CIA: THE MYTH AND THE MADNESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00380R000600020002-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 19, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 1, 1972
• Content Type: BOOK

Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600020002-6
LLM - 1 Nov 72
(Internal Agency Matters)
CIA: The Myth and the Madness
Chapter V
Technology: The Tail Wagging the Dog?
Pg. 95 -- U-2 incident was the beginning of "technical intelligence goofs"
in the 1960's, prompting defensive attitude among intelligence leaders
when called to task by President and Congress
Pg. 104-105 -- CIA agreed with judgment that Pueblo mission involved
"minimal risk", whereas any honest assessment against existing
criteria, public events and secret intelligence indicators would
have led to its disapproval
Pg. :104-105 -- "Each unit above the first merely rubber stamps a recon
proposal... I've seen this happen with U-2 overflights of China,
SR-71 overflights of North Vietnam.... "
Pg. 106 -- Recon schedule containing Pueblo mission involved 400 proposals
and cleared in approximately three days -- author recounts CIA office
experience with the phone book size monthly schedule -- "We didn't
understand its computer language... The schedule didn't explain the
risk categories which were identified by form letters... The collection
guidance staff left it with us for 1 1/2 hours... we all ducked the chore
of going through it. "
Pg. 109 -- CIA scientific analysts involved in a long-standing feud with the
intelligence community "over a mere two-tenths of a kilometer"
difference in the range of SA-2's in North Vietnam which never affected
actual U. S. flight operations.
Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600020002-6
 Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600020002-6
(Internal Agency Matters)
Chapter VI
The Culture of Bureaucracy
Pg. 116 -- Author quotes Henry Howe Ransom, "Viewing CIA's impressive
office buildings... notes Parkinson's law... architectural magnificence
and comfort [are achieved] at point when institutional effectiveness
declines.... "
Pg. 117 -- CIA is protected from official and unofficial scrutiny and has
devised see mingly sound argument to defend committee system and
duplication of effort -- and those charged with looking into CIA
problems never have opportunity to dig beneath surface to see the
bureaucratic ineptness
Pg. 120 -- "Committees are nothing more than protective societies sent
to CIA by their bosses to ensure that their organization [didn't] yield
on sovereignty. "
Pg. 129 -- Author gives example of instances where CIA protects vested
interests where it has an ax to grind -- CIA promoted NIE that
pacification doing poorly after "U. S. Army won its fight to take
charge of pacification... " From early'60's until late' 67 when CIA
ran pacification there was not a single "things going poorly" estimate -
in connection with the Gulf of Tonkin, CIA. left Pentagon in dark about
its commando raids and maritime operations against North Vietnam
which CIA began in the early 1960's - - FBI wanted to publicly discredit
Stokly Carmichael in Hong Kong but CIA squelched idea because it
would affect ongoing operations.
Pg. 129 -- CIA is in constant war in Hong Kong with forces of Communism
and more directly, British Intelligence Service
Pg. 132 -- CIA has upper hand in interagency committees not because its
men are smarter but because CIA men rarely transfer out of town,
become skilled in conference techniques and outgun their service or
State counterparts.
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 (Inter pal~rov cfP(YrWe9tasress001/11/16: CIA-RDP75B00380R000600020002-6
Chapter VI - Continued
Pg. 132 -- CIA intelligence production people normally assign their less
compet..ent officers to committees
Pg. 135 -- Uncovering glaring errors in MACV estimates of enemy troop
strengths in SVN "allowed CIA to conclude that troop strengths are
perhaps 120, 000, not 221, 000 -- on basis of documents purloined
from military in Saigon --" CIA in 1967 believed enemy recruiting
more from SVN villages than military did (U. S. military now in
charge of pacification) and estimated strength at 360, 000. War
within a war with CIA staffers writing "contact reports" every time
they had beer with G. I.
Pg. 136 -- By November 1967, MACV, with complicated "crossover point"
thesis, estimated enemy strength at 260, 000 - - CIA 500, 000.
(NIE summary of 1967 said strength from 200, 000 to 300, 000
with two page footnote that it could be as high as 500, 000 or as low
as 180, 000.)
Pg. 137 -- Had strength estimates been more realistic in 1966, policy
makers would have realized that more could have been achieved
with 20, 000 fewer American deaths by defending populous coastal
area.
Intelligence performance of troop strength "childish" involving
DIA generals and CIA GS 17's and 18's issuing orders not to
inform each other.
Pg. 139 -- OSR's primary subject is military intelligence contrary to
NSC directive that DIA is to handle.
Pg. 139 OSR's role justified on basis that it takes a strategic view
because DOD bogged down in nitty gritty -- is "bureaucratic poppy
cock" -- several hundred analysts at CIA and DIA each do exactly
s ame thing.
Pg. 140 -- Real reason for OSR is CIA's reaction to biased reporting, by
military and CIA feels compelled to keep DIA honest.
Pg. 145 -- CIA since 1961 enamored with making maps of whole world
down to 3' to 4' detail, but won't share material with service
intelligence until whole project completed.
pg P[Ovnrl ~or Re1e~seJ001/11/1&: CIA-RgP75B00380R000600020002-6
wen o and arvar for its think tanks.