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December 19, 2016
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December 20, 2005
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March 29, 1973
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Approved For Release 2006102/09 : CFA=RBP751300380R000300090018-5 ? 9 i!".R '1973 WILLIAM F. I3UCRLEYJR. Ails IiOd It is by no means obvious why everyone persists in re- ferring to the election of Al-, lende as a purely "internal" matter. It was never any such thing, and if only Harold Ge- neen of ITT recognized the character of the Allende vic- tory, why then Harold Gencen is a lot smarter than most of the senators who are interro- gating officials from. ITT and drinking deep draughts of sanctimony over ITT's offer to contribute $1 million to- wards any government-spon- sored plan to prevent the in- stallation of Allende as presi- dent of Chile. We are talking about Sep- tember of 1970. On Sept. 4 Al- lende won a plurality, which did not automatically entitle him to be named president of Chile. That decision was for the parliament to make, at a scheduled session on Oct. 24. The question is whether ITT had a legitimate interest in adding its pressure to that of others to persuade the parlia- Rirtht ITT Prerty N A; rnent to name someone other than Allende or, better still, to call for a new election. How can the Chilean out- come be said to have been purely an internal matter? The officers of ITT, having carefully observed the cam- paign of Salvador Allende and the promises he made, con- cluded that he would certainly proceed to nationalize the Chi- lean telephone company. By everyone's reckoning the val- ue of ITT's holdings was $153 million. The ITT people were smart enough to ? anticipate that when Allende got around to nationalizing the telephone company he would offer for it a small fraction of its ac- knowledged value. That he would, in effect, confiscate the property. In due course, Allende offered $24 million for the $153 million asset, proving the ITT officials to have been altogether accurate in their forebodings. We return to the question: In what sense is it an "internal" matter if A decides to 'steal the property of B? The fact that A is a country and B is merely a corporation says only that B is going to suffer considerable disadvan- tages in attempting to cope with A. It hardly says that B ought not attempt to cope with A. ITT did not, as it happens, mount its own operation in Chile, attempting to persuade the parliament not to vote for Allende. It merely offered to contribute to any U.S. enter- prise aimed at the same pur- pose. To suggest that foreign governments are not involved or should not be involved in wrestling for the favor of the majority in swing countries which are points of contact in the cold war is simply to beg the question: How is it that the Soviet Union and Castro's Cuba were so interested in the election of Allende as to spend millions of dollars and commit entire communications indus- tries to the end of electing him? What President Allende fi- nally did to ITT was, very simply, to take over the oper- ation of t3 a telephone compa- ny withotrf .my compensation whatsoever. Those who are anxious to make any point at the expert e of American busi- ness who say that ITT got what was seining to it in the light of its proffered interven- tion ma1:=! a rather clumsy mistake. It'was not until the spring of 1972 that Jack An- derson published the secret memoranda revealing ITT's offer of $1 irdllion to stop Al- lende. But ii was in Septem- ber 1971 t'-let Allende simply took over t,.e Chilean tele- phone con- any, more or less without coi:;ment: a clean theft of $1 A mWion. I do not believe tli;tt anyone who is a shareholder of ITT believes that that act by Dr. Allende is a purely infernal affair. There is no internal right of any country to seal the goods 'of other people. Approved For Release 2006/02/09 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000300090018-5 Approved For Release 2006/02/09 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000300090018-5 2 () i!t'-i 1 iJi3 eel's lames for Chile !t C A.-They were aware I was meeting with Air. Merriam. Q.-Did Air. Merriam at that luncheon, or any other time, advise you that he was under great pressure from the head office in New York to get something done in connection with the Chilean political situa- tion or words to that effect? ' A'v'ashingtoih-The following he-wanted the fund~controlled are excerpts from the cxami alicl thalineled through the nation of William V. 131,00, the CIA? chief of the Central Inlelli- r,,.-Yes, hetlid. fence Agency's Clandestine Services for the Western ]lcmi-i, ? ? ? sphere, on his contacts with, Q.-Did you agree to accept time. International Telephone the fund offered by Air. Ge- and Telegraph. Corporation ilcen concerning the election of Sal- A-No, I did not. vador Allende as president of Q-I)id you explain to Mr. Chile in 1970. Mr. l3roe was the first CIA agent ever to testify under oath before a congressional committee on operational ac- tivities. Questioned by Church The questioner quoted is Sen- ator Frank Church U).. Idaho), the chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on mul- tinational affairs. Question-On July 16, 1970, did you meet with air. Harold Geneen, the president of the International Telephone and Telegraph Company? Answer-Yes, Sir. A -[\o. It was to support ' . ' 1 Did sou discuss hi ith Air. Jorge Alessandri t Iclirector of the CIA] advise you that Mr. John McCone, former director of the CIA, had called him and suggested that someone on Mr. Helens's staff meet with Mr. Geneen? A.-Yes, sir. D --When v'ou met with [Air Concert 'rt hvhy the CIA could not A.-Yes, he did. accept such a fund? Q.--Did you call Mr. Edward A.-Well I told him we could Gerrity, the ITT vice president not absorb the funds and serve in charge of government oper- as a funding chpuine.l. I also ations and public relations, to told him that the United States arrantle a meeting with him in hip office in New York city? !government was not supporting A.-Yes, sir. I any candidate in the Chilean election.' Meeting in New York Q.-During the discussion did Q.-This call, once again, Mr. Gencon at any time rods- was made under the authority cats that. the fund that he of your Superiors? stood ready to contribut was A.-Yes, to be for, or was intended for. * ? ? constructive use, technical as- A.-Did you meet Air. (.rerr- sistancc to agriculture, the building of houses, or anything ih on September 29 or 30th in- of that .,h? ct r? his office in New York city? E. Alessandri, one of the prest- blE actions by I'.S. companies dential candidates? designed to create nr acecler- rte economic in~tability ill A?-Yes, sir. Q.-In the course of his con- Chile" versation with you slid \ir. A.-[ explored 'lith Mr, Geneen advise you that ITT Gerrit the fea~ihilit of liossi? and other U.S. companies in ble actions to apply shine eco- tian Democratic congressmen swung their support to him he would take office with a man- date from the m ijurity and he would be in a eery strong position. Worsening :situation At the Same time the cco-I nomic situation lead worsened because of the reaction to the Allende election and there were indications that this was worrying the Ghristian Demo- cratic congressmen. There was a thesis that additional deter-I ioration in the et?cnutntic situa- tion could influence a number of Christian Democratic con- gressmen who v,er?e planning to vote. for Allcrule. This is' what was the thesis. Q.-Did you di? cilss with Mr. Gerrity the feasi:liiity of banks not renewing crcdi's or delay-. ing to do so? A.-Yes. sir. Q.-Did you discuss with Mr. Gerrity the fe;i iiiriity of com- panies dra;aging their feet ill, spending money and making deliveries and hi shipping snare parts:' A.--Yes, I did. A.-Did you discuss with Mr. Gerrity the fcasiieilit of creat- ing pressure on savings and lo,ui insititution;< in Cllife so that they, would lave to shut their doors, thereby creating stronger pressure ? A.-Yes. Q.--Did von di e iss with Mr. Gerrity the fea'ibility of with- drawing all ted:n;eal help and not promising airs' technical assistance in tlu future? A.,- Yes, sir. Gclleett, did Air. Geneen askI 1954 had raised an election, nonlie pressure on Chile. Yes, you for a detailed briefin on fund to influence the Chilean sir. the political and ceononlic situ-; presidential election which Q.-`Vhat slid you understand anon .u.) Chile? took place at that time? the purpose of applying cco- A.-M.r. encen requested ill-i A.--Yes. lie stated that ,h :nolnic pressure to be? - formation on the electoral situ- group of businessmen had d A -Well, at the time, set).. ation, such as the status and sired to invest in the 1964 tenibcr 29, the Christian Demo- Demo- election and they had con- . crane members of Con gr ess potential of the candidates and lrlcted Mr. McCoue, who was. b their parties and the campaign; swin showing indications as of that date. That is what then the DCI, the director uE sc',l,ing their full support to to we talked about. central intelligence, and ho Allencle in the belief that they would not accept the food. Ile could make a political bar gams Q,-1)1([. 1ir'. fie'nee11 sat to j had said, no. assemble an election fund for """""t" ~t can ,CJaulen, llll'1S I other firms had been in-j---one of the Chilean presidential I volved besides ITT I in 111;11?' eartdidates, Mr. Jorge E. Riles- I A.--No. saltdri? ? < e A.-Yes, he did. Q--Tn September. 1970. did U.--Did he say that the l you rr?eiv':' a tclepliunc (.;ill! amount of the fund would be from Air. AVillkimn Mo rison iri i substantial? !the APashiut;too office of ITT A.-Ile indicated he was (-on- linviting you to lunch', siderutq a substantial fund. I A.-Yes. Q.---I)id lie mention a spe- i Q.-''.Pere your superiors in citie fissure:' tthc CIA advised of this and didt A.-No, he did not. ApproVealrFor4ftllbasel2QO6/'02/69: CIA-RDP75B00380R000300090018-5 . Q.--Lid Mr. !R[chard] Helmsl Gerrit' the feasibihh of iossi- ' Q-11 was to sup}tort Jorge 1 iUi bL0Li )LLi(LI UUlii ALGfI Ini ulrvuib~ii IL> {" Approved For Release 2006/02/09 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000300090018-5 OPERATIONS CENTER NEWS ANALYSIS SERVICE DISTRIBUTION: DCI DDCI EXD DCI/IC DDI DDS DDP (2) DDS/T D/OCI ONE OSR OSI (2) Ch/OpsC PDB INDICO CSDO (3) 1W SAVA OSD mea fe wh Brb Thuermer Houston LEGCO Initial fragments on Church news conference; more to come. DATE: 2 8 Mare ITEM: NO, 2 REF : NO, p a218 b lby lveyy rlYX URGENT ITT-Chile 2nd Lead WASHINGTOIS AP - Sen. Frank Church, D-Idaho, said today the secret testimony of a CIA agent discloses that International Telephone and Telegraph Corp. initiated the idea of U.S. intervention to prevent the election of President Salvador Allende in Chile in 1970. Church chairman of the Senate foreign relations subcommittee on multinaDional corporations, related to newsmen the closed-door testimony matte Tuesday by V11lliam V. Broe, the CIA agent. Church said the transcript would be made public as soon as copies can be prepared . Church said Broe who beaded the CIA#s western hemisphere clandestine operations in 1970, testified that Harold S. Genee ITT board chairmnan, offered 4'a substantial election fundso on July 16, 1970 to support another candidate in the Chile election. Church said 1-roe testified that Geneen wanted the fund. on behalf of Jorge Alessanfrl to be controlled and, channeled, throu~I) the CIA. (,burch said there ~;ias no the July 16 meeting of Geneen and ]:roe about a constructive purpose such as housing or assistance to agriculture in Chile.. These comments represent the initial and tentative reaction of the Office of Current InteiZigenoe to the attached item from the news services. Approved For Release 2006/02/09 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000300090018-5 //C;~ Z,- Approved For Relea ,e; 048r/8240,9r Clf,~--RDP75B0038OR000300090018-5 2 C MAR 1973 By JEFFREY ANTEVIL Washington, March 27 (NEIVS Bureau)-William V. Broe, the Central Intelli- gence Agency's onetime spymaster for Latin America, appeared before a congres..ional committee today to discuss efforts to block the election in 1970 of Salvador Allende, a Marxist, as president of Chile. I -- Broe, identified by officials of International Telephone & Tele- graph Corp. last week as an agent who had met with ITT officials and approved recom- mendations designed to thwart Allende, testified at a closed ses- other U.S. concerns whose invest- ments in Chile faced expropria- tion. The plan was designed to promote economic chaos there, according to testimony from ITT officials. ITT, meanwhile, offered to contribute as much as $1 million for may U.S. government plan to block Allende's election. But, company officials have testified, Broe's proposal was re- jected by ITT. In the absence of an official anti-Allende plan, the $1 million was never spent, the officials said. Broe's testimony lasted about an hour and 15 minutes. Asked later by reporters if he would discuss what he had told the sena-, tors, he replied, "Not a chance," then ducked into an elevator. In another development, an Anaconda Copper vice chairman, William E. Quigley, told the sub- committee today that he had never discussed with ITT pro- posals to disrupt Chile's econ- oiny. Ths contradicted testimony given last week by an ITT vice president, John Guilfoyle, who said he had talked with Quigley about Broe's five-point proposal. UPI Telephoto William V. Broe at Senate hearing yesterday. lion of a Senate Foreign Pela- tions subcommittee which is probing the ITT-Chile affair. Subcommittee Chairman Frank Church (D-Idaho) said later that he hoped to make Broe's Testi- mony public if CIA Director; James R. Schlesinger approves. Unprecedented Session Church said Broe's appearance had been "the first time that any agent of the CIA has ever ap- peared before a committee of Congress to testify as to his activities." Ile said the panel had acceded to Schlesinger's request to have, the session closed. This, Church said, avoided setting a precedent "that could prove harmful to the national security interests of the United States." Broe met with ITT's president, Harold S. Green, in July 1970 and received regular reports from ITT officials thereafter. In Sep- tenmber 1970, a nlotlth before the Chilean congress ruade Allende's election official, It row submitted a five-point proposal for ITT and Approved For Release 2006/02/09 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000300090018-5 BALT1:,'.uic. SulV Approved For Release 2Q -/0~ ; l -RDP75B0038OR000300090018-5 Ex- Voy e F~ ent ou t ITT, Chile BY GILBERT A. LEwTIIW:SITE Washington Bureau of 7'he Suit Washington-Edward M. Korry, former United States ambassador to Chile, yester- day refused to disclose the orders he received from Wash- ington during the critical pe- riod between the election of Salvador Allende, the Marxist president, and his confirmation by the Chilean Congress. He also declined to answer questions relating to Central Intelligence Agency activities j in Chile during the- 1970 elec- tion period, although he ac- knowledged . that as ambassa- dor he was responsible for them. Ironically, Mr. Korry was preceded on the witness stand by William V. Brae, chief of I the CIA's covert operations in ,the Western hemisphere, who yesterday became the first agent ever to testify under oath before a congressional committee. Mr. Broe was interrogated behind closed doors by mem- bers of the Senate subcommit- tee on multinational corpora- tions. They are investigating alleged political activity by U.S. business corporations, particularly the International Telephone and Telegraph Cor- poration, to try to prevent the election of Mr. Allende, who had threatened to nationalize basic industry and communica- tions in Chile. Mr. Broe, who had contacts with ITT over the Chilean situ- ation, was questioned for more than an hour, and his testi- mony will be published today -after review by the CIA. Senator Frank Church (D., Idaho) said: "It's quite a breakthrough really. I think it was very much in the public interest that. Mr. Broc was permitted to testify. "Illuminating" "One of the cardinal ques- tions has been whether these activities we are discussing were a result of the govern- ment's initiative or ITT's,initi- swer and other answers that were illuminating." He declined to go into detail, but after Mr. Broe's testimonyl, members of the panel made the first references to a $400,- 000 CIA fund for "covert prop- aganda" operations in Chile. Mr. -Korry, now president of the Association of American Publishers, said he was aware that an interdepartmental group, known as the 40 com- mittee, which controlled covert CIA operations, had met in June, 1970, in Washington. "I can't reply" Asked if he was aware that it had sanctioned "limited in- tervention" involving the ex- penditure of $N0,000 for covert propaganda purposes, he said: "Now I'm in an area when I am forced to say I can't reply As far as what you are asking me about, its the unique obligation of the-director of the CIA to respond to." Asked if he was aware that the CIA conducted its own opinion polls in Chile, he again said: "If it was the CIA which you allege did something, it is the director of the CIA who! He acknowled?ed that he did tween an embassy and its gov- ernment. I think this would have a destructive impact for many years to come of the same sort that existed after McCarthyism, when people would never dare to put on paper anything, would never dare to stick their necks out for an opinion +' it was not popular.". Mr. Korry said he was per- sonally in sympathy with a political plan to force Dr. Al- lende into a run-off with the former president, Eduardo Frei but did nothing to support it. The memo from ITT's repre- sentatives in Chile to Edward J. Gerrity, Jr., a corporation senior vice president, said: "He [Korry] has never let up on Frei, to the point of telling him `to put his pants on.' " Mr. Korry said he had only one meeting with Mr. Frei during the election period and did not discuss the situation with him. He said he in- structed U.S. officials in Chile "to eschew actions that could be considered political." He said: "The United States gave up support to any elec- toral candidate." He also said that he ignored requests for funds from three political camps and that the U.S. "maintained total hands off" the Chilean military. There were no contacts, he said, with General Roberto Viaux Mar- ambio. dismissed from the Army in 1969 for leading an insurrection of officers, and considered a likely candidate to attempt a military coup. see opinion polls which sug- gested that Jorge Alessandri.. Conservative National party l candidate in the election, would win by more than 40 per cent. He said he warned against accepting the polls be cause they were based on out- dated election data. The closest questioning came on the orders Mr. Korry re- ceived from the State Depart- ment about U.S. policy and actions in Chile while Dr. Al-I Jende's confirmation was pend-i ;ing. A memorandum from ITT's two representatives in Chile in September, 1970, the critical l period, said the State Depart- ment had just given Mr. Korry 'the green light to move in the name of President Nixon. The message gave him maximum authority to do all possible--I short of a Dominican Repuo lie-type action-to keep Allende from taking power." Mr. Korry said the memo was "totally erroneous," add- ing: "There was no green light," But he refused to say what his orders were. He said "I have a deep abiding conviction that it would be morally wrong r >r me to give you the details of privileged communications ' e- ?LIV- A b-1- - "Approved For Release 2006/02/09 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000300090018-5