LETTER TO THE HONORABLE JOHN C. STENNIS FROM HENRY A. KISSINGER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00380R000700030052-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 21, 2005
• Sequence Number: 52
• Publication Date: June 1, 1974
• Content Type: LETTER

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000700030052-9
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
Dear Lvir. Chairman:
It has been called to my attention that the FY 1975 Defense
Authorization bill will be considered on the floor of the Senate
early next week. I am sure you appreciate that a strong U. S.
military posture is absolutely essential to the success of our diplo-
macy abroad. It is America's strength, both economic and
military, that gives weight to our words in the councils of nations.
Consequently, I feel justified, as Secretary of State, in taking the
liberty of stating my views on two major issues which are bound
to arise during the course of the debate on the bill and which are
of deep concern to our foreign policy. These are: (1) reductions
in our troop deployments abroad, and (2) military assistance for
South Vietnam (MASF).
While I fully appreciate the strong desire in the Congress to
effect reductions in the number of U. S. military personnel and de-
pendents now stationed abroad, I feel compelled to caution that
unilateral reductions at this time could seriously undermine our
efforts to achieve mutual reductions of forces between NATO and
the Warsaw Pact in Europe where the bulk of our overseas forces
are located. As you know, we have already reduced our troops in
Europe by about one-fourth, from about 400, 000 in the early 1960's
to about 300, 000 now. During the same period, Soviet forces de-
ployed in Eastern Europe have increased by about 100, 000, from
475, 000 in 1962 to 575, 000 now. But more important, the U. S.
troops in Western Europe constitute an absolutely essential element
of NATO's military posture in the Central Region. None of our
partners is in a position to replace them. I would certainly favor a
more efficient utilization of the military personnel in Europe, but
any reduction in our forces there should be accompanied by a
commensurate reduction in Soviet forces deployed in Eastern
The Honorable
John C. Stennis,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
United States Senate.
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000700030052-9
 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000700030052-9
Europe. And this is precisely our objective in the MBr'R negotia-
tions which are proceeding with great care and seriousness in
Vienna. Those negotiations are being pursued in the general
context of our efforts, in association with our Allies, to achieve
a more normal relationship with the USSR in which the massive
armies that now confront each other in Central Europe would be
reciprocally reduced. An unreciprocated reduction of US forces
would remove Soviet incentives to negotiate seriously since they
will hardly pay a price for something that is about to be handed
them unilaterally by us. It would also disrupt our Alliance
relationship (possibly encouraging a rash of unilateral cuts by
our allies), and thus undermine the basis on which we are seeking
to induce more constructive policies on the part of the USSR.
Unilateral reductions in Europe would have equally serious
consequences in the West. You and your colleagues are suffi-
ciently aware of the stress in our relationships with Western
Europe over the past eight months, Our objective throughout
this period has been to build toward a closer understanding with
our allies and friends of our shared objectives, and to enhance
the practice of frank and timely consultation. The changes in
governments in Western Europe in the very recent past make it
important to avoid at all costs abrupt and destabilizing actions by
us. Continuity and stability in the Allied defense posture are
essential to maintaining Allied security, which is the indispensable
basis for pursuit of our policy of detente. There is no question in
my mind that a reduction in United States forces in Europe would be
destabilizing, and would afford distinct political advantages to
potential adversaries.
Our troop deployments in .Asia and the Western Pacific, which
are now a fraction of what they were only a few years ago at the
height of the Vietnam conflict, constitute a very tangible measure
of our interest in the security of our friends and allies in that region
of the world. But any major reductions in U. S. forces in South
Korea, Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines could seriously
jeopardize our efforts to achieve a more permanent structure of
peace in that area, Such reductions can be safely made only when
we have firm evidence of improved relations among the contending
nations in the region. Meanwhile, we will continue to make reduc-
tions in our forces in Thailand as the situation in Southeast Asia
permits.
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000700030052-9
 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030052-9
z",Tith regard to South Vietnam, I have a very personal sense of
obligation to do everything I can to make good on our moral commit-
ment to assist that nation in its survival as an independent state.
The Administration's request for $1.6 billion in military assistance
was made because of our conviction that the survival of South Viet-
nam is indispensable to the creation of an enduring structure of
peace in Southeast Asia. Without our military assistance South
Vietnam's ability to resist communist military pressures, fueled
by an extensive flow of arms and supplies from the North, would
be critically endangered.
I recognize that the House has already substantially reduced
the Administration's request and that some members of the Senate
would favor even a larger reduction. But I would be remiss in my
duty as Secretary of State if I did not urge upon you the essentiality
of supporting the Administration's request. Here, as in Europe,
we must not lose sight of our longer range objective, and that is
not just a reduction in the level of hostilities but more importantly
the creation in Southeast Asia of an environment conducive to
enduring peace and reconstruction. This fundamental humanitarian
goal not only deserves the wholehearted support of all the people
in the area, but also of the American people whose devotion to
peace and progress throughout the world has been convincingly
demonstrated over the years. In South Vietnam we have made an
enormous investment in lives and dollars on behalf of the survival
of that country and an enduring peace in Southeast Asia. We have
made marked progress toward these goals. I am convinced that
our willingness to contribute a substantial level of military
assistance to South Vietnam in the coming fiscal year will bring
stable peace closer and enable us to reduce our assistance
progressively over the following years.
Best regards,
Is/ Henry A. Kissinger
Henry A. Kissinger
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030052-9