BILL INTRODUCED TO OVERSEE 'APOLITICAL' CIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00380R000600100001-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 17, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 8, 1973
• Content Type: OPEN

May
8, Moved For Relp ( Q401,27 p& 7AW9f380R000600100001 3449
When the health care leaders and the in-
terested public can move together to plan
realistically to meet community health
needs we have an example of the American
spirit at work which needs to be more active
than it is now.
You are also illustrating that private ini-
tiative can blend in well with public and
non-profit health care organizations.
As you know, the capital used to construct
these new facilities came solely from our pri-
vate enterprise system. There is no govern-
ment money and no public subscription
money involved. I am pleased that investor-
owned health facilities are playing an in-
creasingly important role in meeting our
health care needs, not only here but
throughout the Nation. Many such hospitals
are developing a well-deserved reputation
for improving the image of profit hospitals.
Many investor owned hospitals are leading
the way in applying sound business methods
and financial practices to hospitals. And the
expertise is already improving, directly and
by example, the -administration of non-profit
hospitals. No longer do so many proprietary
hospitals avoid providing the many sub-
sidized community type services which other
hospitals have provided. No longer do so
many proprietary hospitals tend to admit
only short-term patients where income-to-
cost ratios are favorable.
It is clear that the planning and foresight
which have gone into these facilities should
provide a high level of quality in the health
services provided. And it is also clear that
these services are intended to be provided at
the lowest costs possible. The professional
management which will administer the hos-
pital on ? a day-to-day basis should help
achieve, this objective. But the day-to-day
activities of physicians who are conscious
of costs to patients and third party payers
will contribute just as much I am sure.
In closing, it seems to me that we break
this ground under very auspicious c)rcum-
stances. Success seems to be assured cause
the ingredients of success are all here-the
need for new health services, a group of
dedicated people who see the need and are
willing to meet it, a carefully constructed
plan for meeting the need, and the private
capital to finance it all.
To all of you who have worked so hard to
see that day come true. I borrow an old
phrase from our Navy and say simply, "well
done."
SECRETARY RICHARDSON'S CLEAR
AND FORTHRIGHT STATEMENT
ON TRANSFER AUTHORITY
(Mr. SIKES asked and was given per-
mission to extend his remarks at this
point in the RECORD and to include ex-
traneous matter.)
Mr. SIKES. Mr. Speaker, there is
controversy over the proposed transfer
authority for defense purposes which is
carrieeed - in the supplemental appropria-
tions bill. I feel that the issue is clear
and I have no misgivings about the need
for the transfer authority. The matter
was dealt with in a clear and forthright
manner when Defense Secretary Rich-
ardson appeared on May 7 before the
Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Ap-
propriations Committee. The facts which
he set forth should be studied carefully,
particularly by those who find that the
question poses a serious problem for
them.
I submit the Secretary's statement for
printing in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD:
STATEMENT OF HON. ELLIOT L. RICHARDSON,
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Com-
mittee, I appreciate the opportunity to ap-
pear before you to discuss the request now
pending before this Committee to provide
to the Department of Defense an additional
transfer of $500 million.
This additional transfer authority is need-
ed to cover existing critical shortages of mili-
tary personnel and operation and mainte-
nance funds for baseline forces worldwide.
These are all annual appropriations. If the
transfer authority is not provided, it will
be necessary to curtail drastically the opera-
tions of our forces-those in Europe, the
Mediterranean and the Pacific, and the
CONUS training and support establishment
as well.
This shortage of operating funds anises
from three causes, primarily: (1) currency
revaluation-about $110 million; (2) higher
subsistence costs, in turn resulting from the
increase in food prices-about $60 million;
and (3) a higher-than-programmed rate of
activity in Southeast Asia during the second
half of FY 1973-about $175 million, most of
which has been obligated to date.
Because of these three developments, the
Department of Defense has been obligating
funds from Military Personnel and Opera-
tions and Maintenance accounts at a defi-
ciency rate, that is, at.a faster rate of obli-
gations than was programmed or budgeted
and appropriated. There are, therefore, in-
adequate amounts remaining. In these ac-
counts to sustain the baseline forces to
which the accounts are applicable for the re-
mainder of the fiscal year.
The troops must be fed, for example, and
the higher food costs, as well as current
forces and levels of activity, must be financed
from these operating accounts. Meantime,
there are very limited possibilities for effect-
ing offsetting cutbacks within these same ap-
propriations in the short period of time re-
maining in this fiscal year. Separating person-
nel, for example, could not provide any relief
in the last few months of this fiscal year;
one-time separation costs, incurred after
lengthy notification periods, would more than
offset any payroll savings. Since about 80%
of Defense operating costs involve pay, a cut-
back in the non-pay area, concentrated in
the two remaining months, would be crip-
pling.
The only recourse available to the Depart-
ment is to propose that the shortages in
annual operating funds be covered by trans-
fers from other accounts. This would be ac-
complished by deferring or eliminating long-
er-term investment programs. While this is
not a desirable alternative, it is nevertheless,
all things considered, clearly the least unde-
sirable. If this alternative is foreclosed by
denying the transfer authority, the impact
cannot be restricted to the factors which
caused the shortage. We are already paying,
and cannot avoid, the higher 'costs for food
and foreign exchange, and the cost of the
higher level operations in Southeast Asia.
If the transfer authority Is not provided,
then a number of drastic actions would have
to be considered immediately. The would in-
clude standing down forces; curtailment of
flying hours and steaming hour programs;
reduction or elimination of scheduled train-
ing operations; cancellation of supply pro-
curements, leading to gaps in operational
support; deferral or cancellation of mainte-
nance; and a freeze on promotions, military
enlistments, and civilian and military per-
sonnel accessions.
These actions would have to be general
and worldwide in nature. They would not be
felt in Southeast Asia operations, both be-
cause of the priority nature of these opera-
tions and because during the next two
months they will consume only a relatively
small proportion of our Defense effort.
Let me be specific. The relationship of the
issue of whether we continue U.S. air opera-
tions over Cambodia between now and the
end of Fiscal Year 1973 bears only to a
very slight degree on our requirements for
the additional transfer authority. No au-
thority is being sought to obtain funds for
munitions procurement accounts. The only
costs related to the U.S. air operations which
we seek authority to transfer funds are
those for POL used on the missions-a rela-
tively small amount. Indeed, the increment-
al impact on the degree of stand down of
baseline forces which would result from
continuing air operation over Cambodia
through June 30, as compared to the impact
of a denial of the requested transfer author-
ity, would not by. any means be determina-
tive of the question of whether such opera-
tions are to be continued. The cost impact
on the accounts which have been obligated
at a deficiency rate would probably be on
the order of $25 million, some 5 percent of
the total transfer authority requested.
Should the requested transfer authority
be denied, therefore, the bulk of the cuts
would fall with near-crippling effect upon
other units: forces in Europe, the Medi-
terranean, and the Atlantic; other areas in
operational, training and support units in
the United States.
The readiness of our worldwide forces
would be degraded to a dangerously low level
during the next two months, with recovery
extending for several more months into the
next fiscal year.
As you know, Mr. Chairman and Members
of the Committee, the implementation of
this transfer authority would be accom-
plished by reprogramming actions, each of
which would be submitted to this Commti-
tee for its specific approval.
While the circumstances which bear on two
of the three primary causes of the need for
additional transfer authority-currency re-
valuation and increased food prices-are
self-evident, I would like to comment in
some detail on the factors related to one
aspect of the higher-than-programmed rate
of activity in Southeast Asia during the sec-
ond half of fiscal year 1973, that is, the U.S.
air operations over Cambodia since January.
For many years the United States has
pursued a combination of diplomatic and
military efforts to bring about a just peace
in Vietnam. These efforts were successful in
strengthening the self-defense capabilities
of the armed forces of the Republic of Viet-
nam and in bringing about serious negotia-
tions which culminated in the Agreement on
Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-
n.am, signed at Paris on January 27, 1973.
This Agreement provided for a cease-fire in
Vietnam, the return of prisoners, and the
withdrawal of United States and allied armed
forces from South Vietnam within sixty days.
Article 20 required the withdrawal of all
foreign armed forces from Laos and Cam-
bodia and obligated the parties to refrain
from using the territory of Cambodia and
Laos to encroach on the sovereignty and se-
curity of other countries, to respect the
neutrality of Cambodia and Laos, and to
avoid any interference in the internal affairs
of those two countries. The inclusion of this
Article rested on the fact that the conflicts
in Laos and Cambodia had long been so
inter-related to the conflict in Vietnam as to
be necessarily considered parts of a single
conflict.
'Years before the Paris Agreement, the con,
flict for control of South Vietnam had spread
into Laos and Cambodia. Cambodian terri-
tory was used by the North Vietnamese for
essential lines of communication. It was in
large measure the .restrictions on these lines
of communication which permitted the
strengthening of the South Vietnamese mili-
tary posture; a strengthening that contrib-
uted to the North Vietnamese decision to
undertake meaningful negotiations. Cam-
bodia was and is now in every sense an inte-
gral part of the battlefild in the conflict for
control of South Vietnam. Should the North
Vietnamese be permitted to gain control of
Cambodia, it would permit them to establish
a staging area from which to renew large-
scale attacks aimed at accomplishing a mili-
tary take-over in South Vietnam.
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600100001-8
 1-1 Hgpproved For Rele 75? 111 $OR000600100g9 88, 993 time . --- ---- - - ,a - - t h ISRAEL'S 25TH ANNIVERSARY , ..~~L INTRODUCED TO OVERSEE
,Dade clear to the North Vietnamese that the (Mr. SIKES asked and was Oven per-
armed forces of the Khmer Gowversimen.t mission to extend his remarks at this
would suspend all offensive operations and point in the RECORD and to include ex-
hat; the United States aircraft supporting traneous matter.)
fhesn would do likewise, We stated that, if the Mr. SIKES. 'Mr. Speaker, this week
other side reciprocated, ,, de facto CBa'-e-fire the state of Israel observes the 25th art-
would thereby be brought intr. force in
Cambodia However, we arses slatcc t- it if itiversary of the founding of that valiant
the communist forces carried out attacks, nation.
government forces and United Si:ata:a air It was on May 15, 1948, that Israel
forces wculcl >.ave to tale necessar-, c.:7ir.tcr ca :,le into being, bringing into reality
::measures ar,d that, in that event, we would the dreams which Jewish people world-
."ontinuc to carry out air strike. In rani-,irodia wide had nurtured for centuries. Barely
necessary until such time as a ; ef: e-fire I arger than the State of New Jersey,
could be brougut Into ,!fiect Thee state-
inents were based on our conv ctio i Israel is populated by 3 million dedi-
was essential for Hanoi ,o understan? that cated people striving to create for them-
conplianiie with Article 20 of the A ;res,xnent selves freedom and opportunity, a sound
would have to be reciprc,'_ economy, and a solid niche in interna-
In short, Cambodia was inelude.3 iii the tional affairs.
Paris Agreement, since the conflict there was Israel is no stranger to adversity. Its
:an integral part of the war in Vietr,art.
Despite the fact that the Government of people have overcome adversity from the
Cambodia did, in compliance with r'irticie 20 1eginning. Nor has it failed to prove its
of the Paris Agreement, unilaterally der are a mettle as a nation. Forces from the hos-
cease-fire, the forces attacking the Govern- file outside environs have striven to top-
rnent of Cambodia continued the conflict, pre the Country's government through
i6nd, indeed, substantially iticre