S.1726, PUBLIC INFORMATION ACT OF 1973

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00380R000500370002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 2, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 15, 1973
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000500370002-9
SUBJECT : S. 1726 -- Public Information Act of 1973
Generally I would support your comments. The following
will elaborate on some of the same points and make some specific
comments on things that seem particularily noteworthy to me.
Page 2, Line 21
The Bill does not change 5 U. S. C. 552(b)(3), which exempts
from the disclosure requirements matters specifically exempted from
disclosure by statute. While section 6 of the CIA Act provides such
statutory exemption, this is quite specific and thus quite limited. I
would be very concerned about our ability to stretch section 102(d)(3)
on the protection of intelligence sources and methods to meet the pro-
visions of (b)(3) of the present law in the face of the broad disclosure
requirements of the law as S. 1726 would amend it. Section 102(d)(3)
places responsibility upon the Director, but it gives him no specific
authority. I think it would be very weak support in the face of a later
statute as broad as this.
Page 2, Lines 25-26
This is confusing. It appears to result in exempting from
the section 552 disclosure requirement anything which has been
declassified (emphasis supplied) under subsection (e) of S. 1726.
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Page 4, Lines 2-6
This sentence seems to be in conflict with the previous
sentence which authorizes classification when unauthorized disclosure
"may reasonably be expected to cause damage to the national defense".
The use of the word "only" in Line 3 leaves it open to interpretation as
a qualification of the authority in the previous sentence. The sentence
either does nothing or seriously waters down the basic classification
authority and it would be better to delete it. Alternatively, the words
"tend to" could be inserted after "would" in Line 4 or, as you suggested,
"could" might be used instead of "would".
Page 4, Line 13
The only classification provided for would be "Secret Defense
Data". The lack of degrees of classification may be questionable. All
material which would qualify for this classification would not be equally
sensitive. The result could be overclassification of some material and
possibly a need for handling controls for all classified material which
would normally apply only to material of greatest sensitivity.
Page 5, Lines 17 -18
"Section chief or its equivalent" is very vague statutory
language.
Page 7, Lines 16-20
The strict limitation of classification on the basis of content
might create problems, especially in this Agency. I can't come up
quickly with an example, but I think it is evident that knowledge that
the Agency is studying a particular group or type of unclassified
material might make obvious national defense matters which in them-
selves are, or should be, classified. Maybe this is something we
should talk about in order to come up with good examples because
otherwise it will be very difficult to convince anyone who is trying
to restrict classification authority.
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Page 9, Lines 1-4
The requirement that classified information or material
from a foreign government be provided to any member or committee
of Congress notwithstanding any contrary agreement or stipulation
certainly would serve to reduce the availability of information from
foreign governments to the detriment of the United States.
Pages 9-13
These specific requirements for designation, reclassification
and declassification seem to be so burdensome that the system might
fall of its own weight. The least burdensome is section 104(d)(9) set
forth on Page 9, Line 5 et seq. Nevertheless, it would require
employees using previously classified material to reconsider the
material under the S. 1726 requirements even though in many cases
such employees might not be familiar enough with the background to
make a proper decision without great difficulty. The problem with
the declassification provisions is that they cannot be avoided in any
practical way if Page 13, Lines 8-10 are effective. This requirement
that deferrals of declassification be done only by the Agency head and
not be redelegated would make the procedure nearly unusable.
Page 12, Lines 9-20
The requirement of written reports to Congressional com-
mittees of declassification deferrals and the subsequent publication
of reports by the committees provides a head-on conflict with the
Director's responsibility under section l02(d)(3). It is hard to believe
that in a reasonable climate the conflict could not be resolved or the
Director's responsibility be upheld, but if this provision were enacted,
I think it would be a clear indication of a climate which might negate
the Director's responsibility.
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Page 13, Line 13 et seq.
This provision for a civil action by any person contesting
a deferral of automatic declassification seems designed to promote
litigation and harassment including some promoted by opposition
intelligence services. The subsection also places a duty on the
courts which they may not want and in many cases may not be well
qualified to undertake.
Page 14, Lines 15-23
This is another burdensome requirement which must be
designed either to totally defeat the classification system or to
create a paperwork bureaucracy. It also assumes that the declas-
sification authority would know who all the holders of such declas-
sified material are.
Page 15, Line 4
A possible conflict with section 6 of the CIA Act.
Page 15, Lines 16-20
This gives the Administrator of General Services authority
which in most cases he would be unqualified to exercise, at least
without the assistance of the classifying agency. Although the sub-
section provides for such assistance, it does not require the Admin-
istrator to use it, and thus in theory, he could act arbitrarily.
Page 16, Lines 6-14
This subsection appears to require regulations providing for
disciplinary action for improper classification.
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Page 17, Line 19 et seq.
This subsection (F) as well as subsections (B) through (E)
appear to conflict with section 102(d)(3) and possibly with section 6
of the CIA Act.
Page 19, Lines 7-15
This doesn't make much difference to the Agency and I am
sure we won't want to comment on it; however, I think Article I,
section 6 of the U. S. Constitution, as interpreted, says this already.
Page 23, Lines 8-20
Again, we probably won't want to comment on it, but these
two subsections might present a nice constitutional question.
Page 24, Lines 19-23
I agree with your comments about conflicts with statutes
protecting CIA information and I also note that this seems to overlap
the duties and authorities of the Comptroller-General.
Page 27 et seq. (Title IV - - Privileged Information)
This would seem to be just another in the continuing series of
legislative efforts to limit executive privilege by statute. I don't see
why it should have any more or less effect than any other efforts and
I am sure that executive privilege will continue, as it has for 184 years,
to be a controversial issue finally settled case by case by reasonable STATINTL
men who will be wise enough not to take positions they cannot back
away from.
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