Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date: 
March 25, 2002
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 21, 1973
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP75B00380R000600010012-6.pdf580.76 KB
Approved For Release 2002/04/03: CIA-RDP75B00380R00060001 6 G rr THE WASHINGTON POST DATE (.~ -1 PAGE rfr IJy Tall 8=110 Szule is a Washington writer and a former foreign correspondent. His lat- est book is "Com,pulsive Spy: The Strange Career of E. Howard Hunt." U1V1JEIL L Via J. V.1-) -A -7 ~"~~TAS 2`IIL United States, ?'1' through tics, but it also helps In Understanding the Central Intelligence Agency and reconstructing the administration's settlement on the compensatlans to be or otherwise, clirectiy involved in the basic policy of bringing about Allende's and a renegotiation of .' cvcnl5 that led to the bloody coup d'titat paid for naionalized American Property e Chile latil Sept. h11 fall one way or another. Cnle, x.1.'7 bil- nc' ile st Sept. 11? in i.lre militar We are apprised not only that the Iron debt to the United Statq Y CIA's estimate of the number' of vie. No"fe.11;114aliof rcvoluiiorthat ousted he late President Salvador Allende Gossen , a Socialist, tints of tile Milltur y f.ovornntents re. C'1`UALLX, the basic U.;~. t~u~;l.nre S h rr roundly denied s, the Nixon pression is four tinges the official San. ?-ferny rd Allende was ;;et fugth J)y as la-titratiotr and the CIA in tinge figures but that tile United States, Iienry? A. T{iss ndsista 'Urea the Mile o partieular'? in effect, condones mass executions and House special assistant for n~ftiole rc hrrt, givOll the CIA's truck record In imprisonments in Chile because a civil nverUrvon r nr attempting over. ctrrity affairs, at a aacktirofnrd hie.iiu : h row t foreign t1 war there remains "a real Possibility.- for the grass in leacie wn u ,5 cpIili'0, 1'To 0, overnmetrts-Iran, Guato. Yet, even Colby warmed that tile jut to 12 days after Alf:ndo won it ,u nr:fli[;v to rnahr, the I3rr3~ of Pigs, Laos and so on tray "overdo" repression. - deep suspicions have persisted andthat the elections and awaited ;r riCJI (l vntn thn agency, operating Colby's and Davis' testinton irr Congress. 1:{issinger raid them (hat if under White unclear, and contr`adictot yffer parts ouhe directives, has been much more Allende were confirmed, of li Couunutri~t Man an innocent observer of the Chilean on a regime would emer o itt Clrilo and iol- picture of the CIA's activities in Cltile Argentina, Bolle.a and fern nlifIlt fo r cc'rrf sil.tcr.. AII(Ilde' between Allende 's election in n 1970 and Lnt' clays ago, election In 1970, tiro Sept. 11 coup ranging from the t]CIA rather sur?' low this example trr'vm d y most relueta "Penetration" of all the mayor Chilean For the next three a isin confirm lust fy, went quite . political parties, support for anti-regirno ? policy developed Along tiv thr? iii l a wa It to did so in' secret of ? lvo ltriucipa testimony pl dernonstrations and financing of the`op: One position press and other ef? to the Allende Oct, l thn Isecre 9esti mrnittee toforo unsuspected Agency involve bees. was the dcrtial of enil r crorlifn oll in1 before be ore tile Affairs by croups tehere- F;overttment-ile,'5 h.inr. its di- in financial negotiations between Wash ton even blocked loans by intrnnlianal. and I' inst~tut?oalu-to awhefl Ate C'trllc,r reel Dav redericlc ingtolt And Santiago in last 1972 and r ~Ca? rs, a senior official in the nom c Situati Dixon when Allende him';nf reclor, Wiliian B. Colby, rrf,c'ncY'ti Office of Current Intelligence, early 1973 when the Chileans were des- was b?' bgi s down it vaat. y 11110rrare. eg(' nscI'1 of tube testinton perately seeking an accommodation. tent of Iris Own. lire Tile alrancille to thi s writer There are indications that the CIA, nlh'e line ?rs the supportive CIA activity to aca'lcr:rl.e vailable to es writety by s acting on the basis of its own reports f, I` the the economic crisis and ihfto/ nen u r. tensive testimony touches 1"1~ p Ved~nrt>1 gl&9se 1F4 tic~a~4 715 0 to re- ~9~A( QO Unity ,;ovcrfnnent extensive covert role in Chilean counso ins the White Hons to re- coalition. Pali- buff Allende's attemnta to,..,wArlr mir Approved For Release 2002/04/03 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600010012-6 CIA, From Page Cl The only ca:ceptiou to the ban on ' credils was the sale of military equip- reent to the Chilean armed forces-- including the decision last Juno 5 to. Bell Chile F-5E. jot fighter planes '- presumably to signal United States sup- port for the military. Colby's testimony as well as other information showed that the United Slates had maintained close contacts with the Chilean military after Allende's election. The Nixon administration's; firm re- fusal to help Chile, even on humani- tarian grounds, was, emphasized about a week before the military coup when credits to buy 300,000 tons of wheat hero at a tine when the Chileans had run out of foreign currency and bread nhortngcs were developing. Ou Oct. II, however, the new military junta was griani.ed $Z4.5 million In wheat credits after the White I-louse overruled State Department objections. The department's Bureau of Inter- A!ncrican Affairs reportedly believed that such a gesture was premature and i I could be politically embarrassing. All "Uiafo>:'G?isteate" Coup 1,j, AIRAIJOYICALLY, Washington had r, not hoped for the kind of bloody nilutary takeover that occurred on Sept, 11.. For political reasons, it preferred a g.rtgiu-al destruction from within of the Chiieut economy sa that the Al. ieudo re?lino would collapse of its own weight. The CIA's role, it Appeared, wan to help quicken this process. Unrlcr questioning by Rep. Michael J. Jlardngton (D-Mass.), Colby thus testi.ticcl that the CIA's "appreciation" of the Chilean economy was that "it was on a declining plane on ne eco- iiomie ground in term; of Internal eco- uninic problems - inflation, with 320 i i'er cent inflation in one year, the clos- uria of the copper mines, and so forth, your total foreign deficit was more than tiro need for it. They couldn't im- port the food because their deficit was such that over tho long term they had no baso for It." Elsewhere in his testi- mony, Colby said that the CIA reported "Accurately an overall assessment of deterioration" and that with the Chilean navy pushing for a coup, it was only a question of tiAm bi5ewedtF&mJ eleas6 DATE But Colby also told the ciubcoiniiitteo that "our assessment was it might be u.n. ortunatco if a, coup took place. 1,110 TVni.lunsil Security Council olic p y was 7roreoto it." Ila niado this comas: nt after Rely. Charles W. Whalen (R-Ohio) asked Colby whether he agreed with earlier testimony by Jack Kubisch, the assistant secretary of state for Liter. tibn believed that "it would be adverse to our own United states interest if the government of Chile were overthrown." This theme was further developed in a letter on Oct. 8 from Richard A. Fagen, professor of political. science at Stan, ford university, to Sen. J. William Ful- bright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Iiclatioiis Committee re ortin p g on a , meeting between Kubisch and a group of ucholara representing the Latin Amer- scan Studies Association. Fagen said that Kubisch took the view that "it was not in our interest to have the military tako over In Cliile. It would have been better had Allende nerved his entire term taking the na. tion and the Chilean people into com- plete and total ruin. Only then would j the full discrediting of socialism have taken place. Only then tiyould people have gotten the mess.'ago that socialism. ' -,, doesn't work. What has happened has "No .4~1t(ikafi>itDm" of Sup -osi e!'aOLBY'S TESTIMONY on the CIA's to netivilles In Chile supplied a con., siderable amount of new iiiforntation, ? roino of it contradictory, under vigor. aus questioning by the subcommittee. Thus at one point Colby said that "I call make a clear statement that cer- tainly CIA bad no connection with the 11'1'.oup itself, with the military coup. We didn't support it, we didn't stimulate '-it. we didn't bring it about in any way.,, We obviously had some intelligence coverage over the various moves being made but we were quite meticulous in making sure there was no indication of encouragement from our side." Snot involved with the prolonged strike by Chilean truckers that preceded the coup. But pressed by Rep. Ilarrington, Colby acknowledged that the CIA may have assisted certain anti-Allende demon. strations. The following discussion ensuedi 002/04/03 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000600010012-6 Approved For Release 2002/04/03 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600010012-6 Szulc Article Transcript HARRINGTON: Did. the CIA, directly or 113rlirerlly, as;+l ,t to-An demoilstra- lionvg tbron gh tho ur o of sul~aldi.arla s o~ United 114ales corporations in Brazil or other Lai.ia rlinorican countries? COLBY: I think I have raid that the .CIA did not assist the trucking strike. IIARRINGTON: I think It's a broader, and more intentionally broader, ques- tion-any of the demonstrations that are referred tug in the course of this 'questioning. COLBY: I am not quito sure of the scope of that question. IIARIt1NGTON: I make specific ref.- erenee to two, om in the October pe- riod of 1972 and one in March of 1973. Davis: I am not aware of any support. I would be surprised if they needed much support, frankly. Harrington: In view of your- - - COLBY: I would Tallier not answer the' question than give you an assurance and be wrong, frankly. I would rather not. If we did, I don't want to be in a poss. Lion of saying we didn't. But If we didn't, I really don't mind saying I won't reply because it doesn't hurt. But I don't avant to be in it po: itlon of giv- ing you a false answer. Therefore, I ' think I better just not answer that, al- though I frankly don't latow the arn- swer to that' queston right hero as I alt here." Approved For Release 2002/04/03 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600010012-6 Approved For Release 2002/04/03 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600010012-6 p 17 "A Covert O?iea?:it.iiw" r i-IOUG11 COL1;Y connlstcntly re. fused to tell nu.bcomuii.ttteo whether the CIA's operation;i in Chilo had been nuthorized by tlio "40 Com. mittee," the top secret group }fended by ICisshnger in the National Security Council that approver clandent.ino in- tel.ligence operations, )to admitted that 'we halo had .. . varlous relationships over the years in Chile ? with various groups. In aomo cases this was approved by the National Socuri.ty Council and it has meant some nnai.+tnnc,s to thnni, That has not ,Iellen Into tho category we are talking about hero --- the turbu- lence or the milinty coup." In proviouv testlnwny before A ups- me aube6nnnittee, forineir CIA Director ..Richard lielnme diecloeed that the CIA per, had earmarked $400,000 to support anti- Allende news medla shortly before his election. This. was authorized by the , "40 Committee" at a meeting In June, 1970. Colby, however, rofured to~ any whether this otfoi-t, was su,beortu-ntly maintained, claiming that. t n G, ti.ccy of CIA operations had to be protected. Ho then became engaged in this ex- cliango with Harrington: Transcript ? .. as you well know, and it has been referred to in various places, Approved For Release 2002/04/03 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600010012-6 ,-----Approved For Release 2002/04/03: CIA-RDP75B0038 12-6 COLBYt That does go preclsoly on to what we were operating mid what our operations were. I would prefer to leave that out of this particular re- port .. . Harrington: To whom would you feel more comfortable, if not Congress, to give this information. Colby: I would be delighted to give this to the Armed Services Subcommittee or to the Appropriations Committee. As a matter of fact, we have given full accounts of this to various committees of the House or Senate. IIAIRIIINGTON: I think we have run exactly Into what makes this a purpose- less kind of exercise .. . COLBY: If I might comment, the pre- sumption under which we conduct this typo of operation is that it is a covert operation and that the United States hand is not to show. For that reason we in the executive branch restrict any knowledge of this type of operation very severely and con4tuct?procedures so that very few people learn of any typo of operation of this nature. IHARILINGTON: And we end up with a situation sueli as at Sept. 11 because you have a cozy' arrangement. Corporate Cooperation THE QUESTION of support to .1 anti-Allende forces by United States or Brazilian corporations, Colby and Davis gave Equivocal answers to the subcommittee. Colby said, "I am not sure." Davis said, "I have no 'edi- denco as to that," but Colby interrupted him to remark that "I wouldn't exclude it. Frankly, I don't know of any. How- eve-e, I could not say it didn't happen." Subcommittee nicinbers pursued at sonic length the possible involvement by American corporations In the Chilean coup because of previous disclosures that the International Telephone and Telegraph Corp. had offered the CIA' $1 million in 1970 to prevent Allendo's' election. and subsequently proposed a detailed plan to plunge Chile into eco- sonic chaos Approved For Release 2002/04/03 CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600010012-6 tte.l, D,A4 fl"Fi4rt>~g~e~ste2002/04/03 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600010012-6 anhcommtttee chairman, raised the ques- tion of involvement by Brazilian or other Latin American corporations, many of them subsidiaries of United Slntes firs, because of reports that the nntl?Allende moves were widely coor. dinnf.ed. Speaking for the CIA, Davis replied: ~~ "'There is some evidence of coopera- 1 lion between business groups in Brazil i< and Chile. However, this is a small share of the financial support. Most of the support was internal. There is. aomo funding and cooperation among groups with similar outlooks in other Latin American countries. This Is true with regard to most of those , governments I was not thinking so much of companies or firms so much as groups,, organizations of businessmen, chambers of commerce, and that kind of thing t'. in a country such as Brazil." Discussing tho CIA's intelligence op- orations in Chile, Colby said he "would assume" that the Agency had contacts with Chileans opposed to Allende,' Asked by Hnrrington whether the CIA maintained such contacts in social con. texts, Colby wide In that case you get into what we call the protection of our sources. "If a gentleman talks to us under the arsuranco he will not be revcalod, which can be dangerous in some countries, It could have been vop, dangerous for those in Chile ', ? . Harrington: When you talk about those inter- relationships with certain business type connections, are these specific references you would care to make, companies or others involved. I feel that very much falls within the kind Approved For Release 2002/04/03: CIR-l&' ?E~0$bk6g6do2%certain sub- committees of Congress, to which I would be glad to report. However I think... Approvtgd ?[o~-e~zSe 2002/04/03 :CIA-RDP75B00380R000600010012-6 that a?elntionship, ilduelazy rolation,~l~ip with the individual, requires that I be,. Ivory restrictive of that kind of infor- mation." MO Then thi following dialoguo dovel- opedi F'ASCELL: Is it reasonable to assume that the Agency has iionctrated all o: tho political parties in, Chile? COLBYi I wish I could any yes'. I cannot assure you all, becauso we got Into some splintora. FASCIILLi Major? CO1,BY: I think we have an intolil? genco coverage of most of them. Lot's put it that way. FASCIf.LLi Is that standard operat- lul; procedure? COL13Yi It depends on the country. For a country of the importance, of Chile to the Unitcd States' decision-making, we would try to get an inside picturo of what is going on there. I can think of a lot of countries where wo really don't spend much time worrying. about their political parties. I spend much of nay time worrying about penetrating the / Communist Party of the Soviet Union. pry. ho EI;o:i&oilu io iZoi.0 timony was that the .CIA is actively en- gaged in economic negotiations between the United States and foreign coun- tries. This, hac not been generally known here, but Colby told the subconunittco that ,we would normally contribute to (a) negotiating teams" ail closures made by Colby in his tee. NE OF TI/, MOST Intriguing die; Iie said that "we would try to pros vide them intelligence as bacllxlrop aor their negotiations and s'nir:fLnca help them with appreciation of 'lie "Iirolb. Colby: We,would have some people who would be keepi>7.g up to date with the negotiations. We- would not be a part of the negotiating group. Fascell: I understandjhat. I am just speaking for intelligence reporting purposes. Fascell: Do you cover the negotiations themselves? Colby: We would be reading the way negotiations went. It's like the SALT Agreement and BFR and things like that. Approved For Release 2002/04/03 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600010012-6 Approved For Release 2002/04/03 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000600010012-6 Wo follow the day-today pro - ress in ncgotiatioils. If It's An Import- ant economic negotiation, 111m ('.i'rcna^ ury) Secretary Shultz' over in Nairobi and places lino that, we would be in- formed of what they are doing and try, to help them." In the context o1 the Chilean?AmerI- can nc gotlationa before the coup, the ~yr CIA's Davis said that "we did have scale (Juito reIlal)10 reporting at the time Indicating that the Russians were advining Allende to put lily rolntiono with the United States in order, If not to settle compensation, at leant to reach some sort of accommodation which would case the strain between the two countries. There were reports indicat- ing that, unlike the'Cubans, they were In effect trying to move Allondo to ward A comprouaine agreement .. . It was our judgment at the time that the Soviets were very concerned about the state of their relationship with the United States. They were involved in a number of negotiations with us and... Our judgment was that this grew out of four basic considerations on their part of trying to keep situations in Latin America or elsewhere in the world under control. Mr. Fascell: Did the Allende Government in fact undertake to change its posture and seek to take steps towards. an accommodation with the United States: Mr. Davis: Yes. There were some indications of movement on their part or -at least an interest in trying to work something out. They didn't really soften their basic negotiating position very noticeably. But, as you know, as Mr. Kubisch pointed out, they did meet regularly with us. Mr. Fascelll: Is it your impression or part of your estimate that part of the step of accommoda- tion was moving Ambassador Letelier from the United States back to Chile? Mr. Davis: At the,time we thought that might be in their minds, that they might have felt that they could use him there. It was at a time when we were just about to go into a round of serious Approved For Release 2002/04/Q3e; dK46WfDB00W0M?0i8?W 6*t in parparing their position at the time. Approved For Release 2002/04/03 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600010012-6 Mr. Fasce.ll: He told me that that was his purpose. Do we have any confirmation that what he was telling me was accurate? .P5' p1 It . w113 our judgment that the [Cl-ilcans] wero interested in working out nonce kind of nbodus 17tn,ncdi without, however, retreating substantially from their po- sition." Davis added that "our intelligence requirement in the negotiations be- bween the United States and Chile would. be to try to find out, through our sources, what their reactions to a negotiating session were, what their, reading of our position was, what their assessment of the state of negotiations is." In his narration of the events icacliu;g to the coup, Colby said that "under tivo. general deterioration, it was only A matter of getting the Army, the Navy and the Air Force to cover it..[sventn> ally they did get them nil in." Colby then compared the Chilean tour to the' 19G7 Indonesian revolution, reputedly'. assisted by the CIA, when the army ousted President Sukarno. Ile said the CIA shared the suspicions of the Chil- can military that Allende was pion. ning a coup of his own on Sept. 19 to ` neutralize the armed forces, but said the CIA had no firm Information con- 1firming these suspicions. rr "Concern Over 5ceiirily VIROUGIIOUT his testimony, Colby drew a grin picture of the junta's repression and, in effect, predicted that it would worsen even more became of the continued strength of the Clcii+,:)a Mr. Davis: Yes. I think there was some evidence at the time that they did bring him home, that they did have him actively involved because they hoped that he might be helpful in working out some kind of modus vivendi. treason. FIe 0rbgA6"F $ 2002/04/03 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600010012-6 death regardless of the effect on ,sL left. Him estimates of the death toll were roughly four tin cs tlip figures announced by the junta and he told the subcommittee that the Chilean military had it list of the "most wanted" Allencio followers whom they hoped to find and possibly execute. "Communist Party chief Luis Cor- valan is being or will be tried for . national opinion," Colby said. This In., formation led to this exchanger Approved For Release 2002/04/03 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600010012-6 P20 WHALEN: You mentioned tbosi being accused of treason. Did these al- legodly treasonable activities occur after, the takeover by the military? COLl3Y: I think what I referred to was the head of the Communist Party who would probably be tried for treason. Ile would probably be tried for treason. Ile would probably be tried : for activities prior to the takeover. You can have some question as to how valid that is in a constitutional legal sense. There have been some who have been accused-of it since the takeover. WHALEN. That confuses me. If lie is tried for treason against a government (lie] supported, I cannot understand that. COL13Yt You are right, This was Colby's assessrnent of: thu present situation: "Armed opposition now appears tri be confined to sporadic, isolated at! tacks on security forces, but the regime believes that the left is regrouping for coordinated sabotage and guerrilla activity. The government probably is right in believing that its opponent:: have not been fully neutralized. Our reports indicate that the extremist movement of the Revolutionary Left believes its assets have not been damaged beyond repair. It wants to launch anti?govenunent activity iii soon as practical and Is working to form a united front of leftist opposition parties. Other leftist groups, including the Communist and Socialist parties, are In disarray, but they have not been destroyed. Exiled supporters of the oust. ed government are organizing abroad, namely in 11ome," Colby told the subcommittee that "concern over security undoubtedly in whet accounts for the junta's contin- ued use of harsh measnrc3 to deal with the dissidents. The military leaders ap- parently are willing to alienate soma support at home and endure, a bad press abroad, In order to consolidate their hold on the country and finlah the job of rooting out Marxist influ- C1.1,111co of "Civil War" 'i1;SCtl12ING1 the present situation, j Colby said: Iii'/ "Arn1c d resisters eoIIt.Iiiuo to 110 I executed where they nro found, nod a number of pri;,uners have been shot, Huppoendly white 'trying to escape.' ,Such deaths probably niunber 200 or more, The extent of any international backing for insur- gency will depend upon how many Chileans at home show that they are ready and able to take up arms. The regime, however, does not appear to be engaging in wholesale liquidation of its opponents. Approved For Release 2002/04/03 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600010012-6 Approved For Release 2002/04/03 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600010012-6 Several thousand people re- main under arrest, including high-rank. lag officials of the Allende govern. went." Answering questions, Colby agreed that the CIA's figure of more than 200 executions was higher than the junta's official estimate, He added that "thero were a couple thousand, at least, Rill. ed during the fighting which surround- ed the coup. it is quite possible that i.f you went to a city morgue you would find that number. The official figure of total killed is 4'16 elvillans and 37 troops to a total of 513. We would guess, we would estimate, it is between 2,000 And 3,000 killed during the struggles. That would not be in my classification as execution ... Some of those were shot, down, There is no question about that, Ps . They are not just bystanders . . Fascell: You mean street fighting? Colby: Yes I think that is a fair representation of the size of the conflict. p tl-24! Approved For Release 2002/04/03 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600010012-6 Approved For Release 2002/04/03 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600010012-6 Colby disagreed, however, with Rep. Robcit II. Steele (R-Conn.) that the 3 junta killings have "done no one any good." No such reference- -context is the coup generally not "killings. " and how junta has acted since. V(a3 "I think our appreciation is that it does them some good .. . Steele: It does who some good? The junta, their concern is whether they could take this action of taping over the government and not generate it rent, civil war, which was the real chance because the Allende supporters were fairly activist, There were nrntea in the country. There was at least a good chance of it real civil war occurring ar a result of this coup," Colby said. Asked whether civil war remained A possibility, Colby replied that "It wan. It's obviously declining, but it was a . real possibility. Yes, I think it is a real possibility. Whether it's a certainty or not is not at all Kure." Approved For Release 2002/04/03 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600010012-6