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Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 ile/A2/0)7()? FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT LEGISLATION ?i) POST OFF WE AND CIVIL ORTICE HO OE OF REPREStNTATIVES NINETY-THIRD COIGRESS - 'isEco1'p,sh'sAplv17 , 'ON 97W;HR. 70700 d irLS. TO iiitv rolt,:iMpiz9VhpABO 4EMEN B4rlytioist8 vs-tout/14 AND OE OTHEte e.0 / 14.?'? (' ? .?,,s1(?' 7 I \ , Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT LEGISLATION HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANPOWER AND CIVIL SERVICE OF THE COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS SECOND SESSION ON H.R. 13, H.R. 9784, H.R. 10700 and Related Bills BILLS TO PROVIDE FOR IMPROVED LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN THE FEDERAL SERVICE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES MAY 21, 22, JUNE 5, 12, 13, JULY 16, 25, 1974 Serial No. 93-51 Printed for the use of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 34-619 WASHINGTON : 1974 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE THADDEUS J. DULSKI, New York, Chairman DAVID N. HENDERSON, North Carolina, Vice Chairman MORRIS K. 'UDALL, Arix(ma DOMINICK V. DANIELS, New Jersey ROBERT N. C. NIX, Penn(ylvania JAMES M. HANLEY, New York CHARLES H. WILSON, California JEROME R. WALIHE, California RICHARD C. WHITE. Texas WILLIAM D. FORD, Michigan FRANKJ. BRASCO, New York WILLIAM (BILL) CLAY, Missouri PATRICIA SCHROEDER, Colorado JOE MOAKLEY, Massachusetts WILLIAM LEHMAN, Florida BOB TRAXLER, Michigan II. It. GROSS, Iowa EDWARD J. DERWINSKI, Illinois ALBERT W. JOHNSON, Pennsylvania LAWRENCE J. HOGAN, Maryland JOHN II. ROUSSELOT, California WALTnR E. POWELL, Ohio RICHARD W. MALLARY, Vermont ANDREW J. HINSHAW, California L. A (SKIP) BAFALIS, Florida JAMES M. COLLINS, Texas GENE TAYLOR, Missouri JOHN H. MARTINY, Chief Counsel VICTOR C. SMIROLDO, Staff Director and Counsel TI.E0DORE J. KAZY, Assistant Staff Director ROBERT E. LOCK HART, Assistant Counsel ROY C. MESKER, Staff Assistant Eutaw's C. FORTUNE, Coordinator SUBCOM WITTER ON MANPOWER AND CIVIL SERVICE DAVIE N. HENDERSON, North Carolina, Chairman WILLIAM D. FORD, Michigan EDWARD J. DERWINSKI, Illinois WILLIAM (BILL) CLAY, Missouri RICHARD W. MALLARY, Vermont WILLIAM LEHMAN, Florida GENE TAYLOR, Missouri FRANK J. BRASCO, New York Ex Officio Voting Members THADDEUS J. DULSKI, New York IT.R GROSS, Iowa ROY C. MEEKER, Staff Assistant, Room B-370(b), Rayburn Building?Ext. 52821 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 CONTENTS Hearings held on? Page May 21, 1974 1 May 22, 1974 169 June 5, 1974 205 June 12, 1974 263 June 13, 1974 343 July 16, 1974 369 July 25, 1974 430 Testimony of? Bradley, George E., executive director, Organization of Professional Employees, U.S. Department of Agriculture 425 Brasco, Hon. Frank J., Representative in Congress from the State of New York 4 Burnsky, Paul J., President, Metal Trades Department, AFL-CIO; accompanied by Paul R. Hutchings, Research Director 240 Connery, Vincent L., national president, National Treasury Employees Union 297 Elder, Harmon, Washington representative, U.S. Industrial Council, accompanied by James S. Metcalfe, president, Yellow Cab Co., Nashville, Tenn 439 Flynn, Ralph, president, Coalition of American Public Employees, and Vincent Connery, president, National Treasury Employees Union, accompanied by Robert Tobias, general counsel, and Jerry Klepner, director of communications 295 Ford, Hon. William D., Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan 2 Hampton, Hon. Robert E., Chairman, Civil Service Commission, ac- companied by Tony Ingrassia, Director, Office of Labor-Management Relations, Civil Service Commission 8, 169 Hill, James D., executive director, National Federation of Profes- sional Organizations, accompanied by Larry Fisher, secretary- treasurer; Roy Olson, president; Hartley Bowen, Naval Civilian Administrators Association; George Bradley, executive director, Organization of Professional Employees of the Department of Agri- culture; Paul Robbins, executive director, National Society of Pro- fessional Engineers; William Hughes, general counsel, National Association of Federal Veterinarians; Dr. Clarence Pals, executive^ vice president, National Association of Federal Veterinarians ; Robert Calogero, president, Association of Senior Engineers; Dean Fravel, National Association of Government Engineers; and John King, executive director, Air Traffic Control Association 399 Hughes, William G., general counsel, National Association of Federal Veterinarians 423 Kraham, William, National Association of Air Traffic Specialists, ac- companied by John Enlow, union president, and Lawrence Cushing, vice president 391 Larson, Reed, National Right to Work Committee, accompanied by Raymond Lo,sornio 374 Losornio, Raymond, chairman of the board, Right to Work Committee- 376 Leyden, John F., president, Professional Air Traffic Controllers Orga- nization, accompanied by William B. Peer, general counsel; Allan Moskowitz, legislative research director; and John Maher, director of labor-management relations 354 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 TestimonyIv of?Continued .Lyons, Kenneth, president, National Association of Government tm- ployees, accompanied by Allan Whitney, executive director, and Page James L. O'Dea, legislative counsel_ 344 .McCart, John A., operations director, Government Employe's Council_ 245 McLoughlin, Arthur, executive secretary, Overseas Education Associa- tion 471 Meget, Carl, director, Depart/holt of Legislation, American Federation of 'Pen ethers, AFL?CIO 479 Meiklejohn, Kenneth A., legislative representative, AFL?CIO 206 Paterno, -Vincent .1., president, Association of Civilian Technicians, accompanied by John Chapman 453 Robbins, Paul, executive director, National Society of Professional Engineers 432 Walker, Frederick N., Plymouth Brethren No. 4, accompanied by Robert A. Smith and Jack Walley_ 370 Webber, Clyde, president, American Federation of Government Em- ployees, accompanied by Lou Pellerzi, chief counsel, and Dennis Gar- rison, executive vice president, AFL?CIO 230 White, John, director, legislation and public relations, National Alli- ance of Postal and Federal Employees, accompanied by Votie D. Dion. national secretary, and Wesley Young, national vice presi- dent 461 Wolkomir, Dr. Nathan, president:, National Federation of Federal Em- ployees, accompanied by Irving Geller, general counsel 264 Statement submitted by? Bowen, .1. Hartley, Jr., executive secretary, Naval Civilian Adminis- trators Association 493 Clague, Ewan, president, The Federal Professional Association 484 Joint Council of Unions, Government Printing Office 483 Nagel, W. A., legislative chairman, Association of Senior Engineers 491 National Association of Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service Employees 481 Ross. Richard J.. president, National Union of Compliance Officers, Independent, representing the employees of Labor Management Services Administration, U.S. Department of Labor 500 The American Nurses Association 486 Watkins, S. Rayburn, president, National Labor-Management Foun- dation 481 Communications from-- fampton, Hon. Robert E., chairman, Civil Service Commission, in re- sponse to questions submitted subsequent to the hearing 493 Losornio, Raymond C., chairman of the board, National Right to Work Committee 387 Robbins, Paul H., executive director, National Society of Professional Engineers 436 Webber, Clyde M., national president, American Federation of Govern- ment Employees, in response to questions submitted subsequent to the hearing 497 Whitney, Alan J., executive vice president, National Association of Government Employees, responding to additional questions subse- quent to the hearing 353 Additional material included? CSC bulletin 711-30: November :1973 union recognition (statistics) Chart on labor-relations program authorities 80 Federal Labor Relations Council report on case handling 81 Federal Service Impasses Panel report on case handling 84 Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management Relations (Al sa SLMR) Federal workload data Labor-management relations climate survey paper 87 Civil Service Commission/Office of Management and Budget (CSC/ OMB) survey report on the collective-bargaining process 92 CSC/OMB guidelines 117 CSC labor agreements survey_ 122 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 Additional material Included?Continued rage CSC Study: Benefits comparison 123 Comparison of E.O. 11491 and legislative proposals 121 Comments and recommendations of the AFL-CIO on areas for review of the Federal labor-management program pursuant to Executive Order 11491 217" Position paper on labor management relations submitted by Vincent Connery, national president, National Treasury Employees Union 305, Summary of findings regarding the public attitudes toward the right to work laws, compiled by the Caravan Surveys of the Opinion Re- search Corp 382 Portions of document prepared for the National Right To Work Com- mittee by the Caravan Surveys, Opinion Research Corp., regarding the public attitudes toward right to work laws 501 Administrative reports received on H.R. 10700, from? U.S. Civil Service Commission 508 Office of Management and Budget 513 General Accounting Office 517 Department of Defense 524 Department of the Treasury 529 Department of Agriculture 532 National Labor Relations Board 533 Federal Power Commission 534 Federal Communications Commission 538 Administrative reports received on H.R. 13, from? Office of Management and Budget 539 U.S. Civil Service Commission 548 General Accounting Office 557 Department of Defense L 563 Department of the Treasury 568 Department of Transportation 571 Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 576 Department of Agriculture 578 General Services Administration 581 Tennessee Valley Authority 584 Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service 587 District of Columbia Government 589 Administrative report received on H.R. 9784, from? U.S. Civil Service Commission 592 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT LEGISLATION T1TESDAY, XAY 21, 1974 U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANPOWER AND CIVIL SERVICE' Washington,D.C. The subcommittee met at 10 a.m. in room 210, Cannon House Office Building, David N. Henderson (chairman of the subcommittee) pre- siding. Mr. HENDERSON. The subcommittee will come to order. The Subcommittee on Manpower and Civil Service is opening hearings today on legislation to cover labor-management relations for the Federal service. It has been the long standing policy of the Government, since the 1930's that employees in the private sector have the right to be represented by labor organizations which bar- gain with employers on wages, hours, and working conditions. The Congress extended this same concept to employees in the Postal Service when it passed the Postal Reorganization Act of 1970. At the close of 1973 nearly 1.1 million civilian employees of the executive agencies of the Federal Government were represented by labor organizations. This has come about during the past 12 years largely as the result of relationships gained by both Federal agency officials and labor organization representatives during this period and the viability of those relationships, I now believe that it is fitting that legislation be enacted. This legislation will place the two parties on an equal footing when dealing with each other, both at the negotiating table and when appearing before third parties envisaged by the bills before us. I believe it is also of importance that employees and their representatives have access to the judicial pro- cess when they have exhausted whatever administrative machinery is established. Access to the courts is rather tenuous under Executive order. It is now timely, in my opinion, to consider legislation which will permit Federal employees to join the great majority of Ameri- can workers, both in industry and the Postal Service' in the enjoy- ment of well-earned rights and benefits under a Federal Service Labor Management Act. However, I believe that matters affecting pay rates, retirement benefits, health insurance, and similar benefits should remain in the domain of the Congress. Among other things, necessity for these hearings is attested to by the fact that more than 25 bills on Federal labor relations have been introduced during the 93d Congress. Two of my colleagues on the committee, Mr. Ford and Mr. Brasco, have also introduced labor legislation, H.R. 9784 and H.R. 13, repectively. (1) Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 2 At the time Chairman Dulski and I introduced H.R. 10700 last fall, I indicated that these hearings would be held so that labor organizations, the executive branch, and interested persons would have an opportunity to present their views and positions on the many concepts embodied in these bills. I believe that labor-management relations not only must consider the relationship between the patties and employees but the broader public interest as well. I had this in mind when I chose the title of "Federal Service Labor Management Act of 1973.,, We hope that these hearings will provide a forum for a thorough review by the executive branch of Government. There are some principals which, as the result of societal progress made in this country. should no longer be subject to question; these include the right of employees to freely join or refrain from joining labor organizations and the right of these organizations to partici- pate on behalf of the employees they represent in the process of establishing personnel policies, practices and matters affecting work- ing conditions. In the several bills we are considering. I am pleased to find that there are significant concepts in common. Each bill provides for the establishment of a full-time independent body to administer the act. I believe this to be proper because of the size and importance of the program as well as the need for a full-time and objective body which will be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Additionally, the bills all provide for grievance machinery terminating in arbitration and for "make whole" remedies for em- ployees. I also realize that there are provisions in the bills before the subcommittee that treat a number of concepts differently and that many of the proposals may not be fully acceptable to both labor organizations and the administration. For these reasons I am hope- ful and anticipate that the hearings Will focus on such issues as: the kinds and types of employees and agencies that should be covered; the place of supervisors in labor-management relations, and whether labor-management relations legislation should speak to agency rela- tionships with its own supervisors a;nd managers; whether the bill should provide detailed specific on such matters as appropriate units, unfair labor practices, steps in impasse settlement or, instead, general guidelines permitting such matters to be handled by those responsible under the bill for its overall administration such as the Federal Labor Relations Authority proposed in both H.R. 13 and 10700; the sphere or scope of bargaining; and the relationship between this proposed legislation and laws now in force, as well as the relationship among the executive branch, labor organizations, and the Congress on labor- man agement matters. At this time I would yield to the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Ford, for any comments that he would like to make on the subject of labor-management -l'elations before us this morning and any specific remarks he might like to direct to his bill, H.R. 9784 which was introduced by him on August 1, 1978. STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM D. FORD Mr. FORD. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. First, on behalf of all the Members of Congress who are interested in this legislation, I would like to thank you for under- Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 CIA-RDP75B00380R000500220001-6 taking these hearings. I apologize, in advance, that I will be in and out of these first hearings because there- are 120 local officials in town from my district who are going to require my time and as- sistance. During my tenure here?and before coming here for that matter? I have had more than passing interest in the unusual phenomena that has developed within our States and within our Federal Gov- ernment as to how a governmental agency deals, as management. with its employees, as labor. I have halal an interest in some kind of structure where the rules of the game are written, well-understood; based on a regular legislative process, and administered in a way so that everybody can understand where their rights lie and how they are to be enforced. I think that during the next 5 years, and hopefully it's 5 years? some people are saying 10?that the next big historical develop- ment in the condition of working people in this country is going to be in public employment. In the last few years we have seen the phenomena of the public employees' strike grow throughout the United States to the point where in the past 3 years, just with school teachers alone, there have been 6 million man-days of work lost through strikes. I might say almost all of them were technically illegal because they occurred in States like my own where it is illegal for teachers to strike; however, 20 percent of all the teacher strikes in the country in the last 4 years have occurred in my State. Nobody has ever gone to jail for it and they always worked. So it seems to me a little bit silly that we're still trying to solve these problems with the old method. When I first came here, the public employees were operating under Executive order which had mixed reviews depending on who looked at that Executive order, and things have not improved greatly. I have seen Federal administrators attempting to deal with the Executive order. I am convinced, Mr. Chairman, that we have reached a state where legislation is necessary so we can really define labor- management relations for public employees. I serve on three subcommittees that are now considering this question one way or another; one subcommittee on this committee and two subcommittees on the Education and Labor Committee. Before Mr. Thompson's committee, we are considering the general question of all public employees being covered under the National Labor Relations Act, and we have the Clay bill before the second committee. On this committee we are considering some changes in the Labor-Management Relations Act for postal employees to pro- vide for the right to strike, and my proposal before this committee for all Federal employees includes the right to strike because I am absolutely convinced that we are wasting our time by trying to create a totally different model for labor-management relations than that which is working successfully and has worked successfully throughout our private enterprise system. I might say, Mr. Chairman, in closing, I think the experience we have had with the new Postal Corporation should be a warning to us that we need a new system patterned on a workable and working Approved For Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 4 system and not a new hybrid. We made, a bad mistake it seems to me in not more closely paralleling the labor-management provisions of the Postal Service to that which we understand and is in existence. And people in labor-management relations in the private sector say, in attempting to set up a hybrid system, what we have actually done is create a situation where even the most minor differences between labor and management are now becoming a subject of long- drawn-out arguments. They are arguing about what is and what is not negotiable. They are arguing about what is a proper subject for them to bring to us for legislative attention and what is a subject that becomes off limits because of some possibility that it might be negotiated. I certainly hope that in enacting legislation we will try as best we can to follow the patterns that have been proven as workable in the major industries in this country and not launch off again into an experiment with a hybrid or new model which goads the people who work under that model to a good deal of disagreement over trivial matters sometimes in an attempt to develop a new base. The National Labor Relations Act will be 40 years old next year and for 40 years the courts and parties?labor and management? have been interpreting the provision of that act. Its only had four major amendments in the full 40 years; three of them are fairly recent. Probably the most dramatic was the Taft-Hartley Act. But in 40 years it has served extremely well; and that's not to say that everybody has been happy with it, but we have developed a 40-year history of law that would be very useful to us to the extent that it can be used in this legislation. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. HENmalsoN. Thank you, Mr. Ford. Mr. Form. Mr. Chairman, one more thing, I think for the Vice President's peace off mind, I should say this: Somehow the story got out that H.R. 9784 was introduced by the other Congressman Ford before he was appointed Vice President, and knowing the differences that he and I have experienced over labor-management relations, I can't imagine that that could be anything but embarrass- ing for him. But I want the record to show that this is my bill and not his. Mr. HENDERSON. Mr. Brasco has had a longtime interest in this subject. He introdu ;-7!ed the first bill that was assigned to our sub- committee, H.R. 13. I am delighted to recognize him at this time. Mr. I3RAsco. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have had a strong interest for a number of years in the prob- lem of effective labor-management relations in government. During this time I followed very closely the experience through the Execu- tive order. I have also read happily the Many letters I have received from rank and file Federal employees on this subject. The experi- ence gained by all parties has been valuable. The issues are better defined and understood today. Some progress and improvements have been achieved; Perhaps we will see some further advances as a result of the recent hearings held, by the Federal Labor Relations Council on possible, revisions in Executive order practices. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 5 In any event, Mr. Chairman, I believe that two things are now evident: that first, a truly fair, stable, and effective system of labor- management relations in government must be based and founded in law; second, that we now have sufficient practical experience to write a sound, workable statute. These are the reasons why I introduced H.R. 13 which was designed to provide such a system this year. One key provision of H.R. 13 is for the establishment of an inde- pendent and full-time Federal Labor Relations Authority, with three members to be appointed by the President and subject to Senate confirmation. H.R. 13 also provides for the principle of binding arbitration of grievances and disputes. It provides, too, for the payment of fees by members of a unit who benefit from representation by the union but are not dues-paying union members. Together, these two provi- sions do a little to redress the great imbalance which now exists at the bargaining table because of the prohibition against strikes by Federal employees. H.R. 13 extends the scope of collective bargaining beyond the arbitrarily narrow limits now possible under the Executive order? it provides bargaining rights to all employees of all agencies of the Federal Government except in certain cases where the denial of such rights is clearly justified because of the conflicts-of-interest that would otherwise result?and it makes possible the establishment of bargaining units of appropriate size, in order both to recognize the true communities of interest among Federal employees and to deliver management from the present need to negotiate the same issue over and over again with a multitude of small units. I think II.R. 13 provides a sound and moderate approach to this whole problem, one that is fair to management, fair to employees, and?above all?fair to the citizens of the United States. I congratulate Congressman Henderson and this committee for holding these hearings. They are responding to a real need at a time when interest and desire for action in this area are high. I hope that the hearings will be most productive and that from them will come a statute that will provide the base for the kind of equitable, stable, and effective labor-management relations I think we all want to see in the Federal Government. Mr. Chairman, I see that there are many witnesses here, and perhaps some on the firing line already, just anxious to testify on behalf of this bill; is that correct Mr. HAMPTON. Mr. Brasco, I think what you will hear me say is that there are a lot of factors here. I think I'm going to raise more questions for you than I'm goinc, to answer. Mr. BRASCO. In any event, Mr. Chairman, I think that everyone knows specifically where I stand with respect to this and I certainly want to commend the chairman for calling the hearings today so that we could get on about the work of considering all of the pieces of legislation advanced before this committee and hopefully come up with a system that's fair to the employee, fair to management, and above all, fair to the American citizens. I thank you for the time. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 6 Mr. HENDERSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Brasco. Perhaps I should explain to the other members and the audience too, that I will yield to the minority but I thought that perhaps they would like to have the statement on the, part of the authors: of the legislation. Ifs true we have witnesses we want to hear from, but Pm sure that the, chairman and others would like to have a brief explana- tion of the philosophy of the authors of the legislation and what we am attempting to do in the various bills and I appreciate the remarks of the gentlemen. If I may at this time, I'd. like to make a brief statement with regards to my own views on MIL 10700 because in drafting and introducing this bill which was co-sponsored by Chairman Dulski of the full committee, I gave full cognizance to the fact that the competitive civil service system has been with us since 1883 and provided an equitable method for entering the Federal service. It's well to recognize that Federal employees operate in the public interest providing ieryice, to all of the people. The services are those which we believe are better provided by the Government rather than by each of us individually. Therefore, in the provisions of RR 10700 1 provided that Federal employees would continue to be subject to the no-strike law; that Federal employees will be free to determine whether they will or will not be required to join a labor organizatior. It attempts to Provide for the balance of the respective rights of the parties with effective third party proceed- ing procedures before independent bodies or arbitrators to ensure timely decisions with justice. and equity. , Additional provisions provide for no cost to employee organiza- tions for the dues withholding of its members, negotiating an agree- ment., required appearance before the authority on official time, certification without elections in certain circumstances, and provides an employee organization may choose to represent nonmembers in :,Tieyances. I suggested in H.R. 10700 the method for broadening the scope of bargaining and have, provided certain Specific items which should not be negotiable or, if you will, a public interest clause. These concepts, taken together, are. in my view a central founda- tion for legislation governing the Federal service labor-management relations. It will be within the realm of all of the bills before us that spokesmen for the administration will be heard; also, the views of the various labor organizations or other organizations that are interested in this subject will be presented to us in these hearings. On that point, it is the intention of the Chair to provide as much time as possible for the witnesses so that we may have a, full and complete record. We are plowing new ground and certainly it's a subject, of great deal of importance to the future of our Nation. It may be that the committee will decide that witnesses who testify in these early sessions of the hearings will be helpful to us later as we hear from other organizations and we may call you back. I want to assure everybody involved that we will be as deliber- ate and keep the record open for the views of everybody as we possibly can. We certainly will make every effort to hear from responsible organizations. In some eases it will not be possible to Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 7 provide an opportunity to testify, but certainly all views will be received for the record if they are properly submitted to us. I want to commend all of you for your attendance this morning. I recognize, as Mr. Ford pointed out, that some may have to leave. Mr. Lehman has mentioned that he has to testify before another committee. But, if you will, as we hold these sessions, make every effort to come back when you can, I will certainly try to afford you every opportunity to be kept up to date on the record that's being written. I guess we should make an attempt to operate under the 5-minute rule as part of the procedure, but the .Chair will certainly be as lenient in watching the clock as I can to be fair to all the members that are attending. At this time I am delighted to yield to the minority and other members who are here this morning. Mr. MALLARY. I have no formal statement, Mr. Chairman, but. I do appreciate your calling the hearings. I think it's very important. that we do write a full record on this and I think the balanced scope of hearings which you are planning are very significant.. Certainly this is a vital subject which we are all concerned with and I think many of us are looking forward to new information. I think the dialogue and the information that will be presented will certainly be significant to all of us. Mr. HENDERSON. Mr. Lehman. Mr. LEIIMAN. I just want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this meeting. I'm sure it's going to very productive. I have had one experience with labor relations in the public sector when I was on the Dade County School Board. We had no machinery to set up to handle the situation when we had a confrontation and therefore we didn't have a strike which was illegal but we had a walk-out which was just as destructive. Mr. HENDERSON. Mr. Taylor. Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, I have no formal statement. I do look forward to these informative hearings and I commend you -for your leadership in calling these meetings and for the broad base of input that you have planned for these hearings. Thank you. Mr. HENDERSON. Before I introduce our first witness' I would like to take just one moment for the benefit of the record and all here to commend the staff of our subcommittee, and Mr. Masker for the very long hours spent in drafting some of the bills that are before us, especially the bill that Mr. Bulski and I introduced. Not only have they provided the usual staff service to the members of the subcommittee as we prepared for these hearings, but have been in constant contact with the Civil Service Commission and the other Federal agencies vitally involved in the subject that we will be considering, and in addition to that, on their own time have spent numerous hours talking and conferring with people at all levels of Government, both in the Congress as the various Members of Con- gress have contacted us, and in industry and business, hopefully to develop a very comprehensive and very important piece of legisla- tion affecting our Nation. I certainly would want to recognize at Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 8 this time that their work has been outstanding and certainly will be very fruitful to us in the weeks ahead., Our first lead-off witness this morning is the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission. Of course, Mr. Hampton has appeared before this subcommittee and the full committee on numerous occa- sions. I noted earlier this morning, Mr. Chairman, that one of the writers here in the Washington area commented on the dryness of the subject. He did also recognize the importance of it, but I have .always found that these matters perhaps don't catch headlines and perhaps are not as sexy as some of the others, but when you come before us you always. do a fine job and show that you have got a real grasp on the problems of the Federal employees. You always are very helpful to us and I know of no one better qualified to lead oft on this particular subject. I recognize that during these years not only as Chairman but as a member of the Commission in prior years this is a subject that has been very much before you. You have had great input into the real meaningful operation of the Executive orders and I know of no one that will have greater input into the final resolution of this problem than you and your staff members at the Commission. It's a real pleasure on behalf of all the members of the subcommittee to welcome you this morning. STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT E. HAMPTON, CHAIRMAN, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, ACCOMPANIED BY TONY INGRASSIA, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION Mr. HAMPTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. saw that same column this morning and it is a subject that people tend to think is dull, mainly because it's something that is not easily grasped. It's very complex. It has a strong element of law in it. But I thiqk it is one of the Most important subjects that this eornmittee has had to address in the 20?some-odd years that I have been around Washington. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, we are pleased to have this opportunity to appear before your committee this morning to share the administration's thinking on the various labor-manage- ment bills pending before you. With me is Mr. Tony Ingrassia, Di- rector of the Commission's Oflice of Labor-Management Relations. This office has prime authority for assuring the Commission meets it assigned responsibilities under Executive Order 11191 governing the Federal labor-management program. We war t to particularly acknowledge the courtesy the committee has extended in giving me 2 days in which to explore the ramifi- cations of a legislated labor-relations system covering Federal em- ployees. There are many fundamental 'issues concerning the entire fabric of Federal personnel laws that must be addressed in any ineaniagf al consideration of broad-ganged legislation of the types embodied in bills before this committee.. At the outset, let me just briefly preview the areas we would like to cover during these 2 days of testimony. We have provided Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/066 CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 you with our statement for the record, which is an in-depth treat- ment of what we'll be discussing today: 1. The principles upon which the Executive order program is based, our experiences and our accomplishments with the program. 2. The special and unique characteristics of the Federal Govern- ment as employer. 3. Tho evolution and basic features of the Executive order pro- gram, our challenges and progress under the program and how we are moving forward to deal with problems the program is designed to resolve. 4. The other existing systems which promote bilateralism in Fed- eral personnel administration, and the need to assure that personnel policies requiring governmentwide uniformity continue to be handled through a central agency in which labor relations is fully integrated. 5. The major deficiencies we strongly oppose in provisions of pending bills, and the fundamental concerns which must be addressed in any consideration of broad-guacred legislation to govern labor- management relations in the Federdservice. 6. The lack of demonstrated need for such legislation. And, finally, the basic philosophy of labor relations we strongly support for balanced employee, union, and management rights and responsibili- ties in the public interest. The thrust of all our testimony is that the Executive order pro- gram is operating saccessfully and that there is no demonstrated need for changing to a legislated program?and certainly not to one with many great departures from tested methods. Furthermore, it is our strong feeling that any serious considera- tion of legislation must come to grips with the fundamental issues inherent in any basic change in the overall program of Federal labor-management relations. To focus attention on these issues, we have provided you with Summary Charts on 17 identified issues. Of these, we would like to devote special attention to the following in our testimony tomorrow: The central authority?its role and authorities. Supersedure?the impact of collective-bargaining legislation on existing laws. The scope of negotiations?as it relates to established bargaining- unit structure, to the current unavailability of economic trade-offs, and to congressional authority and oversight responsibilities. The paramount need to protect merit principles and other ex- pressions of the public interest. The need to identify who the "employer" will be?for purposes of collective dealings. In addition, we have furnished you with detailed background information on union recognitions and agreements, third-party func- tions and case handling, collective-bargaining experiences and re- sults, structures for labor-relations effectiveness, comparison of pri- vate and public sector economic fringe benefit levels and section-by- section comparison of Executive Order 11401 and pending bills. The climate for labor-management dealings and relationships in the Federal Government has evolved from the first principles on which the existing program is based. These principles are as valid Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 10 and timely today as they were when the Executive order program was formalized 12 years ago in Executive Order 10988 and modern-. ized with the provision for third-party machinery in 1970 by Execu- tive Order 11491, which has since been amended. As the essential statutory framework of Federal personnel policy, merit principles provide the context within which collective dealings must operate. And the essential authority of public officials to meet their obligation to manage effectively must be maintained. What the Executive order reserves to Federal managers?commonly re- ferred to as "management rights"?are in reality those responsibili- ties required of Government to manage in the public interest. A major strength of our program Under Executive order is its ability to make the periodic adjustments necessary to accommodate to new conditions in an orderly and evolutionary process. The twin imperatives of "improved wellebeing of employees" and "efficient administration of the Government" under Executive Order 11491 have shaped the policy, the procedures and the direction of the Federal labor-relations program. That we've come a long way as a result is shown by the overall record of aecomplisment and benefit. -Unions have .!,-rovcrit and stabilized. As of 6 months ago, nearly 1,100,000 employees. or 56 percent of the entire nonpostal Federal work force, lunI Leen organized into exclusive bargaining units. That's just about double the proportion in private industry, and it includes very close to the total population of eligible employees in the Federal bine-collar work force. See attachment 1. More recently, a dramatic upsurge in negotiating activity has broadened agreement coverage to ft very considerable measure. Our studies have shown that over 77 percent of all nonpostal Federal employees in exclusive units are covered by negotiated agreements, with an additional 17 percent on the verge of initial agreements. This overall total of 94 percent cannot be far out of line with the situation in private industry: and even if we assume agreement coverage there approaches 100 percent-, the gap is narrowing all the The collective bargaining process is at the heart of any labor- management program, and the Civil Service Commission in con- junction with the Office of Management and Budget recently under- took to determine ii:ust how it is working under Executive Order 11491. To distinguish fact from opinion?and to sharpen our per- ception of the total picture?we surveyed the bargaining experience throughout Government. The returns are now in on almost nine- tenths of our program's more than .'3,400 recorded units, including virtually all of those under negotiated :agreements. See attachment 7. What emerges is an overall record of bargaining achievements under the Executive order program, notably : The parties are rc aching final agreement in only a few months of regotiat flivs---within 3 to months--in , two-thirds or more of bar- gaining situations. More important, they are learning and managing to settle their own problems across the table in theiv own way, and mostly on their own. Only 16 percent of bargaining situations required third-party Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 11 involvement?and most of them involved only mediation-341 cases. With all other third-party involvement?the Federal Labor Rela- tions Council, Federal Service Impasses Panel and Assistant Sec- retary of Labor?confined to just about 80 bargaining situations. And these agreements incorporate a variety of matters every bit as broad and important as in private industry?with the exception of those areas where Congress has either retained direct control or has established a special statutory mechanism. The matters covered by agreements are amply documented in the Commission's new Labor Agreement Information Retrieval System, which for the first time ever gives us a current, automated handle on what's been negotiated in the Executive order program. See attachment 9. Included in the- wide range of negotiated items are provisions which go beyond what's required in regulations, with bilateral?instead of unilateral ?grievance procedure because of their presence in agreements. We find, for example: That more than 820,000 Federal employees enjoy access to nego- tiated grievance procedures?most of them providing final and bind- ing arbitration. That some 718,000 are covered by negotiated promotion policies. That about 712,000 are 'subject to negotiated overtime clauses. That almost 652,000 are under negotiated safety provisions. That over 589,000 are covered by negotiated disciplinary policies. These are only a few examples of the very real and tangible ac- complishments produced through the collective: bargaining process in the Executive order program. And they represent only a part of the total employee benefits package developed on a bilateral basis in the Federal service. There are other mechanisms providing for union participation in developing wage and fringe levels which must also be considered in the total picture. But before going on to them, I would like to review some of the systemic reasons why basic pay and economic supplements aren't deferred to the bargaining table in the Federal sector?reasons that inhere in the nature of our system of Government. The setting -for labor-management relations in the Federal service has evolved from the special and unique characteristics of Govern- ment as employer?actually, a multiplicity of employers in some 70 departments and agencies employing some 2 million nonpostat civilians. Congressional control over taxation and the budget process, the monopoly character of much of Government's activities and the concomitant necessity for uninterrupted service, expression of the public will in Federal personnel affairs?these are some of the conditions that make us a very special and unique kind of employer, and distinguish us from employers in the private economy. They do tend to limit the scope of bargainable matters?in ways deemed to. be vitally necessary in the public interest. Notwithstanding these essential differences, however, some critics of the Federal labor-management program blindly favor a whole- sale transplant of private sector law, precedents and practices into Government. This might work if Government were just another industry. It is not. The Federal program today is a product of the distinctive conditions that exist in Government, just as the private 34-019-74--2 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/0612 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 sector program is a product of the quite different conditions that prevail there. What makes the Federal environment so special? Labor organizations enjoy long and very important relationships with the Congress. This hearing itself is an example of their impact in the legislative process. Unions in private industry do not lobby their employers for benefits outside and hi addition to those nego- tiated across the table. Federal employees benefit immensely from a wide variety of stat- utory and regulatory policies and protections. These have been achieved through significant union input to the political and admin- istrative, processes of Government. The Executive order itself has fostered a positive approach toward union organizing and dealings. In contrast to the private sector, the Federal Government has adopted a position of neutrality on union representation of its employees. Government officials do not mount "vote no" campaigns in union elections. , The Congress has outlawed the strike among employees of the Federal Government--in recognition of the paramount need to ensure the uninterrupted delivery of services to the public. In its place, there is viable and effective machinery for determining economic and other major personnel benefits. While this removes concerted job action is a lawful weapon in collective bargaining, the Government?as employer- ?has no desire to deny to Federal employees the general level of rights and benefits secured through ngotiations in private industry. On the contrary, the rights and benefits which Federal employees enjoy are fully comparable. to---and in some ways better than?those in the private economy. See attachment 10. I think it is eminently clear that labor-management policy in the Federal sector cannot be the same as in the private sector. While we have some things in common with, collective bargaining as it is practiced in private industry, there are basic and special differences which demand a special and different program for the. Federal ser vim. The state of the program for Federal labor-management relations today is a result, of these essential differences as reflected in our continually evolving character. The Executive order has been revised substantially three times; even now, we are headed toward still another revision as a result of our en Trent review of the program. As these revisions in. the program suggest, ours is not a model of immutable perfection. There are problems, and we have made and continue to make the changes necessary to meet, those problems. Some of the inevitable, problems that would exist in any program-- statutory or Executive order have hen blown up out of all pro- portion to create the impression that the Executive order program isn't working. To the contrary. I believe that the record in resolving problems ampiy demonstrates that the overall objectives of Executive Order 11491 are being met and that the machinery for dispute reso- lution is working, well. Over 370 grievance-arbitration awards have been rendered under the Executive. order program; and, of course, this figure, doesn't inelude, the, many worksite grievances which are settled in the nego- tiated procedure and which never reach, formal arbitration. These Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 13 awards have resolved disputes in a wide variety of areas?including such areas as administration of pay and leave, promotion, discipline, work scheduling and representation. The majority of arbitrations have involved installations within the Department of Defense, where a total of only 12 exceptions to arbitrators' awards have been filed- 5 by management, 7 by unions?indicating the high rate of accept- ance both parties have given to the arbitration process. The Federal Labor Relations Council has closed 129 of its 146 cases of all types?negotiability disputes, appeals from determina- tions in representation and unfair labor practice cases, and exceptions to arbitration awards. The Council's appellate function has increased dramatically?with three times as many cases closed last year as in the previous year?and the leadtime, in case processing has been 'shortened dramatically. See attachment 3. The Federal Service Impasses Panel has closed 92 of its 105 re- quests for assistance in negotiations?with most of them settled in- formally. Only 18 cases involved issuance of a formal report and recommendations following factfinding, and 16 of them were accepted in toto by the parties; in the other two cases, the Panel's recommen- dations were used as a basis for settlement. See attachment 4. This is the Federal alternative to the economic or "contract" strike, and the record shows wide acceptance by the parties directly involved. The Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management Relations has closed 4,885 of his 4,962 cases of all types?representation, unfair labor practice, standards of conduct, grievability-arbitrability?while his Labor-Management Services Administration has supervised 2,063 representation elections. Year-to-year comparisons in the number of elections supervised reflect the recent leveling off in union organizing under the Executive order. And although the number of unfair-labor practice cases had shown a steady increase from 1971 through 1973, projections based on the first quarter of 1974 indicate there may be fewer such. cases this year than last. See attachment 5. Those figures demonstrate that the third-party processes mide,r the order are distinguished by their "successes' ?that the loudly alleged "failures" in isolated cases are the exceptions that prove the rule. This is not to say problems do not exist; they do, and we are moving ahead to meet them. But they should be viewed in the true and broad perspective of Executive order experience?and this is one of overall and increasing successes in surmounting new challenges. The total envronment of labor relations in the Federal Government provides a responsiveness to employee and union concerns that ex tends well beyond the Executive order framework?in many impor- tant directions. The Executive order program realistically cannot be viewed as the alpha and omega of formal and structured opportuni- ties for collective participation in determining personnel policies, practices and working conditions. Over and above what is derived through the collective bargaining process under the Executive order program, improvements in wages and fringes are obtained through a variety of bilateral mechanisms which represent a close first cousin to collective bargaining. Together; they provide direct union involvement on all the various "personnel policies, practices and matters affecting working conditions" of Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 14 Federal employees. If the particular form utilized in a given area is not the same as in private industry, it is because the Congress has determined that the Federal Government is not the same as a private employer for that purpose. Even in the so-called "bread-and-butter" areas of wages and economic fringes which have been temoved by law from the nego- tiating table in the Federal sector, unions enjoy a very real say and influence. Their vepresentatives serve on a variety of statutory bodies dealing with Federal employee pay tuA fringe benefits: The Pay Comparability Act of 1.970 established a Federal Em- ployees Pay Council of five union representatives, who deal with the President's agents in formulating wide-ranging recommendations on the entire system and processes involved in determining pay com- parability for white collar Federal employees. As early as 196.73, the Civil Service Commission established a National Wage Policy Committee of five union and five agency representative who met face to face over a long period of time, to establish all policies and operating instructions for the Federal blue collar pay system. The Committee Makeup was modified slightly and established by law as the Prevailing Rate Advisory Committee, which continues to meet weekly to work out systems and problems on the wage board pay program. Other examples of "bilateralism" beyond the Executive order pro- gram include union participation on the, health benefits and life in- surance advisory committees on economic fringes, and on the Federal Safety Advisory Council. Tit addition, the Civil Service Commission long recognizing the necessity and ,Table of involevement by em- ployees, through their union representatives?has, on its own initia- tive, regularly and systematically consulted with them in the de- velopment of governmentwide personnel policies. The axis that makes all of these systems work in concert is our Federal system's provision for a central personnel authority respon- sible, for personnel policies requiring g,overnmentwide uniformity in which labor relations is fully integrated. This is the role which is carried out by the Civil Service Commission in assuring that the interworkings of central personnel administration and labor-man- agement relations operate efficiently and effectively. From the standpoint of effectiveness as well as fairness, it is essential that government retain this centralized capability for de- veloping and administering policies designed to achieve a necessary degree of uniformity and equity in matters common to employees of more, than one agency. This arrangement doesn't retard labor- management dealings; it facilitates them. Consider the results: Employee, representation in the statutory pay and fringe systems plus employee representation in collective, bargaining under the Executive order have produced improvements equalling the general level of benefits in the, private economy, including the most '-highly unionized industries. See, attachment V/. Tf anything, we are having to contend with criticisms that the Federal employee is more equal than his private-sector counterpart in the economic conditions of employment. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 15 All of which should make abundantly clear to even the most skeptical critic that if our existing program and mechanisms do not happen to fit some preconceived notion of what they ought to look like, they nevertheless yield improvements that meet or exceed the full measure of comparable expectations. The proposals for change embodied in legislation before you now would usher in wide and potentially disruptive departures from established systems in Federal personnel administration?beginning with the repeal of the existina1" Executive order program for labor- management relations, but not stopping there. While there are important variations between these bills?varia- tions in approach, as well as in substance?all of them are variations on a common theme: They would make fundamental and far-reaching alterations in the relationships between the Federal Government as employer and its employees and their union representatives. It is from this perspective?that is, in terms of impact?that we have carefully reviewed the bills and compared the variations. See attach- ment 11. An exhaustive discussion of all the provisions of all the bills would not be appropriate at this time. Their implications are de- veloped more fully in the statement for the record which we have furnished to you. I would, however, like to highlight some of the very real practical concerns we have with what we see as deficiencies of major provisions in pending bills. These are concerns which must be addressed in any consideration of such legislation. Conflicts of interest and separation of powers both go largely ignored from the very outset in II.R. 13 and in H.R. 0784, in their arbitrary and indiscriminate coverage of all Federal instrumentali- ties outside the Postal Service. Features of these two bills would apply to the FBI and CIA in the executive branch and to competitive positions in the legislative and judicial branches alike?in addition to the departments and agencies currently under Executive Order 11491. And even within those instrumentalities, the broad-brush coverage would draw no distinction between the rank and file and those who investigate and audit their work or enforce the rules and regulations; would revoke the. authority to exclude on national- security grounds; and would replace the functional criteria for excluding supervisors and management officials with unrealistically narrow standards of income level, span of control and scope of impact. This kind of shotgun coverage would be sure to backfire on effective labor relations, just as it would on the efficient and credible administration of government. PAYMENT OF THE EQUIVALENT OF UNION DUES AND FEES This would be required as a condition of Federal employment and job retention under the so-called "agency shop" arrangement author- ized by both H.R. 13 and 9784. Requiring membership in a labor organization or mandatory payment of equivalent fees as a condition of Federal employment conflicts with merit principles, which base continued employment on ability to do the job assigned and which bar use of discriminatory measures in making personnel decisions. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 16 THE PROSPECT OF STRIKES, INCLUDING DISRUPTION OF VITAL GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS This could be posed by H.R. 9784, which would provide a condi- tional right to strike government operations in certain instances, while the issue is clotided in H.R. 13 where there is no ban and where; it is unclear as to what effect the bill's supersedure clause might have on the current, statutory prohibition. The strike "right" is not an acceptable alternative to peaceful and orderly impasse procedures, in Federal labor disputes; it; is manifestly incompatible with the public's essential. right to continuity Of government services and national defense. REPEAL OF EXISTING LAWS AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS This could be accomplished by the provisions in ILR. 13 or 9784 for supersedure of all previous statutes and Executive orders con- cerning the same subject matter or inconsistent with these bills. This raises questions as to the extent to which civil service laws?such as all of title 5, I.Tnited States Code- -may be overridden. It also. raises questions concerning the degree to which congressional authority and determination could be, affected in areas such as pay, benefits, and classification. In their present form, the supersedure clauses appear to open to negotiation many areas presently subject to. congressional action. For example, would separate retirement or leave systems evolve?one for unit employees, another for nonunit employees? Would different agencies or, installations negotiate dif- ferent insurance, programs? Or would the supersedure be selective; if not, who would determine the criteria and which laws would be replaced and would not? These are examples of the kinds of questions these hills raise, but fail to answer. PREEMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RULES AND REouLATtorts This would be, the effect of provisions in both H.R. 13 and 9781- which would reverse the current requirement that negotiated agree- ments conform to "aopropriate"?higlier?agency regulations. Such regulations would be preempted to the extent they conflict with terms negotiated in any of the more than 3,400 existing bargaining units. Ta Civil Seri. ice, Commission could not make or apply rules or regulations where needed to protect the public interest and main- tain efficiency of Government operations. Policies and regulations designed to achieve a necessary degree of uniformity and equity in the administration of matters common to all employees of the agency, or to employees in more than one subordinate activity, would be adversely limited. In their place could Mule extreme disparities in the conditions of employment for employees similarly situated and a gradual abandonment of equal pay for equal work as a protection against inequities in compensation for Federal employees. T have chosen. to key on these provisions so as to touch on some of the most, fundamental issues which must be addressed in any consideration of a labor-relations program in the Federal Govern- ment. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 :19IA-RDP75B00380R000500220001-6 H.R. 10700 warrants separate mention. The product of much good thought and effort, it already has served the extremely useful pur- pose of provoking dialogue on the implications of labor-management legislation. In our review of II.R. 10700, we particularly noted that it presents a substantially more reasonable approach and balance to the rights and interests of the public, employees, unions, and management than other bills in the 93d Congress. But it raises some difficult questions, too, the most serious of which involve the bill's provision for a Federal Labor Relations Board?of five agency and five union rep- resentatives, with a chairman designated by the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission?to render determinations on centrally developed and issued personnel policies and regulations of Govern- ment-wide application. It is not clear on its face for example, whether the Board's authority would extend also to rules and regulations affecting the unorganized and exempt, excluded, segments of the work force. If so, what would be the justification for this? If not, what would be the best way to deal with them? What does seem clear is the potential for the Board?or more likely for a single individual, in the person of the Board's Chairman ?to exercise essential personnel authorities historically delegated by the Congress to Federal agencies and officials, the Commission, in particular, to enable them to cary out their statutory responsibilities. While we agree that the controlling impact of Government-wide regulations can have a narrowing influence on the scope of bargain- ing, we would strongly oppose any approach so extreme as to, in effect, "throw the baby out with the bath water." In fact, a means of improving the existing situation?that is, escalating the level of bargaining to the regulating level?is high on the Federal Labor Relations Council agenda in the current review of the Executive order. In our review of II.R. 10700, we noted also that the bill incor- porates many of the existing approaches and mechanisms embodied in Executive Order 11491. Our main concern is whether even this legislation would enhance labor-management dealings in the Federal service beyond the measure of progress already provided for through existing statutory mechanisms and in the advancing Executive order program. That is to say, events have not made our system obsolete: rather, they have confirmed its viability and continuing adaptability. In fact, the forces for change in our system can be viewed realistically in three ways: (1) Changes that can be made successfully within the Executive' order framework. The Federal Labor Relations Council has just completed an indepth process of receiving the written and oral sug- gestions of unions, agencies, and other interested parties and now is reviewing possible changes in the Executive order program. (2) Changes that would require the kinds of legislative action we might support. The executive branch is willing to work with organized labor and the Congress in such statutory areas as authori- zation for make-whole relief to afford back-pay remedies and for Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 ? CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 lg negotiation of binding arbitration of adverse actions?that is, major :disciplinary actions. (3) Changes that would require the kinds of legislation we could not accept and Congress has opposed in the past. Examples include the union or agency shop, negotiation of pay rates .and economic fringes on a fragmented bargaining unit basis, the right to strike. In sum, we are continuing to move forward through established systems to deal with acknowledged problems. We. have a program we know can work, one we know we can grow with, .one we know can promote the optimum balance among all the parties at interest ?Government, its employees, their union representatives and, above all., the public. If you accept collective bargaining as a positive force in personnel administration?and we do?then our record to date, overall, is a powerful rejoinder to the notion that the existing system isn't work- ing. It is changing in constructive and purposeful new directions. Now is not the time to impose fundamental and sweeping changes in the ground rules for Federal labor relations?not the time for law- makers to fix their legislative sights on what is still a moving target. By any measure, the Federal establishment is a "megaemployer," a vast and complex configuration of activities and missions that best responds gradually and deliberately to new conditions imposed by new systems. This is as true in personnel administration as in any other field of public endeavor. it is doing so now. It will continue to do so as our labor-management system continues to improve with experience. Those who are urging a "me-too" approach for adopting broad- gauged legislation fail to take stock of the realities. They are ignor- ing the very real distinctions of the Federal Government as em- ployer, and they are blurring the historical perception. Tho Federal service today is not where the private economy was 40 years ago. We operate under an established system of labor- management relations: then, there was none. We are progressing in an orderly and peaceful process; 40 years ago, there was a real need for a law to achieve industrial peace. , In industry then, there was a demonstrated need for comprehensive labor-management legislation. In Federal Government now, there is no demonstrated need for such broad-gauged legislation. The situa- tions are not merely dissimilar: they are diametrically opposite. The Executive order framework has been refined and continued through three administrations. Overall, it has been conspicuously successful in responding to employee interests, in facilitating union growth, and in improving employee communication with manage- ment. In contrast. there has been no compelling evidence that the proposals before this committee would provide a better or more balanced program. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks for this morn- ing. Tomorrow. I plan to consider in more depth the complicated and serious issues posed by any legislated system of collective bar- gaining superimposed without full consideration of the impact on an existing framework of personnel legislation. We will now be happy to answer any questions you and the members of your committee may have. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 :351A-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 Mr. HENDERSON. The attachments and the statement submitted by Chairman Hampton will be entered into the record at the end of today's proceedings. Mr. Hampton, I certainly commend you on the decrease of the cases that are in process by the Council. What reason can you ascribe to the increased number of cases closed as well as the shortening of the processing time? Mr. HAMPTON. Well, Mr. Chairman, we have made some internal administrative or operational changes in the way the Council proc- esses its cases and this accelerated the decisionmaking process. In addition, I think what we see reflected here is that as the third party machinery began to work the first issues that were before us were, of course, those coming before the Assistant Secretary, in determining bargaining units. Then came the second stage after these organizing and unit matters were taken up; we shifted more into the negotiating stage and issues of negotiability began to be raised with the Council. This accounted for the increase in number of cases and the Council had to change the way it operated internally in order to review these. It switched from dual handling and many internal written briefs on every matter and went more to oral pre- sentations by staff. Mr. HENDERSON. H.R. 13 and H.R. 9784 generally have broad definitions of the term "grievance" to include those matters that are technically now spoken of as appeals. H.R. 10700 would exclude matters subject to appeal procedures pursuant to law. What are your views on these definitions? Mr. HAMPTON. Well, there is a tendency when thinking in terms of matters of differences between employees and employers to say grievances, whereas the Federal Government has long had the statu- tory system for the more serious types of personnel cases and those are called appeals. So there are grievances and there are adverse action and appeals and it's a difference in terms of magnitude of impact on the employee. Now for a long time under the Executive order, in fact in our last review, we made it mandatory that each agreement have a negotiated grievance procedure in it. So the employees in that exclusive unit can negotiate a procedure. In adverse actions which are covered by the Veterans Preference Act, this being a statutory system, it would require an act of Con- gress to have those in negotiated agreements, but we're working now on a legislative proposal to ask the Congress to give us the authority so that these agreements could include a negotiated adverse action System. Mr. HENDERSON. In your testimony concerning a Federal Labor Relations Board that would be established under the provisions of H.R. 10700 you indicate it's not clear whether the Board's authority would extend to rules and regulations affecting unorganized seg- ments of the work force. The bodies that now set pay for both blue collar and white collar employees, include labor representatives, and the decisions of these bodies affect the organized as well as the unorganized. Therefore, could you give me your views as to the best way to. handle the scope of the Board's authority in this area? Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 20 Mr. IlAmvroiv. I think you would have to change the language that is in the law to very explicitly spell out the scope of their?rather, the breadth of their responsibility. If they are to be a third party in labor relations, then it isn't necessary for them to have the authority to issue rules and regulations. One of the difficulties you get in trying to construct this in law is the interpretations of whatever agreement they might have under some particular policy. Are they limited to just making determina- tions within those parameters or can they reach out and make their own rules as they see a problem? And this is what I see. It appears 'front the language there that this body Could make any rule or any regulation which would affect the Federal Government, regardless of what, the President, as Chief Executive. Officer, might have. I mean, I don't know the precise language. It is one of the things that in the process of considering various alternatives in labor relations the eommittee really is going to have to address itself to what you really want this Board to do. Mr. IIEND'einsoi.r. Finally, before I yield to my colleagues?perhaps T. should turn to the more basic point I think you were making in your testimony as it relates to the question of whether or not there should be legislation. It would be possible for the Congress to simply write into law the provisions of the existing Executive order. Would you have objection to that being done? Mr. HAMPTON. I think I would, in the sense that if you're going to move to a statutory system, I think that the character of the Federal Labor Relations Council body or the central body would really have to change. Essentially, the. Council is a body that really sort of directs this program in a sense Of keeping it within all of the various parameters prescribed by law, and if you were to go to a strictly third-party type of operation I would rather see the membership of the Council changed from the present way it's con- stituted. I ean't see tfie Chairman of the Civil Service, Commission and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget or the Secretary of Labor serving Ott a statutory board that would mainly be an adjudicatory process alone without policymaking authority. think the. principles in the Executive order are sound. I think they reflect a balanei rig of interests, a recognition of the fact that the management in the Federal Government is not free, like the manage- ment in the private sector, to deal with the economic issues. That's really something that is reserved to the Congress and I personally feel that's where it belongs. I mean, Congress is here elected to represent the public interest and the public has a very proprietary interest in the conditions of service of civil servants. These sometimes are not expressed until there's a major ,problem or a disaster, but it's one of these latent types of things that pops up. I think you have to recognize in a legislative system?and even in .our present system?that the policymaking body on most of the major economic issues and the taxing authority rests with the legis- lature and we have to operate under the Constraints of certain laws. There are certain conditions of employment that we have no authority Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 :21A-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 to negotiate at all and these, in a sense, the union and the executive, :speaking broadly of them on the management side, have come up to the Congress and have said, "We favor this and we favor that," :and the Congress has made a choice and passed a law and said this is law and that's what has to be implemented. So there are many tiers in the system and then the Civil Service Commission has certain responsibilities that are given it that are statutory in nature or there are certain laws that have been passed that say to the President, "You must do this," and the President uses the Civil Service Commission as the action instrumentality. That's why we were set up. So we do regulate in these areas. Now someone says, "Well, this means that that is off the bargaining table." It is off the bargaining table in the sense that people down in Charleston do not negotiate on that because we don't have the authority to negotiate on it. This is something that has been assigned to us to do by law. But what we do in the field of regulating which is something new, which I think goes sight unseen because it isn't something that anyone is particularly getting credit for, is that we do have a very formalized system of consultation with the unions and with the Government agencies. We don't sit there and make policy in an ivory tower or in an abstract way. We go to the agencies and we go to the unions and we say this is what we're being asked to do by law; this is what we propose to do; let us have your comments; and they comment and then we sit and we, discuss these particular issues and then the Commission, as a policymaking body, makes the final decision? and it's a question of what the agencies say; it's a question of what the unions say. So we're sort of in the middle in that particular thing, but this is not to say that the. employee at this particular tier in the process has no voice. He has an extremely important voice and you can look at the substance of policies and regulations that have been issued and tell this. Now, one of the problems in this whole situation is how much further should central level regulating go, which tends to take some- thing off the bargaining table ? The Federal agencies themselves issue certain rules and regulations. In many cases this is the direct result of a statutory requirement placed on them by the Congress. Once they issue some of these rules and regulations they have the effect of taking them off the bargaining table for the local people who are bargaining. So at all three of these tiers, Congress, central executive agencies such as OMB and Civil Service Commission, agency levels, you have involvement in addition to the local level. Well, one of the things that the Council is considering now is a recommendation providing a mechanism where a union can challenge the agency's regulation as being overly prescriptive, that is having the tendency to unnecessarily restrict the scope of bargaining. The scope of bargaining has been increasing very significantly and we wanted to know really what was in all of these agreements. Well, with 3,400 different units and so many variables in their conditions of employment and what they're doing, and having none of the types of tools that the management would normally have? Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 22 that is, not bargaining on economic items?we wanted to get a handle on what was being negotiated. And the best way was to get all of those agreements and analyze them and find out how broad or how narrow the scope of bargaining is. We found that the scope of bargaining was far broader than we had been led to believe by looking at a few complaints in isolated areas rather than the rule, and all of that information is available.. It can be provided to this committee. We do have some analysis in our background information. But this is the kind of dilemma that you're faced with in a situation where not only Congress has a piece of the action, the Executive has a piece of the action, the Judiciary has a piece of the action?we're not an income-generating type of organization. We have no economic tools. If I were in the private sector and my organization made e. $10 million profit, I could be darned sure that the employees would come in and want a bigger share of that. a.nd it would be on that basis that you 'would make a settlement with your workers, their productivity and what they had contributed. We have, no way of measuring productivity versus profits in the Federal service for bargaining 011 the major economic issues as in the private sector; decisions become political in our sector, political in the sense not only of the parties involved but also the public interest that's involved and the people who pay the taxes. So we just don't Lave the type of circumstances for full collective bargaining. What does that mean; who do you bargain with--I moan, as any central agency, are we going to be required to sit down and to work with 3,400 representatives representing the 3,400 units? I'm oversimplifying here and I shouldn't do that because it tends to distort the issue. But the authority of any statutory body r think, in labor relations, should be to balance the interests of the parties in being ihle to make an objective kind of a decision. I don't think that a statutory body should have the kind of authority that the Council has because you have two people who are members of the Council who hold broad central statutory authority and you could not have that in another board. Mr. IIRNmazsoN. Thank you very much. I commend you for the statement that you did present and certainly I look forward to your appearance and testimony and question session tomorrow. Mr. Ford. Mr. FORD. Thank you very much. I took some courses in under- graduate school about 25 years ago at the conclusion of which thought I had read much more about the Federal civil service than ever wanted to read and knew more :,about it than I would ever want to know, and I'm discovering that I have really had some misconceptions. One o F the problems I have, with dealing with your testimony is I don't know where you're coming at me from because you're kind of dancing on the head of a pin in your position. The Civil Service Commission was created out of a very strong public reaction in this country against the executive branch of :Government primarily, and theoretically the Civil Service Commission has functioned as pro- tection for Government employees in the public interest against Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 23 undue influence and shenanigans from the executive branch and from the legislative branch. It appears to me that you do a pretty effective job in protecting the public interest and the employees when it comes to the legislative branch, but that over its entire history the Civil Service Commission has had an extremely difficult time in its relationship with the execu- tive branch because after all the executive branch not only has always exercised great control over your activities and policies but in recent years, as succeeding Presidents have become more and more central- ized in your activities, it's become more difficult in that role of imposed neutrality that was originally set for you. This is one of the concerns we have about the Executive order approach, no matter who the President might be who is writing the Executive orders, because he, too, is in a difficult position?or his representative in preparing the orders for him?of not really being able to solidly take a stand as to who the prime interests are that they serve. I'm interested that you draw a distinction and say that in collec- tive bargaining in the public sector there's always the overriding public interest, but that that doesn't exist in the private sector. I think my friends at the head of management in my district would take exception to that, because they consider themselves to be very much aware of the public interest and the public has very direct ways to tell them whether their interest is being met or not in the marketplace. At the top of page 8 you say: Labor organizations enjoy long and very important relationships with the Congress. This hearing itself is an example of their impact in the legislative process. Unions in private industry do not lobby their employers for benefits outside and in addition to those negotiated across the table. Well, it may be true they don't lobby the individual employers, but they do lobby the Congress and the State legislatures for every- thing from unemployment compensation to the Fair Labor Stand- ardst'Act at the Federal level. The National Labor Relations Act has amendments proposed to it from time to time. The new pension legislation that we have just passed will arbitrarily determine what kind of a pension plan will meet the Federal standards. The service contract act which we are in the process of amending at the moment has become very important because of the large number of Federal agencies that have contracting out activities. Your statistics to show how many people belong to unions should not only show the present Federal employees outside of the Post Office but the jobs that were formerly Federal jobs now held by private employees through contracting out and those private em- ployees, in turn, have a very high degree of unionization. There is some variation between different parts of the country because of local conditions, but our hearings in the Labor Committee indicate that they are in the most part represented by organized labor and frequently find themselves in a much better position to be repre- sented as a private employee doing exactly the same job on a Gov- ernment installation as they were doing, before the contracting out, as a public employee. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 24 Later in your statement, where you say that the complaint you most frequently hear is that public employees are advantaged over private employees, comes as a little bit of a surprise to me. Maybe. you could give us some examples?without taking the time now-- of what you meant in your statement about the kind of complaints. you get that a public employee is advantaged, from an economic standpoint, over a private employee. You suggest in your statement that the employees coming to the. Congress, and the Congress continuing to affect the employee-em- ployer relationhip by passing various kinds of statutes, is not really elesirable,?you then go on later? Mr. 11Ampro.N. Mr. Ford, I didn't say it was desirable or unde- sirable. I just stated it as a fact that they do. I think it's in the? public interest that they do this and it's something protected by law that they do. Mr. FORD. Should they or shouldn't they? That's the point. Mr. HAMPTON. I think they should. Mr. FORD. Okay, because later, on page 13, you talk about collec? tive bargaining under the Executive order and how it has produced improvements equalling the general level of benefits in the private - economy, including the most highly unionized industries. If any- thing, we have to contend with criticism that the Federal employee - is more equal than his private sector counterpart in economic con- ditions of employment. So you suggest, here that the real reason why the Federal employee has improved and gone ahead of his private counterpart is because of collective bargaining action, not necessarily legislative action. Then, on page 16, you jump back at us again from the other - side--- Mr. Bn.-xsco. Would you excuse me one moment, Bill? Mr. Chair- man, will the witnesses be back tomorrow for questions? Mr. IIENnEusoN. Yes. Mr. BuAsco. I have some people in my office whom I must see and I will be back then the first thing tomorrow morning and we will be able to proceed with the questioning then. Mr. HENDERSON. I anticipate that other questions will run us to 12 o'clock and I'll be glad to let you have the first minutes tomorrow morning to ask any questions of the witnesses. Mr. BnAsco. Thank you. Mr. Foul). On page 16, the general burden of your statement. at that point is that if we have legislative ,intervention in the collec- tive bargaining process an a continuing basis?by taking the legis- lative approach instead of the Executive order approach?that we are in danger of having legislative intervention in matters that would be better left to the collective bargaining process. But then, when you get to page 19, we get to the really basic philosophical problem we have in public employee collective bargaining and you pick out three specific kinds of things that you would find unac- ceptable in Federal legislation. One would be the union or agency shop; and second is negotiation of pay rates and economic fringes on a fragmented bargaining unit basis. You have spoken several times today of 3,400 separate units. Would your objection to collec- Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06j5CIA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 tive bargaining remain if they had complete bargaining for every- thing except pay and fringe "benefits? Mr. HAMPTON. Well, what I'm essentially saying here, when you have 3,400 units, it would be necessary to really define the bar- gaining rights at the local level versus those at the national level. Mr. FORD. Except when you gave me three things that were wrong with my bill?the three basic things that shouldn't be in the Federal statute?you say negotiation of pay rates and economic fringes on a fragmented bargaining unit basis. Later in your testimony you talk about problems of the numerous units you have and I think you said a few moments ago that you had been making astudy and you were surprised at the scope of the agreements covering those 3,400 units. Mr. HAMPTON. Right. Mr. FORD. It really hasn't been a well-controlled situation up un- til now under the Executive order and you're just beginning to dis- cover what's been bargained for and received. Is your principal objection in this legislation to the effect that we would allow nego- tiation for pay rates and economic fringes or that we would allow negotiations, period, at the unit level? Mr. HAMPTON. What I was saying, when we first looked at local bargaining agreements, we did this on the basis that there were charges that the scope of bargaining was quite narrow, but what we wanted to find out is how narrow it really was. We found it was much broader which shows that you can nego- tiate on many matters at the local level and it still does not have the question of uniformity that is needed on some of the more major policy issues. Mr. FORD. Isn't that exactly what labor legislation generally does? Isn't that what the National Labor Relations Act says when it sets forth a shopping list of those things that are negotiable and those things that an employer need not negotiate for and not have to negotiate for? There are three categories. There are things that are optional between the parties. There are things required of the parties. There are things that are prohibited as areas of collective bargaining to the parties. You don't have that same kind of a breakdown in any one place in this Federal service. Mr. HAMPTON. Well, what I mean here is one of the differences? I'm not an expert on private labor relations system, but that law generally applies to a single employer who may have a widely dis- persed situation. What you have in the government is essentially you have 70 employers. Mr. FORD. Don't make that point because my friends in the build- ing trade and the Teamsters would go right through the roof. The largest single union in the country is the Teamsters. They are the largest union but they have literally thousands and thousands of employers in the building trades. Building tradesmen rarely work for the same employer for a whole year at a time arid they function under the same act as an auto worker or a steel worker. We haven't had any trouble with that kind of distinction in the private sector. We have national contracts in steel and national contracts to one Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 20 degree or another in -communications. : The big three contracts, for all intents and purposes, are national contracts, but, there are all kinds of local, conditions that are thereafter bargained for at the local level and it may be paving the parking lot or illuminating the parking lot to keep people from being mugged?a whole variety of things. Last year Chevrolet couldn't get their factory started in Ohio because they thought the line was going too fast. That became a local issue, but that works itself out and these people still make a profit and we're having more strikes now throughout all the public sector than we are? ia the private sector.: What I'm concerned about is when you take these three things an.d say you can't have them, then you can't have labor-management relations in the same way we have labor-management in the private sector?the union or agency shop, for example. You're just asking for continual grief with the employees and continual backdoor at- tempts to find the same result and you're going to have the problem that now exists go on forever. Management in the private sector discovered a long time ago that the union and the management shop, after they once discovered how it worked, was one of the most comfortable adjuncts to labor peace that they ever entered into. You can examine the records from years of testimony by our friends on right-to-work, and you will find most of the big employers in this country want no part of that. Then when you get, to the right to: strike you have me really baffled, because all of your employees live in communities and, as a matter of fact, belong to credit unions With all kinds of other gov- ernment employees. Thy are spending their social life and a lot of their free time in constant communication with policemen, firemen, nurses, rubbish collectors, bus drivers?you name them?who in every State in this country are going to strike, on a fairly regular basis, and attaining their goals. It just seems unrealistic for anyone charged with responsibility for future stability of the work force in the Federal Government to close their eyes to the fact that this is going on. It's a phenomena that's not new. Tt's a phenomena that's been developing very rapidly for over e decade. We'd better anticipate that it's only a question of time before it becomes a common phe- nomena in the Federal Governmeni, This committee went through the pain of a postal strike and went through the first instant reaction of the Postmaster General, who said he was going to fire the people who were on strike?until we started telling him what we were hearing around the country?that such action would close every post office in this country. I don't condone any kind of illegal activity as a way we ought to be running a business. The plain fact is that when we're faced with that kind of massive resistance to a law, it becomes unlivable with the Federal employee. What we were forced to do as a govern- ment? We were forced to pretend that the law didn't exist and then overnight try to develop an instant method of bringing the strike to an end. Shouldn't we anticipate this sort of thing for the future and have in place a set of procedures and a book of rules by Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/0?27 CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 which the game should be played? In the private sector, not all strikes are legal; nor are strikes always legally carried out. When a private employee steps across the line, when he in fact begins to do damage as an employee that's beyond a legitimate withholding of labor, there's a whole set of rules that come into play and he is in court and he is in jail. That doesn't happen when public em- ployees strike. New York put some school teachers in jail and the overall result of that to the entire community is something that's very hard to accept as being good for us. I would hate to see what would happen if we had any major sector of the Federal employees decide that they were just tired of something and go on strike because all we can do is say it's against the law, and that hasn't: worked in the one example we have had. This committee went to other countries where public employee strikes have gone on and, strangely enough, we discovered?it's a source of some embarrassment to me?that the only two major in- dustrial countries in the world today that have an absolute prohibi- tion against public employment strikes are the Union of Soviet Republics and the United States. I'm not trying to argue you into support of this legislation, but I would hope that instead of coming at each other with the straight idea that these three elements which I think are essential to collec- tive bargaining can't be in ultimate legislation, that your people and mine and you and I could do some more talking about this. Unless we can get some philosophical understanding, and at least start playing in the same ballpark, we're never going to get to bat. What we will have is a struggle that will be decided on a political basis. That may not be the best way to write Federal collective bar- gaining legislation. There are differences in opinion here on this subcommittee be- tween the chairman and I as to some of these items and how they ought to be applied and how broad they ought to be, but I would hope that in examining this legislation you could give us some con- structive suggestions about how we could have a workable kind of a situation that looks a little bit more like what's involved in the private sector. And, having said all that, I want to tell you that I commend you very highly for doing the job you do. It's extremely difficult for any of us, with the little time we have to prepare ourselves, to try to understand what these relationships are. I do hope I can impress you with the fact that a number of us do think that we're caught up in a very dynamic situation that is moving much faster than we are. We are being constantly surprised by the people with whom we speak across the country?the growing militants, the growing sense of frustration, that we encounter, and with what used to be nice, quiet little Government unions. I think we're coming into an era when an Executive order just isn't going to do the job. There's just not that kind of confidence at the moment?or' I would say in the last 8 or 10 years?in having the Executive benevolently set down the rules by which we'll play the game between each other. 34 610 74 3 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 :MA-RDP75B00380R000500220001-6 There has to be a feeling on the part of those people who are members of the union that the, rules Of the game were made under some circumstances where neither side was supposedly advantaged by the fellows that wrote the rules. Mr. HENmoisox. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I want to reserve the time for the minority here and I anticipate we will quit by 12. I know you will want to respond to Mr. Ford's questions and com- ments and I'll give you a chance in just a minute, but it seems to me that we're faced with one problem that he didn't mention and perhaps a quick answer could be helpful. Recognizing that I philosophically ,olo disagree with. Mr. Ford, let's just take on the, no-strike question. If we, could be sure of what the congressional policy on that was, and assume for a minute that we could got a vote of the Congress that whatever legislation we would enact would not have or would Contain a no-strike provision continuing, would your opposition to the legislation formulated in that be the same as it is in this area of where we don't know what we're going to decide? In this legislation, for example, if Mr. Ford's view prevailed in the Congress that the legislation would contain the right to strike, I would anticipate that your opposition would certainly be as strong or stronger than it is in your statement. Is that a fair statement? Mr. HAMPTON. I think we feel very strongly about the question of right to strike, but one, of the, things that I think the purpose of the hearing is for, and just as Mr. Ford has said, is to really iden- tify the principal issues and consider the various alternatives to solving them. Now there should be what I call a better balance of the powers at the bargaining table, and you're right that there is an imbalance in a sense, now. It can be a "take it or leave it" situation, and the only recourse, an employee would have would be an illegal strike. That is not the proper balancing of the powers. would hope that we could approach it from the standpoint of thinking in terms of some type of disputes machinery that would move immediately into a key area short of?I mean, so that em- ployees would not be forced to strike in order to assert their de- mands on an issue which they feel very strongly about because I think that we have an awkward situation that we deal with and we do not want to deprive, the citizens of this country of the services of the central Government and I would like to explore and discuss what is an elective mechanism short, of this. But just to say the right to strike without going on into certain conditions of when this would arise and how you would solve them is one that think we, have to be in opposition to. In our earlier discussions we discussed a lot of the issues and recognized the com- plexity of them, and that's why I point out the 3,100 units and the rights of those and the different configurations of multi-unit bar- gaining, coalition bargaining that they have in the private sector compared to the various tiers and who sits in the national councils on the broader issues in the Federal sector. These, are just terribly wide-ranging issues. And essentially the Government is made up of 70 different employers, all having certain sets of statutory rights, and this is what we mentioned a ut the Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/0?g CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 supersedure thing. If we have certain things that are in statute now that are employee rights, if those are struck from the statute, do we immediately go into the question of coming up with a national agreement? And if the Federal Government, whoever happens to represent them, goes there to the bargaining table, what economic tools do they have to achieve the types of things that are necessary for the management to produce a product or accomplish its mission? These are questions I just think we are you know, I think we're openminded on them. I think they really need to be debated and I think through these hearings we will probably have identification of a lot of issues and I really think that has to be followed up with a real discussion of all of those issues, particularly impact. Impact is the thing that has to come out and be ascertained. I don't know what some of these things impact. And you're ab- solutely right. I was on a needle head here, going back and forth on issues just to raise, in a sense, the frustration of the inability to focus in on how these would be resolved in some new situation. And the comfort you have in the situation that exists today and realizing that what the Congress is saying is we want to move off of that comfort and try to get ourselves out of the mold of what you're living with and envisage what you're going to have to live with is very difficult. I think we need to spend a lot of time on it and the initial papers which were presented here, some 130 pages of how we view the program, really doesn't come up with any great concrete-type con- clusion. I don't think I want us to come up with concrete things because I think we want to have an open mind about this. Because I agree with you. We watch the trends in the public sector and the state and local governments and we see what's happening. We have seen the kinds of reactions you get from the public and we see the dilemma that they are faced with and we know these things are coming. Mr. ITENDERsow. Mr. Chairman, if I may just take a minute, for dialog with my colleague from Michigan, because through the years serving with him on our committee and recognizing his outstanding service on the Education and Labor Committee, I certainly want to recognize that in the earlier labor-management relations in the private sector he is a real expert, one whom I admire tremendously, and any time we're together on an issue or a fight I don't know a better fellow in the House I'd like to have with me. I realize that on the issues of no-strike or the agency shop we might have very sharp differences, but I would want the record to show and the audience to realize that I think he can and will con- tribute much to this legislation. Bill, I don't know how we get by our hangups on the point of strike or no-strike. Mr. FORD. Could I suggest a way? I'm working on an economy pitch for Mr. Gross at the moment. I stumbled across a study that somebody made attacking compulsory arbitration in which he pointed out that in the public sector in those areas in which they turn to compulsory arbitration, they end up with a 1?year genera- tion of economic demands as compared to the private sector where Approved For Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 :AIA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 the strike is the ultimate weapon which has now fallen into a pattern of three-tiered generation of economic demands. When an employee knows he can make any demand he wants? when he goes to a union meeting knowing that--he calls upon them to make a demand a little differently when he realizes if the de- mand isn't met he's got to lose his paycheck while they settle the matter. In the public sector, where they have gone the route of com- pulsory arbitration, he, can make a demand every year on the anni- versary of the contract and know ti rat: while it's being fought out he still goes to work every day and gets a paycheck. It does make some difference in the employees making extraordinary demands. There is a school of thought developing that the right to strike might be the way to put the economic lid on the increasinc, cost of public employment.. As one that's never been impressed too much with that as an ultimate goal, I have stayed away from it, but I'm trying to develop for Mr. Gross that kind of a position. .Mi'. HENDERSON. I think I'd like to take just a minute. to make Iwo points with regards to my feelings about the, no-strike in the public sector and, again, T haven't had great experience at the. State or municipal level. Certainly all of my interest has developed in the years here in the Congress and working with the Federal sector. There are two things that give me the greatest concern or con- vince me to stay with the position of no-strike in the public sector, First of all, I feel that. we have had some pretty good indications that in communications, iii transportation, and some of the other areas of the private sector that are no vital to our people' to say nothing of the possible, strikes in public areas such as school teach- ers, yon get a counter-reaction of people against using the tool to strike. Secondly, I feel that the strike is an essential part of the Ameri- can way in the private sector, but if the right to strike is granted in the public sector T would he fearful, not about how it might work in the Government, as much as what might be the public reaction and what would happen to the right to strike in the private sector. could see, somewhere down the way that you would have a reac- tionary government that. would say not only was the right to strike in the postal or government sectors wrong and we're going to repeal the law on that, but we'd have, a reaction to the National Labor Act and circumscribe the rights of the American workers. So those in labor leadership are going to have to decide on that -very tough issue and. just speaking personally, Bill, I hope that, as I see the political situation in this Congress, that we will be able to work together and devise the best legislation we possibly could. Certainly the bill that T worked on, H.R. 10700, would be very different if T knew we were going to have the right to strike, and Fru sure you would agree that starting with your bill that if the dec'siett is made, that it would not contain the right to strike that 'roll would be. interested in giving attention to some of the other things. So I feel we have set the stage this morning for very mean- ingful hearings that will answer some real questions. Now I realize the staff has sonic questions this morning that we didn't get to, but our time and testimony and the comments of the members have been very fitting for the opening session. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 31 Mr. Chairman, inasmuch as you're going to be back tomorrow, I certainly will advise the members who had to leave, as I did Mr. Brasco, that first thing, what I'd like to do is afford them an oppor- tunity to follow on with specific questions they might have and then we will go right into your planned second day of testimony. Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, I can't be here tomorrow, unfortu- nately, and I do have some questions that I didn't get to. Mr. HENDERSON. Since Mr. Ford will not be able to be here to- morrow, we would like to reserve to ourselves the right to, after the session this week and after we have heard from other witnesses, to not only retain the right to ask the Chairman to come back, but we ought to extend to the Chairman of the. Civil Service Commission the right to submit further comments later in the hearings, or if you would like to return for a session we certainly are going to try to work as hard as we can and call as many sessions as we can. I have made every effort to get our legislative schedule in as good shape as we can so we can give close attention to this matter and move forward as judiciously and expeditiously as possible on this matter. Thank you very much for your attendance this morning, Mr. Chairman. The subcommittee will stand adjourned until tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock. [Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, to be reconvened at 10 a.m., Wednesday, May 22, 1974.] [As previously ordered, the statement and its attachments, sub- mitted by Chairman Hampton follow:] STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY HON. ROBERT E. HAMPTON, CHAIRMAN, U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, We appreciate the courtesy you have given the Commission to provide a comprehensive report on the-state of labor-management relations in the Executive branch of the Government, and to present our views on labor-management relations legislation pending before your Committee. This is a unique and privileged occasion to report on where we are in labor- nmnagement relations in the Federal service, what kind of program we have, how it evolved, its accomplishments and the challenges it faces, the special characteristics that give it its distinctive structure and quality, and its capacity to adjust to and respond to the current interests and needs of Federal em- ployees, the unions who represent them, and agency managers charged with the accomplishment of agency mission. We welcome the opportunity, occasioned by these hearings on bills such as H.R. 10700, H.R. 13, and H.R. 9784 and others?bills which would fundamentally restructure and reorient the existing Federal labor-management relations program?to examine the Federal expe- rience in the light of the proposals for change. We believe, that after an examination of the record, you may well conclude with us, that while what we have now is not perfect and needs improvement, it tests out better than any of the proposals that would replace it, and that no demonstrated need has been established to abandon a system that has worked eminently well. That system, which covers non-supervisory employees in the Executive Branch of the Government and non-appropriated fund activities, excluding the Postal Service, the Foreign Service and certain other specified categories of employees, is based upon Executive Order 11491, as amended. The Order provides a constructive framework for collective bargaining in the Federal Service, which has evolved over the past 12 years through three different Ad- ministrations. The present program had its origin in Executive Order 10988, issued by President Kennedy in January 1902. It continued and received en- dorsement from President Johnson, and it was updated to reflect changes that were deemed to be necessary by Executive Order 11491, issued by Presi- Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 32 dent Nixon in 1969, and further amended in 1971. And the program is presently undergoing review by the Federal Labor Relations Council for possible addi- tional revisions to assure its continued, evolutionary adaptation, its effective- IL8. and its responsiveness to the interests and needs of all parties concerned-- eiiiployees, unions, management, and the public. The Federal labor-nlations program is one of the largest in the world, with Federal agencies dealing with unions representing over one million employees in narly 3500 bargaining units spread all over the world, and covering a tre- mendously wide diversity of occupations not governmental activities?machin- ists, clerks, scientists, engineers, teachers, nurses, among others. While there are many similarities, the Federal program is not the same as that in the private sector, for the Federal Government is unique. To assess its effectiveness we mist look beyond comparisons. We must measure its ac- complishments in terms of its stated objectives We will in this report provide a broad perspective on the Federal labor relations program by discussing and developing an understanding of the pro- gram by discussing and developing an understanding of the program prin- ciples and accomplishments. The report covers the unique characteristics of the Federal Government as an employer; the state of the program; the pro- gram within the totat personnel management environment; the deficiencies of major provisions of pending bills ; the lack of a demonstrated need for legislation; and the need for a balanced labor-management relations policy for the Government. In addition, because of the considerable importance of the fundamental is- sues and the major concerns which need to be addressed (such as the extent to which the Congress -will delegate its authority over basic Federal personnel policies to the bargaining tables, the scope of bargainable matters, the right to join or not join a union, authority of a central body, supersedure of laws for the Federal service, we will provide a special supplement to this report on these issues and the questions and concerns that have to be considered in formulating policy and administrative mechanisms for labor-management re- lations in the Federal Service. We have developed the views expressed in this report by using the expe- rience derived from the unique vantage point of the Commission as the central Personnel agency and the center for Executive branch labor relations effort. This assessment is based on information gathered from day-to-day contacts with agency managers, evaluations of agency personnel operations, meetings with agency labor relations awl personnel staff, feedback from special surveys and studies of agreement provisions and program implementation by our staff and others, reports of and efforts to resolve problems in program application, meetings and discussions with agency and union officials, and review of re- ports in journals and the press. TIER CLIM ATE : B 1SIC PRINCIPLES, ACCOMPLISHMENTS, PERSPECTIVE OF C HERE NT PROGRAM To begin our analysis of what kind of labor-management relations program we have in the Federal service, let us look first at the principles on which the program is based, and match these against program accomplishments. Ilajor principles at ivcrk in the program In making its recommendations leading to Executive Order 10988 of 1962, the Presidential Task Force appointed by President Kennedy recognized the right of Federal employees to deal collectively through unions of their choice on matters of concern to them in their employment, and that a system to noeomplish this had to be constructed to accommodate the unique character- Miles and mission activities of the Federal Government os an employer. The eel (or principles on which the original Order was based were relevant then a nil are relevant todaN. They are: pederal employees t re entitled to the benefits of collective bargaining. Government responsibility to the public is paramount. There should not and need not be any basic conflict between a system of labor-management rla -ions and the Civil Service merit system. The merit sys- tem is and should remain the essential basis of the personnel policy of the Federal Government. The principles of entrance into the career service on the basis of mien competition, selection on merit and fitness, and advancement on the same basis, together with the full range: of legislative and executive poll- Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 33 cies and regulations that make up the Civil Service system govern the essential character of each individual's employment. While collective dealing can modify procedures and practices, it cannot vary merit principles. It must operate within their framework. The right of Federal employees to join organizations dealing collectively with management officials is matched by an equal right to refrain from any such activity. A more significant role for employee organizations within Fed- eral agencies is warranted. The corollary is that they must expect to assume greater responsibility. There must be no discrimination under the program against employees or union members based on race, color, religion, or national origin. The right and obligation of public officials to manage effectively must be preserved. The concept of managerial responsibility and the role of managers and supervisors in the public service needs to be strengthened and clarified. Supporting these basic principles, the twin objectives of (1) "improved well- being of employees", and (2) "efficient administration of the Government" direct the focus of policy, administrative structure, and procedures of the Government's labor relations program. It is ordered by the President, in Ex- ecutive Order 11491, that to implement the objectives: "(a) Employees will be provided an opportunity to participate in the formu- lation and implementation of personnel policies and practices affecting the conditions of their employment; and "(b) The participation of employees should be improved through the main- tenance of constructive and cooperative relationships between labor organiza- tions and management officials; and (c) Subject to law and paramount requirements of public service, effective labor-management relations within the Federal service require a clear state- ment of the respective rights and obligations of labor organizations and agency management." Major accomplishments under the program With these principles and objectives as a solid foundation, the Executive order system has produced an effective labor relations program?it has been a progressive program with solid accomplishments over its relatively short life of twelve years. How well the system is living up to its principles and objectives should not be measured in terms of isolated cases cited by its critics, but rather by over-all progress in day-to-day employee-management relations under the Executive orders: "It has been established as national policy that Federal employees have the right to join or to refrain from joining a union; that employees have a right to share in the development of personnel policies that affect them on the job; and that in strengthening the relationships between organized employees and managers, the public interest must be fully considered. "Unions have reported gains in membership, in recognition earned, and in agreements reached. Perhaps the best evidence of the importance of the system to employees is the phenomenal increase in union organization since Executive Order 10988 established the formal labor-management relations system in 1962. As of November 1973, unions have bargaining rights for more than a million (56 percent) of the nearly 2 million non-postal employees. As shown in Attachment "1", there are 3,486 recognized units. Sixty-five percent of these are covered by negotiated agreements, and many others are engaged in nego- tiations. More significantly, 77 percent of all employees in recognized units are covered by agreements. "Agreements have become increasingly meaningful and comprehensive with more and more substantive issues included. The effort to open more areas to bargaining where there is no overriding need for Government-wide uniformity is highlighted by the ongoing review of, and recent revisions to, the Federal Personnel Manual. Agencies are now conducting their own "follow-on" review og regulations to identify unnecessary restrictions to negotiability. "Third-party machinery has been created to deal with unresolved disputes. The Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management Relations and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service have been given strong roles in the Federal program, an Impasse Panel has been created, and the Federal Labor Relations Council exercises general overview. "Several features of the procedures that govern labor-management relations in the private sector have been incorporated in the Federal program, while those that do not recognize the special role of public service have not. Approved For Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 34 "Drawing from this progress, we can conclude that the Federal Labor rela- tions program has not created an atmosphere stifling and frustrating unions, but, to the contrary, has created a positive atmosphere where employees can, and do, freely choose their representatives to bargain for them on matters affecting the conditions of their employment. Under this system, union repre- sentation (as noted above) has grown in 12 years to an extent far surpassing the rate of growth achieved by unions in the private sector in almost 40 years under the National Labor Relations Act. "In summary, the Federal program that has evolved is one in which a rea- sonable be lance has Veen struck between management's ability to manage and employees' rights to have a strong voice in matters that affect them on the job. There have been "horror" stories of differences of opinion or misunder- standing between the parties--such as improper actions, failure to act, nega- tive attitude, and the like. However, if we would be completely honest, these "horror" stories have been rare exceptions to the rule, for the overwhelming number of relationships are positive and productive." For example, last month at the public hearings on the Executive Order pro- gram, spokesmen for the Department of Defense, which accounts for over 6(45,000 employees or 146 percent of all employees in exclusive bargaining units under the Order, summed it up this way: "It is our view, as the largest em- ployer in Government, that on the whole, the Federal labor-management rela- tions program is operating satisfactorily and, that the third parties in general_ have done a good job?although we have our differences with individual decisions. The program continues to evolve steadily, and most of the problems' that inevitably arise from day to day are being resolved. The program has been changing and maturing through an evolutionary process, and we think this is the way it should be." To show that the Order's over-all objeetives are being met and that the dispute-resolution machinery is working well, the Department of Defense in- troduced these statistics: During 1973, over 665,000 employees in DoD (63 percent) were participating' in the formulation of their working conditions in exclusive bargaining units. Over 500 agreements were negotiated or renegotiated in Defense last year involving the Mediation Service in only 61. eases, the Impasses Panel in only rune eases and the Council (on negotiability) in only 16 cases. (i.e. most of the negotiations were resolved by the parties directly without a decision on recommendation for settlement from any third-party.) In 1973, DoD activities were involved in only 47 of the numbered Decisions (including both representation and unfair-labor-practice cases) issued by the Assistant Secretary, only six of which were .appealed to the Council by One party or the other. In grievance eases, arbitrators' awards involving Defense activities since the inception of the program, in only 12 cases were exceptions filed with the- Council (five by management, seven by unions), indicating the high rate of acceptance by both parties of the grievance-arbitration process. This is not to say that no changes in the program are called for?only that they should be approached with great caution, according to the Department of .Defense. in spite of the mar y accomplishments of the program, we do know that no one has yet developed the perfect model for a labor-management relations program?one that is universally applicable, absolutely fair and equitable, internally logical, externally applicable, absolutely fair and equitable, inter- nally logical, externally consistent with other established institutions, and guaranteed to produce workable solutions for all labor-relations problems Even though such a model program does not exist, we have fashioned a pro- gram suited to the uniemie condition of employment in the Federal civil service with a view toward striving to he a model program. And with the dynamic nature of labor relations, we have adapted and refined the program to keep pace with changing times and conditions, and indeed, we must have the flexi- bility inherent in the present system to react to the changing times and conditions. THE SETT} NG : SPECIAL AND UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS OF GOVERNMENT AS EMPLOYER Some critics of the Federal labor-relations program favor, it seems, a whole- sale accommodation of public employment practices and policies to collective bargaining as it has evolved in the private sector during the last 40 years. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/0835 CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 This is an unrealistic approach, as will be recognized from the following discussion. The policies and practices which collectively make up the private sector labor-management relations "model" have developed and evolved over the years to meet conditions and to solve problems in private sector labor-management relations. We are attempting in the Federal sector to develop and refine a program which meets the conditions and solves the problems in today's Federal sector where the public interest is of primary concern. Upon examining some basic characteristics of the Federal public service and analyzing how these characteristics have influenced the development of the Federal labor-management relations program, the imperative of a special labor-management relations program to meet the unique characteristics and needs of Federal employment and Federal labor relations can be better under- stood. Environmental factors in the Federal program An essential premise of Federal employment is merit, which was legislated by the Congress as the governing principle under the Pendleton Act in 1883 and which has endured ever since. This protection from "spoils" considera- tions for Federal employees, and through them for the operations of Govern- ment, is the basic personnel policy we follow and maintain. Certainly the Federal program has many similarities to labor relations in private industry: the aspirations of working people are much the same everywhere; the day-to- day responsibilities of Government supervisors and managers are not unlike those of their counterparts in private enterprise; and many of the unions representing employees in the Federal service also function in the private sector. However, there are many significant dissimilarities, and these are based on the special characteristics which influence the environment of labor relations in the Federal Government. Size and diversity.?The most obvious characteristic is the size and di- versity of the Federal work force. The program applies to two million employees, in fifty departments and agencies, with thousands of principal offices and installations located all over the world. The fact that the work force is spread throughout the world is not an academic consideration. Federal agencies have formal dealings with over 85 different labor organiza- tions. They include the craft and industrial unions active in the private sector and unions composed of government employees exclusively. Scope of liar gaining.?The legal limitations which are imposed on the scope of bargaining in the Federal sector by "applicable laws" and regulations of appropriate higher authority create significant differences from labor-man- agement relations in the private sector. In fact, one of the major features that distfriguish public labor-management relations, as it operates at the Federal level, from labor-management relations, as it is conventionally conceived in private industry, is the fact that union negotiations with management in the Executive departments and agencies are subsidiary and supplemental to the major employee benefits and protections which have been grantd and are periodically improved through the legislative process. The "mandatory" scope of bargaining in the Federal sector under Executive Order 11491, as amended, is described in section 11 as: "personnel policies and practices and matters affecting working conditions, so far as may be appropriate under applicable laws and regulations, including policies set forth in the Federal Personnel Manual, published agency policies and regulations, a national or other controlling agreement at a higher level in the agency, and this Order." Many of the terms and conditions of employment for Federal employees are determined through or based on legislation, particularly the basic economic items?pay, hours, fringe benefits, and retirement; the major personnel poli- cies?merit staffing, job clasification, training, promotion, performance rating, and reduction in force; and the protection of job security through a variety of employee rights of appeal to the Civil Service Commission from actions of their employing agencies. Further, the Executive orders of the President, the standards, policies, and implementing regulations of the Civil Service Commission and the rulings of the Comptroller General add measurably to the body of common ground rules that govern the employment conditions of Federal employees. This has resulted from : Congressional relationships.?In the Federal service, labor organizations have an important influence and direct participation in the legislative process. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 36 They long have testified before the committees of Congress on personnel legis- lation and have worbed closely with committee staffs in offering their version of proposed bills. They hold large-scale rallies in support of legislation bene- ficial to their members. And they have ready access to committees and Mem- bers of Congress to air their complaints and grievances, access which is guar- anteed by the Lloyd LaFollette Act of 1912. Statutory and regulatory policies and controls.?This long history of Con- gressional relationships is responsible, in part, for the extensive coverage by statute of the principal areas of Federal personnel policy and procedure. The basic rules governing hiring, pay, hours, leave, job classification, performance rating, fringe benefits, retirement, and major disciplinary actions in the Federal service are set by law. In most cases, these are implemented by Civil Service Commission regulations?and when drafting such regulations, the Commission consults extensively with labor organizations as well as agency management. Finally, the great size and spread of the principal departments and agencies has brought about departmental personnel policies and procedures which further implement the laws and Commission regulations. Even though relatively few of the "bread-and-butter" issues are left for bar- gaining in the Federal sector, this does not mean that there is nothing left for bilateral negotiations between labor organizations and agency management. Using information supplied by the Commission's recently developed Labor Agreement Information Retrieval System (LAIRS), we have catalogued a wide range of substantive areas covered by provisions of Federal negotiated agree- ments and the frequencies with which they appear. For example: Over 820,000 non-postal Federal employees are covered by negotiated grievance Procedures, most of them providing for binding arbitration. Almost 590,000 are covered by negotiated disciplinary provisions. Nearly 718,000 are covered by negotiated promotion provisions. A more complete rundown of negotiated items is set forth below. Although these matters deal primarily with immediate working conditions on the job, it should not be thought that they are of little importance either to employees or to management. Their importance to employees rests in their direct relevance to on-the-job conditions and in the opportunity for employee participation in shaping policies and practices that affect their day-to-day work life. For manage- ment, their importanee goes directly to its need to get the work of Government carried out effectively, efficiently and with good morale. In addition, labor organization representatives serve on statutory bodies which were formed to ensure employee participation in certain pay and fringe benefits areas. These include the Prevailing Rate Advisory Committee, the Federal Employees Pay Council and the Health Benefits and Life Insurance Advisory Committees. In addition, Executive Order 11612 provides for employee organiza- tion representation on the Federal Advisory Council on Occupational Safety and Health, established to advise the 'Secretary of Labor in carrying out a Federal safety program under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. The point here is that all the various "personnel policies, practices and mat- ters affecting working conditions" are being dealt with in one form or another. Perhaps the form being utilized in a particular subject area is not the same as in the private seetor where the scope of bargaining includes basic pay and over- time: severance pay; Christmas bonuses; pension and welfare plans; profit- sharing plans; merit wage increases; company housing, meals, discounts, and services: length of workday and workweek; work schedules; grievance pro- cedures and arbitration; layoffs: discharges: workloads; vacations and holi- days; sick leave work rules, seniority, promotions, and transfers; compulsory retirement age; union security arrangements; and safety. These matters in fact are also covered in the Federal program, albeit in different forms, containing all of the substance of the private sector agreements. Mnployer attitude toward anion organizing.--Another significant difference between the Federal sector and the private sector is the positive approach the Government, as employer, has taken toward union organizing. A private employer may, and often does, exercise his right of free speech to oppose union representation of his employees. In fact, this right is protected by section 8(e) of the Taft-Hartley Act: which provides: "The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of any unfair labor practice under any of the provisions f this Act, if such expression con- I ains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit." Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 :RIA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 In contrast, the Federal government has taken a position of neutrality as far as union representation of its employees is concerned, and Government officials do not mount "vote no" campaigns. Although nothing in the Order expressly prohibits a "vote no" campaign, . neither does the Order contain a provision similar to section 8(c) of Taft- Hartley. The policy of management neutrality derives from the preamble to the Order, where the President, speaking as the head of the Executive Branch, has said that "the well-being of employees and efficient administration of the Govern- ment are benefited by providing employees an opportunity to participate in the formulation and implementation of personnel policies and practices affecting the conditions of their employment." And it derives from the injunction in section 1 that, "The head of each agency shall take the action required to assure that employees in the agency are apprised of their rights . . . [freely and without fear of penalty or reprisal to form, join, and assist a labor organization- or to refrain from any such activity], and that no interference, restraint, coercion, or discrimination is practiced without his ageney to encourage or discourage membership in a labor organization." Officials within the Executive branch are naturally expected to adhere to the labor-management policy directed by the Chief Executive. This policy coupled with easy access to formal recognition and union dues checkoff during the period 1964 to 1970, under Executive Order 10988, undoubt- edly accounts in large part for the dramatic growth of union representation strength in the Federal sector at a time when it was relatively stagnant in the private sector. "Right to strike".?There is, of course, no right to strike among employees of the United States Government. But strike activity in the private sector is per- mitted (as well as regulated) by Federal statutes. In the Federal sector, on the other hand, strikes are prohibited by statute as we believe they should be. In principle we are against the "right to strike" for Federal employees. There must be continuity of Government operations. But what if, as it is sometimes argued, the particular function is unimportant. Well, if it is not important to some of our citizens or the public welfare, then perhaps it shouldn't be a Government function. More to the point, however, is that the service is being performed because appropria te authority, elected representatives, has determined it is in the public in terest for the Government to perform the service. In the public sector, the forces at work are basically political. Public managers don't lose business during a strike. A. strike succeeds to the extent that it hurts the public and, in turn, their political representatives. To permit a group of Federal employees to strike goes far beyond the guarantee that Federal employees, like any other group of American citizens, may petition the Government for redress of their grievances. If Federal employees were able to withhold their servics in addition to engaging in the accepted methods of political activity of private interest groups, it could not only result in the reallocation of national resources in their favor but also could leave competing private interest groups at a permanent and substantial disadvantage. During 1971 the statutory ban against strikes by Federal employees was upheld by a three-judge panel of the -U.S. District Court. for the District of Columbia, and the decision of the district court was affirmed by a 6-1 vote of the Supreme Court of the United States. The Court held that Federal employees have no constitutional right to strike and that Federal law prohibiting strikes by Federal employees is neither unconstitutionally vague nor overly broad. The majority opinion of the district court contains a very pertinent analysis of the strike ban which bears repeating: "Given the fact that there is no constitutional right to strike, it is not irra- tional or arbitrary for the Government to condition employment on a promise not to withhold labor collectively, and to prohibit strikes by those in public employment, whether because of the prerogatives of the sovereign, some sense of higher obligation associated with public service, to assure the continuing functioning of the Government without interruption, to protect public health and safety or for other reasons. Although plaintiff [the union] argues that the provisions in question are unconstitutionally broad in covering all Government employees regardless of the type or importance of work they do, we hold that it makes no difference whether the jobs performed by certain public employees are regarded as 'essential' or 'non-essential,' or whether similar jobs are per- formed by workers in private industry who do have the right to strike protected Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/OR CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 by statute. Nor is it relevant that some positions in private industry are arguably more affected with a public interest than are sonic positions in the Government service . . . "There certainly is no compelling reason to imply the existence of the right to strike from the right to associate and bargain collectively. In the private sphere, the strike is used to equalize bargaining power, but this has universally been held not to be appropriate when its object and purpose can only be to influence the essentially political decisions of government in the allocation of its resources. Congress Las an obligation to ensure that the machinery of the Federal government continues to function at all times without interference. Prohibition of strikes by its employees is a reasonable implementation of the obligation." By and large, this proldbtion against the right to strike by Federal employees has proven effective as there have been very few incidents during the program's existence whieh actually can be termed "strikes". There were, however, two strike incidents in 1970 which demonstrated the gravity and potential adverse effects on the public of such concerted employee actions. in March of that year, a strike starting among postal workers in New York City had, within a week, spread across the nation and involved approxi- mately 200,000 employees. Mail service was virtually paralyzed in many metropolitan areas and many millions of people were deprived of mail service. Although the strike was ended with the help of a court injunction and the underlying dispute between the Post Office Department and the postal unions ,as resolved, the cost and impact of the strike on business and the economy was quite severe. In the same month, a long-standing dispute between the Federal Aviation Administration RR(' the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PA.TCO) led to a large-scale "sick-out" involving approximately 25 percent of the nation's air traffic controllers. (This was a repeat of a similar but less extensive incident which occurred in June, 1069.) As in the postal strike, court action was required to end the strike and get the controllers back on the job. By the strike prohibition Federal employees are denied the bargaining lever- age of the threat of strike, but this does not means that they are relegated to "second-class" status in our nation's work force. The Federal government, as an employer, has no desire to deny to Federal employees the general level of rights and benefits which employees are able to secure through collective bargaining in the private sector. On the contrary, the record is clear that the rights and benefits which Federal employees enjoy are fully comparable to those in the private sector of our economy. Congress has historically provided the basis for cmPloYee benefits over which private sector unions customarily strike. We are proud of the enlightened personnel management system we have developed in the Federal government, a system based upon Congressional study and enact- ment. We believe that it is responsive to the needs of both employees and management. Even though our Fetteral personnel management system has developed under circumstances in which employees did not possess the right to strike, they have possessed and used tile right to participate in its development. Regardless of what critics might allege about "paternalism" the Federal personnel manage- ment system was not developed by a group of "philosopher-kings" and then handed down for employees to enjoy. As pointed out earlier, the basic rights and benefits have been developed through the political process, with Federal unions 'flaying a large part in their development. Turning more specihcally to labor-management negotiations within the con- text of our existing program, Executive Order 11491 provides a means for resolving negotiation impasses fairly and finally without the need for strikes and lockouts. First, the Order assigns the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service the responsibility for mediating negotiation disputes. It may proffer its services to assist the parties in reaching agreement and may provide preventive mediatioo services at other times when needed to improve labor-management relationships. When a mg (tin lion impasse defies set tleinent by the parties even after exlm imsi lug, mnedialioti efforts, the Order p:.rovides machinery which we believe will guti rantee final settlement of even the toughest negotiation impasss. Opera- tion of that machinery is the responsibility of the Federal Service Impasses Panel. The Panel is composed of seven members appointed by the President from Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 39 outside the government. They are persons of high reputation for impartiality and expertise in labor relations, especially in the field of arbitration. Following initial inquiry into the circumstances surrounding an impasse, the Panel may proceed to fact finding with recommendations as a basis for further negotiation or settlement by the parties. In the event that the parties are unable to settle within twenty days, they must report back to the Panel which may then "take any action it considers necessary to settle an impasse." This means that the Panel may take any of a variety of actions which it believes appropriate to the situation, including directing final and binding arbi- tration or itself directing a settlement of the unresolved issues. It is believed that this process, with its uncertainty as well as its finality will help reluctant parties see the wisdom of engaging in serious collective bargaining and, in any event, provide an importial and equitable resolution to the strike or lockout alternative in private sector collective bargaining. Therefore, because of the major reasons just discussed and others we believe It is eminently clear that labor-management policy in the Federal sector cannot be the same as in the private sector. While We have some things in common with collective bargaining as it is practiced in the private sector, there are basic dissimilarities which require a special labor-management relations program for the Federa service. THE STATE OF THE PROGRAM: EVOLUTION, STATE'S, SUCCESS, PROBLEMS, CHALLENGES Union representation of Federal employees did not begin with the promul- gation of an Executive order formalizing the program of labor-management relations. Federal unions can be traced back to the early days of labor organi- zations in this country. Craft unions existed in Navy shipyards as early as 1830. These unions were active in bringing about improvements ill the working conditions of Federal employees. Their efforts, and those of other labor organi- zations led to the granting of a 10-hour day in 1840, and an 8e-hour day for Federal workers in 1868. Another early achievement was the enactment by Congress in 1861 of the first of the prevailing wage statutes. Other Federal employees followed the lead of the craft workers. In 1869, associations of letter carriers and postal clerks were established. The National Alliance of Postal Employees was founded in 1913, followed in 1917 by the organization of the National Federation of Federal Employees. AFGE came on the scene in 1931, after a split within NYFE. over the issue of position classi- fication. By 1961, according to a study at that time, there were 40 labor organizations with membership among Federal employees and dealing with Federal agencies. Included among these----in addition to those already mentioned?were organiza- tions such as the National Association of Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Field Offi- cers, the National Customs Service Association, the Overseas Education Asso- ciation, the Organization of Professional Employees of the Department of Agriculture, the International Association of Fire Fighters, the American Fed- eration of Technical Engineers, the International Association of Machinists, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, the Air Traffic Control Association, and the International Printing Pressmen's and Assistants' Union of North America. Note that these organizations cover the spectrum of various types of labor organizations?craft unions, postal unions, associations, unions based on occu- pation or employing agency, and industrial-type. unions. Many, in fact, most, were affiliated with AFL-CIO, and others were non-affiliated (independent). The parties to a labor-management relationship were there, and to some extent, on a permissive basis, they were dealing with one another. What was needed was a bridge to span the gap created by the absence of a government- wide system of rights and responsibilities for collective dealings between the unions and the employing agencies. Such a bridge was. established for the private sector by the Wagner Act in 1935. It remained for Executive Order 10988 of 1962 to do the same for the Federal service. While Executive Order 10988 did not bring unions on to the Federal scene, it did much to enhance their status and promote their growth; neither did it establish for the first time the right of Federal employees to join or not join a labor organization. This right was first established in law for postal employees. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 40 following union-restricting action by President Theodore Roosevelt and Presi- dent Taft, by the Lloyd-LaFollette Act of 1912. This law, which is now incor- porated in Title 5 of the U.S. Code, provided in pertinent part as follows: "(.c) Membership in any society, association, club, or other form of organiza- tion of postal employees not affiliated wildi any outside organization imposing and obligation or duty upon them to engage in any strike, or proposing to assist them in any strike, against the United States, having for its objects among other things, improvements in the condition of labor of its members, including hours of labor and compensation therefor and leave of absence by any person or groups of persons in said postal service, or the presenting by any such person or groups of persons of any grievance or grievances to the Congress or any Member thereof shall not constitute Or be cause for reduction in rank or compensation or removal of such person or groups of persons from said service. "(d) The right of persons employed in the,civil service of the United States, either individually or collectively, to petition Congress, or any Member thereof, or to furnish information to either House of Congress, or to any committee or norther thereof, shall not be denied or interfered with." That Act has remained, except for the laws barring strikes, the only signifi- cant Federal statute on union-management relations with broad application to the Federal service. The Postal Reorganization Act of 1970, P.L. 91-375, appli- cable to the new U.S. Postal Service only, but of great significance to the entire Federal service, provided a statutory basis for collective bargaining in the Postal Service. The hi-lateral approach to the formulation and implementation of policies and procedures affecting the working life of Federal employees varied greatly among Federal agencies. Some had, like the Tennessee Valley Authority and Bonneville Power Administration, developed !, comprehensive programs, others had none at all. By the beginning of the 1900'a it had been generally recognized that a government-wide policy should be developed in order to provide for uniform, orderly and constructive relationships between labor organizations and management officials. After his inauguration in 1961, President kennedy appointed a Presidential Task Force of top-level Government officials, with then Secretary of Labor Arthur J. Goldberg, as Chairman, and then Civil Service Commission Chairman 3obn W. Macy, Jr., as vice-chairman. The Task Force, following a thorough review and hearings on labor relations, made its report and recommendations to the President in November 1961. These recommendations were accepted and were promulgated in January 1901 as Executive Order 10988. A Government- wide labor relations program was thus established. The first generation Executive order Executive Order lOPliS was primarily designed as a " start up" program for collective bargaining in the Federal Service. It established a basic pattern for union-management dealings, and contained provisions permitting the continued development of union-management relationships that had been established, and that had proven to be effective. The Executive order, entitled, at that time, "Employee-Management Cooperation in the Federal Service", was basic both in its policy approach and its system structuring. It incorporated the following: The right of Federal employees to join Or to refrain from joining an employee organization was reaffirmed. On the exercise of this right by employees, Federal managers were to be neutral. Federal managers were to demonstrate an affirmative willingness to enter Into a collective bargaining relationship with the unions, once the employees had chosen their representatives. There was a minimum adverse impact on organizations then in existence, resulting from a three-tiered level of recognition based upon the strength of organization rept esen ta ion. (Informal, fern ial and exclusive.) The riOit of management to have limited dealings with veterans, religious and social organizations was preserved. Merit principles were retained. Thronghout the Order, there was recognition of the differences between the private and public sectors. Consultation and negotiation, according to level of recognition was mandated. Advisory arbitration was permissible for settlement of disputes over the titerpreta don or application of agreement language, and over disputes involv- ing bargaining unit determination. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/0641C1A-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 Non-veteran employees were granted the same rights to appeal in adverse action cases to those provided veterans preference eligibles under 'Section 14 of the Veterans Preference Act as amended. A bar was placed on the negotiation of a union security arrangement. How- ever, a measure of union security was introduced later with provision by the Civil Service Commission for union dues withholding. (Application of this recommendation had to be delayed pending clarification of statutory authority for such arrangements.) Responsibility for implementation of the program was vested in the head of each department and agency, with the Civil Service Commission given a leader- ship role in providing guidance, management training, and program evaluation, and the Department of Labor was assigned responsibility to assist in the reso- lution of representation disputes. Technical services required to implement the order were to be provided by existing agencies. The unions were reasonably satisfied with Executive Order 10988 at first, calling it a "Magna Carta". The agencies were generally satisfied as well. The first generation Order served its purpose well in providing a bridge between what had been a completely unstructured Federal program and the developffients that followed. The unions existing at the time were not only able, by and large, to retain their existence and identity, but also to flourish. As the program evolved, unions that at first had attained informal and formal recognition, had reasonable opportunity to expand to the point of eligibility for exclusive recognition. Starting out under a very basic program, the parties had greater opportunity to get to know each other and to establish relationships relatively free of adversary confrontation. Reported union membership soared resulting from both the new status acquired from the Executive Order, and the stability and union security brought about by the adoption of membership dues withholding from the pay rolls of employees choosing this method of dues payment. The program developed under the Order, with its affirmative approach to collective bargaining by management, afforded unions a green pasture in which they were free to grow in status, membership strength, and employee repre- sentation. And grow they did, at a rate far outstripping the union movement in the private sector, to the point where union involvement in the Federal sector is, proportionately, more than twice that in private industry. For the first few years following the issuance of Executive Order 10988, statistics on Federal union growth was preponderantly among postal workers, who had been well organized even before the Order. However, by mid 1963, 180,000 non-postal workers were in exclusive bargaining units; by 1965, the number had risen to 320,000; and by 1967, 630,000 non-postal Federal employees were exclusively represented by unions, 339,000 blue-collar (Wage Board) and 291,000 salaried white collar (GS) employees. Combined, they represented 29 percent of all non-postal employees of the Executive branch of the Federal government. (Today over one million non-postal executive branch employees are represented by unions.) Success, and some problems under E.O. 10988, led to demand for change by both unions and management. In response, an Interagency Review Committee was established by President Johnson in 1969, under the leadership of the then Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz and the then Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, John W. Macy, Jr. A draft report was prepared suggesting program changes, but was not adopted as it came at the time of the close of the Johnson Administration. President Nixon, recognizing the need for Executive Order reform, appointed an Interagency Committee to review and evaluate the program. The findings and recommendations of the 1967 Review Committee were considered and re- examined and to a considerable extent reaffirmed by a new "Interagency Committee on Federal Labor-Management Relations" established in 1969 by President Richard Nixon shortly after his assuming office. Robert E. Hampton, the new Civil Service Commission Chairman, was named Chairman of the Inter- agency Committee, and serving with him were George P. Shultz, then Secretary of Labor, and Melvin R. Laird, then Secretary of Defense, Winton M. Blount, then Postmaster General, and Robert Mayo, then Director, Bureau of the Budget. Based on the Committee's recommendations, the President, on October 29, 1969, issued Executive Order 11491. The new Order adjusted the Federal labor- Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 42 management relations program to meet the problems that had been identified, to respond, within reason to objections that had been voiced, and to provide an outlet for the greater sophistication and maturity that had developed under the Kennedy order. The second generation Executive order On January .1, 1970, in principal part, Executive Order 11491 became effective, setting the stage for a new era in labor relations for unions and management in the Federal Service. The new Order maintained the basic principles and objectives of labor-management relations in ?the Federal service established back in 1962 by Executive Order 10988, but procedures for its administration were evolutionary in nature. It preserved much of the system of relationships that had developed between unions and Federal agencies; yet it contained dramatic and farreaching changes in the overall labor relations structure. The key changes were: The establishment of a central body, the Federal Labor Relations Council, to provide overall direction to the program and to make final decisions on disputed matters; The provision of third-party processes for resolving representation and unfair labor practice disputes assigned to the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor- Management Relations; The utilization of the Federal Mediation and ? Conciliation Service to assist in the resolution of negotiation impasses' ? ? The establishment of the Federal Service Impasse Panel as the ultimate authority for the resolution of impasses; The elimination of multiple levels of recognition. Other major provisions related to extenshm Of coverage; exclusion of certain categories of security end agency internal audit personnel; special provisions on recognition for guards and labor relations personnel; elimination of the prohibition on negotiations; binding arbitration of employee grievances and disputes arising under the terms of an agreement; prohibition on the use of official time for negotiation of an agreement; changes in procedures for certifi- cation of representatives; strengthening standards of conduct and union reporting requirements revisions to the code of fair labor practices; changes in the scope of negotiation and agreement approval provisions; and the incor- poration of procedures for the resolution of negotiability disputes. Basically,what the new Order did was provide third-party machinery for the resolution of disputes and establish a central authority to set major policy. In August 1970 the Postal Reorganization Act, PL 91-375 became law. As a result of provisions in that law, the U.S. Postal Service and its employees were exempted from the administrative procedures of the Executive Order and placed within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. The third (and present) generation Executive Order At the time President Nixon signed Executive Order 11491 in October 1969, he directed that. a review and assessment of operations under the Order be made after one year. The Federal Labor Relations Council initiated such a review with public hearings ht ld on October 1970. Several Members of Congress, top union officials, and key Government officials testified at the hearings or sub- mitted written remarks for the record. Based upon proposals received from the Council, the President issued Execu- tive Order 11616, amending his earlier Executive Order 11491. It was signed on August 26, 1971 and became effective 90 days later (November 24, 1971). The Council, in making its Report and Recommendations to the President, empha- sized that the Order had greatly enhanced the climate for collective bargaining in the Federal service. The major amendmerts to Executive Order 11491 were limited in number, but were none-the-less important and significant to program improvement. The changed were directed to increasing the scope of bargaining, perfecting the exclusivity of certified bargaining units and broadening the use of third-party machinery. Major changes included: The addition of "Professional" to the list of lawful associations, not qualified as labor organizations, with which an agency may have limited dealings not inconsistent with the rights of recognized labor organizations. 'The deletion of that provision of E.O. 11491 that precluded the recognition of an organization that "asserts the right to strike" was deleted based on a Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 :VA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 Federal District Court decision involving First Amendment impact on Section 7311, Title 5, U.S.C. A requirement that all agreements contain a grievance procedure as the exclusive procedure available to the parties and the employees in the units for disputes over the application and interpretation of the agreement. Negotiated grievance procedures are subject to the following: An employee's grievance on a matter not covered in the agreement may be presented under any procedure available for the purpose but not under the negotiated procedure. Matters for which statutory appeals procedures exist are excluded from processing under negotiated grievance procedures. Complaints filed under the negotiated grievance procedure can have repre- sentation only by the exclusive representative. Negotiated procedures may include arbitration (advisory or binding) limited to interpretation or application of the agreement, which may be invoked only by the agency or the exclusive representative. The Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management Relations is author- ized to resolve disputes on questions whether a grievance is subject to the negotiated grievance procedure, or whether a grievance under the procedure is subject to arbitration. The restructuring of Section 19(d) to provide that the processing of unfair labor practice complaints is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management Relations subject to appeal to the Federal Labor Relations Council. Furthermore the amended Order provides that: Decisions under grievance or appeals procedures shall not be construed as unfair labor practice decisions under the order nor as precedents for such decisions. When a grievance includes an alleged unfair labor practice, it is optional with the aggrieved party whether to seek redress under the grievance procedure or th unfair labor practice procedure. Ile may not use both procedures. The modification of Section 20 to eliminate the absolute prohibition of official time for employees when engaged as labor organization representatives in negotiation with agency management. The parties may negotiate on the issues within specified official time limitations. Elimination of the provision that the costs of dues deductions must be charged to the labor organization. This matter is left to negotiation between the parties. A revision of Section 25 to provide that the Civil Service Commission in conjunction with the Office of Management and Budget shall establish and maintain a program of policy guidance to agencies on Federal labor-management relations and periodically review the implementation of these policies. On December 17, 1971, the President made a further change in the program; Executive Order 11636 was issued, placing the Foreign Service agencies under a separate labor-management relations system to take into account the unique conditions of work in the Foreign Service. This was how the Executive order system for Federal labor relations which exists today evolved?with its tested principles and objectives and mechanisms and procedures, including third parties to assist and guide labor and manage- ment in peacefully and constructively formulating and implementing personnel policies and practices that meet their respective and mutual needs and working out differences which inevitably occur in the context of union-management relationships. The state of the program today Federal union-management relations, at the present time, can be characterized as being in a state of maneuver, of testing by the parties of their inherent strength and of the boundaries of the system. The factors relevant to this are: the evolving body of rules based on third-party decisions, with many important areas yet undefined; a slowing in the rate of union representation gains as the saturation point is approached; and indications that there is less awkwardness and indecision and more maturity shown by both parties at the bargaining table. Third parties and mediation.?A most significant feature of the program is the provision for third-party involvement and assistance in addition to services provided by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. Information state- ments on the roles and work activities of the Federal Labor Relations Council, the Federal Service Impasses Panel, and the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management Relations are contained in Attachment "3", "4", and "5". Also 34-619-74 4 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/94 CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 included for your reference in Attachment "2" is a chart showing the relation- ship of the authorities involved in Executive Order 11491. As the principal authority in the administration and interpretation of policy under Executive Order 11491, the three-member Federal Labor Relations Council has a dual role: It decides major policy issues and may consider appeals from decisions of the Assistant Secretary, appeals on negotiability issues, exceptions to arbitration awards, ard other matters which it deems necessary to effectuate the purposes of the Order. The Council's appellate activity has increased dra- matically in its attempt to keep pace with an ever-increasing workload. Thus, iii calendar year 1973, it closed nearly three times as many appeals cases as in the previous year. The number of appeals filed has also grown. In the past year, there was a t,2 percent rise over similar filings in calendar year 1972, and in the first 3 months of this year, a 41 percent increase was recorded over the highest quarter (luring 1973. It is expected that this trend will continue. While the number of negotiability appeals filed appears to have leveled off, due probably to the large number of determinations made by the Council during the past year, exceptions to arbitration awards and appeals from decisions of he Assistant Secretary have increased. As to the arbitration cases, which showed the greatest increase in Council filings, the upward trend can be expected to continue as the number of bargaining agreements in the Federal sector grows and as the sophistication of the parties increases. Greater public awareness of the Council's appellate mle may account, in part, for the increase in the number of appeals filed from decisions of the Assistant Secretary. Tile Federal Service Impasses Panel is composed of seven individuals, ap- pointed by the President, whose function is to assist Federal agencies and labor organizations in the resolution of negotiation impasses. The number of eases filed has grown each year from 16 In calendar year 1970 to 30 in 1973. The fact that as of April 15, 1974, 9 cases have already been filed would indicate that the case intake will continue to grow. Of the 105 cases filed with the Panel as of mid-April 1974, 92 have been closed, and 13 are pending. Only 20 disputes, or 19 percent of those cases closed, required a fact finding hearing. Panel Report and Recommendation for settlement following such hearing was issued in 18 of these cases, and of this number, 16 were accented in full by the parties, and the Panel's recommendations formed the basis for the settlement in the other eases. Of the remaining 72 cases, most were settled informally. The current trend in impasse issues appears to be away from those which were most prevalent in the past (official time for union negotiations, advisory versus binding arbitration, union representation concerning promotions and awards, and scheduling of work) toward other issues (merit promotions, details and temporary promotions, incorporation of "just and sufficient" cause as a criterion for disciplinary actions, and contract language in which disputes over the interpretation of agercy regulations, which have been cited in the agreement, would be subject to the negotiated grivance and arbitration agreement). In his role under the Executive Order, the Assistant Secretary of Labor for :Labor-Management Relations decides questions relating to the appropriate unit for collective bargaining, supervises representation elections and certifies their results, decides unfair labor practice complaints, and in so doing may issue cease and desist orders as well as require such affirmative action as may be deemed necessary to remedy violations found and as he considers appropriate to effectuate the policies of the Order, resolves grievability and arbitrability dis- putes and administers standards of conduct for unions. The Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management Relations (A/SLMR) has closed 4,385 of his 4,962 cases of all types?representation, unfair labor practice, standards of conduct, grievability/atbitrability?while his Labor- Management Servicles Administration has supervised 2,063 representation elec- t nms. (Attachment "5" contains a summary of A/SLMR workload data through March 1974.) Year-to-year comparisons in the number of elections supervised reflect the recent leveling off in union organizing under the Executive Order. And although the number of unfair-labor-practice cases had shown a steady increase from 1971 through 1973, projections Wised on the first quarter of 1974 indicate there may be fewer such cases this year than last. The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service makes available to assist parties negotiating agremients under Executive Order 11491 the use of its mediation services and also furnishes parties upon request panels of arbitrators from its roster of qualified arbitrators, which it maintains. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 45 The growing hotly of preeedent.?A substantial body of administrative deci- sions, providing precedents for the program is being built on representation, conduct and unfair labor practice case decisions of the Assistant Secretary for Labor-Management Relations; negotiability and policy decisions of the Federal Labor Relations Council; fact finding and recommendations on im- passes of the Impasses Panel; and grievance arbitration awards. Many of the decisions, built on particular case circumstances, are being generalized as doc- trine and direction. The decisions are helpful and necessary, but program direc- tion must also continue to come from the program authorities otherwise a fairly flexible program can be converted into a formal, legalistic structure. The extent of union recognition.?There has been a slowing down in the number of units being certified and recognized._ The continued rise in union representation strength of the past 11 years began to taper off in 1972 and continued in 1973. This leveling off can be explained by the fact that almost all the eligible blue-collar workers (84 percent) and about one-half (47 percent) of the white-collar workers are now organized. It would appear that unions have shifted emphasis to negotiating agreements and consolidating their recent gains in representation. Overall, the unions now have bargaining rights for over one million (56 percent) of the close to two million non-postal Federal employees. These data and many of the statistics that follow were derived from the annual survey of union recognition in the Federal service conducted by the Commission's Office of Labor-Management Relations. The most recent survey was as of November 1973. A comprehensive summary of the results of the survey is contained in Attachment "1". Included in the major findings of the 1973 survey of union recognition were: A total of 1,086,361 (56 percent) of non-postal Federal employees are repre- sented by unions, compared to 1,082,587 (55 percent) in 1972. Under Executive Order 11491, which governs the labor relations program, employees have the right to join, or not join, the union. Thus, the number of employees belonging to unions is less than the number covered by exclusive recognition. (The Commis- sion does not maintain records on employee union membership.) Blue-collar coverage declined in absolute numbers for the second consecutive year (-22,134). However, the decline in the number of blue-collar employees in exclusive units was exceeded by the total decreas in blue-collar employment; as a net result, exclusive recognition rose I percent in that segment of the Federal work force. Of all blue-collar employees, 84 percent (404,955) were represented in exclusive units as of November 1973. White-collar coverage, on the other hand, showed a slight increase both in number covered (a total of 681,406) and percent covered (47 percent). The increase between 1972 and 1973 was 25,908 (2 percent). Representation among major unions American Federation of Government Employees (AFL-CIO) increased its representation by 3,578?to 624,322?in the 12-month period ending November 1973, As of that time, 75 percent of employees represented by AFGE were covered by negotiated agreements. The National Federation of Federal Employees represented 118,139, an in- crease of 3,719, and 77 percent of those employees were covered by agreements. National Treasury Employees Union (formerly, NAIRE), which has repre- sented only white-collar employees, added 3,870 to its total representation. It brought to 50,392 the number of employees represented?of which 96 percent were covered by agreements as of November 1973. Unions showing gains appear to have benefited from the over-all expansion in white-collar employment. Three unions, whose blue-collar representation approaches or surpasses their white-collar representation, all showed continued declines in number of em- ployees under exclusive recognition: National Association of Government Em- ployees from 82,187 to 75,953; Metal Trades Council (AFL-CIO) from 57,038 to 52,585; International Association of Machinists (AFL-CIO) from 30,585 to 29,552. Losses in representation by NAGE, MTC, and IAM reflect continued cutbacks in total blue-collar employment. The bargaining unit structure.?The fragmentation of the bargaining unit structure which has affected and conditioned the level and substance of Federal union-management dealings remains a problem as indicated by the table below (additional discussion is contained in Attachment "9") which reveals that 53 percent of the units contain less than 100 employees. As of November 1972, exclusive units numbered 3,392, by November 1973 there were 3,486. The average unit contained 312 employees in 1973; in 1972 the average was 319. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 46 The distribution of Federal recognition units by size was determined by a special survey conducted by the Office of Labor-Management Relations as of April 1974: Number of employees Number of units Percent of total' number of units 1 to 10 280 a 11 to 49 996 28 50 to 99 610 17 100 to 499 1,067 31 560 to 999 306 9- 1,000 and over 234 7 Total 3,493 100 Negotiating agreements.?Exclusive recognition carries with it the right to negotiate with agency management and this may lead to an agreement. Our annual survey of 1973 revealed an unprecedented acceleration in the negotiation. of agreements with employing agencies. For example: Agreements have been negotiated in 335 additional recognition units, an in- crease of 17 percent over 1972. Overall, 2,2(14 or 05 percent of all units are covered by 1,904 agreements. (Sense- so-called multi.-unit agreements cover more than one recognition.) The number of employees covered by agreements has likewise grown 11 per- cent to a new high of 837,410, more than 84,000 above last year and encom- passing 77 percent of all employees under exclusive recognition. Of the entire- non-postal Federal work force, 43 percent were in recognition units covered by negotiated agreements as of November 1973. Following is a partial listing of what's in these negotiated agreements?their frequency SIM coverw?extracted from the Commission's LAIRS system. (Additional discussion s provided in Attachment "9.") These illustrate the very broad range and impact of provisions that already have been negotiated tinder the Executive Order. Subject Number of agreements Number of employees covered Promotion policy Joint Promotion Committee Joint Performance Review Committee. Union member(s) on Promotion Panel Union participation (wage survey) 1, 579 112 92 197 512 717, 912 62,019 44,513 83, 873. 246, 087 Joint EEO Committee 436 294.773 Physical examinations 156 104, 583 Drug abuse clause 61 50,350 Alcoholism clause 82 65, 189. Grievance procedure_ 1,989 820, 104 Discipline policy 1,300 509,274 Pay policy clause 225 118,922 Call-in allowance. 543 246, 654 Environmental pay Seniority 335 481 189, 959. 251,391 Union review (RIF) 300 184,006 Technological displacement 236 139, 416 Safety provision 1, 521 651, 637 Safety clothing 696 350, 091 Safety equipment 744 370, 566 Jowl Safety Committee 886 441, 923 Overtime clause 1,579 711,923 Compensatory time 498 229, 075 Call-in limitation_ 150 55,640 ti oars guarantee 383 172,920 Excused time (training) Cafeteria services Parking Work equipment Tools Joint Suggestion/Awards Committee 359 190 436 326 239 367 217,271 97, 364 318, 511 153,871 13.6, 668 291,034 Leave (hold union office) 727 382,367 Paid-time allowances (stewards) 668 308,062 time ct space (union) 1, 179 578, 597 Use of telephone (union) 299 260, 597 Mail privilege (union) 311 114,255 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 .4FIA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 How the negotiating function is working.?Labor and management represent- atives are learning to work with each other in a productive bilateral atmo- sphere, generally devoid of major disagreements or long delays in the negotiat- ing process. This is the profile that emerges from a comprehensive survey of more than 3,000 exclusive bargaining units conducted by the Civil Service Commission in conjunction with the Office of Management and Budget. Unions and agencies were surveyed during a six-month period ending March 15, 1974. Covering nearly nine-tenths of recorded exclusive units?including virtually all units under agreements?it furnishes an overview of how the bargaining func- tion is working under the Executive Order. This survey was conducted at the request of the Federal Labor Relations Council and the data is being used by the Council in its current general review of the Federal labor-relations program. Attachment "7" provides an overview of the report on the survey. For example: While the parties generally have taken much longer to get to the table to . negotiate an initial basic agreement than is customary in the private sector, once they get there they reach final accord in time periods somewhat com- parable to their private-sector counterparts. There is strong indication, how- ever, that the existence of a prior dues-withholding agreement considerably extends the period between certification or recognition and request for nego- tiations. More important, they are learning and managing to settle their own problems across the table in their own way, and mostly on their own. With the exception of mediation (344 cases), third parties were involved in only about 80 bargain- ing situations;' they were not resorted to in the remaining 3,000-plus situations. The survey also tends to show that while official time for union negotiators has been a troublesome issue it was not widespread statistically, and once the parties reached agreement over total amount the union used less than that allotted. On the negative side, the agency approval process tended to use as much or more time than the parties used at the table to reach agreement. In almost 20 percent of the cases, special problems or circumstances were cited in the approval process. Climate of relationships under the present system.?In May 1973, the Com- mission's Office of Labor-Management Relations conducted a sample survey of the climate of labor-management relations activity at Federal field installa- tions throughout the country?with similar results. Slightly over 10% of all field activities were included in the survey. Samples were taken of those activi- ties that in the judgment of our field staff are representative of the overall perspective in their assigned areas. Following is a consensus of our findings (a more detailed discussion is contained in Attachment "6") : A good case was made for the stability of existing relationships. Problems in negotiation delays are improving as the parties gain maturity and become more proficient in negotiation techniques. Delays in headquarters approval and union ratification of agreements con- tinue to exist. Streamlining methods are improving this situation. More meaningful and substantive agreements are being negotiated as time goes on. Greater understanding of the collective bargaining process is begin- ning to pay off in better relationships. Unfair labor practice charges had increased in volume. This is not bad in itself. The orderly processing of such matters is helpful to the parties in their settlement of disputes. There was some evidence that a number of frivolous charges were filed. Unions were testing the parameters of the system. Disputes over the use of official time for union representatives in negotia- tions were found to be not as wide spread as had been thought. This was also true of the fee for dues withholding. In over 85% of all negotiation activity the parties had settled for the maximum of the options permitted for nego- tiations "on the clock," and for the standard two cent fee that had existed prior to amendment of the Order. Few real problems had surfaced in the field over bargaining unit frogmen- fa tion. The multi-unit agreement concept has provided one solution to problems that had existed. It was difficult to obtain a good "fix" on problems that might exist in nego- tiability because of the imposition of agency headquarters regulations. As was Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 48 to be expected, the opinions of union and management representatives varied Ill this regard. Administration of agreements is working well in a majority of the activities sampled. In large measure, employee problems are being solved through constructive cooperation of the parties. The largest problem surfaced as a result of this survey is that many first- tine supervisors do not relate to their management roles. Most activities consider that third-party involvement has facilitated their dealings with unions. There are, in fact, signs of growing maturity on both sides of the bargaining table. Reports from Commission field evaluations indicate that management is gearing up more effectively than in the past to deal with the labor relations process and that there is more expertise at the bargaining table. There is little evidence of serious conflicts?to the point of militant job actions?between the parties. Agency managers have found their counterparts on the union side more skilled and program-wise. The overall picture, of course, is not uniform; there being great variations from place to place. While there is a greater program understanding, and a more surface acceptance of bilateralism, much' yet needs to be done to build the management team and its effectiveness at the bargaining table and in the implementation of agreements. In addition, there are recent developments that could materially affect the substance of agreements. Included are decisions by the Commission to revise certain regulations in order to remove Federal Personnel Manual impediments to the scope of bargaining; decisions by the Federal Labor Relations Council on negotiability (involving tours of duty, scheduling of shifts, promotion prac- tices, setting academic pay) ; and decisions by the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management Relations on the obligation to bargain during the life of an agreement. It is too early at this stage ? to assess the impact of these decisions. Problems, issues, and general review of the program Although the existing labor-management relations system is working reason- ably well, it is of course, not without: friction and problems. Examples of ma- jor problems or potential problems, issues, and areas of concern are listed below. The impact of higher-level agency regulations on what may be bargainable at the subordinate levels, where the bulk of recognitions are and most of the negotiations take place, is a critical issue; it is probably the most fundamental issue affecting the program today. Agencies have the authority to regulate, but it is evident from the report loading to the issuance of E.O. 11491 that such authority should not be exercised in a manner to frustrate the obligation to bargain. The August 1969 report slated "except where negotiations are conducted at the national level, agencies should increase, where practicable, delegations of authority on personnel policy matters to local managers to permit a wider scope of negotiation." The report also states that: "Agencies should not issue overprescriptive regulations, and should consider exceptions from agency regulations on specific items where both parties request an exception and the agency considers the exception feasible." Some unions have strongly expressed distrust of agency use of its regulatory authority, alleging that such authority was used to throttle meaningful nego- tiation at the local level. The unions want lhe locus of authority to conform to the level of negotiation or vice versa. This is a difficult problem, but legis- lation provides no easier means of resolution than does working with the Exec- utive Order. While new provisions of the Order have slowed down fragmentation, they have done little to consolidate existing units or to bring about better matching of locus of bargaining with locus of authority. This has produced great friction a!: the policy-making levels within uni"ons, particularly those with the greater numerical strength but limited negotiations at the higher rule-making level of agencies. (As noted in the CSC field survey, however, this did not emerge as a major issue at the field activity level.) Nevertheless, there is a need to con- sidr what can be done to alleviate this problems, particularly since permitting local negotiations to override higher level regulations presents additional con- This, too, can be handled administratively. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 :491A-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 Delays in approval of agreements by agency headquarters. Greater delegations of authority and expedited procedures by agencies are now resulting in more efficient and timely handling. The definition of and the role of the supervisor continues to be an issue. Is a supervisor entitled to representation in an agency grievance or appeals procedure by a person who represents the union with exclusive recognition of employees in the unit? There is an apparent need for clarification here. Is the definition of a supervisor, particularly in the white-collar area, pegged too low? Supervisors with limited authority have difficulty identifying with the management team. In this regard we have seen some improvement in efforts to build the management team, but much remains to be done. The unresolved legal issue on the authority to make employees whole be- cause of losses incurred due to agreement violations has damaged the credibility of the arbitration process. The answer is to provide legal authority for back pay and other make-whole payments to employees who have sustained losses because of agency violations of negotiated agreements. The Commission is working on proposals to be included in its legislative program (a) to authorize payments and retroactive personnel actions arising from agency violation of law, order, or regulations, and (b) to permit negotiation of grievance proce- dures which may include binding arbitration on all disciplinary actions, includ- ing adverse actions. The investigation and prosecution of unfair labor practices. In addition to these major concerns, certain unions have proposed changes that would enlarge the scope of negotiations, establish a full-time central author- ity, provide access to courts, and include additional union security. - These items and the matter of "make-whole" remedies and negotiation of binding arbitration of adverse actions, would, of course, require legislation. However, the balance of the issues just noted and others are currently being addressed in the general review (started last September) of the Federal sector labor-management relations program being conducted by the Federal Labor Relations Council. Unions, agencies, and other interested parties were asked to suggest issues for consideration, including possible alternative courses of action. Subsequently, the Council announced the areas to receive the central focus of the review, as indicated in Attachment "3." This was followed by the parties submitting position papers and hearings on April 8-10, 1974, to seek amplification of the written submissions and pursue proposals included in the written submissions. Following a careful review and analysis of the transcript and the parties' written submissions, the Council will prepare a report and whatever recommen- dations it deems needed for submission to the President. THE TOTAL ENVIRONMENT: RESPONSIVENESS WITHIN AND OUTSIDE EXECUTIVE ORDER- CENTRAL PERSONNEL AUTHORITY, INTEGRATING LABOR RELATIONS Union-management relationships in the Federal service extend well beyond the formalized labor-management relations structure, they exist within the context of total governmental mechanisms for personnel matters and employee involvement. This is "bilateralism," the Federal form of union-management deal- ings?extending to the totality of union-management relations, transcending the growing formal scope of bargaining in the Federal service. Responsiveness within and outside Executive order The Executive Order realistically cannot be viewed as the alpha and omega of union and management rights and responsibilities insofar as establishing personnel policies, practices, and working conditions affecting employees on the job. While the Order is the basic part of the totaLlfederal approach to labor- management relations, there are other structures or systems established to provide meaningful union input into determining policies and practices affect- ing them and benefits accruing to them. For example, recent laws have established permanent vehicles for direct union involvement in white-collar and blue-collar pay setting. The Pay Compara- bility Act of 1970 established a Federal Employees Pay Council consisting of five union representatives to deal with the President's agent on the whole process by which Federal white-collar pay is adjusted each year to keep it comparable with private enterprise pay. This is not collective bargaining per se, but those involved in the process are aware it is a significant step forward Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06,6CIA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 in meaningful consultation. The Comparability: Act also provided an Advisory committee on Federal Pay, composed of three experts from outside the Gov- eminent. The Advisory Committee meets with the President's agent and with th unions and submits an independent report to the President on the workings of the comparability process. Likewise, PL 92-392, the so-called Blue-Collar Wage Bill of 1972 establishes a new Prevailing Rate Advisory Committee made up of five union and five gency representatives chaired by an appointee with no other position or re- sdonsibilities in government. Tins replaces the Coordinated Federal Wage Sys- tern and National Wage Policy Committee which had provided a union voice in pay setting for several years prior to enactment of PL 92-392. These are special arrangements to deal with the special problems of an Executive branch comprised of many agencies, diverse jobs and different, as well as competing, unions. Both Council and the Committee have specific and direct tie-ins to the labor relations program under Executive Order 11491 since 1111lial membership on them is keyed to the extent of exclusive recognition. This 0 recognition which covers more than one million employees and membership and dues payments from an estimated half or, more of that number, did not Verne about without a positive approach to unions and collective bargaining on the part of the Executive branch as expressed in Presidential Executive Orders. Other examples of union involvement are the Health Benefits and Life Insur- 4/11C0 Committees and the Federal Safety Advisory Council. Also, the Commis- sion has long acknowledged the need for employee input, through their repre- sentatives, and regularly and extensively has, On its own initiative, consulted unions in the development of government-wide personnel in this total context, we do not see the Federal approach of bilateralism as narrow, one-sided, or unproductive. We view bilateralism as a constructive force in decision-making, requiring better managers and more accountable managers, and in turn making for better personnel management. And the results we have catalogued have been accomplished within a merit system, and without damage to merit principles. Procedures and practices have been determined bilaterally, but merit principles have remained controlling. What is needed to improve this form of bilateralism can not be provided by merely enacting a law, but instead I 'trough understanding, applying and improving this new system of personnel management. central personnel authority, integrating labor relations As the central personnel agency of and center ,for labor relations effort in the Executive branch and administrator of the merit system principles, the Commis- sion has a broad range of responsibilities with respect to the statutory and ad- ministrative structure of the Federal personnel system. Since labor relations is an integral part of the Federal personnel system, it is in the public interest that the Government through the Commission have the capability to develop and administer, where appropriate, personnel policies and regulations designed to achieve the necessary degree of uniformity and equity in regard to matters com- mon to employees Government-wide or in more than one agency. This is from the standpoint of costs as well as equal treatment for employees similarly situated. trader Executive Order 11491, as amended, the President assigned to the Civil service Commission a broad range of responsibilities. Policy guidanee.?In conjunction with the Office of Management and Budget, the Commission established and maintains a program for the policy guidance of agencies concerning the Federal labor relations program. Technical advice and training.?The Commission provides technical advice and training for agencies and management officials. Program review.--The Commission continuously reviews the program to assure adherence to its provisions and merit system requirements. The Commis- sion also from time to time reports to the Federal Labor Relations Council on the Ante of the program and makes recommendations for its improvements. Information.?The Commission, in conjunction with the Department of Labor, develops programs for collection and dissemination of information to agencies, labor organizations and the public. Third-party involvement?The Commission Chairman has designated the Vice-Chairman of the Commission to assume duties of the Assistant Secretary or Labor when the Department of Labor is a party in matters involving unit determinations, elections, national consultation rights, unfair labor practices and Standards of Conduct cases. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 51 Dues tvithholding.?The Commission issues regulations governing dues with- holding procedures with labor organizations and supervisory-management asso- ciations. Adverse action appeals.?The Commission prescribes regulations extending to all employees in the competitive civil service rights identical in adverse action cases to those provided preference eligibles under sections 75/1-7512 of Title 5 U.S.C. Performing a vital role in the transition to bilateral labor-management rela- tions, the Civil Service Commission has, for example: Served as the focal point for policy direction and problem resolution before E.O. 11491 established central authority and third-party machinery. Established the Office of Labor-Management Relations (OLMR) in 1966 to coordinate and direct CSC and agency-wide attention to changes in Federal personnel management for dealing with the growing unionization of the Federal workforce. Recruited, trained and assigned Labor Relations Officers in all CSC Regional offices to coordinate field attention to union-management relations. Provided labor relations training for various levels of the management team throughout the 1960s in the field as well as in Washington culminating with establishment of the Labor Relations Training Center (LRTC) in Washington in 1971. ? Evaluated and reported on management performance of its labor relations responsibilities. Drafted and issued, in conjunction with OMB, and at the direction of the. President in 1972, "Guidelines for the Management and Organization of Agency Responsibilities Under the Federal Labor-Management Relations Program." (See Attachment "8.") Revised parts of the Federal Personnel Manual, opening up the possibility of broadening the scope of bargaining between agencies and unions by the elimina- tion of unnecessary regulations. (This is a continuing effort.) Developed the Labor Agreement Information Retrieval System (LAIRS), for the purpose of systematically analyzing, storing and retrieving the texts of labor agreements negotiated in the Federal service. Through the application of modern computer technology, supplemented by conventional microfilming techniques, all extensive data base has been created by extracting from each agreement 176 substantive elements of labor relations information. As of Febru- ary 1, 1974, the LAIRS file contained statistics on 3,493 recognition units, of which 2,422 are covered by negotiated agreements. Rapid access to the data file is achieved by direct search through a keyboard terminal located at the Civil .Service Commission. In addition, comprehensive reports, both statistical and analytical, are generated periodically by specially designed programs. Complete and reliable Federal labor agreement information is now available for the first time by virtue of this automated technique. Full operation of the LAIRS system, on a trial basis, commenced on April 29, 1974. Information serv- ices are now provided to Federal agencies, unions and the general public. Access to the system, of course, is open to the Committee and its staff. (A concise briefing session has been prepared and can be scheduled and presented upon request.) But this does not account for all of the Commission's heavy involvement in labor-management relations; much of it is a function of the CSC's pay-setting, personnel policy-making and related authorities in areas of immediate concern to organized labor. Even beyond the broad responsibilities we perform under the Executive Order, the Commission deals with labor organizations through a variety of mechanisms?both formal and informal. On the formal side, as noted above, unions sit with management on the Federal Prevailing Rate Ad- visory Committee (on blue-collar pay), and participate on the Federal Employ- ees Pay Council (on white-collar pay) and the Health Benefits and Life Insur- ance Advisory Committees. In a less formal sphere the unions are consulted on other benefits and terms we administer. Thus, the Civil Service Commission's role in labor-management relations has developed into a combination of dual approaches?one inside, the other outside the Executive Order framework. The Commission deals bilaterally in these areas, under these permanent systems, as only a centralized personnel agency?with its broad and comprehensive range of authorities?can. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 52 TIIE PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE : DEFICINCIES OF MAJOR PROVISIONS OF PENDING BILLS At the same time the Federal labor relations program is undergoing a general review for possible changes, Congress has before it the question of the need for it legislated labor relations system. As part of this assessment, we have been asked to comment on the various bills. in general, we found these bills in conflict with the public interest and with the unique characteristics of Federal employment. We believe that they are unsound and would be disruptive to an existing, orderly labor-management relationship. We should like to discuss in an overview fashion, our objections to the major unacceptable features of the bills and their implications. In addi- tion, for your consideration, Attachment "11" compares features of Executive order 11491, as amended, and H.R. 13, H.R. 9784, and H.R. 10700. Application/Coverage.?All Federal departments and agencies, excluding only the Postal Service would be covered under H.R. 13 and 11.R. 9784. This is a most serious failing as such broad-brush ceverage does not provide for special problems and separate circumstances such as those applicable to supervisors, managers, and guards; security agency employees; employees in competitive positions in the Legislative and Judicial branches and the District of Columbia, the Library of Congress, the Government Printing Office, and the Federal Reserve System. Also, certain existing labor organizations could be excluded from covers ge. For example, features of these two bills would apply to the Federal Bureau of investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency and other agencies, offices and bureaus which have as a primary function intelligence, investigative or security work, The authority of agency heads to exclude installations outside the United States would also be revoked. And the bills would cover foreign nationals. Conflicts of interest are diregarded by the two bills in numerous ways. For example, 11.R. 13 replaces the functional definition of supervisory and managerial roles with artificial criteria of income level, span of control and scope of impact. H.R. 9784 would include supervisory and non-supervisory personnel in the same bargaining unit under certain circumstances. Such features would create un- aceptable conflict-of-interest conditions. The lack of prohibition on the inclusion of guards with non-guard employees presents another conflict-of-interest ques- tion, especially in view of the allowance for strikes in labor disputes under H.R. 9184. Certain labor organizations presently recognized as exclusive representatives could be excluded from coverage under the two bills because of the definition regarding their primary purpose and national or international stature or affilia- tion. and from obtaining additional recognitions under the "primary purpose" criterion of H.R. 10100. A tlministration.--Under all three bills, powerful centralized bodies would be established to administer the respective features. These central bodies would be virtually independent and would supplant the key existing third-party agen- cies authorized under the Executive Order program. With greater authority coneentrated in fewer hands and with the enlarged scope of bargaining, espe- cially under H.R. 13 and H.R. 9784, the bodies would probably have immense impact on the Federal personnel program. Should such central mechanisms be established, the experience and body of precedents developed over the years should not be summarily rejected or ignored. ' Careful consideration needs to be given to the range of authority for policy setting by a centralized body. For example, should such a body, without account- ability, have power to commit elected officials to the major, unappropriated ex- penditure of funds, or to matters affecting the mission of agencies? An agency head's responsibility to manage in the accomplishment of assigned mission needs to be carefully defined. To do otherwise, would be to divorce concern for lire public interest from those officials held accountable by the electorate. Recognition and representation.?Provisions in H.R. 13 would permit the smallest unit to be certified as an appropriate bargaining unit, creating prolif- erations of fragmented units. This is based upon a "community of interest" as the single criterion for establishing appropriate bargaining units. Manage- ment and the public, of course, also have an interest in the npact of unit sl !Picture. The bill ignores (1) the effectiveness of dealings, and (2) the efficiency Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 53 of agency operations?an essential part of Government responsibility to the public. These additional criteria under the existing program by Executive Order are intended to avoid excessive fragmentation of bargaining units, while pro- moting units which are more directly linked to existing personnel authority. Under all three bills, employees of the central bodies could be represented by labor organizations, thereby becoming a party-at-interest in matters coming before the central body as well as becoming involved in union-management dealings with the central body. Such potential conflicts of interest definitely are not in the public interest. All three bills propose other means for determining exclusive recognition as well as secret ballot elections. This is an issue currently before the Federal Labor Relations Council. Labor organizations could also obtain national exclusive recognition to the detriment of any and all other recognized labor organizations, including the abrogation of agreements with other labor organizations, according to provi- sions in 11.R. 13. This would permit one labor organization to obtain a monop- oly and create a situation where that labor organization alone could represent all Government employees. This is contrary to the concept of the sanctity of of agreements and stability of labor relations based on existing agreements. It also permits by simple devices the establishment of a single, all-powerful union of all Government employees to the exclusion of all others. This would create tremendous potential for adverse impact on the public interest from the vantages of equity, cost and disproportionate combinations of political and collective-bargaining power. There could be automatic National Consultation Rights for every local ex- clusive representative, under H.R. 13. Such a device would be untenable. It would require highly elaborate administrative coordination of every agency-level personnel management policy, and a response in writing to justify virtually every management policy. Entitlements.?Agency shop arrangements are included in 11.11. 13 and H.R. 9784. This conflicts with the civil service concept that required membersship in a labor organization or mandatory payment of equivalent fees as a condition of Federal employment is completely inappropriate and in direct opposition to merit principles, which base continued employment on ability to do the job as- signed and which bar use of discriminatory measures in making personnel de- cisions. Also all three bills have provisions that grant, as a right, matters that custom- arily are determined bilaterally. For example, H.R. 13 and H.R. 9784 mandate that agencies withhold dues allotments to exclusive labor organizations, at no cost under 11,11. 13; official time for employees representing labor organizations under H.R. 13 and H.R. 0784; binding arbitration of grievances; and 11.14. 10700 requires that arbitrators be selected from lists furnished by the Federal Media- tion and Conciliation Service. As a practical matter, we believe these issues should be left to the parties for bargaining arrangements that best accommodate to their particular situations. In addition, under H.R. 9784, in the absence of an exclusive labor organization unrecognized unions would be entitled to dues withholding privileges and use of employer bulletin boards, mailboxes and other communications media. Addi- tionally, such unions would have the right of representation at meetings be- tween an agency and employees concerning grievances, potential grievances, per- sonnel policies and practices and other matters affecting working conditions of employees in the unit. And this would clearly be unworkable. Negotiations.?Virtually all aspects of employment could be opened to nego- tiation under H.R. 13 and H.R. 9784. Many of the items which are now deter- mined by Congress or delegated to the Civil Service Commission for implemen- tation would be subject to collective bargaining with potential for adverse ef- fects?not only from the standpoint of costs, but also from the standpoint of equal treatment for employees similarly situated. For example, a union with local recognition could negotiate with local management over the entire range of employment issues, which would directly conflict with the equal-pay-for- equal-work policy by authorizing a system that would produce extreme variations of pay and benefits at every local activity where a union represents Federal employees. The retained rights of management in the public interest, as contained in E.O. 11491, the Postal Reorganization Act, and inherent in various U.S. laws Approved For Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 54 are absent from H.R. 13 and H.R. 9784. For example, there is no provision, as in the Order, that management officials of an agency would retain the right, in accordance with applicable laws and regulations, to direct employees of the agency, to hire, promete, transfer, assign, and retain employees in positions within the agency, and suspend, demote, discharge, or take other disciplinary action against employees, and the like. Management could be obligated to nego- tiate on matters with respect to the mission of the agency, its budget, its organ- ization, and the technology of work. Conceivably, public policy as it affects em- ployment?the agency mission?would be negotiable, with negative impact on the functioning of responsible government, in disregard for the will of the Congress. Also, the grievance definitions and procedures set forth in H.R. 13 and H.R., 9784 are so broad as hi appear to encompass many matters which directly by law or indirectly by Civil Service Commission .regulations pursuant to law are covered by existing appeals procedures. This, coupled with the provisions giving direct, legal right to binding arbitration of grievances, would turn over to arid- trators ninny decisions which Congress itself has made or has deemed should he made by other institutions of Government,?for example, classification ap- peals, equal employment opportunity appeals, performance-rating appeals and political interference appeals. In our review of H.R. 10700, we particularly noted that it substantially pre- sents a more reasonable approach and needed balance to the issue of labor rela- tions legislation in general, and to the rights and interests of the general pub- lic, employees, unions, and management in particular, than other bills introduced in the 93rd Congress. W4ile H.R. 10700 incorporates many of the approaches and mechanisms already embodied in Executive Order 11491, it contains a number of unique provisions, which warrant detailed assessment. For example, posing the most serious problem in H.R. 10700 is the feature es- tablishing a "Federal Labor Relations Board" The Board is to make determina- tions on personnel management policies and regulations that relate to employees in more than one agency. This provision alone E would gravely erode, if not ef- fectively usurp, essential authorities historically delegated by the Congress to Federal agencies and officials for fulfilling their responsibilities. Empowering the Board, as proposed and structured, to determine government-wide policies that affect Federal employees, would seriously cripple management's capability to manage. The decisions would not even-be made bilaterally by management rep- resentatives authorized to, and accountable for, making them and employee representatives specifically elected to participate in their determination. Instead, these decisions would be made by majority vote of the eleven members of the Board, with the Chairman of the Board resolving ties. This would mean that one person?answerable to himself alone--would have the power to determine a vast range of government-wide policy without responsibility to any authority includ- ing the President, the Congress, the Civil Service Commission, or the heads of departments and agencies. Such a concept plainly is not in the public interest. Furthermore, it would be impracticable to administer the Board arrangement. The wide range and volume of subjects and material that various agencies of the Government would he required to submit for policy determination, the very real prospect of extended quasi-negotiations on many issues, the provision for introduction of issues by labor organizations and the need to operate within the specified timeframe for the consideration of proposals all would contribute to nearly continuous and piece-meal bargaining, periodically interrupted by time constraints unrelated to priority issues, workload or status of negotiations. This process and environment would seriously jeopardize deliberation, decision mak- ing, and implementation of government-wide policies. This proposal would per- manently damage the capability of the Civil Service Commission to function and to manage as the central personnel agency of the Government, and to administer the inherent Civil Servic merit system principles. More important?though just as inescapable it would disrupt, frustrate and perhaps on some occasions even paralyze the functioning of Government gem 'ally, since vital operating regula- tions of virtually all agencies would be miffeelcd directly. In addition, there are other significant issues and problems stemming from this provision of UR. 10700. For example, would the Board have authority to determine personnel policies and practices for all employees, including (1) non- represented employees and (2) employees excluded from coverage? If so, what would be the justification for this? If not, what would he the best way to deal with employees mit represented by unions or exeluded from the coverage under Pie law? Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 55 There are also serious problems inherent in the H.R. 10700 mechanism for negotiation on agency regulations issued by authorities above the level of rec- ognition. For example, this would result in bargaining rights where there is no appropriate bargaining unit and the employees affected have had no opportu- nity to express their views. In addition, as we understand the concepts involved, it would be extremely impracticable for agencies- to implement and administer the provisions. Piecemeal and continuous negotiations could result. This would be unworkable in terms of the capability of management to effectuate central policies where there is a need for uniformity throughout the agency or in major organizational segments. Thus, such an arrangement would be chaotic and impracticable from the vantage points of meaningful and constructive negotiations, labor-management stability in general and sound personnel man- agement practice needed for mission accomplishment in the public service. Impasses.?Negotiation impasses would be dealt with differently under the three bills, and none of the arrangements are acceptable. For example, unions would have the right to strike as an option according to H.R. 9784. Although there would be some limitations on the right to strike, the right to strike against the Federal Government in a labor dispute simply is not compatible with the public's need for uninterrupted continuity of Government functions and nation- al defense concerns, as discussed above. The impasse procedures of TER 13 are contrary to the concept of voluntary collective bargaining; they are the same as compulsory, binding arbitration without the necessary procedural protection. Since there would be easy and automatic access to the Authority, the effectiveness of mediation would become virtually nil. Quick recourse to binding arbitration has been found in stifle efforts of the parties to resolve their own differences and encourage "holding something back" for the arbitrator. And, conceivably under H.R. 13, a union could strike with impunity if it also follows the impasse procedure, since there is no specific prohibition against the strike while the broad supersedure clause could be interpreted as repealing the "no-strike" law. To assist the parties in settling impasses, II.R. 10700 provides that at the re- quest of either party, the Authority is required to establish a three-person panel. In our opinion, this mandating of a panel would serve to limit the flexibility of the Authority. The Authority needs more discretion in its consideration of a particular impasse matter. For example, this could include preliminary meet- ings with the parties, fact finding, use of its own staff, and recommendations to the parties for the resolution of the impasse or the use of a panel to settle the impasse by appropriate action. Also, as we interpret 11.11. 10700, the action of an ad hoc panel is final and not subject to further review. Except for negotiability questions it appears that the Authority could not review a panel's decision on an impasse concerning major policy issues. For program integrity and effectiveness, we believe that such review should be available to the Authority- as the central body responsible for administering the functions and purposes of the Act. Furthermore, there could well be provisions for checks and balances on actions and decision of the Author- ity when major policy matters requiring the oversight of the Congress and the highest levels of the executive branch are concerned. Unfair labor practics.?An independent category of unfair labor practices for any "person," is contained in H.R. 13. This concept goes beyond all known labor relations law by permitting the Authority to require action against super- visors and managers, rather than the agency itself. Such a provision creates potent disincentive to initiative by an individual manager or supervisor in any situation of uncertainty involving personnel adminstration. Also, in H.R. 13, it is not designated an unfair labor practice for unions to call or participate in a strike, slowdown or picketing against any Federal activity. Arguably, a strike would at most be an indirect unfair labor practice for refusal to comply with the impasses procedure of the bill. There would be 110 effective sanction against an actual strike. H.R. 9784 also fails to make it an unfair labor practice for a union to call or Participate in strikes and related incidents; or to coerce, attempt to coerce, or discipline, fine, or to take other economic sanction against members of the union as punishment or reprisal for, or for the purpose of hindering or im- peding their work performance, their productivity or the discharge of their duties as employees of the United States. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 56 Without such strictures there would be no effective sanction against unfair union actions. This would substantially weaken existing and conventional stand- ards for responsible unionism. Standards of conduct?H.R. 13 establishes for unions only a general require- ment to maintain democratic procedures, prohibit conflicts of interest and main- tain fiscal integrity, and HAL 9784 fails to include even that. Unions in the current Federal program are subject to standards of conduct and reporting requirements similar to the Landrum-Griffin Act for the private sector. These bills would release unions from much of this responsibility and remove any obligation for demonstrated compliance with stated standards. SUpersedare.--All previous statutes and Executive orders concerning the same subject matter or inconststent with provisions of the bill could be superseded, according to H.R. 13 and MR. 9748. That raises serious questions as to the extent to which civil service laws such as all of Title 5, U.S.C. may be overridden. It also raises questions concerning the degree to :which Congressional authority and determination could be affected in areas such as pay, benefits and classifi- cation. In their present form, the supersedure clauses appear to open to nego- tiation many areas presently subject to Congressional action. For example, would two separate retirement, leave, etc., systems evolve, one for unit members and another for non-unit members? Would different agencies and/or installations negotiate different leave or insurance programs? Would supersedure be selective? If not, who would determine the criteria and which acts would be replaced and which would not? These ire examples of questions which the bills fail to answer. Because of the reasons stated above, and others, we, therefore, recommend against enactment of H.R. 13, H.R. 9784, arid H.R. 10700. THE CONCLUSIO_N S NO DEMONSTRATED NEED FOR LEGISLATION? LED FOR A BALANCED PAILOSOPHY No df.vionstrated need for legislation There is no demonstrated need for legislated labor relations program, particu- larly so comprehensive a program as discussed above. Those who would copy the private sector should consider the troubled conditions existing in the 1930's under which the National Labor Relations Act?a law to provide industrial peace?was enacted. The purpose of the N) R4 Is in sharp contrast with that stated in the Executive Order--an order "to facilitate improved employee per- formance and efficiency"; one concerned with employee well-being and one which favors improved participation of employees "through the maintenance of constructive and cooperative relationships between labor organizations and management officials." Each year, the NLRB directs private sector employers to reinstate thousands of employees who were terminated because they formed, joined, or assisted a union. The Federal program, on the other hand; requires management neutrality in employees' selection of a union; management is not to express its views on the "advantages or disadvantages" of unionization. .Further analysis of today's Federal sector labor relations environment as compared to that which existed in the private sector and led to enactment of the NLRA in 1935 reveals that: Wages and fringe benefits under the multi-tiered Federal personnel structure are comparable to those of the private sector. This view was most recently con- firmed by the Commission's December 1973 study of benefit programs of 25 leading employers, summarized in Attachment "10." That the Federal sector is twice as heavily organized as the private sector argues for continuing under the present system?unless success is to be viewed as a reason for change, hardly a tenable proposition. The program for exclusive recognition and bilateral setting of personnel poli- cies is functioning reasonably well. There have been many more "successes" issued by the Federal Service Impasses Panel in four years. Many hundreds of than "failures." In only 18 cases were fact-finding reports and recommendations successful negotiations have been concluded with no need for third-party inter- vention. Of over 3,000 bargaining situations surveyed in the CSC/OMB study (discussed previously), only 16% involved mediation or third parties (FMCS- 344, FSIP--54, FLRC-23, A/SLMR-6). Of course, this does not mean that the program is perfect. There are problems, many minor, but some major, as discussed above. Many of these can be dealt with through revisions to the Executive Order or by limited legislation. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 5CIA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 Some issues have been raised which we expect would be of major interest to the Congress. These are: Union or agency shop; all-powerful central labor rela- tions authority; negotiations on wages and fringe benefits that could result in lack of uniformity, lack of equal-pay-for-equal-work; and right to strike. In addition because the Federal program is governed by Executive Order we have a framework that has given us the flexibility, versatility, and accommoda- tion not found under legislation in the private sector. In 38 years, the National Labor Relations Act has been revised substantially just twice?generally in 1947 when it took a Congressional override of a Presi- dential veto to do it, and on reporting and disclosure alone in 1959 when the major change was a requirement for reporting and disclosure, essentially by unions. In 47 years, the Railway Labor Act has been changed substantially only once? in 1936 to extend its coverage to air carriers. In just 12 years, the Executive Order has gone through three revisions, and a general review of the program is underway. Thus, the record of the Federal exeprience in labor relations clearly shows no demonstrated need for a legislated program. Rather, it confirms that the Execu- tive Order approach is operating successfully and that it should be continued? in a progressively modified and improved form. Need for a balanced philosophy Under the Federal program that has evolved, a reasonable balance has been struck between management's ability to manage and employees' rights to have a strong voice in matters that affect them on the job. The need for some very special thinking about the requirement to achieve a sensible, rational balance between union and public employer interests within the unique environment of the public service is pointed up by many of the features of the bills discussed above. Among the factors to be considered are the budgetary process, the impact of collective bargaining agreements on taxation, the expression of the public will in personnel matters, legislative enactments, the monopoly character of much of the activities of Government, and the need for uninterrupted public service. These do tend to limit the scope, as well as the acceptability of bargainable mat- ters; and such considerations are vitally necessary in the public interest. Public policy demands that the performance of such governmental functions not be hampered by any particular group in the interests of its members. The public interest must be the prevailing interest in our society. Under our economic system a private firm belongs to its stockholders; the Federal Government be- longs to all the people and therefore must be responsive to the will and the needs of all the people. The public has always had a proprietary interest in the public service and its confidence in that service is something we dare not lose sight of. Efficiency, costs, performance, mission accomplishment, management's capacity to make es- sential decisions and to manage?have to be accounted for to the public. After all, the very premise of Government is that it exists to serve the people, not the employees or public managers or unions. Put in another context, a sys- tem of labor-relations is not devised for the purpose of benefitting employees per se, or employers or unions. Rather, a labor-relations system is, or should be, a means for providing employee input in personnel policy decision-making through their chosen representatives. Such a system, to be truly effective, and in the pub- lic interest, must provide for employee dignity and well-being, protection from arbitrary decisions, and maintenance of management's ability to carry out its assigned mission?all with the overriding objectives of high standards of per- formance and efficient, effective administration of Government. Over all, the record is clear. The Executive Order program is conducive to employee well-being and efficient administration of Government. It is meeting the problems and challenges it's been designed to resolve. It is adjusting to change in an orderly and timely manner. It is workable, viable, versatile. Before abandoning this system, we must satisfy ourselves that there is a factually demonstrated need for a whole new program and that the new program itself would provide us with a better, more balanced approach. Above all, we must first pay very careful and thoughtful consideration to the fundamental issues that are involved. (Our concerns in some of the most important of these areas are outlined in our supplemental submissions.) [The 11 attachments to the statement follow:] Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 ATTACHMENT 1 (J. 8. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Washington, D.C., May 7, 1974. Bulletin No. 711-30 Subject: Analysis of Data and Report on Union Recognition in the Federal Service. To : Heads of Agencies and Independent Establishments. This bulletin contains graphs, charts, and tables presenting a summary analy- sis highlighting the statistics on employee covered by exclusive recognition and negotiated agreements in the Federal Service, and the changes in the extent recognition from November 1972 to November '1973. The report is based on information furnished to the Civil Service Commission by government agencies. The principal finding is that agreements have been negotiated in 335 additional recognition units, an increase of 17 percent over 1972. Overall, 2,264 or 65 percent if all units are covered by 1,904 agreements as compared to 1,929 or 57 percent of units covered by 1,694 agreements in 1972. (Some multi-unit agreements cover more than one recognition). The number of employees covered by agreements has likewise grown to a new high of 837,410 (43 Percent of the total non-postal workforce), an increase of more than 84,000. There are 3,486 exclusive units of recognition, representing a net gain of 94 units. Exclusive recognitions cover 84 percent of wage system employees and 47 percent of General Schedule or equivalent employees. Comparable figures for November 1972 were 83 percent wage system and 46 percent General Schedule. Fifty-six percent (1,086,361) of executive branch employees (excluding the Postal Service) are represented by unions holding exclusive recognition rights in Federal agencies compared to fifty-five percent (1,082,587) in 1972. BERNARD ROSEN, Executive Director. A tta chment. kttachment to Btn. No. 711-30 STATISTICAL REPORT Graphs. charts, and tables in this report provide statistics on exclusive recog- nitions and agreements :granted and negotiated by Federal agencies under the provisions of Executive Order 11491---liabor-Aanagement Relations in the Fed- eral Service and under the former Executive Order 10988?Employee-Manage- ment Cooperation in the Federal Service. The statistics are based on informa- tion reported to the Civil Service Commission by Federal departments and :1,!;:elLeif'S as of November 1973. Tile report covers Feueral employees in the Executive Branch, government- wide, excluding the U.S. Postal Service, FBI, NSA, and CIA, and foreign na- tionals employed outsidr of the United States. The statistics include recogni- tions and agreements in he Tennessee Valley Authority and in certain activities of the Department of the Interior and the Department of Transportation which predate Execntive Order 10988. Executive Order 11491, signed by the President on October 29, 1969, became effective on January 1, 1970, except sections 7(f) and 8 which became effective on the date of signing, Oetober 29, 1969. Executive Order 11616, amending Exec- utive Order 11491, was signed by the President on August 26, 1971, and became effective on November 24, 1971. toenail ions of terms and abbreviations Agency?Department or agency of the Executive Branch. Mion--Union, employee organization, or association granted exclusive recog- nition under the provisions of Executive Order 10988 or Executive Order 11491. (58) Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : SUA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 Exclusive?Exclusive recognition granted by an agency to a union. Exclusive Unit?The grouping of employees within an agency, activity, or installation for the purposes of exclusive recognition and representation. Agreement?Is a document which sets forth the terms and conditions of em- ployment negotiated by a union and an agency under the provisions of Executive Order 10988 or of Executive Order 11491. An agreement providing for union dues withholding is not an agreement for the purpose of this report. Multi-unit Agreement?An agreement which is applicable to more than one exclusive unit. Wage'?Wage system employees, i.e., trades, labor and other employees paid on a prevailing rate basis. `GS'?General Schedule employees and those in similar occupations. 'Prof'?General Schedule employees designated as professional. 'Other GS'?General Schedule employees and those in similar occupations other than professional. NOTES All percentages appearing in this report have been rounded off to the nearest whole number and are not shown if less than one half of one percent. The charts provide a comparison of the status of union representation of Federal employees as of November 1973 and November 1972. In table A, the term 'number' appearing under the heading 'Employees in Exclusive Units' refers to the total number of employees in each agency covered under exclusive recognitions. The corresponding percentages are based on total employment in each agency, and those listed under `ToW' and 'eAGS' are based on agency employment figures for each category. In table B, the term 'number' appearing under the heading 'Employees in Ex- clusive Units' refers to the total number of Federal Service employees covered under exclusive recognitions by union. The corresponding percentages are based on total Federal Service employment, and those listed under '%W' and `ToGS' are based on total employment figures for each category. DATA CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT HAS BEEN COMPILED FROM INFORMATION SUBMITTED BY THE FOLLOWING DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES Executive Office of the President: Office of Economic Opportunity Executive Departments: Department of State Agency for International Development Department of the Treasury Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary Department of the Army Department of the Navy Department of the Air Force Other Defense Agencies Defense Nuclear Agency Defense Contract Audit Agency Defense Mapping Agency Defense Supply Agency National Guard Bureau Department of Justice Department of the Interior Department of Agriculture Department of Commerce Department of Labor Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Department of Housing and Urban Development Department of Transportation 34-619 0-74 5 Agencies: Atomic Energy Commission U.S. Commission on Civil Rights Environmental Protection Agency Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Federal Communications Commission Federal Home Loan Board Federal Power Commission General Services Administration Interstate Commerce Commission National Aeronautics and Space Administration National Capital Housing Authority National Labor Relations Board Overseas Private Investment Corporation Railroad Retirement Board Renegotiation Board Securities and Exchange Commission Selective Service System Small Business Administration Smithsonian Institution National Gallery of Art Tennessee Valley Authority United States Civil Service Commission United States Information Agency United States Soldiers' Home United States Tariff Commission Veterans Administration Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/0% CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Commonly used abbreviations of federations and national and international unions and associations Abbreviation: Name of union or association AAE Aeronautical Examiners; National Association of (Ind). ACT Association of Civilian Technicians (Ind). AFGE Government Employees; American Federation of (AFL-CIO). AFT Teachers, American Federation of (AFL-CIO). ANA American Nurses Association (Ind). APCA Aeronautical Production Controlmen Association (Ind). APWU American Postal Workers Union (AFL-CIO). APWU?Clerli. Craft. APWU?Maintenance Craft. APWIl?Motor Vehicle Service Craft. APWU?Special Delivery Messenger Craft. BBF Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers; International Brotherhood of (AFL- CIO). BPAT Painters and Allied Trades; International Brotherhood of (AFL-CIO). BRASC_ Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks, Freight Han- dlers, Express an d Station Employees; Brotherhood of (AFL-CIO). BRC Railway Carmen 4 America; Brotherhood of (AFL- CIO). CJA Carpenters and Joiners of America; United Brother- hood of (AFL-CIO). FOP Police, Fraternal Order of (Ind). FPQI Plant Quarantine Inspectors National Association; Federal (Ind). GAIU Graphic Arts Intemational Union (AFL-CIO). TAFF Fire Fighters; International Association of (AFL-CIO). IAM Machinists and Aerospace Workers; International Association of (AFL-CIO). IAS Siderographers; International Association of (AFL- CIO). IATC Tool Craftsmen; International Association of (Ind). IBEW Electrical Workers; International Brotherhood of (AFL-CI 0) . IBFO Firemen and Oilers; International Brotherhood of (AFL-CI 0) . ICW Chemical Workers Union; International (AFL-CIO). IFFP_ International Federation of Federal Police (Ind). IFPTE 1 Professional and Technical Employees; International Federation of (AFL-CIO). IPPA Printing Pressmen and Assistants Union of North America; International (AFL-CIO). ITU Typographical Union; International (AFL-CIO). IIJOE Engineers; International Union of Operating (AFL- C10). LIUNA Laborers International Union of North America (AFL- CIO). MEBA Marine Engineers Beneficial Association; National (AFL-CIO). MMP Masters, Mates and Pilots; International Organiza- tion ot, International Marine Division of ILA (AFL-C10). MTC Metal Trades Council (AFL-CIO). NAATA National Army Air Technicians Association, Affiliate of TUE (AFL-(710). NAATS National Association of Air Traffic Specialists (Ind). NABET Broadcast Empl. yees and Technicians; National Association of (AFL-CIO). NAGE Government Employees; National Association of (Ind) Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 oFIA-RDP75B00380R000500220001-6 Commonly used abbreviations of federations and national and international unions and associations?Continued Abbreviation: Name of union or association NA GI Government Inspectors, National Asso ciation of (Ind) NALC Letter Carriers of the United States of America; National Association of (AFL-CIO). NAPEP Planners, Estimators, and Progressmen; National Association of (Ind). NAPFE Postal and Federal Employees; National Alliance of (Ind). NCSA Customs Service Association; National (Ind). NEA_ National Education Association (Ind)?NEA Over- seas Education Association (CEA). NFFE Federal Employees; National Federation of (Ind). NLRBP National Labor Relations Board Professional Associa- tion (Ind). NLRBU National Labor Relations Board Union (Ind). NMU Maritime Union of America; National (AFL-CIO). NTEU 2 National Treasury Employees Union (Ind). NUCO National Union of Compliance Officers (Ind). OAA Operations Analysts Association' National (Ind). OCAW Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union (AFL-CIO). OPEIU Office and Professional Employees International Union (AFL-CIO). PATCO Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization, Affiliate of MEBA (AFL-CIO). PML Pattern Makers League of North America (AFL-CIO). POMH Post Office Mail Handlers, Watchmen, Messengers and Group Leaders; National Association of, A division of LITTNA (AFL-C10). POPA Patent Office Profsessional Association (Ind). PPDSE Plant Printers, Die Stampers and Engravers Union of North America; International (AFL-CIO). PPF Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada; United Association of Journey- men and Apprentices of the AFL-CIO. RCIA Retail Clerks International Association (AFL-CIO). RLCA Letter Carriers Association; National Rural (Ind). SOME State, County, and Municipal Employees; American Federation of (AFL-CIO). SEIU Service Employees International Union (AFL-CIO). SIU Seafarers International Union of North America (AFL-CIO). SMW Sheet Metal Workers International Association (AFL- CIO). TDA Train Dispatchers Association; American (AFL-CIO). TRSOC Trademark Society, Inc. (Ind). UTU United Transportation Union (AFL-CIO). UT W United Telegraph Workers Union (AFL-CIO). Councils and directly affiliated locals of AFL-CIO: CBTC Columbia Basin Trades Council. CPTC Columbia Power Trades Council. DATU Truckers Directly Affiliated Union. ECNS Employees' Council of the USMV North Star III. TVSE TVA. Public Safety Service Employees' Directly Affiliated Union No. 2033. TVTLC Tennessee Valley Trades and Labor Council. 1 Formerly AFTE. Formerly NAIRE. NOTE?The abbreviations listed are not necessarily the official ones for these organizations, but are those used in this report and elsewhere. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 62 LO CAL IND EPENDE NT UNIONS Alaska Fisherman's Union. Executive Committee of Planners and Estimators, Progressmen, and Assistants. Educational Secretaries of the Nation's Capitol. Federal Employees Council, Picatinny Arsenal, N.J. McClellan Employees for Equality. Methods and Standards Analysts Association. National Government Employees Union. Navy Civilian Professional Association. Organization of Contract Administration Engineers. Policemen's Association of the District of Columbia. Professional Association of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Seattle Center Controllers Union. Technical Skills Association. TVA Engineers Association. United Police and Security Association. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 GRAPH I EMPLOYEES IN EXCLUSIVE UNITS AND COVERED BY AGREEMENTS 1969 - 1973 NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES 1,100,000 ? 1.050,000 1.000,000 950,000 960000 850,000 800,000 750,000 700000 650,000 600.000 550.000 500,000 450,000 400,000 350.000 300,000 250,000 200.000 150.000 100,000 50,000 YEAR 707,067 1,002.60 Total Employees in Units Wage Grade Employees in Units General Schedule Employees in Units Total Employees covered by agreements .066.361 1969 1970 1971 1972 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 1973 Approved For Release 2001/09/0664CIA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 = z ;822111112RIBIBSSWR RR 4R 22? cc LI : \ :11.1111 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 6cIA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 UNION RECOGNITION IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT,' NOVEMBER 1973 AND NOVEMBER 1972 1973 1972 Change/percent I. Employees covered by exclusive recognitions, executive branch totals: Total covered 1, 086, 361 1,082, 587 *+3, 774 Wage system 404, 955 427, 089 -22, 134(-5) General schedule 681, 406 655, 498 +25, 908(+4) II. Employees covered by exclusive recognitions, by major agency :2 1. Army 185,192 195, 412 -10,220 -5 2. Navy 179, 515 192, 659 -13,144 -7 3. Ai r Force 179,468 181632 -2,164 -1 4. Veterans' Administration 126, 455 120, 344 +6,111 +5 5. Treasury 69, 741 64, 327 +5,414 +8 6. Health, Education, and Welfare 69, 345 59, 503 +9,842 +1) 7. Denfense Supply Agency 36, 578 37, 309 -731 -2) 8. Transportation 35, 345 34, 532 +813 +2) 9. National Guard Bureau 29,051 28, 986 +65 ") 10. Interior 23, 549 23, 164 +385 +2 11. General Services Administration 22, 354 21, 806 +548 +3 12. Tennessee Valley Authority 21, 895 22, 550 -655 -3 13. Agriculture 21, 803 19,778 +2,025 +1) 'Change is less than 1 percent. Date extracted from the forthcoming November 1973 edition of the Civil Service Commission publication "UNION RECOGNITION IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.' Postal Service data are excluded unless otherwise indicated. 2 An agency in which the number of employees in exclusive recognition units exceeds 20,000. 1973 1972 Percent change Number Percent Number Percent III. Exclusive coverage compared with total employ- ment,' executive branch totals: Total 1, 086, 361 56 1, 082, 587 55 d-1 Wage system 2 404, 955 84 427, 089 83 +1 General schedule 2 681, 406 47 655, 498 46 d-1 , IV. Exclusive coverage compared with total employ- ment, by major agency: 1. Army__ 185, 192 58 195, 412 58 2. Navy 179, 515 60 192, 659 60 3. Air Force 179, 468 76 181, 632 76 4. Veterans' Administration 126,455 64 120,344 63 +1 5. Treasury 69, 741 65 64, 327 61 +4 6. Health, Education, and Welfare 69, 345 53 59, 503 52 +1 7. Defense Supply Agency 36, 578 70 37, 309 78 -8 8. Transportation 35, 345 51 34, 532 51 9. National Guard Bureau 29, 051 59 28, 986 61 -2 10. Interior 23, 549 34 23, 164 33 +1 11. General Services Administration 22, 354 60 21, 806 58 12. Tennessee Valley Authority 21, 895 91 22, 550 90 ti 13. Agriculture 21, 803 19 19, 550 17 +2 Federal employment in the executive branch, excluding U.S. Postal Service, FBI, CIA, NSA and foreign nationals serving outside the United States. November 1973=1,940,648; November 1972=1,957,076. 2 Wage employment: November 1973=483,824; November 1972=512,695. General schedule employment: November 1973=1,456,824; November 1972=1,413,874. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 .6k1A-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 Union Number units Employees Units under Employees represented agreement covered Percent covered V. Exclusive recognitions and agree ments, by major union, Novembe - 1973: I. AFGE 1, 587 624, 322 987 469, 371 75 (WG 210088) (GS 414, 234 2. NFFE 659 118, 13 429 91,306 77 (WG SO, 930) (GS 87, 209) 3. NAGE 376 75,953 228 57,880 76 (WG 35, 652i (GS 40, 301 4. MTC 53 52, 58 40 42, 797 81 (WG 50, 145) (GS 2, 440) 5. NTEU 88 50, 392 82 48,250 96 (WG non (GS 50, 392 6. IAM 91 2, 552 74 24, 338 82 (WG 26,862 (GS 2,690 Number of units Employees represented Percent Percent Union 1973 1972 change 1973 1972 change VI. Growth in exclusive recognition, by major unFon: 1. AFGE 1,587 1,541 +3 624322 620,744 +1 2. NFFE 659 646 +2 118, 139 114, 420 +3 3. NAGE 376 381 ?1 75, 953 82, 187 ?8 4. MTC 53 50 +6 52,585 57,038 ?8 5. NTEO 88 86 +2 50, 392 46,522 +8 6. IAM_ 91 89 +2 29, 552 30, 585 ?3 VII. Number of Different Unions Recognized, by category, November 1973: AFL?CIO national and international unions 40 Independent unions 23 Total 63 VIII. Units of Recognition, executive branch total, November 1973: AFL-CIO affiliates 2,161 Independent unions 1,325 --- Total 3,486 IX. Units of Recognition, by selected union, November 1973: AFGE.1,587 NFFE 659 NAGE 376 IAM 91 NTEU 88 IAFF 79 MTC 53 IBEVT 46 ANA_ 44 NAIL. 36 SEIU 27 IFPTE 24 LIUNA 21 ACT 20 IFFP 20 NAPEP 20 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 :61A-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 X. Summary of recognitions, agreements, and employees covered: 1973 1972 Change/percent Exclusive recognitions 3, 486 3,392 +94(+3) Employees covered I, 086, 361 1,082, 587 +3, 774(*) Recognitions under agreements 2,264 1,929 +335(+17) Employees covered 837, 410 753, 247 +84, 163(+11) Employees covered under agreements as a percent of employees in recognition units 77 70 (+7) *Less than 1 percent. 1973 1972 Number Percent Number Percent Percent change XI. Employees covered by exclusive recognition, postal and nonpostal: Postal 614, 554 89 604, 660 91 ?2 Non postal 1, 086, 316 56 1,082, 587 55 +1 Total 1 1, 700, 915 65 1, 687, 247 64 +1 1 November 1973 Federal employment, postal and nonpostal combined=2,632,387. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 TABLE A -RECOGNITIONS AND AGREEMENTS BY AGENCY NOV. 197 AGENCY EMPLOYEES IN EXCLI.WIVE UNITS AGREEMENTS EMPLOYEES ...0E, AGREEmENT RECOGNITIONS NUMBER S WAGE SW PROF OTHER GS SOS Number ????? NUMBER Office Fcunon1H OPP0,1915.1Y 3 I In 4 975 ? 3113 4 1 37 4- 1,657 I 317 97 ? 39% 776 1 975 ? ......_____ Deparlmtn1 of Slate 23 263 27 258 2% , - Apericy Intl. Develop 22 4.454 1. T4: 962J L t- 06'; 845 11 + 39^, "-- 77.; 152 1.483 31% II I 657 31% lreasury 64.741 I---65'; 333 1 ? 24,432 40.825 634 35 116 65.061 60% ?MC Of Octavos% Office of S...crti, 48? 15 9.832 3.804 3.093 312 251 265 _ 270 ? 4 4 398 333 142,712 ? 40 . 1 Army 601 600 241 1 14 75 -1- 1115.192 1 59'; I- 179.515 1 607 - -4--- 179,468 [ 76'; 223 1 ? 373 1 11.; r 1.7119 23'; 83,940 115,705 87,995 14 523 .1.47.0 60.006 88.380 1 119 61 1 1 1.015 45% 401 667 117 303 Navy .?er Force .._H- Defense Natekar Ammo kfense Conirmi Audit _. Meese Maw** Dcfcrise Simply Agency --t- 339 145 369 161 133,815 45% 120,626 51% 213 1 1 373 117 - 20% 10 10 1,452 19% .1 36.578 1 70'.; 9,029 27.284 68% 49 59 33,755 64% National Guard Bureau Justice Irdetior i 37 1. 209 29,031 1 54' ; 11.9711 -r 42% 4 23,549 341: 15.914 66% t_. 737 617 40% i. 77'.i. 917- 721.:. 100%. 757 117 441 3,164 2.468 I 2.396 6,561 13.137 537 75 76 15.301 317 1.046 8.679 2,769 1.839 74 4,703 62 4,334 1' -I- 1 -1- -I- 10.491 11,706 56.566 6 5 3.560 40% 277 7 7 11,321 39% 154 160 20,579 297 Sancultine 96mucius Leer Ikahh, Eduralion & Welfare floosie,/ Urhan Domlornicnt I 34 I lb 3 271 57 __i_ 21.8031, 19% r , 10,746 1 32',1 10.195 -r-,-;.-:- -1 -- 69,345 1 53'; 1- 9634 1 557 10% 9311 -.1.. 83 48 1--95 83 18.069 167 . t 8,671 26'; ' .757 3 3 10,195 75% 4032 421 60,610 I 52';;. 9. 1 5 1 54% 127 27 128 30 93 31/31 40%. 3,382 197 Transportation 219 12 - I -r- 35,345 1 51'; 3,039 -1 ,40::: 1,052 982 29.959 4 2.045 4974 75 26,114 38% Atomic Fiwyry Commission 407 9 9 536 7% 'animist:ion on Civil Kiphis - -i- 72 t ' 3.310 L34%. I 161 II j_. ? 71% 19 164 152 1 ? LnwronInental Protection .1cency 14 1- I 2,785 33% 904 EEOC .1 - 2.067 t ? 1 ? 1,231 825 Communications Comm. Federalm 1 1 1?5 5 ? 475 1 ? 18 5 ? 251 206 ? 350 Federal Dome loan Bank Board 4 Federal Power commission Federal 'Dade Commission I I 1.102 1 ? 36 ? 27 52i 25 550 11 Genera Service Administration 165 22.354 60% 12,371 486 9.497 45% 73 98 14,845 40% Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 TABLE A (cont'd) ? RECOGNITIONS AND AGREEMENTS BY AGENCY NOV. 1973 AGENCY RECOGNITIONS EMPLOYEES IN EXCLUSIVE UNITS AGREEMENTS EMPLOYEES UNDER AGREEMENT NUMBER I WAGE I %W PROF. OTHER GS V %GS Number Reco3. .6.0. Coremd NUMBER % Interstate Commerce Commission 3 1,229 12.161 , ? I - I 45'.4 1 ? t? I 735 I ? 24 1.494 1 * 1 1 93',i, I I ? L';.__6 1 ? -1-71' 1 1 1 " 1 58% 324 3.615 __ . 97 10 881 7,052 4 789 61 1,312 72 500 514 * 425 3 12 3 13 1,229 7,313 ? 27%, NASA 22 National Capital Housing Authorit / I 468 468 19 2 26 73% ? ? ? ? 1 14% 1 1 468 ? 73% _ ? NLRB . 7 I 1,784 7 3 3 i ..1 . I . 1 1 4 7 I 1 I 1,784 73 1,346 Overseas Private Investment Corp. Railroad Retirement Board 1 -- 1346 I I * 8 87 106 ? Renegotiation Board 1 159 621 525 I ? 1----H I14% 15 11 159 * Securities and Exchange Comm. 1 _ 1 4 461 _ 314 --I-- * , 85 Selective Service System 8 Small Business Administration 23 2,040 4 435 I 295 20 297 Ar_ I 100'; I 1 485. 35 1.985 448 113 5.213 3.329 1,550 178 435 235 * 78% 4W; 415 1 ? 10 4 Li - 2 2 I ll 4 1 1 21 L.. 2 1.217 745 132 26'.; Smithsonian 4 . 745 29',; National Gallery of Art 1 21 9 137 1 ? 19 14 497 47 355 418 I? I ? i 99;1 1 81',: '7 1 94'.; 1- I ? 2,185 M5 50 39 TVA 21,895 3,461 1,955 1 ...91c; I 485 1- . , 46% 21,895 915 U.S. Civil Srvice Commission _ 489 455 U.S. Information Agency 3 2 2 1,925 596 U.S. Soldiers Home 3 635 -I I * ' ? U.S. Tariff Commission 2 244 I ? 8 : ? 124 112 . 81,162 1 ? 1 I 8 Veterans Admin. 333 ? 126,455 i-- I 645 33,332 I 915 11.961 58% 270 276 113,843 585. TOTALS 3,486 1,086,361 I I 56% 1 404,955 f I 84% I 86,978 594,428 475 1,904 2,264 837,410 43% - ? Pereentoge? are not shown for agencies of fewer than 2.500 empto Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 70 , NOV. 1973 TABLE B - EXCLUSIVE RECOGNITIONS AND AGREEMENTS BY UNION UNION RECOG- NITIONS EMPLOYEES IN EXCLUSIVE UNITS PROF. REC. NITIOMS c.v... re 1,17.it EMPLOYEES UNDER AGREEMENT EXCL. NUMBER I % WAGE -raT, w .THER GS %GS NUMBER % AAF 6 221 I 221 I 2 105 ACT 20 7,609 14,076 1 -1.---- % 28,799 3,533 I 385.435128% 9 987 2,573 469,371 24% A FGE 1,587 624,322 1 32% 1-' 210,088 i 43% AFT 1,221 1 1-- 1- 1_ 1,221 5,168 I 16t 3 179 ANA APCA 44 5 14 2 6 1 I 4 a f 5,1414_1 30 3,774 890 4 I -- 890 1 4 607 APWU REIF 1,121 1 788 1 1,534 I 4 1 897 I 788 1- 1,214 1-- 224L 320 1 4 2 5 341 788 BPAT 1.525 BRASC -1--- I 141 1 14 SRC CIA FOP 32 T 1,31.2 1 341 1 -- 52 L._ 1340 L I 1,121 F 4 r 26.862 1 6% 4t I 2-21-- 341-I--- 1 2 52 1,339 6 296 FPI:31 I5117 14 79 91 1 1 4 46 46 3 1,2527 1. t 2,462 1 29,552 1 2% 4 1 35 I 10,240 r 1% 507 507 I- 1 507 GAIU AFF 1AM IAS IATC 1-- 141 . 13 1,148 I 1 2.4581 56 1,884 2,690 L I 74 24,338 1% 1- 35 , 9,040 2% I 1 35 186W IBFO 1,2001--- 43 8,170 236 r 236 1 I -- 17-131--- 2 6 236 1CW 6 20 24 460 295 j 468 iFF! IFPIE IPPA TU1 1U0E t 1,609 [ 6,719 3_ I 597 I 2,829 1,609 i 5 370 3.2931 14 3,520 4 10 21 18 10 53 6 4 4 376 le7 1 5 I 2,408 I1 7,169 r 699 r 103 T- 41_ 3 99 5 r 2,173 1 6,748 1 682 i_ I 2531 4211 17T- 7 2,352 1UNA MEBA MMP 16 6340 9 152 382 I 382 1 r 5 77 MTC t 52.565 . 3% 50,145 1 10% 290 2,1504, 387 1 4 40 42,797 2% NAATA 1- - 695 308 I NAATS 3,374 I_ 242 1 75,953 1 4% I 21 1 1 35,652 . 7% -r- 35 . -1 1,392 4 3,374 1 4 3,374 NABET 2,570 221 i i_ 37,7311 3% 4 242 NAGE 228 57,880 3% NAGI NAPEP 9 20 7 971 1 1,472 r 915 r 936 1 8131- 7 10 7-971--I- 8781 NAPFE 633 1 195 1_ I 9 6,173 28-21- 5,7111-- 5 8 850-t- NCSA . 8 3 659 2 5 5,9191- i 6,173 . 5,919 NEA -I-- 2 429 4,404 NFFE NLRBP NLRBU I 118,139 1 6% 208 1 1.576 1 30,930 1 6% 9.76$ -I--- 77,444 j 6% 91,306 5% 1 19-1 208 768 I 789 1 2 5 208 - 1,576 - Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : ckA-RDP75B00380R000500220001-6 NOV. 1973 TABLE B (cont'd.) ? EXCLUSIVE RECOGNITIONS AND AGREEMENTS BY UNION ? UNION RECOG- NITIONS EMPLOYEES IN EXCLUSIVE UNITS REC. NITIONS ....Er. VA% EMPLOYEES UNDER AGREEMENT EXCL. NUMBER 1 % WAGE %W PROF. OTHER GS % GS NUMBER 1 % NMU 36 5.862 1 5.446 1 4 22,135 4121 28,2571 3% 27 82 5,120 48,250 2% NTEU 88 50,392 1 3c; 1 NUCO 1 350 1--- 1 350 1 1 350 OAA 5 1-97--r- 1971 1 74 OCAW 1 120 1---- 120 -1-- ?1- 1 120 OPE1U 3 2,950 , ----2-,t1 I 2,723 PATCO 13 I 15.000 , 10 15,000 1% 13 15,000 1% PML ? 12 I 182 1 102 80 6 138 POPA 1 1.231 1 1,231 1 1,231 PPDSE 3 205 1 205 2 183 PPF 7 1,488 1 1.488 7 1,488 RCIA 2 220 1 181 391 120 SCME 5 2,758 1- 686 19 2,053 2 2,535 SEIU 27 -1--- , 9,995 , l';, 4.140 1% 5,855 21 8,680 SIU 9 I 1,648 1 1,634 II.1 I 3 1 101 1 SMU 2 242 I 242 230 TDA 1 7 I 71 I 1 7 62 TRSOC 1 62 1 162 1 UTU 2 1401F 11n- 7,125 T--- 140 114 1 1 2 2 140 391 UTW 5 Other AFL-CIO 20 3.052 4,0731 13 20 2,679 7,252 1 Other IND. 31 9.328-1- 1,112 4,870 3,37-161- TOTALS 3,486 1 1 1,086,361 , 56% 404,955 , 84% 86,978 1 594,428! 47% 2264 1 837,410 , 43% Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 '72 UNION RECOGNITION IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH - NOV. 1973 TABLE C - EMPLOYEES COVERED BY EXCLUSIVE RECOGNITIONS, BY PAY METHOD 3,4Y METHOD NUMBER PERCENT OF TOTAL EMPLOYMENT , Trades and labor General schedule 404,955 681,406 84% 47% TOTAL 1,086,361 56% -.... TABLE 0- EMPLOYEES COVERED BY EXCLUSIVE RECOGNITIONS, BY AGENCY AGENCY NUMBER PERCENT OF AGENCY EMPLOYMENT Army 185,192 58% 4 Navy 179,515 60% Air Force ? 179768 76% "1 --- Veterans Administration 126,455 64% -- Treasury 69,74165% , Health, Educcion, and Welfare 69,345 53% All Other 276,645 43% Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : 9A-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 UNION RECOGAITION IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH - NOV. 1973 TABLE E - EMPLOYEES COVERED BY EXCLUSIVE RECOGNITIONS, BY UNION UNION 1973 1972 American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO 624,322 620,744 National Federation of Federal Employees 118,139 114,420 National Association of Government Employees 75,953 82,187 Metal Trades Councils, AFL-CIO 52,585 57,038 National Treasury Employees Union 50,392 46,522 International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO 29,552 30,585 All other 135,418 131,091 TABLE F - EXTENT OF ORGANIZATION, BY MAJOR UNION R I A N K UNION RECOG- NITIONS EMPLOYEES IN EXCLUSIVE UNITS RECOG, NITIONS COVERED BY AGREE 'BENTS EMPL. UNDER AGREEMENT EXCL. N TuOMTBAE LR , RANK I WAGE 1 ' RANK 1 GENE RA L 1 SCHEDULE NUMBER I. % 1 1 I /LEGE 1587 624,322 1 1 210,088 1 1 414,234 987 469,371 124% 2 1 NI-FE 659 118,139 4 1 30,930 2 1 87,209 429 91.3061 5% 3 1 NAGE 376 75,953 3 1 35,652 4 1 40.301 228 57.8801 3% 4 I MTC 53 52.585 2 1 50,145 6 1 2,440 40 42,797 1 2% 5 I NTEU 88 50,392 6 I 0 3 1 50,392 82 48,250 1 2% 6 I IAN1 91 29,552 . 5 1 26,862 5 I 2.690 74 24,338 1 I% ('NOTE. This percentage is based on Mai nonposial etnploymet I (1.940.648). TABLE G - UNION RECOGNITION 1969 - 1973 UNION EMPLOYEES REPRESENTED IN EXCLUSIVE UNITS, BY MAJOR UNION 1973 1972 t011 1970 1969 RANK 1 NUMBER RANK I NUMBER RANK NUMBER RANK I 2 NUMBER 530,550 RANK 1 NUMBER 482,357 AFGE 1 624,322 2 1,1 118,139 1 620,744 2 I 114,420 1 606,391 2 106,881 NI-FE 77,099 3 58,676 NAGE 3 I 75,953 3 82,187 3 83,067 3 68,615 4 58,239 MTC4 52,585 4 1 57,038 5 .1 46,522 6 1 30,585 4 61,046 5 I 41,331 4 66,089 2 75,243 NTEU5 50,392 5 38,502 5 38,518 JAM _ 6 j 29,552 6 1 31,098 _ 6 32,350 6 34,139 Approved For Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 9-1?000ZZ009000t108?0089/dCIU-VIO : 90/60/1?00Z eseeieu Jod peAwddv TABLE H -- TOTAL EMPLOYEES :N EXCLUS:VEUNiTS AND COVERED BY AGREE:VitN 1963 .1973 emPLOYEES IN EXCLUSIVE UNITS 17.M;',..:',YELT. C.C'VCriLD BY AGREEMENTS TOTAL EMPLOYEES WAGE SYSTEM EMPLOYEES GENERAL SCHEDULE EMPLOYEES `,EAn? Ti..YrAL PERCENTNUMBER PERCENT NUMBER PERCENT NUMBER PERCENT 1963 180,000 1964 230,543 12 110,573 6 1965 319,724 16 241850 12 1966 434,890. ? 21 226,150 40 179,293 15 291.532 14 1957 529,915 29 338,660 54 291,235 21 423,052 20 1968 797,511 40 400,669 67 396,842 28 556,962 28 1969 842,823 42 426,111 72 416,712 29 559,415 28 1970 916,381 48 429,136 81 487,245 35 601,505 31 1971 1,038,288 53 437,586 84 600,702 42 707,067 36 1972 1,082,587 55 427,089 83 655,498 46 753,247 39 1973 1,086,361 56 404,955 84 681,406 47 837,410 43 "NOTE: 1963-1966 Statistics based on figures as of mid-year; 1967-1973 figures are as of November **NOTE: Wage system and general schedule combined do not equal total because of unavailability of information on status of some employees. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : OtA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 TABLE I--GROWTH OF EXCLUSIVE RECOGNITION MID-YEAR EMPLOYEES IN EXCLUSIVE UNITS % GAIN EMPLOYEES 1963 180,000 1964 231,000 28% 1965 320,000 39% 1966 435,000 36% 1967 (Nov.) 630,000 45% 1968 (Nov.) 798,000 27% 1969 (Nov.) 843,000 6% 1970 (Nov.) 916,000 9% 1971 (Nov.) 1,038,288 13% 1972 (Nov.) 1,082,587 4% 1973 (Nov.) 1,086,361 * *Less than 1% Approved_Fpg Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 0 CD 0- 0 .0s, 1973 TABLE .1. ? ? RECOGNI I IONS AND AGREEMENTS BY UNION AFFILIATION UNION RECOG- NITIOFIS EMPLOYEES IN EXCLUSIVE UNITS REGOGNITiONS EMPLOYEES UNDER AGREEMENT NUMBER I i % WAGE I SW 4- PROF. OTHER GS 1 % GS COVERED BY AGREEMENTS NUMBER % EFL-C10 2,161 763,705 I 73% 330455 1 82% 33,162 429.888 ' 1 685 1,400 604,735 72% . ational Independent 283.328 26% 73 1118 1 18% 48,946 161.194 1 31% 844 225.423 27% her Independent 31 9,328 " 1 I% 1,112 1 . 4,870 3,346 I, 1',T 20 7,252 1% .1294 TOTALS M 3,486 1,086,361 i I I 100% 404.955 I 1100% I 86,978 594,428 1 1 100% 2,264 837,410 100% tri CO Co 0 0 0 tri 0 0 K.) K.) 0 0 0 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 77 TABLE K ? NATIONAL EXCLUSIVE RECOGNITION* November, 1973 , , RECOGNITION GRANTED BY LABOR ORGANIZATION DATE RECOGNIZED UNIT DESCRIPTION l Office of Economic Opportunity AEC& 4/30/72 All non-supervisory GS-WG employees including prof. of the 0E0. nationwide. Agency for International Development AFGE/1534 3/6/72 Activity-wide except Foreign Service employees & employees in the Office of Auditor General en- gaged in security work. Department of Treasury/ Bureau of Alcohol. Tobacco and FirearmN NTH., 4/23/73 liurcau-wide excluding prof. Criminal Enforcement Division employees, and National Head- quarters employees. Department of Treasury/Bureau of The Mini Al-GF 9124/73 Activity-wide except prof. Department of Treasury/Bureau of The Mini Al-GE 9/24/73 Professional activity-wide. Dematment of Navy/Military Sealift Command MFBA 6/15/73 Marine Engineering Officers Worldwide. Department of Justice/Bureau of Prisons and Federal Prison Industries Inc. ARill (Council of Prison Locals) 1/17/68 Service-wide. except Deadquarters perNotilld. Department of Justice/Immigration .d Naturalization Service Al:GI (National Border Patrol ('ouncil) 6/21/67 Non-prufessiona i employees assiped to Border Patrol Sectors. Service-wide. Department of Justiw/Iminigration and Naturalization Service AWE (Council off. & N.S. Locals) 4/26/68 Service-wide, except prof. and Border Patrol employees Departnient of Agriculture/ ' Agricultural Marketing Service. Meat Grading Branch AFGE (National Office) 8/28/70 Meat Graders activity-wide. Department of Agriculture/ Agricultural Marketing Service, Tobacco Div. NFEE Local 1555 9/6/68 Tobacco Inspectors activity-wide. Department of Agriculture/Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Office of the Administration Al-GE (National Joint Council of Food Inspection Locals) 3/7/72 Food Inspectors activity-wide. Department of Agriculture/Animal and Plant Ilealth Inspection Service, Plant Protection and Quarantine EPOI 9/1/64 Professional activity-wide. Department of Agriculture/Office of the Inspector General WEE Local 1375 9/25/64 Special agents & auditors GS-5 to GS-I 3 Department of Labor . AEGE Local 12 _ 8/29/62 1 Department-wide in Washington, IX' Metropolitan area. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/0g CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 TABLE K ? NATIONAL EXCLUSIVE RECOGNITION* November, 1973 (Continued) RECOGNITION GRANTED BY LABOR ORGANIZATION ' DATE. RECOGNIZED UNIT DESCRIPTION Departnicnt of Labor AFGE (National Council of Held Labor Lodges) II/5/65 Department-wide outside the Washington DC Metropolitan area. Department of Labor (IMSA) NUCO 10/18/72 All nonsupervisoly field Labor- Management Relations Compliance Officers & Compliance Assistants, GS-13 & below. Department of Transportation/FAA, Flight Service Stations and Inter- national Hight Service Stations NA VI'S 2/29/72 All air traffic control specialists. Department of .franspot tation/ FAA. Airport TratTic Control Dowers. Air Route Trellis Control Centers and Conibined Station Towers PATCO (an affiliate of MEBA) 0/20/72 All air traffic control specialists. Department of Transporta Eon/ Federal Railroad Administration Headquarters AFGE (National Offix) 4/28/71 Nationwide, except prof. and the Alaska Railroad. Department of Tr. spor ta non/ National Traffic Safety Administration AFGE (National Office) 5/4/73 All non-professional employees. Equal Employrnent Opportunity Commission AFGE 7/6/71 Activity-wide. Federal Power Commission AFGE Local 421 11/13/70 Activity-wide. National Labor Rd:tilt/11S Board. General Counsel NLRB() 11/27/64 All professional employees of the regional, sub-regional and resident offices of the NLRB excluding Region 8 in Clevekind. National Labor ReLi lions Beard. General Counsel NLRBU 1 i t'27/64 All clerical and non-professional employees of the regional, sub- regional, and resident offices of the NLRB excluding Region 8 in ClevelandOverwas Private I nvestinen 1 Corporation AFGE Local 1534 9/22/71 Activity-wide. Railroad Retirement Board ---------- AFGE (Council of Locals 375 and 8081 5/8/63 Activity-wide. Tennessee Valley Authority Tennessee Valley Trades and Labor Council i', )37 TVA-wide. 1 Tennessee Valley Authority __------ ? Salary Policy Employee Panel 11/18/43 TVA-wide. ...See Civil Service Commission Bulletin 711-28, Page 5. for guidelines. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : 96A-RDP75B00380R000500220001-6 TABLE L ? NATIONAL CONSULTATION RIGHTS. November, 1973 AGENCY UNION AGENCY UNION TREASURY NTEU INTERIOR NFFE NCSA (Bureau of Reclamation) . . . . IBEW AFGE AGRICULTURE AFGE (Customs) NCSA NFFE (Customs) AFGE COMMERCE NFFE NAGE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE . ? MTD HEALTH, EDUCATION & . NFFE WELFARE AFGE ? 0EA (Social Security) AFGE . IAM-AW HOUSING & URBAN AFGE DEVELOPMENT AFGE Office of Secretary AFGE TRANSPORTATION AFGE Army IAM NAGE NAGE ATOMIC ENERGY COMM AFGE NFFE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AFGE AGENCY AFGE Navy AFGE GENERAL SERVICES ADM . . ? AFGE IAM ? NFFE MTD INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMM . . AFGE NAGE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS & SPACE NFFE ADMINISTRATION AFGE Air Force NFFE RENEGOTIATION BOARD AFGE NAGE SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM . AFGE AFGE SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM NFFE DEFENSE CONTRACT AUDIT . AFGE SMALL BUSINESS ADMIN AFGE DEFENSE MAPPING AFGE SMITHSONIAN AFGE DEFENSE SUPPLY AFGE CIVIL SERVICE COMM AFGE NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU. ? ACT VETERANS ADMIN SEIU ? AFGE NAGE NAGE NFFE NFFE AFGE JUSTICE AFGE ARMY & AIR FORCE EXCHANGE . AFGE (U.S. Marshals Service) AFGE Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 9-1.000ZZ009000t108?0089/dCIU-VIO : 90/60/1?00Z eseeieu Jod peAwddv AUTHORITIES INVOLVED IN EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491 1 PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION Regulates and adVlses on Government- wide personnel policy through the Fed- eral Personnel Manuel. Provides Tech- nical advice and assistance to agencies an labor-management relations. Develops labor relations policy guidance in con- junction with the Office of Management and Budget and transmits this to agen- cies. Provides information on labor rela- tions to agencies, anions and the public IEvaluates agency labor relations opera- tions and adherence to merit system requirements. Provides labor relations ? training to rnonegers. supervisors and personnel specialists. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET Develops labor relationApolisy guidance for agencies with Civil Service Commission FEDERAL MECIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE Provides mediation services to assist parties negotiating an agreement. FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS COUNCIL Altac'nment 2 SINV011 as principal administrative authority for labor relations policy making under E.O. 11491. Prepares reports to the President with recom- mendations for program changes. Adjudicates appeals on arbitration awards, decisions of the A/SUAR, and negotiability disputes. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF LABOR FOR LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Determines units, supervises elections, certifies exclusive representative. decides unfair labor practice complaints, resolves grievability and arbluability disputes, ad- ministers standards of conduct for unions IMPASSE RESOLUTION DC 0, ? ? 0 0 tri CO co tri rs.) rs.) FEDERAL SERVICs IMPASSES PANEL Serves as final authority on resolution of negotiation impasses. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 ATTACHMENT 8 U.S. FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS COIJNOIL, Washington, D.C., April 26, 1974. To: Mr. Anthony F. Ingrassia, Office of Labor-Management Relations, Civil Service Commission. From: Harold D. Kessler, Acting Executive Director. Subject: Council Case Handling Statistics. The following is supplied pursuant to your request for a breakdown of certain Council case processing statistics previously furnished your office by Mr. Frazier. Received Closed I. 1972: A/SLMR cases 26 16 Negotiability issues 19 10 Arbitration awards 10 3 Total 55 29 II. 1973: A/SLMR cases 33 33 Negotiability issues 22 38 Arbitration awards 12 11 Total 67 82 III. 1974 (January?March): A/SLMR cases 14 12 Negotiability issues 4 4 Arbitration awards 8 2 Total 24 18 FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS COUNCIL The Federal Labor Relations Council was established by Executive Order 11491, Labor-Management Relations in the Federal Service, which was issued by President Nixon on October 29, 1969, effective on January 1, 1970. The Council consists of the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, who is the Chairman of the Council, the Secretary of Labor and the Director of the Office of Manage- ment and Budget. The Council was established in response to a clearly recognized need for a central authority to administer the Federal sector labor-management relations program. Executive Order 10988, the first Executive Order governing labor- management relations in the executive branch, had provided that authority to administer the program should be vested in the heads of executive departments and agencies with technical guidance and assistance provided by the Department of Labor and the Civil Service Commission. Within a few years agencies and unions clearly recognized the need for a central authority to administer the program and make final decisions on policy questions and disputed matters. According to the Report of the 1969 Study Committee, agencies had found that the lack of authoritative central rulings on policy questions tended to build up unreasonable pressures on the labor-management relationship. The mere ap- pearance of bias inherent in agency resolution of disputes between the agency and a union had placed an excessive burden on agency decisionmaking. Labor organizations complained of the basic inequality in such an arrangement and insisted on program supervision by a central authority and third-party handling of disputed matters. (81) Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2oo1io9ffl6 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Thus, the Council was established to provide overall policy and program direction for labor-management relations in the executive branch and to resolve specific disputes between unions and other Federal agencies. In resolving such disputes, it serves as a third party in the sense that it is not a party to the disputes before it. The ?Study Committee and the President concluded that a central body of high-level officials in the executive branch, such as the Council with its particular composition, would ensure the desired balance of judgment and expertise in the resolution of disputes and in the administration of the program. In effect, it is the responsibility of the Council to promote what the Study Committee, which recommended its creation, described as "an equitable balance of rights and responsibilities among the parties directly at interest?the employees, labor organizations, and agency management?and the need, above all, in public service to preserve the public interest as the paramount consid- eration." The functions of the Council are described in section 4(b) and (c) of the Or- der. Section 4(b) states that the Council shall administer and interpret the Order, decide major policy issues, prescribe regulation, and, from time to time, report and make recommendations to the President. Section 4(c) provides that the Council may consider, subject to its regulations? (1) appeals from decisions of the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management Relations issued pursuant to section 6 of the Order (2) appeals on negotiability issues as pro- vided in section 11(c) of the Order; (3) exceptions to arbitration awards; and (4) other matters it deems appropriate to assure the effectuation of the purposes of the Order. To carry out its functions, the Council has issued rules and regulations which are contained in Table 5, Chapter XIV, of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 2410 of those rules sets forth the procedures under which the Council, as pro- vided in section 4(b) of the Order, will issue interpretations of the Order and 8,:atements on major policy issues. Part 2411 of those regulations sets forth the procedures under which the Council will review decisions of the Assistant Secretary of Labor, negotiability issues, and arbitration awards. The Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management Relations is respon- sible for deciding questions as to the appropriate unit for purposes of exclusive recognition and related representation issues; for supervising representation elections; for deciding unfair labor practice complaints and alleged violations of the standards of conduct for labor organizations; and for deciding whether a grievance is subject to a negotiated grievance procedure or to arbitration under an agreement. The Council will accept an appeal from an Assistant Secretary decision in such matters where a major policy issue is present or where it appears that his decision was arbitrary and capricious. Because bargaining in the Federal sector takes place within an extensive existing legal structure of statutes, executive orders and regulations, the Order provides a means to resolve disputes as to whether a given bargaining proposal conflicts with such law. Determinations in such cases are initially made by the head of an agency. A union may appeal to the Council for a decision when it disagrees with an agency head's determination that the proposal would violate applicable law or regulation of appropriate authority outside the agency or the Order, or, where the agency head has relied upon agency regulations, the union may appeal to the Council if it believes the agency regulations, as interpreted by the agency head, violates applicable law, the Order or regulation of appro- p rite authority outside the agency. The third type of appeal which may be brought before the Council is an (exception to an arbitration award issued pursuant to a negotiated grievance procedure. The Council will grant a petition for review of an arbitration award only where it appears from the facts described that the exception presents grounds that the ward violates law, appropriate regulation, or the Order, or other grounds similar to those upon which challenges to arbitration awards are sustained by courts in private sector labor-management relations. From its creation in January 1970 through March 81, 1974, the Council has received 218 appeals cases under section 4(c) of the Order-115 have been ap- peals from decisions of the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management Relations which were issued pursuant to section 6 of the Order--74 have been appeals from agency head determinations on negotiability issues under section 11(c) of the Order?and 29 have been exceptions to arbitration awards issued Pursuant to agreements negotiated under the Order. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : g4A-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 When President Nixon signed E.O. 11491, he directed that a review and assessment of operations under the Order be made after one year. That review was initiated by the Council with public hearings in October 1970. Those hear- ings were followed by an intensive study by the Council of major policy issues which were raised and subsequently by a report to the President which resulted in amendments to the Order. In September 1973 the Council initiated its second general review of the Federal sector labor-management relations program. As a first step, unions, agencies and other interested parties were asked to suggest issues for consider- ation, including possible alternative courses of action. After carefully examining all the matters proposed for inclusion in the review, the Council selected 23 areas which became the central focus of the review and parties were asked to submit substantive position papers on these areas. Following receipt and review of the submissions, the Council held public hearings on April 8, 9, and 10, 1974. Representatives of selected agencies and labor organizations testified at the hearings. The purpose of the hearings was to provide the Council an opportunity to seek amplification of the written submissions which had been previously submitted and to pursue proposals made. Among the areas under review by the Council are the following: (1) The treatment of specific categories of people under the Order, such as supervisors, management officials, confidential employees, professional employees, guards, and attorneys. (2) Recognition procedures, including the requirement for secret ballot elec- tions under the Order. (3) The consolidation of existing bargaining units. (4) The scope of negotiations, including the impact of agency regulations and management rights on the scope of negotiations. (5) Negotiated grievance procedures and arbitration. (6) The requirement for review and approval of agreements to ensure that they comport with law. (7) Operation of third-party procedures. (8) Official time for union representatives. (9) The impact of agency reorganizations on the labor-management relation- ship. Those who testified were invited to submit supplementary statements to the Council. Following a careful review and analysis of the transcript and the parties' written submissions, the Council will prepare a report and recommenda- tionsfor submission to the President. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 ATTACHMENT 4 U.S. FEDERAL 'SERVICE IMPASSES PANEL, Washington, D.C., April 26, 197.4. To: Anthony F. Ingrass'.a, Director, Office of Labor-Management Relations, Civil Service Commission. From: Howard W. Solomon, Executive Secretary. RE: Background material for Chairman Hampton's testimony. In response to your April 16, 1974, request for a brief statement on the Panel's function, organization, membership, and case statistics for Chairman Hampton's testimony on Federal labor relations legislation, the following infor- mation is provided.. The Federal Service Impasses Panel, which has been in existence since August 10, 1970, is an agency e3tablished pursuant to section 5 of Executive Order 11491, as amended, to assist Federal agencies and labor organizations in the resolution of negotiation impasses. If the Panel gives favorable consideration to a request for assistance, it will make recommendations for the resolution of the impasse. The Panel is composed of seven individuals, appointed by the President from outside the Federal Government who are experienced in the field of labor- management relations awl who devote some or a major part of their time to the arbitration of labor disputes. Many have also had War Labor Board expe- rience in dispute settlement, and have served on Presidential Emergency Boards under the Railway Labor Act, Taft-Hartley Boards of Inquiry, and various State, county and municipal boards for dispute resolution. The members of the Panel are: Jacob- Seidenberg, Chairman; Lloyd H. Bailer, Richard L. Epstein, Albert L. McDermott, Jean T. McKelvey, Arthur Stark, and James C. Vadakin. The members of the Panel serve on a part-time basis to the extent dictated by the volume of Panel business. Although three or more members constitute a quorum, the entire Panel has been meeting almost monthly at its Washington, D.C., office. As the administrative head of the Panel, the Chairman is responsible for the overall leadership and dintction of its operations. He presides at all meetings of the Panel and provides coordination with the Federal Labor Relations Council, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, and the Department of Labor regarding administration of the Order. An Executive Secretary assisted by three Staff Associates, is responsible for he day-to-day administration of the Panel's responsibilities. Encompassed within the sphere of the Office of the Executive ?Secretary are ease handling, :informal assistance to agencies and labor organizations, liaison with key staff members of other third-party agencies providing services under the Order, and other administrative responsibilities. As of April 15. 1974, the Panel had received a total of 105 requests for assist- ance. (Chart I) Except for five joint requests, all other actions have been initiated by labor organizations. Ninety-two cases had been closed as of April 15, 1974, (Chart II) and 14 were still pending. Only 20 disputes, or 19 percent of the closed cases, required a factfinding hearing. Eighteen of these factfinding hearings were followed by the issuance of a Panel Report and Recommendation for Settlement. It is noteworthy that 16 of the 18 Panel Reports and Recommen- dations were accepted in toto by the parties. In the other two cases, the Panel's recommendations were used as a basis for settlement. Most of the remaining 72 cases were settled informally either at the ['rehearing conference after fact- finding had .5een directed, or during the course of negotiations which were resumed voluntarily or at the direction of the Panel. Chart III indicates that the most prevalent impasse issues, which have been brought before the Panel, are: official time for union negotiations ; advisory (84) Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 versus binding arbitration as the terminal step of the negotiated grievance procedure; union representation concerning promotions and awards; and sched- uling of work. In the past year, however, the focus of the issues at impasse coming to the Panel have shifted to issues concerning: merit promotions; details and temporary promotions; incorporation of "just and sufficient" cause as a criterion for disciplinary action; and contract language in which disputes over the interpretation of agency regulations, which have been cited in the agreement, would be subject to the negotiated grievance and arbitration procedure. Attachments. CHART I.?CASES RECEIVED 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1 Total Cases received 16 24 26 30 9 105 'As of Apr. 15, 1974. CHART II.?DISPOSITION OF CLOSED CASES " 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1 Total Withdrawn 1 6 8 8 1 24 Jurisdiction declined 7 1 8 Returned for more negotiation 4 1 5 Returned for more mediation 4 4 1 1 10 Returned for other voluntary arrangements 1 1 2 Directed to 11(c) 1 4 3 1 9 Settled prior to factfinding 1 5 8 2 16 Settled after panel report and recommendations 3 3 7 5 18 Total closed 16 24 25 24 3 92 'As of Apr. 15, 1974. CHART III.?FREQUENCY OF ISSUES IN CASES 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974' Total Official time for negotiations 1 2 5 10 18 Grievance arbitration: advisory v. binding 2 4 4 6 16 Promotion and awards?union representation 3 3 3 6 15 Hours of work?including work scheduling 5 3 2 4 14 Grievance procedure 2 3 4 1 2 12 Leave 2 4 2 8 Pension, health, safety 1 1 5 1 8 Allocation of parking spaces 2 2 1 2 7 Service charge for dues withholding 2 5 7 Wages 3 1 1 1 6 Merit promotion 5 5 All other 8 37 22 35 19 116 Total 27 58 53 68 26 232 As of Apr. 15,1974. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 ATTACHMENT 5 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, OFFICE OF' THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY, Washington, D.C., May 10, 1974. Hon. ROBERT E. HAMPTON, Chairman., U.S. Civil Service Commission, Washington, D.C. DEAR BOB The attached data is supplied pursuant to your request for a breakdown of certain Assistant Secretary case processing statistics. If you desire additional information, please let me know. Sincerely yours, PAUL J. FASSER, Assistant Secretary of Labor. Attachment. FEDERAL LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS?WORRLOAD DATA?JAN. 1, 1970 THROUGH MAR. 31, 1974 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974% Total Representation cases: Opened 1,409 970 583 679 179 3,820 Closed 755 1,311 599 642 172 3,479 Unfair labor practice cases: Opened 240 197 243 343 70 1, 093 Closed_ 63 262 203 256 94 878 Glievability and arbitrability cases: Opened 5 26 18 49 Closed 1 17 10 28 Elections supervised 646 666 303 367 81 2, 063 Representation hearings held 18 88 69 62 13 310 Unfair labor practice hearings held 2 14 35 77 27 155 Assistant Secretary's decisions: Representation cases 2 111 95 57 21 286 Unfair labor practice cases_ 1 8 15 40 17 81 Standards of conduct cases 2 3 5 Assistant Secretary's rulings on requests for review 27 114 99 91 26 357 1 As of Mar. 31, 1974. Total number of cases: Opened 4,962 Closed 4, 385 Total number of hearings held. 465 Total number of Assistant Secretary's decisions 372 Total number of Assistant Secretary's rulings on requests for revsew 357 (86) Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 ATTACHMENT 6 AN ASSESSMENT OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS CLIMATE AT FEDERAL FIELD ACTIVITIES Basis of the survey Each of the Commission's ten Regional Labor Relations Officers conducted a survey during the month of May, 1973 in order to sample the general climate for labor-management relations existing at Federal field activities and installa- tions. The sample was composed of field activities which in the judgment of the Labor Relations Officers are representative of the overall perspective within the region. Very small installations and those with little or no labor relations activity were excluded from the sample. The sample consists of 99 representative field activities that are engaged as exclusive representatives of 362 units of recognition (bargaining units) under in a bilateral relationship with unions that have been recognized or certified the Federal program. In those situations where multi-unit agreements apply to multiple units of recognition or to a nationwide agreement, where for adminis- trative purposes, employees are organized into separate local unions on a geo- graphical basis, all such elements are considered as a single unit for the purpose of this study. In order to provide for uniformity among the regions, a series of 13 questions designed to elicit information to provide an overview of program successes and problems was prepared for use as a survey agenda. A list of the questions used as agenda is attached as Appendix "A." Limitations of Findings and Assessment We believe that we have selected a wide enough sample to establish a fairly representative overview of the manner in which Federal labor relations are being carried out. The 362 bargaining units that are represented in data gathered at the 99 installations represent greater than 10% of the total number of units that exist. This percentage would of course be higher if a total count were made of all units covered by multi-unit agreements, rather than to consider them as a single unit. This would be reflected in perhaps a two point increase in percent- age of sample. The data that has been collected was derived through interviews with a single level of management, the managers within the activities having labor relations and/or personnel management responsibilities. The facts as established in this report, therefore, are those as seen through the eyes of staff persons engaged in personnel management activities. No contact was made with union repre- sentatives whose views might have differed in some respects. An overview of labor relations climate at local installations extracted from the findings of the Commission's regular program of personnel management evaluation reviews bears out in general terms the findings of this survey. All levels of management, rank and file employees, and the unions give input to such evaluations. This fact points to the general reliability of this survey. Findings and assessment 1. status of Union-Management Relationship.?An overwhelming number of activities report that they consider that satisfactory relationships have been established with the unions with which they deal. One large installation reported a good relationship despite the fact that the exclusively recognized local union is under a trusteeship imposed by its parent national union. In the few cases reporting adversary relationships, they were attributed to problems generated by personality conflicts or deficiencies. (87) Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 88 A ssessment On the basis of our findings a good case is made for the stability of relation- ships that have evolved in the Federal collective bargaining process. One man- ager "hit the nail on the head" when he said that good labor relations has im- proved the installation's overall management process. 2. The process of negotiations.?Most activities reported that negotiations with their unions progressed reasonably well, although there were a significant number who believed that there had been delays that should have been avoided. Reasons stated for delays were: The immaturity of both parties. Problems created by internal union political situations. Delays ID headquarters approval. A number of agencies reported this. One reported "nit-picking" on the part of headquarters reviewers. Problems over union proposals that, managers considered as non-negotiable issues. Lengthy delays in the union membership ratification process. A number of agencies reported this. Delays caused when national union representatives failed to appear at sched- uled meetings. The hard stand that management took on contract issues. Assessment Many of 1:he problems cited will never be corrected under any system. As the parties gain in maturity and become more knowledgeable and proficient in nego- tiation techniques we can expect attitudinal problems to diminish to some extent but never totally. The outstanding reasons cited for negotiation delays concern the headquarters approval and the union ratification processes. The streamlining of headquarters approval methods that have been initiated in many agencies should be continued and improved. 3. Substance of agreements.?Only 17 instances were given where the activity considers that their agreements are simple boilerplate. Most others believe that their agreements are substantive and properly deal with means and meth- ods for the problem solving process. Agencies are generally in agreement that agreement language and content becomes more sophisticated and meaningful each time that they are renegotiated. A few activities recognize that both parties require additional training in negotiation techniques. Assessment There is no doubt but that more substantive agreements are being negotiated as time goes on. 4. Understanding of the collective bargaining process.?A very large majority of those questioned are of the opinion that the parties to negotiations are deal- ing with each other with a better understanding of the collective bargaining process. This item closely parallels item 2 to which we received similar response. The general consensus is that the negotiating experience is an educational process, and that the parties, especiall3, managers, had achieved a much better understanding of bilateralism as a result of the negotiation experience. Man- agers recognize their deficiencies and are aware that they need more training and a still greater understanding of the collective bargaining process. A few acknowledged that union representatives had matured faster than management personnel, indicating the need for additional management training. Some, while if the opinion that their skills had improved, realize that they are far from :?xperts in collective bargaining techniques. One respondent stated that agree- ment proposals are better researched and presented at the bargaining table. A number of activities attributed a lack of understanding to the fact that nego- tiating teams change frequently. .4 ssessmeat The passage of time during which both parties have gained experience in the collective bargaining process has improved understanding of the collective rgaining process on the part of both unions and managers. While problems still exist, it seems quite apparent that labor relations training activity is beginning to "pay off." 5. Unfair labor practice complaints.--40% of the activities reported that they had had involvement in the Unfair Labor Practice machinery of the Executive Order. Many of these had been resolved informally, or had been withdrawn by Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 the union prior to settlement. Others had gone the full route to A/SLMR deci- sions, had been dismissed by LMSA or were currently in process. Charges had been filed on just about every possible issue. One activity reported that a union that they deal with has made many threats but has not to date filed any charges. An activity reported that it had been the recipient of 34 charges and that a union trend seems to be developing to file unfair labor practice charges in lieu of grievances. Assessment The filing of numerous unfair labor practice charges should not in itself be considered as a breaking down of the Federal labor-management relations pro- gram. Provisions for the orderly processing of such matters were placed in the Executive Order for the use of the parties in dispute settlement efforts. While the reports from this survey are not specific enough to make a sound evalua- tion, there seems to be fragmented evidence that some unions have a misunder- standing of the purpose and use of the unfair labor practice concept. There is no question but what some frivolous charges have been filed. On the other hand activity managers should govern their actions so as to minimize any deliberate violations leading to charges. This entire area of unfair labor practice charges, their causes, their effect upon continuing relationships, problems created by un- favorable decisions, etc. might well be the future subject for a widespread study. 6. Official time for negotiations and dues withholding.?There were few nego- tiation problems reported for either official time or dues withholding. Most activ- ities gave a simple yes or no answer, and the record is not complete regarding either the amount of time or of fee that has been negotiated. On the basis of those reporting actual charge for dues withholding 76% report that a 2 cent fee has been established; 12% report a fee higher than 2 cents; and 12% report a fee lower than 2 cents. On the basis of those activities reporting actual arrange- ments for negotiating time on the clock 75% reported the establishment of a straight 40 hours; 14% less than 40 hours; and 11% one half of all duty time that union negotiators are engaged in bargaining. This indicates that a definite pattern has been established. In three quarters of all negotiation activity, there is little or no actual negotiation on these issues. 7. Fragmentation of bargaining units.?Approximately 70% of the activities reporting stated that they have had no problems because of the over-fragmen- tation of bargaining units. A number of others that indicated problems char- acterized them as minor, more a nuisance than any thing else. A few referred to additional costs, generated as a result of separate negotiation sessions with each union: Examples of specific problems are: overlap of units in periods of reorganization; movement of employees between bargaining units; and union whipsawing in negotiations. Those activities that have instituted multi-unit bargaining as a solution to unit fragmentation problems are well pleased with the results. Assessment There are few real problems resulting from fragmented units, most of which were established under Executive Order 10988. The multi-unit agreement concept provides one solution to many of these problems. 8. Agency regulations as an inhibitor to negotiations.-70% of the activities reported that the imposition of higher agency regulations has not limited the scope of bargaining or otherwise bad a significantly inhibitory effect on negotia- tions. Several of those, however, say that they do not believe that the union would necessarily agree with their judgment. On the other hand 10% made definite statements that higher agency regulations have created negotiation problems at their activities. Aaseasment It must be expected that opinions of both union and management representa- tives would vary in this regard depending upon the degree of their collective bargaining sophistication and their desire to negotiate significant issues in collective agreements. The results of this survey do seem to indicate that there is less of a problem in this area than might otherwise have been suspected. 9. Administration of agreements.?A majority of the respondents indicate that agreement administration is working well at their activities and that they have few problems in this regard. Most problems cited have their basis in the steward-supervisor relationship or with the manner in which the stewards Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/M : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 perform their representative duties. Problems that have developed in agreement administration are listed as follows: Personal animosities holding over from conflict at the bargaining table. Problems because of personal relationships between the steward and the supervisor. Improper use of stewards time while engaged in representational duties. Turn over in military supervision. Frivolous grievances. Supervisors violation of agreements. Managers who have not embraced the spirit of bilateral dealings. Assessment There were no surprises in the replies to this question. They were about as should have been expected, and generally parallel experience in the private sector. 10. Solving problems through union-management cooperation and application of the negotiated grievance procedure.?There were very few examples of activi- ties reporting that employee problems are not being solved through constructive cooperation of the parties. Other than the problems reported in 9 above, the program with the assistance of third parties seems to be working as contem- plated, although at times there are delays and irritations. 25% of the respondents noted that problems are being solved although the grievance procedure has not been used. 10% advised that all grievances had been settled at the informal stage. This is not to imply that there are no "horror stories" such as the local union that has sent 23 grievances to arbitration. asessment This is an area in which the respondent was required to exercise judgment. We do not know how the union representatives would have responded to this question, but findings from evaluation reports do not suggest a different view- point. 11. Supervisors.?Of all the matters raised in this survey, the greatest problem that has surfaced concerns the lack of supervisory identity as a member of the management team. Only 40% of the respondents consider that they have no problems in this area. Despite the emphasis on supervisory training in labor- management relations over the past two years, supervisors are generally identi- fying with employees, rather than recognizing their role as members of the management team. The problem is especially severe at the first level of super- vision, but reports show that there are some problems at higher levels. A few reports do indicate that the situation is improving. It is no doubt due to the training that they have been receiving both in agency and Commission training programs that the situation is improving but, much remains to be done in continuation of this effort. Very few reports make a definite assertion that "supervisors relate to the management team." The following are examples of responses received from the activities: Supervisors are reporting to union officials. Supervisors are giving information to unions, and are siding with union posi- tions. Supervisors identify witn employees; there is little inducement to become a supervisor. Supervisors bow to union demands. Some supervisors are former union officers with divided loyalties. We have definite problems with 1st and 2nd level supervisors. The turnover of military supervisors creates problems. Problems are created bj the retention of supervisors in the unit under the Section 24 savings clause of the Executive Order. 1st level supervisors pass the buck. Assessment Evaluation reports clearly support the information gathered in this survey. This is a real problem which will be difficult to solve. The first level supervisor is management's first line representative in the bilateral process. All efforts should be made to engage him in full management participation. 12. Professional organizations.?None of the activities responding recited problems in dealing with professional organizations. Very few, however, have had dealings with such organizations. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : dk-RDP75B00380R000500220001-6 13. Third party procedures.-90 percent of the activities reported that they had experienced no problems with third party procedures that had inhibited their dealings with the unions. Many, in answer to this question, gave straight "no" answers, making it difficult to evaluate gradations in their replies. Twenty of the activities reported that they had no dealings involving a third party. Twenty-two activities reported that third party agencies had facilitated their dealings with the union. FMCS was cited very often in this context, although in one instance FMCS efforts were said to be pro-union. Assessment Assuming that the sample used in this study is representative of the over- all universe, about 10% of Federal local activities see third party procedures as Inhibiting their dealings with unions representing their employees. Most com- plaints have to do with delays in rendering decisions. Now that the third party agencies have had experience and have "geared up" for discharge of their responsibilities, decisions are coming out with an increasingly greater frequency. It is encouraging to note that so many activities consider that third party involvement has facilitated their dealings with other unions. APPENDIX A Questions asked in the survey of local installations 1. Does management at the estabishment level believe that their relationehlps with organized unions are basically satisfactory? 2. If an agreement has been negotiated or renegotiated since November, 1971 (the effective date of the amended Order), did the negotiations move? along reasonably well, or were there significant problems or delays? Identify the problems and the extent and reasons for the delays. Were these negotiability disputes? Delays in agreement approval? 3. Was the agreement substantive; did it deal with problems and issues par- ticular to the employees in the unit of recognition? If renegotiated, has the substance been increased over the previous agreement? If so, give examples, if available. 4. Are there indications that the parties to the negotiation are dealing with each other with better understanding of the collective bargaining process? 5. Have ULP charges been filed? What type of charges? How resolved? 6. Have any problems been indicated relating to use of official time for negotiation? Dues withholding fees? 7. Have any problems been caused by unit structure (size and composition) of bargaining unit? Illustrate. 8. Have agency regulations had a significantly inhibitory effect on agreement negotiations? Have the parties identified this as a problem? Are there instances of agency regulation changes narrowing the scope of negotiations? 9. Are there any indications as to whether agreement administration is work- Ing well, or problems? Specify. 10. Any indications of constructive union-management cooperation to resolve employee problems? If there is a negotiated grievance procedure, how has it been working? 11. Any problems with identification of the supervisors role as a part of the management team? 12. Any problems in dealings with professional organizations? 13. Any indication that third-party procedures (A/SLMR, FLRC, FMCS, Panel) have facilitated or inhibited dealings between unions and management? If so, specify. ApproVed9Fdr4Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 ATTACHMENT 7 CSC/OMB SURVEY OF TUE COLLECTIVE-BARGAINING PROCESS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491, Mama 1974 SECTION I. OVER VIEW A profile strongly indicating the parties are learning to work with each other in a productive bilateral atmosphere, generally devoid of major disagreements or long delays in the negotiating process, emcrges from a comprehensive survey of more than 3,000 exclusive bargaining units conducted by the Civil Service Commission in conjunction with the Office of Management and Budget.' While the parties generally have taken much longer to get to the table to negotiate an initial basic agreement that is customary in the private sector, once they get there they reach final accord in time periods somewhat com- parable to their private-sector counterparts. There is strong indication, however, that the existence of a prior dues-withholding agreement considerably extends the period between certification or recognition and request for negotiations. The survey also tends to show that while official time for union negotiators have been a troublesome issue it was not widespread statistically, and once the parties reached agreement over total amount the union used less than allotted. On the negative side, the agency approval process tended to use as much or more time than the parties used at the table to reach agreement. In almost 20 percent of the cases, special problems o:r circumstances were cited in the approval process. A quick overview of the findings: 1. In about 65 percent of the units, dues-withholding agreements were nego- tiated before an initial basic agreement. (This figure likely is influenced by the fact that some units achieved dues withholding under formal recognition, which did not entitle the union to negotiate agreements on other matters.) 2. While dues withholding typically was achieved in six months or less (58 Percent) and in three months or less 45 percent of the time, only 23 percent of the units were covered by basic agreements in less than six months and more than 51 percent took a year or more to negotiate their initial agreement. 3. The existence of a dues-withholding agreement tended to delay the nego- filiation of a basic agreement. In those units with prior dues agreements, it took an additional six months or more to negotiate a basic agreement 65 percent of the time and more than a year in 47 percent. Furthermore, in 29 percent of the cases the part:ies have gone more than two years without a basic agreement although a dues-withholding agreement exists. 4. Once a request was made to negotiate (initiated 87 percent of the time by the union) the parties went to the table and started bargaining (including ground rules) in one month or less 40 percent of the time and in three months or less 76 percent of the time. 5. In 64 percent of the exclusive units, ground-rules negotiation took less than one week, and in 87 percent the parties reached agreement in one month or less. 6. Once ground rules were determined, the parties completed negotiations in three months or less in more than 66 percent of the units. Only about 18 per- cent took more than six months, and about 8 percent took more than one year. Actual period at the table once negotiations on a full agreement were started was six months or less in 82 percent of the cases. 7. More than 71 percent of the units completed negotiations in 10 bargaining sessions or less, with only about 12 percent taking more than 20 sessions. Figures are based on 3,085 unit responses?representing 89 percent of exclusive-unit population reported under Executive Order 11491. (See Section 2 for methodology and t'overage.) (92) Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 :9g1A-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 8. The elapsed time between request to negotiate and effective date of the current agreement was six months or less over 50 percent of the time and a year or less 78 percent of the time. 9. The prevailing pattern for official time for union negotiators was 40 hours maximum (53 percent), with the prevailing number of union negotiators being three or four (57 percent). The actual time used per negotiator was 20 hours or less in 57 percent of the cases, while less than 9 percent used more than 40 hours. 10.. In 256 cases, or 12 percent of the units, there were requests for excep- tions to regulations; waiver of regulations was granted to 19 percent of the requests, including a 50-percent rate on requests involving disciplinary proce- dures. 11. The most time-consuming issues at the bargaining table were scope of grievance procedure (indicating apparent confusion and problems with the 1971 amendments to the Order covering scope), promotion policies and procedures, overtime policies and practices, time allowances for union stewards, manage- ment rights, and official time for negotiations (in that order). 12. Third-party assistance was utilized in only 16 percent of the units, with FMCS involvement predominant (344 cases). The Panel was utilized in 54 cases, the Council in 23 and the A/ SLMR in six. 13. The issues most often requiring third-party assistance were promotion policies and procedures, grievance procedure, management rights, official time for negotiations, dues withholding, work-week definition and overtime policies (in that order). 14. In 69 percent of cases, the agreement was forwarded for agency approval within a month after local negotiations were completed; In 7 percent, it was sent forward in three-to-six months. 15. After settlement at the local level, the approval process took three or more months in 36 percent of cases?including over six months in 16 percent, and more than a year in 4 percent. In only 27 percent of the cases was approval completed in less than a month. (These figures include time taken to resolve negotiability issues, and to renegotiate provisions rejected by higher authority.) SECTION IL METHODOLOGY This survey was conducted at the request of the Federal Labor Relations Council?initially, as a result of concerns raised at its first resident summit conference last summer with the other third-party principals responsible for administering the Government-wide labor relations program under Executive Order 11491. During that conference, third-party principals acknowledged a need?expressed before and since by agencies, unions and others?for informa- tion, on a comprehensive basis, about just how the negotiating function is working under the Executive Order program. As it developed, the survey objective became more clearly defined as: To produce the basic information essential to informed decision-making by program administrators on the collec- tive-bargaining process?with special emphasis on those aspects staked out as areas of immediate concern to the Council?for its use in connection with the 1973-74 general review of the program. The Civil Service Commission, in conjunction with the Office of Management and Budget, conducted this survey during the six-month period from September 18, 1973, to March 15, 1974. In anticipation of public hearings on the program scheduled for April 8-10, the Council requested completion of the survey report by April 1, 1974. The basic survey instrument was a computer-coded questionnaire (Appendix III) developed jointly by CSC's Office of Labor-Management Relations and OMB's Executive Development and Labor Relations Division?with primary in- put from the Mediation Service, Council and Impasses Panel. Technical as- sistance from Commission experts in questionnaire-drafting and computer- planning contributed to its design?so as to maximize the objectivity of the responses in eliciting the information sought. Before "locking in," the design and substance of the questionnaire were discussed with headquarters Labor Relations Officers of major Departments and agencies whose suggestions were incorporated, ani reviewed by Council staff for final approval. Some 3,500 questionnaires?one for each unit of exclusive recognition reported under the Order?were mailed to appropriate Federal officials at activities, Gov- Approved For Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 94 ernment-wide. Their return was monitored by OLMR and the Commission's Regional Labor Relations Officers for maximum response. This effort produced 3,085 usable questionnaires by March 15, 1974?repre- senting 89 percent of the 3,486 exclusive units recorded in CSC's Labor Agree- ment Information Retrieval System (LAIRS) as of the November 1973 reporting period for the latest annual recognitions-and-agreements census (Appendix IV). More significant, survey responses included virtually all units covered by nego- tiated agreements: 2,306 questionnaires indicated coverage by agreements in force or awaiting higher-level approval?representing 102 percent of the 2,264 units under agreement in the LAIRS file as of November 1973. For programming purposes, an extended deadline of February 15, 1974, was established for keypunching; 2,868 questionnaires were received by the cutoff date and processed by computer. An additional 217 questionnaires, which arrived between February 15 and March 15, were tabulated manually in OLMR to pro- vide the total survey coverage of 3,085. SECTION uI. SUMMARY At the outset, it is essential to recognize the unit basis of the statistical in- formation produced by this survey. Figures represent the number (or proportion) of exclusive recognition units? as distinguished, for example, from the number (or proportion) of negotiated agreements?covered by a given response. This is commonly indicated by the term "situation." Example.?To say that there are 513 multi-unit situations with respect to agreement coverage means that 513 units are reportedly under multi-unit agree- ments; it does not mean that there are 513 separate multi-unit agreements reported. The discussion elow is punctuated with parenthetical keys?referencing the response table(s) in Appendix I, unless otherwise specified. In addition to pin- pointing the statistical bases of summary findings, they facilitate location of the detailed tabular breakdowns for more specific information. 1. Basic collective-bargaining patterns In the beginning, there was dues withholding, forerunner of basic negotiated agreements in almost two-thirds of situations covered by agreements today (04). In fact, the Federal exaerience sugests a significant difference between the sense of urgency--in terms of elapsed time?in obtaining dues?withholding arrangements as compared with basic negotiated agreements: The parties have managed to reach agreement on dues checkoff within three months of recognition in over 45 percent of situations (05.a). Whereas it has taken the parties a year or more from the date of recognition to reach initial basic agreement in just over 50 percent of situations?half of these stretch on for more than two years from recognition date (1). And it has required over two years for the parties to achieve basic agreement once dues checkeff had been acquired in nearly 30 percent of situations (05.b) ; in over a fourth of units under withholding arrangements, the parties haven't even negotiated a basic agreement--most of them continuing under dues checkoff for over two years now (05.a-c). In a majority of situations, the request for basic-agreement negotiations was made within six months from the date of recognition (03) while the effective date of initial basic agreement followed recognition by a year or longer (1). Today, over nine-tenths of units are covered by basic negotiated agreement, dues withholding or both--most of them by both (01). Where there is no basic agreement in force (although there may be dues checkoff), situations are about evenly divided between nci request for negotiations and some stage of the col- lective-bargaining process following the request for initial negotiations (02). In almost seven-tenths of situations, agreements currently in effect have been negotiated since the November 1971 amendments to the Executive Order (f)? nearly half of them for a two-year term, with another one-fifth operating under automatic renewal (g). Over two-fifths of units covered by in-force negotiated agreements are under basic agreements for the first time (2.a). And negotia- tions for the current agre.unent were requested by th union in slightly over 87 percent of situations?by management in almost 13 percent (1.a). Single-unit bargaining?normally involving a union Local and individual Gov- ernment activity on a one-to-one basis?is the rule in the Federal program, accounting for nearly four-fifths of units covered by negotiated agreements (c). Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : 6)15A-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 A majority of all units covered by agreements (whether single- or multi-unit) comprise a mix of General Schedule with Wage Grade employees?although where they are separate, GS-only units outnumber WG-only units by more than 7?to--3 in terms of agreement coverage (e). Just over half of all units under agreement contain 150 or fewer employees each, while a significant proportion (nearly a fourth) include over 500 employees each (d). 2. Chronology of collective bargaining Currently, in nearly three-fifths of situations the parties are somewhere at mid-term in their negotiated agreement (3). From the request to negotiate, it took them between a week and three months to actually start the negotiations in almost three-quarters of situations (4.a) and between a week and six months to reach an effective agreement in about half of situations (4.b). Commonly, ground rules were wrapped up in one or two sessions, each lasting four hours or less, during the first week (6). From there, the parties proceeded to basic-agreement negotiations within a month in over three-fourths of situa- tions (7). Negotiations on the basic agreement were wrapped up within the first three months in two-thirds of situations?commonly in 10 or fewer weekly bargaining sessions, lasting four hours or less each (8). Once the parties had wrapped up all agreement terms, their settlement went forward within a month for agency-head approval in nearly seven-tenths of situations 9.a). It was approved to become effective within three months from the date the parties had reached agreement in about two-thirds of situations (9.b). And in over four-fifhs of situations, there reportedly was no problem encountered on the approval process (10). 3. Substance of collective bargaining As a rule, the parties agreed to official-time bargaining for employees repre- senting the union in negotiations during regular working hours (13)?with straight time within the 40?hour limit as the prevailing formula, accounting for nearly three-quarters of situations (14). And the official time commonly was provided, in the parties' agreement, for from two to five employee-negotiators (15). That's what the parties agreed to, but how much official time was actually used during the negotiations? Commonly, one to five employee-negotiators wound up on the clock (16)?but for only 20 hours or less in practice in almost three-fifths of situations (17.a). Consequently, a total of 1000 or fewer hours were spent on the clock by the entire union negotiating team during bargaining in over seven-tenths of situa- tions ( 17 ) . Respondents were asked to identify up to six of the most time-consuming issues involved in the negotiations. This produced information on 10,549 re- sponses to a selection of important subjects for bargaining-93 percent of them discussed primarily in the basic-agreement stage of negotiations. Just over 6 percent of these responses indicated requests for exceptions to regulations on the issues-19 percent of which were granted?while less than 9 percent in- volved resort to a third party?commonly, a Federal mediator. (See Appendix II, Table 2, for complete statistical analysis of bargaining issues?by frequency, stage of negotiations, exception requests and resort to third parties.) Thefl specific issues prominently identified as requiring the most time to nego- tiate included: Scope of the negotiated grievance procedure (identified in over half oe situations). Promotion policies and procedures (in over two-fifths). Overtime policies and practices (in almost a fourth). Time allowances for union stewards (in over one-fifth). Management rights (in just under one-fifth). Official time for negotiations (in over one-sixth). Respondents were asked to identify up to four issues on which exceptions to regulations were requested in conjunction with the negotiations; this produced 671 responses on selected issues. In most situations, the parties had an answer to the request within a month; only a bare handful required over six months; none took longer than two years (12.b). Requests for exceptions to regulations figured in negotiations affecting less than an eighth of situations (12)?most commonly involving promotion policies Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/11*: CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 and procedures, travel time, scope of the grievance procedure (in that order). Among issues with significant responses, the "success quotient"?in terms of requests actually granted?ranged from only 5 percent on management rights to 50 percent each on discipline, official-time bargaining and time allowances for stewards. Respondents were asked to identify up to six issues requiring third-party involvement in connection with the negotiations; this elicited 939 responses on selected issues. Resort to third parties was a factor affecting few (just 16 percent) situations?with the requests for third-party participation divided about evenly between both parties acting in concert and the union acting alone (18). Third-party referrals bore some correlation (though not in the same order) with issues identified as time-consuming?with the top six issues in terms of third-party involvement identified as: Promotion policies and procedures (in almost a quarter of situations). Scope of the negotiated grievance procedure (in over one-fifth). Management rights (in almost an eighth). Official time for negotiations (also, in almost an eighth). Service fee for dues deduction (in just over one-tenth). Definition of the workweek (in about one-tenth). Other issues with significant response as to third-party participation included overtime policies and practices, discipline, the terminal step in arbitration, and clothing and uniforms. As a rule, the third-party assistance was invoked during negotiations on the basic agreement (19)?as distinguished from the ground-rules stage?and did not involve a suspension of the bargaining, in about three-fourths of situations (20.a). Third-party participation lasted no longer than a month in a majority of situations?most of them under a week?while it took over two years in less than 2 percent of situations (20). SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT 1 Delays in getting to the table Delays in beginning negotiations following the request to negotiate or expira- tion of the prior agreement were reported in just under one-fifth (496 responses) of situations under agreement or in collective bargaining. Of these, respondent activities attributed the delays to the union in 45 percent of situations (208), to management in 22 percent (110) and to both parties in 33 percent (178). The most commonly cited reasons were broken down as follows?in descending order: Delays on the union side?(1) lack of response or preparation, (2) studying the proposals, (3) preoccupation with representation challenges, (4) unavail- ability of union negotiators, (5) turnover among union officials. Delays on the management side--(1) studying the proposals, (2) unavail- ability of management negotiators, (3) reorganization of the unit, (4) turnover among management officials, (5) preoccupation with other negotiations. Delays on both sides-11) mutually agreed to time for preparation, (2) await- ing issuance of 1971 amendments to Executive Order 11491, (3) impasse on ground rules, (4) mutual agreement to defer start of bargaining, (5) scheduling conflicts. Other reasons commonly given for delay in beginning negotiations?affecting both parties alike--included deaths and illnesses, holidays and vacations, work- load requirements and training of negotiators. Some delays were attributed to internal union activities--including election of officers. And both sides reportedly were involved in delays caused by their resort to national headquarters for assistance in preparing for the negotiations. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT 2 Delays in the approve process A review of installations' comments on problems in higher-level approval of negotiated agreements points up their keen and recurring dissatisfaction with both the mechanics and the operation of such procedures. Multi-tiered clearance requirements (sometimes bottlenecked by bickering between different review levels), excessive delays in processing the approval, repeated rejections of sanitized provisions, lost or misplaced agreements (some- Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 41A-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 times never returned)?these were common problems reported by respondent activities. Most changes required by higher-level authority were? described? without further specification?as minor technical revisions in negotiated lan- guage, to bring it in line with agency policies and regulations. But many installa- tions identified specific issues as most troublesome in securing agency-head approval?in descending order: Grievance procedures not in conformity with the amendments to Executive Order 11491. Limitations on assignment of unit work, including contracting out. Pay policies and practices, including overtime and environmental-pay differ- entials. Scope of grievance-arbitration, including the end step and payment of arbi- trator's fee. Promotion and placement, including R-I-F procedures. Dues withholding, including service charge. Union-sponsored training, including leave policies and apprenticeship. Some installations characterized the approval process as an engine of con- troversy, at higher agency levels, over interpretation or intent of negotiated provisions. A couple of respondent activities even reported "whipsawing" or application of dual approval standards by their own national headquarters. On the other side of the labor-management equation, many installations at- tributed delays in agreement approval to the union?in membership ratification where provided for in the agreement, or in national-union approval where that was provided for. And in many situations, respondent activities ascribed delays in agreement approval to such outside influences as questions concerning repre- sentation and appeals to the Council on negotiability. The most favorable experience with the approval process were reported where the parties had managed to short-circuit the requirement?notably, where the agency was experimenting with delegations of approval authority or where continuing dialogue with higher-level authority during the negotiations made approval a pro forma exercise. APPENDIX I BASIC PATTERNS (a) Distribution of exclusive-recognition units, by unions within individual agency: (See Appendix II, Table 1.) (b) Chronology of exclusive recognition, by unit recognition (or certification) date: Prior to Jan. 17, 1962 95 Jan. 17, 1962 through Dec. 31, 1969 1, 771 Jan. 1, 1970 through Nov. 23, 1971 704 Nov. 24, 1971 to present 400 (a) Total 2, 970 Nature (or type) of agreement coverage, by unit of recognition: Single unit 1, 852 Multiunit 513 Total 2, 365 (d) Number of employees, by unit, covered by negotiated agreements: Under 50 687 51 to 150 667 151 to 250 287 251 to 350 173 351 to 500 191 Over 500 621 Total 2, 626 (e) Composition of units under agreement, by pay method: General schedule 875 Wage grade 345 Both (mixed) 1, 312 Total 2, 532 Approved For Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/069.8CIA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 (f) Effective date of current negotiated agreement, by unit: Prior to Jan. 17, 1962 38 Jan. 17, 1962 through Dec. 31, 1969 226 Jan. 1, 1970 through Nov. 23, 1971 440 Nov. 24, 1971 to present_ 1, -- 597 Total_ (g) Termination date of current negotiated agreement, by unit: 2, 301 1 year 161 2 years 1, 097 3 years. 358 Over 3 years 59 Automatic renewal 501 Indefinite duration 102 ? - --- Total 2, 278 I. PRELIMINARY PROFILE 01. Is the unit covered by: a. Basic negotiated agreement. 304 b. Dues-withholding agreement 562 e. Both._ 1,853 d. Neither 269 Total 2, 988 02. If there is no basic agreement, what is the parties' current status?: a. Negotiations rot requested 459 b. Negotiations requested; have not begun yet 114 r. Negotiations started; not completed yet. 175 d. Negotiations completed; agreement waiting approval 149 Total 897 03. How much time elapsed between the date of recognition and the request to negotiate initial basic agreement?: Under 1 week 110 1 week to 1 month 283 1 to 3 months....463 3 to 6 months 401 6 to 9 months_ 280 9 to 12 months 224 12 to 18 months 176 18 to 24 months 105 Over 24 months.. 387 Total 2, 429 04. Did the effective date of the dues-withholding agreement precede the effective date of initial basic agreement?: Yes 1, 588 No 1,009 05. How much time elapsed between: a. Certification, or recognition, and the effective date of the dues- withholding agreement?: Under 1 week_. 268 1 week to 1 month 377 1 to 3 months 422 3 to 6 months 296 6 to 9 months_ 184 9 to 12 months_ 167 12 to 18 months_ _ 149 18 to 24 months.. 101 Over 24 months_.. 366 Total 2, 330 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 9tIA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 05. How much time elapsed between?Continued b. Date of the dues-withholding agreement and the effective date of initial basic agreement?: Under 1 week 241 1 week to 1 month 98 1 to 3 months 164 3 to 6 months 182 6 to 9 months 168 9 to 12 months 176 12 to 18 months 223 18 to 24 months 129 Over 24 months 555 Total 1, 936 c. Date of the dues-withholding agreement and (where no initial basic agreement has been completed) the present?: Under 1 week 31 1 week to 1 month 22 1 to 3 months 16 3 to 6 months 22 6 to 9 months 15 9 to 12 months 23 12 to 18 months 35 18 to 24 months 27 Over 24 months 451 Total 642 II. FACTORS RELATED TO TIME REQUIRED TO NEGOTIATE AGREEMENTS A. Background 1. How much time elapsed between date of recognition and the effective date of the initial agreement? Under 1 week 1 week to 1 month 1 to 3 months 3 to 6 months 6 to 9 months 9 to 12 months 26 43 185 259 283 297 12 to 18 months 418 18 to 24 months 187 Over 24 months 540 Total 2, 238 a. Which party made the original request to negotiate the current agreement? Management 292 Union 1, 994 Total 2, 286 2. a. Is the current agreement: Initial 1, 003 Renegotiated 1, 300 Total 2, 303 3. At what stage of the collective-bargaining proces are the parties now? a. Mid-term in the current agreement; negotiations for successor agreement not requested yet b. Previous agreement has expired; negotiations for new agree- ment not requested yet c. Negotiations for new agreement have been requested; have not begun yet 1, 367 109 291 d. Negotiations for new agreement are under way now e. Negotiations for new agreement have been completed; cur- rently awaiting approval 265 253 Total $2, 285 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/061061A-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 4. How much time elapsed between: a. Request to negotiate and actual start of negotiations (including ground rules)? Under 3 week 87 1 week to 1 month 804 1 to 3 months 825 3 to 6 months 332 6 to 9 months 77 9 to 12 months 47 12 to 18 months.. 39 18 to 24 months... 19 Over 24 months 21 Total 2, 251 h. Request to negotiate and effective date of current (or most recent) agreement? Under 1 week 17 1 week to 1 month 110 1 to 3 months_ 380 3 to 6 months_ 476 6 to 9 months 313 9 to 12 months._ 228 12 to 18 months._ 208 1S to 24 months._ 89 Over 24 months 130 TotaL 1, 951 B. Time in Negotiations 6. What time frame was covered by negotiations on ground rules? Under 1 week week to 1 month 1, 353 482 I to 3 months 179 3 to 6 months 36 6 to 9 months 24 9 to 12 months 14 12 to 18 :months 8 18 to 24 months 6 Over 24 months 9 Total a. How many negotiating sessions were held on ground rules? 2, 111 1. 1,111 2. 454 3. 191 4. 99 5 51 6. 32 7. 6 8. 14 9_ 3 10 to 20 18 Over 20 5 b. How frequent were these sessions on ground rules? aily _ 1, 984 806 Weekly 571 Monthly 55 Less often 464 Total 1, 896 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 i&IA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 B. Time in Negotiations?Continued 6. What time frame was covered by negotiations on ground rules?Con. c. How many hours did each ground-rules session average? 1 hour 532 2 hcurs 702 3 hours 322 4 hours 309 5 hours 27 6 hours 38 7 hours 5 8 hours 22 Total --- 1, 957 7. How much time elapsed between completion of ground rules and beginning of basic-agreement negotiations? Under 1 week 592 1 week to 1 month 989 1 to 3 months 376 ? 3 to 6 months 85 ? 6 to 9 months 21 9 to 12 months 12 12 to 18 months 9 18 to 24 months 5 Over 24 months 6 2 Total_ , 095 8. What calendar period was covered by negotiations on the basic agreement?as distinguished from ground rules? Under 1 week 452 1 week to 1 month 458 1 to 3 months 515 3 to 6 months 331 6 to 9 months 122 9 to 12 months 103 12 to 18 months 71 18 to 24 months 43 Over 24 months 52 Total 2, 147 a. How many negotiating sessions were held on the basic agreement? 1 189 2 177 3 224 4 199 5 185 6 147 7 83 8 112 9 61 10 115 11 to 20 344 21 to 30 97 31 to 40 81 41 to 50 19 51 to 60 10 61 to 70 12 71 to 80 14 Over 80 23 Total 2, 092 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 102 8. What calendar period was covered by negotiations on the basic agreements?as distinguished from ground rules--Continued b. How frequew; were these sessions on the basic agreement? Daily_ 4 Weekly 801 Monthly 117 Less often 181 Total c. How many hours did each basic-agreement session average? i hour 2, 138 73 2 ]tours 394 3 hours 505 4 hours_ 548 5 hours _ 136 6 hours 222 7 hours 48 8 hours 105 9 hours 53 Total 2, 034 9. How much time elapsed between: a. Settlement on all agreement terms (ground rules and basic) and the date it was sent forward for agency approval? Under 1 week 440 1 week to 1 month 972 1 to 3 months 365 3 to 6 months 139 6 to 9 months 38 9 to 12 months_ 34 12 to lti months 23 18 to 24 months 9 Over 24 months 14 Total 2, 034 b. Settlement on all agreement terms ground rules and basic) and the date of approval? Under 1 week 62 1 week to 1 month 455 1 to 3 months 709 3 to 6 months 385 6 to 9 months 163 9 to 12 months 77 12 to 18 months 45 13 to 24 months 13 Over 24 months_ 17 Total_ 1, 926 10. Were any special problems or circumstances involved in the approval process? Yes 363 No 1,604 1,967 C. Issues in Negotiations 11. What issues consumed the most time in negotiations, over-all? Designate whether each was discussed primarily in the ground-rules or basic-agreement stage of negotiations. (See Appendix II, table 2.) Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001 -6 12. Were there requests for exceptions to regulations in connection with the negotiations? 2 Yes 56 1, 911 No Total a. What issues were involved? Indicate for each whether the exception was granted or refused. (See Appendix II, table 2.) b. How much time (aggregate) elapsed between the requests and the answer? Under 1 week 135 1 week to 1 month 114 1 to 3 months 30 3 to 6 months 12 6 to 9 months 1 9 to 12 months 2 12 to 18 months 1 18 to 24 moiths 1 Over 24 months 0 --- Total 296 13. Was official time authorized for employees representing the union in negotia- tions during regular working hours? Yes 1, 878 No 367 --- Total 2, 245 14. If official time was authorized, what formula was agreed to? Straight time under 40 hours maximum 387 Straight time up to 40 hours maximum 970 Half-time under 80 hours maximum 50 Half-time up to 80 hours maximim 33 Half-time over 80 hours maximum 117 Other 285 2, 165 Total 1, 842 15. How many employee-negotiators representing the union did the parties agree would be entitled to official time? 1 83 2 288 3_ 647 4_ 419 5_ 286 6_ 84 7_ 27 8_ 21 9_ 2 Total 1, 857 16. How many employee-negotiators (both regulars and alternates) representing the union actually used the official time authorized? 1__ 142 2__ 311 3 las- 623 4__ 323 5_ 204 6 89 7_ 25 8 17 9 4 Total 1, 738 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/061041A-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 17 How much official time (aggregate number of hours) actually was used during the negotiations? to 100 1,299 1 _ 101 to 200 339 201 to 300 65 301 to 400 24 401 to 500 46 501 to 600 12 Over 600_ 11 Total ?1-,-79-6 a. Average hours used per employee-negotiator. 1 to 10_ 597 11 to 20 400 21 to 30 284 31 to 40 308 42 to 50 32 51 to 60 47 61. to 70. 11 71. to 80. 27 81 to 90. 7 Over 90 28 Total 1, 741 D. Third-party involvement 18. Did negotiations involve resort to a third party? Yes 352 1, 8327 No_ ? Total 2, 189 Designate which third part (or parties). FMCS...344 FSIP 54 FLRC 23 A/SLMR 6 Other 47 Total_ 474 Indicate whether management, union, both or neither requested the assistance. Management 21 Union 140 Both 137 Neither_ 23 Total 19. At what stage of negotiations was third-party assistance invoked? Ground-rules stage Basic-agreement stage Both 321 36 307 35 Total_ 378 20. What time frame was covered by the period of third-party involvement? Under 1 week 134 1 week to 1 month 73 1 to 3 months 66 3 to 6 months 53 6 to 9 months_ 24 9 to 12 months _ 17 12 to 18 months_ 20 18 to 24 months 12 Over 24 months 7 Total__ 406 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 19A-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 20. What time frame was covered by the period of third-party involvement?Con. a. For how much of this period did negotiations continue? All 110 Most 61 Some 133 None 112 Total 416 21. What issues were referred for third-party involvement? Specify third part for each. (See Appendix II, Table 2.) Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 > 13 13 AGENCY UNIONS 'APPENDIX II (Table 1) > 13 13 -I 0 (D CL -In -I PO (D Ri 2,1 0 (1:0 INJ CD CD -a 8 8 --0.) (,) 5; *1 CO s4 cn 1010 CD CD C4 CO CD PO CD CD cn CD CD INJ INJ CD CD CD -a 47) -I 0 < PATCO IBEW IAFF AFGE LIMA GAM U14 MMP MTC NMU IUOE Other IFPTE . SEW< AFL-CIO (D CL Agriculture -Ino o Commerce -I Air Force PO (D Army FIT Navy, 2,1 (1) National Guard (D INJ DSA CD HEW CD -a ,, HUD CDOD OD Interior CD Justice .. Labor C) Transportation Treasury PO GSA 013 13 NASA s4 cn NLRB CU VA CD CD rvA C.) CO Other (Includes CD NAFAO POCD CD Unspecified CD, CD 9 1 2 9 6 2 17 2 1 1 20 20 24 ? 1 1 1 1 2 1 48 27 131 249 216 27 43 141 36 33 36 4 56 16 61 11 164 58 15 5 5 3 1 1 3 1 2 3 2 3 4 24 29 4 4 1 2 1 1 1 1 4 2 2 5 30 6 2 1 3 18 3 2 6 1 1 4 2 1 1 5 1 1 3 1 11 13 6 10 6 1 2 4 1 1 1 3 1 6 7 12 2 2 14 6 1 12 2 cn CD TOTAL CD 9 41 71 1372 21 8 73 7 46 33 9 18 27 90 INJ INJ CD CD CD -a Co 9-1?000ZZ009000t109?008 Cl 9/dtl-VIO 90/60/1.00z ase6i '8110.16Y13eAoiddv AGENCY UNIONS 2 NCSA NFFE IFFP FOP NAGE NTEU NEA ANA NAPFE Other Independent Un- specified TOTAL Agriculture 66 2 6 1 124 Commerce 12 39 1 3 91 Air Force 46 21 2 1 3 1 239 Army 96 1 1 56 13 3 522 Navy 31 6 3 51 1 48 4 493 National Guard 17 47 14 111 DSA 8 1 15 1 1 79 HEW 44 3 2 2 208 HUD 14 2 53 Interior 130 4 4 7 3 205 Justice 2 38 Labor 1 5 Transportation 14 75 1 2 2 178 Treasury 9 2 1 82 2 1 121 GSA 20 6 5 3 3 2 119 NASA 3 1 21 NLRB 10 10 VA 48 2 14 1 31 2 3 291 . TVA 3 20 Other (Includes NAFAs) 18 10 3 2 100 Unspecified 12 1 1 1 1 24 57 T 0TAL 9 583 15 6 343 84 7 36 5 122 50 3085 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : C1eDP75B00380R000500220001-6 APPENDIX It (Table 2) (See footnotes at p. 3.) Stage of Negotiations Exceptions to Regulations Referrals Third-Party Involvement (%) Ground-Rules (%) Basic (%) Requests Granted (7.) FMCS (%) PSI? (%) FLRC ?the' (%) Most Time-Consuming Total Issues ALL TCCHrq. 10,549 67. 937. 671 19% 939 817. 87. 37, 87. Annual Leave 283 47. 957. 12 337. 13 91% (2) (2) 97. Arbitration Hearing: Official Time 29 137. 877. 5 (2) 9 1007. 0 0 0 Arbitration Procedure (Scope) 291 47. 957. 10 177, 20 727. 227. (2) 67. Arbitrator's Authority: Final Step 87 17. 997. 3 (2) 26 727. 287. (2) (2) Arbitrator Selection, Payment 49 0 1007. 1 0 6 1007. (2) (2) (2) Assignment Clause 114 37. 97% 2 (2) 9 1007. (2) (2) (2) Cafeteria Services 16 0 1007. 0 0 1 1007. 0 0 0 Call-In Allowance 65 37. 977. 9 257. 1 0 1007. (2) (2) Clean-Up (Wash-Up) Time 142 37. 977. 2 (2) 10 897. 117. (2) (2) Clothing and Uniforms 126 47. 947. 29 117. 25 797. 87. 57. 87. Discipline Clause 351 27. 981. 17 502. 29 1007. (2) (2) (2) Dues Withholding (Charge) 290 37. 977. 15 387. 38 857. 97. 37, 37. Dues Withholding (General) 210 97. 907. 12 (2) 14 857. (2) (2) 157. EEO Joint Committee 46 0 1007. 5 (2) 4 1007. 0 0 0 EEO (Nondiscrimination, General) 47 37. 977. 4 o 8 1007. 0 0 0 Environmental Pay 149 (1) 987. 10 137. 6 1007. 0 0 0 Facilities, Services (Union Use) 308 37. 967. 13 29% 23 907. 107. (2) (2) 9-1?000ZZ009000t108?0089/dCIU-VIO : 90/60/1.00Z eseeieu -10d peACLIddV 2 (See footnotes at p. 3.) Stage of Negotiations Exceptions to Regulations Referrals Third-Party Involvement Ground-Rules (%) Basic (%) Requests Granted (%) FMCS (%) FSIP (X) FLRC (%) Other (X) Most Time-Consuming, Total Issues Grievance Meetings: Repre- sentation Presence 242 3% 95% 5 33% 9 1007. (2) (2) (2) Grievance Procedure (Scope) 1,208 3% 97% 49 23% 78 847. 1% 47. 117. Health and Safety (General) 249 0 99% 15 17% 17 847. ? 8% 87. (2.) Joint Committees (Except EEO) 148 4% 95% 20 20% 11 677. (2) 227. 117. Management Rights 436 . 3% 96% 26 5% 41 867. (2) 67. 8% Meal and/or Rest Periods 151 3% 97% 6 (2) 13 927. 87. (2) (2) Miscellaneous Leave (Except Annual and Sick) 153 2% 967. 22 237. 15 100% 0 0 0 Negotiating Team: Composition 98 77% 227. 3 (2) 6 1007. (2) (2) (2) Official Time for Nego- tiations 414 74% 24% 21 50% 41 767. 167. (2) 87. Overtime Policies, Practices . 539 2% 97% 31 10% 30 767. (2) 127. 127. Parking and Transportation 136 1% 98% 7 (2) 19 82% 187. (2) (2) Past Practices Clause 116' 0 99% 6 (2) 19 817. 137. (2) 67. Printing, Distributing Agree- ment 94 47. 96% 4 (2) 14 927. 82. (2) (2) Promotion Policies? Procedures 979 3% 96% 79 187. 85 817. 57. 97. 47. Reduction-in-Force Provision 193 3% 95% 17 257. 12 787. 227. (2) (2) Seniority 181 4% 95% 21 (2) 7 837. 17% (2) (2) Sick Leave 174 2% 97% 16 437. 4 1007. , 0 0 0 9-1.000ZZ009000t108?0089/dC11:13W110 : 90/60/1?00Z eSeelell -10d peACLIddV 3 (See footnotes below.) Stage of Negotiations 1 Exceptions to Regulations Referrals Third-Party Involvement (%) Ground-Rules (%) Basic (%) Requests Granted (%) FMCS (%) FSIP (%) FLRC Other (%) Most Time-Consuminik Total Issues Stewards: Time Allowances 497 (1) 99% 10 501 18 86% 77. 77. (2) Subcontracting (Contracting , Out) 108 17. 997. 13 (2) 19 867. 77. (2) 77. Time (Productivity) ? Studies 10 0 1007. 1 (2) 0 0 0 0 0 Tools and Equipment 43 0 1007. 0 0 1 1007. 0 0 0 Training (General) 287 17. 987. '12 297. 8 1007. (2) (2) (2) Transfer CleufP 18 0 1002. 4 (2) 3 100% (2) (2) (2) Travel Time 129 47. 957. 52 87. 8 767. 127. 127. 0 Unit Definition (Recognition 88 Fr% 897. 2 107. 7 50% (2) (7) (2) Unit Work (Limitations). 152 2% 987. 7 (2) 17 447. 317. 197. 67. Visitation: Union Officials 86 87. 927. 1 (2) - 5 807. 0 0 207. Wage Surveys (Union ? Participation) 49 37. 947. 4 337. 2 1007. 0. 0 0 Workweek (Definition) 290 27. 987. 19 317. 37 827. 97. 67. 3% Lipper Clause 29 47. 967. 2 (2) 8 877. 137. 0 0 Ot%er (Not Classified Above) 649 77. 927. 47 237. 143 677. 87. 17. 247. (I) -- Less than 0.5 percent. (2) -- Statistically negligible or indeterminable. NOTES: Where percentages in the "Ground-Rules" plus "Basic" columns do not add up to 100%, the difference represents situations of overlap--i.e., where the issues were discussed for approximately equivalent periods of time in both stages of negotiations. The "Other" column under Third-Party Involvement does not include referrals to the Assis- tant Secretary (A/SUR)--reportedly involved in only two issues: Promotion Policies (1 response), Unit Definition (2 response). Approved For Release 2001 ioqipp : CIA-RDP75B00380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 111 DIRECTOR E U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OFFICE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS WASHINGTON. D.C. 20415 DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL APPENDIX III APPROVED OSA 0006.OSC.OT.O October 1, 1973 The Civil Service Commission in conjunction with the Office of Management and Budget will be conducting a Government-wide survey of the negotiating function under Executive Order 11491 during the months of October-November 1973. The purpose of this study is to determine how the collective-bargaining pro- cess is working, with a view toward how it might be made to work better. It will be particularly responsive in meeting the widely expressed need for basic information, on a comprehensive basis, about the time required to negotiate collective-bargaining agreements under the Order. The enclosed questionnaire is designed to elicit factual information on the experience and current status of negotiations at your activity--primarily in terms of the time and issues involved. Covering the entire collective-bar- gaining process, start to finish, the survey deals centrally with bargaining on ground rules for the conduct of negotiations and on the basic agreement itself. Preliminary information, on the pre-negotiation period, is sought even where bargaining has not been requested. The questionnaire is post-paid and self-addressed to the CSC Regional Office serving your activity. The Labor Relations Officer there will monitor time- ly receipt of your response, and is available to answer any question you may have concerning the questionnaire. When you have completed it, please fold the questionnaire twice (with the self-address showing on the outside) and staple it once for mailing. It must be received in the Regional Office by October 31, 1973. Thanks in advance for your timely cooperation in this important venture. Enclosure r L__1111 111 1883-1973 MERIT PRINCIPLES ASSURE OUAUTY AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 1 1 2 CODE KEYS GROUP!. (AGENCY CODES) PLEASE SELECT CODES THAT MOST NEARLY DESCRIBE YOUR SITUATION. 01 Agriculture 15 USIA 02 Commerce 16 Transportation 03 Air Force 17 Treasury 04 Army 18 AEC 05 Navy 19 EPA 06 National Guard zo GSA 07 DSA 21 NASA 06 HEW 22 NLRB 09 HUD 23 VA 10 Interior 24 GPO 11 Justice 25 0E0 12 Labor 26 TVA 13 State 27 Non-Appropriated Fund 14 AID 28 Other GROUP II. (UNION CODES) 01 Air Traffic Controllers (PATC0) 02 Boilermakers (BBF) 03 Electrical Workers IIBEW) 04 Fire Fighters (IAFF) 06 Government Employees (AFGE) 06 Laborers I LIUNA) 07 Lithographers (LPIU) 06 Machinists ilAM) 09 Minters, Mates & Pilots (MMP) 10 Metal Trades Councils (MTC) 11 National Maritime Union (NMU) 12 Office & Professional Employees (OPE IU) 13 Operating Engineers (WOE) 14 Profeesional & Technical Engineers (vies AFTE) 15 Retail Clerks (RCIAI 16 Seafarers (SIU) GROUP III. (DATE CODES) 1 Prior to Jan. 17, 1962 2 Jan. 17, 1962 through Dec. 31. 19 GROUP IV. (UNIT CODES) 1 Under 50 employees 2 51-150 employees 3 151.250 employees GROUP V. (DURATION CODES) 1 One year 2 Two years 3 Three years 17 Service Employees ISEIU) 18 State, County Employees (AFSCME) 19 Teachers (AFT) 20 Typographers (ITU) 21 Other AFL-CIO 22 Air Traffic Specialists INAATS) 23 Custorns Service Ann. (NCSA) 24 Federal Employees (NFFE) 26 Federal Police IIFFPI 26 Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) 27 Government Employees (NAGE) 28 Notional Treasury Employees (was NAIRE) 29 National Education Ann. (NEA) 30 Nurses (ANA) 31 Postal & Federal Employees MAFFEI 32 Other Independent 3 Jan, 1, 1970 through Nov. 23, 1971 4 Nov. 24, 1971 to Present 4 251-350 employees 5 351.509 employees Over 500 employees 4 Over three years 5 Automatic renewal 6 Indefinite duration DETACH THIS TEARSHEET FOR CONVENIENT REFERENCE, COMPLETE ATTACHED QUESTIONNAIRE, FOLD TWICE, STAPLE OR SEAL, AND MAIL Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIAIADP751300380R000500220001-6 GROUP VI. (TERM CODES) 1 Under one week 2 One week to one month 3 One to three months 4 Three to six months 5 Six to nine months GROUP VII. (OFFICIAL TIME CODES) 1 Straight time under 40 hours max. 2 Straight time up to 40 hours max. 3 Half-time under 80 hours max. GROUP VIII. (THIRD PARTY CODES) 1 Federal Mediation Service (FMCS) 2 Impasses Panel (FSIP) 3 Council IFLRCI GROUP IX. (SPECIALTY CODES) 1 Ground-rules stage 2 Basic-agreement stage 3 Exception granted 4 Both GROUP X. (SUBJECT-MATTER CODES) 01 Annual Leave 02 Arbitration Hearing: Official Time 03 Arbitration Procedure (Scope) 04 Arbitrator's Authority: Final Step 05 Arbitrator Selection, Payment 06 Assignment Clause 07 Cafeteria Services 08 Call-In Allowance 09 Clean-Up (Wash-Up) Time 10 Clothing and Uniforms 11 Discipline Clause 12 Dues Withholding (Charge) 13 Dues Withholding (General) 14 EEO Joint Committee 15 EEO (Nondiscrimination, General) 16 Environmental Pay 17 Facilities, Services (Union Use) 18 Grievance Meetings: Representation Presence 19 Grievance Procedure IScope) 20 Health and Safety (General) 21 Joint Committees (Except EEO) 22 Management Rights 23 Meal and/or Rest Periods 24 Miscellaneous Leave (Except Annual and Sick) 6 Nine to 12 months 7 Twelve to 18 months 8 Eighteen to 24 months 9 Over 24 months 4 Half-time up to 80 hours max. 5 Halftime over 80 hours max. 6 Other 4 Assistant Secretary )4/SLMR?LMSA) 5 Other 5 Exception refused 6 Management 7 Union 8 Neither ? 25 Negotiating Team: Composition 26 Official Time for Negotiations 27 Overtime Policies, Practices 28 Parking and Transportation 29 Past Practices Clause 30 Printing, Distributing Agreement 31 Promotion Policies, Procedures 32 Reduction-in-Force Provision 33 Seniority 34 Sick Leave 35 Stewards: Time Allowances 36 Subcontracting (Contracting Out) 37 Time (Productivity) Studies 38 Tools end Equipment 33 Training (General) 40 Transfer Clause 41 Travel Time 42 Unit Definition (Recognition Clause) 43 Unit Work (Limitations) 44 Visitation: Union Officials 46 Wage Surveys (Union Participation) 46 Workweek (Definition) 47 Zipper Clause 48 Other (Not Classified Above) Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/019196 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 _ CSC REGION Leave wank) PLEASE COMPLETE ALL BOXES BELOW; ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS, ESTIMATING OR APPROXIMATING WHERE NECESSARY. (TYPE OR PRINT ALL ANSWERS., FOLMR NO. L?eve Slane I r DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY/ACTIVITY UNION/LOCAL ? eaten-code from GROUP I here n, r I 1 CC 4.7 ? intercede frcun GROUP II here ... [ CC 8 9 C,partroent Organizal iol C.ono :v/Subrhy I ni, 1:it i on Coca' No C:ity. Slate RECOGNITION DATE AGREEMENT COVERAGE (check one) SINGLE-UNIT 0 MULTI-UNIT 0 CC 11 ? enter code from GROUP Ilf here.- I I CC 10 ? ismer coda frorn GROUP IV luefe ... L ICC 12 Number of Employees (check one) Covered by Agreement Ce 0 Both 0 CC 13 WO 0 Total EFFECTIVE DATE ICurrent Agrhement) ? enter code from GROUP III here* r----1 CC 14 lERMINATION DATE 1Current Agreement) ? enter code from GROUP V here ... L I cc ,s 01 s the unit (check ore) covered by: basic negotiated agreeMOnt! dues-withholding egreenient? c. both? c. neither? u. I. Preliminery Profile CC 17 02. If there is no bask agreement knock one), chat is the ponies' ch/rent status? n Negotiations not requested b. Negotiations requested; have not b?Itur, yet Negotiations smutted; not completed vet... d. Negotiations cornpleted; agreement ewes- ing approval 0 CC 113 03. How much time elapsed between the dote of recognition and the reouest to negotiate initial basic egreem ? ? carat -node from GROUP VI here 0 CC 19 04. Did the effective date of the dues-withholding agreement (check one) precede the effective deo of initial basic agreement? Yes No ci CC 20 06 How much time elapsed between: a. certificistion, or recognition, and the effec- tive date of the dueswithholding agreement? a enter code from GROUP VI here Om 21 b. date of the dues-withholding agreement end the effective date of initial basic agreement? e enter code from GROUP VI here OCC 22 c. clots of the dues?withholcang agreement and (where no initial basic agreement has been completed) the present? ? ante! CO* from GROUP VI here OCC 23 PLEASE CS.NFINE "X" TO APPROPRIATE ANSWER BOX Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : 96k-RDP75B00380R000500220001-6 IF NEGOTIATIONS FOR INITIAL BASIC AGREEMENT HAVE BEEN REQUESTED OR COMPLETED, PLEASE ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS BELOW. II. Factors Related to Time Required to Negotiate Agreements A. BACKGROUND 1. How much time elapsed between the date of recognition and the effective date of the initial agreement? ? enter code from GROUP VI here 0 CC 25 a. Which party (check ono) made the original request to negotiate the current agreement? Management El Union [3 CC 26 2. Is the current agreement (check one) . . . Initial El Renegotiated El CC 27 3. At what stege (check one) of the collective-bargaining process are the parties now? a. Mid-term in the current agreement; negotia- tions for successor agreement not requested yet. b. Previous agreement has expired; negotia- tions for new agreement not requested yet. El CC 25 c. Negotiations for new agreement have been requested; have not begun yet. 1:1 d. Negotiations for new agreement are under way now El e. Negotiations for new agreement have been completed; currently awaiting approval. ... 4 How much time elapsed between: a. request to negotiate and actual start of negotiations (including ground rules)? ? enter code from GROUP VI here .... DCC 29 b. request to negotiate and effective date of current for most recent) agreement? ? enter code from GROUP VI here .... CC 30 5. If the start of negotiations ems delayed after the request of either party to negotiate or after expiration of the previous agreement, why (explain reasons) the delay? B. TIME IN NEGOTIATIONS 6. What time frame was covered by negotiations on ground rules? ? enter code from GROUP VI here :ICC 32 a. How many (enter number, using 0 as first digit if less than 101 negotiating sessions were held on ground rules? ED CC 33-34 b. How frequent (check one) were these sessions on ground rules? Daily. 51 WeeklyEl CC 35 Monthly El Leta often How many hours (enter number) did each ground rules seteion average? DCC 36 7. How much time elapsed between completion of ground rules and beginning of basic-agreement negotiations? ? enter code from GROUP VI here DCC 37 8. What calendar period was covered by negotiations on the basic agreement?es distinguished from ground rules? ? enter code from GROUP VI here DCC m a. How many (enter number, using 0 as first digit if less than 10) negotiating sessions were held on the basic 411r44)7480? ? ? ? MCC 39.40 b. How frequent (check one) were these sessions on the basic agreement? Daily Weekly M CC 41 Monthly jJ Less often c. How many hours (enter number) did each basic-agreement session average? 0 CC 42 P. How much time elapsed between: a. settlement on all agreement terms (ground rules and basic) and the date it was sent for- ward for agency approval? ? enter code from GROUP VI here DCC 43 b. settlement on all agreement terms (ground rules and basic) and the date of approval? ? enter code from GROUP VI here Oft 44 10. Were any special problems or circumstances (check one) involved in the approval process? (If so, cop/am.) Yes 0 No 1:1 CC 45 C. ISSUES IN NEGOTIATIONS 11 What issues (in descending order, left to right) consumed the most time in negotiation., over-all? (Beloweach, designate whether it was discussed primarily in the ground-rules or basic- agreement stage of negotiations.) ? enter codes from GROUP X hers 1 2 3 4 - 5 6 CID CO CD CO CO DC CC 47-45 CC 49-50 CC 51-52 CC 53-54 CC 55-58 CC 57-58 ? enter codes from GROUP IX here 1 2 3 4 8 6 ODD O CC 59 CC 60 CC 61 CC 62 CC 63 CC 64 12. Were there requests (check one) for exceptions to regulations in connection with the negotiations? , Yes No [3 CC 65 (CONTINUED) PLEASE CONFINE "X" TO APPROPRIATE ANSWER BOX Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 IL 16 a. What iwues ware involved? (Below (tech, in- dicate whether the exception was Wanted or refined.) ? emer codes trot, GROUP X here 14. If official time was authorizod, what formula was signed to? ? enforced, from GROUP VII here [ICC so 1 2 3 4 BEGIN CARD 11] CO ED OD 15 How many (enter numbed employee-negotiators CC 85-57 CC 8889 CC 70-71 CC 72.73 representing the union did the parties agree would be entitled to official time? CC ? Inter codes from GROUP IX here . . . . 16 How many (Inter number) employeehegotiators 0 0 0 (both regulars and alternates) representing the Cc 74 cc 75 cc 75 CC 77 union actually used the official time authorized? DCC? b. How much time (aggregate) sispeen between the requests end the answer? 17 How much official time (enter eeirepte number of hours. using 0 as first digit(s) if les than 100 ? enter code from GROUP VI here .... 13 Was official time withorized (check one; for em- ployees representing the union in negotiations during regular working hours? [3CC 78 (or 101, respectively) actually wee treed during the negotiations? CC 9-10 lilt is Average hours (enter number, using 0 as first digit if less than 101 used per em- E;No ci cc 79 ployee-negotiator MCC 11.12 D. T HIRD-PARTY INVOLVEMENT Did negotiations (Mack one) involve resort to a third party? (Below. designate which third party (or parties) and indicate whether management, union, both or neither requested the assistance.) Yea Ei No CC 14 ? inner codas, front GROUP VIII hole 1 2 3 4 0 Cdt CC15 CC 17 CC 18 ? enter code's) from GROUP IX here 3 Ccli CC 20 CC 21 CC 22 ' 9. At whet stage of negotiations Iground-ru es, basic- agreement or both) vas third-party assistance in- voked? ? enter cod. from GROUP IX here liEMARK.55 Ei CC 23 20. Whet time frame was covered by the period of third.carty involvement? ? enter code f rom GROUP VI here a. For from much of this period (check one) did negotiations continue? All EP Most Some Ej None 21. What 'muss (list in descending order, left to right, and specify third party) were referred for third- party involvement? ? enter codes from GROUP X here 1 2 3 4 5 CO CO ED CD OD OCC 24 Ei CC 25 ED CC 25.27 CC 28-29 CC 30-31 CC 32-33 CC 34-35 CC 36-37 4 enter codes from GROUP VIII here 0 00 DO 0 CC 38 CC 39 CC 40 CC 41 CC 42 CCC? PLEASE CONFINE "lr TO APPROPRIATE AIIISINER BOX Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 ATTACHMENT 8 THE WHITE HOUSE, Washington, September 6, 1972. Memorandum to heads of departments and agencies. This year the Federal Government marked the tenth anniversary of its labor relations program, which now covers more than one million Federal employees. I support collective bargaining for Federal workers, and I have demonstrated that support during the past three years by strengthening the program with the issuance of two Executive orders broadening the scope of bargaining. Now, at the end of the first decade of this, the largest organized labor rela- tions program in the Nation, I am calling on you to make this program even more effective. At my request, the Chairman of the U.S. Civil Service Com- mission and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget have drawn up a set of guidelines for Federal agencies under the Federal labor-management relations program. These guidelines are a solid step forward and should be implemented as quickly as possible. If we can make this program work better, we can make Government work better. I cannot urge you too strongly to take a personal interest in the labor rela- tions activities in your agency and to make your managers aware of your in- terest. You should impress on your top managers that good labor-management relations has a high priority in my Administration. It is as much a part of their overall managerial responsibility as is the accomplishment of their basic mission, whether it be in the defense of our country or in the effective delivery of services to the public. RICHARD NIXON. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, Washington, D.C., September 13, 1972. Memorandum for heads of departments and agencies. In his memorandum of September 6, 1972, President Nixon strongly reaffirmed his desire to bring about more meaningful collective bargaining for Federal employees. To this end, he has called on the heads of departments and agencies to join in a directed effort to make the program even more effective. He has asked that positive and constructive labor-management relations be considered a matter of high priority in his administration. Executive Order 11491, as amended, directs the U.S. Civil Service Commission, in conjunction with the Office of Management and Budget, to establish and maintain a program for the policy guidance of agencies on labor-management relations in the Federal service. Under this authority, and in order to promote the efforts which the President has urged in his memorandum, CSC and 0M13 have developed the attached "Guidelines for the Management and Organization of Agency Responsibilities under the Federal Labor-Management Relations Program." ? The Guidelines are fundamental precepts for developing a positive and con- structive bilateral relationship with Federal employee unions and for use by agency management in assessing program adequacy. Although they are applic- able throughout the Federal establishment, full consideration was given to the wide diversity of agency roles and missions and the varying stages of program development among agencies during preparation of the Guidelines. As a result, the Guidelines are flexible enough to fit a broad range of program requirements. Agency heads are requested to assure that the Guidelines are applied to the maximum extent feasible. The Commission through its evaluation process and OMB in its regular budget review responsibilities, will periodically analyze (117) Approved For Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06141A-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 ....gency performance in implementing the Guidelines. In addition, the Com- mission, through its Office of Labor-Management Relations, will continue to furnish technical advice and guidance to agencies on a day-to-day basis. ROBERT E. HAMPTON, Chairman, U.S. Civil Service Commission. CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, Director, Office of Management and Budget. GUIDELINES FOR THE MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION OF' AGENCY RESPONSIBILI- TIES UNDER THE EDERAL LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS PROGRAM?SEP- TEMBER 1972 I. MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK A. Objective: Develop and issue a clear statement of management policy and philosophy concerning labor relations 1. Need for broad general policy.----The President has stated, in the preamble to Executive Order 114H, as amended, the Government's general labor relations policy. As a means of oroviding all agency representatives (managers, super- visors, staff support) with overall guidance in bilateral dealings, the head of the agency, primary national subdivision or subordinate activities at all levels should affirm in writing acceptance and support for such policy and spell out the philosophy and approach to be followed in implementing it. 2. Content of policy statement.?The statement should clearly define principles to be observed in management relations with unions. This involves such matters as management's commitment in the public interest to modern and progressive work practices, employee and union rights and responsibilities, high standards of employee performance, management's positive approach to third party resolu- tion of disputes, improved well-being of employees through maximum appro- priate participation in establishing personnel policies affecting them on the job, and the importance of sound labor relations to mission accomplishment. 3. Interface of management framework with organization framework.?Agen- cy organization of labor relations activities should reflect the conviction that the growing dimensions of union involvement in the formulation and implemen- tation of personnel policies and practices affecting employees they represent must become an integral part of agency approach to personnel management in order to maximize the cooperative and productive benefits of the relationship. There should be visible, top level commitment to the total personnel manage- ment program. Specific emphasis should be given in allocation and utilization of personnel managemert resources to the new dimensions of labor relations which continue to transform many personnei decisions from a unilateral to a bilateral process. Such a total integration of labor relations responsibilities in personnel management is reflected and intended throughout these Guidelines. It. Objective: Prepare plans and resource estimates required to achieve labor relations goals 1. Labor relations program plan?Guided by its identified management policy a rid philosophy, each agency should prepare a comprehensive plan for achieving its labor relations objectives. Short-range planning period should cover the fiscal year about to begin and the subsequent budget year. Long-range planning period generally will cover the next five years. Thee plans should be the products of two specific steps, described below. a. State short-range end long-range labor relations program objectives.? Agencies should prepare written program objectives for labor relations activi- i ies. These objectives should be formulated according to management's con- sensus of what are desirable and practical goals for the agency to accomplish through its labor relations efforts with the understanding that management is only one of the parties to a bilateral relationship. Short-range objectives may, for example, be (1) reorganizing the personnel staff at the headquarters to provide more effective labor relations support for agency field staff or (2 reviewinng agency regulations relating to matters within the scope of bargaining under Executive Order 11491 to insure locus of Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 119 authority rests at the most effective level for bilateral dealings between unions and agency managers, or (3) reviewing and improving, it necessary, procedures for agency approval of negotiated agreements. Long-range objectives might include (1) eiforts to deal more effectively with fragmented exclusive units through possible use of multi-unit bargaining ap- proach, or (2) seeking to enlist union support for general improvements in quality of public service and implementation of pubiic policy through such matters as improved worker productivity, safe work conditions and practices, or (3) strengthening line supervisor and middle management perception and performance of their role as management representatives. b. Develop strategies to achieve desired tabor relations objectives.?The other necessary step in development of an agency's labor relations plan is to establish priorities and methods by which these objectives are to be achieved. The short- range strategies resulting from this process generally will be more specific and more fully developed than those applied to the agency's long-range labor rela- tions objectives. 2. Develop a resource plan for agency labor relations activities for the /Meal year about to begin and for the subsequent budget year.?Estimates for the agency's personnel management function should reflect the requirements neces- sary to accomplish the labor relations objectives formulated according to the program planning steps outlined above. The resource estimates should be used as a management tool to guide the agency in its obligation of manpower and money toward meeting its current labor relations plan. Amount of funds appro- priated may require adjustment of resource estimates, however the full estimate should serve as the basis for relating the planned labor relations activity with the associated expenditures. It is not necessary to include indirect and overhead costs for this purpose. Similarly, the portioned salary cost for labor relations activities performed by line managers as part of their normal, functions should not be included. The labor relations training budget estimate is sum- marized below. The budget estimate should include the annual salary cost of agency staff personnel involved in activities related directly to labor relations. Full-time and part-time personnel should be included roughly to the extent that they participate in labor relations activities. Other significant costs that are related directly to the labor relations effort should be included such as training, expense of third-party procedures, consult- ing fees or staff travel. C. Objective: Develop a systematic approach for planning agency labor relations training 1. Identify agency-wide labor relations training needs.?To determine train- ing needs, the agency manager should initially define, in some detail, the skills required to perform effectively the various labor relations functions in the agency. That is, with what degree of skill should the various levels of super- vision and management in the organization be able to comprehend and apply the rights and responsibilities designated for management representative under EX). 11491, as amended. After defining required skills, the manager should in- ventory abilities possessed by present agency personnel as a guide to the mag- nitude of training needs. 2. Develop a program to meet the training needs.?After agency training needs have been identified, alternative methods of meeting the needs should be considered. With each method, whether it be hiring skilled personnel, training current personnel through agency or outside means, redistributing current skilled employees, cost estimates should be developed so the agency's needs may be met efficiently and economically with due consideration to long, as well as short, range objectives. These estimates should include all relevant costs. Agency administered train- ing, for example, should include costs of development, facilities, instructors, and participants. The Civil Service Commission has developed a Training Cost Model which agencies may find useful in making these estimates. The Commission also has developed a basic curriculum of labor relations courses designed to meet training needs most common to all agencies. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 120 D. Objective: Develop a systematic approach for planning and negotiating agreements Successful negotiation of agreements requires systematic planning and high level attention. blajor areas of concern include, but are not limited to: 1. Select and train management s negotiating team. 2. Establish management's bargaining objectives and develop management proposals where appropriate. This must involve top and line management as well as total personnel management input. 3. Anticipate union proposals. 4. Attempt to merge management's objectives with anticipated union pro- posals for analysis. 5. Estimate impact of each proposal in terms of cost-benefit ratio, possible problems in administering it, compliance with Order, employee well-being and performance, management effectiveness and mission accomplishment. 6. Settle on bargaining strategies and priorities, involving both line and staff input. 7. Assign management's negotiating team with appropriate authority to bind management to the terms of a labor-management agreement. 8. When mutual agreement is not possible, determine management position and representation in third-party proceedings. 9. Summarize the key negotiation proceedings for use in administration of the agreement and for future negotiation planning. E. Objective: Conduct and annual review and evaluation of the labor relations program 1. Report progress in meeting labor relations objectives.?A system for evaluating agency-wide progress should be established at the headquarters level. Each primary national subdivision, major bureau or command should be re- quested to submit an evaluation of its labor relations activities over the past year to agency headquarters. This report should cover progress made toward established program objectives and should highlight major problems which interfered with achieving those objectives:. It should also discuss activities which were not included in the agency's statement of objectives and analyze the nature of such activities for possible consideration in future plans. Evalu- ators should be careful not to measure program effectiveness solely against achievement of planned objectives. Events may have proved the objective unwise, untimely or unobtainable. An assessment should be made as to the appropriateness of the objectives and possible redirection. Finally, reports should discuss the extent to which actual expenditures exceeded or fell short of the budgeted expenditures for labor relations to assist mana gement in subsequetit planning and budgeting. 2. Evaluate agency labor relations training output?Labor relations training activity should be reviewed annually to evaluate its success in fulfilling the agency's skill needs. Tin review should focus, if possible, on the degree of skills increase on the part o those involved in the labor relations function. The revision of training materials, the need for further training or retraining, and the efficiency of the training function should also be considered. These quali- tative analyses should be in addition to any reporting of numbers of persons trained, hours of training conducted, and other quantitative output measure- ments. 3. Review agency-wide performance in its ',5ilateral negotiation of labor agree- ments.?Using the record of negotiation proceedings prepared at the conclusion of each collective bargaining agreement as outlined above, each agency should determine the extent of its overall success in achieving the objectives set for its negotiators. This prooess should attempt to highlight strategies which have proved to be particularly effective in reaching agreements consistent with management's intentions and to identify workable tradeoffs. This process may also reveal areas in which management can take appropriate permissible uni- lateral steps to improve the conduct of its operations. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 :1QA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 LE ORGANIZATION FRAMEWORK A. Objective: Insure top management recognition of total personnel manage- ment with occult emphasis of labor retations.?Insure adequate line and staff support of tlie pruovain 1. Organization of personnel, management function.?The management of hu- man resources, whether represented ay labor organization or not, requires the personnei management junction ( witnin which labor relations responsibilities are totally integrated) to nave direct access to the head or principal deputy of an agency, activity or installation. Agency policy and program development should incorporate the total personnel management input in the formulative stages ot that development. 2. Assign appropriate responsibility and authority for agency labor relations matters to line supervisors/managers.?Sound labor relations is a line manage- ment concern. Since the line supervisor/manager so deeply affects labor rela- tions policy and in turn is so deeply auected by that policy and by the provi- sions of negotiated labor agreements, agency management should provide that sufficient and appropriate responsibilities and authority are delegated to the line supervisor/manager in order tor him to direct the workforce within the terms of a negotiated agreement and represent higher level management in a labor relations capacity. 3. Assign appropriate responsibility and authority to the personnel staff for agency labor relations activities.?As with the duties and authorities of line supervisors and managers, the agency personnel staff at appropriate levels, requires responsibilities and decision-making authority, as delegated by the head of an agency, to be that agency's primary interface with labor organiza- tions in all aspects of labor relations. It will normally serve management's best interests to delegate to this function the authority to represent the agency in dealing with unions, in third-party proceedings, and in conjunction with line management, preparing and conducting negotiations with labor organizations and implementing and administering the resulting agreement. 4. Engage line management in pre-negotiation planning and in contract ad- ministration.?Line management participation is essential in effective labor relations. At the supervisory level, management has the benefit of frequent, direct contact with rank and file employees which can help identify employee needs and concerns and anticipate union demands. Line managers also can identify provisions that affect efficiency and effectiveness of their division's operations. They know best which provisions will place undesirable and/or unworkable limits on the authority needed to meet agency goals and missions. 5. Provide line management at all levels with labor relations staff support.? The line supervisor's/manager's need for authoritative technical and policy guidance on labor relations matters of agency-wide significance should be furnished by staff support aware of the supervisor's/manager's specific area of responsibility and able to interpret the agency's official position on a particular question of policy. Each agency's particular circumstance should dictate the appropriate pattern. 6. When appropriate, utilize external sources of labor relations skills for guidance and assistance.?Within government, the U.S. Civil Service Commis- sion through its Office of Labor-Management Relations and its Regional Labor Relations Officers, furnishes day-to-day technical advice and guidance to agencies In all aspects of Federal labor relations. This includes coordination of inter- agency activities in all facets of labor relations. The Commission stands ready to assist agencies in labor relations training through its Labor Relations Training Center. Experts from other agencies can also be called on for assist- ing an agency's labor relations staff. Outside government, numerous private and academic institutions and experts can offer assistance in specialized areas; however, all agencies should insure that capabilities do not exist within gov- ernment before turning to outside sources. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 ATTACHMENT 9 SPECIAL LABOR AGREEMENT INFORMATION REIRTEVAL SYSTEM (LAIRS) SURVEY, Aram 1979 The distribution of exclusive units by number of employees shows that 84% of recognitions cover fewer than 500 employees, and more than one half (53%) cover less than 100. Coupled with the fact that the average unit size is 312 employees (corresponding figure for 1972 wat 319), there is a strong suggestion here that fragmentation of bargaining units- is a prominent characteristic of tile Federal labor relations program. As indicated In the report, 1,283 out of 2,400 agreements contain provisions for binding arbitration. 615,469 employees are covered by the provision of these arbitration clauses. Records available in our office show that more than 372 grievance-arbitration awards have been rendered since the inception of Execu- Order 10988. (This includes a large number of arbitrations connected with unit-determination issues under E.O. 10988.) Additionally, 161 agreements covering 72,509 employees provide for advisory arbitration in adverse action eases. Whether the nature of the arbitrations is binding or advisory, 1,452 agreements covering 643,727 employees permit official time to be used by em- ployee participants in the process. Frequently this also includes, in addition to ggrieved employee, employees who are representatives of the union or witnesses called by either party. A survey of these awards reveals that a variety of issues have been addressed. Included are: pay policies, incentive awards, over- time, promotion, wage survey, sick leave, annual leave, performance evaluation, discipline, work scheduling, work assignment, training and representation. Subject Number of agreements Number of employees covered Promotion policy Joint promotion committee Joint performance review committee_ Union member(s) on promotion panel Union participation (wage survey) 1,579 112 92 197 512 717, 912 62,019 44, 513 83, 873 246,087 Joint EEO committee 436 294, 773 Physical examinations 156 104, 583 Drug abuse Clause 61 50,350 Alcoholism clause 82 65, 189 Grievance procedure 1,989 820,104 Discipline policy 1, 300 589, 274 Pay policy clause 225 118,922 Call-in allowance 543 246, 654 Environmental pay 335 189,959 Seniority 481 251,391 Union review (RIF) 300 184,006 Technological displacement 236 139, 416 Safety provision 1,521 651, 637 Safety clothing 696 350, 091 Safety equipment 744 370, 566 Joint safety committee 886 441, 923 Overtime clause 1, 579 711, 923 Compensatory time 498 229, 075 Call-in limitation 150 55, 640 Hours guarantee 383 172, 920 Excused time (training) 359 217, 271 Cafeteria services 190 97, 364 Parking 436 318, 511 Work equipment 326 153, 871 Tools 239 136, 668 Joint suggestion/awards committee 367 231, 034 Leave (hold union office) 727 382, 367 Paid-time allowances (stewards) 668 308, 062 Use of space (union) 1,179 578,597 Use of telephone (union) 299 260, 597 Mail privilege (union) 311 114, 255 (122) Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 ATTACHMENT 10 SUMMARY OF COMPARISONS OF RETIREMENT, LIFE INSURANCE, HEALTH BENEFITS AND OTHER MAJOR EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS, DECEMBER 1973 The U.S. Civil Service Commission has recently completed a study of retire- ment, life insurance, health benefits, holiday, and sick and annual leave pro- grams provided by 25 leading employers. Recognizing that employers spend benefit dollars in different ways, often providing one benefit at the expense of another, the Commission wanted to find out how the government compares with these other employers on the basis of 6 fringe benefits, individually and overall. Employer contribution to life insurance, age and service requirements for optional retirement, number of holidays granted each year, health insurance coverage for surgical expenses?these are but a few of the benefit features the CSC considered. Various features of the other employers' benefit programs were compared to the Federal counterpart and rated as being comparable to, or more or less liberal than, the Federal. The same determination was made for each benefit and then for the total benefits package. The results were: One employer provided retirement benefits more liberal than the govern- ment's; 14 provided comparable benefits; 10 provided less liberal benefits; Three employers provided a holiday, sick and annual leave program more liberal than the government's; 3 provided comparable programs; 19 provided less liberal programs; One employer provided a health insurance program more liberal than the government's; 7 provided comparable programs; 17 provided less liberal pro- grams; and Five employers provided life insurance programs more liberal than the government's; 3 provided comparable programs; 17 provided less liberal pro- grams. Overall, of the 25 other employers included in the sample only the State of New York offers its employees a fringe benefits package that is more liberal than the Federal government's. The benefits packages offered by Baltimore, General Motors, Marylan 3, St. Louis, and U.S. Steel are comparable to the government package. Within their packages, some individual benefits are more liberal, while other are comparable. and still others are less liberal. A limited benefit feature in one category can be balanced or more than offset by a more liberal feature in another category. Private employers: Bank of America, E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., General Electric, General Motors Corp., International Business Machines Corp., Pacific Gas & Electric Co.. J. C. Penney Co., Inc., The Prudential Insurance Co. of America, Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey), Traveler's Insurance Co., United Airlines, and United States Steel Corp. Public employers: Baltimore, California, Dallas, Georgia, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New York State, Phoenix, St. Louis, Virginia, and Wisconsin. (123) Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 34-619 0 - 74 - 9 9-1.000ZZ009000t108?0089/dCltl-VIO : 90/60/1?00Z eSeeleti -10d peACLIddV ATTACHMENT NO. 11 Comparison of Executive Order 11491, as Amended, to Bills on Federal Labor Management Relations TITLE Executive Order 11491, amended by E.G. 11616 H.R. 10700 (Henderson) H.R. 13 (Brasco)/S. 351 (McGee) H.R. 9784 (Ford) Labor-Management Relations in the Federal Service Labor-Management Federal Employee Labor-Management Federal Pmptcyee Federal Service. Act of 1973 (To amend Sec. 2(a) Act of 1973. Act of 1973. Subchapter 1 of chapter 71 of title 5, USC, as "Subchapter I?Employee Labor Organizations".) Lor-Management PREAMBLE Public interest requires high standards of employee performance and modern work practices to iopr" cm. ployee performance and efficiency. Efficient administration and em- ployee well-being require orderly and constructive relationships be- tween labor organizations and man- agement officials. Clear statement of respective rights and obligations needed. Participation of employees of the executive branch, through labor organizations of their own choosing, in the formulation and implementa- tion of personnel policies and prac- tices and matters affecting working conditions, is in the public interest; and collective bargaining rights which are consistent with the public service and the efficient administra- tion of Executive agencies shall be enjoyed by labor organizations rep- resenting employees. [7101] Participation of employees of the Federal Government through labor organitatioiie a their own choosing in decisions which affect them con- tributes to the effective conduct of public buziness. Therefore, labor or- ganizations and collective bargaining in the Federal service are in the public interest. 1101(a)1 Statutory protection of the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards the public interest and contributes to the effec- tive conduct of public business. Labor organizations and collective bargaining in the public interest. Act prescribes rights and obligations of Federal employees and establishes procedures to meet special require- ments and needs of the Federal Government. 12 (a)1 POLICY Employee free right to join or not Similar. Elaborates on right to petition Employee protected in exercise of Similar to HR 13, except agency man- join labor organizations. Except as Congress by including "right to fur- right to form, join, assist organize- agement prohibited from either en- noted below right to assist labor nish information to either House of tions; with prohibition on discourag- couraging or discouraging member- Approved For Release 2001/09/04CIA-RDP75B00380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 organization extends to participa- tion in its management and acting as a representative, including pres- entation of its views to officials of the Executive branch, the Congress, or other appropriate authority. Head of agency to assure that em- ployees informed of rights and that no interference, restraint, coercion, or discrimination is practiced within agency to encourage or discourage membership in a labor organiza- tion. [1 (a) . ] Right to be an officer or representa- tive, except a supervisor may not participate in the management or representation of a labor organiza- tion (other than as excepted by sec. 24) nor may an employee where there would be conflict or apparent conflict of interest or incompata- bility with law or official duties. (b) Congress, or to a committee or mem- ber thereof". [7102; 7103 (b) (1); 7117(a) (2) ; 7117(c).] Similar. [7103(b) (2)] jug membership, but does not pro- hibit encouraging membership. At request of organization employees required to become members (union shop) or pay equivalent dues (agency shop) as condition of employment. Would permit representation of supervisors and managers with rank- and-file employees. [201(j) (k); 101 (b) ; 701 (a) (2) .1 Does not limit supervisors and man- agers from being involved in manage- ment of labor organizations. [101] ship other than requiring 8S condition of employment union membership and payment of dues (union shop) or pay equivalent dues (agency shop). Supervisors and managers can be represented together with rank and file employees under certain condi- tions. [2 (a) ; 5(a) (c) ; 6 (f) ; (10) .] Same limitations as noted above. DEFINITIONS Agency: an Executive dept., a Govt. corporation, and an independent establishment as defined in section 104 of title 5, USC, except the Gen- eral Accounting Office. [2(a)] Similar but Tennessee Valley Authority specifically excluded. Also President can make exceptions due to national security requirements and considera- tions; and head of agency, with ap- proval of Authority, can make excep- tions related to internal security of agency. [7105(a) (3)] Agency means any department, agency, bureau, activity, or organization of the U.S. Government which employs employees as defined in 201(b), refer- enced below. Agency means any department, agency bureau, activity, or organization of the U.S. Government which employs employees as defined below or any person acting as an agent thereof [3 (c) ] Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : eek-RDP75B00380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Executive Order 11491, amended by E.G. 11616 H.R. 10700 (Henderson) H.R. 13 (Brasco)/ S. 351 (McGee) H.R. 9784 (Ford) Employee: an employee of an agency and an employee of a nonappropri- ated fund instrumentality of the U.S. but does not include, for the pur- pose of exclusive recognition or national consultation rights, a su- pervisor (except as provided in sec. 24) [2 (b)] Supervisor: an employee having au- thority, in the interest of an agency to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employ- ees, or responsibility to direct them, or to evaluate their performance, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of inde- pendent judgment. [2(c)] Guard: an employee assigned to en- force against employees and other persons rules to protect agency Similar, but includes individuals no longer employed relative to an unfair labor practice under section 7109; and those employed at Veterans' Canteen Service, Veterans Admin- istration, described in section 5102 (c)(14) of USC 5. Specifically ex- cludes employees in Foreign Service who are paid under Chapter 14 or 14A or section 2385(d) of title 22; aliens and noncitizens employed out- side US; employees stationed in Canal Zone; and members of the uni- formed services. President can ex- clude employees working in locations where intelligence, investigative, or security work is performed and na- tional security requirements and con- siderations are involved. [7103(a) (2)) Similar. [7103 (a)(8)] Similar. 17103 (a) (11)1 Definition of employee is broad-brush and expanded to include supervisors and managers, security agency em- ployees, employees in competitive service of legislative and judicial branches, employees in Library of Congress, in Government Printing Office and Federal Reserve System, but excluding US Postal Service. (Alm see reference below concerning coverage as contrasted to Order.) [201 (b) ] Definition of supervisor in describing authority is similar, provided that employee's pay is at or above top step for GS-10, and that employee has direct responsibility for at least ten employees. [201(j)] Similar to FIR 13, but specifically in- cludes individuals no longer employed relative to an T.:LP under section 10 of Act, and definitions for manager and supervisor differ. [3(b) (f) (r)] Supervisor: definition similar to Order, except with respect to firefighters wherein term to include only employ- ees who perform a preponderance of specified acts of authority. [3(f)] No definition for guards, and does not No definition for guard, but provides provide any limitation on their definition for public safety officer: any representation or inclusion in mixed employee engaged in (1) enforcement 9- I.00 eseeieu Jod peAoiddv 9-1?000ZZ009000t108?0089/dCIU-VI3 : 90/60/1.00Z eseelet1 JOd PeA0AdV property or the safety of persons on agency premises, or to maintain law and order in areas or facilities under Govt. control. [2(d)] Labor Organization: a lawful organiza- tion in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealings with agencies concerning grievances, per- sonnel policies and practices, or other matters affecting the working conditions of their employees, but does not include organizations which consists of managers or supervisors (except as provided in sec. 24); assists or participates in a strike against the Govt. or imposes a duty or obligation to conduct, assist or participate in such a strike; advo- cates overthrow of the constitu- tional form of the Govt.; or dis- criminates on race, color, creed, sex, age, or national origin. [2(e)] Agency Management: the agency head and all mgt. officials, supervisors, and other representatives of mgt. having authority to act for the agency on any matters relating to the implementation of the agency LMR program. [2(f)] Similar, except organization must have as its primary purpose dealings with an agency concerning grievances, etc., and shall not include an organi- zation whose basic purpose is purely social, fraternal, or limited to special interest objectives which are only incidentally related to terms and conditions of employmmt. Also adds that cannot deny membership be- cause of preferential or nonpreferen- tial civil service status. [7103(a) (4)] Similar. Management official means an employee who formulates, deter- mines, effectively influences, or effec- tuates policies of an agency, or who, in the performance of his duties, has discretion to modify the established policies of an agency. [7103(a) (9)] units based on potential conflict-of- interest problems. Labor organization: definition similar to 10700 except it means any na- tional or international union, federa- tion, council or department, or any affiliate thereof . . . in which em- ployees participate and pay dues; and which exists for primary purpose of dealing with agencies concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work. Does not ex- clude organization which assists or participates in strike against Gov- ernment, etc. [201(d)] Management official. Employee in posi- tion which presents conflict of inter- est, or potential conflict of interest, between an agency and employees or who formulates, determines, or ef- fectuates agency's policies and who has discretion in performance of .his job, with power to modify employer's established policies. [201(k)] of criminal laws including highway patrol; (2) a correctional program, facility, or institution where the activity is potentially dangerous be- cause of contact with criminal sus- pects, defendants, prisoners, proba- tioners or parolees; or (3) a court having criminal or juvenile delinquent jursidiction where the activity is potentially dangerous because of contact with criminal suspects, de- fendants, prisoners, probationers, or parolees. [3 (h) ] Labor organization: definition similar to HR 13, except does not exclude orga- nizations which assist or participate in strikes or related activities pro- hibited under Order. [3(d)] Management official. Similar to HR 13 [3(4] 9-1?000ZZ009000t108?0089/dati-A5: 90/60/1.00Z aseeieu JOd peACLIddV 9-1?000ZZ009000t108?0089/dCIU-VI3 90/60/1.00Z eseelet1 JOd PeA0AdV Executive Order 11491, amended by E.O. 11616' H.R. 10700 (IIendersun) H.R. 13 (Brasco)/S. 351 (McGee) H.R. 9784 (Ford) Council: The Federal Labor Relations Council established by Order [2(g)]. Panel: The Federal Service Impasses Panel established by Order. [2(h)]. Assistant Secretary: The . Assistant Scorttary of Labor for Labor. Management Relations. [2(i)]. Authority: means Federal Labor Rela- tions Authority established under section 7104, replacing Council 17103 (a) (5) ; 7104; 71111. Duties of Panel performed by Federal Labor Relations Authority (Author- ity). [7103(a) (5) ; 7104; 7111]. Most of duties of A/S LMR performed by Authority established under sec- tion 7104. Person: an individual, labor organiza- tion, or agency. [7103(a) (1)). Agreement: an agreement entered into as a result of collective bargaining. [7103(a) (6)]. Grievance. eumplaiut by employee or labor organization concerning per- sonnel policies and practices and matters affecting working conditions; complaint concerning effect, inter- pretation, or claim of breach of agree- ment; or complaint by agency con- cerning interpretation and applica- tion of agreement, but does not involve complaint involving matters subject to appeals procedures pre- scribed by, or pursuant to, existing or future specific provisions of law. [7103 (a) (7)] Confidential employee: an employee who acts in a confidential capacity to person who formulates or effectuates mgt. policies in labor relations. [7103 (a)(12)] Authority: Means Federal Labor Rela- tions Authority provided in section 301, replacing Council. [201(e)]. Duties of Panel assumed by Authority. [301, 401]. Board: The Federal Employees Labor Relations Board established by sec- tion 4 of Act, replacing Council, and A/S LMR under Order. No provision. Most of A/S LMR duties performed by No provision. Most functions assumed Authority established by sutler. 301. by Beard referenced above. Person: means one or more individuals, labor organizations, or agencies of the U.S. Government. [201(a)]. Agreement: means agreement negotiated through collective bargaining pursu- ant to provisions of Act. [201(f)]. Gricvanon. any complaint by cinployuc or labor organization concerning any aspect of employment relationship with agency including any matters formerly subject to final administra- tive review outside agency under regulations of CSC, or law, com- plaints related to agreements, and any claimed violation, misinterpre- tation, or misapplication of any law, rule, or regulations governing con- ditions of employment. [201(h)] No provision. Person: Same as HR 13. [3(a)]. No definition for agreement. Giicvanuc. any complaint by au mu- ployee or by a labor organization con- cerning any aspect of the employment relationship with an agency as well as any complaint concerning the effect, interpretation, or claim of breach of a collective-bargaining agreement, and any claimed violation, misinterpreta- tion, or misapplication of any law, rule, or regulation governing condi- tions of employment. [3(q)] No provision. 0 0- 0 (T) rs.) co 0 0 th CO co th rs.) rs.) 9-1.000ZZ009000t108?0089/dCIU-VIO : 90/60/1.00z aseeieu JOd PeACLIddV Professional employee: (not defined in No provision. Order but same definition by Asst. Secretary in case determination): employee engaged in performance of work requiring knowledge of ad- vanced type in field of science or learning customarily acquired in specialized intellectual instruction and study in institution of higher learning. . . requiring consistent ex- ercise of discretion and judgment in its performance . . . predonainantely intellectual and varied in charac- ter . . . or such study and is per- forming related work under direc- tion of professional person to qualify himself to become professional employee. [7103(a)(13)] Dispute: includes any controversy con- cerning terms, tenure, or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of em- ployees in the negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of em- ployment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee. [201(g)] CondilionA of employment. Definition includes virtually all aspects of em- ployment including pay practices, fringe benefits, work procedures, seniority, union security, travel and per diem. [201(i)] Professional: includes any employee whose work?(1) is predominantely intellectual and varied in character; (2) requires the consistent exercise of independent judgment; (3) requires knowledge of an advanced nature in a field of learning customarily acquired by specialized study in an institution of higher education or its equivalent; and (4) is of such character that the output or result accomplished cannot be standardized in relation to a given period of time. [3(g)] Labor dispute. Similar to HR 13. [3(n)] Similar to HR 13. [3(p)] Firefighter: includes any employee en- gaged in the performance of work directly connected with the control and extinguishment of fires or the maintenance and use of firefighting apparatus and equipment. [3(i)] 9-1?000ZZ009000t108?0089/dCIU-VITI90/60/1?00Z aseeieu -10d peACLIddV Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Executive Order 11491, amended by E.O. 11610 H.R. 10700 (Henderson) H.R. 13 (Brasco)/S. 351 (McGee) H.R. 9784 (Ford) Collective Bargaining: Bargaining in good faith between authorized rep- resentatives of a labor organization having exclusive recognition and management officials having manage- ment responsibility for the amiro- priate unit: Educational employee: includes any em- ployee of a school system, college or university who?(1) has regular con- tact with students; (2) participates in the development, implementation, or evaluation of an educational pro- gram; or (3) is otherwise involved in the teaching-learning process. [3(j)] Service: means the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service established by chapter 29 or title 172, U.S. Code. 13(1)] Collective bargaining. Definition de- scribes mutual obligation of repre- sentatives of parties to bargain in good faith in effort to reach agree- ment. Duty to negotiate extends to matters which are or may be subject of a statute or regulation and if legislative action necessary to imple- ment agreement shall include the obligation of agency to submit such to appropriate governmental body for action. Agency not to make or apply rules or regulations restricting scope of bargaining or which con- flict with any negotiated agreement. 13(m)] Determination of agent: in determining whether any person is acting as an agent of another person $o as to make such other person responsible for his acts, the question of whether the specific acts performed were actually authorized or subsequently ratified shall not be controlling. [3(0)] Approved For Release 2001/09/061:: 9-1?000ZZ009000t109?0089/dCltl- 9-1?000ZZ009000t108?0089/dCIU-VIO : 90/60/1.00Z aseeieu JOd PeACLIddV Exclusive Representative?includes any employee organization which has been (1) selected or designated pursuant to the provisions of section 6 of the Act as the representative of the employees in an appropriate collective bargain- ing unit; or (2) recognized by an agency prior to the effective date of this Act as the exclusive representa- tive of the employees in an appro- priate collective bargaining unit. [3(e)] APPLICATION Applies to employees and agencies in executive branch . . . except for FBI, CIA, or agency components having intelligence, investigative, or security functions, including the investigation of employee integrity in perfonnance Of duties, when agency head determines order can- not be applied consistent with na- tional security requirements or internal security of the agency. No appeal. Exceptions do not apply to section 22. [3(b) (1), (2), (3), (4)] Agency head may suspend any pro- vision, except non-veteran adverse action appeal right (Section 22), in installations outside U.S. No ap- peal. [3(e)] Employees involved in administering a labor relations law or the order may not be represented by organi- zations representing other em- ployees subject to such law or order 3(d)] Similar to application under Order (see definitions above for agency and em- ployee): President can make excep- tions based on national security; exemptions by agency head, with approval of Authority, based on in- ternal security. [7103(a) (2)(3)1 Exemptions by agency head limited as noted above. Non-veteran adverse action appeal right remains in effect under continuity clause. [7103(a) (2) (3)1 Such limitation applies only to em- ployees administering this Act. [7106(b) (2)] Coverage greatly enlarged to apply to all Federal Departments and agen- cies, excluding only the Postal Serv- ice. It would apply to the FBI, CIA, and other agencies having as primary function intelligence, investigative or security work, or agencies concerned with internal security duties. No ex- ception by agency head based upon national or internal security. [201(b) (c)1 Exceptions by agency head not pro. vided. [201(b)(c)]. No provision on non-veteran adverse action appeal rights. No such limitation on representation for employees administering Act. [201(b); 501(d)] Coverage similar to HR 13. [3(b)(0)1 No provision. No provision. ? ADMIN-ISTRATION?? Executive Order 11441, amended by E.O. 11616 H.R. 10700 (Henderson) H.R. 13 (Brasco)/S. 331 (McGee) H.R. 9784 (Ford) Federal Labor Relations Council (FLRC): consisting of CSC Chair- man, who is Chairman of FLRC, Secretary of Labor, Director of the Office of Mgt. and Budget, and other officials President may desig- nate. ??to administer order, decide major policy issues, prescribe reguletions, report to President; and ?to consider appeals from decisions of Asst. Secretary of Labor, certain negotiability issues, exceptions to arbitration awards, other appro- priate matters. CSC to provide administrative sup- port and services to Council. (4) Federal Service Impassea Panel: con- sisting of at least 3 members ap- pointed by President. Panel had independent authority but is or- Establishes the Federal Labor Rela- tions Authority to carry out func- tions of Act except as otherwise pro- vided, including activities of FLRC, FSIP, and Asst. Secretary under Order. Arbitrability and grievability issues to be determined under negotiated grievance procedures. Pvithcrity con certify exclusiu,, p- resentative without election under section 7106(1). Authority composed of Chairman and two additional members; full time; appointed by President and confirmed by Senate. Annual report to President for transmittal to Congress. Can delegate functions to Executive Director or other employees, whose decision or action is subject to review by Author- ity within 60 days. To prescribe rules and regulations to carry out its responsibilities, and appoint neces- sary staff. [7104; 7105; 7117(a) (1)] Activities of Panel under Order as- signed to Federal Labor Relations Authority as discussed above. (also see impasse procedures, below, 7111.) Creates Federal Labor Relations Authority.. Authority to carry out such functions as performed under Order by FLRC, FSIP, and Al SLMR, with enlarged authority and scope, including certification of rep- resentative without election. [501 (b)(g)I However, arbitrability and gricvabiiity questions subject to negotiated grievance procedure. [201 (h); 1101(e)] Composed of a Chair- man and two additional members, full-time, appointed by President with advice and consent of Senate, from a list of ten persons submitted to President by the American Arbitration Association; to report in writing to Congress and to President at close of fiscal year concerning cases, decisions and moneys dis- bursed. Can delegate functions to Executive Director and certain other employees whose determinations stand unless Authority undertakes to grant review within 30 days after request for review filed. Executive Director has final authority con- cerning alleged ULP violations. To prescribe rules and regulations and appoint necessary staff. Certain restrictions on employment of attor- neys, and on review of trial exam- iner's report. (301, 401) No provision. Activities performed by Panel under Order assigned to Au- thority as reflected above. Creates Federal Employees Relations Board, consisting of five full-time members, appointed by President with consent of Senate. Board to issue rules and regulstion.s necessary to carry out provisions of Act; has subpoena power; decides unit and representa- tion issues [6 (b) (c) (d)1: conducts elections where appropriate; rules on showing of interest and recognition without election [6(b)]; determines alleged ULP's including directing back pay and disciplinsxy actions as necessary, with cease and desist powers relative to violations of Act; and fines and/or imprisonment for interference with Board. Establishes position of General Counsel of Board ; appointed by President with consent of Senate; to investigate alleged violations of Act; file and prosecute complaints; intervene before Board in unlawful act proceedings brought under section 11; and to have other powers as Board may prescribe. (4, 6, 10, 11) No provision. Special impasse procedures established under section 7. 9-1.000ZZ009000t109?0089/dCltl-VIO : 90/60/1.00z eseeieu JOd PeACLIddV ganizationally located within Coun- cil for services and staff assistance. Authorized to take action necessary to settle impasses on substantive issues in negotiations. (5) Parties may agree on techniques to assist in resolving impasses (11a), but arbi- tration or third-party factfinding with recommendations may not be used except when expressly author- ized by panel. (17) Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor- Management Relations: ?decides unit mut representation issues. ?supervises elections and certifies results. ?decides disputes on eligibility for national consultation rights. ?decides unfair labor practice com- plaints and standards of conduct COSS. ?decides grievability and arbitra- bility questions under an agreement. ?may require an agency or labor organization to cease and desist from violation of Order and require affirmative action. ?may request and use the services and assistance of employees of other agencies. ?shall prescribe regulations to ad- minister his functions under Order. ?costs not reimbursed. ?a member of the Civil Service Com- mission to perform duties of Assis- tant Secretary when such matters involve the Department of Labor. (6) No provision. Activities of A/SLMR under Order assigned to Federal Labor Relations Authority as noted above. No provision. Most activities per- No provision. Most duties of A/SLMR formed by A/SLMB. under Order under Order assumed by Board or assigned to Authority. Board empowered to issue appro- priate regulations effectuating the Act. (4) Approved For Release 2001/09/06 :131A-RDP75B00380R000500220001-6 9-1.000ZZ009000t108?0089/dCltl-VIO 90/60/1?00Z eseeieu JOd peACLIddV RECOGNITION Executive Order 11491, amended by E.O. 11616 H.R. 10700 (Henderson) H.R. 13 (Brasco)/S. 351 (McGee) H.R. 9784 (Ford) Recognition to be accorded to quail- Similar. 17106(a) (m)] fled organizations. New determination of right to exclu- Same. [7106(c) (2)] sive recognition not required in unit or subdivision thereof within 12 months after prior. 141ectioxi with respect to unit. [7(e)] Recognition of labor organization does Language of Act differs from Order but not preclude an employee, regard- it appears that intent is to parallel less of whether he is in a unit of rights under the Order. exclusive recognition, from. exercis- ing grievance or Appeal rights es- tablished by law or regulations and from choosing his own represents.; live excent when presenting a griev- ance under a negotiated grievance procedure as provided in section 13. 17(d) (1)1 Recognition does not preclude or Similar. [7106(1)(2)(3)] prevent consultation and dealings with religious, social, fraternal, professional orgauir,,tions, or other lawful organizations not qualified as labor organizations (with certain restrictions)..17(d) (2) (3)] Separate system for .comrauni.cation and consultation with associations of supervisors required. [7(e)] Similar. [501(a)] Similar. [501(f)] Negotiated grievance procedure is pro- cedure for all grievances and com- plaints. Exclusive representative to represent all employees, but em- ployee can present own grievance, provided that organization has op- portunity to be present and to pre- sent its views. [502(1) ; 110 (3) (c)1 Exclusive representation and recogni- tion to be accorded organization des- ignated or selected by majority of employee.; in appropriate unit. [6(a)] Similar, except majority determination and representation can be determined without election. [6(h) (3) (4) ; 6(d) (iH)] Similar exclusive representation rights, but scope of bargaining virtually un- limited. [6(a); 5(b)] Continues under continuity clause until otherwise specifically superseded by order of President or regulations issued pursuant to Act. [7117(0(2)1 Similar. [502(2)(3)] No provision. No provision. No provision. Approved For Release 2001/09/0fACIA-RDP75B00380R000500220001-6 9-1.000ZZ009000t109?0089/dCltl-VIO : 90/60/1.00z eseeieu JOd PeACLIddV Natitmal consultation rights accorded based upon criteria established by Council. Right to comment on pro- posed substantive changes in per- sonnel policies, to suggest changes in personnel policies, to confer in person on such policies, and pre- sent views in writing. NCR not accorded for unit covered by na- tional exclusive recognition. Or- ganization may appeal to Assistant Secretary of Labor agency decision not to grant national consultation rights (9) Exclusive recognition to be accorded organization selected in secret bal- lot election by majority of em- ployees. 110(a)] National Consultation Rights granted per criteria issued by Authority: when labor organization has exclusive rec- ognition below agency level for sub- stantial number of employees of the agency. Not applicable when there is exclusive recognition at agency level. Issues over recognition re- viewed by Authority. Right to be in- formed on proposed changes in agency personnel policies and prac- tices and matters affecting working conditions and shall have sufficient time to present its views and to in- initiate proposals. Proposals shall re- ceive consideration by agency before final action is taken, and agency shall provide written statement of rea- sons for its actions. Scope of con- sultation same as that for exclusive recognition. [7106(m)] Exclusive recognition determined by secret ballot "election; or Authority may certify without election if it determines that unfair labor prac- tices by agency prevent free elec- tion; or Authority may certify upon its determination that organization represents majority of unit and no other petitions or questions exist over appropriateness of unit. Authority supervises elections, certifies, and hears issues at dispute. Waiving of hearings not prohibited by stipula- tion for consent election per regula- tions and rules or decisions of Author- ity (presently provided in Asst. Secretary's regulations). [7106(a) (c) (e) (k)] National Consultation Rights may be granted organization that has ex- clusive recognition at local level, per criteria issued by Authority. Con- sultation to permit sufficient time for organization to initiate pro- posals, present agreement or objec- tion to agency proposals and its rea- sons. Agency to consider vfews of organization before action and pro- vide written rational,' far its actions. Does not appe.erfhen there is national exclusive re gaition. (504) Exclusive recognition similar to HR 10700, except in any election where none of choices on ballot receives majority, but majority of all votes cast for representation, runoff elec- tion shall be conducted between two organizations with largest number of votes. National exclusive recogni- tion to supersede all other recogni- tions. Determinations by Authority not subject to judicial review. [501] No provision. Exclusive recognition is only form of recognition and na- tional exclusive recognition of agency to supersede all recognitions within unit. [6(h)] Exclusive recognition obtained either through showing of credible evidence that majority of employees desire representation or through secret bal- lot election in which majority of bal- lots cast favor petitioning organiza- tion. [6(b) (c) (d) (e) (01 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 igIA-RDP75B00380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Executive Order 11491, amenrjari by E el liens H.R. 10700 (11ender5ou) H.R. 18 (Brasco)/S. 351 (McGee) H.R. 9784 (Ford) Appropriate unit may be established on a plant or installation, craft, function, or other basis which will ensure a clear and identifiable com- munity of interest among the em- ployees and will promote effective dealings and efficiency of agency operationa. Also unit shall not include mgt. officials or supervisors (except as provided in section 24), or guards together with other em- ployees, nonclerical, Federal per- sonnel workers, or professionals with nonprofessionals unless pro- fessionals vote for inclusion. [10(b)] Exclusive recognition to represent unit of guards not to be accorded to organization which admits other employees to membership or is affiliated with such organization. [10(c)] Established right of organization to act for and negotiate agreements covering all employees in unit, obligation to represent interests of all employees without discrimina- tion or regard to membership, op- portunity to be represented at formal discussions between mgt. and employees or employee representa- tives concerning grievances, person- nel policies and practices, other matters affecting working conditions in unit. [10(e)] Unit criteria are similar. Plus specifies that unit may be on agency basis. With approval of Authority, organi- zation and agency may agree to com- bine two or more units. Adds criterion that unit be consistent with the centralization or decentralization of authority for personnel policy mat- ters within agency. Exclusions include nonclerical "personnel work- ers", confidential employecs, and employees engaged in administering Act together with other employees. [7106(g) (WW1 Similar provision for guards. [7106(b)] Differs as follows: Organization "entitl- ed to represent and bargain collec- tively for employees in the unit." Thus, organization not obligated to represent interests of all employees who have a grievance. Employees can represent self under negotiated grievance procedure but organization has right to be present when griev- ance adjusted. Similar to HR 10700, except sole unit criterion is community of interest; no reference to confidential employees; supervisors not excluded; narrow definition for managerial officials who are to be excluded; and guards are not treated separately. (501) No provision covering guards. Exclusive representation rights similar to Order, except scope of representa- tion extends virtually to all matters related to employment. [502; 503(a)] Appropriate unit may be established on agency, plant, or installation, func- tional or other basis insuring a clear and identifiable community of inter- est among employees and will pro- mote effective dealings and efficiency of agency operations as well as insuring employees fullest freedom in exercising rights under Act. Excludes units including managerial employees, both professional and nonprofessional without self determination, and em- ployees engaged in Federal personnel work in other than purely clerical capacity. Permits combining super- visory and nonsupervisory firefighter, educational employees and public safety officers. WO] No provision on guards. Reference to public safety officers as noted above. Exclusive representative to represent in collective bargaining "all employees in such unit for such purpose." Employees may individually or as group present complaints informally to agency, provided exclusive given opportunity to be present at adjust- ment and to make its views known. Employee cannot be represented by any other labor organization. Right to dues withholding and agency or union shop. Right to be present at diseussions between agency and em- ployees or employee representatives Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 concerning grievances, potential griev- ances, personnel policies and prac- tices, or other matters affecting working conditions of employees in unit; and employer to grant access solely to representatives of exclusive representative. In addition, exclusive to have access at reasonable times to employee work areas, right to use employer's bulletin boards, mailboxes, and other communication media, subject to reasonable regulation, and right to use employer's facilities at reasonable times for purpose of meet- ings concerned with exercise of rights under Act, and provided challenging organization denied use and access until timely and lawful challenge. I5 (b) (e) ; 6 (a)] AGREEMENTS Agency and organization representa- tives shall meet and negotiate in good faith on personnel policies and practices and matters affecting working conditions, subject to ap- plicable laws and regulations, in- cluding policies set forth in the Fed- eral Personnel Manual, published agency policies and regulations, a national or other controlling agree- ment at a higher level in the agency, and the Order. In the negotiation which can result in the execution of a written agreement, parties may determine appropriate techniques to assist them (consistent with sec- tion 17 of Order). [11(a)] Similar rights and duties of labor orga- nizations and agencies, to deal in good faith, with some changes in pro- cedures and scope of dealings as out- lined: Representatives to meet and negotiate in "good faith" for purpose of arriving at an agreement, with description of good faith bargaining. [7107(a) (b)] Negotiation to encom- pass personnel policies and practices and matters affecting working con- ditions. [7107(c)] Most matters and areas presently in sections 11(b) and 12(b) or E.O. 11491 are combined and reserved to management. Exclu- sions do not include technology of performing work and related impact, and maintenance of efficiency of Government operations. [7107(h)] Negotiations are also limited by laws, policies and regulations, and control- ling agreements. [7107(d)] Similar obligation to bargain in good faith, except scope of bargaining virtually unlimited, not to be re- stricted by agency regulations. (503, 901) Similar rights and responsibilities of organization and agency to bargain in good faith, except bargaining under Act extends to virtually all conditions of employment. See definition of "collective bargaining." [3(m) (p)] 9-1?000ZZ009000t109?0089/dCltIND : 90/60400Z eseeieu .lo d peAoiddv Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Executive Order 11491, amended by E.O. 11616 H.R. 10700 (Henderson) H.R. 13 (Brasco)/S. 351 (McGee) H.R. 9784 (Ford) Obligation to consult or negotiate does not include matters with respect to the rolasion of an agency; its budget; its organization; the number of em- ployees; and the numbers, types, and grades of positions or employees assigned to an organizational unit, work project or tour of duty; the technology of performing its work; or its internal security practices. May negotiate appropriate arrange- ments for employees adversely af- fected by impact of realignment of work forces or technological change. [11(b)] Issues 99 to whether a proposal is not negotiable because contrary to law, regulation, controlling agreement, or the Order are to be tet.11,ed ill, a specified manner?by agreement procedures, by agency head or by Council, depending upon circum- stances. [11(c)] Application of agreement provisions is subject to existing or future laws and the regulations of appropriate authorities, including policies set forth in the Federal Personnel Manual; published agency policies and regulations in existence at the time the agreement was approved; and subsequently published agency policies and regulations required by law or by the regulations of appro- priate authorities, or authorized by the terms of a controlling agree- Most matters within section 11(b) of No reserved rights of management. No provision. See definitition of co llec- Order are herein combined with areas Scope of bargaining virtually un- tive bargaining. [3(m) (p)] presently reserved to management in limited as noted above. [201(i); 503; section 12(b) of Order. See note 504; 901; 1704(01 above. [7107(h)] Similar provisions for resolution of No similar provision on negotiability No provision. See above. negotiability issues. Function of issues. See above. Council assumed by Authority. [7107 (i) Similar provisions; [7107(d)] No provision. Bargaining not to be No provision. Bargaining not limited by limited by agency regulations. agency regulations or law. [3(m) (p)) [503(o); 1704(a)1 Approved For Release 2001/09/M: CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 9-1.000ZZ009000t109?0089/dCltl-VIO : 90/60/1.00Z aseeieu -10d peACLIddV ment at a higher agency level. [12(a)] Agency management retains right to direct employees; to hire, promote, assign, retain, discipline or lay off; to maintain efficiency; to determine methods, means and personnel for doing the work; to take necessary action in emergency. [12(b)] Agreement shall not require an em- ployee to become or remain a union member, or to pay money to a union except as he voluntarily authorizes for payment of dues through pay- roll deductions. [12(c)]. Same areas reserved to management except no reference to efficiency of operations. As noted above, are com- bined with existing optional matters under section 11(b) of Order. [7107(h)] Employees have same freedom of choice. [71.08 (c)]. Establishes new and special bargaining arrangements as follows: Issuance of policy or regulations con- cerning negotiable matters are sub- ject to: (1) if to be issued by Civil Service Commission or any other agency (except Department of De- fense) and relates to more than one agency, copy goes to Federal Labor Relations Board for consideration under section 7107(h); (2) if to be issued by head of agency or manage- ment official, relates to employees of the agency, and labor organisation holds exclusive recognition at the agency level, proposal subject to negotiation with such organization; (3) if to be issued by head of agency, proposal subject to negotiation upon reqtest from labor organizations holding national consultation rights Under section 7106(M) if such organi- zations hold recognition among ma- jority of employees affected by the proposal; (4) if to be issued by mgt. No provision. No provision. Employee either becomes member and Employee either becomes member and pays dues, or pays representation pays dues, or pays representation fee amounts to union shop or fee?agency shop. [5(c)]. agency shop upon request of organi- zation. [701(2)]. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 :1302k-RDP75B00380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 9-1?000ZZ009000t109?0089/dCltl-VIO Executive Order 11491, amended by E.O. 11616 H.R. 10700 (Henderson) H.R. 13 (Brasco)/S. 351 (McGee) H.R. 9784 (Ford) official, other than head of agency, and exclusive recognition not held by organization at level of the mgt. official, proposal shall be transmitted to labor organizations holding ex- clusive recognition at subordinate levels of agency, and upon request by organizations which represent majority of employees affected, pro- posal subject to negotiation. Issues on representation of majority of em- ployees affected under (e)(3) or (4) determined by Authority. Organiza- tion representatives participating within (e)(3) or (4) are not entitled to travel costs or per diem. [7107(e) Federal .Labor Relations Board estab- lished to consider policies and regula- tions involving negotiable matters under section 7107(e) (1) to be issued by Civil Service Commission or any other agency (other than Depart- ment of Defense). Members des- ignated by Chairman of Civil Serv- ice Commission consisting of a Chair- man, five mgt. officials, and five labor organization representatives, under special criteria. Board to meet and consider proposals not earlier than 21 days, nor later than 30 days, after date on which proposal is transmitted. Determination on pro- posal by majority vote. Chairman votes only to break ties. When pro- Pb/6o/.o0Z eSeeleti .lo d PeACLIddV 9-1?000ZZ009000t108?0089/dCIU-VI3 : 90/60/1.00Z eseelet1 JOd PeA0AdV Grievance procedures are required in negotiated agreements. Procedure to be applicable only to unit em- ployees for consideration of griev- ances over interpretation or applica- tion of the agreement, and it may not cover other matters for which statutory appeals procedures exist, and shall be the exclusive procedure available to the parties and the em- ployees in the unit for resolving such grievances. Employees may present their own grievances with- out the intervention of the exclusive representative so long as the ad- 4ustment is not inconsistent with the terms of the agreement and the _exclusive representative has been given an opportunity, to be present at the adjustment. [13(a)] posal required by law to be issued within specified time, the policy or regulation to be issued within the time required by law although Board may not have reached agreement on proposal. If four members of Board propose change or addition to policy or regulation of Civil Service Com- mission or any other agency (other than Dept. of Defense) relating to employees of more than one agency it will be considered by Board. Man- agement Board members serve with- out additional pay, and members representing organizations not en- titled to pay from Government. Civil Service Commission to provide cleri- cal and professional personnel serv- ices to Board. [7107(g)] Negotiated grievance procedures re- quired in agreements, and to cover arbitrability questions. Procedure not limited to matters covered by agreement, to be exclusive griev- ance procedure available to unit em- ployees, but grievance procedure not to supersede appeals procedures es- tablished by law. Employee cap pre- sent own grievance, but exclusive representative has right to be present at adjustment if it is not the repro- sentative of employee, [7112; 7106(I) (1) ; 7107(d) (1)] All agreements to have grievance pro- cedure: sole procedure for unit em- ployees concerning all grievances over agreement or otherwise related to employment; employee can pre- sent own grievance if organization has opportunity to be present and present its views. Binding arbitra- tion required, may be invoked by organization, including questions of arbitrability. [101 (h) ; 502 (1) ; 1101] Grievance procedures required in agree- ments for binding arbitration of grievances, including 'criestions of arbitrability; exclUsive ' procedure available to unit employees. Party to agreement aggrieved by second par- ty's failure or refusal to proceed with arbitration under agreement can ask court for summary. action directing that arbitration proceed. Arbitrator's decision may be enforced by appro- priate court. Other conditions and rights of organization and employee similar to HR 13 as noted above under exclusive recognition. [8; 5 (b) ; 6(a)] 9-1?000ZZ009000t108?0089/dCIU-R3 : 90/60/1.00Z eseelet1 JOd PeA0AdV 9-1?000ZZ009000t108?0089/dCIU-VI3 : 90/60/1.00Z eseelet1 JOd PeA0AdV Executive Order 11491, amended oy 11010 H.R. .19709 (Henderson) H.R. 13 (Brarsco)/S. 351 (McGee) H.R. 9784 (Ford) Arbara4ori is permitted and is limited to the same matters as is the griev- ance procedure. Arbitration may be invoked by the agency or an exclu- sive representative. Either party may file exceptions to an arbitra- tor's award with the Council, under regulations prescribed by the Coun- cil. [13(b)] Grievances may be initiated by unit employees on matters other than the interpretation or applicaton of the agreement under any procedure available for that purpose. [13(c)] Grievabiiity and Arbiirubilsty issues. Disputes over what is subject to the grievance procedure or arbitration may be referred to the Asst. Secre- tary of Labor. [13(d)] Provisions are not applicable to agree- ments made before effective date of the Order as amended. [13(e)] Agreements are subject to approval by agency head or his designees. Agreement must be approved if it conforms with law, published agency policies and regulations (un- less agency has granted exception), and regulations of other appropriate authorities. Local agreements sub- ject to controlling agreement at higher level is approved under pro- cedures of controlling agreement. (15) Procedure must include a process for binding arbitration, to be invoked by organisation or agency. Arbitrators to be selected from Federal Media- tion and Conciliation Service list. Either party may file exception with Authority to arbitrator's award. Agency must implement decision by arbitrator to make an employee whole, including back pay. (7112) Negotiated procedure is sole grievance procedure to be used by unit employ- ees for settlement of grievance de- fined in Act?see above definition, [7103(a) (7) ; 7112(a)) Grievability and arbitrability issues, processed under negotiated proce- dures. [7112(a)] Arrangements in existing agreements protected under savings clause. [7117(b) (1)] Similar due to continuity clause. Pro-, visions to continue until specifically superseded by order of President or regulations issued pursuant to Act. [7117(0 (2)1 Binding arbitration required in griev- ance procedure. Similar to HR 10700 provision except invoked only by organization, and arbitrator's award appealable to courts. (1101) No provision. Negotiated procedure is only procedure available to unit em- ployees. [1101(c)] Similar to HR 10700. [1101(c) OA Arrangements in existing agreements protected under savings clause. (1702) No provision. Existing arrangements subject to negotiation. (1702) Binding arbitration required in griev- ance procedure, similar to lilt 13. (8) Similar to HR 13. [8(a)] Grievability and arbitrability issues processed under negotiated grievance procedure and arbitration. [8(a)] Arrangements in existing agreements protected under savings clause. [12(a)] No provision. Provision in existing agreements protected under savings clause. [12(a)] Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 NEGOTIATION DISPUTES AND IMPASSES Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service to assist parties in resolving negotiation disputes, subject to its rules. (16) If voluntary arrangements, includ- ing services of FMCS or other third- party mediation fail to resolve nego- tiation impasse either party may re- quest the Federal Service Impasses Panel to consider the matter. Panel may, in its discretion and under its rules, consider the impasse; may rec- ommend procedures to the parties for resolution of impasse, or settle the impasse itself. Arbitration or third-party factfinding with recom- mendations may be used by parties only when authorized or directed by the Panel. (17) Same FMCS services and assistance. [7111(a); 7117(a) (1)] Similar, except either party may re- quest Authority to consider. Author- ity to establish impartial three mem- ber panel to consider impasse. Three panelists to be "familiar with Federal Government operations and knowl- edgeable in labor-management rela- tions". Action of panel on impasse is final and not subject to further re- view. (7111) Similar provision. [901(a)] Provides for voluntary arrangements including FMCS services. Either party can subsequently request as- sistance of Authority, but parties may agree to binding arbitration of impasse. Authority to determine ap- propriate methods and procedures and may determine binding settle- ment. (901) Similar FMCS services and assistance. [7(6)] If mediation procedures agreed to by parties and FMCS assistance does not resolve impasse, impasse referred to factfinding with advisory recommen- dations (binding if agreed to by labor organization). If binding, organiza- tion prohibited from striking to resolve impasse. (If organization selects ad- visory factfinding, it may strike under provisions of section 9.) (7) Strikes. Provides right to strike for the exclusive representative and for em- ployees to participate in strikes aris- ing out of or in connection with labor dispute. Restrictions: Restraining or- ders or injunctions may be granted on the basis of findings of fact made by the appropriate district court after due notice and hearing that the strike poses a clear and present danger to the public health or safety and it is in the best public interest to prevent. If the exclusive elects binding fact- finding during negotiation disputes they will be prohibited from striking for the purpose of resolving the dis- pute. Courts may grant restraining orders and injunctions where strikes are conducted in violation of a nego- tiated agreement provision. [9(a) (b) (c) ; (e) Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : VIM-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 9-1?000ZZ009000t108?0089/dCIU-VIO : 90/60/1?00Z eseeieu Jod peAwddv CONDUCT OF LABOR ORGANIZATIONS AND MANAGEMENT Executive Order 11491, amended by E.O. 11616 H.R. 10700 (Henderson) H.R. 13 (Brasco)/S. 351 (McGee) HR. 9784 (Ford) Standards of Conduct for Labor Orga- nizations require recognized orga- nizations to subscribe and adhere to internal democratic practirpg, exclude from office persons affiliated with Communist, totalitarian or corrupt influences, brohibit officers and agents from having business or financial conflicts of interest, main- tain fiscal integrity, file financial and other reports, provide for bond- ing of organization officials and employees, meet trusteeship and election standards. Asst. Secretary o Lgh,..? preseeifies regulations, decides alleged violations. (18) Unfair labor practices. Agency man- agement shall not interfere with, restrain, or coerce an employee in the exercise of rights; encourage or discourage membership in labor or- ganization; sponsor, control, or otherwise assist a labor organization (except for customary and routine services and facilities under certain conditions); discipline or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he files a complaint or gives testimony under Order; refuse to accord appropriate recognition to a labor organization qualified for such recognition; or refuse to consult, confer, or negotiate with a labor organization as required by Order. Similar, except organizations subject to reporting and disclosure requirements applicable in private sector under diesetion sod regulations of Sec- retary of Labor. (7115) Similar. Does not include phrase in section 19 (a) (3) of Order concerning the furnishing of services and facili- ties whereby such is to be "consistent with the best interests of the airenny, its employees, and the organization". And section 19(a) (5) not included: "refuse to accord appropriate recog- nition to a labor organization quali- fied for such recognition. Adds to ULP's for agency: (6) to fail or refuse to cooperate in impasse procedures and impasse decisions as required by this subchapter; or (7) to fail or re- fuse to comply with any provision of this subchapter [7109(a)]. Complaints filed with Authority. (7110) Requires that organizations only adopt No provision on standards of conduct governing requirements providing for labor organization as in Order. for democratic practices, freedom See UPL's below concerning unlawful from aunt:Med and business eciriffiets VaULJ. of interest, and fiscal integrity. No reporting or disclosure requirements, or procedures for deciding alleged violations. (1401) Management ULP's similar to H.R 10700, except not ULP for mgmt. to encourage membership, or to require union or agency shop arrangement es eonditien of empleyment. Com- plaint filed with Authority. [701(a)] Similar to H.R. 13, except not improper to enforce agency shop arrangement as condition of employment, and ULF' to either encourage or discourage membership. Alleged violations Men with Board. [10(a)] 9-1?000ZZ009000t108?0089/dCIU-VIO nb/60/1?00Z aseeieu JOd 130A0iddV 9-1?000ZZ009000t108?0089/dCIU-VI3 : 90/60/1.00Z eseelet1 JOd PeA0AdV [19(a)]. Unresolved complaints filed with Asst. Secretary [19(d)] Similar prohibited practices for labor Similar. Same additional ULP's as for Similar to H.R. 10700, except no listing Similar to H.R. 13, except strikes are organizations, with additions that agency as noted above. [7109(b) (c)] of ULP for calling or participating legal under stated conditions. Alleged organizations may not coerce, dis- Complaints filed with Authority, in strike, slowdown, or picketing violations filed with Board. [10(b)] cipline, fine, or take other economic (7110) against any Federal activity. [701(b)] sanction against a member as pun- ishment for or to hinder his work performance or productivity; may not condone strike or prohibited picketing activity by failing to take affirmative action to prevent or stop it; may not discriminate in member- ship because of race, color, creed, sex, age, or national origin; and may not refuse to consult, confer, or negotiate with an agency as re- quired by Order. [19 (b)] Organiza- tions to have reasonable and uni- form membership standards, and may enforce appropriate discipline of membership. [19(c)] Unresolved complaints filed with Asst. Secre- tary. [19(d)] Only issues in an unfair labor practice Similar. Unresolved complaints filed No provision. No provision. which can be raised in appeals pro- with Authority under procedures of cedure may not be raised as an section 7110, discussed below. [7109 unfair labor practice. Issues which (d)] can be raised under a grievance procedure may be processed through either grievance or unfair labor practice, but not through both pro- cedures. Appeals or grievance deci- sions are not considered unfair labor practice decisions and are not precedent for unfair labor practice decisions. Unresolved complaints filed with Asst. Secretary. [19(d)] 9-1?000ZZ009000t108?0089/dat% : 90/60/1.00Z aseeieu JOd peACLIddV 9-1?000ZZ009000t108?0089/dCIU-VI3 : 90/60/1.00Z eseelet1 JOd PeA0AdV Executive Order 11491, amended by E.O. 11616 H.R. 10700 (Henderson) H.R. 13 (Brasco)IS. 351 (McGee) H.R. 9784 (Ford) Authority empowered to prevent ULP'S, Its power not to be affected by any other means of adjustment or pre- vention that has been or may be established by agreement, existing or future laws, by procedures author- ized to be issued by existing or future laws, or otherwise. Procedures out- no complaint, hearing, and testimony. Authority can order cease and desist from ULP or take other affirmative action including rein- statement of employee (backpay may be required of agency or labor organi- zation), and require periodic reports. Exceptions to proposed report by Authority may be filed and Authority to grant review if it believes ex- ception raises substantial issue of fact or law. (7110) Similar to HR 10700 except Authority may order agency to discipline supervisor or official of agency upon determination of arbitrary, capri- cious, or otherwise kliowitig of Act. (801) Establishes independent category of ULP'S for any person. [701(c)] Prevention of unlawful acts. Similar to HR 10700. Board empowered to pre- vent any person from engaging in unlawful acts under section 10. Board may diteci, back pay, discriplinary action against management repre- sentatives, and may petition courts to seek enforcement of its orders. Judicial review of Board decisions authorized. Provides detailed pro- cedures on prevention of ULP'S. (11) MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS Use of official time. Solicitation of union membership, dues, and in- ternal union business must be dur- ing non-duty hours. Negotiations by an employee representing a labor organization shall not be on official time unless the parties agree to other arrangements which may provide for official time for ;'ent:, Internal business of labor organization during nonduty hours of employees concerned. However, negotiations by employees representing organize, tion, including attendance at im- passe settlement proceedings, to be on official time for such during regular working hours. Employees on such authorized official time shall Mandates full official time for em- ployees called by either party to participate in any phase of pro- ceedings, or representing organiza- tion in negotiations, grievance or impasse prooedures, without limit on number of employees. (1201) Similar to H.R. 13: 0 0- 0 (T) to co o CO) ? ? 0 th CO C.c.) CO 0 0 0 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 ployees for up to 40 hours or one- half the time spent in negotiations during regular working time. Num- ber of employees authorized of- ficial time "normally shall not ex- ceed number of management repre- sentatives." (20) Allotment of dues. Authorizes volun- tary dues allotments by organiza- tion's members in unit of exclusive recognition pursuant to negotiated agreement. Allotments subject to CSC regulations. Employee can revoke authorization at stated six- month intervals [21(a)] Authorizes voluntary dues allotments pursuant to agency agreements with associations of mgmt. officials or supervisors, subject to CSC regulations. Agencies not required to recover cost of making dues allotments. [21(b)] Adverse action appeals. All employees in competitive civil service have same rights in adverse action cases as preference eligibles under section 14, Veterans' Preference Act. Right of appeal to Civil Service Commis- sion. CSC decision binding upon agencies. (22) Agency implementation. Agencies to issue policies and regulations for implementation of Order, after con- sultation with appropriate organiza- tions. (23) not exceed the? number of persons representing agency. Additionally, ? Authority to determine if employees participating for, or on behalf of, organization in any phase of pro- ceedings before Authority to receive official time for such purposes dur- ing regular working hours. (7113) Similar, except allotments at no cost to organization or employee, with exceptions assignment irrevocable for one year. (7108) Continues under continuity clause until otherwise specifically superseded by order of President or regulations issued pursuant to Act. [7117(a) (2)1 Continues under continuity clause until superseded as noted above. Similar. [7117(a)(2)] Requires agencies to withhold dues and initiation fees at no charge. Assign- ments irrevocable for one year or until expiration of agreement, which- ever occurs later. (601) No provision. No provision. No provision Similar to H.R. 13, no reference to cost. Requires agencies to withhold from nonmembers, as a condition of con- tinued employment, amount equal to dues, fees, and assessments that a member is charged: Authorization not revocable for one year. [5(b) (2), (c)] No provision. No provision. No provision. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : chk-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Executive Order 11491, amended by E.O. 11616 H.R. 10700 (Henderson) H.R. 13 (Brasco)/S. 351 (McGee) H.R. 9784 (Ford) Savings clauses. Order does dot pre- elude?(1) renewal or continuation of a lawful agreement between an agency and representative of its employees entered into before the effective date of Eli loose (1/17/62); or (2) renewal, continua- tion, or initial according of recogni- tion for units of mgmt. officials or supervisors represented by labor organizations which historically or traditionally represent mgmt. offi- cials or supervisors in private in- dustry and which hold exclusive recognition for units of such officials or supervisors in any agency on the date of Order. (21) Guidance, training, review and infor- mation. Civil Service Commission, in conjunction with the Office of Management and Budget, shall establish and maintain a program of policy guidance to attenciea nn labor-mgmt. relations and period- ically review implementation of these policies. CSC provides tech- nical advice and information, and training assistance to agencies; re- views operation of program to assist in assuring adherence to its pro- visions and merit system require- ments; and, from time to time, re- ports to Council on state of the program and recommends improve- ments. [25(a)] Department of Labor and Civil Ser- vice Commission to collect and dis- seminate program information to Similar. Savings clause expanded to specifically protect exclusive recog- nitions and certifications of repre- sentation entered into before effec- tive date of Act. 17117(b)] Continues policies, regulation, and procedur= established under Executive orders in effect on effective date of Act, until revised or revoked by President, or unless superseded by specific pro- visions of this Act or regulations issued pursuant to Act. 17117(a) (2)] Savings clause. Rights and responsi- Savings clause continues agreements bilities under exclusive recognition prior to Act. [12(a)] or national consultation rights granted pursuant to E.O. 10988 and E.O. 11491, as amended, or ? any agreement thcreander except as may be agreed to by parties thereto, or until modified or superseded by an agreement made pursuant to Act. (1702) Continues under continuity provision No provision, until superseded by order of Presi- dent or regulations issued pursuant to Act. [7117(a) (2)] No provision. Authority to maintain file of its pro- Similar to H.R. 10700, except Bureau No provision. ceedings and publish texts of its de- of Labor Statistics to maintain files cisions and actions of panel under and data and publish information to 9-1?000ZZ009000108?0089LdCN-VI3 :16/60/1?00Z aseeie 10d penolddy 9-1?000ZZ009000t108?0089/dCIU-VI3 : 90/60/1.00Z eseelet1 JOd PeA0AdV agencies, organizations and the pub- lic [25(b)] section 7111. Civil Service Commis- sion, for guidance and information of any interested person, to maintain file of copies of all available and ap- plicable agreements and publish full texts of all arbitration decisions in- volving any such employees or agency. All ffies maintained -relative to such services open to inspection and reproduction subsect to section 552 of title 5 USC. (7114) effective date. Order effective 1/1/70, Effective date of Act not mentioned. (issued 10/29/69). (26) interested parties?files open to in- spection under conditions prescribed by Secretary of Labor. (1301) Effective date of Act not mentioned. Funding. Authorizes appropriation of Funding provision similar to H.R. sums to carry out functions and 10700 (1601) purposes of Act. (7116) Supersedure. Provides for supersedure of regulations, Executive orders and rules noted above under savings clause. (Amendment to Sec. 5, USC 5). Severability. Standard severability clause on any provision of Act. (Amendment to Sec. 6, USC 5) Specifies that Administrative Procedure Act applicable to rules, regulation or adjudication provided by author- ity or FMCS in carrying out Act. (1701) Provides that Act supersede all previous statutes and Executive orders con- cerning subject matter under Act. [1704(a)] Standard severability clause on any provision of Act. [1704(b)] Violations, enforcement, and suits. Maximum fine of $5,000 and/or imprisonment of one year, of persons interfering with Authority and offi- cials or an arbitrator in performance of duties under Act. (1501) Effective one hundred and twenty days following enactment. (13) Supersedes laws or parts of laws which are inconsistent with provisions of Act. [12(b)] Standard severability clause on any provision of Act. [12(c)] Similar to HR 13. [11(m) (7)] 9-1?000ZZ009000t108?0089/datiVlb : 90/60/1.00Z aseeieu JOd peACLIddV Approved For Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Issue Issues 1. Philosophy and Policy References ?gator Concerns Whet should be the public policy and philo- sophy for the labor-management program for the Federal service? How should the program balance concerns for the representation rights of em- ployees, status of unions, responsibil- ities of managers to manage, efficient accomplishment of agency mission, and responsiveness to the public interest. Background The public policy of the existing program, shaped by experience and the special con- ditions of the Federal sector, is based upon these principles: Law and public intermit are paramount. Opportunity for employee participation in personnel policy setting and imple- mentation contributes to employee well- being and efficient administration of the Government. ? Such participation is improved through constructive labor-management relation- 01, Program should facilitate improved em- ployee performance and efficiency, and the continued development and Imple- mentation of modern and progressive work practices. A clear statement of rights and respon- sibilities of unions and management is required. Agreements are subject to laws. . Negotiations are subject to higher- level regulations required to assure that degree of uniformity necessary to protect equity to employees and merit principles. E.O. 11491 maintains public policy favorable to collective bargaining for Federal employees within framework of law and higher level regulations. First stated in E.O. 10988 of 1962 and contin- ued through three successive Administra- tions. -- H.R. 10700 is similar in policy and philosophy to E.O. 11491. -- H.R. 13 and H.R. 9784 provide for col- lective bargaining as the basic mechan- ism for determining Federal Service personnel policies and practices. Supersede laws or portions of laws in conflict with their provisions; Agency regulations subordinate to agreements. Virtually all conditions of employ- ment are negotiable. . Bmployees required to join union or pay equivalent duee ee condition of employment. Management rights and efficiency of operations not included as policy objectives. H.R. 9784 legalizes strikes under specified conditions; H.R. 13 has no prohibition against striking by Federal employees. In constructing any Federal Service labor relations system, the following warrant consideration: -- Protection of the public interest. -- Impact of any legislated program on existing and future laws affecting Federal personnel and agency management. Recognition of diversity of missions and other special differences among Depart- ments and agencies. -- Special circumstances and limitations which distinguish Federal personnel administration from private and other public sectors. -- Assurance of uninterrupted continuity of public services. -- Protection of Federal management's essential rights to manage and mission accomplishment. -- Meaningful opportunity for broad range of collective bargaining, within balanced system reflecting employee needs, union interests, and public expectations that Government operations be efficient, effective, and responsive. Approved For Release 2001/09/9R6 CIA-RDP75B00380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Issue 2,; Definitions References Major Concerns What definitions are needed, and how should they be expressed in a labor-Management rela- tions (LMR) program for the Federal service? Background, -- Definitions are necessary to: . resolve potential ambiguities . set parameters of various terms used in the program -- Definitions exist under E.O. program with history of workability. with Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management Relations (A/SLMR) and Federal Labor Relations Council resolving disputes as to meaning of terms. E.O. 11491 provides numerous terms commonly used in the LMR program. A/SLMR has fashioned definitions for Management Official, Confidential Em- ployee, and Professional Employee, and they are now undergoing test. -- H.R. 10700 provides definitions aimilar to E.O. 11491 except . "labor organization" . "grievance" -- H.R. 13 and H.R. 9784 definitions fit the greatly expanded coverage and scope of bargaining. Major differences from E.O. appear in definitions for: . agency . employee ? supervisor . guard . labor organization . grievance dispute conditions of employment collective bargaining -- That the definitions clearly reflect the special personnel, organizational, and mission characteristics of the Federal Service. -- That the definitions be consistent with the intended scope and coverage of the Federal labor-management relations pro- gram. -- That the definitions are not in conflict with other terms defined in Title 5 U.S. Code, and other laws; and any differences in terms that are intended are clearly specified. -- That coverage is clearly defined, with attention given to relationship to coverage of other personnel laws and regulations. -- That definitions be specific yet flexible enough to accommodate to the wide variety of situations in the Federal Service. -- That terms used to define the scope of bargaining reflect understanding of the bargaining structure in the Federal Service and the locus of delegated decision- making authority. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Issue 3. Coverage References What employees and employers 'should be covered? Who is affected by or excluded from coverage of LMR law? Background, -- Under E.O. program, coverage has extended only to employees and employers of Executive branch. . Non-appropriated fund employees brought in under E.O. 11491. -- Onions are interested in greatest possible coverage. Groupe and categories of employees covered by State statutes differ among states. -- Some States follow NLRA and exclude supervisors from coverage. -- Other States cover supervisors, but they must bargain in separate units. -- In number of States professionals afforded solf-4atailmatlwm Ly eLaiwie or agency decision. E.9. 11491 Covers only employees of Executive branch Exclusions based on security and investigations considerations, conflict of interest Foreign Service employees under E.O. 11636 , ? -- H.R. 10700 . Similar to E.O. 11491 -- H.R. 13 and H.R. 9784 greatly enlarge coverage to include, except for Postal Service: ' Employees of Executive branch, Legislative and Judicial branches (employees in competitive positions) . Library of Congress . CPO ? Federal Reserve System ? And, due to definition for super- visor, as in H.R. 13, many super- visors under E.O. 11491 could become ber.ssioioe Major Concerns That coverage be compatible with the basic policy objectives of the LMR program. --Whether Foreign Service personnel should be covered--justification for separate itceLmuni. --That "supervisors" be treated as meaning- ful members of the management team. --Whether, or thu extent to which, employees involved in national and internal security and investigative activities should be covered. --What would be the impact of coverage of employees in the three branches of Government on the separation of powers doctrine: --Whether employees of the Administrative body responsible for LMR program im- Plementation should be covered or ex- cluded; and whether they should be affiliated with other labor organizations. an independent organization, or none. 9-1.000ZZ009000t109?0089/dCltl-VIO : 90/60/1.00Z eseeieu -10d peACLIddV Issue What should be the structure and authority of a central body (or bodies) to administer the program? What functional responsibili- ties will be placed in such authority or authorities? Who Mill have what authority and under what circumstances are considerations vital go success or failure of program? -- How will the authority (it.) relate to existing agencies of government, to the President, to Congress? Background. Moat labor relations systems in public sector provide central body, as is the case in the private sector with the NLRB. -- The power or authority of the central body varies by jurisdiction. 4. Administrative Machinery References E.O. 11491 places administrative author- ity in: Major Concerns . Federal Labor Relations Council (FLRC) . Federal Service Impasses Panel (FSIP) . Assiitant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management Relations (A/SLMR) . In addition, Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) provides mediation services. -- H.R. 10700 establishes central authority and special Federal Labor Relations Board. . Central authority assumes roles of FLRC, FSIP, A/SLMR. The Board, creprising of union and management members, would make deter- minations on Government-wide personnel policy. -- H.R. 13 and H.R. 9784 also establish a central body with wide authority. . Authority extends to major policies due to broadened scope of bargaining. . Agency heads and Governmental agencies such as the Civil Service Commission, would be subject to decisions of central authority. -- What would be the authority of the tentral body? Would it be superior to present central personnel policy-setting agencies, Would it have authority to override Executive Orders of the President? --.To what extent would it be given latitude to make policy determinations presently established through legislative actions of the Congress? -- Credibility with all parties. Would it be so structured as to facilitate timely and judicious case detilions? -- Accountability to President and/or Congress. -- Relationship to the courts. . Finality of decisions, rulings . Scope of judicial review . Standards for review Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : %-RDP75B00380R000500220001-6 9-1?000ZZ009000t108?0089/dCIU-VIO : 90/60/1?00Z eSeeleti -10d peACLIddV 5. Recogation Issue References Major Concern What should be the method of granting 11491 -- That employees have free choice as to recognition? -- This will determine J. employees are to be represented: if so, by whom, Background -- Under E.O. 10988 and E.O. 11491: . Showing of interest requirement. . 607. participation criteria in elec- tion under E.O. 10988. . Dissatisfaction led to majority voting criteria as-sole method in elections under 8.0. 11491. -- Private and other public sectors: ? NLRB provides for voluntary recogni- tion, without board certification, or certification by election, unless un- fair lab practices preclude fair election. . Most states have recognition policies similar to NLRB. Election is sole method (of majority voting) I. 8,11. 10700, H.R. 13 and H.R. 9784 Central body may certify exclusive, if -- Proper showing of interest. -- Mgt. OLP prevents fair election. Election if dispute or petition by another union. representation. -- That method effectuates stable LMR. 9-1.000ZZ009000t108?0089/dCIU-VIO : 90/60/1.00Z aseeieu -10d peACLIddV Issue 6. Unit Recognition References Major Co earns Bow should the appropriate bargaining unit be determined? Background -- Critical issue as it determines, ^ What will constitute a proper group- ing of employees for purpose of col- lective bargaining. ? How collective bargaining will be con- ducted. -- Fragmented unit may narrow the scope of bargaining because mgt. may have limited authority at that level. -- Pre-determined agency-wide or Government- wide units may have broadest scope of bargaining, but . May join together many diverse inter- ests serving to frustrate employees in selection of bargaining agent. . May serve to prevent challenges to unit by other unions. -- Private sector: NLRB determines -.- Many public sectors follow private sector practice, but a few states fix unit or indicate preference for broadest unit. Practices differ widely at local govern- ment level. E.O. 11491 . Early 'roots of community of interest as sole unit standard under 140. 10988 leading to substantial number of units, . E.P. 11491 established criteria of community of interest, promotion of effective dealing and efficiency of agency operations. . Supervisors and other conflict-of- interest employees excluded. __ H.R. 10700 follows criteria of E.O. 11491, plus: . Criterion that unit be consistent with centralization or decentraliza- tion of personnel management authority. . Permits consolidation of units by agreement of parties; subject to re- view by central authority. -- H.R. 13 . Community of interest is sole criterion. . Guards not treated separately. . Supervisor definition would allow in- clusion of lower-level supervisors in unit. -- H.R. 9784 . Basic criteria similar to E.O. 11491. . Supervisors can be in units under special circumstances. -- That appropriate unit promote effective dealings and meaningful bargaining, while promoting efficiency of opera- tions. -- That unnecessary existing unit frag- mentation be minimized. - Maximum flexibility to parties and -central authority in determining appro- priate unit, thus effectively dealing with relationship of agreement and recognition bars. , -- Minimize unnecessary adverse impact on established stable relationships. -- Supervisors be treated as important. members of mgt. team. And provision for exclusion of other conflict-of- interest employees (e.g., confidential employees, guards, etc.) 9-1?000ZZ009000t108?0089/dCIU-V159:190/60/1?00Z aseeieu -10d peACLIddV 9-1?000ZZ009000t108?0089/dCIU-VIO : 90/60/1.00Z eseeiati Jod peAwddv Issue 7. Scope of Negotiations/Bargaining References Major Concerns What should be the scope of bargaining? Background -- Conduct of negotiations and scope of bar- gaining are of fundamental importance as they are connected with outcome of bilat- eral dealing. . Meaningful dealings, of substance; . or perfunctory gestures. -- Private sector dealings encompass wide range of conditions of emplOyment including pay and fringes, and are conducted by various means ranging from small single.. unit bargaining to bargaining at corporate and industry-wide levels. -- Most States have followed N1RA language of "wage:, hours and oihai conditions of employment." -- Some States have been more specific by making bargainable fulfillment of "pro- fessional duties," "all matters over which appointing official may exercise discre- tion," etc. E.O. program of Federal SOLVICO makes bar- gainable personnel policies, practice, and matters affecting working conditions, with major items, such as pay and fringes, set by Congress, subject to: ? law, regulations and published policy ? areas reserved to gene). management ? higher-level agreements . other conditions specified in 6.0., such as negotiated grievance procedure -- 6.0. 11491 ? Negotiable matters subject to laws, higher-level regulations, PPM policies, management rights provi- sions. . Multi-unit and agency-level bargain- ing *Alit* in practice. . While not in Order, exception to agency regulations encouraged when agreed to by parties. ? FLRC determines negotiability disputes. -- H.R. 10700, similar to 6.0. 11491, except; Prescribes FLRB to rule on multi- agency or Government-wido personnel policies. National consultation rights can lead to negotiations. Parties cin combine units, subject to FLRA review. -- H.R. 13 and H.R. 9784 provide bar- gaining similar to private sector: ? virtually all aspects of employment . no management rights provided ? may Nuke bargalnahlo areas now covered by law, per supersedure provision ? agency regulations not controlling . H.R. 9784 permits negotiations on matters set by law, but dues not override law. Agency, if it agrees, must seek change in lot. -- What items will be specifically allowed? Compatibility with merit principles? -- Some items be specifically excluded: . such as necessary management right under 6.0.; . owner:hip of woik and right of con- tracting out. -- In what areas is uniformity of policy desirable or necessary? Intended that wages and other major fringes be negotiable, how would this work? Bargaining: . in each of approximately 3500 units? ? on a coalition bails? effect on existing units? ^ on regional or nptionAl h..4.9 ? in legislatively-defined units more attuned to major issues, such as pay, fringes? - Jtll management be able to develop and implement personnel programs, including wages and fringes for managers and other employees not covered, or will these be concretise by Congress? Negotiability determination. Role of Courts? 9-1?000ZZ009000t108?0089/dCIU-VI3 : 90/60/1.00Z eseelet1 JOd PeA0AdV Issue 8. Impasse Resolution Reference Major Concerns How would negotiation impasses be resolved? 8aShIE2112i: Constructiue and peaceful resolution of impasses is paramount to mission accom- plishment and LMR in the public interest, Wide range of methods exist in private and other public sectors, including joint efforts such as joint fact-finding through third-party intervention, strikes and lockouts (private sector). Historically, strikes by public employees have been prohibited by statute or by court decision. While public employees do not have right to strike, the power to strike exists; hence, the threat of strike is ever-present during negotiations. Alaska, Hawaii, Minnesota, Montana, Oregon, Pennsylvania and Vermont enacted legisla- tion allowing strikes under limited circumstances. Strikes by Federal employees are illegal. Emphasis is on bilateral resolution, with third-pary intervention (arbitration in Postal Service, and FSIP under E.O. 11491). FSIP offers recommendations for settlement, with imposition of a settlement as a last resort. Evidence in other public sectors of author- ization of strikes, with limitation, coupled with binding arbitration. E.O. 11491 program Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) provides mediation serv. vice. FSIP may recommend settlement or decide conditions itself. Arbitration or factfinding with recom- mendations only upon decision of FSIP. Overall emphasis is on voluntary settle men t, Strikes are illegal. H.R. 10700 similar to E.O., except: Authority, on request of either party, establishes 3-member Panel. ? Panel decision binding, not reviewable. ? Arbitration when authorized by Panel. . Strikes illegal. H.R. 13 . FMCS and other voluntary means. ? May agree to binding arbitration of impasse. May request assistance of central body which may decide settlement. No reference to strikes. H.R. 9784 ? FMCS services. ? If FMCS assistance fails, to factfinding (advisory or binding at unions' option). Union can strike if it selects advisory factfinding, subject to public safety and health limitations. -- Emphasis on voluntary settlement. -- Availability of FMCS services. -- High degree of objectivity in any third- party intervention. -- Public interest remains paramount. -- That strikes remain improper and illegal. -- Speedy and effective resolution of impasses. -- Impasses panel has option of involvement with authority to implement actions, subject to review by central body. -- Role that courts may play. -- That impact of impasse-resolving decisions on public be given weight. -- That impasses be resolved in the context of the total negotiated package. -- That in the absence of strikes, non- disruptive dispute resolution machinery be available that is satisfactory to the parties, and accountable to public con- cerns for costs, efficiency of govern- mental operations, and equity to em- plo,,ees. 9-1?000ZZ009000t108?0089/dati-40: 90/60/1.00Z aseeieu JOd peACLIddV 9-1?000ZZ009000t108?0089/dCltl-VI3 : 90/60/1.00Z eseelet1 JOd PeA0AdV Issue 9, Grievance Procedures References Malor Concerns What procedures should be provided for the resolution of grievances? Background Important for parties to know what griev- ance-resolving procedures may or may not be required to be included in agreements. Not legislated in private sector, but practice includes: Binding arbitration on conditions of em- ployment extending beyond scope of agreement. ? Decisions of arbitrator appealable to courta under special circumstancea. . Union is exclusive representative. Binding grievance arbitration is gaining acceptance in public sector. . Its legality is well-established. . Estimated that over 507. of agreements now include binding arbitration. Legislated arbitration is recent de- velopment with 16 states and several municipalities having it. E.O. 11491: All agreements to contain procedure. Sole procedure for terms of agreement, Nor to Include appeal, on matters where statutory procedures available. Union is exclusive representative, but employee may represent self. Union has right to be present at ad- justment. May include binding arbitration. Exceptions to arbitrator's award to FLRC. Grievability and arbitrability questions to A/SLMR. H.R. 10700, almilar to E.O. 11491, ex- cept: May include grievability and arbitra questions. Not limited to scope of agreement. ? Must include opportunity for binding arbitration. ? Arbitrators from FHCS jest. ? Arbitrator has authority to make em- ployees whole. ? Union not obligated- to represent non- members. ? No specific reference to role of court. H.R. 13 and H.R. 9784s . Unlimited scope. . Mandatory binding arbitration. . Arbitration invoked only by union, in H.R. 13. -- Should negotiated grievance procedures extend to matters not covered by negotiated agreements. -- Scope of procedure to include matters outside agreement? erotecti,1 ot statecery appeal. rights. Right of union to exclusive repre- sentation in grievances of unit employees. Authority of arbitrator to make em- ployee whole. Role of courts and central authority. Exception to arbitrator's award. Resolution of arbitrability and grievability disputes. eight or employee to moose nix own representative; and to process his own grievance. Avoidance of duplication in reviews of grievance on same matter. 82 9-1?000ZZ009000t108?0089/dCltl-VIO ? 90/60/1.00Z eseeletliod peAcuddv Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Issue 10. Union Security References What union security arrangements should apply? Background -- Union security is a major objective of unions and serves to stabilize labor-management relations. Under NLRA, agreements may require union membership when not prohibited by State law. Public sector: Hawaii requires checkoff of service fee. 15 States permit checkoff per agreement. A number of states have agency or modified agency shop union security arrangements. Federal sector: Voluntary checkoff of union dues per agreement with union. Subject to CSC regulation. Union membership or payment of dues or fees to a union mar not be made a condition of continued Federal employment. --E.O. 11491 Voluntary checkoff per agreement, subject to CSC regulations, revoca- tion at 6-month intervals; cost negotiable. No required membership or payments of dues or fees to unions. --H.R. 10700 similar to E.O. 11491 except: Allotments at no cost. Revocation of allotment after one year. 13 Requires payment of union dues and initiation fee at no charge (employees join union or pay equivalent dues). Allotments revocable after one year or at end of agreement, whichever is later. -- H.R. 9784 - similar to H.R. 13, except: No reference to cost. Revocation after one year. Union without recognition could obtain voluntary dues allotments. Major Concerns -- Employees free to join or not join union -- Cost of dues withholding negotiable economic item vs. total no-cost withhold -- What arrangement should be made to pro- vide unions with reasonable financial security and membership stability, as against compulsory membership or payment of fees and dues? -- How would such arrangements fit into mer system requirements that continuation of employment be conditioned solely on fitn and be free of all forms of discriminato treatment2 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 i9A-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Issue 11, Unfalc labei prat:tiues References Major Concerns What unfair labor practices (ULPs) and pro- cedures should apply is parties? Background Prohibited practices are necessary in order to protect and guarantee rights and responsibilities. -- Pertain in both private and public sc.,: tors but vary in what specific actions are prohibited and how enforced. tinder National Labor Relations Act: . General Counsel (GC) of National Labor Relations Board investigates, prose- nip ,nmplaint. ho.for,. AAmtnis- trative Law Judges. AU l Decision is appealable to NLRB within 20 days. NLRB decisions enforced by and appeal- able to Court of AppeAl s, which Aprite, substantial evidence standard. . NLRB may seek district court to enjoin CL?, pending disposition of complaint. -- Various state laws provide for prosecu- tion by separate body or administrative body itself with burden of proof on complainant or the prosecutors office. -- Bill before Congress to modify NLRA by establishing Court for labor disputes to hear and determine, replacing that function of NLRB. E.O. 11491 ? CLE's specified f,,r manag..cnt and unions. ? Burden of proof on complainant, ex- cept in strike cases. ? A/SLMR hears and rules, with power to order cease and desist; appeals to FLRC. ? Make ,whul remed-, tacktoi;. H.R. 10700 ? Specific ULPs similar to E.0. 11491. FLRA hears and rules - can order cease and desist and make-whole reme- dies. . FLRA will entertain requests for ex- ceptions if filed within 20 days based on substantial issues criteria. . No sporifir r.f, ..... to,ourts. -- H.R. 13 . Mgt. ULPs similar to H.R. 10700, ex- cept not ULP to enforce agency shop. ? Strikes, etc. by unions not listed UL?. . Independent category of ULP's for individual. ? FLRA assumes role of A/SLMR and FLRG under E.O. ? FLRA has power to order cease and de- sist,make-wholc remedies and disci- plinary remedies for supervisors and managers. ? Access to courts by all parties. That IlY pertain to both siana,:emcnt and anion, as in Who shall bear burden of proof? What standard of proof shall apply? Wheiner ti.rs in L.0. 11491 be re- tained, contracted or expanded. Central body have adequate authority to enforce, including make-whole remedies. Mo indepeadeui category of ULFs, or authority of central body to discipline managers, as that is role of agency. thc right of one Fi.dteol dgency, such as FLRA, to take action against another agency. Effect of make-whole and reinstatement In context of Veterans Preference Act and existing adverse actions system. Relationship and role of courts. -- If strike prohibited,who shall enjoin? Central authority? Courts? -- Limitations on taking matter through more than one available procedure, such as grievance and CL?. 09J 9-1?000ZZ00900n109?0089LdCN-VIO ? u0/60/1?00Z aseele AoA penoAddy 9-1?000ZZ009000t108?0089/dCIU-VI3 : 90/60/1.00Z eseelet1 JOd PeA0AdV Issues 11. Unfair labor practices (con't.) References Major Concerns --Federal sector moved from sole determina- tions by agency to hearing and enforce- ment by A/SLMR; appeals to FLRC. --Burden of proof on complainant, except in S. 19(b)(4) expedited procedure, where Assistant Regional Director (LMSA) prose- cutes, has burden of proof. --H.R. 9784 ? No independent ULP, as in H.R. 13. ? Management ULPs similar to H.R. 13. . FLRB handles violations, Office of GC as under NLRB; make-whole remedies. . Procedures on access to court. ? Strikes, subject to some limita- tions, are legal. 9-1?000ZZ009000t108?0089/datlib : 90/60/1.00Z aseeieu JOd peACLIddV 9-1?000ZZ009000t108?0089/dCIU-VI3 90/60/1.00Z eseelet1 JOd PeA0AdV Issue 12. Standards of Conduct References Malor Concerns What standards of conduct should apply labor organizations? Background unions in both private and public sectors required to meet certain minimal standards of conduct: . Report and disclose financial transactions. Maintain democratic admin- istrative practices. Necessary for protection of em- ployees and integrity of LMR system. to --E.O. 11491 . S.18 specifices standards. . A/SLMR prescribes regulations and decides alleged violations. --HR. 10700 . Similar to E.O. 11491, except as in private sector under dir.,,ion and regulations of Secretary of Labor. --H.R. 13 Requires only that unions adopt own governing requirements 09 democratic practices and fiscal and financial integrity. No reporting or disclosure re- quirements. No procedures on deciding alleged violations. . No provisions on standards of conduct. Standards for protection of employees and integrity of LMR program. Continuation of E.O. 11491 standards. Procedures on deciding alleged violations, Authority of new central body to enforce, or remain as at present with Labor Depattment. 9-1?000ZZ009000t108?0089/dCIU-VIO ? u0/60/1.00Z eseelet1 JOd PeA0AdV Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Issue 13. Supersedure Reference Malor Concerns Under a Federal LMR program based on statute, what should be the impact on existing laws affecting conditions of employment, such as pay, classification, E.E.O., health and life insurance, veterans preference, retirement, and merit principles? Background Major items such as those noted above are established by law. Most are bargainable in private sector and increasingly are bargained in other public sectors. These are the so-called nbread-and-butter. issues, generally excluded from the E.O. program. Unions continue calling for greatly- enlarged bargaining in Federal sector, but failing to specify what statutes, if any, should be wiped out. Issue is central to scope of bargaining, delegation of authority by Congress to collective bargaining process, the method of personnel management in the Federal service, public policy and public interest. There is already union involvement through congressional enactments on setting blue and white collar pay. --E.O. 11491 program is subject to existing and future statute. --H.R. 10700 would not supersede existing laws, but would provide Board with author- ity over Civil Service Commission regu- lations that are within the scope of bargaining. H.R. 10700 also provides for negotiation on agency regulations issued by author- ities above the level of recognition. H.R. 13 and H.R. 9784 would supersede laws in subject areas in conflict with its provisions; it is not clear as to how this would work--which laws and the process of termination. Depending on how the supersedure pro- visions of these bills are interpreted and applied, much of the existing statutory structure of Federal employee rights and benefits could be wiped out - to be replaced by what could be bargained between the many unions hold- ing exclusive recognition and agency management. -- Which laws would or should be super- seded, and what would be the effect on various systems? -- Separate retirement and pay systems for unit members and non-unit members? Would supersedure be selective? What criteria would be used to de- termine supersedure? What provisions exist for transition and s.sfeguarding Would statutory benefits serve as floor for collective bargaining? Who would determine which Acts would be replaced? -- What would be the impact of supersedure on personnel management regulations? -- Would consultation between agency and non-union groups (i.e., supervisors, professional associations, minority groups, etc.) be continued? -- Would Federal personnel policies and employee rights and benefits be de- termined by what happens in about 3400 different bargaining units? -- How would the costs resulting from such negotiations be met? -- Is the Congress prepared to relinquish control over matters traditionally determined by statute? 9-1.000ZZ009000t109?0089/dCltl-VIVI 90/60/1?00Z aseeieu JOd PeACLIddV 9-1?000ZZ009000t108?0089/dCltl-VIO : 90/60/1?00Z eseeieu Jod peAoiddv Issue 14. Merit Principles Reference What would or should be included to maintain a Federal service system based upon merit principles? Merit principles are fundamental to the viability of the Federal Civil Service and effective and efficient public services. Background This involves compatibility of collective bargaining and merit prin- ciples. . Special system for Federal LMR accommodates to merit principles. Full collective bargaining as sought by some unions could - but need not - conflict with merit principles (eon- nideraLion based upon ability and not non-member factors), as the bedrock of public policy. --E.O. 11491 and earlier order based on merit principles: No discrimination based upon non- merit factors. Union membership and activit-, iv entirely voluntary. Precedence of existing and future laws and regulations. Emphasis on well-being of employees, efficient work practices and adndn- istration of Government. Kg10700 is conceptually similar to E.O. --HR 13 and HR 9764 provide no protection for merit principles: Full scale collective bargaining, including use of seniority and union security, in determining lob status and advancement. Virtually all laws and regulations are conditions of employment subject to supersedure. Employees may be required to join union or pay equivalent fee as con- dition of employment. War Concerns --That any Federal LMR program recognize, preserve and clearly spell out the supremacj of merit principles. --That established rights and responsibi- lities with respect to merit principles be maintained. --That accountability or' application of merit principles be specified. --That merit principles and collective bargaining be compatible as regards the paramount needs of the public interest. --That continuity of employment be de- termined by fitness for the work and without discrimination based on union membership or payment of dues or fees. --That lob related faetoes, and not solel seniority, be determinative in employee advancement. -- That merit principles be defined, and specifically exciudeo from matters suoject to collective bargaining. That personn:i practicis, if are., carried on in name of merit which have nothing [0 ml with mm. ri , and , fa. t , cv he ,untrue to merit principles do net SI re 1 bar diversity and innovation in personnel systems. Approved For Release 2001/09/0k4CIA-RDP75B00380R000500220001-6 9-1.000ZZ009000t109?0089/dCltl-VIO 90/60/1.00z aseeieu -10d peACLIddV Issue 15.. Congressional Authority Reference Major Concerns What authority over matters affecting con- ditions of employment, i.e. LMR, would be delegated or retained by Congress? Nsckgyound --- Congress has retained or has specifically delegated authority over many items which are not subject to collective bargaining, e.g., pay; classification; retirement; and insurance. rights of employees in appeals on adverse act classification. regard to on, EEO, Such areas are of interest to unions rep- resenting employees and unions continue to exert pressure to make Chem bargain- able. Congress and authorities such as the CSC and agencies retain control on certain of these matters in the interest of mission accomplishment, cost, and equity through use of regulations and policies which unions see as unjustifiable road- blocks to negotiation. - E.O. 11491 provides that negotiated agree- ments be governed by existing or future laws and regulations of appropriate autbor- ities, including policies set forth in th. Federal Personnel Manual. Thus, laws of Congress, and regulations issued pursuant to them are controlling. H.R. 10700 follows E.O. 1191. H.R. 13 and H.R. 9713:. broadly define collective bargaining and conditions of employment so as to cover virtually all aspects of employment, including pay practices, fringe benefits, work procedures, etc.?while providing for supersedures of laws, Executive Orders or regulations which relate to or are in conflict with the concept. . [hug, related authority presently retained or delegated by Congress could be subject to collective bargaining. That there he appropriate balance of au- tilority on conditions of employmert be- tween what is retained by the tongress and what is subject to collective bar- gaining. Effective cost control. Effective and efficient public services. Meaningful bargaining on appropriate matters, subject to public interest criteria, with accountability ultimately to representative of the general public. Equity to employees; basic rights and benefits be assured. 9-1.000ZZ009000t109?0089/dCltl-VIN: 90/60/1.00z aseeieu JOd PeACLIddV Issue 16. Employer References Malor Concerns An essential prerequisite to the process of negotiations is the clear identification of the "parties" who generate the give-and-take that culminates in mutual agreement, and who are responsible for the interpretation and application of the terms of the agree- ment during its life. Genuine labor nego- tiations, whether bilateral or multilateral, private or public sector, requires at least one distinct and unmistakably identified party, who possesses the legally-constituted and effective authority over the resources to be committed in support of the agreements terms. This party is the "employer." Bzglaur_Lt Meaningful collective bargaining's essential characteristics: -- clear identification of parties -- authority to reach agreement at level of bargaining -- responsibility for administration of agreement E.O. 11491, while containing no defini- tion of "employer", identifies "agency" as "an executive department, a Govern- ment corporation, and an independent establishment as defined in Section 104 of Title 5, United States Code, except the General Accounting Office." "Agency" includes all cognizant subordinate echelons. The scope of negotiations is deter- mined by the authority of manage- ment at the level of recognition. -- H.R. 10700 similar to E.O., except it establishes special bargaining mechanisms. . Federal Labor Relations Board to pass on multi-agency policy and regu- lations affecting negotiable matters. . Higher level regulations must be negotiated with any union or group of unions which hold exclusive recogni- tion for majority of affected em- ployees. -- H.R. 13 includes as employers depart- ments, agencies, bureaus, activities or organizations of Executive, Legis- lative, and Judicial branches, Library of Congress, and Federal Reserve System. -- H.R. 9784 similar to H.R. 13. -- If negotiations with Executive Branch at national level on Government-wide personnel policy, or across agency lines, is intended, who would be the employer representative? -- What authority should be delegatdd to bar- gaining agent, and to whom is the agent accountable? Should agent in all 3,400 plus units have power to reach agreement on all bargainable items at the level of recognition? -- How will the separation of governmental powers be preserved? Is it possible to devise a labor relations program that covers all branches of government that is equitable and workable, while continuing to regard each branch as a virtually auto- nomous employer? -- Must there be one employer, or can there be joint or different levels of employers? -- Who will have ultimate authority when executive branch is controlled by one poli- tical 7,,rty and leqislative branch by another. Approved For Release 2001109L i: CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Issue 17. Impact of Federal LMR Legislation on State and Local Government References Major Concerns What impact would Federal LMR have on State and local governments? -- As a catalyst for further LR develop- ments at state and local level? As a model? Bar kg E.O. 10988 in 1962 triggered torrent of legislation at State and local level. Prior, only one State (Wisconsin) had legislation. Since, over 30 states enacted legis- lation. Executive orders and ordinances also enacted. -- No reference in E.O. 11491 or pending bills. -- Under the IPA, CSC is involved in State and local personnel administration (in- cluding LMR) in following ways: ? Grant Program ? Merit Systeme ? Technical Assistance ? Cooperative Recruiting and Examining Mobility Assignments What are the probable consequences that would be felt in State and local govern- ments? What relationshlp, if any, should chere be between State and local government personnel practices and Federal LMR legislation? Should proposed 7:8is1utlzr state inapplicability to Federal grant- aided programs which require merit systems? Should State/local eligibility for Federal funds (grant or revenue-sharing) be in any way contingent upon presence or absence of LMR legislation? Approved For Release 2001/09/06 :191/A-RDP75B00380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT LEGISLATION WEDNESDAY, NAY 22, 1974 U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANPOWER AND CIVIL SERVICE, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met at 10 a.m. in room 210 Cannon House Office Building, Hon. David N. Henderson (chairman of the sub- committee) presiding. Mr. HENDERSON. The subcommittee will come to order. It's our pleasure again this morning to have Chairman Hampton of the Civil Service Commission back before the subcommittee and, Mr. Chairman, I'm going to ask that you proceed with your, pre- pared statement. At the conclusion of that statement, unless other members here want to return to the portion yesterday, we will try to get questions relating to your statement this morning and then afford them an opportunity as they come in to either ask questions on the subject of yesterday or today. 7:ou may proceed. STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT E. HAMPTON, CHAIRMAN, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, ACCOMPANIED BY TONY INGRASSIA, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION Mr. HAMPTON. Fine, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, in our earlier testimony we discussed the history of the Federal labor-relations program under Executive order, the changes that have been made during its 12?year period, the struc- ture of the program and our views concerning the various bills pending before Congress. We also indicated that in our view there is no demonstrated need for the substantial changes embodied in the statutory approaches pending before this committee. Furthermore, we stated our belief that the program as it currently exists does establish a viable system for effective labor-management relations and that this system has been and will continue to be revised to accommodate to any demonstrated needs. At this time I would like to amplify some of our views concerning matters that time, should consider before determining the desira- bility of establishing a statutory system of collective bargaining for Federal employees. We have furnished our analyses of the broad issues which we think Congress should address in its consideration. These are discussed in some length in our statement for the record. 1.69) Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06th9IA-RDP75B00380R000500220001-6 This statement, Mr. Chairman, is some 80 pages long and I think it gives an excellent history of the fundamental issues and I only hope that the members of the committee and the staff can give them some attention and that we can have further discussion because I think this is a very, very complex subject. Mr. HENDERSON. I certainly do think it w ill be very helpful, Mr. Chairman. Mr. HAMPTON. I think even to the point, Mr. Chairman, on that, I'm not sure how the legislative process works in all this, but I think some kind of joint staff discussion even with people from the unions which are not in the form of a hearing might be helpful. But I don't know whether that's out of order or not in the legislative process. It's that type of subject matter. Mr. HENDERSON. I appreciate the suggestion and we will keep it in mind. Mr. HAMPTON. We do believe, however, that certain of these issues warrant priority consideration by this committee and by Congress in the consideration of any statutory program. The issues include: The role and authority of the central administrative body. The impact of collective bargaining legislation on existing laws: the so-called "supersedure" issue. The scope of negotiations, including such concerns as (1) bar- gaining unit structure, (2) the presence or l ack of economic items needed to provide the "glue" for successful "full" collective bargain- ing, (3) the presence or lack of congressional authority and over- sight responsibilities. The paramount need to protect merit pr i nciples and other ex- pressions of the public interest. The need to identify who the "employer wil:L be. UTE CENTRAL A U 1 AORITY At present, the Executive order provides for a central authority to oversee the Federal labor-relations program--namely, the Federal Labor Relations Council, consisting of mysel f as Chairman along with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and the Secretary of Labor. In other words, the President's principal per- sonnel, fiscal and labor-relations officials with their broad and cen- tralized authorities in areas affected by labor. management dealings are empowered to regulate and administer abor-management re- lations. Each of the bills now pending would establish an independent regulatory body appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to administer the Fixleral labor-relations program. Although the number, responsibility and authority of the members of the administrative body vary, there is a common denomi- nator in all of these bills. All would establish a regulatory body which would have the authority to dictate to other Federal agencies in the Executive branch that they take certain actions. Such a regulatory body is the so-called "liHe NLRB" discussed and sought by union representatives for over a decade. The very Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 :ff-RDP75B00380R000500220001-6 nickname used indicates part of the problem presented by an all- powerful, all-encompassing body. The National Labor Relations Board, which administers the private sector labor relations program, has authority to determine bargaining unit structure, exclusive repre- sentation, mandatory bargaining subjects and to resolve unfair labor practice complaints. It does not, however, have any authority to determine the wages, hours or conditions of employment the parties must accept. It does not have any authority to supersede other existing laws. In sharp contrast, the so-called "little NLRB's" proposed by some of the pending bills being considered by this committee would be given a type of authority the National Labor Relations Board has never had. We certainly do not oppose a central administrative body if and when legislation is enacted. But we are concerned with the authority of such a body and feel strongly that the Congress should carefully delineate its role and structure. Necessary limitations or protections could be accomplished by the makeup of the body and/or specifically listing those areas over which it could and could not exercise author- ity. This is an issue that cannot be ignored. The approach in some bills of empowering a regulatory body to direct other Presidential appointees to carry out certain actions of very real and direct consequence in performing their statutory responsibilities without checks and balances and without congres- sional oversight is not only novel in the Federal establishment, but poses serious practical, as well as statutory, problems which we believe this committee must consider and consider most seriously. Although Congress has created many regulatory agencies to Im- plement its statutes as they impact on the general public, on labor, or on industry, it generally has not, with the exception of the Civil Service Commission, established any authority, any commission, any board with the sweeping power envisioned in pending bills to over- see compliance with personnel management and related requirements among other Federal agencies. And even our enforcement authorities are subject to considerable statutory limitations. Let me just cite a few examples, Mr. Chairman: In the Civil Rights Act of 1972, the equal Employment Oppor- tunity Commission was given authority over all other employees but Congress specifically did not place Federal agencies under the regulatory wing of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis- sion; rather, Congress elected to give this role to the Civil Service Commission. When Congress decided to extend the Fair Labor Standards Act to Federal establishments and to State and local employees earlier this month, it again placed the administration of Federal-employee coverage with the Civil Service Commission. When Congress established systems for determining and applying prevailing rates applicable to the private-sector employees of Federal contractors (Walsh-Healey Act and Davis-Bacon Act), it placed these functions in the department of Labor. When, however, in 1972, a statutory system of prevailing wage rates was established for Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 34-619 0 - 74 - 12 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 172 Federal blue-collar employees, Congress placed its administration in the Civil Service Commission. Similar examples of statutes vesting in the Civil Service Com- mission the responsibility to implement statutory requirements con- cerning Federal employees are included in laws dealing with ad- verse-action appeals, retirement, health benefits, life insurance and leave administration. In fact, we can say without overstatement that in virtually every instance (outside the areaE, of occupational injury and safety) in which a Governmentwide system has been established by Congress to protect Federal employees, the responsibility for administration has been placed in the Civil Service Commission. These comments are not an invitation to place a statutory pro- gram for Federal-employee labor relations in the Civil Service Com- mission; they are offered only to point up Chngre,ss' traditional and continuing recognition of the special, integre ted nature of personnel administration in the Federal Government. In fact, I would like to add here that I really don't think that if a statutory program is established in another body that the Commission would be the place that this program would be. The consistency of approaches adopted by Congress to date reflect the very real problems associated with the establishment of an authority outside, and in addition to, our central personnel agency to direct other Federal agencies to take action in the area of per- sonnel management or to seek compliance with its directives by instituting court action against a Federal agency. SUPERSEDURE The issue of the impact of labor relations legislation on existing laws is a natural "follow-on" to the concern with the undefined but apparently unlimited authority given the "little NLRB's." One of the most vexing problems currently surf acir.g in States which have enacted laws granting collective bargaining rights to their own employees is the overlap and interaction of such laws on other legis- lation covering personnel policies and practices applicable to these same employees. Where the laws have been drafted carefully, where the continued commitment to merit principles and the public interest have been maintained, friction has been minimized. Where, however, this was not done, friction and disputes have mushroomed with the courts being placed in the position of determining which laws should have precedence. Of the bills before this committee only H.R. 10700 deals with this issue in a direct and, in OUT opinion, appropriate manner. H.R. 10700 clearly requires the continuance of all existing laws and related regulations required to implement and administer those laws. Other bills speak in terms of supersedure of existing legislation covering this same subject matter. Since those bills cover everything conceivable in the area of personnel policies and practices, a literal reading would wipe much legislation off the books. Title 5, including Veteran Preference, conceivably could cease to exist, at least insofar L5 employees in exclusive bargaining units arc concerned. Supporters of those bills claim this interpretation was not intended but they are reluctant to speak to specific laws and issues. Will Approved For Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 :ffulA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 laws involving pay and fringe benefits prevail? Will they be super- seded? Will they continue and serve as a guaranteed floor from which negotiations must begin? What about the Classification Act? the Civil Service Act? the Retirement Act? the Health Benefits and Life Insurance Act? The list could go on and on. Suffice it to say, unless this issue is dealt with head on in any consideration of broad-gauged legislation, it will be decided by the courts after much turmoil between agencies and labor organizations. SCOPE OF NEGOTIATIONS The scope of bargaining issue is a continuation of the supersedure issue, just as supersedure concerns flow logically from consideration of the structure and role of a central authority. Obviously, the scope of bargaining is affected by the controlling or noncontrolling impact of existing legislation. But this is only part of the problem. As we have previously noted, the Federal labor relations structure is marked by extreme fragmentation of bargain- ing units. We have over 3,400 exclusive units, some quite small and far-removed from ultimate authority on many personnel manage- ment matters. As long as the scope of bargaining was clearly limited to only that authority help by the top management official at the level of recognition, few real problems developed. These limitations were clearly understood by the parties; in fact, union representatives acknowledge and subscribed to them in hearings before the task force chaired by former Secretary of Labor Goldberg which led to the issuance of Executive Order 10988 in 1962. As exclusive recognition has grown, and unions have expanded, the limitations of 1962 no longer are accepted. This is understandable. What is not understandable and what this committee must carefully consider are the provisions of some bills that would give the bar- gainers in all those thousands of units the authority to "override" all higher level regulations, both within and outside the agency involved. To put it another way, there was justification for finding thousands of small units appropriate for exclusive recognition when the scope of bargaining was limited to the authority of the manage- ment official at the bargaining unit level, but there is no justification for greatly broadening the scope of bargaining without at the same time reassessing the continued appropriateness of the units. An increasing number of States that have been faced with this problem have decided that if the rules of the game are being changed ?scope of negotiation?then the determination of "teams" should be changed. Thus, they have legislated broad bargaining units or ac- complished the same result through stated criteria and policy direc- tion to the central authority. H.R. 10700 attempts to deal with this problem through a com- plicated system of ad hoe, coalition-type bargaining on higher level regulations within the agency and equally complicated but even more potentially disruptive "ouasi-negofiations" on regulations issued by central agencies which have go?ernment-wide application. As indi- cated in my earlier testimony, this problem of dealing with higher level regulations is a serious and difficult one. You are to be corn- Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/9,i4CIA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 mended, Mr. Chairman, for attempting to fi ad a solution. However, in all candor, I must say the proposed solutions in all the bills before this committee are not only unaccepta'ile, but potentially very damaging to the efficient and effective operations of Government. This brings us to a consideration of the dynamics of so-called "full" collective bargaining. In the private sector, the economic package?the bread-and-butter items?provides the glue?or trade- offs?that enables the parties to resolve their differences. The union is able to show results and management is able to protect its vital need to retain the essential tools of managing. This is particularly important where, as in most of the pending bills, no provision is made for the mandatory protection of management rights. When, however, direct negotiation of economic items within each bargaining unit is not feasible, and we believe that is the case in the Federal structure, the dynamics of bargaining cannot operate. True there can be much room for bilateral decisionmaking in a broad area of personnel policies and practices, but an elaborate system of "full" collective bargaining with compulsory, binding arbitration of impasses, as envisioned by pending bills, cannot operate success- fully. For example, demands for detailed procedures and practices to be followed. in carrying out management's personnel responsibili- ties which seldom become impasse or ?strikE " issues in the private sector because of compromise language arrived at through economic concessions, remain at impasse to be decided I hrough the arbitration process. think this. is caused, Mr.. Chairman, by the fact that economic concessions may have been made in another arena and with involve- ment of union representatives, but these concessions play no role in determining the contract language at another level. This is a round- about way of saying that without the full economic package and without labor being able to say to their members that we have obtained this for you, negotiations tend to concentrate on procedures and the fine legal aspects of an agreement. Would the Congress be willing to turn over authority for economic benefits to over 3,400 bargaining units without control on appro- priations, without oversight responsibilities; with no way of ex- plaining to constituents why they are being treated differently, from identical employees working for the agency 'Jut in a different bar- gaining unit? If not, the Congress must give serious attention to the scope of bargaining envisioned in pending legislation. PARAMOUNT NEED TO PROTECT MERIT PRINCIPLES .kND OTHER EXPRESSIONS OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST The basic concept of merit as the guiding factor in the employ- ment, promotion and retention of Federal err ployees has long been determined to be in the public interest. If the principle of merit is not to be eroded or superseded altogether in the collective-bargaining process, then very careful consideration must be given in several areas. A major cond3rn involves proposals which would mandate union membership?or payments in lieu of such membership?as a condition of acquiring or continuing employ- ment. Such a statutory provision, which was rejected by the Con- Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 :1CfA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 gress in passing the Postal Reorganization Act in 1970, would con- stitute a non-merit intrusion in personnel decisions. While we recog- nize the real concern for union security, some other way to accomplish it must be found other than denial of freedom of choice. Promotions predicated solely upon seniority, a provision frequently found in the private sector, similarly would be contrary to the current system which provides that merit shall be the determinant for promotion. Private-sector type agreement provisions which de- termine the mix of helpers, apprentices and trainees would not only be incompatible with Federal-sector merit considerations; they could cripple an agency's ability to perform its mission. This is not to say meaningful collective bargaining cannot take place with respect to most employee concerns without damage to merit principles. While the principles themselves should never be compromised, there is ample room for the negotiation of alternative procedures and practices by which the principles can be effectuated. However, the laws and implementing regulations that protect merit principles must specifically take precedence over the terms of any collective-bargaining legislation or agreements flowing from such legislation. Of course, concern for the public interest cannot be limited to preservation of merit principles. It is our firm belief that all public policy issues such as, but not limited to, mission, budget, choice of mothods, means and personnel should be determined by the normal political processes set up by the electorate and answerable to the electorate so that institutionalized collective bargaining machinery does not overwhelm other competing and legitimate public interest groups. NEED TO IDENTIFY THE EMPLOYER We have discussed the need to address what subject matter should be negotiated, the level at which it should be negotiated and the interface with existing legislation and governmental structure. All of this has a bearing on the vital issue of who the employer shall be; that is, who represents the executive branch in negotiations as envisioned by pending bills? Obviously, if the concerns we have addressed are successfully dealt with, the matter of identifying the employer automatically is resolved. If, on the other hand, approval is contemplated of provisions in some bills that would permit nego- tiations on a wide range of wages and fringe benefits, then serious consideration must be given to identifying the employer. For example, in determining executive branch white collar pay the President is the employer and his designated agents are the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission. In determining blue collar pay, the head of an agency is the employer, and he is bound by policies and regulations issued by the Civil Service Commission with the advice of a union-agency advisory board_ In determining most fringe benefits, the Congress and the President act together as the employer. .If broad-gaged legislation is passed, the issue must be addressed with an eye to not fragmenting the employer in a manner inviting whipsawing, inequities, confusion and lack of authority at the bargaining table and uncontrollable costs. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/063FIA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 As I indicated earlier, what have discussed is not an exhaustive list, nor an exhaustive analysis. Instead, I have attempted to high- light some of the most fundamental considerations posed to this committee; others are included in our statement for the record. I am certain that in your deliberations you will consider other important matters. My failure to mention other issues we have raised? such as the denial to Federal employees of the right to strike and alternative machinery for resolution of impasses?should not be construed as minimizing their importance. Although we have attempted to show that the present program is satisfactory and successful and that there has been no demonstrated need for legislation, we recognize that otli ers may not agree. In your deliberations, we ask that you seriously consider the issues posed. We would be pleased to discuss with you any issues, at any- time, on which you may wish additional clarification, or to answer any questions you may have. In closing, I would like to again express my appreciation for the courtesy you have extended in giving me these 2 days in which to testify. Mr. HENnraisow. Thank you, Mr: Chairman. For the benefit of the members, Chaim an Hampton has just completed his prepared statement which he lad planned to give for the second day of hearing. Some of the members yesterday suggested they had questions they would like to submit today or ask today of the chairman regarding yesterday's testimony. If you'd like to do that the Chair would afford you any opportunity at this time, or if you have no objection we will go right into questions and open up the entire subject for the, members for questions on either day's presentation by the Chairman. Chairman Hampton, in discussing the role and authority of the ventral administrative, body, you indicated you had no objection to such a body but you did have concern with the functions assigned to the central body. You specifically referred to the National Labor Relations Board and the possible correlation with this legislation. What suggestions or ideas do you have as to the functions and responsibilities that should be assigned to a central administrative body? Mr. HAMPTON. Well, giving you a rather informal opinion, wanting to keep options open as we go along through this process, I don't want to be bound by anything that I say shout the role of this kind of a body at this time because I think it depends upon many other things. Mr. HENDERSON. Yes. It very definitely does, but I think it would be helpful for us to have your ideas within the constraints that you suggest. I want to keep the same options open. Mr. HA MPTON. Well, I would envisage, say, an operation of a central authority as assuming the duties and responsibilities that now rest with the Assistant Secretary of Labor and with the Federal Service Impasses Panel and with the Federal Labor Relations Council. Mr. HENDERSON. f T could interrupt right there, starting from that point, leads me to ask another question. You have indicated that the Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 MA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 central regulatory body as you envisage it in the bills would have authority to dictate to other Federal agencies in the executive branch. How do you see that the legislative proposal differs from a council under the existing Executive orders regarding the dictating to Federal agencies? Mr. HAMPTON. Well, the Council really cannot dictate to Federal agencies in the broad way. I mean, the parameters of the Council's action are related very strictly to interpreting the Executive order. So it cannot go beyond those bounds that are spelled out in that Executive order. In other words, we can't initiate a new policy. We have the authority to enforce a decision that usually comes to us in the form on an individual case. Only recently have we changed our rules to allow a major policy issue to be brought before the Council by both parties in order to make a determination under the Executive order. Mr. HENDERSON. But to the extent that decisions are made in matters before the Council, they are binding on the agencies, aren't they? Mr. HAMPTON. That is correct. They are binding on the agencies but they are limited to only those things that are spelled out in the Executive order and that's mainly in the relationship area. Mr. HENDERSON. So do I understand from your testimony that if the central body we would create in the legislation is limited in its authority to decisionmaking and circumscribed within those areas, it could function comparably to the Council now? Mr. HAMPTON. I would think that you could so structure a body. There are certain authorities that the Council has because of its membership; as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission I have broad statutory authorities to regulate. If deficiencies are noted, then I can use that regulatory authority to make changes in the basic system. I wouldn't recommend this to a body that was separated from all of the other statutory responsibilities. Mr. HENDERSON. That leads me to another question. Do you feel that as we provide for the Chairman of the regulatory body the Chairman should be the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission or his designee or the appointee of the President? Let me add, in the instance where I would require a Chairman to be appointed by the President, it certainly would be my great hope that the President would consult with the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission. He would take his recommendation. But I'd like to have your feel- ing as to whether or not or how wise it would be that we designate the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission as the Chairman of that regulatory body. Mr. HAMPTON. No, sir. I don't think the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission should be. I think that?I mean, I'm just thinking in my own mind how I would envisage such a body?that it would be essentially a body outside of any existing organization of government; in other words, a creation of a new body with new people, but that there be parameters on their authority considering the existing statutory structure of what the Congress is already giving and the Constitution gives to the heads of agencies and the Approved For Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/0pACIA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 other authorities given to the Civil Service Commission and the Office of Management and Budget over economic matters. Mr. HENDERSON. What would you think cf the requirement that the Chairman or the Commission designate the Chairman of the regulatory body? Mr. HAMPTON. Well, it all depends upon what you do before that. In other words, how you structure in the statute and what the duties are. I would really think that the Board should be a Board that is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate and would be independent of any ties with the Civil Service Commission. think there has to be provisions of consultation where if they're dealing with an issue that requires some sort of better understanding of a statute or policy of the Commission which is based on statute, that they would seek our advice. Mr. HENDERSON. Arguing just .for a mornenl: contrary to your posi- tion?and I certainly am appreciative of the difficult task you have as Chairman of the Commission?but the concern I have in the President's nomination and the Senate confirmation is whether or not the primary emphasis would be that we have someone serving as the Chairman of the regulatory body who does understand the real differences between private sector employment and what we are attempting to do with the Federal sector. One of the big problems you have highlighted in your testimony we must always keep in mind is that if we're talking about a little "NLRB," and I think that has great danger as we discuss the regulatory body here, the tendency could be on the part of a President sometime in the future to pick someone who has great expertise in labor-management relations in the private sector and be the most unknowledgeable practitioner in the world with regards to this legis- lation and the responsibility of the regulatory body. It's for this reason I continue to explore the possibility of the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission or his designee naming the Chairman of the regulatory body or choosing the Chairman from members of the Board. In other words, at least it would be limited?he would be picking who he thinks is the best qualified person from the membership. I would certainly express my great support and feeling that if you had this responsibility upon the enactment of the legislation you certainly would not go out and seek one who had negotiated con- tracts between U.S. Steel and their workers, for example, but rather, you would look within the Federal sector. I think you would agree with me that from these 12 years of experience we have on both sides of the table within Government and labor organizations very competent people to serve on a regulatory =Board and serve as a Chairman with good understanding of the constrictions that are necessary in the public sector. Mr. HAMPTON. Well, I have to agree with you, I mean, in terms of my own exnerience of being Chairman of the Commission and Chairman of the Federal Labor Relations Council. As we go along in the number of years that we have had under 11491 I think the fact that I served in both capacities was o plus because of the knowledge of what really goes on in the personnel management areas Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 :171A-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 in the public sector. And it has been I think invaluable to have that experience and if the Congress thinks this is a desirable thing, then whatever the Congress passes in law that's what I deal with. The other thing, if I were given the authority to appoint such a person, I would appoint someone that had a distinguished record of understanding the public sector problems. They are significantly different. It has been the major problem that we have faced from the outset of this program, particularly when we began to bring in third parties, that everyone that had experience in labor relations essentially had that experience out of the private sector and they tended to draw similarities where similarities really did not exist; and we have had to build over a period of years experts in the public sector and that expertise is in the unions today that represent Fed- eral employees and in the people who administer the program in the Department of Labor and within the agencies; and I agree with? you that it's quite significant and it's always difficult to explain. Most of the participants in the conferences and seminars and things that I go to with the bar associations and all and the aca- demics are all experienced in the private sector, but not in the public stocr' and the problems are unique. So there's considerable merit in what you say. Mr. HENDERSON. I hope through these hearings we are able to demonstrate that we have the quality of personnel in the Federal sector both within the employee organizations and on the manage- ment side to perform very competently in this area. I certainly recognize this. One of the reasons I believe legislation is timely is that I have seen such great improvement in understanding on both sides of the bargaining table. This has given me a great deal of satisfaction. Let me move on to supersedure before my time expires. You pointed out H.R. 10700, the bill introduced by Mr. Dulski and me that no laws would be repealed. Do you know of any other way to do this except to rim a risk that this kind of legislation does supersede law without Congress specifically knowing what we're doing? Mr. HAMPTON. Well, I think in the other bills, as I pointed out, the language?and I don't recall offhand specifically?but it says that all laws affecting these matters?well, there's nothing in the personnel business that isn't covered in some way in the labor relations incident, and even though people have said this is not the intent, what I'm saying is that if that is not the intent, then it is the job of the Congress to say what it really means very specifically so that we do not have continual litigation in the courts; and it was the other point about the central body. The central body can, by its action, say that this law is now superseded by our judgment and I don't think it was the intent that that be done; but it needs to be addressed very specifically. And I think the very real issues here that come out that the Congress must address?it's very easy and very simple to say full collective bargaining and full situation of rights. but you have a management that is constrained by the board of directors in the Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/Rd CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Congress and what is the Congress' role going to be in the economic area ? What happens if you have a law and we do have the economic package and the economic package, as we have tried to point out, is the glue that sort of holds together any kind of collective bar- gaining relationship that is going to be similar to the private sector. But I do not think that the Congress is willing to say to the President of the United States: You have the authority to set pay completely, both blue collar and white collar, to negotiate whatever you negotiate. You have the right to affect all of the conditions of the retirement system without any congressional review. You have the right to change the health benefits package. You have the right in life insurance. You can change Veterans Preference. All of these things have an 83? or 90?year history. Now I just wonder, if this is the case, then 'you can have bargain- ing that's similar to the private sector but then you even run into the unit structure. Mr. HENDERSON. Well, I want to touch on one item that I believe makes the point so well. You have touch on it. That's veterans preference. If this committee wants to get this legislation in a turmoil and be sure that it doesn't pass or it gets all torn apart, all it has to do is try to get into that area. We are vitally interested as Members of the Congress is veterans preference. I hear iirom time to time that some people want changes to veterans preference. I could even admit that if 1 were legislating alone and going back over this, I might not devise the law just as it is today, but it has been law and it's so meaningful. I think a word of warning needs to be given to all of us on this committee. We have got to be sure that we protect veterans preference. If there's anything that has been clear out of the Bolling committee report with regards to jurisdiction, it's that one of the big problems in this Congnss is the overlap or assuming of jurisdiction. Certainly you and I have had much experience with regards to the supergrades in the Federal sector. I noted just recently?and I think it's worthy of note here?that Mr. Dulski, in his recommendation to the Hansen subcommittee sug- gested that rules of the House make it clear with regards to all other committees of the Congress that they be restricted and this committee's jurisdiction should be protected to that point. So I think that in the formulation of this legislation you have pointed out an area in which we must be very careful or we will do more damage than simply superseding existing law. Mr. HAMPTON. In following on that, one of the things I have noted recently is that we have had three major bills that impacted on Federal employees and the Commission we,s not even given the opportunity to testify on such legislation that came out of other committees. I mean the Fair Labor Standards Acts amendments having a significant impact, far greater than was anticipated; also the age discrimination provisions that were in that; and the Reha- bilitation Act which sets up the structured program dealing with the handicapped. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : W-RDP75B00380R000500220001-6 Those were matters that I think should have been under the jurisdiction of this committee to at least take testimony on and to observe its impact. Mr. HENDERSON. Let me respond on two of those. On the Fair Labor Standards Act, your point is well made. It was with the assistance of Mr. Dulski, Mr. Gross and members of the committee we were able to get the provision for the administration of that legislation in the Civil Service Commission. I felt very strongly that this was where it should be and we had some success which you noted in your statement. But with regards to the handicapped bill we were not able to, and not only were you not able to testify, but I found the attitude of the managers in the House when it was being considered was absolutely adamant. I realize that we have a primary commitment to this legislation in the next few weeks but just as soon as I finish this, you can be sure that HEW officials, as relates to the program of the handicapped, are going to be sitting right where you are and they are going to spend more days than you telling this committee how they are operating over there and what they are paying their people, simply because they did rape the jurisdiction of this committee and run all over us. They will certainly account for their stewardship of the very broad authority they received. Mr. HAMPTON. May I mention this one other thing that was on a point? Mr. HENDERSON. And I hope the press made note of that and the public. Mr. BRASCO. Double-spaced, fellows. Mr. HAMPTON. One of the things you mentioned about Veterans Preference, when that issue was faced in the Postal Reorganization Act, that act was not repealed. Second, one of the issues that I think this committee has been dealing with is the fact that no provisions were left in for con- gressional oversight, and the Congress has been fighting that issue ever since the Reorganization Act was passed. Now you have absolutely no oversight of some of these bills that are passed, and, quite frankly, I have been in the executive branch for 20?some-odd years and I think public interest issues and over- sight belong in the Congress. And I think that in any kind of a bargaining situation where you have a monopoly where employees have the right to strike and the tools of settlement, if they are not in the hands of management and they are unable to settle and then the public begins to bring pressure on appointed officials who are there for a limited period of time, the tendency is going to be for excessive settlements. And I think the Congress, as the elected representatives, is the only body that has the wherewithal to resist such pressures. Mr. HENDERSON. I thank you very much. I have some other ques- tions I will come back to. At this moment let me yield to Mr. Brasco. Mr. BRASCO. Mr. Chairman, yesterday we made an observation? well, the chairman made one and said this was rather dry material Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/0k CIA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 and I agree with that. You said it was rather complicated and it certainly is. But the thing that really troubles me?and I admit it and I don't say this facetiously but just to make a point?basically, what the problem is, as I see it, is that the role of the Civil Service Commission is so intertwined in so many areas that it, of necessity, becomes involved in a real conflict. And I understand and appre- ciate the fact that it's a difficult bill to work out, but I think that you fellows have the expertise if you were for the bill in some way to help us work it out. For instance, in this Executive order it says public interest re- quires high standards of employee performance and modern work practices to improve employee performance and efficiency. Efficient administration and employee well-being require orderly and con- structive relationships between labor organizations and management officials. That's the preamble of the Executive order. Ts that correct? Mr. HAMPTON. That's correct. Mr. BRASCO. Isn't that conflicting in and of itself? I mean, you're wearing two hats and sometimes more than two hats and this is the problem I think the employee organizations perceive and that's why they have been complaining about it, I want you to answer. Mr. HAMPTON. My view is that efficient operations come about through good employee relations. I think the two go hand in hand. In other words' I see a benefit to having good relationships with the people who are doing the work. Mr. %Asa). :But don't you think that from time to time the trying to strive for both of these goals could put you in a con- flicting position? Mr. HAMPTON. I have never run into that kind of conflict to date with the--- Mr. BRASCO. You say no? Mr. HAnyrmst. yes: I say no. Mr. BRASCO. Well, getting down to the administration portion of this, you have the situation where the Civil Service Commission, even under this Federal Labor Relations Council, :s responsible for pro- viding all the administrative support and services to the Council. Is that correct? Mr. HAMPTON. That administrative support is only to the extent of providing them with space and the fact that I go before the Congress and testify as to their budget. Mr. BRASCO. No bodies? Mr. HAMPTON. The Council?no bodies. They are all employees of the Federal Labor Relations Council and tney are not employees of the Commission. Mr. BRASCO. So that role, you feel, doesn't put you in a unique kind of position with respect to the Council? Mr. HAMPTON. No, there's no intermixing 4)f the people whatso- ever. Mr. Bmksco. Well, going down a little further, the Federal Service Impasses Panei supposedly has independent authority, but organi- zationally is located within the Council for services and staff as- sistance. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 183 Mr. FIAMVPON. The Impasses Panel is made up of people that are recognized nationally in their field. We have no direct input or contact or provide any kind of support. Mr. BRASCO. In the Executive order it says specifically that the Impasses Panel is organizationally located within the Council for services and staff assistance. Now I think Chairman Henderson pointed out very clearly when we began the hearings, thanking the staff for their tremendous amount of work, and there's no question in my mind that staff has an important and an influential role with respect to development of legislation because you work side by side, but it just seems to me that there's an overlapping of staff; that, in and of itself, is a problem and I wanted to ask you whether or not you perceive it as a problem. Mr. HAMPTON. There's no overlap of staff. The Impasses Panel has its own executive secretary. He hires the people on that staff and he reports directly to Mr. Seidenberg, the chairman of the Impasses Panel. Mr. BRAsoo. Well, we can settle this very quickly, Mr. Chairman. You say this statement is incorrect when it says that the panel has independent authority but is organizationally located within the Council for services and staff assistance? You say that portion that relates to staff assistance is incorrect? Mr. HAMPTON. Well, staff assistance doesn't mean providing people to perform the duties. Mr. BRAsco. What does that mean? Mr. HAMPTON. It's simply the housekeeping types of functions. They are included in the budget of the Council and they are housed in that and that is all. In fact, the only time that I ever see Mr. Seidenberg, the chairman, is when we get together all of the third parties to critique the program. That is to say, what kind of problems have you run into; what kind of changes can be made to improve the program--there's no communication on any cases or any overlapping staff work or anything of that kind. Mr. BRASCO. Well, let me drop clown a little further where it gives the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor- Management Relations, and down at the bottom it says a member of the Civil Service Commission will perform duties of the Assistant Secretary when such matters involve the Department of Labor. Isn't that overlapping? Mr. HAMPTON. No. In that particular case., if there's an issue involving the Department of Labor in terms of their own internal problems, rather than have those people in the Department of Labor perform the services for that?say they have an unfair labor prac- tice; you don't want Labor Department people considering an unfair labor practice. In this case the Vice-Chairman of the Civil Service Commission hears the case and deals with it like the Assistant Secretary would normally deal with it, and the Vice-Chairman of the Civil Service Commission has absolutely nothing to do with the Federal Labor Relations Council. Mr. BRASCO. I certainly do appreciate your explanation of it, but to me, as I sect it, we just have an agreement to disagree. It just seems that it's too much of an overlap and it seems to be too clubby Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/0614CIA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 and too chummy in terms of the general mission that is supposed to be set forth. In your discussion with the chairman a moment ago, you said that?at least I thought you said if such a bill were passed you thought the Civil Service Commission should be out of it. My own thought would be that the Civil Service Commission had a mission and has a mission to be involved in the protection of employees That should be its mission. Management should be concerned with general productivity and efficiency of the Federal work force, obviously, as it relates to the An erican citizens who pay the tab; and any one of these bills that has an independent authority to be there is the arbitrator between management and labor. Let me go on for a moment. We talked about bilateralism in the context of labor relationships and I suppose that by definition is two parties, labor and management, of equal strength, conducting negotiations toward a goal and obviously ultimately reaching agree- ment. Now with regard to the Federal Employees Pay Council, the President has total authority to accept or reject the suggestions of this Council, and the record of the President in this regard has been to delay all pay increases and reject a:1 Pay Council sugges- tions. Mr. HAmmorsr. I'm not sure that in eery instance?I know that? Mr. BRASCO. But the point is, though, does that bother you that after somebody says--- Mr. HAmprrox. Well, there's no real, in the use of the term, bargaining. I mean, the President can accep: the recommendations or he can go for an alternate plan. In the cases during the eco- nomic stabilization period we went for deferrals, but it's been upset by Congress, in one case by the courts, because he did not submit to the Congress an alternate plan; but that's the responsibility of the President to do that. Whether or not he followed the recommendations, that's within his prerogatives. It may have been that the agency and so forth recommended something that wasn't bought either. Mr. BRASCO. But notwithstanding that, doesn't that contradict the point you're making to Chairman Henderson when you were talking about whether or not the Congress wanted to give up its prerogatives in this area ? Apparently, no matter what we do, we have the Civil Service Commission come up?and I have been here on many bills?they're not for any bills. I don't remember when the Civil Service Com- mission was for any bills that we want to pass that have anything to do with the uplifting or upgrading of labor. The President certainly doesn't care what we do because he tither vetos it or sends word back from the Bureau of Management and Budget that it is out of line. So it just seems to me that the argument of our wanting to preserve congressional prerogatives is just kind of an item for debate. As a practical matter, it doesn't work out that way. Would you say that ? Mr. HAMPTON. No. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 :MA-RDP75B00380R000500220001-6 Mr. BRASCO. No? Mr. HAMPTON. There were a number of bills that we supported and there a number that we are opposed to. Mr. BRASCO. I can't remember any. Mr. HAMPTON. Well, there's a few. Mr. BRASCO. That you do support? Mr. HAMPTON. That we do support. I'll agree with that. Mr. BRASCO. That's the truth of the matter; right? Mr. HAMPTON. But most of the bills that we were in opposition to were liberalizations in the retirement program, a program that has a $68 billion unfunded liability that is going to cost $11 billion in government contributions by fiscal year 1980 on the most conserva- tive assumption, and that's a 5 percent pay increase every year and a 3 percent rise in the cost of living every year. Now there has been, in our opinion, very little hue and cry? Mr. BRASCO. Well, you were against the health benefits, weren't you? I was sitting on that committee. That's not retirement. Mr. HAMPTON. Well, we have a package of fringe benefits that now exceeds the best packages in industry by a little over one and some-odd percent. I think it's a question that we're bound to have debate on these issues which I don't see that the debate is wrong. In fact, I think it's good. Where many of the bills that are intro- duced in this committee are initiated by the unions in the desire to achieve more for employees, which is understandable. Mr. BRASCO. But that doesn't strike true in terms of your initial statement yesterday v-hen you said this Executive order is working out and the bargaining and everything is working out. It's obviously not because what is happening here is that the Congress is getting involved in terms of attempting to pass legislation which you people can't apparently agree on, and I don't think that there can ever be any agreement because there's really no bargaining. It's bargain- ing if the employee groups agree ivith the position that the Council takes. If they don't they're out in the cold. Mr. HAMPTON. No. The issues that come before Congress are not of the issues that we face in the bargaining situation because we have no authority to change the retirement plan. We have to come to you. Mr. BRASCO. I know, but I'm transposing the attitude with respect to it. Mr. HAMPTON. You know, I could turn the question around. How would the employees be if they dealt with management that was essentially against everything? You know, they come to Congress. They're getting a better deal. But the retirement thing, I'll be send- ing to the Congress very soon a complete report on the status and cost of many of these bills and one of my responsibilities under the law is to keep this retirement system fiscally sound and reason- able. We have the best plan in existence for retirement that is not bankrupt. Mr. BRASCO. Let me ask you this, Mr. Chairman. How does the Commission view its role in this situation? How do you view your role? Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 186 Mr. HAMPTON. Well, in the first place, I have had a number of studies done on what is the appropriate role of the. Civil Service Commission and the question of protection of rights is one of how do you view the definition of "protect." In fact, we do have a responsibility to See that employees are unencumbered in the. exer- cise of those rights. It doesn't mean that we prosecute claims in favor of employees and so forth, but we do assure that their rights are protected in the sense that they are given the authority and the wherewithal with which to exercise them. Now you have to view the. personnel opera don as an integral part of the management process. I would say that we have to view ourselves as an important part of management as far as personnel administration is concerned and this has really been the thrust of most all of the legislation that has been passed by the Congress and even in the original Civil Service Act, and I think in many cases we are put in conflict with the management of an agency because we're assuring that employees can get?good management is going to see that employees are given the rights that the law says they are entitled to, and so we have the . position as a central agency of exhorting management, at the same time leading the personnel man- agement system to continually improve it ar.d modernize it, recog- nizing the need to be responsive to employee needs. In fact, yesterday in your opening statement, you said three things that I agree with 100 percent, and fiat was in your state- ment, that we must recognize legitimate employee needs; that we must recognize the taxpayer; and we roust recognize the ability of agency managers to manage. And most of the conflict that results from our role is one that is an internal type of thing. My job is a very unpopular job. I mean, we have far more Mr. INAsco. Ours is unpopular too. Mr. HAMPTON. It is. I agree- with you. Ent I would think we have many more conflicts or disagreements with management as we do with employees but we don't advertise thin. Mr. BRASCO. Let me just ask this one quest ion and then I'll yield back to the chairman. You discussed yeSterdav improvements e Executive order .and the bargaining process. You kept using the word "bargaining." Now, as I understand it, what- we're really talking about is that the Civil Service Commission is voluntaril3; consulting with the unions. Is that right? Mr. HAMPTON. That's correct, yes. Mr. HENDERSON. Would the gentleman yield? Mr. BRASCO. Yes. Mr. HENDERSON. Bargaining is going on, though, in these 3,400 units you're talking about? Mr. HAMPTON. Yes. That is correct, and the agreements are quite significant. Mr. BitAsco. But getting back to my questim, doesn't consulting mean that you retain the right to reject? Mr. HAMPTON. That's correct. Mr. BRASCO. Then, in that sense, you re not indicating that that means bargaining? Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/0618FIA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 Mr. HAMPTON. It's not bargaining in the private sector sense. Mr. BRASCO. It's not bargaining in any sense. Mr. HAMPTON. Well, in the question of consulting, it's just not going to the union and saying, 'Here it is. Take it or leave it." Mr. BRASCO. Well, I consult with my children all the time but that doesn't mean we're bargaining. Mr. HAMPTON. But there are many things, though, that in con- sulting with your children you respect their views and you agree with them. Mr. BRASCO. I usually have the final say. That's what I think the employee unions are objecting to. Mr. HAMPTON. Well, even under a bargaining situation where they can come to a consensus, there are gives an takes on both sides. We don't have the gives. I mean, we don't have the economic pack- age. I really can't promise someone they will get a better health benefit or a better life insurance or a better salary because they buy something that we're proposing. We do try to achieve consensus, but I not, only consult with labor unions; we consult with management; we consult with public interest groups. Mr. BRASCO. Just one very short last question. I know that I have a bill and Mr. Ford does and Mr. Henderson does. Don't you really think that the Commission can come up with something in this area that is workable? Mr. HA-mpToN. Well, being very pragmatic about it, I know even- tually we're going to have a labor relations law. Mr. BRASCO. night. Don't you think we can come up with some- thing that's workable instead of being dragged in by the feet? Mr. HAMPTON. Well, I would hope so and I hope this is the initiation of that process. The thrust of my testimony Mr. BRASCO. Yesterday you said you were against all three bills I thought. Mr. HAMPTON. Well, that's a good position to start out with when you're bargaining. Mr. BRASCO. That's bargaining. Thank you. Mr. HENDERSON. Mr. Mallary. Mr. MALLARY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. HENDERSON. If the gentleman would yield just a moment, Mr. Brasco opened a subject that is very vital and I want to conic back to it, but I think in all fairness we should yield to the other members. Mr. MALLARY. I Will just proceed on a couple areas, if I may, Mr. Chairman, and let me just follow on the area Mr. Brasco was just discussing. I gather that your position, officially at least, is that the time is hot ripe for legislation in this area. Is that essentially right? 14r. HAMPTON. That essentially is it. I think that the issues are quite complex but our mind isn't closed. I think what experiences we have had has been very pioneering in cutting new ground. What I tried to do in this testimony is simply raise the kinds of issues that I think that the Congress has to consider and that we would like to be a part of that consideration, and the vehicle by which 34 619 74 13 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/061:891A-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 you get to the point of drafting a bill which is acceptable to the administration and is acceptable to tlie unions and to the Congress is going to be very, very painful and lengthy in its consideration. But our mind is not closed because in this area of public admin- istration the whole foundation--your actions are basically based in law and I think for the future and for thc benefit of the program and its credibility that we should seek to come up with something that is workable. Mr. MALLAny. You stated yesterday,: I think, that you did not feel that to embed in permanent law the present provisions of Executive Order 11491 would be appropriate. In other words, you felt there were parrs of that that were appropriate as Executive order, but would not be appropriate as statutory law. Do you find any substantial impediments or problems in dealing with the, labor-management relations problems that you necessarily face by working under an Executive order rather than working under specific, more precise statutes? Mr. HAmmoN. Well, right now, I think we face considerable im- pediments in the Executive order because we have a lack of statutory authority in certain areas. I think one, of the, critical issues is this question in a process where you're unable to implement the awards of arbitrators that result from the negotiated agreements procedures. We are unable because, we do not have the legal authority to make people whole.. So I think this is a serious deficiency that must be corrected. We can still correct that by a special law t,t the same time leaving the Executive order structure. The second impediment is ore that we're dealing with adminis- tratively and at this point T think it's best to keep it that way, and that is what do you do with 3.400 units? This is an awful lot of bargaining going on on a lot of issues. But the limitation there is that they can only bargain up to the level of authority that is given. the person they're bargaining with. which is sound to get the process started, but they're outgrowing this, And some of the gut _issues are above that level. And what we're seeking to do in the present review of the. Executive order is C.etermine how can you deal with this question of higher level regulations; and the other issue is the continued fragmentation of units. It would. be much easier, believe me, if liere were, some process where you could deal on some of the pint ismes, but the ouestion is who do you bargain with? The praeticalities here are, quite real. mean, in the States where they dealt with this, you must keep in mind that a State is a much smaller entity than the Federal Gov- ernment which is located. in 50 States. In state law in a few cases they have been able to spell out the bargaining units and Inte., achieved that kind of stability. In those lager States where tliev have not been able to spell out units, they Lave done to some ype of criteria. It's a very _complex issue and. this is something that the anions are going to :lave to address themselves to because a lot of unions as you know them today could not survive in the bargaining pro- cesses. There, will be new elections and new representatives deter- mined. So that's an issue. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/0q CIA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 The "make-whole" situation is one that is an impediment. The other is the desire on the part of unions to achieve judicial review. Traditionally, the courts do not provide judicial review for any rights that are the result of an Executive order, although it has the force of law. Only if constitutional issues are raised will the courts then review a case. So this is an objective of the unions that could be achieved by separate legislation. But we, have a lot of growing to do. This program isn't standing still and it is moving along quite well. The question is: How long does it go on before you have a statute? And many people feel that the time is here. I feel it's not far away myself because most of the issues that we're now confronted with are ones where only changes in the law are going to achieve it. Mr. MALLARY. Let me pursue one corner of that issue. I gather from your testimony today that you feel that adherence to merit system principles and the continued prerogatives of the Congress in its budget and appropriations authority precludes collective bar- gaining in the traditional sense that is done in the private sector. Mr. HAMPTON. That's right, sir. Mr. MALLARY. But you don't say at any point that you don't feel that collective bargaining or bargaining is not appropriate. Have i you identified anywhere n your statement a list of those areas which you feel would be appropriately bargainable? Mr. HAirryroN. I don't think we attempted to do that in any way in our statement or even in our background statement, but I think it's one of the things that in the process of considering legislation, considering the responsibilities of the Congress and the executive branch, that must be addressed. Mr, MALLARY. If legislation is to be enacted, have you addressed yourself to the definition of areas or appropriate scope of bargain- ing? You have raised the problems?and I gather you don't feel that any of these bills fully outlines what is an appropriate scope of bargaining, but if, in fact, legislation is to be seriously considered, do you have or can you recommend to the committee a listing of the appropriate scope? Mr. HAMPTON. We probably could. We have many, many discus- sions among ourselves?Mr. Ingrassia and I and others. We have said to ourselves many times, what kind of a statute can you draft; how can you get at this problem? And we have run into some blank walls. But that doesn't mean that you can't do this, and certainly I will be glad to try anything. MT. MALLARY. Thank you very much. MT. HENDERSON. Mr. Lehman. Mr. LEirmAN. Thank you very much. In the school board we ran into one problem that I think relates to this. When we do have problem, the assistant principal and the principal really don't know, who they are with regards to labor-management relations. Which level in the school system is management and which is really labor? How would you advise us to handle the role of the supervisor ? Mr. HAMPTON. Well, I think defining the supervisor by statute would be really essential in any labor relations law. The question is: Who is the supervisor and what supervisors are a part of manage- ment? Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : W-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 Mr. LEHMAN. At what point? Mr. HAMPTON. Right. Because we have had?this has been one of the critical problems all along. I mean, the claim of the unions that the definition that we have drawn from the Labor Relations Act? the Taft-Hartley---may be too narrow as far as the Federal service is concerned, and I think it should be and must be defined and I think the Fair Labor Standards Act passage affecting Federal em- ployees makes this even more critical because there are exempt and nonexempt categories there in which, by the law,. we in the Com- mission are going to have to come up with the definition. Here, the Commission may be in confide; with the definition that's in the Executive order. To give you some idea of the problems we're talking about, it's no easy task. Mr. LEHMAN. I was troubled by that when I was on one of our big school boards and I didn't know exactly who we should be talking to as a representative of management and who do you .talk to as a representative of labor. There is ar overlap and I think we have to make a pretty careful definition. Mr. HAMPTON. I agree with that. Mr. LyanyrAN. Thank you. Mr. FIENDERsow. Mr. Chairman, let me come back and go over a matter that both Mr. Braseo and Mr. Mallary went over with you. It seems to me it's fair to say at the present time that in these numerous bargaining units there is meaningful bargaining going on until you come to the area of statute, which is pay, benefits, and so on, or veterans preference; or we come to Commission regulation or agency regulation; and it's in that area where in our colloquy with Mr. Britsco you talked about the consultation at the Commission level. - Consultation also goes on at the agency level, but once policy has been established it's not unusual at the local bargaining -level for the management to say, in addition to the matters of statute, items are not bargain able, because of agency regtilat on. Isn't it fair to say that under ExecutiN e order today there is no negotiation going on in connection with agency regulations and Com- mission. regulations? You've got consultation. Mr. HAMPTON. Well, there is, in the sense that while the specific regulation may not be bargainable, there are certain aspects of achiev- ing the purposes of that regulation that are bargainable, and this is one of the things that, through. experience, both parties are beginning to rOCOgrHZe. Mr. ITENDERsoN. Well, don't you anticipate that labor organiza- tions are going to come in and testify that there is a need for legisla- tion in this area. They will contend that at the Commission level you go through the consultation process, but when you receive theiy comments very little attention is given to their recommendations or their positions, that very little chang...e is made. The argument is also made with regard to agency regulations. Don't you think that's going to be? Mr. HAMPTON. Well, I think they will make that charge in all probability, but in our consultation process, to say that no changes have been made that were of their suggestion would be incorrect. It's had a considerable impact and I think very salutary effect. There Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 191 have been significant changes made, but that won't keep the charge from being made, because it isn't something we're sitting down on a negotiating table and negotiating. Mr. HENDERSON. Under the bill that Mr. Dulski and I introduced, H.R. 10700, we require true bargaining at the Commission level. What difference do you see in what you do now and the require- ments of the bill for bargaining with the organizations? Mr. HAMPTON. Well, it wouldbe, hard to envision. Mr. Ingrassia may want to comment. Mr. INGRASSIA. Well, to put the whole thing into perspective first, Mr. Chairman, there is negotiating on agencywide regulations wher- ever the union has achieved national exclusive recognition, as we call it. Mr. HENDERSON. How many have you got out of the 3,400 we're talking about? Mr.&'INGRASSIA. Probably not 20 or 25 out of that, but in some of the big agencies, for example, the Department of Labor has agency- wide contracts that are negotiated with the Secretary of Labor and there are a few other agencies such as that. Mr. HENDERSON. And wouldn't you envision that if H.R. 10700 be- came law, you would have more of that? Mr. INGRAssiA. It could very well be, particularly because the criteria for determining bargaining units could have an impact on whether the unit is appropriate up at the national. level. So how you structure your unit will determine to some extent what your scope of bargaining is. Mr. HENDERSON. In the course of the hearings I want to go in depth into the recent experience we have had with regards to bar- gaining units. We have had some real problems in this area, haven't we? Mr. INGRASSIA. That's right. Mr. ITENDEnsoic. And I think this legislation has got to face up - to those problems. Go ahead. Mr. INcrizAssu. Then in the consultation process it's not just sub- mitting of paper and then a comment back. I know the agencies and I know the Civil Service Commission do a lot of what I call face-to- face or eyeball consultation which is much more effective than asking somebody what their comments are on a piece of paper. Mr. HENDERSON. As to the question of what the impact would be, under the board proposed in ll.R. 10700, I believe the board would have final authority on any personnel matters within the scope of bargaining. This would not be recommendations to the three Civil Service Commissioners. It would be by majority vote. The board is composed of five union representatives, five agency representatives and a chairman appointed by the, Civil Service Commission Chair- man. Any action they would take would be final. So there would obviously be considerable difference in what presently transpires in . that it would go beyond consultation, and a final decision would be reach d without involvement of the three- statutorily appointed Civil Service Commissioners. Mr. HAMPTON. And what we're saying is that this is where we come down to the real differences with regards to any bill. This is Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 192 the area where you see the greater objections to legislation because thif; is the area where there's real change in the procedures under the Executive order. Mr. INGRASSIA. That's right, because the areas now are outside of the scope of bargaining because bargaining units not recognized at those. levels would then come under this new machinery. Not only the Commission, of course, but by the provisions of H.R. 10700, any central agency, whether it was the Office of Management and Budget or the Federal Energy Office or the Environmental Protection Agency?anything that they would put. out that would have an impact would have to run by this board, and the timetables there would be rather brutal to meet even if it was otherwise workable, which I doubt. Mr. IIEN-orasoN. But the attempt we havr made was to get above the present bargaining level under the, executive order to give to the labor organi2iations meaningful bargaining as it pertains to agency regulations or Commission regulations. The chairman recognized this in his statement. was not completely satisfied with all the provisions but I think we have to get over the first decision of what levels of bargaining we are going to permit in the Federal sector. Are we going to keep it as it is under the Executive- order so that as they bargain the management side says, "These are not bargainable items at any level," or will we under H.R. 10700 be abb to say that those items hot bargainable at the bargaining levels that now exist, are bargain- able at a higiaer I would hope, and I feel sure, that the, employee organizations are going to address themselves to this important difference because they certainly led ine to believe that this is one of the big things they are contending for by way of legislation. In an attempt to give them better bargaining at the agency and Commission level, we tried to devise a bill that would provide a syslem and, just as yon say, we have the five management representa- tives, five labor representatives, and w chairman. I'm sure charges are going to be made, Mr. Chairman, that it ends up to be a 6-5 'Commission again. We made the best attempt we could and it ought to be obvious to everyone that my decision was to come down on the side of bargaining' it. the. higher level. Mr. HAMPTON. Well, one of the difficulties I see. there, Mr. Chair- man, is that who are the five union people going to be and what Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 1: CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 93 five agencies, because in a sense it excludes all others. The other thing is that they are not issues that come up in a collective bargaining type process. The thing is that that isn't a unit. The five people you would have to say are representing all employees. Mr. BRAsco. Would the chairman yield at that point? Mr. HENDERSON. Let me make one other point and then I'll be glad to yield. You must keep in mind the bill does provide that no statutes will be superseded. So that constraint must be considered in my own view. On page 26 beginning on line 20, we set out what is not bar- gainable. "Collective bargaining procedures under this subsection shall not involve matters with respect to?" and here's where I try to spell out management prerogative and I want to make this point so you will give us recommendations with regards to anything we have left out of what are management prerogatives. I feel very strongly and I think you agree with me that we're going to have these prerogatives: (h) Collective-bargaining procedures under this subchapter shall not involve matters with respect to? (1) the mission, budget, or organization of an agency; (2) the number of employees; (3) the numbers, types, or grades of positions or of employees assigned to an organizational unit, project, or tour of duty; (4) the internal security practices of an agency; or (5) the right of management officials of an agency? (A) to direct employees of the agency; (B) to hire, promote, transfer, assign, and retain employees in posi- tions within the agency and to suspend, demote, discharge, or take other disciplinary action against employee; (C) to relieve employees from duties because of lack of work for other legitimate reasons; (D) to determine the methods, means, and personnel by which agency operations are to be conducted; and (E) to take whatever actions may be necessary to carry out the mission of the agency in emergency situations. So the record ought to be clear that all items are not bargainable even at that level. We attempted to bring bargaining up to a high level but we clearly said in the "hill that where Congress has pre- rogative or Congress has acted the law must be complied with at all levels. ? Then we go on to say items which are not bargainable, so I would hope that we, would understand that the bargaining at the higher level is ended. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/061IA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 Mr. BRAsco. The chairman was talking about the composition of the board as it appears in 10700, but isn't it a fact that it would be easier as proposed in either one of the two bills. H.R. 13 or H.R. 8794 to have a three-man board appointed ly the President with the. advice and consent of the Senate from a ?list of ten persons submitted to the President hy the. American Arbitration Association. So you don't have to go through this business of what agency. Isn't that really easier? Mr. HAMPTON. not sure, but the structure of what you have in 10700 is entirely different than H.R. 13. Mr. BRAsco. I wasn't talking about all the subject matter. I sup- pose you coind have a board predicated on fiat and pick up the part of the chairman's bill which says you can negotiate for this or not. But just from the point of view of the composition of the board_ isn't that easier to arrive at? Mr. HAMPTON. Three is a lot easier to arrive at than 11. There's considerable, difference in the structure. Mr. BRASCO. Yes, but I was Mst talking ibout-- Mr. HAMPTON. I'm not sure, either, on the question of using arbi- trators as members of the board in an area like this is really the best thing. I mean, we're dealing with tremendous economic issues. Mr. HENDERSON. 77)on't you think if we are talking about using arbitrators we are talking about arbitrator> that are expert in the private sector? Mr. HAuFroN. In most cases that's where the expertise is, although that's building up. Mr. BRAsco. That's still appointed by the President. Mr. ITEximaisox. 'You're talking about a list submitted by arbi- trators. Can you imagine an arbitrator sirmoitting to us anybody who has no arbitrating experience in the public sector? Mr. BRASCO. I don't think that's very comparable. Mr. INCRASSIA. M. Brasco, could I attempt to clarify a previous point? I think we're talking about two different bodies. The body that Chairman Henderson was talking, about in his question to the Chairman dealt with his bill's provision for a Federal Labor Rela- tions Board that is separate and apart from the administrative cen- tral authority which is in both your bill and the chairman's bill. Three or five-man bodies could administer the law. Then, in addition Chairman Henderson's bill has a provision for, a Federal Labor Relations Board that would deal only with the quasi-negotiation of matters at the Commiision level or the OMB level. Mr. BRAsco. I understand that, but 11 just was suggesting that H.R. 13 sort of cuts through the red tape and lays it right on the table without bogging down with what agency should be chosen. May I ask this question? I know that H.Tt. 13 has a provision for union shop or agency shop and T know that -r-aises a red flag in many quarters. But, let me ask you this quetion: Why is it not proper for an employee, who derives benefits by virtue of the fact that people working in the same area where he is have organized into a union and are bargaining not only for their Own individual benefits but collectively for everyone who is involved on the. same job doing the same work, to pay union dues or a registrar: on fee? Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/061:9c1A-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 If it were in any other walk of life you'd call; that guy a free- loader if he didn't want to contribute towards the collective benefits of all. Why is that improper? Mr. HENDERSON. Mr. Chairman, do you want me to take that, it being a political question? Mr. HAMPTON. Go ahead. I'd be delighted for you to, Mr. Chair- man. Mr. BRASCO. Really, why is that improper? I don't think you'd find that improper, would you? Mr. HAMPTON. I think that there should be no condition on the public employment that Mr. BRASCO. Why would that be a condition? Mr. IIAmpToN. That an individual has to pay dues or a member- ship fee to keep his job. I just think that it goes against the whole concept of public employment. Now turning it around a little bit, union security is what you're essentially talking about. I think it's a real problem. I think that we ought to consider alternatives to that. Mr. BilAsco. Let me say this: What really disturbs me?and I don't want to take all the time, but maybe I can make the point by telling a little story about the philosopher who is sitting up on a hill with a servant of his and he's looking over this vast gardens and talking with this servant and he's got a real fetish with the gardens and he sees a wild bull chopping up all his flowers and he sends the servant, Erasmus, down there and tells him to take care of that Wild bull. He's a real big guy and he goes down there and gets the wild bull and pins it and rolls it out of the garden. Lo and behold, it's not his day, and he turns around and sees a big horse coming down the garden path. Erasmus just about sits down and he sends him back down there and tells him to bridle that horse and, as a matter of fact, "He's so good-looking, put him in our barn," and he does that. They ''get to talking a little more and he turns up to the cherry tree and he sees a big hornets' or bees' nest up there and he turns to Erasmus and says, "Take care of that. It's going to destroy our tree. Get rid of that bees' nest." And Erasmus turns around and he walks away and the master says to Erasmus, "Listen, you threw the bull out of the garden and you bridled that big horse. What's the problem with those bees?" And Erasmus turns and says, "Master, them bees is organized." And I think what the real problem is is just that management is concerned for no other reason than if there are many more people in unions they are obviously more organized and obviously protect- ing their rights. I don't think that's a condition of employment. As a matter of fact, in all the time that I have been here, we have had one group that came before us in one of the bills?I think it was the Seventh Day Adventists group, and they said based on religious conviction that they couldn't do it, but they understood and even agreed with the principle. So unions take their dues and fees and give it to charity or something, and we worked out the problem with them. But I just don't see why it's so frightening other Approved For Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 f9IA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 than the fact that good organization produces a more effective bar- gaining unit. Does that make any difference in your previous response? Mr. HAMPTON. The public employment issue is paramount in my own thinking. Mr. HEN-mutsolsr. I often wonder, Mr. ChErrman, if those of us who feel strongly on this issue would introduce a bill simply to give agency shop to all Federal employees?I have been tempted to do this?and to say I will give you that but 7 won't give you any of the H.R. 10700 or 11.R. 13 provisions or anything else, what would we be doing to Federal employees, to union members. It seems to me there's so much meaningful possible legislation that we get bung up on the one little issue here. I think you could say from the head- aches and the problems you have had in the experience of the Executive orders that if you could trade al that off and just give union security as such, simply by the dues 0-Heck-off with the require- ment that everybody in an organized unit puy dues, we'd be tempted to do that if we were not conscious about the real meaningful things for employees. Mr. HAM Pril'ON. You might be tempted to do it, but I just cannot see, that as a condition of employment in the public sector. Mr. ITEN-DynsoNt. T hope we're realistic as to what we're trying to accomplish because T don't want us to get too bogged down on the problems and TT think we'll face these as the employee organizations come to testify on legislation. We have a lot of technical questions that the staff is just chafing to get at and time is almost gone, FO let me yield now to Mr. Mesker. I know he's got, a number of questions he would like to get in the. record and it's much better if we can do it with the Chairman here than it is to simply do it by way of sub- mitting them. Mr. Mssicze. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, there are many areas we have, not touched in detail. One of them is the question of professionals and supervisors in a labor-management statute. In your opinion, should provisions he added to the bills to provide for recognition of separate unions for supervisors? Mr. HAMPTON. T don't think so. Mr. MtskEn. What. about the treatment of professionals? Under 11.11. 10700, as it's drafted, it would permit an agency to discuss with organizations, veterans groups, professionals. and others, matters of interest to tho members as long as those. discussions did not intrude upon bargaining rights. know in yew FLRC hearings there's been a considerable amount of discussion on the role of professionals. Do von think, for example, iii the way the, bill is written now. that such discussion should be optional with the agency. or should they be mandatory? What should be. the role in dealing with these groups? Mr. HAMPTON. Well, T think it's a very sensitive. problem because you have a number of professionals that are included in bargaininty units and it all depends upon the way the. professional organizations also view themselves. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/061WA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 Many of the issues the professional organizations are interested in are those items that are covered in the labor relations situation, and management could be cited for unfair labor practice if they dealt with such organizations when they have an exclusive unit that is made up of professionals in that unit. So it's the way they view them- selves. We're trying to look at this and it's part of something that we'll take up as soon as we have the time in which to deal with it. Right now we're involved more in the question of the review, but I'm not sure that you want to spell out in the statute some of these things in view of the conflict that is presented so often between professionals and others in the union. Tony may have much more insight into the details of this and may want to elaborate on the matter. Mr. INGRASSIA. Just briefly. I think the treatment in the Execu- tive order which is reflected in II.R. 10700 is the appropriate way for dealing with the professional organizations that seek to represent their members on personnel policies, practices, and working con- ditions. If they seek that role, then they should be treated and meet the same requirements that a union must meet, and if they want to deal in purely professional matters, then management should be able to deal with them in concerns of their members without committing an unfair labor practice. I think a perfect example that comes from my own background where I used to represent the American Newspaper Guild and there, of course. I represented employees as a minion representative. I also was an officer of Sigma Delta Chi, which was the national journalism fraternity, the professional society. Now, as an officer of the Sigma Delta Chi, I made no attempt, nor would management have ever permitted me, to deal on wages, hours, and working conditions of employees of various newspapers; and when those differences are understood we have very little problem with the interaction of professional organizations and unions. When they're not understood and where an organization wants to deal on wages, hours, and working conditions, personnel policies, but not meet the requirement of recognition or the proper running of the or- ganization, of the nonsponsorship and control by management, then they have to deal in the other areas. Mr. Mnsfun. One other area that takes a great deal of time to go into but maybe we can open it up this morning is the question of coverage of individuals, organizations, parts of organizations or, I guess more importantly, we could phrase it as exclusions. Page 4, H.R. 10700 provides a procedure for an agency head with the approval of the central authority, to exclude certain organiza- tions from the bill's coverage. What are your views about the estab- lishment of a similar procedure in the bill for any agency or group of employees to be excluded from coverage by using this procedure in0,ea,d of the specific exclusions that are currently included in the bill to cover certain agencies and groups of employees. Mr. HAMPTON. I think on exclusions, I think the Congress should legislate on who is really excluded rather than resorting to an ad- ministrative procedure to do that, because I think there are some very significant exclusions that you should consider. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 :1RA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 Mr. MESKER. Then, in addition to general exclusions, you would not object to a procedure in H.R. 10700 which provides that the head of an agency can recommend :9(c,lus on of certain groups but only with the approval of the central. authority. Mr. TTAmpro-K. I think that appears to be appropriate because you're dealing with a unit- within an agency that isn't excluded over- all by statute. Like the question of whether the CIA or the FBI?I think that's a public policy issue that Congress, if they legislate in this area, should face. Mr. INGRASSTA. That's an issue that, while it's an issue of concern perhaps from an academic point of view, his not been a real issue in the program. The current Executive order permits the head of an agency to exclude from coverage certain .?arts of the agency that are involved in internal investigative, work and auditing work and that is subject to review by the assistant secretary and the council as to whether that action was arbitrary and capricious. H.R. 10700, in the, first instance, would require approval by the central authority and, as the chaima.n points out, it presents no big problem. But, of course, it, has not resulteC. in a problem in 4 years under the Executive order. There's been very limited exclusions. There's only been one, time where a charge has been made that it was an arbitrary exclusion and that went through the machinery. So it has not presented itself as a real problem. Mr. MEsx.En. To return to the subject of the Labor Board, accept- ing the fact that we have heard the Comitission's objections to the Labor Relations Board which will be negotiating regulations issued by an agency which affect more than one 'agency, for example, the Civil Service, Commission. Tinder IT.R. 10700, the choice of the members of the Federal Labor Relations Board from among management officials is based on the number of employees in a particular agency who are under exclusive recognition. However, the Board would consider regulations governing all em- ployees, and I think you recognized this point. Would it be practical for its to base the management representation on the basis of the total number of employees in the agencies rather than the other procedure? Mr. TTAmproN. Well, T don't really know how it would come out, the mathematics of that. Mr. MESNEE. I was thinking in terms of who is negotiating and is it representative negotiation. Mr. IfAmpToN. Well, I would think that in all probability those agencies that are large and represent 90 pe7cent of the employees-- I mean. have 90 percent of the employees, would also be the same ones that would have, the, largest number civered by exclusions. I'm not. sure of that statisticalliJI don't know how it, would prove out. T don't, think if we ever went that far that that would be a great problem. Mr. MEs-KErt. You don't think that would necessarily improve the_ acceptability of the Board itself in terms of our current discussion? Mr. HAmproN. I don't, think so. Tony, car you think of any? Mr. TNGRASSIA. No. You know, the, way you choose, the. agency rep- resentatives is not the problem that's presented by the- Federal Labor Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 199 Relations Board. The problem would be how the machinery would function, the fact that each issue is taken up as if it's an individual grievance rather than the normal structure of bargaining where you deal with issues in totality and where priorities can be determined and trade-offs can be made?what is more important today?and instead, each one is dealt with on the merits of its own issue. These are the matters that would be of concern, and the matter of union involvement and agency involvement in decisions that then would not just apply to the bargaining units but as we read the, bill would apply to people outside the bargaining units; and their man- agement would not be in a position to determine the policies that affect management representatives. For an example, the Fair Labor Standards Act has just, been passed and the Commission must implement and enforce that. Tinder that provision of H.R. 10700, we could not issue implementing in- structions to put that law into effect without going through that board. Yet the Department of Labor which has the same authority to administer insofar as State and local employees and private sector employees, is not required to bargain in the same way before it issues its own implementing regulations: Mr. HAMPTON. Another thing is that the three Civil Service Com- missioners would have no say about what is implemented. Mr. HENDERSON. Would you say in connection with Commission regulations to implement law that the procedure should not be fol- lowed? Mr. INGRASSTA. That certainly would be a narrowing through, but there's very little that we issue that doesn't flow from a law that we have to administer. Mr. MESRER. Could we go back to the board in that context and maybe you could give us your experience and a comparison on a projection basis in looking at H.R. 10700. In effect, the Labor Rela- tions Board in negotiating regulations versus consultation at the present time could be a very similar operation. Granted, that PRA_C coming from statute on blue-collar employees has certain limitations, there you are consulting with employee organizations who do not necessarily represent all of the employees. What would be the difference in a negotiation procedure set up under the Labor Relations Board and consultation that doesn't neces- sarily represent all of the employees? Based on that experience, could you draw any comparisons? Mr. HAMPTON. Well, the Prevailing Rate Advisory Committee is dealing with, in a sense, broader issues on one narrow area and that's blue-collar pay and the conditions, like hazard pay and certain other utilization of certain skills. There's a very pragmatic limitation there, too, in the law. The law says that you will go out and '"fret prevailing rates and application and that sort of thing. Here, then you'd lose all similarity. The structure appears to be similar but in the impact it's significantly different in that the issues that would be before this board are matters of major policy concern that the Chief Executive, the President of the United States may have a point of view or the Office of Management and Budget or the three Civil Service Commissioners. There is no input of those into the Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 200 consideration of the matters before this board and so I think impact and scope is a significant difference. Tony's examined this a lot closer and we haven't discussed all of the implications but he may have something to add. Mr. INGRASSTA. Just two brief points. The two major differences between the two boards, in addition to wi at the chaiman has com- mented on, under PRAC, the decisions of that board are advisory to the three Civil Service Commimssioners. ITnder the. Federal Labor Relations Board., as envisioned in the bill, it's final action. Secondly, the actions taken by the Prevailing Rate Advisory Com- mittee deal with the advice affecting employees that would be eligible for bargaining units. In other words, the rank and file employees. And while the conditions in the regulations that go out may often be the same, nevertheless, the Commission is not hound insofar as it would apply to supervisors, for example, as it wdfild be in a decision made, by the Federal Labor Relations Board. Mr. MEsKEn. Why is it that the five mar agement members of the Board who are somewhere in the chain of command from the chief executive down, plus the Commission-appointed Chairman, could not represent management's interest, on the basic issues that are before the Board Mr. ITAmmoic. Well, I would think tha: if you would think in those terms that you would have five agency heads on the Board. I don't think that. would be. practicable. Mr. MEstom. I'm sure that they would caucus, as any bargaining parties do. Mr. HAMPTON. Yes. They caucus now in he Prevailing Rate. Ad- visory Committee, but I'm not sure that you will get the breadth of the overall picture. of the operations of the 7ederal Government. An agency is more or less thinking in terms of that agency. He's not thinking in terms of the agency as it relates i;o the total Federal Gov- it ici it. There are only two central agencies of glvernment who do that, and that's the Office of Management and Budget and the Civil Service Commission. Those are the principal central agencies of the Govern- ment, other than GSk which is not as involved in these matters. So I think that would be a deficiency of input because I may view a personnel management issue quite differently than someone who is, say, with the Air Force or the Vete.ran.s Aiministration or HEW, because from my vantage point I see how niis impacts on the Gov- ernment as a whole and not inst. on One particular agency. Although their input and so forth is valuable, there are considerable variations. T think, too, the labor-management relationship is essentially one -between the employer and the employee. ani that we should strive in any legislation to foster that kind of relalonship, even though it may involve 70 agencies, up to a point. In otaer words. I don't think there'e any escaping the fact, that we have a tier system in the Gov- ernment and that any bilateral situation must recognize the limita7- 'inns of that tier. Now what vou're, really trying to do is te get at the top tier be- cause. I think it is helpful to have local union-management relation- ships. I don't think we should do anything to destroy that. It has Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 201 great benefits. It's taken 12 years for the management of Federal agencies to begin to recognize that it is good business for them to deal directly with their own employees. So let's let them do every- thing that they possibly can within the scope of that authority. Then you get to the second tier and this is the question of agency regulations. The question is: Are those agency regulations overly prescriptive in that they take things off the bargaining table at the -local level without any real consideration, is this an equity issue that it is essential to deal with at, say, agency headquarters level? Now that's one way we can enrich the bargaining where it should -take place and that is directly between the employer and the em- ployee. Mr. HENDERSON. Mr. Chairman, didn't the Commission recently direct the agencies to review their regulations to try to make them less restrictive and to put more matters back on the bargaining table? Mr. HAMPTON. Yes, we did, and we also reviewed our own Federal Personnel Manual to see if the regulations of the Commission were overly prescriptive. So matters that were even- covered at the Corn- -mission level would then be picked up. Now if the agencies view; our loosening up on the Federal Person- -nel Manual as a signal for them to regulate in this area, then it defeats the purposes of our actions. Now one of the items that we're reviewing in the present review at the Council is some mechanism 'whereby if it is contended by the unions that agency regulations are Dverly prescriptive, that they can get an answer to this question and thus here again enhance the bargaining relationship at the local level. So we're doing something right now to get at the second tier. Now the third tier is the one. that I think you're interested in getting at, and that is the regulations that are issued by the Civil Service Commission which may have a tendency to take things off the bargaining table. At the same time, most of the rules and regnIa- tions that we issue. are covered by a statute which under 10700 still .does not change the statutes, and then you set up this Board that is going- to supposedly bargain on these issues. . Well, I'm not sure and I'm not ready to commit myself to thinking as to really does this accomplish in an orderly way what you want lit to accomplish, Which we would agree with you is a good thing to 'accomplish; but does this do it? And does it do it in a way that .it reduces the input of the President of the United States through his .central authorities because the Civil Service Commission, despite what everyone says, in our basic statute, it says we will assist the President .and all of our authority essentially flows from that. So while I would object to this kind of body because it tends to distort that, somewhere, someday, somebody is ()ping to have to repre- -sent top central management of the executive branch. T mean, I don't know how we get at this. Our way that we have gotten at it, Mr. 'Chairman, is to extend consultation, which we didn't have to do and. -which no one really appreciates the. fact that we did because they don't win 100 percent of the time, but even in a collective bargaining; .situation you don't win 100 percent of the time either. So it's one of the things that when we do (rive, that local union leader sitting out there can't go to his membership and say, "Hey, look what we got." Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 202 Mr. ffincralasoNr. Let me touch on an earlier point you made with regards to the desires of the labor organizations to get into court. How would you suggest. we meet that objective without trying to set up some formal procedures? I was interested in your comment there; you were not suggesting we might ,(2;_ve greater freedom to the. labor organizations to go to court on theme matters as a. simple solution, were you? Mr. ETA.mrToNt. Well, T was just saying that is one of ?the points. I think one of the erhical points a, lot of the unions have expressed in- formally is this question of judicial review. It's not anything that is unique to the personnel business of the Federal Government because there is judicial review of most of the deci3ions made that are as a matter of .law, and the only .limitation on that is the exhaustion of the administrative remedies. Now if you have a labor relations system, after the exhaustion of those remedies they can go to court. I think what you have to examine here, though, is what is it that they want to get into court under the question of individual rights. Under the Equal Employment Oppor- tunity Act that was extended by statute, people who have, discrim- ination complaints do have the right of judicial review. In the ap- peals setup under the Veterans Preference Act that is subject to judicial review, but it is limited in the case of the exercise of indi- vidual rights.. Now when you get into some of the complex issues of collective rights and say an unfair labor practice or a unit determination or a negotiability issue, then you're putting into the courts issues that transcend individual rights and questions of equity that are very complex and require an understanding of organizations. The Con- gress, if it would consider this question of judicial review?say, in other words, that this committee determines that we need a transition period; that in order to get to what you would think would be an excellent, labor relations program statute but you don't feet comfort- able in just doing it in. one, fell swoop, that what you might want to do is go to the question of the "make-who l e" legislation and some kind of judicial review. But I think you. would have to ascertain what is it that you want. reviewable by the judiciary. Is this a limited review or is it all out ? I don't know the answer. I don't even pretend to know it. But I think in the courts, in terms of reviews of private sector labor de- cisions, there's a limited review by the. courts. It isn't, a total review. I think the court has set standards, for instance, on reviewing an arbitrator's award. We use similar standards in the Federal Labor Relations Council. T think that the courts have limited the review of NLRB decisions. Tony is more expert on all this than T. Tony, can you think of any other thing in terms of judicial review? There are some limitations. Mr. INGRAssr.A. Cettainly in the private sector, but I think you covered it very well. Getting back to Chairman Henderson's comment in the question, I don't think the chairman was intending in any way to leave the impression that he was advocating: a bill that. would turn the Executive order over to judicial review aid I think that should be clarified. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/0CIA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 Mr. HENDERSON". Well, that's a point I guess I was really making. Mr. MESKER. Another aspect is the GAO position and their re- sponsibilities and how that can be spoken to in any statute and how they make decisions on certain fiscal matters. Thank you for your comments on the Labor Relations Board. I think it's probably safe to say that we would both agree that the provisions in H.R. 10700 providing for negotiation at the Civil Service Commission and agency levels would tend to discourage regulations being issued by agencies and the Commission. Mr. HENDERSON. Well, I have no problem in getting it, but I will ask unanimous consent that the record be held open. Certainly, any comments that you would like to submit for the record, feel free to do so. There may be questions as our staff reviews our two days of testimony and responses. There will be further questions for clarifi- cation you might want in the record. The staff will work that out. I See p. 493 for material furnished.] Thank you very much. I think it's been a very helpful and very fruitful opening of these hearings. Mr. HAMPTON. Thank you. [Whereupon at 12:20 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 34-519-74 14 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT LEGISLATION WEDNESDAY, JUNE 5, 1974 U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANPOWER AND CIVIL SERVICE. Washington,'D.C. The subcommittee met at '9 :40 a.m., in room 210, Cannon House Offiec Buliding, Hon. David N. Hemierson (chairman of the sub- ..committee) presiding. Mr. HENDERSON. The subcommittee will come to order. Today the Subcommittee on Manpower and Civil Service is con- tinuing hearings on legislation to cover labor-management relations in the Federal service. It's been a long-standing policy of the Govern- ment since the 1930's that employees in the private sector have, a right to be represented by labor organizations to bargain with its employers .on wages, hours, and working conditions. Congress has extended this same concept to employees of the Postal Service in the passage of the Postal Reorganization Act in 1970. At the close of 1973 nearly 1.1 million civilian employees of the executive :agencies of the Federal Government were represented by labor orga- nizations. This has come about during the past 12 years largely as a result of the relationship established by Executive order. Because of the experience gained by both Federal agencies and the, labor organizations representatives during this period and the viability of those relationships, I now believe that it's fitting that legislation be enacted. This legislation will place the two parties on an 'equal footing when dealing with each other both at the negotiating table and when appearing before third parties envisioned by the bill; before. us. I believe it's also important that employees and their representa- tives have access to the judicial process when they have exhausted the administrative remedies established by law. Access to courts is rather tenuous under Executive orders. It's now timely I think to consider legislation that will permit Federal employees to join the great majority of the American workers both in industry and in the Postal Service in the enjoyment of the well earned rights under a Federal service labor-management act. However, I believe that matters affecting the pay rates, entitlement benefits, health insurance should be retained by the Congress, at least in the immediate foreseeable future. There are several bills introduced on this legislation and one of the chief sponsors, Mr. Brasco of New York, certainly has long demon, (205) Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP756003801R000500220001-6 206 at his interest both by the introduction of his bill and by attend- ance at these heari?gs, but today found it is necessary to be in his dis- trict in New York. He sent me word on this and asked that I explain his absence and express his regrets and certainly I'm sure Mr. Brasco will attend the future sessions to the best of us ability and will con- tribute much to the resolution of the problem. I understand that the, other members of the subcommittee are mak- ing efforts to be here and I'm very appreciative of Mr. Clay's attend- ance early this morning so that the meeting might get started. Our witnesses today are Mr. Ken Mei kiejoha, on behalf of Mr. Bie- miller, Director, Department of Legislation, AFL-CIO; Mr. Clyde 'Webber, president of the American Federation of Government Em- ployees; Mr. Paul J. 1.3urnsky, president of the Metal Trades Depart- lent, AFL-CIO ; and Mr. John A. McC art, Operations Director, Gov- ernment Emjiloyees Council; and will testify in that order. Mr. Meiklejohn, I understand that there are others with all of you. 1 would request that you introduce your associates in the Department ef Legislation of the AFL-CIO, and T. will ask Mr. Webber and the other witnesses to do the same at the time they testify. It's my pleasure to welcome you this morniug and you might begin your testimony in any manner that you would like. STATEMENT OF KENNETH A. MEMLEJOHN, LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATIVE, AFL-CIO Mr. Miutc?Fdottx. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Bie- miller had .hoped to be here this morning and he asked me to express his regrets he is not able to do so. I will read his statement but I will be available for any questions if any of the members of the committee have, any questions. 1.kt me identify in vself. T am Kenneth Meiklejohn, legislative rep- resentative of the AFL-CIO. I think it would be just as well if the representatives of each of the groups identify the people who are with them and we will leave that to them if that's all right with you. Mr. lituvonitsoN. Very good. Mr. MEnii.,ibonutx. Mr. Chairman, the American Federation of Labor and Congress. of Industrial Organizations appreciates very much this opportunity to present our views on lc:gigaton to place the Federal labor-management relations program on a statutory foundation. Three bills are before this committee: H.R. 10700, introduced by the chairman of the subcommittee, Congressman Henderson, for himself and the committee chairman, Congresman Dulski; H.R. 13, intro- duced by Congressman 13rasco, the bill which we support; and H.R. 0784, introduced by Congressman William D. Ford. Each of these bills is designed to place on a statutory foundation a system of labor- management relations in the Federal service generally similar to that which applies in the private economic sector under the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. A similar system of labor-management re- lations based on union recognition and collective bargaining already exists for employees of the U.S. Postal Service pursuant to the Postal Reorganization Act of August V?,, 1970. The system of labor-management relator s in the Federal service called for in each of the bills that are the subjects of these hearings Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 .2A-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 also resembles in many respects the Executive order system that has been in operation in the Federal Government since January 1962 when Executive Order 10988 was issued by President John F. Kennedy. Union recognition and collective bargaining as established under that order, and its successors, Executive Orders 11491 and 11616, have since become an integral part of relations between Federal Government em- ployees and their unions, on the one hand, and Federal agency man- agement, on the other. Indeed, I think by now we can all agree that union organization and collective bargaining in the Federal service is no longer a matter of controversy. The issue before the committee in its present hearings is simply whether Federal employees are to have a legislated system, with the administration and rules of the program laid down by the Congress, or an Executive order system, subject to amendment or revocation by the executive; whether the program is to be adminis- tered by an impartial outside board or by Government management and personnel officials. In 1967, in testimony before the Cabinet-level Committee appointed by President Lyndon B. Johnson to review the then 5-year experience with Executive Order 10988, president George Meany of the AFL?CIO made some observations concerning the Federal labor-management program which I believe the committee will find informative in con- nection with the legislation now before them. I would like to quote briefly some of the things president Meany had to say on that occa- sion. He said: We find general agreement that the Executive Order of President Kennedy to Provide for employee-management cooperation in the federal service has brought significant improvements in labor-management relations within the federal government. "For the first time, bilateral collective bargaining has become the recognized way to determine issues regarding personnel policies that affect the working conditions of federal employees. Although there are still considerable differences from collective bargaining in private industry, unions in the federal service have gained the right to bargain collectively wth management on a variety of issues, including grievance procedures and arbitration. "Nevertheless, in spite of this progress, government employees?union mem- bers and non-union members alike?are dissatisfied and restless. "The AFL?CIO believes that in the light of past experience with collective bargaining under the Executive Order, the scope of collective bargaining must be enlarged, more effective machinery must be developed to break negotiation impasses, the grievance and arbitration procedure must become more meaningful and an impartial government board must be established to deal with unfair labor practice charges and to supervise the administration of the Executive Order." Parenthetically, I might note that in reading that it seems to me that we have not done all that much since 1967 in this field because all of these are still the same problems. Basically, these observations of President Meany are as applicable with respect to the Government's I abor-manaffement relations program today as they were in 1967. Some improvements have undoubtedljr been brought about in procedures and operations, and the system as a whole has been strengthened under Executive Orders 11491 and 11616. It is also true that the number of nonpostal Federal employees now represented by unions with exclusive recognition rights has increased from 630,000 in 1967 to some 1,100,000 in 1973, and during this same period the number of agreements has grown from 650 to 1,904. How- Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/0&p1A-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 ever, the rate of increase has slowed markedly in the last year, and' discouragement and frustration have continued among Federal em- ployees and their unions in attempting to advance their interests under the order. The AFL-CIO and its Government; employee unions want to see established principles and procedures of labor-management relations that will assure Federal employees basically ihe same recognition and collective bargaining rights that most other employees in the United States already enjoy. This has been against the background of the fact that, except for State. and local government employees?though by no means all of them?and farmworkers, only Federal employees. are still denied protection by statutory law of their right to organize into unions of their own choosing and to bargain collectively for their. own interest and welfare. This activity has proceeded in two forums--first, within the execu- tive branch of the Government in the development and implementation of principles and procedures to bring the Executive order system into lino as closely as possible with those of true union recognition and collective, bargaining, and second? in the Halls of Congress to place such principles and procedures on a statutory foundation. The AFL--010 urions having members employed in the Federal service - have worked cooperatively with the Government throughout the his- tory of the Executive order system to make this system function fairly and effectively. Although much thought and effort have one into accomplishing ? this objective, the lack of impartiality in administration of the Execu- tive orders and the absence of standards and requirements which agency heads and representatives, as well as unions and their rep- resentatives, must comply with have proved -0 be insurmountable ob- stacles. We have experienced, and we contint e to experience, lack of - uniformity in administration of the program in the various Federal' agencies and persistent. frustration on the par; of employees and their unions in their efforts to secure and exercise the rights supposedly guaranteed them by the order. We believe this is inherent in the present :741xecutive order system; administered as it is by m.anagernent, Mr. Chairman, as you know, the Federal Labor Relations Council. during the past 6 months has been engaged in a general review of Executive Ore er 11491. To the. extent that we have been able to do so, within the, procedures and methods of review adopted by the Council, the AFL-CM has been endeavoring to coonerate with the Council' in this review. I would like at this point to offer and request inclusion. in the record of the committee's hearings---and I will have to submit this to the committee at a later date since I find I didn't bring them with me?a copy of a letter and comments, dated February 20, 1974, submitted to the Council by the AFL-CTO and its affiliated unions having members employed in the Federal service. The comments contained in these documents dealt with areas the Council stated "should be the central focus" of the review as deter- mined by the Council. Many of these subject areas are the same or - similar to issues the committee will have to consider in developing legislation following these hearings. We believe our letter and com- ments will provide a useful basis for judging the complacent sun Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/062:0tIA-RDP75B00380R000500220001-6 port, of existing Executive order procedures which Chairman Robert E. Hampton of the Civil Service Commission, who is also Chairman of the Federal Labor Relations Council, presented to the committee during his appearance on May 21 and 22. As I say, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask that this be included in the record as part of our testimony. Mr. HENDERSON. Without objection, the letter and the material to, which you refer will be placed in the record at the end of your testimony. Mr. MEIKLEJOIIN. Chairman Hampton came before the committee. with voluminous material to support his contention that there is "no' documented need for the substantial changes embodied in the statutory approaches pending before this committee." The comments made in our letter and memorandum last February provide the rationale, based upon experience in attempting to function under the Executive ordei. system, for our firm conviction that a legislated collective bargaining. system must now replace the Executive order system. One of the principal reasons why we believe legislation is needed, . is that we have serious doubts that the Federal Labor Relations Coun- cil, as presently constituted, can successfully implement or review ob- jectively a system of labor-management relations in the Federal Gov- ernment based on union recognition and collective bargaining. Who, is it that makes up the membership of the Council? It is the Chairman, of the Civil Service Commission, the Director of the Office of Manage- ment and Budget and the Secretary of Labor. While the Connell's, administrative and review functions are spelled out in the Executive. order, we question seriously its capacity to administer or review the operation of the order with the objectivity and impartiality required: to deal effectively with the problems or define fairly the issues to be. considered in the course of its administration or review. Without prejudice for or against any of the individual Federal officials who presently serve as members of the Council, we believe that the adminis- tration of the order and review of its operation by the Council as pres- ently constituted is necessarily and inherently limited and biased in favor of management's point of view. As we see it, this has two unfortunate consequences. On the. one hand it has led to attempts to divert attention from efforts to secure from. Congress legislation to remedy the weakness and arbitrariness which have long characterized the Federal labor-management program. As we pointed out to the Council in our submission last December listing issues we thought should be considered in its review of the present Executive order, it is not mere coincidence that the announcement of the Council's review came at a time when more and more public dis- trust was being articulated against both the procedural framework of the program and concerning decisions being issued under the pro-- gram. Nor is it mere coincidence that the Council only within recent. months began to issue decisions in cases that had been backed up for months and, in some cases for years. It's also not mere coincidence, we think, that this review comes at a time when Congress is beffinning. actively to consider legislation in this field. While the role of union organization and collective bargaining has increased substantially under the Executive order, even more signifi- cant have been?the recent dramatic increases in unfair labor practice Approved For Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 9jA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 complaints before the Assistant Secretary of Labor, in appeals to the Council, and in the filing of grievance and arbitration cases. These statistics do not necessarily evidence the present system is working or that the system enjoys the trust and confidence of employees. We be- lieve they indicate that relatior s between management and employees have been worsening because true and meE.ningful participation by employees in the bargaining process has not been accomplished. Based upon. their day-to-day dealings with Federal management and their daily contacts with their members, our unio:as tell us, they do not be- lieve. the Council hes a finger on the pulse of Federal labor-manage- ment, relations. The second unfortunate consequence of the management-oriented conduct of the present Executive order program is the failure of the Council to appreciate the importance of recognizing and attempting to remedy some of the irritating and frustrating problems that have arisen in the administration of the program. For example, it is par- ticularly important, we believe, to eliminate the unnecessary and provocative safeguards of management rights. These are implicit in the employment relationship, are founded firmly in statute, and need - not be specifcally spelled out in the order as at present. The purpose of the order is to assert and maintain the organization and collective- bargaining rights cri labor, both those, of employees and those of the unions that represent them, which are not yet established by statute. The format of the Council's present review also reflects the man- agement orientation of its attitude toward administration and review of the Executive order. Instead of providing an opportunity for free presentation of analysis and .recommendatiors by interested parties as in prior reviews and revisions of the order, the Council sought list- burs of "issues for consideration," selection therefrom by the Council of the issues they would consider, and finally a hearing "to seek am- plification of written submissions and to pursue proposals included in the written submissions." We found this a particularly unrewardirg format for review. It provided no opportunity for joinder of issues which might have been illuminating for both the Council and intel ested parties. The state- ments of issues and subsequent substantive position papers tended to Force the parties to concentrate on special pmblems. The overall im- provement of the Executive order in terms of its contribution, if any, to stable and constructive labor-management relations in the Federal service was lost sight; of in a forest of particular problems of particu- lar agencies in particular places and at particular times. The hearing which resulted based on our experience must have provided little new enlightenment of any significant value to the Council. The issue selections made by the Council omitted a number of issues which we felt should have been included fcr consideration, such as (1) the question of "make whole" remedies; (2) inclusion of job classification within the scope of negotiat on and grievance pro- cedures; (3) use of arbitration in agency adverse action appeals; (4) a system of union security or representation fees; (5) elimination of interference by the 6-eneral Accounting Office in the implementatim of remedies ordered by arbitrators, the Assig:ant Secretary of Leber, or the Federal Labor Relations Council; ,(6) and strengthened renie- Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 :Elp-RDP75B00380R000500220001-6 dies in connection with unfair labor practices and enforcement of arbi- tration awards. Unfortunately, we can expect little relief with respect to these mat- ters under the present Executive order labor-management relations system. The Council asserts that existing law and regulations preclude dealing with most of them and that new legislation would be necessary to do so. But if legislation is necessary, why should it not be sought by the Council ? 'We feel it is incumbent on the Council, if it wishes to im- prove the operation of the Executive order system significantly, to propose and work for such legislation. The AFL?CIO has indicated its support for and would cooperate with the Council in obtaining enactment of the necessary bills. We would, of course, welcome the ad- ministration's support, and particularly that of the Council, for legis- lation to provide a statutory underpinning which we believe is clearly necessary for a truly effective Federal service labor-management re- lations program. I should like to turn now to a discussion of the three bills that are before the committee. Each of these bills would establish by law the right of Federal employees to join unions of their own choosing and to engage in collective bargaining with the agencies by which they are employed through their union representatives. Each would set up an authority or board to certify bargaining representatives, to prevent unfair labor practices by agencies or unions, to provide machinery and rules for settling bargaining impasses an to establish independent arbitration procedures to deal with grievances. The authority or board would function generally in the manner of the National Labor Rela- tions Board, although its impasse and arbitration roles would give it a substantially broader jurisdiction than that board has under the Na- tional Labor Relations Act. The AFL?CIO and its interested unions have given careful consid- eration to all of the bills that are before the committee. We believe that there are features in each one of them which should receive care- ful study by the committee. As I pointed out at the beginning of my statement, we prefer H.R. 13, the bill introduced by Congressman Brasco. This bill was the subject of lengthy discussion among the rep- resentatives of our unions. In the form in which it is before the com- mittee at this time, it has the united support of all our interested unions. This does not mean that there are not features of H.R. 10700, Chairman IIenderson's bill, and H.R. 9784, Congressman Ford's bill, that might well be included in H.R. 13 when it is reported by the com- mittee. We appreciate very much the interest of all three sponsors of these measures, and particularly that of you, Chairman Henderson, in scheduling these hearings. I am not going to discuss in detail at this time any of the three bills. Many of the issues discussed by Chairman Hampton of the Civil Serv- ice Commission were dealt with in the letter and memorandum sub- mitted for inclusion in the record earlier in this statement and will be 'discussed in the statements of the union representatives who will fol- low me. Our affiliates in the Federal Government field have had the experience of operating under the present and past Executive orders. It is they who can be most helpful to the committee in informing them Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 212 of the problems they have encountered in attempting to function effec- tively under tie Executive order system and the reasons for believing that this system must now be replaced with a. statutory system. The committee is aware, I am sure, that there are substantial seg- ments of Government service that already enjoy the benefits of union recognition and collective bargaining. Long before Executive Order 10988 was issued by President ,John F. Kennedy, systems of union recognition and collective bargaining were srecessfully operating in the Tennessee Valley Authority and certain units of the Department of the Interior. Under the Kiess Act employees of the Government Print- ing Office have enjoyed some measure of participation in the setting of wages in that Agency. In 1970, when Congress had occasion to con- sider, and acted to recognize, the U.S. Post Office Department, one of t he most important aspects of that reorganization was to institute a !fermi ne system of collective bargaining administered by the National Labor Relations Board. So far as we know, that system is functioning pfiectively and in the public interest in the U.S. Postal Service today. ILIZ. 13 would establish a Federal Labor 11 elatioms Authority. This Authority would be composed of a chairman and two additional mem- bers appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, from a list of 10 persons submitted to the President by the A merican Arbitration Association. The powers and duties of the Au- thority would, include unit determin.ations, ce:7tifications of bargaining repre,sentatives, prevention of unfair labor practices, and decision of negotiation impasses. In considering the type of agency that sl ould be assigned the re- ,Iponsibility of administering the substantive provisions included_ in the law, we have given considerable attention to the question whether his should be a separate authority or whether the existing National Labor Relations Board should be assigned this duty as under the Postal Reorganization Act of 1970. We support the idea of a separate board for the reason that the National Labor Relations Board's exist- ing jurisdiction is already very broad and the problem of delay, which already is serious in the administration of the present Executive order program, might wel be accentuated across the whole scope of the labor- management field. The special character of government employment 'indicates a separate authority is needed which would more readily develop the expertise for dealing with the problems coming under its jurisdiction. Such an 1.11thority would be established by all three bills before the committee. .FLIZ. 10700. however, provides for an additional bipartisan Board appointed by the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission to consider policies and regulations involving "matters subject to negoti- ation" encompassing "personnel policies and practices and matters affecting working conditions" which the Commission or any other agency. except the 1/epartrnent of Defense, proposes to issue. TI!e Board would be composed of a Chairman, without vote except to break ties, five members from among management officials of Govern- ment agencies, and live members from unions holding exclusive recognition rights. This bill also spells out many matters that may not lie made the subjects of negotiation or bargaining, such as the mission, organization or budget of an agency, the number of employees, the Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 213 number, types or grades of positions, internal security practices, and management rights in relation to employees. Under H.R. 10700, negoti- ability questions would be determined by the head of the agency, sub- ject to appeal to the Federal Labor Relations Authority. These provisions would result in a limited system of negotiation and bargaining basically similar to the procedures and rules that prevail at the present time under Executive Order 11491, as amended. Man- :agement control would continue to be maintained through the Board 'mid the broad delineation of management rights contained in the bill. This is a basic defect, as we see it, in H.R. 10700 and requires us to ,oppose this bill in its present form despite the fact that in many re- spects its passage would institute a number of important improve- ments as compared with the existing Executive order system. Both H.R. 13 and H.R. 9674 would be administered by an independ- ent public authority or board appointed by the President, with the 'advice and consent of the Senate. They contain no such provisions limiting the scope of bargaining or protecting management preroga- tives as are contained in FIJI. 10700. Under these bills the collective 'bargaining system for which they provide would function in substan- tially the same manner as the U.S. Postal Service system and the pri- vate sector system administered by the National Labor Relations Board. In our view, these bills are definitely to be preferred over H.R. 10700. II.R. 10700 provides that employees are guaranteed the right not to join, as well as the right to, join a union. It further provides that an employee shall not be required to become or remain a union member, or to pay money to a union in lieu thereof, except as he may volun- tarily authorize payment of dues through dues deductions. This bill would expressly forbid even the. so-called "agency shop." H.R. 13 and H.R. 9784 provide that when a union has exclusive recognition rights, employees in the unit must either become members of the union and pay dues, or pay a "representation fee." Thus, while H.R. 10700 would in effect continue the limited union status that even exclusive recogni- tion provides under Executive Order 11491, as amended, the other two bills would provide a measure of union security when the results of the nni on's organization and bargaining work have resulted in a col- lective bargaining agreement. The subject of "union shop" or "agency shop" is one, of course, about which there is great controversy. It is also one about which there is great misinformation. The union shop, or agency shop, which unions representing employees in the Federal Government seek, is basically a moans through which the union can bring about in the minds of the employees it represents a recognition that the gains they achieve through collective bargaining are the result of the, union's work on their behalf. The union is required to represent all the employees in a unit, not just their own members, if it enjoys exclusive recognition. It seems to us it is entitled to all the employees' support, not just that of its members, for the work and activity it carries on in their behalf. The, support of employees in the unit, without reference to whether each one is or is not a member of the union, is important to provide the union some measure of security against the activity of employer or outside agents who might want to undermine or destroy its majority. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 214 status. Unless such security is provided, the stability of the relationship between the, union and the management is weakened, and a period of some turmoil within the unit can well ensue. We, believe that union security is in the interest, not only of the onion, but of the nonmember and the ae.ency itself as well. The record of constructive, stable relationships between labor and management where union security agreements are not forbidden by archaic open shop laws is persuasive evidence that the agency shop is not some- thing to be feared, ;tut rather something to be welcomed. Its enact- ment as a part of a labor-management relations law for the Federal service would put the Federal Government in the vanguard in this field where, it belongs. We strongly urge that any bill reported by the committee include such a provision. In the private sector the right to strike has been regarded as the basic requirement for assuring equality of bargaining power between labor and management. The AFL?CIO strongly affirms and supports the right to strike. The Tenth Constitutional Convention of the AFL? CIO last fall resolved: That the APL?CTO and its affiliated unions :work diligently to repeal laws and ordinances that seek to prohibit public employees, from exercising their right as workers to withhold their services, and to defeat future attempts to penalize public workers who choose to exercise the right to strike. We believe that the right to strike is basic to all American workers, public and private alike. We recognise, however, that the coinniittee may feel that in the public sector alternative means may be required to achieve the equality of bargaining power without which true collective bargaining is unachievable. Principally, we believe, these are to be found in the vol- untary inclusion in agreements of commitments by the parties to sub- mit issues, including grievances and disputes concerning the interpre- tation or application i' the agreements, to final ind binding arbitration when the parties are, not able to resolve, them through negotiation or collective bargaining. in this effort, obviously, the services of effective mediation and conciliation by the Federal and State mediation author- ities can be of great assistance. This is the method proposed in H.R. 13, the t ill which we support? and I note that it's the bill that we generally i-upport, but all this in this respect we believe it does not go as far as 'it should in connection with the right to strike. By contrast, :FI.R. 10700 leaves the parties to depend on decisions of a management-appointed board. Under this bill the problem of inequality of bargaining power on behalf of the employees is resolved by perpetuating', rather than alleviating, this inequality. KR. 9784 purports to assert the right to strike, but provides that restraining orders or injunctions may be, sought and granted on the basis of findings of fact by the appropriate United States District Court made after due notice and hearings that a strike would pose a clear and present danger to the public health or safety. Furthermore, if the union elects binding fact-finding during negotiation disputes the union would be prohibited from striking for the purpose of resolving the dispute. These provisions, it seems to us, give the, right to strike with one hand, but take it away with the other. In our judgment, the better way is the way proposed in H.R. 13, the wiiy of voluntary agree- ment on final and binding arbitration. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 ZZIA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 Obviously, there are many facets of the bills which are the subjects of this hearing which are of importance but which I have not been able within the time available to deal. Many of these matters will, of course, be discussed by the other union representatives appearing with me here today. I have tried to stress that the time for a legislated Federal labor-management relations system is now, and I have tried to put some of the basic questions the committee will have to con- sider in drafting legislation for this purpose in proper perspective and significance. We strongly urge the committee to report favorably H.R. 13, with such amendments consistent with its basic purpose as the committee feels will make it the kind of bill it would like to see enacted into law. We will be glad to work with the committee and its staff in developing the bill into a measure that will assure Federal workers equal status in the labor-management field with all other workers and that will place the Government in firm support of the following principle and policy declared in this bill: That participation of employees of the federal government through labor organizations of their own choosing in decisions which affect them contributes to the effective conduct of public business. Therefore, labor organizations and collective bargaining in the federal service are in the public Interest. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. [The letter and attached material referred to are as follows:] AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, Washington, D.C., June 7, 1974. HOD. DAVID N. HENDERSON, Chairman, Subcommittee on Manpower and Civil Service, Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, Rayburn House Office Build/ing, Washington, D.C. DEAR CONGRESSMAN: You will recall that during the course of my testimony before the Subcommittee on Manpower and Civil Service on June 5, 1974, I requested that there be included in the record of your hearings on legislation to place the Federal sector labor-management relations program on a statutory foundation a copy of the comments and recommendations of the AFL-CIO and the covering letter, dated February 20, 1974, in connection with the current re- view of the Federal labor-management program pursuant to Executive Order 11491 being conducted by the Federal Labor Relations Council. A copy of the letter in question from Andrew J. Biemiller, Director of the Department of Legislation, to Chairman Robert E. Hampton of the Federal Labor Relations Council, and the comments and recommendations of the AFL- CIO to which I referred are enclosed herewith. Thank you very much for includ- ing this material in the record as a part of our statement. Sincerely yours, KENNETH A. MEIRLEJOIIN, Legislative Representative. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, Washington, D.C., February 20, 1974. Mr. ROBERT E. HAMPTON, Chairman, Federal Labor Relations Council, 1900 E. Street, NW., Washington, D.C. DEAR Mn. HAMPTON: The AFL-CIO and affiliated unions having members em- ployed in the Federal service have considered the announcement of the Federal Labor Relations Council concerning the areas which the Council stated "should Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/062.1p1A-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 be the central focus" of its general review of the Federal sector labor-manage- ment relations program. The areas listed by the Council in its Information Announcement of De- cember 18, 1973, do not include all of the natters which the AFL?CIO and its affiliated unions believe should be included in the scope of the Federal Labor Relations Council's review of the operations of Executive Order No. 11491, as amended by Executive Order No. 11616. In this connection, the Council's announce- ment stated : "A number of proposed items which were not selected would have required. legislation. These hove not been included because they are beyond the scope of the review of the Order. For example, a number of! submissions suggested the question of `make whole' remedies he included. Legislation would, of course, be. required to effectuate such a change." The Council's announcement of December 18, 1973 enumerated for similar ex- clusion several additional items which had been proposed by the AFL?CIO for consideration with the Council's review of the operation of the Order. These in- eluded items 8 and 12 of Section One and items 1, 3 and 11 of Section Two of the AFL?CIO submission. In the view of AFL?C10 and its affiliated unions the issues raised by these items encompass many areas, some of which may be restricted by statute, some- which are in no way affected by statutory provisions, and others which although related to statutory provisions, are not outside the FLRC's authority, For example, we fail to see why legislation would be required to provide for direct enforcement of arbitration awards by the FLRC, as proposed in item 11 of Section Two of the AFL?CIO submission. Prior to their revision in 1972, the FLRC's own rules and regulations provided for Enforcement of arbitration a.wards.1 If the FLRC now believes legislation would be required, we believe it is incumbent upon them to give the rationale for its conclusion, including relevant citations and authorities. We were also greatly concerned over the FLRC's statement that "Legislation would, of course be required . . ." for make whole :7emedies. Specifically what "make whole" remedies are included in this statement? Reinstatement?with or without backpay'? Retroactive promotions?with or without backpay? Gissell-type bargaining orders?' Any others? The FLRC has accepted two AFGE arbitration cases for review on precisely the issue of retroactive pi ()motion with backpay. Are. we to assmne these cases have already been decided? Another very significant issue raised in item 11 of section Two is the relation- ship between unien grievance procedure and other griermnce or appeal procedures. The plethora of different procedures and forums whiffi federal employees .must cope with is a tremendous burden on labor organizations and federal employees. Till,: multiplicity of forums is by no means required by etatute. We do not agree that legislation would be required in order to permit certain issues to be litigated pursuant to unfair labor practice proceedings or binding- arbitration. Why would legislation be required to litigate adverse actions involv- ing nonveterans under negotiated procedures? What is the FLRC's rationale for concluding that legislation would be required to make issues regarding perform- ance ratings, reductions-in-force, salary retentions, E:107) matters, separation of probationary employees, or withholding of step increases, subject to union grievonee procedures? Specifically what statute or court decision precludes mak- ing these matters subject to the negotiated procedure IL a manner consistent with the basic statutory rights of federal employees! We believe that where review of such important issues is denied on the basis of a need for leE,,isf,ation, it is incumbent upon the FLRC to state the specific areas which, in its view, would require legislation, and to give the supporting reasons for its conclusions, including relevant citations and authorities. In keeping with the Freedom of Information Act, 4 U.S.C., Sec. 552, agencies are expected to make available any opinions, policies, or interpretations upon which they rely, 1 cnemare. see. 2411.20(al of the PLR(''s original Rules and Regulations with See. 2111 27(10 of the current Rules and Regulations. 2The, NLRB 11,11V reonire an emnlover to reeoemize ri union without lip eleet'on wher,, determines that the unfair labor nraetices committed by tile employer during an organizing eampaign woold tend to podwaninp the 11T110'1'S 111211,1tV and make i fair election an un- likely possibility. See, NLRB v. GiRset. Packing Co., 395 U.S. 5'l5 (1969), and related eases. 3 See for exnmple, OnlIner Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB No. 150, and related eases, where the NLRC gives a broad delegation of its stat 'tory responsibll ties to arbitrators. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/0SUCIA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 particularly where such reliance is to the detriment of the party requesting the information described above. We also suggest that it serves little purpose to exclude items from considera- tion that require legislation if such matters materially and substantially affect the operation of the program. If legislation is needed to deal with such problems, then legislation should be obtained. If the area's problems are important and cannot be dealt with without legislation, then legislation should be sought by the administration to enable such problems to be dealt with. As you know, it has been our consistent view that a system of effective union recognition and col- lective bargaining in the Federal service cannot be achieved without the enact- ment of legislation placing such a system on a statutory foundation. We would invite the Council's cooperation in achieving any necessary legislation that may be required to establish such a system. Enclosed herewith are our detailed comments on the various items listed by the Council in its Information Announcement of December 18, 1973. It is our understanding that hearings will be held by the Council at a future date on the areas for review listed in that announcement. The AFL?CIO and its affiliated unions would wish to be represented at any such hearings. Sincerely yours, ANDREW J. BIEMILLER, Director, Department of Legislation. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE AFL?CIO ON AREAS FOR REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL LABOR-MANAGEMENT PROGRAM PUR- STJANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491 AREAS DETERMINED BY THE FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS COUNCIL To BE THE CENTRAL FOCUS OF TILE REVIEW I. SPECIFIC CATEGORIES OF PEOPLE UNDER THE ORDER I. Should section 3 of the Order be amended to provide for additional exclusions? Executive Order 11491, hereafter referred to as the "Order", we believe, should not be amended to provide for additional exclusions. Instead, it should be amended to remove the present exclusions of FBI, CIA and the Foreign Service. (The principle which should apply is that all persons who appear on the pub- lished rosters of Federal agencies should be covered by Labor-Management Re- lations.) Specifically, Executive Order 11636, establishing "employee-manage- ment" relations for the Foreign Service should be revoked especially since this Service was originally included in Executive Order 10988 and Executive Order 11491. The Order should be deemed to cover all Federal employees, including Panama Canal Government and Company employees, in the Panama Canal Zone. The Zone is not a territory "outside the United States"; consequently, Federal employees there have a right to be covered just as any employee in any U.S. territory. Section 3(c) should be amended to end the discretionary authority which agency heads have to suspend provisions of the Order. No reasonable basis exists to justify this provision of the Order, especially when Section 3(c) fails to pro- vide standards for agency heads to apply when deciding whether to suspend the Order. Certainly, there is no rational basis for an agency head to deny arbitrarily coverage of employees under the Order on the basis of geography, e.g. the Army's exemption of the Panama Canal Zone Company/CZ Government under Section 3(c) of the Order. Section 3 (d )-type employees should only be excluded from a unit if they are effectively recommending the formulation or execution of agency labor relations for the unit in question. Continuation of the present provisions of Section 3 arbitrarily denies excluded employees equal protection and equal rights. Section 3 should, we urge, be modified to provide that, in the event no labor organization exists for representing Section 3 employees in an appropriate unit under the Order, the employee may designate any union of his choosing to represent the employee's interests under statute or regulations without reference Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 :9W-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 to the provisions of the Executive Order, except the general policy provisions of Section 1. Furthermore interpretations of Section 3 in its existing form, by the Federal Label- Relations Council, hereafter referred to as the "FERC", should be made in accordance with established appeals procedures. 2. Should the Order be amended to include any additional definitions pertaining to inclusions and exclusions (e.g.., management official, confidential employee, professional employ ee ) ? Consistent with our answer to Ll., we believe there is no need for additional definitions regarding exclusions. To clearly j.dentify the rights of employees and labor unions and the matters with which they can deal through unions, we recommend that the following defi- nition be included in the new Executive Order: "Employee" means an employee of an agency and an employee of a non-appropriated fund institution of the United States. 3. What should be the Executive Order policy with respect to guards? (See sections 2(41) and 10(b) (3) .) The definition and references of guards in sectiens 2(d) and 10(b) (3) should be deleted. We believe the provision in E.O. 11491 relating to guards is a misconception of the role of guards in private enterprise as contradistinguished from their use in the Federal government. The Federal government has access to a whole series of protective services additional to guards, whereas private employers must rely on their own guards to protect premises or :*ely on protective services by hire or on public police forces. But U.S. can use FBI, Deputy Marshalls, Secret Service and imst of other protective forces and in the final resort, the military without going outside its own jurisdiction. Its resources are all within the premises. Consequently, we believe that considerations valid for private enter- prise are irrelavant and tangential in Federal 'service and are only harmful and confusing. For this reason we call for removal of the prohibition against unions who represent non-guards from seeking new units of guards, as well as removal of the prohibition against such unions from appear .ng in reresentation proceed- ings, including placement on the ballot, in defense of established exclusively rec- ognized units Df guards and of mixed guards and non-guards. Since currently there are criminal and civil sanctions for Federal employees who engage in strikes. Federal guards cannot antciipate being called upon to play a role in labor relations strife, especially in hght of complete lack of such activity by guards throughout E.O. 10988 and E.O. 11491, as amended. The Assistant Secretary's handling of ct.rve-out elections involving units of both guards and non-guards should be changed to allow the incumbent union to appear on the ballot in contrast to NLRB procedure. (A/SLMR Nos. 45, 325, 326 and 333). Present Assistant Secretary procedures put an incumbent union which rep- resents a mixed unit or a pure guard unit at a disad?-antage contrary to the Study Committee Report and Recommendations which provides at Page 39: "These requirements would not affect existing units of representation but should be applied in all unit representation determinations m der the new Order." The Assistant Secretary's handling of carve-outs or challenges to pure guard units is illogical because, on the one hand, it denies an incumbent a place on the ballot on the theory that guards may not be represeited by a unit which includes guard employees, while on the other hand, allowing guard units to continue if the challenge unit fails to win the election. 4. What special policy, if any, should be established concerning the status of attorneys under the Executive Order? There should not be any special policy regarding the status of attorneys under the Executive Order, or of any other professional.he relationship of attorneys to other employees in the Federal service does not per se create any conflict Qf interest. Other than clearly recognizable conflict of-interest situation, which would apply to all employees, attorneys should nceive no special treatment, regarding either inclusions or exclusions. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 219 XL surEnvisofts 1. Should the definition of Supervisors be modified? (See section 2(c).) If so, how? Yes, we believe it is necessary to redefine supervisor in terms relevant to the Federal Service where so-called "supervisors" in fact do not have the same func- tions, powers or roles as "supervisors" do in private enterprise. For this reason, we propose retaining all of the present definition of "super- visor" in Section 2(c), but adding to it also the following paragraph of two "presumptions" making the definition relevant to Federal Service: "Provided, That all employees in civil service grade GS-1.0 and below shall be presumed not to be supervisors within the meaning of the Order. "Provided further, That fire captains and fire prevention inspectors, shall not be considered to be supervisors within the meaning of the Order except where it is demonstrated that a preponderance of the duties they perform are within the scope of section 2(c)." 2. What provisions, if any, should the Order contain concerning associations of supervisors and management officials? (See section 7(e) and 21(b).) Associations of supervisors and management officials should have no status under an executive order dealing with labor-management relations. The inclusion of such associations is a contradiction of fact, overlooking or ignoring the basis for the original exclusion of supervisors and managers on the basis of conflict of interest. This original exclusion is conceptually insurmountable. If individual managers and supervisors have any rights of association, it should not be within the context of the Order, which should deal only with the rights provided to labor unions. For this reason, we recommend elimination of Section 7(e) of the Order. 3. What policy should pertain to the representation of supervisors by unions in proceedings under agency grievance and appeals procedures? We believe the following policy should pertain: A labor organization which holds bargaining rights and represents an appro- priate unit of employees of an agency may, if requested by a supervisory em- ployee who is a member of such labor organization and employed by the agency at the same activity, not in the recognized bargaining unit, represent such em- ployee in proceedings under the agency grievance and appeals procedure; and such recognized labor organization may similarly represent in a grievance or appellate action any employee within the unit for which it holds exclusive recog- nition on any grievance or appellate action that is not subject to the negotiated grievance procedure of the labor organization's negotiated agreement. TU. RECOGNITION PROCEDURES 1. Should the requirements in section 10(a) for a secret ballot election as a prerequisite to exclusive recognition in all cases be modified or retained? Section 10 should be modified to allow certification on the basis of designated majority support, e.g., authorization cards. Such practice has worked well in the private sector and would promote efficiency for both unions and government agencies. There is no evidence whatsoever that this procedure was defective as utilized during the eight years of E.O. 10988. Thus, we favor this item, and recommend that Section 10 of E.O. 11401 be modified by deleting the phrase "selected, in a secret ballot election" and sub- stituting for it the phrase "designated or selected". The revised section 10 would then read as follows: "Section 10. Excln,,tive recognition. (a) an agency shall accord exclusive recog- nition to a labor organization when the organization has been designated or selected by a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit as their repre- sentative." 2. Should unions and agencies be permitted to consolidate bilaterally their exist- ing units without meeting the requirement of a secret ballot election if the resulting unit is otherwise in conformity with the provisions of the Order? Unions should be permitted without secret ballot to consolidate existing units unilaterally on the basis of certification as to appropriateness of the larger units. This should not require any action by agency management. 34-619-----74-------15 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 220 The present Assistant Secretary rule of certifi?ation and agreement bars pre- venting consolidation of units must be reversed because it means that the more employees a union represents in individual unit, the more difficult it becomes for that union to acquire a showing of interest necessary for certification of a larger all-encompassing unit. Further, if such unit is deemed appropriate, unions should not be forced to lose already established smaller units because of the present Assistant Secretary's requirement of "putting them on the line" in an election. This is particularly valid when no other unions are involved. Whenever a union wishes to merge its existing units into one larger consoli- dated bargaining unit, it should be allowed to do so without agency consent and without an election. An election should not be necessary because a consolidation of existing units does not constitute an attempt to represent new employees. Rather, it is merely an effort to eliminate artificial unit lines which divide agency employees into fragmented nnits. Therefore, the employees of these units should be allowed to express their feelings regarding consolidation through their elected represen- tatives without the necessity of a second election. Agency approval should not be required for an appropriate unit consolidation because such consolidation merely seeks to join individual units, which have already been certified as appropriate, in order to at am more effective and efficient labor relations. If, on the other hand, a union is seeking to consolidate its units with other unrepresented units or with units represented by other unions, then an election should be conducted to determine the wishes of al employees involved. . Agreement and certification bars, correctly understand, are intended to promote stable labor relations by providing some protectien against the harrassment of raiding units and should never be allowed to impede the consolidation of bargain- ing units. The present Assistant Secretary rule on unit consolidation (Veterans Administration and Council of AFGE VA Locals, A/SLMR No. 240, FLRC No. 73A-9) must be overturned because it punishes unions for their success in organ- izing employees and reaching collective bargaining agreements. (V CONSOLIDATION OF EXISTING trivrrs 1. What should be the Executive Order policy with respect to the consolidation of bargaining units? 2. What changes in the Order or its implementailon should be made for this purpose? We believe the new Executive Order should elm rly establish the principle of non-application of agreement and certification bars now in effect through various decisions of the Assistant Secretary of Labor, it petitions for exclusive recog- nition of nationwide units or "national exclusive recognition". In this connection, attention is called to the lest paragraph of Section B.6 of the Study Committee Report and Recommendations, dated August 106D, which reads as follows: "When national exclusive recognition has been granted in an appropriate national unit, no recognition should be granted to any other labor organization for employers within the national exclusive unit. This does not preclude consul- tation or negotiation at any level with representatives of the nationally recog- nized exclusive union." V. SCOPE OF NEGOTIATION S 1. Should the Order be amended to delineate a recognized union's rights con- cerning agency regulations and the impact of such regulations on the scope of bargaining? If so, what changes should be made for this purpose? 2. Should sections 11(a), 11(b) and 12(b) be modified or revised or clarified? How? 3. Do the agency's obligations to negotiate, to consult and to inset and confer. es- pecially with respect to midcontract changes in personnel policies and proce- dures, require clarification? Our position on these issues includes three related recommendations: (1) The Order should be amended to include a general list of representa- tive items which are mandatory subjects of bargaining, irrespective of agency regulations. (2) Sections 11 and 12 of the Order Should be deleted and Section 10(e) expanded to define the continuing obligation to bargain in good faith. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 221 (3) There should be no doubt that the obligation to bargain is a continuing obligation. It is a violation of Section 19(a) (6) to make a unilateral change in? any contract item during the term of the contract. Even where a past practice is not specifically covered by a contract, management may not make a unilateral change in a past practice without first bargaining to impasse, including recourse to the Impasses Panel. For purposes of convenience, we are presenting separate discussions of each recommendation. The recommendations are, however, interrelated and should not be viewed in isolation. Listing representative items as mandatory subjects of bargaining We recommend that the term "personnel policies and practices and matters affecting conditions of employment" (see our proposed amendment to Section 10(e), infra), be specifically defined by adding the following subsection to Sec- tion 2. Definitions: "(j) 'Personnel policies and practices and matters affecting conditions of em- ployment' means, but is not limited to, such matters as working conditions and environment, pay practices, fringe benefits, work hours and schedules, overtime, work procedures, automation, safety transfers, job classifications, details, pro- motion procedures, seniority, assignments and reassignments, reduction in force,. job security, contracting out, use of military personnel, disciplinary actions and appeals, training, labor-management relationship, methods of adjusting griev- ances, granting of leave, union security, travel and per diem." [See Section 201 (i) of S. 351 or H.R. 13.] At the present time, two entire sections of the Order are devoted to areas excluded from the duty to bargain, but their is no detailed listing of areas where management must bargain. Even the nine-word phrase "personnel policies and practices and matters affecting working conditions" in Section 11(a) is practi- cally qualified out of existence and can, in fact, be regulated out of existence by an agency.' Surely unions should have certain areas clearly established so that we can avoid as much litigation as possible. At the very minimum, the scope of negotiations should include any areas not specifically prohibited by statute. If an agency believes that circumstances pe- culiar to their operation warrant a different conclusion, this is properly aii. impasse question to be determined only after a factfinding hearing where all relevant factors can be evaluated. Elimination of sections 11 and 12 and eopansion of section 10(e)2 We recommend that the obligation to bargain be set forth in detail. This can be accomplished by expanding Section 10(e) to provide as follows: "(e) When a labor organization has been certified as the exclusive repre- sentative of employees in an appropriate unit, it shall be entitled to represent and baragin collectively for all the interests of all such employees. Such labor organizations shall have the right to participate in the formulation, implemen- tation, and modification of personnel policies and practices and all other mat- ters affecting the conditions of employment of employees in the unit and shall be given the opportunity to be represented at discussions between management and employees or employee representatives. The agency and such labor orga- nization, through appropriate officials and representatives, shall meet at reason- able times and places for purposes of negotiating a written collective bargaining agreement in regard to all matters not prohibited by statute. The agency and the labor organization shall negotiate in good faith for the purpose of arriving at a collective bargaining agreement. Such obligation to bargain shall include the execution of preliminary ground rules and any such understandings reached by the parties may be incorporated in a separate written agreement. The duty of an agency and a cretified, employee organization to negotiate in good faith shall include the obligation? "(1) to approach the negotiations with a sincere resolve to reach an agreement; "(2) to be represented at the negotiations by duly authorized representa- tives prepared to discuss and negotiate on all matters within the scope of collective bargaining; 1 See, National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 779 and Department of the Air Force, Sheppard Air Force Base, Texas, FLRO No. 71A-09, p. 3 (Report No. 30, Aar. 27, 1973), and related cases. Section 4(e) (2) should also be eliminated. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 :,RA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 "(3) to meet at reasonable times and. corr,enient places as frequently as may he necessary, and to avoid unnecessary delays; "(4) to furnish to the other party, upon request, data normally main- tained in the regular course of business, reasmably available and necessary for fah and proper discussion, understanding, and negotiation of subjects within the scope of bargaining; and -(5) if an agreement is reached, to execute upon request a written docu- ment embodying the agreed terms, and to talit such steps as are necessary to implement the agreement,. ?rhe agency shall not make or apply rulet or regulations which restrict the scope of collective bargaining permitted )3, this Order or which are in conflict with any agreement negotiated under this Order." In addition to expanding Section 10(e), we beLeve Sections 11 and 12 of the Order should be entirely eliminated. Our experience under the Order has con- vinced ns that the most fundamentally damaging aspect of the existing labor- management program is the concept of a separate category of nonnegotiable items and a separate adjudicatory procedure for determining those items. Not only are these procedures unnecessary in terms of protectir g the public interest, but they invite and encourage agency abuse of the collective bargaining process. As long as these procedures exist, there will be no freed?. n of contract and equality of bargaining power between management and emrloyees.3 Without such funda- mental rights, collective bargaining in the federal sector will remain collective bogging. Sections 1.1 and 12 of the Order, as interpreted by the PLRC, suggest that there exists some abstract body of items which by their very nature are nonnegotiable. As interpreted by the FLItC, these items are viewed as inherently belonging to management and any dilution of management's absolute rights will, in the FI,RC's view, automatically damage the public in:erest because the mission of the agency would be thwarted. Presumably, in these areas of nonnegotiability, management rghts are viewed as being identical w.th the public's interest. This entire concept of negotiability disputes fails to recognize the underlying problems of effective collective bargaining in the public sector. The real problem is how the terms of a collective bargaining agreement?or the lack of an agree- ment---impact .apon the public interest. The problem is not simply what the parties should be permitted to talk about at the table. Both the public interest and the mission of the agency will be enhanced by a satisled and efficient civil service work force. It is a question of balancing tile interests of the parties. In other words, the real questions are impasse questions an questions of refusals to bar- gain in good faith. Only impasse proceedings and unfair labor practiee proceedings are responsive to the underlying problem. Each seeks the proper balance between the public interest and the interests of employees in those areas where there may be a conflict. Balancing the legitimate interests of the public, of management, and of labor organizations and the employees they represent requires careful considera- tion of many factors. To he fair and accurate, these factors must be objectively Iletermined by record testimony, as evaluated by men and women who possess the necessary expertise?administrative law judges, and arbitrators. The broad outlines of the respective rights and interests of the parties can be set forth in enabling legislation, or for the time-being, in the Executive Order." This broad outline sholild strike a balance between the interests of the parties. It should not list only management rights and leave mandatory areas of bargain- ing unstated and in doubt.' With the overall guidance from the enabling legislation, specific questions as to the proper balance between the legitimate interests of all concerned can be de- See, Section 1 to the Labor Management Relations Act which specifically recognizes the need for legislation to restore equality of bargaining Power. 4 This would be accomplished by defining the term "personnel policies and practices and matters affecting conditions of employment" and by expe:nding see. 10(e), as suggested tthove. In a recent speech before the Maryland Public Sector Labor Relations Board, .Terome Darrett of the PMCS, nottd the growing trend in state labor-management legislation of omitting any reference to management rights. It is felt that with management's rights ade qmitely protected by impasse proceedings and with no right to strike or :I limited right to strike, management can protect itself adequately at the bargaining table without such addi- tional statutory protection. See, ERR. No. 524, p 17-1 at 7-2 (Dec. 17, 1973). The states -have never required separat, negotiability "nrocedurRS. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 223 termined only after a full factfinding hearing which takes into account all of the relevant considerations. To wit: the practical impact of a particular proposal on the operations of a particular agency; the validity of the, reasons advanced in support of or against the proposal, including any evidence of previous manage- ment abuses; any evidence of present or past attempts to abuse the collective bargaining process directly or indirectly; and the relative needs of the em- ployees and management as these needs may impact upon the public. Our experience thus far under the Order amply demonstrates that the negoti- ability procedures set forth in Sections- 11 and 12 of the Order are totally incapable of determining the proper balance between the interests of the parties.' These procedures are, therefore, incapable of protecting the public interest. In fact, particularly as administered by the FLRC, negotiability procedures have seriously threatened the public interest by failing to recognize the legitimate interest of employees. The decisions of the FLRC have given management a carte blanche to abuse the very purpose for which the Order was established, to encourage high standards of employee performance and modern and progres- sive work practices.' Two examples involving actual cases amply demonstrate the way in which Sections 11 and 12 of the Order operate to prevent consideration of the public interest by precluding consideration of the factors listed above (the practical impact of the proposal, evidence of abuse of the collective bargaining process, etc.). Both examples demonstrate how impasse proceedings- or unfair labor practice proceedings would have given greater protection to the public interest. The first example involves the question of whether employees should receive temporary promotions, rather than details, when they perform the work of a higher level position for an extended period of time. When a labor organization attempted to negotiate a proposal which would require employees who were properly qualified to be temporarily promoted after serving in a detail status for over 80 days, the Army was able to preclude the union from even discussing the merits of the issue through the simple device of asserting a regulation as a bar to negotiations.' In spite of a statutory policy recognizing the principle of equal pay for equal work,' a clear warning in the PPM against management abuse of details in lieu of temporary promotions,' and a general industry practice consistent with the union's proposal, the Army's regulation was viewed as automatically precluding negotiations. There are no factfinding hearings in negotiability disputes. Moreover, . the Army's formal brief did not even bother to offer any justification for the regula- tion, and the FLRC did not require any justification. There was no attempt to consider the needs of employees or the needs of the Army in relying on this regulation. The Army was not even required to show that its regulation was, in fact, uniformly applied to all its component activities. In contrast, where the same issue was litigated as an impasse, recognition of eveyone's interest was permitted. The impasse panel noted the history of agency abuse in this area, as demonstrated by record testimony and exhibits, and also recognized the agency's need for flexibility and efficiency in performing its mis- sion. Consideration was also given to the practices at other activities and agencies. After a full hearing, the Panel found that the interests of all the parties would be served if a maximum limit on details before temporary promotions was agreed upon by the parties. If the parties are not able to reach agreement on the precise limit, the Panel will recommend a precise limit." The second example demonstrates how easily management can use even the threat of negotiability procedures as a means of avoiding its obligation to bar- gain in good faith, leaving labor organizations and their members no legal recourse.' It involves not only an abuse of the authority to approve contracts at 0 See, .the preamble to Executive Order 11491, as amended, for a statement of its purposes.. 7 Local Lodge 2424? IA M?AW, and Aberdeen Proving Ground Command, FERC No. 72A?. 17 (Report No. 29, June 1, 1973). 5 11.5.C. 5341. O PPM 300.3-4d. and e. ; FPM 335.4?le and 4-4a. 10 General Services Administration, Region III, Washington, D.C., and AFGE, Local 2111,. cip,w No, 73 FSIP 15 (Dec, 6, 1973). 11 Once an issue of negotiability is raised by management, the Assistant Secretary auto- matically defers to the negotiability procedures and disndsses any charges alleging a refusal to bargain in good faith. A/S Report No. 26. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 994 the agency head level," but also represents a clear disregard for the role of the "SIP. The example involves an impasse case currently pending before the Panel.' The issue at impasse is whether or not references to agency regulations should be included in certain provisions of the contract and thereby be made subject to interpretation er application by the arbitrator. It iE another version of the cele- brated "Elmendorf" issue. While bargaining to impasse over this issue, in a unit of national exclusive recognition at a sub-agency level, no issue of negctiability was raised. At the impasse proceedings, however, a higher level agency official actually testified on the record that while the agency would not raise a negotiability issue at this stage of the proceeding?which would permit the P mel to refer it to the FLIIC pursuant to the expedited procedures?he did intend to raise a negotiability issue if the Panel finds for the union. This official, in effect, has ma de it a matter of public record that he intends to force the union to go through the time-consuming and expensive process of taking the issue through impasse proceeding, only to be faced with disapproval of the Panel's recommendation when the contract comes to him for approval at the agency head level. What possible good faith reason could there be for such a tactic? It is simply a device to delay reaching agreement? (The agency has not signed the contract, refuses to agree ro a reopener, and even refused to extend the previous contract pending resolution of the impasse.) Perhaps he int( ads to hold the embarassing prospect of declaring their recommendations non-negotiable over the Panel, in an effort to persuade the Panel th reach a decision in favor of the agency. What reconse does the Panel have? They cannot refer the case until the agency takes a position on the negotiability issue, and if the Panel refuses jurisdiction, it will only demonstrate the inability of the present program to deal with manage- ment abuses of the system. If ever there was a per se violation of the ditty to bargain in good faith, it is the conduit of this official before the Panel. Since we are powerless to raise a negotiability issue on our own (and should not be remired to do so in any event), and any unfair labor practice would only be dismissed by the Assistant Secretary, we can only hope this official will decide to honer his obligations. There are many other examples but it is clear from the above that separate negotiability procedures are incapable of protecting the legitimate interests of the parties and are not responsive to the interests of the public. Such procedures are weighted in favor of management and no protection is available to labor organizations or employees when management uses these procedures to undermine the status of time union as collective bargaining representative, 0:7 to deprive employees of the protection of a contract. The manner in which the present negotiability procedures invite abuse are a matter of public record in the cases described titove. Cases which are now in the preliminary stages and have not yet reached the FERC level will demon- strate, even more graphically, how negotiability procedures are used to litigate what is really an impasse question. For example, a unit of immigration officers has proposed that the agency youth all immigration vehicles used in remote areas with appropriate com- munication equipment which will permit: prompt contact with local law enforcement authorities. The Union is seeking this provision on the basis of its right to negotiate health and safety issues. Eoth the safety of the public and of the individual officers is involved. Thas, if an immigration offi- cer who works alone in a 100 mile patrol area discovers a group of illegal aliens in a remote border area, he now has no way of calling available local law enforcement officers for additional help in bringing in the aliens. Instead, '2 Higher level agency officials still use their authority to disapprove of contract provi- sions as a -means of avoiding a provision of which they d a dot approve. What should have been an impasse issue is then artificially raised as FL negmlability dispute. Again, the agen- cy's authority is absolute and labor organizations have ru. remedy when their members are left without the protection of a contract. Hearing Transcript, pp. 45-52, and pn. 57-90, Agricultural Marketing Service. Meat etradina Branch, Wa Rhino on, D.C., and A POE National Meat Grader's Council, Case No. 73 FSIP 26 flannasse Pending). '4 M. APGR Local 2595 and rmatrigra,tion and Naturalization Service, U.S. Border Patrul, Varna Sector (vanta, Arizona), FLRC No. 70A-10 (Repor- No. 6, Apr. 16, 1971), the loLliC recognized a union's right to negotiate in areas of health Rad safety. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 225 if attacked, he must make the appropriate response, including where necessary, using his firearm to stop the aliens. In remote urban area, without prompt recourse to local law enforcement officials, immigration officers may have to use their weapons in a populated area, thus increasing the risk to innocent bystanders. In response to the union's position, the agency declared the proposal non- negotiable, claiming that it violates the management's rights clauses in Sec- tions 11(b) and 12(b) of the Order. Specifically, management claims the proposal violates its right to determine technology, the methods and means of operation, and to maintain the efficiency of agency operations. The real question here is to balance the union's interest in maintaining safe working conditions, and the agency's problem in finding the money to provide the necessary equipment. It is not a problem of interpreting some of the abstract terms in Sections 11(b) and 12(b). Yet, by creating an artificial category of nonnegotiability items, the Order permits an agency to declare this nonnegotable, refuse to even discuss it further at the table, and force the union to litigate the issue without the benefit of factfinding and the expertise of experienced arbitrators. The litigation of negotiability issues takes a minimum of one year, and we can still be forced to take the question to the Impasses Panel. This would take an average of another six months. In the meantime, our members are without the benefit of a contract. Is management attempting to undermine the status of the union by trying to make their representative appear to be unable to get results? Such conduct on the part of agency management only increases the frustrations and distrust of federal workers in the present program. It serves no useful purpose. Many more examples could be given of health and safety issues, promotion issues, efficiency of agency operations issues, etc. All of these areas require a balancing of the different interests of the parties. They do not?or should not?turn on abstract notions and dictionary definitions of terms used in what are basically management rights clauses.' The entire concept of a separate negotiability procedure is unrealistic. It creates artificial distinctions, obscures the real issues, and is simply another procedure used to divert the time and resources of unions and employees from the more significant and substantial problems. The states do not find separate negotiability procedures necessary and the federal sector should follow their example. Negotiability procedures do not protect the public interest?they only encourage management abuses and this undermines the public interest. The continuing obligation to bargain We believe implementation of the changes recommended above would remove the obscurities which currently plague the area of scope of negotiations. If the present restrictions on the duty to bargain are removed, there will be no doubt as to the continuing obligation to bargain collectively with respect to personnel policies and practices and matters affecting working conditions. VI. GRIEVANCE AND ARBITRATION PROCEDURES 1. Does the meaning and scope of Section 13 need amplification? 2. Should Section 13 be revised to: a. Exclude from the negotiated grievance procedure grievances over agency regulations?even if regulations are referenced or cited in the agree- ment??or b. Provide that the negotiated grievance procedure is the sole procedure available for all grievances filed by or on behalf of unit employees thereby including grievances over agency regulations and policies not contained in the agreement and excluding only those issues subject to statutory appeal procedures ??or e. Permit negotiation on scope of grievance procedure, with statutory appeal procedures as the sole mandatory exclusion? 3. Should parties be permitted to take jointly to an arbitrator questions as to whether a grievance is subject to a negotiated grievance procedure or subject 15 See, for example, Tidewater Virginia Federal ginployees Metal Trades Council and Nava/ Public Works Center, Norfolk, Virginia. FLRC No. 71A-56 (Report No. 41, June 29, 1973). Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 to arbitration under an agreement?--or should such questions be resolved only by the A/SLMR? [see sections 6(a) (5) and 13i d).1. Our positien on this item is as follows : (1) The parties should be permitted to n?gotiate a grievance procedure as broad as they wish. The sole limitation should be those areas in which a statute does not permit an alternate forum. (2) The scope of the grievance procedure should be negotiated, not uni- laterally prescribed by the Order. (3) Section 13(d) should be eliminated in its entirety. 1. Scope of grievance proecdure.--We believe the grievance should include any aspect of the employment relationship except areas which, by statute, are spe- cifically and exclusively assigned to another forum. Unless a statute specifically provides that a particular issue must be 'litigated in certain forum, we believe an employee should be permitted to choose the route he prefers. For example, an employee should be permitted to liquidate an EEO issue pursuant to the negoti- ated procedure if he prefers. There is no requiren.ent in the Civil Rights Act of 1072 to preclude this. The question posed in paragraph 2.a. of the FLIIC announcement appears to IW an attempt to reverse the Elmcmlorf case." There is no reason why agency regulations should not be subject to intertmetati.on or application by an arbitra- tor. If agencies are applying their regulations in a fair and equitable manner, they should have no fear of submitting them to r wiew by an independent arbi- trator. This ..can only increase the trust and cenfidence of employees in the agency's effort to act in a manner consistent with merit principles and sound personnel management. Moreover, as pointed out in the Elmendorf case, an agency can always appeal an arbitrator's award to the FLRC, if it believes the award is contrary to lf.w or regulation. If management contends that only management can understand the complex regulatory provisions of their operation, our question is how can employees be expected to understand? Can it be assumed that an arbitrator cannot grasp what every personnel officer must know? Most importantly, any attempt to exclude consideration of agency regulations would virtually wipe out union grievance procedures. There are no areas of personnel policies not affected in some way by agency regulations. The Elmendorf issue is simply an attempt to limit the union's participation in the collective bargaining process. This is hardly consistent with the purpose of the Order and should be rejected out of hand. A s:!stem whore the agency is the prosecutor, judge and jury is hardly a credible system. It is definitely not bilateralism. .? 2. Negotiating the wope of the procedurc.?The scope of the grievance proce- dure in a particular unit should be left to the elscretion of the parties--not unilaterally prescribed by the Order. The needs of each unit may differ, and we should not presume, to know what is in the beat interest of the parties in a particular situation. Moreover, as a general rule, most items shoul d be left on the table, not unilaterally prescribed. It gives the parties greatet flexibility and room to work out compromises where necessary. 3. Elimination of Scotian. 13(1).?We believe that Section 13(d) should be deleted and ah questions of grievability and arbitrability should be determined by the arbitrator. The present procedure of referring these questions to the Assistant Secretary is time-consuming and inefficient, and is making a shambles out of contract enforcement. It should be returned to the arbitrators as has been the practice in the private sector and in the federal sector for the 10 years prior to the addition of Section 13(d). .Questions of grievability and arbitrability are essentially questions of con- tract interpretation am) an arbitrator, not the AssIdant Secretary, is the expert, in this area. Moreover. as pointed out by the Supreme Court in the Steelworkers Trilogy, questions of grievability and arbitrability are often integrally related to the substance of the grievance itself. Therefore, the Assistant Secretary may end up deciding the substance of the grievance itself. This is certainly not what the parties bargained for nor is it consistent with the overall intent of Section 13. The existence of Section 13(d) suggests that arbitrators are not to be trusted to do the very thing they have the recognized professional expertise to do! It is AMPriear Pedevation of Government Rtapiove,,,. Pm": 1668 and Elmendorf Porte Rase (Wildumod kir Form. Station), Alaska, FLEC No. 12A-10 (Report No. OR, May 21, 1973). Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 :29A-RDP75B00380R000500220001-6 a totally unnecessary procedure which only encourages management to avoid its contractual obligations. It is another example of how the process of the Order permit management free reign in undermining the strength of the union through extensive and time-consuming litigation in a multiplicity of forums. Justice delayed is justice denied. A recent survey demonstrates how unnecessary and time-consuming this pro- cedure is." Without this added procedure, the 1973 figures indicate that it takes an average of five months from the time the grievance is filed to receive the de- cision of the arbitrator. If this decision is appealed to the FLRC, ten more months must be added?making a total of one year and three months to receive a final decision. If a question of grievability or arbitrability is filed, however, another six months is required to receive a decision from the Assistant Secretary, and another ten months added if his decision is appealed to the FLRC. This means it could take an additional period of one year and four months just to litigate the question of grievability or arbitrability! It would bring the total time period up to two years and seven months if all decisions were appealed to the FLRC. The futility of this procedure and the potential for abuse is obvious from the time periods involved. Also, significant is the fact that, thus far, decisions from the Office of the Assistant Secretary (none have reached the appeal stage yet) have demonstrated that management's claims have not been meritorious.' If this procedure is not eliminated, it could be used to make a shambles out of the grievance-arbitration process. The FLRC's reference to permitting the parties to "jointly" take a question of grievability or arbitrability to the arbitrator is unrealistic. If the parties agree, they will submit such questions to the arbitrator. They do not need a provision in the Order to permit them to do so. The fact is that unless the parties disagree, no one will raise the issue. VII. APPROVAL OF AGREEMENTS 1. Should section 15 be revised to include additional limitations upon the author- ity of an agency head to disapprove negotiated agreements (e.g., by requiring the review to be exercised on a "post-audit" basis; by limiting disapproval to specific agreement provisions, permitting the remainder to go into effect; by setting time limits for agency action; by precluding intermediate level review of agreements prior to agency head review) ? Section 15 of the Executive Order should be deleted in its entirety since all contracts should go into effect when they are signed off by the parties, rather than being subject to review by the head of the agency or his designee. The present agency review procedures are making a mockery out of bargaining as they are extremely time-consuming, often taking many months, and the agencies have consistently refused to approve clauses that are not in violation of law or regulations, but which merely they do not like. Certainly, after 12 years of collective bargaining in the federal sector, this paternalistic concept of higher agency authorities' approval of lower level nego- tiated agreements no longer has substance. If agency heads do not, trust their local negotiators, then they should retrain or replace the local negotiators. Why should the unions and the employees they represent be asked to bear the burden of management's inability to direct and supervise their own local officials? Contracts should go into effect immediately at the local level. The agency head would then have only 30 days to disapprove of a particular section. It should be specifically stated that any evidence of abuse of the authority to disapprove a contract are grounds for a violation of Section 19(a) (6). VIII. OPERATION OF THIRD-PARTY PROCEDURES I. Should the Assistant Secretary of Labor hear and rule negotiability disputes that arise in the context of unfair labor practice proceedings under- the Order? The Assistant Secretary of Labor should rule on negotiability disputes which arise in the context of unfair labor practice proceedings. (See A/S Report Num- aer 26) The FLRC is not established to deal with fact-finding issues which would "For a SITP,MRrV of the results of the survey, see, the AFGE Washington Letter, vol. 8, N6. no, Oct. 12. 1978, at 9. 5. 1,, Warner Robins Air Material Area, Robins Air Form Base, Ga., Case No. 40-4930 (GA) ; TOtrerot of Retirement and Surv4vors Insurance, Social SPeurity A dministration? ensp No. 20-5214 (GA) ; Department of th-e Army Watervliet Arsenal, Cases Nos. 35-2902 (GA) and 35-2885 (GP) and 35-2892 (AP). Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 228 he involved in a mixed negotiability-unfair labor practice dist Me. In this regard, H) be noted is the Report and Recommendations on the amendment of Execu- tive Order 11491 at Page 43 which states: "Issues as to whether a proposal advanced during negotiations, either at the local or national level, is not negotiable, because the agency bead has determined by appropriate authority outside the agency may be referred to the Federal Labor Relations Council for decision." Therefore, such disputes should not automaticallr be channeled to the FLRC without the Assistant Secretary rendering a decision after full consideration of all the disputed facts in the unfair labor practice proceeding. In addition, we should like to offer certain contrients and recommendations with respect to section 1.9(d) of the Order. We believe this provision should be revised to the effect that unfair labor practice complaints may be pursued re- gardless of existing agency appeal procedures, such as adverse actions, equal employment opportunity discrimination, etc. 'Phis position is consistent with our strong opyosition, as set forth in our covering letter accompnnying this memorandum, the FLRC's statement of De- cember 18, 1973 that legislation would be required for such matters. Neither the Federal Labor Relations Council nor tny other Federal agency has as yet afforded express statutory or case law authority which provides exclusively for one agency appeals procedure regarding a specific management action. We have found no such authority.' :Further, it has been our experience that, in Many' cases, proffered evidence of unfair labor practices as an issue to support alleg.ttions of wrongful personnel actions, such as removals, will not even be considered in agency appeals procedures. Directly on point is the October 18, 1973 FLRC O. 73A-27 ruling in United States Postal 8ervice, iferwyn .Post, Office, illinois, A/SLMR No. 272, where the Council sustained the Assistant Secretary's decision overturning of the Adminis- trative Law Jndge's findings that agency management and the agency bearing officer, with subsequent approval by the hoard of Appeals and Review of the Post Office Department, prevented the complainant in his removal during "the established grievance or appeals procedure" from introducing evidence of alleged discrimination because of union activity. The Council affirmed the Assistant Sec- retary's conclusion that he lacked jurisdiction uncle:. Section 19(d) of unamended KO. 11491 and considered it none of his business "whether such procedures have been applied in a fair and regular manner Or whether they have provided an ade- quate remedy." With the above frustration in mind, we looked 7iorwarcl to the Assistant Sec- retary affording some sort of equitable relief through Executive Order 11616, which amended Section 19 (d ) and reads in pertinenl part as follows: "Issues which can properly be raised under an appeals procedure may not be raised under this section." To no great surprise, it now appears that any hoped-for relief is not forth- owning, The Assistant Secretary held in Departmertt of Defense, National Guard Rureau. Texas Air National Guard, A/SLAIR No. 336, decided January 8, 1974, "that there is no evidence that Burgamy [the appellant] was prevented from raising under the appeals procedure the issue wlether he was denied reenlist- ment for discriminatory or other improper reasons under the Order," again con- trary to the findings of unfair labor pactiees by the Administative Law Judge. Among other frustrating points of decision in this case, it should be noted that the hearing record revealed no evidence, proffered or otherwise, to support the agency's pleaded defense which nakedly contended such an issue could be raised-- although any support for this contention appeared to be clearly within the singu- lar knowledge of the agency. Thus, it appears the Assistant Secretary has cre- ated, in effee7, an irrebuttable presumption that an unfair labor practice issue ean be raised in any agency appeals procedure without an agency offering any simporting evidence whatsoever for its pleaded defense and, as such, the related unfair labor practice complaint would be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, we recommend that the first sen-ence of Section 19(eT) he de- leted and the second sentence be revised as follows ',Somewhat remotely related, FIxemitive Order 109S7 provides authority for advisory arbitration in neotiated aareements for adverse actions, such as removals. However. Civil Service Commission appeals procedure is available after a final decision by the activity or agency heat. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 :20A-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 "Issues which can be raised under a grievance [or appeals] procedure may, in the discretion of the aggrieved party, be raised under that procedure or the complaint procedure under this section, but not under both procedures." Of course, in line with our discussion above, if there exists express statutory or case law authority which provides exclusively for an agency appeals proce- dure with respect to a specific management action, i.e., the law prohibits any other procedure, Section 19(d) should be amended to that effect and such au- thority be cited for reference by all interested parties. Finally, regardless of whether our recommendation is accepted, we strongly believe that any favorable change in Section 19(d) would still be inadequate where administrative or arbitrated remedies based upon protected union activi- ties result without an expressed right for effective judicial review and enforce- ment. 2. Should the Order be amended to provide for the investigation and prosecu- tion of unfair labor practices by the Assistant Secretary of Labor? We urge that the Order be amended to provide that the Assistant Secretary of Labor should have the authority and responsibility to investigate and prevent unfair labor practices. Although tile Federal Labor Relations Program has developed a staff within the Assistant Secretary's Office with the expertise necessary for proper protec- tion and enforcement of rights guaranteed under Executive Order 11491, the program nevertheless requires that individual employees or their representatives bear the entire burden of pursuing their own unfair labor practice cases. This means that individual employees can be pitted daily against the resources and expertise of agencies such as the Department of Defense. Even the presence of a union does not necessarily correct this obvious imbalance because, under the present system, local unions must often depend entirely upon shop stewards or local officers unschooled in litigation or labor relations. No reason or justification exists for making the effectuation of rights guaran- teed by Executive Order 11491 depend upon the financial resources of an indi- vidual employee or his chosen representative. The purpose of the Federal Labor Relations Program as stated in the Preamble to Executive Order 11491 is to serve the public interest, not the interest of agency management, or the interest of unionism, or even the interest of public employees. It is time to reject the hypothesis that the wishes of agency management ,are automatically in the public interest. It is also time to realize that no justification exists for expending Federal resources to support agency labor relations and training (both directly through individual agency funding and indirectly by providing programs such as the, Civil Service Commission's Office of Labor-Management Relations) without also acknowledging the government's responsibility to support individual employee. rights under the Executive Order. The question is not how best to help Federal employees or unions or man- agement. The question is how best to create a workable labor relations system in the public interest. The answer requires a balanced, even-handed approach. As long as all parties agree that the Federal Labor Relations System of the future must take cognizance of the public interest, it is only natural that the public have an impartial prosecutor with the resources and expertise necessary to protect the rights of all parties. Accordingly, it is recommended that the Assistant Secretary perform investiga- tory and prosecutory functions as has long been the practice of the NLRB's counsel in the private sector. TX. IMPACT OF THE EXPIRATION or AN AGREEMENT ON DUES WITHHOLDING 1.. Should a uniform policy be established that so long as the .parties are nego- tiating or seeking to negotiate a renewal agreement dues deduction .should continue until (1) a new contract is negotiated, (2) the union loses repre- sentation rights, or (3) procedures for the resolution of a bargaining impasse have been exhausted. We recommend that dues deduction allotments be authorized immediately upon 'inning of exclusive recognition election and that there should be no charge fi'Fr this service to the union. 1Regarding agreements which are being negotiated, the Order should provide tht.lt all provisions of the old agreement including dues withholding and the ne- Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 230 gotiated grievance and arbitration procedure automatically continue in effect until a successor contract is executed. In particular, agencies should not be al- lowed to use dues withholding to discourage access to the Impasse Panel or the FLItli because of the time factor involved in using these third-party procedures. Also, antomatic extension of an agreemeat and dues withholding agreement maintenance should apply during any challenge to the status of an incumbent union until an Assistant Secretary determination of the representation question is finalized. X. STATUS OF NEGOTIATED AGREEMENTS DURING, REORGANIZATION I. What special policies, if any, should be established concerning the status of exclusive bargaining units (together with existirg negotiated agreements and dues withholding arrangements) which are affected by agency reorganizations? Time Order should contain provisions for maintaining exclusive units intact with accompanying negotiated agreements and dues withholding arrangements idler agency reorganizations until the Assistant secretary of Labor and the 'LRC (if so appealed) have rendered a filial decision as to any change. This has special validity since recent Assistant Secretary decisions have begun to establish criteria for dealing with agency reorganizations. (See A/SLAIR No. 282.) XL OFFICIAL TIME I. Should the policy regarding the use of official time (section 20) be eleminated, modified or retained? Since collective bargaining is as ranch in the imerest of management and of the public as it is in the interest of employees, employees and their representa- tives should be entitled to the same amount of official time for training, con- sultation and ether labor-management related matters as is granted management representatives assigned functions under the ExEcutive Order. Mr. IIENDEllsoN. It's my pleasure to recognize Mr. Webber, the nresi- dent of the American Federation of Government Employees. Mr. Webber, you may want to introduce your associates and proceed. STATEMENT OF CLYDE WEBBER, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN FEDERA- TION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES; ACCOMPANIED BY LOU PELLERZI, CHIEF COUNSEL; AND DENNIS GARRISON, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT Mr. WEBBER. Thank you very much, ME. Chairman. This is our general counsel, Mr. Pellerzi ; and our executive vice president, Mr. Dennis Garrison. The American Federation of Government Employees represents over 650,000 Federal employees in exclusive recognition units or- ganized under Executive Order 11491. We look forward with a great sense of urgency to the day when all of our exclusive recognition units will exist under Federal statute. In our view, that day should come sometime this year and we are most grateful to you, Mr. Chairman, for these hearings which give us the prospect that our hopes will be fulfilled. At the very outset, I should like to stress the civic. and legal phi- losophy with which we appear before you today. Its principles and concepts permeate every particular proposal or provision which we, will be endorsing during this hearing. Just as the Congress speaks on behalf of fill citizens in matters go, erning the scope of political and economic life as a whole, so lalvor unions should be able to bargain for workers they represent in a Approved For Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/OhiCIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 oanized unit on the entire scope of all matters affecting the working conditions of employees in that workplace. Moreover, just as the elected Congressmen in their exclusive dis- tricts represent all their constituents and not merely those who voted for them, labor unions in their exclusive units rightfully do represent all employees in that unit and not merely those who voted for them. This system of representative democratic government has evolved a code of tested procedures which protect the .best interests of all. At the heart of these procedures is the rule that the elected representa- tive has both the right and the obligation to represent all members within the recognized unit and may not rightfully refuse to protect the interests of any. But there is also a corollary to this rule. Just as the elected repre- sentative has both rights and obligations to the members of the orga- nized unit, so do the members of that unit also have rights and duties vis-a-vis the elected representative. While they have the right to claim full. service and protection and representation?they also have the duty to pay for that service, just as much as everyone else does. The foregoing reflects our views on representative democracy. We believe it conforms historically to the American experience. But there is one other distinctive element in our legal philosophy, as a union of Federal employees, which is also fundamental. This re- lates to our union's attitude as to the nature of Federal employment as distinguished from private employment. As you know, we are members of the AFL?CIO and subscribe com- pletely to its philosophy regarding the rights of all workers to orga- nize and choose by majority vote an exclusive representatiVe in mat- ters affecting them at the working place. There is no difference whatso- ever between us and the AFL?CIO on this matter. We hold that the application of those rights of labor to the Federal workplace must take into account the statutory environment in which. Federal employees work. Although Federal employeesare all workers,. the legal structures within which they carry out their duties are sig,. nificantly different from those in which private enterprise employees. function. We not only state these principles?we live by them. As you know, we have opposed the recommendations of the Select Committee on Committees to abolish the House Post Office and Civil Service Com- mittee and to merge it into the Labor Committee. The entire AFL? CIO joined us in this opposition. The principles underlying our oppo- sition to the report of the select committee are precisely the same prin- ciples with which we present our recommendations today. There is meaningful difference between the Federal workplace and the work- place of private enterprise. But both workplaces must give full scope to the workers and their unions to. exercise their rights as representa- tive democratic organizations. You have already heard the AFL?CIO spokesman present the, rationale of our preference among the bills, before you today. I beg' your indulgence in not repeating or .elaborating on those arguments.' Instead, I should like to use this occasion to review with you the un- fortunate interpretation of data in reports concerning the current status of relations in the Federal service which appears inthe State: Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 232 meat made to you by the spokesman for the administration, Chairman Hampton of the Civil Service Commission, who is. also the chairman of the Federal Labor Relations Council established under Executive Order 11491. Though Chairman Hampton's theses may be summarized in various ways, in any case he praises the present, labor-management system in the Federal service as better for employees than the collective bar- gaining in the private sector; and ho intimates strongly the collapse of the, entire Federal. personnel structure, if not the whole government itself, if the present Executive Order 11491 were replaced by a proper labor-management, statute, whether that be modeled on H.R. 13 or H.R. 10700. Specifically, his theses may be -reduced to two main argu- ments, as follows: First, there is no need for legislation because the existing system is more than adequate. since it includes, in addition to the alleged "bi- lateralisms" in Exemtive Order 11491, such other "bilateralisms" as union participation in the. Federal Pay Cuencil, the Prevailing Rate Advisory Committee, the Health Benefits and Life Insurance Ad- visory Committee and the Federal Safety Advisory Council. Second?and here I quote verbatim: The proposals for change embodied in legislation before you now would usher in wide and potentially disruptive departures from established systems in Fed- oral personnel administration?beginning with the repeal of the existing Exec- utive order program for labor-management relations, but not stopping there. Both of these sets of arguments reflect lic.rd and fast management biases and_ a complete disregard for the veluminous compilation of data submitted with the testimony. Frankly, I am underwhelmed by the vast array of paper and the illogical conclusions based on un- supported opinions. And, as an example of the opinions, this Attachment 10, I couldn't put that out of our office, a report on a summary of the comparisons of retirement, fife insurance benefits and other major benefit programs, -December 1973--there's not a single number rn there in comparison of one of these 25 companies or cities with the other. As to the first, let me observe that all of the alleged "bilateralisms," excepting Executive Order 11491, are statutory. You will, recall the dire predictions of doom delivered to you from the same sources when Congress was considering the passage of Public Law 92-392 establish- ing a statutory wage system for the blue collar employees, which up to that time had been authorized by Presidential directive and not by statute. It's noteworthy that Mr. Hampton now cites the wage grade statute itself as an example of "bilateralism." On page 12 of his summary statement Chairman Hampton says of the National Wage Policy Com- mittee the following, and I quote verbatim: The Committee makeup was modified slightly and established by law as the Prevailing Rate Advisory Committee, which continues to meet weekly to work out systems and problems on the wage-board pay program. You will note, he says the "make-up was :modified slightly and es- tablished by law"?this is the kind of "slight" change established in law which we a,re seeking here today. That "slight change" in the wage grade system produced a chairman made neutral by law; made the Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 :bA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 representation of management and labor genuinely "bilateral" by express statutory equality of numbers, and further provided a statu- tory base for the system with prescribed authority not subject to change without congressional action. You will recall, during the wage grade hearings before your committee, in our testimony we com- plained about the repeated 6 to 5 votes favoring management when the CSC official acting as Chairman had to cast the deciding vote on im- portant issues involving employee rights or pay. Instead of a management-dominated Federal Labor Relations Council, we want that "slight change" in labor-management relations. We want a neutral authority such as that proposed in H.R. 13 as well as H.R. 10700. And we want it "established in law." Since by Mr. Hampton's own admission, the change in the wage grade system brought about by Public Law 92-392 was "slight," we are perplexed by his opposition now to a similar "slight" change in labor-manage- ment relations. But let us look a little closer at those other highly praised "bilater- alisms" Chairman Hampton cited and see whether anybody at all has been violating, or trying to violate, the spirit and even the letter of the laws on which they are founded. Let us take for example, the Federal Pay Comparability Act of 1970, one of die "bilateralisms" Chairman Hampton cited. That law has been in existence for 3 fiscal years?the administration has had the opportunity during those three fiscal years to act on three separate occasions under that law. What happened? In 1971, the President, on the advice of 0Ml3, sought to postpone for a half year the 6.5-percent pay increase rightfully due Federal employees on January 1, 1972. Fortunately, the Congress placed a rider on the extension of the Economic Stabilization Act resulting in a 5.5-percent pay increase on January 1, 1972, for Federal employees. On the next occasion, the President's legal and political advisers again re- fused to obey the law. Instead, they recommended that the President defer the 5.14-percent pay increase due by law on October 1, 1972, until January 1, 1973. The issue was taken to the courts which ruled that the President had acted illegally. The executive branch is now laboriously going through its past records at great costs to pay this 5.14 percent retroactively for the period between October 1, 1972 and January 1, 1973. Finally, just last year, the President's legal and political advisers tried to delay the 4.8-percent pay increase, itself based on a dubious and new so-called dual pay line, from October 1 to December 1, 1973. On this occasion, the Senate in an overwhelming 72-16 vote, refused to concur. The record of the present administration regarding compliance with the terms of the statutes setting Federal pay is the worst in American history and this is cited as good "bilateralism." It is true there is union participation in the Federal life insurance and health benefits programs through union representation on statu- torily required advisory committees. I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that you request copies of the agendas and minutes of such meetings for the past few years and learn for yourself how sincere and exten- sive the spirit of ?bilateralism" has been manifested in terms of sub- Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 234 stantive proposals which bare been changed in any way whatsoever as a result of Advisory Committee consultatiors. The situation is somewhat different, in regard to the Federal Safety Advisory Committee. Assistant Secretary of Labor, John Stender, Las extended every opportunity for union re L)resentatives to partici- pate in the formulation of policy and implementing regulations; how- ever, when proposals reached the stratospheric levels of Federal policy determination as represented by OMB, many of the safety protective ?iiieasures were, in I he vernacular of today, "deep-sixed." C 1 AIMING CREDIT FOR PEOPLES WORK-11 EA LT Fl RENEE ITS l'Rl /GRAM AND ORGANIZATION Chairman Hampton builds his theses of how good the Federal labor-management system is by giving it, cre lit for everything Fed- eral employees have?for fringe benefi Is Such as the health and hos- pitalization program, and believe it, or not, even for union member- ship! As to the Federal health benefits prow' am, you will recall how strongly the executive branch resisted raising the Federal Govern- ment's contribution, even though most large private employers now pay the entire cost of health and hospitalization insurance as well as life insurance. As for union membership, I should like to slate as clearly as possible that we, the unions, take full and. exclusive credit for organizing Fed- eral employees against, obstacles raised against us which do not exist in private enterprise. We face delays, hindrances, difficulties from the very first to -e..h.e very last moment. For ?example, unlike in private enterprise, Federal employee unions must always submit to secret ballot elections, at great cost in money and time, even when it is obvi- ous that the majority of, and sometimes. all, employees belong to a union. That's at the beginning--and from there on out, as shown in the appendix on Executive Order 11401 to the AFL?CIO statement before you, obstacle after obstacle confronts us. Let us look at some figures: Chairman Hampton said, and I quote verbatim, "As. of 6 months ago, nearly 1,100,00 employees, or 56 per- cent of the entire nonpostal Federal work force'had been organized nto exclusive bargaining units. That's just about double the propor- tion in private industry. . . ." Of course, Chairman Hampton is playing games with statistics. The Federal Government is the largest employer n the United States and he should be comparing unionization statist cs with large industrial employers. What, do those statistics show, compared to the 56 percent for Federal employees? They are as follows Basic steel, 05 percent; motor vehicles, 95 percent.; pulp and paper, 04 percent ; petroleum re- fining, 92 percent; motor vehicle parts, 90 percent; meat packing, 84 percent; electricity and gas, 83 percent; coal mining, 79 percent.; cigarette Manufacturing, 72 percent. As you can see Federal employees are not organized even as much as employees in cigarette manufacturing, let alone as those in basic steel, motor vehicles, or petroleum refining. We, have far, far to go and we, need legislation to help us attain our proper role. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 :W-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 THE ISSUE OF MANAGEMENT RIGHTS Chairman Hampton has suggested that enactment of any of the bills before you would disrupt the Federal personnel system. Most of all, I believe, he objects to H.R. 13, which is silent on "management rights." We believe that 11.11. 13 appropriately omits reference to "management rights" because these are nothing more. than the corpus of the U.S. Code, none of which could be abrogated, derogated, or bar- gained away, no matter how weak or poor or misguided management was. Here again, I want to ask you who in the past has been the less re- spectful of "management rights"? After all., who is the real "manager," the real board of directors of the Federal Establishment? It is Con- gress. And who recently has been disregarding repeatedly the will of Congress? Let us review the history of the Office of Economic Opportunity. It was 0E0 management which proclaimed the impoundment of funds; it was 0E0 management which decided to violate the civil service laws; and yet when this happened, it was not the Civil Service Com- mission or the Office of Management and Budget or the White House which ordered the Director of 0E0 to exercise his legal "management rights." It was the Federal court, on petition of our union and others, which ordered "management" to exercise "management rights" in obedience to the, will of the board of directors of our country, the Congress of the -United States. MANAGEMENT RIGHTS AS SEEN BY THE EXECUTIVE ORDER AND AS ADMINISTERED BY THE FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS COUNCIL What could be more revealing of the poor climate for collective bargaining in the Federal Government than the Executive order ex- clusion or a long list of so-called management rights from the test of collective bargaining? I think this illuminates the whole landscape with an eerie light. First, we are asked to believe that there is practically a 100-percent correlation between these so-called management rights and the public interest. We know better?every member of this committee knows bettor?and the administration spokesmen know better. Now, I can understand any manager not wanting to give up some authority and privileges he's gotten used to--but let's analyze the issue objectively, not just allow a protective cloak labeled "public interest" to be thrown over everything that management itself says is its 'right." Second, anyone who has ever drafted a law or regulation can take one look at the section covering these management rights in the Ex- ecutive order and tell you one simple thing: No one sweated trying to find language which protected management rights of unquestioned validity but at the same time giving equal protection to the public interest or employee rights in collective bargaining. Quite the con- trary. The Executive order reflects a one-sided reflex reaction on the part of managers to whom the best collective bargaining is the least collective bargaining. Third, as a result of this very broad statement of management rights in the Executive order, any Federal manager is handed a 34-619-74--16 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/0A6 CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 weapon not available to labor?which many managers will use and have used?to limit the scope of collective bargaining or even to frustrate bargaining entirely until it just can't be dignified as such by an honest man. What member of this committee, pating himself in the shoes of an agency head, doubts that he .ould, if he wished, find a way to relate almost any significant proposal put forward by a labor 'mien to one of these management rights or to an agency regulation? and then 4: lecla re it nonnegotiable ? Couldn't almost anything be somehow related to: the agency "mis- sion," the agency "organization," the "grades of positions," "internal security" of the agency, the right to "direct employees," the right to determine the "methods, means, and personnel" by which agency operations are to be conducted, and the right to hire, promote, trans- fer, assign, retain, suspend, demote, discharge, "ake disciplinary action, a ad so forth, with respect to employees ? And, if you will then consider the exclusion of Commission, OMB, GSA, and agency regulations from bargaining, as well as the entire area of pay and fringe benefits, I think you will see why this whole- sale exclusion of so-called management rights by Executive order is, indeed, a sore point with us. As long as it exists, let no honest man say we do or can have equality in bargaining in the Federal Government. Fourth, even the mere mechanics of the system are stacked in favor of management. Management can raise the question of management rights and nun-negotiability whenever it suits their bargaining tactics. This can be at the outset of the bargaining?hr after expensive time- consuming negotiations?or even as late as impasse procedures. This action ends negotiations and precludes consideration of the real issues involved. It negates bargaining. Lastly, our actual experience under the order has shown that one of the most fundamentally damaging aspects of the existing labor- management -program is, indeed, this very concept of an arbitrary, unilaterally established separate category of non-negotiable items. .\ nd, also, the unique time-consuming adjitdie atory process for deter- mining them. To sum up this point: We maintain that this whole process operates to establish management control of the bargaining process and to preclude real collective bargaining. We object to the entire concept of arbitrary, predetermined, non-negotiable "management rights." We. object equally to the separate adjudical3ory procedures, for determin- ing which specific items are negotiable and which are non-negotiable. Therefore, ecause these procedures are unnecessary to protect the public interest, because they invite and encourage management abuse, and because they prevent freedom of contract and equality at the bargaining table, we would propose an alternative. Ti INT ALTERNATIVE IS COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ESTABLISIIED IN LAW Let the parties discuss these issues. Let both be charged with pro- tecting the public interest as well as the interests of management and employees. Let all the relevant factors be considered on each issue under appropriate legislative guidelines. Let the issue, if it can't be resolved by the parties, go to a trained administrative law judge or an Approved For Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 :MA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 arbitrator?who should also be charged with protecting the general public interest as he weighs all the factors involved, again under legis- lative guidelines. Only thus, we believe, will the impact of any pro- posal on management, on employees, and on the public be fairly and thoroughly considered and balanced. How much bilateralism is there really in the Executive order sys- tem ? Aside from the recitation of so-called management rights there are other elements in the Executive order which violate the proclaimed aspiration to bilateralism. A clear symbol of this is the structure of the Federal Labor Rela- tions Council itself. It consists of three top executive managers, none of them identified with labor unions representing federal employees. The Chairman of the Federal Labor Relations Council is concurrently Chairman of the Civil Service Commission. I must say for Chairman Hampton that, at least, he attended the public hearings of the Council when we provided testimony before it. I note that neither Mr. Roy Ash, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, nor Secre- tary of Labor Peter J. Brennan attended any of the meetings of the Council. Though their alternates, Mr. David Taylor of OMB and Mr. Richard F. Schubert of the Labor Department are fine gentlemen, we are nevertheless left with the distinct impression that both the Director of OMB and the Secretary of Labor themselves have little i personal time for, or official interest n, the rights or the problems of Federal employee unions. This is indeed a strange form of bilateral- ism not much better than sharecropping where the worker only sees his bilateral partner when he turns half his proceeds over to the land- lord. If there is to be genuine bilateralism, the ultimate central authority must be composed of a neutral body whose members shall not engage in any other business, vocation, or employment while functioning on that authority. We find such a central authority in both 11.11. 13 and H.R. 10700. Certainly Federal employees are entitled to a legally established neutral body to supervise their labor-management rela- tions. Who prefers Executive orders and why? There is no one today who will challenge the statement that the "participation of employees of the executive branch, through labor organizations of their own choosing, in the formulation and implementation of personnel policies and practices and matters affecting working conditions, is in the public interest." Certainly, President Nixon does not challenge that; he issued it in Executive Order 11491; Chairman Hampton is bound by it and does not challenge it. It appears in your bill, and I know of no person in a responsible position in the executive branch who challenges it. Therefore, the main difference between you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Hampton on this point is that you believe there should be legislation on labor-management relations in the Federal service and Chairman Hampton does not. We agree with you. What is the root cause of this difference between Chairman Hamp- ton, on the one hand, and you and us on the other? May I offer a suggestion? Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 238 I believe that the root cause is that this administration generally prefers to execute its programs on some otaer basis than statute. Whenever possible, this administration seeks to actin terms of official eommand, a procedure, by which an incumbent officerholder seeks to ovoid accountability by resorting to manageritl techniques and execu- tive powers not readily subject to congressienal or judicial review. We see this growing i esort to command in all sectors of the executive branch today; it accounts, among other things, for the great stress on "contracting out" of Federal jobs. In this 'vay, the rule of men by official command is gradually substituted for the rule of institutional, low based on statute. The exercise of executive command not subject to congressional or luridieial review did not begin, of con t.se, -?y-th this administration. But it has grown continuously over the period of the last 30 years, particularly because of the involvement of the -L-Tnited States in a series of ,L)Teat and long wars where the President, as Commander-in-Chief, often had to act on the basis of personal eommand usually in situations of military exigency outside the United States. This situation of eecuting, governing, or directing by command. tolerable in mi litary situations abroad, h As unfortunately become a had habit of life with important segments of the executive branch even in isle dornestic.civilian n ffairs. I believe that this preference for command over law is at the root of the preference for an Executive order--please note the word -order"?over statute. This attitudo, of command also accounts, I believe, for the exclusion o r long lists of Federal agencies and employees allegedly because of national security or fiscal -egrity considerations. Supposedly, these somehow represent, a conflict of interest with the rights of labor. Our union believes in national security; wc believe in fiscal integ- rity ; but we also believe in the rights of American citizens and of the rights and duties of Federal civilian employees. And, quite frankly, we prefer statutes over commands, precisely because we believe there is a. distinction between a civilian and a military service, between a government of laws and one, of men. In short, where we are designing a system of "bilateralism" for la- q)r-management relations, it seems elementasy under our theory of government that the authority for the system should stem from the Congress, through enacted law, rather than 1.),, based upon the exten- !-ion of limited privileges by one of the parties, which can be altered or wit hdrawn at its will. it is our firm view therefore that, in a civilian service, there is no need whatsoever to exclude any agency as a whole from coverage of a iabor-managlquent statute solely on the grounds that that agency is in- volved in national security affairs. The defenso departments certainly a In not excluded?no other agency should be either. We hold the, view that the only civilian employees who should be excluded are those employees who hold positions where the public interest in national security manifestly conflicts with, and supersedes, the other public interest that all Federal employees be accorded "par- Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 2A-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 ticipation * * through labor organizations of their own choosing, in the formulation and implementation of personnel policies and prac- tices and matters affecting working conditions." his "participation" is also a matter of "public interest" and should be safeguarded unless it clearly conflicts with the "public interest" in national security or fiscal integrity. And we think that it should not be the agency which decides this issue for itself but that the central :Federal labor relations au- thority should render the decision on the basis of standards developed in an objective manner. The agencies desiring to "exclude" employees should petition the authority; t'but the authority should have the final decision on the basis of clearly defined standards applicable to all situations. I have raised the subject of "exclusion" of agencies and employees in this section of my statement because I believe "exclusion" is the fundamental philosophy of the Executive order system. First of all, the Executive order system excludes all Federal employees from the protections of statutory law. Second, within the executive branch, the provisions of the Executive Order 11491 are drafted in such a way as to exclude labor unions from the protections of an impartial administrative body under whose supervision both the actions of management and labor would be judged. Such a neutral body is envisioned, in the Federal Labor Relations Authority contained in both H.R. 13 and 11.11. 10700. How can one expect, such a body of top management executives as the Federal Labor Relations Council provided by Executive Order 11491 to want to render, let alone expedite, judgments finding subordinate managerial levels violating the rights of labor? Obviously, these decisions would be delayed or rendered in an equivocal manner. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION Consistent with the civilian character of the Federal civil service, our union requests the introduction of the rule of law through the enactment of a labor-management statute to replace the present system of Executive order, based on command. We believe that the statements presented to you by the AFL?CIO, its metal trades department and its Government employees council and by us clearly show the inadequacy of the present system and the urgent need for legislation. To achieve this legislation, we pledge you our fullest cooperation. In conclusion, I wish to thank you again for the great service this subcommittee. is rendering the American public and all Federal em- ployees in holding these public hearings which we know will result in legislation replacing the rule of command by the rule of law in the area of labor-management in the Federal service. Thank you. Mr. IIENnErtsarc. Thank you very much, Mr. Webber. Our next witness is Mr. Paul J. Burnsky, president of the metal trades department of the AFL?CIO. It's my pleasure to welcome you this morning and you may introduce anyone with you. Approved For Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06?;4IA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 STATEMENT OF PAUL J. BURNSKY, PRESIDENT, METAL TRADES DEPARTMENT, AFL-CIO ACCOMPANIED :3Y PAUL R. HUTCHINGS, RESEARCH DIRECTOR Mr. BrewsKy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Appearing with me for and on behalf of the metal trades depart- ment, is its research director, Paul R. Hatchings. Mr. Chairmen and members of the .committee, my name is Paul J. Iltirnsky, and I am president of the rectal trades department of the. A.FL-0 0 with offi,os in the AJ L- Building, S15 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. Our department is composed of 23 affiliated national and interna- tional unions of tin, AFL-CIO representing the workers of their many trades and ca flings both in private industry and in Federal establish meIrts. At the outset may extend to the chairman and members of the com- mittee our thanks ancl appreciation for their concern with the need Lo obtain a strong statutory base upon which we can work to build strong, consistent, and equitable Federal labor-management relations which will not be subject to the vicissitudes of change with which we are constantly faced under an Executive order base. We heartily join in endorsing the testimony being given to the com- mittee today by the AFL-CTO and by its Government Employees Council and the American Federation of Gov .rnment Employees. The four appearances which we are making here this morning reflect the collective thinking and the endorsement of not only the AFL-CIO but its major affiliates in the Federal service and who have the re- sponsibility to effectively represent such membership. Our metal trades department was chartered in 1908 by the Ameri- can Federation of Labor at the behest of the metalworking affiliates (ff. the AFL to provide them with a vehicle through which they could coordinate their activities at all levels in all areas of their mutual concern and primarily in their joint organizational, collective bargain- 111,2", and legisative, activities. Our department from its inception has been concerned with the rep- resentation of Federal workers, parCcularly in the metalworking and related crafts and trades. It is interesting to note that in 1908. the year of our chartering, we chartered our first metal trades council at the request of the affiliated unions of the craffs and trades with mem- hens employed at the, Brooklyn Naval Shipyard. This was followed by the chartering of similar metal trades councils in each, of the other naval shipyards on both coasts and in Hawaii. At the, present time, metal trades councils chartered by our depart- ment hold exclusive bargaining rights for th trades and labor units in all naval shipyards?except only Boston, lithiCh is presently being closed down?and in various other naval actiYities, including weapon centers, public works Centers, supply centers and other naval activi- ties, as well as in various installations of the -Army, NASA, Coast tbiard, the Bureau of Standards, the Natior aT Institutes of Health and other Federal agency establishments. Our Federal employees metal trades councils presently hold bargaining rights for more than 50 exclusive bargaining units, all of which a7e covered by collective Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 241 bargaining agreements which embrace approximately 60,000 blue- collar workers. - Presently our metal trades councils represent more than 95 percent of all eligible blue-collar workers in all naval shipyards. We have a request pending before the Department of Navy that it grant to our department a multiple bargaining unit embracing our barouining units in all naval shipyards and which would allow for unified and simplified collective bargaining negotiations covering all of the work- ers we represent in all such yards. Our department is unique among the chartered departments of the AFL?CTO in that it is the only department that holds and exercises collective bargaining rights and responsibilities for collective bargain- ing units organized by local metal trades councils and their affiliated local unions both in numerous private industries and in the Federal sector. Our department and its chartered councils presently are re- sponsible for upward to 600,000 members of affiliated local unions employed in establishments or activities where our department or its chartered metal trades councils hold bargaining rights. We have always been in the forefront of the long and vigorous effort which our trade union movement has exerted to help Federal workers gain the right to organize in unions of their Own choosing and to bargain collec- tively to the fullest possible extent, as enjoyed by their fellow workers employed in private industry. Long prior to the issuance by President Kennedy of his Executive Order 10988 on January 17, 1962, our department, in conjunction with numerous AFL?CIO unions interested in gaining true collective bar- gaining for Federal workers, urged the passage of appropriate legisla- tion to achieve this end. We also played a major role in the task force hearings held in major cities throughout the country in 1961 prepara- tory to the issuance of Executive Order 10988. During the first 5 years under President Kennedy's order sub- stantial gains were made. That order constituted a fine first step toward extendine? to Federal workers their rights to union representation and collective" bargaining. Under President Johnson, task force hearings were held in 1967 on changes and improvements needed and desired; and, as we all know, such recommendations never officially saw the light of day. Over a year and a half later, President Nixon issued his Executive Order 11491 on October 29, 1969, replacing Executive Order 10988. This order appeared to meet some of the major shortcomings of its predecessor, but it also took away from Federal workers some of the benefits they enjoyed under the original Kennedy order. This new Executive order got into gear very slowly. It took many months for the many required applicable regulations to be drafted and finalized. As a result, very little in actual experience had been accumulated under this order when hearings were held in 1970 before the Federal Labor Relations Council on changes in it. The APL?CIO, our department and many AFL?CIO affiliates presented testimony on major problem areas already experienced or reasonably anticipated. Amendments to this new Executive order were issued on August 26, 1971, almost before the agencies and unions had fully assimilated the numerous regulations issued to effectuate the original Executive Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06,3491A-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 Order 11491. While President. Nixon's original order had brought hope for some overall improvements in Federal labor relations regulations, the amendments issued in August 1971, rathei7 than providing improve- ments, reflected substantial losses to Federal workers and their labor organizations in their efforts to achieve meaningful collective bargaining. ? Despite .the impressive statistical totals presented by the Civil Serv- ice Commission Chairman as to the allegedly broadened scope of col- lective bargaining: under the amended order, the cold fact is that the amended order and the interpretations made thereto and thereunder by the various agencies, the Assistant Secretary of Labor and the Federal Labor Relations Council'. have sharp1:7 restricted collective bar- gaining areas previously achieved in agreements negotiated since the inception of the original Kennedy order. Many of these areas are now ruled nonnegotiable as exclusive management rights. Another major loss was the right to allow an arbitrator to deter- mine the arbitrability of an issue before him in grievance arbitration eases and the requirement that a:rbitrability and grievability questions must now go for decisions to the Assistant Secretary of Labor before arbitration can be invoked. This, coupled with the restriction of arbi- trable issues ITO the interpretation or a.pplica:iion of agreement provi- sions, represents a real loss of one of the few areas where Federal workers had under the Kennedy order developed an effective means to obtain equitable application and interpretation of agency policies and regulations. We are pleased to join our AFL?CIO cnlleagues here today in heartily endorsing not only the principle Of a Federal Labor Relations Act but spechically endorsing the adoption of H.R. 13, which we be- lieve is best designed to meet the needs of the Federal employees and his labor organizations and which we believe will assure the broadest range of meaningful collective bargaining and the achievement of a substantial reduction in the restrictions and the frustrations which have been intrinsic in the Executive order type of operation. More than a decade of operating experience extending over more than 50 collective bargaining agreements negotiated and renegotiated numer- ous times during that, period has brought us to a strong advocacy of the compelling need for a meaning,ful statutory base to be placed under the whole Federal collective bargaining relationship. As a current example of the complete lack of comprehension of nor- mal labor-management relations proprieties even under the present Executive order. I wish to point out to the committee our experience 6 weeks ago at tie Norfolk Naval Shipyard. The Civil Service Commis- sion, through a team of its representatives, submitted questionnaires to our union stewards and to a sample of the workers which we repre- sent at that yard. Various of the questions asked were clearly of such a nature as to invade the relationship between the stewards and their unions and also the relationship between the represented workers and their unions. As the munbers of the committee will be interested, I have repro- duced copies of the letter of protest which I received from our local council president concerning this matter and which has attached to it the, letter of notifiontion he received from the shipyard and the full Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : 243CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 text of the questionnaire distributed to union stewards and the ques- tionnaire distributed to a sample of the work force in our bargaining unit. A reading of these questionnaires will quickly disclose to anyone with a working familiarity with either the National Labor Relations Act or the provisions of the present Executive order that numerous of these questions are improper, are loaded, and are designed to supply the Government's principal personnel agency for its use with the de- tails of the relationships that may exist between individual stewards and their unions and between individual represented workers and their unions. We understand that most of the shop stewards refused to answer these questionnaires presented to them by the Commission's represent- ative. May I also point out that our local leadership at Norfolk was at no time advised of the nature of the questions that were to be asked. At the request of our Tidewater Virginia Federal Employees Metal Trades Council, which holds bargaining rights for this large group of blue-collar workers and which has struggled to maintain these rights over a period of several years when raids by a nonaffiliated labor or- ganization was taking place' we brought this matter to the attention of the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission. Upon failure to_ ob- tain a satisfactory solution and guarantee against further invasion Of the rights protected by section 1of the Executive order, we have now filed unfair labor practice charges against the Commission charging it with violating section 19(a) (1), (5), (6) of the Executive order and have also filed similar charges against the Norfolk Naval Shipyard. for providing the Commission with the opportunity to come on the premises and have access to the stewards and workers to whom such improper questionnaires were submitted. For the Civil Service Commission, whose Chairman also serves by Presidential designation as Chairman of the Federal Labor Relations Council?the agency responsible for the administration of the Execu- tive order and in making final rulings on cases arising under it?to engage in such improper questioning of union stewards and repre- sented workers is yet another persuasive argument in support of the need for an effective Federal collective bargaining statute. Our department and its affiliated unions have devoted more than a decade of effort in striving with its Federal employees metal trades councils to make collective bargaining a meaningful functioning re- ality under the various Executive orders and the myriad of regula- tions issued in connection with the same. We are now fully and com- pletely convinced that fairness and equity can only be achieved through the establishment of a strong statutory base under which Fed- eral workers and their unions can develop meaningful, forward-look- ing, true collective bargaining which is not subject to the vicissitudes of Executive orders and administrative fiat in its application. Prompt ac- tion in providing a Strong statutory base for the benefit of the entire Federal Establishment, its work force, the unions which the workers choose to represent them must be achieved without further delay. We indeed appreciate having this opportunity to appear briefly and urge the enactment of this comprehensive statutory approach. We Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/064:4CIA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 will be happy to furnish your committee whatever additional informa- tion or materials it may desire. Thank you. Mr. Mulder3on. Thank yon very much, Mr. Burnsky. IThe letter submitted by Mr. Burnsky regarding the Norfolk Naval Shipyard follows. The questionnaire referred to is retained in the files of the subcommittee.] EDEW ATER VIEGIN IA FEDERAT EMPLOYEES METAL TRADES COUNCIL, NORFOLK NAVAL SHIPYARD, Portsmouth, 17a., April 22, 1974. MT. PAUL .1. BUR N SKY, President, Metal Trades Department, Washington, D.C. DEAn Papsinervr BURN KY : The Civil Service Commission was in the Shipyard Inst week as the enclosed letter explains. The CSC met with the Conference Com- mittee and myself to explain what they would be doing. At no time were we ad- vised of the nature of the questions to be asked, specifically the union stewards. I am enclosing copies of the questionnaires used. When I was advised by one of our stewards of the contents regarding union internal affairs I notified the I ll'PTE Local Union President and together with Metal Trades Stewards the 111`PTE Stewards advised the CSC representative Um; no steward would partici- pate by answering the questions. I believe we were mislead in agreeing to stewards answering questions on Mb/yr-management relations. I can find no basis .for the CSC asking how many training sessions the union has conducted nor what per cent the national union proceeds support. etc. I believe shipyard management and OCNIM were aware of the questions to 'oe asked and quite frankly it is none of their business. I urge you to protest to the Chairman of the C unmission this attempt to gather internal union information for their computer. The results of these in- vestigations will be to effect 'some change in the ED. and attempting to elhni- nate the support for legislation on the labor fmanagement relations. - Sincerely, S. I. WHITEHEAD, President. Mr. S. L. WHITEHEAD, Chairman, Tidewater Virginia Federal Employees .711(ltal Trades Council, PEPS Unit Conference Committee, Portsmouth, Va. DEAR Mn. WHITEHEAD : The United States Civil Service Commission under its charter contained in Section 25 of Executive Order 11491, as amended, is pres- ently conducing a research project regarding labor management relations in the Federal Government. The Department of Navy recorimended two naval activi- ties for participation in the study, the Norfolk Naval .$1aipyard being one of them. As part of the project study a CSC ream, composed of Mr. Dan Sobrio of the Washington office, Mr. Leon Wallace of the Washirgton office, and Mr. John Kearney of the Philadelphia office, will be on board tie entire week Of April 15, 1974. Mr. Sobrio, team loader, plans to meet with each union president or confer- ence committee Chairman at the outset of his visit. During the meeting he will personally explain to you the nature and purpose of the study. JO14EPFI E. WILKINSON, Director of Industrial Relations. Mr. HENDERSON. Our next and last witness i3 Mr. ,John A. McCart, the operations director of the Government Employes Council of the A FL-CIO. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, NORFO LK NAVAL SHIPYARD, Portsmouth, Va., April 9, 1974. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/0545CIA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 I'd like to take just a moment to welcome Mr. McCart, even though that's not necessary because he's been before us so many times in the past and has always been most helpful to the subcommittee and this committee. I have waited until this moment to mention for the record and comment on the earlier remarks with regard to the very effective work that all of you and the AFL-CIO have done with regard to the Bolling Committee's recommendation because I know that Mr. McCart spent a great deal of his time coordinating the position of all of you in working with me and the other members of the committee; and suf- fice it to say, Mr. McCart, that I appreciate and recognize the very important role that you played in this. I believe that speaking not only for myself but for the overwhelming majority of the members of the full committee as well as Mr. Dulski, the efforts of all of you should be as gratifying to you as it is to us. We believe we have ac- complished a great deal toward saving the Post Office and Civil Serv- ice jurisdiction for the benefit of the employees and the American public in the proper role of the House of Representatives. So it's my pleasure to welcome you this morning. STATEMENT OF JOHN A. McCART, OPERATIONS DIRECTOR, GOVERNMENT EMPLOYES COUNCIL Mr. McCAnr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your very generous comments. You may be assured that the work of our organization and. I'm sure the others on this particular matter will continue. I'd like first, Mr. Chairman, to introduce the gentleman who is sating with me. Tie is Mr. George Knaly, who is the chairman of our council and is the director of government operations for the Inter- national Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. . Mr. HEicoFiasox. We are glad to have you with us, sir. Mr. MCCART. As you know, it's customary for me not to read statements verbatim. Particularly in view of the testimony you have received thus far it would be appropriate if I refer to some of the highlights because understandably Mr. ITENDEnsoN. Your entire statement will be printed in the record and you may proceed any way that you like, sir. [The statement follows STATEMENT OF JOIIN A. MCCART, OPERATIONS DIRECTOR, GOVERNMENT EMPLOYES COUNCIL, AFL?CIO Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, the Government Employes Council and its 30 AFL?CIO unions representing more than 1 million wage grade, classified, and postal employes desires to endorse as a matter of highest priority II.R. 13, one of several bills under consideration at this hearing. We support the views presented by the AFL?CIO. All of the pending measures propose a statutory base for the present executive order system of collective bargaining in Federal agencies. We are grateful to you and your colleagues on the Subcommittee for arranging this series of hearings on legislative proposals, which are vitally important to the success of the Federal Government's program of collective bargaining for its employes. Other witnesses will describe in detail the deficiencies of the present system of labor relations and collective bargaining in Federal service. The sum total of all the testimony will demonstrate clearly that the existing mechanisms for establishing mutually beneficial labor relations through negotiations fall in non Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 246 postal agencies far short of the expectations envialoned when the program was inaugurated in 1062. ADM INI8TRA TION From its inception the system has.. been administttred by high ranking manage- ment officials. Ender the present program, three organizations participate in its administrn- tion?the Federal Labor Relations Council, the Department of Labor, and the Federal Service Impasses Panel. The very existence of three separate bodies charged with executing, different functions in the system indicates that the Fed- eral Government has hi effect a piecemeal, i1Isparate approach to resolving labor relations problems in the agencies. ? General mte?sight and policy direction of the .tystem are exercised by the FLRC. The Chairman cf the Civil Service Commission, the Director of the. Office of Management, and Budget, and the Secretary of .7,abor constitute the Connell. Other responsibilities, including representation proceedings and allegations of unfair labor practices, are executed by the ,Department of Labor. Clearly, the officials designated to administer.these functions occupy high level Positions in the Executive Branch. The third body involved in the administration at the program is the Federal Service impasses Panel Unlike the other two entities, the mentbers and staff of the FSIP are recognized mediators and arbitrators. Its function is to resolve disputes arising from the failure of unions and agencies to achieve agreement during collective bargaining. Among these three ot?ganizations, there are cert un overlaps in jurisdiction. A fourth agency plays an important function in the system. Although not a part of the formal structure, the General Accounting Office influences the course of collective bargaining. Its ability to overturn decisions of arbitrators on grievances, and its responses to agency requests for opinions about issues in col- lective bargaining and personnel policy matters can affect the functioning of the negotiation process. Thus, there are two basic deficiencies in the exisPng structures. The responsi- bilities of the FLRC and Department of Labor are executed by managerial officials of the Executive Branch. And the thrett bodies have interlocking responsibilities. hi leveling these criticisms, we cast no aspersions on the integrity of the individual officials involved. SCOPE OF RARGA 1 NINO One of the matters addressed consistently by the unions associated with the GEC is the limitation on subjects available for bar mining. Two examples will suffice to illustrate the deficiency in the current program. In 1070. Congress established a job evaluation and pay review task force to examine the methods of grading jobs under the Classification Act and to report its findings to the President for transmission to Congress. Two years later, that group completed its work. Throughout the IS months of its examination, the GEC in conjunction with the AFL?CIO insisted that any revision or refinement of the system now in effect include an opportunity for strong employe mirtic- illation in the plan with some form of negotiations and arbitration of individual job evaluntion complaints through the bargained gritvance procedure. The only recommendation of the task force on which the Civil Service Commission decided to proceed was to test use of the point factor ranking method. Action by the Commission on that test is the next step in the process. No mention has been amide of the application of collective bargaining to this classification system. Adverse action is another subject, which we belifve should be available for arbitration. Here the Commission has announced to this Subcommittee its com- mitment to the use of an impartial third party to resolve disciplinary action issues. But no positive steps have been taken to convert the commitment to reality. These two areas of personnel policy alone illustrate the need for expanding the limitations on collective bargaining which appear now in Executive Order 11401. UNION SECURITY One of the fundamental differences between HiT. 10700 and H.R. 13 involves the subject of union security. The first of these :Nib bars negotiation between unions and management in Federal agencies on this subject. The second requires Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/0624CIA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 establishment of a union shop when requested by a union possessing exclusive recognition or a representation fee. In the absence of any type of union security in the present system there exists an innate discouragement of union membership. Moreover, erosion of union membership in existing units is likely to occur. We make these assertions be- cause at some point the Federal employee who is not a union member in an exclusive unit will become conscious that he can continue to accrue the benefits attained in the negotiated agreement, regardless of whether he continues to maintain membership. Over a period of years, this process could lead easily to a petition for decertification of the exclusive recognition status. In such cases, the stated intent of both H.R. 13 and H.R. 10700 to foster a system of collective bargaining in Federal service would be imperiled. The resentment of union members against fellow workers who benefit from a negotiated agreement, but refuse to support the union in any way is certainly justified. It is contrary to our tradition to expect enjoyment of benefits without sharing the cost. Stability of union membership in the bargaining unit is important to man- agers, as well as unions, because it promotes a sound labor management rela- tionship. By dealing with a unified voice of the employees through their elected union officials, managers can promote understanding of policies and communicate more effectively with the employees they supervise. But the concept of union security is more fundamental than these considera- tions. Those who advocate the "right to work" principle found in Section 7108(c) of II.R. 10700 insist that each worker has an inviolate right not to be compelled to join or support a union organization against his will. There is, however, another side to this issue. In our democratic society, few, if any, rights are absolute. The "right to work" is no more absolute than the right to freedom of speech. About that guarantee in our Constitution, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes observed that freedom of speech does not permit an individual to shout "fire !" in a crowded theater in the absence of a conflagration. Put another way, the rights of one individual must be viewed in relationship to the rights of others. Workers in bargaining units have a right to desire security for their union. Other employees who do not share that view have a social obligation to participate with their fellow workers in the responsibility of sustaining the organization which produces their benefits. Where union security arrangements are in force, they become a condition of employment. The prospective employee should consider this arrangement just as he would vacations, pensions, promotions, before deciding whether is it de- sirable to apply for a job with a particular employer. For these reasons, we believe sound public policy dictates that any legislation approved by Congress on Federal collective bargaining contain union security provisions. COVERAGE Turning now to employee and agency coverage of the proposed law, there are several agencies whose present system of union management relations should not be disturbed. In each instance, unions and employers have established long standing systems of collective bargaining, which have proved quite satisfactory to both parties. These activities have established a broad base of understanding and a cordial atmosphere, which have permitted unions and agencies to develop bargained agreements meeting the needs of both workers and management while leaving undisturbed the Government functions. Any bill proposed by the Subcom- mittee should not impair these operations. Some examples of such relationships are the Tennessee Valley Authority, Bonneville Power Administration and others. Where current bargaining practices surpass permissible limits under Executive Order 11491 or the pending bills, the current relationships should be retained. This purpose can be accomplished by incorporating in the bill Section 24(1) of Executive Order 11491. Postal Service labor relations are governed, of course, by the Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 and should remain so. With the Panama Canal Zone Company/Government, the situation is quite the reverse. Employes and their unions in that enterprise do not possess collective bargaining rights. Under both Executive Orders 10988 and 11491, heads of agencies are em- powered to exclude from the system activities located outside the United States. Consistent with this authority, the Department of Army has decided that collec- tive bargaining will not be applied in the Zone. Unions there possess "formal Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06,J4lA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 recognition," and volubtary payroll withholding of dues. This, of course, does not entitle them to negotiate written agreements as is done in the continental United States. No doubt members of the Subcommittee will reed! there has been a history of labor relations FA the Canal Zone spanning almost i half century. Employes rep- resented by unions there are quite proud of the contribution they have made to the construction and operation of this world waterway over many decades. On the other hand, they feel isolated in labor relaticns matters because they are viewed as incapable of conducting collective bargaining on the same basis as their counterparts in the fifty states. In the past year thet.e have been several instances in which labor unrest has come to the surface. An overall reassessment of the labor relations program Was begun last August during the labor dispute with the pilots, and was intensified in March, 1974-, according to a recent Defense Department communication. At the moment, though, we see no prospect of introducing collective bargaining into the personnel system by Department action. Even if that occurs, it is the con- sidered judgment of the Council that the existing executive order and any statute enacted on the subject should apply to the Panama Canal Zone Company/ Government. MANAGEMENT lUGHTS From the ineeption of organized labor relations in our country, management rights has been the subject of considerable controversy. Traditionally, managers have tended to resist any encroachment of their pre- rogatives by union insistence on making their decisions a part of the bilateral bargaining process. Professer Harold W. Davey in "Contemporary Collective Bargaining" (1972) offered a rather perceptive analysis of the union point of view: "American unions do not wish the responsibility of running businesses. Union leadership in most cases lacks the interest and the knowledge to per- form the full range of managerial functions needed for successful conduct of a business enterprise. Furthermore, the rank-i rid-file union members have expressed little interest in having their leadership participating in the man- agerial function. In short, American unions wart management to continue to manage. They insist only on bargaining with management over any policies that, in th,3ir view, directly affect the economic well-being and on-the-job conditions of the employees whom they represent," (P. 103.) The problem with the management rights features of the present system is that they inhibit genuine bargaining. Agency officiah: are tempted to revert to the language in Sections 11(a) (b) and 12(a) (b) to insist that a proposal offered by a union for bargaining is not negotiable because :t infringes on management prerogatives. Labor relations is a dynamic method of arriving al: agreement on wages, hours, and working conditions through negotiations. Jt uould be difficult, indeed, to predict twenty-live years ago, the subjects which are bargainable today. The fact that current private industry contractE spell out policies and pro- cedures governing separations, recalls, transfers, pre motions, and discipline does not indicate an erosion of necessary management authority. Our tendency to want to negotiate about more and more subjects aa years pass reflects the ex- panding desires of employes in the social and economic climate in our nation. It does not connote a union intent to usurp managerial decision making. In the absence of collective bargaining for many years, Federal workers found it necessary to look to Congress to enact the statates providing many of the benefits and working conditions which are found in collective bargaining agree- ments in the private sphere. By the same token, these laws outline with con- siderable clarity the rights of Federal agency officals to manage their public enterprises. This situation supplies a built in series of management rights which will continue in effect until rescinded by Congress. Thus, there need be no fear that unions in Federal service will assume management functions to the detri- Ment of the public interest. CONCLUSION Prior to 1962?the year in which President John F. Kennedy issued the first (lirective on Federal service collective bargaining?one state had enacted a statute on this right. Today. 30 states have such lows, ranging from the right of public employees to strike under certain conditicns to a simple requirement Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06,149A-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 that state agencies confer with representatives of employe organizations in developing personnel policies. This total does not include state laws governing labor relations for teachers, firefighters, and police. We believe the existence of the original and successor Presidential directives on labor relations in Federal agencies has contributed to a growing awareness on the parts of states, counties and municipalities of the need for enacting legis- lation in this field. Yet, the Federal Government has no law controlling the course of collective bargaining for its employes in non postal agencies. Finally, Mr. Chairman, for more than four decades this Nation has pursued a policy enunciated in law of recognizing the value of collective bargaining as a contributing factor to stable economic and social relations in our society. But there exists no comparable statute applying this fundamental principle to the millions of workers who labor in Federal agencies. The vehicle for correcting the situation?H.R. 13?is before you. Its enactment will have the salutary effect of restoring confidence to Federal employes that their government has made a solid commitment to the development of sound labor relations. We recommend that you approve I.R. 13 as the first order of Sub- committee business. Mr. HENDERSON. You may continue. Mr. MCCART. Understandably, some of the material in our state- ment is repetitive. If you turn to page 3, Mr. Chairman, on the subjeet of scope of bargaining, I think it would be well to just embellish what has already been presented here on that subject with two illustrations. You will recall that some 4 years ago Congress authorized a 2-year study of the classification systems in Federal service. Over the course of 18 months a committee of the AFL?CIO met on numerous occasions. with the task force that undertook that study. There was one simple theme that we presented to the task force on many occasions and that was the necessity for employee and union participation in any system they finally recommended. Fortunately or unfortunately, the work of that task force has been largely lost. The only surviving element of it is a job ranking factor evaluation program that the Civil Service Commission apparently intends to put into effect either later this year or early next. To date we have seen not one reference to the question of collective bargaining in this very vital area of employee personnel practices. The other matter you're familiar with as well. That's the question of adverse actions which was the subject of a hearing earlier this year by your subcommittee. During recent testimony the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission made a commitment to third-party impar- tial decisionmakinff in the adverse action process, but we haven't seen anything surface to date. You will recall this commitment was made as long as 9 months ago to this subcommittee. Here again, we must emphasize the necessity for expansion of the scope of bargaining so the parties will be able to reach agreements on matters of vital importance to employees. On the question of union security, those who espouse the concept of right-to-work feel that each worker has an inviolate right not to be compelled to join a union or to pay dues to a union. As you well know, Mr. Chairman, in our democracy there are few, if any, absolute rights. You will recall that in a case involving a theater here in Washington, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes spoke to this point when he said that the right of -free speech does not extend to an individual who shouts "Fire" in a crowded theater, if there is no fire. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 gIA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 So the rights we enjoy as individual American citizens have to bee- judged against the rights of other people. On the question of union security we have the rights of groups of workers who desire to have their union and their benefits protected through union security ar- rangements c,gaitist the rights of individual3 who do not. We feel in this case that the rights of union ;security should prevail. As a matter of fact, all of us operate daily ,inder conditions that are imposed upon us by majority action, and there's no better example of this than the Congress itself. With respect to coverage, Mr. Chairman, tie council wants to point to the reverse side of the coin flat has been presented already, which is the necess-ty for protecting those collective bargaining arrange- ments that have been traditioml in some agencies even prior to the issuance of any Executive orders. The reverie side is exemplified by the Panama Canal Co. Government which, of course, is excluded from Coverage. under 11.R 10700. There has been a long history of trade unionism in tne Panama, Canal dating back aHmost to the construction of the waterway The succession of Executive orders has permitted heads of agencies to exclude from coverage individuals who are employed overseas. The Department of the, Army, with equal consistency, has excluded the workers in the Panama Canal Co. Government. They have now a system of formal recognition, a carryover from the original Kennedy Executive order, and they have voluntary pay roil withholding of dues, lint, they cannot bargain. There have been labor difficulties in the Canal Zone, particularly in the last few years. As a result of that, the Defense Department has advised our unions that it is addressing itself -:o the necessity for shor- ing up its labor relations program dating back to August of last year, and they have, intensified this activity from March of this year on. We are confident, however, that whatever steps are taken to improve the, labor relations situation, coverage under the existing Executive order and coverage under the proposed bills will not be advocated by the executive branch and the Department of Defense and Department of Army. We believe very strongly that the workers in that area of our Fed- eral Government should be entitled to c,ollecive bargaining and we recommend to this subcommittee that such a provision be included in any legislation it proposes. Zildr.''Chairman, we inove now to the conclusion of our statement. It is generally recognized that the issuance of Executive Order 10988 by President Kennedy had a profound effect on the course of labor-man- agement relations and collective bargaining in the public service gen- eral ly, partied any at, the State and local levels. When that order was promulgated there were very, very few States which had statutes governing collective barotining. Today there are some 30 States. This does not include the teachers, firefighters, and police who may have separate statutes. It's ratner ironic that the Fed- eral Government which stimulated so greatly the whole, collective bar- gaining process at the State and local level's to-lay finds itself without a collective bargaining law covering nonpostal Federal workers. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/0621/1A-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 For more than four decades our country has followed a policy well engrained in law of espousing the collective bargaining process. Yet in the executive branch of the Federal Service we have no comparable statute. Mr. Chairman, that concludes the thrust of our position. We join our colleagues, the four organizations at this table, in expressing our ap- preciation to you for your introduction of legislation, for your deep interest in this subject, and we very sincerely hope that it will be pos- sible for you to produce a reasonable bill at a very early date. Thank you. Mr. HENDERSON. Thank you very much, Mr. MCCart. Because of the timeliness, let me comment on your testimony with regard to the Panama Canal Zone situation. We are aware of the situ- ation that you commented on. I think it's fair to say that from our conversations with the Civil Service Commission, they agree that the problem does need review. I believe the possibility will be afforded us later this year to take an interest in this matter and in some way to assist in the resolution of the problems there. We expect to be working very closelywith the Canal Zone Co. and the Department of Army and the organizations involved and certainly very close attention will be given to the question that you pose as to whether or not they should be included in legislation or otherwise have the problem resolved. It's certainly one that we are mindful of. I think it's also fair for me to put on the record at this point, inasmuch as some may believe that the jurisdiction of our committee might in some way overlap with that of the House Merchant Marine and Fishery Committee, who also as you recall was very much under the gun of the Bolling committee report, to record that the chair- woman of that committee, Mrs. Sullivan, had conversations with me with regards to this problem and the members of that committee are likewise concerned. She has assured me of the fullest cooperation but has also suggested that in this area the members of our committee probably have wider experience in the matters of collective bargain- ing and what kind of statutory provisions or policy decisions ought to be made. I'm hopeful that we will? be able to tackle that question promptly. Before I take the time for questioning, I want to commend all of you and your organizations for the very excellent presentations that you made this morning. You have done an excellent job of providing an over view and supporting the position of what I believe to be the majority view of the members of the subcommittee on the first point that legislation is needed and timely. I think once you arrive at that point, you begin to take off into some very deep waters as to where you're going from there. Your statements this morning are clear not only to the need but the philosophy and the kinds of legislation that you would like to see Congress enact, and I commend you for that. I think as we begin to make the major decisions of where we're going that it will be very helpful and necessary for us to contact you again either by way of formal appearance or informally through our staffs to get your views. 34-619-74 17 Approved For Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/062.5pA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 Again, the most difficult thing I see in this legislation is how do we fit into our attempts to write legislation the best of our philoso- phies and our objectives in a balanced plan that will give us not only legislation that will be workable and Manageable and efficient, but effective for the employees and your organizations that you represent. I think perhaps one of the most difficult tasks?and it's not one that's unique to this particular session of Congress, but I found in my 14 years it's always a real issue with regard to legislation, is how do. we read the political situation and the possiblities of what we can get enacted into law. This is the primary responsibility of the members of the committee and as we go to the House where all cif the other Members will par- ticipate and take interest in the broad subject. While I think we're doing a fairly good joo when we come to mak- ing those political decisions, I also would like to recognize that the tone and the tenor of your presentation this morning impresses me that you're going to make our job easier. You're going to recognize that we have different philosophical views from time to time but as we demonstrate our determined effort to do a responsible job, we can compromise, we can work together. As; we really zet into the writing of the provisions not only do we have to deci de the best kind of lan- guage, the best kind of legislation, but we also have to back away and take the more difficult view of how do you put each of these decisions together in an overall package. I would hope, however, that as we work on this legislation and finally report out a bill from the subcommittee and possibly the full committee, that while the chairman's and the Commission's view would still be that it's not quite time for it, that the final product would be such that they would not have to run up red flags to the point of saying that it's absolutely unworkable, it's not in the interest of the country and, from what might be interpreted as political action,. they would feel that they would have to recommend a veto. I think that this final point of thinking a.iout a veto relates back to my earlier point of the responsibility that we have in trying to devise the kir d of legislation in the political situation that we find. ourselves in. If think this is a part of the goal of the Members of Congress that have served on this committee. I think that you have made our job much easier by the presentation and the testimony you have presented this Morning. The only other thing I think that cart make the job a little bit easier would have been for the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission to announce that they have come to the conclusion that perhaps now is the time that we all get our heads together. Let me also say it's been my experience with Chairman Hampton and, the present Commissioners that, irrespective of their position and. their position that's now on the record, as we get to making these. decisions I feel that they will cooperate with rs here on the committee and I hope that they will?and I have founi my experience in the past that they will recognize positions that :Tou take and they will, I'm sure, continue to maintain their position. Prom the very intense interest and long-tine study that the mem- bers of the subcommittee have, had in this Subject, we look forward to Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06591A-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 working with all of you in this area to accomplish much for the views you well expressed this morning with regards to your members, your organizations, and on behalf of the citizens of our Nation. With that, I would like to yield to Mr. Clay, who has been with us this morning and certainly has a very intense interest not only in this subject but all legislation affecting Federal employees. Mr. CLAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like some clarification from Mr. Meiklejohn about some state- ments that he made in his presentation. On page 3 you say: "The AFL- CIO and its government employee unions want to see established prin- ciples and procedures of labor-management relations that will assure Federal employees basically the same recognition and collective- bargaining rights that most other employees in the United States already enjoy." Then, on page 13, you say: "We believe that the right to strike is basic to all American workers, public and private alike." But in the next paragraph you advocate inclusion in agreements of commitments by the parties to submit issues, including grievances and disputes con- cerning the interpretation or application of the agreements, to final and binding arbitration." And further down you disagree with the provisions of II.R. 9784 extending the right to strike to public employees. Now just what is the position of the AFL-CIO? Do you believe that Federal employees should have the right to strike? Mr. MEIKLEJOIIN. Yes. Our policy position as set forth in the reso- lution adopted by our 10th constitutional convention last October was in unequivacable support of the right to strike. What I tried to indicate here was that we recognize the judgment of Congress may be different from our judgment in this respect and that if that turned out to be the case, and I believe this has been con- sistent with our position in our fields, that a system of voluntary ar- bitration would not be basically inconsistent with the support of that right. This is a matter which we feel Congress will have to decide one way or another. We would prefer that they decide in favor of the right to strike, but we recognize that may be a very difficult thing for Congress to accept. Mr. CLAY. Well, you prefer that we decide on the right to strike, but you're in disagreement with the strike provision of Congressman Ford's bill? Mr. MEIKLEJOIIN. Mostly because we think they won't be very effective. Mr. CLAY. How would you recommend that we make them effective? Mr. MEIKLEJOIIN. We would prefer to see that the right to strike be dealt with in the same manner it is in the National Labor Relations Act and that is that the right of the employees through concerted ac- tion to strike be protected by law. Mr. CLAY. So, in other words, you would advocate that we take the strike provision out of Congressman Ford's bill and include it in II.R. 13 with the proviso that there be no limitations on that right to strike? Mr. MEIKLEJOIIN. I think our position?and I'm speaking for the AFL-CIO?is that we would prefer to see a right-to-strike provision basically the same as what we have in the National Labor Relations Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 254 Art. There are qualifications in Congressman Ford's bill on the right to strike which we think tend to confuse the issue. Mr. CLAY. Thank you. Mr. HENDEnsoy. I wonder if the gentleman would yield to me, just on that point. CLAv. Be happy to. Mr. Ilnximusoic. I don't want to take too in iich time, but Mr. Meikle- john, this is an area that I have some (Him: ty with. If the Congress provides for binding arbitration, does the ricit, o to strike being written - into law but limited to collective bargaining remain a meaningful rurht? Mr. Mtn]: LE.T01 i N. 'The right to strike Under those circumstances? Mr. Il Exiwrisox. Yes. Mr. Mtmin,roinv. Yes. We think it would still be a meaningful right. Mr. hENDERSON. Well, let me follow on this because I envision that what we did in the postal reorganization was to provide binding arbi- tration, binding both on the management of ?e postal system and on the union organizations, and if that's the case, do the workers have a meaningful night ? You see, we've got a bill bfore our committee that would give them the right to strike. Ti binding arbitration is in fact binding and it's effective, will the employee organizations or the em- ployees have the right to strike? Mr. MELKLE.TOIIN. I guess what we're praintrily concerned with, Congressman Henderson, is some procedure which assures equality of bargaining when the parties get to the bargaining table. Mr. IlimunisoN. Right. Mr. MEIKLEJOUN. That is accomplished in the private sector, basically through the preservation of the right to strike?union recog- nition and the right to strike. If the equality of the bargaining table can be achieved in some other fashion, well and good; but it has been our experience that generally speaking the right is necessary to assure that equality. As far as the Postal Reorganization Act is concerned, think that act does not include the right to strike. It does not include, protection of the right to strike. It does provide another mechanism which is designed to achieve that equality of bargaining power. The committee may feel that this is appr opiate in this field and that it will achieve that equality of bargaining power. That's our main concern. Mr. Iinrcimisox. Well, my concern really goes to why the organiza- tions would so soon come back in the area of the Postal Serviee and say that they want legislation recognizing the n ght to strike. You have made the point this morning that Mr. Ford's philosophy has been clearly enunciated and I know of no one who articualtes better on this than he does, but as you say, he gives the, right to strike then goes on in his bill and takes if away. Where I start from is that there's got to Ix something better in the public sector than the, right to strike. :If we compare it to the private sector, the industry sector, we have to recognize that industry and business always have the right to go out of business. They always have the right to completely collapse. We have tc start from the premise with regards to Government service that main gement, ultimately Con- gress, doesn't have a very good alternative tc providing mail service. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/062IA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 In other words, it's- a constitutional requirement. So I would think that from the lono. conversations I've had with Mr. Webber for ex- ample, he feels as ''I do. We can have meaningful legislation without getting really hung up at this time over the so-called right to strike. I flunk lie feels that if we on this committee do a good job of legislat- ing that he would prefer to see legislation enacted without the mem- bers of the Committee and Congress getting hung up or fighting over the right to strike and losing the meaningful legislation that we would otherwise be able to agree on and devise for the Federal employees. Now, Mr. Webber, am I fair in so stating? Mr. WEBBER. I'd say this, that we are very anxious to get legislation passed which will provide appropriate rights to Federal employees. We, as a union, subscribe to the principle that the right to strike is an important part of the overall rights of all workers. However, we be- lieve that the emotional problems which would come over the right to strike question has been addressed in: the legislation which was that endorsed by all the AFL-CIO unions that, represent people in: the Federal service, and it was a consensus when the bill was introduced that we would look down the road to first get a solid base for rela- tions?employee?labor-management relations in the Federal service, and then let's talk about the right to strike as a single issue. Mr.111:ExnEnsoN. I thank the gentleman for yielding. In the political atmosphere that I see at this time, I have to announce somewhere along the line that you have persuaded me and I thought wouldn't .vote for a bill that didn't have the right to strike and you'd be torpedoed and I would be, too. Mr. CLAY. I'm even more puzzled now as to your position on that, of the AFL-CIO Mr. HENBERsox. If the gentleman would yield, let me say when I'm puzzled I like to keep my colleagues puzzled. Mr. CLAY. I'm really puzzled now because as I read H.R. 13 you're talking about involuntary binding arbitration; yet there's no other feature in this bill for resolving nnpasses, which means that the in- voluntary binding arbitration then becomes a binding arbitration or compulsory arbitration. Now is it the position of the AFL-CIO that you're recommending to this committee that we impose compulsory binding arbitration on Federal employees? Mr. MEJKLEJortN. No. I would say that we're recommending that the legislation provide that the parties seek voluntarily to include in their :bargaining agreements agreements which will provide for final and binding arbitration on matters arising under the agreement. Mr. CLAY. How do they resolve impasses without submitting to bind- ing arbitration if they don't have the right to strike? Mr. 'WEBBER. Negotiation disputes and impasses I believe is title IX of H.R. 13, and it states that the Federal Mediation and Concilia- tion Service shall provide services and assistance to agencies and labor organizations in the resolution of negotiation disputes. When volun- tary arrangements' including the services of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service fail to resolve a negotiation impasse, either party may request the Federal Labor Relations Authority to consider the matter: Provided, that the parties may agree to adopt a procedure providing for binding arbitration of a negotiation impasse. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 256 I believe, that it's envisioned that there would be fact finding, there would be all kinds of attempts to achieve resolution of the impasse through voluntary means before it was referred to the Federal Labor Relations Authority which would be a three-man committee with no other job except to supervise and administer this bill to come up with a solution to this. Mr. CLAY. I don't quite follow, but accept your explanation. Mr. WEBBER. Well, there are a number of other paragraphs which go into the details of it. The Authority shall promptly investigate and resolve any impasses presented to it under subsection (b) of this Act. After its services have been invoked, the Authority or its designee shall assist the parties in arriving at a settlement through whatever methods and procedures it ma:7 deem to be appropriate. If the parties do not arrive at settlement through such other means, the Authority shall, with due dispatch, render its decision in writing on the matters in dispute. This decision shall be promptly served upon the pirties to the proceedings and shall be final and binding upon all parties during he term of the agreement. Mr. PELLERZI. TVs essentially the same as 10700. There are some technical differences. The impasse resolution procedure is the author- ity under both bills with the assistance of Federal mediation and conciliation findings. There are technical differences but the resolution mechanism is the same as 10700. Mr. CLAY. On page 10 on Mr. Meiklejohn's testimony you're advo- cating a separate board for Federal employees. There are two bills currently pending before the Subcommittee on Education and Labor of the House that would establish basieally the same rights for public employees, State, county, and municipal employees, as this bill would establish for Federal employees. One proposes to place jurisdiction under NLRA ; the other bill proposes to establish a separate agency similar to the one advocated in H.R. 13. What's the. position of the AFL?CIO in regard to those two bills pending before the Education and Labor Committee? Mr. Mmiee.rottiv. This problem has been a matter of some disagree- ment between the several unions in the field Df labor-management re- lations in State and local government employment. We have not taken a position on those bills because of that disagreement. We don't ordi- narily take a position on any matter that our international unions want to pretty much decide for themselves the position they will take. Mr. CLAY. Well, in your statement you said---- Mr. MEIKLEJOIIN. We're talking here, of course, about the Federal Government where, our unions are not in disagreement. Mr. CLAY. But you say you support the idea of the separate board for the reasons NLRB is already very broad and the problem of delay which is already serious in the administration of the present Executive order program might well be accentuated across the whole scope of the labor-management field. Do you include State and municipal workers any differently than you do Federal employee;? Mr. MEIKLEJOTEN. If we were called upote, Congressman Clay, to discuss the provisions of legislation relating to local and State gov- ernment employees, then we would be in a position to decide what position we would take. Here we are discussing only the matter of Federal employment. As to this, there is g. neral agreement among the unions in. the Federal field that a separate authority or board Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 :2SIfk-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 should be established independent of the National Labor Relations Board. Mr. CLAY. But that doesn't deal with my question. I think if you can take the position that a separate board is good for Federal em- ployees, why is it you cannot take the same position for other public employees? Mr. MEIKLE.TOTIN. Because I think we have not discussed this among ourselves as to whether the organizations in that field wish to take that position. We try as much as we can to reflect the views of our membership and our constituent unions; this is our responsibility, as we see it, as a federation of international unions and if and when we are advised of a unified position in the State and local field we will take that position. Mr. CLAY. Thank you. No further questions? Mr. Chairman. Mr. HENDERSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Clay. Mr. Mallary ? Mr. MALLARY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'm sorry that I was not here for the earlier presentation of testimony. There are two or three questions that I'm not sure have been fully addressed that I would like to get into. The first one is this. Chairman Hampton talked to us about super- sedure and he expressed concern about the impact of the passage of a labor-management relations act upon existing statutes that affect cer- tain present conditions of employment such as classification, veterans preference, retirement, merit principles and so forth. Do you have a position with regard to the appropriate termination or repeal of some of these provisions or could you address yourselves to the impact of this kind of labor-management relations act upon some of the present statutory provisions? Mr. WED13ER. Well, we took a hard look at the bill. I know precisely what you're speakinc, of; that not all the people in the Federal service, first, are within units of recognition. Specifically, some of them are ex- cluded from units of recognition and this goes to the start of the scope of bargaining. I believe there's a provision in H.R. 13, section 504(C), which says: The agency shall not make or apply rules or regulations which restrict the scope of collective bargaining permitted by this act or which are in conflict with any agreement negotiated under this act. Now I know in the discussions that we had when we were working on this that there was a question as to whether this would repeal other laws. I think it was the intent of the group that worked on it that the other laws would not be repealed. The problem is not with the statu- tory requirements of the law. The problems that we have encountered in the scope of bargaining are the matters of implementation of laws, the issuance of extensive regulations which are within the scope of someone's administrative authority. Now we took a position in our testimony that the scope of bargain- ing should not be restricted by these so-called management rights; that these management rights which are genuine management rights are rights which are established as a result of legislation passed by Congress1 and that the artificial or arbitrary management right are those artificial rights which have been established through regulation Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 258 and T can foresee no problem in negotiating contracts which in the scope of legislation and statutes which are on the books, and if we are able at some time in the future if we have a god solid base for labor- management relations in the future, service, and Congress chooses to relinquish action on certain fringe benefits and subject them to nego- tiation, then it would come within the scope of bargaining. On the other hand, where there are statutes which provide for such statements as fringe benefits, such statements as the. number of days of leave employees will have, such statements as the number of holi- days that an Employee will receive, such statements as veterans pref- erence, certainly I believe that we could negotiate appropriate con- tracts within those parameters. Coming to things which Mr. McCart talked about earlier, in regard to the classification problem, we propose a test program in which there would be union participation and we recommended that they run a test. under the current legislation, under the Classification Act of 1049. Now if the acts are the things which we have to work within, I don't see anything in lIlt. 13 having the intent of simply dispossessing. the Federal Government of all its personnel laws, but when it comes to implementing those laws, those matters 'Md.+ are not required by si :Ante in which administrative discretion is permitted and we hold recognition at the level in which the discretion can be exercised, we certainly feel that we should have the opportunity and the right to bargain on those particular matters. Mr. MA LI. MIT. But it. would not be unfair lben for me to say that it- would not be your bitention that there would be bargaining or nego- tiation on those items which are specifically provided for by statute-- Mr. AVEniwn. That's correct. Mr. MALL:ally. And presumably, if it is necessary from a legal point of view to make it clear, there will be no problem with ',inking that explicit within the law. Mr. WI:mut. I would think in the review of this particular section that we made in the last few days it may have to be redrafted to precisely express this thought that what we're concerned about is bar- training on the items which are not prescribed by law. Mr. Mn 1 KLEJ011 N 'ongressman, 1 think our problem is not so much the matter of statutes as it is regulations and orders of administrative officials that have created the, problem as far as the scope of bargain- ing is concerned. I don't think that we have rcised any questions with regard to the statutes with respect to veterans rights or other rights creating preferential status for a particular group, but Chairman Hampton obviously refers to or relies upon section 1704 of HT. 13 which is a general provision that this act supersedes all previous sl atutes and executive orders concerning this subject matter. This is a very general provision and in the face of a specific statute and a specific area certainly there would be substantial legal question as to whether a general superseding provision could supersede a provision establishing specific statutory rights. Mr. PELLER21. I think you could read that, too, Mr. Midlary, as re- fitting to the subject matter, which is labor-management relations. So Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 259 there are no existing laws on that subject matter that that provision would operate against. It would only operate against Executive orders. I think our position is that we like the scope of negotiations to go up to the statutes. The statutes are not self-implementing. They have to be implemented through regulations in almost every instance. Those reg- ulations have to conform to the statutes and all we're asking by scope of negotiation in H.R. 13 is to be permitted to sit down with manage- ment and negotiate the implementing regulations under the statutes. We're not asking for the repeal of those statutes. Mr. MEiKLEJOHN. Certainly we are not in favor of any action which would in any way supersede the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; for example, as amended by the Civil Rights Enforcement Act; under his interpretation that could possibly be the case; but we never envisaged this possibility under this bill. Mr. '-?MALLARY. Let me pursue one other question. When Chairman Hampton or other members of the Commission are in here they talk to us about the so-called neutrality doctrine, which I gather implies that agency managers theoretically do not; take positions on matters of labor-management relations. Is my understanding of their under- standing of the neutrality doctrine correct? Mr. NicCArtr. It has to be defined, Mr. Mallory. They profess that management representatives are neutral on the question of employees making a free choice as to whether they want exclusive recognition or not. I don't think oven they would accuse their management colleagues of being neutral beyond that. Mr. MALLARY. If in fact a labor-management relations act was to be legislated, would it be your feeling that it would then be appropri- ate for management spokesmen or managers to have the same rights of speech as they would under Taft-Hartley? Mr. WEBBER. Oh, yes. Mr. MEIKLEJOHN. Yes. Mr. MALLARY. The answer is yes? Mr. MEIKLTUOTIN. Yes. Mr. MALTARY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. ITENDEnsoN, Thank you very much. The staff has prepared sev- eral questions that I think could improve the record by clarifying some points that you have made, and I'm going to ask unanimous consent at this point, because of the time limitation here, that they may submit those to you for your comments and ask that we may have the right to include them in the record at the proper point. Mr. Webber, in your testimony you indicate you feel there's no need to exclude an agency as a whole from coverage. I'd like to have your reaction to a procedure that would permit an agency to exclude the entire agency or any part of the agency being subject to review or approval by the Federal Labor Relations Authority or, alternately, have the decision made by the President. This relates to page 18 of your testimony. Mr. WEBBER. Did you want us to submit a written reply? Mr. TIENnnnsoN. Or if you could answer now - Mr. WEBBER. We have given thought to this and as indicated in the testimony we propose that procedures be established within the Fed- eral Labor Relations Authority for addressing questions of exclusion Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 260 of an agency or elements of agencies and that these standards be uni- formly applied on a case-by-case basis. Wo believe that the Federal Labor Relations Atithority, if it were constituted in a fashion described in either ILE,. 10700 or in H.R. 13, that the:.:.e would be a neutral body that it would not be simply a management action or a management decision; that it's more comfortable and 1es3 of a problem to us to not have to deal with a. labor union but, rather, there's proper exclusion, that this proper exclusion be made on the basis of standards that are uniformly applied within the Federal Government. Mr. HENnresoN. If we were to agree that an agency should be ex- cluded, would you like, for the legislation to provide some technique or device by which part of that excluded agency might be granted the right to have organizations for their employees? For example, if the Central Intelligence Agency were exempted, would you like to see some provision in the legislation where it might be possible for a group of employees who could be. identified as not being in a sensitive area that could by any stretch of the imaginatio u affect national security, that we all know is inherent in that kind of agency, to have the right to be organized into a unit? Of course, I base this on the premise that by statute the agency would be excluded. Mr. WEnime. Well, we, have discussed this, too, at some length, and this is one thing I would really like to have an opportunity to prepare a written statement on in regard to such exclusions. We find it very difficult to--- Mr. Ilniconesoic. I use this brief question to? Mr. WEnnne. I was going to say, we. have lied some experience with Executive Order 1106 in which the entire Foreign Service personnel in the State Department were excluded and an alternate system of recognition was established with inferior rights for the people in the State Department with predetermined units of recognition, and a num- ber of things which are very difficult for us to swallow. If you're going to have labor-management relationships they should be uniform. We should have uniform rules. If exclusions are necessary they should be done on a uniform basis. Finally, it's very hard for me to feel that labor organizations are any less patriotic, arty less responsible, any less worldly in considera- tion of security than some organization which did not happen to be affiliated with AFG, for example, or does nct happen to be affiliated with the AFL?CIO ; and this is a, question that we would certainly like to address ourselves to in writing in responsc to your question. Mr. HENDERSON. This illustrates the kind of real in-depth considera- tions that we will all have to pay attention to when we get to the point of really marking up and deciding on the specifics of the legislation. I'm glad that you mentioned the State Department and the Foreign Service employees because, you know, in my bill I did exclude them. I don't mind stating for the record and for your benefit that the pri- mary reason I did this was not because I didn't think we could devise legislation that would be workable in their peculiar constraints under the, law and their organization, but I simply felt that it would be a political issue that could bomb AS and maybe we ought to set them aside and let them go to their own legislative committees and work this out. Thank you very much. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/0626c1A-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 Mr. MEIKLEJOHN. Mr. Chairman, we would want to comment I think on that question, too, for the AFL?CIO, and we certainly would be very happy to respond to questions that any of the members of the committee may have. Also, of course, we would be very happy and very Flad to work with you in any way that we can be of any assist- ance in connection with the legislation. Mr. HENDERSON. Pm sure that all of you not only can be helpful but that you will be called upon. At this time the hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.1 [See p. 497 for additional information furnished by the American Federation of Government Employees.] Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT LEGISLATION WEDNESDAY, JUNE 12, 1974 U.S. HOIJSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE, S UBCOMMITTEE ON MANPOWER AND CIVIL SERVICE, Washington, D .0 . The subcommittee met at 9 :42 a.m., in room 210, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. David N. Henderson (chairman of the subcom- mittee) presiding. Mr. HENDEnsoN. The subcommittee will come to order. ?The Subcommittee on Manpower and Civil Service is continuing bearings on legislation to cover labor management relations in the Fed- eral service. At the close of 1973, nearly 1.1 million civilian employees of the executive agencies of the Federal Government were represented by labor organizations. This has come about during the past 12 years, largely as a resut of the relationships estabished by Executive orders. Because of the experience gained by both Federal agency officials and labor organization representatives during this period and the viability of those relationships, I now believe it is fitting that legislation be enacted. In addition, the necessity for these hearings is attested to by the fact that more than 25 bills on Federal labor relations have been introduced during the 93d Congress. Our witnesses today represent two of the larger Federal independ- ent employee organizations and recently formed coalition of public employees. With us are Dr. Nathan Wolkomir, president, National Federation of Federal Employees Mr. Vincent Connery, president, National Treasury Employees Union; and Mr. Ralph Flynn, president, Coa- lition of American Public Employees. At this time, it is my pleasure to recognize Dr. Wolkomir and his associate. Dr. Wolkomir, you may introduce your associate and pro- ceed in your usually fine manner. It is certainly a pleasure to welcome you before the subcommittee. My span of time as chairman of the subcommittee is not as lowg as yours as a leader in the employee sec- tor, but I want the record to show that our working relationship has been a beneficial one to this committee and Members of Congress and it is a pleasure to have you with us this morning. 20) Approved For Release P2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 264 STATEMENT OF DR. NATHAN IVOLICOMIR, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES, ACCOMPANIED BY IRVING GELLER, GENERAL COUNSEL Dr. Woratomm. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, in particular for the kind words. Maybe I should let my testimony stand as is based on that introduction. To my right is Irving Geller, NFFE's general counsel. We are proud once again to appear before you, Mr. Chairman and the members of this subcommittee, and once again to share the views of the National Federation of Federal Employees on management relations with employee organizations and to review our findings and recommendations based on day-to-day observation since the promulga- tion of the. first Executive Order 10988 and based on the many years of experience prior to and after its issuance in 1962. On October 3, 1973, Mr. Chairman you introduced H.R. 10700 and stated that it would provide "a statutory base for labor management relations covering Federal employees of the executive. branch. It pre- serves for employees and their labor organizations the rights and bene- fits now enjoyed." Therein, in actuality, rests the core of the problem. The NFFE from the outset has favored legislation rather than an Executive order in this area.. We took this issue to court while other unions, now joining our stand, proclaimed the first Executive order, "the Magna Carta for labor management relations." Legislation en- acted by Congress has the force and prestige of law, not the less persuasive tactic of hearings before executive branch panels. It is not subject to whimsical revocation but Call still be amended by holding fruitful hearings whose various points; of view can be developed. statutory base provides basic rights and defends the liberties provided. We sincerely hope that a statutory base will provide, legally a true Magna Carta for employee management relations in the Federal sector. The field of public relations is too complex to be discussed lightly with a Cursory review that can be slimmed up in a simple proposition. Permit US the time for a few general remarks. Twelve years of e,xperi- en ce, in the Federal sector under Executive ,orders and the experience at the city, county, and state levels has shown that spelling out collective- bareraining procedures via legislation has tended to lessen the chances of strikes in the public sector. We are convinced, as mandated by reso- lutions at, NFFE consecutive National conventions, that a law, backed up by injunctive power and penalties, will reduce the likelihood of strikes. Others may argue that the withdrawing of services, individ- ually or collectively from a public employer is not committing an illegal act. In truth, we find that a strike in the public sector is in fact a strike against themselves where public employees are involved. In addition to the strike issue, the problems of the union or agency shop, the question of inherent management rights, budget, techno- logical changes that affect employment conditions, reorganizational structures, and the selection, promotion, and direction of personnel mongst others, are further areas of consideration. Wages, hours of work, fringe benefits, and other conditions of employment are subject to congressional action in the Federal sector. Thus there exists a Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06261A-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 dichotomy in collective bargaining where the bread and butter issues are alienated and not really bargainable. Some meaningful system must be derived to provide the public employee an opportunity to participate in other areas of concern involving his daily condition of employment including the adminis- tration of policy and perhaps policy itself. The gross class distinc- tions created by Executive orders are other points of consideration. Is the individual who supervises one other individual, or the super- visor over a secretarial pool truly management ? We believe that an inherent conflict of interest, vis-?is the management role, should be only where there is a true conflict of interest in fact. Elected or appointed officials, true policymakers, not administrators of policy, should be considered a part of management. All others should be members of a unit. In your opening statement at these hearings made on May 21, 1974, you stated, Mr. Chairman, that? Because of the experience gained by both Federal agency officials and labor organization representatives during this period?that is, 12 years?and the viability of those relationships, I now believe that it is fitting that legislation be enacted. This legislation will place the two parties on an equal footing when dealing with each other both at the negotiating table and when appearing before third parties envisaged by the bills before us. I believe that it is also of impor- tance that employees and their representatives have access to the judicial process when they have exhausted whatever administrative machinery is established. The rest of your statement is a matter of record. We purposely extracted that statement because it deals with the heart of the prob- lem. A statutory base, balanced evenly by the scales of justice for both management and employees and the right for redress before an impar- tial third party is desperately needed. You and your staff, as well as those of the members of the subcommittee, should be commended for a forthright and objective approach to a very perplexing problem. The fact that over 25 bills on the subject have been introduced in the ?93d Congress further augments the need for legislation and indicates widespread interest. In addition to the summaries of the key legislation proposed, the subcommittee also provided comparisons of Executive Order 11491 as amended with key legislation prepared by the Office of Labor Manage- ment Relations and CSC. These comparisons have provided an excel- lent source for review and an orderly procedure to pursue an in-depth coverage of all pertinent issues. It thus becomes obvious that this sub- committee realized to the fullest degree the complexity of public employee-management relations, appreciated the self-centered inter- ests of many involved, and finally provided the forum for expression. For 2 days, the chairman of the CSC/FLRC eulogized on the his- tory of labor management relations, the role and authority and need of a central administrative body, supersedure issues, merit principles, and other divisionary matters. Our purpose is not to belabor the views of entrenched management but rest our case on its own merits, using the comparison pamphlet of May 15, 1974, as our guide. We do compli- ment the Chairman of CSC for providing much data in his testimony and enclosures that we intend to use, we hope objectively. Using the format of the comparison pamphlet of May 15, 1974, by subject as itemized, we offer the following: Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 266 TITLE The Good Book teaches us that "a good name is rather to be chosen than great riches." We thus recommend that the title of the proposed legislation be changed to Federal Service -Enployee-Management Act of .1973, with the, proper subchapters noted. With no attempt to be ludicrous, we have experienced for I yea -s an attempt to emulate private sector climates in the Federal sector without providing the eeth, institution, or even the ultimate, weapons so essential to true collective ba rgaining in the private sector. In the Federal public sector, Nye deal with approximately 70 departments and agencies, each with multiple. missions and services to the pub] tc. We are public service oriented as Federal employees and are presently involved in playing at the sophistication of the art of collective bargaining by even using a title synonymous with the National Labor Relations Act as appli- cable to the private sector. We thus have, even plagiarized said act by attempting to brine- its grammatical errors into a public service oriented climate. The pro- gram even in_ title should imply a truly meaningful program?for/of,' and by Federal service employees and management. We say this with due reverence to our sister unions in the private sector. PR EA NIB tiF, We heartily concur with the preamble to ILIZ. 10700 (sec. 7101). In order to be consistent, we, recommend that the. reference in to "labor organizations" throughout the bill be changed to read "union organ- izations." POLICY We heartily recommend grave consideration be given to suggested changes to section 7103(b) (2) of H.R. 10700 and related sections of -MR. 13 and H.R. 9784. The question of supervisors is of deep concern and has caused grave problems under a series of executive orders: The, question of union representation for supervisory or management officials is one which should, be left to the sole discretion of the union. There are examples, most notably the Ride and Fitzgerad cases, in which management officials are, involvtd in disputes with agency man- Elven tent that have a bearing on the rights of all agency employees. In these instances, unions should have the option to offer its services to the employee even though he is not. indeed could not, be a member of the union because the case may afford an opportunity to take issue with an agency policy of concern to unit employees. A recent FLRe decision relating to exclusion of supervisors has created chaos throughout the Federal Service.. The breadth of the pre- sent definition is so all-encompassing that agencies are in the process of forcing large scale exclusions from employees in units all over the country. Here again the assumption seems to be that union membership requires fealty to the union and a corresponding disloyalty to the agency. The question should be: Is the employee (supervisor) an instru- ment, of agency policy? Is he in a position where he is required to make Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 :2W-RDP75B00380R000500220001-6 judgments about the implementation of policy? If not, if he is merely parceling out assignments, dividing work among employees but is not in a position to decide how much work or in what manner it will be performed he should not be excluded from the unit. If he has no significant role in the labor management relationship, in the collective bargaining relationship, he should not be excluded. That a supervisor plays a role in recommending employees for promotion is no reason for exclusion. In the private sector there are numerous examples of foremen who play a significant role in hiring. and firing employees, yet they remain participating members of the Unless there is a demonstrable conflict of interest, in fact in the two roles, we believe that all first line supervisors should be permitted to fully participate in union activity. Such a conflict of interest would exist if a supervisor found himself in a position to make a judgment on implementing a, policy of the agency in which he could reasonably be expected to confront a conflict of divided loyalty because of the contradictory policies of the union and .management. Only conflict of interest in fact, where a policymaker is involved, should be considered as a base for exclusion. The best example of this is the inherent conflict of interest faced by the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission in his role as CSC Chairman. There, independent judgment must be exercised on policy questions. Thus, because of two institutional responsibilities, divided loyalty is inevitable. The key point is that the entire body of law on supervisory exclusion has created utter chaos. Management has been given a blank check to declare that a unit member performs supervisory duties and can therefore be excluded. Our experience has been that lower level supervisors cling to the union for support. They do not consider themselves to be management officials. Thus, for purposes of legislation, the only time a supervisor should be excluded is when he has a role that can clearly be defined as mana- agerial ; that he has a stake in the role performed by the agency, not if he is merely performing a perfunctory supervisory role such as keeping attendance records or announcing the lunch hour. Further, there should not be a presumption that any employee above a certain grade is a supervisor. The burden should be on the agency to prove that he is in fact a supervisor either in a unit hearing, or if the employee is already in an exclusive, through a unit classification hearing. Pending the outcome of the hearing, the employee should re- main in the unit. DEFINITIONS Agency.?Our recommendation in this area of definition neces- sitates some explanation. No document should be written and construed in such a manner as to raise questions about the Government's willingness to establish a truly meaningful program. Fundamental changes must be carried out in order to put the parties on a more equal. footing. Second, a number of collateral policies, which as presently implemented tend to deni- grate and undercut the position .of unions, should be altered. Finally, 34 .61.9 74 IS Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 268 our experience indicates certain procedural reforms would be desirable to increase the effectiveness of the program ind to promote profes- sional ism. Section 7103 (a) (3) of H.R. 10700 is entirely to restrictive. The underlying assumption seems to be that unions are, in some way, a threat to the security of the. Federal 'Government; or that member- ship in a union re,quires of the employee a higher degree of loyalty to It than to the employer. This assumption, we believe, permeates the present program as a whole, and is the major reason for the failure of the Executive order to provide a means for employees to be effec- tively represented. We do not object to exclusions of certain agencies such as FBI, TA?alreadv excluded?and possibly DIA. These agencies clearly perform intelligence work and are concerned with national security. The problem is with the broad grant of authority to the agency head to exclude employees who he alone believes should be excluded because he believes subjectively that it is not consistent with national security requirements. While there may have been a. time, when for purposes of a cautionary approach, this grant of arthority was necessary; nothing has occurred since the implementation of any of the orders to justify the fear. Every agency has employees that perform investigative duties and audits. But in the future the agency should be required to petition the Authority as proposed in H.R. 110700 if they want to exclude these employees from participation in union activities, and the agency should carry the burden of proof in establishing, the reasons for the exclusion, or carry the burden of proof in unit hearings on the ques- tion of exclusion. The standard applied should be that only those employees directly involved in recommending and formulating labor relations policies should be excluded. The Authority should assert its function by establishing criteria which should be applied in these cases?with a strong presumption that all employees should be permitted to become union members. The union's purpose is to represent employees on matters relating to their working conditions. An employee involved in investigative work has concerns which are no different than those of other Govern- ment employees; they are concerned about promotion policies, wages, leave, travel regulations, assignments, and a number of other issues. To give such employees an opportunity to organize will in no way threaten the mission of the unit in which they are employed. The proposed bill should be amended to either eliminate the term "investigative" or define the term narrowly in an additional sub- paragraph. Further the, terms "intelligence" and "security work" should be accurately defined, and the sole judgment of the agency head should be made reviewable. In stating this, we do not imply that such exclusions are not justi- fied in some instances but rather that, as they now read, their applica- tion can result from a simple desire to avoid having to deal with a union. As stated, most agencies perform some kind of investigative work; the question is will such work be compromised by an employee's membership in a union? In short, discretion should be taken away from the agency head in this area. The slipperiness of the term "national security" should be Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06269 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 obvious to everyone by now. Moreover, we strenuously object to the implication that unions are somehow disloyal, that is, note the lan- guage of section 3a (4) of the Executive order and practically retain in section 7103 of II.R. 10700: Any bureau . . . which has a primary function of investigation or audit of the conduct or work of officials or employees of the agency for the purpose of ensuring the honesty and integrity in ?the discharge of the official duties. Only national security requirements and considerations should be of issue. The internal security aspect can be resolved to the Authority. We heartily recommend the broad definition as recommended in section 201 of H.R. 13 with the above-mentioned suggestions in mind. Employee.?Based upon our previous rationale on the definition of agency, we consider the proposed definitions of 11.R. 13, S.-351, and H.R. 9784 more appropriate and inclusive. Supervisor.?As stated under our policy recommendation, we believe that the definition of a supervisor requires substantial change to realistically denote significant supervisory responsibilities in the Federal service. The only instance wherein supervisors should be excluded from the unit is when supervision is full time ,and includes significant managerial with the full range of responsibilities which represent the final authority to affect the conditions of employment of employees within the supervision of an official. We recommend the following definition: Supervisor means an employee spending full time in his position having final authority or possessing the final recommendatory authority in the interest of an agency to hire, transfer, suspend, remove, reduce in force, promote, assign, reward, and discipline employees with responsibility to direct them, make adjust- ments to their grievances or to be the final recommendatory authority, when in connection with the foregoing the exercise of authority evidences substantial supervisory responsibilities and dscretion, thereby excludng first-level super- visors, unless they possess the full range of supervisory authority. Guard.?The separation of guards from other employees seems to be based on the 19th century notion that guards and other employees are bound to clash. Guards in the Federal sector are not Pinkerton agents. There is no right to strike which obviously reduces such a likelihood. During the entire history of the Executive order, we know of no incident which has borne out the fears implicit in the separation of guard organizations from other employees. The only basis for excluding guards from the larger overall unit should be the same as those applied to all other unit determinations. If the history of bargaining is the same and if the community of interest is the same, they should be included. Possibly we might permit the guards themselves to elect to be repre- sented in a separate unit?much as professionals do presently. But our experience has been that guards wish to be part of the overall unit; a good example is the case of Tooele. '..Moreover, the Federal Government has other protective devices, like the Executive and Federal protective services. There is no rational basis for setting guards apart from all other employees. Implicit in the reasoning behind this exclusion is the belief that unions threaten the security of Government operations. We recog- nize, though we are not sympathetic, with the complaint of manage- Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 270 nient officials that the unions create headaches; however, this is not synonymous with a threat to the stru,'tuxe of the. Government. We lwartily recommend removal of the guard definition and the removal of guard exclusion in union participation. Th.ion organizatjon.--We concur with the H.R. 10700 definition of a union organization as defined in section 7103(a) (4). Dues withhold- ing, however, should be applicable only to those unions so defined. The granting of dues withholding to an association of supervisors and man- agement as provided by sectior 21 ( b) of 1. xecutive Order 11491 is III the line of facts a clear management bias provision. Unions are re- quired to go through elaborate and expensive election recognition procedures, negotiate agreements that are costly and time consutning-, while on the other hand supervisory and management associations are handed the "holy grail" based upon an agency subjective whim or fancy. Unions are subject to the Lobbying Act and appropriate report- the others are not. ...1gency management.?The conflict of inter est clause as proposed in the H.R. 13 legislation is more definitive of the management role and is recommended for use. Authorify.--We endorse the concept and :wed for a Federal Em- ployee Relations A iitimrity. One does not have to be expert in the labor- management scene to appreciate the. implicaCons and need for an in- stitution that will do something more than just stand by while the Federal collective-barg,aining program falls n disarray. It is clearly apparent that the public interest must be protected via the principle of collective negotiation in areas of pub)ic. Sen ice limited as it is. Al- though both unions and management render lipservice to true third- party intervention. Executive, Order 11491 offered the FLRC and the .FS IP as alternatives but permitted the, reins to be held by the hands of management. The third party to the holy triumverate offered was A /SLMR. This falls far short of the authority as defined by practically all proposed legislation. On October 1967, at the hearing before the President's Review Com- inittee on Federal Employee-Management Relations, NFFE proposed fie establishment of an entirely new boa rd or agency to determine rules rid regulations and administer the employee-management cooperation 1)4.0gram?composed of three members to be. appointed by the Presi- dent, confirmed by the Congress, to fISS lint that an independent, 1100- political. nonpartisan administration wdl resia. Such board or agency will establish uniform rules and guides for all agencies, which shall be equally applicable regardless of the mission cf the agency. This will assure greater uniformity of interpretation and application of rules and guides. It will assume all of the unit determination and election functions andreview of violations of the Code af Fair Labor Practices now vested in the Department of Labor, as well as Dolicymaking and rulemaking functions to reflect fully thc, spirit and intent of the Gm-- waiment employee-management cooperation Program. In that context ,NFFE endorses sections 7104 and. '7105 of H.R. t0700. Experience has indicated. however. despite the general assumption hy the Authority of both the FLRC and A/ SLMR functions, that itemizing specific definitions of the. terms "grievance," "confidential employee," "complaint." "supervisor," "professional," et cetera, as pro ApprovedFor Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 AIA-RDP75B00380R000500220001 -6 posed by section 7103 of H.R. 10700, may seem explanatory, but could lead again to the CSC and agency restrictive interpretations. Despite, Chairman Hampton's success story that the Executive order program is changing and maturing through an evolutionary process, we are faced daily with such frustrations as a "lack of feel" by management bespeaks of interminable delays, inconsequential agreements, waste of taxpayer money on trivial and negative issues, unduly restrictive regulations, indiscriminate tagging of employees .as "supervisors" and/or "professionals," arbitrary conflict-of-interest ,determinations, et cetera. For the above and many other reasons, NFFE recommends the broad aspect coverage of definitions as spelled out in IT.R. 13 and S. 351. 'These are more receptive to the rank and file felt needs. APPLICATION For reasons previously stated, here again, we recommend the cover- age aspect as defined by H.R. 13. We do not object to exclusion of agencies which clearly perform intelligence work concerned with na- tional security. When an agency's and/or employee's mission is not national security, but concerns the security, or internal audits, et cetera of the agency itself, the agency should be required to petition the Authority for such exclusion and carry the burden of proof in establishing- the reasons for such exclusion. The standard applied, how- -ever, should affect only those employees involved and not the popula- tion. of a complete bureau or division of said agency. The Authority would thus eventually establish concrete criteria. ADMINISTRATION A.,uthority.?We emphasize NFFE's endorsement of sections 7104, 7105, 7117 of H.R. 10700. Although all proposed legislation seems to agree on the need for such an Authority, grave consideration should be ,given to the arbitrability and grievability questions becoming subject to the negotiated grievance procedure. Here again, experience has shown that clarification in the area of negotiated grievance and arbitration procedures are desperately need- ed. Just as contract negotiations should include issues covered by agency regulations, the parties should be permitted to subject disputes over agency regulations to the. negotiated grievance procedure. The only exclusion should be statutory appeal rights. In the initial stages, it would probably be best to give an employee the right to choose between the agency procedure and the grievance, procedure. While we believe it is important that the employee even- tually have a single remedy; for purposes of examining the effective- ness of the program, a choice should be given, at least until some feed- back can be _obtained. Numbers as exploited by Chairman Hampton's report do not provide, a measure of the equity involved. Subjecting interpretation of agency regulations to decision by arbi- trators will reduce employee frustration with agency appeals proce- dure. It would reduce delays, and in general result in more equitable results. Statistics show that employees win close to 50 percent of cases handled by arbitrators but the percentage is far lower in cases handled through the agency grievance procedure. It should be obvious Approved For Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/062:7pA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 that the reason for this is the conflict of interest encountered by the appeals examiners. The Civil Service Commission recently recognized the problem in reorganizing the adverse action procedure by providing for the complete independence of the appeals examiners. For the reasons stated above' we would. support a proposal to give a grievant the choice of going to an arbitrator or to the Authority to determine whether or not a grievance is subject to a negotiated griev- ance procedure. All present regulations in addition should be incorpo- rated by reference,? arbitrators within the authority structure can judge whether they are properly applied---ani then this would require' negotiations on the charges. uLp.-With reference to ULI"s, we support a change to present pro- cedures to provide, for the investigation and prosecution of unfair labor practices by tine Authority. In this connection, we would like to call to this committee's attention the present procedures followed by the DOL area offices in investigating allegations of unfair labor practices. It is our contention that if the charging party makes out a prima facie, Case., the charge should go to hearing. The area offices are conducting 'investigations in a manner which in effect, requires the charging party to plead and prove its case before, a hearing is granted. This results in interminable delays which is. particularly frustrating since the remedies available are prospective onl V. The Authority should study the possibiliti,7 of establishing a sum- mary .proceeding, similar to a temporary: restraining order, when the charging party makes a substantial showing that an unfair labor prac- tice has been committed which threatens irreparable injury. Included in this category would be unilateral cancellation of dues withholding and failure to accord appropriate recognition. The issuance of a cease-and-desist order, while useful in the afore- mentioned summary broceedings, is totally inappropriate in most un- fair labor practice situations. Prospective application is totally mean- ingless, particularly when most fact situations differ. While adverse publicity may have positive effects in some ag,3ncies, others are totally unconcerned with repeated citations for inclations. The Authority should be empowered to order remedial action. For instance, in appro- priate circumstances, reductions in force should be suspended, reassign- ments canceled and backpay awards granted. These actions, as well as others not enumerated here, are presently imposed by other agencies of the Government or by the courts. Since the Authority will be the court of last resort tp parties covered by the law, it should be exercising similar powers. The present procedure for resolving unfair labor practice complaints h totally unsatisfactory. DOL's only investigation is conducted by correspondence, which is time consuming. Whether the complaint is considered valid for a bear- ing most often depends on whether the compliance officer takes the union's submission as fact over management's :rebuttal, most often, the decision, comes from 12 to 18 months after tin ULT. And finally, tlie decision is simply a cease-and-desist order, with no chance of the com- plainant being "made whole." Further, the cease-and-desist order most often does not touch the management official who violated the order., For example, a recent ITLP ease involving an Air Force colonel was resolved by agreement between. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06031A-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 DOL and the Air Force activity; yet the cease-and-desist order was not signed by the colonel who violated the order, nor was he considered to be a party to the agreement. We might add that the so-called resolution of the ULP came 1 year after the violation. It is our considered opinion that the system must be changed to af- fect procedural reforms in this area by utilizing the following proce- dures: (a) On-site investigations immediately upon receipt of a com- plaint where a substantial showing that an unfair labor practice has been committed; (b) A summary proceeding, similar to a temporary restrain- ing order, where on-site investigation reveals that a ULP may have been committed which threatens irreparable injury ; (c) Resolutions of ULP's within a 120-day time frame; and (d) "Make whole" remedies within a reasonable time. RECOGNITION Although NFFE, for mere sake of conformity, generally takes an acceptance stand with reference to section 7106 of H.R. 10700, we of necessity must call to the committee's attention the gradual trend toward private sector recognition procedures within a service-oriented environment. A review of basic concepts is most essential if a legisla- tive or statutory base is to be utilized. The public interest and the preservation of the merit principle are of paramount importance. Only shared decisionmaking can provide an equitable forum. "Conditions of employment" defy concrete defini- tion and become even more restrictive in a collective-bargaining en- vironment involving public employees where bread and butter issues are controlled by law. Thus, the "right to be heard" via recognition procedures bears close scrutiny. Present guides implementing this subject to Federal departments and agencies concerning solicitation of membership, et cetera, are clearly contrary to the public interest. This is reflected in both FPM and DOL regulations, which establish rules for recognition and or- ganizational work. It seriously inhibits employee organizations from conducting organization drives where another employee organization has gained exclusive recognition. A majority of those voting is not a vote of a majority in a unit. We have called attention to the fact that the basic goals and pur- poses of employee-management cooperation are not achieved by this ruling. In point of fact, it has had contrary and negative results in which the Government, the public, the employees, and all unions will be and are being seriously disadvantaged. In this ruling, we have mistakenly followed rigid private sector union policy, and Federal employees have been and are being effectively denied the opportunity to choose or not to choose the employee organization they want to represent them, since it does not provide the means for true democratic orderly change. It tends to establish an iron curtain between the agency and the unions seeking to gain membership. Historically, or- ganizing always has been permitted at the installation as contrasted with the private sector concept where such practice traditionally was and is for the most part prohibited. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/061A-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 The NFFE has pointed out that the policy is unsound from the standpoint of the public, the agency, and unions concerned. Em- ployee organizations lacking exclusive recognition will be obliged to conduct solicitation and rallies and meetings outside the gates of military installations, hospitals, and other public buildings. It will encourage employee organizations to make inflammatory and exag- gerated comments regarding the agency,: opt, rating officials, and rival unions. This in fact already has occurred ani is increasing in volume and shrillness. .The present procedure, beyond doubt, has resulted in widespread misinterpretation, especially in those situations where parts of the installation are covered by exclusive recogn,tion and other segments are not. and some having several exclusives. The net effect has forced employee organizations into harsh or- ...:anizational practices including some of the, dangerous and improper acts which have for so long disfigured organizing activities in the private sector. On the. other hand, the policy previously in effect in the Federal ,-4uvice created an atmosphere, in which employee unions could prop- erly and decently provide information to employees under reasonable, open conditions?and this is a policy which should be encouraged istead of bring, in effect, repealed by the present methods. .1.t. the risk of haying the Walls of Jericho fall on us, we defy the ,-;elf-centered hue and cry of our sister ifflliatd unions by stating that though we "represent" a majority of Government employees under exclusive recognitions, they are not paying members. Thus, a large voice is not heard, not consulted witli? and is in fact intimidated by both management and the. unions. They should at least. be represented by a return to the concept of "Formal. Recognition" as it existed under Executive Order 10988. Also, iiresent policy represents a further invasion of the right of free speech as exemplified by the curious assrrance, given in the guid- a nee to agencies that employees still have the right to normal person- to-person con munica tion?a, bureaucratic ref wence which Should win onie sort of prize for egregious irony.. "We can still talk to one an- other," the N-FFE has noted wryly in commenting on this policy. Present guidance also includes an organizational-limiting provi- ,-ion, obviously included for the accommodation of entrenched Gov- ornment, employee unions and may I say, w,?. are some of them and ostensibly designed to forestall cutthroat raiding and virulent juris- dictional disputes. But its practical effect will be to handicap the 'eg-itimate and proper organizing activities of many independent Federal unions which are not. plagued by such quarrels. The introduction into the. Federal service of various bare-knuckle I ype organizing methods, taken from private sector unionism, has had widespread adverse. effects. One, result n mong -nany has been outbursts oI' bitter jurisdictional infighting by tl[e unions. Moreover, it has re- sulted in a flood of literature, some of it seurr: ions, some of it libelous, as the unions have. engaged in a no-holds-bar-ed contention for mem- bership and the winning of recognition elections. Recently, at a meeting of union -officials with some. Department of Defense inanrimunent people. there were displayed Piles of such litera- ture with i which various military installations nave been flooded. There Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/062:SIA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 are those, of course, who hold that if that kind of name-calling is an accepted fact of life in private sector unionism there is no reason why Government worker unions should not be allowed to sling mud along. with them. On the other hand, there are many members of Federal employee unions who do not regard the situations as being the same; do not relish the gutter tactics, and ar6 urging their unions to follow the high rather than the low road. There. is no doubt, also, that those who take this vieWthat there are or least should be, some important differences in modes of conduct in the public and private Sectors?run the risk of being called management stooges, members of company unions, and other cliches from the shopworn grab bag of smear phraseology. But it also is evident that the rising crescendo of attacks is having a progressively more negative effect as scores of thousands of career employees who should be members of unions are declaring "it plague on all your houses." The credibility gap for both management and the unions thus widens! Legislation should consider that all requests-for unit determinations, election or violations of the Code of Fair Labor Practices should be reviewed and decided by the Authority previously proposed to make appropriate investigations and decisions. Utilization May be made of outside arbitrators or mediators from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. However, the full-time employment of media- tors and arbitrators employed by the Authority would be preferable. to achieve greater uniformity and understanding. Methods for training- agency personnel in the principles and proce- dures of consultation, negotiation and settlement of disputes have been provided by the agencies. Such training opportunities should be af- forded equally to all employees. We appreciate:, Mr. Chairman, the ef- fort in this direction made by you, which resulted in a Comptroller General's decision which permits the granting of miserly leave to em- ployees to participate in seminars. An effort was made by the Comp- troller General to distinguish between matters of mutual interest and special interest. It is the NFFE's view that all matters pertaining to the employee-management cooperation program, other than internal. business of the employee organizations, constitutes matters of mutual interest. Certainly employee-management cooperation- does not and should not mean a Government policy of endeavoring to sweat the greatest volume of work out of its employees at the lowest possible wage. Nor should it mean, on the other hand, a union policy of the least work forthe highest possible wages. Such propositions are wholly self-serving and contrary to the paramonnt national interest. We, seek an employee management program which avoids those ex- tremes, so inimical to sound personnel administration and good gov- ernment. We, ask for equal time. with management for training, not a restrictive, 8 hours per year, as presently doled out in a "welfare State." manner. This should be clearly stipulated in the proposed legislation. We previously stated that? Th provision for a secret ballot election should be waived only in instances where two conditions are met. First, when a union submits signatures of over 50 percent of all employees in the unit and second if no other union submits a 10 percent showing of interest to challenge that showing of interest. Unions and agencies should be permitted to consolidate units only when employees in those units are given an opportunity to express their views on the matter. If signifi- cant opposition to consolidation is expressed, an election, monitored by the De- partment Of Labor should be conducted. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 276 We add some qualification to our previous statement as follows: We are concerned about phony signatures in cases where there is no intervention. Thus, no election should be, rec nired if a greater than 50 percent showing of interest is submitted, and no one intervenes except in an instance where another party challenges the validity of the signatures (even if the party does not intervene). In such an instance, it secret ballot election should be required. As for consolidations, We should amplify our statement * * * "em- ployees in those units be given an opportunity to express their views on the matter * * *" What we mean here is not an. election hut a posting indicating that there has been a request to consolidate units and that any unit mem- bers who obje,ct should do so by a certain dite, including reasons for opposition. The Authority can then weigh the objections and deter- mine whether they are sufficient in number and substance to require an election. To clarify all of the above, we offer the following as a recommended SOP under the overall recognition question: Unit hearing will be conducted at the regional level of the PERS Authority. The Authority may be petitioned to review a decision of the regional level but the Authority detelmination is 'final. What is important here is taking the unit hearings out of DOL. A unit deter- mination is probal&y the most important :3roce,dure in the field of Federal labor relations and yet, as presently conducted, these questions are resolved bv the most inexperienced individuals in the field, the area officers of DOL. The, most important aspect of the recognition section concerns the size of the units. We provide (1) no recognition will he national in scope, (2) local units shall be presumed to be the appropriate units, and (3) multiunit bargaining will be permitted on a regional basis with an additional provision for supplemental local agreements. A national or regionwide unit would be permitted if a single union represented every installation within an agency or region. This is far 'different from permitting a single union with great financial resources to ask for a national unit and thus wipe out all existing contracts. Further, the smaller unions would have difficulty in trying to conduct an effective nationwide campaign. The only justification for big units is administrative convenience for management and monolithic power for the union. Such an arrange- ment neither serves the public interest nor the interests of employees in a service-oriented environment. Concerning administrative convenience, 'agency management can deal with one union which makes them happy but if the, purpose of the Federal labor relations program was to serve the wishes of adminis- trators, we would have no -unions at all. Moreover, we hear a great deal of talk about returning decision- making power to local governments, and people. Implicit in this is the feeling that much of the alienation of modern life results from bigness and an inability to have an impact on decisions that affect our daily lives. We believe our members know what matters are most important to them and we think local management, given a free hand, can work out a mutually beneficial relation with uniors at the local level. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/062.7FIA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 The other problem with large units is the power of the union itself. -Large national unions do not serve the interests of individual ,employees but rather become power-political lobbies. While political 'power is important, strong local units do not minimize national politi- cal power and they also restore democratic vitality to the labor movement. The specter of one union representing all employees in the Federal Government is frightening from two aspects. First it should frighten the Government itself. Second, it does not bode well for unions because with the first threat to shut down, may we state, the Government, .Congress will repeal the law permitting us to organize. AGREEMENTS Collectixe bargaining.?It is important to recognize the manner in which our collective-bargaining provision intermeshes with the con- cept of strong local units. Collective bargaining at the local level should permit negotiation on all matters affecting working conditions, includ- ing contracting out, except for pay, retirement, insurance, leave, and job classifications. Local bargaining should permit coverage on prac- tices and procedures used to implement these last five items. The point -here is that local working conditions are the concern of employees and management at that level and they should be permitted to negotiate fully on issues of direct concern to them. The Authority should have final say on contracting out and the unions a right to be heard on said issue. We have excluded the five mentioned items because these issues are extremely complex and a hundred different agreements on wages, retirement, and job classifications would create an administrative nightmare. I add, we again speak of 70 agencies, including independent agencies, their subdivisions, and area bureaus. We are talking about -classification and job pay and other factors under a national type of collective 'bargaining agreement. Congress would never approve collective bargaining on these matters and the merit system would be -destroyed. Pay, insurance, retirement, job classification, and leave.?Congress retains its sole authority to legislate on these issues. But we believe -unions are entitled to a more systematic input in these areas. 11.R. 10700 does establish a separate advisory board on each of these issues modeled after the Federal Prevailing Rate Advisory Committee. These committees would submit annual reports to the Congress and appro- priate committees recommending any desirable changes in legislation. Unions and management would have separate staffs and the unions would have access to all documents in the possession of the Govern- ment to be used in preparing recommendations. This will solve a recurring problem we now face?that is the ability to make detailed systematic studies of relevant information in these areas so that we can make informed comprehensive recommendations. For instance, we might recommend that Congress got rid of Blue Cross. Board.?Experience on both the Prevailing Rate Advisory Com- mittee and on the Pay Council behooves me to state that thortab it may seem to be democratic and participating on the surface, we have found both to be cumbersome and ineffective for timely reaction. We thus recommend the provisions of H.R. 13 as more applicable to the prob- Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 278 lem. We, however, offer a substitute for the union or agency shop concept as proposed in section 701(2) of H.E. 13 as follows. Fair representation fee election.?Since. the NFFE stress for nego- tiating is at the, local unit level, we, of necessity must state the pro- cedures as outlined in section 7107 of Mt 10700 will also prove unwieldy and tend to advocate national or agency type exclusives. We recommend the creation of a fair representation fee election. After the certification of an exclusive represe:ltative, the exclusive may request an election to determine if employees in the unit must pay a representative fee to the exclusive. This election requires that an absolute majority of the employees in the unit cast an affirmative vote. The obligation of unit employees, should this election be successful, is a, monthly representation fee. However, Ile one need join the union, pay initiation fees, partake in insurance programs or operate as -union mem hers. If the fair representation fee election is unsuccessful, any employee organization in the unit with 10 percent of the employees is entitled to have dues withheld as a? labor organization. This establishes the con- cept of formal recognition. We believe that this insures democratic process. 'la the event such election is successful, aft,r I year, a petition filed. by 30 percent of the unit employees can require an election to rescind the fair representation fee. Thus, a. group with. formal. recognition. can begin to erode a strong union by taking awa:7 their fee. firSt and chal- lenging recognition after the group is weakened because of a lack of -ler vice to its mem hen-;. What we, are attempting to do here is romp nize the need for unions ( o sustain themselves when they are required. t represent all employees while at the same time insuring that only a, strong union which is orovidim.r, effective representation to all emp- oyees will be entitled to this right. The formal reeoonition con cent is :Ilse) in portent to foster union ,lemocracv. A minority union. wtili 10 pereen '7, of the employees ti.t. an. ? tistallation, will be able to sustain itself through clues checkoff and loake, certain that the ins (the, majority union provide effective repre- :.;entation or -lace a challenge The competition will be good for em- tiloyees' interests and will prevent. atropliy mid unresponsiveness on the iart of the unions. ARration.--Tt is argued that disputants to bargain seriously and in good faith when an arbitration procedure] 00ms over the deliber- ations of the parties. Admittedly this can be a problem, but if unions are denied the right to strike they must have some method to cOMpel notion by the agencies. The fact is that under 'he present. system there is, in my opinion, a complete lack of good faith by management, be- cause, in many cases. they don't care whether they ever complete a contract. One of the. reasons we. can live very easily with arbitration is our belief that unless agency management radical] alters its attitude, dis- putes which go before the authority are bound to get. objective treat- ment. We think it disgraceful that so much time it contract, negotiation is consumed by the issue of time, on the Clock for negotiations and the cost of dues withholding. This is alolutel7 preposterous. Accord"- Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/062:7&IA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 ingly we endorse. the concept that all negotiating time will be on the clock and dues checkoff will cost nothing. The fact that these issues remain unresolved in 1074 is an indication of the lack of interest the Federal Government has in a vigorous, effective labor movement. Man- agement is permitted to use Government time for all purposes at a terrific cost to the taxpayer and thus use the 40-hour half-time con- cept as a club to force union negotiators into meaningless agreements. In many cases, management purposely uses all negotiated time in exer- cising the prenegotiation agreement itself. In fact some are so trained. MayI say, I speak from experience. I don't think that anyone spends more time at training centers for management than the. NFFE does, because I have seen it in action. We feel even more strongly about this in instances where an agree- ment, exists. There the agency should be required to make an over- whelming showing at a fact finding hearing that there is a clear need to abrogate the contract provisions. Actually sections 11 and 12 of the present order invite agency abuse and underline the basic imbalance in the program. Federal Labor Relations Board.?Although the proposed Board in H.R. 10700 does provide a form of summary proceeding, the stress of day-by-day dealing seems to be left with the hierarchy of either man- agement or the unions. We wonder if another Edsel is being created by such a structure. Considering the number of policies and regula- tions issued by CSC, 70 some odd agencies, and various intermediary levels, we can visualize full-time task forces debating the proverbial angels dancing on the head of a pin. This can result in nothing but time consuming and costly battles with management representatives and unions on interpretations. For purposes of emphasis, may I say, both the Pay Council and Wage Fixing Committee have proven this. A major problem is the inability of local management to bind itself to a contract. It should be a violation of law to make any unilateral change in regulation, even where no written agreement exists. There- after the burden should be on the agency to go to the authority if questioned and the regulation should not be implemented until the case is resolved. Agencies should delegate this authority to the lowest level with all agreements stating the general prohibitions of sections 7107 ( a) ? (d) as proposed in H.R. 10700. The authority could set up an internal structure to handle the matters as proposed for the Federal Labor Relations Board. Thus only section 7107(i) would become applicable. NEGOTIATION DISPUTES AND IMPASSES Mt authorities outline the major difficulties in resolving bargain- ing disputes in the Federal sector as follows: Negotiating deadlines normally force the parties to clarify issues; and, as the deadline approaches, begin to work out an agreement with give and take on both sides. In the Federal sector there is no meaningful deadline, primarily be- cause the unions do not have the weapon of the strike. Consequently, management is often content to let the negotiations drag on intermi- nably. There is pressure on the union however, since it is threatened with the loss of dues withholding or a Challenge. They sometimes capit- ulate under the. strain, accepting essentially meaningless agreements. Approved For Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 280 The only pressure on management is the cost of litigation?a weak reed at best. We do not contend that agencies uniformly refuse to bargain, many do. However a deciSnn to do so is more a -matter of their beneficence? not union pressure. If management wishes to be hardnosed, the union is, generally hamstrung. For example, at Keesler Air 'Force Base, Miss., 37 hours was spent on the ground rules, over 9 months on the contract and even then most of the key provisions were sent either to impasse or to the council on negotiability issues. Even now we are awaiting Air Force Headquarters analysis of the issues. In the Federal Highway Administration in. Vancouver, Wash., after negotiations broke down at the local level, discussions were initiated in Washington to determine the source of the problem. That agency's head of labor relations took the position that he was seeking uniform- ity in all agreenients with activities under his jurisdiction?this was, the only reason for not accepting a union proposal. The present wording of sections 11 and 12 encourages management to avoid meaningful negotiations and consultations on literally every issue raised by the union. This comes up most often on the issuance of regulations by higher- agency authority. In the Sheppard case, the right to consultation on. personnel practices and procedures and matters affecting working. conditions was made meaningless. However, in a very recent A/S decision DCA SR?No. 372 the As-- sistant Secretary said: I reject the contention made by the activities that certification of Tess than, region wide unit would limit the scope of negotiations solely to matters within the delegated discretionary authority of the particular chief of the particular- subordinate unit. Citing United Federation of College Teachers and U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, they stated: Clearly, the order requires the parties to provide representativs who are Pm- - powered to negotiate and to enter into agreements of all matters within the scope? of negotiations in the bargaining unit. Applying that reasoning he states: Where certain labor relations and personnel policies are established by the- DCASR to provide representatives with respect to the units found appropriate- herein who are so empowered. We believe this rationale should apply to the issuance of all policy. to this extent: If there is a negotiated agreement in the unit and the regulation conflicts with the provision of the agreement, the agency should have the burden of negotiating at the local level and if 110 agreement is reached, the agency must go to the Authority before the regulation. can go into effect. If there is no agreement or the regulation is not in direct conflict with the agreement. consultation must be conclucted at the local lever before implementation and if the agency refuses to accept union roc- oimnendation it must say so in writing and provide reasons. The- Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/062;scIA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 union should then have the opportunity to appeal to the Authority as proposed in Congressman Henderson's bill H.R. 10700. Implementation must not be permitted until consultation or nego- tiations are complete. To repeat our basic philosophy, we feel little harm is done to the agency and benefits accrue to local unions and ac- tivities by granting maximum authority to the local level. Agency re-- view should be conducted on a post audit basis, or in the alternative, a. time limit should be set for agency review, at most 30 days. Post audit review is preferable. The present system underlines to both parties at the local level their relative inability to make deci- sions concerning their relationship. Agencies have been very slow to' approve contracts. In some cases it has taken as long as 6 months to reach accord. This is especially frustrating when the new contract con- tains provisions of vital importance to the local, provisions which are needed immediately for resolving longstanding problems. To have to, hold resolution of these issues in abeyance is demoralizing and frus- trating. One of the most pressing problems for national unions ia finding local lumbers who have a knowledge of and interest in the development of the Federal labor relations program. So long as these employees feel that they lack the power to affect their relationship with local management without referring most issues to a reviewing authority, this will continue to be a problem. A first step would be the elimination of the intermediate level review while permitting agency headquarters to make only a postaudit review. Contracts should be effective upon signing by the local parties. Any objections by higher authority should be argued on appeal to the Au- thority and that should be the only remedy available to the agency. Much of the reason for poor labor relations at local levels is the lack of authority. Why should activity level management, or union officials, for that matter, develop as much expertise as possible in labor rela- tions, when both parties know everything is going to be reviewed at a higher level? Our response to this question must be read in light of our previous reply to the question involving negotiability of agency regulations. It is our view that a more effective labor management relations program will be achieved as more collective bargaining power, and concur- rently, more authority and responsibility, is given to the activity level. We submit the fear that chaos in Government organization will result is unfounded; any drift in such a direction can be prevented by the retention of power by agency heads in areas of obvious direct concern to the mission of the agency and the substance of agency policy. Most issues of concern to employees regard not substantive policy ques- tions but the day-to-day difficulties of functioning as an employee in a large bureaucracy. For this reason, we believe negotiated grievance procedures should be employed to resolve disputes- of agency regulations. '7I'ypically in informing a local union that a provision must be de- leted the agency will cite FPM or agency regulations which are vague and clearly open to varying interpretations. The problem is that pres- ently, unless the union accedes, the agreement remains in limbo, unexecuted. Sfiope of bargaining.?A major bar to expanding the scope of nego- tiations is the agencies' insistence on issuing overly prescriptive regu- Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 ,;51A-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 lotions, if not at deparment level, then at intermediate command, bu- reau, regional office district, or head office level. Such actions unduly restrict, the scope of bargaining at activity level, where the vast ma- jority of negotiations occur. A good example of this practice concerns the CSC's recent move to broaden the scope of negotiations (reference FPM letter 250-2). To date, we have seen no real evidence to indicate that agencies gave the guidance anything more than a cursory glance. In fact, the vast majority of our local unions have received no consultation regarding the policy areas reflected in FPM. We. continue to be. confronted with the familiar "not negotiable." For example The social security district, office, manager cannot negotiate on merit promotion procedures, because the regional office establishes the policy. The MA School Superintendent cannot negotiate. policies on RIF, merit promotion, leave, et cetera, because the area office establishes the policy; and additionally, the Labor Relations Officer at the area office would like, all imit agreements under the office to be similar. The above are oily a few of the many examples which coud be cited. We feel that the crux of the problem centers upon the lack of meaning given by the Council to the statement: In prescribing regulations relating to personnel policies and practices and working conditions, an agency shall have due rega:x1 for the obligation imposed by paragraph (a) of this section. (Section 11,b), E.O. 11491.) The now often cited Sheppard Air Force Base ease, cut the very heart out of the order insofar as any real intent to prevent unduly restrictive regulations by the agencies ani subordinate levels of command. We urged the Council to review its policy in this area, in light of continuing efforts to unduly restrict negotiatioms. We might add that the question in the SAFB case was not whether the agency, and in turn its subordinate commands, had the right to issue regulations, but was whether in so doing, the intent of the Executive order was observed. In the SAFB case, Air Force declared "inoperative" the paragraph of the ATC regulations stating that "it could not be supplemented by ATC bases" To data this has not changed. Thus, the Council in its decision Assumed negotiability of some aspects of the merit promotion procedure, while, in fact, the ATC base's overprescription of the command regulations left no ne- gotiability to more than eight large units involving several thousand employees. We urgently recomm.ended that members of the FLRC and the staff of the Council be assigned as observers in cases of negotiation, unfair labor practice charge impasses, unit determinations and to review the paper processing and documentation involved in these matters and to review the time frame required for each oi the processes. It is ap- parent to us that the Council and its staff are formulating concepts without benefit of knowledge and experience. We sincerely hope that the provisions of sections, 7110 through 7117 of MR. 10700 eradicate some of these inequities and endorse, same. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/0tPitIA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 CONDUCT OF EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATIONS AND MANAGEMENT NFFE generally concurs with both the spirit and intent of sections 7109, 7110, and 7115 as prescribed in H.R. 10700. We heartily recom- mend however that the Authority may order an "agency to discipline a supervisor or official of an agency upon determination of arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise knowing violation of act." This was pro- vided for in section 801 of H.R. 13. Without such a provision, controls become empty shells with toothless digesting taking place. An apology posted on a bulletin board is a meaningless device, permitting re- petitive actions. Unions, however, could be subjected to revocation of both dues withholding and even recognition itself. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS NFFE concurs with most of the provisions under sections 7108, 7113, 7116, and 7117 but strongly opposes certain provisions of sec- tion 7117 (a) (2) authorizing voluntary dues allotments to associa- tions of management supervisory employees. We specified our reasons previously. They should be compelled to go through the union pro- cedures to obtain same. This is in truth management subsidy to itself. For similar reasons, we concur with the 11.11. 13 proposal?section 1301?that the Bureau of Labor Statistics or the Authority itself maintain the files, data, and publish information to interested parties. CONCLUSION Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, we extend our sincerest thanks to you and your capable staff for both the opportunity to present the NFFE viewpoint, and for the many guidelines and references provided. You have identified by the proposed legislation that the efficiency of the Government is not the sole trust of manage- ment officials and recognized the true purpose of an employee-manage- ment program. You have recognized that efficient administration of the Government is enhanced by orderly and constructive relation- ships between employee organizations and management officials. We believe that we have made constructive and forward-looking proposals of the employee-management relations program. They have been hammered out not in an ivory tower or in academic and theoreti- cal discussions but rather on the basis of long, hard, and often frus- trating pragmatic experience of more than 57 years. They are the result of our day-to-day, face-to-face dealing with the problems aris- ing out of Executive orders and with too many administrators who show little competence or initiative in handling personnel problems in a complex Government structure. We believe we have married the public interest with merit concepts. Thus, to our specific proposals presented herein we add a strong and urgent plea to this committee to take whatever steps are within its jurisdiction to impress upon Federal administrators in every depart- ment, and at every level of supervision, that employee-management cooperation means just that?and that cooperation to be meaningful must be a two-way street. Unless and until that message takes hold, throughout the Federal service, conflict and frustration inevitably will continue to be the order of the day. Approved For Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 284 We thus offer as an addendum to our testimony and in rebut to the Civil Service Commission stand, the _NFFIIIS summary and evaluation of the status of em oloyee-management rela:ions on a general agency- by-agency review. 'I 'hank you. I would like Mr. Geller to highlight twc points in the addendum. Mr. ITENnErisoN. 1_ would consent to the entire addendum being pub- lished in the, record. statmient follows:] AnnuNnt:IF Prior to a final evaluation of the various bills, 31.R. 10700, H.R. 13 and H.R. tr754, we believe it essential to furnish you with cur status report and evalua- tion of the employee-mana.gement relationship as they now exist under Executive Order 11.191, f)s amended, You have heard from .0hairman Hampton concern- ing the euphoric and idyllic conditions resulting from the administration of he Execntive Order, it is simple to say that the Chairman's facts are slightly awry and his ,onelusions equally beat. I believe it would really serve the pur- poses of this Committee to learn of the situation as it really is. It might be appropriate to begin with the Air Force by way of an illustration. Kessler Air Force Brse. located in Mississippi, and our Local at that station have been engaged in negotiations of an agreement for almost two years. A few months ago, they signed an interim agreement which put aside the really signifi- cant issues that are still pending, which number about 50. Representative of our !meal have spent 11.1proximately vir; hours each in negotiations without reaching an agreement. As I understand it, Secretary of State Kissinger spent approximately 1,30 hours in negotiations on the Mid-East dispute between Syria and Israel, a matter. I believe. more complicated than negotiations between the management of the station and our representatives. In fact, it took 55 hours of negotiations to arrive at the ground rules. . i- .dlAir Force Base a similar situatimi exists where negotiations there ilaVg been in progress for one year and a half. The President of our Local, as in the ease of Kgt.',1P1' Air Force Base, has exhausted his administrative leave ;rrid is rising his own time in dealing with management which has no incentive for reaching en agreement. In both of these situations as well as elsewhere in t he cortntrY, officials of the Locals have been subjemed to recurring harassment is reflected in poor evaluations and denial of justly-earned promotions. All of those Locals have utilized the so-called appellate system which Chairman ilampton praises as usetol mechanisms operating under the present Order. Conditions at Army aid Navy stations are not mich different. At Fort Mon- ?outli, New jersey, for example, the President of our Local previously received recurring outstanding /valuations. Accelerating activity in representing the email organization has resulted not only in the denial of the outstanding rating bat in a questioning of tho satisfactory nature of his pmformance. Ta the Department of Navy at Pascagoula. Mississippi, the local command summarily told our Loehl representatives that they could not receive a promo- tion unless and until tile7, signed a mobility statement. Our Local representatives aii,3. others suffeged deniel. of promotion due to this arbitrary and vicious denial or employe freedom and, while the appellate system worked in this instance, it took more than a year. There is serious doubt whether the loss of promotion importunity oven it' applied retroactively will alleyiati the enormous harm caused by the failure to dispense prompt justiee under an emoloyee-management system. In the Department of Transportation, and in parteular in the Federal Avia- tion Administration, our Loc-al at the Naval Aviation Federal Experimental Cen- ter bas tiled many unfair labor practice charges .again3t its management, 'The De- partment of Later after nitwit foot-dragging, sustained virtually all of the charges after abort a year of enosideration. New charges and additional charges have hen made. The had conditions complained of have :lot been altered. The poor i'mployep-management relationships persist. In the Federal Highway Administration in Vancouver. Washington, the man- agement has arbitrarily withdrawn dues withholding privileges, refused to negoti- ate on a new agreement and harasses the President m! our Local in the arrange- went of meeting dates and in insolent and arrogant treatment towards him. in the Department of ilommeree, the management at the Bureau of Census bas arbitrarily contracted out work previously palormed by employees in Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 2S5 Jeffersonville, Indiana, all the while advising the employees that such work would be performed by the government employees as heretofore. The Department of Commerce and the Bureau of Census and the local station never bothered to consult with the Local. In the Department of Interior, our organization faces an enormous burden in representing membership, particularly, in the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The administration has an avowed policy of contracting out virtually all of the operations now performed by the Bureau. This will be administered by the various tribes. Our organization has for the past three years made reasonable recom- mendations to the Bureau and to the Secretary of Interior for the placement and consideration of those thousands of dedicated employees in the Bureau of Indian Affairs to be placed in other civil service positions. We brought an unfair labor practice charge against the Secretary of the Interior, all to no avail. Although a similar case brought at a lower level in Albuquerque held in our favor. However, its application resulted in no change. This points up the inherent weak- ness of the current nominal leadership of the Federal Labor Relations Council which is headed up by the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission. It is obvious that an unfair labor practice charge brought against a Cabinet level member could hardly be sustained by an official at the Assistant Secretary of Labor rank or by the Chairman of the Civil ServiOe Commission. This illustration, in particular, demonstrates the necessity for an employee-management authority head who may not have Cabinet rank, but whose status and importance and authority would be of such nature as to overrule the decision of the Cabinet Member or the Director of the Office of Management and Budget with regard to conditions of employment of Federal employees. Much has been said in an effort to sidetrack the legislative move concerning the question as to the employment. It is obvious that both the President and the Congress and the Cabinet Members and individual Administration officials are the representatives of the government in the employer-employee relationship. The Veterans Administration, whose management activities have come under increasing question, has consistently disregarded recommendations made by our organization in the national consultation role concerning its promotion policies and in reassigning employees to other parts of the country in an arbitrary fashion. The VA employs a nomadic personnel policy system which requires employees to move about the country in order to receive promotions. This has resulted in promotion of many less qualified employees, having a resulting deterioration in efficiency as well as destroying the morale of career employees who aspire to higher positions. In Austin, Texas, our Local has filed eight unfair labor practice charges resulting in extended hearings without benefit of reconciliation or adjustment. Management has repeatedly challenged the charges made by the Local while at the same time acknowledging deficiencies in its program to process checks for veterans under the various veterans benefits programs.. In the Department of Agriculture, our organization brought an unfair labor practice charge against the Secretary based on a failure to consult in connection with the reorganization of the Forest Service. This was one instance where the Depart.ment recognized the error of its ways and adopted many of the recom- mended suggestions of our organization. On the other hand, in a similar instance involving the failure to consult regarding reductions in force in the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service Office in Des Moines, Iowa, a reduction in force was announced eliminating several positions, on which the local activity failed to consult with the organization. As a result, this matter was handled as an unfair labor practice charge long pending with the Department of Labor. The Department of Agriculture blames each higher level of the agricultural hierarchy for the failure to consult, denying employees the opportunity of knowing why actions affecting them are kept secret and denying them the opportunity to challenge the appropriateness of the action. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare instituted a new systeni for collecting and distributing dues withholding to unions holding appropriate recognition under the present Order. This resulted in enormous loss of funds and members because of an anti-union and unnecessary bureaucratic approach to a matter which had heretofore worked reasonably well. This failure to remit funds properly owing to the organization resulted in a communication to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare requesting prompt correction and including the possibility of a law suit against the Secretary for improper denial and holding of funds due our organization. This matter continues to be unresolved even though the Department's Finance Office has made some belated efforts to resolve the problem. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 286 Mr. (ELLER. We took, particularly, the. Air Force, for example. As noted in our appendix, the time required for negotiating a ..prenegotia- Lion agreement took some 55 hours and tc, negotiate this has con- sumed about 155 hours. If my memory serves me right, Secretary Kissinger spent 130 hours in the rather complex problem involving the Mideast. This, I think, highlights the difficulty in especially this agency and many of the other agencies. The record of frustration is not found me rely in the Air Force. It occurs in the other .agemcies, the military agencies, the Department of Transportation and one serious concern we have is that we find the leaders of our organizations, the presidents, are being subjected to un- warranted al: use, denied promotion opportunities. This is underscored, getting back to the Air Force, in at least seven or eight stations, 'urging from Vandenberg Air Force Base to Keesler Air Force Base to Plattsburg Air Force Base to Homestead Air Force Base and you can go around the country and find these oppressive measures being taken by the Air Force, the Department of Transpor- tation, and I would like to just point out :.n particular, the station iipar Atlantic City known mis the National Aviation Federal Experi- mental Center, where our organization has initiated perhaps 10 un- fair practice charges and in virtually every L.tistance, the Department of Labor has substantiated them in its findings. The activity of that management continues apace. The charges continue. The system_ just does not work and it does not stop the inevitable abuse that exists in the Federal serrice. These are just?one point I want to stresi, apart from the current problems that we face, is the extreme impo:tance of having as head of the authority a man or men of substantial authority. In that con- nection, we commend the chairman, in partindar, for the new dollar- ceiling type of control imposed on the Department of Defense. This does not completely solve the awesome problem occurring every day of the contracting out of governmental activities and we urge this authority be delegated substantial power to review these contract- ing out problems, especially to make judgments concerning the ()MB circular A-76. In that connection, we are faced immediately with the serious prob- lem of possible dislocation of 10,000 or 15,00() employees in the. Bureau of Indian Affairs. The Bureau and Department of Interior have an- nounced thai; beginning July 1, a very activ3 program to contract out much of the work being performed by Federal employees to the vari- ous tribes. This concerns us very much. Just highlighting that suggestion, Mr. Chairman, and 1 will close with that, is tha5 this authority the chair- man or whatever he is called, have with rgard to personnel deter- mination should be the same standing and authority as the Cabinet level, the rank now existing in the Cabinet. Dr. WoLicomut. That concludes our testimony, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much. Mr. HliNnEusoN. Dr. Wolkomir, with r?.spect to the supervisors under the proposed legislation, referring to the top of page 8 of your Statement, you speak of supervisors who cmu. reasonably be expected to confront a conflict. Then, you go on to sair only conflicts of interest, Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 ? 5IA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 in fact. Could you clarify these two thoughts and let us have your views on how we should treat supervisors who are in a position to give the appearance of a conflict of interest? Dr. WOLKOMIR. Under the present concept, of course, and the in- terpretation by the Federal Labor Relations Council, any man who performs an evaluation on another individual is a supervisor. The distinction is between what is supervisor and what is management and which individual is dealing in labor management on the policy- making level. This is at the core of our problem. When we speak of conflict of interest?I can exemplify?when I was president of my own local for 15 years, even under the original executive order, my boss never saw a conflict of interest, even though I was his adviser, in doing my union work. He had enough faith in the integrity of the individual. I was merely rendering advice as a staff representative. I wasn't making policy. He made the policy. We made recommendations to him as staff members and there is a large distinction between the man who serves on staff and has a function of making recommendation to the policymaker and the man who makes the policy. This is the grave distinction I believe, in the determination of the distinction between a so-called management individual and the individual who is merely an adminis- trator or renders suggestions in the staff function. Mr. HENDERSON. On page 10, in paragraph (d) of your statement, you say that agencies should be required to petition the authority if they want to exclude certain employees. Rather than the petition being initiated by the union, what would be your views on a procedure which would permit the agency to exclude by a labor organization? Dr. WOLKOMIR. Well, we are reversing the procedure. What we are saying is when we apply for recognition under our petition, we must include the individuals who will be covered by that particular unit. The unit has a responsibility to include the definition of the unit. If the agency disagrees, then they should have the burden of proof as to why they want to exclude the individuals and let the authority make a determination. We are reversing the procedure. Mr. HENDERSON. Would you object strongly if we reversed it the other way? Mr. GELLER. We would have no objection. As a practical matter, it would originate that way, if it would clarify that the question of the security or investigative work could be subject to determination and review by authority, the organization the union would petition the agency and start the process moving. We have no objection. ''Mr. HENDERSON. On page 12 or your statement, you recommend a definition for supervisor. Using your suggested definition, would a person who can settle a grievance or could say yes or no to an em- ployee's requesting 3 or 4 weeks' vacation, be a supervisor ?. Dr. WonKorvitrt. Not necessarily. This is merely the delegation of working up a work schedule or a relief schedule. That doesn't make that individual management. He administers certain paper forms. Mr. HENDERSON. Do you have problems with your suggestion with regard to supervisors in the Federal law as it relates to and is com- pared to the definition of supervisor or the rights of supervisors in the private sector? Let me put it another way. Admittedly, I have Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06,;8c1A-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 tended to feel that the line of drawing supervisors in the Government sector should be the same as in the private sector. Is that necessarily ? the right pla.2e. to draw the line? Dr. WOLKOMIR. Unfortunately, I must say no. The demarcation in the private sector is contingent on the contract they sign. At a series of Federal Bar Association seminars?I don't know why I inherit the panel involving supervisors and conflicts of interest?in a. study of about 28 contracts we see no clear-cut definition of what is a super- visor or management in the private sector. Mr. HEN-romsoic. Isn't the lawclear on that, though? Once you deter- mine who is a supervisor, the law is clear, Isn't it? Part of my fear with regard to drafting this legislation would be that if the legislation defined supervisor differently from that?and the effects thereof?than the National Labor Relations Act, we would get a cry prom the private sector of this country that we are going back to the situation before the enactment of section 14?A of the NLRA. DT. WOLKOMTR. If there is a possibility of a definition from the private sector' we would prefer that definition to the type of definition we have now. We would prefer the private sector type of definition to the present one in existence. Does that answer your question? Mr. HENDERSON. I think it does, because it is responsive to the con- cern I have that if we could clearly demonstrate to the private sector we were not reversing a trend or we were doing something in the public sector that could read to reverse ar of the present law--- Mr. GIELLER. Mr. Chairman, may I address myself to that. I think the problem doesn't arise in terms of the definition. The pragmatic approach to it is who has been included or excluded in the private sector. We would accept that kind of realtionship. But in the Federal Government, this structure is much larger, even than the typical pri- vate industry arrangement and you have supervisor upon supervisor. in the smaller stations, there are three, four, or five levels of super- visors. We feel in the situation, the, first level supervisor is properly in- cludable with in the ii nit. You find in the private sector, for example, a foreman, perhaps in the constriction operation. He is a member of the unit and union, with rather substantial authority to fire, hire, et cetera. Tie is included in the, unit. But the definition of a supervisor in the National Labor Relations Act is a rather strict one. So, it is observed in the breach. And it is not?and I think if we parallel that definiticn, that is a danger in in- corporating large chunks of the National Labor Relations Act in the statutory law. There are those dangers. Within the Federal Govern- ment. we have found that in any deficit size station, a first line super- visor just has the most limited authority. Mr. HENDFRSON. Dr. Wolkomir, you advocate the binding of guards together. To the extent guards are required to enforce agencies' rules and regulations with respect to other employees, would we not have a delicate or difficult relationship when a guard found himself en- forcing a rule against a Federal employee who belonged to the same unit or organization? Dr. WOLKOMIR. We presently handle dozen; of grievances involving union members against union members. To this day, we have never found it created any kind of feeling in terms of affecting the security Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 289 of the job they have. In no single instance since we have had exclusion of guards, have we come to this. Mr. HENDERSON. I Will defer to Mr. Ford. Mr. FORD. I want to move along. We have a time problem. At the beginning of your statement on page 2, you say, "Others may argue that the withdrawing of services, individually or collectively from a public employer is not committing an illegal act. In truth, we find that a strike in the public sector is in fact a strike against themselves where public employees are involved." Later on on page 5, in pointing out the problems in dealing with the National Labor Relations in the Federal sector, you say in the second paragraph of that section, "With no attempt to be ludicrous, we have experienced for 12 years an attempt to emulate private sector climates in the Federal sector without providing the teeth, institution, or even the ultimate weapons so essential to true collective bargaining in the private sector." I assume relevant weapons are strikes? Dr. WonKomia. Right. Mr. FoRD. Back on page 34 where you are talking about the negotia- tions and disputes and impasses, you talk about the problem of setting a deadline that puts pressure on the respective parties to try to get a solution to the problem. Your paragraph b says, "In the Federal sector, there is no meaning- ful deadline, primarily because the unions do not have the weapon of the strike." I seem to find inconsistency with the philosophical statement that a public employee is striking against himself and I took it to mean you are against public employees having a right to strike. Later, I see you rely or accept the proposition that without the right to strike, you are kidding yourselves if you think you can have meaningful labor rela- tions. 33 a matter of philosophy, which side are you on? Dr. WOLKOMTR. It may seem inconsistent but it isn't. We mandated that we are against the strike in the public sector. In fact, we are the only union left that does retain the no-strike clause in our constitu- tion. There is nothing inconsistent in believing a public employee should not strike against the public. He is part of the public. Second, in terms of the use of the ultimate weapon Mr. FORD. I find it inconsistent. What do you mean, nothing incon- sistent that the public employee is part of the public and, therefore, doesn't have the right to strike? Dr. Won:Komi% He is part of the public. He is striking against him- self. Who is he striking against? Ultimately, it is against the taxpayer, regardless of the supervisor or agency he is working for. In terms of relationship of what we are saying, we do not have the ultimate weap- on ; we don't have it. And until the laws says we do have it, what we are saying is concessions must be made to the employee in the pub- lic sector 'because he doesn't have the ultimate weapon and this is the contention under which we are proclaiming a need for the liberaliza- tion of collective bargaining aspects of our relations with management in the public sector. I have made the statement that because we don't have the right to strike, we should get paid more. We should be compensated for not having that right. Approved For Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 290 Mr. FORD. On the one hand, you say you 'are entitled to special con- cession because you don't have the right to strike but on the other hand, you don't want the right to strike. I think it will be hard to sell the principle to Congress we are not -asking for this right but if you deprive us of it, we want something special in Terms-- Dr. WOLKOMIR. We need a special instituton to handle labor man- agement relations in return, not what you have given us in the way of executive order. That institution should be oriented toward the public sector concept of organization. I can't yisuali2e any union sitting down and negotiating classification. I can't see any union sitting down with the diverse bureaucracy we have and 'collecti,Tely bargaining on every issue that every agency has. Mr. Folio. I am sorry to bear you say that because I think we will have to find a way to make that possible, because the -public employees are now responsible for the overwhelming majority of time loss. When you lose it, one way or the other, the taxpayer is involved, whether or not it is industrial or public operation. My own feeling, looking at it is it happens because we allow jungle warfare to continue and there are no rules. There is no way to call a strike legally and, therefore, there is no legal mechanism to deal with it. There is no definition of how you go ;bout striking or what is a proper strike or how you can 'conclude it, because striking is illegal and it prohibits anybody from officially setting the rules. As a matter of :fact, when the public strikes contrary to law occur, everybody gets together fast and fixes a kargaroo court type of ar- rangement and winks at the law from both 3ides and tries to get to some agreement. The vast majority of public strikes in this country are illegal. There are an infinitesimal number of public strikes in the last 13 years that were technically legal. There have been an infinitesimal number of strikes that have, not been successful as a weapon in the hands of the employee aganist the public and employer, whether it has been the city rubbish collectors, schoolteachers, postmen or whoever. I guess the postal strike, is the outstanding example in the Federal Government. Dr. WOLKOMTR. May I answer you, Mr. Ford, with reference-- Mr. Form. I am not trying to persuade you to be for the right to strike. I 'am suggesting you present a dilemma if you draw this kind of barrier. Mr. (ELLF,R. Congressman Ford, I think that is the challenge to us and the committee to find a constructive 'alternative to the strike. The United Steel Workers proudly proclaim along with the companies, about the no-strike provision. I think the stri.ce is passe. It may have and does have its place in the private sector. That is why we are sug- gesting very special authority and delegation of responsibility to the authority that is mentioned in virtually all the bills 'presented and give them special power. Mr. Foul). I can't agree with you that the industry, as a vehicle, is going to -have. difficulty as a unit with the indr stria] worker with Only that industry. T don't know I think that has the national contract. I belieye, one, that has the national contract. It is a kind of practical committee for employers. And the entire industry without regard to any other industry ha; reached the state of where it may ;be working Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 A roved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 291 toward an alternative. We are a long way from that in any part of the public sector. And the facts seem to indicate that each year there is a degree or a geometrical indication of public employees who resort to strike, or whatever you want to call it, as a way of bringing about pressure to settle agreements, or to get recognition for their labor organizations. Most of the long strikes are, in fact, recognition strikes, labor recognition strikes. So the fact seems to suggest that public employ- ees who get a paycheck from the Federal Government are going to live in the community with public employees at their units who are being integrated right into the strike in one fashion or another. It just seems to me naive on the part of either labor or management. Mr. GELLER. But I think you are oversimplifying this when you are talking about the proliferation of public strikes in the Federal Gov- ernment. In the past few years, there have not been any strikes. So it may be true in counties and municipalities that we are talking about, but the law for the Federal legislation accordingly does not have it. Because a public employee is a part of the public, and, therefore, he strikes against himself. He can be a state taxpayer, or a local taxpayer, or a common taxpayer, or a school taxpayer, but he is not in the same relationship to his Government as an employee would be as a Federal taxpayer. Mr. HENDERSON. I almost got the impression that you are saying that it is all right for teachers to begin to strike, but not all right for the public. Dr. Wor,nomm. It just so happens that it is that way because they are very successful in this sort of illegal strike?if I may call it that. It is akin to the fact that the Secretary of HUD was picked up bodily and thrown out of his office. And that's how minority groups got what they wanted. And it is akin to the Indians walking into the BIA to burn the building down and get what they wanted. That doesn't make it right. We could use this sort of tactic and say, "The only way to get any action today is to burn those damn buildings down." Mr. HENDERSON. That's why we passed the National Labor Rela- tions Act, because we didn't want that to happen. And since its been in effect, we have had very little compared to what the conditions were in this country in the 1920's and in the very early 1930's. That is the kind of violence that brought about the National. Labor Relations Act. Dr. Womcomnt. We have no argument with that, with the ultimate weapon in the private sector. But let's be realistic. I believe that if you were to present the right to strike as opposed by both your legislation and H.R. 13 today in Congress, we would not get anything, absolutely nothing. Let's experiment with all institution as recommended by H.R. 10700. And let's see how we can go on this count. Mr. FORD. I may say that you just mentioned my bill for the first time today. And I suppose I am a little bit disappointed. T)r. WOLICONLIR. My apology. Mr. FORD. And it is in the very final statement. And you don't give me. any advice about how I can improve H.R. 9874. I wonder if, after today, you Could take a few minutes and look it over. - Dr. Woracomut. We have, Congressman Ford, except that we find Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 292 that TI.R. 13, as a bill, is so akin to the elerr ents that we discussed, even. to the elements in the definition of which we speak, that on H.R. 13' we are really speaking about both pieces of ':egislation. Mr. num. On behalf of Mr. Brasco I will take exception for both of us. T inn wanted to ask you one quick thing. . You felt, or your description of what you can perceive as exclusive bargaining makes this somewhat puzzling to me. On page 21, you talk about encouraging the bare knuckle activity. But later you set up a system that seems to me to guarantee that you are going to have constant conflict between competing unions. I think it is a fact sometimes that competition between unions sometimes gets very emotional. And it is rougher than some people would prefer to have it become. But you suggest that after an organization such as your own achieved complete collective bargaining exclusive recogni- tion from the unit, whatever that unit might be, that any other or- ganization that has 10 percent or more of the employees willing to ts, sign up can have the right to have dues checked off. Now, doesn't this guarantee that you are going to have a min tiplicity of organizations continuing a fight within a unit to gain recognition? Now this would destroy the major industries in this country if we allowed that to happen to the private sector. My God, the automobiles would go out of business in 1 year if you, let every other organization that has tried one way or another to get into their bailiwick and come up with 10 percent and get the dues checked off and so on. Dr. WOLICOMIR. That's exactly our point. We are not in industry. We are in the service oriented concept. Mr. FORD. You have expressed great concern, as I think you should, and certainly as Congress should, for the staloility in these relation- ships from the standpoint of our obligation to the public as the formal employee representing the public as the employer of public employees. And I am saying to you, that from the standpoint from the employees to private inierpri se that they would regard the kind of procedure you have here as a very irresponsible threat to ever having labor peace. And I cannot understand, on the one band, the great concern you show for labor strife. That is, one organization against the other, or union strike, as you prefer to characterize it. And then, on the other hand, you suggest that there should be com- pletely imbedded in the legislation, a method to keep this kind of competition alive. Dr. WorKomra. Will you buy the idea that after a national election that if the majority of the Democrats are e:ected to Congress, we should throw out every Republican and only Democrats speak for the , Congress? Mr. FORD. No.. We have another election in :2 years, and let them make that choice. And under the National Labor Relations Act when union A gets exclusive bargaining, they have protecCon of that for 1 year. At the end of that year, you can have anoth?,r election, like we do for Congress, and maybe the other union will win somehow. Dr. WOLK0241TR. When the restrictions on that outlined today are so obvious no one even has an opportunity to inteject themselves when there is an exclusion of recognition today?none at all. You can't even get to the membership. You have got to meet them in bars, and in saloons, and in basements, outside installations, if you are going to pro- voke any kind of interest. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/ tit] 4 CIA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 yer:1,-nal, and not at the, necessarily, national levels because the people 1,-, we are concerned with are at the local level. And we are concerned with their immediate needs and condition. I am not going to sit in Washington, D.C. and negotiate a contract for the Government employees across the land. I'd be crazy if I tried it. We are dealing with some different concepts. We are not an industry producing an end-item. We are dealing with services, services of all kinds. And that's why we need something different. Mr. HENDERSON. Thank you very much, Dr. Wolkomir. We have some other questions the staff has prepared, and I am sure Mr. Ford has. We will ask the staff to coordinate them for you to get into the record. I will ask that the staff may insert those for the record at this point. [The following information was furnished 1. We do not subscribe to the notion that an employee should be limited to one grievance procedure. At present all agencies have a grievance procedure which permits the filing of a grievance on a wide variety of matters. These matters may also be the subject of a negotiated grievance procedure. There may, however, be deficiencies or gaps in either the agency or the negotiated procedure. Because there may be gaps or deficiencies in the procedures, it is our belief that since allow him to present his grievance in an orderly fashion. Otherwise, an employee complaints, the employee should be permitted to use that procedure which will allow him to present his grievance in an ordrly fashion. Otherwise, an employee with a legitimate grievance could be prevented from filing a grievance simply because of a lack of procedure. 2. Language such as mandatory payment or equivalent fees as a condition of employment are something different than the fair share fee that we advocate. Our requirement for achieving the fair share fee status is a severe one in that it requires a majority of the employees in a unit to vote for such fee. We believe that the result of such an election reflects a democratic determination. he CSC objection that fee is contrary to merit principles is without merit. Advancement will continue to be based on the merit system. indeed, we would suggest our concept will improve the merit system in that it will provide greater resources thereby allowing us to police the system. Political appointees to career appointments belie the belief of a pure merit system. We think the system will be improved. The CSC's objection also fails to consider the fact that merit principles are already circumscribed by policies and regulations which prevent the true func- tioning of the merit principle. For example, many agencies impose a mobility requirement on their employees as a condition for advancement. All agencies have certain "goals" or "quotas" superimposed over their employment prac- tices which are the antithesis of merit. We would suggest that if "goals" or mobility requirements can be imposed without damage to the merit system, so too can a fair share fee. 3. We believe that in order for meaningful negotiation to take place all nutters within the discretion of the head of the agency should be on the table for negotiation. This would wipe out any broad range of unnecessary regulations which are issued unilaterally by the various agencies. We do not challenge the ultimate right of management to hire, fire, promote or the accomplishing of its programs and missions. However, we believe that the method and policies adopted to carry out these functions and responsibilities must Include the oppor- tunity for negotiation on those matters which could affect the conditions of employment. Our statement that management rights could not be bargained away was intended in the context of the preceding statement. That is, certain fundamental inattors such as the mission of the agency, which is established by the Congress, cannot be bargained away. The basic charter of the agency is a matter which only the Congress could alter. Similarly, the manner in which the agency accomplishes its mission are matters which should not be bargained away. 4. In our suggestion for compulsory arbitration, we would give free rein to the arbitrator to negotiate or Impose an appropriate determination in a nego- tiation. It does not necessarily require tie suggestive method for settlement. It Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 :9 CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 If there are people who are there who are interested in what they believe, I say they should have a right just like the Republican has a right as a minority party to express themselves and have a voice in Congress. We completely eradicate this right if any union may lose an. election. Mr. Foam The largest single union in the country is the Teamsters. And it would come as a great shock to them if you are to tell them that it is impossible for an outside organization to go in where somebody else has exclusive bargaining rights to win im election. Because that's one of the ways that they have become the largest single labor organization in the country, Dr. WOLKOMITIR. But I don't want to take any of your time in dis- cussing the methods that they have used to come creeping into the Federal sector. And that's what we want to keep out of the, Federal sector. Mr. GETZ,ER. I think it is important to rt)te, Congressman, that this IS not a novel idea. This is the situation as it existed before the change in the Executive. order. And your fears: abcut what would happen just didn't happen when it was in effect. Dr. WotaKomni. Seven years. It was in effect 7 years and it was wiped. out. only because of the pressure of whom? The monolithic union. Mr. Foci). Well, presumably, whatever we ended up with, whether it was Mr. Henderson's bill, or Mr. Bra sco's or a combination of !nine and theirs, I have no idea. We are going to have a much more effective bargaining system than either Executive order provided. And that's why the question of exclusive targaining rights will be ill) pOrtant. You now have exclusive bargaining rights and the meaning of it pro- vides a situation where you have relative peace. Ono() the. people with exclusive bargaining rights really have the ability to act like a labor union representing their employees in all aspects of their labor management relationships, then you can have real competition for that privilege. You iria:7 not have had the incentive in the past. 1/r. WOLKOMTE. But we refuse to recognize the private sector concept of un ionization. And I think this is 'where we differ, basically, in our original premise. .Mr. Foal). I don't suggest that it is an idyllic system. I am simply suggesting that it doesn't make much sense for us to pretend that the last 40 years of history in labor management and the National Labor Relations Act doesn't exist, and hasn't produced for our economy a stable labor management situation that in absolutely essential to a country as diverse as this one is. And our Federal Government repre- ents the national diversity, and we are going to have to find a way to wrestle with this problem, and with some of the wisdom that was dis- played by Congress back in 1035. Dr. Wousomin. Well, we don't, want to go back to the 1.930 labor movement either. But, ba sed upon our experience under the National Labor Relations Act as amended. let's not. also inherit their mistakes. Let's, through, these years, benefit hy the mistakes, not incorporate them into the public sector. That is all we are saying. And., I believe that's why there is so much rhetoric in the testimony. And that's why we want representatives at. the local level, not at the Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 295 does not require that the arbitrator be from outside the Government. As a matter of fact, we would encourage the establishment of federally employed arbitrators or the utilization of Administrative Law Judges. The important Ingredient of settlement of impasses is to provide a speedy resolution within the Government Labor Management structure. . 5. The simple method for broadening the scope of bargaining is to permit unions to negotiate on all matters that are discretionary to the agency. On those matters that are regulated by the Civil Service Commission, a Board consisting of an equal number of Management and Union officials should sit regularly to negotiate on the issuance of the Civil Service Commission regula- tions implementing laws and Executive Orders. This Board would be chaired by a full time employee agreeable to both management and the employee organization groups. 6. Agency systems of intra-management communication and consultation with supervisors or supervisory associations should be eliminated since they appear to take on the identification of an organized relationship. Management has ample opportunity to train supervisors in whatever philoso? phy it wishes. Mr. HENonusow. We appreciate your appearance today, and I think that your presentation has been in your usual, very excellent, thought provoking manner. And I appreciate it very much. Dr. Womcomuz. And thank you very much. Mr. TIENDERsoiv. Our next witnesses are Mr. Vincent L. Connery, the national president of the National Treasury Employees Union and Mr. Ralph Flynn, president, Coalition of American Public Employees. It is our pleasure to welcome you gentlemen this morning. You may introduce your associates and then proceed. Mr. FLYNN. Thank you very much. Well, first I would like to thank you for giving us the opportunity to appear before this committee, and also to commend the committee for taking the effort to consider such an important issue of national policy. STATEMENT OF RALPH I. FLYNN, PRESIDENT, COALITION OF AMERICAN PUBLIC EMPLOYEES Mr. FLYNN. The Coalition of American Public Employees wishes to go on record in support of H.R. 9784, introduced by Mr. Ford. The coalition consists of the National Education Association, the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFL?CIO), and the National Treasury Employees Union. These or- ganizations represent 4 million public employees at the Federal, State, and local levels of government with a combined membership in excess of 2 million public employees. Our interest in sound collective bargaining legislation for Federal employees is threefold. First, as a matter of equity and sound public policy, we believe the right of public employees to collective bargain- ing should be guaranteed in law and not Executive order as adminis- trative fiat. Second, the unions within our coalition have determined. that they need collective bargaining legiSlation to meet the needs of their members in Federal service because what exists under the Exec- utive order and the patch-up remedies proposed to head off legislation are inadequate. Third, because of the ripple effect caused by the Fed- eral Government's treatment and relationship with its own employees on public employees at the State and local levels. Among the major nations of the Western World, the United States stands out as the only one without legislated rights for its public em- Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 996 ployees to bargain collectively with government. Nations and s far less stable than ours and with only a friction of our resouro shown that government can bargain collectively with its without jeopardizing its public trust. If any nation has the maturity and confidence in its own institutions to deal with its employees as responsible adults, it should be our Nation. And in our society, collec- tive bargaining is the mechanism we use to determine employment relations among adults. The most depressing quality in Chairman Hampton's extended statement to this committee was its tone of insecurity. Fear, if you will, that our Federal structure is a house of cards that could topple under pressure from its organized employees. I believe that if our sys- tem can survive Vietnam, the drug culture, and Watergate, we have nothing to fear from a collective bargaining law. The concerns ex- pressed in Commissioner Hampton's statemeiit read like a compilation of all of the hobgoblins which have been raised in State legislatures across the country in the last 10 yea rs?so 'rereignty, the impact of collective bargaining agreements on taxation, and the ultimate -clincher?the need for uninterrupted -public service. Not one of these terrible concerns has been realized where a State government has enacted public employee collective bargaining legislation. Commissioner Hampton is on more familiar ground when he balks at the proposed collective bargaining legislation because of: * * * something we dare not lose sight of. Efficiency, costs, performance, mis- sion accomplishment, management's capacity to make essential decisions and to manage?have to be accounted for to the public. am sure that every manager since time immemorial has uttered the same plea when faced with the specter of collective bargaining. But while such a position is predictable, it must be rejected. For al- though Alfred Sloane and Henry Ford said much the same thing in the mid-1930's, both G.M. and Ford would now concede that, overall, col- lective bargaining has been an asset to the indusny. The coalition is in support of H.R. 9784 because we believe that this is the best bill under consideration to give full collective-bargaining rights to Federal employees,, and incidentally, we do believe it is quite distinct from H.R. .13, as well as H.R. 10700. Perhaps the most striking feature of the bill is its provisions for resolving impasse. We believe that public Unions and public marta,ge- ment have a moral duty to exhaust every mediative remedy in their efforts to reach a settlement. However, should these good faith efforts fail, we believe that public employees have the tight to strike and the privilege to waive that right in favor of binding arbitration, should they so desire. The impasse procedures in H.R. 9'84 provide for media- tion, but, should mediation fail, the union would move on into fact- finding, retaining its right to strike, or opt for binding arbitration and waive its right to strike in that negotiation. The option for binding arbitration as contained in H.R. 9784 is an extension of the right, to strike; the union formally chooses not to exercise its right?strike, in return, for an acceptable alternative?binding arbitration. There is nothing bizarre or even untried in this mechanism to try to aceommodate, the right of public employees to strike with the fact that public employees would often prefer to go to binding arbitration Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/1v7CIA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 rather than strike. Since 1967, Canada, under its Public Service Staff Relations Act, has utilized substantially the same procedure for im- passe resolution. In April of 1973, the Public Service Staff Relations Board of Canada, under the direction of its Chairman, Mr. Finkelman, was ordered by Parliament to conduct a study of the act and to make recommendations. Between March and May of this year, Mr. Finkel- man delivered to the Government a three-volume assessment of the 7-year experience under the act with recommended changes to improve the law. Significantly, there is no recommendation to eliminate the strike/binding arbitration option. Any lingering doubt about the need for legal protection of Federal employees' rights has been dispelled in the recent lawsuit won by the National Treasury Employees Union to secure backpay for all Federal employees. Ilad NTEU nothing stronger to lean on than administra- tive fiat, there would have been no basis for a lawsuit. The coalition believes that collective-bargaining legislation for Fed- eral employees is an idea whose time has come. And H.R. 9784 would best do the job. Thank you. Mr. HENDERSON. All right, Mr. Connery, would you like to proceed at this time? STATEMENT OF VINCENT L. CONNERY, NATIONAL PRESIDENT, NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION Mr. CONNERY. Mr. Chairman, in addition to my statement, we have prepared a rather comprehensive position paper, which I would appre- ciate being introduced into the record in conjunction with my statement. Mr. HENDERSON. All right, Mr. Connery, with regard to your posi- tion paper' it will certainly be received. I would like for the committee to momentarily reserve the right to decide whether or not it should be printed in full in the hearings. But it will be very helpful to us. It is obvious, in just looking at the index, that it would be very helpful to us. Is there any other highlight of your position that you would like to take a moment or two to comment on? Mr. CONNERY. Well, I would say, Mr. Chairman, that our absolute support for H.R. 9784 is paramount in my statement. We believe it constructive in all sectors, and it would cure the wrongs, which cur- rently exist in the present program. I also go to great lengths to take issue in my statement with previous remarks of Chairman Hampton of the Civil Service Commission. And I would call attention to those areas in my statement. Mr. HENDERSON. Your prepared statement will appear at this point in the record. [The statement referred to follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT OF VINCENT L. CONNERY, NATIONAL PRESIDENT, NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION My name is Vincent L. Connery. I am President of the National Treasury Employees Union, formerly the National Association of Internal Revenue Em- ployees. Our union represents over 6(L000 employees of the Treasury Department, Approved For Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 29S including more than 90 percent of those Internal evenue Service employees who are eligible to be represented by a union. We appreciate this opportunity to present our views on the current labor rela- tions program in the Federal government and the need for collective bargaining legislation. To adequately deal with this vital and complex subject requires a great deal of time. We do not wish to belabor this Subcommittee, however, with a lengthy oral presentation. We have prepared an exhaustive analysis of the present program and detailed recommendations for the future of collective bar- gaining in the Federal sector which, I would now ask, be inserted into the hearing record. Since its inception twelve years ago, the Federal labor relations program has been governed by Executive Orders; first, ExEcutive Order 10988 and then Executive Order 11491 as amended in 1.971 by Executive Order 1161.(1. Sonic say that for more than a decade we have been engaged in a "noble experiment" which has proven so successful that it should remain as such for years to come. With the misplaced enthusiasm of a proud parent, these propagators of the present program proclaim that because the child has flourished it should never become a man. We do not believe, as Chairman Robert E. Hampton of the Civil Service Com- mission attempted to convince the Subcommittee, that the success of a labor relations program call he measured by contrived statistics extolling the number of employees represented by unions and the diversity of provisions in existing collective bargaining agreements. The true test :must be the responsiveness of the program to its stated goals. We must judge the program on the basis of whether or not it is fulfilling the promises and expectations that it has set forth for employees and their union representatives. To do this for the Federal sector, we need only fook to the preamble of Execu- tive Order 11401, which states, in part that "the well-being of employees and efficient administration of the Government are beuefited by providing employees an opportunity to participate in the formulation and implementation of person- nel policies and practices affecting the conditions of their employment." When the state of the present program is compared to his fundamental precept it is not difficult to discern how little we have progressed over tile past twelve years. Despite its declarations of high purpose, the lilxecutive Order has failed to promote or even foster true "bilateralism" in the Federal sector. Faced with he speetor of legislation, management unilaterally prffiuced Executive Order 11491, which precludes any effective voice for Federal employees and their union repre- sentatives despite its verbiage designed to give the impression of bilateralism trumpeted by its salesman, Mr. Hampton. By its terms, the Executive Order prevents employees from negotiating in areas that have a. significant impact on their job. For example, it gives management the complete right to determine areas of negotiability, to reject the terms of a collec- tive bargaining contract even though it has been agreed upon by both parties, and to decide which employees in the same office or shop are to be covered by the agreement. Such needless roadblocks on 'Federal collective bargaining are but part of the strangling restrictions being sM.d to ycu by Chairman Hampton as a model of bilateralism. Even in the minor and relatively unimportant areas which remain subject to five Order 11491, whieh states, in part, that "the well-being of employees and their unions have been so narrowly restricted as to render much of the negotia- tion process a sham. Unions have been denied the right to effectively negotiate promotion plans, assignments of work, access to inThrmation necessary to process grievances, performance evaluations, and many other matters necessary to have any real impact in a oargaining process. The result, of course, as explained in detail in our accompanying position paper, is that the rights of management reign supreme. Chairman Hampton, in appearing before this Subcommittee, sought to ;give" the impression of a wide range of negotiations taking place in the .Federal sector by citing the fact that there are 1,904 agreements in the Federal government and by presenting a laundry list of subjects contained in the contracts. What Chair- man Hampton did nor disclose is rhat the substance of these negotiations are extremely limited and have no real effect on the management-ordained person- nel regulations previously in existence at the agener or facility. In essence, then, there is no bilateralism, there is no true employee participa- tion in the "formulation and implementation of personnel policies and practices" as envisioned in the beginning some twelve long years ago. Bureaneracy has triumphed to date. Federal managers have clearly up to now, thwarted the will Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 RA-RDP75B00380R000500220001-6 of Congress, as the rest of us have always understood it, and the rights of Federal employees to negotiate on significant matters "affecting the conditions of their employment." This should occasion no surprise; the results flow directly from the built-in unbalance of the Order relative to the basic rights of the parties. The original vision of bilateralism and unbiased third-party adjudication lies in tatters, the management controls every aspect of the elaborate, but meaningless, negotiation rituals. The Executive Order provides for a Federal Labor Relations Council com- posed of the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission who serves as the Chair- man of the Council and in many respects is the Council, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the Secretary of Labor. It is the responsibility of the Council to review decisions of the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor Management Relations and to determine major policy issues concerning the labor relations program in the Federal sector, including negotiability disputes. In effects, the Council serves as the equivalent to the National Labor Relations Board in the private sector. In his testimony before this Subcommittee, Civil Service Commission Chairman Hampton described this system as providing "third-party machinery for the res- olution of disputes." Such a description, however, is not only misleading, it borders on the absurd. "Third-party machinery" to most of us means that a dis- interested party reviews an action and makes an independent evaluation and decision; certainly, no one can claim, the Council members to be disinterested parties since each is a high-ranking management official accountable directly to the President. It is impossible for these men to change their managerial hat with the hat of an impartial arbitrator in labor-management disputes simply by changing their title for a few moments a month. To have to rely upon agency heads for un- biased decision-making in union controversies with other agency officials is as dis- heartening to the unions as it would be for Federal managers to have their differences with unions adjudicated by a council of three union presidents. Even the Assistant Secretary, who is charged with the responsibility for mak- ing initial determinations in representation cases, unfair labor practice charges, and grievability and standard of conduct determinations is not an unbiased third- party. How can he perform his job in an independent manner when lie is ap- pointed by, and is directly responsible to, one of three men who sit on the appellate body which reviews all of his actions? In addition, the same situation exists with the Assistant Secretary of Labor as with the members of the Council: lie is a manager who must carry out the managerial policies of the Secretary of Labor and the President. If this is third-party machinery, or objective third- party adjudication in any sense of the word, we would prefer being left to the mercy of Mao's Red Guard. No one is taken aback that Chairman Hampton would forsee no "demonstrated need" for a major change in the present program. Certainly, Chairman Hamp- ton, having played a major role in the genesis of Executive Order 11491, has ac- complished, thus far, the purposes of the present Administration in effectively throttling the development of real collective bargaining and reasonable labor rela- tions in the Federal government. Needless to say, for bilateralism and unbiased third-party decision-making to ever have any real meaning in the Federal sector, there must be a complete alteration of the present program. As a minimum, employees must be not only guaranteed but provided impartial and objective decision-making in their disputes with management, and even more important, they must be allowed to meaning- fully participate through a system of collective bargaining in all matters, includ- ing the negotiation of pay and fringe benefits, which are of vital concern to them. In explaining the allegedly wide scope of bargaining and "bilateralism" in the Federal sector, Chairman Hampton described the present discussions for deter- mining wages for over 2 million General Schedule and military employees as a "close first cousin to collective bargaining." This is not the case. If it were, such bargaining would have been abandoned years ago as unfair to both parties. For example, I have served as one of three union Presidents who are mem- bers of the Federal Employees Pay Council for three years and, during this time, neither the President nor his Agent, who happens to be Mr. Hampton together with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, have not made any effort to establish a "bilateral" relationship with the Pay Council. The discus- sions between the Pay Council and the Agent, rather than a "close first cousin 34-019----74 20 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/063WIA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 to collective bargaining," more Closely resemble Greek theatre, where the fatal flaws of the system foredoom the result .to predictable failure. To fully appreciate the widespread unilateralism in the present pay-setting system, one need only look at the structure of .tht Federal Pay Comparability Act of 1970 and the parties involved. The President's chief budget and manage- ment officers serve as the Administration's representatives in discussions with the Council. Before they begin, the budget for the next fiscal year has already been determined as has the pay raise which is to be accorded General Schee-ale and military employees. Because there is no requirement for "true negotiations" between the Agent and the Council, any recommendation by the Council which WO Llia increase the pre-determined ligure beyond that already budgeted, has been automatically rejected by Mr. Hampton and his asscciates. Once the discussions between the Council and the Agent draw to a close, the Agent then submits its recommendation for the October adjustment to the Presi- dent, as does the Council and the President's Adviso7 Committee on Federal Pay. However, the President is not bound by the recommendations of any of the parties and since it is his Agents, which are not enly charged with submitting pay recommendations under the Comparinetity Act but also with determining he Ee.deral payroll in their capacities as terector of the Office of Management and Budget and Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, it comes as a surprise to no one as to which yearly report he has opted to implement. This system then has been doomed from the beginning. The President has been in complete and total control .of the pay-setting process. To describe this almost dictatorial authority of the President and his Agents as a "close first cousin" to anything but total itarlanism is literary license gone wild. ,When Executive Order 10988 was issued in 1962, it was hailed by many as the public employee "Magna Carta." At that time, only the State of Wisconsin had enacted legislation providing collective bargaining rights to public em- ployees. Today, more than a decade later, thirty-three states have adopted legis- lation requiring public employers to engage in: collective bargaining with all or some of its public employees. Thirteen states authorize collective bargaining by statute, Attorney General opinion, or court decision. Only nine states have failed to provide any collective bargaining rights for publ.e employees. It is truly ironic that the alleged "model employer" who spawned so much legislative activity among the states remain itself, twelve yewrs later, pith no legislation. Of all the nations in the free world, our government is the only one that has denied its workers the right to engage in full collective bargaining. Federal em- ployees have been excluded from virtually all of the benefits of a collective bar- gaining system that has enabled untold millions of public and private sector workers in this and other countries to prosper and grow. As things are, Federal employees are prohibited by statute and Executive Order from negotiating on pay, classification, workweek, retirement benefits, health and life insurance, and a liost of other bread-and-butter issues. They are also statutorily forbidden from exercis.,mg the right to strike or even to seek third-party binding arbitration in such matters as disciplinary actions. And, as we stated earlier in our testimony, even within those areas which are subject to collective bargaining, Federal enibioyees have been precluded by the Executive Order and the decisions of the 1+ steral Labor Relations Council from engaging ia full negotiations. To me, the;i inure a specter of a Federal work- force in chains than the fantasy of bilai era lism painted by Chairman Hampton. For nearly forty years, private sector workers have enjoyed the protections, rights, and benefits under a collective bargaining system that has given sub- stance to the noble principals laid down by our Founding Fathers. Postal em- ployees, school teachers, policemen, firemer., sanitation workers, and other civil servants have been granted the right to engage in full collective bargaining. There is absolutely no justification for denying to Federal employees that which bas been accorded to all others. What is necessary and beneficial to the workers in private industry and in the states in similarly so to his Federal counterpart. We are all too familiar with the preachings of those purveyors of doom and gloom who assert, among other things, that. colleclive bargaining in the Federal sector would have a devastating impact on the "merit" system, would jeopardize a Federal managers ability to manage in the publie interest, and would interfere with the "need for uninterrupted public service." 'Are deal with these arguments at length in our position paper and to them, we say at this time that years of experience in the private sector and in the states have proven that these phan- toms are more aberrational than real. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : 94X-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 These, and many other arguments against collective bargaining, have been raised by private and public sector management, as well as in state legislatures across the country, and not one of their onerous predictions has ever been realized. In point of fact, collective bargaining has proven as beneficial to industrial and state management as it has to the worker. There is no evidence whatsoever to show that the experience gained in the private and public sectors is not applicable to the Federal government or that the problems in the Federal sector are so unique as to require further "experimentation" under Executive Orders before legislation. Executive Orders may be fine for short-range interim programs, but they are ill suited to serve as the governing doctrine for a program as long-range and important as the Federal labor relations program. What is needed is a program grounded on statute which will provide Federal employees with full collective bargaining rights, including the right to strike. The total unilateral arbitrary control of the program may be seen in an occurrence just yesterday. Based upon Section 22 of the Executive Order, NTEU negotiated clauses in all its collective bargaining agreements which provides for advisory arbitration of adverse actions. This clause has been good for the govern- ment, for its decisions for the first time have been subjected to outside review rather than review by another arm of management in the form of the Civil Service Commission. Now the President of the United States, at the insistence of the CSC has issued a new Executive Order which has the effect of abolishing the negotiated advisory arbitration clauses covering 70,000 employees which we represent. Thus, we see when the CSC is even peripherally challenged, the President of the United States unilaterally comes to its assistance to the detri- ment of thousands of employees. Employees must be statutorily guaranteed the right to negotiate on matters of substance which are vital to their job rights and security; matters no pre- empted from the bargaining table by law and administrative action. They must also be assured that their disputes with management will be adjudicated by an impartial body completely independent of Federal management, and charged with administering the Federal labor relations program. None of these are unrealistic goals. Congress now has before it a bill which would grant Federal employees each of these rights. H.R. 9784 would remove Federal employees from the cave of unilateral and paternalistic management decisionmaking and permit them to join their public and private sector counter- parts in an era of enlightened bilateralism. We fully support H.R. 9784. Cer- tainly, it Would considerably improve the present labor relations program in the Federal government. H.R. 9784 provides for the creation of an independent Federal Employees Labor Relations Board which is to consist of five members appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate. Much like the National Labor Relations Board, the Federal Board would he vested with the responsibility for adminis- tering the labor relations program in the Federal government and with "pre- vent (ing) any person from engaging in any conduct in violation of this Act." In effect, it would combine the present functions of the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management Relations and the Federal Labor Relations Coun- cil, but, most importantly, it would remove them from the tenacles of manage- ment domination. To no one's surprise. Chairman Hampton strenuously objected to the creation of an independent authority when he testified before this Subcommittee. Since, as matters stand, he and two other management officials are in total control of the ma chinery under the present program, his position. while understandable, is far from fair. Yet, if fairness and eolith- to employees rather than management domination is to be the criteria, then it is an absolute necessity for the govern- ing authority in a labor-management relations program to be completely inde- pendent of both unions and management. Each of the bills now before Congress call for the creation of an independent authority to administer a Federal labor relations statute. Not one of them would retain the present umbilical cord which so closely links the Federal Labor Relations Council and the Assistant Secretary to Federal management. We believe that the Federal Employees Labor Relations Board as set forth in H.R. 9784 is manifestly the most logical and practical method of running the Federal program in an orderly and constructive fashion without prejudice to either party. In addition to establishing an independent governing authority, H.R. 9784 provides for full collective bargaining on all matters of concern to Federal Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 302 employees, including the right to negotiate On Wages and fringe benefits. The negotiations must take place at the level of exclusix e recognition. In contrast, H.R. 10700, which is presently being considered by ttis Subcommittee, seriously limits the scope of bargaining by prohibiting negotiations on wages and fringe benefits and by maintaining, with one ineffective exception, the management rights clause contained in Executive Order 11491. This sole exception concerns the issuance of changes in personnel policies by agencies other than the Defense Department. H.R. 10700 establishes, in this regard, an elaborate procedure for discussing charges in personnel policies. if the agency head seeks to change a person :net policy, then negotiations take place: however. If the policy issuance is from the Civil Service Commission or covers more than one agency, it is referred to the Federal Labor Relations Board composed of five representatives from the unions, five representatives from management, and a Chairman appointed by the Cha" rman of the Civil Service 'ominission. The Board would then meet to deterndne the merits of the proposal for change. We believe that the elaborate procedure contained in H.R. 10700 for consider- ing changes in personnel policies falls far short of employee participation in matters which affect them. Employees band together in collective action and appoint specific individuals to represent their interests. Under the procedure out- lined in H.R. 10'1'00, their designated representatives may or may not represent them on the Board. And even if on the Board, their vote may be overruled by management or other unions. This procedure is totall:t unfair and undemocratic. Elected represerrntives should be allowed to perform their function of repre- senting the interests of their constituents. Tri addition, we cannot support H.R. 10700 for it would simply perpetuate many of the inequities that undermine the present labor-relations program. Not only does this bill forbid negotiations on wages and frirge benefits, the expansive management rights clause would exclude from corlective bargaining almost every matter of importance to Federal employees. The continuation of such a clause merely Increases employee frustration over taeir inability to have any voice in matters which directly affect them. There is considerable experience in the private sector as well as in the states which warrants the conclusion that the place for a management rights clause lies in collective bargaining agreement itself and int in an Inflexible statute. Certainly. this is so, since subjects which were not 2onsidere0 appropriate for collective bargaining in 1935 are now common at collective bargaining tables. Our world is much too complex and fast-changing to limit the subject of col- lective bargaining by a statutory management right.; clause which could very well be outdated within the year. The Congress itself has recognized this in previous legislation. The Postal Reorganization Act sets forth a specific list of management rights but goes on to provide that each of these rights are subject to alteration through collective bargaining. Quite rightly. Congress concluded in this Act that collective bargain- ing rather than statutorily mandated management rights is the appropriate method for ensuring problem solving. In his testimony before this Subcommitteo, Chairman Hampton raised the serious question of how could the Congress turn over the authority for economic benefits, classification, and other conditions of employment to 3400 separate bargaining units. He characterized the alleged problem of having Federal em- ployees who perform identical functions, but yet *nal receive different pay and fringe benefits, as an ominous threat to the public and the power of Congress. However, a close analysis of this issue, as set forth in our position paper reveals that Chairman Hampton's "problem" is totally illusory and like the tinman in the Wizard of Oz---has neither substance nor heart. What irony that Chairman Hampton should be t le man to bring this up! The Commission, itself, from the very beginning directed Federal agencies not to recognize large units and, in fact, ordered a policy which would insure small, fragmented units of recognition. We, and other Federal employee unions, have attempted to consolidate small units of recognition into larger units so that we could effectively negotiate with management. However, we were denied this right by Mr. Hampton who now seeks to use this as,: an issue to preclude full negotiations in the Federal sector. lb e that as it may, the proliferation of bargaining units has not deterred unit negotiations in the states, municipalities, or even in the Federally controlled Tennessee Valley Authority. As a matter of fact, the State of Michigan. which Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/063091A-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 has a very sophisticated labor relations program covering public employees, presently has 3500 collective bargaining contracts in 1400 units of government. No state or municipality which engages in unit bargaining has collapsed because of the existence of numerous collective bargaining units. Nor has any state legis- lature resisted legislation on the basis that it would be unable to conduct negoti- ations on the unit level. H.R. 9784 defines an appropriate bargaining unit in the same terms as the present Executive Order: community of interests, effective dealings, and effi- ciency of operations. This definition strikes a reasonable balance between units which are so large that individuals cannot participate in the bargaining process and units which are so small that they are impossible to administer. It recog- nizes that like-situated employees will better understand their own problems and press their unique need as well as the desire for direct participation which causes employees to form their own organization rather than become part of a larger organization in which they may feel themselves strangers. We do not believe that the Federal government would in any way be harmed because Federal employees performing essentially the same work chose to receive ,different pay and fringe benefits. After all, the essence of collective bargaining is participation; and if employees in one unit decide to negotiate working con- ditions and pay which differ from that of another group of employees, we think they should be allowed to do so. For example, employees in Del City, Oklahoma, may be satisfied with a lower salary and a higher employee contribution to a pension plan than employees in New York City who wish a higher salary and a lower employer contribution. Also, employees who must drive their own vehicles on government business may desire a higher mileage reimbursement rate and a lower salary than employees who remain strictly in the office. The examples are endless, but the point is clear: unit bargaining recognizes diversity and the divergent needs of employees; whereas, employee participation on a government-wide basis may very well fail to satisfy the needs of any of the employees. Chairman Hampton also claims that the supersedure of existing laws and regulations by a collective bargaining statute which permits full negotiations in all areas of concern to employees would create havoc within the Federal govern- ment. Once again, he cites no proof of this claim. Da fact, numerous state legis- latures have faced and resolved this problem as did the Congress itself in the Postal Reorganization Act. It is apparent that Chairman Hampton is not familiar with either the provisions or experience of the Postal Reorganization Act which contains protective provisions for the continuance of compensation and benefits and other terms and conditions of employment in effect prior to the implemen- tation date of the law. The Postal Reorganization Act provides that compensation, benefits, and terms and conditions of employment will continue to apply unless changed through collective bargaining, with the proviso that any change in fringe benefits "must result in a program of fringe benefits which is not less favorable on the whole than the fringe benefits in effect on the effective date of the law." In addition, Postal employees continue to be covered under the Federal Employees Compen- ,sation Act and the Civil Service Retirement system. Thus, the question of supersedure was resolved in the Postal Reorganization Act by retaining some statutes in total such as the Civil Service Retirement Act and the Federal workman's compensation law, while other statutes were estab- lished as the base from which negotiations could begin. We believe that this is a fair and just procedure and would strongly recommend that it be incorporated into the Federal labor relations statute. Included in H.R. 9784 is a provision establishing an agency shop, whereby, those who elect not to join a union must pay a fee equivalent to the amount of memilers' dues. The agency shop is a widely accepted doctrine in the private sector and we know of no good reason why it should not be authorized in the Federal sector. As a problem-solving mechanism, collective bargaining assumes that unions are free to act, and have the wherewithal to act. A union must have the security and policy making stability that flow from the fact that policy and strategy decisions affecting all employees in the bargaining unit have been sanctioned by a union membership that is coextensive with the bargaining unit. And it must have the financial stability resulting when the costs entailed in exercising its responsibilities are shared by all employees in that unit. Approved For Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/06,. CIA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 304 Like Chairman Hampton, opponents of the concept of an agency shop have traditionally charged that it is discriminatory, that it disrupts the "merit principal," and that it: violates an employee's right to work. These specious arguments are dealt with at length in our position paper. It is sufficient to say here that when viewed against court decisions and a realistic appraisal of work- ing conditions in the Federal sector, they prove to be just as groundless as other charges which have been levelled against full ,!ollective bargaining in the. Federal sector. One of the most nefarious provisions in H.R. 10710 stipulates that although a union has exchasive recognition in a unit it is merely "entitled to represent and bargain collectively for employees in the unit." Thii clause has been interpreted by the sponsor of H.R. 10700 to mean that a union could negotiate a collective bargaining agreement covering only members. We are convinced that this provi- sion would lead to great instability and completely undermine the collective bargaining process. All an agency need do is conduct long and expensive nego- tiations for the benefit of union members and then grant the same benefits to non-members through regulation. This portion of H.R. 10700 could have the effect of discouraging membership in unions and ending all union activity in the Federal government Coupled with the expanded right of negotiation must be the right to strike. For the past several years, the incidence of strik es by public employees has been very much on the increase. Experience has taught us that the hoary adage that strikes ;ire intolerable merely because of the ;mblic nature of government work is no longer acceptable. Strikes by Federal employees are both thinkable and tolerable. .A.ppeals to a rather amorphous "public interest" can no longer sustain a blanket prohibition against any strikes, under any circumstances, by any class of Federal employees. The public interest does not support such a prohibition; nor does the public itself. This is evinced quite clearly from the experience of the letter carriers and the air traffi?aintrollers. To permit Federal employees the right, to strike would not open the floodgates to wholesale work stoppages. All experience in the states has proven otherwise. In these states wIrich have granted public employees the right to strike, the in- (lence of atrikes has greatly diminished. Nor need t Oe right to strike invite dis- ruption of vita), affairs of state. Even in the priva a, sector the right to strike is not absolute ; it is subject to regulation. Strikes may lie delayed on an appropriate showing and enjoined where Ihey threaten a bona fide national emergency. The strike provision in H.R. 9784 builds on the experience of the states and, most particularly, the experience of the Canadian government. H.R. 9784 pro- vides that either pa rty may declare an impasse to esist and request the Federal: Mediation and Conciliation Service to appoint a it ediator, If the mediator is subsequently unable to resolve the outstanding issues within fifteen days. the parties would select a fact-finder with the power to make findings of fact and to recommend terms of settlement. Before the fact-finder's report is issued, the union would decide whether the recommendations are to be landing or only advisory. If the recommendations are binding, the unions would be prohibited from engaging in a. strike. If only advisory, the unions could strike. However, the employer may obtain an injunction against the strike if it "poses a clear and present danger to the public health or safety which in all relevant circumstances it is in the best public interest to prevent." We believe that the right to strike as provided in H.R. 9754 is fair and equitable to hath employees and manage- ment while at the same time protecting the public interest. In describing the Canadian system in a report issued by fl Subcommittee of the House Post Office and Civil Service Committe, Congressman Charles A. Wilson stated: The visit to Canada clearly showed the success of the Canadian law. The net result: Is more responsive management awl more responsible union leadership In Canada this system has proven to be a realistic and effective method of promoting equality between labor aner management while guard- ing against capricious, lengthy. and debilitating strikes. The Italian, German. and. French Constitutions guarantee the right of public employees to strike. Sweden, Norway, and Denmark authorize such by statute. In Latin America. the right to strike by government employees is recognized by most countries. Mexico. our cloeest neighbor, has the right to strike by constitutional amendment. In fact, the only two modern indus- trialized nations that prohibit their governmens employees from engaging Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500220001-6 Approved For Release 2001/09/0%65CIA-RDP751300380R000500220001-6 in lawful strikes are the United States of America and Russia. In fact, two' of our own States, IIawaii, and Pennsylvania, have a limited right to strike for State and local employees. There are many arguments both for and against the right to strike, but as Judge Wright said in a district court decision involving postal employ- ees: 'sit is by no means clear to me that the right to strike is not fundamental. A union that never strikes, or which can never make a credible threat to, strike, may wither away to ineffectiveness." The arguments against granting the right to strike to Federal employees are grounded in sand. Its antagonists consider that Federal employees owe a special duty to the sovereign and that a strike is a heretic action against His Majesty. They also argue that the Federal government, unlike private industry, performs essential functions that cannot be disrupted; that there is lacking in the govern- ment a profit motive which forces the public employer into an unequal bargain. in posture; and that if public employees have the right to strike they can exert disproportionate pressure in the political arena. We believe that a careful analysis of these arguments will prove them each to be specious at best. For example, a truckers strike, which is legal, could have a far more damaging effect on our economy than a strike among government printers. Economic and market restraints have the same effect in controlling public sector strikes as they do in the private sector. In both instances, employees are faced with the loss of wages and the possibility of their work being contracted out. And, we all know, that private sector unions are just as active, if not more so, in the legislative process than are public sector unions. In sum, H.R. 9784-would grant Federal employees the sante rights and benefits that have been accorded the overwhelming majority of public and private sector workers. Federal employees have been discriminated against for far too long. They are ready and fully prepared for true negotiations on all issues that affect their interests. Now is the time to bring full collective bargaining and impartial decision-makin