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November 17, 2016
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July 17, 2000
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May 8, 1973
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May 8, Moved For Relp ( Q401,27 p& 7AW9f380R000600100001 3449 When the health care leaders and the in- terested public can move together to plan realistically to meet community health needs we have an example of the American spirit at work which needs to be more active than it is now. You are also illustrating that private ini- tiative can blend in well with public and non-profit health care organizations. As you know, the capital used to construct these new facilities came solely from our pri- vate enterprise system. There is no govern- ment money and no public subscription money involved. I am pleased that investor- owned health facilities are playing an in- creasingly important role in meeting our health care needs, not only here but throughout the Nation. Many such hospitals are developing a well-deserved reputation for improving the image of profit hospitals. Many investor owned hospitals are leading the way in applying sound business methods and financial practices to hospitals. And the expertise is already improving, directly and by example, the -administration of non-profit hospitals. No longer do so many proprietary hospitals avoid providing the many sub- sidized community type services which other hospitals have provided. No longer do so many proprietary hospitals tend to admit only short-term patients where income-to- cost ratios are favorable. It is clear that the planning and foresight which have gone into these facilities should provide a high level of quality in the health services provided. And it is also clear that these services are intended to be provided at the lowest costs possible. The professional management which will administer the hos- pital on ? a day-to-day basis should help achieve, this objective. But the day-to-day activities of physicians who are conscious of costs to patients and third party payers will contribute just as much I am sure. In closing, it seems to me that we break this ground under very auspicious c)rcum- stances. Success seems to be assured cause the ingredients of success are all here-the need for new health services, a group of dedicated people who see the need and are willing to meet it, a carefully constructed plan for meeting the need, and the private capital to finance it all. To all of you who have worked so hard to see that day come true. I borrow an old phrase from our Navy and say simply, "well done." SECRETARY RICHARDSON'S CLEAR AND FORTHRIGHT STATEMENT ON TRANSFER AUTHORITY (Mr. SIKES asked and was given per- mission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include ex- traneous matter.) Mr. SIKES. Mr. Speaker, there is controversy over the proposed transfer authority for defense purposes which is carrieeed - in the supplemental appropria- tions bill. I feel that the issue is clear and I have no misgivings about the need for the transfer authority. The matter was dealt with in a clear and forthright manner when Defense Secretary Rich- ardson appeared on May 7 before the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Ap- propriations Committee. The facts which he set forth should be studied carefully, particularly by those who find that the question poses a serious problem for them. I submit the Secretary's statement for printing in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD: STATEMENT OF HON. ELLIOT L. RICHARDSON, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Mr. Chairman and Members of the Com- mittee, I appreciate the opportunity to ap- pear before you to discuss the request now pending before this Committee to provide to the Department of Defense an additional transfer of $500 million. This additional transfer authority is need- ed to cover existing critical shortages of mili- tary personnel and operation and mainte- nance funds for baseline forces worldwide. These are all annual appropriations. If the transfer authority is not provided, it will be necessary to curtail drastically the opera- tions of our forces-those in Europe, the Mediterranean and the Pacific, and the CONUS training and support establishment as well. This shortage of operating funds anises from three causes, primarily: (1) currency revaluation-about $110 million; (2) higher subsistence costs, in turn resulting from the increase in food prices-about $60 million; and (3) a higher-than-programmed rate of activity in Southeast Asia during the second half of FY 1973-about $175 million, most of which has been obligated to date. Because of these three developments, the Department of Defense has been obligating funds from Military Personnel and Opera- tions and Maintenance accounts at a defi- ciency rate, that is, at.a faster rate of obli- gations than was programmed or budgeted and appropriated. There are, therefore, in- adequate amounts remaining. In these ac- counts to sustain the baseline forces to which the accounts are applicable for the re- mainder of the fiscal year. The troops must be fed, for example, and the higher food costs, as well as current forces and levels of activity, must be financed from these operating accounts. Meantime, there are very limited possibilities for effect- ing offsetting cutbacks within these same ap- propriations in the short period of time re- maining in this fiscal year. Separating person- nel, for example, could not provide any relief in the last few months of this fiscal year; one-time separation costs, incurred after lengthy notification periods, would more than offset any payroll savings. Since about 80% of Defense operating costs involve pay, a cut- back in the non-pay area, concentrated in the two remaining months, would be crip- pling. The only recourse available to the Depart- ment is to propose that the shortages in annual operating funds be covered by trans- fers from other accounts. This would be ac- complished by deferring or eliminating long- er-term investment programs. While this is not a desirable alternative, it is nevertheless, all things considered, clearly the least unde- sirable. If this alternative is foreclosed by denying the transfer authority, the impact cannot be restricted to the factors which caused the shortage. We are already paying, and cannot avoid, the higher 'costs for food and foreign exchange, and the cost of the higher level operations in Southeast Asia. If the transfer authority Is not provided, then a number of drastic actions would have to be considered immediately. The would in- clude standing down forces; curtailment of flying hours and steaming hour programs; reduction or elimination of scheduled train- ing operations; cancellation of supply pro- curements, leading to gaps in operational support; deferral or cancellation of mainte- nance; and a freeze on promotions, military enlistments, and civilian and military per- sonnel accessions. These actions would have to be general and worldwide in nature. They would not be felt in Southeast Asia operations, both be- cause of the priority nature of these opera- tions and because during the next two months they will consume only a relatively small proportion of our Defense effort. Let me be specific. The relationship of the issue of whether we continue U.S. air opera- tions over Cambodia between now and the end of Fiscal Year 1973 bears only to a very slight degree on our requirements for the additional transfer authority. No au- thority is being sought to obtain funds for munitions procurement accounts. The only costs related to the U.S. air operations which we seek authority to transfer funds are those for POL used on the missions-a rela- tively small amount. Indeed, the increment- al impact on the degree of stand down of baseline forces which would result from continuing air operation over Cambodia through June 30, as compared to the impact of a denial of the requested transfer author- ity, would not by. any means be determina- tive of the question of whether such opera- tions are to be continued. The cost impact on the accounts which have been obligated at a deficiency rate would probably be on the order of $25 million, some 5 percent of the total transfer authority requested. Should the requested transfer authority be denied, therefore, the bulk of the cuts would fall with near-crippling effect upon other units: forces in Europe, the Medi- terranean, and the Atlantic; other areas in operational, training and support units in the United States. The readiness of our worldwide forces would be degraded to a dangerously low level during the next two months, with recovery extending for several more months into the next fiscal year. As you know, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, the implementation of this transfer authority would be accom- plished by reprogramming actions, each of which would be submitted to this Commti- tee for its specific approval. While the circumstances which bear on two of the three primary causes of the need for additional transfer authority-currency re- valuation and increased food prices-are self-evident, I would like to comment in some detail on the factors related to one aspect of the higher-than-programmed rate of activity in Southeast Asia during the sec- ond half of fiscal year 1973, that is, the U.S. air operations over Cambodia since January. For many years the United States has pursued a combination of diplomatic and military efforts to bring about a just peace in Vietnam. These efforts were successful in strengthening the self-defense capabilities of the armed forces of the Republic of Viet- nam and in bringing about serious negotia- tions which culminated in the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-, signed at Paris on January 27, 1973. This Agreement provided for a cease-fire in Vietnam, the return of prisoners, and the withdrawal of United States and allied armed forces from South Vietnam within sixty days. Article 20 required the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from Laos and Cam- bodia and obligated the parties to refrain from using the territory of Cambodia and Laos to encroach on the sovereignty and se- curity of other countries, to respect the neutrality of Cambodia and Laos, and to avoid any interference in the internal affairs of those two countries. The inclusion of this Article rested on the fact that the conflicts in Laos and Cambodia had long been so inter-related to the conflict in Vietnam as to be necessarily considered parts of a single conflict. 'Years before the Paris Agreement, the con, flict for control of South Vietnam had spread into Laos and Cambodia. Cambodian terri- tory was used by the North Vietnamese for essential lines of communication. It was in large measure the .restrictions on these lines of communication which permitted the strengthening of the South Vietnamese mili- tary posture; a strengthening that contrib- uted to the North Vietnamese decision to undertake meaningful negotiations. Cam- bodia was and is now in every sense an inte- gral part of the battlefild in the conflict for control of South Vietnam. Should the North Vietnamese be permitted to gain control of Cambodia, it would permit them to establish a staging area from which to renew large- scale attacks aimed at accomplishing a mili- tary take-over in South Vietnam. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600100001-8 1-1 Hgpproved For Rele 75? 111 $OR000600100g9 88, 993 time . --- ---- - - ,a - - t h ISRAEL'S 25TH ANNIVERSARY , ..~~L INTRODUCED TO OVERSEE ,Dade clear to the North Vietnamese that the (Mr. SIKES asked and was Oven per- armed forces of the Khmer Gowversimen.t mission to extend his remarks at this would suspend all offensive operations and point in the RECORD and to include ex- hat; the United States aircraft supporting traneous matter.) fhesn would do likewise, We stated that, if the Mr. SIKES. 'Mr. Speaker, this week other side reciprocated, ,, de facto CBa'-e-fire the state of Israel observes the 25th art- would thereby be brought intr. force in Cambodia However, we arses slatcc t- it if itiversary of the founding of that valiant the communist forces carried out attacks, nation. government forces and United Si:ata:a air It was on May 15, 1948, that Israel forces wculcl >.ave to tale necessar-, c.:7ir.tcr ca :,le into being, bringing into reality ::measures ar,d that, in that event, we would the dreams which Jewish people world- ."ontinuc to carry out air strike. In rani-,irodia wide had nurtured for centuries. Barely necessary until such time as a ; ef: e-fire I arger than the State of New Jersey, could be brougut Into ,!fiect Thee state- inents were based on our conv ctio i Israel is populated by 3 million dedi- was essential for Hanoi ,o understan? that cated people striving to create for them- conplianiie with Article 20 of the A ;res,xnent selves freedom and opportunity, a sound would have to be reciprc,'_ economy, and a solid niche in interna- In short, Cambodia was inelude.3 iii the tional affairs. Paris Agreement, since the conflict there was Israel is no stranger to adversity. Its :an integral part of the war in Vietr,art. Despite the fact that the Government of people have overcome adversity from the Cambodia did, in compliance with r'irticie 20 1eginning. Nor has it failed to prove its of the Paris Agreement, unilaterally der are a mettle as a nation. Forces from the hos- cease-fire, the forces attacking the Govern- file outside environs have striven to top- rnent of Cambodia continued the conflict, pre the Country's government through i6nd, indeed, substantially iticre