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May 6, 1974
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Approved For Release 2001/08/30 ? CIA-RDP76118003e000500290006-4 May 6, 1974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENA cept of reciprocity is introduced into diplomacy. In my view, it is time we drew the line, recognized we cannot be all things to all men, and introduced a bit of reality into these proceedings. Therefore, I will shortly present to ? this chamber a bill that would prohibit the shipment of goods or services from U.S. firms either here or abroad to U.S.- owned firms in other countries being forced to do business with Castro's Cuba. My bill would put the teeth back in the trading with the enemy act and take U.S.-owned companies out of the position of establishing foreign policy for this country. This measure would stipulate our posi- tion without interfering with any other nation's right to self-determination. Passage of this bill would make it crys- tal clear to all concerned that we have no intention of changing our policy to- ward Cuba until such time as Cuba changes her policy toward the rest of the hemisphere. That may sound like harsh medicine, but harsh medicine seems to be what is required. If the choice lies between corporate profits and the cause of freedom in the Western Hemisphere, there can be no doubt, and I think most every corporate executive would agree with me on this, that the cause of freedom must prevail. For our sakes and for the sake of the freedom- loving Cuban people, I hope that ConJ gress will take the steps necessary to see that it does. NEW HAMPSHIRE BANK COMMIS- SIONER SPEAKS OUT ON FEDERAL INTEREST RATE CONTROLS Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, the distinguished New Hampshire State Bank Commissioner, Mr. James W. Nel- son, recently commented on the manner In which Federal interest rate controls, commonly referred to as "Regulation Q," work against the best interest of the small saver. I share Jim Nelson's feelings on the un- fair impact that Regulation Q has on the average saver and have also spoken out against this Federal policy. Federal interest rate controls were orig- inally enacted in the hope that their existence would tend EC hold down in- terest rates on loans and particularly with regard to mortgages. Our exper ence, however, his been just the opposi and we find ourselves in a situa whereby the small saver is receivi q,an unrealistically low return on his o ary savings during a period of rec high Interest rates. These interest rate cont only ap- ply to savings accounts o 00,000 or less and, in effect, allow wealthy to obtain a fair market p s for his sav- ings and, at the same e, the smaller saver is held to a .imum 5-percent interest on his savin account at a com- mercial bank and 4 percent on a reg- ular savings acc t in thrift institu- tions. These pre t interest rate maxi- mums are tota unrealistic and cannot be justified. I compliment Commissioner Nelson for the Public position he has taken and re- quest unanimous consent that an article appearing in the Saturday, April 27 edi- tion, of the Nashua Telegraph be printed in the Recoils. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Recoao, as follows: NEW HAMPSHIRE BANK COMMISSIONER HITS FEDERAL RESTRICTIONS CONCORD, N.H.?New Hampshire Bank Commissioner James W. Nelson said today federal restrictions on the interest paid on savings accounts give an unfair advantage to the rich. His pet peeve, and what he sees as the big problem today in the struggle by banks to attract investment money, is federal Reg- ulation Q. It sets a limit of 5 per cent for the interest commercial banks may pay on ordinary savings accounts, 5.25 per cent for savings institutions. "Reegulation Q is undemocratic in that It places at a disadvantage the little fellow," Nelson said. "Regulation Q is undemocratic in that can pay in interest, but there is no maxi- mum prescribed on deposits of $100,000 or more. Someone with that kind of money can go in and bargain with the bank. A man with 6100,000 to invest can probably get a 10 per cent on a certificate of deposit," said. Besides favoring the rich, Nelson Regulation Q drives savings money ay from banks because the federal gove ent itself offers a more attractive rate per cent interest or more on some of secu- rities. But that 8 per cent is only f ose who can buy in units of $1,000?o ore, if the bills available on a given da ppen to be in units of $10,000 or more, aid. If banks can't attract gh money at going interest rates fro vers, they lack money to loan out?or Ye to bargain with big investors for muc '-'gher rates, and in turn will have to oh high loan interest rates, Nelson explai Bank security h een in New Hampshire headlines as the erstate highway system makes it possib ? or big city hoodlums to rob formerly I cessible banks and get out of New Ramp e again quickly. "I myself der if we have to go back to the old t ank we had at the turn of the century," th tellers separated from the public metal and stone counters and grilles. son said. "If lers can stay behind bullet proof glass d have access to police through an ala system, that's all you can do," he said. PUBLIC PROTECTION e outlined the department's purpose as rotecting the public interest by securing e safety and soundness of banks and by promoting competition." Nelson said the last time a bank failed in New Hampshire was in 1953 when the Valley Trust Co. of Penacook closed. It said it had made loans "considerably over the legal limit" and some loan recipients went bankrupt. The commissioner said New Hampshire's law limiting branch banks to those within 15 miles of the headquarters bank had helped prevent takeover of the banking in- dustry by out-of-state giants. Nelson got into banking during the de- pression when he worked for the New Hamp- shire Savings Bank Association, a forerunner of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. "All the savings banks in the state banded to- gether for mutual protection. It liquidated seven banks and paid off 100 cents on the dollar on them," he said, making New Hamp- shire one of the states least hurt by bank closings. Nelson joined the Banking Department in 1942 as an examiner, became deputy com- missioner in 1952, and was made commis- sioner in 1968. S 7113 Nelson recalls when his disgust w h leek of money as a musician drove him in r. bank- ing. Early in the Depression, he w playing clarinet with a band doing a T nksgiving Eve dance at the armory in Tro N.Y., on a 60-40 profit split with the ma gement. "When the dance was over e found the management had run off wit I the money. We didn't have a darn pe . We collected five ginger ale bottles, t ed them in for 25 cents at a grocery stor and had five-cent hamburgers and a cup coffee at a White Tower. That was our anksgiving." Nelson said. DEATH OF LEAVES A OF LA IN VIRG LES C. STANLEY GE VOID IN RANKS LEADERSHIP AND HEARTS OF WEST ANS Mr. NDOLPH. Mr. President, on Frid May 3, one of the ablest labor lea s of our Nation died unexpectedly, 1 ng his friends and associates cked and saddened. Miles Stanley, esident of the West Virginia Labor ederation, was a gentleman and a labor union statesman. His life exemplified character and compassion and courage. His dedicated leadership, in a broad range of worker, community, and educa- tion interests was the hallmark of his arduous career. His commitment to that cause which he thought was right and in the public welfare was never in doubt. He presented his case always with earnest- ness but without rancor. Miles devoted more than half of his life as an advocate for the well-being of those who toil. He gained wide respect among his adversaries by his gentle manner and reasoned presentations. At the age of 49, Miles Stanley stood at the pinnacle of achievement in his ef- forts on behalf of the people of our State and region. In the early 1960's, President Kennedy and our State officials turned to this vigorous and selfless man to help spearhead the endeavors to assess the ills of Appalachia and recommend corrective action. From these studies came the basic structure of legislation creating the Appalachian Regional Commission and similar economic development bodies across the country. In 1964, Miles was instrumental in creating the AFL-CIO Appalachian Council, an organization composed of State central bodies in a multi-State region. Its purpose, he wrote? Is to aid the Appalachian poor and secure to disadvantaged regional inhabitants, to the extent possible, the realization of their full economic and cultural potential. Working in cooperation with employ- ers and funded by the Manpower Admin- istration of the U.S. Departfnent of La- bor and the Office of ...Education, the Council has in the past 5 years recruited nearly 20,000 youth to Job Corps Centers and placed more than 14,000 other trainees in jobs at minimal costs. Last week, only hours before he was felled by a massive heart attack, Miles was scheduled to meet with Members of Congress as a member of the board of the Appalachia Educational Laboratory. This is a research and development or- ganization he supported strongly because of his belief that in education lies the Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500290006-4 :19 q Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP751300380R000500290006-4 S 7114 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE Way 6, 1974 key to progress for t loved mountains. Miles Stanley was the laborer because the ranks and und and aspirations. He bor movement for m beginning his career serving .as recording union local. After enlis Army in World War civilian life and becarn local in the United America. He was electe children of his be- true champion of (wed up through tood their needs active in the la- than 31 years, machinist and retary of his service in the he returned to n officer Cf his elworkers of ocal president In 1947. After serving in a n positions with the Stee elected the first presicl Labor Federation in 19 merger of the America Labor and the Congre Organizations. Miles Stanley was bor est home of loving pa Kanawha County. He tive of that community, his service and dedica movemer t extended to councils of labor. A Meany, who selected ant in 1965, has descr the most promising St the union, and I. W. the United Steelwor death "a tragic loss fo State of West Virginia ment and, in partic Steelworkers of Ameni the Senate Labor an Committee valued his Miles Stanley was m I recall that when he his father brought him I was speaking in Dun shook hands with me beginning of a valued f This morning in Dun his wife, Romaleda, th tens, and his mother, ley. Mike was truly a C his values are reflec knit family, devotion, standing. The passing of Miles a large void in the rank ship and in the hearts ginians vat? shared his human freedom and h all Americans. ber of official rkers, he was Of the State following the Federation of of Industrial a very inod- ts in Dunbar, a lifelong na- t the scope of to the ::ablor internat io:nal 0 Presj.dent s as an assist- hirmas one of presidents in , president of , termed his e Nation, the e labor move- r, the United " Members of blic Welfare nsel. erished friend. s 10 years old, meet me when r. Young Miles that was the ndship. , I visited with three dough- Worthy Stan- stian man and in his closely e, and under- Stanley leaves f labor leader- all West Vir- ncern for the an dignity of QUORUM d Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr esident. I sug- gest the absence of a uorum. The ACTING PRE PENT pro tem- pore. The: clerk will c the roll. The second as'sista legislative clerk proceeded to call the r I. Mr. THURMOND. President, 1: ask unanimous consent th the order for the quorum call be rescin d. The PRESIDING ? CER. Without objection it is so or ? erect DEFENSE SUPPLEMENTAL APPRO- PRIAT EON AUTHORIZATION ACT. 1974 The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tent- pore. Under the previous order, the l3en- ate will now proceed to the consideration of S. 2999, which will be stated. The ASSISTANT LESISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (S. 2999) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1974 for procure- ment of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, and other weep- () is and research, development, test and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to stithorize construction at certain instal- lations, and for other purposes, which was reported from the Committee on Armed Services with an amendment to strike out all after tkle enacting clause and insert: TITLE I?PROCUREMENT SEC. 101. In addition so the funds author- ized to be appropriated under Public Law 9e-tes there is hereby authorized to be ap- propriated during fiscal year 1974 for the use of the Armed Forces of she United States for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval ves- sels, tracked combat vehicles, and other weapons authorized by law, in amounts as follows: AIRCRAFT For aircraft: for the Army, $15,000,000; for the Navy and the Marine Corps, $37,500,000; RA' the Air 'Force, $120,900,000. MISSILES For missiles: for the Army, $47,100,000; for the Navy, $17,000,C00; for the Marine Carps, $22,300,010; for the Air Force, $22,- 900,000. ? TRACKED COMBAT VEHICLES For tracked combat vehicles: for the Army, $ 2,000,000. OTHER WEAPONS For other weapons: for, the Army, $8,000,- 000. AUTHORIZATION TO TRANSFER FUNDS SEC. 102. In addition to the funds author- ized to be appropriated under section 101 of this Act, there are authorized to be made available by transfer during the fiscal year 1974 to the Departmen; of Defense, out of any unexpended funds appropriated under the heading "Emergency Security Assistance its* Israel" in title IV of the Foreign Assist- ance and Related Pros;rams Appropriation Al, 1974, the following amounts: Alums ET For aircraft: for the Navy and the Marine Csrps, $63,600,010; for the Air Force, $33,- 900,000. MISSILES For missiles: for the Army, $19,200,000. TRACKED COME/IT VEHICLES For tracked combat vehicles: for the Army, $58,900,000. OTHER WEAPONS For the weapons; for the Army, $200,000. TITLE II?RESEARC/1, DEVELOPMENT. TEST AND EVALUATION SEC. 201. In addition to the funds au- thorized to be appropriated under Public Law 93-155, these is hereby authorized to be appropriated during the fiscal year 1974, for the use of the ,Armed Forces of the United Ssates for research, deselopment, test and evaluation, as authorized by law, in amounts as follows: For the Army, $35,898.000. For the Navy (including the Marine C?srps), $33,523,000; For the Air Force, $29,466,000; and For the Defense Agencies, $5,016,000. TITLE III?MILITARY CONSTRUCTION SEC. 301. In addition to the funds au- tLorized to be appropriated under Public Law 93-166,, there ils hereby authorized to be appropriated during the fiscal year 1974 for use by the Secretary of Defense, or his des- ignee, for military family housing, for operating expenses and maintenance of real property In s'apport of military family hous- ing, an amount not to exceed $3,866,000. SEC. 302. The authorization contained in this title shall be subject to the authoriza- tions and limitations of the Military Con- struction Authorization Act, 1974 (Public Law 93-166), in the same manner as if such authorization had been included an that Act. This Act may be cited se the "Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriation Au- thorization Alt, 1974". The ACTNG PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. The time for debate on this bill is limited to 3 hours, to be equally divided and controlled by the majority and mi- nority leaders or their designees, with a limitation cl:! 30 minutes on any amend- ment, except an amendment to be offered by the Senasor from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY), on which there is a limita- tion of 1 hour, and any debatable motion or appeal. Who yields time? Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of s quorum. The ACT:IIG PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. On whose time? Mr. THURMOND. Without the time being charged to either side. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. Is there objection? The Chair hears none. The clerk will call the roll. The secor.d assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The ACT:ENG PRESIDENT pro tern- pore. Without objection, it is so ordered. Who yields time? Mr. MANineeaLD. I yield myself such time as I need on the bill. Mr. President, what is the pending business? The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern- pore. S. 2990 is the pending business. Mr. MANSFIELD. What is the title of that business? The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. S. 2999 is a bill to authorize appro- priations during the fiscal year 1974 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, and other weapons and research, develop- ment, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to authorize construction at certain installations, and for other pur- poses.. Mr. MANSFIELD. I (lid not expect to get the full treatment. but I appreciate It. [Laughter). Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent that debate on the amendment to be offered by the distinguished senior Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KEN- NEDY) begin at the hour of 2 p.m. today. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. MANSFIELD. That 1 hour be al- located on the amendment, and an hour and a half to be equally divided under the previous unanimous-consent agree- ment. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, if the Senator from Montana will yield, I will not object, but just on that amendment alone, to be equally divided between the author of the amendment and the Sen- ator from Mississippi, is that right? Mr. MANSeatILD. That is correct. Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500290006-4 May 6, 1974 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500290006-4 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 7115 Mr. ertmtis. I thank the Senator very much. The ACTING. PRESIDENT pro tern- pore. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. 1N8FThL1J In other words, the vote on the Keim4xly amendment will occur not later than the hour of 3:3-0 p.m. today. I thank the Chair and the manager of the bill. ? Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the follow- ing people may have the privilege of the floor during the discussion: of this bill: John Goldsmith, Catherine 'Nelson, Don Lynch, Nancy Berg, Edward Braswell, Clark McFadden, and Edward Kenny. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern- Pore. Without objection, it is so or- dered: Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, the Senate now begins consideration of S. 2999, the supplemental military pro- curement authorization bill for fiscal year 1974. At the request of Chairman STENNIS, I chaired the hearings on this particular legislation and will handle the bill at this time on the floor. The committee is recommending a total authorization of $415,474,000. This is a reduction of $841,981,000 from the re- quest of $1,257,455,000, a reduction of 67 percent from the request. Before outlining the major items in this bill, I would comment on the gener- ally acknowledged purpose of a supple- mental request. The Office of Manage- ment and Budget's own guidelines for submitting supplementals to Congress are as follows: No supplemental or amendment (or in- crease in limitation) will be considered unless the matter is of sufficient urgency to warrant Immediate action. Another general premise for request- ing a supplemental is that subsequent ac- tions by Congress have created additional costs which cannot be absorbed within existing funding; also, that the funding of these additional costs cannot be de- layed until the next fiscal year. The items requested in this legislatien were judged by the committee in accord- ance with these "supplemental criteria" as well as on their merits; and we con- cluded that many of the programs for which funds were requested did not meet the qualification of "sufficient urgency to warrant immediate action." In an effort to conserve time, may we point out that there is before each Mem- ber a copy of Senate Report 93-781. It discusses all the aspects of the pending legislation, and we would hope each Member would refer to this report with regard to specific details. The committee hearings on this sup- plemental are also available to each rie4er I would 'hope that as many Members as possible would read this important re- port, Mr. President, because I note that only two or three Senators are in the Chamber at this time. The purpose of this statement is to pre- sent the highlights Of this legislation as approved by the committee. MIDDLE EAST PAYBACK Included in this supplemental request Is $155.8 million for what is known as the Middle East payback?the difference between what Israel would pay for the equipment the United States shipped to them and the cost of the new equipment that our forces must by to replenish our own inventory. The committee recommends language in this bill which authorizes the transfer of that $155.8 million for the $2.2 billion already funded under the military assist- ance program account as "Emergency Security Assistance for Israel." The issue being addressed is not the amount that is charged to Israel or any . other foreign country for equipment pro- vided out of U.S. inventory, but rather in which account the actual replacement costs are funded. At the time the committee marked up the supplemental request, the Defense Department advised with respect to the $2.2 billion that? Cast data are not. yet complete, but it is estimated that these additional approvals (of defense articles and services for sale) will bring the dollar value of items approved and/ or supplied to Israel since 8 October to ap- proximately $1.5 billion. In that some $700 million of the total approved had not yet been either obli- gated or identified for obligation, the committee felt that the additional incre- mental costs should be borne by the mili- tary assistance program?MAP?ac- count. The committee fully supports the re- quirement to replace equipment provided to Israel; however, the committee does not agree that the replacement costs should be borne by the military depart, ments and has included a new section 102 authorizing transfer of the $155.8 mil- lion from the "Emergency Security As- sistance for Israel." DIEGO GARCIA The committee deferred without prej- udice the $29 million requested to up- grade U.S. Navy and Air Force facilities on the British-owned island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. It is the committee's view that testi- mony did not indicate any great urgency in this matter. Moreover, because of the complexity of this issue from both a for- eign and military policy standpoint, plus the fact there is yet no signed written agreement with the British, who own the island, regarding the status and use of this island, the committee deemed it pru- dent to defer the matter for more thor- ough examination in the fiscal year 1975 military construction authorization bill. TRIDENT ADVANCE PROCUREMENT The committee also recommends de- ferral without prejudice of the $24.8 mil- lion request for long leadtime compo- nents for two Trident submarines in fiscal year 1975, for the following rea- sons: In action on the regular fiscal year 1974 defense bill, Congress denied long lead funding for more than a one Trident program for fiscal year 1975. The contract award for the Trident submarine has slipped. The Defense Department is now rec- ommending backfit of the Trident I mis- sile into the Poseidon. Development funding for a new and smaller ballistic submarine, the Narwhal, is now being requested. The leadtime for materials and equip- ment has increased dramatically. Navy shipbuilding programs continue to exhibit delays and cost increases. The peacetime backlog of shipbuilding is at an alltime high, and the billions upon billions of dollars involved should be watched with more care. INCREASED AIRLIFT CAPABILITY Programs associated with increased airlift capability in the supplemental are, first, 40 million for the C-141 stretch pro- gram; second, $108.9 million for C-5A/ C-141 increased war readiness replenish- ment spares; and, third, $19 million for the Civil Reserve Air Fleet modification. The committee decided that sufficient data had not been supplied to make an. intelligent judgment as to both the urgency and the merit of the programs in question and, therefore, recommends that consideration of these programs be deferred until review of the regular fiscal year 1975 budget request. It should be pointed out that funds re- quested for these programs in this sup- plemental, when combined with other programs in this same category recom- mended in the fiscal year 1975 budget, could exceed $3 billion. In particular, it is the committee's view that the Civil Reserve Air Fleet modifi- cation, which involves the modification of existing commercial airlines with fea- tures that in a contingency would permit their use as cargo carriers, should be de- ferred because the Air Force, the Depart- ment of Transportation, and the Office of Management and Budget are still working on legislation which the Air Force counsel has recommended be en- acted prior to implementation of any such program. MILITARY ASSISTANCE SERVICE FUNDED AUTHORITY The committee recommends denial of a requested increase in the fiscal year 1974 ceiling on obligations from the $1.126 billion voted last year to $1.6 bil- lion, because a thorough examination of this program by the committee staff determined that statistical obligations for ammunition which was delivered in prior fiscal years should not have been charged against the fiscal year 1974 ceiling limitation. This "statistical" reporting method re- sulted in the reporting during fiscal year 1974 of a $266 million obligation for am- munition that was actually delivered to South Vietnam in either fiscal year 1972 or fiscal year 1973, and thus reduced the real amount of support available in fiscal year 1974 to $860 million. Based on congressional action last year however, it would appear the intent was to provide sufficient obligational author- ity so as to permit obligation of new fiscal year 1974 funds?$907.5 million? plus unobligated funds?approximately $200 million estimated by Defense at that time. The committee, therefore, points out Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500290006-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500290006-4 S 7116 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE May 6, .1974' that the Defense Department could make a change in its bookkeeping proce- dures which would enable obligation of an additional $266 million of already ap- propriated but unobligated prior year funds during fiscal year 1974, without increasing the current fiscal year 1974 ceiling. The statistical method of reporting may have been valid when United States forces and South Vietnam forces were supported by a common pipeline. How- ever, since U.S. forces have been with- drawn, statistical reporting is completely unsatisfactory. I wish to add that the De- partment of Defense fully agrees that their cost-accounting records in this sit- uation were, to put it mildly, "cockeyed." The Department of Defense should change its method of reporting obliga- tions under the ammunition program from a statistical basis to a more realistic basis as soon as possible. This concludes a summary of the highlights of this bill. All of the recom- mendations contained in the committee report were adopted unanimously, and the bill w as reported accordingly. I would like to take this opportunity to extend my thanks to Chairman STENNIS, Senator THIJRAIOND, the rank- ing minority member of the committee, and to the entire membership of the committee for their cooperation during consideration of this legislation. In addition, I would like to express my appreciation to the staff for their fine assistancS in reviewing this rather wide- ranging legislation in terms of types of programs; covered. Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President the Senate Armed Services Committee re- ports to the Senate today on the fiscal year 1974 supplemental defense author- ization bill, S. 2999, which contains $571.3 million in new authorization. The administration requested ape rox- imately $1.6 million in new authority and the committee approved about one- third of that sum. A summary of the funds requested by title and the arrtouts approved follows: lln millions of dollars! Request Approved Procurement 1,007.1 458.5 Research and ievelopment....... _ 217.5 108.9 Construction _ 32.9 3.9 Vietnam aid (MASI (4740) Of the $458.5 million approved by the committee in the procurement request, the committee directed that $155.8 mil- lion, known as the Middle East payback account, be financed from the $2.2 bil- lion already authorized for emergency security assistance to Israel. The $155.8 million represents the difference in the cost to the United States for replace- ment of Items transferred to Israel dur- ing the October war period. In the research and development ac- count the -committee approved $108.9 million to cover the October 1973 classi- fied civilian pay raises. The other $108.5 million requested as a "readiness" sup- plemental was denied on the grounds that the programs for which these funds were requested Were not of sufficient ur- gency to justify inclusion in the supple- mental, In the military construction account the $29 million requested for the naval buildup on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean was denied without prejudice. The committee concluded that a buildup of this nature was of sufficient impor- tance to justify more thorough examina- tion in the regular procurement process for the fiscal year 1975 program. The final item in the bill involved the Vietnam aid program which is shown as the military assietence service funded account. The administration requested that the ceiling be lifted from the $1.126 billion approved last year to the $1.6 billion requested in the original fiscal year 1974 account. In denying the in- crease in the ceiling the committee did approve a change in fiscal year account- ing. This change would provide an addi- tional $266 minion expenditure under the $1.126 billion ceiling with a simple accounting adj ustmen t. Mr. President, this matter may be ex- plained by noting that $266 million paid out in fiscal year 1972 and 1973 for am- munition was charged against the $1.126 billion ceiling authorized for 1974. Thus the committee would allow that the $266 million be shifted back to the ac- counts during the period when the ex- penditure actually took place. This pro- cedure would allow the administration an additional $266 million in fiscal year 1974. These funds weuld go chiefly for ammunition, but also for some aircraft replacement and operation and main- tenance. Military support costs have ex- ceeded expectations, because South Viet- namese forces have met unforeseen Communist attacks in the current fiscal year. Mr. President, frankly, it is my view the committee was too severe in its paring 03: the fiscal year 1974 supplemental re- quest. The Middle East war which came in October of 1973 resulted in a depletion of many U.S. supplies. The war has taught 1.1,3 some lessons which require prompt actions such as acquiring certain types of new equipment and modifying some equipment already on hand. Mr. President, it would have been my view that more of the approximately $1.0 billion authority requested by the administration should have been ap- proved. However, I support this bill as presented to the Senate, and urge its prompt passage: In closing, Mr. President, I want to express my sincere appreciation to the able and distinguished chairman of the subcommittee, Mr. SYMINGTON, for the splendid report he has given, which is very thorough: and also for his unfailing courtesy in the handling of this matter. I would also like to express my appre- ciation to majority counsel, Mr. Lynch, who worked on the bill with Mr. Ken- ney, minority counsel both of whom did fine job. Mr. SYMINGTION. Mr. President. I suggest the absence of a quorum. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro teal- pore. The clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. THITIMOND. Mr President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, I simply want to ask whether th3 committee was in full agreement on this report or not. Mr. THURMOND. We are in agree- ment on the report. Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I suggest the :absence of a quorum. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. The clerk will cult the roll. The legislative clerk proceeded to eall the roll. Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern- pore. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I yield the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee all the time that he desires. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern- pore. The Senator from Mississippi. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Missouri. I shall use only about 5 minutes. As I understand it, this is time on the bill, and not with reference to the so- called Kennedy amendment. I shall defer my discussion of that until later. Mr. President, the record shows al- ready, but I repeat now, that I requested the Senator from Missmari (Mr. Syenero- TON) to act as chairman for the purpose of handling this supplemental bill. He conducted the hearings, the markup, and is in charge of the bill on the floor today. The Senator, as my colleagues will re- call, handled the authorization bill last year, for fiscal 1974, and this is a supple- mental bill to the fiscal 1974 authoriza- tion. So he has continued the fine work that he did lest year on the 1974' budget, and I want t) thank him?for myself and for the membership of the committee-- for his work and efforts on the legisla- tive items last year and this one, too. I do fully support the bill before the Senate today as reported by the com- mittee. Subatantial cuts were made in this bill. The committee took the posi- tion that no item should be included un- less it met the strict test of need for funding on ,an emergency basis, without waiting for regular consideration in the fiscal 1975 bill. I want to emphasize that point to the Senate. Congress must protect itself from a supplemental bill for this, and a sup- plemental bill for that, and for every- thing that any department of the Gov- ernment may want, just so they can get the Budget 33ureau's approval. We spend about 11 months of our time out of each 12, here in session now. I am not com- plaining about that, except I complain to this extent: that it keeps us away from our home States away from our constituents, and awes from the prob- lems of those constituents far too much in the course of a year. We are trying to meet that problem by having periodic recesses, which sometimes are called vacations. 'They are the very opposite of a vacation. - Anyway, I shall not dwell on that now. Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500290006-4 c? , MgY 6, 1974 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDF'75B00380R0005002.90006-4 CONGRtSSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE S 7117 We just think it should be the rule that committees shall not take up matters as an emergency?and that is what a supplemental 'bill is?unless they are really emergencies. One of the Trident submarines, for in- stance, Was deferred without preffidice for the forthcoming regular authoriza- tion bill, a ndthat was true with reference to other items that just were not emer- gencies. The Diego Garcia project in the Indian Ocean is certainly not an emergency to the extent that it has to be acted on now rather than 6 to 8 weeks later, or even 4 to 5 weeks later. So those matters were taken out of the bill. I trust that thaf meets the ap- proval of the Senate and tifose items will not be brought up in this bill, but will cOme in for their part of consideration, debate, and votes in the regular annual bill. _ I think the Senator from Missouri has spoken, hi his opening statement, for the committee with one exception, to which I shall refer briefly. He held the hearings and had a very good considera- tion of this matter around the table, and it was marked up on the basis of an active consideration. I also want to pay J'thy respects and my thanks to the Appropriations Com- mittee of the senate. They would not let themselves be pushed forward, or pushed around, either, With reference to items that were 'left out of the bill, but said they would have to have an express au- thorization before they would take up matters like Diego Cia.rcia, the extra Tri- dent, and other matters. I think that is really the way to ap- proach legislation here. Any other sys- ter, except on a real emergency basis, will create chaokand is not to be toler- ated by this body. Mr. President, there will be an amend- ment considered this afternoon. I shall not discuss the merits of it now. It is the so-called Kennedy amendment, with reference to the $266 million for military aid in South Vietnam. ft is not new money. That item will Toe fully debated here this afternoon. The committee ap- proved language regarding that money, and I shall support the position of the committee in that. I thank the Senator for yielding time to me on the bill, and I gladly yield the floor. - Mr. STIVIINGTON. Mr. President, I would like to say to the able Senator from Missouri what a privilege it is to work with him and for him in these mat- ters. I had the opportunity of having it last year, and again this year. He is very Lair and very sincere in his position, which impresses us all as we take up what could be the most important part of this year's budget. I thank him for what he has said about the efforts 3 have made to han- dle this matter to his satisfaction, and I look forward to discussing this afternoon the one relatively minor difference we have. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern- pore. The clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. COOK. Mr. President, I ask unan- imous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. ? The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Who yields time? Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Kentucky as much time as he desires on the bill. Mr. COOK. I thank the distinguished majority leader. CAMPAIGN FINANCING Mr. COOK. Mr. President, the Sen- ate recently passed and sent to the House S. 3044, a bill which would provide for the public financing of Federal primary and general election campaigns as well as significant campaign reform which we had previously passed in S. 372. I think the record will show that I supported the principle advanced by this bill when It was first introduced in the Rules Com- mittee and reported favorably by this committee to the Senate floor. I was one of 20 Members who, along with other Senators, signed the first cloture petition and spoke against the filibuster so that the bill could be voted on on the floor of the Senate. Unfortunately, during the lengthy de- bate during which some 100 amendments Were submitted, the bill was weakened, and I felt in clear conscience that I was forced to withdraw my support. One of the amendments adopted which gave me concern was the requirement that the income tax returns of Federal employees whose salary exceeded $20,000 a year would be subject to audit. I did not feel that we had given this matter sufficient consideration before voting for its adop- tion. Accordingly, immediately following the passage of this legislation, I addressed a letter to the Comptroller General to determine the estimated cost of this leg- islation and have now received a reply which I would like to place in the RECORD. The Comptroller General informs me that he estimates there are approximate- ly 312,000 employees and officials?in- cluding military personnel?of the Fed- eral Government having a gross income in excess of $20,000 a year. Section 503 of S. 3044 would require that each of these returns would be subject to audit. The Comptroller General states that his office has no experience in auditing in- come tax returns; however, in consulta- tion with the Internal Revenue Service he has found that a cost of $66.64 is standard for a detailed audit of tax re- turns of a gross income range of $10,000 to $50,000 a year. He assumes that the GAO could perform this audit at the same cost as the IRS estimates that on this basis the audit for 1 year would cost nearly $21,000,000. This figure does not include the added space rental, equip- ment, travel and so forth. He further as- sumes that the estimated cost for 1 year will have to be multiplied by five to arrive at a figure for auditing each re- turn submitted during the 5-year period and arrives at an estimated cost of $105,000,000 plus space rental, equip- ment, travel, and so forth. Mr: PreSident, there is ample argu- ment for the complete audit of the re- turns of a candidate for Federal office, and if this requirement becomes law, I will, of course, be very happy to comply with the provisions._ However, I cannot see how the auditing of the funds of a lieutenant colonel who is stationed in France, or an air force pilot who is flying in Alaska, can in any way have an im- pact on good or poor campaign proce- dures. Neither do I believe that the gen- eral public wishes to incur a cost of $105,- 000,000 to audit such returns. Mr. President, I favor the reform of our present method of conducting our Federal election campaigns. I believe that the provisions contained in S. 343 passed by the Senate to shorten the pe- riod during which these campaigns are held would go a long way to reduce the cost of the campaign itself. I also believe that the provisions of S. 372 to estab- lish significant checks and balances for the conduct of campaigns will satisfy many of the deficiencies which we now find in our procedures, and I urge my colleagues in the House to act expe- diently on these measures. Mr. President, I ask unanimous, con- sent that the text of the reply to my let- ter to the Comptroller General be printed in tht RECORD. -There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, Washington, D.C., May 3, 1974. Hon. MARLOW W. COOK, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C. DEAR SENATOR COOK: Reference is made to your inquiry concerning the cost to the General Accounting Office to carry out sec- tion 503 of S. 3044, the "Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974", which was passed by the Senate on April 11. Section 503 requires the Comptroller Gen- eral on or before July 1 of each and every year hereafter to make an intensive inspec- tion and audit of the income tax returns filed by each Member of Congress and each em- ployee or official of the executive, judicial and legislative branch whose gross income for the most`recent year exceeds $20,000, for the five previous years. We estimate that at present there are ap- proximately 312,000 employees and officials (including military personnel) of the Fed- eral- Government having a gross income in excess of $20,000 per year and therefore sub- ject to the audit requirements of section 503. We have had no experience in auditing income tax returns. However, we have con- sulted with the Internal Revenue Service and have found that its experience shows a cost of $66.64 for a detailed audit of a tax return with a gross income range of $10,000 to $50,000. Assuming the GAO could perform its work at the same cost as IRS, we estimate that an audit for one year of 312,000 returns would cost nearly $21 million. To that figure must be added space rental, equipment, travel, etc. We have not been able to make an estimate of the audit of the previous four years. It is conceivable that some economies could be brought about by auditing five years of returns at one-time but we have no experience upon which to base an estimate of any economies that might be achieved. Therefore, we have to assume that our esti- mated cost for one year would have to be multiplied by five to arrive at a figure for auditing each return submitted during a Approved For Release 2001/08/30: CIA-RDP75B00380R0005002130006-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500290006-4 S 7118 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE May 6,, 1974 five year period- This would raise the first year audit coat to 4105 million plus space rental, eqtdpinent, travel, etc. We de not think it is appropriate to re- quire the GAG to peelers:a the auditing work width le already the re:poem-Minty of the Internal Revenue Service, parttoularly In view of the eubstalitial expense inn:lived. and we are, therefoie. oppesed to the enact- ment of section 503 in ite present forra. The GAO on its own initiative his not been able to make any reviews of the audits performed by the IRS of taxpayers' returns.. It is the position of the IRS, with which we do not egret. that no matter involving the administration of the Internal Revenue laws can be efecialiky before the GAO and there- fore GM) Ime no audit responsiloilite. The Corernistioner of IRS in a letter to the Comptroller General dated June 0, 1968, stated: "* * I must note that the (chief counsel. IRS) opinion holds that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is barred by Section 6408 and 110,2g of the Internal Revenue Code from allowing any of your represeni Wives to review any documents that peiteirt to the administration of the Internal Revenue laws. Thus, Federal tax returns and related records can be made available to you only where the matter otteially before GAO does not MvolVe adordnistratIon of those laws." We are making sonim reviews of Ind' op- erations for the Joint Committee on In- ternal Revenue Taxation which involve the administration of the tax laws. Under this arrangement the IRS has given us complete cooperation but we are considered as per- forming work as agents of the Joint Com- mittee rather than performing work on our own initiative. As an alternative to section 503, the Con- gress could makes it clear that the GAO has the authority to audit the work performed by the IRS and the GAO could then make periodic reviews of the audit performed by the kierviee on individual incoina tax returns. Sincerely yours ELM= B. STAAT&, Comptroller Genera/. of Use United Stater. Mr. COOK. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern- pore. On whose time? Mr. MANSFIELD. On, the bill. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern- pore. On whose time? Mr. MANSFIELD. On the bill--the time to be charged to both sides. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk Neill call the refl. The assistance legislative clerk pro- ceeded to call the roll. Mr, MANSFIELD. Mr. President, e ask unanknoes consent that the order for the quorturx call be rescinded. The ACTING pitzsivairr Pre ;erne pore. Without objection, it is so ordered, MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT Messages in writing from the President of the United States were communicated to the Senate by Mr. Hefting, one Of his secretaries. ST. LAWRENCE SEAWAY DE- VELOPMENT CORPORATION RE- PORT---MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore (Mr. Nrnor) laid before the Senate a message from the President of the United States submitting the annual re- port for 1973 of the St. Lawrence Sea- way Development Corporation, which, with the accompanying report, was re- ferred to the Committee on Public Works., The message is as follows: To the Congress of the United States: I herewith transmit the St. Lawrence ,Seaway Development Corporation's An- nual Report for 1913. This report has been prepared in accordance with Sec- tion 10 of Public Law 83-358, as amended, and covers the period January 1, 1973, through December 31, 1973. RICHARD NIXON. THE WHITE ROUSE, May 6, 1974. eeEPORT OF THE UNITED STATES- JAPAN ODOPERATTVE MEDICAL SCIENCE PROGRAM?MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern- pore (Mr: lemen) laid before the Senate a message from the President of the United States submitting the annual report of the United States-Japan Cooperative Medical Science Program, which, with the accompanying report, was referred to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. The message is as follows: Yo the Congress of the United States: I am pleased to send to the Congress the Seventh Annual Report of the United States-Japan Cooperative Medi- can. Science Program. This joint research effort in the bio- medical. sciences, undertaken in 1965 following a meeting between the Prime Minister of, Japan and the President of the United States, continues to focus upon diseases of both worldwide Impor- tance and of special significance to the peoples of Asia: cholera, environmentally induced diseases, leprosy, malnutrition, the parasitic diseases .elariasis and schis- tosomiasis, tuberculosis, and the viral diseases dengue and rabies. The sustained success of this biomedi- cal research program reflects its care- ful management and the strong commit- ment of both nations to its continuation. The increasingly effective research plan- ning and communication between inves- tigators, ill our two countries has intensi- fied our scientific productivity and strengthened our detfrmination to work together toward better health for all mankind. RICHARD NIXON. TIIX WHITE HOUSE,. May 6, 1974. .....??????????^ON11111111 EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED As in executive session, the Acting President pro tempore (Mr. NUNN) laid before the Senate messages from the President of the United States submit- ting sundry nominations which were re- ferred to the appropriate committees. (The nominations received today are printed at the end of the Senate pro- ceedings.) RECESS TO 1 P.M. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move that the Senate stand in recess mi- til the hour of 1 p.m. The motion was agreed to; and at 11:50 a.m. the Senate took a recess until 1 p.m., at which time the Senate reas- sembled when called to order by the Pre- siding Officer (Mr. Melenente). Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President. I suggest the absence of a quorum and ask unanimous consent, that the time not be charged against ether side on the bill. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is ,so ordered., and the clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. RECESS TO L:30 P.M. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand in recess until 1:30 p.m. today. There being no objection, at 1:08 p.m., the Senate took a recess until 1:30 pan., at which time the Senate reassembled when called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. Mclerreae) . MILITARY PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATIONS, 1974 The Senate continued with the con- sideration of the bill to authorize aP- propriatiorui during the fiscal year 1974 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles. and other weapons and research, develop- ment, test and evaluation for the Armed' Forces, and to authorize construction at certain installations, and for other pur- poses. Mr. McGeeE. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. (Mr. MC- INTYRE) . On whose time? Mr. MeGle.E. Equally divided. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk Will call the roll. The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. ROBERT C. EYED. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING CeFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT ON S. ell, POSTAL SERVICE Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President. I make the following unanimous consent request, conditioned on the approtval of Mr. BEALL and Mr. JAVITS: I ask unanimous consent that at suce time as. Calendar Order No. 737, S. 411, a bill to amend title 39, United States Code, relating to the Postal Service, is called up and made the pending busi- ness before ethe Senate, there be a time limitation thereon of 3 hours, to be equal- ly divided tetween 'Mr. McGee and Mr. FONG; that there be a ti ne limitation on any amendment thereto of 30 minutes: that there be a time limitation on debat- able motions or appeals of 20 minutes: and that the agreement be in the usual form. Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500290006-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500290006-4 May 6, 1974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, re- serving the right to object, would this in any way interfere with the matter which was being discussed in the cloak room? Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. This would in no way interfere with that. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, ask unanimous consent that at 10 o'clock Thursday morning the Senate proceed to the considerations of S. 411. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. ORDER TO PROCEED TO RESUME CONSIDERATION OF S. 2986, IN- TERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY ACT OF 1972, ON THURSDAY NEXT Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that upon the disposition of S. 4 on Thursday, the Senate then proceed to the considera- tion of S. 2986, a bill to authorize appro- priations to carry out the provisions of the International Economic Policy Act of 1972, as amended. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. ORDER TO CONSIDER, S. 3267, EMER- GENCY ENDRO Y BILL, A.ND EDU- CATION 13ILL ON WEDNESDAY NE= Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that on Wednesday, the Senate proceed, at the hour of 10 a.m., to consider Calendar Order No. 758, S. 3267, a bill toprovide standby emergency authority to assure that the essential energy needs of the United States are met, and for other purposes, and that at no later than 3 p.m., the Senate take up a bill to amend and extend certain acts relating to elementary and secondary education programs. I ask unanimous consent that at no later than 3 p.m. it be in order for the leadership to call up either of the two elementary and secondary education bills on the Calendar. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. ROBERT 'C. BYRD. I think that about -wraps up my unanimous-consent requests. It would mean that on Wednesday at 10 the Senate would proceed to the con- sideration of the energy bill, S. 3267, and would debate that bill until about 3 P.m" at which time the leadership would then lay the energy bill aside? and take up one of the elementary-secondary education bills. In other words, the Senate would operate on a double track. On Thursday, the Senate, at 10 o'clock In the morning, would begin considera- tion of the postal service bill, S. 411, un- der a time limitation agreement. Upon the disposition of that bill, the Senate would take up S. 2986, upon which an order has previously been entered lay- ing it over until Thursday. That is a bill to authorize appropriations to carry out the provisions of the International Eco- nomic Policy Act of 1972. ORDER POR LAYING EDUCATION BILL ASIDE THURSDAY Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that on Thurs- day, the then unfinished business, which would be one of the education bills, be laid aside temporarily until the disposi- tion of S. 411 and S. 2986?neither which we will complete?or until the close of business that day, whichever is the earlier. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, on behalf of the leadership on both sides of the aisle, I yield 2 minutes to the dis- tinguished Senator from Wyoming (Mr. McGss). Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I take this opportunity to say only a brief word about the pending matter. The Commit- tee on Appropriations and the appropri- ate subcommittee, of which I am a mem- ber, have gone into great detail on the examination and merits of this partic- ular request for the $266 million to be validated as a procedural operation. The money has already been authorized in 1972 and 1973, and this proposal is sim- ply to enable the adjustment of the dis- crepancies that occurred at that time. It has nothing to do with making new mon- eys available. It has only to do with add- ing equity in the procedural mechanisms that at first brought up the question re- garding the money. I think it would be unwise for the Sen- ate to strike down this pending request only for the reason that the commit- ments and the procedures entered had already been undertaken and the proc- ess agreed to, in an attempt to correct the inadvertencies of the preceding 2 years. This measure would simply bring the matter up to date, where it would have been had the intent been pursued at that time. Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum, and I ask unanimous consent that the time be charged against both sides on the bill. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. INCREASE IN AUTHORITY OF THE SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRA- TION Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, my amendment to S. 3331 on minority busi- ness contained an error in the last sen- tence. I ask unanimous consent that the third reading and passage of S. 3331 be reconsidered and that all language after "shall be responsible for," in the second sentence be stricken and the following new language be inserted in lieu thereof: S 7119 The formulatiOn of policy relating to the Administration's programs which provide as- sistance to minority small business concerns and in the review of the administration's execution of such programs in the light of such policy. I have cleared this matter with the minority side. It is just a tactical change, and there is no problem about it. The PRESIDING OrriCER. Is there objection? Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, I do not know what consultation has been had on this side of the aisle, but we would like to know what is involved before we do something. Mr. CRANSTON. There has been con- sultation with Mr. Dompierre of the Re- publican licy Committee. Mr. HRUSKA. What is it about? Mr. CRANSTON. It is a technical mis- take in the last sentence of the bill on small business. Mr. HRUSKA. On that basis and the representations of the Senator from California, I have no objection. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The question is on the third reading and passage of the bill. The bill was ordered to a third read- ing, read the third time, and passed, as follows: S. 3331 An act to clarify the authority of the Small Business Administration, to increase the authority of the Small Business Adminis- tration, and for other purposes Be it enacted by the Senate and Hcruse of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Small Business Amendments of 1974". SEC. 2. (a) The Small Business Act is amended? (1) by redesignating subsection (b) of sec- tion 2 as subsection (c) and by adding after subsection (a) of that section the following new subsection: "(b) The assistance programs authorized by sections 7(i) and 7(j) of this Act are to be utilized to assist in the establishment, preservation, and strengthening of small business concerns and improve the mana- gerial skills employed in such enterprises, with special attention to small business con- cerns (1) located in urban or rural areas with high proportions of unemployed or low- income individuals; or (2) owned by low- income individuals; and to mobilize for these objectives private as well as public mana- gerial skills and resources."; (2) by striking out paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 4(c), and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "(c) (1) There are hereby established in the Treasury the following revolving funds: (A) a disaster loan fund which shall be available for financing functions performed under sections 7(b) (1), 7(b) (2), 7(b) (4), 7 (b) (5), 7(b)(6), 7(b) (7), 7(c) (2), and 7(g) of this Act, including administrative ex- penses in connection with such functions; and (B) a business loan and investment fund which shall be available for financing func- tions performed under sections 7(a), 7(b) (3), 7(e), 7(h), 7(i), and 8(a) of this Act, and titles III and V of the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, including adminis- trative expenses in connection with such functions. "(2) All repayments of loans and deben- ture, payments of interest and other re- ceipts arising out of transactions heretofore Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500290006-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500290006-4 S 7120 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE 'Way 6, 1974' or hereafter entered to by the Administra- tion (A) pursuant to sections 7(b) (1), '7(b) (2), 7(b) (4i, 7(b) (5), 7(b) (6), 7:b) (7 e and 7(c)(2) er this Atat shall be peed into a disas- ter loan fund; and B pursuant to seations 7tali 7(3)(3), 7(e), 7?11). 7(i): and 8(a) of this Act, and titles III and V of the Small Business Investment Act qf 1359, shall be paid into the business loan and investment fund."; (3) by striking out paragraph (4) of ,sec- lion 4(c), and inserting in lieu thereof 'the following: "(4) The total amount of loans, gualan- tees, and other obilge.tions or commitments, heretofore or hereafter entered into by the Administration, which are outstanding at any one time (A) under sectfons 7(a), '7(b) (3), 7(e) 71h), 7(1), and 8(a) of this Act, shall not exceed $6,000,000,000; (B) under title DI of the Small Business- Investment Act of 1988, shall not exceed $725,000,000, (C) under title V of the Small Business In- vestment At of 158. shall not exceed $525,- 000,000; end (D) under section '7(1) of this Act, shall not exceed $450,000,000ne and (4) by adding at the end of section 7 the following three new subsections: "(1) (1) The Administration also ik em- powered to make participate (on an immedi- ate basis) in, or guarantee loans, repayable in not more than fifteen years, to any small business concern, or to any qualified person seeking to establish such a concern, when it determines that such loans will further the policies established in section 2(b) oL' this Act, with particular emphasis on the pres- ervation er establishment of small business concerns :vested in urban or rural areas with high proportions of unemployed or 10w-in- come individuals or owned by low-incorae in - dividuals Provided, however, That no such Mane Shan be made, participated in, or gusunnteed if the total of such Federal as- sistance to a single borrower Outstanding at any one lime would exceed $50,000. The Ad- ministration may defer payments on the principal of such loans for a grace period and use such other methods as it deems necessary and appropriate to assure this suc- cessful establishment and operation of such concern. The Administration may. in its dis- cretion, as a condition of such financial as- sistance, require that the borrower take steps to improm his Management skills by par- ticipating in a management training pro- gram approved by the Administration. Pro- vided, however. That any management training program so approved must be of sufficient scope and duratinn to provide rea- sonable opportunity for *the served la develep entrepreneurial and managerial self-sufficiency. "(2) The Administration shall encoaraige, as far as possible, the participation of the private business community in the program of assistauce to such concerns, and shall seek to stimulate new private lending activities to such con:erns through the use of the loan guarantees, participations in loam, and pool- ing arrangements authorized by this sub- section. "(3) To insure an equitable distritiution between urban and rural areas for loans be- tween $3,500 and woo? made under this subsection, the Administration is autharized to use the agencies and agreements and dele- gations developed under title III of the Eco- nomic Opportunity Act of 1964, as amended, as it shall determine necessary, (4) The Administration shall provide fur the coatiming evaluation of programs under this subsection, including full info/mat-On on the location, income characteristics and types of businesses and individuals assisted, and on raw private lending activity stimu- lated, and the results of such evaluation to- gether with reciemmendations shall be in- cluded in the report required by section 10(a) 0:7 this Act. "(5) Loans made- pursuant to this sub- section (including immediate participation in and guarantees a such loans) shall have such terms and conditions as the Administra- tion shall determine, subject to the follow- ug limitations-- "(A) there is reasonable assurance of re- payment of the loan; "(B) the financial assistance is not other- wise available on reasonable terms from pri- vate sources or other Federal, State, or local r rograins; "(C) the amount of the loan, together with other funds available, ..s adequate to assure completion of the project or achievement of the purposes for whict the loan is made; "(D) the loan bears tnterest at a rate not Ins than (1) a rate determined by the Scare- tery of the Treasury, taking into considera- tion the average market yield on outstanding Treasury obligations of comparable maturite, r his (11) such additional charge, if any, to- ward covering other costs of the program as the Administration may determine to be con- sistent with iteneurposes: Provided, however, That the rate of interest charged on loans made in redevelopment; areas designated un- der the Public Works and Economic Develop- ment Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C. 3108 et seq.) shall not emceed the rate currently applicable to new loans made under section 201 of that et (4213.8.0. 8142) ; and "(s) fees not, in excess of amounts neces- sary to cover adentnknrative expenses and probable looses may be required on loan guar- antees. "(6) The Administration shall take such steps as may be necessary to insure that. in any fiscal year, at least 50 per centum of the amounts loaned or guaranteed pursuant to this subsection are allotted to small business concerns located in urban areas identified by the Administration as having high concen- trations of unemployed or low-income indi- viduals or to email business concerns owned l'y tow-income individuals. The Administra- tion shall define the meaning of low income silt applies to owners of small business con- cerns eligible to be ass nted under this sub- section. "(7) No, financial assistance shall be ex- tended pursuant to thie subsection where the Administration determines that the assist- ance will be used in relocating establish- ments from one area to another if such relocation, would result in an increase in unemployment in the area of original location. "(j) (1) The Admini-tration ie authorized to provide financial assistance tes public or private organizations to pay all or part of the cost or projects designed to provide technical or management assistance to indi- eiduals, or enterprises eligible for assistance -ender subsection 7(0 of tins Act, with special attention to small business located in urban knits of high concentration of un- employed or low-income individuals or owned t y low-income individuals. "(2) Financial assist ;ince under this sub- section may be provided for projects, includ- iag without limitation--- "(A) planning and research, ineludieg feasibility studies and market research; "(B) the identification and development Cf new business opport mit tee; "(C) the furnishing f centralized service; with regard to public services and Govern- ment programs including programs author- ised under subsection '7i); "(D) the-establishment and strengthern of business service agencies, including trade associations and cooperatives; "(E) the encouragereent of the placement ef subcontracts by major business with small liminess concerns located in urban areas of high concentration of unemployed or low- income individuals or owned by low-income including the provision of in- centives and assistance to such major busi- nesses so that they will aid in the training and upgrading of poen dal subcontractors or other small business" concerns; and "(F) the furnishing en business counsel- ing, management traianim and legal and other related services, tvih special emphasis on the development of m magement training programs using the resources of the business community, including t le development al management training opi:ortunities in exist- ing businesses, and with emphasis in all caves upon providing management training of suf- ficient scope and duratio a to develop entre- preneurial and manageritil self-sufficiency on the part of toe individuan served. "(3) The Administration shall give prefer- ence to projects which leo-mote the- owner- ship, participation in ownership, or manage- ment of sma a business concerns by residents of urban areas of high concentration of un- employed or low-income Individuals, and to projects which are planned and carried out with the participation of local businessmen "(4) The anancial assistance authorized by this subsection ineludea assistance advanced by grant, agreement, or contract, but does not include the procurement of . plant oi equipment, cr goods or services. "(5) The ,edministrati in is authorized to make payments under giants and contracts entered into under this subsection in lump SUM Or installments, anti in advance or by way of reimbursement, and in the ease 01 grants, with necessary adjustments on ac- count of overpayments or underpayments. "(6) To the extent fmeible, services under this subsection shall be .irovided in is loca- tion which is, easily accessible to the individ- uals and small- business concerns served. "(7) The Administra.tion shall provide for an independent and continuing evaluation of programs under this :subsection. including full information on, and analysis of, the character and impact c1 managerial assist- ance provided, the location, income charac- teristics, and types of bnsinesses and individ- uals assisted, and the extent to which private resources and skills hays been involved in these programs. 'Such (valuation together with any recnnunendatioils deemed advisable by the Administration s iall be included in the report required by section 10(a) of this Act. "(8) The Administration shall take such steps as may be neeessiey and sineromeate, in coordination and cooperation with the heads of other Federal departments and agencies so that contracts, subctmtracts, and deposit-, made by the Federal Go-s eminent or in con- nection with programs aided with Federal funds are placed in such a way as to further the purposes of this sub.;ection and of sub- section '7(1) of this Act. The Administration shall provide, for the continuing evaluation of programs under this subsection and the results of such evaluation together with rec- ommendations shall be included in the report required by section 10( a of this Act. "(e) In carrying out its functions under subsections 1(i) and 7(I) of this Act, the Ad- ministration is authorised? "(1) to utilize, with their consent, the services and facilities in Federal agencies without reimbursement, and, with the con- sent of any State or political subdivision of a State. accept and utilize the services and fa- cilities of Buell State or eubdivision without reimbursement; "(2) to accept, in the name of the Admin- istration, and employ or dispose of in further- ance of the purposes of this Act, any money or property, real, personal, or mixed, tangible or intangible, received ey gift, devise, be- quest, or otherwise; "(3) to accept vohmte ry and uncompen- sated servicee. notwithrennding the provi- sions of section 3679(b) of the Revised Stat- utes (31 USC. 6435(b)); and "(4) to employ experts and consultants or organizations thereof as authorized by sec- tion 15 of the Administrative Expenses Act of 1946 (5 U.S.C. 55a1, eecept that no indi- Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500290006-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/3_0L: Ql&RDPOMOR000500290006-4 May 6, 1974 CONGRESSIONAL REConl) vidual may be employed under the authority of this subsection for more than one hundred days in 'any fiscal year; to compensate indi- viduals so employed at rates not in excess of $160 per diem, including traveltime; and to allow them, while away from their homes or regular places of business, travel expenses (including per diem in lieu of subsistence) as authorized by section 5 of such Act (5 U.S.C. 73b--2) for persons in the Government service employed intermittently, while so employed: Provided, however, That contracts for such employment may be renewed an- nually." (b) Title IV of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 is hereby repealed; and all refer- ences to such title in the remainder of that Act are repealed. SEC. 3. The Small Business Act is further amended? (1) by amending section 5(b) by striking out "and" following paragraph (8), by strik- ing out the period at the end of paragraph (9) and inserting in lieu thereof"; and" and by adding at the end of paragraph (9) the following new paragraph: "(10) upon purthase by the Administra- tion of any deferred participation entered into under section 7 of this Act, continue to charge a rate of interest not to exceed that initially charged by the participating institution on the aramint so purchased for the remaining 'term of the indebtedness."; and . (2) by striking out the third sentence in paragraph (2) of section 7(h) and inserting In lieu thereof: "The Administration's share of any loan made under this subsection shall bear interest at the-rate of 3 per centum per annum," Sac. 4. (a) Section 7(a) (4) (A) of the Small Business Act is amended by striking out "$350,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "$500,000". (b) Section 7(a) (5) (A) of such Act is amended by striking out "$350,000" and in- serting in lieu thereof "$500,000". Sze. 5. Section 18 of the Small Business ,Act is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection: "(g) The Administration shall transmit, not later than December 31 of each year, to tho Committee on Banking, Plousing and Ur- ban Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Banking and Currendy of the House of ReinresentatiVes a sealed report with respect to public 'complaints alleging illegal conduct by employees of the Administration which were received or acted upon by the Adminis- tration during the preceding fiscal year." SEC. 6. (a) The Small Business Investment Act of 1958 is amended? (1) by striking out in the table of contents in section 101 all references to title IV and section numbers therein and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "TITLE IV?OVAHANTEES , "Ran A?nnass atialtaNTEEs "Sec. 401. Authority of the Administration. "Sec. 402. Powers, "Sec. 403. Fund. "PAR'K B--Sinwry BOND GUARANTEES "Sec. 410, Definitions. "Sep. 411. Authority of the Administration. "Sec. 412.Fund (2) by sirikini out section 403 arxd insert- ing in lieu thereef the following: "FUND "Sec. 403. There is hereby created within the Treasury a separate fund for guarantees which shall be available to the Administra- tor without fiscal year limitation as a revolv- ing fund for the purposea or this part. There ,are authorized to be _appropriated to the fund from time to three such amounts-not to exceed $10,000,000 to provide capital for the fund. All amounts received by the Adminis- trator, including any moneys, property, or as- sets d'erived by him from a his operations in connection with this part, shall be deposited in the fund. All expenses and payments pur- suant to operations of the Administrator un- der this part shall be paid from the fund. From time to time, and at least at the close of each fiscal, year, the Administrator shall pay from the fund into Treasury as miscel- laneous receipts interest at a rate determined by the Secretary of the Treasury on the cum- ulative amount of appropriations available as capital to the fund, less the average undis- bursed cash balance in the fund during the year. The rate of such interest shall be deter- mined by the Secretary of the Treasury, and shall not be less than a rate determined by taking into consideration the average market yield during the month preceding each fiscal year On outstanding marketable obligations of the United States with remaining periods to maturity comprable to the average ma- turity of guarantees from the fund. Moneys in the fund not needed for the payment of current operating expenses or for the pay- ment of claims arising under this part may be invested in bonds or other obligations of, or bonds or other obligations guaranteed as to principal and interest by, the United States; except that moneys provided as capi- tal for the fund shall not be so invested but shall be returned to the fund in such amounts and at such times as the Adminis- trator determines to be appropriate, when- ever the level of the fund herein established is sufficiently high to permit the return of such moneys without danger to the solvency of the program under this part."; (3) by striking out "$500,000" in section 411 and inserting in lieu thereof "$1,000,000"; and (4) by adding after section 411 the fol- lowing new section: 4 "FUND "SEC. 412. There is hereby created within the Treasury a separate fund for guarantees which shall be available to the Administrator without fiscal year limitation as a revolving fund for the purposes of this part. There are authorized to be appropriated to the fund from time to time such amounts not to exceed $35,000,000 to provide capital for the fund. All amounts received by the Ad- ministrator, including any moneys, proper- ty, or assets derived by him from his opera- tions in connection with this part, shall be deposited in the fund. All expenses and pay- ments pursuant to operations of the Admin- istrator under this part shall be paid from the fund. From time to time, and at least at the close of each fiscal year, the Administra- tor shall pay from the fund into Treasury as miscellaneous receipts interest at a rate de- termined by the Secretary of the Treasury on the cumulative amount of appropriations available as capital to the fund, less the average undisbursed cash balance in the fund during the year. The rate of such interest shall be determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, and shall not be less than a rate determined by taking into consideration the average market yield during the month pre- ceding each fiscal year on outstanding mar- ketable obligations of the United States with remaining periods to maturity comparable to the average maturity of guarantees from the fund. Moneys in the fund not needed for the payment of current operating expenses or for the payment of claims arising under this part may be invested in bonds or other obligations of, or bonds or other obligations guaranteed as to principal and interest by, the United States; except that moneys pro- vided as capital for the fund shall not be so invested but shall be returned to the fund in such amounts and at such times as the Administrator determines to be appropriate, whenever the level of the fund herein estab- lished is sufficiently high to permit the re- turn of such moneys without danger to the solvency of the program under this part." (b) Unexpended balances of appropriations S 4121 made to the fund pursuant to section 403 of the Small Business Investment Act of 1958 (15 U.S.C. 694), as in effect prior to the ef- fective date of this Act, shall be allocated, together with related assets and liabilities, to the funds established by paragraphs (2) and (4) of subsection (a) of this section in such amounts as the Administrator shall determine. SEC. 7. Section 4(b) of the Small Business Act is amended? (1) by striking out "three" in the third sentence and inserting in lieu thereof "four"; and (2) by inserting after the third sentence the following new sentence: "One of the Associate Administrators shall be designated at the time of his appointment as the Asso- ciate Administrator for Minority Small Busi- ness and shall be responsible for the formula- tion of policy relating to the Administration's programs which provide assistance to nority small business concerns and in the review of the Administration's execution of such programs in the light of such policy.". MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE A message from the House of Repre- sentatives by Mr. Berry, one of its read- ing clerks, announced that the House had passed, without amendment, the bill (S. 2509) to name structure S-5A of the Central and Southern Florida Flood Contra District, located in Palm Beach County, Fla., as the "W. Turner Wallis Pumping Station" in memory of the late W. Turner Wallis, the first secre- tary-treasurer and chief engineer for the Central and Southern Florida Flood Control District. The message also announced that the House had agreed to the amendment of the Senate to the amendments of the House to the bill (S. 1125) to amend the Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alco- holism Prevention, Treatment, and Re- habilitation Act and other related acts to concentrate the resources of the Na- tion against the problem of alcohol abuse and alcoholism. ORDER OF BUSINESS Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I sug- gest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk pro- ceeded to call the roll. Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OPTICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. MILITARY PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATIONS, 1974 The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1974 for procure- ment of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, and other weap- ons and research, development, test and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to authorize construction at certain instal- lations, and for other purposes. AMENDMENT NO. 1238 Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 1238. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated. Approved For Release 2001/08/30: CIA-RDP75600380R000500290006-4 S 7122 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500290006-4 CONGRESSIONAL. RECORD ?SENATE May 6, 1974* The assistant legislative clerk pro- ceeded to read the amendment. Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with. The PRESIDING OFFICkette Without objedtiOn, it is so ordered; and, without objection, the amendment will be printed in the RECORD. The amendment is as follows: On pace 7, between lines 3 and 4, irsert new title as follows: TITLE IV----PROIECBITION ON CERTAIN USE OF FUNDS Sae. 401, None of the funds authortsed to be apprcrxie.ted by this Act, and no funds heretofore appropriated to or for the use of the Department of Defense by any other Act and which remain uuobligated on Uht. date of enactment of this Act, may be expended in, for, or On behalf of any country in South- east Asia. Mr. 101INNEDY. Mr. President, a par- liamentary inquiry. The PRESIDING orricat. The Sen- ator will state it. Mr. KENNEDY. There is a time liraita- tion On this amenciment. Is that corned? The PRESIDING OFFICER. One and one-half hours, to be equally divided. Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Dale DeHaan and Jerky Tinker be permitted the priv- ilege of the floor during the debate and the vote. The PRESIDING OlevICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. KENNEDY. I yield myself 3uch time as I May require. Mr. President, the pending amend- ment has three simple objectives. First, it prohibits on the date of en- actment any further transfer -Of funds for the Military Assistance Service Ftmd?MASF--for South Vietnam be- yond thieve already obligated this fiscal gear. Second,, the amendment reaffirms the decision of the Congress that the Penta- gon must not spend one penny over the ceiling established for this fiscal year? a massive sum of $1.126 billion?for mili- tary aid to Sputh Vietnam, notwith- standing , the Armed Services Commit- tee's finding that the Department of De- fense wrongly charged $266 million to this year's ceiling. Finally, the amendment puts the Pen- tagon on notice that Congress is tired of the practice of shipping guns and am- munition now, and paying for them later. The amendment, in effect, sup- ports the Important recommendation of the Armed Services Committee that the Department must put its bookkeeping on military aid to South Vietnam in order, and that all military supplies delivered to Saigon during 1 fiscal year must be charged to that year's ceiling. For too long, the Pentagon has shipped ammuni- tion to Saigon as if fiscal years did not exist. Clearly, the question before us toelaY has as much to do with fiscal control as it does with the issue of whether Saigon needs or Should have more military aid. The question is whether more money for more guns will come by a vote of Con- gress or through the back-door. And the question is whether there is any real ourpose in Congress setting a ceiling on spending for military aid to South Viet- nam, if the Pentagon continues to spend as if ceilings did not exist?assuming it will always get approval somehow, some- way to spend more when it runs out. Make no mistake about it, if we fail to adopt this amendment the Pentagon will, in effect, be allowed to expend up to $266 million more?or nearly a quar- ter of a billion dollars more?above the congressionally mandated ceiling of $1.- 126 billion for military assistance to south Vietnam this fiscal year. On April 10, I requested the General Accounting Office to compile statistice on the totality of 13.5. assistance to South Vietnam and Indochina. Regret- tably, this has become a difficult task for the GAO, for they have encountered obstacles in obtaining complete and ac- curate information from the Pentagon on exactly how much it has spent this fiscal year in providing military aid to Saigon. But, according to the best in- formation available to me, it appears that the Pentagon has, to date, already spent close to the ceiling of $1.126 billion. 2 months before the end of the fiscal year. This includes the new appropria- tion of $907.5 million as well as some $219 million in pipeline and transfer funds authorized for this fiscal year. The Senate Armed Services Commit- tee, in a commendable effort to review the accounting procedures the Depart- ment of Defense has used in the MASF program, has found the Pentagon's bookkeeping system to be in error?to the tune of $266 million. If we fail to adopt this amendment, the Department will be free to use these misobligated funds this fiscal year. No other Department is rewarded in such a fashion if it makes a bookkeep- ing error?after it had already spent the money. If the agencies waging the war on cancer made such an error, they would have to live with their mistake foe this fiscal year. Furthermore, there is reason to believe that part of this $266 million transfer is illegal?according to preliminary questions raised by the GAO. On April 4 the House of Representa- tives, on a recorded vote of 177 noes to 154 ayes, barred the Pentagon from rais- ing the ceiling on military aid to Saigon this fiscal year. It did so, in part, because in hearings before the House Armed Se vices Committee, it became apparent that the Department of Defense had ob- ligated funds for Saigon at a rate which was certain to make them run short in the last quarter of the :fiscal year. It was also clear that the Department was try- ing to do through the back-door what it could not do through the front, and the House voted to reject it. Today the Senate should do no- less in rejecting another form of back-door financing and stand with the House for greater fiscal responsibility. Let us also be clear that the issue be-- fore us today is not one that affects ow' national defense?and hardly one affect- ing our national security or national in- terest. And it is not a question of "aban- doning" an ally. The American taxpayer is currently spending well over $2.5 bil- lion dollars this 'year in military and economic aid to support the Saigon goy-- eminent?over $1.126 billion of tb in mili- tary aid. Such a sum hardly cosastitutes "abandonment." It is also :not a question of "scratching" South Vietnam, or ending our aid pro- gram there. America still bears heavy responsibilities to the people of Vietnam But these obligations are today less with governments and armies than with peo- ple?to the millions of war victims who cry out for our help in relief and rehabil- itation. And, the basic question before the Sen- ate today is really not whether we will allow the Pentagon, by an accountant's slight-of-hand, to spend another quarter billion dollars in South Vietnam?al- though it clearly exceeds the ceiling set for this year. Rather, the true question before the Congress and the Ameri- can people is whether this additional amount?and our continuing massive military aid to South Vietnam?truly contributes to the peaceful evolution of the area. The issue is whether our action today will contribu.te to a reduction in our con- tinuing involvement in Indochina, or whether it will help perpetuate old rela- tionships ard policies at the same old levels. If the Paris agreements, and peace with honor, are to mean anything, they must mean that our country's involve- ment and relationship with South Viet- nam must change?and change not only from what it was 2 years ago, or 10 years ago, but even from what it was last year. The ceasefire agreements for Vietnam and Laos?a:ad the persistent hope that renewed diplomacy will achieve a similar agreement in Cambodia--are bench- marks of immense historical proportions. Although conditions are mixed in the field, and many difficult problems remain for all parties involved, I disagree with those who say "that nothing very much has changed in Vietnam." The fact is for the first time in many years, the United States is no longer directly involved. And for the first time in over a. decade we have real opportunities to embark on new policies?to change the character and level of our involvement, to reorder our aid priorities, and to finally practice some lessons .from the failures and frus- trations of the past. But this hopeful opportunity implicit in the ceasefire agreements apparently is not shared by this administration, which still seeks to maximize American presence and influence In the area, with the old- tools of war instead of a new diplomacy for peace and reconciliation. The dichotomy between the opportu- nities for change provided by the cease- fire agreemen:s, and the tired policies of the past, is most explicit in the charac- ter of the administration's continuing budget requests for Indochina?and its determined effort to ship more guns and bombs to Saigon no matter what Con- gress says the limit should be.. The administration is still more inter- ested in funding armies than in provid- ing humanitarian assistance to heal the wounds of war. And the budget prior- ity remains with the means of war, Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500290006-4 Approved For Release 2001/68/30 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500290006-4 May 6, 1974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE rather than with the tools for building peace. It is argued that this request for more military aid is crucial for the survival of South Vietnam because it is running out of ammunition. But the question must be asked, Why is Saigon running out of ammunition? According to a recent cable from Am- bassador Graham Martin in Saigon it is apparently not entirely due to North Vietnamese violations of the cease-fire. The Ambassador says it was only after, and I quote, "U.S. imposed constraints" and better South Vietnamese "manage- ment controls," that the use of Ameri- can-supplied ammunition dropped at a rate of 20 to 50 percent. In effect, Am- bassador Martin confirms what many have observed over the past year, that without some outside constraints on the supply of ammunition, South Vietnamese military commanders will continue to fire their guns just as they have before, as if nothing has changed. There has al- ways been, and there apparently will al- ways be, a strong connection between the availability of ammunition and its use, According to testimony given the Armed Services Committee, the current estimated average consumption of am- munition in South Vietnam is 700 tons fired each day by Saigon troops, at a cost of over $1 million a day. That is a very explosive and expensive peace. So the question remains whether the shipment of more arms to South Viet- nam will help strengthen the cease-fire agreement, or will it fan the flames of violence. And it is questionable whether shipping More will encourage greater self-reliance and conservation by the South Vietnamese Army, or simply en- courage it to use more, not less. It is argued also? that this additional military aid to Saigon is necessary be- cause of inflation?to which I can only say, again, that inflation begins at home. And the Vietnam veteran must Wonder at this administration's worry over the effects of inflation in Saigon, when the costs for his schooling or job training Climb every day. Apparently the Presi- dent can find the money to fight the effects of inflation in Saigon, but not to help Vietnam veterans deal with inflation here at home. Finally, there are some who argue that it would be unconscionable to de- mand a cutoff or reduction of aid to South Vietnam. The fact is, we are doing neither today. No one here has demanded a cutoff of aid, or even a reduction in the ceiling es- tablished by the Congress. A ceiling is a ceiling, and that is what we are reaffirm- ing here. It was the Pentagon which re- fused to spend according to the ceiling. And the issue is not the end of Ameri- can aid to South Vietnam, but hox to encourage a transition in our continuing relationship?from a master-client aid relationship, to a more balanced one that encourages self-reliance rather than de- penftnce. I ,beileve teCogress acted respon- sibly last year in limiting our funding of military supplies to the South Viet- namese Army. That wise decision should not now be circumvented. Rather, we should properly consider any further American military support of South Vietnam in the context of the budget request for the next fiscal year?which, again, will be in the neighborhood of $1.6 billion. This is a sum for continuing war in Vietnam that is over three times the amount we now spend on the war on cancer here at home?even though can- cer will take next year the lives of 350,- 000 Americans, or seven times the num- ber of Americans who lost their lives in Vietnam over the past decade. The recent action of the House, coupled with the actions of the Senate over the past year, correctly reflect the view of most Americans that the time has now come for us to reduce our funding of war, not increase it. In the absence of any new or mean- ingful diplomatic initiatives by the ad- ministration to reduce the level of con- flict in Indochina and strengthen the cease-fire agreements ? the Congress must act to chart some new directions, and to change the level and character of our involvement in iVetnam. By accept- ing this amendment the Senate will re- affirm that this is the new road we should follow?not the road that says more guns and more ammunition for an endless war. Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me? Mr. KENNEDY. I am glad to yield to the Senator from South Dakota. Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I wish to commend the Senator from Massachu- setts for offering this amendment which provides for reasonable restrictions on the amount of American military aid flowing to South Vietnam. I think most Americans would applaud any effort on the part of the Saigon government to heal the wounds of this war and to work out some kind of an accommodation with the people in their country that are chal- lenging that government. But we do not do either the people of Vietnam or our- selves favor when we continue to pour in more and more military aid which only has the effect of prolonging the war. I think it is quite clear from the avail- able evidence that this military assist- ance is not being used to restore peace and it is no tbeing used to bring the coun- try back together, but to perpetuate the political rule of the present regime in Saigon. We did some calculations in our office the other day on the South Vietnamese military budget. That government is now spending what would be the equivalent here in the United States of a $350 bil- lion American military budget. In other words, for the United States to be spend- ing as much on our military budget as the regime of General Thieu is spend- ing on their budget on a per capita basis, we Would have to increase our own mili- tary budget three and one-half times. It is no wonder that the major prob- lem in South Vietnam today is inflation because the expenditure on that level of military outlays will inevitably wreck the economy of that country with the kind of ruinous inflation that is now taking place. It is the kind of aid that does not contribute to the wealth of the country. Mr. President, you cannot eat guns; the consumer cannot go out and feed his S 7123 family on bombs or weapons carriers. So we are not contributing things to heal the country and helping them to stand on their own feet. We are further fuel- ing the fires of inflation and setting back the day when South Vietnam can estab- lish the kind of viable economic base that holds any hope for its independence. So I think the Senator's amendment is In the interest of the people of South Vietnam and in the interest of moving them away from a war that has gone on far too long and which further weakens the people of that country. As the Sen- ator said, it comes at a time when our budget is under a strain and when we are asking the American people to pour in tax funds for military purposes abroad, at a time when those funds are desper- ately needed to strengthen our own so- ciety, not the least of which is meeting the needs of the young men who partici- pated in that war, as the Senator said. I commend the Senator and I hope the amendment is agreed to. Mr. KENNEDY. I would like to ask the Senator from South Dakota, who has been spending a good deal of time in his home State, whether the people of his State understand that we are spending in this fiscal year some $2.5 billion in aid to South Vietnam; whether the people of South Dakota understand the magni- tude of that type commitment; and that it appears, given the reasoning and ra- tionale of the letter Dr. Kissinger sent to me in explanation of policy toward South Vietnam, that this apparently is a con- tinuing and open-ended kind of commit- ment or understanding by the present administration; whether they under- stand we are going to continue to spend that kind of money in South Vietnam? I would be interested in what kind of reaction the Senator from South Dakota is receiving from his constituents. Mr. McGOVERN. I can only say to the Senator that the people in my State who do understand the dimensions of what we are still pouring into South Vietnam are not enthusiastic about it. As the Senator knows, it is very diffi- cult even for us here in the Senate to keep posted on the way public funds are being spent. Many of these arrangements are worked out by executive discussions, and even we do not catch up with them as fast as we should. But I can say to the Senator that the people in my State are deeply troubled by the mounting cost of living and are deeply troubled by the growing scarcities of things they need. We are basically an agricultural State. We are short not only of fuel but of fer- tilizer. Everything from baling wire to binding twine is in short supply. Chemi- cals that produce fertilizer are in short supply. One of the reasons is that for the last 10 years we have been pouring billions and billions of dollars of the limited re- sources of this country into Southeast Asia. I think the people of my State and the people of the country ag a whole would not object to constructive assist- ance to make life better for people abroad. It is not that they are isolationist people but the fact they see those re- sources being wasted on an enterprise Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP751300380R000500290006-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500290006-4 S 7124 CONGRESSION AL RECORD -- SENATE May 6, 1 7 that they thought had been put behind us nearly 2 years ago. One of the things that I find disturb- ing is that our official policy as a country is to stand on the terms of the Paris agreement That was the so-called "peace with honor that was supposed to have come some 18 months ago. It is interestingan fact that while that agree- ment has apparently been violated on both sides, the Government of South Vietnam has made it illegal to publish the terms of that agreement in South Vietnam, whereas the other side, which Is supposedly the culprit in this whole enterprise, is distributing the agreement widely. They are encouraging the read- ing of its terms and coming to a better understanding of It. I think We had better be advised of what we are doing when we back with further millions of dollars of support a regime that does not want its people to know the terms of the Paris agreement. We ought to be more interested in see- ing the agreement enforced rather than bankrolling a regime in South Vietnam that is bent on sabotaging it. Mr. KEN1sTEDY. I want to thank the Senator from South Dakota for his comments. As all Americans know, this has been an issue and a question about which he has felt deeply. and I think he has made a substantial contribution to the general understanding of the Ameri- can people with respect to it. ADDITIONAL Srn.ITARY AID TO VIETNAM IS ILL, ADVISED Mr. McGOVBRist. It is vital that Con- gress exercise its constitutional powers to end the further drain on American tax dollar now fueling the continued killing in Indochina. The time has come - for healing, reconstruction and accom- modation in Indochina. If these healing efforts are to get under way we must stop pouring In billions of dollars in Ameri- can arms, oil and money to keep the war going. I ask unanimous consent that an im- portant statement by Mr. Fred Branf- man, codirector of the Indochina Re- source Center, before the Asia and Pacific, .Affairs Subcommittee of the Howe of Representatives May 1, 1974, be printed at this point in the RECORD: There being' no objection, the s Ate- ment was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: THE NEED FOR CONDE/ SSIONAL ACTION FOR PEACE IN INDOCHINA (Statement of Fred Branfman I KEY POINTS 1. The Administration has quietly iclated congressional intent to cut economic aid to Indochina in FY 1974. The original ed miii- istration request was for $827.8 million. Con- gress out this back to under $700 million. By the end of FY 74, however, the Adminis- tration has wound up allocating $1.1 Billion in economic aid to Indochina. (See Table 1? p. 28, as well as page 16.) 2. The Administration allocated a ,oaal of $3.2 billion in FY 74 for Indochina, almost as Much ineney as was allocated for specific countries in the rest of the Third World com- bined. This figure, for example, is C times what wena to Africa and Latin America com- bined for economic aid. This was part a the Administration's continuing commitment to combatting local insurgencies, despite a clear public and congressional mandate for non- interventionism in such ineurgencies. (See PP- 4a-8) 3. This Administration commitment to counter-insurgency is inflicting unaccept- able costs on the people of Indochina?more war victims in 1973 than the seat of the world put together; and it is a disturbing strn of the lack of Administration concern far its own citizens, ct3 well as others in serious need. Food For ?Peace shipments to Indochina were increased by $300 mil/ion in FY 74, for example, while hundreds of thou- sands starved in Sahel. 413ee Parts III and IV) 4. Congress must "Pause for Peace" by sus- pending aid pending progress towards politi- cal solutions, or at least substantially reduce what are greatly increased. Administration requests for BY 1975. Military and "Indo- china Postwar Reconstrention" requests have jumped 45%. (p. 19). EY 74 total spending SSW Only 0.1%. actually going toward "hu- manitarian", "reconstruction", or "develop- ment" projects. (p. 18) The FY 74 budget, therefore, was a war budget?caused by the structural unviability of the GVN and Lou Nal regimes. Administration claims that U.S. aid will allow them to -stand on their own" are myths. (See pp. 18-2a) I. INTRODUCTION--CONGBESS AND THE LESSONS OF VIETNAM As Congress considers this year's giant $3.7 b:llion Administration request for U.S. ex- penditures in Indochina, (see table 1), it will be deciding far more than simply the nature of our Indochina involvement. During -the 1960s, millions of Amertcans turned against the war?in the streets, at the ballot box, in the army. Congress, however belatedly, fin- ally responded to this mandate for peace tram the American people. Powerful congressional opposition to the 852 carpet bombings of urban centers in Christmas 1972 helped farce the Administra- tion to sign the Paris agreement. Congress halted the bombing of Cambodia in Au- gust 15, 1973, and passe: legislation aimed at ending U.S. support for South Vietnamese police and prisons on December 19, 1973. And, last month, it took the historic step of rejecting an Administration proposal for $474 million in supplemental military aid for Indochina. These congressional actions have saved countless Vietnamese, Cambodian and Loa- 'Han lives; made billions of dollars available for urgent domestic and humanitarian inter- national needs; reversed what seemed like lock-step progress toy:rands Presidential Dic- tatorship; and, in a subtle and not yet fully understood way, these 'congressional actions have begun to restore the spiritual health of a nation torn apart by our Indochina in- volvement. By so doing, Congress clearly embarked on a new path, away from-Global Policemansbip, away from silent and willing partnership in a Presidential Dictatorship, away from war and towards peace. If this process is to be continued during the 1970s, Congress cannot continue to assent this FY 1976 to the same lond of covert Executive involvement that got us involved in Indochina in the first pace. The Nixon Administration has in the past year, however, quietly been subverting this public and congressional mandate for peace it Indochina. Intervening covertly as in the early 1960s, the Administration has in- itiated a spiral which will bring ever-in- creasing U.S. escalation Unless Congress acts. During FY 1974, the Administration ex- pended $2.53 billion in Indochina, only 7% of which was designated for "humanitarian," or "reconstruction" and "development" pro- grams. The remaining 93% went to prop un military regtmes which are unwilling to bring peace to their countries. The Thieu government in South Vietnam, for exam- ple, has refused all offers by the other side to negotiate a standsaill ceasefire, allow democratic liberties, and form a National Council of National Reconciliation and Con- cord to help plan elections. As a result, over '75,000 were killed in Indochina last year, 125,000 were wounded. :and 1 million made homeless?more war victims that in the rest of the World put together, including the Middle East. (See table 2). The Administrations FY 1975 progsam, moreover, offers even more of the same. Its proposed FY '75 military and economic aid requests, total $3.28 billion?or '27% more than what was allocated last year. Once more, over 90% of this aid is des- tined neither for reconstruction nor human- itarian needs but for the maintenance of the war machines' in Cambodia and South Vietnam. And, the Administration's PY 75 program offers even more disturbing visions for FY 76 and beyond. If General Thieu continues to refuse to allow his opponents to partici- pate in the p'slitical process outlined by the Paris Agreement, for examnle, there is every reason to believe that they will feel no choice but to launch an offensive. And what then? Are we to give even more billions to Mr. Thieu in an attempt to repel such an offensive? Is the 200th aniversary of this country to find us convulsed in a national debate over a Presidential attempt to re- new U.S. bombing to save Thieu? And even if U.S. bombing is renewed, what reason is there to believe that it will "succeed" next time? Clearly, this fiscal year :1975 provides Con- gress with a historic oeportunity to ensure that our aid is no longer used for war in Indochina, that the hesitant progress made toward halting our global asterventionism be 'continued. Congress OM achieve these goals by only appropriating aid for Indochina in the letter and spirit of the Paris Agreement. Two means offer progress toward these goals: (1) A pause for Peace: Congress could sun- pond all non-humanitarian and non-devel- opmental aid to either side in Indochina until governing bodies emerge which reflect the political realities of the situation. In South Vietnam, this would mean waiting until the political machinery outlined by the Paris -Agreement was set into motion, and a newly-formed National Council of National. Reconciliation and Concord had gotten off the ground. In Cambodia, this would mean withdrawing from what over- whelming evidence indicates is now a war only among Cambodians, and allowing the Cambodian parties to evolve whatever form of government they will. in Laos, it means absolutely halting all U.S. economic and military inputs which are not approved by all of the parties which have just entered a fragile coalition. This alternative, we believe, would lead to a major change for peace on the part of all parties concerned within fa matter of weeks and would, in the end, result in far less suffering and disrupt ani than any oth- er alternative, (2) A substantial reinction in non-im- manitarian aid: although less likely to bring peace quickly to Indochina, this alternative would also reduce the level of violence and generate pressures on all sides for peace. It has been contended that such a suspen- sion in aid?or even the more moderate step of a substar.tial reduction--would deliver South Vietnam "bound hand and foot to the Communists." It is our contention, however. thannresent Administraticn policies can do nothing to prevent such an outcome?and, indeed, are quite likely to produce victory for the guer- rillas in any event. All thst present Adminis- tration programs mean is that there will be millions more war victims billions more dol- lars denied 'people in need. before Indo- chinese guerrillas eventually seize power Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500290006-4 'Ma; 6, 197-4 Approved Fo&RAInsfsif8g0A8/39tiett, militarily because they were outlawed from competing politically. A suspension or substantial reduction in American aid, such as we are proposing, offers the only hope of moving the conflict away- from the military and toward the political arena. The present ifiTN administration?or a successor?should have no trouble competing politically, if it enjoys the pi:pular support its advocates claim. Nor would it necessarily be precluded from picking up the gun once again, if it turned out that its opponents were not willing to compete politically. Under the Paris Agreement, niereover, Third Force elements would be accorded an important "balancing" role in the political play of tOrces between right and left. Under the circumstances, then, Congres- sional aid designed in accordance with the Paris Agreement offers far less chance of a complete PRO takeover than present Admin- istfation policy. And, in Cambodia, a serious American attempt to move the conflict into the political arena offers the only possibility that moderate elements in the Lou Not cabinet can avoid the complete eclipse an all-out Khmer Rouge military victory could bring. Congress clearly has a public mandate for such policies. The Administration can point to no substantial group of Americans which supports an admitted 'expenditure of $3.7 billion and hidden expenditures totalling many billions more?to continue our futile attempts to impose unpopular military re- gimes on the people of Indochina. Millions of Americans, however, support the notion that the people of Indochina should be al- lowed to determine their own affairs; the Paris Agreement provides just such a vehicle for this occnrring. This year could be remembered as the year that Congress finally regained its rightful say in making ,foreign policy; a year which future Americans would remember as the one in which the Presidential Dictatorship over our country's destinies was significantly altered; in which this country began the slow, painful and long process of turning to peace and healing throughout the world. If 1976 is to be a year of rebirth, however, Congress must re-cast any U.S. aid requests to Indochina into a form that will bring peace. It can happen .. . this year. It is up to Congress to act. IT. U.S. INVOLVEMENT Di INDOCHINA--THE DEOPOLITMAL CONTEXT Before turning to the specifics of U.S. expenditures for Indochina this fiscal year, it is important to remember the overall con- text in which the Administration is present- ing them. The key issue which Vietnam has symbol- ized for many is 'whether the U.S. should in- tervene to put down wars of national liber- ation in the Third World. Most Americans hire by now decided we should not?for moral or practical reasons or a combina- tion of both. The Administration, however, has reached just the opposite conclueion. It is as com- mitted to tl.$, intervention to put down local insurgencies in 1-974 as was the US. presidental branch :60 years ago?and par- ticularly in the East Asia and pacific region that we are discussing today. This is why the Administration has sta- tioned more U.S. trOops in the East Asia and Pacific region today than in 1964. We have today 1'73,000 troops Stationed from Guam to Thailand, compared to 156,000 in 1964. (Another 33,000 naval troops .are afloat in the Pacific.) This is why 7 disguised and admitted mili- tary dictatorships in the East Asia and Pacific regions receive more Administration aid than the rest of the world put together. In its original FY 1974 budget presentation to Con- gress, for example, the Administration spe- cifically allocated $3.863 billion for South :69P7M3ppRO00500290006-4 Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, and South Korea. By contrast $2.13 billion was specifically allocated for military and economy aid to 97 other coun- tries in the Third World. Put another way, two-thirds of the Administration's aid world- wide was destined for 7 nations having a population comprising but 10% of the Third World's population. And this is why the Administration has in FY 1974 allocated so much money to South Vietnam and Cambodia's military regimes, while millions went hungry around the globe: ?In FY 1974, for example, the Thieu gov- ernment received $878 million in economic inputs (see table 2). This money that went into the tiny land of South Vietnam, a na- tion of 18 million, was 50% more than what the U.S. gave to all of Africa and Latin America combined, two continents with 534 million people ($500 million) . ?Also in FY 1974, tens of millions starved and many died from hunger, in the Sahel and Ethiopia. AID contributed some $130 million in food and non-food emergency assistance, as of February. 4, 1974. The Ad- ministration, however, has targeted nearly 30 times as much money for Indochina, money which is designed to fight a counter- insurgency. Particularly reprehensible was an extra $300 million in Food for Peace money which the Administration added to its original requests for Cambodia and South Vietnam? to compensate for cuts made in economic aid by Congress. The Administration clearly had a choice between using that $300 mil- lion worth of food to shore up military dic- tatorships in Indochina or to feed starving millions in the Sahel. It chose the former. This commitment to Global Policing, fl- ually, is why the Administration transferred economic aid money from nations all over the world to Indochina, where such money is designed to help in the counter-insurgent effort. A recent chart supplied to Congress by AID administrator Parker, for example, shows the differences between AID original proposals for economic aid for FY 1974, and their final allocations, in 18 selected coun- tries plus the continent of Africa. The Ad- ministration has reduced aid to nations where millions go hungry precipitously?aid to 13angladesh was down 41%, to India down 56%, to Pakistan down 40%, to Africa down 6%. Aid to Vietnam was listed as increasing 10% (our estimate is 34%, see Table 1), however, aid to Cambodia was listed as in- creasing 273% and aid to Thailand was up 16%. (Source: Hearings Before House Ap- prop. Corn., Part II, on Second Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1974, pp. 877-880) . It has been argued that detente has made such counter-insurgency efforts obsolete. There is little evidence to support this point of view, however. The only Third World "success" the Administration has been able to point to as a result of detente has been its ability to carpet-bomb Hanoi and block- ade Haiphong Harbor without the Soviet Union or China intervening in response. Besides noting that not initiating World War III due to saturation bombing of a tiny far-off land is a curious measure of success, we should point out that there is no reason to believe that things would have worked out any differently without detente. More to the point, however, the impor- tance of support from the Soviet Union or China during the early stages of insurgency has always been highly exaggerated. As the Pentagon Papers make clear, such support was almost nonexistent in the very begin- ning in South Vietnam. And even at the height of the war, only 3% of the military expenditures by all three super-powers in Indochina were those of the Soviet bloc and the Chinese (see Table 3). Furthermore, of course, there have been no signs whatsoever S 7125 that the Soviet Union and China have de- cided to eliminate the relatively minor aid they give local insurgencies?or why they should or would. The Administration's massive and con- tinuing commitment to counter-insurgency in the 1970's was particularly brought home to me during a visit to Thailand in the snrina and summer of last year. While in Thailand, I interviewed a large number of American officials, including a member of the U.S. counter-insurgency board, a member of the 'U.S. Embassy po- litical-military sections and members oi pri- vate 'U.S.-supported counter-insurgent think-tank. I discovered that these officials also feel that Vietnam was a "mistake", that to a man they deride publicly the President's no- tion that we have extricated ourselves through "Peace with Honor". But I also discovered, to my dismay, that our failure in Vietnam has not led them to draw the conclusions drawn by most Americans: that we should get out. The only lesson they seem to have drawn is quite the opposite: that we should have gotten in sooner. Time and again I was told that while our cause was just in Vietnam, our means appropriate, we had intervened too late. It was absolutely essential to "get them before they build up", I was told. Which is precisely what the Nixon Admin- istration is trying to do in Thailand. Un- known to most Senators and Representa- tives, not to mention the American people, the U.S. Mission in Thailand has recently embarked on an ambitious new counter-in- surgency program in Thailand. I was told by an official in the "Pot-Mit" section that it would be modeled after the "Regional Forces" and "Popular Forces" concept in South Vietnam, and involved deploying dis- trict and province-level "reaction" forces throughout Northeast Thailand. It would be much smaller than in South Vietnam, this official told me, involving only several million dollars and several thousand men. Other Americans told me, however, that this pro- gram was not at all modeled after thp RF- RP program, but rather the infamous Phoe- nix program. Assassination of civilians thought to be working for the other side, selective terror, programs for issuing ID cards to all adults linked to computerized bio-dossiers, and mass arrests?based on quotas?had alreadly been tried out on an experimental basis, I was told. At this point, I have no way of knowing which source was correct, i.e. whether U.S. officials in Thailand have launched new counter-insurgency programs modeled after the RP or Phoenix programs. I do know, however, that they are commit- ted to such counter-insurgency efforts?as are their counterparts from Indonesia to In- dochina to the Philippines. What we are seeing today in the East Asia and Pacific region is an Orwellian vision come true, as the leaders of our Executive branch engage in the deadly serious business of mass assassination, mass incarceration, and mass labelling of human beings in a Pacific region inhabited by several hundred million people. There is no more reason to believe it will succeed than did similar visions of totalitar- ian control held by American leaders in Viet- nam during the early 1960's. And I know that, just as in the 1960's, Administration commitment to counter- insurgency in the East Asia and Pacific re- gion is inflicting unacceptable costs on Asians and Americans alike. rn. COSTS TO THE INDOCHINESE At the end of his request for Indochina funds during his Foreign Aid message last week, the President of the United States said that "the investment I am now seeking (Ls) Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500290006-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500290006-4 S 7126 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE May 6, /974' an investment to sustain the peace, to over- come' the human suffering resulting fro in the war." This statement is beyond. comprehension. We have already pointed that officiel fig- sures reveal that more than 1.5 million war victims were created this past year. To this number of newly killed, newly wounded and newly refugeed last year, more- over, must be added: Several million refugees living in marginal, undeveloped areas to whom the GVN has denied the right to return to the villages ot their birth. Tens Or thousands of political prieonere who remain in prison despite the Paris Agreement, and the thousands more who have been arrested, tortured, imprisoned viithout trial since the ceasefire was signed. Thome ads of people who are suffering and dying from lack of medicine or an adequate diet?in the cities, in the refugee camps, in the villages. If Compess does not substantially alter the Adnamistrationas ai request, one can assume that casualty figures will be at least as high one year from today as during the past year. That is. Congressional acquiescence to the Presidents aid request will guarantee al, least 50,000 corpses among people who are now alive, in she coming sear. At least twice an many will be wounded. And hundreis of thousands?in Cambodia, in, South Viet-, nam?wili. lose their homes. For President Nixon to claim that his aid bill is designed to "overcome human suffer- ing" goes beyond mere duplicity, and enters into a realm of Orweillan doublespea:e be- yond my *understanding. I know that to accept this statement, how- ever, is to acquiesce in a monstrous lie; one which continues to threaten the lives of all Vietnarnigie and Cambodians, not merely the war victims enumerated above. xv. mars FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE The costs to the Arnericars people of con- tinuing Insecutive involvement in Indoehina are no less real, though perhaps less evident. I need not tell U.S. Representatives what $3.7 billion could do this fiscal year fol mil- lions of the ill, aged, infirm, young and de- prived in this society: The following examples, however, may make clearer a larger point: The chute/nail of this committee, for ex- ample, has noted the distressing plight of hospital workers around the country, earn- ing woefully inadequate salaries. Ten ehou- sand workers could have their annual wages raised by over 25% for the $10 million the Administration is proposing to spend each day in the coming fiscal year. During fiscal year 1975, the Nixon Admin- istration has reduced federal funding of med- ical research into diabetes, kidney disease, egging, sudden infant death, glaucoma and cystic fibrosis from $82.4 million allocated in FY 74 to it proposed $14.8 million in FY 1975. These ditseases affect tile lives of well over 15 million Americans, with the U.S. ranking today 16th In infant mortality. The Adinin- istrationas proposed saving of $7.6 million will be expended before the next 24 houes are up in Vietnam. Another serious example is "Public Service Employment", a program which allows tens of thousands of Americans to engage in use- ful constructive work during periods of temporary unemployment. In FY 1974, ap- proximately $1.25 billion was allocated to these programs. This year, however, while the Nixon Administration is proposing spending $3.7 billion In Indochina, it has reduced its FY 1975 Public Service Employment Program by 1 billicm to a mere $250 million. And, alehough the Nixon Administration sent well over a million men off to fight in Vietnam, ft has not yet been able to provide them with adequate Hying benefits on their return. Recently, the Senate Committee on Veterans Affairs proposed raising GI benefits from $220 a month to $270 a month, a move which would affect the lives of 1,630,000 teterans in the first year alone. The Nieon telministration is opposing this program. Its cost? In EY 1915, it would come to $554 rail- ion, about the cost of 11/2 months lighting in Indochina. The total cost of the program. over a five year period, comes to about $2.272 billion?about 60% of what the Administra- proposes spending in the next year alone in Indochina. And, we may remember the dismember- ment of programs reaching tens of millions of Americans carried oat by the Nixon Ad- ministration on January 29, 1973 when it unveiled its FY 1974 budget. Proposed sav- ings by abolishing the Office of Economic Opportunity?an agency which had helped millions of poor people in its decade of ex- tence?were $62 million in FY 1973, $323 niillion in FY 11974, and $390 million in FY 1175. In other words, in order to save $780 million over a three year period, the Adrein- ittration chose to abolish 0E0. Meanwiiile, however, it spent four times that sum 'list year alone for war in Indochina. Finally, indeed, we may note the fact that virtually all of the programs abolished by the Administration in the fields of social nelfare, job opportunities, health and educa- tion, resulted in a saving of far less than tile $3.7 billion proposed by the Administra- tion for this year's FY 1975 budget. For example, last year's $3.2 billion of Indochina spending was $600 million more than the e2.6 billion the Administration expected to save lii FY 1974 by termineding 0E0 ($328 mil- lion), reducing child feeding programs ($59 million), phasing out the Economic Develop- ment Administration ($35 million), elimi- nating soil and water programs ($258 nal- lion), terminating rural water systems find waste disposal grants ($100 million), sus- pending new housing programs ($305 mil- lion), phasing clown of the Emergency Em- ployment Assistance Program ($670 million), cutting back Old Age Survivors and Disabil- ity Insurance ($310 million), manpower training programs ($3.54 million), federal student loans ($264 million) and student subsidies ($119 million). I bring up these examples not because I think that foreign policy objectives can al- ways be weighed against domestic needs so directly. There are indeed cases where it may lir alto more sense to fend money abroad, than to use it to help our own citizens at h erne. This year, for example, when there are millions starving in the Sahel and India, flood and storm 'victims from Pakistan to Nicaragua, a cogent case can be made that such cases deserve urgent priority. And there is also, to be sure, a very strong case for reconstruction and rehabilitation in Indo- china. I bring up these examples of what our Indochina experience is costing the Amer- ican people, however, because the Adminis- tration is doing none of these things. Not only is it not aiding the starving and sick of the earth anything like it might; not only Is it not meeting humanitarian and develop- ment needs in Indochina; but it even denies its own citizens badly needed billions, only to take this money for use in killing, main- ir g and torturing abroad. I have already in testimony before tis cemmittee attempted to describe the .kind oi mentality, shared by the highest Executive leaders in this land, which I saw in Indo- china; a mentality which reduced human beings to numbers, numbers to be tracked. Jelled and broken if deemed necessary. My testimony today reveals the other side of the coin. Not only has this mentality created One of the most sophisticated police- states in the world today abroad, but to achieve this the Administration has begun tlie process of reducing its own citizens to mere objects, to be manipulated and de- prived as well. I do not think it is necessary for me here to elaborate on the indecency, inhumanity and wretchedness of the present occupants of the Executive branch in following such a policy. But feel I must stress again that in is question of U.S. aid to Indochina goes beyond mere outrage, or shock. I is an issue which directly threatens every man, woman and child in this country, an issue that will in the end determine whether this is a country to be ruled by its people, and, however im- perfect, their representatives in Congress: or whether policy will continue to be made by a tiny group of war-makers who turn ever- more to deception, as tileir foreign policy runs ever-more counter to American ideals and values. The cost of our continuing involvement in Indochina to the people of this country. in a word, is riot to be measured merely in ailancial terms, What is at stake is no more or less than the spiritual and moral lit alth of this nation. To understand this point, we may now turn to a consideration in detail of the Administration's FY 1975 aid request. For only through 11 microscopic look at this gigantic demand can we see how duplicitous, how indiffereet to human needs, and how war-like our Executive branch has become. I daresay there is no other administration in the world today which would dare tee present a budget over 90% of which is de- signed for war, and call it a budget for "reconstruction". I know there has never been a time in the history of this country when the American Executive has been so contemptuous of its people and Congress: unilaterally eilloting money in direct viola- tion of congressional intent, advancing the crudest sort of propaganda to support its position. The Administration has resorted lo the most transparent sueterfuge simply to mulct their FY 1975 appropriation out of Congress. "A -nation divided ars one, itself cannot stand," said the President during America's iirst civil war. The cost to Americans of our continued involvement in Indochina will be continued division during this present, rather quiescent phase, all what has become our second civil war. V. THE ADMINISTRATIO1?: PROGRA NI FOR 17NENDING WAR--PRF-gENTED AS A PLAN FOR PEACE Realizing public and congressional senti- ment for peace and against U.S. involvement, the Administration has sought to present its program to Congress as ore designed to heal, rebuild, and bring peace In fact, however, U.S. aid programs are doing precisely the opposite. What is mere important, moreover, is that there is no end in sight. Henry Kissinger im- plicitly admitted this recently, when he wrote to Senator Kennedy on March 25, 1974, that "we believe it is important that we continue our support as long as it is needed." This shockingly open-ended commitment to involvement in Indochina, one year after Mr. Kissinger had negotiated an agreement committing the U.S. to ending its involve- ment, is sufficient cause for alarm. When it is realized hens ever, that there is no possibility that pro-UnS. military regimes will ever be able to etard alone, Mr. Kies- singer's statement is revealed as nothing less than a commitment to American involve- ment for decades to come?with the cost of this involvement, moreover, steadily rising. I. THE FY 1974 PRESENTATION: WAR PRESENTLD AS arcesecunarrerrose" AND ''RECONSTRUCTION" One year ago today, for example, the Presi- dent of the United States went before Con- Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500290006-4 111ay 6, 1974 Approved For 'Release 2001/08/3Q ? 965RDPLIBOCIVOR000500290006-4 S 7127 CONGRESSIONAL RECo &UN A gress to present his FY 1974 foreign aid pro- posals, and stated: "The signing of the ceasefire agree- ments . . will pcfrmit its to turn our atten- tion to the condiderable post-war needs of Southeast Asia.... The legislation I am pre- senting today . . . Wtaild provide a sound beginning of the process of reconstruction and rehabilitation there." In fact, however; only 4% of the Indochina .Aid that President Nixon proposed for FT 1974 was actually designated for "recon- struction and rehabilitation" or "develop- rnent" ($121.4 Million Out of $2.9 billion- See Table 3). And only another 4% was even termed "humanitarian" ($107.4 million out of $2.9 billion). Ninety-two percent of the Administration- requested funds for FY 1974 were meant to continue ?the war-both military funds, which were 72% of the total, and "economic" and "rood for Peace" funds, which were -indirectly war-related. Even more importantly, the Administra- tion's aid programs went to feed our narrow- based war machines in South Vietnam and Cambodia, which offered no hopes of peace. In South Vietnam, President Nixon had announced on January 23, 1973-even before he had signed the Agreement-that his Administration would continue to recognize the Thieu Administration as the "sole" and "legitimate" government of the Republic of Vietnam. In elaborating on this, Henry Kis- singer explained that the U.S. would con- tinue to recognize the GV,N "with its consti- tutional structure intact". This not ofily directly violates the Paris Agreement, which establishes that there are "two parties" exercising sovereignty only over their respective zones of control, and that neither held sovereignty over the Republic of Vietnam until both-together with a "third segment"-met together in a National Council of National Reconciliation and Con- trol to hold elections. But the Nixon-Kissinger announcement of their recognition of. the OVN as the "sole, legitimate" government of the Republic of Vietnam, also ruled out any serious chance for peace. For the Thieu government's con- stitution, left structurally 'intact," outlaws the PRG from peaceful political competition. By committing itself Solely to the Thieu re- gime, the Administration also ensured no hope for a political settlement because of the nature of that regime. The GVN would hardly favor allowing the refugees to return to PRO-controlled villages, emptying its prisons of its tens of thousands of political prisoners, or allowing popular Third Force leaders to have the freedoms guaranteed them by the Paris' Agreement, as long as it could count on an Administration lavishly supplying aid with no conditions. And the situation in Cambodia is even less amenable to a political solution. In throwing its weight behind the Lon Nol regime, the Administration has managed to produce of the most unpopular, ineffectual, corrupt, and comic-operaieh regimes in modern history. Visiting Cambodia last year after the cease- fire, I not only failed to find any Cambodians supporting the ren Nol regime. I was also told by high-ranking officials in the American embassy in Phnom Penh that Lon Nol had lost even the support of the few groups- students and intellectuals-who had sup- ported him at the time of the 1970 takeover. More Moderate elements within the Phnom Penh regime- have -Made no secret- of their distaste for Lon Nol-and he in turn has systematically excluded them from power. The latest casualty was Premier In Tam, who had spoken vaguely of negotiations. The result is that the Administration has found itself in a no-win situation in Cam- bodia, spending hundreds of millions annu- ally to 'prosecute a War which cannot be won. 2. FY 1974 mttPLEMENTATION: sinvintistaarioN COVERTLY INCREASES ECONOMIC AID 34 PERCENT Last year, Congress clearly showed its de- sire to reduce our involvement in Indochina by cutting the Administration's request for Indochina Postwar Reconstruction. from $632 million to $450 million. Through a variety of subterfuges, however, the Administration succeeded not only in restoring the cuts, but in actually spending nearly twice as much for economic aid to Indochina as the Congress had originally intended. The main means the Administration used for this subversion of Congress was taking money from world-wide Food for Peace allo- cations and channeling it into Indochina. Since Congress has until now only set world- wide levels, such Administration subterfuge was possible. Food for Peace for South Vietnam shot up from an original request of $176.4 million to $309 million, and for Cambodia from $30.9 million to $191.2 million. In addition, the Administration pushed through two "loans" to South Vietnam to- taling $110 million, and "supplemental" eco- nomic aid of $49 million. The result is that the Administration pro- posed a total of $840.8 million in economic aid to Indochina as of the spring of 1973; Congress reduced this figure to about $700 million ($450 for "postwar reconstruction," $50 million "development loan," $208.8 "Food for Peace") by Christmas 1973. The Administration then proceeded to re- store all cuts-and then go beyond even its original request, winding up at $1.1 billion. This $1.1 billion, moreover, is used almost entirely for war-related programs and has no impact whatsoever on the reconstruction or human needs of Indochina. Almost half of this money, for example, is for "Food for Peace" "Food for Peace" is imported in South Vietnam and Cambodia by local importers, who pay local currency fb the GVN and Lon Nol governments. The Administration has used 100% of these funds in South Vietnam, and 80% in Cambodia, for "common defense" needs, i.e. war. Most of the remaining money-for the commodity import programs, "technical sup- port" programs, etc.-are similarly used to support the war. They are designed to pro- vide the minimal economic backing neces- sary for the Thieu and Lon Nol regimes to survive, with much for the local currency generated by the CIP and other programs also finding its way into the budgets of the army, airforce and police. 3. FY 1974 IMPLEMENTATION: HUMANITARIAN AND RECONSTRUCTION FUNDS REDUCED Despite the fact that the "economic" aid has risen, moreover, the actual FY 1974 funds devoted to humanitarian or reconstruction needs has actually fallen. Total funds re- quested for "humanitarian, reconstruction and development" programs in the FY 1974 original presentation amounted to $228.8 million. At this writing, however, we have found that the Administration has allocated only $172 million or what is termed "devel- opment", "humanitarian", and "reconstruc- tion". And even this miniscule amount of aid contains a massive deception of Congress. Of the $96.4 allocated for "humanitarian" needs, some $75 million went to "refugee relief." Much of this money pays for "refugee re- settlement" which, as former U.S. AID offi- cials Edward Blook and Leon Van Wagoner, as well as the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Refugees, have recently pointed out, is not humanitarian at all. Rather U.S. and GVN officials have denied refugees the "freedom of movement" guaranteed them under Ar- ticle 11 of the Paris Agreement, by refusing to allow them to return to the villages of their birth and instead resettling them in marginal areas, often without water and decent farming land, so as to claim this land for "strategic reasons". Of a total of $3.2 billion appropriated by Congress in FY 1974 for Indochina-related expenses, then, only 96 million, or 3% has actually gone to meet the humanitarian and reconstruction needs of the people. The rest has gone-directly or indirectly-for more war. 4. REQUESTS FOR INCREASED FY 1974 AID: FOUR ADMINISTRATION MYTHS Since FY 1974 aid was not designed either to meet the human needs of the people of Vietnam, nor to lead to a political solution, it is not surprising that the Administration's FY 1975 aid requests far exceed FY 1974 allocations. Just one week ago, on April 24, the Presi- dent unveiled his FY 1975 budget proposal for Indochina. This year, this section of the President's Foreign Aid speech was entitled "Toward Reconstruction of Indochina". In it, the President requested $939.8 million for "Postwar Reconstruction", more than double last year's $450 million allocation. Other Administration documents reveal, moreover, that the President intends to ask for $2.1 billion in military aid for FY 1975, an increase of 42% over last year's military appropriations. The only major category which did not jump up spectacularly for FY 1975 was the Administration's "Food for Peace" request, which was only $260 million, about half of the FY 1974 allocation. Last year at this time, however, the Administration ony requested $208.8 million for "Food for Peace." Since it eventually grew to $507 million, there is no doubt that this year's request could grow similarly over the next 12 months. Depending on one's measure, therefore, the FY 1975 Administration request represents an increase over FY 1974 allocations of vary- ing degrees: 1. Overall, the jump is from $3.2 billion in FY 1974 to a requested $3.7 billion in F-Y 1975-an increase of 16%. 2. Total economic and military inputs into. the three countries of Indochina have in- creased 30%, from $2.5 billion to a requested $3.2 billion. 3. The most real measure of the increase, however, comes from ignoring the prelimi- nary "Food for Peace" estimates for FY 1975. Comparing "Indochina Postwar heconstruc- - tion Aid" funds, with "Military Assistance Service Fund" and "Military Assistance Pro- gram" funds, we find an increase from $2.08 billion to $3.02 billion, a jump of 45%. This large increase in requested FY 1975 aid has resulted entirely from the weakness of the Administration position in Indochina. Unable to triumph militarily, but unwilling to try and compete politically for fear of losing, the Administration is doing little more right now than simply more of the same. Unable to admit this to the American peo- ple and Congress-and perhaps to them- selves-however, Administration officials have instead attempted to present this year's aid requests in the best possible light. The essence of their position is that if these aid requests are passed, they will both give the GVN and Lon Nol government a "fair chance" against the weapons supplied the other side by the Soviet Union and China, and also make them economically and mili- tarily viable so that they will not demand American aid 3 or 4 years from now. Unfortunately, such arguments by the Ad- ministration are little but myths. Myth (1). Administration Programs are made necessary by our "commitments" under the Paris Agreements. On March 25, 1974, Henry Kissinger wrote to Senator Kennedy that "as a signator of the Paris Agreemeni? . . . the United States committed itself to strengthening the conditions which made the Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000500290006-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500290006-4 S 7128 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE May 0, 1974 ceasefire possible . . with these commit- ments in mind, we continue to provide the Republic of Vietnam with the meanie neces- sary for its self-defense and its economics viabilitm" The American people have been given many Messons in public for our intolvement In Vietnam over the years: there was the domino theory, the Gulf of Tonkin, theBeato treaty, the 'Yellow Peril" scare, and the ever- popular commitment to allowing the Viet- namese people the right of self-determina- tion." In fact, as the Pentagon Papers reveal, all of these public rationales were mere sugar- coating for what former Assistent Secretary of Defense John McNaughton described as 70% of our goal: "To avoid a humiliating defeat (to our reputation as a guarantor)." McNaughton also stated that only "10%" of our "aims" were to "permit the people of SVN to enjoy a better, freer way of life." Of all the previous untruths, however, none Is more absurd than Mr. Kissinger's. The notion that the Paris Agreement serves as ratior ale for our continued intereention is plainly untrue. Article 1 of the Paris Agreement states that "The United States . . , respect is) the independence, sovereignty, unity, and terri- torial integrity of Vietnam." By signing this, the Administration conceded on the crucial point of debate over the years: Vietnam is one country, by definition wrought by a civil war. Continuing U.S. involvement iii 'Viet- nam, tY.eref ore, constitutes blatant inter- vention in a civil war, one recognii.ted by interne-tonal law and common sense to be illegal, If theee was any doubt on this question, moreover, Article 4 of the Paris Agreement removes it. Article 4 states that -The United States will not continue its military involve- ment or intervene in the internal aft airs of South Vietnam." In signing the Agreement, therefore, the Administration was making a solemn commitment tra end our involve- ment?military, political, and erionomic?in South Vietnam, i.e. the zones controlled by Presidene Thieu, as well as by the P11.0. For Mr. Kissinger to now claim that this Paris Agreement in fact "commits" tie U.S. to further and massive involvement repre- sents One of the most grotesque and twisted myths ever put forward to the American public an a reason for intervention abroad. Myth 12) : This substantial amount of aid will suffiiie to launch the GVN on the road to economic recovery, allowing us to reduce our aid substantially in the next 2- 3 years. Recently, for example, the VS. Ameassa- dor to -Saigon Mr. Clraham Martin stated that, "If . . . the Congress approves the 850 million dollars I have recommended for fis- cal year 1975, plus approximately 700 million dollars f or the following year. I ani con- vinced further economic aid from the United States could be drastically reduced ox even eliminated altogether by fiscal year 1977". (U.S. News Sx World Report, April 29, 1974). All available evidence suggests precisely the oppatite, however. The World. Bunk, for example, recently completed a survey for South Vietnam's economy. In its report, dated January 28, 1974, World Bane ex- perts concluded that ". . . net aid reeuired in 1980 will be on the order of $770 trillion a year or about $100 million higher than seems probable for 1974. In short, it seems probable that Vietnam is at least a medium 'long haul' ease as far as foreign aid is con- cerned. For what it is worth, as a purely arithmetical exercise but with abou.; the same parameters we have mentioned e.bove, by 1990 the external resource gap would close by exbout $300 million a year to about $480 million." (Source: "Currant Economic. position and prospects of the Republic of Vietnam" a World Bank Study Mission, Jan- uary 28, 1974, page 34), Mr. Martin is alio rather disingenuous about the total amount of funds necessary to get the Thieu economy back on its feet again. For example, he states in the same interview that "We were able to give only 300 million dollars" in economic aid to the Thieu government in JPY 1974. In actual fact, however, AID provided a chart to the House Government Operations Subcommittee on March 20, 1974, indicating that the U.S. had actually provided $708.5 million in "economic and humanitarian as- sistance to Vietnam, fiscal year 1974." (House Government Operations Subcommittee, Sec- ond Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1974, part II, page 860). This figure, more- over, does not include a $60 million "loan" and $49 million supplemental appropriation expected to pass Congress for FY 1974, and an extra $59 million ' .tooril for Peace" money. Thus the U.S. is supplying $878 million to Thieu's economy this year, not only the $300 million that Martin suggests. Mr. Martin's $850 and $700 million figures, moreover are based ore the assumption that the fighting does not drastically increase in the next year or two. In fact, however, esca- lation is not only possible but probable, given the refusal of the GVN to even test the other side's offer for a ceasefire and po- litical settlement. Myth (3) : Our aid is "defensive", designed to off-set weapons given the other sides by the Soviet Union and China. The only cmclsl figures of Soviet and Chinese military aid to North Vietnam of which I am aware are for the years 1969-68, and 1970 and 1971. For these 6 years, during which hundreds of thousands of US, ground troops were fighting- in Indochina, and the U.S. airforce dropped well over 5 million tons of bombs, U.S. military ex- penditures were estimated to total roughly 190 billion. During these same 6 years, source Soviet and Chinese military aid corn- sled was esticriattad to total roughly $2.245 ?or roughly about $180 million a year, or !toughly 1/30 the amount of armament, we ninnelled in. Since the. ceasefire, moreover, Soviet and Chinese aid has reportedly been substan- tially reduced. Mr. Martin himself, for ex- ample, stated on Jane try 16, 1974, that the ;Soviet and Chinese "are not resupplying them (Hanoi) with massive weapons of war as they have continuously over the past ;rears," ((Ioeroaessionat Recone, E2122, April 4, 1974.) Given this fact, It is fair to assume the noviet and Chinese military aid to its relies ;nay be on the order of $1-200 million, or less for the coming fiscal . year. At the same time, however, we find the Administration proposing $2.03 billion or 19-20 times as much military aid to the Thieu and Lon Nol regimes, as well as $463 million more for U.S. forcer; in the area. Indeed, the Soviet and Chinese could turn this equation around and argue that they ere in fact only supplying their allies to pro- tect them against the vastly greater quantity of arms given the Thies; and Lou Nol govern- ments. This case can be made even more strongly, moreover, by noting that many of the most expensive items in the other side's iventory, e.g. SAM missiles, are quite clearly defensive weapons; or-as In the case of So- viet-supplied MIGs for the North Vietnamese sir force?they are weapons which have his- torically been used defensively. Many of the most expensive item% we sup- ply our allies in Indochina however e.g. air- planes, spare parts of bombs, are often used offensively. Numerous western journalists visiting FRG zones since the ceasefire, for ex- ample, have reported GVN bombing deep in- side numerous PRO zones, where no PRG military activity was taking place. The thesis that our military aid is not at ad geared to the threat from the other side, moreover, is strengthened by a comparison of our military aid to the GVN in calendar years 1972 and 1E73. In CV 1972, we supplied $2.383 billion in military aid to the Thiel; regime. In that year 39,587 ARVN soldiers were killed. In CY 1973, ARVN casualties declined by two-thirds, to 13,822. Thin substantial decline in casualties helps to substantiate tie universal opinion that fighting was subidentially lower in 1973 than it was in 1972. And yet U.S. military aid to the Thieu regime totalled $2,271 bil- lion in 1972, precisely as much as it had been In 1972 when the fighting had been much higher. (Soiree: AID figures supplied to Con. Abzug, Feb. 20, 1974) All evidence indicates, therefore, that the amount of U.S. military aid given to the Thieu government is determined more by the constant siee of the Civet army 1.1 million? men?than by the amount of aid supplied by the Soviet Union and thins to their allies. Myth (4): Administr ition FY 75 aid re- quests will allow pro-ills, regimes "stand on their own !eet", thereby allowing the U.S. to walk away in a matte of years: At the en e of his request for economic aid funds for Indochina last week, the President stated that "the invesenient I an; now reek- ing (is) . . to give the neople of Indochina a chance to steed on their own feet." Graham Martin, in the interview referrer; to above, was even more ex.,licit about the time required for the "to steno on their own feet": "How do we end our invelvernent? ... I have said our objective sec tild be to end it leaving a Vietnam e000omies:411 ir viable, militarily capable of defending lie t' with its own men- power, and free to choose its own govern/melt and its own leaders. I believe this can be denie within the next three years." These opinmistic and idealistic pronounce- ments are reminiscent farmer predictions of a "light tat the enel or the tunnel". And, as in 1961, as in 1964, these predictions esn- not and are not subset!, tilted. All available evidence, indeed indicates exactly the op- posite. Th ieu 's opponents are, if anything, stronger since the ceasefire Numerous re- ports from western jourealists indicate that the PRG has begun building sip its economy, reconstructing its borne-leveled communities In the zones under its e introl. The relative. prosperity, cleanliness, sad lower prices in its rural villages, moreoiier, have astonished numerous outside observers who have visited its zones. The PRO las, moreever seieed the politica) initiative. Oil my recent trip to Saigon, lox example, one friend explained it this way: before the ceasefire. hone sides meant war. You might be for the PRO, but tc; join it meant to opt for a dirlieuIt and dangerous life. Since tie ceasefire, however. Thiele has continued to call for w en while the PRO have come to represent; !mace. It is common knowledge, for example, that everyone in PEG zones In encouraged to learn the Paris Agreement, and the PRO las convinced many Vietnamese that it sincerely wants to imple- ment it. In C1VN zones, en Mlle other hand, the Paris Agreement is not publicized awl Thieu does little but talk of more war. During my visit to S31: th Vietnam, snore- over, I found that most exports believe that the military balance 13 also shifting away from Thieu. U.S. techeimans trying to keep the GVN airforce together, for example, told me -that VNAP mechanics have little interest in maintaining their own planes. The deser- tion rate is reportedly hieh shies the cease- fire, and local aecomodations between PRO and ARVN units have sin rocketed since the ceasefire. This has allowed the PRO to more more freely than eve; diroughout Sem ii Vietnam, extending its influence into mar y villages and hamlets it formerly could not reach. The notion, moreover, that by providing well over 90% of the OriN's resources. the Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500290006-4 Approved For May 6, 1974 RelimffigllikateeD7R9NROR000500290006-4 s 7129 CONG U.S. is leaving Vietnam "free to choose its own government" makes no more sense to- day than it did 20 years ago. The basic fact is thdt the Thiess government is the only administration in the world (except for Laos and Cambodia) which derives 90% of its resources froth a foreign government. And, as such, it is not re-,ponsible to its own people but to the U.S. This basic structural fact means that the GVN will never be able to "stand on its owii"-for it has no base in its own country. (See Table 4) The principal economic problem of the GVN, for example, is the tremendous cost of maintaining its 1.1 million-man army, 350,000 civil servants, and 120,000 police- men. This huge parasitic class not only de- vours our aid, but can only survive through an ever-increasing amount of aid and war material from the outside. The Thieu government, unwilling to com- pete politically, unable to allow a relaxa- tion of tensions which might see its army desert en masse, unable to relax police control of its population, is therefore struc- turally committed to maintaining this huge bureaucracy indefinitely. Thus it is, for example, that despite the decline in the real value of U.S, transfers of resources to South Vietnam's economy since the 1969 peak, the per capita level of imports into 'South Vietnam in constant U.S. dollar values remains today at about $25-still higher than the $21 per capita a decade ago. Despite his tremendous influx of funds from the outside, however, the Thieu government has been unable to use this capital for development. It has all been eaten up by an ever-bourgeoning bureaucracy which has seen GVN per capita spending increased ,from about $25 to $50 during the same period. Another example of the structural inability of the GVN to stand on its own is the arti- ficial nature of its urban economy. By re- fusing to allow millions of refugees to re- turn to the villages of their birth-because such villages are in zones controlled by the GVN has ensured that millions of its citizens will remain unproductive, and often 1,n need of doles just to survive. This has in turn, led to over-crowding and filth in and around South Vietnam's major cities-and increased the probability that the GVN will need aid indefinitely. Fundamentally, however, the most basic structural inability of the GVN is its mili- tary orientation and disinclination to shift towards a peace-time economy and political mode of competition. In part, it is a question of sheer momentum. For over a decade, Gen- eral Thieu and other top officials have re- mained in power due to American largesse in return for brderifig troops into battle. Like any government anywhere, it finds it easier to do what it knows best, than shift to what appears to be a more high-risk arena of political competition. In part, how- ever, it may also be a realization or fear on the part of the GVN's part that it simply cannot compete politically with the PRG- that the GVN's well-known corruption, its police-state tactics, and its decade-long com- mitment to war, will place it at a disad- vantage against its adversaries.' Whatever the case, it is clear that as long as the war in Indochina continues-at what- ever foreseeable level-the GVN will simply not be able to "stand on its own" no mat- ter how much aid is given it. (1) Agricultural production will still be limited, with war victims, refugees and often, urban dwellers, demanding American food imports indefi- nitely. (2) Domestic and foreign investors will not put money into long-term invest- ments. (3) Mobilization of manpower and resources for the war machine will continue to constitute a powerful inflationary force; world prices will remain high, and the major items required for capital intensive agri- culture we have introduced to compensate for lost production due, to war, will con- tinue to be too expensive for most farmers. And if all the above is true for South Vietnam, of course, the situation is even less hopeful for the Administration in Cambodia. One need do little here but repeat the obvious: the Lon Nol regime is composed entirely today of hard-line extremists, with such moderates as In Tam having left the- cabinet in disgust. The Lon Nol govern- ment's military position is hopeless, with the Khmer Rouge controlling 70-80% of Cambodia, and remaining on the offensive in the rest. Politically, the Lou Nol govern- ment has virtually no support at all-it has even lost the support it originally enjoyed from a numerically tiny group of intel- lectuals. For the Administration to suggest that it is in either the American or Cambodian interest for Congress to appropriate more than $600 million in FY 1975-for war in Cambodia is beneath comment. Even more so than in South Vietnam, the only solution for everyone is for us to stop intervening in Cambodia and to allow what all admit is a civil war among Cambodians to take its course. This fiscal year 1975 budget request for Indochina aid, then, represents a funda- mental attempt by the Administration to deceive Congress and the American people. It will not allow the GVN or Lon Nol gov- ernments to become economically viable, it is not a measured responde to Soviet and Chinese aid to their allies, and it offers no hope of ever ending. TABLE 1.-FISCAL YEARS 1974 AND 1975 U.S. EXPENDITURES FOR INDOCHINA Original Original anal year 1974 Fiscal year 1974 fiscal year 1975 request allocation request ECONOMIC AID 1. "Indochina postwar reconstruction"_ $619, 000, 000 1 $435, 000, 000 2 $939, 800, 000 2. "Food for Peace" 2 208, 800, 000 53 507, 300, 000 34 260, 000, 000 3. Loans_ 3 110, 000, 000 4. Supplemental . , 049,000,009 Subtotal, economic aid.... 827, 800, 000 1,100, ON, 000 1, 200, 000, 000 Original Original fiscal year 1974 Fiscal year 1974 fiscal year 1975 request allocation request MILITARY AID 5. Masf 6. Map Subtotal, economic and military aid_ Indochina-related U.S. forces. Grand total G$1, 900, 000, 000 $1, 126, 000, 000 11, 600, 000, 000 0 181, 000, 000 2 342, 000, 000 5 480, 000, 000 2, 909, 000, 000 2,530, 000, 000 5 3, 280, 000, 000 15 1,000, 000, 000 41 691, 000,000 12 463, 000, 000 3, 909, 000, 000 3, 321, 000, OGO 3, 743, 000, 000 "Current Programing Levels Compared with fiscal year 1974 Congressional Presentation", hearings ,-before ouse Operations Subcommittee, Mar. 20, 1974, p.877-879. 2 President's foreign aid message, Congressional Record H3094, Apr. 24, 1974. o "GAO reports on U.S. Aid to South Vietnam," Hon. Lee H. Hamilton, Congressional Record, E1917, Mar. 28, 1974. Of this, $183,000,000 for South Vietnam (source-footnote 3 above), $77,000,000-Cambodia (source-telephone conversation with Department of Agriculture). $54,000,000 supplemental expected, though not yet appropriated at this writing. O Hearings before the Senate Appropriations Committee pt. II, 1973, P. 1363. 7 Letter from Secretary of State Kissinger to Senator Kennedy, Congressional Record 54884, Apr. 1, 1974. 8 "American Aid to Indochina", Hon. Ronald Dellums, Congressional Record, Apr. 3, 1974. o 27 percent up. 10 This 9,000,000,000 was the figure advanced by Robert Moot, DOD Comptroller, on Jan. 29, 1973, when he stated that $1,000,000,000 was for "support of U.S. forces involved in the Southeast Asia situation, both naval and air." 11 This figure was supplied the Indochina Resource Center from the DOD Comptroller's office on Apr. 29, 1974, and defined as "incremental Southeast Asia costs for the support of U.S. forces related to the phase-down of the Indochina conflict." Is Annual Defense Department budget, Mar. 24, 1974, p. 24-"Included in the $1,800,000,000 for Southeast Asia costs in fiscal year 1975 is $463,000,000 for U.S. forces-largely the air bases in Thailand. TABLE 2.-HUMAN TOLL or WAR 'Civilian figures below prepared by the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Refugees' Refugees I Civilian hospital . entries- annuals Civilian hospital entries- monthly average! Civilian killed s Civilian ARVN wounded 3 killed ARVN "Enemy" Total killed wounded, killed' and wounded 1965 *772,1100 50, 000 , 1966 *906, 000 50, 000 1967 *463, 000 49,707 1968 *494, 000 86, 993 1969 *590, 000 66, 002 1970 4'410, 000 59,663 1971 136,000* 50,737 1972 *1, 320, 000 53,901 1973 *818, 700 43,166 Expelled from Cambodia 210, 000 PRG zones 700, 000 Estimated non registered 2,000,000 4,166 4,166 4,142 7,249 5,500 4,971 4,228 4,491 3,597 25, 000 50, 000 60,000 100, 000 60, 000 30,000 25, 000 65,000 15, 000 Total 8, 819, 700 510,169 4,723 430,000 O Refugees: Figures inarked by * are newly generated refugees as reported yearly by the U.S. Agency for International Development. The 1970 figure, marked by **, includes 281,000 persons who registered in 1970, but were generated as refugees from 1965-69. a Hospital entries: These figures are official, supplied by the U.S. Agency for International Development. Approved For Release 2001/08/30 75, 000 11,234 23, 118 35,436 ? 169,788 100, 000 01,953 20, 975 55, 524 238, 452 115, 000 12, 176 29, 448 88,104 304, 728 200, 000 27,915 70,696 181, 149 579, 760 140, 000 21, 833 65, 276 156, 954 444, 063 95,000 23,346 71, 582 103, 638 323, 566 75,000 22,069 59, 823 98, 094 279, 986 135, 000 39, 587 109, 962 111,949 481, 498 70,000 13,822 60,005 48, 237 207,064 1,005, 000 183, 935 510, 885 899, 085 3,020, 905 2 Civilian killed and wounded: These figures are estimates made by the U.S. Senate Subcom- mittee on Refugees. 4 Soldiers killed and wounded: Figures for 1965 -Jan. 27, 1973, supplied by Pentagon Infor- mation Office, (202)QX7-2873. Jan. 27 to Dec. 31, 1973, figures are those supplied by the Govern- ment of the Republic of Vietnam. : CIA-RDP75600380R000500290006-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500290006-4 S 7130 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE TABLE 3.--A COMPARISON OF UNITED STATES, I, OVIET AND CHINESE EXPENDITURES IN INDOCHINA In millions of U.S. dollars) May 6, 1974 Soviet Chinese United States Military aid Year Military Economic Military Economic Military Economic Soviet-Chinese total Soviet-Chinese percent of total U.S. percent of total 1966 1967 210 505 85 200 60 145 50 BO 5, 263. 5 17,431.9 736.5 568.1 270 650 5.0 0.0 95. 0 91.0 1968 440 240 100 1)0 22, 463. 3 536.7 540 2.0 98.0 1970 70 345 85 60 16, 523.3 476.7 155 1.0 99,0 1971 100 315 75 1)0 11, 424. 3 575.7 175 1.5 98. 5 Total 1, 3(10 1, 200 165 390 73,100 2,900 1,800 2.0 98.0 ? SOURCES: I. Soviet and Chinese expenditures for 1966-68 ware drawn from national security study mem- orandum No. 1, as reprinted in the Congressional Reiord, May 10. 1972. They are included in the section prepared by the State Department, in response to question 28, in a chart captioned "le Million U.S. Dollars at Soviet Foreign Trade Prices," 01 p. E5000. 2. Soviet and Chinese expenditures for 1970-71 a te taken from an Associated Press dispatch published n the New York Times on Apr. 13, 1972. The dispatch cites "U.S. Government sources, not allowir g use of their agency name." It is entitled "Soviet Arms Aid to Hanoi Is Down." 3. U.S. expenditures for 1966--SO, and 1970, are taken from "Impact of the Vietnam War," pro- UNITED STATES Now SUPPLEES 86.3 PERCENT OF THIEU'S TOTAL RESOURCES Note. The chart following this page was recently supplied by the U.S. Agency for In- ternational Development. For the first time in the war it officially outlines in the clear- est way possible the fact that the U.I3. is re- sponsible for over 85% of the Thieu govern- ment's total resources. It is important to note, moreover, that during 1973 the U.S. was forbidden by the Paris Agreement from interfetng in the internal affairs of Vietnam. The 86.5% of the Thieu government's re- sources supplied by the U.S. is divided up as follows: 1973 INCOME 11110 SOUTH V ILTRA Amount (minions) Perm U.S.-supplied income equals 86.3 percent: U.S. nulitary aid. .__ 97, 270.S U.S. commedity import program 300.0 U.S. Food for Peace 143. 0 U.S. project aid 86.1 ll S. loan 50. 0 66.8 8.8 4.2 2. 5 L 4 pared by the Library of Congress, June 30, 1971, p. 2. ents are given in fiscal years, and are incremental; i.e., costs that would not have been incurred was the United States riot involved in Indochina. The 1971 figure is an estimate reported by "The Air War in Indochina," by a Cornell University study team, Beacon Press, p. 100. We have divided U.S. costs into military and econirnic by subtracting from the total figure given in the sot rces just listed, the figures for U.S. economic aidl listed in the "Fiscal 1,74 Year Program Presentation to the Congress " prepared by the U.S. Agency for International Development, p. 10. Note. The 5 selected years chosen above are the snip ones for which it is possible to compare U S., Soviet, and Chinese expenditures for Indochina. Amount (millions) Per cent Import revenues the to U.S. presence (minimum) GVN-generated income equal, 13 percent: Direct tarn,. Indirect taxes................ Import revenues Currency addit ons_ _ Bond sales 3rd country aid 91.44 2.6 58.6 1.7 283.2 8.3 10.16 .2 30.1 9 30,3 .8 40.0 1.1 Key to Chart following this page Line (1) The GVN did accomplish a modest gain in direct taxes during 1973. For a pop- ulation of 20 million, however, the $3 per capita raised in taxes is a telling indictment of the GVN's political appeal. Line (2) Although we have counted all $283.2 million in "indirect taxes" as inter- nally-generated, in fart 30% of indirect taxes during the war were generated by the U.S. presence, and a substantial portion of such "indirect taxes" are still derived directly from the U.S. presence. Line (3) Virtually all import revenues are derived from U.S.-bubsidized imports. None- theless, we have estimated the GVN's inter- nally-generated import revenues at 1G% of the total, a. rather high estimated, Line (4) This simply means that the GVN printed up new currency, thus stimulating inflation. Line (5) The GVN borrowed on the future here, presumably from the national bank. Line (6) The 1973 "loan" was from the U.S.. those in1974 will come from a variety of countries find institutions LI:e the World Bank. Lines (7)-(10) These are 4 overt and admitted categories of U.S. funding. Inflaton has meant that they amount to a declining amount of real aid and thus declining living standards. The 1974 "military aid" figure of $1.026 billion is not taken seriously by the Indochina :Resource Center, since it cannot Oe correlated with t e requests of $1.6 billion for FY 1974 and $1.6 billion for FY 1975. Line (12) This indicates that portion of American aid which enters GVN budget accounting. The budget is quite obviously a small portion of what 1; takes to keep the GVN in existence. SOU rfl VIETNAM- GOVERNMENT OUDGETS BY CALENDAR rpm 1964 74 tin millions of dollars] 1964 1. Direct taxes 12.3 7. Incline: and other domestic taxes_ _ 07.7 3. Import revenues 63.0 4 Additiot to currency supply 63.0 5. Bond sales_ 15.2 6. Loans hem foreign countries_ 7 U.S. Alt) project Ant 46. 3 8. U.S. C.I P. 104.8 9. U.S. food for peace 33. 9 It. U.S. miltary aid 111.1 11. 3 country grant aid_. 19. 9 Grant total 627.9 12. Counterpart contribution to the budget 129.5 Total GVN budget 212.5 (Conversion rate V149/13ST)- - (81/1) Calendar year - 1965 1966 1367 1968 1969 1970 1971 1.972 11973 11974 12.7 11.7 13.4 24,4 28.1 35.4 34.0 39.2 58.6 65.5 124.1 128.3 135. 6 138.1 158.9 190.3 .99.0 261. . 283.2 301.0 70.9 215.8 171.5 158.9 275.5 328.8 :179.6 114,1 101.6 86.9 255.7 131.7 111.5 249.4 86.5 98.2 54.81 47. i 30.7 93.8 27.1 17.7 11.6 40.0 28.6 13.1 75.7 121 d 30.3 NA 50. 0 HO. 0 55,7 184. I 321.8 224. 1 153.0 115.9 95. 7 72. 1 86. 1 201, 7 157.5 259.1 -165. 2 104.4 176.1 182.3 239.4 225,1, 300.0 240.11 48. 2 76. 3 153.3 138. 3 94, 1 121.0 81. 8 118. I 143. 0 160.0 268.9 862.) 1, 203. 5 I, 504. 5 1, G08. 2 1, 692. 6 I, E82. 5 2,382,6 2, 270. 5 1, 026. 0 19. 9 19.') , 20. 0 20.0 26.0 20. 6 20.3 34.1 40.0 60.11 .050.7 1, 907. 4 2, 32E. 4 2, 152. 1 2, 632. 3 2, 798. 2 3, 170. 8 3,356.63, 394. 0 2, 345. 6 174.5 301.2 217.7 177.4 190.6 239.5 267.4 305.11 400.2 390.2 382.2 657.11 fill,. 2 498.8 653. 1 794.0 180,0 675.0! 855.6 854.3 (79/1) (120/1) (160/1 (16811) (192/1) (22611) (294/1) (41211) (512/1) (604/1) Estimated Source: Table 1, Letter to Congresswoman Bella Abzug, from House Foreign Operations Committee, Feb. 20, 1974-from U.S. ECONOMIC AID TO INDOCHINA, FOR FISCAL YEAR 1974 III millions of U.S. 80110r51 AID. Humanitarian Reconstruction Development Comm. Imp. Prot; Stabiliz. Fund SV 1 Cambodia Laos Total Original I Andel 2 Originall Actual? Original 1 Actual Original' Actual 85.0 70.0 4.0 13.4 18.4 13.0 107.4 96. 4 50.0 2.0 5.0 0 5.9 10.9 60.9 25.9 48.0 13.0 12.5 60.5 275.0 200 0 46.7 62.1 321.7 2(2.1 13.3 18.3 18.2 16.1 36.5 34.1 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500290006-4 " May 6 .1974 Approved For Release 2001/08/30_. CIA_,RDP7ABOOfflOR000500290006-4 s 7131 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --SENA ? Technical Support Ind. Post-War Rec Food for Peace DOD Moneys Supplemental, Cip Loan, Cip Development Loan Grand total swd ? Cambodia Original; Acutali Original Actual 3 17.0 15.0 1.0 1.2 475.0 300 0 75.0 95.0 176. 4 309.0 30.9 194.2 105. 0 115.0 49.3 (7) (7) 60.0 50.11 756.4 873.0 105.9 289.2 Laos Original Total Actual Original' Actual 18.0 16.2 55.0 1.5 (7) 39.8 3.6 605.0 208.8 (7) 435. 0 506.8 (7) 49. 0 60.0 50.0 56.5 43.4 813.8 1, 100.0 I Original :Stands for original administration requests for fiscal year 1974, present in spring 1973. 2 Accual: Stands for final administration appropriations. Mr. /VIeGOVERN. I also ask unanimous consent that a letter from the Saigon Government denying permission to a Vietnamese citizen to publish the terms of the Paris Peace Agreement be printed at this point in the nECORD. There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: Trams; Itt10111 REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENCY, NA7/0NAL IN- FORMATION COMMISSION,* ? gegen, June 9, 1973. No.: 1JG [21 PTDtIV/P1311CRT/ICSAL. To Mr. --: DEAR Sm: We' regretfully inform you that, alter examining your 'work with leniency, we cannot issue you a permit to publish your book; To End the War and Reestablish Peace in Viet-Nam. Please Come to the Bureau of Domestic Printed materials, National Information Commission, at 170 FhanViinh Phung Street, Saigon, at your early convenience so that we can return your manuscript. Sincerely yours, [The seal reads, around its circumference, "Republic of Vietnam, Office of the Presi- dency," and, in its center, "National Infor- mation Commission .1 [Signature] EATUOC. Chu-Bn-Tuoc. Mr. MANSeleiLD. ?IVIr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. KENNEDY. I yield. Mr. MANSFIELD. Does this amend- ment by the distinguished Senator cover just the $266 million which was "found" a few weeks ago?? - Mr. KENNEDY. The Senator has stated it accurately. It is related only to that amount of money which the Mai or- ity leader stated. Mr. MANSFIELD. Does the Senator know whether that $266 million was "found" in the Pentagon or in the Con- gress? Mr. KENNEDY. It is the understand- ing? of the Senator from Massachusetts that it was found in the Pentagon, and not in a congressional appropriation. Mr. STENNIS, 1V1r. President will the Senator yield to me on that? Mr. KENNEDY. I yield. Mr. STENNIS. I think the answer is that the Armed Services Committee dis- covered the existence of those fund. That is my information. Mr. KENNEDY. If I may a..dd this, to complete the matter, I would agree with 7 *Translator's note: The National Informa- tion Commission is now the Ministry of In- formation and Open Arms. Translated by Phyong Khanh Nguyen, Legal Processing Assistant, Far Eastern Law Division, Law Library, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 20540, April 1974. the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, it was a result of congres- sional investigation and pursuit, but still the money that is being considered here today was money that was in the Penta- gon, and this does not represent any additional funds that have been in any way appropriated or earmraked by a vote of the Congress. Mr. MANSFIELD. Did I correctly hear the Senator say the cost to the United States as of now is $2.5 billion annually in Vietnam? Mr. KENNEDY. The Senator is cor- rect. That is an estimated figure. Mr. MANSFIELD. And that is exclu- sive of costs in Cambodia. Does the Sena- tor recall what those figures are? They are roughly $400 million- Mr. KENNEDY. Approximately $400 million. I will correct the RECORD if that is wrong. Mr. MANSFIELD. Does the Senator recall what the costs are today in Laos? Mr. KENNEDY. It is approximately $125 million, I think. Mr. MANSFIELD. Does the Senator know what the cost to this country is of maintaining- 35,000 troops and airmeti and planes, including B-52's, in Thailand? Mr. KENNEDY. Well, the Senator has me on that one. Mr. MANSFLELD. The Senator can get those figures, I am sure. Mr. KENNEDY. On April 10 I asked the help of the GAO in compiling sta- tistics on the totality of U.S. aid in Indo- china; it is a massive sum. Mr. MANSFIELD. The point I was trying to get at is that we are still in- volved in Southeast Asia almost a year and a half after peace was declared and after the remaining Americans were withdrawn. Does the Senator realim that the war in Southeast Asia was not only the longest war in the history of this Na- tion, but the second most expensiVe war? I have here a statistical extract of the United States, 19'73, 93d Congress, first session, House Document 93-134, a U.S. Department of Commerce publication issued by the Bureau of the Census. The estimates based on the assumption that the war would end by June 30, 1970-almost 4 years ago-except for original war costs and for veterans' bene- fits, 1973. It is estimated that the cost for the Vietnamese war or the war in Southeast Asia will extend almost through the year 2050, and the estimated ultimate cost of that war, listed as the Vietnam war in this official Government document, and based on the assurnntion that war war would end by June 30, 1970, almost 4 years ago, is $352 billion. That is something to think about. I hope the Senator is successful. I cer- tainly will support his amendment, be- cause I think we are throwing away too much money, too freely, too far, and too widely. SENATOR RANDOLPH SUPPORTS IMPROVED CON- TROLS ON MILITARY AID TO SOUTH VIETNAM Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, I have studied carefully the amendment of the able Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY) and his compelling presenta- tion. I strongly support the proposal. It will provide reasonable restrictions and a tightening of procedures on the mili- tary aid destined for South Vietnam. ' My colleague has stressed this is not a question of discontinuing aid to South Vietnam. Rather, the issue is whether the Congress will impose controls on the expenditure of funds in South Vietnam. Other departments of the Government are required to operate under strict budgetary controls-there is no reason why the Defense Departments should not be forced to utilize accurate and proper spending procedures. Certainly, vital domestic programs come under the closest scrutiny and examination, and any error in domestic activities of the magnitude-$266 million-to which the pending amendment is directed would be viewed with alarm and pressures for intensive investigation. Our Nation has unfulfilled commit- ments to our citizenry for improved housing, health care, transportation, water, and sewage systems and essential public facilities. Programs authorized by the Congress to meet these needs are op- erating under the most severe budget limitations. In my judgment, citizens generally would- agree that foreign as- sistance programs should be subject to the same strict controls. The amend- ment of the Senator from Massachu- setts (Mr. KENNEDY ; is designed to achieve this purpose and I earnestly hope it will be approved by the Senate. It has my complete support. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, in oppo- sition to the amendment of the Sena- tor from Massachusetts, these are rather complicated facts. It is a great pity that such a policy question is going to hinge on one vote here with so few Senators present to get the basic facts. Just going back briefly as to the his- tory of this legislation: this whole pat- tern goes back to the Korean war. The pattern of the operation was such in the field of battle that, instead of making a direct appropriation for military aid to operate the Korean army, we merely Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000500290006-4 ? Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500290006-4 S 7132 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE May 6, 19i 4 put a ;provision in the law that money appropriated for our military forces over there would be eligible for use by the Koreans. When we got into the war in South Vietnam, we adopted the same general - pattern, and, by agreement with the Foreign Relations Committee, tins pro- gram was turned over to the Armed Services Committee. This was before I became chairman. Originally, there was no ceiling on these aid amounts. It was just possible to spend any amount that the military might aft fit for foreign aid in South Vietnam, so long as they were spending out of their money. But we put a ceiling on it?in 1970, I think it was?and it was $2.5 billion. We have put a ceiling on the am3unt every fiscal year since then. But let me digress a little, now. The cost of this war to us, out of our Treasury, was at one time running at the I ate of $25 billion to $28 billion a year. So the amount we are discussing is only a very small part of the yearly cost of the war when it was going full scale, and A per- tains to the military aid that comes out of money appropriated for our military forces. Last year they asked for $1.6 billion. The Senator from Missouri, in ins dili- gent way, held hearings last year, and the committee proposed a figure that was lower than $L6 billion, but it was .anally settled In confererece at $1.1 billion, as it is rounded off. That is the same money as is involved here,, the same subjit we are discussing now. Then, this year, at the beginning of this session, there was a supplemental authorization bile that contained an amount for Trident. It also contained an amount for Diego Garcia, in the Indian Ocean; and it contained some additional money for this military aid to South Vietnam. It is true that our forces are no longer fighting there. This assistance goes for the South Vietnam Army and military. The Pentagon asked, in this supple- mental bill, for an increase of $474 mil- lion as a supplemental item. / asked the Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON) , and he reacliy agreed, to hold hearings on the supplemental bill, because A was a part of the 1974 program. Everybody has been open, straightforward, and honest about this item, but I understood we had all agreed on the bill as a pack- age, as it is before the Senate now. No one voted against any item. The Sen,a- tor from Missouri will speak for him- self. I do not blame him one bit. He is going to speak for the Kennedy araend- ment, which is why I am handling the opposition to it, or at least why I am the floor manager for the opposition. I did not favor including in the sup- plemental bill amendments that were not emergencies. No one else did very much, and we unanimously left them out. But as to this money for military aid to South Vietnam, it having run out, I felt that, we ought to do something about it rather than simply totally and sud- denly stopping all of it, which is what this amendment would do. There are some supplies on hand in Vietnam., I am sure. They have what is called an inventory base. There may be some rifles, some bullets, some gasoline, some trucks, and other essentials that are necessary to make war, but they are being depleted mighty fast. The Kennedy amendment, if it became law, would stop everything except this supply, which may last for some weeks. It might be 8 weeks or 10 weeks, or something like that, for whatever they have on hand, and that would vary. That is the real issue. We found this money, which is not new money. This supplemental bill does not authorize any adclitionel new money, as we ordinarily do. The report merely points out that there am some =obli- gated balances from previous fiscal years, and that we can go on and use that money. That is what the report says. That is why it was so nearly unanimous in the committee. Teat is all that is asked for now. This 'amendments?and I do not blame the Senator from Massachusetts for it? would write into hard law this cutoff proposition; whereas the committee bill, we brought it before the Senate, and as the report speaks now, would Permit the use of this money, the old money, the old authorization, at least for these pur- poses. Let me say, though, that we are writing into the regular authorization bill a provision which will provide a much larger sum for military aid, and we are going to write in even stricter provisions now, because there are no longer two armies over there now fighting side by side. That provision will say how much more ammunition will be provided, since there is only one ar ey now. We are going to impose additional restrictions, more than we have now. So back to the provision brought in by the committee, it does not violate the ceiling set by the committee. It does not violate the ceiling or any new authority. It will not require the Committee on Ap- propriations to appropriate more Money. The supplemental appropriations bill will be filed just as soon as we get through with this bill. They are awaiting the outcome of this eupplemental bill on some items, but on his program they did not have to wait 3ecause there is no money for this item. So there is no money involved in it. The bill is here, and as a practical matter it .ather quickly boils down to this fact. Talk about the billions invested. We envested 54.000 lives over there, the lives of men who were sent into that war and died in battle or from wounds received in battle. Many more were seriously wounded. I am not willing to turn our backs totally on those men and the mem- ory of their sacrifices. I do not want to be >entimental or emotional about this sub- ..ect. I just have not made up my mind that I am ready to do that?not yet; not yet. I will not do it all of a sudden, on ?an amendment offered from the floor, by whomever it may be offered. I will move on this subject, for my part, on a more gradual basis. That is what we did. We said we were going to end the war by gradualism, and we did. I think a great majority of American people, although they were sick and tired of the war, are pleased that we did work on that basis, rather than come out of their with cor flags turned toward the ground. We came out with our flags flying. No one can yet say that the United States over turned its back and ran out of any war. We almost lost one a 100 Years ago, maybe, at one ? time. But seriously I am glad, and most people are, I believe, that we did- not turn our back and come out: ? Now, to a degree, the same issues are involved, except the lives of our men are no longer involved. None of our peo- ple are going into battle, and there is no prospect of them going back into battle over there. This is a winding down and getting out of that war, as far as we can?not just turning our backs and running out. I do not know what was promised own there. I would- be willing to go over there and go into it, if anyone wants to go into it, and get the most minute facts about it. But I already know what my position is, and my position is to get out of there as fast as we reasonably can, carrying out our obligations, first to our men that we sent to their deaths there and their loved ones left behind, and carrying out our general obligations as an ally there. We stayed there for years. We knew what we were doing. No one made us go in. And I think we had just better take a second thought here, and whatever we are going to do, not do it on a sup- plemental bill that has already been stripped or almost everything in it. I think we have taken out about 60 per- cent of the original bill. And let us not do it by a floor amendment on a matter that is going to be back before this Sen- ate in a few weeks. It will be only 4 or 5 weeks before the general authorization bill is back before the committee. The Senator from Montana has said we must have it, and must have it soon, and we will make- it the pending busi- ness soon after the committee gets it here. Let us act on that, bill. Let us act on that bill in the light of more extensive hearings, and in the light of a full rec- ommendation of the Armed Services Committee Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question? Mr. STENNIS. Yee, l yield to the Sen- ator from Texas for a question. Mr. TOWER. It is the understanding of the Senator from Texas that by virtue of the very specific language of this amendmene, if the amendment were to prevail and become law, it would mean the end of ithe Joint Casualty Resolution Center activities to resolve the MIA cases, and would result in the withdrawal of U.S. negotiators in the' four-party joint military tier, which would end our effort to get information from the other side on MIA's, so it would mean the total abandonment of our MIA's; they could go to blazes, those 1 400 or 1,500 MIA's. We can forget about them? The money Is more important, apparently, than our MIA's. Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President can the Senator quote the part of the amendment that applies to that? The Senator is to-- Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP751300380R000500290006-4 Approved FeoganffiggiS/ilkeetp_PRMOMOR000500290006-4 May , 1974 tally misrepresenting the effect of my amendment. Mr. STENNIS. Walt a minute I have the floor, The PRESIDINC4 OFFICER. The Sen- ator from Mississippi has the floor. Mr. STENNIS. How much time do I have remaining Mr. President? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator has used 15 minutes of his 45 mM- . utes. Mr. ST 1$, Mr. President, there are other Senators who wish to speak. I ask the Senator from Massachusetts, if I may yield to him briefly, and he then proceed on his own time? Mr. TOWER. Mr. President I will be glad to respond to the question of the Senator from Massachusetts. Mr. STENNIS. All right. Mr. President, the Senator says he will answer the ques- tions on the .time of the Senator from Massachusetts. I yield the floor. Mr. TOWER. As read the amend- ment, it says: None of the funds authorized to be appro- priated by this Act, and no funds heretofore appropriated to or for the use of the De- partment of Defense by any other Act and which remain unobligs Lid on the date of enactment of this Act, may be expended in, for, or on behalf of any country in Southeast Asia. That seems to me to be pretty com- prehensive. , Mr., KENNEDY. If the Senator will read it completely, he will see that it directly applies to the MASF ,assistance program, which deals only with ammu- nition, and relates to the transfer of un- obligated funds. So this distorts com- pletely the meaning of the amendment of the Senator from Massachusetts. Mr. TOWER. No,'! have not. It says: None of the funds authorised to be appro- priated by this Act, and no funds heretofore appropriated to or for the use of the Depart- ment of Defense by any other Act Mr. KENNEDY. This applies only to the question of ammunition and the MASF program. It does not relate to any of the funding which is for the MIA pro- gram, which comes from other DOD funds which, I understand, are obli- gated. . The Senator can state whatever his interpretation is, but he is stating it in- accurately. He can put whatever mean- ' Mg he wants into it, but I am not going to have my amendment distorted by the Senator's language. Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I have not quoted anything but the Senator's Own language. Mr. k..E1INEDY. The Senator is? Mr. TOWER. The Senator says "ap- propriated by this act or any other act." Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Missouri. ? Mr. MANSFIELD. If they did not find it in one place, they could find it in an- other, could they not? TO,WEILIV: but it is specifically barred, arid let us make that plain. I do. hot care what interpretation may be placed on it; the language here is very specific. The PRESIDING OrVICER. The Sen- ator from Mi,ssouri has the floor. Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, let me first assure my colleagues I do not want in any way to furl the flag of the United States. I am mighty proud of that flag and my service under it. On October 3, 1967, on the floor of the Senate, I made the following statement: The resources of any country, even those of the United States, are not inexhaustible; and therefore developments in the Middle East and Europe should also be considered as we in turn consider future policies inci- dent to Vietnam. That was October 3, 1967. On that day, I continued: I have presented for many months my con- viction that the United States is overcom- mitted and overextended. We need a great deal of money to handle all these commit- ments along with our growing problems at home, and we do not want to jeopardize the integrity of the dollar. Mr. President, every time anything comes up about more money for Indo- china, which means Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam, there is talk about our honored dead. In that same speech, on October 3, 1967, I presented that 13,500 Americans had already been killed in Vietnam, and 85,000 wounded. A few days later, I was asked in Kansas City, Mo., my own State, whether I did not honor those men who had been killed. I replied, "I will answer that question with another question: Would you rather rather kill 13,500 more than admit we were wrong?" The able and distinguished chairMan of this committee, ler whom I have the greatest respect, has just given a figure which is four times more that have now been killed than were killed at the time I'made that talk on the floor of the Sen- ate 7 years ago. Mr. President, for these reasons I sup- port the Kennedy amendment. The record is all too clear that the Defense Departinent has spent and will continue to spend every cent and more Congress approves to support current military and logistic activities in Indochina Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. This is the record over many years, brought back to us by many staff, repre- sentatives of the Senate. Let me review briefly the history of the fiscal year 1974 request for the mili- tary assistance service funded program. This is a matter of practical figures and statistics. When it conies to the romance of war regardless of what coun- try is involved, I am tired of seeing all these people killed with the premise it is necessary to protect the best interests of the United States. The executive branch initially re- quested a $2.1 billion ceiling on obliga- tions for this MASF program. As a result of the January 1973 cease- fire, however, this initial request was reduced to $1.6 billion. After discussion, the Senate Armed Services Committee placed an authoriza- tion ceiling for said program of $952 million. At that time, because of the illness of our able and distinguished chairman, S 7133 I chaired the conference with the House of Representatives. They came in with $1.3 billion. We compromised at $1.126 billion. As early as July 31 of last year, the Defense Department was put on notice that their $1.6 billion request for MASF would be substantially reduced. But there is no evidence that any action was taken to reduce the level of support so as to conform to the planned reduced level; in fact, for the first 6 months Defense reported MASF obligations of $890 million, actually the rate Defense would have obligated had Congress approved their originally recommended ceiling of $1.6 billion. Again, this is but typical of their actions over the years with respect to funds for Indochina. Congress ultimately approved a ceil- ing of $1.1 billion; but since in the first 6 months Defense obligated nearly $900 million, they are now out of obligational authority. As we know, Mr. President, a supplemental is to consider cases where there must be prompt or immediate ac- tion. Defense knew they were over- spending the money. They continued to over-spend. Now they ask for justifica- tion in this supplemental. Mr. President, I approved this in the beginning, though I understood where the $266 million came from, and I give full credit to our staff. Now I have had some accounting training, but still am not entirely clear where the money originates that was not spent. In any case, the Defense Department solution to this, their own action, was to come back to Congress with this supple- mental request, one designed to raise the limitation back to the $1.6 billion origi- nally recommended and rejected?not only by the Senate but also by the House as well as in the conference. Actually, the request to raise the MASF ceiling was made but one month after Congress had finished action on the fiscal year 1974 appropriations bill. I, for one, do not believe the Congress should continually bail out the Defense Department?and that is what this is, a bailout?we should not bail out the Department of Defense from monetary jams which they deliberately plan them- selves into. Now we have heard arguments which cite possible dire consequences of not providing more money than the ceiling imposed by Congress last year. But here we are, with less than 2 months left in this fiscal year. I am not convinced any- thing will happen within the next 2 months if Congress maintains its pre- viously established position, and does not add to this obligational ceiling. It would seem the time has come for the Senate to hold the Indochina line. We have been hearing for years and years about the fact we were getting out of Indochina, that we are getting out of Indochina, but we are always coming back for more money to get out of In- dochina. Only this morning I read that South Vietnamese troops are attacking in Cam- bodia. Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500290006-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500290006-4 S 7T34 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE Nay We all know only too well that today the United States has serious and current ecorennieprobterns here at home. II any- one does not so believe, they do noi have to travel' to my State of Missouri. They can go a few blocks from this Capitol and see homes where people are Living, under current Federal housing proerams, without heat or light. There can no longer he approval by us of every single monetaey request now coming in from all-parte of the globe. mr. President we are now ehing a great deal of aid to Egypt. I do not protest that. We plan, according to the press, to give military aid to Egypt. I do not nrotest that. We are giving bil- lions of dollars of aid to Israel and I do not protest that. We are sending bil- lions upon billions of dollars for oil to Middle East counties. I do not protest that. We are spending billions upon bil- lions maintaining a very large military force in Europe. At this tune I do not protest that. But I do question whether the American economy can continue to bear all these burdens indefinitely; in fact, that was the basic thrust of my talk on this floor nearly 7 year!, ago, October 1967. Surely one could rate a few of the more obvious needs of some of our own American people as being higher in pri- ority than this $266 million now being requested, all of which is above the agreed upon original ceiling for the sup- port of Vietnam. Let us remember that, if approved, MASF would still be obtaining $174 mil- lion more than what was originally passed last year by the Senate. It is for these reasons, let me repeat, Mr. President, that I support the amend- ment of the distinguished senior Sen- ator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY) . The PRESIDING OrrICER. The 10 minutes of the Senator have expired. Mr. SIT:INNIS. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. MCINTYRE). The PRESIDING OrriCER. The Sen- ator from New Hampshire is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. IncINTYRE. Mr. President, I in- tend to support the position of the Armed Services Committee and vote against the amendment offered by the distingutshed Senator from Massachu- setts (Mrs KENNEDY). Because so much comment has surrounded this araend- meat, and because many different inter- pretation are likely to be placed cn the results of this vote, I believe it is im- portant to state the reasons for my vote. At the outset, let me make it clear that: This is not a vote for open-ended and indiscriminate fending for the Thieu regime. This is not a vote for devious account- ing procedures that allow the Pentagon to "find' mysterious sources of funds. This is a vote to fulfill congressional intent regarding fiscal year 1974 aid to Southeast Asia, and to live up to the guidelines given to the Defense Depart- ment. Mr. President, this Issue can be put In better perspective by a short ieview of the Armed Services Committee action After the Pentagon's request for an in- :Tease in the fiscal year 1974 ceiling on aid to Southeast Asia. When this matter same before our committee, it was my Arrow feeling that the request was not justified, Accordingly, I voted with the sommittee to remove this request from the bill and thereby retain the $1.12 billion spending limit. Close examination by committee staff nembers of the Pentagon's accounting )ractices revealed that a system was be- am used that failed to differentiate be- :ween aid given to Southeast Asia dining escal year 1974 and replenishment to domestic inventories for ammunition end other aid supplied to Southeast Asia .n previous years. Thus, the $266 million figure which is the focus of the pending amendment actually represents aid given 3efore fiscal year 1974. The total funds ;pent for aid to Southeast Asia in this fiscal year would therefore be less than 'he $1.12 billion ceiling. Mr. President, I do not regard the sum $266 million as insignificant or trivial. I would prefer that this money be spent iere at home on some of our pressing domestic problems. :But that is not the issue at hand. This Congress has made a commitment?to the Defense Depart- ment and to the government of South 'Vietnam. We have stated that a certain eum of money, but no more than that Aim, will be available in this fiscal year. To pass the amendment offered by the Senator from Massachusetts would be to eenege on that commitment with less ehan 2 months remaining in the fiscal year. However attractive that might seem from the standpoint of domestic oriorities, I believe it would be unfair and capricious in light of the promises :Implicit in the 1974 authorization. At a lime when the integrity and credibility of he governmental decisionmaking proc- ess is under heavy scrutiny, we should not diminish the value of a congressional pledge. But at the same time that we uphold our previous commitments, let us also serve notice on the Pentagon and on President Thleu that we are not giving a blank check for the future. In no way should my vote be read as a promise to "bail out" the Pentagon any time it over- spends or seeks to vitiate a congressional spending ceiling. One glance at the treat- ment given the Pentagon's supplemental research and development requests by my R. & D. subcommittee should make my position clear. Furthermore, I intend to take a very hard look at the fiscal year 1975 budget requests and especially the 81.6 billion Vietnam aid ceiling sought by DOD. I firmly believe that our policy should continue to be to decrease our in- volvement in Southeast Asia. Mr. STEN/US. Mr. President, I yield myself 1 minute to say that I certainly thank the Senator nom New Hempshire for going to the trouble of studying this matter and for stay Ing here to make a very fine and clear-cut speech that con- tributes to the situation, and firmly and strongly backs up the committee posi- eion. This is another illustration of how valuable the Senator from New Hemp- 1914' shire (Mr. Mcblegrue is not only on the Armed Services Committee, but wherever else he puts his hand to the plow. Mr. McINTYRE, Mr. President, this was a most difficult decision for me to snake but I think we should live up to the pledges that we make. Mr. STINNES. Mr. President, I yield 7 minutes to the Se: lator from South Carolina Ian TAURAWND) . The PRESIDING 07eFICER. The Sen- ator from South Carolina is recognized for 7_ minuies. Mr. THURMOND. nen President, when the defense supplemental bill came in this year, the adshinistration requested $1.6 billion, for Southeast Asia for mili- tary support. The committee reduced that to $126 billion. We feel that this is reasonable. We feel that it is proper. We have het almost 50,000 men in Viet- nam. We have had 300,000 wounded in Vietnam. We believe that with some ammunition and equipment, the South Vietnamese would be able to hold their own and maintain n ieir freedom. But without this, they cannot do it. Mr. President, under the amendment of the distinguished Senator frone Massachusetts, $266 million will be cut from this $1.26 billion The Armed Serv- ices Committee did not add any new money. I would like this to be clear in the minds of my colleaeues: We delivered ammunition in 1972 and 1973 that was charged to the 1974 authorization. Therefore, that reduced the authoriza- tion for this year, 1954, to $860 million. All we are trying to do here is to pre- vent the loss of that $266 million, which we have already authorized and already appropriated. I repeat: We are not add- ing $266 million. We are merely trying to keep that much frem being lost from this year's authorization appropriation which Congress made last year. Mr. President, Congress has already acted. We do not want to see now the action of Congress undone. If there were justificatioa for undoing it, that would be one thing. But there is no justifica- tion. The South Vietnamese need this money. We were pressed to vet out of the Viet- nam war, and we made statements and promises that if we could get our man- power out, we- would provide them with ammunition and equipment. That is what we are trying to do now, except on a smaller basis, because we are not providing it on a 1-to-1 basis as the agreement provided. This is less than the agreement provided. The question might be asked, How is this money going to be used? This is how it will be used: ammunition, $160 mil- lion; aircraft procurement, $69 million; operations maintenance and spare parts, $37 million--a total of $266 million. The South Vietaamese teed it. They need it in order to stop the aggression of the enemy. I sincerely hope that _the Senate will not undo uhanit has-already done. I re- peat: We are not taking any affirmative action to give them snore money. We are just trying to hold what Congress has al- ready given. It would be a great blunder, In my opinion, if we were to take steps to deny this $266 million to those people Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500290006-4 May 6, 1974 over there who are ftghting for their freedom. An article appeared in a newspaper a few days ago which stated that a bat- talion was lost over there because of lack of ammunition. We do not want that to happen again. The article reads: "A Battalion Dies at Kontum. Officers Say Lack of Ammo Hampers Operations." Do we want that to happen? Do we want South Vietnam to go down the drain? Do we want the South Vietnam- ese to lose their freedom? Do we want the whole of Southeast Asia to go Com- munist? It will be determined on the floor of the Senate. These brave people are willing to fight. All they are? asking and pleading with us for is a little ammunition and weapons and equipment, and let them do their own fighting. We said we would do that, when we pressed to get out, and now they have taken it over. We have an obligation to those people to provide them with am- munition and equipment, because, after all, they are fighting for the free world as well as their own freedom. Mr. President, I hope the Senate will not adopt this amendment. I hope the Senate will stand by what it did last year and let South Vietnam have what Congress already has considered, au- thorized, and appropriated, and not dis- turb that amount by trying to reduce it by $266 million. One might say that the Pentagon is trying to pull a fast one or it is the Pentagon's bookkeeping. V'es, the Penta- gon made a mistake; and Mr. Don Lynch, of the Senate Armed Services staff, caught that mistake. The VICE PRE$1DENT. The Senator's '7 minutes have expired. Mr. $TENNIS. I yield 1 additional minute to ,the Senator. Mr. THURIVIOND. Mr. Lynch caught that mistake. What was done was that this $266 million, instead of being charged to the 1972 and 1973 fiscal years, was charged against this year It was purely an error. If anybody makes a mis- take, can they not correct it? A mistake should be corrected I commend Mr. Lynch for catching that error. Ile is a very able staff member. Simply because the Pentagon made a inistake, we should not punish the South 'Vietnamese in their struggle and in their effort to maintain their freedom, by denying them what Congress has already anpropriated. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield 4 minutes to the Senator from Nebraska. Mr. HRUSKA: Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the amendment proposed by the distinguished senior Senator from Massachusetts. The amendment, in reality, seeks to nullify and revoke the considered action of Congress earlier this session in enact- ing the Armed Services regular authori- zation and appropriation acts for fiscal 1974, which we are now considering. The amendment is an attempt to deauthorize and to cAnce1 an appropriation duly made on the military assistance service fund- ing in regard to South Vietnam and Laos. It would be extremely unwise to adopt this amendment, and it should be re- jected. Previous action by Congress was Approved pzes4Ranggi693N89il&S.M5RDPMR8OR000500290006-4 well considered; it was deliberate and pursuant to sound, long-range policy. It should be preserved. There may be a time when the merit of this action can be more fairly can- vassed, and that time will be here within a few short weeks. But to reverse the de- liberate and well considered action of both houses of Congress and the signa- ture of the President on the basis of a 45-minute debate on each side of the respective sides of this issue certainly Is not in order and is not wise. The complicating aspect of the current situation results in the fact that approxi- mately $266 million worth of ammuni- tion had been delivered from Army in- ventories to South Vietnam in prior years. Under understandings with Con- gress, and consistent with past practices, the Defense Department charged this amount to the 1974 ceiling on the amounts that were set aside for the mili- tary assistance to South Vietnam. In reality, this was "payback" ammunition for United States inventories delivered in previous fiscal years. This resulted in a reduction of $266 million from the amount approved and appropriated for support for fiscal 1974. Mr. President, there are two ways con- gressional intent and action can be re- stored: First, by increasing the ceiling from $1.126 billion to $1.6 billion. The House refused to do so. The Senate Armed Serv- ices Committee also recommended that such increase be denied. The second way is to correct the book- keeping entry by which the $266 million were charged against the fiscal 1974 limi- tation and make that charge against prior years unused authorizations and appropriations. Such a correction would do two very helpful things: First, the actual military assistance rendered for fiscal year 1974 will be clearly and real- istically reported; and second, the au- thorized and appropriated amount for such military assistance will be restored to the amount Congress intended it to be for fiscal year 1974. This is the amount which Congress authorized and appro- priated in the regular fiscal year 1974 Authorization and Appropriations Acts. The Senate Armed Services Committee report in its final paragraphs at page 32 reads: This $266 million should not have been included under the MASF limitation for FY 1974. The funds in fact have been obligated for accounting purposes in prior years, and the ammunition was delivered in prior fiscal years. The statistical method of reporting may have been valid when U.S. forces and South Vietnam forces were supported by a common pipeline. However, since U.S. forces have been withdrawn, statistical reporting is completely unsatisfactory to the committee. The De- partment of Defense should change their method of reporting obligations under the ammunition program from a statistical basis to a more realistic basis as soon as possible. By making the correction of bookkeep- ing to which I have referred, congres- sional intent and previous action will be obserired. A great dear of painstaking study and consideration was devoted to reaching the decisions contained in the regular S 7135 fiscal 1974 Authorization and Appro- priations Acts. At this late hour, we should not divert the course of action so carefully and deliberately achieved. Policy decisions of far-reaching im- pact are involved. They are well grounded and well founded on a longer range view. A more clear understanding of the situation can be gained from a reading of the April 29, 1974, U.S. News & World Report article entitled, "Envoy to South Vietnam Answers His Critics." I ask unanimous consent that its text be printed at the conclusion of my remarks. The article consists of a verbatim in- terview in Saigon by Wendell S. Merick of the U.S. News & World Report with Ambassador Graham A. Martin, a 40- year veteran in the diplomatic service of his country. It is urged that the pending amend- ment be rejected. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: ENVOY TO SOUTH VIETNAM ANSWERS HIS CRITICS?INTERVIEW WITH GRAHAM A. MARTIN Q Mr. Ambassador, has Vietnam made any real progress toward peace since the January, 1973, cease-fire agreement? A Yes, but the pace has been much slower than most Americans had hoped for. How- ever, many of us who have followed Indo- China events over the years have been con- vinced all along that there were essential prerequisites to a real peace. One is that Hanoi would have to become convinced that the South Vietnamese still retained the will to stay free, as well as re- taining political unity and the military capa- bility to do so even after all American com- bat forces had left the country. This is, I think, now clearly established. The second prerequisite was some diminu- tion of the bitterness which was the inevita- ble aftermath of a quarter century of savage fighting. That, of course, would take time? but by then Hanoi would come to the reali- zation that only the Vietnamese parties could work our methods of implementing the Paris accords. Then, perhaps, the political machinery established by the accords could be used, quietly and seriously, for real and effective negotiations. The Republic of Vietnam has been and is now willing to do this. Any objective and dis- passionate review of the record confirms that attitude. And one hopes that Hanoi will soon conclude that its own best interests will be best served by a positive political response. Q Are you optimistic about future prog- ress? A If you take into account only the two prerequisites I've mentioned, then condi- tions are certainly ripe for negotiations. But actual progress toward a real peace really is totally dependent on a third requirement. Hanoi must come to realize the futility of its marvelously clever, ingeniously sophisticated and frighteningly pervasive propaganda campaign to force the American Congress to Immediately and drastically reduce Ameri- can aid to the Republic of Vietnam. I deeply believe that once Congress, by taking action to provide adequate economic and military aid to South Vietnam, shows Hanoi that its campaign cannot succeed, then we will see rather rapid progress. The intensity of fighting and other violence then should lessen, leading to real and meaning- ful negotiations between the Vietnamese parties. Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500290006-4 S 713 6 Q Is the U.S. committed to previda South Vietnam with economic and military aid into the indefinite-future? A Searetary jof State] Kissinger pointed out recently that while the answer, in a pre- cise legal sense, is "No," nevertheless we un- dertook eertaba obligations when we signed the -Paris agreements. Among the obligations waa oui commitment to the South Vietnam- ese peciale's right to self-deternainanon. The provision of adequate econoraie and military aid is, of course, 4 matter for the Congreas to determine as it eonsiders the foreigmaid billa each year. Howerer, I'd like to look beer a few years, back to 1954. Many Americans have forgot- ten that our real emotional involvement in Indo-China affairs began in 1954, with a characteristic American humanitarian re- sponse when we helped move almost a mil- lion?mostly Catholic?Vietnamese from the North to the South. They abandoned every- thing at material value, choosing to become penniless refugees in the South rather than. rerenne under the totalitarian rule of Hanoi. Also, it seems to use that debate over abstruse questions of "legality" ought not to obscure the fact, the reality, that our present commitment arises from an even more characteristic American trait?our de- termination and pride that we finish what we set out to do. And in this case, it is to leave Vietnam economically viable, militarily capable of defending itself with its own man- power, and its people free to Choose their own government and their own leaders. I am thoroughly convinced that this goal can be achieved rather quickly. Q Is South Vietnam's claim that it will need 3 1:41lion dollars in U.S. comics:Mc aid through the 1970's realistic? A It Is probably correct that South Viet- nam, win need a. billion dollars in a combina- tion on foreign aid, foreign investment and export earnings in the 1970s. But in my opin- ion, if the decisions I have reconuner ded are made now, not much more than half that amount 'need come from the United States. Q How much aid Is the U.S. providing now? A In this fiscal year, military aid has been limited to a little over 1 billion dollars?a very tight slim to help complete the last step of the highly successful process Df Viet- nam/ewe:ma Unfortunately, Hanoi did not observe the cease-fire to which it had agreed, and the rate of necessary expenditures for ammuni- tion fat exceeded the estimate made in the expectirden of peace. I'm very hopeful, however, that the Con- gress will appropriate the full amount the Department of Defense has requested for the fiscal year 1975. If this is done, I am certain the process of negotiation will be speeded, leading to a drastic reduction in the intensity of fighting. That, in turn, will result in a decreased need for U.S. military Me there- after. It had originally been planned to provide 625 million dollars in economic aid for this fiscal- year. We were able to give only 800 million dollars and. as it turned cut, the aStual impact of that was much red aced by the increase in world prices of commodities that have to be imported, such as petroleum products. If, as I very much hope, the seecutIve branch proposes and the Congress approves the 850 million dollars I have recommended for the fiscal" year 1975, plea approelinately 700 million dollars for the following year, I am convinced further economic aid from the United_ States could be drastically reduced or even ea iminated altogether by fisial year 19'7'1. - Q. Would South Vietnam be anywhere near an "economic breakthrough" if there were peace? A. Very close to that, as a matter of fact. When I. was told a year ago by some of the Approved For Release 2001/08/30 .? CIA-RDP75600380R000500290006-4 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE May (r, 1974 meat competent ecoaomists in the United States that all essential conditions were pres- ent In Vietnam for an economic break- tbrough along the lines achieved in Taiwan and South Korea?test, note this, in a much shorter time frame?I thought they were overly optimistic. NOW I am convinced they were right. Q. What will happen here if Congress fails to appropriate the funds you've recom- mended? A. It will take us longer to finish what we set out to do. You see, I do assume we are going to finish it. I do assume this will not be the first time we Americans will fail to do so. The question in any mind is whether we will, but how long will it take? I do assume that when we leave we will have accom- plished our objective: leave Vietnam eco- nomically viable, militarily capable of de- fending need with its own manpower, and free to choose its own government and its own leaders. My goose is that we leave in the quickest possible time, with that objective accomplished. My other goal is that, as quickly as pos- sible, Americans will be able to look back at Vietnam and say that the historians can sort out what mistakes we made, but in the end we did a few things right and it came out all right. I want to get to that point as quickly as possible, and I believe the recommenda- tions I have made will greatly accelerate the speed with which we reach that goal. , Q. What sort of economic formula do you see putting South Vietnam on its feet? A. I am not an economist. But I have been exposed to some of the. world's best and I have been a long-time intensive student of the economic-development process. I have ri- eluded that no special formula can repeal c G the basic laws of economics. Occasionally, we find in a country a com- bination of great natural resources, an able administration comm .tted to sound economic policies, an intelligent, ingenious, innovative, incredibly tough people, with a proven capa- bility for sustained effort and with a fierce and passionate determination to maintain their freedom. When this Combination exists, as it does now in South Vietnam, an infu- sion of sufficient outside capital acts as a catalyst, bringing all. of the elements I've mentioned together In a way that can pro- duce truly remarkable results. Q. Going back to the U.S. aid program. In a cable to the State Department in March you stated that Hanoi decided last autumn to launch an all-out campaign to persuade Con- gress to cut economic and military aid to Saigon. In your opinion, has Congress been In any way swayed by Hanoi? A. What I actually said was that we had long been aware of decisions taken last fall ' In Hanoi to mount an all-out campaign this winter and spring to persuade the Congress to drastically reduce the magnitude of both economic and military aid to the Govern- ment of Vietnam. Hanoi's pians called for the Stockholm International Conference on Vietnam to be the main co-ordinating mechanism, and the Provisional Revolutioaary Government dele- gation in Parts?the South Vietnamese Com- munist representatives?to be the principal channel. The remnants of the American "peace movement" would be used in such a way as to bring influence to bear on selected susceptible?but iniluential?elements of American coramuniestions mettle and, par- ticularly, on susceptible members of emigres- sional staffs. The eiemsat of timing was important. First, as much material as possible con- demning the South Vietnamese Government was to be moved the "Congressional Record." The hope was that these insertions would show up in?or at least influence-- forrnal reports of congressional subcommit- tees. These, in turn, could be followed up and given wide circulation by "investigative re- porting" which would tend to confirm and, where possible, expana on the distortions already in the congressional subconunetee formal reports. When I referred to t he Hanoi decision or last autumn I was refer Ing to a special effort designed to particularle affect the authoriz- ing and appropriatioa process for the fiscal year 1975 aid program or Vietnam. Hanoi's campaign 4 not something new. / watched the same process being used in France in the early '50s when the French were still here in Vieinam. I became fas- cinated by its efficiency and pervasiveness. Q. But is it really effective in the U.S.? A. Let me give you an example. Outside the corps of professional Hanoi watchers. I have probably been ene of the most regular and consistent reader . of the output of Hanoi's principal newspaper -Mum Dan" and of Radio Hanoi. W. th a background like that you'd think one should be immune to the propaganda. Instea it, I find that even I have on occasions aceeeted as true parts of the "conventional wiactmn" so carefully im- planted. I believe an Americans have been touched by it to some degree, and since the Congress is representative of our people, it is Inevitable that Congres t would be influenced by it, When some of these listortions began ap- pearing in the "Congressional Record" and even in some congresieonal-comrnittee re- ports, I began to worry more about what was happening to us in the United States than about what was happening in Vietnam. "THE PEOPLE Mn, r .CAVE THE TIIITTR" I deeply believe that when the American people and the American Congress have the whole truth, their decisions are almost al- ways cense,. But they must have the whole truth. Let me illustrate this with a wonder- ful passage from Aleaander Solzhenitsyn, published in Oslo last, fall. It reads like this: "The error cammittea by man in his un- derstancline of the -meaning of 'peace' is nothing Int emotional I meant what I said. This is nothing unueual. We often err not because we find it hard to perceive the truth (it is often right there at the surface), bet because it is easier and more pleasant to be guided by our feelings, especially if self- centered. "The truth has lone been demonstrated and proved and explained, and yet it has remained without attention -or sympathy, like Orwelits '19E14' because of a 'universal conspiracy of adulation' (ha the author's own words). "The bestial mass killings in Hue [South Vietnam], though reliaJ sly proved, were only lightly noticed and almost immediately for- given because the sympathy of society was on the other side, and the inertia could not be disturbed. "It was :list too bad that the information did seep into the free press and for a time (very briefly) cause embarrassment (just a tiny bit) to the passiorate defenders of that other social system." I was well aware that if I chose to disturb the intertia, if I openly Suggested the cur- rent carefully cultivated "conventional wis- dom" did not provide :he Congress and the American people with the whole truth, which was essential to reach decisions that would truly corrmpond to A mer lean interests, I would be subjected to tonsiderable personal abuse. Nevertheless, I thought the abuse would be vorth taking if it might contrib- ute to providing the whole truth to the American aeople. Q Does the abuse bother you? A Not really, Last fail my wife told me the integrity of my 40 years of service to the American people was lust too well known for such attacks to be taken seriously. She was confident the int jority of Ameriesties still preserved an instinctive aversion to be- ing "taken in," and would appreciate the few Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500290006-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 ? CIA-RDP75BOOMR000500290006-4 'May. 6, 1974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE who w.erc still willing to fight to see they were told the whole truth. She said our "pas- sionate defenders of that other social system" did not, any more than did the Soviets, know how to handle a completely honest man who Was not afraid, and if the fluttering in the dovecotes gets too frantic, she would get me a? broad-brimmed hat. Prejudiced and overly generous as her appraisal of me may be, it sure is awfully nice to have around. Q. Senator Kennediin early April charged that you had recommended that the State Department refrain from giving him an "honest and detailed answer" to questions about U.S. policy in Vietnam. What was the purpose Of your recommendation? A My first reaction was that George Or- well's 1984 world of "doublespeak" had ar- rived prematurely. I have always assumed that all reports of the Secretary or the Department to the Con- grass or any merriber thereof would be "hon- est and detailed." It was obviously a deliber- ate distortion a thd clear intent of my mes- sage to suggest that / 'recommended that Renator Kennedy get any other kind. ? On the other hand, I have not been in- formed that the Senate Judiciary Subcom- Mittee op. Refugees has superseded the For- eign Relations and Appropriations commit- tees. I had been impressed by the feet that Senator Kennedy had giVen a rather free rein to his SubcOmmittee Staff which, it seemed to me, sometimes ill-Seri/0 him by being more conderhed - with headlines than - with the thorough; painstaking Leareh for accuracy and perceptive insight that has long been the hallmark of the highly competent and professional staffs of the Foreign Rela- tions, Foreign Afra,ini and Appropriations committees, Therefore; since the rather linportarit mat- ters of substance raised in Senator Kennedy's lettex were very Stier): to be given: an "honest and detailed" presentation to the 'Foreign Relations Committee and, .to, the Appropri- ations Committee, my recommendation was simply to convey-privately-MY feeling that it would be the height of "folly to give the same "honest and detailed" presentation -to the Subcommittee on Refugee's before it ' was given to the committees which had always handled these affair's. I have not the ...slightest apology for this recommendation. NOW TO END THE WAS. "VERY QUICKLY" Q Mr. Ambassador, A lot of Americans ask: "Why should we worry any longer about Viet- nam?" A The important questions remain:. How do we end our involvement? Mow quickly Can this be accomPlishecl? My personal belief is that we should end it very quickly, and / believe this, pan be done. Ilow we end it is of ? crucial importanee. I have said our objective should be to end it leaving a Vietnam eco- nomically' viable, militarily capable of de- fending itself with its own manpower, and free to choo:se its own government and its own leaders. I believe this can be done within the next three years. I believe that the, effect on our power re- lationships elsewhere in the world of being able to walk away from such a Vietnam with the evidence of American commitments fully discharged may well determine whether our grandchildren will live in a peaceful world or one where senseless Violence will be the daily norm. Only those Who are incapable of un- derstanding the intricate interplay of the bal- Rf loves now loose in the world, or TV* .tp lii,k abOnt it; will, con- tend that the preceding -sentence is other than a dispassionate Statement of a simple fact. I also believe that if the Congress and the people are given the whole truth, we will end our involvement quickly, with that objective accomplished. , . Mr. STENNLS. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Arizona. Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I was present at the subcommittee meet- ing when the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY) made the first presentation of his amendment. After listening to it and without having had at that up-to-date briefing on the whole subject, I said to Senator KENNEDY, "I would not find a lot of diffi- culty in supporting the amendment." I further said, "I do not think the Defense Department should use domestic infla- tion as a reason for upping the ceiling." When I made that statement I felt just exactly as I expressed it. However, since that time, and the full committee having been briefed on the entire concept which has been discussed on the floor today, and which I will not repeat. I have changed my opinion, and I think that the money should be allowed. I do not want to make a long speech on this mat- ter. I will just say briefly that I think it Is a question of whether or not we want South Vietnam to stand or fall. I doubt seriously, too, that $266 mil- lion would answer that question, but if this amendment is adopted and it leads, as it will inevitably lead, to other amend- ments, that could mean a striking of the entire sum, something the Senator from Massachusetts assured me he does not want to happen. Then, I think we would be in difficulty. I refer, for example, to an editorial that appeared in this morning's Wash- ington Post?and I might say they have never felt too strongly that Vietnam should stand. Referring to a letter Secretary Kis- singer wrote to Senator KENNEDY?and I have not seen it?I do not know if Sec- retary Kissinger sent it to anybody else, but the Post probably has seen it?they r3ferred to a characteristic statement made by Secretary Kissinger: The presence of large numbers of North Vietnamese troops in the south demonstrates that the military threat from Hanoi is still very much in evidence. I go on to read the editorial: His plain implication was that Hanoi is violating the peace agreement by keeping troops in the south. Yet the accords permit Hanoi to keep in the south as many troops as it had there in January 1973. By suggest- ing that Hanoi is doing something it has no right to do, he is implicitly granting Saigon an excuse to take countering steps in its own "self-defense," even though those steps may not be contemplated in the Paris ac- cords. In the aid vote, the Senate has the opportunity to inform the administration whether?and to what extent?it agrees. Now, I would point out that in the briefings I have had, the North Viet- namese have far greater strength in the South than they had at any time during the actual war. They have completed two paved highways through the South, one. going to within 25 miles of Saigon. They have completed a railroad part way down and they have completed a petroleum oil line to points where it could be of ad- vantage to them. It has been my observation that if we ever withdraw our support from South Vietnam, South Vietnam cannot stand S 7137 on its own against the forces of North Vietnam, bolstered as they are by air- craft reaching them from the Soviets through Red China and Hanoi. So, Mr. President, I do not think the Post- really understands what is going on over there. I admit I did not at the time I told Senator KENNEDY I liked his amendment. I think the North is merely awaiting the time when the South does not have ample ammunition to make their major attack. As I see the military situation over there now it clearly indicates that the North is far stronger in men and equip- ment and, of much more importance to me, of course, is the fact that their air force has been greatly restructured and reinforced by the advent of the new MIG aircraft, not the most modern aircraft but something they did not have during the war to any extent, aircraft with which they can now fight the very goc d South Vietnamese air force. They also have constructed many new airfields and rebuilt airfields that had been com- pletely destroyed during the course of the conflict in the Vietnam War. So while I once agreed in part with the Senator from Massachusetts, I find my- self in opposition now. The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator's 5 minutes have expired. Mr. GOLDWATER. I thank the Chair. I was just going to conclude. The Chair is a good observer of time, having been trained properly in the House. Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, how much time do we have? The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Massachusetts has 12 minutes re- maining and the Senator from Missis- sippi has 6 minutes remaining. Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I yield myself 11/2 minutes. Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for one question? Mr. KENNEDY. I shall yield to the Senator after I speak for 11/2 minutes. I will be happy to yield then. The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Massachusetts is recognized,. Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, there have been inflammatory statements - made here about whether the effect of the impact of this amendment would cut back on the funds that would be avail- able to the Joint Casualty Resolution Center. This is a new argument. When the administration appeared before the House Committee looking for an increase of $474 million, they never said for one moment they would need this money for the Joint Casualty Center. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, may we have order? Will those who are not Members be still for a while? The Sen- ator is entitled to be heard. The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senate will be in order. Mr. KENNEDY. Second, the amend- ment as stated makes reference to funds which remain unobligated. Funds for the Joint Casualty Center are obligated. The comments of the Senator from Texas are mistaken with regard to the amendment. I have listened to the argument of the - Approved For Release 2001/08/30: CIA-RDP75600380R000500290006-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500290006-4 S 7138 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE May 6, 1974 Senator from South Carolina and other comments made here. Either the ceilings whiich are established by Congress have some meaning in terms of authorization or they do not. The American taxpayers are investing their money at the rate of $42,500 per year in electing each Mem- ber of Congress, and they are wasting their money if we go ahead and provide a ceiling which does not have any mean- ing for the Department of Defense or any other department. What we have done here is to se; the ceiling at $1.128 billion, and they are trying to Increase it by $266 million. Then, :1 hear the argument that :f we do not provide the $266 million we are defaming the 55,000 Americans whc lost their lives and the 300,000 who were in- jured. But those who make that argu- ment do not say anything about the $2.5 billion we will be spending on Vietnam, or the fact that the administration wants to double economic aid for Vietnam in the next fiscal year and to increase ,nili- tary spending by about one-third. How long are we going to hear those arguments? We have been hearing them long enough. It is basically because the Defense Department has not proceeded to allocate our resources wisely and has frustrated the will of the Congress. Finally-- The VICE PRESIDENT. The time of the Senator has expired. Mr. KENNEDY. I yield myself 1 imn- ute. The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator is recognized for 1 additional minute. Mr. KENNEDY. The General Account- ing Office has said that this is probably illegal in the first place, because we follow the line of reasoning of the Armed Services Committee and say the money is actually for ammunition that came from 1973 funds and that 60 percent of that was delivered in fiscal 1973, that would raise the ceiling which we au- thorized. The fact is that the Mita, re- ports of the GAO show that this is clearly I hope the amendment is going to stand. It makes sense. Are we going to comply with a decision that has been made as a result of conferences between the Armed Services Committees of the House and the Senate on putting a ceil- ing into effect, or are we not? Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield 1 minute for a question? Mr. KENNEDY. I yield. Mr. JAVITS. Does the rationale the Senator wishes us to follow in any way involve the question of judgment as to whether or to what extent the United States should back South Vietnam finan- cially, or is it involved in the fact that we are not being asked to pass upon that issue frontally but, rather, in an implied or indirect way, by asking us to author- ize money as if we were being asked to Pass on the issue? In other words, are we being asked to add $266 milion frankly and frontally because that is de- sirable because of our interest in South Vietnam, or are we asked to do it in the cover of? some accounting which does not let us face the issue? Mr. KENNEDY. The Senator's latter statement is correct. There is no frontal Approved facing of the issue. No hearings were held on this $266 million payback transfer. It is an accounting change. It is very interesting to listen to the fiscal conservatives say they are willing to authorize this kind of backdoor fi- nancing, but when we are talking about the need for programs having to do with poverty, health, and similar issues they sing a different tune. Mr. JAVITS. And no backdoor spend- lg. Mr. KENNEDY. I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES) . Mr. HUGHES. I thank the distin- gaished Senator from Massachusetts for yolding. Mr. President, I would like," by way o beginning, to associate myself with the remarks of the distinguished Sena- tor from Missouri primarily because on that day at that particular committee I had given the Senator from Missouri my proxy, because I was unable to be there. He has stated his own thoughts and his confusion as a result of that pro- cedure. So- my proxy must have been voted on that basis. Mr. President, I welcome this oppor- tunity to join in supporting the amend- ment proposed by the distinguished Sen- ator from Massachusetts (Mr. KEN- ICEDY) to deny an increase in military aid to South Vietnam. The issue, as I see it, is a simple one of obeying the law. Last year the Congress set a ceiling of $2,735 million for the MASF program, and the Pentagon reported, as required by law, obligations of $2,713,100,000? that is, all but $22 million of its author- ity. Now the Pentagon claims that $266 million for ammunition, reported to the Congress for the first time last ,f all should not be counted against this year's ceiling of $1.126 billion. Where should it be reported? I am told that most; of those funds properly sliould be counted against the fiscal year 1973 ceiling, but that would invoke a violation of that restriction on spend- ing. So now the Pentagon wants us to sanc- tion an ex post facto violation of the law and, in the process, allow over a quarter of a billion dollars more for South Vietnam, The most charitable interpretation is that the MASF program has the shoddiest bookkeeping in the entire Pent- agon. Alternatively, the administration chose to pour money and equipment into V..etnam without regard for the legal re- strictions imposed by the Congress. In any case, I believe that the Defense Department should be held to the letter of the law. And since this extra $266 mil- lion was not reported to the Congress until fiscal 1974, then this program should be held accountable for its re- ports. Otherwise, we will be in the position of letting misleading reports to the Con- gress become justifications for violations of the restrictions we wrote into law. This year alone, we will spend $1.852 billion in South Vietnam for all U S. Government programs, according to the GAO. Our aid comes to 6.Y2 times what the Thieu government raises for its own budget. We have built up a massive military machine in South Vietnam, one which have over one-fourth of the male labor force under arms. And despite the talk of cease-fire vio- lations, the South Vietnamese Govern- ment's own figures show that its force have suffered over 40 percent fewer casualties and two-thirds fewer deaths since the cease-fire agreements went into effect. Reduced violence dons not justify in- creased aid. Nor should we allow the current scare tactics to force us to capitulate to these demands for more money. ? Every time an aid bill is before the Congress, it; seems that Saigon starts shouting about a new offensive. We heard it last, December; we hear it now. But just as no offensive took place last winter, I doubt that anything sur- prising will happen this spring, espe- cially not since the rainy season is about to begin. A few weeks ago, Saigon trumpeted the "fall" of a ranger base called Tong Le Chan after heavy righting. U.S. re- porters subsequently discovered that the base had been quietly evacuated at night. As the New York Times reported: It appeared that Pra4ident Thieu was superheating the atmosphere of tension in order to increase the chances that a mili- tary appropriations bill would be approved In the United States Senate. Mr. President, I think we have had enough of deceit and manipulation. The time has cane to draw the line. I strongly support this amendment, because I believe it will do that job. Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I yield the Senator from California a minute and a half. Mr. CRANSTON. I thank the dis- tinguished Senator. Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to vote for the Kennedy amendment. I think that nothing less than responsible gov- ernment is at stake. In the last year or two, Congress has taken inrnportant steps toward self-re- form. Improving its budgetary proce- dures is one of the most crucial. Even though the mechanism set up by the budget reform bin has not yet come Into being, the budgetary review process has already become more effective. The Senate Armed Services Committee offers us a fine example. This year, the target date for the regular military procure- ment bill is mid-May instead of well into the fiscal year, as it has been in past years. I commend the distinguished -chairman of the Armed Services Commit- tee for that new anel more rational timetable. ' The Kennedy amendment conforms to this spirit of more responsible budgetary review. Originally, the Pentagon asked the Congress to :increase the ceiling on mili- tary aid to Saigon from its present level of $1.126 to $1.6 billion. But on April 4, the House voted 177 to 154 to keep the.e ceiling where. It is. For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500290006-4 or May 6, 1974 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000500290006-4 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --- SENATE S 7139 The Senate Armed Services Commit- tee voted to retain the present ceiling as well. But at the same time, the commit- tee approved a change in fiscal year accounting which has the effect of pro- viding an additional $266 million to South Vietnam?money which the com- mittee -says is available because of "in- accurate accounting." Mr. President, I have struggled with the Pentagon's accounting system ever since I came to the Senate. I know full well how frustrating it Is to try to dig statistics out of the files, only to find that you cannot use them, because they are not consistent. I wholeheartedly agree with the committee's insistence on straightening out the bookkeeping maze surrounding military aid to Saigon. The effect of reform in this case should have been to tighten the procedure and to close the loopholes. Instead, the imme- diate result is qUite different. Somehow, $266 million has suddenly materialized, seemingly from nowhere. And unless we Pass the Kennedy amendment, the Sen- ate will go on record in favor of mailing that money directly to General Thieu? airmail special delivery. When I say that responsible govern- ment is at stake; I mean this: Congress should not set formal imits on spending at the "front door" and then allow money to go out the back door. Congressman MAnon, chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, put the matter very ine'cinctly. He said on April 10: If Congress. docs net see fit to provide addi- tional funds in a forthright way, then I am not in favor of making funds available by changing accounting procedures or by changing reports, or by any other legerde- main, and I will oppose any attempts to ac- complish in committee reports what cannot be accomplished by law. , Mr. President, only 5 months ago. Con- gress reduced the Pentagon's request for military aid to South Vietnam froin $1.6 to $1.126 billionAt did so in the appro- priate way; namely, through action on the regular flical. year 1974 military pro- curement authorization bill. We should not reverse our decision now?particularly when nothing has happened to justify a supplemental request. - A supplemental funding authoriza- tion should not be normal procedure. It should he used only when something major and unexpected has happened, such as the "October War" in the yfiddle East. It should not he a way Of getting around the regular budgetary process. In this case, there has been no emer- gency. The "major new offensive" that North Vietnam ,Was. supposed to have launched by now has not occurred. I went back to my files and fmmd that there 1-4Ve been Periodic predictions that sack an ,offensive was Just about to take place, tn. November, veteran reporter, Denis Warne;, filed a dispatch which began: North Vietnam is openly preparing to launch its heaviest offensive ever against South Vietnam. In December, tbe National Observer quoted unnamed U.S. officials as saying there was "a strong possibility" of a new offensive by early 1974. In the same month, someone described as a "veteran Vietnam hand" in the State Department told the Chicago Tribune that? The next couple of months are going to be extremely crucial . . . in that time it will be clear to everyone whether there will be a major offensive. And General Thieu, who hardly needed any encouragement, announced in January that his army was going on the offensive against Communist base areas in South Vietnam to preempt the possibility of a major new North Viet- namese offensive. So much for offensives. In presenting the administration's case to the House Armed Services Com- mittee, Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements did not haul out the bugaboo of a major new offensive, but talked instead about inflation and high prices. He said on March 18: The present ceiling is insufficient to keep up with inflation and price rises. Now those are things that Americans really understand at this point in time. But Deputy Secretary Clements was not talking about the inflation and high price hitting American consumers so hard. The consumer he was talking about was the South Vietnamese mili- tary. Perhaps it has not occurred to him that Thieu and his generals should do just what the American consumer has had to do?make do with a little less. Certainly there is no way that this $266 million is going to help South Viet- nam's economy. Nothing which has the effect of fueling the war will help South Vietnam's economy. In fact, the World Bank recently went on record for the first time against considering capital de- velopment funds for South Vietnam as long as the war continues. Similarly, there is no way that this $266 million is going to help our economy. Actually, it hurts it?for this sort of spending feeds and fuels our own infla- tion. And certainly this $266 million would not help American small busi- nesses to weather the energy crisis. It would not . build a new factory which would provide jobs: It would not help our elderly citizens to cope with the higher cost of living. What will it do? It will buy ammuni- tion and aircraft for what the Pentagon calls "H and I"?harassment and inter-. diction?in a war whose continuation is not in our national interest. That is why Congress reduced the re- quest for military aid to Saigon last De- cember. Inflation and higher prices?the factors cited by Deputy Secretary Clements in support of more military aid?were live issues then, too. Oil prices, which he also mentioned, had already risen dramatically. In other words, Mr. President, nothing has changed. We must not rubberstamp back-door funding practices designed in part to get around congressional opposi- Win to military aid. Sure they have inflation in Saigon. So do we. That is all the more reason why military aid to Thieu shoffid be going down?rapidly--not up. If we really want to help South Viet- nam, we should remember that our com- mitment is not to Thieu, but to peace. Mr. President, I yield the floor. Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, how much time do I have? The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator has 3 minutes. Mr. KENNEDY. I yield 1 minute to the Senator from South Dakota. The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from South Dakota is recognized. Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President I lis- tened to the argument made by the dis- tinguished Senator from Texas that we would be jeopardizing information on our missing men if we restricted military aid to South Vietnam. That is the same old argument that used to be made by President Nixon, that if we did not have such a military operation we would never get our prisoners out. It turned out it was just the opposite. As long as we carried on our military operations, not one sin- gle prisoner was released, and it was only after we terminated our military opera- tions that we were able to sit down with the other side and arrange for the release of our prisoners. None of us knows what the condition is of those men who are missing in action. We are operating in the dark. But it would seem clear that if there was any relevance in this particular issue to our experience, we would be cutting back on the military operations in conse- quence of opening up negotiations -with the other side with regard to the ques- tion of men missing in action. The VICE PRESIDENT. The time of the Senator from South Dakota has ex- pired. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, how much time do I have? The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Mississippi has 6 minutes. Mr. STENNIS. I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Texas. Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I was very Interested in the comments of my dis- tinguished friend from South Dakota. He said that the cessation of military activities on our part resulted in the re- turn of the POW's. Obviously the POW's do not believe that way, and obviously that is not the way it happened. The escalation of military activity against North Vietnam in December of 1972 re- sulted in the termination that resulted from the negotiations that began in Jan- uary 1973, and that is why the prisoners are home today. Now, relative to the matters of MIA's, the Senator from Massachusetts has con- tended that the funds are already obli- gated.My question would be: Under what obligation and under what specific ap- propriation are they actually obligated on an open-end basis? They are not. The amendment before us reads: None of the funds authorized to be appro- priated by this Act, and no funds heretofore appropriated to or for the use of the De- partment of Defense by any other Act and which remain unobligated on the date of enactment of this Act, may be expended in, for, or on behalf of any country in Southeast Asia. Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000500290006-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP751300380R000500290006-4 S 7140 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE May 6, 1974 And whatever the intent of the Senator Irons Massachusetts is?and I am sure that he did not intend this?the actual effect of his language is so specific that do not think any court in the land would sai that this language does not prevent our maintenance of the joint fund for casualty activities. And there- fore, the enactment of this amendment into law constitutes an abandonment of the MIAs. The language is specific. There is no undeliga,ted authority, that is au- thorized funds appropriated on an open- end basis. Let us, therefore, understand what we do by this amendment. Let us, therefore, understand when we 'do by this amendment. The VICE PRESIDENT. The time of the Senator from Texas has expired. The Senator from Mississippi is recognized. Mr. STENNIS. X will be quite brilef. Let me refer to this fact. There has been talk about the Pentagon asking for one thing and then shifting to an-other. This situation was found by Mr. Donald Lynch, a very able and faithful member of the staff of the Armed Services Com- mittee, who did a great deal of the staff work on this bill, He was checking, first, to see if all of the fiscal year 1974 author- ity had been used up. He was checking back on the prior fiscal years also. And in that checking he found this ammunition situation. And that is why the committee adopted this course. We are going to have the same matter of military aid for South Vietnam up 4, 5, or 6 weeks from now in the large authorization bill. And my thinking on that is that if they get the $266 million here, we can well charge them with part of that or all of it in the big authorization bill. Now, ELL the way through we have had criticism of the Pentagon for handling this money. But all the way through the Congress had to yield to the fact that they were operating under battlefield conditions'. We allowed estimates to be used. We did not require obligations as we ordinarily do in good accounting practices. We allowed estimates to be used, because the battle was going on in a dozen different places. We were send- ing shells, rifles, and gasoline from our Army to their army day after day and night after night. So, these were the circumstances. These estimates were the only thing that we required. And that is why they vary. We do not find that the General Ac- counting Office has condemned this mat- ter. They have told us, through our staff, as late as today, that they had formed no kind of conclusions about this mat- ter, that they had to find out about this matter for themselves. So, I hope that this vote does not go on what the GAO says. They have not said anything. Again, X emphasize that this matter is coming back before the Senate?the Congress--as it will necessarily have to in the other bill. And the supply is so thin now that they emphasize it is down to what they call the 90-day in- ventory. And certainly we are not going to let them use up all of that. The VICE PRESIDENT. All of the time of the Senator from Mississippi has expired. Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, is ar y time left on amendments or on the bill? The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator fie an Massachusetts has 11/2 minutes re- maining. Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, may I have 1 minute? Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, could I have 2 minutes on the bill from the Se nator from Mississippi? Mr. STENNIS. That will be satisfac- tory. Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I yield 2 uninutes on the bill to the Senator from M I nnesota. The VICE PRESIDENT. Without ob- jection, it is so ordered. Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I have supported military assistance to Scuth Vietnam. I have supported eco- nomic assistance to South Vietnam. I did so because I thought it was right. How- ever. I do believe that if the Pentagon n( eds more money, it should not be bind in a bookkeeping transaction. They can request an authorization. They failed to do so and the House of Repre- sentatives turned them down. We cannot, afford to let the Pentagon juggle the books on the basis of using the taxpayers' funds for that basis on that or on any other basis. We do not permit it with any other department, and we cannot afford to do it with this one. I shall with great reluctance, support this amendment. I do not want to see South Vietnam in trouble. However, we have poured our resources in there. And the fact of the matter Is that just prior to the cease-fire, we poured our resources In there as fast as they could be put on the docks in South Vietnam. I have introduced and we have adopted In the Foreign Relations Committee an amendment to the foreign aid measure that directs the Secretary of State to sub- mit to the Committee on Foreign Rela- tions of the Senate and the Speaker of the House within 120 days after the en- actment of the authorization, a detailed plan for the future of U.S. economic and military assistance to the Government of South Vietnam, including a specific timetable for phased reduction of such assistance, to the point when the United States will cease to be the principal source of funds and materiel for South Vietnam's self-defense and economic viability. Now, why? Not because I am opposed to assistance. In fact, I want us to develop a plan. for a phased reduction. However, I think it is wrong for the peo- ple in the Pentagon to decide what they w ll spend and then spend at a higher figure than that authorized by the Congress. This is reverse impoundment. When the President disapproves of a program voted by Congress, he refuses to spend the money, When the Pentagon believes it needs niore funds, it seems willing to violate the Anti-Deficiency Act and allo- cate more than the Congress has authorized. I believe the Senate must express its condemnation of such spending prac- tices which violate the intent of this body as to the allocation of funds. The Pentagon has overspent for the MASF program. Now they ask: "We need help. Bail us out." I do not think it will be necessary between now and the end of the fisca; year. I am per- fectly willing to take a good look at fis- cal year 197f; when the matter is before us. I have supported foreign aid. And I have managed that bill on the floor, and I am perfectly willing to do it again. However, I am not prepared to see the administration ignore toe intent of the Congress concerning appropriated funds. And defy the Anti-Deficiency Law. That is the issue before us. And that is why I support the amendment offered by Senator KENNEDY. Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the majority leader. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I have no hesitation and no reluctance whatsoever in supporting the amend- ment of the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY) . It has been said on the floor of the Senate this afternoon: "If anyone has made a mistake, he should be allowed to correct it." I agree completely. think the 'war in Southeast Asia and South Vietnam was one of the greatest tragedies that have ever struck this country in the field of foreign affairs. I think it was unrealistic as well as tragic. What has come Cu'; of that war? 55,000 dead, sent home in flag-shrouded coffins; 303,000 wounded. Among those 303,000 wounded, somewhere between 25,000 and ;i:0,000 were paraplegics and quadriplegics. Do we want to forget that these men died? Do we want to know what they died for? Was it in defense of this country? I served in a war. T. was not much in the way of rank. However, when I served, I served in defense of fey country.. Was the war to stop communism in Southeast Asia? What was it for? Mi Leis? The destruction of a society and the creation of a refugee class? The use of herbicides to destroe forest lands? What was it for? We will never forget Vietnam, at least I never will, because it is a stab wound in the heart of America. It is an episode in which this country should never have become .involved. It was an involvement in a civil war, and we have paid a tremendously high: price. Yes, when you make a mistake, admit It: and they way to do that is to get out., get out of South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand, and the sooner the better as fa: as this country and those countries are concerned. I ask unanimous consent that esti- mates of the total cost of American wars, by rank, contained in the Statis- tical Abstracts of the Urited States, 1973, 93d Congress, 1st Session, House Docu- ment 93-184. a U.S. Department of Com- merce publication issued, I believe, by the Official and Economic Statistics Ad- ministration of the Bureau of the Cen- sus, be printed in the RECORD at this point. There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500290006-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500290006-4 May 6, 1974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE ? N..408.?ESTIMATES OF TOTAL COST OF AMERICAN WARS, BY RANK 41In millions of dollars, except percent! Veterans' benefits Estimated interest payments on war loans War Estimated Ultimate costs Original war costs 1 Total costs under_ pros- ent laws 2 Percent of original war costs Total costs to 1973 Total Percent of original war Costs World War II 664, 000 288, 000 290, 000 100 96, 447 86, 000 30 Vietnam conflict + 352, 000 I 128, 000 0 220, 000 ?200 7,271 7 22, 000 20 Korean conflict 164, 000 54, 000 99, 000 184 16, 960 11,809 20 World War I 112, 000 26, 000 75, 000 290 52, 411 11, 000 42 Civil War (Union only) 12, 952 3,209 8,580 260 8,572 1, 172 37 Spanish-American War 6, 460 400 6, 000 1, 505 5, 526 60 15 American Revolution 190 100 70 70 70 20 20 War of 1812 158 93 49 53 49 16 17 Mexican War. ,. 147 73 64 88 65 16 14 Based on expenditures of Departments of the Army and Navy to World War I and major national security expenditures thereafter. Usually the figures begin with the year the war began but in all cases they extend 1 year beyond the end of the actual conflict. Seo. "HistoricalStatistics of the United States, Colonial Tinies to 1957," series Y 351-352 and Y 358. P To World War I: estimates are bleed on Veterans' Administration data. For World War I, World War II, and Korean conflict, esti- mates are those athe 1956 report of the President's Commission on Veterans' Pensions plus 25 percent (the increase in the average value of benefits since the Commission made its report). 6 Source; 11. $. Veterans Ad-ministration, "Annual Report of Administrator of Veterans' Affairs." Estimate's based on aisum-ption that war would end by June 30, 1970 (except for original war costs and for veterans benefit costs to 1973). 6 Estimated Department of Defense expenditure in support of Southeast Asia for fiscal year 1965 to 1972. Medium-level estimate of 200 percent (high, 300; low, 100) based on figures expressing relationship of veterans' benefits payments to original costs of other major U.S. wars. 7 Medium-level estimate of 20 percent (high, 30; Inc. 10) based on figures showing interest payments on war loans as percentage of original costs of other major U.S. wars. Source: Except as noted, U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, The Military Budget and National Economic Priorities, pt. 1, 91st Congress, 1st sess. (Statement of James L. Clayton, University of Utah.) Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, today the Congress has an opportunity to ex- press its resolve to support the Vietnam peace accords signed in 1973. Specifically I refer to the obligation we undertook to supply replabernent military hardware on a one-to-one basis to the South Viet- namese. One cannot overestimate the signifi- cance Of this provision for the? mainte- nance of the integrity of the cease-fire areeinent. Althoutgh combat has con- tinued to take place since the accords Were signed,- there has been a substan- tial reduction in activity when compared to the situation ;which obtained prior to the signing of the accords. To maintain the uneasy peace which has existed since January of 1973, it is essential that the military balance in the region be main- tained. During the past year, in the Mid- dle East, we haVe witnessed a tragic ex- ample of the consequences of the ero- sion of a military balance when the Arab military buildup made an attack on Israel an inviting opportunity. The uneasy peace which has been maintained in Southeast Asia has re- moved this area as a direct source of superpower confrontation. If the United States should fail to maintain an ade- quate level of military assistance as pro- vided in the pending bill, the uneasy cease-fire would almost certainly turn into full-scale war because South Viet- nam would provide an inviting target if In a weakened military state as a result of a shortage in military supplies. Finally, for us to reach so important an undertaking could have far-reaching consequences. The accredibility of Amer- ican tmdertaking in other parts of the world would inevitably be brought into question. The imPlidations of a default can have reverberations that reach far beyond the boundaries of South Viet- nam. The interests of the United States clearly call for a strong demonstration of support for this continuing program of military assistance. I, for one, will sup- port this necessary assistance. Mr. ABOUREZK. Mr. President, it is heartening to know that in this day and age necessity can still be the mother of invention. The old saw has not been so well exemplified in years as recently in the fortunate discovery that the Depart- ment of Defense had "mislaid" at least $266 million. The $36,000 a year account- ants claim to have found the quarter of a billion dollars just in the nick of time for use as supplemental aid money to South Vietnam during the remaining 2 months of this fiscal year. ? Certainly this "newfound 266 million dollar" mystery is as challenging to the mind as the 181/2-minute tape gap and other puzzles which have emanated as of late. How can anyone mislay $266 mil- lion? Better yet, how in the nick of time, with their backs to the wall, did they happen to find it just now? There is more than an air of sheer coincidence at- tached to the roots of this story, I fear. It is interesting that, in the shadow of the sharp refusal by the House to go along with the original $476 million re- quest, the Pentagon has now discovered a chunk of money already signed, sealed and delivered to DOD by the Congress back in 1972. Mr. President, I am convinced that if this issue were taken to the American people, they would overwhelmingly re- fuse to send an additional $266 million? or any amount?to South Vietnam in the remaining 2 months of this fiscal year. Already the United States spends more than 10 times as much helping South Vietnam, with a population of 19 million, than it spends aiding just three of its Asian neighbors?India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh?with more than 35 times South Vietnam's population. The truth of the matter is that this additional amount is needed by the Thieu regime to finance the next 2 months of our "peace with honor" in that war-ravaged place. Everyone, of S 7141 coarse, knows by now that there is neither peace nor honor over there. The blood-soaked tradgedy of the sixties and early seventies is haunting us now more than ever. Our latest blackmail pay- ment?the payoff so to speak so they leave sus alone?is now $266 million. A sale price you might say considering the original request was for $476 million. Mr. President, the Vietnam war has continued steadily and has even esca- lated in violence in recent months. With reports that Saigon's war effort would have to be curtailed, the Pentagon had apparently promised General Thieu an- other half billion dollars. When the House balked, I believe that the Penta- gon simply moved then to "Option No. 2". Who knows how many more options they had up their sleeves had they needed them. The DOD position has been and con- tinues to be, that we support a strug- gling government trying desperately to establish a democracy. Yet, it is clear from reports of recent months that the elements of repression that reflect a cruel military dictatorship have never been more obvious. Thieu and his regime are rapidly abandoning even lipservice to deniocracy. There is complete sup- pression of dissent and arrests are as common as parking tickets in this coun- try. Most disturbing of all, however, is the torture that is routine upon arrest and the horrible maltreatment which con- tinues to be the norm. According to one reporter who recently talked with a South Vietnamese police official, he ad- mitted that? We torture the guilty and they confess we torture the innocent until they become guilty. Mr. President, a statement such as this only illustrates the erosion of whatever remnants of democracy there may have been at one time in South Vietnam. The unfortunate fact of life, however, is that without the massive injections of U.S. financial support, this corrupt regime could fall in an instant. What troubles me, however, is that, while everyone knows this, we continue to go on living in some kind of myth that things will one day change. I believe that nothing could be further from the truth. Nothing will change until this country decides that the $21/2 billion we insist on giving to Saigon could actually be better served at home on programs in this country. In fact, I am not so sure that even the Vietnamese people would not rather have it that way. The people in Vietnam believe that without our paternalistic and over- whelming presence, they can work out their own destiny and find a future in which the wounds of war will one day be healed. They plead with us in the Congress to give them the right to work out this destiny and to allow them the responsibility of true self-government. Even more importantly, I would add that the quarter of a billion dollars which has been so conveniently over- looked by the Pentagon is desperately needed for programs right here at home. I can guarantee that you would not find Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP751300380R000500290006-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500290006-4 S 7142 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE 266 million in "mislaid dollars" in pro- grams for Vietnam veterans, Indian health services or in rural housing pro- grams. It is obvious, Mr. President, that these funds have not been spent, primarily because they were not needed in the first place. I believe that now that the money has been found, rather than turning the money over to the Thieu treasury, it ought to te put back in the U.S. treasury where it le elongs. If the Pentagon cannot find anything better to do with the funds than to give it to General Thieu, we ought to save it or use it en programs here at home. Mr. McGEE. Mr.- President, I would have to oppose the amendment being of- ferred to cut $266 million from the De- partment ef Defense's military assistance service funded program. I oppose the amendment because the $266 million does not violate the MASF ceiling- authorized and appropriated by the Congress. The MASF obligations re- ported in the first quarter of fiscal year 1974 include $266 million for payback ammunition for U.S. inventories. This ammunition replaced that which was Paid for with moneys authorized in prior 3-ears and Was, in fact, delivered to South Vietnam in 1972 and 1973. If, indeed, there had been a violaeion elf law, I would have to support the amendment striking $266 million from the Department of Defense's MASF pro- gram. However, the case for such a vio- lation has not been made. In addition, today's tenuous balance of forces in South Vietnam must be main- tained to lead the North Vietnamese and Vietcong to the recognition that their objectives are better served through Peaceful political means than through force of arms. This is being impaired by a reduction in purchasing power to provide the South Vietnamese with the capability for self-defense. This reduction in pur- chasing power is the result of interna- tional economic events which were we- foreseen last year when the Congress considered. the MASF request. The South Vietnamese Government is facing dramatically increased fuel prices. Inflation of about 65 percent in Vietnam and significant equipment prices in- creases in the United States have re- duced the purchasing power of the funds available under the current ceiling. Denial of the $266 million adujstment recommended by the Senate Armed Serv- ices Committee would certainly create grave problems for South Vietnam. In conclusion, I would reemphasize that had an actual violation of law oc- curred, I would have to support this amendment. However, the $266 million would not break the congressionally-im- posed ceiling of $1.126 billion for the MASF program. The VICE PRESIDENT. All time on the amendment has expired. Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays. The yeas and nays were ordered, Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I move to lay on the table the amendmene of the Senator from Massachusetts, and I ask for the yeas and nays. The yeas and nays were ordered. The VICE PRESIDENT. The question Is on agreeing to the motion to lay on the table the amendment (No. 1238) of the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY) . On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered, and tile clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk called the roll. Mr. WEICKER (after having voted in the. negative). Mr. President, on this vote I have a pair with the distinguished mi- nority leader, the Senator from, Pennsyl- vania (Mr. HUGH SCOTT). If he were pres- ent and voting, he Would vote "yea." If I were at liberty to vote, I would vote "nay." Therefore, I withdraw my vote. Mr. ROBERT C. Pi ITRD. I announce that the Senator from Indiana (Mr. Bien), the Senator from Texas (Mr. BeNTsoN), the Senator from Florida (Mr. CrinEs), the Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH), the Senator from North Cam- lira (Mr. ERVIN) , the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. Fruenneverr), the Senator from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL), the Senator from Indiana (Mr. HAETKE) , the Senator from Maine (Mr. HATE;AWAY) , the Sena- toe from Louisiana (Mr. METCALF) , the Senator from Ohio (Mr. METZENBAUM) and the Senator form Alabama (Mr. SPARKMAN) are necessarily absent. 'C further announce that, if present and voeing, the Senator from Indiana (Mr. BIM!) , the Senator from Alaska (Mr. Gr AVEL) , and the Senator from Ohio (Mr. METZENBALIM) Would vote "nay." GRIPI'Lg. I announce that the Senator from Utah (Mr. BENNETT) , the Senator from 'Wyoming (Mr. HANsEN), the. Senator from Oregon (Mr. PACK- woon) , the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. HUGH SCOTT), and. the Senator from Ohio (Mr. TAFT are necessarily absent. 7 also announce that the Senator from Arizona (Mr. FANNIN) is absent on official bu dness. The result was annotmeed?yeas 39, nays 41, as follows: [No. 179 Leg.1 YEAS? 39 AR en All m Baer Ba -Hat Beall Be' imon Brock Bu Arley By 11, Harry F., Jr. Ca Anon Co ton Cu rtis Do e Domenici Dominick Eastland Fong Goldwater Griffin Gurney Helms Hollings Hruska Jackson Johnston McClellan. McClure NAYS? 11 McGee McIntyre Nunn Roth Scott, William L. Stafford Stennis Stevens Talmadge Thurmond Tower Young Ab3urezk Huddleston Nelson Bible Hughes Pastore Bitten Humphrey Pearson Brooke Inouye Pell Burdick Javits Percy' By 11, Robert C. Kennedy Proxmire Cae Magnuson Randolph Clf rk Mansfield Ribicoff Cook Mathias Schwelker Crknston McGovern Stevenson Ea -jeton Mondale Symington Ha rt Montoya Tunney Ha kell Moss Williams Hatfield munkie PRESENT AND GIVING A LIVE PAIR, Aa PREVIOUSLY RECORDED-1 Weicker, against Bayh Bennett Bentsen Chiles Church Ervin Fannin May 6, 1974 NOT VOTING-19 Fulbright Gravel Hansen Hartke Hathaway Long Metcalf Metzenbaum Packwood Scott, Hugh Sparkman Taft So the moeion to lay on the table was rejected. The VICE PRESIDENT. The question recurs on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY). On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered and the clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk called the roll. Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce that the Senator from Indiana (Mr. BAYH) , the Senator from Texas (Mr. BENTSEN) , the Senator from Florida (Mr. Cren.Es), the Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH) the Senator from North Caro- lina (Mr. ER HE), the Senator from Ar- kansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT) , the Senator from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL) , the Senator from Indians. (Mr. HARTKE) , the Senator from Maine (Mr. HATHAWAY), the Sen- ator from Louisiana (Mr. Lorre), the Senator from Montana (Mr. METCALF), the Senator from Ohio (Mr. MirrzEN- Einem) , and the Senator from Alabama (Mr. SPARKMAN) are necessarily absent. I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Indiana (Mr. BATH). the Senator from Alaska. (Mr. GRAVEL) and the Senator from Ohio (Mr. METztersAum:, would each vote "yea." Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from Utah (Mr. BENNETT), the Senator froni Wyoming (Mr. HANSEN) the Senator from Oregon (Mr. PACK- wool)), the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. HUGH SCOTT), and the Senator from Ohio (Mr. TAFT) are necessarily absent. I also anncunce that the Senator from Arizona (Mr. FANNIN) is absent on offi- cial business. I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Ohio (Mr. TAFT) would vote "nay." The result was announced?yeas 43, nays 38, as follows: Abourezk Billie Blden Brooke [No. 180 Leg.] YEAS-43 Hughes Humphrey Inouye Javits Burdick Kennedy Byrd, Robert C. Magnuson Case Mansfield Clark Mathias Cook McGovern Cranston Mondale Eaglet= Montoya Hart Moss Haskell Muskie Hatfield Nelson Ruddiest= Pastore Aiken Allen Baker Bartlett Beall Bellmon Brock Buckley Byrd, Harry F., Jr. Cannon Cotton Curtis Dole NAYS-3R Domenic!. Dominick Eastland Fong Goldwater Griffin Gurney Helms Hollings Hruska Jackson Johnston McClellan McClure Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500290006-4 Pearson Pell Percy Proxmire Randolph Ribicoff Schweiker Stafford Stevenson Symington Tunney Weicker Williams McGee McIntyre Nunn Roth Scott, William Is. Stennis Stevens Talmadge ThunnOnd Tower Young May 6, Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500290006-4 1974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE NOT VOTING-19 nayb Fulbright Metzenbaum Bennett Gravel Packwood Bentsen Hansen Scott; Hugh Chiles Ha rtke Sparkman Church Hathaway Taft Ervin Long Fannin Metcalf ? So Mr. KENNEDY'S. amendment was agreed to. Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to. Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I move to lay- that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. The VICE PRESIDENT. The question is on agreeing to the committee amend- ment as amended: The committee amendment, as amended, was agreed to. Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield back the. remainder of my time. - Mr. STENNIS. I yield back the re- mainder of my time. - ? The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading and was read the third time. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill having been read the third time, the question is, Shall it pass? The bill (S. 2999) .was passed, as fol- lows: S. 2999 An act to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1974 for procurement of air- craft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked com- bat vehicles, and other weapons and re- search, development, test and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to authorize ' construction at certain installations, and for other purposes Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, TITLE I?PROCUREMENT SEC. 101. In addition to the funds author- ized to be appropriated under Public Law 93-165 there is hereby authorized to be ap- propriated during fiscal year 1974 for the use of the Armed Forces of the United Statea for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, and other weapons authorized by law, in amounts as follows: AIRCRAFT For aircraft: for the Army, $15,000,000; for the Navy and the Marine Corps, $37,500,000; for the Air Force, $120,900,000. SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL MISSILES PRIATIONS, 1974 ? MISSILES For missiles: for the Army, $10,200,000. TRACKED COMBAT VEHICLES For tracked combat vehicles: for the Army, $38,900,000. OTHER WEAPONS For other weapons: for the Army, $200,000. TITLE II?RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND EVALUATION SEC, 201, In addition to the funds au- thorized to be appropriated under Public I..Law 03-155, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated during the fiscal year 1974, for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States for research, development, test and evaluation, as authorized by law, in amounts as follows: For the Army, $35,808,000. For the Navy (including the Marine Corps), $38,528,000; For the Air Force, $29,466,000; and For the Defense Agencies, $5,016,000. TITLE III?MILITARY CONSTRUCTION ? SEC. ? 301. In addition to the funds au- thorized to be appropriated under Public Law 93-166, there is hereby authorized to be ap- propriated during the fiscal year 1974, for use by the Secretary of Defense, or his designee, for military family housing, for operating expenses and maintenance of real property in support of military family housing, an amount not to exceed $3,866,000. SEC. 302. The authorization contained in this title shall be subject to the authoriza- tions and limitations of the Military Con- struction Authorization Act, 1974 (Public Law 93-166), in the same manner as if such authorization had been included in that Act. TITLE IV?PROHIBITION ON CERTAIN USE OF FUNDS SEC, 401. None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act, and no funds heretofore appropriated to or for the use of the Department of Defense by any. other Act and which remain unobligated on the date of enactment of this Act, may be expended in, for, or on behalf of any country in Southeast Asia, This Act may be cited as the "Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriation Au- thorization Act, 1974". Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the bill was passed. Mr. SYMINGTON. I move to lay ?that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. For missiles: for the Army, $47,100,000; for the Navy, $17,000,000; for the Marine Corps, $22,300,000; for the Air Force, $22,900,- 000. TRACKED COMDAT VEHICLES - Por tracked combat vehicles: for the Army, $12,000,000. OTHER WEAPONS- . For other weapons: for the Army, $8,000,- 000. AUTHORIZATION TO TRANSFER FUNDS Sze,. 102. In addition to the funds au- thorized to be appropriated under section S 7143 The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to eon the roll. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. Pre unanimous consent that the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFIC objection, it is so ordered. The PRESIDING OFFICE The Sen- ator from Arkansas in reco lized. How much tune does the Senatm yield him- self? Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. esident, a parliamentary inquiry. The PRESIDING OFFICE . The Sen- ator will state it. Mr. McCLELLAN. Is the ti e control- led? - The PRESIDING OFFICE . Under the previous order, there will be 2 hours on the .Schweiker amendment, 1 hour on ' other amendments, with the Utile to be equally divided and controlle Mr. McCLELLAN. I was n consulted about the agreement. I did not know about it. . The PRESIDING OFFICE The Sen- ator from Arkansas is recogn . Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. Pr ident, the Committee on Appropriati s recom- mends in the pending meas c a grand total of .$9,645,935,398 In r w budget obligational authority for fisr 11974. This amount is an Mere e of $834,- 273,355 over the $8,811,662, t 3 provided by the House and is a red tion of $1,- 454,594,679 from the reviset udget esti- mates of $11,100,530,077. Included in these totals i he $530 mil- lion estimated cost of t fiscal 1973 retroactive pay increase, !ovision for which is recommended I he Senate ill Senate document 93-72. asmuch as an indefinite appropriation recommended the exact effect on new bligational au- thority is not known at is time. An ex- Planation of this 3-mol 3, retroactive pay increase is found on ge 149 of the re - port. Of the total RMO t of $9,645,935,398 recommended in th kS ill, as reported, $3,- 910,443,595 is to fi mace increased pay and related costs, d is included in titles II and III. The committ also recommends transfers betwe appropriations total- ing $295,118,800 n lieu of providing new budget authori in these amounts. The amount provi d in transfer authority is $212,155,20i more than the total re- quested and 225,221,000 more than the House bill p vides. Rather r, an ? detail every item in the bill, I wi riefly summarize the major -highligl contained in each chapter of title I tile general program supple- ment C Yjter I, agriculture, environmental consumer protection, provides for w budget authority of $616,641,000, hich is $40,991,000 more than the budget estimate and $56,411,000 more than provided in the House bill, The in- crease over the budget estimate is repre- sented in two items?$26,161,000 for the Soil Conservation Service, and $15,000,- 000 for the school lunch program. Chapter II of the bill and the title H 80R000500290100164 the Department of Defense provide ffscal year 1974 sup- plemental funds in the amount of $4,906,871,000, This is $1,293,550,000 be- dent, I ask der for the Without Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate turn to the consideration of Calendar Order No. 781, H.R. 14013, that the bill be laid before the Senate and made the pending business. - The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DomEmcf) . The bill will be stated by title. The bill was read by title as follows: A bill (H.R. 14013) making supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974, and for other purposes, 101 of this Act, there are authorized to be The PRESIDING OFFICER. der made available by transfer during the fiscal the previous order the Senate 21 Pro- year 1974 to the Department of Defense, out ceed to consider the bill. of any unexpended funds appropriated under the heading "Emergency Security Assistance The Senate proceededVi consider the for Israel" in title IV of the Foreign As- bill which had been reported from the sistance and Related grams ApPro.nriation Committee on Appropriations with Act, 1974, the followin*pprioivet1 For Releasedleerti08/30_: CIA-RDP756003 AIRCRAFT Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I For aircraft: for the Navy and the Marine suggest the absence of a quorum. Corps, $63,600,000; for the Air Force, $33,900,. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk