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December 12, 2016
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March 25, 2002
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October 26, 1973
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Approved For Release 20026' ... 4i! a' O5B00380R000600010007-2 WI: DIRTY TRICKS-PART Il Forgive him, Mother, for Miles Copeland has undertaken to tell us what CIA is all about; why `intelligence' and `espionage' are different, what the term `agent' really means, and why things may just be looking up There's a CIA ? Your Future ESIDES THE Encyclopedia Bri- tannica, a complete set of the works of Dickens, and autographed copies of The Jeweler's Eye, The Four Quartets, and On Being a Real Person, Mother's floor-to-ceiling bookshelves contain every known book on spies and counterspies, with the latest ones especially in evidence-from Wise and Ross's The Invisible Government to a book by somebody named Fletcher Proutty propounding a theory that the President of the United States, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Director of CIA com- prise a "secret team" which runs, the affairs of the country. Why such a li- brary? "We have to read all this stuff to understand what everybody says about us," explained Mother. ,Until the top people at . CIA started .? reading.what the outside' world thought ; ? about spies and spying they had to face their critics in bewildered silence, not having the faintest idea what they were talking about. "Is it true," some senator once asked Frank Wisner when he was head of the CIA's covert services, "that in every American embassy you have at least one agent?" Frank thought the senator was implying that, the CIA spied on the State Department. "No, sen- ator," he said, "We only put agents in .?~'enmbassies ?of Communist countries: MILES COPE-LAND the general public an, understanding which will silence those critics who play to the galleries, and to young peo- ple a picture of Agency work which will make them suspect that the CIA might not be such a bad place to be employed. Recruiting Good Guys So long as the Agency can hold onto its best personnel and recruit high quality replacements, say its top offi- cers, it can ride out the post-Watergate storm and then put itself through the organizational overhaul it has long needed.. Recruitment, they say, is the main problem. The campus disturb- ances of the past few years have helped enormously ("anything those creeps are against, I'm for, a Columbia law. stu- ; . dent told a CIA recruiter' after having ?_ to karate chop his way through a jeer- ing crowd to make the interview), but the constant harping on the CIA's al- leged misdemeanors by supposedly re- sponsible adults does plant doubts in the minds of young people of the sort the Agency needs. Senator Church may not be a great statesman, but he is a senator, and when he flailed out at the CIA because its officers had actually talked to ITT. executives some of the 'Agency's' recrdits awaiting 'security clearances dropped out before the clear- ances were completed. On the face of it. the Agency's con- cern over ITT's problems was clear enough. A Soviet-hacked candidate was about to become President of Chile, to confiscate all American assets in the now when some congressman or news- paperman speaks of our employees: as `agents' we know what, they -mean, and: we don't fight it. But it does incon- venience our image." A "convenient" image, it appears, is all the Agency seeks. Angus Thuermer, the CIA's public relations officer, de- spite all his Shelley Berman chatter is a very tough hombre and is the only official in the Administration I have met who doesn't feel he has to apolo- gize for the Agency. He can defend the Agency's actions in Vietnam, Laos, and elsewhere in.such a way as to convince almost anyone whose mind is not totally closed. But, aside from the. fact that none of ' the Then he realized that the senator was newsmen he sees feels inclined to re- talking about regular employees, not port what he says ("It's had taste these agents, and he had to explain that he days to go around saying nice 'things would promptly fire any of his employ- about the CIA," a Washington col- ees who got themselves directly in- umnist told me), the Agency itself volved in "acent" work, i.e., spying. holds him back. His job is not to give The senator, 4pgEo gdrlF> 9ticfeJ0" a 2t0,02(Q4WG3 ti -F+ EP7Z5BOO68DRO00600t '1-@oio7d: Spies from popular books on spies, didn't image such as is sought by Coca-Cola will be brought out bclicvc him. "Okay," said Mother, "so or Chneral Motors, but tQ pass on to Simon and Schuster. Image Problem and Counter-spies in the spring by Approved For Release 2002/04/03 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600010007-2 country, including those of ITT, and to make his capital a base for anti- American activity throughout Latin America. In asking the help of the U.S. Government ITT was doing exactly what any American victim of such de- velopments would be expected to do. But with a democratically elected sen- ator raising a fuss, the youngsters rea- soned, there must have been more to the affair than met the eye. The insist- ence of other congressmen that the CIA's attempts to identify our coun- try's enemies and learn about their ac- tivities somehow reflect a "Gestapo mentality" or result from the "pressures of Big Business" has scared off even more-all on the grounds that "the know something we Intelligence v. Espionage izations of other names do for business concerns. It resorts to espionage to about the same extent that busi- ness organizations resort to it-or perhaps less, if we are to believe ac- counts of recent industrial espionage scandals. Specifically, the CIA's espion- age unit contributes about 5 per cent of the material which goes into the U.S. Government's highest level intelli- gence summaries, and about one tenth of 1 per cent of .the, total quantity of material on which these summaries are based. One satellite in q, single turn.of the globe amasses more "intelligence information" (i.e., raw information which is processed into "finished intelli- gence") than the CIA's spies collect in a month. So what does the CIA em- ployee do in the course of a day's work? "We read newspapers," was the truth- ful answer of an Agency staff member who was being interviewed by someone writing in article for a magazine. minister is, from that. time on, an "agent"-although not one reporting information which, strictly speaking, is indispensable to national security and which cannot be obtained by other means. If the CIA's espionage service is larger than its officers would like it to be (apart from operations in Indochina, it has 15 per cent of the Agency's total personnel, and 25 per cent of the bud- get), it is not because of genuine, con- ventional espionage operations, but be- cause of the political action activities with which it has been saddled. In the Communist countries and throughout the Third World the CIA has hundreds of cabinet ministers, gov- ernment officials, and leading politicians on its payroll, all seeking "insurance." Some of them are valuable as agents, many are not-especially those who do not gain in confidence, and who decide that they need reinsurance from, the other side. All the same, keeping the doors open to the 'government leaders and politicians of these countries is re- garded as a necessary practice in a world where, whether or not it suits our democratic principles, ' tremendous pressures are exerted from the other side. Every CIA station chief complains about the deadwood on his payroll, but he is overridden-by his ambassador, not by his bosses at Langley. Our diplo- mats feel that. we must maintain a pre- tense of obedience to the policy, "We do.not,'interfere?.in? the internal, affairs of sovereign' nations,"..' even in those places where it is obvious that we couldn't bring about fair elections if we tried. My Agency friends tell me that they It is CIA policy to use espionage are toying with the idea of coming into only in quest of information which is the open' to explain, mainly to young indispensable to national security, and people, just what the intelligence busi- which cannot be adequately obtained ness is all about, and what role the by other means. The CIA's spies some- Agency is supposed to play in it. While times acquire information which does the era of Nixonmania lasts, however, not meet these qualifications, but only I doubt that any program to educate as a byproduct of operations designed the public on the CIA will get past the to get information which does meet idea stage. Therefore, during this "sort- them. More often, it gets non-essential ing out period," as Mother and the -and often useless-information from others call it, if the story is to be told sources developed in the course of its it can only be told by a knowledgeable passive "political action" programs. A outsider.}yself: Here (,forgive, ..,prime ?, trlinister: .of ? some, :African me, Mother) goes. Asian country decides for some reason First, the layman should be made to -just possibly for the,reason that he understand that "intelligence" and "es- thinks he is doing what is best for his pionage" are not synonymous. "Intelli- country-that he wants to stand against gence," a CIA training manual says, the anti-American currents which sur- "is looking before you leap." A market survey is one form of intelligence; an round him, but he feels he needs in- Secret Army in Laos surance. After, some weeks of fencing ordinary map of New York City is with the American ambassador, he is This is by way of saying that the another. So is looking out of the win- turned over to the CIA "station chief" CIA conies to "political action," as dow to see what the weather is like -for the reason that the CIA has fa- those operations in aid of interfering before you decide what to wear to the cilities, and the State Department does without interfering are called, only with ',.office. Intelligence `is anything you. do; not. for setting up Swviss hank accounts, the greatest reluctance. All, political ac-. any info' rhtatioh?'you, take into *consid- arranging for hasty departures' in case-. tion bperatioris. in w hich the .Agency oration, in order to maximize your of emergency, and providing all the has been involved, including the small chances of doing the right thing-or, other elements of insurance needed to percentage of them which have been more important, to avoid the wrong. bolster the courage of a straight-think- found out and reported in the press, Only to the extent that you spy to get ing prime minister. In the course of have been planned and conducted on the information you need are you en- arranging all this, the CIA officer who explicit instructions from the White gaged in espionage. But most people- is in contact with him gets a contiiwing House.. There is no "invisible govern- and most corporations and governments flow of political information, most of ment"; the CIA does not generate its -learn most of what they need to which is concerned with. reasons why own political action operations. It in- know without having to spy. the man is behaving as he is. As time Jluences the decisions of its superiors, The CIA is APt eI-tl,FlAK I l ,asegW.0RAP4Q3as (j,,~f>tir[ r7&aQQ3g$,Q} 00Q6QRD1QD)07t}2t market analysts in- telligence organization, it does for the confidence, the supply of information fi'uence the decisions of the soap man- llnitccd Statt's Ciovernm nt wlrtt orgiln' is lout on it regular basis, and the prime ufacturers 'who employ them, but in Approved For Release 2002/04/03 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000600010007-2 k every case where one of its political to have access to the target and re- action operations has failed it has used cruiting them as agents, receiving their. its influence, unsuccessfully, to per- reports, giving them instructions, and suade its superiors not to go ahead with paying them. As the attention of the it. The Bay of Pigs fiasco is an exam- specialists shifts toward the conventi- ple: A review of the Agency's report- Iles of "the people's war against capi- ing prior to that occasion shows clearly talism and imperialism" there will be that its officers had misgivings through- modifications to the approach, but the out, and on the eve of the launching essentials remain the same. stated unequivocally that it could not The CIA's agents, please note, are possibly succeed without the air cover persons who are already inside their as- which President Kennedy had at the last minute withdrawn. CIA, officers are against all large scale operations, from the attempted invasion of Cuba to the army in Laos, simply because they are large scale and therefore, by definition, out of place in a secret organization. According to Mother and his staff, the unsecret secret army in Laos is probably the Agency's last anomaly. Although it was a success (a fact which its critics seem to regard as irrelevant),'its cost, not only in mere funds but' in operational manpower and administrative time, was such as to throw the whole Agency out of kilter. Now that it is all over, the CIA's "dirty tricks" specialists will get back to con- centrating on what they know best, "precision penetration," directed against "targets" of the "people's war against imperialism and capitalism." "Precision penetration," as the term is used by espionage specialists means: 1) identifying a "target"-i.e., the exact place (an office safe, a conference liner might be formed at six o'clock one room, the brain of a person) where evening, exist only for the duration of "the secret" is kept: 2) making a thor- the operation,. then disperse-its mcm- ough "target study"-i.e., mapping the bers going in various directions to join target's layout, examining the security other ad hoc groups. Another is that defense around it, determining what the targets are not offices, complete traditional ways persons have access to it, and getting with safes containing 'Fop sncmtnr writ- . CIA, however, whatever information is necessary to ten materials and corruptible file clerks, services of other countries to apply ef- determine how best to go about recruit- but rooms in the apartments of the ter- fective community surveillance systems, ing someone insiqq ri~~ec~`bp~~aSC'~2tf~'y~~':sl2E7'5B'610t36tQR01f4G6t~!}l1~(}02tmdue power to gov- or more persons wh have cen toun in refugee camps. Another difficulty is ernments, which are corrupt or other- signed targets, not persons who have been introduced from without. The sug- gestion that the CIA might pick' out some clever young Westerner, teach him perfect Russian, drill him. in con. tinental mannerisms, and send him off to insinuate himself into a job in the Kremlin has always been a fiction. The CIA has rarely, if ever, employed Americacitizens as agents. (The U-2 pilot, Gary Powers, was no exception. A friend of mine in the KGB assures me that the word "spy" was flung at Powers only as part of the prosecu- tion's rhetoric, and that he was found guilty not of espionage but of "acts against the security of the state," and was sentenced for what he was, an ordi- nary. airplane pilot taking photographs in forbidden areas of the USSR.) In modern practice, the CIA does not even employ locals as agents unless they are already properly placed to gain infor- mation of value. In a Moslem country it would employ only Moslems, never a Jew or even a Christian. To pene- trate a Palestinian terrorist organiza- tion, it would employ only Palestinian terrorists-Christians being permissible in this case, since Christian elements are fast gaining ground ' in Palestinian extremist circles. There are various obstacles' in the way of achieving "precision penetra- tion" of Palestinian terrorist move- ments, and all other targets of the "people's war." One is that these targets are not only compartmented, but com- partmented on an ever changing basis: A group bent on blowing up the Ameri- can embassy or hijacking a TWA air- that there are many targets -to pene- trate, and the relations between them are so loose and unsystematic that those who manage espionage operations against them keep finding themselves in blind alleys. The only answer to the problem seems to be to keep whole communities under surveillance. "This means we are subscribing to police state methods," says Mother, "but what else can we do?" With intelligence on the "people's war" pouring in as it presently is, even the most liberal-minded CIA officers feel that they have no choice but to do whatever is necessary to deal with it. They believe that, sooner rather than later, the public will swing over to sharing the alarm, and will become sud- denly unsqueamish about police state methods or whatever it takes to give them a good night's sleep. The CIA, the FBI, and other security agencies had better be prepared. They had better have in readiness methods of "com- munity surveillance" which have in them only such invasions of privacy as are absolutely necessary, and which en- sure that the invasions are handled with such discretion and delicacy that even the most ardent liberal can't conscien- tiously object to them. The FBI has a comparatively simple problem. Provided it, can be assured of freedom from political influences, it munity surveillance which will he per-. vasive enough to check terrorist in- fluences in the U.S. yet not constitute more than a minor departure from our dai14 `0y. W%iV" SO ?5 to :1V[l1Ci ills' 'tlLera IUli LIz:~ .."i;c~11SC i1Z: `li" L'ci.2 and i]colasing lsulvous tipping its hand ~~~~v ~g cl Pt aSPn~t~O~/~~ 0~ 5 1 i aPi ~d~~~Q ~ ~ 0~ra~ were spotted, cluse- terrorists or to provoke premature out- cries from shortsighted liberals, the CIA must reorient its covert services so they can cope with this objective. Togetherness Against ? Terror To wind up this short unauthorized course on the CIA, may I predict that the following will be the principal fea- tures of its covert services' New Look: 1. There will be closer cooperation between the CIA's covert services and the FBI and other federal agencies re- sponsible for the internal security of the United States' In earlier days, the CIA and the FBI were barely on speaking terms, but they have been drawn closer together by the Watergate affair, and they will move still closer as clear pic- tures of the foreign connections of ex- tremist groups in America begin to emerge. Until now, there has been con- siderable conflict between intelligence and police in counterterrorist opera- tions: Intelligence leans toward keeping discreet' track of terrorist groups ? and neutralizing them quietly, while police- men lean toward arresting their mem- bers and bringing them to trial. Intel- ligence officers think in terms of information, policemen in terms of evidence that will stand up in court. In the future, these distinctions will be- come less and less important-and extra-legal (i.e., intelligence) actions against terrorists will be closely coor- dinated with. legal (i.e., police) actions against them. . 2. --There will' be less iise of foreign security agencies by means of penetrat- ing parts of them, and more emphasis on obtaining straightforward official co- operation. Instead of inducing section heads to spy for the United States, CIA station chiefs will convince their bosses at the top that the control of terrorism is even more in their interests than in ours. The CIA is already having marked success in this. Even the rabid- ly anti-American Palestinian Liberation Organization has admitted that "Black September" terrorism.. has harmed the Palestinians far more than it has harmed the Israelis, and all Arab gov- ernments but two have taken official positions consistent with this belief. Many of them have openly admitted to recognizing that purely local counter- terrorism is ineffective in the face of CIA's penetration of the agencies will continue, but mainly to keep track of the extent to which they are being mis- used for internal power purposes. One hundred per cent of them are being so misused (of course the fuss, during Watergate, over the impropriety of using government investigative agencies as "resources of the incumbency" is lost on all populaces but our own), but it is advisable that we keep tabs on the effects. 3. There will be more cooperation than ever before with private organ- izations-industrial, financial, labor unions, 'philanthropic, religious; and educational. The notion that it is some- how sinful for the U.S. Government to help American interests, or vice versa, will pass. These organizations will not allow themselves to be used to cover out-and-out clandestine operations, of course, but there are various quite proper ways in which they can join in a common effort, inside their own or- ganizations and in collaboration with local governments, to combat interna- tional terrorism. Cooperation of the sort which existed during World War II and just after between the ITT and the CIA's predecessor, the Office of Stra- tegic Services, may well become the model. 4. Already "community surveillance" facilities-miniature television cameras, microphones, metal detectors, "black lights," and X-rays-are being installed at strategic observation points through- out major cities,; industrial: areas, .and, military bases, with concentration on airports, railway stations, communica- tions centers, and other places which are normally most tempting to terror- ists. Through vast though simplified monitoring arrangements, a compara- tively small number of technicians can keep watch over large crowds of per- sons, and photograph them so that they can be studied in detail after terrorist occurrences. Within days fol- lowing the IRA outrages in London railway stations, the British security authorities had installed equipment to photograph in their entirety all the crowds entering and leaving the. sta- tions. Following the bomb explosion.ili the King-'s Cross station of September 12. Scotland Yard Special Branch offi- cials were able to run over. their films again and again in a search for persons picked out who is almost certainly the guilty one. The police now have some- thing better than an Identikit picture to go on. We are not allowed to know the specifics of the American equivalents which have been in effect since early in 1970, but friends of mine in the FBI tell me that they have thwarted perhaps hundreds of terrorist attacks. So have the systems which have been installed by the CIA in other countries of the world, from Morocco to Hong Kong. The press does not report thwarted acts of terrorism, but only those which elude the system. For some, time to come,' terrorists will elude the system to cause an increase in public indignation, causing, in turn, an escalation of com- munity surveillance systems. 5. All the while, the CIA and the FBI will be on guard against being pushed too fast by all the public indig- nation, and against its being exploited by democratic politicians, including those in "the incumbency." These agen- cies must become "as antiseptic as the Supreme Court," as Mother puts it, adding that the Buckley proposal that there be "bonded buggers" is already a reality. The easy access to computer- ized information-which, incidentally,* has never been as easy as some critics of the government have claimed-will be stopped. Only a select few persons who have been specially cleared, and who live under special controls, will have. access to this information, and be- fore passing it on to other officials who must make use of it they will "sterilize" it so that it contains only what is needed for the legitimate purposes at hand, and no more. Once Watergate has blown over, together with the ]in- gering sympathies for the Ellshcrgs and others who have made heroes out of themselves by leaking official secrets, congressmen who have a particular un- derstanding of the problems will push for legislation to strengthen the position of the "bonded huggers" and'to enable them to do their job more efficiently. But 'even without the legislation, I am told. there is every sign that the system will continue to work. Those of us with sinful pasts may relax; only those sins which might justly disqualify us from something we may dare to apply for will ever be found out. Even then, only the bonded buggers will know. ^ Approved For Release 2002/04/03: CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600010007-2