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December 12, 2016
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March 25, 2002
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October 26, 1973
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,ii 111 l+1 i,- Approved For Release 2002/dit f7B00380R000600010011-7 I 1' 1171 DIRTY TRICKS-PART 11 T 1. here's a CIA in Four Future Forgive him, Mother, for Miles Copeland has undertaken to tell us what CIA is all about; why 'intelligence' and `espionage' are, difjerent, what the term 'agent.' really'means, and why things may just be looking up MILES COPE-LAND tannica, a complete set of the -----s~ - - works of Dickens, and autographed copies of The Th h . k_ .. 'A' . i ?Yf_i F e e our and counterspies, with the latest ones -y.....c,..Y ALL VY1JC i111LL Ross's The Invisible Government to a the general public an, understanding which will silence those critics who play to the galleries, and to young peo- ple a picture of Agency work which will make them suspect that the CIA might not be such a bad place to be employed. Recruiting Good Guys book by somebody named Fletcher So long as the Agency can hold onto Proutty propounding a theory that the W~r, 1 13 its best personnel and recruit high President of the United States, the quality replacements, say its top ofI'i- Secretary of ]Defense, the Secretary of ,i cers, it can ride out the post-Watergate State, and the Director of CIA com- [/~ rl~ storm and then put itself through the prise a "secret team" which runs. the organizational overhaul it has long affairs of the country. Why such a li- : t J FK needed.. Recruitment, they say, is the brary? "We have to read all this stuff main problem. The campus disturb- to understand what everybody says ances of the past few years have helped about us," explained Mother. . now when some congressman or news- enormously ("anything those creeps are Until the top people at CIA started pa.perman speaks of our employees: as against, I'm for,", a Columbia law. stu-; readingwhat'the outsido' worldithougfit `.agents' we know what. they?mean,' and;`- dent told a CIA recruiter' after having about spies and spying they had to face we don't fight it. But it does incon- to karate chop his way through a jeer- their critics in bewildered silence, not venience our image." ing crowd to make the interview), but having the faintest idea what they were A "convenient" image, it appears, is the constant harping on the CIA's al- talking about. "Is it true," some senator all the Agency seeks. Angus Thuermer, leged misdemeanors by supposedly re- once asked Frank Wisner when he was the CIA's public relations officer, de- sponsible adults does plant doubts in head of the CIA's covert services,."that spite all his Shelley Berman chatter is the minds of young people of the sort in every American embassy you have a very tough hombre and is the only the Agency needs. Senator Church may at least one agent?" Frank thought the official in the Administration I have not be a great statesman, but he is a senator was implying that, the CIA spied met who" doesn't feel he has to apolo- senator, and when he flailed out at the on the State Department. "No, sen- gize.for the Agency. - CIA because its officers had actually ator," he said, "We-only put agents in He can defend the Agency's actions talked to ITT executives some of the ??en~bas'sies.?of "Comrrriinist.countries in Vietnam, Laos, and elsewhere' in. such '""Agency's recruits awaiting security a way as to convince almost anyone clearances dropped out before the clear- .Image Problem whose mind is not totally closed. But, ances were completed. aside from the . fact that none of' the On the face of it. the ? Agency's con- Then he realized that the senator was newsmen he sees feels inclined to re- ' cern over ITT's problems was clear talking about regular employees, not port what he says ("It's bad taste these enough. A Soviet-backed candidate was agents, and he had to explain that he days to go around saying nice 'things about to become President of Chile, to would promptly fire any of his employ- about the CIA," a Washington col- confiscate all American assets in the ces who got themselves directly in- umnist told me), the Agency itself volved in "agent" work, i.e., spying. holds him back. His job is not to give The senator, wp6 OSF Ftd self201 2/b4lol3af'K' AI#igp7i58big: 8E koo}d60ft4t llf-Ipies and Counter-spies from popular booFs on spies, didn't image such as is sought by Coca-Cola will be brought out in the spring by believe hint. "Okay," said Mother, "so or General Motors, but to pass on to Simon and Schuster. Approved For Release 2002/04/03 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000.600010011-7 country, including those of ITT, and izations -of other names do for business minister is, from that. time on, an to make his capital a base for anti- concerns. It resorts to espionage to "agent"-although not one reporting American activity throughout Latin about the same extent that busi- information which, strictly speaking, is America. In asking the help of the U.S. ness organizations resort to it-or indispensable to national security and Government ITT was doing exactly perhaps less, if we are to believe ac- which cannot be obtained by other what any American victim of such de- counts of recent industrial espionage means. velopments would be expected to do. scandals. Specifically, the CIA's espion- If the CIA's espionage service is But with a democratically elected sen- age unit contributes about 5 per cent larger than its officers would like it to ator raising a fuss, the youngsters rea- of the material which goes into the be (apart from operations in Indochina, soned, there must have been more to U.S. Government's highest level intelli- it has 15 per cent of the Agency's total the affair than met the eye. The insist- gence summaries, and about one tenth personnel, and 25 per cent of the bud- ence of other congressmen that the of 1 per cent of the, total quantity of get), it is not because of genuine. con- CIA's attempts to identify our coun- material on which these summaries are ventional espionage operations, but be- try's enemies and learn about their ac- based. One satellite in Q, single turn -of cause of the political action activities tivities somehow reflect a "Gestapo the globe amasses more "intelligence with which it has been saddled. mentality" or result from the "pressures information" (i.e., raw information In the Communist countries and of Big Business" has scared off even which is processed into "finished intelli- throughout the Third World the CIA more-all on the grounds that "the gence") than the CIA's spies collect in has hundreds of cabinet ministers, gov- congressmen must know something we a month. So what does the CIA em- ernment officials, and leading politicians don't." ployee do in the course of a day's work? on its payroll, all seeking "insurance." "We read newspapers," was the truth- Some of them are valuable as agents, Intelligence v. ful answer of an Agency staff member many are not-especially those who do Espionage who was being interviewed by someone not gain in confidence, and who decide writing 'an article for a magazine. that they need reinsurance from the My Agency friends tell me that they It is CIA policy to use espionage other side. All the same, keeping the are toying with the idea of coming into only in quest of information which is doors open to the 'government leaders the open-to explain, mainly to young indispensable to national security, and and politicians of these countries is re- people, just what the intelligence busi- which cannot be adequately obtained garded as a necessary practice in a ness is all about, and what role the by other means. The CIA's spies some- world where, whether or not it suits Agency is supposed to play in it. While times acquire information which does our democratic principles, ' tremendous the era of Nixonmania lasts, however, not meet these qualifications, but only pressures are exerted from the other I doubt that any program to educate as a byproduct of operations designed side. Every CIA station chief complains the public on the CIA will get past the to get information which does meet about the deadwood on his payroll, but idea stage. Therefore, during this "sort- them. More often, it gets non-essential he is overridden-by his ambassador, ing out period," as Mother and the -and often useless-information from not by his bosses at Langley. Our diplo- others call it, if the story is to be told sources developed in the course of its mats feel that. we, must maintain a pre- it can only be told by a knowledgeable passive "political action" programs. A tense of obedience to the policy, "We outsider such,as..myself:.Here (.forgive...;priniel..minister: of.. some. African or: do ~.not ?anterfcre?in the internal affairs hie, Mother) goes. Asian country decides for som' some reason of sovereign nations," even in those First, the layman should be made to -just possibly for the' reason that he places where it is obvious that we understand that "intelligence" and "es- thinks he is doing what is best for his couldn't bring about fair elections if pionage" are not synonymous. "Intelli- country-that he wants to stand against we tried. gence," a CIA training manual says, the anti-American currents which sur- "is looking before you leap." A market round him. but he feels he needs in- Secret Army in Laos survey is one form of intelligence; an surance. After-some weeks of fencing ordinary map of New York City is with the American ambassador, he is This is by way of saying that the another. So is looking out of the win- turned over to the CIA "station chief" CIA comes to "political action," as dow to see what the weather is like . -for the reason that the CIA has fa- those operations in aid of interfering before you decide what to wear to the cilities, and the State Department does without interfering are called, only with ;.office. Intelligence is anything you. do; not, for. setting up Swiss bank, accounts, , the, greatest, reluctance. All. political ac- any information 'yore take into ?consid- " arranging for hasty.'-departiures''in case'' -tion trpeiatioris. in 'which 'the Agency oration, in order to maximize your of emergency, and providing all the has been involved, including the small chances of doing the right thing-or, other elements of insurance needed to percentage of them which have been more important, to avoid the wrong. bolster the courage of a straight-think- ? found out and reported in the ? press, Only to the extent that you spy to get ing prime minister. In the course of have been planned and conducted on the information you need are you en- arranging all this, the CIA officer who explicit instructions from the White gaged in espionage. But most people- is in contact with him gets a continuing Ilouse.. There is no "invisible govern- and most corporations and governments flow of political information, most of ment"; the CIA does not generate its -learn most of what they need to which is concerned with. reasons why own political action operations. It in- know without having tosyp the man is behaving as he is. As time /luences the decisions of its superiors, The CIA is r~l ~@lY9A:F1Q( WIMaseg2 (OQAQ,,s ~q { &aQQ00900p,6QQQQ1,W11h' t market analysts in- telligence organization, it does for the confidence, the supply of information fluence the decisions of the soap man- United States (lovernnfcnt what organ- is put on a regular basis, and 'the prime ufacturcrs 'who employ them, but in Approved For Release 2002/04/03 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000600010011-7 every case where one of its political action operations has failed it has used its influence, unsuccessfully, to per- suade its superiors not to go ahead with it. The Bay of Pigs fiasco is an exam- ple: A review of the Agency's report- ing prior to that occasion shows clearly that its officers had misgivings through- out, and on the eve of the launching stated unequivocally that it could not possibly succeed without the air cover which President Kennedy had at the last mjnute withdrawn. CIA, officers are against all large scale operations, from the attempted invasion of Cuba to the army in Laos, simply because they are large scale and therefore, by definition, out of place in a secret organization. According to Mother and his staff, the unsecret secret army in Laos is probably the Agency's last anomaly. Although it was a success (a fact which its critics seem to regard as?irrelevant),'its cost, not only in mere fiends but' in operational manpower and administrative time, was such as to throw the whole Agency out of kilter. Now that it is all over, the CIA's "dirty tricks" specialists will get back to con- centrating on what they know best, "precision penetration," directed against "targets" of the "people's war against imperialism and capitalism." "Precision penetration," as the term is used by espionage specialists means: 1) identifying a "target"-i.e., the exact place (an office safe, a conference room, the brain of a person) where "the secret" is kept: 2) making a thor- ough "target study"-i.e., mapping the target's layout, examining the security defense around it, determining what persons have access to it, and getting whatever information is necessary to to have access to the target and re- cruiting them as agents, receiving their. reports, giving them instructions, and paying them. As the attention of the specialists shifts toward the conventi- cles of "the people's war against capi- talism and imperialism" there will be modifications to the approach, but the essentials remain the same. The CIA's agents, please note, are persons who are already inside their as- signed targets, not persons who have been introduced from without. The sug- gestion that the CIA might pick' out some clever young Westerner, teach him perfect Russian, driii him. in con: tinental mannerisms, and send him off to insinuate himself into a job in the Kremlin has always been a fiction. The CIA has rarely, if ever, employed American citizens as agents. (The U-2 pilot, Gary Powers, was no exception. A friend of mine in .the KGB assures me that the word "spy" was flung at Powers only as part of the prosecu- tion's rhetoric, and that he was found guilty not of espionage but of "acts against the security pf the state," and was sentenced for what he was, an ordi- nary.airplane pilot taking photographs in forbidden areas of the USSR.) In modern practice, the CIA does not even employ locals as agents unless they are already properly placed to gain infor- mation of value. In a' Moslem country it would employ only Moslems, never a Jew or even a Christian. To pene- trate a Palestinian terrorist organiza- tion, it would employ only Palestinian terrorists-Christians being permissible in this case, since Christian elements are fast gaining ground'in Palestinian extremist circles. There are various way of achieving "precision penetra- tion" of Palestinian terrorist move- ments, and all other targets of the "people's war." One is that these targets are not only compartmented, but com- partmented on an ever changing basis: A group bent on blowing up the Ameri- can embassy or hijacking a TWA air- liner might be formed at six o'clock one evening. exist only for the duration of the operation,. then disperse-its mem- bers going in various directions to join other ad hoc groups. Another is that the targets are not offices, complete with safes containing Tot, SECRET writ- ten materials and corruptible file clerks, that there are many targets to pene- trate, and the relations between them are so loose and unsystematic that those who manage espionage operations against them keep finding themselves in blind alleys. The only answer to the problem seems to be to keep whole communities tinder surveillance. "This means we are subscribing to police state methods," says Mother, "but what else can we do?" With intelligence on the "people's war" pouring in as it presently is, even the most liberal-minded CIA officers feel that they have no choice but to do whatever is necessary to deal with it. They believe that, sooner rather than later, the public will swing over to sharing the alarm, and will become sud- denly unsqueamish about police state methods or whatever it takes to give them a good night's sleep. The CIA, the FBI, and other security agencies had better be prepared. They had better have in readiness methods of "com-' munity surveillance" which have in them only such invasions of privacy as are absolutely necessary, and which en- sure that the invasions are handled with such discretion and delicacy that even the most ardent liberal can't conscien- tiously object to them. The FBI has a comparatively simple problem. Provided it- can be assured of freedom from political influences, it can easily administer a system 'of com- munity surveillance'which will he per-. vasive enough to check terrorist in- fluences in the U.S. yet not constitute more than a minor departure from our traditional ways of doing things. The CIA, however, must enable security services of other countries to apply ef- fective community surveillance systems, ing someone irA0P \MdcF ciRiel~ se fa 0021041 j'O 1kDPVS`B?U3 00Obt0?M6Mlii undue power to gov- or more persons who have been found in refugee camps. Another difficulty is ernments. whit are corrupt or other- tipping its hand tAi p El tLea$ft)20QRf /A dbgApRQRMOWI ORQ 08QM1 QO4thU were spotted, close- terrorists or to provoke premature out- cries from shortsighted liberals, the CIA must reorient its covert services so they can cope with this objective. Togetherness Against - Terror To wind up this short unauthorized course on the CIA, may I predict that the following will be the principal fea- tures of its covert services' New Look: 1. There will be closer cooperation between the CIA's covert services and the FBI and other federal agencies re- sponsible for the internal security of the United States' In earlier days, the CIA and the FBI were barely on speaking terms, but they have been drawn closer together by the Watergate affair, and they will move still closer as clear pic- tures of the foreign connections of ex- tremist groups in America begin to emerge. Until now, there has been con- siderable conflict between intelligence and police in counterterrorist opera- tions: Intelligence leans toward keeping discreet ? track of terrorist groups ? and neutralizing them quietly, while police- men lean toward arresting their mem- bers and bringing them to trial. Intel- ligence officers think in terms of information, policemen in terms of evidence that will stand up in court. In the future, these distinctions will be- come less and less important-and extra-legal (i.e., intelligence) actions against terrorists will be closely coor- dinated with. legal (i.e., police) actions against them.. 2. -There will' be less tise of foreign security agencies by means of penetrat- ing parts of them, and more emphasis on obtaining straightforward official co- operation. Instead of inducing section heads to spy for the United States, CIA station chiefs will convince their bosses at the top that the control of terrorism is even more in their interests than in ours. The CIA is already having marked success in this. Even the rabid- ly anti-American Palestinian Liberation Organization has admitted that "Black September" terrorism.. has harmed the Palestinians far more than ? it has harmed the Israelis,-and all Arab gov- ernments but two have taken official positions consistent With this belief, Many of them have openly admitted to recognizing that purely local counter- terrorism is ineffective in the face of "Octopus" arrangement -is essential. The CIA's penetration of the agencies will continue, but mainly to keep track of the extent to which they are being mis- used for internal power purposes. One hundred per cent of them are being so misused (of course the ' fuss, during Watergate, over the irinpropriety of using government investigative agencies as "resources of the incumbency" is lost on all populaces but our own), but it is advisable that we keep tabs on the effects. 3. There will be more cooperation than ever before with private organ- izations-industrial, financial, labor unions, philanthropic, religious, and educational. The notion that it is some- how sinful for the U.S. Government to help American interests, or vice versa, will pass. These organizations will not allow themselves to be' used to cover out-and-out clandestine operations, of course, but there are various quite proper ways in which they can join in a common effort, inside their own or- ganizations and in collaboration with local governments, to combat interna- tional terrorism. Cooperation of the sort which existed during World War II and just after between the ITT and the CIA's predecessor, the Office of Stra- tegic Services, may well become the model. 4. Already "community surveillance" facilities-miniature television cameras, microphones. metal detectors, "black lights," and X-rays-are being installed at strategic observation points through- but major cities,; industrial. areas, and, military bases, with concentration on airports, railway stations, communica- tions centers, and other places which are normally most tempting to terror- ists. Through vast though simplified monitoring arrangements, a compara- tively small number of technicians can keep watch over large crowds of per- sons, and photograph them so that they can be studied in detail after terrorist occurrences. Within days fol- lowing the IRA outrages in London railway stations, the British security authorities had installed equipment to photograph in their entirety all the crowds entering and leaving the. sta- tions. Following the bomb explosion,iri the King's Cross station of September 12. Scotland Yard Special Branch offi- cials were able to run over, their films again and again in a search for persons ups were made and a young man was picked out who is almost certainly the guilty one. The police now have some- thing better than an Identikit picture to go pn. We are not allowed to know the specifics of the American equivalents which have been in effect since early in 1970, but friends of mine in the FBI tell inc. that they have thwarted perhaps hundreds of 'terrorist attacks. So have the' systems which have been installed by the CIA in other countries of the world, from Morocco to Hong Kong. The press does not report thwarted acts of terrorism, but only those which elude the system. For some, time to come,'terrorists will elude the system to cause an increase in public indignation, causing, in turn, an escalation of com- munity surveillance systems. 5. All the while, the CIA and the FBI will be on guard against being pushed too fast by all the public indig- nation, and against its being exploited by democratic politicians, including those in "the incumbency." These agen- cies must become "as antiseptic as the Supreme Court," as Mother puts it, adding that the Buckley proposal that there be "bonded buggers" is already a reality. The easy access to computer- ized information-which, incidentally,' has never been as easy as some critics of the government have. claimed-will be stopped. Only a select few persons who have been specially cleared, and who live under special controls, will have. access to this information, and be- fore passing it on to other' officials who must make use of it they will "sterilize" it so that it contains only what is needed for the legitimate purposes at hand, and no more. Once Watergate has blown over, together with the lin- gering sympathies for the Ellsbergs and others who have made heroes out of themselves by leaking official secrets, congressmen who have a particular un- derstanding of the problems will push for legislation to strengthen the position of the "bonded huggers" and'to enable them to do their job more efficiently. But -even without the legislation, I am told. there is every sign that the system will continue to work. Those of us with sinful pasts may relax: only those sins which might justly disqualify us from something we may dare to apply for will ever be found out. Even then, only the bonded buggers will know. ^ Approved For Release 2002/04/03.: CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600010011-7