ago, we would have been better off on all counts.
Mr. RODINO. It was my intent in drafting this proposal to avoid
interference with Presidential prerogatives in foreign policy matters,
and to provide affirmative economic assistance in order to prevent an
adverse impact on the economy of opium-producing countries.
Since this bill did not receive active consideration by this subcom-
mittee in the last Congress, and in view of the overall negative ap-
proach taken by the State Department in their report on this proposal
and all other legislative proposals relating to the international illegal
drug traffic, I introduced this bill as a floor amendment to the supple-
mental Foreign Assistance Authorization Act on December 9, 1970.
As you know, after detailed debate indicating widespread support
for this proposal, the floor amendment was adopted. Unfortunately,
the Senate deleted this amendment on the ground that they did not
have sufficient time to consider and debate the amendment.
I should mention that the State Department report categorically
rejected all similar proposals designed to eliminate the illegal heroin
traffic as being ineffective and possibly creating "international political
pressures which would make it difficult for the foreign governments
to take the action we desire." Instead, they suggested a sense-of-the-
Congress resolution "to demonstrate the concern of Congress * * * and
the desire of the American people to find a solution to the problem of
illegal narcotics."
What could be more ineffective and futile? And how would parents
suffering the agony of their children's drug affliction find this dis-
couraging and negative response from officials of their government?
Recent testimon before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee illus-
trated that the State Department is certainly out of touch with present
conditions in American cities and as a result is completely unqualified
to pass judgment on the drug crisis.
Surely, their approach could in no way be construed as a realistic
solution to the problem or a constructive alternative to my proposal.
Likewise, it is no coincidence that the administration's- recently an-
nounced "national offensive" against drug abuse comes in the wake of
revelations concerning the scope of heroin addiction amongservicemen
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in Southeast Asia. Because I was gravely concerned about this drug
problem in South Vietnam almost a year ago, I wrote the Department
of State requesting information regarding the use of opiated mari-
huana and the efforts of certain Southeast Asian governments to elimi-
nate the sale of dangerous drugs to American servicemen.
The State Department, however, as well as the Armed Forces, was
not willing at that time to concede the existence of a serious drug prob-
lem in Southeast Asia-now the problem has exploded.
It was not until the recent "World Heroin Report," issued by Rep-
resentatives Murphy, of Illinois, and Steele, of Connecticut, of this
committee, that the public was completely and accurately informed
as to the extent of drug abuse among GI's in Southeast Asia. Indeed,
it is my feeling that the public clamor and. outrage which resulted from
estimates that there may be as many as 40,000 addicted GI's in South
Vietnam, together with the House action on my proposal last year,
triggered the administration's recent action on the drug problem. I
applaud these gentlemen for their informative report, and I fully
support many of their recommendations.
However, I was especially interested in two of the conclusions that
were reached by these distinguished gentlemen. Namely, that most
countries view heroin addiction as "essentially an American problem."
And, second, that "there is no sense of urgency on the part of most
governments that action must be taken immediately to stop the illegal
production of and traffic in heroin."
I concur wholeheartedly in both of these statements and it is for
this very reason that the initiative must be taken now by the United
States.
Similarly, the administration has now departed from its earlier
position that "since addicts create the illicit demand for narcotics,"
heroin addiction should be considered primarily as a law enforcement
problem. This transition is exemplified by President Nixon's recent
statement that "the only really effective way to end heroin addiction
is to end opium production and the growing of poppies. I will propose
that as an international goal."
I fully support this goal. But the real question is-what tactics are
to be employed to achieve this goal?
Since I believe that neither persuasion nor coercion alone is the
proper solution, I have drafted legislation which embodies both of
these approaches.
As I have already mentioned, this proposal received the approval
of the full House of Representatives last year. I feel that this con-
gressional action assisted our officials in persuading the Turkish Gov-
ernment to ban opium production. Likewise, passage of this legisla-
tion would induce other countries to cooperate with us in curtailing
the production of opium.
If one is bothered by the foreign policy considerations in the event
of a Presidential determination that funds to a particular country
should be cut off, he need only ask himself whether we should sustain
our relationship with these so-called "allies" if it means sacrificing
our youth to the heroin plague.
We must inform the countries of the world, which readily accept
our assistance, that we cannot tolerate their inaction and indifference
concerning the international problem of heroin addiction.
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I do not believe in being a prophet of doom, but unless we take
strong action of this kind thousands of our young people will be
doomed to a life of crime and desperation and many thousands to a
tragic and untimely death.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. Congressman Frelinghuysen?
Mr. FRELINOHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to welcome my colleague from New Jersey. Ile is one
of the experts in Congress on the subject of drugs and control of
drugs.
My earlier question, Mr. Rodino, was how effective your so-called
solution would be. You have suggested that a combination of coercion
and persuasion is needed. The persuasion would be to encourage them
to prevent illegal entry into this country of drugs from their country.
That might be some sort of a carrot, but nothing very remarkable. I
wouldn't think there would be much of an inducement for them to do
anything.
The coercion is, presumably, the weapon that you think is going to
be effective. Much as I would like to see these sources of supply elimi-
nated, I doubt very much whether the threat of suspension of foreign
aid is going to be very effective a weapon to prevent the growing of
poppies.
Granted, if a country is desperately in need of our assistance, it may
be reluctant to give up that assistance. However, it may feel unable
or unwilling or unprepared to eliminate the livelihood of a great many
of its people. How will it reduce the threat to our young people if we
cut ourselves off from certain countries that grow poppies? In other
words, aren't you overrating the value of foreign aid as a weapon?
Aren't you politicizing foreign aid in an unfortunate way?
Again, aren't you emotionalizing about the nature of the problem
at home? The problem, of course, cannot be exaggerated, but in offer-
ing this as a solution, aren't you deluding us? For instance, how do
you think this would have operated against Turkey? How would it
operate. against the countries that presumably will be continuing pro-
duction of poppies?
Mr. RoDINo. Mr. Frelinghuysen, I have got to assume that Turkey
intends to remain our ally and intends to continue receiving assistance
from us. And I feel that so long as she would want to remain our ally
and would want to continue to receive assistance, that knowing that
the President would have this power, Turkey would then cooperate
and ban completely the production of opium poppies.
Mr. FRELiNGrrursEN. Suppose they didn't? Suppose she said, "To
hell with you. Your aid isn't that important to us."
llr. Ronrxo. I am saying let's first give the President this power.
Let's pass this law. I think Mr. Murphy and Mr. Steele pointed to a
situation that I think we lose sight of, and that is that others don't
seem to realize the way we actually feel about this and they think that
it is our problem, and that is it. It is not our problem alone. It is our
problem and their problem, and if they are supposedly our allies, if
they want to remain our friends, if they want to continue to receive our
assistance, then I think they on-ht to show that they are willing to
cooperate to that degree; and, if they felt that the President had this
power, that the Congress gave him this power, that people of the
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United States shout out in this way, I am sure that the reaction would
be the same.
I recall that last year when my bill. was first being considered and
when it was making some kind of waves, that the then Prime Minister
of Turkey-when a question was addressed to a member of another
committee of the House as to whether or not some action might be
taken on our bill-tremors, I understand, went through Turkey. Im-
mediately they sought me out and asked me whether or not we couldn't
defer, and whether or not we wouldn't hold off and whether or not we
wouldn't wait until we might be able to work out the problem in some
way.
Mr. Frun TNGIIUY-SEN. You may create more tremors in Turkey than
in New Jersey, Mr. Rodino. but I wonder whether the passage of legis-
lation and the cutoff of all assistance to a country as important as
Turkey would be in our best interest? If your proposal didn't perform
the function of browbeating them into absolute suspension of all
growing of poppies, where would we be?
We would have lost our ally and we would still have the source of
supply. This is what worries me.
Suppose we now turn our backs on Southeast Asia after all of the
problems we have caused despite our good intentions. We have caused
a lot of problems there, and they are going to need both economic aid
and military aid. Foreign aid could be a very powerful weapon with
very small and poor countries, but it is a hard process to educate them
quickly to what we consider their responsibilities. It is conceivable we
might not see things as they do. As a result we might end up with a
source of supply and be unable to help them in their adjustment to
what we hope will be more peaceful conditions.
Mr. RonmNo. Mr. Frei inghuysen, I must respectfully disagree with
the conclusion you reached in presuming that we are going to wind up
with nothing, that they are not going to cooperate, that they are not
going to be concerned with our assistance.
1llr. Fxrl,ING.IIUYSEN. I am concerned about the fact that there are
two sides to the coin, and you see one. Suppose they say the growing
of poppies is of sufficient importance to them that they are not going
to accept our aid. There may be countries that would feel this way,
so the source of supply would remain, and we would have failed in
our efforts to coerce these countries in seeing things our way.
We would not solve the problem that way.
Mr. RODINo. If that were to occur, we haven't solved the problem
but I would urge that we take the kind of action that shows the
world we mean business. l of his to
When the President says that it is an international goal
end opium production and growing of poppies, then I can't see any
other way of doing it than to have the President of the United States
armed with this weapon to say, "Look, this is a problem that is afict-
incr us and we are not going to tolerate it if you people don't cooper-
ate with us."
Mr. Flur.INGIIUYSEN. but the President says international control
is the only answer. You seem to be saying unilateral efforts on the
part of the United States are the only way. I would think, with all
of your experience in the international arena, that you would recog-
nize that other countries do have a responsibility.
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France has responsibility. For us to try to go it alone and act as
if we had found the key to solving the problem of eliminating the
source of supply, strikes me as naive.
Mr. RODrNO. Mr. Frelinghuysen, all I would like to add there is this,
if we could cutoff some of the supply, we have less addicts.
Mr. FRELINGrITTYSEN. You are not stating anything very startling
when you say that.
Mr. RODINO. Turkey was supposed to be the principal source of
heroin, 80 percent of it. We would be cutting off a great source of
that supply and we would be able to then reduce the problem to a
size where we might be able to cope with it. I recognize it is an
international problem but I recognize the problem is greatest in these
areas, and unless we take this kind of affirmative action, I think we
are deluding ourselves.
We have been talking with Turkey for many years. We have tried.
to impress upon her the need to actually eliminate the growth of
poppies there. But only now, after this kind of clamor on the part
of the America public-I am not deceiving myself or deluding my-
self that it was my voice-1 think the fact that the American public has
been speaking out, that mothers have been outraged, that Members of
Congress have been speaking out, I think all of this finally has ex-
ploded into a situation that the people outside recognize that they
have to do something too.
Mr. FRELINGFIUYSEN. It was persuasion and not coercion that
brought Turkey around. I am suggesting persuasion is a more useful
tool :than attempted coercion, especially since the proposed coercion
probably isn't of sufficient weight to produce the desired results.
Mr. ROVING. Mr. Frelinghuysen, all of my formula is merely to give
the President the opportunity to assess whether those countries are
actually cooperating.
Mr. FRELINGIiuYSEN. You are putting the monkey on his back. If
he doesn't act, you can blame him for not taking action.
Mr. RoDINO. The President took part of it. The President says it
is something he feels responsible for, and, as a matter of fact, this
is why he created only last week the Special Office of Drug Abuse.
Mr. FRELINGIIUYSEN. I appreciate your testimony, Mr. Rodino.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Burke?
Mr. BURKE. Mr. Buchanan is ahead of me, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Buchanan?
Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you, Mr. Burke.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to commend the gentleman for his leadership in this matter.
As one member of the committee, I do see wisdom in his approach to
the problem and, as you know, Mr. Rodino, would support some
such action on our part.
President Theodore Roosevelt said, "Speak softly, and carry a big
stick."
If the State Department wants to speak softly, that is all right with
me, but we should give this stick to the President to use.
It seems to me you are giving him the weapon to use if he decides
this is the effective means to obtain the end you desire, is that correct?
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Mr. RonINO. That is correct. I am not particularly wed to this and
it is not with pride of authorship that I am concerned about this bill.
I hope that we get some proposals which will bring about the results
that I am seeking and I think that this is the only way.
When the President says this is a problem that engages his attention
in this way, I think then the people of the world who are supposedly
our allies are going to take note, and this is the one way that I think
they will.
Mr. BUCHANAN. I can understand your being a little hard on the
State Department in your written statement,. Sometimes I think the
State Department would rather see the ship of state sunk than making
waves to save it, but I think you are a little bit, tough on this adminis-
tration in that Attorney General Mitchell has declared a very real
war on organized crime. And distribution is also a very vicious part
of this problem, the systematic hooking of young people and the dis-
tribution system within this country of these illegal drugs.
It does seem to me a good deal of action is being taken in that direc
tion which is very much in order in addition to the President's ini-
tiative to which you have referred several. times.
Mr. RODINO. I applauded the action that was taken in that area es-
pecially, for, as you know, this is a profitable area for organized crime.
I am happy that I was one of those who, in the Judiciary Committee,
initiated the organized crime bill so that it would come to the floor and
I am sure that this, again, is another area where we could attack, too,
the role of organized crime in narcotics addiction.
Mr. BUCHANAN. I commend the gentleman for his leadership in
this area, and I hope that he will be successful in his efforts toward
passage of the legislation.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Murphy?
Mr. MURPIIY. I have no questions at this time.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Burke?
Mr. BURRS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rodino, I am interested in the purpose of your bill. In fact, I
remember when it was introduced originally you sent a "Dear Col-
league" letter to all of us, and my first impression was that I wanted to
join as a sponsor. I want to say now that I join in the idea of what
you are talking about, but it seems to me that your bill would operate
somewhat as a camouflage for the real problem. we have in the country :
First, drugs getting into this country.
Second, your bill talks about poppy fields, but there is a bit more
to solving the problem than growing the poppies. There is the proc-
essing, and where it goes, and how it gets into this country from
there.
It seems to me that the bill itself can be construed to be somewhat
political because everybody in this Congress. -1 am quite sure, is aware
of the dope problem and the problem of narcotics in this country as
well as its effect upon the younger people.
What concerns me is that in your statement you keep talking about
illegal opium production.
First of all, the production itself is not illegal in all of the countries
of origin. What makes it illegal is how it gets into this country. It gets
into this country because we have people in this country that import
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it, that push it, and who are responsible for the problem itself, not
necessarily where the poppy grows.
We try to do away with the supplies. We tried the Volstead Act
one time and we had bootlegging and we didn't do away with the
illegal supply that the bootlegger peddled.
I would think that we have to attack this not on the basis of just
blaming one of our allies but we must attack the problem in its entire
sphere. We have to somehow or other bolster the protection of our
borders to prevent its coming in here.
We stop a few cars, pick up some of them, we must go beyond that.
Certainly there should be sufficient investigations in this Congress and
elsewhere to warrant somebody from the top gang echelon going to
jail, one of the higher-ups that are involved in this dope racket, and
that is exactly what it is.
So. Mr. Rodino, I think your idea, although I agree with the con-
cept, operates in a way of changing the look at the problem on the
basis that Turkey is the only culprit involved in the dope racket and
this I think alone doesn't help its in stopping the dope problem.
Mr. RoD[No. Well, Mr. Burke, first of all, Turkey isn't the only
culprit. I don't point to Turkey alone. I point to those countries that
produce opium.
Mr. BmtKL. Turkey is a NATO ally of ours, and the rest of them
you haven't mentioned.
Mr. RonuNO. There are countries also receiving assistance. I am talk-
ing about all of those countries that receive our assistance. You have
got Laos and Thailand, and other countries that continue to receive
assistance.
Now, let's make a distinction. There is the illegally grown supply of
opium and there is a legal supply of opium poppy. I know that it is
going to be physically impossible to completely stop the traffic of this
opium poppy in here but, nonetheless, this is why I am directing my
attention toward getting at the source so when you get at the source you
don't have to wait for it to be processed.
Mr. BURKE. How, Mr. Rodino ?
Mr. RoDINO. Only 10 percent of it is stopped by customs officials.
Mr. BuitKE. But there are other sources of poppy growth besides
Turkey and the others are big sources of poppy growth.
Mr. RomNo. Yes, Southeast Asia.
Mr. BURKE. I mean of our nonallied countries who certainly are in
a position to get it over borders if they can get it into this country.
Mr. RODINO. But, Mr. Burke, the biggest supply comes from Turkey ;
80 percent of it has been a figure that has been accepted as such. If we
were to cut off 80 percent of it. you are cutting off a big part of this
problem. You are resolving a big part of the problem.
AIr. BURKE. But we haven't resolved the big problem.
Mr. RODINO. Mr. Burke, I would like to say that if we cut off a big
supply of this opium poppy then our law enforcement officials could
more effectively deal with the rest of it which would not be as big a
problem.
Mr. BURKE. Forgive me for arguing, but you are putting it in the
first person. I tried to preface this with the statement that I think
everybody in the Congress has the same feeling as you do in this re-
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gard. I think all of us would like to knock of 80 percent any time we
get a chance.
But I am not so sure that 80 percent of the supply coming into this
country comes from Turkey. I think it comes from other areas and
most of all it comes from the processing countries.
I think we ought to start
Mr. RoDrNo. The best statistics would lead us to conclude that it is
80 percent.
Mr. Buxgr. The processing is what makes the heroin. The poppies
are grown. I am talking about processing countries such as Marseilles,
France, where most of our smuggled dope originates.
As I stated, poppies alone aren't the answer. Marseilles and other
areas that process the poppies into heroin cannot be overlooked.
Mr. RODINO. That is only after they get the base supply.
Mr. BURKE. I agree but what I am trying to say is that they may
still very well get that basic supply.
Mr. Romwo. They won't be getting 80 percent of it.
Mr. BuRKE. I don't mean to argue the point because I agree with
you in concept, but what bothers Inc is the fact you pick one country,
which is a NATO country, and somehow or other it seems to be the
proper political thing now to attack our NATO al lies.
Dir. Ronmwo. Mr. Burke, may I say, and interject here, that I cer-
tainly don't want to attack our NATO ally, Turkey. I have addressed
myself to the representatives at the NATO Assembly. I am a delegate
to the NATO Assembly. We have discussed this. I know there is the
kind of cooperation that we would like to get, but I think that really
it is not the total kind, and I think we have got to consider all angles.
1 am sure that you are not being political and I am not being political.
Mr. BuRKE. We are both political animals.
Mr.RODIN0. If we felt we could get to the solution of the problem
by cutting off the supply. I am sure the gentleman would want to join
me in that solution. But I am not going to be concerned, frankly, and
I don't make the statement idly, I am not going to be concerned with
the waves I create in Turkey if I know I can save thousands of young
people from being addicted.
Mr. BuRKE. That is an unfair statement. Do you think I would be
concerned about Turkey if I could save one or two young people?
So, we agree on the principle, but that was a nice political speech,
and we should not get political. Truthfully, Mr. Rodino. we have to
get to two things : Not only the poppy growers, but to the processors
and suppliers, and I am Afraid a bill such as yours puts too much em-
phasis on one thing and, therefore, it tends to throw the smokescreen
around the real problems.
Mr. RonmNo. Mr Burke. may I point out my bill specifically states.
"to prevent narcotic drugs produced or processed in whole or in part."
Mr. ROSENTHHAL. The. gentleman's time has expired.
We will have to move along.
Mr. BURKE. May I sayy, thank you, Mr. Rodino, I appreciate what
you are trying to accomplish.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. Thank you, Dir. Rodino, for bringing significant
light on a very important subject and one that concerns all of us.
Mr. RODINO. Thank you.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. The next witness is Congressman Murphy, of Illi-
nois, and then Congressman Robert Steele, of Connecticut.
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STATEMENT OF HON. MORGAN F. MURPHY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
Mr. RosENTHAL. Go right ahead, Mr. Murphy.
Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is an
honor to appear before the Subcommittee on Europe of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee. I want to thank the committee for this
opportunity.
As you know, Congressman Steele and I released a report on the
"World Heroin Problem" which was based upon a round-the-world
study mission conducted during the month of April. That report dealt
with the heroin problem, both in the United States and abroad.
Of particular concern to us was the rapid increase in heroin addic-
tion within the United States military forces in South Vietnam where
the problem of heroin addiction has reached epidemic proportions.
In Vietnam, we discovered young American soldiers whose day-to-
day existence depends on a $> vial of "skag." We found men whose
minds and bodies have been shattered by the effects of habit-forming
drugs as well as marihuana and other nonaddictive, but, nevertheless,
dangerous drugs.
At the time of our visit, the military authorities told us they esti-
mated 10 to 15 percent of our soldiers were heroin addicts. That figure
has since been lowered to a firm 10 percent labeled as users, and 5
percent as hard-core addicts.
I must admit my skepticism, gentlemen, about these revised figures
as past experience shows the Department of Defense (DOD) has a
tendency to deemphasize any problem which places the military in a
bad light before the American taxpaying public. This time last year,
for example, DOD claimed a mere 100 heroin addicts were wearing the
uniform of U.S. soldiers. It appears DOD was either deceiving itself
or totally out of touch with reality.
But let's assume their numbers are correct. This means we still have
25,000 men who have tried heroin and 12,500 whom they believe are
hard-core addicts. I emphasize that these are the ones the military
knows about. Unofficial sources place the number at a more realistic
figure of between 30,000 to 40,000 men who became addicted to drugs
while in Vietnam.
This epidemic of drug abuse is not something which arose overnight.
It has been coming for a long time-we have known about it, we urged
the President to take action long ago, but nothing was done. And, now,
we are faced with an overwhelming task-that of rehabilitating thou-
sands of young men, not only from the strain and horrors of combat,
but from the hideous specter of drug addiction as well.
In Vietnam, heroin addiction became an epidemic before action was
taken. It is my hope that action will be taken now to prevent the same
disastrous results in Europe and the Near East.
Following the publication of our report, Congressman Steele and I
introduced on the House floor a comprehensive bill which we feel puts
the drug abuse problem in proper perspective and offers some hope for
finding a solution. This bill, T might add, was introduced before the
administration offered its so-called solution to the drug menace among
our soldiers.
Our bill called for a two-stage rehabilitation approach including the
identification of heroin addicts through urinalysis and providing de-
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toxification and rehabilitation for all addicts during their regular
military enlistments. Step two provides that where military rehabili-
tation efforts fail, the addict could be admitted to a veterans hospital
for up to 3 years of treatment.
Other recommendations included the authority for the Admin-
istrator of the Veterans Administration (VA) to assign an addict to
any one of the existing civilian rehabilitation programs including the
Public Ilealth Service and National Institute of Mental Ilealth.
State and community hospitals and drug centers would also be made
available for veteran add ivts.
Another important aspect of our measure would give the addict a
medical discharge rather than a punitive or for-the-good-of-the-serv-
ice type discharge, which normally deprives him of treatment at VA
hospitals.
Up until 2 weeks ago, by the way, the VA had only five drug treat-
ment centers with beds for less than 250 persons. These centers were
opened this year under mounting pressure from political and civic
organizations.
The VA has since announced plans for expanding their services to
27 additional treatment centers capable of caring for 6,000 addicts each
year. Needless to say, gentlemen, I feel they are being more than op-
timistic. As it matter of fact, it is sheer fantasy to think the drug prob-
lem in the proportions of which we are speaking, can be attacked suc-
cessfully by this token gesture.
However, I think it is a tribute to the administration and VA that
they have increased it, and I know this is a tremendous increase, but
I think that we are going to find that once the realization on the part
of our veterans that they can come forth and admit their drug addic-
tion problem without the punitive measures which usually follow, I
think we are going to find how many we have and we are going to need
more beds than that.
The Nixon administration meanwhile has made its proposal to the
Congress and the American people, outlining what it called a "com-
prehensive pro ram for drug rehabilitation." 'The program called for
an additional 155 million to be added to already approved funds
bringing the total the President desires for the fight against drug ad-
diction to a mere $371 million.
This amount is for all drug rehabilitation programs in this country,
not just for the military, I might add. The President's proposal is
hardly a drop in the bucket when you consider that heroin addicts
spend more than $2.2 billion a year to support their habits.
I would like to interpose that after careful study of the President's
program and attending bearings of the Select Committee on Crime,
of which I am also a member, under the leadership of Chairman
Pepper of Florida, what I thought was just $12 million for pure re-
search on part of the problem, I have found. to be $34 million, and
I apptaud the President for that. I think we should devote more money
to pure research on this problem. I think therein lies the answer, and
I will get to that after my testimony.
I feel that the bill introduced by Congressman Steele and myself
defines a better starting point for hitting the problem. head on-by first
curing our military men who will soon be returning to society.
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This is not to underrate the drug addiction problem in our civilian
communities, but if we can't meet and defeat drug abuse in the confines
of military service, how can we expect to accomplish it on a nationwide
basis?
The first step to combat the heroin problem in Vietnam is being
taken. All homeward-bound GI's must submit to urinalysis. If the test
indicates drug use, the GI undergoes 5 days of preliminary treatment
at Cain Ranh Bay in Vietnam before being shipped to the States for
more extensive treatment.
First-hand reports from GI's in Long Binh, however, attest to the
fact that the machine which performs the urinalysis can produce in-
accurate results. In addition, GI's are scheming to devise foolproof
ways to beat the system. In the words of a high-ranking Army medical
officer, "If there's a way to beat this thing, the GI's will think of it."
Above all, gentlemen, I think it is clear that a quick solution is not
coming-abroad or at home. We need long-range improvements in
drug control and rehabilitation. We cannot allow drub abuse to be the
victim of a 3-month spurt of activity because it is politically expedient
on both sides of the aisle.
I was much heartened by the Turkish Government's opium decree
announced last week. Their pledge to discontinue the planting of the
opium poppy within the year is the result of increased efforts on the
part of the Nixon administration to cut the heroin off at its source. It
would be gross negligence on my part if I failed to acknowledge the
roles played by Turkish Prime Minister Nihat Erim and U.S. Am-
bassador William Iland]ey in reaching this decision.
In his prepared statement, the President announced that this ad-
ministration was committed to aid nations and peoples prepared to
help eliminate the narcotics menace. In April of this year, Congress-
man Steele and I cautioned that the United States must be prepared
to undertake a multimillion-dollar program to assist these countries
to develop substitute economic activities for their opium farmers. I
reiterate my earlier point-we cannot solve the heroin problem we
now face in this country by setting monetary limits on spending.
I feel we must make important decisions in the near future as to
what international efforts we should take to prevent drugs from com-
ing into this country or from reaching our servicemen around the
world. Economic leverages can and must be utilized.
As one young man who wrote me put it: "Tough decisions must
not be avoided in order to maintain the most cordial of diplomatic
relations with our so-called allies." While we concern ourselves with
cordiality, we risk the loss of a generation.
Gentlemen, I am sure I don't have to detail for you the ramifications
of the international drug problem on American society. Think of it
in terms of the crime committed on our streets, crime committed by
drug addicts who are driven to any lengths, including violence, to ob-
tain money for their next fix.
Think of it in terms of stolen property, of muggings and prostitu-
tion, of youths who sell drugs to other youths to obtain money. High
school and college students, disenchanted with our country because of
this nightmarish war in Indochina, think they have found comfort
at the end of a needle. This is what we are now facing and will con-
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tinue to face unless we dosomething positive to stop this terrible drug
infection on our society.
Mr. ROSENTHAr. I think you said you wanted to comment.
I would also be interested in your views about the dialogue between
Mr. Rodino and members of the subcommittee.
Mr. MuxrrHY. When I came to Congress, I read the Rodino amend-
ment and at first blush I agreed with it. After my trip, I agree with it
in part and in part I do not agree with it. I do not think the Nixon
administration would have been able to bring Turkey to the position
it now takes of banning opium growing in the country eornpletely by
just saying we are going to cut off foreign aid. I think they would have
rebelled.
I think, as Mr. Burke and Mr. Frelinghuysen pointed out, we would
have lost a valuable ally. We would have lost a valuable ally in the
NATO setup, the anchor to the. Near East, protection of the Dar-
danelles, down to the Mediterranean.
Ambassador William Handley has been working on the Turkish
people to see the effect on the United States of their growing opium.
Interestingly enough, one Turkish senator, whom I have gotten to
know quite well, told me that one of the biggest problems in Turkey
is deaths resulting from automobiles, the misuse of the automobile. He
said, "Morgan, what if we came to the United States and went to
Detroit and said, `Please ban the. making of the automobile because. we
Turks don't know how to use it."'
That is really what we are saving because they have no drug addic-
tion problem in Turkey. The Turks know how to handle opium. It is
a cash crop. The seeds from poppies are used. The oil is used. for cook-
ing. The seeds are used on bread and the stem of the flower is used for
fuel. These people are completely oblivious to the ramifications of
growing of poppies and the production of opium.
What we are concerned with is illegal trafficking in opium where
Corsican syndicates, four families, insulate themselves. They have a
buyer who goes into Turkey after it is harvested and takes the raw
opium and smuggles it into other areas of the Middle East such as
Syria and Lebanon where it is -processed into morphine which is in
turn smuggled into the Marseilles area of France where chemists
refine it into heroin. These same families, through additional contacts,
route. this heroin through Italy and Corsica into the United States.
Some of it is also smuggled through Mexico and Canada.
But, gentlemen, one statement which impressed me was made by a
Bureau of Narcotics man. He said once the poppy was cut allowing the
opium gum to seep out overnight. the war to stop heroin from getting
into the United States was lost. A kilogram of opium which costs $25
in Turkey goes for 5250,000 on the streets of New York. So you have
got a tremendous profit picture there that you have to be concerned
with.
In the Select Committee on Crime, we had testimony from a young
girl who took two trips from New York to Chicago with $3,000 in cold
cash.
This is what you are dealing with. There is no one simple solution to
the problem. I think the Turkey declaration is to be applauded. I think
the Nixon administration is to be commended, especially Ambas-
sador William Handley. It was of no small note that they would volun-
tarily ban the future growing of opium.
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v. r
But we have to, as Mr. Burke pointed out, brino these same economic
leverages, whatever they would be, to bear. I don't support a com-
plete cutting off of economic assistance. I would like to say we will
give you assistance. Where is it you are weak? If it is farmers, we will
teach them crop rotation. If it is some loss of revenue, we will see what
we can do about making that up.
In Southeast Asia the poppy is gown in the tri-border areas of
Burma, Laos, and Thailand by nomad tribes. Whatever you could do to
these governments, they have no control over the area in which the
opium is grown. You could cut off all of the aid until the cows come
home and it won't affect Burma because the poppy is grown by ex-
Nationailst people driven out of China in 1048. These people, 15,000 or
20,000 of them, wives, families, and soldiers, guard these nomad tribes
that grow the poppy in this tri-border area.
I think we could get a little tougher with the Thais who, I think,
are very lax. We could get tougher with Laos. The leaders of Laos,
who are supporting our mission in Southeast Asia, are actively in-
volved in trade and trafficking of heroin. High officials in South Viet-
nam are involved in it, and they are supporting our mission in
Indochina.
So this is not an easy problem, gentlemen. My recommendation for
your consideration, to deal with this problem, is not only to cut off
aid to some country not cooperating with us but also to help countries
that have undertaken a burden such as Turkey, to clear up this problem.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. Congressman Frelinghuysen?
Mr. F1ELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murphy, I have been very impressed with your testimony and
I think you and Mr. Steele are both to be commended for your report.
I don't know how much either of you gentlemen knew about the
drug problem before you took the trip, but it surely proved invaluable
to us.
I think it is a very clear articulation of what is a very serious na-
tional problem and I think your words of wisdom here today are very
helpful to us.
My question, really, is what the solution is. You say there is no easy
solution and, in effect, in your testimony you indicated that identifica=
tion of addicts and rehabilitation and treatment of addicts is certainly
an important part of the process, but that is quite late in the process
and, of course, the fact that so many of our men in Vietnam have been
exposed to the temptation of drugs is a real crisis. I notice you say
that the returning GI's are tested.
My son just got back last week and I am glad to say he was not de-
tained either in Vietnam or in this country, so I guess he must have
cleared the new hurdles that have been erected to detect addicts, but
he certainly substantiates the very widespread use of drugs in the
Armed Forces.
He also mentioned that there are apparently defects in the urinal-
ysis. He said there were hundreds of enlisted men who failed to pass
the test, and two officers.
I said, "Only two officers?"
He said, "Yes," and it was found out that it was because they had
been drinking tonic water. in gin and tonic, and the tonic water
shows up in the same way as the use of drugs.
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So if you don't want to be classified as in addict, you better be care-
ful what you drink as well as what you have used.
What worries me is, is there nothing more that we can do to prevent
the problem from being as big as it is?
You pointed with some pride, and I think justifiable pride, to the
fact that Turkey has taken significant steps to control its production
of poppies, but I would suppose, and certainly the articles in the news-
papers indicate, that other sources of supply will develop to meet the
continuing demand and because of the very tremendous rewards, we
are not necessarily solving the problem by having identified and
eliminated a major source of present supply.
Mr. Muupiiy. May f answer that, Mr. Frelingliuysen? Turkey's
banning the growing of opium makes these syndicates involved in the
purchase and the smuggling from Turkey into Marseilles, France,
make new contacts in different countries. There are other Middle East
countries that will take up the slack that Turkey is going to give
because of the money involved in it.
But you make these syndicates go out and make new contacts and in
making those new contacts they become very vulnerable to detection
and arrest because they are set in their ways now. They know the
farmers in Turkey will say to the government, "I am only going to
grow a couple of acres of poppy this year," but in fact may grow
10 times that much and sell the illegal amount to the smugglers.
You make them go to a different country and, by doing this, they
are exposing themselves.
We have a better chance of detecting and arresting these people
then.
It is not a cure. I would say it is a very significant step because any-
body can argue about figures, but there is no argument that at least
60 to 80 percent of all. of the opium received in the United States is
coming from the fields of Turkey.
Now, to make up that supply, these families are going to have to
look some place else. After arrests have been made in Italy and Mar-
seilles, France. you will find six or eight bodies floating in the harbor.
Whether they had any information that. leis to the arrest is unknown.
If they suspect anything, they will kill people.
Mr. Rl1SENTTTAL. Mr. Steele. Why don't you make your presentation
now? We are very grateful for the opportunity to hear from you now,
and then we will continue with the questions.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT H. STEELE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
Mr. STrFFP. Mr. Chairman. I am very appreciative of the chance
to test.ifv. I know of i:he. excellent work on drugs that your subcommit-
tee. has been doing, and T appreciate this opportunity. I have a brief
statement. It will take me. 41/o minutes, and then I will conclude.
Tn the last 2 months. there has been more constructive action by the
Federal Government to fight narcotics addiction in America than there
was in the last 20 years.
Among the recent developments. Turkey's announcement that it
will ban the. production of opium after August 1972 stands out as the
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single most important development that could occur in our Nation's
battle against heroin addiction.
The increasing flow of heroin into the United States in recent years
has literally drowned out our efforts to fight narcotics addiction in this
country. For every addict rehabilitated or incarcerated, several new
addicts have taken his place because of the ever growing flow of heroin
into America.
Approximately 75 percent of the heroin reaching the United States
originates in Turkish poppy fields, and the elimination of this source
will give us an unprecedented opportunity to mount a successful, all-
out attack on narcotics addiction in America using all the weapons of
education, rehabilitation, research, and law enforcement at our com-
mand. Furthermore, it will allow us to concentrate on finding ways
to reduce the flow of heroin to the United States from other parts of the
world, such as Mexico and the Far East, which will quickly step in to
take Turkey's place unless we move now to forestall this threat.
I heartily congratulate and applaud President Nixon for launching
the vigorous diplomatic offensive which has resulted in this critical
breakthrough. I also congratulate Turkey's new Prime Minister, Nihat
Erim, for his political courage in requiring tens of thousands of Turk-
ish farmers to stop growing the opium poppy, which has been their
most important cash crop.
On our recent visit to Turkey on behalf of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, Congressman Morgan Murphy and I devoted a major por-
tion of our time to urging Turkish officials to abolish opium produc-
tion, and our subsequent report to Congress recommended a new U.S.
diplomatic offensive to further encourage the Turkish Government to
take this critical step. Mr. Murphy and I are, therefore, particularly
gratified by the recent Turkish announcement, which marks the first
concrete step toward saving a generation of young Americans from
the scourge of heroin.
Yet, the Turkish action alone is no panacea for ending heroin addic-
tion in the United States. We must now move to reduce the market for
heroin in the United States through new programs of education, re-
habilitation and research and we must simultaneously press our dip-
lomatic offensive to forestall other opium-producing countries from
taking up the slack which will be created by Turkey's withdrawal
from the opium trade.
Chief attention must be given to Thailand, Laos, Burma, Vietnam,
and Mexico.
Mexico is currently estimated to be the source of 15 percent of the
heroin entering the United States. According to one U.S. narcotics
expert, "We have found opium fields in Mexico that make Turkey
look sick."
The Burma, Laos, Thailand border area, also known as the "fertile
triangle," is the world's largest illicit opium producing region. This
area accounts for close to 1,000 tons of opium annually or over one-
half of the worlds total illegal output. An estimated 10 percent of the
heroin reaching the United States and all of the heroin being sold to
U.S. troops in South Vietnam originates in the fertile triangle.
An increase in the flow of heroin from Southeast Asia to the United
States already appears to be underway. U.S. narcotics agents report
that they have seized more heroin being smuggled into the United
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States from Asia in the last 6 months than they seized in the last 6
years.
The heroin traffic in Southeast Asia is permitted and encouraged by
a combination of deep-seated political corruption and. the military
realities in the area.
In Laos, the chief of the Laotian General Staff, Gen. Ouane Rathi-
koune, is reportedly deeply involved in the heroin traffic. According
to reliable sources. General Ouane.'s troops both protect the opium and
heroin refineries along the Mekong River and transport heroin via
Royal Lao military aircraft.
In Thailand, the Thai border control police, who are responsible
for controlling the opium traffic in the Thai border areas, are totally
ineffective due to widespread corruption in their ranks.
In the Burmese border area, the local militia which is loyal to the
Burmese Government is allowed to carry on the opium traffic in their
areas, and they provide military protection to Burmese opium and
heroin laboratories.
The Thai and Burmese situations, moreover, are vastly complicated
by the presence of two remnant Chinese Kuomintang (I(M'T) army
divisions which fled China in 1949 and which provide most of the
logistical support for transporting the opium down from the moun-
tains to lowland pick-up points. The two Chinese armed groups-rem-
nants of the 3rd and. )th KMT divisions-number approximately
3,000 men, and most or all carry automatic. weapons ranging up to.50
caliber machineguns. The two KNIT divisions constii ute a controlling
influence on opium trafficking activities in Burma and Thailand and
have played a major role in stimulating local opium production.
I might add it had been the policy until recently for the U.S. Gov-
erniment to support the KMT.
The Chinese Nationalist Government on Taiwan continues to main-
tain contact with these two remnant divisions.
In Vietnam, despite a recent crackdown on corruption in the South
Vietnamese customs department, I have learned this week that South
Vietnamese military officers continue to deal in large quantities of
heroin and to transport it around South Vietnam in military aircraft
and vehicles, all of which were supplied by the United States. U.S.
military authorities have provided Ambassador Bunker with hard in-
telligence that one of the chief traffickers is Gen. Ngo Dzu, the com-
mander of II Corps. Dzu is one of the staunchest military backers of
President Thieu and is one of the leading strongmen my the current
Saigon government.
From the foregoing brief synopsis, it is clear that the U.S. Govern-
ment must be prepared to skillfully and forcefully exercise every dip-
lomatic, political, and economic leverage available to us in Southeast
Asia if we are to break th rough the web of corruption and self interest
that perpetuates and promotes the opium trade in Southeast Asia.
Failure to break through that web and gain the cooperation of the
Southeast Asia governments will seriously jeopardize the important
but tenuous gains made in Turkey last week.
Thank you.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Frelinghuysen?
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. NO.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Burke?
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Mr. BURKE. I would like to compliment both of you gentlemen for
your report and certainly the efforts you have made to get statistics
following your return here. I am glad you mentioned the fact that it
is a two-pronged problem, not looking at Turkey alone but looking at
the subsequent source of supply that would come into this country and
the necessity, then, of making it not only an international problem but
one that we must make within this country with regard to the importa-
tion and certainly the rehabilitation of those that have returned.
I have no questions.
I want to compliment you both for your work.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Vander Jagt?
Mr. VANDER JAGT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I, too, would like to commend both Congressman Steele and Con-
gressman Murphy for their very outstanding contributions in this
area and for their helpful testimony.
In your bill, the bill that you testified about and have proposed,
there is rehabilitation provided for the serviceman while he remains
in the service, and then he can be referred to a VA hospital after his
discharge. Is there any kind of requirement or incentive that he un-
dergo rehabilitation even after the discharge, or could there be?
Mr. MTJRPITY. That would depend on the .type of treatment that he
would receive. This is a personal thing with these fellows. You must
remember there are two types of addiction. There is the physical and
the phychological. Of course the psychological would vary with each
individual fellow who has become addicted. The depth of their psycho-
logical need "Till. determine how long it will take to treat them.
The returning veteran from Vietnam was probably introduced to
heroin while he was in Vietnam. Some medical people in their testi-
mony state that they feel that there can be success in curing these men
in a short period of time.
I think we have an opportunity here within the military to really
work out a program.
In the Select Committee on Crime we have had medical'personality
after personality testify concerning many modalities of treatment,
such as methadone. Methadone is an addictive synthetic drug that has
been successful in many instances. What methadone does is take the fel-
low off heroin, and he gets methadone at some treatment center. He does
not have to go out and support his habit by committing crime. But
methadone in and of itself is not the complete answer, as Congressman
Rangel will testify in a short whi le.
I would like the administration to spend more money on pure re-
search. We have had testimony on naloxone and cyclazocine, drugs that
offer hope with much more research. We may come up with a drug or
medicine that we could use to inoculate our children in grammar
school and immunize them from future heroin addiction.
This is what I think the Federal Government must pursue and the
path it must take. We know we have at least 250,000 addicts right now.
The modalities we have used to correct them have not been working
for the most part. This is not to say that we must give them up, but
we must pursue them.
Mr. VANDER JAGT. But under the terms of your bill, it does not ad-
dress itself to the problem, I don't believe, of the guy who is physically
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addicted, psychologically addicted, and when his discharge time has
arrived, he says "I like being addicted. I don't want to be rehabilitated."
Mr. MURPHY. Then he can be committed to a VA hospital. The Sec-
retary of the particular service will have the boy returned to the VA.
Mr. VAINER JAGT. VA via the district court?
Mr. MURPHY. Right.
Mr. VANDER JAGT. Then one last question. You state, on page 4, we
must make important decisions in the near future as to what in.terna-
national efforts we should take to prevent drugs from coming in, and
Congressman Steele mentioned we have to mount an all-out attack po-
litically, culturally, and economically. I think everybody would agree
with that, but do you have any recommendations as to what specific
steps could be taken?
Mr. MURPHY. In Turkey's particular instance, I think it was by per-
suation. Had we cut off foreign aid as suggested by some Members of
Congress to the Turks, we would have gotten no place with them.
Mr. VANDER JAGT. Congressman Steele, would you recommend cut-
ting off aid to a country that did not cooperate?
Mr. STEELE. I am a little at a loss to understand all of the discus-
sion about Turkey. We j ust had an enormous breakthrough in Turkey.
It isn't going to happen immediately, to be sure, but it gives us a chance
to go in and buy up some of the crop. I don't think you buy up the crop
until the last year, otherwise the crop will be enormous, of course.
I am very much in sympathy with the approach that Congressman
Rodino has taken. I think Mr. Rodino's approach has played a signi-
ficant role in getting the Congress and country excited about this and
has had an effect on Turkey. There is no question about it.
Yet had we taken that step with Turkey, I think you would have had
exactly the opposite effect. I think they would have gotten their backs
up and we would not have gotten anywhere with them. Now that we
talk about Southeast Asia, it is an entirely different situation.
In Turkey we had an ally which essentially was a Western ally, al-
though, to be sure, a Middle Eastern one, but, nontheless, one we could
talk to. The Turks have control of their country to an extent none of
the Southeast Asian countries' governments do, and I think we are
dealing with a different thing now in Southeast Asia.
I think it is going to take a more forceful approach in Southeast
Asia than it would have in Turkey.
What would have been counterproductive in Turkey, I think may
well be productive in Southeast Asia.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. Do you advocate passage of a bill that has the po-
tential of cutting off aid to one of the Southeast Asian countries?
Mr. STEELE. I advocate a bill that would give the President the
power to do that, but would not necessarily contain language such
as "the President shall suspend." I think there has to be some flex-
ibility here.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. He has the power not to provide assistance
now. Except for the psychological value of Congress doing something
additional, if the President decided it was in the national interest not
to give economic assistance to any country, he could now simply decide
with or without publicity not to provide assistance.
Mr. STEELE. I think one of the things that has moved this Govern-
ment to action in the last two and a half months has been the enormous
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outpouring of pressure from the Congress and from the people of this
country to move.
How does it happen? How does it come about that suddenly we get
a breakthrough in Turkey? Why wasn't it last year or 2 years ago?
Mr. ROSENTHAL. You fellows are being modest. The fact of the
matter is we owe it to you.
Mr. FRELINGIITUYSEN. What we have said is already going to their
heads. You better be careful.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. I think in my 10 years I have never seen a case
where two Congressmen took an initiative and brought it so to the
public attention, causingthe President to act.
If you fellows had not made the trip you did, and had not brought
back the results and reports you did, factually supported, a great deal
less would have occurred.
I don't know if Turkey's breakthrough would have occurred. I don't
know if the President's appoinnnent of Dr. Jaffe would have occurred.
This is sheer speculation. But my assessment, based on 10 years in
Congress, is that this is one of the occasions where congressional ini-
tiatives brought executive action. And so it does prove the point that
if Congress occasionally does enact certain legislative proposals, al-
though the President already has the authority to act, this becomes a
mandate, and it puts a little extra pressure on him to cause him to
act.
Mr. STEELE. I think that is very well put and that is why my basic
sympathy with the bill. I don't mean the compliments. I appreciate
those that were directed at the chairman of our study commission,
particularly. But I think congressional pressure could only have a
beneficial result.
But, why the breakthrough in Turkey, for example? The difference
is the kind of instructions I believe that were going out from the White
House and State Department in the last 2 months that never went out
before.
Mr. ROSENTIHAL. They called back all of the ambassadors here and
the pressure was on.
Mr. STEELE. We have been talking indirectly to the Turks. Fin-
ally we told them what we had to have and it was done. I believe we
can get a lot of the same results, not exactly the same, and I think
the Congress will go on record and push the administration, that is
desirable, but f don't want to see ,a situation where the President is
forced in making a counter-productive decision, being rushed into a.
decision because f think the point was brought up quite well, here,
what happens if we cut off aid to Thailand, and we haven't got their
cooperation.
I think we have to use our leverages. For example, in Laos, if we
stopped supporting Laotian Got,eraunent for 1 day, it would fall. 1Ve
support the Laotian currency. Every week we go in and buy. up cur-
rency in Laos. We help pay the army. We buy up war material. Amer-
icans organized the Royal Laotian Armed Forces. The Laotian Gov-
ernrrient would collapse in 2-1- hours if it were not for us.
What about telling the general that lie doesn't get this or that
because. of what he did last week with a certain heroin consignment?
TVhy don't we use these enormous leverages we have?
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I don't mean to take too long here but I would like to make one
other comment on this military situation that is developing that con-
cerns me greatly, and I think should concern the Congress and this
entire Nation, and particularly this committee. That is, it has leaked
out, these are not official statements, that 2 percent of the urinalysis
tests in the military in Vietnam have proved positive. This is totally
misleading.
\Ir.ITURPfiy.Ills boy came back from 'Vietnam.
Mr. FRELINGIIUYSE_N. The percentage of enlisted men may be higher
than that.
Ali?. Srrri.n. I would be interested in talking to him about it.
The first 2 days, the Army will not acknowledge this, the first 2
days the urinalysis test was showing some 7 to 9 percent of morphine
in the urine. Then it rot out to all of the troops that everybody was
going to be tested. You abstain from narcotics and nothing shows up.
r The New York Times had a great. article the other day about how
G.I.'s beat the test.
(The article referred to follows:)
[From the New York Times, June 24, 19711
GI's IN VIETNAM SAY TEST FOR HERoiN ADDICTION CAN BE BEATEN
(By Iver Peterson)
LoNOBINH, South Vietnam, June 23.-The homeward-bound G.I.'s taking the
Army's new urinalysis test for heroin use here believe the test is not accurate,
that even if it were, it can be beaten, and that even if it can't be beaten, it
doesn't make any difference.
Last Sunday, American servicemen leaving Vietnam forhome began taking the
compulsory urine test, which uses an advanced and specially designed machine
to determine whether they are addicted to heroin..
"It doesn't work anyway," said Specialist 4 Mike Lombardi as he waited at the
90th Replacement Battalion processing center for the bus to the airport, where he
would board the "Freedom Bird" for the flight home. He took the test yesterday.
"There was one guy smoked three caps [capsules of heroin] when he took the
test, he was so nervous, and he checked right on through," Specialist Lombardi
said.
"And another guy came down off skag [heroin] three weeks ago and they
pulled him out of line," he added.
ALL TAKE THE TEST
-It just varies." another G.I. said. "Some guys just luck out find some don't."
The 90th Replacement Battalion handles all newly arrived homeward-bound
Army servicemen in Vietnam's southern half. There is another processing system
at Camranh Bay, on the central coast, where the command has its only other
heroin urinalysis machine. The Air Force, Navy and Marines use the same two
machines but handle their personnel separately. All servicemen and women
from general on down, must take the test.
As they wait for the test, which now is the first step in being processed out of
country, the soldiers idle around the camp area reading comic books, fingering
the bargain-priced suits and bell-bottom pants at the Last Chance Unclaimed
Tailor and talking about the drug test.
Guy Walton, a sergeant who had yet to take the test, said that many of his
friends were worried when they learned of the urinalysis.
"I'm worried about it and I'm a full-fledged juicer" [liquor drinker], he said.
PLAYED A MUNCIE
The high-ranking Army medical officer who first announced the urinalysis
program-he refused to be identified-said last week: "If there's a way to beat
this thing the G.I.'s will think of it." They're busy thinking now.
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One soldier, who decided not to give his name, said lie played a hunch in trying
to beat the test despite his heroin habit. Ile spent the morning of the test drink-
ing beer, he said, and what he gave the Army technicians "was damn near pure
water." He passed.
Some soldiers say they can't urinate when the times comes for the test. "That's
why we have the coffee and fruit juice here," said one of the male nurses.
Another way of beating the test, the G.L's said, was simply to stay off heroin
for a few days before reporting for processing. The Army nurses at the testing
center say they have seen men visibly suffering withdrawal symptoms while
taking the test.
MOST MEN APPROVED
Most of the men interviewed today agreed that the urine test was a good thing
because it may provide hell) for addicts. If the test indicated that a serviceman
is a drug user, lie undergoes five days of preliminary treatment at a special cen-
ter at Camranh Bay. If he is a hard addict, he may receive up to 60 days of treat-
ment at an Army or Veterans' Administration hospital in the States.
These facts are explained to the men before they ta1;e the test.
"I believe the majority is for it," said Sgt. James Miller, who shepherds the
men through the "out processing" routine. "Everybody's in such a hurry to get
out of here they don't care anyway."
In fact, today there was more griping about the second step in the outprocess-
ing routine-the barbershop---than about the urine test.
"Sideburns cannot be down below the ear opening." Sergeant Miller intoned.
The men, who don't want to face their girl friends with an Army haircut,
groaned.
Mr. STEELE. What the military doesn't tell you is that 8,200 heroin
addicts turned themselves in to rehabilitation programs between Jan-
uary and June of this year-8200. Let's take this statistic : Let's
assume that one out of four, or one out of five, people turn them-
selves in. Surely it is not any more tban that. Multiply 8,000 by four
or five and you come up with 35,000 that is the rough ball park esti-
mate that, we were working with.
I think it would be a great disservice to this country if the military
at this point tries to sweep this tiring under the rug just because the
urinalysis program, easily beaten, is showing up 2 percent.. They
haven't come out with an official statement yet, but I think it is im-
portant that Congress--
Mr. FRELINGIILYSEN. Mr. Steele. do you know if there is any truth
in the story that a. man can fail urinalysis tests if lie has been drink-
ing tonic water?
Mr. STEELS. I heard it was beer.
Mr. l OSENTHAr.. On page 4 of your statement, Mr. Steele, you
mention General Dzu : What shall we. do about a situation like. that?
Mr. STEELE. It seems to me we are getting down to the nitty-gritty
now.
We have gone to the South Vietnamese and said, "We have to have
action." They say they are going to give us action, and they crack
down on street peddlers. It is harder for the G.T. today to buy heroin
on a base than it was before. The national police are cracking down.
This was an easy step.
Second, they cracked down on the customs department. This was
harder because it involved relatives of the Prime Minister. Never-
theless, they did it.
Now, who do we come to? We come to a top strong man, a general
in the South Vietnamese Armed Forces, one of the staunchest mili-
tary and political backers of President Thieu.
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Now is the question, how serious are you about cracking down?
This is the point we come to.
I think we have gotten fairly far so far with diplomatic repre-
sentations, Secretary Laird and Ambassador Bunker, and we have to
lay it on the line again, our commitment to South Vietnam is on the
line, either you are serious about this or you are not serious about it.
I don't think you should put the man. against the firing squad but he
has to stop.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. Supposing Dzu says, "I don't know anything
about it" and that is that?
Mr. STEELE. I have said, and Congressman Murphy has said, and
we said in our report very specifically, in less than 2 to 3 months unless
there is substantial progress, the only solution is to withdraw from
Vietnam. I hold to that.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Murphy.
Mr. Muxriuy. We bad, before the Foreign Affairs Committee, peo-
ple from the Laos desk at the State Department. I asked how much
economic and military assistance we were giving to Laos annually. The
answer was $200 million in direct economic and military assistance.
This does not include other assistance growing out of the Indochina
war, which is substantial. Not a word in the testimony had to deal. with
the problem of narcotics production or transportation or narcotics sup-
pression in Laos. l asked the various witnesses how much of that money
was going to go into suppression or police work regarding narcotics in
Laos and he came up with a figure of two policemen, out of almost $200
million. I think this is what Mr. Steele and I have in mind.
Hue, is a li a that we can say to these people, "You are going to
devote so much of this to the policing of narcotic traffic in your coun-
try. We know a certain general in your high command :is involved in
it." This is where the President could take this aid package and use it
as a leverage to get rid of this fellow. What disturbs me is the State
Department. It takes two freshmen Congressmen-of 5 months-to
come up with this idea and it doesn't reflect brilliance. I think it is just
common sense.
Here was 30 pages of testimony and not one word in there about
heroin addiction in Southeast Asia or Laos. It defies me how a prob-
lem of this magnitude can be overlooked by responsible officials of the
U. S. Government.
Mr. BOSENTIIAL. Tliank you both very much again. Our indebted-
ness and gratitude goes to you both for the magnificent job you have
done.
The next witness is my distinguished colleague from New York,
Hon. Charles B. Rangel. Mr. Rangel, we know you, too, are a member,
together with our colleague, Mr. Murphy, of the Select Committee on
Crime. We know you have had considerable understanding of this
problem for many, many years, both in your district and during your
service in the legislature in New York. We are very pleased to hear
from you.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES B, RANGEL, A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Mr. RANGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members
of the committee. I welcome the opportunity to testify before this com-
mittee. Many of the remarks that you have heard earlier are incor-
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porated in my statement, so with the chair's permission, I would like
to have my entire written statement entered into the record.
Mr. ROSE THAL. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(The statement referred to follows:)
STATRuENT OF HON. CHAaLI.s B. R NGEL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM
i' I I ii : 'uATE OF NEW YORK
I am pleased to have the opportunity to share with you my views on bills seek-
ing to curb the illicit flow of international narcotics to our shores.
I have introduced two bills, HLR. 4608 to provide for increased international
control of the production and trafficking of opium and H.R. 6709 to prohibit
foreign aid from being provided to foreign countries which do not act to prevent
drugs from unlawfully entering the United States.
I live in Harlem. I would like you to put yourself in my shoes for a moment
and see what heroin imported front abroad is doing to my community. Harlem
reflects on an exaggerated scale what is in store for the rest of our cities if we
do not do an about-face in our foreign policy toward countries growing, convert-
ing and exporting this international poison.
If you were walking down a Harlem street, it is not unlikely that you would
encounter one of our 40,000 heroin addicts. Although addicts normally inject
heroin into their veins while in bathrooms, basements, alleys, or other places out
of the public view, nevertheless it is still possible to spot an addict under the
influence of heroin. You can spot him on the nod," drifting into somnolence,
waking up, and drifting off again.
You can also spot him because of the cringes he is forced to commit to finance his
habit. Property crimes by addicts are about as common as parking tickets. In fact,
the Small Business Chamber of Commerce of New York in a study this year
reports that theft by addicts living in or operating in Central Harlem amounted
to $2.3 billion in 1970. About $1.8 billion of this theft is estimated to have been
committed in the Harlem Community and the remaining half billion is estimated
to have been committed by Harlem addicts in neighborhoods outside Harlem. You
can actually see them ripping metal fixtures out of vacant tenement buildings and
selling them to local junkyards. Among addicts, this practice known as "stealing
copper," is considered a middle status occupation.
Last year there were over 11,750 narcotics arrests in Harlem. This arrest statis-
tic, as large as it is, does not begin to tell the law enforcement problem. The vast
number of criminal acts remain hidden, that is, they are simply not observed or
reported. Some of those which are observed are not reported to the police. Some
of those which are, are not recorded. The New York Narcotic Addiction Control
Commission did research on the addicts it handles and found that only 79 percent
of the addicts had arrest records. Interviews with the addicts themselves, how-
ever, revealed that virtually all committed crime to support their habit. One of the
most startling findings of the Commission is that the addict may commit up to 120
crimes on average for each crime for which he is arrested and charged.
New York Police Commissioner Patrick Murphy testified with me before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 1st concerning the fruitlessness of
domestic law enforcement against the traffickers who receive tons and tons of
heroin from abroad. He described how he and his 800 man narcotics force in
cooperation with the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and customs
officials conducted an intensive two-year campaign against heroin trafficking
and how they arrested, In 1970 alone, at least 33 major distributors and inter-
national traffickers as well as thousands of junkies and addicts. But none of
these efforts, he conceded, have reduced the availability of heroin on the streets
of New York. What we have been doing. he said, is spending huge fortunes In
largely unsuccessful and virtually impossible efforts to plug up what may be
likened to thousands of tiny streams from a perforated garden hose Instead of
taking the more efficient course of shutting off the narcotics flow at the faucet.
What Is critically necessary now, he concluded, is to turn off the flow out of the
poppy fields until all illicit and unregulated growth can be dried up forever.
I could describe to you how heroin has broken down our corrections system
In New York City. Fully, 50 percent of the people In New York City jails are
addicts. The City is crippled with a $50,000,000 bill just on prison, court, and
police costs for these criminal addicts.
I could describe to you how narcotics-related court cases are a revolving door
operation. Those defendants whose cases are not dismissed outright, get off
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with light sentences because of the lack of space in jails and the enormous back-
log of criminal cases awaiting disposition.
1 could describe to you how drugs including heroin have invaded our public
schools. Heroin use is now the leading cause of death among teenagers in New
York City. Off certain schools grounds a nickel bag of heroin can be as easily
obtained as a pack of chewing gum.
Instead I want to tell you about how heroin kills. Last year it killed over
1,150 people in the City. That amounts to three a day. About half of those who
~[1ied were under the age of 23, while about one-fifth were 19 or less. Of all
narcotic-related deaths in 1970, 75 percent were due to acute reactions to a dose
of heroin ; 10 percent were due to heroin-related diseases such as hepatitis,
tetanus, and bacterial endocarditis; and 15 percent were due to violent incidents
involving narcotics.
These narcotics statistics do not include our returning GIs. Last year more
people in New York City were killed by heroin than were killed in the war.
Although initial results of President Nixon's new tests designed to weed Out
and rehabilitate the heroin addicts among homeward-bound GIs indicate an
addiction rate of only 2 percent, I am certain that some addicts have slipped
through by temporarily breaking their drug habit: and "drying out." The fact
remains when the GI comes home, his mother no longer gets a hero, but an addict.
Heroin, to my way of thinking, is. just as dangerous a foreign threat to us as
was the threat of Soviet missiles pointed at us from Cuba. When the Cuban
missile crisis occurred, the nation united behind the President in his determina-
tion to make the Soviets back down.
Yet our efforts to deal with the foreign threat of heroin have been less than
dramatic. On June 30, the State Department announced that after years of
negotiating, it has finally gotten Turkey to promise to quit planting and harvest-
ing opium by Fall, 1972. As you know, in the past the Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs estimated that as much as 80 percent of the heroin entering
the American mainstream had its origin in the fields of Turkey.
Despite this breakthrough, BNDD officials admit that there is a distinct possi-
bility that the illicit traffic chat flourished in Turkey may be re-established else-
where such as India, West Pakistan, and Afghanistan.
Ilow do I explain to my people the federal government's inactivity and their
apparent lack of results? How do I explain to them such things as the recent
State Department announcement concerning the Turkish breakthrough which
said in part :
"It is a difficult thing to explain to the Turkish farmers who use the seeds
for seasoning, the oilfor cooking, the stalk for fodder and fuel-that they can
no longer grow opium."
It should not be too difficult a thing to explain to these opium farmers since
the United States has prowled to subsidize them in return.
My constituents tell me they just wish the State Department would give then
half the consideration that it apparently gives Turkish opium farmers.
Harvey Wellman, the State Department's Special Assistant for Narcotics Mat-
ters, testified on July 1st before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the
federal government was in fact doing all sorts of things. The State Department
has made bilateral arrangements for mutual assistance in drug control with
Mexico. Turkey and France. It has paid $1 million of its $2 million pledge to the
United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control and it has sent to the Senate for
confirmation the United Nations convention to extend international controls to
psychotropic substances.
These steps are commendable but so far they simply have not made the
slightest impact on the availability of heroin on our streets. And as long as
the heroin supply is so abundant, there will remain the likelihood that the
number of persons introduced and addicted to heroin will continue to spiral
upward.
The reason the federal government has placed more emphasis on Its rhetoric
than on its actions in international drug control is not so much that it has
purposely Ignored this national emergency but rather that things like narcotics
control had to be balanced against the diplomatic considerations. How, after
all, could the heroin problem be possibly as serious as the risk of offending a
NATO ally? How could heroin which has devastated Harlem with pandemic
virulence be more important than our relations with Iran or Laos?
I believe it is time that we re-examine our diplomatic priorities. Since the
Executive Branch in the last three or four years has been unable to do so, it
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becomes the task of congress. For this reason, I have introduced H.R. 6709
which is cosponsored by 74 of my colleagues.
The bill would empower the comptroller General, as an agent of Congress,
to make an annual determination by :March 31st of each year of the effectiveness
of measures taken by each foreign government to prevent narcotics from un-
lawfully coming to our country. Should the Comptroller General determine that
a government has not undertaken appropriate steps, he would notify Congress,
and after 90 days foreign assistance would be terminated. Following the deter-
mination of the Comptroller General, however, should the President find that a
government has subsequently taken sufficient measures or should the Presi-
dent feel that the over-riding national interest requires that economic aid be
continued, he would request that Congress waive the provisions of the Act.
Additionally, the President is authorized to utilize the various federal agencies
he may deem appropriate to help foreign governments to curb the flow of illicit
narcotics.
Special Assistant Wellman, in testifying before the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, outlined the State Department's position on my bill. He stated
that an explicit threat to terminate assistance would not promote our objective
of curbing the illicit flow of narcotics from abroad. Such action might well
create internal pressures which would make it difficult for those governments
to take the actions we desire. This may be true to a limited degree but this is
the assumption that we have been operating for years, and foreign govern-
ments still consider heroin an internal United States problem, not their prob-
lem. All our current diplomatic efforts have had little effect on these govern-
ments. The leverage is there and the heroin epidemic is so dangerous that we
can no longer afford the luxury of waiting to see if foreign governments are
going to take appropriate steps.
The State Department also said that such a bill would have no effect on those
countries which are involved but do not receive foreign aid. What they are re-
ferring to is countries like Burma. In the first place while Burma is one of the
biggest producers, it is also one of the biggest consumers. Very little trickles to
the United States. In the second place, no one has yet come up with a. solution to
this problem. International cooperation has been suggested, but as BNDD Direc-
tor John Ingersoll recently testified, Burma has not even agreed to meet with
United Nations Secretary General U Thant to work on a solution. Finally, it is
ridiculous to say that just because termination of foreign aid will not be a useful
tool in one or two countries, we should not apply it to countries like Thailand or
Laos where it would be highly effective.
The State Department also opposes the bill because it claims some areas of
illicit opium production are outside the control, political and administrative, of
the government and it would not be fair to cut off its aid. This misinterprets the
bill. The bill would only require foreign governments to do what is reasonably
possible. It would not require governments who are in the midst of war to dry up
entirely all production and trafficking of opium. Thus, in Thailand where there is
considerable uncontrolled local production, we would only expect the government
to tackle the corruption in the Royal Laotian armed forces which is a major
trafficker.
Finally, the State Department opposes the bill because It claims that we should
be helping these governments not threatening them. The problem apparently is
that there is no reliable substitute crop that will pay as much and that many
countries have poorly trained and administered narcotics enforcement agencies.
This also misinterprets my bill. Section 4 of my bill would allow foreign govern-
ments who wish to really do something about the problem to secure the assistance
of the appropriate United States departments and agencies with their particular
problem. For example, West Pakistan could request the assistance of the Depart-
ment of Agriculture in setting up high yield Mexican wheat production instead of
opium poppy. India could request the assistance of the Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs and customs officials to tighten up the leak of illicit opium
which it currently den its exists.
Attached to my testimony is a table of the economic assistance programs and
the countries than. would pos; ibly be affected by my bill. (See p. 37.) I have re-
drafted the bill to make certain that for practiclal reasons the Food-for-Peace
Program administered by AID in cooperation with the Department of Agricul-
ture would net be affected. (A copy of the redrafted bill referred to appears on
p. 36.) Also for political reasons, the Military Assistance Program and the
Military Sales Program would not be affected under my bill as re-drafted.
The second bill I introduced, H.R. 4608, to provide for increased international
control of the production and trafficking of opium, represents a pioneer effort.
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It requires the United States representative to the International Criminal
Police Organization to propose to the Organization that a special opium control
staff be established within the Organization in order to investigate and propose
appropriate action to eliminate the production, processing, and transportation of
opium (other than for medical or research purposes).
It establishes a committee composed of those under secretaries of Executive
departments, as designated by the President, who are engaged in the enforcement
of laws with respect to the production, processing. transportation, selling, or use
of opium, which shall coordinate the efforts of the United States in such Organi-
zation.
It authorizes the President to furnish assistance to any friendly foreign
country, on such terms and conditions as lie determines necessary, in order to
encourage and enable that: country; to eliminate the production and processing
of opium within its boundaries (except such minimal production and processing
as that country may require, or any other foreign country may require, for
medical or research purposes).
It requires such assistance to be used : (1) to aid opium producers in develop-
ing alternative crops and commodities and markets for such crops and commod-
ities; (2) to provide new employment opportunities in the recipient country for
those persons in that country who become unemployed as the result of the policy
of that country to eliminate opium production and processing; and (3) to
strengthen the capability of the recipient country to enforce its laws with respect
to opium production and processing.
It provides that, if the ['resident determines that a foreign country is con-
tinning to permit the production and processing of opium which illegally enters
the United States (other than for medical or research purposes), he shall im-
mediately discontinue all military, economic, and other assistance to such coun-
try authorized under this or other law. Allows the President to seek, through
the United Nations or any other international organization, the imposition of
international economic sanctions against such country.
Finally, it establishes an Executive Committee on International Opium Control
to advise the President and Congress on the administration of this Act.
In short, the bill would do all the things that I think are necessary to do in
order to curb the international illicit flow of heroin to our country. Currently
the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) continues as a
skeleton communications organization with a small budget and a staff of 108
persons only 12 of whom are assigned to narcotics.:INTERPOL does not actually
investigate crimes itself. Its function is to coordinate the detective work of the
various nations involved in a given case. Without this, of course, thousands of
criminals around the world could find safety the minute they step over their na-
tions' borders. INTERPOL maintains 1.3 million file cards on criminals and sus-
pect individuals around the world. It also operates its own radio network in its
headquarters in St. Cloud, France. Our government's representative to INTER-
POL is Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Eugene Rossides. Since INTERPOL
represents the only international police organization with any potential for fight-
ing international narcotics traffickers, I believe its authority should be expanded
and broadened and its current role re-defined.
REDIL FTF,D VF.RS"CoN OF II.R. 6700
A uTL7. To amend section 620 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to prohibit foreign
assistance from being provided to foreign countries which do not act to prevent narcotic
drugs from unlawfully entering the United States.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled. That section 620 of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new
subsection :
"(v) (1) The Comptroller General of the United States shall review and de-
termine annually (A) the effectiveness of measures being taken by each foreign
country to prevent narcotic drugs, partially, or completely produced or processed
in such country, from unlawfully entering the United States, and (B) whether
that country has undertaken appropriate measures to prevent any such narcotic
drug from unlawfully entering the United States. Not later than March 31 of each
year, the Comptroller General shall make a report to the Congress of his review
and determinations for the preceding calendar year.
"(2) Except as otherwise provided under paragraph (3) of this subsection,
ninety days after the making of any such report to the Congress, any foreign
country with respect to which the Comptroller General has reported a deter-
mination under paragraph (1) (B) of this subsection, that such country has not
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:7
undertaken appropriate measures to prevent any such narcotic drugs from un-
lawfully entering the United States, shall thereafter receive no further economic
assistance under part I of this Act.
"(3) if the President finds that a foreign country referred to under paragraph
(2) of this subsection has undertaken, after the determination of the Comp-
troller General, appropriate measures to prevent such narcotic drugs from un-
lawfully entering the United States, or finds that the overriding national interest
requires that economic assistance under part I of this Act be continued, he may
ask Congress to waive the provisions of such paragraph, and if the Congress
concurs, the provisions of such paragraph shall not apply to that country unless
the provisions of such paragraph would apply further to that country as a
result of a subsequent report and determination.
"(4) The President is authofized to utilize such agencies and facilities of the
Federal Government as he may deem appropriate to assist foreign countries in
their efforts to present the unlawful entry of narcotic drugs into the United
States. The President shall keep the Congress fully and currently informed with
respect to any action taken by him under this paragraph.
"(5) No provisions of this or any other law shall be construed to authorize
the President to waive the provisions of this subsection.
"(6) For purposes of this subsection, `narcotic drugs' has the same meaning
as given that term under section 4731 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954."
Sec. 2. The provisions of this Act shall be effective on the first July 1 occurring
on or after the date of enactment of this Act.
(Following are the tables referred to in Mr. Rangel's statement.)
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE COMMITMENTS FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES, FISCAL YEAR 1971 (ESTIMATES)
(In thousands of dollars)
Development Technical Supporting
AID loans cooperation assistance
Afghanistan -----------------------------------_ - 8,700 1,700 7,000 --------------
India --------------------------------------- --- _ 184,530 175,530 9,000 --------------
Iran ------------------------------------------- --------- -----------------
Lebanon----------------------------------- --- ----------- ---------
Nepal --------------------------- --------------- - 2,631 706 1,925 --------------
Pakistan------------------------------------ _-__- 88,840 82,840 6,000 ----------
Turkey---------------------------------------- _ 68,385 65,000 3,385 --------------
United Arab Republic --------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------
Bolivia--------------------------------------------- 3,585 335 3,250 --------------
Mexico----------------------------------------- - - --------- ------------ -----
Peru --------------------------------------- --- - - 7,010 3,360 3,650 --------------
Burma--------------------------------------
Hong Kong -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Japan -------------------------- -------- --- -- -------------------------------------------------------
Laos --------------------------------- 45,925 925 6,600 38,400
Malaysia -----------------------------------------------------
Thailand__------------------------------------------- 23,095 1,395 6,100 15,600
France-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE COMMITMENTS FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES, FISCAL YEAR 1972 (PROPOSED)
[In thousands of dollars]
Development Technical Supporting
AID loans cooperation assistance
Afghanistan ---------------------- ----- 7,018 -------------- 7,018 --------------
India ---------------------------------------------- 230,050 220,000 10,050 ---------------
Iran ------------------------------------------ - ----------------------------------------
Lebanon-------------------------------------------------------- -
Nepal-------------------------------------------- 2,695 -------------- - 2,695 --------------
Pakistan----------------------------------------- _ 118,580 110,000 8,330 250
Turkey------ --------------------------------- -- 43,948 40,000 3,948 --------------
United Arab Republic --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bolivia-------------------------------------------- 13,400 10,000 3,285 115
Mexico -------------------------------------------------------------------- ?--
Peru --------------------------------------------- _ 14,100 10,000 4,100 --------------
Burma
Hong Kong---------------- ---- ------------------------------ -----------------
Japan------------------------------------------------------------------- -------- -----------------
Laos ------------ ?--------------------------------- 50,550 -----------------?---------- 50,550
Malaysia ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thailand ------------------------------ 40,000 ---------------------------- 40,000
France-------------------------------------------------
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33
Mr. RANGEL. I would I ike to share with the Chair its commendation
of Congressmen Murphy and Steele. I think it is significant to note
they are both freshmen and have done an outstanding job in making
the narcotics problem a national issue.
In the consideration of any amendment to the foreign aid bill,
there is a great deal of concern about protecting the sensitivity of our
relationships with host countries. Because I am new in the. U.S. Con-
gress and am more used to thinking about heroin on the streets than
diplomacy considerations, I will not comment. on that.
I do hope that you will take time out to read the legislation that
I have introduced and that, of my colleague, Mr. Rodino.
I am not concerned with whether the amendment you adopt is my
bill, or a combination with another Corigressman's bill, but I think it
is important to develop a mechanism to apply leverage against for-
eign governments involved in narcotics. My bill gives this leverage
to the Comptroller General as an agent of Congress.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. You are the only one who mentions the Comp-
troller General. What would you have him do?
Mr. RANGEL. The Comptroller (;enera.l will have annual responsi-
bility to investigate the conduct of any nation to see what its involve-
ment is in cultivation or manufacturing of drugs which are being ex-
ported and imported into these United States. He will report back
to the Congress on those nations -,vhicli aren't taking adequate steps
to curb the flow of narcotics and economic aid to these countries would
be terminated.
Tt also provides for the President to waive provisions of the bill
where in his opinion it -,w?ould affect our national security. Congress
would then authorize aid to continue if it concurred with the Presi-
dent's opinion.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. What can you tell us about the depth of the prob-
lem as you have seen it from the community point of view? What is
the broad general nature of this problem? flow serious is it?
Mr. RANGEL. First of all, I would like to say as Assistant TT.S.
Attorney in the Southern District of New York, I dealt extensively
with prosecution of those people who had been charged with violating
the Harrison Act, which is basically section 18 of the U.S. Code.
At that time, we were. working closely with the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics. It became abundantly clear to me that 70 to 80 percent of
the persons convicted we.r,' blacks and Puerto Ilieans.
One of the elements of the crimp under this Federal statute was
that the person had to have knowledge that the drugs were imported
into these United States illegally. I think it is safe to say that while
black may be beautiful. it is not perfection ,rnd many blacks simply
did not know anything about importation of heroin lDt alone how to
import it.
Our failure to get the importers brings m- to wonder whether our-
law enforcement efforts are a realistic method of dealing with the
problem. The fact, of he matter is that in my community we have
screamed out about the trafficking of drugs for veers but our voieeC
have not been heard and tons of heroin continue to be imported
unabated.
We have received absolutely no results from the efforts of the
Congress of the United States, much less results from the efforts of the
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39
State of New York. Police Commissioner Murphy has testified before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and also before the Knapp
Commission as well as the State Investigating Commission and he has
pointed out that the corruption that exists in a substantial part of the
32,000-man New York City Police Department stems mostly from
narcotics trafficking.
Now, what this has done in a large segment of our community is
to have the minority members review what has happened to their
families, to their court system and to school systems to find out who
would be responsible for such acts.
Black mothers are no longer praying that their children complete
high` school but only hoping and praying that they will not succumb
to drugs.
It has almost corrupted the United Federation of Teachers because
for professional reasons they have refused to cooperate with the New
York City Police Department in reporting specific addiction informa
tion in our primary schools and secondary schools for inclusion in the
Narcotics Regi ster
.
Our court system is overloaded with narcotics cases. Over 75 percent
of those incarcerated are incarcerated for crimes Closely associated with
drug addiction. Those that cannot make bail are incarcerated for 2
to 3 years while awaiting trial. Needless to say, 70 or 80 percent of
those people waiting for trial happen to be black or Puerto Rican.
One of the ways we try to have due process is called the bail
system, but bail is set in New York City courts not on the bass of
whether or not the defendant is expected to return to the court when
his case appears on the calendar but whether there is enough space in
the house of detention. The department of correction commissioner
advises the court and the court advises legal aid. Legal aid then
decides whether or not the defendants will have any bail at all or
hether or not the. initial char es would be held.
One of the methods which i used to eliminate calendar congestion
is to allow drug pushers, whether addict or not, to plead guilty to
misdemeanor and receive a reduced sentence if, in fact, any sentence
at all. This is what imported narcotics has done to our justice system.
In our hospitals, drug addiction has almost corrupted. the, profes-
sional standards expected of hospital administrators as .they attempt
to politically react to the need for having beds for drug addicts at
the expense of the aged, poor, and sick.
In the area of rehabilitation and job training, of course, we cannot
expect rehabilitation to have any effect on our addicts since most of
our rehabilitation centers are merely used by experienced addicts to
reduce habits in such a way they can get by with $3 and $5 bags as
opposed to $60 and $70 habits.
I mention all of this outside of the testimony which I submitted
into the record because it, is clear to those of us that come from com-
munities such as Harlem that no one in middle America seems to be
concerned about how the addicts have taken over our streets, closed
churches, and prevented any type of community activity in the eve-
ning. Political clubs that used to be open one or two nights a week have
closed. The Catholic church has closed. Protestant churches and svna-
gogues have long been gone.
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But when it became known that our returning GI's were addicted,
when it became known there were whites getting addicted to the same
drugs, when mothers began seeing not heroes returning from the war
but drug addicts, then we observed a flurry of activity in the con-
sciences of Americans who claim to be deeply concerned about all
Americans.
I submit we must be concerned with disruptions from within as
well as protecting our security from without, because while we find
an overwhelming number of minority group members escaping the
economic purges of not being able to survive in this Nation by enlist-
ing into the service, we also find a growing feeling among minority
group members that this is a plot of genocide which is meant to extin-
guish a segment of community members who may not be considered
useful by the larger white majority.
Of course, there is very little credence that should be given to this
type of thinking because this epidemic has spread outside of the inner
cities into suburbia and throughout these United States. But I am
saying that many of our people in the Harlem community who once
felt America could protect them against foreign foes, if not against
some of the domestic problems which we have historically faced, are
now questioning whether America itself might not be unintentionally
involved in, the trafficking of narcotics.
It has been said over and over by distinguished members of both
Houses that, in fact, we are giving subsidies to nations, we are giving
military aid to nations, nations whose governments are involved in
the growing and trafficking of narcotics. Details on this have been re-
ported back by Congressmen and testimony that has been received
from Congressman Steele and from Congressman Murphy but has not
been rebutted by any responsible agency of Government.
We can know that planes that we have purchased, trucks that we
have purchased, governments that we are supporting are actively en-
gaged in trafficking drugs which affect our youngsters abroad as well as
the people in this country.
I would suspect that there will come a time when legislators such as
myself, who have attempted to be diplomatically responsible with the
legislation that I have introduced, will have to concern myself with
whether my primary responsibility will besurvival of my community
rather than the sensitive relationships that this country enjoys with
our so-called allies.
So for these reasons, I welcome the opportunity to conic here, but we
know in Harlem, as many other communities throughout these United
States know, when America has a foe, we know how to deal with it.
Unless we can review our relationships with the nations which we can
pinpoint are directly responsible for cultivation and manufacture of
heroin, then we may lose a large segment of America from within.
It is commonplace for our department of hospitals to receive chil-
dren that have received heroin overdoses. I just ask you to try to
walk in my shoes and try to think of my children as being your chil-
dren and I am convinced you will change your ideas about which is
more important-the survival of American youth or the, relations
we have with nations with whom we have attempted over the years
to negotiate.
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I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity and I
think that you and this committee should take a great deal of credit
for the recent agreement that was made with the Turkish Government
because I, for one, know the pressures that have been put not only on
this House Foreign Affairs Committee but on the Senate Foreign Re-
lations Committee as well to make certain that people did not say
things that were offensive.
I think the value of life is far more important than many of the
things we have concerned ourselves with in the past. Thank you very
much.
Mr. ROSE\TIIAL. Mr. Frelinghuysen.
Mr. FRPLINGUrz-sr_,, Tani: you. Mr. Chairman. I would like to
congratulate Mr. Range]. The freshmen are making a very impres-
sive case today. I have been interested in your eloquent and profound
testimony. I haven't, read your prepared statement but if it reeds as
well as your spoken statement. it is going to be a valuable contribution.
In comment, I would only say that. it is not a question of your
children as against. ours. All children are subjected to the same prob-
lem today. It has, as you pointed out, spread so far that our youth,
no matter how they are brought up, no matter where they live, no
matter what kind of edncat ion they are getting, are subjected ',o what
we used to call temptation in a very real form. We are all very sensi-
tive to the fact that something needs to be done.
The best way to protect our children isn't necessarily to throw the
book at our friends or neighbors or other countries. That isn't going
to solve the problem of the source of supply. I would suppose we face
a much more tedious job of educating countries to the fact that this
does constitute an international problem, with which they need to
concern themselves more directiv that. they have.
If we are simply to cut ourselves off in an attempt to express dis-
approval of a policy which doesn't seem, to the Southeast Asians, for
instance, to be evil because they have been accustomed to drugs for
a long time, or in Turkey, we may not be solving the problem. We
may be simply complicating it.
In other words, if we should have used what I understand is your
approach with respect , o Turkey u years ago, we almost surely would
not have been able to secure the success which has occurred with re-
spect to Turkey. The source of supply would not have dried up or
be in the process of drying up had we simply said, "You are not our
friend if you continue to grow opium because opium is being trans-
ported to our country from Turkey."
Mr. R?ANGEL. I have not, the expertise to speculate as to -\i-hat would
have happened if we had taken a harder line in Turkey. Certainly. I
suppose we could have nc,Erotiated with Cuba when Nye suspected they
had missiles over there but I did somehow believe this Nation felt
it was a national threat.
Your children are not subjected to what the children in my district
are. Legislators like Senator Hughes and Senator Javits walked the
streets witnessing narcotics sales with policemen on the scene.
Mr. FRFLIr;GIItYsEN. I am saying we should not pass judgment on
the conditions that other children grow up in. I live in a town of
20,000 people and pushing takes place on the green in the center of
town. I_t happens in a lot of different communities.
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I am not downgrading your concern with your district. Admittedly
the inner cities have a peculiar problem, in an exaggerated form., but
the drug problem is prevalent and very widespread.
Mr. RANGEL. My whole point, and I didn't intend to belabor it, is
that we have to find out what is the difference between communities
such as mine and communities such as yours because this is going to
have a direct effect in determining how we deal with nations that are
affecting the very lives of our children.
Perhaps the freshmen Congressmen have not been here long enough
to be responsible enough to fully understand the Government's inter-
national involvement with ether nations that are supposed to be our
friends but, as you well know, there has been a tremendous increase in
addiction and I am certain ghat we must reevaluate whether in fact, we
are dealing with allies.
I seriously doubt, whether America is going to be standing alone as
we see this drug epidemic sweep not only our Armed Forces but those
who potentially will be called upon to serve this country.
I earn merely suggesting that without fully disagreeing with the fine
worl-. done by my colleagues Murphy and Steele, that 4 he Congress
has the control over the pur-:estrings of foreign aid and the Executive
should decide what is in the national interest.
It is difficult for me to understand why Congress has given foreign
aid to those nations which we have already through our agencies found
to be engaged in cultivation and manufacture of drugs, notwithstand-
ing the fact that their cultures do not allow them to understand that
they are killing our kids.
`Someone said that once y e dry up the fields in Turkey tl iat it is going
to move to some other area,,, and I suspect that it will as long as you
have this inflated profit involved in this trafficking.
The. only question I ask of my country, and certainly those that are
sworn to uphold what it stands for, is how much courage will we have
to deal with any nation that is involved in activities which affect our
national security. I submit that until we really and fully believe that
this is affecting our national security, then we will just continue to
enrage in our 10-year negotiations with friendly countries.
But for me, it makes no difference whether the killing comes front
a so-cal 'et 1 Commnmti-t oatirnt or whether it comes from a nation which,
historically, has enjoyed a friendly reiationshi). I am seeing deaths
on y streets. Therefore, I am prepared to go beyond the responsible
pos mition which I have taken in my statement.
Mr. FRrLZ GxuYSrN. But is the. issue having the courage to deal
with other nations, or having the wisdom to know how to get the re-
sults? By simply closing the door to a country like Turkey, you don't
solve the problem. The drugs continue to come in.
What is needed is a process of persuasion and education. Perhaps
that is tedious and perhaps you get impatient and perhaps you feel
there must be a quicker solution to protect children. Yet in the long
rum, I don't think there is any other way except to continue, on an in-
ternational basis, the process which has already made some progress,
in Turkey especially.
Mr. RANGEL. But have we tried another way?
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I don't think there is any other way,
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Mr. RANGEL. The strongest talk I have heard has come from this
'Congress in the last year and it has only been in the last year that we
have successfully concluded a 10-year negotiation.
Mr. FRELINGIIGYSEN. This was not done through coercion.
Mr. RANGEL. I don't know how we did it, but it seems to me the State
Department and Turkey were very concerned about what your com-
mittee was taking up and your committee was taking up coercion.
Mr. FitELrti GuuYSrN. I am sure coercion was not a factor. The only
coercion was that the President could withhold aid if lie felt it
advisable.
Mr. RANGEL. If he. felt like it, but as long as the bills come through
Congress and not the White House we will have to decide how much
foreign aid we are going to give and what conditions we are going
to place on it. I also believe, since I have over 70 sponsors of my bill,
that many Congressmen and legislators who are not concerned specifi-
cally about the drug problems ill their community are concerned about
foreign aid.
Mr. FRELINGliuYsE N. I wish niece were concerned in a constructive
way about foreign aid, to tell you the truth.
Mr. RANGEL. When you are talking about survival, it makes no dif-
ference what their concerns are. I think that we have to really look at
how long is hying going to live in the cities. 1 have to be concerned
about your children and hope this tragedy doesn't overflow into your
community. But every Congressman that ever sees what happens in
my community on a daily basis will come back and review very closely
the relationships we enjoy with friendly nations and perhaps it will
not take coercion and may not work, but life is only one life and you
can only try it one time.
Mr. ROSENTIIAL. Mr. Murphy?
Mr. Muitri1Y. Mr. Range!, both you and I serve on the committee
known as the Select Committee on Crime under Claude Pepper's
leadership. I think that many members here have not had the op-
portunity of sitting in on those hearings and would like to know the
approaches of treating heroin addicts that has taken place in New
York.
New York State and New York City have spent more in the last 10
years than the Federal Government has spent in this entire century
on the drug problem. I think the members here and my colleague on
this committee would be interested in exploring methadone. Dr. Revi-
chies, although he is suspect in a lot of quarters especially in the medi-
cal profession, does have. a drug that bears taking a good look into
and I think this is where the Federal Government has failed.
Mr. RANGEL. Congressman Murphy is referring to a method of
rehabilitation. We were shocked to find out that the drug methadone
has been before the Food and Drug Administration 7 years. Histori-
cally, no drug has been before the committee that long and has yet to be
determined whether the drug is safe or whether the drug is dangerous.
Of course, it was just being used in Harlem then and communities
like Harlem and I suspect now they will be moving much faster. I>itt
as you have heard earlier, heroin and methadone are both add*Tctive.
All doctors agree that it is more difficult to rehabilitate a methadone
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addict than it is a heroin addict. It takes a longer time to detoxify
him.
It is a dangerous dtzent-
ID WV, Justice, and VA-dealing with domestic Federal narcotics
rehabilitation pro;r?ams.
Mr. IZosi:NTrr:~r,. If this other report is worth seeing, might Mr.
Brady h aye to look at it? I don't think we will finish marlctiE Elie
bill for 2 more weeks. Some of the snggc stiorrs yon imadle aboutnoticc
to the Congi ess I think are relevant to r rnttei?s we )rave iind(r present
consi deratron.
Mr. Fulton
\[r. FULTON. I have a r,nestion on your jurisdiction. Do you have
the jurisdiction in the executi fire branch to make recommendations
65-728--71--9
by the drug industry.
executive branch, we would] be misleading the committee, I think, if
we said that we felt we could carry out the re sponsibility which is con-
tained in H.R. 8093 or 6,S ~2.
Second, Ave do agree that there needs to be more clearly fixed re-
sponsibility in the executive branch for doinur? something about this
problem than Nye have today. We would certainly raise no objection if
the Congress wanted to spell out in the statute the kind of responsibili-
ties on our office which we have suggested here in point 4 on our last
page.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. I think you have made some very useful sugges-
tions. I think the subcommittee will consider them very carefully. It
is obvious to me that something has to be done. Maybe I am having
difficulty in getting a fix on just exactly what it should be.
I think the point you make, a very valid one, is someone has to be
charged with real overall responsibility in this area, particularly with
the import situation. In the President's message he was worrying about
what we do with treatment and research and things like that. There
has never been a really high level effort or mandate directed to any one
individual in terms of the imnrirt of heroin into the United States.
Mr. STAATS. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to
further outline activities that we have ongoing with respect to the
drug problem both in the I)efen~4e Derrrrtment and our review of the
activities of other agencies.
Our Defense Division has recently undertaken it review of drug
abuse among military personnel. This review will be performed in the
United States as well as in overseas locations. The objectives of this
review are to evaluate the policies, procedures and practices of the
military departments concerning (1) preinduction screening of actual
or potential drug abusers, (2) educational and law enforcement efforts
to prevent drug abuse, (3) the scope and extent of the amnesty and
rehabilitation programs, (4) identification of drug abusers and (5)
what arrangements are being made for the treatment and rehabilita-
tion of drug abusers by the responsible Federal agencies after separa-
tion from the military service.
Our Civil Division is conducting a review of the efforts by the
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Department of Justice,
to reduce the diversion of dangerous drugs. The Los Angeles- region
is involved in this assignment with the New York region also partici-
pating. We are expecting the draft report from Los Angeles in August.
Tentative findings are in the area of (1) information gathering pro-
cedures and coordination with other agencies on findings and potential
problems; (2) State compliance programs; and (3) self-recognition
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126
at the level. below the Department of Justice? That would mean in
the particular offices of U.S. attorneys for various districts in the
United States.
Mr. STAATS. Yes. We have, of course, very broad authority and
responsibility to review the operations of most agencies of the execu-
tive branch. There are some exclusions, but for the most part we have
very broad jurisdiction.
Any place where we have appropriated funds and where the GAO
has access to records authority, we can go in on our own or we can go
in at the request of a committee of Congress, or even a Member of
Congress.
Mr. FULTON. In the eastern district of New York, the statement
has been made by the State senator from New York, that the Office
.of the U.S. attorney operates on a selective basis in these narcotics
cases. That means to me a very restrictive basis. So that there is a
very limited official Federal action in response to a major problem
which would appear not only to be citywide, statewide, but national
rn scope, with New York as one of the main entries and points of
distribution.
Would it be beyond your jurisdiction to recommend expansion of
the policies and administration of the Federal agencies operating in
New York State?
Mr. STAATS. It would be within our jurisdiction; yes., sir.
Mr. FULTON. With the chairman's permission, could the witnesses
and their supporting technicians give Congress recommendations at
this level as to the policies that should be put into effect. These, obvi-
ously, have not been implemented at the present time in the U.S. dis-
trict attorney's office in New York State.
(Subsequently, the Department of Justice was asked to comment on
Mr. Fulton's inquiry. The Department's response appears on p. 215.)
Mr. STAATS. I would like to know more about the specifics and
details of what Senator Hughes was referring to today.
Mr. FULTON. This is pretty much, especially to me, Mr. Chairman, a
shock treatment. I am sure the average Member of Congress does not
realize the extent of the problem, nor the fact that the Federal. juris-
diction is not being used to an extent comparable to the increase of the
problem.
Mr. STAATS. We would be happy to develop that a little bit further
and discuss it with the chairman.
Mr. FULTON. Would that be all right?
Mr. ROSENTHAL. Yes.
Well, thank you very much, Mr. Starts. We are grateful to you,
again, for a very important and significant presentation.
Mr. FULTON. And may I add my compliments, too? It was ex-
plicit and plain and directed to the point.
Mr. ROSENTIIAL. There are some good ideas here.
The subcommittee will stand adjourned until 10 o'clock tomorrow
morning.
(Whereupon, at 5:05 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to recon-
vene at 10 a.m., Friday, July 9,1971. )
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INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE
NARCOTICS PROBLEM
DOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met at 10 a.m. in room 2200, Rayburn House
Office Building, Hon. Benjamin S. Rosenthal (chairman of the sub-
committee) presiding.
Mr. ROSENTIIAL. The subcommittee will be in order.
We shall continue hearings this morning on international aspects
of narcotics control. Our first witness is the Honorable Eugene T. Ros-
sides, Assistant Secretary of Treasury (Enforcement, Tariff and
Trade Affairs and Operations).
We are happy to have you with us and we would be pleased to hear
your prepared statement.
.STATEMENT OF HON. EUGENE T. ROSSIDES, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF TREASURY FOR ENFORCEMENT, TARIFF AND TRADE AF-
FAIRS, AND OPERATIONS
Mr. RossmES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate being here to discuss this important subject with you.
On behalf of the Treasury Department I welcome this opportunity to
appear before you today to discuss Treasury's role in President Nixon's
antiheroin action program and to comment upon the overall antidrug
abuse program of this administration. The problem of drug abuse and
particularly heroin abuse was not created overnight, and it will not be
cured overnight. The drug problem of the 1950's became the drug crisis
of the 1960's. It will take hard work and cooperative effort in the 1970's
by many groups on the Federal, State and local levels to win this
battle.
Early in his administration the President moved on several fronts
with a multidimensional action program :
First, he elevated the drug problem to the foreign policy level and
has taken personal initiatives in soliciting the cooperation of other
governments.
Second, he stressed the crucial role of education, research and re-
habilitation, and provided for increased funds and emphasis in these
essential areas.
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128
Third, he recommended differentiation in the criminal penalty struc-
ture between heroin and marihuana; and flexible provisions for han-
dling first offenders.
Fourth, he provided a substantial increase in budgetary support for
Federal law enforcement in, this area.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. How much did he provide in additional funds?
Mr. RossIDES. In the law enforcement in probably the last 2 years,
Mr. Chairman, we estimate over $50 million. That is my recollection.
I can get the figures for you.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. What are we spending altogether on law enforce-
ment?
Mr. RossIDES. That would be difficult to actually determine although
I think OMB has that figure and I will endeavor to get it for the
committee. My recollection is when the President announced his new
program, he added $155 million. A question about that was asked and
OMB says that about $375 million is earmarked for the overall drug
program.
Approximately $55 million of that would have been increased
budget in the enforcement area, but it is difficult to say.
Today the Bureau of Customs has an added budget of $15 million
that was just added now plus the regular parts for enforcement, but
literally the entire Bureau has become enforcement-minded on drugs.
So what percentage of their total budget do you say is involved?
Mr. ROSENTHAL. Yesterday State Senator John IIumlies said that the
New York State budget and problems connected with heroin use and
importation is over $150 million
Mr. Rossmvs. It is.
Mr. RoSENTHAL. It.is hard to put that in relationship to the Presi-
dent's very significant statement, saying that the I?.S. Government
would now spend $155 million. There is something wrong somewhere
if the State of New York is spending $150 million and the Federal
Government is only spending twice that.
Mr. Rossmrs. I think the Federal Government is spending probably
three times that much.
Mr. ROSENTIIAL. That is still not that impressive.
Mr. ROSSIDES. The question is how fast, you can spend the money
available. But, secondly, it.may not be that much of a differentiation.
Mr. Chairman, or a difference. Ndw York State has the greatest prob-
lem. New York State has done more ,than' any other State through
the leadership of. Governor Rockefeller, Starting in 1966 for the first
time to alert the citizens to the drug problem.
You remember the problem he had gett.irng through his massive re-
habilitation prbgrain. We have not had the success with that program
that we would like, but can you imagine where we would be if we had
not broken the ground in 1966?, The big problem rests with the States
onccl the President's program; recognizes that.
Law enforcement and reserve police po veers is on the States and
they have' not done` the job. New York -tnd California have led the
way because they have had more of a problem:
Take the educational system--it is the States and must remain
there.
Primary responsibility for hospital administration and rehabilita-
tion lies with the States. We must not take away the responsibilities
from the States.
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Mr. ROSENTHAL. If the United States kept heroin out of the United
States, there would be less of a problem.
Mr. RossIDEs. That is correct and the President recognizes that as a
foreign policy matter and as an enforcement problem, and that is
where there has been a massive effort in funds.
Fifth, he recognized the central role of the States and the need for
close Federal-State cooperation in a unified drive against drug abuse;
and
Sixth, he stressed total community involvement-the private sector
as well as governmental agencies-in this anti-drug abuse drive.
There is no question we are talking about community groups, action
groups that can do more good on the local level than the Federal
Government.
Take research, which I will mention in a moment, specialized re-
search, maybe only the Government can do and that is where I think
the latest program of the President will have its impact. I would say,
Mr. Chairman, for the first time in history we have seen not only the
total involvement of the institution of the presidency in the battle
against drug abuse, but also the personal involvement of the President.
In my judgment this program has arrested the United States' in-
credible downward slide into drug abuse-although we have a long
and steep climb ahead of us to return to the level from which we
fell-and has alerted the international community to the global prob-
lem of drug abuse.
1. FORETGN POL! Y AND PEESTDENTTAL INITIATIVE
As you said. Mr. Chairman, if we could keep the stuff out, we would
not have the problem we have had, that is absolutely true, but we
failed to appreciate in the past that it was a worldwide problem calling
for an international response. Prior to this administration, interna-
national activity by the United States was principally on the enforce-
ment level.
President Nixon raised drug abuse to the foreign policy level at the
beginning of his administration and took personal initiatives to elicit
the cooperation of other governments.
The result of this major change in the approach of the executive
branch was to make the Department of State, as the primary represent-
ative for communicating to foreign governments the vital interest of
the United States, responsible for doing everything necessary to ad-
vance our anti drug abuse policy through diplomacy.
Secretary of State William P. Rogers has given high priority and
personal leadership to the Department of State's efforts in this area.
This role of the State Department in the administration's war on
drugs has had a unique and important impact. Through the use of
diplomacy we have achieved a substantial advance in our objectives.
The administration's diplomatic efforts have been worldwide. The
President's words, in his address to the United Nations on its 25th
anniversary in October 1970, sums up the problem :
It is in the world interest that the narcotics traffic be curbed. Drugs pollute
the minds and bodies of our young, bring misery, violence, and human and eco-
nomic waste. This scourge of drugs can be eliminated through international
cooperation.
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13()
An example of such cooperation is the effective partnership we have
developed with the Government of Mexico. Operation Cooperation, the
successor to Operation Intercept, has led to joint efforts by the two
governments in the area of opium poppy and marihuana eradication
and smuggling suppression. Both governments realize that a great deal
more has to be done, particularly along our common border.
The French Government has pledged its cooperation and has in-
creased substantially its enforcement efforts against heroin production
and trafficking.
The most important and dramatic diplomatic news was the joint an-
nouncement on June 30, 1971, by Prime Minister Erim of Turkey and
President Nixon that Turkey has decreed that within ]. year, in
accordance with the law of Turkey, the opium poppy will no longer be
planted in Turkey.
The Government of Turkey has pledged that, in the meantime, it
would make a full effort to prevent the diversion of the crop now being
harvested. The President has called the action of Prime Minister Erim
important and courageous.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. The Turks will, in fact, have the opportunity under
this arrangement to plant two more crops, isn't that correct?
Mr. ROSSMES. In part. Actually they are harvesting a crop now and
they plant one crop in September and October, and if there is an un-
successful planting, if there is a winter kill, say, a bad season, then
they can plant in March. It is one more, crop basically in September
plus the crop that is being harvested right now.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. For all practical purposes the product of two more
crops will enter the pipeline of the world opium market, and will
keep things going for another 3 or 4 years.
Mr. RossrnES. If the crop that is being harvested now and if there is
a crop that is planted in September and if that crop gets planted and
there is significant diversion, then it well keep things going for at
least 1 year and probably 2.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. Why couldn't we get them to agree to kill the whole
show now with no 1972 crop and confiscation of the present crop?
Mr. RossrnES. They have a statute which requires a year's notice on
plantings. They have now given that notice and I think the President
characterized it as a courageous and important act. They have coupled
that with the pledge of full collection of the present crop and harvest.
I think that is where the world should be focusing its attention and
the Congress keeping its eye on the collection process going on right
now in Turkey, and I would hope that the world press would follow
this daily.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. I just want to pick that up in a minute. Do you
have any idea how much money we have given in grant and aid to
Turkey in the last 20 years?
Mr. RossrnES. The figures come to approximately $5.7 billion start-
ing with the Marshall plan aid to Greece and Turkey.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. After giving them $5.7 billion, why can't we get
them to confiscate the present crop and kill the planting of the Sep-
tember crop?
Mr. ROssIDEs. As I say. Mr. Chairman, they have had a history of
centuries of planting poppies and to the farmers they are not aware
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of the damage that eventually results from the conversion of opium
to morphine to heroin.
The Prime Minister has made in our judgment a very courageous
move, and we are hopeful that the increased enforcement and collection
effort will purchase up the present crop. We don't control the Govern-
ment of Turkey. I think that the achievement in 2 years of getting
the Turkish Government, which has planted these crops for over 200,
300,400 years, is a significant diplomatic achievement.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. I would say that would be true if we had not given
them X5.7 billion. Then we would be equal to negotiations.
Mr. ROSSIDES. Once the money is given, it is like your constituents.
You may have been able to do many things for them in the past, but
they say that is over with. But what are you going to do for me now?
Mr. ROSENTHAL. We are doing more good for them now. I wouldn't
belabor that.
What are your people, such as customs, doing in terms of coopera-
tion with the Turkish Government
Mr. RossIDES. In terms of cooperation with the Turkish Government
we are prepared to offer on what we call a TDY-temporary basis-
numbers of persons. In fact, our Commissioner has been developing a
plan that would involve a certain number of customs inspectors to
work with the Turkish customs inspection service that we will propose
to the Turkish Government.
Mr. ROSEN HAL. Will they work in Turkey?
Mr. RosslnES. It will be to work in Turkey during this next 3-month
period during the collection and harvesting of the present crop. We
have not proposed that to the Turkish Government. We have that
plan in being to do that on short notice. As a matter of fact, I have
had initial discussions of that with the State Department, but they
may not have had a chance to review it as yet.
Mr. ROSENTIIAL. I)o you consider that this is an important and ur-
gent step in combatting the importation of heroin into the United
States?
Mr. RossmrS. We feel it would be helpful. It would be up to the
government receiving assistance to accept that. We have been working
with the police force of Turkey through the Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs, and we are just trying to offer customs inspectional
expertise to work with their Customs Service at the border, to help
with our experience to mount an effort to stop the huge overland traffic
from Turkey to the labs in Western Europe.
Mr. RoSrNTFHAL. Up to now there have been three principal agencies
of Government dealing with heroin-State, Justice, and Treasury. I
still find it difficult, to get a fix on who is really in charge. Who is lead-
ing the fight against heroin drug importation and abuse in the United
States.
Mr. ROSSIDES. That answer is very simple. The President is leading
the fight, Mr. Chairman. We have. a very clear demarcation of effort
and i+ is working well. In fact, as far as Treasury is concerned on the
enforcement end, it is working remarkably well.
The State Department is involved and this is one of the great ad-
vances. in my iudgment. of this administration. The State Department
is saddled with the diplomatic negotiations with other countries
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around the world and has done a fine job, particularly with the recent
announcement from Turkey.
?Ir. ROSENTIrAL. Other than the President. is there cny one person
ill command of all of the U.S. resources that'are necessary to prevent
the importation of heroin into the United States?
Mr. ROSSIDES. You are talking on the enforcement level ?
Mr. ROSENTIIAL. Enforcement. Justice, Treasury, or State?
Mr. ROSSIDES. There cannot be by the nature of our federal system,
Mr. Chairman. We have the Customs Service, which has the respon-
sibility to stop the smuggling into the united States. Agents of the
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs are responsible for work-
ing with foreign governments to stop the source of the cultivation of
it. Once it starts in the pipeline and starts toward the United States,
that is a Customs responsibility on smugglino-; and we have a working
arrangement with the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and
the Customs agency service that gives the guidelines of operational
enforcement matters.
It is just like the FBI which has operational guidelines with CIA,
with the Internal Revenue Service, with the Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms Di vision of IRS. This is standard procedure.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. It may be that standard procedure is just not good
enough any more. When the President felt and the Congress agreed
with him there was concern here over environment and pollution, we
created an agency and a new job for Mr. Ruckelshaus.
When the President felt there should be a greater effort to fight
cancer, he set up a separate agency. Would it be useful in your judg-
ment if the President set up a new agenew so that coordination among
these three branches would be more efficacious?
Mr. ROSSIDES. No.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. Your reason is it has not worked ;o well in the
past?
Mr. RossmDES. In the, enforcement end niy answer is no. On the other
hand, I agree fully with a coordinated effort on nonenforcement as-
spects of drugs which is a coordinating office, not a directing office in
the White House.
To return to my statement
2. EDUCATION, RESEARCH AND RE1E; DILrrATION
The drug abuse problem is one of both supply and demand, and
President Nixon's response has been guided accordingly. While we
are working to elinlin~ite t-he supply at the sources, to stop the smug-
gling of illicit drugs into the United States, and to stop the distribu-
tion of illicit drugs internally, eliminating the demand for drugs
among our young is also central to success.
The key to eliminating the demand for drugs lies in education. The
vast majority of youth, when given access to the facts, will reject drug
abuse as against their own self-interest as well as against the interest
of their Nation.
President Nixon is convinced that much of our problem is attribut-
able to the mass of misinformation and street-corner mythology which
has filled the vacuum left by our failure in the past to deal with the
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young on a mature, reasoned and factual basis. In the past our Gov-
ernment took the easy but ineffective route of "do as I say because I
say so" rather than the more difficult route of clearly presenting the
facts necessary for informed decision.
In his June 17, 1971 message, President Nixon stressed "reclama-
tion of the drug user himself," and has requested congressional ap-
proval of ,,L total of $105 million in addition to funds already contained
in the fiscal year 1972 budget 1 o be used solely for the treatment and re-
habilitation of drug-addicted individuals.
He asked the Congress to provide an additional $10 million in funds
to increase and improve education and training in the field of danger-
ous drugs. This will increase the money available for education and
training to more than $24 million.
3. DIFFERENTIATION IN PENALTY STRUCTURE AND FLEXIBLE PROVISIONS
FOR HANDLING FIRST OFFENDERS
Before enactment of the Controlled Dangerous Substances Act of
1970, Federal laws erroneously treated marihuana as a narcotic drug
and compelled felony sentence upon conviction for any drug offenses
for first offenders. The harsh and unrealistic effects of the Federal law
generated credibility problems with our youth and posed enormous
problems for Federal prosecutors and judges in dealing with first
offenders.
President Nixon proposed a change in the penalty structure which
for the first time provided a re:.sonable distinction between narcotic
drugs and marihuana and provided the courts needed flexibility in
dealing with the first offender. The courts were granted authority to
clean the slate on the first offender by striking from the record mention
of the first offense without adjudication of guilt. Both of these meas-
ures enhance credibility and acceptance of our drug laws, not only
with youth, but also with those charged with its administration.
Drug law enforcement is a difficult and dangerous business. It
demands the highest standards of professional competence of
enforcement agents. Presiclei)t Nixon has increased substantially the
budgets of the two Federal agencies primarily concerned with drug
law enforcement-the liurea;nn of Narcotics and Dangerous Drubs of
the Department of Justice and the Treasury's Bureau of Customs-
and has initiated a major new Treasury enforcement program. of tax
investigations by the Internal Revenue Service of middle and upper
echelon narcotics traffickers. I will discuss the Treasury programs
later.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. Isn't it a fact in the last year or two your Depart-
Inen_t wanted to be a good deal tougher with the Turkish Government.
You wanted more stringent action taken and the State Department
dragged its heels in (1(1,,ling with the Turkish Government? Isn't that
true ?
Mr. RosslDEs. No, I would say what you are talking about.
Chairman, is normal give and take of any policy question in the Gov-
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ernment. There were many people in different departments and differ-
ent areas who took different points of view of how to achieve the
objective in Turkey and in other countries, in Mexico.
In interdepartmental meetings, these were thrashed out and a policy
decided upon.
Mr. ROSENTh AL. I think if one person would be in charge, it could
be decided in 24 hours.
Mr. RossmEs. The concept that some one person in charge is going to
be the oracle and come up with miracles is nonsense. The coordinating
system in the Federal Government works pretty darn well. We have
to thrash out very many conflicting problems and interests and views.
As far as I am concerned, in the enforcement area we have done all
right. I am not that familiar with the research and rehabilitation
area, so I could not comment on that.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. What is Dr. Jaffe's role?
Mr. RossiDEs. Dr. Jaffe would come in and coordinate the non-
enforcement area. He is not going to come in and tell. each of the 14
agencies what to do. He is going to try to coordinate that aspect of
many, many different departments.
The point is, they are trying to coordinate and bring more emphasis
in the nonenforcement area. I think in the enforcement area we have
been highly successful on the Federal level, particularly against
smuggling. On the State level, where most of the enforcement should
be internally, we have not been.
Mr. ROSENTIIAL. Senator Hughes testifies the police in New York
City could pick up all of the addicts-customers--they want, but there
are so many customers on the streets that if they were arrested, it
would take the courts 20 years to hear all the cases. The jails can't
process fast enough those who are arrested, and the penal institutions
can't handle them.
I don't see how you can say there has been much success when five
kids a day are dying from narcotics addiction.
Mr. Rossmrs. At the Federal level. the customs enforcement has
been remarkable.. Enforcement at the State level has not been. This has
been a role of the States and the role of the cities. They have tried to
throw their failures off on the Federal Government; not that the Fed-
eral Government has done such a. fine job in the past, but to try to
throw the blame on the Federal Government is too easy a way for
mayors and others to duck. their responsibilities.
I get quite annoyed when I see that. Talk about the police. More
support being given to the support of the police in their role in the
cities could also help in this area.
I remember when I first devoted time to this in the first months of
the administration. If I had had a dollar, I probably would. have spent
75 cents of it on education: maybe 90 percent. I still feel that the over-
whelming amount should be spent on that. I am convinced of the
youth-if you talk of facts of the dangers of heroin-the youth can
be convinced.
Marihuana is a different story. I say we have made substantial head-
way in the Federal Government in the past few years.
Mr. RosrN?rrHAL. That is not what Congressman Tiangel said the
other day'.
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Mr. Rossir>ss. I respect the problem very much, and I know his
problem, and I cut my eyeteeth in 1'966 on the drug problem as deputy
manager in New York City for Governor Rockefeller, and I am very
familiar with the problems in Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant on
drugs. I am not saying it is getting any better or getting any worse
there.
One of the results of President Nixon's initiative in making this
a priority issue, a national issue, an international issue, is that for
the first time we have had the proper debate on the subject. Before
January 1969, there was not discussion, and parents were even con-
cerned whether they should bring it up with their children.
Now at least there is a full national debate. Many programs are
underway on the Federal, State, and local level, and I think we are
making progress. You have to remember it took 10 years to get to this
crisis stage, and it will take several years to get out of it, but I think
we have turned the tide.
I could discourse a long while about the problems in Harlem and
various groups in Harlem and outside of Harlem and their responsi-
bility.
I think I have discussed education. To return to my statement
5. CENTRAL ROLE OF TIIE STATES AND FEDERAL-STATE COOPERATION
Federal-State cooperation is one of the essential elrments for suc-
cess in the struggle against drug abuse, and this administration is
working closely with the States in this effort. Except for certain areas
of special Federal interest, law enforcement and our educational sys-
tem have been and must continue as essentially State and local re-
sponsibilities.
President Nixon has emphasized the Federal-State cooperation in
his message to Congress of July 1.4, 1969, on control of narcotics and
dangerous drugs; again at the Governors' conference on drugs at the
White House held in December 1969, and as outlined in his more
recent message to the Congress on June 17, 1971.
The President has stressed that the private sector must provide com-
munity leadership in organizing drug-abuse educational and other
action programs. Religious organizations and community and civic
groups such as Rotary, Kiwanis, Chamber of Commerce, and Jaycees
are best equipped to get directly into the home where they can assist
parents in handling the problem of drug abuse with intelligence and
credibility.
TREASURY'S ROLE IN THE PRESIDENT'S AN TIIIEROIN ACTION PROGRAM
Treasury is playing a major role in the enforcement phase of the
President's antiheroin action program. Its Bureau of Customs, the
Nation's first line of defense against heroin smuggling, has achieved
spectacular success; and the Internal Revenue Service is embarked on
a major presidential program designed to take the profit out of
narcotics.
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In his September 16, 1968, Anaheim, Calif., speech, the President
stated :
Let us recognize that the frontiers of the United States are the primary re-
sponsibility of the United States Bureau of Customs. I recommend that we triple
the number of customs agents in this country from 331 to 1,000.
The President has followed through on that pledge and more. In
his July 14, 1969, message to the Congress on the control of narcotics
and dangerous drugs, he stated :
The Department of the Treasury, through the Bureau of Customs, is charged
with enforcing the nation's smuggling laws. I have directed the Secretary of the
Treasury to initiate a major new effort to guard the nation's borders and ports
against the growing volume of narcotics from abroad. There is a recognized need
for more men and facilities in the Bureau of Customs to carry out this directive.
This directive was backed up with a substantial antinarcotic sup-
plemental budget request. The Congress responded with full bipartisan
support in December of 1969, by passing an appropriation for $8.75
mill ion for 915 additional men and for equipment for customs.
The hiring of these people, begun in January 1970 and completed in
June of that year, has produced remarkable results.
In a 2-year period the number of seizures by Customs has more than
doubled.
Preliminary statistics show that narcotic and drug seizures by Cus-
toms in fiscal year 1971, were 9,042, an increase of 2,500 over the 1970
total of 6,507. In fiscal year 1969, 4,024 seizures were made.
Most dramatic is the increase in seizures of hard drugs. Customs
seizures of hard drugs in fiscal year 1971 are over 1,200 pounds, more
than was seized in the whole preceding 7 years. During the same period
seizures of heroin alone, 906 pounds, in more than 460 seizures, ex-
ceeded the total amount seized for the preceding 10 fiscal years
combined.
Cocaine seizures have also increased with 344 pounds seized this
fiscal year as compared to 109 last year. In fiscal year 1969 separate
statistics for cocaine were not even kept.
Hashish and marihuana have also increased.. During fiscal year 19 71
there were about 1,208 seizures of hashish with more than 3,000 pounds
seized. This is nearly twice the seizures in fiscal year 1970, but the
pounds seized remains constant, 3,122 pounds of hashish being seized
in fiscal year 1970.
In fiscal year 1969 only 623 pounds of hashish were seized. In that
same year 57,164 pounds of marihuana were seized. During fiscal year
1971 this figure has grown to 76 tons in 5,490 seizures. 52 tons were
seized in fiscal year 1970.
Over 6 million 5-grain units of dangerous drugs such as ampheta-
mines and barbiturates were seized during fiscal year 1971. This is
about half the number seized last fiscal year, though the number of
seizures increased to about 1,348 from 1,080. Attached is a chart set-
ting forth Customs' drug seizures in detail for the past 3 fiscal. years.
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(The chart follows:)
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, DRUG SEIZURES BY FISCAL YEAR
Seizures
Pounds
Seizures
Pounds
3
1
1
203
45.5
462
906
Heroin------
-- 240
(
=
)
88
109
159
344
iacame
42
34
3
42
21
132
--------------
Opium_________________
623
646
122
3
1,208
3,00
Hashish-----------------
186
57
1
4
4113
,
a 52
5:490
6
Marihuana_____________
2,673
,
6
1,
680
271
000
12
348
1
6,000,000
Dangerous drugs------__
---
630
253
+4,763,361
199
,
335
,
,
-_.-?---------
,
243
--------------
Total(seizyres)__.
4,024
--------------
6,507
______-__--_-
9,042
--------------
I Preliminary figures (minimum amounts-there may be slight increases).
s Cocaine figures for 1969 included in the "Other" column.
I Tons.
4 5 grain units.
Mr. jtOSSIDES. Major seizures of pure heroin have included :
1. 98 pounds (October 1970 -1MLiami).
2. 210 polutds (December 1970-illiami).
3. 98 pounds (April 1971-Newark).
4. 155 pounds (May 1971-Miami).
5. 247.5 pounds (May 1971-San Juan).
The men and women of the Bureau of Customs, under the dynamic
leadership of Commissioner Myles J. Ambrose, deserve enormous
credit for these outstanding accomplishments.
These results took dedication, imagination, and total commitment
of forces. Let me mention some of the things Customs has done
with the resources provided by Congress for this drive :
In 6 months Customs added 915 trained personnel to its staff.
These included an increment of inspectors who were able for the first
time to give priority attention to checking for narcotics enforcement
purposes persons, vehicles, cargo, and mail entering the country. A
substantial addition to our force of special agents enabled us to run
down intelligence leads, investigate violations of the smuggling laws,
and gather evidence for the convictions of those apprehended.
CADPIN, from the initial letters of Customs Automated Data
Processing of Intelligence, has been installed across the country. One
hundred and.sixty terminals, located at every important port of entry
along the Mexican-United States border, at major international air-
ports, and at various intelligence centers now have access to CADPIN's
huge data bank. Merely by punching the keys of his terminal, the
inspector on duty at a border crossing or an airport can obtain an
almost instantaneous reply if a car or person is suspected of smuggling,
the car is stolen, or the person is the subject Of an, outstanding
warrant..
Custp al's communications system has been expanded,and modern-
ized, with better radios} repeater stations, and sector 166inmun?icatlons
cet'f ca .:V y icftl, equipment, particularly cars,-boats and planes, both
fixed wing and helicopters, have been increased giving Customs agents
the tools with which to deal rapidly and responsively with smugglers
and their syndicates.
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Additional customs stations have been opened. Two of these are in
the remote Big Bend area of Texas, a favorite section of the border
for smugglers.
New laboratories, to provide rapid identification of narcotic and
dangerous substances, now speed the judicial processing of violators.
The use of dogs specially trained to locate marihuana in cars or in
mail packages entering the country has been greatly increased, and
they are now making substantial contributions in intercepting that
substance as it enters the country.
The President, in his program announced on June 17, 1971, recog-
nized these accomplishments of Customs and proposed a budget
amendment of $18 million to maximize Customs-demonstrated capa-
bilities in interdicting the flow of drugs into the United States.. This
amendment funded major additions to equipment and 1,000 addi-
tional personnel.
The Congress, with bipartisan support, authorized $15 million and
the Appropriations Subcommittees stated they would entertain a sup-
plemental request after use of the $15 million. The Congress acted
swiftly, passing the appropriation bill on June 30.
The effects of these additional resources will be felt from the New
York docks to the Florida airports, from the marinas of southern
California to sod airfields in the State of Washington, and along the
lengths of the Mexican and Canadian borders. They will yield better
enforcement at border crossings without increased delays.
The additional funds also provide for major equipment additions,
principally aircraft and boats, with appropriate detection systems
for both new craft and those in current inventory. The current intelli-
gence indications of extensive smuggling by unscheduled planes and
boats create this substantial need for detection, communication and
interception resource. These will have particular impact along the.
Mexican border and against small craft making end-runs into southern
California, Florida and Texas.
CUSTOMS-TO-CUSTOMS COOPERATION
As one part of the antidrug smuggling program, designed to dis-
rupt the trafllc in drugs between countries, Treasury established the
policy of fostering and strengthening cooperation between and among
the customs services-of the various countries. The Bureau of Customs
was directed to put the policy into effect.
The first customs-to-customs contacts, and the ones that have re-
sulted in the most cooperation, have been with our neighbors to the
north and south. In discussions with, the Governments of Mexico and
Canada we have improved cooperation in the attack on, the drug
traffic through, customs-to-customs cooperation.
Applying .the policy of increased customs=to-customs cooperation to
a wider area, the Treasury Department obtained authorization and
appropriations for U.S. Customs to become a full member of the
Customs Cooperation Council. This is an organization of they customs
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services of more than GO nations. Its purpose is to foster close working
relationships between and among these services.
At its annual meeting in Vienna last month this Council adopted a
resolution calling for its member countries to exchange information
on illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. Pre-
viously the customs services of many countries had paid little atten-
tion to the drug traffic.
The Bureau of Customs has an ongoing program, sponsored
through AID, with the Vietnamese Customs Service. This has been
helpful to the Government of Vietnam in its efforts to stem smug-
gling of heroin into that country. The Bureau is also preparing plans
now for possible technical assistance to the customs services of other
countries of Indochina, particularly Thailand and Laos.
As part of this ongoing program of full cooperation among the
customs services, the Commissioner of Customs recently made in on-
the-spot survey and talked with his counterparts in Yugoslavia, Bul-
garia, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. In these, contacts, the resolution
for the exchange of information on the drug traffic adopted at Vienna
was the stepping stone for talks on increased action against drug
traffic by the customs services of each of these countries against the
flow of opium and morphine base from Turkey to Western Europe.
On April 22, 1971, Secretary Connally transmitted to the Congress
new legislation designed to increase the security and protection of im-
ported merchandise and merchandise for export at ports of entry in
the United States from loss or damage as a result of criminal and
corrupt practices. This measure is currently pending in both the
House and Senate. We hope that hearings will soon be held.
This legislation is designed to provide security against cargo theft
and will provide increased protection against the smuggling of nar-
cotics through tighter control over a major area within which orga-
nized crime has been operating.
Included in the June 17. 1971, Presidential message, which an-
nounced the administration's expanded effort to combat the menace
of drug abuse, is a high priority program to conduct systematic tax
investigations of middle and upper echelon narcotics traffickers. These
are the people who are generally insulated from the daily operations of
the drug traffic through a chain of intermediaries.
This program will mount a nationally coordinated effort to disrupt
the narcotics distribution system by intensive tax investigations of
these key figures. By utilizing the civil and criminal tax laws, our
objective is to prosecute violators and to drastically reduce the profits
of this criminal activity by attacking the illegal revenues of the nar-
cotics trade.
Reflecting the high priority given this,program by the President,
Congress has provided financial support for the program. amounting
to $7.5 million in fiscal 1972 and authorization for 541 additional posi-
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tions-200 special agents, 200 revenue agents and 141 support
personnel.
Certain major features of this program should be noted :
1. Treasury will not only coordinate its efforts with all other inter-
ested Federal agencies, but will actively seek the maximum coopera-
tion of State and local agencies as well. This is a vital feature of this
program.
2. With the manpower provided, our goal is to have at least 400 full-
scale IRS on-going investigations.
3. In line with the high priority given this program by the President,
the Internal Revenue Service is assigning, effective immediately, 100
experienced special agents and 100 experienced revenue agents, full
time to this program.
We believe that this program will make a major additional contribu-
tion to the President's offensive against drug abuse.
Interpol plays an important role in providing the mechanism for
cooperation and the exchange of information among the law enforce-
ment agencies of over 100 nations. The United States has been success-
ful in sharpening Interpol's focus on the international narcotics traf-
fic. At the 1969 and 1970 Interpol General Assemblies the drug traffic
was the subject of a great deal of productive attention.
In closing, I would like to express Treasury's appreciation for the
bipartisan support that the Congress has given the Treasury programs.
The support and swift action of the Appropriations Subcommittees of
the House and Senate in approving the amendment to the Treasury
appropriation bill for fiscal year 1972 made the funds for the new in-
creased programs promptly available to us.
This was made possible under the leadership of Chairman Tom
Steed and, Congressman Howard W. Robison in the House and of
Chairman Joseph M. Montoya and Senator J. Caleb Boggs in the
Senate.
I assure you that all the personnel of Treasury will do their utmost
to express that appreciation in the way I know that each Member of
the Congress wants it to be expressed-in the most effective possible
attack on the illicit heroin traffic.
Mr. ROSENTHHAL. At the top of page 8, you say that Bureau of
Customs has achieved speetacular success.
Mr. RossIDEs. That's right.
Mr. Chairman, the estimate is that 4 or 5 tons of heroin is used per
year illegally. The Bureau of Customs in these last 12 months, thanks
to the President's initiative in seeking the appropriation and the enor-
mous support of the Congress in December 1969 passing a supple-
mental appropriation, this last fiscal year we have seized over 900
pounds of pure heroin.
That is not only spectacular, but I could not think of a better word
and it is spectacular and it will show results.
One of the problems is this--
Mr. RosENTHAL. How much came in?
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Mr. RossiDES. We don't know, but we know what we take. You don't
know statistics in this area. I say in my judgment we have turned the
tide. I cannot prove it.
When you seize 900 pounds, when you get reports that the kids are
turning it off in the colleges, I say that we are making progress in
the heroin area. But that does not mean that you don't have an inven-
tory of heroin available.
As you pointed out, if you have the crop coming in now, they can
snap it up and put it away and use it for future years.
But we are at the threshold in enforcement of making the risks for
the smuggler maybe up to a 50-50 chance instead of before when it
might have been a 10-, 15- or 20-to-1 shot that he would ever be caught.
These are enormous seizures that have been made.
Mr. ROSENTIHAL. Were they made overseas or in the United States?
Mr. ROSSIDES. No, in the I 1nited States; 247 pounds in San Juan
in May-we seized that and that hurts. It is not the idea of some
farmers not planting and you go to another farmer. A lot of money
passed at this point; 155 pounds in Miami, 98 pounds-I have the list
here, and there is L chart, Mr. Chairman, that gives more full statistics.
On page 10, 210 pounds in Miami, 98 pouncs in Newark, 150-all in
the United States. Even the criminal syndicates may start to think
twice when the odds of possibly getting caught have increased. That
has happened and we I've] that this is a most salutary development.
Mr. ROSENrHHAL. Yesterday New York State Senator Hughes testi-
fied that from 1965 to 1969 deaths from heroin in New York City
were 2,935, close to 3.000 deaths. that, the projection for the period
1`=x70 to 1974 would be 6,600 deaths in New York City. The availabili,y-
of heroin in New York City is greater today than at any time in the
past. How that stands lip as spectacular success I don't understand.
Mr. ROSSIDES. It stands up in the following: First, no one can prove
that the availability of heroin is greater than in the past and I chal-
lenge that statement on any kind of evidence. Indeed, the evidence is
the opposite when you have 900 pounds you can look at, you can see it
and you can weigh it-no speculation. That does not mean that the
inventory that has been on hand has not been available, and with the
heroin there is the gradation of strength.
They may be cutting it even more. I am not saying that it is not still
readily available-obviously it is, but not to recognize the tremendous
achievements of the adininistration and particularly in the custoinsen-
forcemeut, I think, is unfortunate because this has been a bipartisan
effort.
The Congress has recognized this and they have moved and given
us the tools and we will do snore, but it is only one of the parts.
Mr. ROSENTiiAL. According to the National Institute of Mental
Health the rate of addiction to heroin has increased two to three times
the last 2 years.
Mr. RossivES. I have not seen that study, Mr. Chairman. When they
say the rate of addiction has increased, I have not seen those statistics
and I would question them. Are they talking about for the first time
they are getting statistics? I get reports from different areas that the
youth are turning it off. I get a report from my college dean that there
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is less use in the college, less college students are, going for counseling
on the heroin.
I am not talking about marihuana statistics regarding -chat the
youth are doing or not doing, but one of the great problems in this
area is we don't know enough on statistics in this area. For the first
time these last couple of years we are getting more reports as to what
should be happening, and we know the drug-related death. reports.
Mr. Ros'rN'rlrnr.. How many deaths are there in the TTnited States
from addiction?
Mr. RossznEs. We don't have the statistics. In New York they have
an average of three deaths a day. I believe it is estimated over a thou-
sand a year and it is the largest killer in the age group of 15 to 35.
Mr. ROSENTFHAL. I still don't see how you can use the words "spec-
tacular success."
I really wish all of us would say nobody has done enough, there
has been no spectacular success, but spectacular failure, and Ave will
try to do more.
Mr. RossmES. I don't believe that. I believe that there has been spec-
tacular success in the Bureau of Customs when you have more seizures
of pure heroin than you have had in 10 years. Nowhere do I say the
picture is rosy. All I have said is we have stopped the downslie.
We have a long way to go to get back to where we should be. We
have 12,000 people in the Bureau of Customs. We want to let them
know we recognize the job they are doing and we want them to do a
better job. We are not saying more cannot be done.
The IRS program that Secretary Connally and the President
adopted we should have had that a long time ago. We hope that pro-
gram will help take some of the profits out of the narcotics traffic.
Mr. Chairman, I agree with you. I don't minimize the crisis. Every-
day for 21/2 years I have spent time on this problem. So, I am well
aware of the enormity of the problem and the job to be done.
In this statement I was trying to show in this particular area we
have had what we feel is enormous success. That takes time to pay
off in less heroin on the street, but combined with other efforts, Fed-
eral, State and local, we feel it will.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. How are you doing in Vietnam?
Mr. RossmES. I understand that Asistant Secretary Green from the
Department of State will testify later. Again let me give you a bal-
anced picture as I feel of the matter.
As you know, last year heroin started appearing on the scene with
the American troops. We happen to know a fair amount about the ac-
tivities because there was a Customs advisory team. that was most help-
ful to the Ambassador in making recommendations, which have been
accepted by the Saigon Government regarding a reorganization of the
Vietnamese customs service. We have had a team of advisers under
the AID program, which has been helpful to them. The military has
had a program. I would say, because I have been there on one trip and
I work closely with the militar , on an interdepartmental committee,
that they have done. a jol, of education and of rehabilitation, that is
commendable.
f)o you realize they had an arruiestv program before all of the
hullabaloo of the stories about the large alleged heroin percentages
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there and we are very hopeful that the low percentages that we have
heard so far will bear out, but this was the military rehabilitation
programs that have been in operation for the last few years. These
were, tiwell-thought-out programs.
I remember reading the MACV program in December 1970. You
can't say they don't have a tough problem. They have been overly
hit, but that is the nature of the game.
Mr. ROSENTITAL. Do you think they are overly hit when there are
25,000 to 30,000 heroin addicts there?
Mr. RossrmEs. They have been overcriticized as to the amount of
heroin addiction. I have not read the latest story of yesterday, but
as I recall the percentage rate was 2 percent.
Mr. R0SENTIIAL. The Army itself admits 10 to 15 percent.
Mr. Rossmrs. They do not admit 10 to 15 percent. You don't know-
Mr. Chairman-they are all estimates, Mr. Chairman. How main-
were on drugs before they went and so on. No one can say there isn't
a problem when you have a enormous availability. What surprises
me is that the marketing syndicates in Southeast Asia didn't think of
conversion from opium to heroin earlier than last year, because there
is a vastness of the supply of opium from the Burma-Laos-Thai area.
Mr. RosENTHAL. I will pass to my colleagues.
Congressman Burke.
Mr. BuRKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have been somewhat inter-
ested in your figures on page 10, which I think add up to a little over
800 pounds of the 900 pounds that you were talking about that were
seized. What surprised me is that. one. of these, listed in Miami, I
think, was the heroin that was taken off at Port Everglades in a car
that was shipped here. They found it was bulging in on one side and
they inspected it, but that was discovered somewhat by accident.
Nevertheless, it was a good thing. What about seizures at other ports,
for instance, New York which obviously is a large port, and the ports
in California and on the Mexican and Canadian borders where we
have a great deal of traflie coming in?
Mr. ROSSIDES. The main number and amount of seizures are at the
borders by inspectors without advance evidence. We are trying to
increase the intelligence we gather so that we decrease the amount of
seizures that are not by pure luck, but inspections without prior
evidence.
Actually we had one, the 98-pound- one referred to, in Newark, N.J.,
which is .part of the New York waterfront, and that stemmed front
an inspector who wanted to give a little further review of a particular
automobile that was on the docks there, but that, stemmed in my judg-
ment from the total effort being made by Customs.
We have increased the intelligence efforts and intelligence bulletins
go out to our inspectors, and they say, "One of the favorite methods is
automobiles." These inspectors read that and take a little more care.
The 247-pound seizure in an Juan was definitely-we had the
pattern of routes and ships down to Vera Cruz and on up through
Mexico-as a transit. We gave it a tough going over in San Juan and it
proved most fruitful.
Mr. BURKE. What I :mm driving at, it would semi to me this is sort
of a hit-and-miss method. What we need is greater education in the
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methods by which it is brought in individually to the various customers
and a beefing up of the Customs Bureau.
Mr. RosszmES._I agree completely. The President's current proposal
which has been passed by the Appropriations Committee allocated a
thousand more employees in the Customs Service. Let me say it ties
in with that exact point.
First, we increased the intelligence. We never had intelligence units
before. Commissioner Ambrose has such an intelligence narcotics unit
and it was the intelligence that helped break at least three of these
five cases.
Second, inspectors had never had schooling other than routine
narcotics and the techniques of narcotics. So we sent a team around
throughout the country to visit each of the places so that inspectors
could be upgraded.
Now any new inspector- goes through a special training course. Our
intelligence network, automatic data processing, the C ADPIN, com-
puter for automatic data processing, it was practically nothing,, be-
fore and now we have it nationwide. You just type onto the machine
and you will be able to tell whether that car is a stolen car within a
matter of minutes, and that has been most helpful in the number of
seizures that customs has made.
But again we are talking about a sleeping giant that was literally
unused. That is why I say, Mr. Chairman, I still feel it has been
spectacular in the last few years. We have gotten off the ground. We
feel with the 1,000 men Congress has authorized we will be able to
help close the net.
You can go along any clock in Boston, New York, Miami and there
is no security.
Mr. BuRKE. We talk about getting at the sources. We had testimony
about N lhy the poppies should be destroyed at their source and so on,
which I agree with. But it seems with all of the increased fight against
addiction in this country that dope is coming in from. other sources.
By that I don't mean necessarily by commercial airlines or ordinary
methods of travel.
In my area, for instance, in south Florida, there are a good many
planes that, fly to Bimini and to other areas. It would seem to me that
those planes should be inspected before they leave an area rather than
wait until they get in, because they could clump almost anyplace in
Mexico or Canada.
Mr. RossrnES. That is correct, i4Tr. Congressnman. As von know a
couple of those seizures were from light' aircraft. That is the major
loophole we have learned and discovered in the last 21/, years' efforts.
By beefing up the inspection and investigations, we have done a fairly
good job.
But now what we have found is that this whole belt along the
southern border, including Florida, is a loophole because you don't
have the equipment and the radar for the low-flying general aviation
aircraft.
Mr. BuRKE. You have a good many small airports also.
Mr. Rossin s. That is correct and this appropriation request we
made of $18 million, which the Congress allowed $11") million and said
as soon as we spent it, our appropriations committee would further
entertain a supplemental-primarily the large share was for equip-
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ment, for aircraft and boats. The original was $12 million for that and
$6 million for the additional thousand manpower. We feel that this
one item may prove enormously helpful in stemming what comes up.
Mr. Bumir;. The trouble is you are working on suppositions and I
think this attack upon the problem takes more than suppositions of
what we can or cannot do.
Going back to what I tried to indicate, are there any working
agreements that we have with flying aircraft out of other countries
so that they can be examined and inspected before they enter through
our borders?
Mr. RossiDES. No, we don't and it might not prove fruitful unless
that other country was willing to seize and arrest and give a stiff
penalty.
Mr. BuRKE. They don't have to seize and arrest if you know the air-
craft is there and have the evidence which they have to dump. At
least you could have a look at it if you knew an aircraft was coming
over our borders that had contraband.
Mr. RossmEs. We are working closely with the Mexican authorities.
If there is a suspect plane-
Mr. BuRKE. I think if we are going to get to the source, you have
.to find out when it leaves.
Mr. ROSSIDES. Say the Mexicans inspect the plane and there is some
contraband, which we want them to To so it doesn't come up. That is
all to the good.
Mr. BuRiiE. We could refuse its landing in this country and the
pilot would be rather concerned about what he is going to do.
Mr. RossIDES. I don't really want to comment on the caliber of the
inspection that we could expect from the Mexican inspectors.
Mr. Buaxn. Could we have our own inspectors?
Mr. RossIDES. No, that is the problem. We have preclearance of air-
craft. in Canada and the Bahamas and it has been very harmful to
the drug problem. We have tightened up because what happens, if
they found somebody, they can't arrest him. There is no arrest author-
ity on foreign soil and it really is more for facilitation of passengers.
Just 21/2 years ago a passenger could be precleared in Montreal, go
downtown and have lunch and come back and get on the aircraft.
Mr. BuRIiE. It seems to me with all of the charter fishing and what-
not that they have in certain areas, and certainly in south Florid:;,.
anybody coming over from those areas could drop a package, a fisher-
man could take it in and it is not subject to any inspection at all.
Mr. RoSSIDES. Congressman Burke, this is not easy. We are not say-
ing it is. When we say we have had spectacular success, we have had
that.
Mr. BURT~E. But you have not ba.d success with the older methods-
the fact that somewhere in your report you mentioned about two times
as much as you seized.
Mr. ROSSIDES. Seizures.
Mr. BuRKE. When you get two times as much doesn't it mean any-
thing at all? Maybe the, job was not being done very well in the past.
As our chairman tried to indicate it is important to discover where
it is coming from and where the new addicts are getting it from rather
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than just talking about spectacular success in the field, which I don't
really think have been spectacular. You have had enough to get some
big headlines.
Mr. ROSSmES. 900 pounds of heroin is spectacular success. It is not a
question of new, old, side methods. It is a question of hard work and
getting the intelligence which they did not have before. Customs was
not even allowed in the business before. They are in the business now
and it has been by hard work and not hit or miss or the old methods.
These successes have been based a great deal upon intelligence-
gathering. One of the most important seizures we made stemmed from
import specialists who never even thought of drugs before, we have
galvanized them to check invoices and check suspicious ones. I am not
trying to overplay it because this is a very balanced statement, I
thought.
I am just trying to say, at least recognize the men and women of the
Customs Service who have done this. Tell them, "You have (lone a tre-
mendous job. Do better." Japan was able to beat this problem because
of tough customs enforcement and tough internal enforcement. She is
close to the greatest source of opium in the world and all I am saying
is we have had this spectacular success, which means now for the first
time with added effort and added manpower which the Congress has
now given us, we are going to try to make it at least a 50-50 chance on
anyone bringing in hard narcotics.
If we get to that, that is very good.
Mr. Bum E. It would be better if you had it 99. I am not trying to
tak' anything away from the Customs officials themselves or those you
have working in the narcotics field because I do think this is an ex-
tremely difficult thing to try to solve and it is something you don't
stamp out overnight.
The trouble is it is difficult to say, "Let's be patient with the problem
the way it is." I do recognize your problem, but I think there are cer-
tain things you should investigate further.
Mr. RossIDES. I will look into this one about inspection of aircraft.
Mr. Bun-u.E. Not only aircraft. The thing that bothers me-is that
it is easy to leave Bimini. I have been on fishing trips there, have come
back and have gone through the Customs inspectors. At night it is
quite easy to throw something over the side and have somebody pick
tt up. It would seem to me the only way you could stop that would be
to have a thorough inspection of the ship, or plane, charter boat or
even your personal craft before it leaves the dock.
Mr. ROSS1oES. I will pursue that to see to what degree that is being
done.
Mr. BumiE. That would have to he done by our own inspectors. The
problem is here, not over in Bimini.
Thank you very much.
Mr. ROSENTIrAL. Mr. Vander Jagt.
Mr. VANDER JAGT. You testified the war against heroin depends
upon complete cooperation between Federal, State and local units of
government. I also understood you to testify in response to a question
of the chairman that in many instances the States and the cities have
failed miserably and have done a terrible job.
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If they are doing a terrible Job and yet success depends upon this
complete cooperation, is there any hope of solving the problem?
Mr. Rossivns. Yes. I am an optimist by nature. We have turned the
tide. The States are doing more. They have to because States and
cities particularly have been dragged into it. I credit in large part the
Congress for arousing the pub] is and the press in this area.
I am not going to read any names and I am using it as a general
comment. I see attacks on police departments and the mayors saying
to the Federal Government do this and do that, as if they are going to
solve problems by serious headlines-it just does not happen that way.
When the police departments themselves and the International As-
sociation of Chiefs of Police for the first time are recognizing police
corruption, and in their own convention they are passing resolutions
and acting to do something, that is progress.
The American Bar Association and their efforts over the years have
done very little, to say the least, as to court procedures, conditions in
the court system, and finally it is just like an explosion and we have
to do something because something has to get done.
I think the debate and the spotlight that has been put on it the last
21/2 years has been most salutary. I credit the President with that, in
large part, in the national community and the international commu-
iii ty. When he spoke about it before the United Nations, it was the first
time a head of state discussed this subject at the United Nations.
The President has raised the problem and instituted an action pro-
;ram. They say there are still drugs on the streets and there are, and
it is dreadful in Harlem and Redford-Stuyvesant and they say he is
doing nothing. I say a lot is being done. Because of this debate various
cities are waking up, doing things, action programs in private
-communities.
I remember voluntarily the president of MGM records banned rock
groups that were extoling drugs. This was an interesting action when
this happened last fall. So, as I say, I think a lot of people have been
awakened, but what can happen is if this becomes a political football,
it would set it back.
Mr. VANDER JAGT. On a grading system, would you give a very
good, fair, satisfactory, or unsatisfactory rating to the Bureau of
Customs?
Mr. ROSSIDEs. I would say they have had spectacular success, but the
success has been poor because we need more spectacular successes.
Mr. VANDER JAGT. What rating would you give New York City?
Good, satisfactory, poor, unsatisfactory?
Mr. RossID1s. I will not make that comment.
Mr. VANDER JAGT. You also testified that in your opinion we don't
really need one person or one agency working full time on the co-
ordinating aspect of this problem, because you said the President is the
one who is leading it and coordinating it. I agree with you that there
has been great leadership forthcoming from him, but he has many
other problems on his mind in addition to drugs.
Don't you think it would be helpful to have one man or one agency
or one commission working full time on the coordinating aspects of
this. For example, you testified in response to Congressman Burke
some of the legal problems that we have relative to arrest, inspecting
airplanes at the point where they are taking off rather than landing.
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148
Wouldn't it be good to have someone coordinating perhaps new dip-
lomatic relations in regard to this problem ?
Mr. ROssrDxs. I do support very strongly the coordinating role that
Dr. Jaffe is playing. Specifically on the enforcement area, the effort
on the Federal level is working well and, therefore, there was no need
to talk about someone to come in and coordinate customs with other
agencies.
The coordinating effort is going well and the enforcement end is
going well. On the other part, it is different. That is all I was saying-
just on the enforcement.
Mr. VANDER JAGT. You just told me a couple of minutes ago meas-
ured over the improvement 21/2 years ago, it is a spectacular success.
but you said a moment ago measured by the amount of heroin still
flooding in, you are doing very poorly.
Mr. ROSsIDES. What I meant by that was we are not satisfied with
spectacular success. We will only be satisfied when the evidence is
visible of less heroin on the streets, of less addicts corning in for treat-
ment or other evidence we can find, when the reports start coming back
to the law enforcement communities around the country that it-is not
that easily available as it was, that is when we will be satisfied.
Mr. VANDER JAGT. Thank you and thank you for a prepared state-
ment which was well balanced and very helpful to this subcommittee.
Mr. Rossmrs. I would stress one additional item, Mr. Chairman, this
new IRS program could be a great sleeper. It is one which we have
substantial hopes for as part of the total picture.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. Our neat three witnesses will appear together so
we can get a balanced view of the problem. We are happy to welcome
Hon. Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State for EastAsia and
Pacific Affairs; Hon. Martin J. Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary of
State for European Affairs ; and Mr. Rodger P. Davies, Deputy As-
sistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.
We will begin with Secretary Green and give each of you an op-
portunity to read any prepared statements that you might have.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARSHALL GREEN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
Mr. GREEN. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I appreciate the oppor-
tunity to discuss the serious and widespread drug problem in East Asia
and the steps which we., together with the concerned nations of Asia,
are taking to confront all aspects of this situation.
Drug production and use have long been a part of the Asian scene.
In what is probably the most. extensive area of illegal production, the
so-called Golden Triangle where Burma, Thailand, and Laos coverge,
opium has been the sole cash crop of the inhabitants for nearly two
centuries. This area has been fo years virtually beyond the control
of any government.
Approximately half of the world's illicit output of opium is pro-
duced in this area. Until fairly recently this production was consumed
almost entirely by East Asian addicts, mainly overseas Chinese said
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to number a million. Use was generally confined to refined opium,
morphine, and purple-or smoking-heroin.
The appearance on the scene of white, 96 to 98 percent pure heroin
is a very recent phenomenon aimed almost entirely at the U.S. service-
man in Vietnam. It is the brush-fire escalation of white heroin usage
and addiction among our military forces in Vietnam which has cre-
ated the sense of urgency and alarm which is shared equally by the
administration, the Congress, and by the American people.. Our con-
cern is strengthened by the fact that now, in contrast with earlier
practice, there is evidence that Southeast Asian heroin is increasingly
finding its way into the United States through a variety of ingenious
smuggling methods.
We greatly welcome recent moves to stem the flow of heroin to the
United States from Turkey via France and the announcement of the
Government of Turkey to outlaw opium production by 1972. We see
as a result, however, a corresponding intensified effort by drug traf-
fickers to concentrate more on East Asia. Unless we and the Asian
nations take positive actions to prevent such a change of venue of these
unscrupulous operations, much of the expected effect of the Turkish
ban on production and increased pressure on European trafficking
will be lost.
The enormity and complexity of the East Asian drug problem have
become particularly apparent to us in the past few months, when
drugs in increasing amounts have come into the hands of some of our
servicemen in Vietnam. As a result, there have been a number of moves
in- both the legislative and executive branches to investigate the prob-
lem and seek corrective action. These moves include :
The visit to Southeast Asia in February 1971 by an interdepartment
task force and the subsequent report of this group which focused at-
tention on the rapid escalation in heroin abuse amo-n U.S. troops in
Vietnam.
Publication in April 1971 of the report entitled "Inquiry into Al-
leged Drug Abuse in the Armed Services" by a special committee of
the House Armed Services Committee.
A. regional conference held in Bangkok in mid-April 1971 including
all U.S agencies responsible for combating the drug problem.
The April 1971 visit to Southeast Asia by Congressmen Murphy and
Steele of the Rouse Foreign Affairs Committee. We are giving careful
thought to their comprehensive report "The World Heroin Problem."
The working visit to nine Fast Asian countries in May 1971 by
RNDD Director Ingersoll and Snec~ial Assistant for Narcotics Meas-
ures to the Secretary of State.. Mr. Wellman. Discussions were held
with senior Asian and U.S. officials.
The annual meeting of U.S. chiefs of mission in Fast Asia at Baguio
in mid-Mav 1971. The drug problem was a key agenda item.
The visit to Southeast Asian countries in late May 1971 by Under
Secretary of State Irwin and myself. The drug problem was a major
topic of discussion with leaders of Southeastern Asian countries.
The recall by President. Nixon of envoys to countries where drugs
-areaparticular problem fora June 14 dicussion of the problem with
senior officials of the adtninist.ration.
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The presentation to the Congress on June 17 of the President's mes-
sage on drug abuse.
The meeting in Bangkok on June 18, 1971, of U.S. Ambassadors and
other senior officials in East Asia to consider and recommend actions
to combat the problem.
These events highlight the growing awareness and concern over this
situation. Related to these developments have been on-going discus-
sions throughout Asia involving our Ambassadors and Asian leaders
at the highest levels and leading toward effective measures for dealing
with illegal drugs.
In the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs I have designated
a senior officer to devote his full time to drug matters. A similar desig-
nation has been made in the East Asian Bureau of AID.
Earlier this week an iii.teragency working group met under the
chairmanship of the East Asian Bureau to take up on a priority basis
the recommendations of the Bangkok ambassadorial meeting and to
begin work on comprehensive plans to combat the problem in East
Asia.
Thus we have been moving with deliberate speed toward the estab-
lishment of programs designed to attack the heroin problem through-
out East Asia. As we increase our knowledge and delve more deeply
into the problem, it is appa rent that, there are no simple nor quick solu-
tions to this situation which involves political, social, economic, and
legal problems of a most sensitive and complicated nature.
A key ingredient in effectively attacking the problem is an Asian
leadership convinced that the trafficking in hard drags is not simply
an American problem. but one which knows no borders and respects
no nation. Over 50 percent of Asia's population is under the- age of 18.
As we reduce our presence in Vietnam through the Vietnamization
program heroin traffickers will undoubtedly seek new customers for
their drugs. The youth of Asia are a prime target and this disturbing
possibility is beginning to come home to Asian leaders.
As East Asian leaders increasingly come to understand that they
share in what is an international problem of the gravest nature, we
see a corresponding increase in their willingness to cooperate in at-
tacking the problem. This is as it should be.
While we will work together with the East Asians and assist where-
necessary, positive results can only come about from Asian initiatives
and actions, and to this cud we look to the countries where the drug
problem is found to apply their limited resources and capabilities to
the greatest extent possible toward elimination of the drug traffic.
We recognize this to be a problem of major proportions requiring
the complete cooperation of Americans and Asians alike. So far only
a beginning has been made in tackling this problem. hut we shall
soon see more positive results. I tun sure, as the full weight of U.S.
and Asian resources is brought to bear in combating this deadly
threat.
Some positive actions are being taken by Southeast Asian Govern-
ments.
In South Vietnam, top Vietnamese and U.S. officials are in close
touch on the entire drug problem. In recent weeks, ri4*id control
measures have been introduced by the Government of Vietnam at
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Tan Son Nhut Airport, a major point of entry of heroin, and at other
airports and seaports. A number of officials have been removed or
transferred.
Laos is moving rapidly toward passage of legislation which would
outlaw all forms of drug traffic. Armed with this legislation, the
Government of Laos will for the first time have the authority to initi-
ate positive steps to stamp out the production and traffic in opium
and its derivatives.
In Thailand we are working together on a continuing basis with
Thai officials at the highest levels, to plan and coordinate actions
aimed at eliminating all elements of the drug traffic. Thai laws are
comprehensive and strict and, together with the tradition of coopera-
tion with the United Nations and the United States, provide the solid
base needed to attack the problem.
What
growing of awareness, briefly and this
concern which the
rapidly
d g roblem in sense
East Asia has generated among both U.S. and Asian
leaders. I can assure this committee that we are pursuing this problem
as a matter of top priority, and that we will continue and intensify
our effort to insure that our resources and those of the Asian nations
themselves are used effectively against all drug abuse among both
Asians and Americans.
Mr. RosrNTHAL. Secretary Hillenbrand.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARTIN J. HILLENBRAND, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
Mr. HILLENBRAND. Mr. Chairman, France has been a traditional
source of heroin coming to the United States. Morphine base is
smuggled to laboratories in southern France, where it is converted to
heroin. Several laboratories exist in southern France, but they have
proven most difficult to track down. They typically occupy no more
space than a small garage.
The growth of a domestic drug abuse problem in France in the past
several. years has created public concern there and has contributed to
the great increase in official French cooperation with the United States
in the drive against illicit heroin production and international traf-
ficking in drugs.
France and the United States have cooperated for a number o f years
on the problem of illegal drag trafficking. The basis for a closer and
mreatly expanded cooperative relationship was laid in late 1969, when
President Nixon wrote to President Pompidou explaining his deep
concern over the problem and suggesting that they discuss the matter
during Pompidou's forthcoming visit to the United States.
President Pompidon replied that he shared the President's concern
and agreed to put the item on their agenda. This exchange also fa-
cilitated the creation of a Franco-American Intergovernmental Com-
-ni++ee on Drug Abuse, which now meets on a regular quarterly basis.
The drug problem was discussed during President Pompidou's-
state visit in February-March 1970. and Foreign Minister Schumann
indicated an awareness of the need to enlarge the French program.
French Interior Minister Mareellin's visit to the United States in.
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152
July 1970 was largely devoted to the drug problem and helped to ce-
ment the enhanced cooperation between our two countries. As a re-
sult of the agreements reached at these meetings, the French Govern-
ment during 1970 increased the total number of agents dealing with
narcotics traffic almost fourfold.
In order to facilitate the expanded cooperation and liaison between
the French Police Judiciare and the BNDD, a formal agreement was
worked out that clarified the responsibilities and obligations of each
side and established the basis for a concerted joint effort between the
two agencies. This agreement for the "coordination of preventive and
repressive action against illicit narcotic and dangerous drug traffic"
was signed in Paris by Attorney General Mitchell and Minister of the
Interior Marcellin on February 26,1971.
The French Police Judiciaire are in charge of these efforts in France.
The French enforcement agency increased the number of agents deal-
ing with narcotics traffic from a total of 28 to 87 in the course of
1970. concentrated in its Paris headquarters and at Marseilles and Nice.
The French also have two liaison personnel at the BNDD regional
headquarters in New York. The BNDD has correspondingly increased
its staff in France to five agents in Paris and two in Marseilles.
The French are a member of the U.N. Commisison on Narcotic
Drugs and participate in its programs. The French Government passed
legislation last veer, which restructured the penalty provisions for
illegal drug activities and established prison sentences of up to 20
ye'1 rs.
Franco-American efforts in the drug field are carried out both
through daily operational cooperation between the French Police
Judiciaire and BNDD personnel. at Paris and Marseilles and through
the quarterly meeting of the principals where major programs and
policies are developed.
In the technical field, the BNDD has furnished training assistance
and certain equipment to the French ; and exchanges are continuing
regarding new and highly sophisticated methods and techniques.
The United States will continue to exchange suggestions with the
French authorities, designed to intensify the cooperative efforts in
controlling illicit production and traffic in heroin and other danger-
ons drugs. The exchange of visits by Attorney General Mitchell and
Minister of Interior Marcellin, and the signing of the formal agree-
ment on cooperation, on February 26, 1971, signal the importance
attached by our two countries to this problem.
Illegal drug operations are international in scope. Information de-
veloped in one country may lead to arrests and seizures anywhere
along the path of the illegal narcotics as it is processed and shipped
to the United States. Recognizing that one cannot always pinpoint
the major responsibility for a seizure or arrest, the results are so far
encouraging. As a result of cooperation with French authorities and
operations in France. seizures of morphine base and heroin (1 pound
of morphine base converts to 1 pound of heroin) have been : 1969,
992 pounds; 1970. 1,014: pounds; 1971 (6 months), 2,864 pounds.
I have just received another message indicating that that last figure
can be increased further because on June 21 in Montreal, Canada,
acting on information furnished by the French Police Judiciaire, an
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additional 50 kilos of heroin were uncovered in a vehicle there and
several arrests were made at the time so that figure of 2,864 for the
first 6,months can be raised to 2,974 pounds. When you compare that
figure with the figures Assistant Secretary Rossides gave, it is a rather
impressive demonstration when compared with previous years that
some progress is being made and that the augmentation of the French
police forces is having some effect.
To continue with the statement--
In the spring of 1970 an attempted suicide by an American univer-
sity student while on an LSI) trip brought to the attention of the
Luxembourg Government and the American Embassy in Luxem-
bourg the fact that a drug subculture was established in Luxem-
bourg.
Investigation of the matter also revealed that drugs were being sold
and consumed at the junior high and high school at a nearby All,
Force base in Bitburg, Germany.
During the course of the investigation that followed, it became evi-
dent that there was scant expertise among Luxembourg police and
medical officials about the problems of drug abuse. Additionally, ex-
isting Luxembourg drug laws made no distinction between sale and
use and provided maximum penalties of a $40 fine and 1 month in
jail.
Our Embassy and the Government of Luxembourg, realizing the
need for immediate action, organized an action program designed to
promote official expertise in, and public knowledge of, the dangers of
drug abuse.
The Embassy organized a briefing for top level Luxembourg offi-
cials by the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. BNDD lec-
tures and movies were given to the American community in Luxem-
bourg and arrangments were made for the Chief of the Luxembourg
Sureto to attend an intensive course in Washington last summer spon-
sored by the BNDD. A new drug abuse law distinquishing between
sale and use and providing for rehabilitation programs for victims of
drug abuse has been introduced in the Luxembourg Legislature.
The second part of the action program centered on a two-part.
multinational drug symposium. The first session took place in October
1970 under the- sponsorship of the Luxembourg Government at the
initiative and with the close cooperation of the American Embassy.
The meeting studied the law enforcement aspects of the drug pro--
lem with police officers of six nations represented (Belgium, Fran(-e.
Germany, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, and the United States).
Our BNDD was primarily responsible for the conduct of the meeting.
which lasted 4 days and received very favorable reaction from both
participants and press.
Drug Symposium IT was held on .Tune 19-30, 1971, and was directed
toward the medical aspects of the, drug problem : prevention. treat-
ment, and. rehabilitation. It was the logical continuation of the first
session and again represented a joint,effort on the part of the. Luxem-
bourg Government and the F.18. Government.
On the initiative of our Embassy, the Luxembourg Government
agreed- to sponsor the meeting and to invite nine -other nations,to at
tend (eight of which ultimately- sent representatives'). A steam of ex-
perts from the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
attended and played an i mportant role in the successful meeting.
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This very fruitful cooperation by the two governments will con-
tinue. A special effort is now being undertaken to assist the Luxem-
bourg radio-television network to obtain films for showing to the
Luxembourg public on the national television.
Mr. ROSENTIIAL. Mr. Davies.
STATEMENT OF RODGER P. DAVIES, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRE-
TARY FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
Mr. DAVIES. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee :
I welcome this opportunity to make. a statement about the problem
of illicit production and traffic in narcotics in the Near East and
South Asian area. I can report to you today that in Turkey, the most
important country insofar as the T "nited states is concerned because
it is at present considered to be the largest single source of opium
being used for the manufacture of heroin reaching the United States,
it major breakthrough has occurred. As you know, we have ;been en-
gaged for some time in cooperative efforts with the Government of
Turkey to eliminate the illegal diversion of opium from Turkey's
legitimate production.
In late 1968 a $3 million AID loan was extended, which provided
equipment to improve the Government's enforcement program and to
develop adequate and financially attractive substitute crops.
Since 1967 Turkey has also reduced the number of provinces where
opium poppy planting was legally permitted (from 21 in 1967 to
four for the fall 1971 planting). It took this action to reduce the en-
forcement problem to manageable proportions and to concentrate the
Government's collection effort in a, smaller and contiguous area. IIow-
ever, despite substantial effort, Turkey was unable to prevent opium-
smuggling.
Against this background, the new Turkish Prime Minister, Nihat
Erim, who when he assumed office just. 4 months ago publicly declared
that it was the policy of his government to eliminate the illegal flow
of opium from Turkey, on June 30 took what we believe is a coura-
geous and statesmanlike decision to end all opium production after next
year's summer harvest.
Under Turkish law, farmers must be given 1 year's notice before
opium poppy planting can be prohibited in areas where cultivation
has been permitted.
In a public statement explaining his government's decree banning
opium production, Prime Minister Erim said he will take every meas-
ure to eliminate smuggling. Since the future amount the farmer will
be paid by the Turkish Government will depend on the quantity of
opium turned into the government, monopoly from this year's harvest,
there will be a built-in incentive for farmers to present the entire pro-
duction from this year's crop.
We have also been encouraged by other recent evidence of the Turk-
ish Government's intention to prevent opium from entering illicit
channels. In mid-June a strict opium licensing and control bill was
passed by the National Assembly of the Parliament. It is now under
consideration in the Senate, and we anticipate it will be passed this
month by that body.'
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Other measures which the Turkish Government has taken to insure
collection of the total production from this year's harvest will result,
we believe, in a much improved performance. Among these are : Train-
ing of additional agents, an increase in the purchase price of the
opium gum, provision for advance cash payments to the farmers, col-
lection of the gum at the farm immediately after harvest, and im-
proved coordination of the elements involved in the collection.
Enforcement efforts, with assistance from U.S. BNDD personnel,
are also showing improved results. The amount of opiates seized dur-
ing the first 4 months of 1971 (equivalent to 574 pounds of pure heroin,
which would have been worth about $60 million in the U.S. market) is
more than double that seized during the entire year of 1970. It is also
more than the total amount seized by U.S. enforcement agencies within
the United States and at. our borders during these same 4 months.
In the -four provinces legally permitted to plant in the fall of 1971,
the Prime Minister has announced that he will undertake a program
to induce farmers to voluntarily abstain from planting.
Prime Minister Erim recognized that the cost and difficulties of con-
trolling opium cultivation were greater than the economic importance
it has for the Anatolian farmer, great as this is. His courageous and
statesmanlike action will greatly help to reduce and to disrupt the
existing pattern of illicit international trafficking, and we hope it will
provide an example for other countries.
I would like to briefly cover the situation in Iran, India, Afghani-
stan and Pakistan, other countries in the region where substantial
amounts of opium are being produced.
Iran, which is an authorized opium producer under the 1961 Single
Convention on Narcotics, resumed production in 1969 after a 15-year
hiatus, to satisfy its own internal requirements. Like the United States,
Iran is a victim country, having about 330,000 opium addicts and esti-
mated 50,000 heroin addicts. Iran has a strong antismuggling law
which imposes the death penalty on violators-more than 90 persons
have been executed since 1969-and it has instituted a control system
intended to prevent illegal diversion. At present there is no evidence
to suggest that Iranian-grown opium is entering the illicit interna-
tional market.
India is by far the largest legal producer of opium, accounting for
about three-quarters of the world legal output and exports. Its annual
production ranges from 500 to 1,000 metric tons. However, only a small
amount finds its way into the international illicit traffic-an estimated
5 to 10 tons to the Arabian Peninsula and the same amount to the Far
East. This is largely due to India's relatively effective system of con-
trols and incentives which results in the bulk of the raw opium gum
being sold to the government. The balance, together with small amounts
smuggled in from neighboring countries, is used internally by an esti-
mated 25,0,000 to 300,000 opium addicts.
There are no reliable statistics on opium production or trade in
Afghanistan, but annual production has been estimated at 100-125
metric tons. Opium poppies are primarily grown in tribal areas of
eastern Afghanistan where administrative control is not as strong, as
in other parts of the country. Smuggling is a way of life for these tribal
people, and they live quite independently.
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The difficult problem here will be to help the government establish
and enforce an effective program, given the nature of the problem
and Afghanistan's limited financial and administrative resources.
Pakistan has a licensed production of about 10 metric tons. However,
illicit production has been estimated as high as 175-200 tons. As in
the case of Afghanistan, most of this production takes place in remote
regions, in part tribal areas unadministered by central authority.
We have made representations to the Governments of Afghanistan
and Pakistan regarding opium suppression. We plan now to have
more detailed discussions concerning how we, and multilateral
agencies, can assist in improving the organization, training, and equip-
ping of enforcement and control agencies, and in encouraging pro-
grams of crop substitution.
That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman, and I will be happy
to answer any questions I can.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. Could I ask the somewhat unusual? Have you ever
met or talked with an addict or former addict, particularly young
people? Have any of you ever had that opportunity?
One of the events that impressed me during the course of these hear-
ings came 2 days ago when Congressman Rangel who represents the
Harlem District of Manhattan, talked of the total inability to live a
normal life in that community as a result of heroin availability. His
own children are just not safe. He said that the problem is of such in-
credible urgency and desperation that he himself cared not at all
about the security of the United States vis-a-vis other countries such
as Turkey if that country did anything to help destroy his children
and the children of his neighbors.
Yesterday, Senator Hughes, who is chairman of the relevant com-
mittee that has jurisdiction in this area, produced maps and charts
showing the number of deaths in the city of New York which, even to
myself, a lifelong resident, was shocking. He produced maps and
charts of the Bedford-Stuyvesant area and described shocking condi-
tions in that community.
I have visited heroin treatment centers in the city of New York
and have seen 14-, 15-, 16-year-old kids that were shriveled up and
whose lifestyle was totally stunted.
I think one of the problems-and we are all guilty-Congress and
the executive branch--is that we never dedicated the energy or felt
the urgency or the desperation during the growth of this heroin
epidemic.
I think that perhaps some of the negotiations we have had with
foreign governments have not been as vigorous as the situation war-
ranted. One of the reasons is that none of us either on this side of the
table or you three gentlemen have ever smelled what life was like in
those areas where heroin addiction has become prevalent.
What I am going to ask is this : What do you three think of the idea
of joining me and those members of the committee who are available
to visit Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant and south Bronx 2 weeks
from today so you could meet and talk with some heroin-addicted
people; if we are not attacked on the street, but we could. go to places
like Odyssey House. I know it is not commonplace and Ian-1 sornewhut
embarrassed at making this suggestion.
Mr. GREEN. Mr. Chairman, I would be very glad to join.
Mr. HILLENBRAND. I think I will be out of the country on that date,
but if something separately could be arranged, I would welcome the
opportunity to do that.
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Mr. DAVIES. I would be happy to do that.
Mr. ROSENTIIAL. It will not be a pleasant day. There will be no
hospitality and you will not enjoy lunch, and there will be no wine
and no placecards. It will be a very gruesome experience, but I do
think it would be in the national interest if we just all had our spines
screwed a little tighter. That is one way of doing it.'
Secretary Green, Congressman Steele said recently at this subcom-
mittee meeting that General Dzu is the chief trafficker in narcotics in
Vietnam. Attorney General Mitchell said before the Senate Govern-
ment Operations subcommittee that he had the names of those people
but was not prepared to release them. Is there anything you want to
tell us about information you have had or action you are preparing to
take or have taken ?
Mr. GREEN. With regard to the charges against General Dzu, we just
do not know if there is a basis for these charges. I inquired last night
by immediate cable to Saigon to find out what the story was. I just
had a little slip of paper delivered to me, almost anticipating your
question, Mr. Chairman. It says that the Government of Vietnam
spokesman said the charges against General Dzu are being investi-
gated. We have no information yet, and South Vietnamese spokesmen
said no comment with regard to the allegations against them. Ile did
go on to stress that a major effort has been launched against the drug
problem.
Could I add here the South Vietnamese Government is fully alert
to the strong feelings that. we have on this subject, and they them-
selves have their own compelling reasons for moving, too. As I said
earlier, theiryouth and their soldiers can be affected and they are giv-
ing this the same high priority as they are giving to the pacification
program itself.
They have now removed either for corruption or inefficiency or other
reasons a lot of officials. In other words, they are putting the best
men they have onto the problem.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. As far as General Dzu is concerned, all you can
report is that they have investigated?
Mr. GREEN. Yes, sir.
Mr. ROSENTI[AL. You have no information of your own?
Mr. GREEN. I have no information of my own.
Mr. ROsENTIIAL. Has the Attorney General communicated the names
to you?
Mr. GREEN. I assume the Attorney General was referring to the peo-
ple who had already been removed, and there are others who are now
being investigated by the South Vietnamese Government.
Mr. Rosr.NTIHAL. Do you have any figures about the total number of
American troops involved in Heroin addiction in Southeast Asia?
Mr. GREEN. I heard the colloquy while waiting here between you and
Mr. Rossides, and I have nothing to add to that.
I might point out that. many of the Armed Forces, when they ar-
rive in Vietnam had already had a drug experience, and I have heard
I The chairman of the subcommittee, Hon. Benjamin S. Rosenthal, Representatives
Morgan P. Murphy and John Buchanan. together with John J. Brady from the Foreign
Affairs Committee staff : Assistant Secretaries Martin I. Hillenbrand and Marshall Green.
Messrs. Harvey R. Wellman and Rodger P. Davies from the Department of State; and
Messrs. Andrew C. Tartaglino and Robert Rosthal from the Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs, visited New York on July 23. 1971. Their findings substantiated the
testimony of witnesses concerning conditions in New York.
65-728-71-11
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figures as high as 50 to 62 percent, and that one of the tragedies of
this is they have never been exposed to this pure heroin, so when they
take a shot of that, they are hooked, if, indeed, they survive.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Hillenbrand, I have heard reports that West.
Germany is becoming a- conduit country for some of this opium and
heroin on its way to Marseilles. Is there any truth to this?
Mr. HILLENBRAND. 1 have heard this rumor, too, but there has been
no concrete evidence of processing in West Gerrnany.
In this telegram that came in within the last 24 hours, it is reported
that on June 21, 1971, in Munich, BNDD agents from Paris and the
Frankfurt office directly assisted the police rn the arrest, of a Syrian
and anIranian national. They confiscated more than 200 pounds of
morphine base. This would seem to suggest the answer to your question
is yes, since things are toughening Lip in France, the natural tendency
is to flow through other channels.
Obviously, the problem has not been as acute as in the caseof France,
but we will be in the process of making arrangements through the
BNDI) and the Embassy and the Germans if this is a pattern of the
future so it will not be permitted to develop on any large scale.
The German police are already organized in-such a way to enable
them to make seizures and process. information usefully that comes
to them from outside sources. .
iMr. ROSENTHIAL. Mr. Hillenbrand, are you satisfied the French are
doing enough in view of the severity of the problem?
Mr. JIrra.ENBRAND. We, of course, rely largely on what Ave are told
by P,NDD about the technical police aspects of the -French cooperation.
I do think there has been not only a heightened willingness at the
political level as the awareness of the nature of the problem has in-
creased but also a willingness down the line through the Ministry of
Interior, and so on, to provide more personnel. Nov, whether these
efforts are adequate to meet the actual needs of the situation is a judg-
rent that only the BNI)I) could rrrake. It maintains daily liaison with
the organization. - - - -
All I can say is that at the political level, the French Government
has proved exceedingly cooperative. If there are specific, concrete re-
quests that we have to make, they will, I am sure, be equally receptive
to these requests. -
Mr. RosENTIJAL. Mr. Davies, I am told that the Turkish Assembly
passed this law and that it becomes law automatically if the Turkish
Senate takes no action; is that correct?
-
Mr. DAvi s. The Senate is expected to take action. As I understand
it, it will become law if action is not taken, but we expect that the
licensing law will be ratified by the Senate.
Now, the decree which Prime Minister Erim promulgated at the
end of. June is Turkish law. He acted under existing legislation which
authorizes the Government to set the terms for poppy production.
i'Tr. ROSENTHAL. How many crops will develop in Turkey that will
be available for distribution to the heroin market from today on?
Mr. DA.VIES. The harvest is underway at the present time as is the
collection effort. There will be one planting in the fall of this year, in
September, and a spring planting at the time of the rains. So, the
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harvest which will take place in .Tuly and August of 1972 will be the
last harvest of opium gum in Turkey.
Mr. IloanrrrnAr,. So, there wi11 be two more crops?
Mr. DAVIES. It is actually one crop. They pant at the time of the
rains.
Mr. ROSENTHHAL. They- are harvesting right now?
Mr. DAVIES. They are.
Mr. ROSENThrAL. And there is another planting, so there' will be two
to provide substantial quantities of heroin for the next 2 years.
Mr. DAVIES. This is coupled by increased measures of the Turkish
Government to prevent leakage into illicit channels.
As I noted in illy statement, already in this year the measures which
have been-innovated have shown very promising results.
The fact that the Turkish Government is willing to pay farmers on
the-basis of the harvest they turn in this year for not planting during
the next authorized season, l think, will pay off in terns of a, a substan-
tially reduced yield and a, more complete collection by the official
Turkish Land Office.
Mr. ROSENTIJA.L. l)id we make -ill ,y representations to the Turkish
Government soliciting them or urging them not to permit the next
planting?
Mr. DA-v11SS. The Turkish Government was bound by law which was
passed by the Turkish Parliament, to give 12 months' notice of plant-
ing restrictions. At the end of .Tune of 1970, the decree promulgated
by the government of Prime Minister i)emirel reduced the provinces
where cultivation was authorized to seven and said that in the follow-
ing season it would be further reduced to four.
So. then Government was legally obliged by the June 1971 decree to
authorize cultivation in those four provinces and to state that further
production would not be Permitted following the harvesting of that
crop.
711 . ROSENTHAL. !low much assistance are we providing Turkey in
this fiscal year?
Mr. DAMES. We have several programs going, Mr. Rosenthal. There
is.of course, it military assistance program. We have provided Public
Law480 wheat. Economic aid runs about $40 million.
Mr. ROSrNTrrAr,. Military assistance is confidential?
Mr. DAVIES. It approximates $10) million It year, sir.
Mr. ROSENTTTAL. So. we are giving the Turkish Government this
year about $140 million?
Mr. DAVIES. Yes, sir.
Mr. ROSENTIHAL. And the estimated cost of the opium crop is how
much.?
Mr. DAVIES. $3 million to $5 million.
Mr. ROSENTITAL. Mr. Burke.
Mr. Bunny. I would like to ask Mr. Green a question, if I may,
Mr. Chairman.
You say that in Thailand we are working together on a continuing
basis with the Thai officials in coordinated actions aimed at elimi-
nating all elements of the drug traffic. In what way are we doing
this ?
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Mr. GREEN. The principal problem, of course, relates to the pro-
duction by the Mao tribesmen up in the north where the writ of gov-
ernment does not extend. The Thai Government has a program
through which they are going to try to give alternate means of liveli-
hood to the people in the hills, and we are helping their Thai police
with our assistance program.
So, in those ways, there will be assistance. But I think it will also
be, principally in intercepting and stopping the flow from that Golden
Triangle that is so inaccesible. This will involve a whole series of
steps. It would include amassing intelligence and making effective
use of the intelligence as to what the movements are and how to
intercept them. This would require the full cooperation of the Thais.
This would be basically their operation. It is also a question of where
the acetic anhydride and other types of chemicals that are used in
the refinement of heroin are originating, and intercepting those ship-
ments.
There is a question of aerial surveillance so you know where the
poppy fields are. There is a whole series of measures being taken all
across the board.
Mr. BurFE. I understand there was quite a black-market operation
in. dope in Thailand and it was not too difficult to acquire.
Now, if the laws are as strict as you say, why are there open
traffickers in dope?
Mr. GREEN. The laws are stiff and there is a new awareness in track-
ing clown. Our views and assertiveness on this problem do carry weight.
But I think the Thais also realize this new heroin presents a great
threat to their own young people. In other words, I think there is a
paTvallel growing awareness among the Asian officials along with ours
as to the gravity of the problem.
Mr. BIIRBE. Let's take South Vietnam. particularly Saigon, where
there have continually been notorious operations. If these notorious
black-market operations have been in existence and they have been
tolerated apparently by our own military, our State Department and
our own people there as well as the Government officials themselves,
how can we possibly imagine we are going to get any cooperation with
regard to the drug problem there with the enormous a mount of money
involved in the drug traffic?
Mr. GREEN. I think you have phrased the. problem very well. It is
a tough one. and it will require tough measures in cracking down and
severe penalties and the enforcement of severe penalties.
The first step is being taken and that is to put an effective inspection
on at the airports and other places where drugs enter Vietnam. As
far as we know, there is no production or manufacture of heroin in
Vietnam itself. It is brought in from various sources. So. controlling
your airports and other means of entry becomes terribly important
at the same time as you suggest. Mr. Burke, it is terribly important
that they root out all types of public officials and whoever is gaining
from this trafficking. 11Iy guess is they are going to do this. They know
how we feel about it and we believe they feel that strongly themselves.
Throughout my remarks I have emphasized not approaching the prob-
lern as though they were doing its a favor. This is vital in terms of
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their own interest, and f think this is perhaps truer in Asia than in
Turkey. I understand in Tin-hey there is no local consumption of these
illicit drugs, but in the Far East there is. There was already.this drug
culture going on in the, overseas Chinese communities for many years.
When you talk about countenancing this for all - these years, that has
to be borne in mind. It was countenanced by the governments, and the
victims of opium in particular were set aside in little isolated ghetto
communities and isolated from the rest of society. So, it is really a
revolutionary situation now, and I think it does call for revolutionary
methods.
I have tried to convey through my remarks the gravity with which
we hold this problem-we all do-and I think the South Vietnamese
Government does also. But it is the reversal of the attitude of the
past.
You used the term tolerating or tolerant in terms of the Department
of Defense. I don't think we are tolerant. I don't think we were aware
of what was going on. This has hit us rather recently.
Mr. BURKE. All you have to do is walk down the streets of Saigon
and you would be aware. This is not a new situation.
Mr. GREEN. I agree it is now.
Mr. Burun. You would be walking down the street with blinders on
if you could not be aware of it.
Mr. GREEN. We were not aware of the gravity of the problem a year
?v 2 years ago. I recall some people coming back from East Asia re-
porting how this problem had hit the communities where our troops
were located. Obviously, it has been going on to some extent before
and obviously the servicemen arriving in East Asia had had some. ex-
perience,, but the problem is that this is pure heroin which is arriving
there now.
Mr. BuRKE. It seems rather strange that if the military had been
aware that 40 percent of those sent over would go to an area where
dope was easy to acquire, they would not have been sent into that area
in the first place. Perhaps troops could have been moved from the
European area where it was not so prevalent.
Why does it seem to be our custom to make things easier for those
we know whohave a problem, at least in the military?.
Mr. GREEN. I can't answer that question. This is, of course, a question
of selecting our military for going overseas. This is something ob-
viously that will have to be taken into account in the future.
Mr. Burge. As a practical matter, you will have to agree, if the
situation goes for the better and they stop the poppy production in
Turkey and actually stop that source, there have to be measures taken
in the Far East.
Mr. GREEN. I fully agree with that and I said that in my opening
remarks. In my opinion, it constituted a new hazard in that, part of
the world simply because the problem had been alleviated elsewhere.
Mr. BURKKE. Doesn't it have to he done with more than just rhetoric?
It has to be done with concrete methods so you can say this is what is
being done and we are going to do this before it starts.
Mr. GREEN. Absolutely.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Vander Tapt.
Mr. VANDER JAGT. Thank you. Mr. Chairman.
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Earlier today it was testified that customs officials have been spec-
tacularly successful in comparison to a few years ago.
On page 2 of your statement, you say now in contrast to other
practice, there is evidence that Southeast Asian heroin is increasingly
finding its way into the United States. Measured in terms of results
at least as it applies to the heroin from Southeast Asia, our efforts
there would be less than satisfactory. The situation is growing worse
as it applies to Southeast Asia.
Mr. GREEN. Precisely. That has a great deal to do with the fact that
the servicemen coming back, friends, and all the rest of it, so this be-
comes a new medium for transfer.
Mr. VANDER JAGT. It does not necessarily reflect, on the efforts of the
customs officials but it reflects on the nature of the problem.
Mr. GREEN. And the expanding proportion of the problems.
Mr. VANDER JAGT. If we are measuring results as applied to South-
east Asia
Mr. Gr.EEN. We cannot boast about the results so far. It is too soon.
Mr. VANDER JAGT. Throughout your testimony, you emphasized
that East Asian leaders came to the gravity of the problem because
it is beginning to affect their young so that now they are cooperating
with us. It seems to me before we could gain their confidence, they
had to realize, it would be to their benefit and their own children.
Wasn't there any way to show them before that it was to their own
self-interests to help thrust aside these problems before threatening
withholding of aid, and so on? Wasn't there any leverage we could
give them before they realized their own children would be involved?
Wasn't there leverage that we could have exercised that we did not
exercise?
Mr. GREEN. The awareness of this problem only hit us in recent
months. In retrospect, obviously, it would have been desirable if we
had moved in on this sooner. I guess we can all share a degree of
blame in that.
What I was suggestinz in my opening comments was that we did
see this. It was almost a brushfire, sudden resurgence of drug use that
was affecting our people: once we detected it I think both branches of
Government have moved with alacrity in trying to approach it. If the
peddlers are denied the Turkish production, they are likely to be in
our area, and we don't know how effective the steps are going to be. I
know all of the different steps, some of which I cannot say here, that
will be taken but one of the difficulties we have in East Asia that we
do not have in Turkey is that we will have great difficulty, I think, get-
ting at the sources of production-the. poppy fields themselves. I ex-
pect we .rill be able to do something about that, but I think our main
effort is going to have to be directed against transportation and sale
and consumpion of the drugs.
Mr. VANDER TACT. You also mentioned in your statement that suc-
cess in South Vietnam will depend upon the close cooperation of U.S.
officials and South Vietnamese officials.
You also identified that the South Vietnamese are conducting an in-
vestigation into the charges that have been leveled against General
Dzu. Certainly if success depends on close cooperation, and certainly
if a very top official is, in fact, himself engaged in the smuggling
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business, it does not appear we will have the cooperation that is neces-
-ary for success.
My question is this: Are we going to merely rely oil an investigation
conducted by South Vietnam or will we independently try to ascertain
the truth or falsity of the charges against General Dzu ?
Mr. GREEN. Both.
Mr. VANDER JAGT. Secretary Hillenbrand, do I understand the
French now permit U.S. investigators on French soil to conduct
investigations?
Mr. HILLENBRAND. They a re working very closely together. We
don't have all that many BIND people, but there are Ave in Paris and
two in Marseilles. How they work on a day-to-day basis, I am not quite
sure, but obviously they work closely together and they exchange in-
formation. The effective police action-t iat is, the execution of police
power and the staging of arrests, and so on-has to be done by the
French police because we don't have any writ of authority. Neverthe-
less, I think the symbiosis is so close that that is not a problem.
Mr. VANDER JAGT. The mere fact that U.S. investigators are operat-
ing on French soil indicates some type of diplomatic breakthrough.
Isn't it unusual for one country to permit foreign investigators?'
Mr. HILLENBRAND. I think that is an indication of their willingness
to acknowledge that there is a real problem.
Mr. VANDER JAGT. When did our investigators start operating over
there?
Mr. IIILLENBRAND. I think they have been there for several years,
but the present group is the largest that there has been, and I am sure
there would be no difficulty if we wanted to put more people there.
lair. VANDER JAGT. How many pounds of heroin were seized in all
of 1969?
Mr. IIILLENB1iAND. In 1969 it was 992 pounds of heroin and mor-
phine base.
Mr. VANDER JAGT. How- many pounds in the first 6 months of 19712
Mr. I-IILLENBRAND. 2,974 pounds of heroin and morphine bike.
Mr. VANDER JAGT. Secretary Davies, I congratulate our Govern-
ment for the agreement that Turkey has just announced, but my ques-
tion is this: We have had testimony in these hearings suggesting the
Congress should pass a law which indicates that if in our judgment
a country has not made reasonable efforts to stamp out the illegal
trafficking in heroin which on rinates within their borders, that there
should automatically and totally be a ban on all further aid to that
country. In your opinion, if such a law had been in existence' 'over
the past couple of years, would that have hastened the Turkish con-
cession or would it have made the Turkish concession impossible to
achieve?
Mr. DAvirs. I do not think it would have made it impossible to
achieve the Turkish law; I do not think it would have been helpful.
The problem in Turkey, and as has been. indicated by Secretary
Green; there is no drug addiction in Turkey, is that. here is a, long-
established socioeconomic pattern. For over four centuries the Turkish
farmer has been raising poppies% taking the oil for Cooking' purposes,
and taking the black seeds for flavoring. I think 'ire 'even use these
in this country. The problem is t hat poppies are planted and harvested
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at a time when the Turkish peasant isn`t doing anything else. It is a
labor-intensive operation. They have to go out and make an incision
in the head of the poppy and let the sap ooze out and then scrape the
residue off. It is not an economic operation that yields very much to
the peasant. But during the particular time poppies can be planted
and harvested, the peasant and his family have nothing else to do.
So, this is a very delicate internal problem for the Turks. The Turkish
Prime Minister took this decision, I am convinced, not on grounds of
possible economic pressure. He took it because the Turks value the
alliance between the United States and the Government of Turkey.
Also, they recognize their international responsibility to prevent the
ellicit diversion of this drug.
In sum, I think in most cases assistance is probably necessary rather
than a threat to cut off assistance.
Let me be frank with you. I am very concerned that the Turkish
action may increase pressures against countries in my region which
are not as developed as is Turkey where notevithstanding the best will
of government, it is going to be difficult to control the activities of
tribes in the border areas. It is for this reason that we and other agen-
cies of Government are looking at the results of pressures of these in-
ternational thugs that may begin operating against even India where
the controls have been very good. There may be more pressures against
diversions from India.
Mr. VANDER JAGT. I am certain it is a delicate political matter in
Turkey, and I admire his ability in making that decision, and I ad-
mire our ability to induce that decision.
But if they are weighing the loss of a $300 million crop against $1
or $2 billion in foreign aid, would that not have induced them to ar-
rive at that decision a little earlier, and wouldn't that same kind of
threat rather than inducement work in the other countries for which
you are responsible?
Mr. DAVIES. Based on my 15 years living in the Arab area, I feel
these Governments do not react completely because of economic moti-
vation. There is a great sense of national pride, and in. the case of Tur-
key there was no lack of will on the part of the previous government.
Again, paralleling your question to Secretary Hillenbrand, we have
had six BNDD agents working with the Turkish gendarmerie, and it
will be increased to 12. It was the nature of the problem that made it
difficult. The Turks for their own reasons and, I think, for their con-
cern over Turkey's image in the world,have Laken this very statesman-
like step.
Mr. VANDER JAGT. What about changing the bill a little bit? In
fact, there are bills of this nature already introduced, not that the
ban would be automatic or mandatory, but if the country did not take
some reasonable steps, you would withhold funds until they took such
efforts.
You mentioned Turkey cooperated because they realized it was a
concern to the United States and they wanted to be a good ally and
friend. Wouldn't that be a way for the rest, of the countries that you
are responsible for, for getting the message across that this Congress
is very much concerned about this problem?
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Mr. DAVIES. I am sure that that, message is well transmitted. I think
giving the President authorization to use his discretion would be very
helpful.
I have just seen a copy of the bill. I see it does have Presidential
discretion. I think speaking as a father, in cases where foreign gov-
ernments knowingly permit illicit diversion, we must move to stronger
measures. But as a general proposition, I believe that through coop-
eration, technical assistance which perhaps is even more important
than the economic input, we can achieve our goals, at least in the
countries with which I am familiar.
Mr. VANDER JAGT. Thank you, and I think all three of you have
been most helpful in your contribution to this subcommittee.
Mr. RosENTIIAL. I want to thank all of you for taking the time out
to join with us. Mr. Brady tells me I sort of sandbagged you to come
to heroin land on July 23. Rather than retreating, I am going to ask
Mr. Wellman to join us. You, too, can come to New York City to
meet some heroin addicts.
Mr. WELLMAN. I have already been up there, but I will be happy
to join you on the 23d.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. We are going to invite Mr. Rossides and Mr. Tar-
taglino to come with us, also.*
Thank you very much.
The subcommittee stands adjourned.
(The subcommittee adjourned at 12:15 p.m., to reconvene subject
to the call of the Chair.)
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INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE NARCOTICS
P 1tOBLEDI
FRIDAY, JULY 30, 1971
[lo-SE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met at 10:40 a.m., in room 2200, Rayburn House
Office Building, the Honorable Benjamin S. Rosenthal (chairman)
presiding.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. The subcommittee will be in order.
We are continuing this morning with a matter of great interest to
the subcommittee, international drug traffic and trade, and what
we can do about it in terms of Executive action and legislation.
We are very pleased this morning to have two of our distinguished
colleagues, Congressman Roush and Congressman Sisk, with us, both
of whom exhibited a longlasting and deep concern over this subject
and have been out in. front in trying to get us to do what ought-to be
done in this area. We are very pleased to hear from both of you.
?I'a suttee on the basis of seniority more than anything else, Mr. Sisk,
we would be very pleased to hear from you first.
`STATEMENT OF HON. B. F. SISK, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
`ROM THE STATE OF CALTFOIRNIA
Mr. Sisic. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me commend the committee on the efforts, that have been made
in this series of hearings which you are con4ucting.
Let me first say I do not clim to be an expert on narcotics or
narcotics cbntrol, but I am, as I am sure ttiie committee is, gravely
concerned.'
Mr. Chairman, the full committee was kind enough to. write into
,the foreign assistance bill of 1971 a provision which, directs the Presi-
dent to suspend. all military and economic aid and military and agri-
cultural sales to a country when he determines that country has failed
to take adequate steps to prevent narcotics produced or processed
there from being sold to official U.S. Government .personnel or their
dependents or From illegally entering the United States.
I favor this provision, although I have a suggestion which would
go farther in correcting drug abuse among young American service-
n.en' in Vietnam.
The excellent committee report on the world heroin problem dis-
closes that the main supply of heroin imported illegally into the
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United States comes from Europe through South America and neigh-
boring countries although the Far East may become a more im-
portant supplier.
However, the greater number of new heroin users probably will
come from the ranks of discharged servicemen who have picked up the
habit in Vietnam.
Although the recently inaugurated amnesty and treatment program
begun in the Armed Forces will help, it is almost certain there will be
many relapses by men who thought they had shaken the habit and
cured themselves.
My proposal gets to the specifics of this problem. It would prevent
servicemen in Vietnam from obtaining drugs unless they are prepared
to go to great lengths to get them. It would certainly prevent involun-
tary addiction by removing an easy source of supply.
This proposal is to beef up the Public Safety Division of the U.S.
Agency for International Development in Vietnam with a specific
directive from Congress to assist the Vietnamese in controlling the
drug traffic to American soldiers. The provision of restricting aid to
the country could give force to the law enforcement attempt.
The military services have taken steps to correct the situation in the
Armed Forces. The civilian agencies have not shown the same urgency
toward the problem. This, too, was noted by the committee study.
The heroin problem can be solved, insofar as our forces are concerned
in Vietnam, only if all branches of the U.S. Government there work
hand in hand, if that ie the correct description, with Vietnamese nar-
cotics agents.
More than 2 months ago I sought the aid of the U.S. `Agency for
International Development in drafting legislation to accomplish the
purpose I have outlined. Several telephone conversations produced
information and also a noted resistance to legislation which would
directly hit the problem.
I then wrote to the Administrator of All) and received an answer
that the administration would submit a proposal to Congress which
would authorize AID appropriations to be used in the drug control
program in Vietnam. This still fails to get to the root of an imme-
diate problem which can have broad and tragic consequences to the
civilian population of the United States.
I had hoped I would have AID assistance so that the agency's legal
and operative expertise in public safety programs throughout the
world would be reflected in the bill. In the absence of that assistance,
I again today propose that legislation be introduced to set up a Nar-
cotics Corps in the Public Safety Division of U.S. AID Vietnam to
train Vietnamese for the specific purpose of stopping the narcotics
traffic to American servicemen serving there. Further, I think the
agency should report on the progress of the program and the bill
should be written to phase out the program. with the withdrawal of
American troops to avoid setting up a self-perpetuating bureaucracy.
It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, at the same time we are assisting in
the development of South Vietnam we ought not to forget or ignore
those who, through their help in trying to build that country into a
free, democratic nation, have suffered medical or psychological
problems.
Civilian employees of the U.S. Government could be included as
well but I do not think they are faced with the same temptations. For
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169
the most part, their service in Vietnam is voluntary. The hazards of
their professions are less than those of the military, especially the
front-line soldier. The civilians are older and better equipped to resist
the psychological pressures of service far from home.
I am sure members of ibis subcommittee have been under the same
kind of pressure from home that I have received about this problem.
The public is adamant that sonuethiiig be done about it. It is both the
cause and effect of bad morn le in the military.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, I want to again commend the subcom-
mittee for the hearings that von have been holding and certainly
would hope that the suggestions that you receive during these hearings
will produce good legislation in this field. I thank you very much,
.N1r. Chairman, for the opportutill y of appearing.
Mr. I OsEicrirn.. Is it agreeable with you, ong ressman Sisk, that
Congressman Roush present his statement and then We would enter
into a dialog?
Mr. Sisx. Very good suggestion. Thank you.
Mr. RosExriier. Congressman Roush.
STATEMENT OF HON. J. EDWARD ROUSH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA
Mr. Roush. Thank you, 1%Tr. Chairman.
I also would like to thank you and members of the subcommittee
for giving me this opportunity to appear before you today. As Mr.
Sisk testified, I could not help but think perhaps it would have been
a little better if I could have had illy son here in my stead testifying.
He has just within the last couple o]` days returned from a year's stint
in Vietnam as an infantry sergeant. I did question him briefly about
the problem and he stated to Inc that it was really more serious than
we realize, especially in the rear echelons and among the enlisted men,
and some of them were actuall v avoiding detection even in the matter
of taking their tests and coining home.
Sometimes we listen to the wheels and to the bureaucrats, and I
think sometimes Ave could get some practical advice from some of
these people who are actually ni ing] ing with people who are actually
using these drugs.
Mr. ROSENrlIAL. Why didn't you bring him along with you?
Mr. Roush. I didn't thinly of it, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. I VELINGi[UYSEN. I had a Soil who came back just about a month
ago. It~is strange that we should have similar experiences, both have
sons returning from Vietnam. Alino did not attain such an elevated rank
as yours, however.
Mr. Rousrr. Well, my sore didn't want to go any higher, he just
wanted to come home, and he, wants everyone else there to come home.
Mr. Chairman, with your permission I will proceed with my formal
statement.
I am here to testify on behalf of the bill introduced with other of
our colleagues, H.R. 7822. This is a proposal which would discontinue
all economic assistance to those countries which do not act to prevent
the flow of narcotic drugs into this country.
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1,0
First, I would like to emphasize that this legislation is far from a
solution to the massive drug problem our Nation faces, but I feel it
is a positive step in the right direction. Due to the e idennic propor-
tions drug addiction has reached in this country, I feel that pres-
sure at the highest level is crucial. This legislation acts as the strong-
est possible warning that this country will no longer tolerate partial
cooperation on the part of foreign countries involved in illicit drug
production and trafficking.
The need for control is immediate. The U.S. Congress must act now,
expressing its intent to the world community that the flow of illicit
drugs must be stopped. If those nations involved reach voluntary
agreements, such as in the case of Turkey, I know this country would
be delighted to make implementation of this proposal unnecessary. It
is my hope that it will act as an incentive to prompt those foreign gov-
ernments to introduce and, more importantly, enforce strict controls
on illicit drug traffic.
I will not attempt here to set forth all of the now available sta-
tistics concerning the drug problem as I know you are all acutely aware
of the statistics. However. I feel that citing a few facts is appropriate
and worthy of repetition to emphasize the severity of the problem
and the need for immediate action.
The United States has the largest single population of heroin ad-
,diets in the world. The National Institutes of Health estimates that
there are over 250,000 heroin addicts in the United States. The U.S.
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs has estimated that some
22,000 pounds of heroin were smuggled into the United States last
year alone. The Bureau also reported that new addicts under the age
of 18 in 1969-70 increased at a. ratio 3?/2,, times that which this
country experienced in the preceding 3 years (1965-68). Heroin. ad-
diction is responsible for approximately 50 percent of urban crime
and causes an untold number of deaths each year. The situation
has indeed reached crisis proportions.
Where do we begin to attack this problem? There are three critical
areas involved in the fight against drug abuse : The source, the illegal
traffic, and the demand. It is essential that we deal strongly with each
of these categories. This legislation concentrates on the first: The
source. It is a strong method of attack at the supply where I believe
our prime target should be. We must wore together and cooperate
fully_ with all the countries of the world in combating the drug men-
ace. The problem is international in scope and is spreading on a mas-
sive scale i n such highly developed countries as the United Kingdom,
Holland, France, Sweden, Spain, and Italy as well as. in the un-
derdeveloped countries in Africa, Asia, and Central and South Amer-
ica. I recognize that we have long worked together with these coun-
tries in the fight against illicit drug traffic but more has to be done.
With the supply greatly diminishing in t:.he Middle East, we must
prepare for the fact that production will increase elsewhere. It is
highly probable that the source will come much closer to our borders
and perhaps impose a more serious threat than already exists, espe-
cially in the case of Central and South America. We must direct full
efforts at cooperation with our neighboring countries of Canada and
Mexico, continue and strengthen our efforts with France, one of the
major processing points in the route from the Middle East, and give
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all-out assistance to Turkey in enforcing the ban she has proposed in
1972. And perhaps most important, we must concentrate attention on
Southeast Asia where opium production is' increasing and is highly
difficult to control due to the many remote and isolated areas where
production is presently occurring virtually undetected. We must an-
ticipate every possible source now.
If we can discourage illegal production, control the source, which
is the specific goal of this legislation, we can somewhat control the
epidemic and give more complete attention to drug education and re-
habilitation. We must strive to isolate the problem so that we can
more effectively deal with it.
It is of vital importance that we emphasize strongly our willing-
ness to cooperate with foreign countries in any efforts they may under-
take to control production and trafficking. I think it is interesting to
note here the success of a cooperative effort between the United States
and Mexico called Operation Intercept, a campaign launched last year
by this Government working through the Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs to control the increased smuggling across our south-
ern border. It is all example of an "economic squeeze" which prompted
a foreign government to enforce tighter controls.
For weeks, Customs Bureau officials searched all vehicles at certain
checkpoints, causing a traffic holdup which dissuaded many Ameri-
can tourists from crossing the border and thus badly hurting the
Mexican economy. As Daniel Casey, the Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs Regional 1)irector in Los Angeles, put it, "Intercept
convinced the Mexican Government, that it had to work with us in
combating the narcotics traffic." Operation Intercept has since led to
Operation Cooperation which is an even more detailed program to
cut back the drug traffic, attempting to destroy the poppy and mari-
huana fields deep in the Mexican interior.
Obviously, illegal traffickers have gone elsewhere as a result of such
close scrutiny but the fact remains that Operation Intercept succeeded
in that it jogged the Mexican Government itself into action. It is just
this type of response that I hope this legislation will encourage.
I know your committee has an awesome task before it in face of the
widespread drug abuse problem, one of the most complex problems
we, as it nation, face today.
I merely hope that this legislation and other similar proposals will
show the world that the U.S. Congress, insofar as it is able, will rise
to the challenge and meet I he responsibility of combating drug addic-
tion. There are additional avenues to take but I believe this legislation
to be a most promising one.
That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. Thank you very, very much.
Mr. Sisk, you said that when you spoke to the AID people about
helping or cooperating in the drafting of legislation along the lures
you suggested you sensed a certain resistance. Can you expand on that
a little?
Mr. Sisit. Yes. We were disl urbed by what we felt to be a lack of
interest. Maybe that is an unfair way of puttir}g`it. I can }mderstand
that AID people pl?obably have a feeling, andm ybe'if Iwere Dec
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tor of AID I might feel the same way, that this is not an area in
which we should. necessarily be involved; On the other hand, our
feelings-mine and my constituents--are so strong about narcotics
abuse that I feel every agency of the Federal Government, particularly
those attempting to help and assist foreign nations, are going to have
to be willing to get into this, and this is what we are seeking.
Certainly not being expert in all 'those 'problems, we felt that our
suggestions about the possibility of a. Narcotics Corps in'Vietnani,
and in the areas where we are undergoing an almost unbelievable
buildup of the drug problem, 'could be helpful. As I said, we were
disappointed that they showed considerable resistance to any help
in this field.
We were seeking expertise and suggestions on how they could
cooperate.
Mr. ROSENTrrAL. Put in simple language, would you say that their
attitudes seem to be, "A ell, we are sympathetic but it is just not our
baby"?
Mr. Sisr. I think this generally reflects their attitude.
We have had a number of telephone calls and have written letters
to AID. Of course, they finally replied and said, well, the administra-
tion was going to offer a proposal. As I said, we were attempting
frankly to create a spark of interest we felt was needed in an agency
which could then in turn cooperate with the armed services.
If the armed services are not to be alone in this field, Mr. Chairman,
it seems to me that an additional assist is needed. We are trying to
prevent servicemen from becoming addicted, but with absolutely no
control, no attempt to stamp out drug traffic in this case in Vietnam
civilian circles, they are going to become addicted. So unless, you have
another source of help and assistance and cooperation to stamp out
drug traffic, the Armed Forces program in Vietnam is .going to fail.
Our only other answer there is to withdraw these people as quickly
as we can. We had hoped that through the civilian population,
through AID cooperating with Vietnamese counterparts. that a pro-
-ram or so-called Narcotics Corps could be successful. I still think
it could be.
Mr. RosENZrrAL. It sounds to me like a very creative, very useful
idea.
Mr. SISK. Well, of course, as I say, not being expert in the field of
narcotics we were desperately seeking any method to bring some
rationale to the problem. We know that the heroin is coming from
the civilian population within Vietnam. I think that we are going
to have to work in that field through cooperation to destroy the
source, to destroy the supply, and control the traffic to stop that dis-
ease from being inflicted on our servicemen.
As I understand it, narcotics of one kind or another in Vietnam
are as easy to get as alcohol or tobacco here. So when you have that
abundant a supply then Lord knows whatever program the Armed
Forces alone itself has is certainly going to fail because you just can't
surround servicemen with an iron shield to keep them a-way from it.
Mr. ROSENTJIAL. Mr. Roush, after talking with your son, and from
your own knowledge, how serious would you say the problem is (a)
in Vietnam involving our soldiers, and (b) here in the United States?
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Mr. Rousm Well, first I have really hardly had a chance to talk with
my son seriously about many of these things, in that he just arrived in
Washington the day before yesterday in the evening, but what brief
conversation I had led me to this conclusion : First, it is in the rear areas
where there is the problem. My son spent the greatest portion of his
time with a line unit and there he said the men themselves police the
problem, discipline each other; and when you are with a squad and
you are out on night patrol you are not about to have someone with
you who is addicted to drugs. So they took care of their own problems
in those areas.
Ile said about 6 weeks or 2 months ago he was sent back to division
headquarters in the rear echelon and there he found the problem to be
quite severe. I asked him why, and lie said mainly it is boredom. These
guys are just plain bored and they don't have anything to do, and this
is available and the'You are more tempted to experiment and they do.
Mr. ROSENTIIAL. use the word "severe." Can you translate that
into any statistics at all?
Mr. ILousij. No, sir; I can't. However, Mr. Chairman, I did read a
report issued by one committee of the Congress-I don't even recall
which committee- -which caused a survey to be made of both of the
infantry divisions with which my son served; one was the 25th Infantry
Division, and one was the lmerical Division. This report centered
around these two divisions, and I am sorry I don't have it with me but
this report is available and it emphasizes, I think, the severity of the
problem within these two units which are both infantry divisions ac-
tually more involved on the line than perhaps in rear echelons and
perhaps underestimates the severity of the problem because they are
line divisions rather than rear echelon troops. Again, I have not really
had a chance to sit down and talk with my son at any great length
because of lack of time.
Mr. ROSENTIIAL. Mr. Frelinghuysen.
Mr. FRELING HUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to join in welcoming our colleagues to the subcommit-
tee. Certainly the problem we are discussing is one that concerns us all.
Is it not a coincidence that my son should have come back from Viet-
nam only a few weeks ago? I have had time to talk with him, and cer-
tainly what he tells me bears out what your son told you about the very
widespread use of drugs and the reason for its use by the troops.
I am not quite sure whether you gentlemen are commenting on the
language in the bill and criticizing it or whether you are saying you
are glad we put something like this in the foreign aid bill because it
is needed. In other words, does this go far enough, in your opinion?
I would suppose the diminishing military presence in Vietnam is going
to reduce the severity of the problem. Certainly the fewer of our forces
there are in the area the less there are to be exposed.
I would suppose that you have an enormous problem, Mr. Sisk, if
you arc aiming at the destruction of the source of supply in a country
like Vietnam throughout, the civilian population. The Americans there
would be a drop in the bucket with respect to a problem of that siz(,.
We have not done such a good job in controlling the supply and avail-
ability of drugs in our own country, so I would guess that All) is
quite understandably chary about assuming responsibility. But the
bill does say that the President may use foreign assistance funds for
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this purpose, which presumably means that the All) may be drawn
more or less directly into a program of cooperation with other
vountries.
Mr. SISK. Let me hasten to say to my colleague that I am very
happy with the language you put in. I am in full support of that.
I think anything we do in this area is to the good.
Now I recognize the enormity of the task of control in a country
like Vietnam and other areas of Southeast Asia where there are vast
supplies. I guess we were grasping around desperately 'king some
way to get at the problem because we hope our men are shortly going
to be home. However, as a part of the international development pro-
gram, it seems to me that certainly this is an area in which aid is des-
perately needed. We could well devote a portion of the funds we put
into AID to countries desirous of cooperating in the control of drugs
as we try to eradicate these sources and traffic.
The enormity of the task is great but I know of nothing that would
be more helpful to some of these countries than the elimination of
traffic in drugs. This was the thing that led us. then, to seek this type
of an approach. I felt that, at least, All) would be interested.
I understand that this is a problem for which there are no easy
solutions. When we consider our own failures in this country, in not
being able to keep drags out of the hands of users, maybe we are
asking more than we should. We are after measures that would help
us keep heroin away from our own people and be helpful to a foreign
country. That, after all, is the whole idea in appropriating and spend-
ing money on AID programs.
Mr. ROSENTIIAL. What is your point, Mr. Roush? Are you endorsing
this language by saying this is just what you had hoped Ave could
come up with, or are yori saying this does not go far enough? It is
not clear to me whether you are arguing for a flat prohibition, a
unilateral suspension or prohibition of assistance if there is not a full
cessation by the country that otherwise would receive aid.
Mr. Roush. No. This bill to -which I testified, II.R. 7822; provides
that there shall be a determination as to whether or not the country
is making an effort.
Mr. FRELINGIIUYSEx. So there is in the foreign aid bill on page 7
language that covers your point. exactly. I am not sure whether you
want tighter restrictions. Your reference to Operation Intercept has
me somewhat worried because the Mxicatis certainly resented it
keenly and you say it jogged them into action. But I would suppose
that if we had eliminated the intercept process but had developed a
cooperative process, one of education, we would have accomplished the
same result at least as easily and perhaps without stepping on as many
toes.
Mr. Roush. I cloia't mind stepping on their toes if it produces the
result.
Mr. FRELINGIIUYSES. I don't necessarily mind either but I don't
think you need to do it if you can get the result a different -way. If you
had had a prohibition on aid 5 years ago which was sufficiently tight
to prevent Turkey getting aid, we might not have been able to de-
velop the result which you now are praising in Turkey. What I am
wondering now is whether you are suggesting that we apply much
stricter standards which would have prevented thus country from hav-
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ing given aid to a country such as Turkey because it had not regulated
the growing of opium.
Mr. Roush. I would applaud the provisions of the bill and I do feel
that perhaps it could be somewhat more stringent. I think perhaps the
effect of this bill I am advocating would be somewhat more stringent.
I would be delighted to see this enforced and I would hope that we
could reach agreements with these countries. I think, however, they
should understand and understand with great certainty that this coun-
try is intent on prohibiting the trafficking of illegal drugs and that
perhaps in this instance we leave the determination to the President.
And it. would appear to me that perhaps in spite of good intentions,
that because we don't want to step on toes, that we might not proceed
as aggressively as we might if we had a definite pattern of action set
out such as is set out in II.R. 7822, a definite determination by the Gov-
ernzment of what is happening in each country to which assistance is
given as to whether or not the, country is making a good-faith effort.
Mr. FRELINGIIIIYSEN. Well, to clarify in my own mind what your
position is, had your bill been enacted 5 years ago, would it have pre-
vented aid to a country such as Turkey which had not at that tune
taken the steps which have presently led to the happy state in which
you say now that we should give all aid possible to 't'urkey?
Mr. Rousii. It would have prohibited it but it would not have pro-
hibited Turkey from correcting its problem and making itself avail-
able for aid. suggesting
en-
couraged them-is that right--to take these steps?
Mr. Roush.. Yes.
Mr. FRELINGIIUYSEN. 1 think you have a very difficult political prob-
lem to be subjecting a country to perhaps severe economic pressure,
withholding of badly needed aid unless they do something.
Mr. Rouser. I am sure.
Mr. Fr,ELrnonuYSEN. I would guess we might well have done better
in a quiet, undramatic way than by throwing the book at them in a
public way at a time when they didn't realize the enormity of what
their people were doing. This has been going on for hundreds of years
in Turkey and there is no drug abuse in Turkey. An educational proc-
ess was necessary to get the Turks to it and the political problem was
important enough to have it an achievement when it came but one that
might not have been achieved at all if we had thrown the book at them
5 years ago.
Mr. P.ousri. May I comment?
Mr. I+'ici:LTNGiiui-sr:N. That is what I am looking for.
Mr. ROSENTIHAL. Som etiines it is hard to tell.
Mr. FRELINGIIUYSE . I don't know why it should be hard to tell ; I
am asking for reactions, of course. The chairman must know my
technique.
Mr. Rousii. If we should follow your line of reasoning then we
would have solved our trafficking of illegal drug problems a long time
ago, and if we didn't we should have.
Mr. FRPI,INGiIuYSi;x. IIow can you possibly come to that conclusion,
Mr. Roush? You astonish me. ~~~ e have not even started the educational
program in certain countries because there has not been the problem
or it has only become a problem quite recently.
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176
Mr. Rousrr. You pointed out yourself, Mr. Frelinghuyserr, that 5
years ago we knew of the drug problem in Turkey and for 5 years we
have done nothing to
Mr. FRFLINGFrUYSEN. I didn't say any such thing, Mr. Roush.
Mr. Rousrr. Didn't you I.
Mr. FRELINGrTUYSFN. I said just the contrary. I think perhaps you
weren't listening.
Mr. Rousrr. I was listening.
Mr. FRELINGHIIYSEN. I said that our government engaged in very
intensive efforts to educate the Turkish Government, to lei, their offi-
cials know that we are very seriously concerned about Turkey as a
source of supply. You act as if l said that we lied been indifferent be-
cause we had not thrown the book at them. I was just saying : Is throw-
ing the book at the country the best way to secure its cooperation when
cooperation is what is needed ?
Mr. Rousrr What Ian: saving is that we have certainly been ineffec-
tive.
Mr. h RTLINOTIU : six. I to can you say that talking about Turkey ?
I think we should both be crowing about what has been accomplished
as a result, of fl- eclu o+,,.., ..7 -4T--!_
Mr. Rousrr. I rum glad for what has ha
n
d i
T
ppe
e
n
urkey.
1'Ir. I r,r r,r e.rruYSrr~. IVhY are you talking about being ineffective ?
Ir. Roush. I am not just talking about '_L'urkey, but about every
country in the world. It ,