ISRAELIS BUILDING BARRIER IN CANAL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00380R000400010012-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 2, 2005
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: November 18, 1973
• Content Type: NSPR

WASEJJ U:ruty rvai
18 NOV 1973
Approved or Re e 2 / S9 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000400010012-8
Israciis
r er in Canal
War Was Hinted
By Michael Getter
Washington Post Staff Writer
A Central Intelligence
Agency report late in Sep-
tember warned the White
House. of a strong possibility
that war might soon break
out in the Middle East, ac-
cording to reliable sources.
The CIA evaluation, based
mostly on unusually large
Egyptian maneuvers near
the Suez Canal, did not go
so far as to predict flatly
that an invasion was certain.
But the signs were viewed
as sufficiently ominous to be
immediately passed along at
very high 1 e v e 1 to the
Israelis.
Tel Aviv, however, report-
At that time, Kissinger said tion of only 'certain officials,
under questioning that "... all reportedly warned that the
the_ intelligence at our dis-)
1 b f e Oct 6) and all
t
September maneuvers this
c. oa
posy
the:iutelligence given to us by ! Year were different and more
foroien countries suggested ominous than the past.
that there was no possibility Informants say there were
of the outbreak of a war."
Sources say there is no
quoation that in the period be-
tween the end of September
- after the Israelis had chal-
lenged the CIA warning-and,
just a day or so before the
war actually started, the Unit-!,
e States had accepted the Is-
many more troops involved
than in the past, more ammu-
nition being used and stock-
piled, a much greater logistics
build-up and, perhaps most im-
portantly, more field commu-
nications being hooked up and
operated-something which
occasionally can be listened in
racli view that "they knew ` on by electronic sensors.
best" and there was no cause The transfer of officials
for alarm. !within the Defense Intelli-
But Kissinger's assertion', gence Agency, according to
that the intelligence available one source, came about be
suggested "no possibility of cause of some strong objec.
the outbreak of a war" is re- tions voiced by these officials
garded by a number of sen- before the war started to the
ioc- officials both in and out of validity of these danger sig-
edly disputed the American the` intelligence field as an nals.
interpretation of Egyptian overstatement at the very At his Oct. 12 press_ confer-
,teem in which Israeli inter-
: ligence is held in Washing-
ton and the closeness of the other parts of the intelligence tendency to "fit the facts into
Israelis to the would-be war community such as the State existing preconceptions and to,
zone, the Israeli assessment Department, while not making make them consistent with
was quickly accepted here. outright predictions of war- what is anticipated."
As late as Oct. 4, just two fare, were certainly express- By and large, the prevailing
days before the war began, ing-wariness. view since the 1967 war had
the joint U.S. Intelligence The most difficult, and some been- that the Arab armies',
Board, made up of represen- say impossible, part of intelli- would never risk another hu-+
tatives from several intelli- gence work, however, is the miliating defeat at the hands of
gence agencies - including difference between gathering Israel.
CIA-took a common position facts and estimating inten-
th6t hostilities were unlikely, tions. It is this difference that
according to informants here. Kissinger sought to emphasize
The readiness to accept the at, an earlier Oct. 12 press con-
Israeli view, the failure to heed ference when he _ was ques-
some unusual danger signals tion.ed about the apparent in
anti the general surprise of telligence failure in not pre-:
the.. Arab attack has caused dieting the attack.
considerable post-war concern, Kissinger said then that
both within the administration - both U.S. and Israeli intelli- I
and the intelligence commu- gence had been aware of the
nity. pre-war build-up of forces in
Within the Pentagon's Egypt and Syria. He explained
that Egyptian army maneu-
Defense Intelligence Agency?! vers on the west side of the
it. has been learned tliat the !Suez Canal had been carried
three top men--an Army co- I out during September in each
loner, Navy captain and senior l of the last 10 years. He indi-
the Ian Middle official-who Fast intelligeheadednce caged that three times during
the I the week preceding the war,
branch were transferred out ! asked
of those jobs in the aftermath assessments had been from U.S. and Israeli intelli-
of the fighting. gence agencies and that each
At the same time, however, time they concluded that
.the' existence of the earlier - "hostilities were unlikely to
CIA warning, roughly one to the point of there being no
two. weeks before the fighting - chance of it."
started, seems to suggest that Yet the earlier CIA report,
the. intelligence community which informants say was con
wag not totally as flat-footed which at Secretary of State llenry A.I tained in the more highly clas-
sources here suggest that ?gence assessments". . the
xi mVeid cF106 Rel 6,2005/06/08?teQIA*RE)P46'B0OP80ROO0400010012-8
25 press conference. . -ports that come to the atten-