MIDEAST WAR: A MATTER OF ARAB PRIDE. . .

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00380R000400010032-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 2, 2005
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: October 14, 1973
• Content Type: NSPR

4 G ~vL, WASHINGTON POST
Approved For Release 2005/06/044GQ~'R[75B00380R000400010032-6
Jack Anderson
Mideast mar: A Ma'Lter of Arab Pride .
A study of the Intelligence reports
from the Mideast strongly suggests
that Egypt and Syria may have been
driven by fierce pride into a war they
;fully expected to lose.
The Syrian Army chief, Gen. Musta-
pha Talas, was quoted by the Central
Intelligence Agency, for example, as
declaring desperately: "Despite, the
fact that . . . all the Arabs combined
are weaker than Israel, there is no
other choice, We must fight; and we
will fight."
For months, he has been contending
that the Mideast must be kept in-
flamed to attract world attention and
to compel a solution. Only by keep-
ing "the war case hot between us and
Israel," he argued, could a political set-
tlement be forced.
Continued the CIA cable: "Talas
said he thought that if the Arabs had
continued to 'fight' Israel after their
successive defeats in 1948, 1956 and
1967, rather t~ian turning their backs
in defeat, many world leaders would
have changed their policies vis-a-vis
.the Arab-Israeli dispute."
This logic reportedly was accepted
by Syria's President Hafiz al-Asad but I
was resisted by Egypt's more cautious
President Anwar Sadat. For three
zyears, Sadat made belligerent noises
but held back from open hostilities. He
made saber-rattling speeches. He posed
in uniform inspecting the Suez fortifi-
cations. He called upon Egyptians to
prepare for the "inevitable battle."
But lie issued secret orders to his
generals, according to the intelligence
reports, not to provoke Israel. A CIA
cable quoted military sources as saying
"that President Anwar Sadat, when
threatening Israel with an all-out war,
was bluffing and that he had informed
the Army of this."
Sadat explained to his generals, as-
serted the cable, that he "had to make
this stand in order to maintain interna-
improper to attack Israel on the Jew-`
ish sabbath.
The ridicule of Sadat, some observ-
ers feared, might goad him into taking
rash action. This was the subject of a
secret message from the U.S. embassy
in Tel Aviv a few months ago.
"We believe," reported the embassy,
"that Israeli leadership considers
Egypt to be capable now with virtu-
ally no further preparation, and with
practically no warning to launch re-
newed war of attrition along Suez
canal or limited attack across it ...
("There is a) tendency among Arabs,
which Israelis have noted, to trbat Sa-
dat's threats toward Israel with deri-
sion. Israelis feel that it is this credi-
bility gap of Sadat's within the Arab
world which conceivably could lead
him, even against his better judgment,
to decide impulsively to resume shoot-
in g."
The "snowballing of the situation,"
suggeatec' rcpnrt, finally forced Sa-
dat to liwit. 1iOi war preparations,, ac-
cording to intelligence, began last
spring. His Syrian ally, President al
Asad, reportedly was eager to plunge
into the war. ",Phen the blow-comes ...
he vowed, according to !the CIA, "we
will :seize the opportunity and fight,"
But Sadat, cautious to the last, care-
fully coupled a diplomatic offensive
with his military attack. He lined up
Saudi Arabia's King Faisal to neutral-
ize the U.S. by threatening to cut off
oil shipments if Washington favored
Israel.
Sadat also sent word to both Wash-
ington and Moscow that the fighting
was intended to wake up the world
over the Mideast crisis. Apparently, he
sought to compel the great powers to
impose a settlement on Israel that
would force the Israelis to pull back
from territory they captured in 1967.
The Israelis, who easily detected the
military moves on both borders, bom-
barded Washington with warnings that
the Syrians and Egyptians were pre-
tional interest in the problem and to racli messages as wolf cries.
But the empty threats eventually
bubble-gummed in Sadat's face, Other
Arab leaders began to mock him. An
intelligence report from Syria, for ex-
ample, quoted President al-Asad as de-
claring derisively that "lie did not ex-
pect too much from Egyptians even if
they initiated the fighting."
Even at home, Egyptians began to
snicker at Sadat. A joke made the
rounds in Cairo that he had ordered
an attack on Israel but had come un
The outbreak of fighting, apparently,
has caused Moscow as much dismay as
Washington. The Egyptians have made
no overtures to Russia, so far as we
-can learn, to support the war effort
or-replace Egyptian losses. Instead, Sa-
dat reportedly has turned to Saudi
Arabia to finance the rebuilding of
Egyptian military forces.
Syria's relations with Russia have
also deteriorated. The Syrians were an-
noyed because the Soviet technicians
Gen.' Talas: "Despite the
fact that . . . all the
Arabs combined are
weaker than
Israel, there
is to other choice. We
11tilst. fight, and we
will fight."
paring for a full-scale offensive. The'
warnings intensified in late September
as the signs became clearer. But the
policymakers in Washington, finding it
difficult to believe the Arabs would
wouldn't man air defense missiles
against Israeli planes. This forced the
Syrians to go all the way to Hanoi to
seek qualified people who knew how to
operate the sophisticated Soviet equip-
ment.
The Syrians were also stung by Is-,
raeli superiority in the skies. The
proud Syrians preferred to blame this
on inferior Soviet equipment rather
,than their own pilots.
Shortly,before the fighting resumed,
according to intelligence reports,
Syria's Foreign Minister Abdel Khad-
dam got into a nasty argument
with Russia's Ambassador Noureddine
Mohiedinov. The angry foreign minis-
ter responded by slapping strict travel
restrictions on all Soviet personnel in-
side Syria. The Syrians tipped off the
Russians about the coming attack,
however, in time for then to withdraw
dependents before the hostilities "be-
gan.
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger,
meanwhile, is trying to persuade the
Arabs that the big powers cannot im-
pose a settlement upon the Mideast.
Only painful negotiations between the
Arabs and Israelis, he has told there,
can possibly bring?a lasting peace.
n 1973. United Feature syndicate
with an excuse for (Ayyr&&edfF ^ Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000400010032-6
week for holding back. The punch line:
Saturday's excuse was that it would be