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December 9, 2016
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August 27, 2001
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September 13, 1973
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Approved For Release VMFM F1D!NTtAr38oRS4ohl -5 JOURNAL OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL Thursday - 13 September 1973 1. (Confidential - JGO) Met with Frank Slatinshek, Chief Counsel, House Armed Services Committee, and reviewed with him our proposed comments on H. R. 8592. Slatinshek had no problem with submitting as the Agency report the previous report filed by the Agency with the Senate Armed Services Committee on the companion bill, S. 1935. Slatinshek told me also that he has been unable to get with Chairman Nedzi, Intelligence Subcommittee, even though he has been trying. At the moment he does 25X1C not know what the schedule will be for Intelligence Subcommittee hearings. 3. (Confidential - JGO) In response to his earlier request, I called Mike Finley, Inter-American Affairs Subcommittee staff, House Foreign Affairs Committee, and made a tentative date for briefing of Chairman Fascell; Marian Czarnecki, Chief of Staff of the full Committee; and Finley for Tuesday afternoon, 4:00, in Chairman Fascell's office on developments in Chile. OCI, has been advised. Approved For Relea '/4 bP75B00380R000500400011-5 July 27, 1 973 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - Extensions of Remarks E 5153 MUTUAL DEVELOPMENT AND COOP- ERATION ACT OF 1973 SI pis or HON. JAMES A. BURKE OF MASSACHTTSETTS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Thursday, July 26, 1973 The House in Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union had under consideration the bill (H.R. 9360) to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and for other purposes. Mr. BURKE of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, for the first time in my 15 years in service as a Member of Con- gress I voted for cuts in, and finally alto- gether against, the Mutual Development and Cooperation Act. This vote was cast in a very reluctant manner on my part, done after a great deal of soul searching and examination of the who, what, where, when, why, and hows of the overseas poli- cies of our Government. In the past 18 months we have had two official devalua- tions and one unofficial devaluation of the dollar as a result of foreign countries raising the value of their currencies. This has had a most disturbing effect on our economy, the result of which has been the extreme disruption of our monetary policies, the skyrocketing of prices, and an almost uncontrollable increase in our interest rates. This administration seems to have placed itself in a hopeless posi- tion, unable to cope with these inflation- ary problems whose conditions appear to worsen instead of improve with each passing day. In 'fight of this untenable situation, I was compelled to register my vote of opposition to this legislation as a mark of protest. I am not against foreign assistance per se, in fact, I feel there is a great deal we can do in this area if properly administered. In fact, had I felt that the aid and assistance we were voting on was reaching down to the impoverished peoples of the world I would have had no reluctance whatsoever in voting to approve that act. Every shred of evidence we have in our possession, however, points to the contrary. With monstrous national deficits, with the dollar dwindling away in its value, with high rates of unemployment and the high cost of welfare, and with the stag- gering burdens facing those on fixed in- comes, I make specific reference here to the elderly of our Nation who are being forced to live in real misery and depri- vation, with these concerns in mind I could not in good conscience vote for this bill. There comes a time when we must stop, look, and listen and that time is here. There is great debate ongoing about the abuse of power in the executive de- partment of Government and this bill embodies further extensions of author- ity to the Executive which I do not be- lieve the President is entitled to have. Last year the Congress passed a law establishing a Joint Study Committee on Budget Control. I am a member of that committee and in that capacity I feel that I have a responsibility in this area. I regret having to oppose my good friend and esteemed colleague, the honorable Foreign Affairs Committee, on this bill. In Massachusetts and Rhode Island, where we have the highest unemploy- ment rates in the Nation, we have re- cently witnessed Department of Defense decisions to exercise sharp meatax cut- backs which will result in the loss of 35,- 000 jobs. Other indiscriminate national policies have contributed to excessively high and unjustified rates of unemploy- ment not only in Massachusetts but in the neighboring State of Rhode Island as well. Thousands of people have swollen the unemployment roles and they can attribute their predicament directly to these policies. Great hardships have re- sulted in the 11th District of Massachu- setts, indeed in the entire Northeast sec- tion of the country, because of these poli- cies. In the face of meatax cuts like these taking place in America without the na- tional administration stopping even one moment to consider the economic impact of their decisions, then I say there is but one alternative for us, the duly elected Representatives of the people, and that is to question each and every spending policy of this Government. As I stated at the outset, I was reluctant to cast this vote; however, I shall continue to do a lot of soul searching and I shall continue to investigate, examine, and scrutinize all questions on future spending policies of this country particularly where they seem to run counterclockwise to the spending policies in selective areas of the Nation. I refer specifically and unequivo- cally to the administration's unfair atti- tude toward the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. I hope and trust that I will be able to vote for foreign aid and assistance programs in the future be- cause I feel that there exists such a need; however, the loosely drawn policies of this administration make it very difficult to do so. ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE PROCEDURES HON. RONALD V. DELLUMS OF CALIFORNIA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Thursday, July 26, 1973 Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, on Wednesday, July 18, the House Commit- tee on Armed Services released its report on H.R. 9286, the military procurement authorization bill for fiscal year 1974. I would like to compliment my colleague from Colorado, the Honorable PATRICIA SCHROEDER on her additional views which accompanied the committee report and to lend my support to them. MS. SCHROEDER demonstrated by her comments a clear insight of committee procedures. She presents valuable criti- cism of those procedures and suggests possible reforms. Certainly her concern can only improve the currently inade- quate method of conducting hearings. One of the most severe inadequacies which I have experienced and which Ms. SCHROEDER also described is the amount of advance time available to read written testimony. On many occasions I have received written testimony only 24 hours committee prod'bdure requires testimony be made available to Members. This gives too little time to fully read and analyze many of the proposals and arguments presented. I believe Ms. SCHROEDER's sug- gestion to require written testimony at least 3 days in advance would help to provide the time needed. Analysis of our national defense pro- gram is virtually impossible without the assistance of the committee staff. The staff, while small in comparison to the Pentagon, often provides assistance to Member generally favorable to the mili- tary. Those of us who have been critical of our defense program have found that the committee staff has often failed to provide necessary assistance to our of- fice staffs. Criticism of our current de- fense program is not a disservice to the country. The failure to meet the respon- sibility to review programs thoroughly is a disservice. MS. SCHROEDER'S criticisms of the ac- tual hearing process, I believe, are ex- tremely important. Questioning of wit- nesses should be sharp and debate should be open. It is obvious, though, that much of the responsibility for the lack of such sharp questioning and open debate lies with us, the Members. Instead of acqui- escing to the military preoccupation with "more," "bigger," and "faster," the Mem- bers should begin to reassert their over- sight responsibilities. The committee's preoccupation with technology, with "bigger" and "better," obscures the committee objective of leg- islating defense policy. As Ms. SCHROEDER states, the Armed Services Committee seems now to be not much more than the Pentagon's "lobby-on-the-Hill." I urge my colleagues to read Ms. SCHROEDER'S comments which I am pleased to insert into the RECORD: ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HONORABLE PATRICIA SCHROEDER, DEMOCRAT OF COLORADO It was with extreme reluctance that I joined the majority of my colleagues on the House Armed Services Committee in vot- ing out the Military Procurement Authoriza- tion bill for fiscal year 1974. My primary objection, aside from specific weapons systems noted in my minority re- port, centers around what I believe was the deficient manner in which this legislation was prepared. Our national defense program requires more analysis than other aspects of the overall budget, not only because it consumes about 40 percent of our taxes, but because it is presented to our committee by military men rigidly disciplined in what opinions they are permitted to express. This kind of discipline is invaluable on the battle- field, but when it comes to determining na- tional defense priorities and strategies, it can frustrate the work of the committee. The situation is not helped by the fact that the relatively small staff of the House Armed Services Committee, no matter how good its intentions, cannot adequately cope with a multi-billion dollar weapons procure- ment program that, I understand, is pre- pared by some 30,000 Defense Department employees with a huge computer system at their command. Nevertheless, the committee made no effort to supplement its staff, to hire outside authorities or to seek its own computer services. Rarely during the long process of hearings which I attended did the committee, or the staff, make the kind of comprehensive effort to master the separate parts of the program, or even to challenge Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000500400011=5 E 5154 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000500400011-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ---Extensions of Remarks Jul y/ 27, 1973 it as a whole (or in part), that I believe plicated multibillion dollar bill as this one. should have been made. But I have observed the process and proce- Unfortunately, the committee seemed to dures of the committee sufficiently to believe prefer spending its time in a cursory review that they should-indeed, must-be im-? of individual weapons systems-a "once over proved. lightly" approach-simply deleting a bit 'l'ie committee must welcome open and here and adding a bit there. Some members vigorous debate. Such openness would soon gave the impression that doing the hard result, I believe, in reestablishing the com-- arid tedious work of analysis and criticism miti,ee's independence of action and judg-- h.ow unseenringly, unmilitary-indeed, un- patriotic. Rarely during all the hearings I attended were the basic assumptions behind many weapons systems ever questioned. Nor was there adequate discussion of basic national security questions which would allow com- nnittee members an opportunity to evacuate a. particular weapons systems with any sense of perspective. The" often seemed preoccupied with the technology of it par- ticular weapons system--asking whether a weapon was "bigger" or "faster" than the previous model-rather than with the larger long-range prospective of whether or act the weapon was needed in the first place. We are all subject to this fixation with technol- ogy but must not let it become our sole area of inquiry. To me this preoccupation with "more" and "bigger" and "faster" is dangerous thinking. Those with such a limited vision of our mili- tary requirements end up, I believe, doing more harm than good to this country. Taey are like those French politicians who thou 3ht a bigger Maginot Line would provide more defense. They are like our own nuclear stra- tegists who argue that killing an enemy 15 times over makes us more secure than if we can kill hira only five times over. They re- mind me, to use a non-military example, of those people who believe we would honor George Washington more if we increased the height of his monument. The corrnaittee seemed annoyed, even frightened, of vigorous and open debate. The inordinate use of secrecy is a major wea?on to suppress debate. In my brief tenure on tale committee it became clear to me that the excessive use of executive sessions, from which the '7ublic is barred, and the Penta- gon's heavy-handed use of classifies ;ion stamps, is designed more to keep information from the American public than from an;r of the country's enemies. - Two examples come to mind of the trepi- dation with which the committee views the prospect of full and vigorous debate. First, the number of witnesses favorable to the Pentagon's point of view who came before the Seapower Subcommittee, for instance, numbered at least 30, while those critical of the program numbered only two. Generally, the 30 witnesses were seldom pressed and their judgment was rarely questioned. The two critical witnesses, on the other hind, were treated in an indifferent manner and their arguments dismissed by many commit- tee members. The other example concerns the showing during an open Seapower Subcommittee hearing of the NBC-TV documentary film on the CVN-70 nuclear carrier. Some members of the full committee, not just members of the Seapower Subcommittee, felt sufficient concern over the showing of this film that they put in an appearance to criticize it. By all measures it was a balanced presenta;ion, but senior members castigated it as, and I quote, "a diatribe," "unfair," "snide," "de- structive," "damnable" and "poisonous." These are strong words for men who should :look at all sides of a question before they decide. None of this is conducive to opening; up i;he legislative process so that the committee can examine the proposals in a thorough and competent manner. As a freshman member of this committee, clearly I cannot presume to have mastered the intricacies of such a com- sponsibility. As it stands now, the committee is not much more than the Pentagon's lobby.- on-1 he-hill. refusal, to open up committee proceed- ings is, in fact;, a serious mistake because it promotes many unhealthy trends. Some members, for instance, have all but abdicated their critical faculties to the so-called Penta- gon "experts"; the vision of many committee members is obscured by the shine of military brass; and there ace far too many others who take any criticism at all as a personal affront. After attending all the hearings I could, after asking questions, listening intently and seeking answers, I confess that I am still somewhat in the dark regording the weapons systems themselves, their costs, and the role they are and/or should (or should not) be playing in our national defense program. Part of the blame obviously lies with me, for in retrospect I could probably have dug even a 1 ittle deeper worked even longer hours, asked even more questions and demanded eve's more answers. But the bulk of the bla;ne, in ray op:inion, lies with a hearing process and procedures that restrict debate, stife criticism and leave unanswered im- portant questions. The resultis a piece or legislation whose implications and true costs no one on the committee, I fear, fully understands. It is not my purpose here to criticize `the Integrity and sincerity of Individual mem- bers. Many spent long hours listening and reviewing the testimony that was presented. There are other members of the committee, both senior and junior, whose experience and judgment I respect and cherish. My criticism is directed solely to the procedures and practices of the committee, and the debilitating side effects, which I am con- vinced. deter the committee from doing its jot properly. The ideal situation, in my opinion, would be one in which all hearings were adversary in nature. As I see it, the military should present its case, and the committee should receive it with considerable skepticism, The questioning should be sharp and the debate free and open. It should be permitted for written questions to be submitted for the military to answer. It would be healthy for the committee to hear differing opinions within the military establishment itself, as we witnessed briefly (anti no doubt by acci- de:rt) when factions within the Navy clashed openly in hearings on the 8th and 12th of June over a request for two additional DLGN's. Indeed, it should be the policy of the Pentagon to encourage open and public debate within its own racks. Having its pro- gram accepted each year should be a trial by firs for the Pentagon rather than the cake- walk which it; is today. The ideal would include requiring all written tes?.?imony at least three days in ad- vance so that our time ii; not wasted having the witness read it to us. Perhaps more hear- ings should be held so that we could spend more time understanding and examining the proposals. We would also benefit from the use of more staff, outside consultants and the use of computers. Instead of acquiescing to the military, the House Armed Services Committee should take i lee lead, as it did in the case of the nuclear Navy. Reasonable men-and women-should be able to differ not only philosophically but on the means we seek to achieve a common goal. I believe that opening up the proce- dures and letti:ag in the cleansing light of criticism and debate will not only enhance the comm':ttee',i stature but even produce superior legislation. Indeed, the development and maintenance of a strong, flexible and healthy military Ieferrse Program require that this be so. MCPL REPORT ON CVN-70 HON. PATRICIA SCHROEDER OF COLORADO IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Thursday July 26, 1973 Mrs. SCHROEDER. Air. Speaker, I want to share with my colleagues the excellent repcrt prepared by Congress- man BINOHAM for Members of Congress for Peace Through Law on the proposed nuclear carrier CVN-70. I will be offering an amendment to delete the $657 mil- lion authorization for this carrier when the House considers H.R: 9286 next week. The report follows: RESEARCH REPORT ON THE. NUCLEAR-POWERED AIRCRAr'T CARRIER (!.CVN-70) SUMMARY CONCLUSION At a co: t conservatively estimated at one billion dollars, 0VN-70 adds only a small frac- tion to the U.S. capacity for air power at sea. The U.S. capacity already dominates all the other navies of the world combined, and will continue ;o do so, even without new con= struction, into the 1980s. When the cost of the nuclear-powered. ships which are regtlred to provide CVN-70 with a protectb"e es+ ort of comparable endurance and sea-keeping capability are included, and when the Jost of CVN-70's air group is added to the total, the total initial cost of this pro- gram will react about three billion dollars. This figure does not Include the staggering cost: of operation and maintenance and peri- odic replacement of aircraft. The marginal addition :o national security provided by such a nuclear task force I incommensurate with its cost, especially in view of the exist- ing and projected lead held by the U.S. in this type of military power. RECOMMENDATION It is recommended that the CVN-70 project be cancelled and that the 5657 million dollars requested In the FY 1974 Department of De- fense budget request by deleted. The Navy should make every effort to find alternative uses for the items already on order as long; lead-time Items. Description of CVN-70 If built, CVN-70 would be the Navy's fourth nuclear-powered attack aircraft carrier. It, would be the third Nimitz class carrier, the first two of which are still under construc- tion. Current Navy planning calls for an Inc- tial Operating Capability (fOC) date of 1981. The specifications for C-VN--70 are as fol- lows: Displaoement: 94,400 tons; Length 1,092 feet; Estimated Speed: 36 knots; Crew (approximate): 5,000. This new nuclear attack carried is expected to support an air group of some 100 aircraft. This air group would consist of a number of different aircraft types: lighters (for combat air patrol [CAP] or protection of the carrier and its escorts against air attack) ; anti-sub-- marine warfare aircraft (to protect the car- rier task force against enemy submarines) fighter-bcmbe:-s (for projecting air power In- land from the seas) ; support aircraft (such as the carrier on-board delivery [COIF] air.- craft); rescue aircraft (principally helicop'. ters) ; and reconnaissance aircraft for photo.. graphic or electronic surveillance missions. Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000500400011-5