BREAKFAST WITH DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER ON 15 JUNE 73

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00380R000400140034-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 4, 2006
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: June 18, 1973
• Content Type: MFR

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Breakfast with Dr. Henry A. Kissinger on 15 June 73
ATTENDING: Dr. Kissinger, BG Brent Scowcroft, and Mr. Colby
1. We opened with mutual pleasure at renewing this associ-
ation which began in the mid-'60s over Vietnam. We agreed that
the overthrow of Diem was a great mistake. (I described the
Mendenhall/Krulak visit to the "same country" in 1963. ) Dr.
Kissinger said. the overthrow of a friendly government was a very
wrong thing. I concurred and added that doing so without a clear
idea of the follow-on alternative was certainly less than wise. I
discussed the need for a Pacification Program in the early '60s and
our inability to organize in the USG to have one, as a result of which
the military option was pursued. We discussed the Watergate
slightly, Dr. K. commenting that he didn't understand why Mr. Helms
hadn't consulted him on the approaches made to Helms. I said that
Mr. Helms had essentially turned these down. and was particularly
anxious to keep the Agency out of any form of involvekn.ent. Dr. K.
commented that this managed to keep him out of involvement as if
Mr. Helms had come to him he might have had to move on the
subject. He expressed his high regard for Mr. Helms including
the comment that Helms would probably still be in the office of DCI
if it had been up to him. (Saying this without any reflection upon
the incumbents.) We did agree to reaffirm the Kissinger-Helms
understanding that all White House requests for CIA support or
assistance should be funneled through Dr. Kissinger or at least
subject to appeal to him. Dr. Kissinger hoped that the Watergate
problems had not shaken CIA so that it might become subject to the
same kinds of leaks that occur in other agencies. I said that I did
not think the Watergate had done this in view of the way CIA had
conducted itself but that there was some concern at the lower levels
about the personnel reductions. I said I viewed this as one 'of my
principal duties, to re-establish the cohesion of the Agency after
this turbulence over personnel but at the same time to indicate
clearly that periodic cuts would be made of the less qualified people
and that a er~ous problem faces us of financial capability tom intain
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staffs at any level. I described my concept that savings might be
possible in the big mechanical systems through stretch-out if
and only if the normal collection and analysis can provide assured
strategic warning of problems ahead so that the big systems could
be reactivated in time.
2. Dr. Kissinger expressed his particular desire for
intelligence support in the following areas:
a. That our analysis clearly bring out alternative
interpretations and possible developments and that he not
be. subjected to any consensus language. I said that it was
in my intention to update the NIE process with this in mind,
as I know Dr. Schlesinger had. I also said that I was trying
to develop identified experts in major areas or functions to
draw together the best expertise in intelligence on these
subjects. I was conscious however of the need for the
intelligence to be presented in a fashion which clearly
brings out its strengths and weaknesses to him.
b. He stressed the need for warning, com henting that
this is less a military problem than a political problem. He
said he would probably not be able to ask me all the questions
as he would be involved in many other things. I concurred and
said I thought it my responsibility to anticipate his needs and
to look ahead to problems on the horizon and call his attention
to them at an early stage. I referred to this as political
strategic warning.
c. Dr. Kissinger expressed particular concern over
Sino/Soviet developments and relationships. He said that it
is very important to him to have a constant assessment on these
relationships and the directions in which they are moving.
3. Dr. Kissinger also commented on the 40 Committee. He
said he had the impression that we were perhaps doing many things
of marginal importance, perhaps to satisfy Ambassadors and others,
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rather than concentrating on a few operations of major significance.
He said he had no problem of approving those if they were wanted
but he questioned their utility. I concurred with him to some degree
saying that in some respects the mechanism continues to conduct
operations despite a lack. of substantive need.
Dr. Kissinger concurred
and suggested that it be reduced. I described our concept of "covert
influence" through a few key contacts in indigenous circles who
can exert influence on major developments without showing the
American hand. I said that we are moving in this general direction
with our covert activities and that I would look carefully over the
utility of some of the on-going efforts.
4. In response to Dr. Kissinger's question, I described the
problems in our relationships with the FBI in the winter of 1969-70.
I then described a bit of the background of the lEC and Mr. Hoover's
position. Dr. Kissinger asked whethei. there was any truth to the
fact that the White House was dissatisfied with a "youth report" that
CIA had produced and therefore had ordered the assignment abroad
of a number of FBI officers. He said he had not been4consult.ed
and that he had merely been informed that such officers were to be
sent. He thought it stemmed from a personal relationship between
Mr. Hoover and the President rather than any dissatisfaction
with CIA, which is not indicated in his files. I said I believed this
was quite appropriate as I did not think there was any direct relation-
ship with CIA's performance on the.youth paper, which I described
as a roundup of youth problems abroad with an introduction which
included some discussion of youth dynamics in America. Rather
I said that I thought that the purpose was to strengthen the FBI for
its efforts on internal subversion in the 1970 atmosphere. I said that
we have no substantial problem with the FBI representatives abroad
who focus on criminal and domestic subversion problems. Dr.
Kissinger said he would continue to look only to the DCI, although
he would get Mr. Kelley of the FBI in some day and indicate clearly
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his primary reliance on,the CIA. This was accompanied by a
certain number of critical references to the fact that he had never
read a foreign intelligence report submitted by the FBI so he
didn't understand what their officers were doing abroad. I tried
to reassure him on this point. Dr. Kissinger also indicated that
concurred and said that hoped we couict exploit e
enormous operational potential in this country along the same
lines but that obviously we are limited by the fallout from the
Watergate problems. I said however this is a matter of great
interest to me in view of the very substantial potential offered.
Dr. Kissinger seemed quite sympathetic.
W. E. Colby
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