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August 21, 1974
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Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP756003 OR000700060017-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE August 21, 1974 the procedure. Does that state it sub- stantially? Mr. MUSKIE. That states it precisely, may I say to the Senator. We have no Interest in blocking the project. We a just concerned with the particular aspe of it that I have described. Mr. McCLELLAN. If my distinguis colleague, the Senator from North kota (Mr. YOUNG), has no objectio his side of the aisle, I see no object the amendment, and I would be wil accept it and take it to conferen Mr. YOUNG. I have no objec fact, I think the Senator fro makes a good cage. Mr. MUSKIE. May I expre predation to both of my co The PRESIDING OFFI tion is on agreeing to the the Senator from Maine. The amendment was agr Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. Pr gest the absence of a quor The PRESIDING OFFI will call the roll. ? The second assistant proceeded to call the rol Mr. EAGLETON. Mr unanimous consent the quorum call be res The PRESIDING objection, it is so orde a- on to g to . In Maine my ap- gues. e ques- dment of to. dent, I sug- The cler gislative cler esident, I ask the order for ded. CER. Without DISTRICT OF CO MBIA CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT s.ONFERENCE RE- PORT Mr. EAGLETO Mr. President, I submit a report of e committee of con- ference on S. 370 and ask for its imme- diate considerati The PRESIDI OFFICER. The re- port will be stat by title. The second a istant legislative clerk read as follows: The committe f conference on the dis- agreeing votes the two Houses on the amendment oft House to the bill (S. 3'703) to authorize in he District of Columbia a plan providing or the representation of defendants wh ? are financially unable to obtain an ade uate defense in criminal cases in the co ts of the District of Colum- bia, and for oth purposes, having met, after full and free erence, have agreed to rec- ommend and recommended to their re- spective House this report, signed by a ma- jority of the erees. The PRE- 'ING OFFICER. Is there objection to e consideration of the con- ference rep ? There bei g no objection, the Senate proceeded e consider the report. (The con rence report is printed in the House roceedings of the CONGRES- SIONAL RE D of August 15, 1974, at pp. H8448-H84,0.) Mr. EAG ETON. Mr. President, I move the adopti s of the conference report on S. 3703. The PR IDING 0.10.1e10ER. The ques- tion is on greeing to the motion of the Senator f m Missouri. The mi ion was agreed to. MESSAO FROM THE PRESIDENT A mess go from the President of the United S ates was communicated to the Senate b Mr. Marks, one of his secre- taries. EXECUTIVE MESSAGE REFERRED As in executive session, the Acting President pro tempore (Mr. Norm) laid before the Senate a message from the President of the United States submit- ting the nomination of William R. Craw- ford, Jr., of Pennsylvania, to be Ambas- sador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Republic of Cyprus, which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. NOTE In yesterday's RECORD, at page 15354, third column, a message from the Presi- dent of the United States is shown as having been referred to the Committee on Appropriations. This reference is in- correct. The message has now been re- ferred to the Committee on Armed Serv- ices. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPRO- PRIATION ACT, 1975 The Senate continued with the con- sideration of the bill (H.R. 16243) mak- ing appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975, and for other purposes. Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, what is the pending order of business? The PRESIDING OFFICER. HR. 16243. Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, I call up my amendment No. 1836. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will state the amendment. The legislative clerk read as follows: On page 50, between lines 20 and 21, insert a new section as follows: SEC. 848. No funds in excess of $81,000,- 000,000 may be appropriated pursuant to this Act. Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the distin- guished junior Senator from Delaware (Mr. BIDEN) be added as a cosponsor to the amendment. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, the amendment I propose today to the de- fense appropriations bill is motivated by two important considerations: First, that waste and mismanagement due to several years of overspending have diminished rather than expanded the effectiveness of our conventional forces; second, that the severe inflation facing our economy today and in the foreseeable future ne- cessitates a real reduction in budgetary outlays for fiscal year 1975 and beyond. The distinguished chairman of the Appropriations Committee knows that I greatly admire the work he has done on this bill. But despite the reductions that have been made, the defense budget continues to grow disproportionately while the American people have less to show for it. Last year, General Brown, now chair- man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned: We are going to be out of business if we don't find ways to cut costs. But the $82.1 billion budget we con- sider today is permeated with wasteful programs which add nothing to the na- tional security. And, as such, it is a dis- incentive in the search for managerial Innovation in the important areas of weapons procurement and manpower utilization. Each year we hear the symptoms of mismanagement?cost overruns, weap- ons failures in combat, reductions in quantities of arms due to excessive costs, burgeoning headquarters personnel, and excessive numbers of support forces. It Is no longer possible to argue that more money will give us a stronger national defense. And there is no time more ap- propriate than during this period of rampant inflation to establish a budget ceiling which will encourage change. It is my firm belief that there is no more intelligent and creative group in these United States than the men and women of our military services. When you add the managers and employees of the largest corporations in America, you have a force which is indeed formidable. But in recent years that force has been misdirected by a budgetary process which encourages deceit and punishes innovation. And Congress must share the blame. During the 5 years I have served in this body, I can think of only one de- fense debate?excluding Vietnam? which provided congressional and pub- lic exposure of the issues equal to their importance. That was the ABM debate. Senator MCINTYRE'S excellent efforts on Trident and counterforce notwithstand- ing, we have generally failed in provid- ing an adequate forum for debate on some of the most crucial issues of our time. And the defense bill has grown heavy under the burden of unnecessary weapons and programs. We have also failed to scrutinize the defense budget because too often such spending is considered worthwhile in "Grand Rapids" and a "wasteful boon- doggle in Oklahoma," as it was so aptly put by President Ford in a slightly dif- ferent context. But I am optimistic. I do not believe that parochialism need doom Congress to a perpetual inability to reduce or elim- inate specific items in the defense budg- et. Today, however, we must recognize the obvious political reality and act ac- cordingly. We must seek ways to con- sider this budget on a national scale and reduce it to its proper level. Though there is always a measurable limit to our economy's ability to support both defense needs and consumer de- mand, a strong defense and a healthy economy are not mutually exclusive goals. Both are vital to our national well-being and both should entail na- tional sacrifice. It is our job to find the lines beyond which we cannot venture? at the upper extremity lest we stimulate more inflation?and at the lower, ex- tremity lest we weaken our defense pos- ture. It is my firm conviction that an $81 bil- lion ceiling on new budgetary authority is more than adequate to maintain the effectiveness of our military forces. My only concern is that it may still be too high to help in the battle against infla- tion. In that regard, it is important to un- derstand that, due to the peculiar nature of defense spending, any savings we can effect in this budget will be particularly helpful in countering inflation in the cur- Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP751300380R000700060017-5 Jease 20.05t06/09 ? CIA-RDP751300380R000700060017-5 P.IGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE ihroved For& August 21, has been investigating possiVe sites In Maine r the radar systerx However, until June 25 of Illis year? passage of tlrie military thorization be?that the ced the se tion of a tter site 1 western er Site jn eastern It was n after Sen procuremern Air Force ann "preferred" tra Maine and a re Maine. The receiver site, in of valuable farmland, h most concern among Ma land in question produces Maine's total blueberry cro estimated annual cash value As a result, Maine citizens an officials seek adequate appo ni to point out to the Air Force e ad economic impact of the ssle site to solicit from the Air Force 1.9format1 as to the availability and cost pf alterna- the tech- ra. Environ- ve been the Air ,000 acres rated the zens. The ercent of th an 7,000. tate tive sites which would still me nical requirements of the sy Public hearings on the bra mental Impact Statement scheduled for September a Force has encouraged public_corrunent. At the same time, however, tire are in- dications that development the pro- posed site is proceeding apape. There- fore, the hearings may notM ovide an it adequate opportunity for a e citizens to convince the Air Force of e impor- tance of the land in question til our econ- omy. The purchase of land tions on some tracts involved in the s'stem are scheduled to take place pr4ir to the hearing. Also, potential cont4tors were re quested on July 25 to sub detailed proposals and cost estimate* on site development. This amendment is intende t =imply to limit any further action on si Outs/- tion and development of the ?prototype receiver mitil additional inforration on the matter of site selection 1.1 obtained. It is not our intent to preys* the Air Force from proceeding with d lopment of the radar technology and ,other re- search activities associated 'with t 0TH system. , I believe the delay I era urgtng is sonable and will assure that:NI of Congress and the cit17ens of will have ample opportunity 30 the questions which have bee We are currently holding with the Air Force, and I today's vote?evidence of th of the Senate to the pr the Proposed receiver site system?will generate erative spirit which we order to resolve the pr I ask unanimous printed in the Ilse? recent corresPOnde the Air Force There being were ordered ti e as follows: Maj. Gen. M. Director, Le the DEAR Colonel Admi Over- dar cour ne olve ed. Ions hopeful nativity ncerning r the 0TH na of coop- ed to have in ems. onsent to have t this Point some I have had with rning this Matter. objection, the letters printed in the RECORD, AUGUST 13, 1974- SpOBWELL, ice Liaison, Department of Force, Washington, b.c. BRAM BOSWELL: On nugest 9, ace Wood briefed my staff on the ation's plans to build aprototype e-Horizon-Backscatter (07H-B) ra- em in the State of Mabee. In the of the briefing, several queetions were raised which Colonel Wood suggested would S 15527 CONUS 0TH-B system is aircraft detection. answered in writing for the record. The distinguishing chareeteristics of aa Specifically, the following questions were 0TH-B radar is Its ability ? use the lose"- raised abeut which I would like to know the sphere to reflect the high uency (BF) Air Forces thinking: How does the orii-13 signals around the earth's'store, typi- improve the current DEW lam? How likely eally on the order of dorneters. This is it that an operational 0TH-B would be capability provides a lel to provide a able to detect the kind of subsonic raleeiles quantum improvenae in the range at that an adversary might employ? How does which aircraft Can etected, and at all the planned development of an 07*-B aye- altitudes down to t earth's surface. It will tern relate to the Executive projected re- 136 possible, th e, with an operational (Motions in. the Air National Guard? What OTFI-B radar to t and provide warn ng conedderation was given to the economic im- of an asive ircsraft before they Pe le- -pact of constructing the 0TH-B on. the State trate to the neceeeary to launch their of Maine and, specifically on Washington subsonic lea. County? Finally, what criteria were used for 3. Q How does the planned de. choosing the receiver site in 'Township 19, as velopm of an 0TH-B system relate to he opposed to another nearby site with less ad- gneeu projected reductions in the kir verse ecohornic impact? Nati Guard? Since the Congress is currently considering the yr '75 Military Procurement Appropria- as BM, I would appreciate the favor of an ly reply. Sincerely, Hon. En U.S. Sena DEAR SENA omit: This to your letter ugust 12, the Air Force On seeming the (0TH-B) Radar Specific answers contained in the a copy of the ?Impact Statement Environmental forwarded for tent to note renter and finalized un cies sad th to comm Evian-Ns S. Musicie, U.S. Senat EPARTMENT OF THE Axe FOR Wigton, D.C., August 2 S. Musson, tY inf the 'coati stations atter Federal a ic have had an on the Draft Ste may su t their comments to As for Environmental of the tary of the Air Force, or of t. open hearings scheduled for her ? 12, and 13. The deadline for Is September 23. all comments are considered, we pare and issue a Final Environmental Im- t Statement setting forth our decisions. o action can be taken to implement the decision until 30 days after release of the Final Statement. If we can be of further assistance in this Matter, please do not hesitate to contact us. Sincerely, ROBERT B. TANG1TE, Brigadier General, USAF, Dep. Dir. Legislative Liaison.. OVER-THE-HORIZON BACKEDATIMS (0TH-B) REDAR PROGRAM 1. Question: How does the 0TH-B im- prove the current DEW Line? Answer: The present Air Force program and long-range plans call for two 0TH-B radars, ORB sited in the Northeast in the State of mtaine and one sited in the North- west portion of the Continental United States (at)Nms) . When operational these 'two sites will preclude an end run of the DEW Line in the north. The initial phase Is to design and develop a limited coverage prototype and conduct a teat and evaluation for one year for the purpose of validating system concepts and dennitizing perform- ance and costs before building the opera- tional sites. 2. Question: How likely is it that an oper- stiorml 0TH-B would be able to detect the kind of subsonic missiles that an adversary might employ? Answer: Although it is possible for an 0TH-S radar to detect the missiles to which you refer, the primary mission of the 974. response requesting stineas con- Bacicscatter ur questions are at. In addition. a ft Environmental the Connell on ily 30, 1974, in It is impor- the trans-. t become ty They ecial : The long-range surveillance and warning which is possible with the -B system is more vital than ever in new of the projected reductions in the Air National Guard Interceptor Force and our ability to react And intercept potentially hostile aircraft entering our novereign air- space. The 0TH-B system will Significantly increase the warning time available to alert National Command Authorities such that appropriate action can be token to deter- mine the identity and purpcas of the ni- t:ruder. 4. Question: What consideration was given to the economic impact of constructing the OTH-B on the State of Maine and, specifi- cally, on Washington County? Answer: Consideration of site locatic na during the concept formulation phase was based primarily on technical and operational criteria. Once the State of Maine was ccn- sidered optimum under these criteria, erten- sive consideration of the economic Impact In the local areas within the State was fac- tored into the final site selection. Recoin- rnendations were solicited and received frcm the State of Maine Land Development of- flatele on possible site locations, and the preferred site takes into conakieration the availability at land and the economic con- ditions. 5. Question: What criteria were used for choosing the receiver site in Township 19, as opposed to another nearby site with lees ad- verse economic impact? Answer: The detailed criteria used for lug the receiver site are contained in vised Draft Environmental Statement elude minimum Radio Frequency In- ce (RPI distances), economic impact, n densities, existing soil and foliage dezisit topography, wad other neeeciatel Impacts costs. The selected site in Town- ship 19 onsidered optimum in this case. Surveys ? areas around the Township 19 site dete that the topography was less than technic desirable due to orientation and size. Co tion in the possible sur- rounding areas ld, therefore, necessitate relocation and grading ts and enviroranental extensive land with much high impact. Mr. MUSKIE. I eciate the pis - tience of the disttngui ? floor manager of the bill, the roes Arkansas (Mr. MoCimizAa), in considers - tion to this amendment. Mr. McCI.ELLAN. Mr. Senator will yiekl, as! u are not taking the money out we are simply providing for ture until some of these Problem further considered and hopefully out. Mr. MUSKIE. The Senator is co Mr. McCLICLLAN. It is not killing project, but it is trying to make an ac- commodations? that there can be a spirit of cooperation and good will as a part of Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP75600380R000700060017-5 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP75600380R000700060017-5 Auguk 21, 1974. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE rent fiscal year and beyond. In the jargon of the economist, defense spending is "inherently inflationary" due to its "non- productive demand generating nature." In plain English, defense expenditures translate into consumer demand, but for every dollar that goes into defense pro- duction, there is one less potential dollar for the production of consumer goods. The increase in consumer demand re- sulting from defense spending and the simultaneous reduction in supply create a classic inflationary environment. Furthermore, other than increasing consumer demand, defense spending has a limited impact on economic growth. Private spending?or even nonmilitary Public spending?can create capital goods which can add to the total pro- ductive capability of the economy and also create more jobs. Goods produced for military purposes have no such return. It is not my intention to base my entire case today on economic theory. I recog- Pin that any theory has a countertheory, especially in the field of economics. But I do believe it is necessary to characterize the nature of the Federal spending my amendment seeks to reduce. President Ford has reaffirmed his pred- ecessor's goal of reducing outlays in fis- cal 1975 below the $305 billion originally requested. Congress, for its part, has also resolved to cut the budget; $5 billion is the goal most frequently cited, although the Senate has twice gone on record as favoring a $10 billion cut. But according to the most recent budgetary scorekeep- ing report, appropriations bills and other legislative spending measures enacted as of August 2 place us $1.1 billion over the administration's request. Of the $305 billion Federal budget, only $84 billion are in the controllable category; that is, items not already desig- nated for payment by other legislative measures. Of that $84 billion, $58 billion, or 70 percent, is attributable to defense spending. There, if we cannot establish an $81 billion ceiling on this appropria- tions bill, I think it will make it more difficult for us to tell our constituents that Congress is going to cut the Federal budget. I have heard no one proclaim that the fight against inflation is a 1-year battle. In this regard, a reduction in this budget .will help in curbing budgetary outlays in later years as well, since much .of the Procurement and research money we will appitopriate will not be spent in this fiscal year. As I said earlier, we have overspent for defense in the recent past. There is no better illustration of that assertion than to examine the unexpended bal- _ances on hand at the-end of the past 4 fiscal years. This amount has risen steadily from $31 billion in fiscal 1972 to an estimated $44.1 billion at the end of fiscal 1975. This means that, increasingly, goods and services for which the Defense De- partment has contra&ed are being de- livered at a slower, pace than appropri- ated money is being poured into the sys- tem. We are appropriating more money than the delivery system can keep up with. While there will always be unex- pended balances, they should remain steady or decrease, except in wartime. The current trend is causing a serious distortion which my amendment would help rectify. In his book, "The Politics of the Budg- etary Process," Aaron Wildavsky said the most successful tactic in assuring the financial growth of a bureaucracy was the technique of "incrementalism." In other words, an agency should ask Con- gress for just a little more than it wants even while it wants a little more than it needs. In the past 2 years the Defense Department has probably caused Mr. Wildavsky to want to rewrite his book. Soon after the fiscal 1974 budget was approved, DOD asked for a supplemental appropriation of $6.2 billion. The very day they asked for the $6.2 billion as a supplemental the Pentagon submitted its fiscal year 1975 request calling for an $11.4 billion increase. But even that request did not stand. Budget amend- ments were received in the spring which raised the fiscal year 1975 request to $87.1 billion. Thus, if the fiscal year 1974 supplemental is included, the total in- crease requested by the Defense Depart- ment since the fiscal year 1974 budget was enacted on December 20, 1973, is $19 billion. In action to date Congress has reduced those requests by only $6.5 billion?this includes a $1.5 billion reduction of the fiscal year 1974 supplemental and the re- duction of $5 billion approved by the Senate Appropriations Committee. It seems clear that the Defense Depart- ment's mastery over the politics of the budgetary process is unsurpassed. Now, as we debate an amendment which would allow an increase in the de- fense budget of $6.8 billion over the amount appropriated last year we hear calls of alarm from those who would rather ignore the total DOD request? the supplementals, the budget amend- ments, the special aid for the Middle East war?and the admission that at least $1.5 billion in outlays was put into the budget for economic purposes rather than defense purposes. This budget is a model for the tech- nique of "incrementalism." It is still more than the Pentagon wants, to say nothing of what it really needs. Mr. President, as I said at the outset, it is my hope than an $81 billion budget would encourage positive managerial change within the Defense Department. This year I had the opportunity to ex- amine one of the more current mana- gerial innovations at Defense, the so- called "design-to-cost" program. It was adopted with great fanfare In 1969 at the insistence of then Deputy Defense Secre- tary David Packard. On January 28, 1974, approximately 5 years after Mr. Packard made "design- to-cost" an official DOD policy, I asked about the current status of the program. I wanted to know the cost goals that had been set for each weapons system. I was amazed to find that the vast ma- jority of systems were not yet under the program 5 years after David Packard S 15529 for the first time to determine how and whether weapons programs would come under a "design-to-cost" requirement. "Design-to-cost" is a good program, but there is simply no incentive to care about cost goals when there are so many tax dollars to be spent. David Packard posed a general cure for the problems which afflict our Defense Establishment when he said: We are going to have to stop this problem of people playing games with each other. Games that will destroy us, if we do not bring them to a halt. The "game playing" to which Mr. Packard referred is the most debilitating symptom of our failure to bring efficiency to defense. Unfortunately, the budgetary process itself may inspire the most de- structive tendencies. For example, military planners under- stand that the public seeks dramatic, not marginal, improvements in the perform- ance of a particular weapon. Imagina- tions, therefore, work overtime in establishing performance goals that are frequently unattainable, often unneces- sary and sometimes downright imprac- tical. Next, it is felt necessary to understate costs. In this the military services have ready allies. Contractors abound who are willing to bid low to buy in. And when the Pentagon comes before Congress to certify the low cost of a new system, it does so with the support of industry. The military planner also understands that it is difficult to sell long-range proj- ects. Consequently, a schedule is drawn up which shows quick progression from milestone to milestone. Scarce margin is left for error and the pressure to de- liver often leaves little time for adequate preproduction testing. The direct consequence of this exces- sive concurrency in weapons develop- ment is the cost overrun. We have, all heard the incredible toll these overruns take. In 1972, according to GAO, 77 major systems had accumulated overruns totaling $28.7 billion. This year a GAO study of 55 major systems revealed over- runs of $26.3 billion. There is simply no getting around it, from the contractor to the military proj- ect officer to the Secretarys of Army, Navy, and Air Force, the message is clear: cutting costs is not the way to get ahead. It is time that Congress sent a new mes- sage to the decisionmakers at the De- fense Department. Mr. President, I have said repeatedly today that the budget that we are con- sidering contains waste?that $81 billion Is more than adequate to maintain the effectiveness of our forces. While I am sure the vast majority of American peo- ple would agree that the defense budget does contain waste, I would not expect any Member of this body to support a ceiling on military expenditures that could not be supported by specific sug- gestions of areas where reductions can be made. Congress has a constitutional responsibility to assure that our military forces are properly equipped to maintain our security. had put it into place. Indeed, my letter I would also concede that in enumerat- forced the military services to sit down lng areas where further reductions could Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP751300380R000700060017-5 S 15530 Approved For Release 2005/06/09: CIA-RDP75600380R000700060017-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE August .21, 197.e be made, my judgment is not infallible. I will, therefore, discus,s reductionAtotal- ing twice as much as are necessary to achieve the $81 billioneceiling. Certainly, the defense experts onswhose recommen- dations I will base my suggestions must be correct at least half the time. Mr. President, we will begin discussing several duff event weapon systems and De- fense Departmenteprograms, the sum ag- gregate of which twill be close to double what I am recommending insofar as a cut in this year's budget is concerned. In addition, I have attempted to steer away from programs and systems which I believe have been subjected to the de- bate and decision of this body. Systems such as the Trident submarine, the B-1 bomber, counterforce aeid programs such as MASF aid to South Vietnam enost certainly require our continued surveil- lance, but they will not,be part of my list of potential savings. If I may, Mr. President, I will now go Into an item-by-item analysis of where I think substantial cuts can be made in this budget. MILITARY PERSVNNEL Mr. President, I will begin my discus- sion of potential reductions in the man- power area. The committee has made a note- worthy step in dealing with the problem of excess forces stationed overseas. A withdrawal of 25,000 tropps is to be com- pleted by March 31, 1975. This require- ment combined with the reduction in total end strength of 24,211 could mean that the Department of Defense will make major dollar savings from the over- seas withdrawals. On the other hand, the Senate Armed Services Committee in their report on the authorization bill outlined many areas where additional personnel costs could be saved, primarily in the area of support functions. Altogether, they rec- ommended a total reduction of 49,000, some 25,000 more than the reduction now before us, Since the Armed Services Com- mittee emphasized cuts in support per- sonnel and the APpropriations Commit- tee dealt primarily with overseas forces, I believe the work of both committees could be combined to justify a larger sav- ings to the taxpayer. It is clear, for example that an addi- tional 25,000 personnel could be deac- tivated with no perceivable effect on na- tional security. If one-half of the direct costs?$12,500 per person?can be salred this fiscal year, the net reduction would be at least $156,250,000. With this addi- tional reduction, the end strength level would approximate that recommended by the Senate Armed, Services Commit- tee. I would add that the full potential of such a reduction would he $300 million. I will draw upon the report of the Senate Armed Services Committee on the authorization bill, S. 3000, which de- scribed cuts totaling 31,560, to delineate the 25,000 reduction I feel is feasible: First. Reduce the active duty man- power request for the Air Force an ad- ditional 5,500. The Air Force has decided that any increases in strategic airlift manning?C-5A and C-141 aircraft? should be achieved through Reserve com- ponents. An earlier reduction of 2,810 for this purpose was mandated in the fiscal year 1975 authorizing legislation already enacted into law. Second. Cut active duty levels by 10,850, to achieve a 7-percent reduction In military personnel assigned to train- ing functions. Overall, the proportion of staffs, overhead and support personnel compared to student load in the Depart- ment of Defense ie extremely high. For example, using both military and civilian staff and overhead personnel, the Senate Armed Services Committee found an un- acceptable ratio of students per staff in each of the services. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Armed Serv- ices Committee study of this problem, taken from the committee report on S. 3000, be printed in the REcORD. There being no objection, the study was ordered to be peinted in the :Recoite, as follows: STUDENT PER STAFF Merios Students per staff: Army Navy Uarine Corps Air Force_ Total DOD 1.6 to 1 1.5 to 1 L.8 to 1 1. 6 to 1 6 to 1 If training base support personnel -were included in the above ratios, it would reduce the overall Defense Department ratio to al- most one instructor or staff man for every student. That is much more than other school systems in the country. For com- parison, student to s;aff ratios for several kinds of non-Defense schools are shown be- low: Students per staff: Public high schools_ 18 9 to 1 Public post high school voca- tional schools From 1.6 to 2 to 70 4 to 1 Private post high school voca- tional schools From 286 to 6 to 123.7 to 1 Colleges 15.0 to 1 Local school system_ 15.0 to 1 Tie committee is aware of the fact that military training diffeis substantially from the training and education in the civilian sector. It is also aware of the accounting dif- ferences that make exact comparisons diffi- cult. However, the difference in staffing is so wide, the committee bel.eves that much more can be done to tighten down on staffs and overhead for training. As a minimum, the committee feels that the following avenues should be vigorously pursued to achieve reductions in training manpower and ex- pects a report on actions taken in each area prior to the FY 1976 manpower request. Reduction of the levels of staffing in training activities. Consolidation of schools and courses to eliminate duplication within each service and between Defense components. Use of educational technology to sub- stitute equipment for training personAel. Use of improved systems for on-the-job training instead of formai individual train- ing. Reduction in the scope of career develop- ment education as opposed to Job related skill development. Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, i: am Pleased to yield to the ,distinguished act- ing majority leader, the Senator from West Virginia. Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. Presi- dent, I merely wish to ask whether or not it would be agreeable to enter into a time limitation on this amendment. Mr, EAGLETON. I would propose the following, Mr. President: I-do not think I will use the time I am going to propose, but I did talk to some other Senators who want to speak on this subject. In order to protect them, I would propose 4 hours to a side on this amendment. I realize that I probably will not use that much time and, knowing the Senator from Arkansas, I am almost positive he will not use that much. Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, in my earlier discussions with the Senator from Missouri, I thought he meant 4 hours equally divided. Mr. EAGLETON. No, sir, I did not. Mr. McCLELLAN. Four hours to each side? Mr. EAGLETON. The problem is that other Senators who are cosponsors want to speak, and this would give me the widest latitude in protecting them. I do not think we will use that much time, and I will be eager to yield back time. Mr. 1VIcCLELLAN. isuggest, then, that we do not have an agreement on time. that we talk until we are through, and? will expedite it on this side. I would like to complete action on the bill today. Mr. EAGLETON. I think we will, but? am trying to consider Senators who are not in the Chamber and who want to speak on the subject. Mr. MeCLELLAN. Eight hours from now will be about 9 o'clock tonight. 1 hope we can do a little better than that. Mr. EAGLETON. I plan to move ex- peditiously, I say to the Senator Mr. McCLELLAN I suggest that we wait a while, to see how the debate Progresses. I would like to dispose of the bill late this afternoon. I have no intention, I may say, of speaking anywhere near 4 hours. I prob- ably will speak 15 or 20 minutes myself, and a few other Senators may wish to speak. I think we could take an hour on this side. I would be willing to accept a 3-hour limitation and give 2 hours to the Senator from Missouri and take 1 hour on our side. I ani just trying to expedite the matter and shorten the proceeding, and not deny anyone the right to be heard. Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. My question was for the purpose of hoping to ex- pedite the matter. If we entered into an agreement that there would be 4 hours to a side, Senators would not be obliged to take that much time. They could yield back such time as they wish, ar d that would be an outside limitation. Without an agreement, the debate could go on throughout the day and into tomorrow. Mr. McCLELLAN. I would like to vote on it today. Mr. EAGLETON. I can assure the Sen- ator that this amendment will be voted on today, well before sundown. Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Will the Sen- ators agree to this proposal: that the Senator from Missouri have not to exceed 4 hours and that the Senator from Ar- kansas have-- Mr. McCLELLAND. Not to exceed 2 hours. Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. And the Sena- tor from Arkansas have not to exc eed 2 hours on the amendment? Mr. EAGLETON. That is fine with me. Mr. McCLELLAN. I will agree to that. Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP75600380R000700060017-5 Approved FKKengsiSK/R/ORE:CMDP7silgTORIOR000700060017-5 August 21, 19.4A1313 -S 15531 The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and It is so ordered. Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I thank the Senators. Mr. EAGLETON. I thank the distin- guished Senator from West Virginia. Mr. President, I had completed item 2 of my discussion, and I shall continue. Third. Cut 12,750 or 5 percent of the 255,000 active duty personnel requested for base operating support. This support Includes many varied functions involved in operating bases for active duty and reserve military and civilian personnel and their dependents. It includes such items as the operation of commissaries, laundries, and theaters, the providing of base transportation, supply and food services, building and road maintenance and construction, providing utilities, fire and public services and running the base headquarters and administrative actitvi- ties. Since fiscal year 1973, the Department of Defense has announced 463 base clo- sures or reallnement actions that have eliminated 69,400 military and civilian jobs. However, these reductions are not reflected in the DOD manpower request for base -support personnel. In fact, the DOD request included an increase of 5,000 in military personnel above fiscal year 1974 levels for base support. Fourth. Cut 2,460 or 3 percent of the 82,000 military personnel requested for medical support. According to the Armed Services Committee report? These personnel are for "fixed site" medi- cal facilities such as hospitals and include all the various kinds of people from doctors to administrative clerks who operate these facilities. This category does not include the medical personnel and units that directly support Army and Marine divisions. Navy ships or Air Force direct support clinics and dispensaries. Although the overall number of military personnel has declined and the Defense Department reported a decrease in medical workload (i.e. patients), the DoD request included an overall increase in the number of medical support personnel and in the ratio of medical support personnel to military manpower. The committee went on to make the following recommendations: The committee felt that the number and proportion of medical support personnel in the military services should not be increased. The committee has no intention of decreas- ing' medical care, but there are compelling reasons to hold up increases in medical sup- port personnel at this time. First, a major study of Health Personnel is underway with participation of Defense, HEW and the Office of Management and Budget. This study, which is to be com- pleted in late 1974, will examine the require- ments for medical personnel and is seeking to find ways of /baking Defense health care delivery more efficient. The reduction wOuld hold medical support at current levels until the study is completed. Second, medical personnel are difficult to recruit and retain in an all-volunteer situa- tion. The reduction would deny increases in medical support until the recruiting situa- tion is clearer and there Is more experience with the medical bonus. Third, defense medical costs have been increasing rapidly. "Fixed site" medical sup- port costs, including, civilian salaries, totaled $1.6 billion 1 FY 1960 compared with $2.8 billion In FY 1975. These medical costs on a per man basis have risen from $470 per man in FY 1970 to $1,280 per man in FY 1975? up 2.7 times. M.D. President, it is clear that the Armed Services Committee has made re- sponsible recommendations in this im- portant area which, if adopted, will bring considerable savings to the taxpayer. Perhaps even more import the recom- mendations will go far in trimming the fat of excessive support personnel from our conventional forces. CIVILIAN PERSONNEL Mr. President, another area of the Defense budget with excellent potential for substantial savings this year is in re- ductions of Department of Defense civilian personnel. I would propose reduc- tions from the committee-approved level of civilian manpower which would result in a savings of approximately $153 mil- lion. The committee has approved funding for 995,000 direct hire civilians who are employed to perform military functions administered by the Department of De- fense. The Committee on Armed Services, under the distinguished leadership of Senator STENNIS, earlier proposed fund- ing 982,727 civilian personnel. This would- be a reduction of 12,273 below the Appro- priations Committee level and 4 percent under the Pentagon request. I endorse Senator STENNIS' proposal, the reduction proposed by the Armed Services Committee, and feel that this further trimming of civilian personnel levels is easily justified by the inflation- ary pressures on our economy. Further- more, Mr. President, a reduction of an additional 12,273 civilian personnel can be accomplished without laying off a single employee of the Defense Depart- ment. In fact, the 4-percent cut in the Pentagon request for civilian Manpower was, as the Senate Armed Services Com- mittee report on the fiscal year 1975 au- thorization bill stated, "largely a denial of- increases of civilians in the Defense Department request." D015 employed 994,000 civilians on January 1, 1974, according to the Armed Services Committee report. That is equivalent, I might say, to the popula- tion of the two largest cities in my State, St. Louis and Kansas City. That is how many civilians the Department of De- fense employed on January 1, 1974. The Armed Services Committee, there- if ore, simply rejected the increase of 33,000 civilians and recommended a further 11,600 reduction from the Janu- ary 1, 1974, level. This further reduc- tion of 11,600 could be accomplished, the Armed Services Committee report went on, "by not filling new job vacancies and by normal attrition, rather than by any layoffs." The report further stated: The Defense Department reported that about 215,000 new civilians would have to be hired just to keep the number of civilians in FY 1975 about equal to the number in FY 1974. A reduction of less than 10 percent of the new hires would more than accomplish that part of the Committee reduction that would reduce strength below actual on- board levels. Mr. President, civilian manpower is a significant portion of the Pentagon's annual budget that has been largely overlooked. Yet 17.4 percent of total De- fense Department outlays for fiscal year 1975 were slated for the civilian person- nel payroll according to Defense Secre- tary James Schlesinger's fiscal year 1975 posture statement. That meant that $14.9 billion in outlays was planned for civilian pay alone. This figure is incredible when it is con- sidered that we are not talking about paying for military personnel to fight in combat, but rather another part of the massive support elements needed, osten- sibly to keep the troops prepared for fighting. Senate and House Armed Serv- ices and Appropriations committees have commented at one time or another in the last few years about the large combat-to- support ratio which is such a costly burden in the military budget. Yet the support category referred to in this poor teeth-to-tail ratio does not even include almost one million civilians. Indeed, while many point to the sky- rocketing manpower costs in today's De- fense Department budgets, which reach about 55 percent of the Pentagon's budget, it is frequently not realized that 17.4 percent of the 55.4 percent man- power costs go for civilians. The stark statistics are provided in Dr. Schles- inger's posture statement. I ask unani- mous consent that the table used in that statement to show the pay costs for DOD manpower categories be inserted in the RECORD. There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: ESTIMATED PAY COSTS FOR DOD MANPOWER IN FISCAL YEAR 1975 Category Fiscal year 1975 outlays Percent of DOD outlays Civilian personnel payroll $14, 929, u00, 000 17.4 Militaiy personnel payroll 19, 030, 000, 000 22.2 Military special pay and allow- ances 6,655, 000, 000 7.8 Family housing 878, 000, 000 1.0 Military retired pay 6, 011, 000, OJO 7.0 Total manpower outlays_ 47, 504, 000, 000 55.4 Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, it is clear that DOD employs a massive num- ber of employees costing a large amount of money. In fact, while the Defense De- partment employs almost a million civil- ians, the Department of Health, Educa- tion, and Welfare, frequently cited as an example of an overgrown bureaucracy, employed 142,159 employees as of June 1974 or, I hasten to add, Mr. President, about one-eighth as many civilian em- ployees as DOD. The Monthly Report on Federal Per- sonnel and Pay of the Joint Committee on Reduction of Federal Expenditures' statistics as of June 1974, demonstrates that, excluding the quasi-Federal Postal Service, the Defense Department em- ploys about as many civilians as do all other Federal agencies combined. The Senate Armed Services Commit- tee report also pointed to Many cate- gories of civilians which are not included in the number authorized by that com- mittee. They include: First, employees performing civil func- Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP75600380R000700060017-5 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP75600380R000700060017-5 S 15532- CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE August 21, 1974 tions administered by DOD, the largest of which is the Corps orEngineers tdvil works activities. This category inclutes about 29,000 employees' in fiscal year 1975. Second, indirect-hire employees who are hired by host nations in support of U.S. troops stationed abtoad. There are about 103,000 persons included in this category. Third, employees In gpecial employ- ment programs for stuOnts and disad- vantaged youth, such as the stay-in- school campaign and the tempofarY summer aid program. The number in this program varies from abcint 22,000 at the end of fiscal year 1913 taTa. summer peak , of 40,000 employees. Fourth, employees of the National Se- curity Agency who areeluded because n their employment statists are classified. Fifth, schoolteachers the Depart- ment of Defense Oversee School System who are not included beeause they serve on a 9-month basis anct are not on the DOD payroll at the end ce the fiscal year. There are approximately 8,000 schbol- teachers in this category. ? Sixth, employees paid from nonappro- priated funds?including those working at base exchanges, coilimissaries, mid clubs. There are an eetimated 15000 personnel in this categola All these exceptions, some of which have to be paid for by tile taxpayers and some of whom are painor through in- ternally generated funds, bring the total worldwide Defense Department fon:* to well over 1.3 million peOPle. A reduction of a mere 12,273 seems insignificant in .. comparison. There are 1.3 million civilians working worldwide for the Defense Department. If memory serves me cdtrectly, this Is a number of people greater than abottt 20 of the States of the Union. I just added the name of the distin- guished Senator from -Delaware !Mr. BIDEN) BS a cosponsor'to this amend- ment. I am not sure as to the precise population of Delaware, but I suspect that it is under a half million. I know Delaware has one Hone 'Member. The number of civilian personnel, worldwide, for DOD is then greater, I think, than the total of about 20 Stites in the Utdon. Thus, in terms of what Senators repre- sent in terms of States,/ should say that DOD's work is alreacl so well repre- sented here, they shouTd have about 30 Members of Congress assigned to them, based on their populatioti. , ? The distinguished eimirman of the Armed Services Coninittee, Senator &imams, has more than once expressed his dissatisfaction with the number of civilians requested by the Pentagon. In his opening comments lit the manpower authorization hearing for fiscal year 1975 on March 21, 1974; Senator Smarms said: I am _concerned that the Defense requests before us today include a substantial in- crease in civilian personnil, some 30,090 and a nearly stand-pat eituaion in the military strengths requested. It looks as though the taxpayer is not getting tioluh economic bene- fit from any improvements in Defense ef- ficiency. It seems to me he ought to get Some. Lest year the House Appropriations Committee expressed a similar unhap- piness with Defense Department civilian manpower levels. In its report on the fis- cal year 1974 Defense Department ap- propriations bill, the committee, chaired by Representative Maiton, stated: For the past few years the Committee has been concerned about ttse high number of civilians being employed by the Defense De- partment. It has been unsatisfied with the extent of reductions. The House Approplations Committee repprt also gave several reasons why civilians jobs should be cut: 1. The ceasefire in Vietnam and the with- drawal of U.S. combat forces from Indochina. 2. The reduction in the number of military personnel and equipmer 3. The proposed clos .ng of some military installations. 4. New production te chniquee and mech- anization which should take over some of the civirtan workload. That committee, the Mahon commit- tee, called for action to bring about de- creases in its report on the fiscal year 1975 appropriations bill when it pointed out that for fiscal year 1974: The Congress made a reduction of about 15,900 positions as an indication of its in- terest to encourage the Department to care- fully monitor and control its cltilian employ- ment practices. The Department, however, did not make the reductions recommended but, in lieu thereof, submitted a supple- mental budget request in civilian positions of about 19,000. Thus the Department re- quested about 35,000 more civilian positions than the Congress approved. In short, Mr. President, it is clear that substantial reductions can be made in the civilian personnel area. I am rec- ommending a cut of only /2,273 person- nel to the level approved by the Senate Anned Services Committee with the at- tendant savings of about $153 million. Yet It is clear from the evidence pre- sented by various congressional commit- tees and distinguished military experts, that we can make even further reduc- tions from that which I propose. My pro- posal will, I repeat, lead to no layoffs nor will it harm U.S. security interests. AW &CS In the weapons system- area, I will begin with a program I have followed closely for almost 3 years?the atrborne warning and control system?AWACS. The savings I believe can be derived in this area are typical of the subsequent recommendations I will make. They are savings designed to slow down the de- velopment of a west:alms program to as- sur that it is properly tested before it is procured. As I will explain in detail, the risk we take in moving ahead too fast on the AWACS program is not simply that the system may end up not working well. It is that AWACS may not work at all In performing Its primary mission. AWACS, an overland look-down radar and tracking system housed in a modi- fied Boeing 707, was originally assigned the primary task of strategic air defense. In February 1970, a revision to a DOD development concept paper added a sec- ondary role?tactical command and con- trol. But that secondary role was not given serious consideration until August 1973, when Secretary Schlesinger as- signed the tactical NATO role as the new primary mission. At about the same time, he deemphasized the air defense mis- sion stating in his March 1974 posture statement that: A cONUS air defense system structure pri- marily for peacetime surveillance (the cur- rent air defense mission) would not require an AWACS force. In November 1913 the Defense Systems Acquisition. Review Council met to decide the future- course for the AWACS pro- gram. A main concern of the participants was the feet that the aircraft scheduled for procurement with fiscal year 1975 funds were to be built in the strategic, or r,ore, configuration?the configuration suitable for the obsolete air defense role. They were, in short, stuck with a con- figuration that was to perform the func- tion that no longer existed. A letter from the Chairman of the Re- view Council, Deputy Secretary William Clements, to the Secretary of the Air Force pointed out the need for major changes to achieve a design capable of performing the much more complicated tactical Job?the job recently created for AWACS. It is evident that a more capable configure.- tion than the core is essential to support general purpose tactical forces. The effective Integration of command and control in yarn operations requires additional (Intelligence) equipment . . identification (devices), com- munications, data transfer, cosnmand and coatzol and a measure of self defense. Secretary Clements then directed the Air Force to Conduct extensive tests to determine what the tactical configure - tion should be. That configuration has yet to be defined, and could not Possibly be validated until operational tests have been performed. This rather obvious point was made In a highly critical GAO report on AWACS seat to me in March 1974. In testimony before the Armed Serv- ices Committee, GAO defense analysts even more explicitly described the prob- lems of designing the new version ot AWACS: The change in the primary mission empha- sis from strategic to tactical requires that more and better equipment of all types. computers, processors, displays, and par- ticularly communications equipment, be on board the aircraft. Thus, the question exists as to whether all of the needed systems can be installed in the aircraft, can be Integrated so as to function properly togethe., can in- terface with a large number of command an control- systems now being operated ill Europe by U.S. and NATO ally forces. and whether the system will have tle needed tracking and communication capacity ti accomplish its mission. The GAO went on to recommend that. "defer funding for production models of the AWACS until the Air Forcc verifies and demonstrates through testF, that a viable and useful tactical config- uration can be developed." There is good reason for that recommendation for cau- tion, for there are grave doubts that AWACS will ever be viable in the tac - tical environment of Europe. When a GAO technical consultant pre - Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP751300380R000700060017-5 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP75600380R000700060017-5 August 21, 1974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 15533 pared mathematical calculations show- ing that AWACS could be completely blacked out by ground-based jammers from within 200 miles of the Iron Cur- tain, the Air Force protested that the calculations were based on a more lim- ited capability than the AWACS radar actually possessed. But these calculations were based on the official specifications for the radar given to the contractors. Now, we have a study performed by the Air Force itself which shows clearly that AWACS can be jammed with inex- pensive and unsophisticated jammers which could virtually render the $80 mil- lion plane useless. In analyzing this Air Force study, the GAO took the Air Force's "bombs-over- target" effectiveness estimates for AWA CS and concluded that because self- screening jamming could be used against the system, the unenhanced version?the version we will buy with fiscal year 1975 dollars? contributed "nothing to the air defense of Europe." The GAO did point out that the Air Force has suggested two techniques for at least minimizing the Impact of the jamming threat, but also states that: Neither of the two techniques for over- coming self-screening jamming has been demonstrated in tests nor evaluated as to effectiveness. It is important to understand the dif- ference between the mission originally conceived for AWACS and its present task. Whereas in the air defense role AWACS would have only to detect and track a wing of slow-moving turbo-prop bombers flying toward the United States over large expanses of ocean and waste- land, in the tactical role AWACS will confront literally thousands of tracks of fast-moving fighter aircraft. These air- craft will have to be detected and sorted out by AWACS' computers and ?then tracked as intercepts are attemped. In the air defense role AWACS has no ground?based jamming threat to consider and there are no fighter aircraft to pose a threat to its survivability. AWACS would naturally be a high priority target for the numerous enemy aircraft we will confront in a European air battle and, according to GAO, if these aircraft were equipped with jamming devices, AWACS would have a_ "nearly zero probability of surviving," The principal mission for AWACS is In the European theater, and yet our NATO allies have not decided whether they will purchase the system. NATO is currently studying the question of whether to buy AWACS and no decision will be made by our allies until the end of the calendar year 1975. I will not speculate on the eventual decision NATO might make but I do not believe that we would be fulfilling our ob- ligation to the taxpayer if we funded the procurement of AWACS before we know whether and how many systems NATO will buy. Perhaps, the most compelling reason to delay procurement of AWACS in fiscal 1975 is the recommendation by the Sen- ate Armed $erviceS Committee that an independent grotup of radar experts study whether AWACS will ever, be capable of performing its primary mission against ground-based jamming. This group will provide the Secretary of Defense and Congress with a full report on this most vital question. It seems obvious that no money should be appropriated for procurement of AWACS until we know whether NATO feels AWACS is worth the invstement and whether the system will ever be capable of performing in Europe. It is clear that a reduction of procurement funds would help to avoid an excessive amount of con- currency?and the resultant overruns in later years?and, at the same time, save $311.1 million approved by the committee for procurement of 4 aircraft and initial spares. SITE DEFENSE Now, Mr. President, I move on to the next system I will use as an illustration to prove wherein the budget can be pru- dently, and safely cut without sacrificing one iota of national security?site de- fense. One might have assumed that the ABM issue died with the signing of the ABM treaty. Mr. President, General MacArthur said "old soldiers never die, they just fade away." Well, weapons systems, Mr. Presi- dent, never die and, believe me, they never fade away; no, sir. So we still have an ABM kicking around, and it is called site defense. Site defense is being developed as an upgrade for the Safeguard system around our ICBM site at Grand Forks, N. Dak. While it cannot be deployed, it is said that it is needed as a "hedge" against a possible Soviet abrogation of the ABM Treaty. But in July of this year that treaty looked stronger than ever as the United States and Russia agreed to protocol lim- iting each side to only one ABM site. I have to digress there, Mr. President, and reminisce, if I may, about a former colleague of ours in the Senate who, I think, had as intriguing a way of put- ting things as anybody I have ever known. That was the former distin- guished Senator from Minnesota, Gene McCarthy. He was in the Senate the first 2 years I was here. I was here in 1969 and 1970, and he was completing his term in the Senate at that time. If the Members will recall, he took a trip to the Soviet Union. He was not only a Senator but had been a candi- date for the Presidency of the United States, so he went to Moscow and he met with the Soviet leaders. I think he met with Brezhnev and Kosygin. He told me of the conversation that he had with one of those Russian lead- ers, I think I can share that conversa- tion with the Senate. I do not think he would mind. He said that?let us assume it was Breshnev?Breshnev asked him, "Why are you people building the ABM?" McCarthY, in that wonderful way of his, arrswered very quickly, "We are building it, Mr. Chairman, because it does not work." Now, the Russian, not being used to the McCarthyesque, sense of humor, said, "We do not understand. Why are you building a system that you know does not work?" "Ah, ha," said McCarthy, "if we build a system that? does not work you will build a system that does not work be- cause you want to be just as good as we are, and both of us could keep very, very busy building systems that do not work In the public interest." I just add that as an irrelevant foot- note. But since it is so irrelevant, it is a true testimonial to ABM, which is a living irrelevancy; and it is a true testi- monial to site defense which is an_irre- levancy superimposed on top of an ini- tial irrelevancy. Even without that tangible reflection of support for the strategic doctrine of limiting defensive missiles, it is gener- ally conceded that neither we nor the Russians want to throw money down the drain on defensive systems that are generally obsolete when deployed due to advances made in offensive weaponry? the Gene McCarthy theory of planning notwithstanding. For the purpose of this discussion, however, I will assume a worst case? ? that we do need a "hedge" against the rather remote possibility that the ABM Treaty will one day be no more. What should that "hedge" be comprised of? Should we build a system which could be made obsolete by the latest Soviet technology? Or should we continue to research in the area of defensive strate- gies . . . to perfect the difficult task of "hitting a bullet with a bullet?" Until recently, the site defense pro- gram called for the development of a prototype demonstration model, which would have been ready for deployment under original plans, in 1977, when the 5-year ABM Treaty expires. According to the Senate Armed Services Commit- tee report on the authorization bill, site defense is composed of "a state-of-the art phased array radar, a third genera- tion commercial data processor and related software, and a modified Safe- guard Spring interceptor missile, called Sprint II." As is clear from that description, the components of site defense are not uni- que. But the program did have one uni- que quality which distinguished it from the other ABM programs in which we are engaged. It was to have been a prototype program. Site defense would tie the various ABM components together for testing. General Leber, the head of all the Army's ABM progranis, described the principal need for site defense this way: It is system technology. It is not compo- nent technology. The component technology is done over in the advanced technology pro- gram. But the conference report on the mili- tary procurement bill completely trans- formed the site defense program. That report states that "the primary objec- tive of the site defense program should be development of subsystems and com- ponents to advance the technology in such elements as sensors, missiles, and software." The report goes on to state that site defense should no longer be "directed toward a prototype demonstra- tion. . . ." Site defense, in short, is now the same component technology "done Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP75600380R000700060017-5 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP75600380R000700060017-5 S 15534 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE August 21, 1974 over in the advanced technology pro-- gram." It is also now a totally redundant pro-- gram for which there to no further use. The work on ABM conmajaent technology is being done under the advanced blahs- tic missile defense research program, for which $91 million has been approved in this budget. That is more than enough to spend for a "hedge" against an un- likely occurrence. The Armed Services Committee have, therefore, answered our question-2 is not worthwhile to build a system which could be obsolete when int is deployed. As General Leber said in discussing the rapid technological progress being made In the ABM field: Site Defense isn't the end of this tlibig. Five years from now they will look back on it and say that it is ancient. Although I have attempted to avoid recommending the elimination of pro- grams, I believe site defense is an obvious waste of title V R.. 8; D. funds. We do not need a redundant program and we do not need a system which, if built, would be "ancient" when deployed. The demise Of site deSense would represent a savings to the taxpayer of appreximately $103 million, leaving $20 millbin for termina- tion costs. Moving on to yet another system, which have discussed a bit already, Safeguard. SMPEGUARD If site defense would have been an- cient 5 years hence, its ttitended prede- cessor, the Safeguard syetem is already In that category. Safeguard sits, uncom- pleted, around our ICBM site at Grand Forks, N. Dak. It is limited, under the ekBai Treaty. to 100 missiles which are intended to protect our ICBM's. But recent studies, inebiding a claesi- fied GAO analysis, show that our ICBM's do not need protection. Soviet missile accuracy is not sufficient now, nor will it be in the future, to threaten our land- based missiles. These missiles are, of course, deployed in hardened silos. If, in the future, the Soviets develop their MIRV system, an, ABM system comprised of only 100 notreseles would be easily overwhelmed. Wlien the Soviet MIRV becomes a reality?assuming that, In the meantime, we do not reach a war- head-limitation agreement?then we should consider what rneaeures we should take to protect our land-based deterrent. If we decide at that time that an ABM is needed?and I personally would oppose such a choice?then we will be able, to design a system to meet the current threat. But the most compelling reason of all -to eliminate funds for Safeguard in this year's budget, is the decision by the Pentagon itself to mothball the system soon after it becomes fully operational later this year. That such a decision has been made was recently confirmed by a Defense Department spokesman. Now, think of it, Mr. President, in the Pentagon they want more money, a little over $135 million, to complete a system that they have already decided to moth- ball. Instead of allowing funds to complete Safeguard and maintain it for a full year, I would give the Army exactly what it needs to put the system in moth- balls. The savings heree therefore, would be $80 million, leaving $55.1 million to phase out the program. I repeat for emphasis, Mr. President, what I am doing with theme systems is trying to show by adding the &Oar amounts, that would be able to safely cut the budget in excess of over $2 billion. But I am-not even, as 1 said earlier, ask- ing for $2 billion. I might be half wrong, so I cut it in half to about $1 billion. SAM. D The SAM-I) program has received the careful attention of Senator Ba.yli and the General Accounting Office. Senator BAYH has made a very responsible recom- mendation to slow down this program to keep it out of the engineering develop- ment phase before it is tested. But the token $11 million cue made in this bill will not accomplish that purpose. SAM-D, which is a medium altitude surface-to-air missile system designed to replace the Nike-Hercules and im- proved Hawk for air defense purposes, has experienced a unit cost growth of almost 400 percent. Mr. President, I emphasize, a unit cost growth of almost 400 percent. The program is at least 76 months be- hind schedule and the unit cost is almost eight times as much as that of the im- proved Hawk, the system it is designed to replace. Prior to January 1974, the SAM-D was a full-scale engineering development program. The Defense Department had overlooked its own fly-before-hue guide- lines in allowing the program to proceed to this stage even though cruciaa ele- ments of the technology, most notably the TVM?target via missile?guidance system and the warhead fuse, had never been adequately tested. Secretary Schles- inger recognized this serious concurrence, problem and on January 10, 1974, he ordered that the program be reoriented so that the testing would be completed at an earlier stage. Although the Secre- tary's decision was intended to reduce the concurrency problem, the program experienced no fundamental change ex- cept in its scheduling. Fully half of the fiscal year 1975 funds?$5&.5 million? are to be spent for engineering develop- ment of tactical versions of the system. Thus, while a decision was made to re- duce concurrency, that decision has not been fully implemented. The sole justification for -the SAM-D as articulated by the Army and OSI) has been its requirement to defend the 7th Army forces stationed in Europe against conventional attack by high-perform- ance Soviet-built aircraft. Perhaps the most telling comment on the cost-effec- tiveness of SAM-i) has been the fiat re- fusal of every NATO country?with the exception of Germany?to even indicate an interest in purchasing the system. Although Germany has indicated a potential interest in acquiring the sys- tem once it is fully developed, there has been no attempt to gain financial partic- ipation on the part of that country in the developmental stages. Just as in the case of AWACS, our NATO allies are ap- parently Willing to allow the Uaited States to bear the expense of developing a system designed to defend Europe. A full-scale cost-effectiveiaess analysis of SAM-fl was undertaken this past year by OSI) in conjunction with the General Accounting Office. This study was de- livered to Congress on April 15, 1974. Its major conclusion is that we are unnec- essarily duplicating air defense weapons systems at high cost. In its comments on the study April 20, 1974, the GAC) noted. Cost effectiveness of the SAM-I) or its variants apparently commit be proven based on realistic assumption . . It would appear that even it the SAM-D technology works and even if the threat rnaterialiees, the SAM-D will probably not be necessary if F-1S's are available. It is important to note that a:though the oat) study assumed that the tech- nology testing progranewould be success- ful and would not increase costs---an un- likely assumption?it also concluded that two wings of F-15's coukl reduce the suc- cessful penetration by the eneme in the NATO area to close to zero. In recent developments, the Army has programed $10 million out of fiscal year 1975 funds for research on a backup guidance system. This most certainly cannot be read as reflecting confidence in the proposed TVM guidance system. Furthermore, the $10 million will be spent on exploring the feasibility of one of the two types of guidance techniques now employed in current?state- of-the- art?systems. This would indicate that the case for SAM-D superiority over present systems?based on its TWA tech- nology?is on most uncertain gro Ind. It would appear that little more than the Army's prestige in having a new missile in development is keeping SAM-D alive. It is the same sad story, Mr. President, of not letting a system die which should have had a laudable death yeass aco. Why cannot a weapon system go to the grave with decency? Why must it linger on and on, eternally, long after it has outlived even an imagined useful role? But SAM-i) goes on and on. While I suspect this program will be terminated or completely revised in the near future, I will not make such a rec- ommendation at this time. Instead. I would propose to save $60 million above the reduction recommended by the com- mittee. This $60 Million is earmarked f er continued engineering developmer t. This action would return the program to the advanced development stage until the TVM guidance system Is tested, as Sen- ator BAYH has so many times and so wisely suggested. WILIPEITILaING PROGRAMS. Mr. President, as I leave pointed or it, In each of the past 4 fiscal years the Defense Department's unexpended bal- ance at the end of Ihe year has ine eased, indicating that the feeds being appro.- Priated for the Defense Department are beginning to exceed the Department's ability to spend them. This is especially true in the shipbuilding business where orders for new ships have overwhelmed the delivery system. In addition, the in- flationary impact of these programs on the economy is substantial. Both of these conditions make it essential that we Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP75600380R000700060017-5 August 21, 105p "roved For EtiRtsitiffigwp itwwwz?i?iplyt000moo600l7-5 examine with great care several ship construction programs. The three major private shipyards are Litton Industries in Pascagoula, Miss., Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock in Newport News, Va., and the Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics in Groton, Conn. These "3 yards ..are presently building 63 of the 136 ships which the Navy has under construction and they have all the work that they can handle. Several factors contribute to this situation. Private yards have experienced -a large increase in commercial ship con- struction and are presently working at -a higher percentage of capacity than they have experienced in several years. Many yards also find commercial con- tracts more attractive than Navy con- tracts because the commercial specifica- tions and quality standards are somewhat lower than the Navy's. Commercial ships , are easier to build, are being ordered in large batches, leading to long profitable production runs while Navy ships? especially auxiliaries such as the de- stroyer tender and fleet oiler requested in the present budget?are built a few at a time. As a result, they are less profitable and less desirable from the point of view -of the contractors. And as we all know, dealing with the Government bureauc- racy is somewhat more difficult than dealing with private buyers, except when you get to that thing called "bail out." But we are not to that point yet with ships. Many ships now under construction .are experiencing substantial delays. The DI)--963 is one of those and appropriating funds for seven more ships this year will simply add to those delays. It would be less inflationary if we ap- propriated for three instead of seven of these ships. By doing so some $264 mil- lion could be saved this year. The appro- priation for the four additional destroy- ers could be deferred until next year. Litton's Pascagoula yards have had serious labor problems. Due to inade- quate labor supply as well as technical problems with a new yard and new meth- ods, Litton's programs have experienced delays and cost increases. At present, according to the most recent figures available, the last of the DD-63's will be delayed some 18 months. The cost of each ship has increased from $86 million per unit to $108 million. By slowing the rate of procurement we can ease the pressures on Litton and give them time to get the bugs out of their construction techniques so that the remaining ships built will be of higher quality. - The impact of this proposal on the ca- pabilities of the fleet would be minimal. The U.S. Navy is already ahead of the Soviet Navy in numbers of ocean es- corts?destroyers, frigates, and other es- corts?and will continue to be in 1980 even if we stretch out the procurement of these destroyers. The Navy has some 191 destroyers, frigates, and escorts, com- pared to 188 for the Soviets. In addition, our destroyer-type ships are generally larger than the Soviet's and some of ours are nuclear powered while the Soviets have nO nuclear powered surface ships. The current budget also calls for ap- propriating $502.5 million to build three In a series of 36 SSN-688 Los Angeles class nuclear attack submarines. How- ever, it would be more prudent to appro- priate funds for two instead of three this year at a savings of some $167.5 million. Again, the shipyard situation has a di- rect bearing on this program. Five of these submarines are being built at New- port News and the other 18 at Groton, Conn. Both of these yards are backed up with considerable work. Newport News, in addition to building the five SSN-688 submarines is also building two other submarines of a different class, four nu- clear frigates, and two CVAN's?nuclear powered attack carriers. The first of these two carriers will be delivered more than 3 years late. This is partly the re- sult of a severe manpower shortage which will surely be made worse by mak- ing further demands for additional ships. This problem can be eased by slowing the pace of procurement somewhat. As Admiral Frank Price of the Chief of --Naval Operations Office recently pointed out, reducing the SSN construction rate allows industry to "catch up on their present contracts and to be able to pro- ' ceed with nuclear attack submarines and Trident at tlte same time." If funds for only two of these submarines are appro- priated this year the United States will have 90 attack submarines in 1981 rather than 91. The difference in one submarine will not have a significant impact on the fleet's capabilities. In considering this proposal, we should take a close look at comparative United States and Soviet capabilities in this area. The United States at present has 61 nuclear attack submarines in com- mission plus 27 under construction and funded for a total of 88. The Soviets have approximately 35 nuclear attack sub- marines and 40 nuclear powered sub- marines with cruise missiles. The Soviet's overall submarine force has been de- clining in recent years and will continue to do so, despite the growth of its nu- clear submarine force toward the maxi- mum allowable under SALT. A large part of the existing Soviet sub- marine force consists of approximately 153 obsolescent diesel attack subs which will very likely be retired in coming years. In addition, experts such as Admiral Rickover and Admiral Moorer have re- peatedly told us that U.S. submarines are qualitatively superior to their Soviet counterparts. Admiral Moorer has pointed out that the 688 class is both quieter and has better sonar than the best of the Soviet Union's attack sub- marines. It should be pointed out that the SSN- 688 is very large and displaces almost 7,000 tons. This is larger than many World War II type cruisers presently in the Soviet Navy. The Navy has said it would be desirable to develop and build a new class of smaller and less expensive nuclear attack submarines than the 688 class, which presently costs about $200 million per ship. It might be wise, in light of, current national economic prob- lems, to build fewer 688-class submarines and urge the Navy to move ahead more quickly in developing a smaller and less expensive submarine. The Navy has requested some $81 mil- S 15535 lion to build a fleet oiler?AO. This would be the first of a class of 10 ships which together with other support ships are projected to cost a total of approximately $2 billion. The purpose of these ships is to deliver fuel to operating ships at sea. Currently, the Navy has 27 fleet oilers, or 1 for every 8 major surface combat- ants. It is my view that these funds should be deleted from this year's ap- propriation and deferred for at least 1 year. There are several considerations Which I think justify this position. First, it should be kept in mind that the oiler is an auxiliary?not a combat ship. Thus, while some of the existing oilers are old, retaining them in sevice for 1 or 2 more years will not reduce significantly the combat efficiency of the fleet. At the same time, many of the existing 2'7 oilers are among the newest, largest, and most modern replenishment ships in the world. Furthermore, the new class that the Navy wants to build will have about the same capacity as present AO's. Thus, they will not add significantly to the Navy's capabilities. The Navy also has nine oilers under construction in the "build for charter" program. We should also keep in mind, that the role of the oilEr in providing fuel for Navy ships is declining as more and more ships become nuclear powered. For exam- ple, the Navy will soon have 3 nuclear powered aiferaft carriers in operation and a total of 14 nuclear ships by 1980. This, of course, reduces the need for oilers. Finally, the shipyard crunch is im- portant here. Ships such as the bilers seem to-be the least popular to build by private shipyards. The Navy has two submarine tenders and one destroyer tender for which funds were appropri- ated in prior years?fiscal year 1972, 1973?that are not yet under contract because of lack of interest by the ship- building industry. The House Appropriations Committee report should be paid special attention in this regard. The committee concluded that the request for funding an oiler was premature by a year and urged that the amount be denied without prejudice un- til the Navy has determined the extent of interest by the shipbuilding industry In building this ship and at what cost. We should keep in mind that if past experience is any indication, even if we appropriate funds for this ship for fiscal year 1975, it may be 1 or 2 years before a contractor is found to build it. As was suggested by the House Appro- priations Committee, the Navy should first determine the interest in the ship- building industry and then return for funding. Mr. President, the appropriations bill calls for the funding of a new destroyer tender?AD--at a cost of $116.7 million. The initial Senate authorisation bill ex- cluded all funds for the AD. The Senate" Armed Services Committee report justi- fied this action, stating that: The Committee recommends denial of $116.7 million for one destroyer tender. Three tenders approved by Congress in FY 1972 and 1973 are not yet under contract, and until such time as these ships are under con- Approved For Release 2005/06/69: CIA-RDP75600380R000700060017-5 S 15536 Approved ForMva,?RA(0,5A6/A0p .,?q1A.F8p.e75qq,u?pitioo070006001A.7-5 ugust 21:. 1974 LVIN Ultro33.13../1:11 /XL 11-Glat.IW anemia tract and the costs and schedules are known, authorization of additional tenders will not be authorized. The House prevailed, however, and the tender was put back in by the conference committee. The purpose of a destroyer tender is to provide minor repairs and services for destroyer-type ships at forward bases. The U.S. Navy has and plans to main- tain about 200 destroyers and related types of ships which are serviced by de- stroyer tenders. The Navy current& has 12 tenders, or 1 tender for every 16 destroyer-type ships. The existing 12 tenders are more than enough to provide foe those regu- larly stationed overseas with the 6th and 7th Fleets. The majority of tenders are stationed at naval bases here in the United States. A 1-year deferment in the tonstruction of a new tender would not affect the read- iness of the destroyer force. Minor re- pairs or services required can be supplied by the existing 12 tenders, augmented if necessary by naval-shipyards and-shore- based facilities. Thus, Mr. President, the total savings In the shipbuilding area?the area most responsible for the rise in unexpended military balances?would total $629.2 million. Again the slowdowns and the delays I have recommended would en- hance rather than hinder our military effectiveness. M6 0A1 TANK Another reduction which le budgetarily feasible and which will not undermine national security, concerns._ the rate of production of the M60A1 tank to the ori- ginal rate of production planned by the Department of Defense. In -hearings be- fore the Senate Committee on Articled Services this year, SecretarY Schlesinger said that the Defense Department orig- inally planned to increase the rate of production of the M60A1 to 515per year through fiscal 1976, but that "the lessons learned from the recent Middle East war" have made the Defense Department increase the production of lat60A1's tc) 667 per year over the next few years. Using the Middle East war for justifi- cation of increased tank production is very misleading. Tanks sent to Israel are sold through MAP, which does not affect the bill we are currently considering. Also, Israel pays us back for the tanks it purchases. In the fiscal 1974 supple- mental, the Defense Department was given the funds required for enabling at- tainment of the planned buildup in pro- duction rate. Thus, the fiscal year 1975 request will not affect in any way our aid to Israel. The Pentagon is using the Middle East war as the reason for accelerating the modernization of M60A1's or the Army and the Marine Corps. in fact, the Marine Corps plans to en their mod- ernization program in fiscal 1976. The Defense Department has given Congress no real reason why these modernization programs have been accelerated, and why the original rate of production is no longer feasible. According to the House report on the authorization bill "fiscal year 1975 M60A1 procurement requests have been based on the maximum rates of produc- tion that the assembly lines can deliver, Particularly since there is only one remaining willing supplier-subcon- tractor of the traversing turret." I do not believe it makes sense to approve a maxlinum rate of production that orly one supplier-subcontractor is willing to produce, and might have trouble meeting. I propose that we restore the original rate of production?a cutback of 150 tanks for fiscal 1975. We would not be halting the production line; we would not be cutting off new production lines; and we would not be violating contracts. We would simply be slowing down the rate of production, which in turn would guarantee that the rate of production is met. The savings to the American tax- payer would be $50 million in fiscal 1975. This is a prudent reduction which does not go beyond the original request of the Department of Defense. CH-47C, CARGO TRANSPOFT HELICOPTER The Senate Committee on Appropria- tions recommended restoration of $41.4 million for the procurement of 19 CH- 47C cargo transport helicopters. This seems to be questionable funding item in light of the fact that the House Appro- priations Committee recommented denial of these funds. This is what the House committee said about the CH- 47C request: The Army requested $51,400,000 for 19 CH-47C Chinook cargo helicopters. This would represent a last buy of this helicon :er. The Army has initiated a three-year research and development prograrr. to improve the maintainability, reliability, suririvability and safety of the CH-47A/B models of this heli- copter, while reducing operating costs. In some respects, they will be, an improvemant over the CH-47C model. The asset position of these helicopters is such that these 19 CH-47C helicopters need not be bought. The Committee recommends the funds be denied and the Army wait until the CH-47A/B helicopters are improved before buying addi- tional ones, if this becomes necessary. I very much agree with Chairman MAHON'S statement. The need for the CH-47C seems minimal, especially in light of ongoing research to build a better version. This purchase could easily be eliminated without endangerng national security and with substantial savings for the Nation. WAR RESERVE S TOCKS On to yet another subject, -Mr. Presi- dent. / shall not dwell too long on this, because I believe that at a later point in this debate, Senator KENNEDY of Massa- chusetts may offer a specific amendment on this point. But I should like to speak very briefly to what are called war re- serve stocks. In 1973 the Department of Defe:ase initiated a new program which was called war reserve stocks for Allies; $23 million was budgeted for these sto in fiscal year 1973?which is not so terri- bly much in 1973, and for the Pentagon, $23 million is just about their daily paper clip account. But that araount has grown to the request we have before us today, which is approximately $529.6 million. It should be noted that this program is not for our NATO allies, but was created to help support certain Asian allies? allies such as South Vietnam, Thailand, and Cambodia. These stocks are in addi- tion to our own inventory needs, but be- cause they remain in U.S. inventories unless and until they are needed by our allies, the program was not considered a military assistance program or a military assistance service funded program. But by .whatever name is contrived by the Pentagon, it is clear that this is a back- door military aid program. The Senate passed an amendment of- fered by Senator KENNE)YY on Jure 6, 1974, to the military procurement bill, to bar the supply of stockpiled war ma- terials or equipments to any Asian coun- try unless specifically authorized by Congress. Sadly, the amendment was dropped in conference, but the Senate is on record as disapproving the war re- serve stock concept. It is not easy to find thel appropriation for the war reserve stock program in the budget since the $529.6 million that has been approved by the committee is hid- den among various accounts in the pro- curement section of the bill. In fact, the committee has been able to ascertain the exact amounts in each account only after great effort. I think that the reason for this is obvious: such a Program would not survive an up or down vote in the Congress. I hope we shall have a chance to prove that with Senator KENNEDY'S amendment. Although I will personally vote to com- pletely abolish this program, I will not assign a savings of $529.6 million?the total for War Reserve Stocks in the budget?because a more conservative ap- proach has been taken by certain mem- bers 6f the House Committee on Ar pro- priations. These members have sug- gested deleting the ammtmition portion of the stbcks which, because they have a limited shelf life, would require con- tinued replenishment. Stich a reciaire- ment would involve an endless commit- ment of money. I would therefore suggest leaving $180 million in this program so that certain obsolete tanks and aircraft could be maintained. Thus, the potential savings to the taxpayer would be at least $350 million. The most conservative saving that I can point out to you would be $354) mil- lion. If it were up to me, I would vote to do away with the whole 1529, but I am trying to come up with a very conserve - tive estimate. It should be obvious after this ler gthy discussion?may I digress, Mr. President. It has not been my plupose, it is net my Purpose to debate this amendment at undue length. We have already agreed to a time limit. I am not a filibusterer, either by talent or persuasion. But ( felt it was necessary to discuss at some not inordinate length certain facets of this budget. As I said at the outset, we purposely omitted those matters that have been discussed previously, whether it be the Trident or the B-1. We tried to get down to some programs that first, the Com- mittee on Armed Servicei itself had al- ready frowned upon or that the Eouse Committee on Armed Services or the House Committee on Appropriation f dis- approved of, even programs that the military itself was not too satisfied with. Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP75600380R000700060017-5 ktgust 21, 19fTproved For&ftlehnpsyM9kEMBP75s1M8pE000700060017-5 S 15537 But I have only recommended two pro- grams for elimination, the two that are so patently redundant and unnecessary that they should be eliminated; to wit, site defense and Safeguard?and I have left money in the budget for termination costs. In the personnel category, wherein I am supported very strongly by Senator STENNIS and his committee, I have sim- ply taken the recommendations of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, a committee which I believe is eminently qualified to discuss such matters. Like- wise, the slowdown in SSN-688 procure- ment and the delay of one year in pur- chasing a tanker and a tender, are pro- grams designated by the Senate Com- mittee on Armed Services for the reduc- tions I have suggested. So I am really in'accord with Senator STENNIS again on all of those. The elimination of the last buy of CH-47C helicopters was strongly recom- mended by Chairman IVIAnox Of the House Committee on Appropriations due to the on-going development of a more modern version. I feel that my sugges- tions to slow down the AWACS and SAM-D programs will help in eliminat- ing excessive concurrency and assist in avoiding cost overruns in later years. The reserve stocks program is a form of backdoor foreign aid which the Senate has previously gone on record as op- posing. Therefore, we get to the bottom line, Mr. President. The total savings to the taxpayer in the areas I have discussed up to now would come to just over $2 billion. This, of course, IS twice as much as is necessary to bring the committee bill down to the $81 billion level. If ply colleagues cannot accept all of my sug- gestions, I would hope that they could accept half. The cut I am recommending in my amendment, joined by many distin- guished cosponsors, is $1.1 billion. I feel we have been able to demonstrate a $2.1 billion cut. , Well, perhaps they can say I am half wrong. If I am half wrong in every item that I have saved, then it still comes down to just about my amendment, $1.1 billion. If I am half right, if you want to appl'oach it from the viewpoint of the positive, then it still comes down to $1.1 billion. So, half right or half wrong, the figure that we recommend in this budget is minimal. Obviously, the list of suggested sav- ings that I have put forth is not ex- haustive. Such programs as Phalanx, the surface effect ship, the sea control ship, the heavy lift helicopter, the CH- 53E helicopter and the patrol frigate have all been severely criticized by the General Accounting Office in reports sent to Congress. I am sure that a care- ful examination of these programs would find areas where immediate savings could be made that would help us to avoid cost overruns in the future. As I stated at the outset. I have not included programs such as the B-1, Tri- dent and counterforce, which' have been focused upon extensively by Congress. Finally, it is important to note that the Secretary of Defense need not ac- cept ray suggestions if my amendment Is enacted. He would haie the discretion to reduce programs which he felt were of low priority. I would venture a guess, however, that many of the programs the Secretary of Defense would choose would be among those which have been dis- cussed in my speech today. Mr. President, for years Congress pro- vided little or no check on the military budget. But we have seen an important reversal of that attitude of unquestion- ing submissiveness. Much of the credit for that important turnaround goes to the distinguished chairman of the Ap- propriations Committee (Mr. MCCLEL- LAN). He has made the tough decisions concerning this bill and he has made them with courage and determination. While I obviously feel strongly that fur- ther reductions can be made, my sugges- tions are based on the firm foundation of Senator MCCLELLAN'S work. Today we have more reason than ever before to assure that there is no fat. . . that there is no waste in this budget. In- deed, we must assure that there is no waste in the entire Federal budget, and I have voted consistently to reduce that budget to assure that it does not feed the fires of inflation?to be sure that, If belt-tightening is required within the American economy, that the Federal budget will be an example to all sectors. The Defense Department cannot be ex- chided from the general effort to reduce the Federal budget?and it need not be excluded. Reductions on the level I have recommended today would not endanger the security of the United States one Iota. Mr. President, I am hopeful that my discussion today will not be interpreted as "just another gratuitous slap at the military." For it is not intended as such. I have great admiration for the men and women who are assigned the awesome task of defending our Nation. Those De- fense Department officials who have urged Congress to reject my amend- ment are doing so because they sincerely believe that it is in the best interests of the Nation. But the Nation cannot continue down the path toward internal economic de- struction as it strives to defend itself against external forces. Whether my amendment is successful or not today, I call upon the military and civilian em- ployees of the Defense Department to use their exceptional talent to effect managerial change to cut costs. I urge those individuals to respect the Ameri- can tax dollar and to spend it only when a tangible benefit to our national defense can be derived. Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. EMIT.PITON. I am pleased to yield to the distinguished Senator from Min- nesota. Mr. HUMPEREY. Mr. President, I rise for two purposes: First of all, to com- mend the distinguished Senator from Missouri for an exemplary statement, an outstanding service in the area of de- fense expenditures. I think it is possibly one of the most thorough and well-docu- mented statements that has ever been presented in the Senate. The Senator from Missouri was kind enough to make his statement available to Senators earlier so we had a chance to see what he is going to say. I, for one, am grateful for the monumental work he has undertaken, and I would like him to know that I should like to be associated directly with his endeavors. I think this is one of the more impor- tant developments in the area of defense expenditures during my long experience in the Senate. I thank the Senator, and commend him on behalf of the American people, who know, that we have to make some defense expenditure cuts that will enable us to bring the budget under con- trol, and at the same time not imperil our security. The Senator's statement was made without malice, without being deroga- tory, and without any effort to abuse the military; and I think we are all indebted to the Senator from Missouri. Mr. EAGLETON. I thank the Senator. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the name of the distinguished junior Senator from Minnesota be added as a cosponsor of the amendment. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. , Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, we are rapidly approaching the hour of 2:30. May I ask the distinguished majority leader what his wishes are? I yield to the majority leader on my time. QUORUM CALL Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. MANSFIELD. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING 0.ev10ER. Without objection, it is so ordered. APPOINTMENT OF A COMMITTEE TO ESCORT THE PRESTnENT Mr. MANSFIFT al. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Chair be au- thorized in appoint a committee to escort the President of the United States into the Chamber. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. WIL- LIAM L. SCOTT). Without objection, it is so ordered. The Chair appoints the following Members of the Senate to escort the President of the United States into the Chamber: Senators MANSFIELD, ROBERT C. BYRD, MOSS, BIBLE, FULBRIGHT, ERVIN, METZENBAUIVI, HUGHES, HUGH SCOTT, GRIF- FIN, COTTON, BENNETT, TOWER, BROCK, AIKEN, and GURNEY. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Orerer-for _ the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP75600380R000700060017-5 S 15538 Approved For &Om/2kOraffip kWAI:157_51?29,132Vilik0007000600ngust 21, 1974 ORDER FOR RECOGNITICiN OF SEN- ATOR CURTIS, AND FO lt THE SEN- ATE TO TAKE A RECESS AT 2:35 P.M. Mr. MANSFIELD. I ask_ unanimous consent that the Senator f;11 Nebraska (me. Comas) be permitted: to proceecr not beyond the hour of 2;35 p.m., at which time the Senate vAll stand in recess. The PRESIDING OFFIC3ER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The Senator from Nebraska is recognized. SUMMIT CONFERENCE ON INFLATION Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, on Au- gut 19 I addressed the following letters to tile President of the United States: DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The vait majority of Americans approve of the plan to have a Summit Conference on Inflation. It is _be- lieved that the placing of fafts concerning the various segments of our ecianomy out oft the table will assist in arriving at sound solutions. No segment of our economy' has a greater stake in retarding and ultimately stopping inflation than does agriculturer We urge that those in chrage of this suifirnit meeting develop fully the case in reference to the increased costs imposed upoir the farmers. These relate to everything th! farmer must have in order to carry on thekroduction of' food and, fiber for our econo y. We would mention such things as trptors, trucki, other machinery, repair parti, tractor and truck fuel, fertilizer, pesticida, land taxes, payroll taxes, seed, the requeemente relat- ing to safety, health, sanitattan and pollu- tion, freight, labor, fencing, ad the Count- less other items of cost whidh our farmere face. We are aware that all of our citizens are experiencing the harsh treatment that in- flation brings. We are awareof the public sentiment against rising prices including the protest that is voiced atinst the cost of food in the marketplace. is important and necessary that the full Tfacts be ade- quately demonstrated to the &bile and that misinformation be avoided and corrected, rf this is not done, many well-inientioned citi- zens will arrive at an erronedus decision in reference to food costs. It is i open oppor- tunity for the demagogue. It is the costs added after the food leaves die farm which make food expensive. We call attention to the disitetrous, -unwise and unfair policies of the government some months back in placing a &fling on bed without across-the-board ceilings and con- trol on everything. This did not lead to a mere loss of profits. It spelled disaster to many people. It drove some ant of business. It wiped out the assets of son*. It dislocated the orderly production, feeding and market- ing of cattle resulting in surpliises, shortages, scarcity, disastrously low prices and, later, higher prices to the consurnir. This action was taken without any justiffable economic reason. It was opposed by all *ho are knowl- edgeable in agriculture. It *as stubbornly kept on too long. We submit that unwise and unfair actions which cannot lie justified ecO- nornically should not be taken for political purposes. We suggest that those 'who select the par- ticipants and plan the agenda for the Sum,- mit Conference on Inflation see to it that al the presented; that the full story ven to the American consumers concern- ing the non-farm cost that*Contributes to the cost of food in the marketplace; that the whole story in reference to the increase in the costs that farmers must pay be vividly placed before the American public; that the facts in reference to the percentage of the income of the American consumer which is spent for food both historically and currently be presented, and that these figures be com- pared to the other nations of the world; and that the facts in relation to the price in- creases of non-food cost-of-living items be fully developed and compared. We believe that Americaa farmers have a greater stake in the fight against- inflation than any other segment of our economy be- cause of agriculture's inability to pass on added costs. American agriculture wants knowledgeable people to chartea course for fighting inflation?people who liese.the oa- pacity Eoia the will to examine an facts and the Courage to apply real solutions.. Mr. 11,0BM:it!'" C. BYRD. Mr. President, may we have order in the Senate. ? Mr. CURTIS (continuing). We commend you for the steps that you are taking and we are sum that there are many individuals in the field of agriculture who can make a distinct contribution for the good of our entire economy, With kindest personal regards, I am Itespectfully yours, And it is signed by the junior Senator from Nebraska. Mr. President, I yield back the re- mainder of my time. RECESS Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, move that the Senate stand in recess awaiting the call of the Chair. The PRESIDING OraviCER. Without objection, it is so ordered_ Thereupon, at 2:32 p.m., the Senate took a recess. The Senate reconvened at 2:38 p.m. when called to order by the President pro tempore. VISIT TO THE SENATE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE 'UNITED STATES At 2:39 p.m., the President of the United States entered the Chamber ac- companied by Senators MANSFIELD, ROBERT C. BYRD, MOSS, BIBLE, FuLBRIC?HT, BRVIN, METZENBAUM, HUGHES, HuGH SCOTT, GRIFFIN, COTTON, BENNETT, TOWER, BROCK, AIKEN, and GURNEY. The PRESIDENT pro tempore. It 'Is my distinct pleasure and privilege, on behalf of the Senate, to welcome the President of the United States to the Senate. The President will now address the Senate. [Applause.] ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT FORD The PRESIDENT. Mr. President, Sen- ator MANSFIELD, Senator SCOTT, Members of the United States Senate, I wanted to step by today just to say hello to those with whom I had an opportunity to get better acquainted and to officially ir au- gurate Pennsylvania Avenue as a two- way street. [Applause.] It is wonderful to be back in a Chamber where so much of America's history for almost 200 years has been written and, I say without any hesitation, one of the greatest experiences of my life was the privilege of presiding here, though for a relatively short period of time. [Ap- plause.] Although my tenure was quite short, I think it was long enough to convince me that the U.S. Senate is one of the greatest legislative bodies in the history of mankind. [Applause.] I think in the days and months ahead all of us must draw upon the great tradi- tions of the Senate. Our job, both in the legislative as well as in the executive branch, is to restore the people's faith In the history and tradition of our Amer- ican Government. No single man and no single woman can possibly do this all alone. It is a job for all of us working together to achieve. As Governor Rockefeller said yester- day, we must deal with some very :lard and somewhat harsh realities. We are not always going to be on the same side. It would not be America if we were. I do not think that really matters. It only matters if we end Up by being on the best side for America from one State to another. [Applause.] I would be very, very remiss if did not express my appreciation for the Sen- ate and the House going more than half- way on several measures of major im- portance in the last week Or SO. I speak here specifically of the Cost of Living Council proposal, some actions taken on appropriation matters, the action on housing, the action on pension legislation, and the legislation affecting education. I think what has taken place and transpired in these various proposals is Indicative that we can march toward the center in achieving some good results for our country as a whole. Now, I do riot intend to talk specif- ically about any prospective legislation. I think I would probably be out of order, and I certainly shall respect the rules or traditions of the Senate in that regard. As we go ahead, we must look not only at our problems at home, but also at our problems abroad. I believe we have a good'team in the executive branch of the Government, ,and I can assure you that that team will be working with this teasn, the House and the Senate, in the months ahead. Thank you very much. [Applause, Senators rising.] The PRESIDENT pro tempore nounced that Senators would assemble, to greet the President. Thereupon, the President was greeted by Senators in the well of the Senate Chamber. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPRO- PRIATION ACT, 1975 The Senate continued with the con- sideration of the bill (H.R. 16243) mak- ing appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975, and for other purposes. The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senate Will come to order. Let us have order. The Senator from Missouri is recog- nized. Mr. EAGLETON. While Senators are still on the floor, I ask for the yeas and nays on the pending amendment. Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP75600380R000700060017-5 August 21, 19Approved ForftRamisge(01960,9 ReueRriP-7-5BILWRO 00700060017-5 ? The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there a sufficient second? There is a suf- ficient second. The yeas and nays were ordered. Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, I will momentarily yield the floor to Senators JACKSON and BROOKE for a colloquy on a related subject. Before yielding, Mr. President, I must confess my senatorial naivete. As I was concluding my remarks and saw? Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, may we have order? Mr. EAGLETON. I thank the Senator from Mississippi. The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senate will come to order. Senators will take their seats. Mr. EAGLETON. As I was concluding my prepared remarks, I noticed that the visitor galleries started to fill up and the press galleries started to fill up. I thought that the "word of wisdom" had gone forth In this citadel of deliberative intelligence and that the press and thou- sands of people were coming to hear "the word." [Laughter.] My aide quickly corrected my errone- ous judgment and whispered to me, "President Ford is coming to speak to the Senate." In further explanation of my naivete, I then thought that President Ford had perhaps heard "the word" and was com- ing to make a public endorsement of my amendment. But, sadly, he did not. As I marched down to shake hands with our fine, new President, accompa- nied by Senator HATHAWAY?and not too far away was Senator NELSON?I mum- bled to Senator HATHAWAY and said: Is it too late too ask unanintoue consent to rhange the vote that three of us made last year? But, since Senator LONG is on the floor and he objects to all such unanimous- consent requests, I shall make no such request. Yes, there were three who voted "No" on the nomination of Gerald Ford to be Vice President. We did so for such rea- sons as each of us felt appropriate at that time. I, as one of the three, pray to God that my judgment passed at that time was wrong. History will determine the future course of this country. History will determine the wisdom, or lack there- of, of my vote. I have been mightily impressed by what I have seen of and heard from our 38th President. If my judgment was wrong last year, then so be It. I think I speak the sentiments of all Senators who are here today when I say that we have been deeply touched not only by what the President said to us, but by the fact that he came to this Chamber to say it to us, face to face. I am an honored individual, indeed, to have been here today. I now yield to the Senator from Wash- ington. Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I yield first to the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Bsocia) . Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, it is not my intention to take a great deal of the Senate's time in discussing the "stra- tegic initiatives" advocated by Secretary Schlesinger. At the initiative of the dis- tinguished junior Senator from New Hampshire the Senate, in closed session, discussed this issue in some depth dur- ing debate on the fiscal year 1975 defense authorization bill. Nor is it my intention to propose the deletion of funding in this appropriation bill for several strategic programs?the terminally guided MARV, guidance im- provements for Minuteman III and the MARK 12A warhead and reentry ve- hicle?which I believe to be premature reactions to admittedly disturbing de- velopments in Soviet strategic programs. Given the evident belief by large major- ities in both Houses that the United States should proceed with research and development in these areas, such an amendment would be futile. I term these funding proposals pre- mature because I have yet to find con- vincing reasons, either in deterrence theory or by examination of the linkages between technological possibilities and our strategic policies, to believe that the Initiatives proposed by Secretary Schle- singer will result either now or in the fu- ture in an enhancement of our national security through increased stabilization of the deterrent relationship between ourselves and the Soviet Union. This ob- jective must be the criterion by which we judge any proposed alterations in our strategic posture. The most disturbing aspect of the pro- posed "strategic initiatives" is the pos- sibility that they foreshadow deployment programs that will eventually undermine the stability of the superpower deterrent relationship. Such stability is predicated, to a great extent, on the assumption that neither side will have an incentive to strike first in a crisis situation. However, a marriage of significant accuracy im- provements with increased yield that re- sults in one or both sides achieving a significant silo-busting capability will in- evitably increase the incentives to strike first in extreme crisis situations. As a noted British strategist has written: Especially at a moment of acute political anxiety, the existence of that capability, whatever the intention behind it, is bound to force a nervous adversary to consider whether he can afford not to strike first, lest he allow himself to be at least partially disarmed. This would be especially true if one of the adversaries maintained the major portion of his strategic inventory in fixed land-based missiles as is the case with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the pressures on a power emphasizing the sea-based deterrent, such as the United States, will be less intense because less of Its strategic inventory will be threatened by an effective silo-busting capability. Nevertheless, it too would likely experi- ence increased pressures to consider a first strike under certain conditions. I am also troubled by the implicit as- sumption in the Secretary's proposals that nuclear war can be waged at various levels of intensity and that escalation from one level to another can be con- trolled. Fortunately, we have no prac- tical experience by which to judge whether or not this is the case. More importantly, I fear that deter- S 15539 rence may be weakened by emphasis on planning for war scenarios having escala- tory nuclear exchanges as a prime focus. This creates the impression that sooner or later the nuclear threshold will be breached arid it is only prudent to plan for that eventuality. Such fatalism, un- fortunately, may prove self-fulfilling to the degree that it inspires alteratibns in our strategic posture that decrease the Inhibitions regarding use of nuclear weapons. The "strategic initiatives" sug- gested by Secretary Schlesinger threaten to be such alterations. The assumption that proposals to ex- ploit technical possibilities in the ac- curacy-yield combination will influence the Soviet Union to adopt policies more conducive to the U.S. position on a permanent limitation on offensive strate- gic systems is also open to question. Many respected analysts of Soviet mili- tary policy seriously question whether Soviet planners will give much heed to such a blunt signal. The more likely re- action in the Kremlin will be to continue development of MIRVed delivery ve- hicles while stepping up efforts to achieve a Soviet form of efficient accuracy-yield combination. I seriously doubt that we can substantially affect the tempo of Soviet strategic developments through Initiatives that appear to be a direct challenge to the survivability of their own strategic forces. It is also disturbing that many readily accept the view that research and de- velopment on these "strategic programs" Is only a first step in a process that can easily be arrested at any time. In theory this may be the case. However, past prac- tice leads me to believe that the tempta- tion to deploy such capabilities once they are fully developed will likely prove ir- resistible regardless of whether or not world conditions or our own self-inter- ests justify such deployment. MIRV deployment is a -case in point. Had a moratorium on MIRV testing been achieved and had the United States shown some unilateral restraint in MIRV deployment, concern over the possible evolving Soviet MIRV threat to our land- based ICBM's would have been much less today and there would be far less reason to give serious attention to the initia- tives advocated by Secretary Schlesinger. The perceptual affect of these research and development decisions may be far more pervasive than is commonly thought. Once the U.S. research and de- velopment phase has been completed on these programs, a prudent security plan- ner in the Kremlin may feel compelled to assume deployment will take place re- gardless of congressional actions. One can count missiles and staging platforms but it is impossible to verify, short of on-site inspection, whether or not yield and accuracy improvements have been deployed. Hence, the Soviet Union will likely feel pressured to fashion its stra- tegic policies and weapons to take ac- count of assumed deployment of U.S. silo-busting capabilities regardless of whether or not such deployment actually takes place. This, in turn, may stimulate many of the destabilizing tendencies I have already mentioned. In pointing out the real or potential Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP75600380R000700060017-5 S 15540 Approved For Frairiairibieg.: EVIAMBRIT5B00461O007000600141-25gust negative implications of these "strategic initiatives," I do not mean to imply that I am unconcerned about the threat Posed to our security by the dtenatiaic nature a ongoing Soviet strategic programs. tt would be dangerous and injurious to U.S. security and world stabilitylf we allowed ourselves to become strategically inferior in any significant respect to the Soviet Union. I share Secretary Schleeinger's view that we must take the atm& necessary to insure that this does not happen. How- ever, I do not believe that the course at action proposed by the Secretary is the only or necessarily the be alternative open to us. Other strategic alternatives do exist. Indeed, the United States has an active strategic program, disregarding the counterforce initiative% that will deny the Soviet Union any unitary advantage should it continue its strategic mtssile buildup to a point where it threatene to achieve a significant disarming capa- bility against our fixed land-ba.sed strar tegic forces. One needs only point to the Trident or B?1 programs as well SA tilt active investigation of various modes for mobile ICBM's to substantiate this assertion. It is my belief that in the next few years, as the debate over the U.S. stra- tegic posture continues .the Congress and the Executive should thoroughly explore alternative strategic empha- sizing the ability to der,v the Soviet Union any benefits it might attempt to achieve through seeking a disarming capability vis-a-vis any of our strategic forces. At the same time we should eschew any similar attempt to deploy a disarming capability against fixed land- based missiles or other straiegic systems of the U.S.S.R. Through continued efforts to achieve success in the SALT negotiations and through a strategic policy that seeks to avoid offensive first-strike threats to any of the components of the Soviet ill:don"; deterrent forces while denying a similar disarming capability to theKremlin vi- a-vis any segments of our strategic Triad. Nee can best hope for the tUtablishment of greater security for ourselves and others and for a lessening of the dangers of the nuclear age. This should be our overriding goal and should guide deci- sions involving the modification or de- velopment of U.S. strategic nuclear weaponry. Mr. President, the committee report quotes Secretary Schlesinger to the effect that a prineipal feature of U.S. strategic Policy should be, The avoidance of any ccanbination of forces that could be taken saan. adort to acquire the ability to execute a first-strike disarming attack against the trssit. Hopefully, we all support that view. However, to talk of a "first-strike dis- arming attack" in such Iertieral ten* Ignores the possibility that one could seek a disarming capability against a certain portion of an adversary's zumlear arsenal, silth as fixed, land-based mis- siles, and still maintain that the "com- bination of forces" sought for deploy- ment would not give one the ability to execute a drst-strike disarming attack against the U.S.S.R? In order to forestall any misconcep- tions in this regard, the report also states that the committee construes the Secre- tary's statement to mean that the United States will not seek to deploy a first- strike disarming capabrity against fixed land-based or other strategic systems of the 'U.S.S.R. I interpret this to mean that 4 should continue to be U.S. policy to eschew any attempts to achieve an accuracy-yield combination on our Mis- siles that would provide us with an ef- ficient silo-busting capability that could be construed by a reasonable opponent as an effort to achieve a disarming capa- bility vis-a-vis his fixed land-based mis- siles. Does the Senator from Vtashington agree with my interpretation? Mr. JACKSON. The question, as I understand the matter posed by the distinguished Senator from Massachu- setts, essentially refers to the statement in the report of the Committee on Armed Services quoting Secretary Schlesir ger as follows: .& principal feature of United States strxte- gic policy should be the avoidance of any combination of forces that could be taken as an effort to acquire the ability to execute a frststrike disarming attack against the U.S.S.R. The Appropriations Committee goes on to construe this to refer to "such a deployed capability against fixed land- based or other strategic systems of the U.S.S.R." I take it that the Senator's question essentially is, Do I agree with this con- struction of Secretary Schlesinger's re- marks? The answer is, "yes." It is not the stra- tegic policy of the United States to de- ploy systems that could execute a first strike attack against land-based or other strategic forces of the U.S.S.R. It should be pointed out, however, that the stra- tegic policy of the United States should not be limited to the single option, of attacking the civilian population of the Soviet Union. The report of the Senate Armed Services Committee, with which the Appropriation Committee associated itself, is clear on that point. Taking both the growth of Soviet forces and future developments at SALT Into account, we should be working to de- sign a strategic policy that will provide for enhanced flexibility in our strategic forces. Continuing research and development along the lines of the strategic initia- tives advocated by Secretaries Schlesin- ger and Kissinger is an essential part of that effort, and I am glad that the Com- mittee on Armed Services and the Com- mittee on A,ppropriationa have recognized that fact and supported those programs. Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, in my conversations with the Senator from Washington he stated that the "strategic initiatives" proposed by Secretary Schle- singer were research and development initiatives only. He stressed that a clear distinction must be made between re- search and development efforts and pro- duction-deployment decisions. I fully agree with this view. However, at some 21, 1974 point in the future pressures are Likely to occur for deployment of the accuracy- yield capabilities that are Pinkly to be developed through the proposed 'Stra- tegic initiatives" programs. In contem- plation of these pressures, I wonder if the Senator from Washington has any views regarding what, if any, conditions would justify deployment of an accuracy-yield capability that would provide the United States with an efficient silo-busting "effigient" refendng to a 2-to-I or 1-to-i ratio of warhead to silo de- struction. Mr. JACKSON. To state it another way, as I understand the-Senator's clues- tion, under 'what circumstances would I favor moving from the research and de- velopment of a missile with a significant silo-killing capability to the actual de- ployment of such a weapon? First, let me say that there can be no hard and fast answer to that question. But I think it is useful to discuss the factors that would go into any decision to deploy missile systems capable cf de- stroying Soviet silos on a one-to-one basis. These factors. are, first, the future growth of Soviet forces. lithe Soviets ex- ploit their throw-weight advantage by deploying a significant number of ac- curate MIRVs or additional missiles, they could acquire the capability to destroy a large fraction of our land-betted iorces utilizing only a small fraction of theirs. This would place the United States at an unacceptable disadvantage, and in my judgment we would require acapabil- ity to destroy their reserve forces as an essential part of any American reline- tory attack. The second. factor relates to future de-. velopznents a SALT. We need to achieve a SALT II agree- ment based on essential equivalence. Such an agreementis unlikely to include limitations on accuracy, since there is no way to verify accuracy. X do not ladieve that we could have a stable SALT II agreement over the long rim if the tech- noIogical quality of our forces were al- lowed to deteriorate in comparison with Soviet forces. We must assume thatthe Soviets will continue to improve their technology and that we will, therefore, have to con- tinue to improve dirs. With a SALT 31I agreement that provides for reductions to a level of equality, we might be able to defer indefinitetz the deployment of extremely high accuracy-high yield mis- siles. Without such a SALT agreement, we might not. It is simply too scon, I think, at this point in history to come to a final conclusion. Mr. BROOKE. Then, as I understand It, we are ha agreement on the distinc- tion between, research and development efforts and production and deployment decisions? There seinns to be no question of that point. Mr. JACKSON. That is right. We have made a clearcut distinction in this appro- priation bill, together with the author- ization bill, Mr. Ptesiderid, between re- search and development on the one side and actual deployment and produetion. Mr. liROOICE. W'hat we are doing in this appropriations bill is merely re- Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP75600380R000700060017-5 /Approved For Relesse2aa&lafitfla, vriletAiam August 21, ki-KAL-Nunzaa.t?imm z5EgINkoft9 00700060017-5 S 15541 search and development, is that not correct? Mr. JACKSON. The Senator is correct. Mr. BROOKE. And prior to any time we move to production and deployment decisions, we will again have to assess the posture of the U.S.S.R. as far as its strategic posture is concerned and deter- mine what the proper course of action should be to maintain our own security. Mr. JACKSON. That is correct. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent to place in the RECORD that section of the report of the Committee on Armed Services dealing with the authorization bill, pertaining to aspects of the bill con- cerning the strategic initiatives, research and development. I do that, Mr. Presdent, because we have, of course, the language of the report of the appropriations bill before us, but we do not have this item. There being no objection, the section of the report was ordered to be printed In the RECORD, as follows: ASPECTS OF BILL OF SPEC/AL INTEREST STRATEGIC INITIATIVES?RESEARCH AND * DEVELOPMENT Defense Department proposal Both in his testimony before the commit- tee and his posture statement, Secretary Schlesinger presented a thoughtful, com- prehensive analysis of U.S. strategic policy. One of Secretary Schlesinger's major themes was the importance of strategic flexibility. While pointing out the importance of the as- sured destruction mission, Secretary Schle- singer highlighted its limitations, stressing, in particular, that the President must have a full range of strategic options to cover a variety of contingencies. The Secretary ar- gued strongly that the United States must not limit its strategic objectives to the threat to destroy millions of innocent civilians as the sole?or even the principal?response to potential Soviet actions. To provide for a necessary range of options, Secretary Schlesinger announced a new em- phasis in targeting policy. As outlined to the committee, this emphasis in targeting doc- trine does not represent a major departure from past 'U.S. policy. Indeed it is consistent with the committee's longstanding convic- tion that the United States must have the capability to destroy a variety of selected targets, military and civilian, if and when necessary. In addition, several new R&D programs have been proposed in an effort to develop a broader range of strategic options. The fol- lowing programs have been proposed: Navy: Submarine Launched Cruise Missile Terminally Guided Maneuvering Reentry Vehicle Air Force: Air Launched Cruise Missile Mobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Improved Yield for Minuteman Improved Accuracy for Minuteman Increased Number of Minuteman Reentry Vehicles According to Secretary Schlesinger, these specific R&D programs in large measure rep- resent hedges against the potential growth and development of Soviet strategic forces as well as the outcome of SALT II. Finally, Secretary Schlesinger reported to the committee on the relentless momentum of Soviet strategic weapons development. As Secretary Schlesinger declared in his pos- ture statement, "In summary, the new So- viet ICBM program represents a truly mas- sive effort?four new missiles, new bus-type dispensing -systems, new M1RVed payloads, new guidance, new-type silos, new launch techniques, and probably new warheads." The breadth and depth of the new Soviet missile development is both surprising and disturbing. - Committee action In assessing the strategic initiatives pro- posed by the Defense Department, the com- mittee shares a fundamental commitment to the principles of deterrence and to the main- tenance of a U.S.?U.S.S.R. strategic balance based upon parity. Although making some minor dollar reductions, the committee felt that the new strategic initiatives were neces- sary to maintain and implement these prin- ciples and should be supported. By its action the committee seeks to in- sure that the necessary resources are avail- able to the United States in order to main- tain its technological margin in the face of Soviet strategic advancements. Under the provisions of the interim agreement on stra- tegic weapons, Soviet strategic missile forces are numerically superior to our own. More- over, they deploy three times the missle throw weight of the comparable 'U.S. forces. A vigorous program of research and develop- ment on the part of the United States is es- sential to our effort to maintain the stability of the strategic balance. The committee believes that the strategic programs recommended to be authorized for fiscal year 1975 are a particularly appropriate means of maintaining the technological margin of our strategic missile forces in a period of rapid Soviet technological develop- ment. The programs are not primarily de- signed to make numerical additions to our existing strategic forces. On the contrary, the major thrust of these research and develop- ment programs is to upgrade our existing forces so as to enable them to be used with greater discrimination and with less unin- tended damage over a broader range of se- lected options. Finally, the committee wishes to reaffirm, as it has in the past, its hope for a successful and stabilizing follow-on agreement at the SALT negotiations. The nature and extent of the deployments that these strategic initiatives will enable us to make will inevitably reflect the out- come of present and future negotiations at SALT as well as the evolution of Soviet stra- tegic forces. It is worth pointing out that the new strategic programs now underway in the Soviet Union, which have given rise to great concern within the committee, have all come to light since the conclusion of the ABM treaty and the Interim Agreement on Offen- sive Weapons. In authorizing these programs, the committee intends to demonstrate, with unmistakable fOrce and clarity, its resolve never to allow the Soviets to obtain strategic superiority. These new R&D programs create the most compelling incentive for Soviet re- straint in the technological exploitation of its numerically superior strategic forces and for a genuine effort to conclude a stabilizing SALT II agreement. The improved accuracy-yield issue The primary focus in the deliberations on strategic initiatives was on the issue of whether it was in the best interests of the United States to improve the accuracy and yield of U.S. missiles. The $77 million re- quest was as follows: Improved Guidance to increase the accuracy of the Minuteman force, Maneuvering Reentry Vehicle (MaRV) with terminal guidance for increased accu- racy of the Trident missile, and Mark 12A to increase the yield of the Minuteman force. The committee voted to support the pro- posed accuracy-yield program for a variety of reasons. There were, however, as discussed below, four principal points upon which a broad consensus was achieved. First, the committee has long been con- cerned to sustain the technological excel- lence of our strategic forces and, wherever possible, to improve the efficiency of those forces. Improving the accuracy of our stra- tegic forces enables us to broaden the range of options available to the President and to minimize the collateral damage associated with a retaliatory strike in the event that deterrence fails. Moreover, improved accu- racy enhances the values of our existing strategic forces by permitting one strategic launch vehicle to accomplish a strategic mission that might, with less accurate weap- ons, require several such weapons. Given the growth and development of Soviet strategic forces, a deterrent posture based principally on the threat to retaliate against Soviet civilians, knowing that such a strike would almost certainly lead to the destruction of millions of American civil- ians, is less and less credible. Development of the technology required for a range of more discriminating?and more credible? responses is, in the judgment of the commit- tee, simple prudence. Second, a purposeful failure to improve the accuracy and yield of our strategic war- heads would be a gratuitous self-constraint. Since the growth of Soviet strategic forces, especially that reported to the committee by Secretary Schlesinger, appears to be accel- erating such a unilateral constraint on our part would give the Soviets the strategic initiative. Third, several members emphasized that the development of these yield and accuracy improvements would not be a commitment to deployment. At a relatively modest cost, these developments provide an important hedge against future as well as developing Soviet programs in ? addition to preserving flexibility. Fourth, the committee was extremely sensitive to the importance of negotiating from a position of strength in the complex SALT deliberations. In reviewing SALT I it was noted that favorable Congressional ac- tion on the ABM program enabled us to do precisely that. The Secretary of Defense will advise the committee of any developments affecting Soviet strategic capabilities, includ- ing the conclusion of further agreements at SALT, that may bear on the committee's assessment of the strategic initiatives au- thorized in this bill. The committee would also like to stress that these improvements are not intended to provide the United States with a first-strike capability. The committee agrees with Secre- tary Schlesinger that a principal feature of United States policy should be, "The avoid- ance of any. combination of forces that could be taken as an effort to acquire the ability to execute a first-strike disarming attack against the USSR." Conclusion In summary, the committee considers that maintaining technological superiority in strategic weapons, even more so than in other areas of weaponry, is critical to the future deterrent posture of the United States. The line of demarcation between re- search and development and production is clearly defined. The Soviets have thus far made it clear that research and development is in no way constrained by the agreements reached at SALT I. In fact, their own rate of development nearly underlines this point. Thus, the committee recommends supporting the strategic initiatives proposed by the De- fense Department. Mr. EAGLETON. I ask the distin- guished Senator from Washington how long his colloquy with the junior Sen- ator from Masachusetts will go on? Mr. BROOKE. We have concluded our colloquy. I wanted the opportunity to discuss with the Senator from Wash- ington his views as far as the question of a first-strike capability is concerned. Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP75600380R000700060017-5 S 15542 Approved For tospgatetlf61?01/ :TEMODB7-5EIMon000moo600lzheigust 21, 1974 Presidential statements and those of the Secretary of Defense confirin that it Is U.S. policy not to seek sti first-strike capability. I want to be. sure that it is understood that in appropriating this money for R. & D. on ifscreased ac- curacy and yield, we are not ?hanging our strategic doctrine. I think :the Senator from Washington has agreed that 'this does not represent a change in the stra- tegic doctrine of the United_States. Mr. JACKSON. The Seltor is cor- rect. I want to complimeithe distin- guished Senator from Massgehusetts for his able assistance in our joint effort to agree on report language in the bill which is before the Senate. That Innguage does have the informal concurrepce, as I mi- derstand it, of the Secretary of Defense, speaking for the administration. Likewise, the language in the report in connection with the Defense authori- zation bill for the current fiscal year, which I previously referred to, reme- seats, to my knowledge, a 'view that Is concurred in by the Secraary of De- fense, speaking for the administration. Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, I had the Intent, first, of offering in-the Defense Appropriations Subcommit*e and then, failing there, in the Conn/dace on Ap- propriation and, failing Mere, on the 'flOor of the Senate, an amendment whch would have deleted the approximately $77 million for R. & D. on accuracy and field improvements. I feel strongly that these programs may be interpreted as a sign that we might be moving in a direc- tion of seeking a first-strike capabiltly at least aganst fixed land-based strategic systems. After discussion with the distinguished chairman of the Senate qaminittee on Appropriations and subsequently with the distinguished junior Senator from Washington, report lang- uage was worked out which clearly indicates that such is not the intent of tlie Committee on Appropriations in recommending these funds. Moreover, frot the quoted remarks of the Secretary qf Defense, I assume it is the intent of the administra- tion not to seek a first-strIke capability against either fixed land-based or other strategic systems of the U.S.R. More- over, I assume there Is no change be- tween the intent of former President Richard Nixon, and Preshient Gerald Ford In this rd am very grateful to the distinguished Senator from Washington for Joining this colloquy and for working together with me on the report laliguage which is provided in the report of their Com- mittee on Appropriations. - Mr. JACKSON. I thank the Senator. Let me just conclude by repeating the report laugUage, quoting Secreta17 Schlesinger: A principal feature of United States stra- tegic policy should be, "The ayoidance of any cotablnation of forces that timid be taken as an effort to acquire the ateinty to execute a first-strike disarming sista& against the USSR." I think that speaks for itself, and I believe that my distinguished colleague from Mastaehusetts agrees that the combination of the statement of the Sec- retary of Defense, the statement of the Committee on 'Appropriations, and the statement of the Committee on Armed Services, In the reports of tEutise hiffso conforms to his understanding and my understanding. I thank the Senator for his very help- ful dialog here. Mr. 'BROOKE. I thank the Senator. Mr. JACKSON. The dialog has been one that I hope will dissipate the con- fusion. Mr.Presid.ent, / ask unanirrious con- sent to. have printed at this point in the Rncorui four articles pertaining to this subject matter. There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RED- ORD, RS follows: I From the Scientific American, May 1974] NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS iBy Barry Carter) "Should a President, in the event of a ]1U- clear attack, be left with the single option of ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilian's, in the face of the certainty that It would be followed by the mass slaughter of Americans? Should the concept of assured desk elation be narrowly defined and should it be the only measure of cur ability to deter the variety of threats we may face?" The questions asked in the preceding quo- tation, taken from President Nixon's first foreign-policy report in 19'.4), have been cited repeatedly in the past few months by Ad- ministration spokesmen in an effort to ex- plain and justify some significant changes that are being made in U.S. policy regarding its strategic military forces The new strategy, spelled out Most clearly in Secretary of De- fense 4amett R. Schlesinger's annual report for the fiscal year 1975, release4 in March seeks "to provide the President with a wider set of much more selective targeting op- tions," and hence greater "flexibility," in . choosing an appropriate responds to "any kind of nuclear attack." As the opening quotation illustrates, much of the , official rhetoric concerning this :Lew development in U.S. strategic policy has teen more misleading than illuminating. To criti- cize the "aspired destruction" doctrine of the past decade or so as planning only for MSS-. stve retaliation against .Russian cities ignores the fact (belatedly acknowledged by Scale- singer) that U.S. strategic forces have for years had, the capability, both in weapons and in, planing, for a "flexible response." More important, the broad hypothetical issues `invoked by such public statements have tended to obscure the more immediate real issues presented by this Administration's recent actions. The mai issues are serious ones. The pri- mary operational question at present ill whether or not the U.S. should develop mis- siles with an Improved capability for attack- ing "hardened" targets It. the tte.s.n.. The main rationale offered for developing such an improved "counterforce" capability (so called because it is aimed at an opponent's military forces) is that it is "impermissible" for the 'U.S. not to "match" certain Russian ociunterforce developments. There is also the suggestion that these minsiles would mini- mize "Unintended collateral damage." The nrededing question in turf raises the subtler issue of how the active promotioa of such programs for improved counterforce capabilities affects the stability of the stra- tegic nuclear deterent and hence the likeli- hood that there will be a nuclear war. Be- fore ohs oaf address these two issues one must Imderstand why public debate should propecy focus on each questions and not (at this time anyway) on the kind of questiorul posed in President Nixon's 1970 remarks. In the late 1960's and early 1960's US. strategic Policy went through a serips of transformations. By 1962 American nal itary planners recognized that the U.S. would have many more miasiles than the U.S.S.R. could have for several years and in fact many more /Pigmies than were requinni to devastate every major city in the US.S.R. A counter- force strategy therefore held out the attrac- tive option of limiting damage to U.S. cities by destroying a substantial part of the Rus- sian strategic force& In language that sounds remarkably familiar today, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara said in a speech in Ann, Arbor, Mich.: "The United States has come to the conclusion that, to the extent feasible, basic gcnitary strategy In a possible general nuclear war should be approached in much the same way that more conventional military operations have been regarded in the past. That let to say, principal military objectives, in the client of a nuclear war stemming from a major attack on the &inane% should be the destruction of the enemy's military forces, not of his civilian population." The Russians, holwever. continued to deploy land-based intercontinental ballistie missiles (I(JBM's) and subniarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBans). As a result, even If the U.S. sought to limit damage to itself by the partial destruction of the Russian strategic forces, there would still be more than enough Russian fortes left to kill tens of millions of Americans. Recognizing this fact, McNamara increasingly emphealzed by the mid-1960's the coneept at "assured destruction," which be said in 1968 meant the -ability, even after absorbing a well.. coordinated surprise first strike, to millet unacceptable damage on the attacker.' ThEa criterion he defined explicirty: "In the case of the Soviet 'Union, I would judge that a. capability on our part to destroy, say one- fifth to one-fourth of her population and one-half of her industrial capacity would serve as an effective deterrent." Pew concepts have been as maligned or misunderstood as that of Assured elattrue- tion. Critics label it genocide or use the acronym of "mutual assured destruction" to can it man nt fact, the concept seems well designed to serve two purposes. First, by planning the size of VB. forces on the basis of the "worst case" scenario of an all-out Russian surprise attack, it ensures that the U.S. possesses the ultimate threat: to be able to wipe out the U.S.S.R. or any attacker in retaliation. Second, since the destructicn cri- terion is reasonably precise, the concept pro- vides a useful basis for limiting strategic.. weapons proourement and for evaluating arms-control proposals. While retaining the assured-destruction concept, McNamara and his successsor, Clark Clifford, supervised the development of the wide array of weapons that constitutss to- day's U.S. strategic arsenal. Both the num- bers and the characteristics of many of these weapons were consistent with the assured-de- struction concept, partly because the U S. possesses a 'triad" of strategic offensive forces and partly because of the hedge !against the "highest expected threat." The triad approach seeke to maintain a major retaliatory capability in each component of our strategic offensive forces:: ICBM's, SLIIM's and long-range bombers. Justified on the grounds that each component presents a different problem for an attacker, difficult end costly problems for his defense Ind a hedge against unexpected failures in one or both of the other components, the rot re- sult of the triad approach is to prov de in the aggregate a high degree of confidence that the assured-destructima mission could be carried out. The hedge against the highest expected threat, as projected in the National Intel- ligence Estimates, meant that weapons would be developed and sometimes procured as a Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP75600380R000700060017-5 A 9 Tr proved For 7-5 August 21, cushion against Russian developments that, although not considered likely; were pos- sible. The predictable result was that the U.S. came to possess much more powerful forces than were shown by subsequent events to be required for -assured destruction. Il'or example, one of the main justifications offered for developing multiple independ- ently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV's) was to hedge against a greater-than-expected Russian deployment of an anti-ballistic-mis- sile (ABM) system on the theory that in- creasing the number of incoming warheads would enable the U.S. offense to penetrate the Russian defense more easily. Of course, some of the development and procurement decisions also reflected inevita- ble political and bureaucratic pressures. For example, faced with pressures from the mili- tary and from Congress, McNamara appar- ently thought he could not ask for fewer than 1,000 Minuteman ICBM's. Finally, the Proponents of the assured- destruction concept in the latter half of the 1960's quietly subscribed to secondary strate- gic objectives, in particular the desire to retain some ability to respond flexibly in the ease of an actual attack. If the U.S. were subjected to a "limited" nuclear attack? possibly with a small number of missiles or because of an accident launch?most thought the President should have a range of options from which to choose. This factor helps to explain why, for example, the Min- uteman II warhead, which was first deployed in 1966, could be programed for up to eight alternative targets, and why there was flexi- bility in the actual targeting plans. As a result the U.S. ended up with stra- tegic-war capabilities considerably greater than the assured-destruction concept re- quired. That this situation was rarely ac- knowledged publicly was a serious mistake, the results of which we are now reaping in public misunderstanding of the policies of the past and, more important, in the some- times surprising ignorance about the present capabilities of the U.S. strategic forces. The simple fact, which cannot be stressed too strongly, is that the U.S. strategic forces are now capable of carrying out a large array of alternative missions, far in excess of assured destruction. To begin with, assured destruction does not require many forces. Assuming zero or low Russian ABM levels (a reasonable assumption given the 1972 Moscow Treaty limiting ABM systems), the delivered warheads of 220 Min- uteman in ICBM's could kill about 21 per- cent of the Russian population from imme- diate effects alone and destroy about 72 per- sent of the Russian industrial capacity. The delivered warheads from 170 Poseidon mis- siles (which is fewer than the total carried by 12 submarines) could cause a similar level of damage [see illustration on page 24]. Projec- tions of bomber survivability vary greatly, but most experts would estimate that enough B-52's could reach their targets to satisfy easily the traditional assured-destruction criterion. . . The total of U.S. strategic forces is, of course, much larger. There are at present 1,054 ICBM's, of which 1,000 are Minuteman missiles and 54 are the older, larger Titans. Of the Minuteman missiles 550 have been or are in the process of being converted to the Minuteman III, which can carry up to three warheads. These MIRV's are estimated?to have an accuraty of 1,500 feet or less (ex- pressed in terms of "circular error probable," which means that 50 percent of the warheads are expected to fall within a radius of 1,500 feet of the target). The explosive power, or yield, of each warhead is equivalent to be- tween 170 and 200 kilotons of TNT, or at least 11 times the size of the 15-kiloton bomb dropped on Hiroshima. Rapid retargeting of the Minuteman III will be possible soon with tho advent of new computer-software sya- tams, such as the Command Data Buffer sys- tem. (All estimates of the numbers and char- acteristics of U.S. forces used in this article are taken from the statements of U.S. officials, from publications of the International Insti- tute of Strategic Studies and from other reli- able publications.) In addition the U.S. arsensal includes 656 SLEM's, 496 of Which are scheduled to be- come Poseidon missiles. The Poseidon can carry uP to 14 MIRV's, but it is usually de- ployed with 10. Although accuracy might be reduced by uncertainties about the subma- rine's location, it still is probably less than 3,000 feet. Moreover, even though each war- head is smaller than Minuteman's, there are many more of them and each is still about three times the size of the Hiroshima bomb. Like the Minuteman III warheads, the Posei- don warheads can be retargetell quickly. Bombers are often viewed as the step- child of the U.S. strategic triad. The ap- proximately 400 B-52's and 65 FB 1.11.'s are unaccountably ignored in many comparative tables of American and Russian strategic forces, notably in President Nixon's first three foreign-policy reports. This Is surpris- ing given the fact that an estimated 40 per- cent of the U.S. budget for strategic offen- sive forces is spent on bombers. Moreover, from the standpoint of nuclear strikes the per-sortie attrition rate of about 3 percent suffered by the B-52's in their attacks on heavily defended Hanoi demonstrated high survivability. Indeed, most places in the U.S.S.R. would not be as heavily defended as Hanoi, the B-52's would not be making the more vulnerable high-altitude attacks they made there and the bombers would use nuclear warheads to silence air-defense bat- teries. Each B-52 carries between four and 24 nuclear weapons, the load being a vari- able mix of gravity bombs and air-to-surface missiles. The bombs can be in the megaton range (that is, equal to 1,000 kilotons) and can be delivered with very high accuracy. (This accounting of the U.S. strategic forces does not include the extensive U.S. "tactical" nuclear forces, many of which could attack targets in the U.S.S.R. In addi- tion to the more than 7,000 tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, many such weapons are deployed in Asia and on forward-deployed ships in the Atlantic and the Pacific.) In short, the US. already has a considera- ble potential for "limited" strategic strikes. Exactly how much capability depends on the critical assumption of who strikes first and how, as well as on one's assumptions about the nature of the Russian threat. In any case three important factors should be remembered about potential targets in the U.S.S.R.: 1. There are Many nonmilitary, industrial targets outside urban centers that would require only one or two nuclear warheads each; such targets include manufacturing plants, power plants and the two construc- tion yards for missile submarines. 2. Except for "hardened" targets, most military targets could be destroyed by only one or two warheads each; such targets in- clude air-defense sites, military airfields, major army bases and submarine bases. 3. Even for hard targets such as missile silos, nuclear-weapons storage facilities and command posts, the use of small numbers of warheads will create a high probability of destruction. For instance, three Minuteman III warheads delivered against three Rus- sian missile silos with a "hardness" about the same as that of the U.S. silos when they were first built would have approximately an 80 percent chance of destroying one silo, whereas seven Minuteman III warheads would have a similar 80 percent probability of knocking out one silo three times as hard. Presumably many Russian missile silos have a hardness in this range. As a result, even with existing missiles a S 15543 limited strike by the U.S. that employed 100 missiles or fewer could do substantial damage to the 'U.S.S.R. and could knock out some Russian ICBM's. In calculating the sufficiency of our strategic forces, one should not forget the Chinese. For any conceivable "crisis scenario" the total expenditure of U.S. warheads against China could easily come from the present surplus exceeding the weapons needed for the assured-destruction mission against the U.S.S.R. Not only could the U.S. destroy most of the nascent Chinese nuclear forces, but also it has been estimated that a few warheads detonated over 50 Chinese urban centers would destroy half of the urban population (more than 50 million people), more than half of the industrial capacity and most of the key governmental, technical and managerial personnel. 'Indeed, against fixed targets such as cities the 'U.S. could use its B-52's, which could return to their bases for other missions. Not only does the U.S. have this multi- faceted capability but also its nuclear strategy has always included plans for at- tacks other than massive ones on Russian cities. This conclusion is logically inescapa- ble when one realizes that the U.S. has had thousands of strategic warheads since the mid-1960's, has abuot 7,500 now and is ex- pected to have almost 10,000 by 1977. There are only about 200 major cities in the U.S.S.R. Either the 'U.S. has aimed a superfluously large number of warheads at each major city 43r it has planned for other targets all along. Any doubts on this score were resolved by Secretary Schlesinger's statement in March that "our war plans have always included military targets." President Nixon has made it very clear from the early days of his Administration that he wanted changes in U.S. strategic policy. Neither he nor any other high official, includ- ing Secretary Schlesinger, has ever rejected the assured-destructioon concept. Rather they have defined assured destruction nar- rowly to mean only massive retaliation against cities and have said that more options are needed. To date the Nixon Administra- tion has really presented two different sets of what "more" is needed. First there were the "sufficiency criteria," which were pub- licized in the period from 1970 to 1972. This past year has seen the emergence of a new set of criteria. The sufficiency criteria, which President Nixon first hinted at in 1970, were spelled out by Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird in 1971. They are: 1. Maintaining an adequate second-strike capability to deter an all-out surprise at- tack on our strategic forces." 2. "Providing no incentive for the Soviet Union to strike the United States first in a crisis." 3. "Preventing the Soviet Union from gaining the ability to cause considerably greater urban/industrial destruction than the United States could inflict on the Soviets in a nuclear war." 4. "Defending against damage from small attacks or accidental launches." These four criteria have been explained further, including the fact :that the deter- rence is for the benefit of U.S. allies as well as the U.S. The publication of the sufficiency criteria at least moved the public debate off the mis- leading view that U.S. policies and forces only envisioned massive retaliation against cities, but beyond that there is little new in the criteria. This is partly because they were never clearly explained; accordingly they re- mained more Delphic than definitive. The first criterion is simply a basic state- ment of the assured-destruction concept. The third is a result of the assured-destruc- tion assumption at meaningful levels of de- struction; beyond the ability of either side to inflict 75 million fatalities and between Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP75600380R000700060017-5 S 15544 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP75600380R000700060017-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE August 21, 1974 50 and 75 percent industrial darnage?levels that would finish either country as a viable society?relative differences in ablity to inflict urban or industrial dat age seemIn- significant. Besides, much h er levels of destruction can only be achi d with con; seierable difficulty, since either country soon reaches a point of rapidly dtinishing re- turns in terms of urban or dustrial de- struction per additional warhead. The fourth criterion was dopier justifica- tion for the Safeguard A131.1 syiftem. Without getting into the debate over %itch issues all whether or not the advantages of damage limitation against small Bata% or acciden- tal launches outweighs the d dvantage of the Russians' misinterpretinethe purposes of any ABM deployment, suiSce it to say that the Administration as swirly as May, 1971, was committed to insidelficant ABlvt levels in the ongoing Strategic Arms Limita- tion Talks (SALT). The fonrth criterion thus became "Inoperative." That leaves the second criteiton. It clearly enunciates a desirable objective in strategic policy: to avoid strategic fortes or actions that would be destabilizing ite a crisis. Al- though this objective was not explicit be- fore, it was inherent in the astored-destruc- tion objective of providing highly survivable forces that would thereby redire the incen- tive for a first strike. The seceted sufficiency criterion fails to delineate what more, if any-. thing, was needed. _ The criteria are silent about the kinds of option other than assured de ruction that the President was so concerne about. More, over, should the U.S. react protect its t allies (still undefined) in the *me way that It would to protect its own itory? And what are U.S. strategic objee ves with re- gard to China? In short, exce for the flir- tation with the ABM possibil4ty, the suffi- ciency criteria only hinted at new strategiC policies rather than estalelislatag them. Instead of trying to amend the sufficiency criteria, the Administration desided about e year ago simply to scrap the and to start anew in redefining strategic bolicies. This time Secretary Schlesinger Itas been the. principal spokesman. After sow of his press conferences late in 1973 and sarly in 1974 led to confusion among jodrnalists and other observers as to what thi new policies encompassed, the appearanceof Schles- inger's annual repo in Marc clarified the rt issues considerably. At one Iace in that report the 'Principal Features of the Pro- posed Posture" (a posture, Schlesinger clearly likes to refer to as "estential equiv- alence") are listed: 1. "a capability sufficiently forge, diversi- fied, and survivable so that it will provide us at all times with high con ence of rid- ing out even a massive surprete attack and of penetrating enemy defensils, and with the ability to withhold an asseired destruc- tion reserve for an extended peeled of time." 2. "sufficient warning to ensure the sur- vival of our heavy bombers tagether with the bomb alarm systems and command-. control capabilities required by our National Corrimand Authorities to dixe4 the employ- ment of the Strategic forces ine a controlled, selective, and restrained fashisela" 3. "the forces to execute ade range of options in response to potent 1 actions by an enemy, including a capability for peeciee attacks on both soft and hardiargets, while at the same time minimizing unintended col-, lateral damage." , 4. "the avoidance of any cciribination of forces that would be taken as an effort to acquire the ability to execute a first-strike disarming attack against the USSR." 6. "an offensive capability of such size and composition that all will perceive it as in overall balance with the strategic forces of any potential opponent." 6. "effensive and defensive capabilities and programs that conform with the pro- visions of current arms control agreements and at the same time facilitate the conclu- sion of more permanent treaties to control and, if I possible, reduce the main nuclear arsenals." These factors plus the accompanying text in the report provide the best available in- sight into the proposed new policies. The f.rst factor, Combined with the second's require- ment of bomber survivability, constitutes essentially a restatement of the assured- destruction concept. It needs no further elaboration here except to note that as- sured destruction does not require imme- diate response; indeed, the emphasis on a "second strike" capability and on the sur- vivability of U.S. forces reflects the goal of having ,time in' which to consider what the appropriate response should be. Skipping briefly to the fourth, fifth and fectors, they raise a host of diverse Is- sues?touching on all offensive and defen- sive strategic programs. There is not suffi- cient space to treat them comprehensively here; instead the focus will be on their Im- pact on the Administration's concepts of strategic flexibility and limited nuclear war. The third factor and the balance of the second address the questions of flexibEity and limited strategic war directly. The un- derlying questions can best be summarized as follows: (1) Should the U.S. have a num- ber of response options? (2) Should the U.S. develop, missiles with improved counterforce capabilities? (3) Should the U.S. actively promote the idea of improving counterforce capabilities for fighting, if necessary, a lim- ited nuclear war? Since the first question is essentially nencontroversial, the remaining two define the immediate issues. Schlesinger reports that most of the tar- geting options in the past have involved "relatively massive responses." He wants to provide the President with a "wider set of ranch more selective targeting options." There is general agreemene among strategic analysts that the U.S. should have a variety of response options other than massive re- taliation against cities. These options could be useful, for example, in deterring a lim- ited strategic attack. As Paul C. Warnke, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense, has put it: "There can . be little objection to the concept that our targeting plans shoald be sufficiently flexible to provide the Presi- dent with a variety of options in the event of a nuclear attack." Wamke believes 'We might be better positioned to deter a less than all-out Soviet attack if we have the re- finement of command and control to push only one or a few buttons rather than -he entire console . . . to respond with less than our Sunday punch." This broad consensus includes those op- tions that draw on the capabilities of pres- ent forces and those already well along in development. As we have seen, our present forces already have the accuracy-yield com- binations to be used effebtively to destroy al- -most anything except hard targets. Even against such hard targets as ICBM silos these forces could destroy large numbers of tar- gets, but they would not do it "efficiently." Schlesinger makes it clear, however, 'teat he wants more than flexibility, that he wants counterforce options that require new or improved weapons. The incremental options are ones "minimizing unintended collateral damage" and providing a hard-target kill capability that "matches" that of the Rus- sians. To be able to achieve these options Schlesinger seeks programs to develop mis- siles with improved counterforce capabilites. The proposed defense budget for the fiscal year 1975 includes a number of such pro- grams. The programs appear to fall into two categories. First, there are the short-term programs, the ones that involve relatively minor changes and for which initial deployment might easily begin by the late 1970's The major programs in this category include pro- curement of more Minuteman III miesiles; refinement of the existing guidance syst-mn of the Minuteman III to increase accuracy (probably from 1,500 feet down to 700 feet or less); a higher-yield warhead for the Minute- man III identical in configuration wit a the existing warhead, and a general program to improve and measure the accuracy of SLBM's. The proposed budget also includes funds to flight-test a Minuteman HI with a larger number of smialler reentry vehicles. Whether this program will increase counter- force capabiltes or net depends on the ac- curacy and yield of the new warheads. Second, there are two major long-term programs. Both will require considerable de- velopment time, and initial deployment would seem unlikely before 1980. Advanced development will be Initiated for a termin- ally guided "maneuverable reentry vehicle" (MARV) for possible "retrofit" into both ICBM's and SLBM's. Althatigh a MARV war- head has been programmed for some time for the advanced Trident I SLBM, it is not to be terminally guided, being designed for evasion of ABM interceptors rather than for improved accuracy. A new terminally guided MARV, however, will presumably have en ac- curacy of a few hundred feet. This would give even warheads the size of the Poseidon's a very effective hard-target kill capability. Further research and development is aeed- ed to decide exactly how the new MARV will work. By definition, after the MARX has separated from the "bus," or postboost vehicle, that holds all a missile's warheads, it can maneuver almost up to impact in order to correct its flight path. The corrections could be accomplished in two ways. The most likely development is the homing MARV, what some call the true MARV. A sensor in the warhead would acquire an image tin- ages of the target or of prominent terrain features nearby (or perhaps would simply acquire an "altitude profile" of the terrain along its flight path). An on-board matehing device would match this information with a map stored in its memory. The warbead's flight path would then be corrected either by gas jets or by aerodynamic vanes. An alternative approach is to use ae in- ertial guidance system in the warhead as well as in the bus. Since the reentry vehicle often separates from the bus early in Its flight, an on-board guidance system would allow much later changes in trajectory. The information on position would come, how- ever, from the system's gyroscopes, from stars or even from satellites and not from the target area itself. As a result this ap- proach in theory would probably not De as accurate as the homing approach. The second long-term program is the de- velopment of an entirely new ICBM for the 1980's. This missile, which may even be an air-mobile missile, would include a new guidance system (presumably a terminally guided M.ARV), which Schlesinger says would give it "a very good capability against hard targets." How reasonable or necessary is it to de- velop missiles with improved counterforce capabilities in order to minimize collateral damage or to match the Russians' hard- target kill capability? It is particularly difficult to undentancl how these missiles will minimize collateral damage. The warheads Secretary Schlesinger is proposing will probably have at least the yield of the present Minuteman III and Poseidon warheads. Such warheads would cause extensive damage over a wide area. For example, a "small" 100-kiloton bomb exploding in the air over a target would cause substantial fatalities and damage from Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP75600380R000700060017-5 August .2 1 , 1 9 71p proved Foalgitstes r000700060017-5 YMPALSInetiCk..KRIP-17?FIVA3t Immediate effects alone over a circle with a radius of 2.5 miles. Since the poSsible im- provement in .accuracy for the Minuteman, for example, is at most about 1,000 feet even in the long run, the number of civilian fa- talities will hardly be reduced significantly if a warhead at least three to 11 times the size of the Hiroshima bomb lands a feW hundred feet closer to the intended target. A substantially smaller warhead that still nrovides an improved hard-target kill capa- bility is unlikely to be ready for deployment until the 1980's, since a very accurate termi- nally guided MARV is needed to allow a significant "trade-off" between lower yield and higher accuracy. Furthermore, the value of much smaller warheads In saving lives must be put in perspective. First, the way to minimize fatalities, if nuclear weapons must be used, is careful tar- get selection, in other words aiming at tar- gets distant from urban centers. Air-defense sites or air bases in the Arctic and isolated army posts or industrial sites are good ex- amples. For a very limited exchange the dif- ferences in fatality levels from an attack on such targets with warheads of, say, 50 kilo- tons as against five kilotons would not be significant. Second, if there is a large-scale nuclear ex- change, then there simply is no way of keep- ing civilian damage at a low level. The ef- fects not only of immediate blast but also of radioactivtiy would kill millions. Third, in an actual nuclear exchange the successful continuation of a U.S. policy aimed at miniminzing civilian casualties depends in large part on what the Russians do, and the Russians have never seemed much attracted to this objective. Their stra- tegic warheads have always been large. Even though they necessarily reduced the size of Individual warheads on their ICBM's in or- der to deploy MIRV's on them, some if not all of the warheads are still in the mega- ton range. Schlesinger's main justification for the new counterforce programs Is that the U.S. to match that of the U.S.S.R. This seems a questionable refinement of the broader theme of "essential equivalence." Schlesin- ger has on occasion defined essential equiva- lence to suggest overall balance. For exam- ple, lie recently testified: "We do not have to have a match for everything in their ar- senal. They do not have to have a match for everything in our arsenal." Whether or not such an overall balance exists today and for the foreseeable future is a question that deserves public debate; a good case can be made for the affirmative. Most important, both the U.S. and the :U.S.S.R. have a high-confidence ability to carry out a wide variety of retaliatory op- tions. In terms of static indicators the Rus- sians do have more missiles and greater mis- sile "throw weight." The US., however, has more bombers, more warheads (now and for the rest of the decade) and about equal throw weight (if bombers are included in the calculations). In terms of qualitative fac- tors U.S. missile submarines are much 'quieter and hence harder to find than the Russian ones, and U.S. bombers are more modern. Finally, to maintain or even en- hance some of its capabilities, the U.S. al- ready has a number of strategic programs well along: the conversion of older missiles to larger Minuteman III and Poseidon mis- siles, the B-1 bomber and the Trident sub- marine with its advanced missiles. Schlesinger, however, avoids the complex .qUeStion of whether the general U.S.-U.S.S.R. strategic picture is one of overall balance? of essential equivalenee. Rather, he selec- tively focuses on relative counterforce ca- pabilities against ICBM silos (Selective vi- sion is not exactly a new tactic in military analysis. The 'missile gap" Of 1960 is a ohs- etc case; the heated debate over the num- ber of U.S. ICBM's compared with the num- ber of Russian ICBM's ignored the massive 'U.S. bomber force. Schlesinger's selective vi- sion is even blurred within its own field. Although the Russians are clearly develop- ing new missiles and NITRV's, they appar- ently have not pursued the accuracy aspect of a counterforce strategy. with much zeal. As General George S. Brown, the chief of staff of the Air Force, recently remarked about the new Russian programs, "MIRVing alone won't [take out the Minuteman force]. Accuracy is the other key element and we haven't seen evidence of accuracy improve- ment in their work which we would expect to see." Is there some reason why the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. should have essential equiva- lence in the capability to destroy missile silos? The arguments against this course of action seem persuasive. There is no benefit in terms of traditional strategic analysis in being able to kill efficiently very large num- bers of the other side's silos. As we have established, the U.S. can already destroy some silos, although at a cost of a few U.S. missiles each. Inefficient, limited destruction of silos should suffice for the war scenarios That some envision, in which the 'U.S. feels it necessary to destroy silos as a way of show- ing its "resolve." Killing many more silos would not minimize damage to the U.S.; everyone agrees that the U.S. cannot expect to destroy a large enough fraction of the silos or other strategic offensive forces of the U.S.S.R. to limit damage to this country in any ,meaningful way. Finally a critical assumption underlying the preceding discussion is that the silos will have missiles in them when they are destroyed. In fact, the flight time of a Min- uteman missile to the Russian missile fields is about 30 minutes. If the Russians were to deploy early-warning satellites, they could detect almost instantaneously the launch of U.S. missiles, which means that the U.S.S.R. could probably have the option of launch- ing many, if not all, of its missiles before the U.S. warheads arrived. Using U.S. 'war- heads against empty silos in empty fields seems a particularly questionable policy. The full cost of these new programs is unclear. Much depends on the size of the deployments and the extensiveness of the modifications. A useful benchmark is the Minuteman III program; tile conversion of $50 older Minuteman missiles into Minute- man III's will cost between $5 billion and $6 billion. Although the costs of some of the new counterforce programs might be comparatively small, the total cost of all the new programs would greatly exceed the Min- uteman III costs. Added to the questions about the ana- lytical reason for the new counterforce pro- grams and the inevitable costs must be the distinct possibility that these programs will be destabilizing and will make arms limita- tions more difficult to negotiate. Assuming a crisis situation, a substantial U.S. counterforce capability against Russian ICBM's is more likely to create an incentive for the U.S.S.R. to adopt a hair-trigger, launch-on-warning posture; the Russian leadership would fear that the 'U.S. might attack first in an attempt to limit damage to itself. These fears would make it even more likely for the U.S.S.R. to attack first In a crisis in order to destroy some of the U.S. ICBM's that had become more tempting targets as a result of the new U.S. counter., force programs. Schlesinger deplores this instability (as In his fourth feature, cited above, of the new posture), but he and other high officials say that the new U.S. programs are not extensive enough to create such Russian fears. The conceivable accuracy and yield improvements on 1,000 Minuteman missiles, however, even without the terminally guided MARV, could give the 'U.S. the capability, on S 15545 paper at least, of destroying between 80 and 90 percent of the Russian ICBM force. The deployment of the MARV or the use of improved SLBM's against the Russian mis- siles would push that percentage even higher. The Russian leadership, moreover, might be more conservative than the U.S. leader- ship in assessing Russian strengths and weaknesses. This conservatism would be based at least partly on the fact that, unlike the balanced reliance in the U.S. on all three - elements of the strategic triad, in the U.S. S.R. ICBM's are the primary component of the strategic offensive forces. The U.S.S.R. is allowed up to 1,613 ICBM's under the SALT I Interim Agreement (compared with 1,054 for the U.S.), and the Russians are actively developing four new ICBM's. More- over, these missiles are under the command of the Strategic Rocket Forces, which since it was created in about 1960 has been one of the most important branches, if not the most important one, of the RUSSian military. Unlike the U.S. Air Force, which has respon- sibility not only for. ICBM's but also for bombers and many tactical forces,' the pri- mary responsibility of the Strategic Rocket Forces is the Russian ICBM force; conse- quently this organization has every incen- tive to enhance its role in strategic planning. The Long Range Aviation command, which has responsibility for the Russian bombers, has never had the bureaucratic strength of the Strategic Rocket Forces, and the Russian navy has responsibility for a number of other forces besides missile submarines. The strategic-planning emphases of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. differ particularly on the subject of bombers. At present the U.S. has more than 450 intercontinental bombers, about a fourth of which are kept on "ready alert" at a large number of air bases (so that they can avoid being destroyed even in case of surprise attack). The Russians have about 140 long-range bombers. These are qualita- tively inferior even to the B-36 bombers de- ployed by the U.S. in the 1950's, are not kept at at as high readiness and are located at just a few air bases. Although a new Russian bomber (named the Backfire by the Pentagon) is just beginning production, it seems primarily intended for targets on the periphery of the U.S.S.R. In any ease it is not certain how many Baekfires will be built, and the plane appears to lack the critical range and low-altitude capabilities of the B-52's. _ As for SLBM's, the U.S.S.R. is building new missile submarines and is allowed more boats and SLBM's than the U.S 1 under the terms of the SALT agreements. In contrast to the active U.S. MIRV programs for both ICBM's and SLBM's and the new Russian MIRV pro- grams for ICBM's, however, the Russians have not begun testing multiple warheads on their new SLBM. The U.S.S.R., moreover, usually keeps only five or six missile subma- rines on patrol at any one time, compared with 40 percent of the 41 U.S. boats. In sum, the U.S.S.R. does not seem to give missile submarines the same priority in strategic planning as the U.S. Schlesinger essentially hinges his denial that first-strike fears by the U.S.S.R. would be enhanced by the planned U.S. improve- ment in its capabilities against ICBM'i on the relative invulnerability of the Russian missile submarines. Compared with the U.S. missile submarines, however, the Russian boats are noisier?an important qualitative disadvantage?and must operate in ocean areas where it is easier for the 'U.S. to locate and detect them. In addition the U.S. has under way a large, aggressive antisubmarine- warfare program for tactical Iliad strategic uses. It has been reliably estimated that U.S. expenditures in the fiscal year 1972 for anti- submarine warfare were $2.5 billion and that by 1974 they would rise to more than $4 bil- lion. The Russian leaders might well fear, at Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP75600380R000700060017-5 S 15546 Approved For Rtenffsit9iCki-M5BOROAVE070006001715 August 21, 1974 some future crisis point, that the U.S. had developed a significant antifibmarine-war- fare capability, snaking Salesinger's sug- gested ultimate reliance on t*ir missile sub- marines less than compIetelyyeassuring. One "crisis scenario" that is often con- cocted to show the danger 'elf the growing Russian counterforce capability against Min- uteman and to justify devegming improved U.S. counterforce capabilities is an attack or threat of attack by the 11.S.3R. against U.S. ICBM's. The scenario envisions the following chain of events: (1) a real or threatened Russian attack against Mitgateman; (2) a realization by the U.S. Ieadeiship that it is left or will be left with no more than a capac- ity to attack Russian cities; (3) major con- cessions or even surrender 14 the U.S. This scenario has an ob4ously fantastic quality. Even if the internal logic of the scenario were accepted, it still does not justify improving U.S. counterforce capabili- ties. It does not matter w4ether the 1:1-4. missiles destroyed are highly accurate or not. What matters is what other'As. forces can do if these missiles are destroyed. Indeed, as we have seen, by presenting an increased threat to the U.S.S.R., U.S. gevelopment pf highly accurate missiles might actually make the Russians more likely to attack, thus making the scenario less Implausible. , More important, the underlying logic of the scenario Is simply wrong, as should be evident to both the U.S. and the Russian leadership. First, the Russiaps would have to consider that Minutensien might be launched against RIM/310,n targets in the 313- minute warning time between the launch g the Russian ICBM's and their arrival at the Minuteman silos. Second, even if a surprised or reasonably cautious U.S. 'leadership did not launch on warning, a few Minutemen would survive even the most -pareful attack. Also surviving would be at least the bombers on alert and most if not all or the U.S. mis- sile submarines in the water, (If the attack occurred after an initial est* period, more bombers than usual would to on alert and more submarines would be In the water.) These combined forces would 'provide the U.S. with the capacity to carry a* a number of limited strikes while still retaining an as- sured-destruction hedge. Finally, some U.S. retaliation would seem very likely to the Russian leadership since tens of millions of Americans svould be killed in any "Minuteman only" attack. In attacks against silos the bombs are sect to explode as close to the ground as possible, thereby pick- ing up much dirt and debris. 'nee fallout from the explosion of thousands g megatons of nuclear weapons over the Minuteman fields would be tremendous, and witnis would carry the lethal contamination over many major U.S. cities. Such calculation of fallout do not even include the possibilitg of a few Rue- sion warheads going off comae and directly hitting populated areas, nor the collateral damage by Russian attacks against other tar- gets, such as bomber bases, Many of which are near cities. Even not assuming a crisis, the conse- quence of these new U.S. counterforce devel- opments might be to push the U.S.S.R. to- ward accelerating or expanding programs, dr starting new ones. The arms _race is not as mechanically "action-reaction!' as some have suggested, but a substantial new U.S. capa- bility against the primary strategic offensive force of the TJ.S.S.Rt will surely fuel justifi- cations within the Russian bureaucracy for some kind of reaction. This sheuld be partic- ularly true when 11.8. antisubmarine-warfare programs, noted above, are also considered. If the U. counterforce programs are al- lowed to co ue beyond the rhetoric of an- nouncing them, these programs would oper- ate to undercut any progress at SALT. Of course, if announcing these programs is just a short-term ploy designed to strengthen the U.S. bargaining position for the impending SALT H agreements, then little real :norm will result. There Is no evidence, however, that top Administration officials intend to turn these programs off quickly. And even if there are such intentions, new weapons pro- grams tend to gain a momentum of their own once they are announced. High-level offi- cials become publicly committed to rationales for them, rationales that include more than the systems' just being "bargaining chips." Bureaucracies are created with a vested in- terest in the continuation and expansion of these programs. Moreover, improvements in accuracy and yield would be particularly dif- ficult to limit explicitly in SALT, making it harder to rationalize publicly any subsequent termination of the prograin. Accuracy improvements are generally ac- depted as being among the most diiacult weapons characteristics to limit in an arms- control agreement, because of problems of both definition and verification. Drafting a workable, direct limit on accuragy seems im- possible, since the counterforce potential of a warhead depends on the accuracy-yield combination. Moreover, a simple numerical limit on accuracy would not be verifiable. A photograph of a silo or even the missile gives little clue to the kind of small but im- portant differences in accuracy that are be- ing, considered here. Closer examination through on-site inspection, even if such in- spection could be negotiated, would be in- sufficient. On-site inspection could indicate whether the warhead was a terminally guided MARV, but this would not establish any par- ticular accuracy. Moreover, on-site inspection includes a heroic assumption that the latest warheads are on the missile and not stored nearby in an area excluded from the on-site inspection provisions. Surveillance of Russian missile-testing may :eye some indication of accuracy. The indicaffitn, however, is indirect erntil not con- clusive. Test data tell one about the ballistic coefficient (or pointedness) of the warhead, its reentry speed and similar information, all of which helps in estimating accuracy. An outside observer, however, can never he sure what the actual target is. Similarly, course corrections by the warhead would in- dicate a maneuvering capability but not nec- essarily terminal guidance or particularly high accuracies. An Indirect way to limit or impede accu- racy improvements through SALT would be by placing a strict limit on the number of missile tests. This would make it more diffi- cult to develop advanced guidance tech- niques and to test them often enough so that the military would have confidence in them. The low limits necessary seem non- negotiable, however, since they represent a direct challenge to all new strategic pro- grams. Even without accuracy improvements the Pentagon will want to do extensive re- search and development and operational testing of the new Trident missile and fur- ther operational testing of the Minuteman and Poseidon missiles. Similarly, the Rus- sians will want to flight-test extensively their four new ICBM's and their new SLBM as well as their existing arsenal of missiles. Limits in SALT on the yield of warheads might be more possible, but they would be of uncertain significance. The two sides could limit yield by an agreement that warheads not be larger than a given yield or a given weight. The effect of any such limitation could be circumvented, however, by in- creasing the number of warheads and by in- creasing their accuracy. Moreover, it would be difficult to verify the exact yield of a war- head. Even elaborate on-site inspection would not ensure that "advanced" warheads were not hidden nearby. Surveillance of fight tests only gives an estimate of the size of the warhead, and yield per pound of warhead can be varied by warhead design and the richness of the nuclear "fuel" used. In short, the practical difficulties of ash- toning limitations in SALT on the type of counterforce improvements now planned by the U.S. make such limitations unlikely and will instead presumably Create strong pres- sures in the U.S.S.R. to expand old programs or to start new ones that either mach or compensate for the U.S. programs. This in turn can only work against other limitations on strategic arms. Allied concerns about the credibility of the U.S. deterrent are another reason offered fiv developing missiles with improved cc,unter- force capabilities. Occasionally a specific scenario?a Russian attack in central Europe?is given as a justification for such imprgvements. Neither the scenario nor the more general invocation of allied claims is persuasive. The European scenario supposedly demon- strates that the U.S. needs the ability to respond with nuclear weapons in order to show its resolve and to destroy some of the attacking Russian forces. There are, however, already sizable U.S. forces in Europe that could accomplish both of those objectives, Even if the U.S. decided to employ strategic weapons, existing US. forces could carry out a wide variety of selective attacks. As for the broader claims of allied con- cerns, Morton Halperin, an authority on nu- clear strategy, has remarked: "The credi- bility of the U.S. deterrent to an Ally is primarily a result of the overall U.S.-Ally relationship, which includes economic and political considerations as well as military. To the extent that Allied leaders evaluate U.S. military capabilities, they look especial- ly to the U.S. conventional and nucleat forces in that particular theater of operations. Fine distinctions in the U.S.-Soviet strategic bal- ance or in U.S. strategic policy are unimpor- tant to Allied leaders. Among those Allied analysts who care, opinion is probably split between those who favor the U.S. possessing an efficient silo-kill capability and those who do not." Among the European strategic analysts who oppose such deployments is Ian Smart, formerly assistant director of the London- based International Institute of Strategic Studies. Smart writes: "Producing and de- ploying much more accurate strategic mis- siles . . . is to be regretted and even feared since . . . it can only reduce the stability of the strategic balance in any period of acute tension." At least part of this European concern can be attributed to the fact that, in a strategic exchange, the industrialized European countries are very likely taagete? if only because of the U.S. forces deployed in or near those countries. Finally, evei assuming that the ail es (or even the American people) accord consider- able political significance to fine distinctions in the "strategic balance," Schlesinger s pro- posed counterface improvements are not very helpful politics. The supposedly important distinctions are usually visible ones such as the number of delivery vehicles, the in-amber of warheads or the throw weight. Schles- inger's accuracy and yield improvements do not affect these indicators, except possibly in the counterproductive way of reducing the number of warheads in order to allow larger ones. On balance, then, there seem to be strong arguments against developing missile,. with improved counterforce capabilities. Collat, eral damage can best be minimized by shift- ing targets, not improving accuracies by a few hundred feet. The ability to destroy efficiently large numbers of missile silos in order to "match the Russians" seems not only unnecessary and expensive but also de- stabilizing. SALT might well be undercut, and the supposed concerns of our allies about the U.S. deterrent are not answered by such programs. As one gets caught up in considering nu- clear-war scenarios and nuclear-weapons ca- pabilities there is a dangerous tendency- to Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP75600380R000700060017-5 August 21, /Approved For FMNORKGROliat :gfitegtr)7.5139044M00700060017-5 forget that the primary objective of nuclear strategy is to avoid nuclear wars, not to fight them. Given the destructive power of nuclear weapons and the world's lack of experience in using them, crossing the "nuclear thresh- old" would be a profoundly destabilizing event. It is a delusion to believe one country could employ nuclear weapons, even on a limited scale, and have a high degree of con- fidence that the response by another nuclear power would be predictable and proportion- ate. The particular first use might be esti- mated by the opposing country's observers to be greater than it actually was, or the use might have created more damage than ex- pected (for example through greater-than- expected fallout). The opposing country might not have readily available weapons of the same yield or similar targeting options and decide to escalate. The political reaction in the opposing country might lead to escala- tion. In short, the possible causes for mat- ters getting out of hand are endless. To make deterrence work, a country must carefully consider its public attitude toward nuclear war and cautiously select its retalia- tory options. This does not mean that the U.S. should have only the single strategic option of massive retaliation against cities. This country already has ample capabilities for lesser options, and it seems appropriate to have the flexibility, at a minimum, for possible responses to accidental or limited launches. The Nixon Administration, however, is go- ing beyond this. It is seeking the additional capability to attack efficiently large numbers of Russian missile silos. Not only might this counterforce option be destabilizing in it- self but also the Administration's promo- tion of the option and its general public advocacy of a counterforce strategy might have a pervasive, if subtle, tendency to re- duce the inhibitions against the use of nu- clear weapons?in effect, to lower the "nu- clear threshold." New bureaucracies, with vested interests in the hardware and ration- ales of a caunterforce strategy, are created. In trying to gain public approval of new policies and programs, leaders find them- selves taking more simplistic positions than the uncertainty of nuclear warfare war- rants. In this climate some of the risks of nuclear war are downplayed. Unrealistically precise calculations suggest that limited nu- clear war can be kept limited and even re- sult in positive gains. There are some disturbing parallels here to the vogue of limited conventional war in the early 1960's. In pushing for changes in conventional strategy and new procurement, advocates of limited conventional war ig- nored some of the pitfalls and costs of such a strategy. The searing national experience of the war in Vietnam was needed to demon- strate these oversights. Exactly where the line should be drawn on "selective targeting options" is not at all clear. It seems most inadvisable, however, to take the gamble of developing missiles with improved counterforce capabilities, whether this is to match a specific Russian capability or for any other reason. Opponents of U.S. counterforce improve- ments, nonetheless, must recognize certain 'practical limits to their arguments. Even if Congress declines to fund the new and ac- celerated development programs Schlesinger is pioposing, continued U.S. testing of stra- tegic missiles and various researchand-devel- opment efforts already under way inevitably will lead to some improyements in missile ac- curacy. (As Schlesinger has pointed out, some refinements in existing guidance systems will occur almost as a matter of course?through better software programs, greater purity in rocket fuel, better, measurement of the earth's gravitational field and numerous oth- er factors. The development of a terminally guided MARV, something further beyond the state of the art, requires more of a conscious bureaucratic decision to proceed.) Besides U.S. advances, moreover, Russian counter- force improvements are Likely to continue, raising serious questions about Russian in- tentions. Faced with these likely developments, the solution is still not to follow the Schlesinger approach. Rather, the solution should be to seek actively to negotiate for limits on MIRV's and for the reduction of vulnerable strategic forces. Limits on MIRV's would be designed to slow the perceived threat to U.S. ICBM's, a Russian threat that many consider destabil- izing. In return for the U.S. slowing certain of its strategic programs, for example, the U.S.S.R. might agree to limits on the deploy- ment of the SSX-18, the "fallow on" missile to the large SS-9. This would push at least a few years further into the future the time when analysts would estimate that only a particular level of Minuteman could survive a Russian counterforce attack. Negotiating missile reductions represents another approach: to limit not only the threatening forces but also the threatened ones. This approach would essentially mean bilateral reductions in ICBM's, presumably In a way that would retire the more threaten- ing ICBM's, so that the remaining ICBM's would be less vulnerable. Some asymmetrical reductions might also be considered. For in- stance, the U.S. could reduce its ICBM's, whereas the U.S.S.R. (having less to fear in the short run about the vulnerability of its ICBM's) could reduce some ICBM's plus oth- er forces. Reductions in the land-based missiles of both sides would reduce the importance of this strategic strike force. It would thereby undercut the rationale for an expensive con- test of matching counterforce improvements. More important, it would reduce the great- est potential source of instability in a crisis. Both countries would have less incen- tive to adopt an unstable, launch-on-warn- ing posture or to launch an attack out of fear of a preemptive strike. The reductions approach has received sup- port recently from such diverse sources as the Federation of American Scientist's and Fred C. Me, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. It was even accorded the status of a possibility in Schlesinger's recent annual report. Rather than focusing on how to match the U.S.S.R. in a particular capability when such matching does not bode well for either country, the strategic debate in the U.S. in the coming months should focus on MIRV limits, force reductions and other measures designed to minimize the chances of nuclear war and to decelerate the arms race. [From the F.A.S. Public Interest Report, February 19741 COUNTERFORCE 10 YEARS LATER: PLUS CA CHANGE On January 10, 1974, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger revealed a quiet change in U.S. central war strategy. (See box, page 3). He announced that, several months before, he had begun the process of improving the ac- curacy of U.S. missiles, that we were now targeting Soviet military targets, and that we were preparing to fight less than all-out nuclear wars. This was a fundamental and far-reaching decision reversing a position which had previously been debated for more than a decade under the heading of "deter- rence" versus "counterforce". Several questions arise. First, why was the decision taken in secret when it is of such importance, and when it seems to contradict policy statements made by President Nixon, Senator John Stennis and others, only a few years ago. S 15547 Second, the decision is partly justified on grounds involving the SALT Agreements limiting missile numbers, but the deci- sion ts clearly not to be negotiable at SALT. Third, will the decision encourage limited nuclear war both by acknowledging that we are prepared to fight a controlled nuclear war if initiated by the other side, and by making our own preparations for initiating one? Thus, will the decision enhance or un- dermine U.S. safety? Fourth, will the decision make future SALT agreements more or less difficult? In what direction is the arms race now heading? COVNTERFORCE VERSUS DETERRENCE ? In the early fifties, the United States thought of nuclear war as a prolonged (sixty day) campaign of exhaustion. Both cities and military targets were to be devastated. Later, the United States gradually realized that its preponderance of strategic weapons should be aimed initially at the time-urgent targets that could retaliate against us?a counterforce strategy evolved. Still later, during the missile gap period, the United States was preoccupied with defending it- self against counterforce threat-possibilities to its bombers, threats that never material- ized. But by 1962, it was evident that the United States would have far more missiles than the Soviet Union for several years?and more missiles than were necessary to strike Soviet cities. The excess of missiles had been pur- chased for esentially political reasons?Secre- tary McNamara did not feel that he could come into Congress with a request for fewer than 1,000 although it was conceded, inside the Administration, that 400 would do for military reasons. (By 1965, the United States had a four-to-one lead over the Rus- sians at about 1,000 to 250, in land-based missiles). In 1962, Secretary McNamara said, in a famous speech at Ann Arbor: "The U.S. has come to the conclusion that to the extent feasible, basic military strategy in a possible general nuclear war should be approached in much the same way that more conventional military operations have been regarded in the past. That is to say, principal military objectives, in the event of a nuclear war stemming from a major attack on the Alliance, should be the destruction of the enemy's military forces, not of his civilian population". The rationale for this decision was not particularly strong. If we were not going to strike first, it was asked, would we not be aiming at only empty holes? DOD said the Soviets might have a "reload capacity". In fact, DOD was assuming, as usual, that the war would begin in Europe with a Soviet aggressive act and that the United States might well strike first on the nuclear level. Underlying the arguments and the rhetoric was an excess of missiles for which there simply were not enough civilian targets. Supply produced its own demand. As the Soviet Union built submarines, Secretary McNamara moved away from this pronouncement. His rhetoric became that of "deterrence" rather than "counterforce". Undoubtedly, U.S. missiles remained targeted upon Soviet missiles. But the Soviet missile force was growing beyond the ability of the U.S. force to keep up?at least on a missile for missile basis. In the sixties, counterforce became a generally discredited term. In the research institutes, however, there was a solution: MIRV. It could make each missile count for several. Thus it could make possible a continued economical effort to tar- get many Soviet missiles. Secretary Mc- Namara would not purchase MIRV for this (counterforce) purpose. But he would, and did, buy it to overwhelm any possible Soviet ABM. In this regard, it was the perfect pene- tration aid, requiring that each "decoy" be destroyed because each was a warhead. Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000700060017-5 S 15548 Approved For 'WIflieltaggRAWAV.:16A4M3Z-CEUNAME0070006001211,tutt 211 194 This kept MIRV alive. And much was said about it being defensive only. It was arffned that the small (2-10 times Err ?shims) size precluded use against enemy missile silos only. For Preaident Nixon's assirtions in this regard, see box above. In fact, however. It was conaddered inevit- able among the more sophisticeted observers that the Defense Department'Could not be prevented from putting iighj accuracy on these small warheads. There re too many temptations. At that point, Dc would have a really potent counterforce treat. We had the potential for 3,000 20a-kiloton warheads on our 1,000 Minuteman missiles (three such warheads on each), And we had programmed 5,000 warheads in 31 Polaris submarines (16 missiles with 10 warheada each on each submarine a 50itiotons each.) The warheads were relreavel small but, in such calculations, accuracy 1$ Mach More useful than yield. An eightfoll diminution in yield (megatonnage, payload capability) can be compensated for by a thsubling Of ac- curacy. Thus a giant Soviet utsslle with 25 megatons and 1,4 mile accuracy is only as effeative as a 'U.S. one-megatddi missile 'with i/edth mile accuracy. The 'United States did Indeed lead the Soviet Union accuracy by a factor of two to three. And ttese accuracies were getting to the point where even with the smallest programmed ithoshima-type bombs, hardened missile sloe could be threatened. Furthermore, as with SecrivaeV McNamara, when there are too many ads to target on civilian targets, what can one do or say to prevent the Defense Departmpnt from tar- geting military targets? And care this is con- ceded, what can one do to Tawniest the missile targeting from being done dith high ac- curacy? Thus did cynics argue. People did try. Senator Edward- W. Brooke wrote a long series of letter t to 'President Nixon and Secretary of renege Laird, The responses were favorable in tone but equivo- cal read literally. The heart of the often re- peated response was: "We have not developed anclare not devel- oping a weapon system havrag, or which eatild reasonably be construed, as having, fITSC StTlite potential." In addition, the President (nied that he -was funding a specific prograla for improv- ing accuracy to Which Air 'Pores General Ryan had referred with pleste and an- ticipation as ,providing "hard- get" .killers. But this was all, The evident hiephole rrea- sonably be construed") Ise now being exploited. Our own MERV was first teeiled in eugusC 1968. By 1970, it was being dqployed. It was evident to -the same experietped observer! that this deployment meant the begtnnin of the vulneeability of our ogn land-based The Soviet Union w d never be stopped from catching up. August 11, 197$ when the Soviet Union had finally and belatedly tested a MIRV, five years late, Sec- retary of Defense Schlesinger responded to a question about the chances tor MIRV con- trols by saying: ."11 think that the minimal point that one can make is.thist the Scalets are unwaliag not to derrianstrate a tenlincffogy that the Americana heves demonStrateda The imagery is semething,thit presiimgoly 4 not particu- larly appealing ineldienuin7 If only weload argued this ja` y In 1968 we might have tried harder to negotiate. New that our own MIRV JR deployed, and the ABM danger has evaporated in a emir Agreement precluding ABM, the question naturally and predictably arises in the De- ferme Departthera of completing the process? putting on the high accuracy. 'The rationale being need partly three shadowed end partly new. In the fore- shadow part, Secretary Schlesinger argues that the strategic situation is now so stable that a ceunterforce strategy cannot be con- sidered a 'first-strike' potential. After all, the lenisians have submarines. FresUmably he does not argue that the Soviet Union will like it 'es;ra Secretary McNamara inside his speech, Mar&all Sotto- lovskii ,said "MaNamara's statement shows concrete and practical evidence of prepara- tion of 'a preventive war" (Red Star, July 19, 1962). And When the Defense Department, In 1969; projected similar Soviet capabilities against our land-based force, Secretary Laird said there was no question they were prepar- ing a "first-strike" threat. Secretary Schlesinger's new argument is based on asserting that the Soviet Union might, in 1980, have a counterforce capabilty itself if it learns what we know NOW. "If tie Soviets were able to develop these lreprov d technologies presently available to the Un ted States in the forms of guidance, Mint's, warhead technology, at NOMA point around 1980 or beyond they would be in a position in which they had a major counter- force option against the United States and we would lack a similar option" (January 10, 1973). He goes on to say that this capability might be use t in a novel way. The counterforce option e has in mind is selective or reason- ably an-out, attacks on U.S. land Military targets notwithstanding the existence of a secure /sea-bated force. In erect, he fears that the increasingly stable nuclear balance might permit limited strategic attacks that avoided cities. 'The U.S. might then be faced with an ultimatum to avoid retaliation lest the Soviet attacks further escalate to cities. Pre- sumably, the Soviet purpose would be a show of force. These limited attack possibilities are not only feared by Secretary Schlesinger. They are also welcomed, as a way of solving a Strategic dilemma in Buroae. In arguing for flexibility before the Senate Armed Serv Les Committee on June 18, 1973, Secretary Schlesinger said, in support of the plausi- bility et such attacks, a. ? . or ter take another example, the United States' pledge to come to the aid of the NATO salience, which would mean that we woald be forced if we had to rely ex- clusively on the assured destruction options, to destroy Soviet cities said in consequence of this have destruction of American cities". He would prefer limited strategic attacks instead. Indeed, such demonstration at- tacks on a very limited basis?are said to be programmed already in the event of war in Burope, Tt seems evident that these apocalyptic considerations are sufficiently important and Interesting to the body politic that they should have had much greater airing. As ate as two years ago, Senator John Stennis, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, was arguing in support of the Defense De- partment against putting high accuracy on our MIRVed warheads: "DOD AND SENATOR STENNIS OPPOSED COVNTEEPORCE IN 1971 -"On October 5, 1911, Senator James L. Buckley (Conservative?Republican, N.Y.) proposed amendment No. 448 to the Military Procurement Authorization and asked that "not lees than $12,000,000 shall be available bray for the purpose of carrying out work In connection with providing counterforce capability for the Minuteman In system." **Scattered excerpts from the debate follow: **Senator Buckley: The amendments I have offered will ncrt provide us with a first-strike capability for two reasons. "First of all, these are designed only to modify the warheads within existing missiles. We simply do not have enough missiles to mount enough warheads. For a first-strike effort, With the improved aecuracy, we should need in excess of 12,000 warheads if we were ever to try a first strike against the Soviet Union . . . 'Editor's note: 8,000 are now pro- grammed on missiles Slone]. "Second, it should be kept in mind that there are innumerable situations where flex- ibility is urgently desired. lakus assume that either from the Soy* Union or tram some other country there age indications that they acquired the capability for a first strike ca- pacity. Let us assume that their first ;strike knocks most or all of aur siaategic weapons. We would then have our .submarine and additional weapons. We would then face the choice of atrrana those at the civilian pepul- ation of the enemy. thereby destroying tens of millions of Inman. beinspi in the Soviet Union or trying to desfend renselve.s by di- recting our missiles at a second strike against the remaining weapoats held by the enemy. "Senator Stennis: The explanation or this amendment includes_ the avord "Oct sitar- force", Those familiar with these terms know that essentially means a first-strike capabil- ity. We have stayed within the terms of de- terrence, deterrence, deterrence. That is what we are talking` about at the SALT talks. * * "Here is what [the Defense Department says] in their position paper on proposed Amendmersts No. 448 and 440. "'The Defense Department cannot support the proposed amendments. It is the position of the United States to not develop a weapon system whose deployment meld reasonably be construed by the Soviets ass having a rust- strike capability. Such a deployment might provide an incentive for the Soviets to strike first.' ? * al stand squarely on that ground. It is not often that the Departanent et Defense comes out against an amendment that would put more money in a bill. ". . . we do not need this type of improve- ments in payload and guidance now, the type of improvements that are proposed, in order to have the option of attacking military tar- gets other than cities. Our accuracy is already sufficiently good to enable us to attack any kind of target we want, said to wrote eel- lateral damage to cities. The only reason to undertake the type of program the amend- ment suggests Is to be able to destroy enemy missiles in their silos before they are launched. This means a U.S. strike first, un- less the adversary should be so stupid as to partially attack us, and leave many of his ICBM's in their silos for us to attack in a second strike." (See pages 515888, ? 5139], 15893 of Congressional Record, Senate, acto- ber 5,1971). VOITNTERPORCE AND SALT The counterforce decision is put forward by the Secretary as if it had much to do with SALT?in fact, however, it is non-negotiable. He does emphasize that we cannot permit the other side to have a relatively credible counterforce capability if we lack the same" (January 10). And he empaaeizes that the other side might have the capability by 1980 In the form of 1,009 ene-megaton. warl.eads. (The -11(3. will soon have more than that number of warheads, and, assnotect, with the accuracies anticipate the will be quite adequate for target-killing. Indeed., for lim- ited strikes one wants less collateral damage; a force of smaller warheads would be beater.) But he notes that the tergeting strategy change "has taken place" and that it is "quite distinct" from our SALT position (January 10, 1974 backgrounder). In this sense, the current furor ebout SALT end the Interim Agreement is an irrelevant smokes( reel). Even if the SALT Agreement had provided for forces of quite eiwal size, the Secretary would presumaloly have wanted this same targeting doctrine and the same acceracy. Why? It is true that the Secretary puts great emphasis, as do military men, on the pont- Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP75600380R000700060017-5 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP75600380R000700060017-5 August 21, .1974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE cal consequences of letting the other side get more than our side possesses in some di- mension of armament. It is assumed in such statements that the side with the most meg- &tonnage might be able to frighten the other. (Why the side with the most warheads or accuracy?our side?might not be able to gain the upper hand is never clear.) Indeed, no measure is sufficient to make much difference. The fact is, and the litera- ture of "limited strategic attacks" reveals it, that shows of force or resolve in a contest where neither side can disarm the other have to do with psychology rather than with weaponry. If one is "chicken" no amount of additional megatonnage will help. If one is bold, and willing to take risks to coerce the other side, no weapon inferiority need matter as long as a secure retaliatory force is main- tained. These facts are much blurred in the dec- larations of the Secretary of Defense, which are further tied to SALT negotiating strategy. He notes with repeated emphasis: "We must maintain essential equivalence between the forces available to the Soviet Union and the forces available to the United States. There should be no question in the Minds of the Soviets as we negotiate with them of our willingness to achieve that es- sential equivalence" (January 10). Even as SALT strategy, this can be ques- tioned. Why should there be "no doubt"? Might we not, just as well, argue that there ehould be "no doubt" in Soviet minds that the U.S. was not going to try to keep up with the nuclear Jones mindlessly? Obviously, much turns on the felt political relevance of militarily irrelevant force imbalances. 'Un- fortunately, on-going SALT negotiations tend to exacerbate concern about imbalances that would otherwise be seen to be politically irrelevant as well. svoztrrioN OF NIXON ADMINISTRATION DOCTRINE The link between strategic weapons and resolve has long preoccupied this Adminis- tration. The link began to be emphasized in the 1970 State of the World Message where the Administration began to take pot-shots at the existing strategic posture. It criticized the theory of "assured destruction" RS one which believed: "Deterrence was guaranteed if we were sure we could destroy a significant percentage of Soviet population and industry after the worst conceivable Soviet attack on our stra- tegic forces". It suggested that the previous Administra- tion believed that, if this criterion were satis- fied, "restraint in the build-up of strategic weapons was indicated regardless of Soviet actions." The Administration called for "strategic sufficiency" which, despite its -name, was de- signed to require more weapons than "as- sured destrnction" under a somewhat cooler label than the discredited "strategic supe- riority". There was not?as there had been in the late fifties?concern that the Soviet Union might be able to disarm us. Significantly, the 1970 State of the World expressed concern about the "Soviet threat to the sufficiency of OUT deterrent; the 1971 statement talked of the possibility that the Soviet Union might seek forces that could destroy "vital elements of our retaliatory capability" (italics added). Indeed, the 1970 statement indicated that the overriding purpose of our strategic pos- ture was political: "to deny other countries the ability to impose their will on the United States and its allies under the weight of stra- tegic military superiority". Di both the 1970 and 1971 statements, the Administration emphasized that it must not ,be "limited to the indiscriminate mass de- struction of enemy civilians as the sole pos- sible response to challenge" (1971) . (It also mentioned, without much conviction, that "sufficiency also means numbers, character- istics and deployments of our forces which the Soviet Union cannot reasonably inter- pret as being intended to threaten a dis- arming attack".) In 1972, the President re-emphasized what he had said in 1971: "In its broadest political sense, sufficiency means the maintenance of forces adequate to prevent us and our allies from being coerced. Thus the relationship between our strategic forces and those of the Soviet Union must be such that our ability and resolve to protect our vital security interests will not be under- etsimated" (italics added). In short, the Administration had shifted the standard for strategic forces from a measurable strategic goal to a goal that was open-ended, depending ultimately on its own sense of psychological vulnerability. It was concerned that its sense of "resolve not be underestimated". But in a balance of terror, as noted, no amount of additional weapons can be certain of satisfying that criterion. Thus, sufficiency, defined this way, was an open ended invitation to weapons procure- ment. In short, the decision to change our central war strategy was really quite independent of SALT. It grew out of the Administration's unwillingness to fall behind by any measure, no matter how militarily irrelevant the meas- ure. It grew out of the double standard with which the Administration strategists can- not help but measure what constitutes "es- sential equivalence". And it grew out of the excessive number of warheads which we have programmed?an excessive number that forces the Administration to targeting and accuracy decisions for Parkinsonian reasons. The problem is simple: weapons in Search of a target. COUNTERFORCE AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF WAR The United States is now legitimizing the notion of limited strategic attacks. In pre- paring for the possibility ourselves, and in talking of the fear that the Soviet Union might engage in this possibility, we are im- proving the prospects for limited nuclear war. This assertion can hardly be doubted. It takes "two to play" controlled war and if the other side is clearly not prepared, one would be foolish to try. By advertising our consciousness of the possibility, we are molt- ing a giant step closer to having the Russians try out the ultimatums that we previously shrugged off as an impossible joke. This is not good. Furthermore, if we plan limited nuclear at- tacks and talk about" it enough, to this ex- tent, we might try such a strategy. This is a dangerous course. The Russians are less likely than we to have invested in, and to be able to rely upon, the command and con- trol that is necessary to play limited nuclear war. They, more likely than we, would just salvo their weapons or not fire at all. If counterforce targeting means kidding our- selves about these facts, then the security of the United States will be undermined by it. Finally, the Secretary does not plan to pur- chase just the forces necessary to strike a few Soviet targets as a show of force: this ability we have already had for many years. He plans to purchase high accuracy and in- stall it on the Minuteman and Poseidon MIRVs. The result will be an enormous boost in the capability of our forces to attack all of Soviet land-based missiles, DOD thinks that by not specifying exactly what military targets they are planning to aim at, they can confuse the issue. But once higher accuracy is purchased, it will provide enough capability to attack all of the Soviet retaliatory weapons?obviously these will then be the ones aimed at. And high ac- curacy is needed for nothing else. SALT AND COUNTERFORCE The Interim Agreement limits the number of silos in which the two sides can place their missiles, Thus it pins down the targets at S 15549 which counterforce weapons would be aimed. How long will the two sides be willing to abide by the agreements limiting missile force numbers if these forces become vulnerable? Growth in missile forces is probably not the answer to their dilemma, of course. New forms of missile deployment would have to be arranged. With each side gaining several thousand target-killing warheads, multiply- ing the existing forces in number will not seem cost-effective. After all, it is cheaper to buy an attacking new warhead than an en- tirely new defensive missile. One answer, of course, is the one FAS pro- vides. Throw away the land-based missiles and they will cease to be aimed at each other, with the benefits described on pages 1 and 2. It should be noted, however, that this solu- tion will not prevent the targeting of other less important military targets. Nor will it prevent shows of force, limited nuclear war (or limited strategic attacks) or whatever. These could still be carried out by submarine based missiles. What our solution will provide, however, is a very small difference between the results of striking first and of striking second?in this sense it will increase the stability of the nuclear balance by providing the smallest possible incentive to strike first in a major way. In the absence of such a solution, there will presumably be land-based missiles in other modes: mobile-based or based in silos under mountains and so on. Nothing could be more ridiculous at this stage of the arms race. But in light of the history summarized in this Report, no arms race procurement possibility can be ruled out as too bizarre. RISE AND FALL OF NUCLEAR SURPRISE ATTACIC Consider the decline of the nuclear sur- prise-attack scenario. It began in the late fifties when exaggerated estimates of Soviet missile production suggested the USSR would have missiles while the U.S. still had only bombers. Scenario (1958-61): The USSR launches large numbers of missiles at U.S. bombers on their bomber bases, destroying the deterrent. Problems: The attack is hard to effect be- cause the bomber bases in question were all over the world; to hit them at the same Instant meant launching the attacking mis- siles at different times, thereby providing some warning. Also, U.S, had nuclear weap- ons in Europe and on carriers. (Especially important, the Soviets did not in fact ever have the missiles on which the attack is premised.) But, at least, the USSR attack made sense on paper and in concept. By the mid-sixties the situation was much different. The United States had 1,000 land- based (Minuteman) intercontinental missiles and a fleet of 41 ballistic-missile-firing (Polaris) submarines, with 16 missiles each, more than half on station at any one time. The Soviet attack scenario became at least ten times less plausible. Here it is. Scenario: (mid to late sixties): The USSR launches missiles attacking not only 'U.S. bombers but 1,000 U.S. missiles as well. In order to cope with the retaliatory strike from our Polaris submarines, the USSR plans to shoot down hundreds of such missiles with an antiballistic missile system. Problems: No sane military or civilian plan- ner in any country would rely upon a ballistic missile defense to shoot down hundreds of missiles. For this reason, this attack did not make sense, even on paper. (Further, the Soviet Union did not have a ballistic missile defense. Still further, the Soviet Union did not have the capacity to destroy even the U.S. land-based targets.) Notice especially, how much harder this is to believe than the earlier scenario. This plan may make conceptual sense but it does not make practical sense. Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP75600380R000700060017-5 S 15550 'Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP75600380R000700060017-5 CCVGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE Augua 21, 1974 In recent years the scenarid further dee Surprise Attack Scenario: (T969-71): Soviets launch large mamba* of missiles against our land-based inessilerand bombers. Problem: No Solution whatever is pro- vided for neutralizing our seiPaased deter- rent. The scenario is -badly WernPlete? Notice that, by this time, the Sollet 'Onion can not even be assumed to aye a ballistic missile defense. By 1972, there W even a SALT agreement precluding all but Wvo (strategic-- ally irrelevatt) missile defeats sites. As a result, the surprise attack seintario for this period is simply incomplete /an paper or in concept. In short, by 1970, thee was no sur- prise attack scenario based orehurrent Soviet forces or any proclaimed ethrapolation Of them!_ The result was a new politWal addition to the scenario: Surprsie Attack Scenario (1973?):; The Soviet Union launches large Members of mis- siles against U.S. land-based missiles and then issues an untimatum *Must U.S. re- sponses with sea-based ballistic missiles. Problem:41 the attack on l'eur land-based forces dame not significantlynhange the de- terrent situation. Why then would the Sovi- ets risk it? Our sea-based forces cotaderespond against any Soviet targeta they wisheissuing a min- ter ultimatum?that full Melee attacks on U.S. cities would result in &dull scale attack on Soviet titles. - Soviet attack on one Idettlebaseti fortes Would inevitably cause widespread -fallout and many millions of casteeties. No Soelet planner conici assume that vie would carefully arid restrainedly calculate after that. Nor could he be sure that We muld distinguish this attack from an all-out attack. Nor could hs be sure that we coked destrain our sea- based forces with sultablencommunications Once the crisis began or our airborne bomb- ers. e The entire scenario is bizarre--enornieus risks for no point. The edliany disarms his land-based missiles in order to disarm our land-based missiles (with the sole advantage that they are disarmed serer our territory rather than over his). Bath side retains a deterrent as before, be.sed en sea-based Mis- siles. One can only imagine theff the Joint Chiefs have been smoking pot. The most incisive way to See the flaw in this scenario is to Imagine that, some montlesebefore the attack, the -United States had mdlaterally disman- tled all of its land-bilged threes. What Would be the significance then caddies scenario'? We would have removed the xgets for the at- tack but would have retalttied a totally ade- quate strategic deterrent. STATUS OF THE Femond Foust Cerrerree In 1911, the Administeltion allowed' as ii had four secret criteria far determining what strategic forces it needed and how to negoti- ate. For those who are insufficiently cynical about such things, it is revealing to see how little attention is paid to hem. By 1072 and 1973, these criteria were pub- lic. By now they seem to have been all but abandoned. Of course, the first criterion is still with us: "Maintaining an adequate sec- ond-strike capability to eeter an all-out sur- prise attack on our Strategic forced" But the fourth efiterion eDealeandirig against damage from small attack or acci- dental launches" was given up when the SALT agreement prohibiting a thin ABM over the entire country Was reached. The third criterion wee: "Preventing the Sovbilt Union from gain- ing the ability to causeeconsiderably greater urbeneindustrial destruction than the United States could treffict on the Soviets in a nuclear war". Without doubt the destructive Capabei- ties of each side have reached the point where any differences are irrelevant. But the Administration itself signed an Interim agreement at SALT which did provide the Soviet 'Union with much greater payload Ca- pability. Finally, the last criterion is very muck at issue today: "Providing no incentive for the Soelet -Union to strike the United States first in a crisis". The only method for doing this today is to get rid of land-based missiles. Indeed, de- struction of U.S. Minuteman -missiles? whether dons unilaterally or as part of a bi- lateral reduction?would dramatically re- duce the difference between a U.S. retalia- tory blow before or after a Soviet attack. Thus it would precisely 11111111 the criterion above by providing no Soviet incentive to strike first. 1From Arms Control Today. January 11)741 PLEXIBI/ATY THE IMMINENT DETtATE Ira his 1970 "State of the World" menage President Nixon asked, "Should a Predlent, in the event of a nuclear attack, be left with the single option of ordering the mass de- struction of enemy civil ens, in the face of the certainty that it would be -followed by the malls slaughter of Americana?" While it was obvious that the President believed. that -he needed greater flexibility in the ereploy- ment of nuclear weapons, the ispecific impli- cations of this remark for American nuclear strategy and strategic weapon programs were unclear at the time, and remained so for the next four years. Now, it is expected that the missing details at last will be welled out in the President's 1974 netate of the World" message and in Defense, Secretary Schlesin- ger's defense budget report. Congress and the American people would do well to scrutinize these documents closely because it is very likely -Amy will raise funda- mental _questions for the nation concerning what type of nuclear doctrine it should adopt. Furthermore, the choice of nuclear doctrines will have otereaus consequences for American political relations, arms control efforts, and weapon procurement Most importantly, the issue will not be whether the HS. should or should not adopt greeter strategic flexibility in the employ- ment of its nuclear weapons, as some would imply, but rather what kinds of actions in the name of strategic flexibility would most contribute to American security?and what kinds would moet detract from it. While "strategic flexibility" is a concept which does not lend itself readily to defini- tion, Penner Defense Secretary Richardson explained it last year in congressional testi- mony as "having the plans, procedures, forces, and command end-control capabilities necessary to enable the United Slates to select and carry out the response appropriate to the nature and level of the provocation." Even more recently, Defense Secretary Schlesinger stated that a change in the "tar- geting strategy'. of the American strategic forces had taken place and therefore the US. now has "targeting options which are more selective and which do not necessarily involve major mass destruction on the other side." These statements imply?erroneously--- that' the previous American doctrine of "as- sured destruction" lacked the capacity for flexibile options. The implication that new types and numbers of strategic weapons are required is similarly groundless. In a recent article in Foreign Affairs 'Wolfgang It. H. Paricdsky pointed out that there is no in- herent technical reason that prevents exist- ing American retaliatory forces from being employed in a limited manner. Similarly, as Schlesinger himself recently reaffirmed, the VB. does have strategic weapons which could be used in a "limited counter-force role." Furthermore, the U.S. has rasintained such a capability for some time: Alain O. Entlt oven and K. Wayne Smith in their 19/1 work, How Much Is Enough? noted that even with the "assured destruction" doetrine, American strategic weapons could be used to perform 'limited and controlled retaliation." What neither the U. nor-the Soviet -Union has today is an efficient cotuiterforce capa- bility against hard targets or hardened mis- sile silos. This type of tounterforce capability would be comprised of a substantial nt reber of nuclear weapons, each With a high prob- ability of destroying a hardened missile silo. POT example, the U.S. could presently de- stroy some of the Soviet missile silos with a high degree of confidence, but only "ineffi- clently"?by means Of targeting 8 or 4 Min- uteman missiles on each Soviet silo. With an "efficient" counterforce capability the num- ber of missiles:required to be tweeted at each silo might be reduced to the more favorable ratio of one or two Minuteman miss/ es per Soviet missile silo. In sum, the doctrine of mutual ensured de- struction (MAD) characterized as ineeefele by President Nixon and other critics IS not inflexible at all. Several events clueing the first term of the Nixon Administration have fundamentally increased the degree of Strategic flexibility available to the U.S. and Would not, te over- looked. For one thing, the ABM Treaty has significantly enhanced the ability to respond at a low level since every email attack does not have to overwhelm the adversary's de- fenses. In addition, noteworthy advances in command and control capabilities can now make available to the President an -unlim- ited number of strategic targeting options for the American missile forces. One exam- ple of this is the-current deployment of e computerized retargeting system which vastly reduces the amount of time required to change the target selections tel each missile. Therefore, it is clear that not only did the previous American forme contain a :41.1 bet an degree of flexibility, but presen: Ameri- can forces have acquired even male in re- cent years. If the present nuclear force struc- ture is already inherently flexible, then what further capabilities could the President and Defense Department desire? Although it is likely that certain improvements could be made in US. command and control capabili- ties to increase flexibility, the only step which remains to be taken in the area of counter- force capabilities is the development cd an efficient "silo-killing" oounterforoe capabil- ity. While at the present time the Nixon Ad- ministration has not explicitly stated that the development of such a capability is an American strategic objective, Secretary Schlesinger in recent weeks hae implied that the capability to destroy Soviet military targets, including missile silos, would be one way of enhancing American "strangle flex- ibility." The forthcoming foreign policy mes- sage and defense report are expected to pro- vide the details. In our view the development of such a capability would be net only or warranted but also dangerous. Moving to a counterforce doctrine would also represent a major porky shift since in the past President Nixon anct other top officials have frequently assured the Congress and American public that the U.S. would neither develop a co-anterior:a capability nor any weapons "which the So- viets -could construe as having a first-strike potential," While it is possible to argue that "technically" a hard-target caunterforce ca- pability does not cons-eft-etc a disa-ming Taft- strike potential since both sides will main- tain relatively invulnerable sea-based me- siles and bombers, the fact renains tbet both nations will peredive such a Impabili as an attempt to achieve such is capability and therefore highly provocative, regmdleas of what is "technically" correct. It is difficult Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP75600380R000700060017-5 August 21, /974pproved FooReilmcsgpANONORECOREDP-7?ft(a318pR000700060017-5 S 15551 to believe that those Americans who for years have been most concerned about the vulnerability of the U.S. ICBM force to a Soviet MIRV attack will not be able to com- prehend that even a "limited" U.S. counter- force potential can generate uncertainties in Soviet eyes about our intentions, create in- stabilities in the strategic balance, and foster suspicions between the two nations. What are Soviets doing right now? The acquisition of such counterforce capa- bilities would increase the likelihood of nu- clear war and the potential for crisis insta- bility. The likelihood of nuclear war will be increased since a counterforce doctrine and related capabilities will make nuclear weapons seem more "useable" in addition to making their attractiveness as a viable policy option superficially greater. Crisis stability will be decreased since with hard-target counterforce capabilities and vulnerable land-based forces each side will perceive in a crisis situation the incentive of even a limited first-strike upon its adversary's mis- sile force. The attractiveness of counterforce targets in a second-strike attack could never equal those of a first-strike attack. Conse- quently, an incentive will exist for the side which seizes the initiative to strike first. Yet, any benefits gained from such a first-strike attack would be only short-sighted and illu- sory since each nation will still retain more than enough nuclear weapons to ultimately destroy the cities of the other. In addition, the development of a hard-target counter- force capability will only promote further strategic arms competition between the U.S. and Soviet Union, while impeding progress in arms control efforts such as the SALT II negotiations and the Comprehensive Test Ban. In light of the disadvantages of such a capability, the United States should make the basic choice to increase strategic flexi- bility through further improvements in com- mand and control capabilities rather than by the development of a provocative hard- target counterforce capability. Finally, the ultimate solution to the prob- lem of an increasingly vulnerable land-based missile force will be found, not in the devel- opment of more efficient "silo-killing" weap- ons but rather in the negotiation of mutual limitations on MIRV flight-testing and de- ployment as a Preface to the eventual reduc- tion of the land-based missiles on both sides.?John C. Baker. [From the Economist, Mar. 2, 1974] THE SCHLESINGER GAMBLE After the energy conference, Nato: Mr. Kissinger has scored another point in Amer- ica's relations with Europe. He has been arguing that the United States and its Euro- pean allies need a better method of regular consultation. Now, from next month, the political heads of 14 foreign ministries? everybody in Nato, including France, except Iceland?will meet frequently with the Nato permanent council. This provides a new level of consultation, between the twice-yearly meetings of ministers and the stodgy gather- ings of the permanent council meeting alone. The change is needed: the recent publication of the American defence budget is a vivid reminder not only of the preeminence of the United States in matters of defence but also of the two-way dependence with its allies. The new items in the American defence budget, plus some major changes in em- phasis, have set the United States off in a fresh direction. This budget is very much the creature of the new Secretary of Defence, Mr. Schlesinger. The hallmark is flexibility. He wants to have several possibilities for response in any situation. Not only does he want the power to fight a conventional war, he wants a rich variety of nuclear options as well, so that even nuclear action can be tailored to the shape of any particular crisis. There are three distinct results of this budget; all are, or ought to be, highly con- troversial, and not looked upon simply as this year's ration for the American military es- tablishment. First, the bad news for Ameri- ca's European allies is that Mr. Schlesinger's nuclear flexibility is apparently to be achieved at the expense of some kinds of conventional forces. Although widely billed as America's biggest defencS budget since the second world war, it is actually smaller in real money terms than any since 1961. It does not directly reduce the American forces In Europe, but it does cut about 20,000 men out of the armed services as a whole. If this kind of budget becomes routine over the next few years it will certainly generate pressures of its own for reductions in Europe; a size- able part of the Defence Department could find itself allied with the isolationists in Congress. The second result of this budget will be to make the current round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Salt) much more difficult. The negotiators are confronted with Amer- ica's proposal to produce lots of different new weapons. There are now not only bomb- ers and land-based and submarine-carried missiles (and numbers of warheads) to be considered. There is a new quiet missile submarine, smaller than the 24-missile Tri- dent; there are missiles with maneuverable warheads; there are also, in one of the sharp- est budget increases, new cruise missiles which can be launched from submarines or aircraft. None of these new weapoins is here yet; most are years away. But the American defence budget, with its tradition of reveal- ing nearly everything about American plans, is itself a major instrument in arms politics. And this one, with its bewildering array of strategic possibilities, cannot fail to make Salt-2 a. very complex operation indeed. The third result of this budget may be a sharp acceleration of the arms race. The Americans' nuclear strategy has passed through several distinct stages. There was President Eisenhower's "more bang for the buck", which was massive nuclear retalia- tion for any attack by the Soviet army. This was followed by flexible response, which has never seemed entirely convincing because Nato has never been willing to provide enough troops to hold off a Soviet attack for more than a few days. Then the advent of anti- ballistic missiles (ABMs) threatened to break the nuclear balance. The Salt-I agreement tried to put the lid back on this box by lim- iting the numbers of ABMs. But in retrospect Salt-1 may have been a hollow triumph; cer- tainly the tacit agreement by both sides to deploy only one of their two allowed ABM systems was due in large part to the realisa- tion that offensive technology is moving faster than defence. The new American budget pushes this technology a stage fur- ther with all its hints of new attacking weapons to come. The nuclear arena is, once again, the centre of the American-Russian competition. SEE WHAT WE CAN DO Of course, the American budget is not the only factor which threatens to destabilise things. The Russians have built a lot more missiles over the past few years than the Americans have, and have lately tested sev- eral new long-range missiles; they have also developed multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles before western intelligence predicted they would. Mr. Schlesinger's an- nouncement that some American warheads are being re-targeted on to Russian missile sites is part of the response to that. (It Is also the result of the increased number of Poseidon missiles in America's inventory. With Poseidon's multiple warheads, there are so many warheads available that they are literally running out of city targets.) The budget is another part. So this year's American defense proposal? which is all the budget is at this point? may simply be a historical milestone in a process that began several years ago. There Is a strong argument that the nuclear flex- ibility this budget represents can be used to make war less likely. And if the budget brings home to the Russians the breathtaking range of possibilities available to the technological power of the United States, Mr. Brezhnev may decide to make Salt-2 the great break- through to cooling off the cold war which most of the world hopes it will be. But if Salt-2 fails, 1974 will have introduced the idea of a flexible nuclear response and could be the beginning of an extremely expensive round in the arms race. Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I would like to associate myself with the remarks of my distinguished colleague from Mas- sachusetts. I believe there is a strong case against developing an increased capacity to destroy Soviet land-based missiles. First, it is an illusion to believe that the United States can develop a capabil- ity for limited nuclear war that will sig- nificantly reduce casualties in a war with the Soviet Union. Even if both sides di- rezted highly accurate weapons against exclusively military targets, the associ- ated civilian damage would be immense, both from direct blast effects and from fallout. Casualties would still be in the millions on both sides. To be sure, it is important for the United States to have many options in its nuclear strategy. Yet we have had these options for many years, including the targetting of many of our weapons against Soviet military sites. Having op- tions might, indeed, increase the chances of stopping a nuclear war--especially one that started by accident. But we would only fool ourselves if we believed that these options?or the new programs we are considering?would in a nuclear war prevent death and destruction the like of which has never been seen on this planet. Second, we must consider the risks of destabilizing the balance of mutual assured destruction between the two superpowers. It may be that hard analy- sis would indicate that even a U.S. abil- ity to destroy the Soviet Union's land- based missiles would not provoke them to launch a preemptive attack against us, and that we would not be provoked to launch a preemptive attack if the Soviet Union could destroy our Minute- man and Titan missiles. There are simply too many nuclear weapons on both sides that would still get through?bombers, weapons based at sea, and land-based missiles not effectively destroyed?for either power to escape massive destruc- tion in any nuclear war. Such a war would remain an act of insanity, and would most likely end civilized life in our two countries and elsewhere. Yet even if the possibility of a success- ful attack against land-based missiles alone would be unlikely to provoke a nu- clear war based on cold logic, we must still consider the imponderables?the psychological factors that so often gov- ern men's actions. Any country whose land-based missiles were vulnerable to destruction in a first strike would be likely to consider adopting a strategy of "launch on warning," thus returning us to the hair-trigger days of the 1950's. This strategy might be adopted out of fear? Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP75600380R000700060017-5 S 15552 Approved For ReLlmtiMpolig9itC167,89E1:5139giftgli)20700060017Agust 21, 19;? 4 wrongly in my judgment?even though other weapons systems remained invul- nerable. Yet no national leader?either here or in the Soviet Union?should once again be faced with the awful responsi- imity of potentially deciding on nuclear war in the few precious minutes between the word of an impending attack and its occurence. No leader should be placed at the mercy of fallible machines to tell hen whether or not an attack has actu- ally been launched. eete,b. superpower has gained from the sure knowledge that a devastating nu- clear response is possible, what ever the other side does first. In no way should we undermine that strategic and psy- chological assurance?which underpins the current relaxation of tensions be- tween the superpowers. And we should demand that the Soviet Union take no action that would do likewise. Third, I concur with Senator BROOKE that it would be very difficult for the Soviet Union to distinguish between de- velopments we make in the yield, accu- racy, and maneuverability of U.S. war- heads, in order to destroy Soviet land- based missiles; and the actual deploy- ment of these weapons. Unlike deployed missiles, themselves, these new warheads cannot easily be counted?if at all. Hence, once development is completed, the Russians will never be entirely sure that we have not deployed them. They will very likely act as though we had done so, just as our military planners believe that later in the 1970's they will have to count on a full deployment of Soviet MIRV's, whether or not Moscow actually decides to follow this course. The time for restraint, therefore, is now, before new doubts are raised in the minds of Soviet planners about our in- tentions, and before they use these doubts to argue for the building of yet more Soviet nuclear weapons. Penally and most important. I believe we must assess very carefully the effect of these new developments on the pros- pects for reaching a firm agreement at the SALT II talks?an agreement in the interests of both sides. To be sure. we must be prepared to meet any Soviet challenge to our ability to respond ef- fectively to any Soviet nuclear attack. To he sure, we must be mindful of the rein- live balance of nuclear forces on both sides for psychological reasons. We must ecek a substantial overall equality, in both quantitative and qualitative terms, het ween the nuclear forces of both sides. We must seek by every means to gain eesviet restraint in the arms race?re- straint particularly in the possible de- looyment of new, large missiles which the ll-ayiet Union has been testing. ?et it is important at this critical stage of arms negotiations tor the United S;tates to take no action that is likely to nroulate further Soviet nuclear weapons deployments. For if we do so, we will only play into the hands of the Soviet mar- Pals, against those officials of the Soviet iiovernment who may genuinely seek an end to the nuclear arms race. Pollowing my trip to the Soviet Union rot April, I am firmly convinced that it is possible to reach an effective SALT II agreement, provided teat both side:; are prepared to exercise restraint. And I am even more convinced that the time eo do so is now. Secretary Kissinger himself has stressed the problem of coping with a rapidly-approaching nuclear env:son- ment in which there are thousands and thousands of nuclear weapons on botn sides, of every conceivable type and char- acteristic. It will not be easy to cope with the growth of nuclear technology in any event; but it will be immensely more diffi- cult if either side goes forward with new deployments or develops new capabilities that are read by the other side as imply- ing new deployments. These new U.S. ha rd-targetting pro- grams would take several years to de- velop, and would not improve our ability to survive a Soviet first strike and re- spond effectively. But if that is true, then we have nothing to lose and everything to gain by waiting?waiting to see whether a small measure of U.S. restraint will lead to the Soviet restraint that we earnestly seek in deployment of new, large missiles. In light of the limited accomplishments In arms control at the last summit?a failure to make any substantial prog- ress?and in light of the imperative need to move forward at SALT II, I be- lieve that we should not muddy the dip- lomatic waters. We should hold off on these programs, and c:eallenge the Soviet Union to hold off on it; new deployments. Mr. President, it is for these reasons that I join with Senator BROOKE in op- posing these new research and develop- ment programs. Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment, No. 1836, be temporarily laid aside and that I be permitted to yie:.d the floor to the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. :KENNEDY) SO that he may call up his amendment. The PRESIDING 010.eaCER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered. Mr. MANSFIELD. Will the Senator yield briefly? Mr. KENNEDY. I yield. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the final vote on the pending business occur at 4:45 this afternoon. Mr. EAGLETON. Is that on the pend- ing amendment? Mr. MANSFIELD. The pending busi- ness, the bill. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HELMS) . Does the Senator also ask that rule XII be waived? Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes. Mr. GRIFFIN. What about the vote on the Eagleton amendment? Mr. MANSFIELD. That is on con- trolled time. I do not anticipate that the opponents will consume anywhere near the 2 hours that have been allotted. Mr. KENNEDY. MT. President. reserv- ing the right to object, I have an amend- ment I would like to be able to oler. I have discussed it briefly with the ,Sena- tor from Arkansas. He has indicated a willingness to take it to conference. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, may we have order? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Seri- ate will be in order. Mr. KENNEDY. I want to make sure that we will have an opportunity to con- sider the amendment and discuss it briefly. I am not interested in in ex- tended period of debate. Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President I was not in the Chamber a moment ago What is the request? Mr. MANSFIELD. That the vote en passage-occur at 4:45. Mr. McCLELLAN. I have no objection, I am perfectly willing. What is the question of the Senator from Massachusetts? Mr. KENNEDY. It is with respect to my amendment, which we discussed'. I understood that we were going to hove a brief exchange. Mr. McCLELLAN. I indicated to the Senator that I would be willing to take the amendment to conference, so that we would not unnecessarily take up a lot of time arguing it and discussing it. If the Senator is willing to do that, I think we can proceed. Mr. KENNEDY. The distinguished senior Senator from Missouri has been extremely interested in this matter, and I am wondering whether I could lave an opportunity to talk with him briefly, and then if the majority leader would propound such an agreement, I am sure there would be no objection. Mr. EAGLETON. I can say, on behalf of my colleague, that he would be amen- able to the unanimous-consent request. Mr. MANSFIELD. Does the Senator want a quorum call? Mr. KENNEDY. Yes, Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum . I ask unanimous consent that the time not be charged to either side. The PRESIDING OFFICER. With out objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk pro- ceeded to call the roll. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order tor the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President Iv ish to repeat my earlier unanimous-consent request that the vote on final passage occur at the hour of 4:45 p.m, and that rule XII be waived. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Witt: (nit objection, it is so ordered. ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT IONTIL 9 A.M. TOMORROW, AND FOR SCHEDULE OF BUSINESS Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if this bill is disposed of tonight, 1 ask unanimous consent that the Senate con- vene at 9 a.m. tomorrow: that there be an appropriate period for the recognition of special orders and the joint leat ersi lip, with a brief morning hour; and t:aot the vote on passage of the State, Justice, and Commerce appropriation bill, which e be the pending business, occur riot later than 3 p.m. tomorrow, with rule XII waived. Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP75600380R000700060017-5 August' 21, 197Approved F6CIEWEREENWegitt/CRACMAI:1PgtibbigOR000700060017-5 S 15553 The PRESIDING 0.1..riCER, Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPRO- PRIATION ACT, 1975 The Senate continued with the con- sideration of the bill (H.R. 16243) mak- ing appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975, and for other purposes. AMENDMENT NO. 1835 Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I call up my amendment No. 1835. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated. The assistant legislative clerk pro- ceeded to read the amendment. Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. KENNEDY'S amendment (No. 1835) is as follows: On page 50, line 21, insert a new section as follows: SEC. .(a) No funds appropriated for the use of the Department of Defense by this or any other Act in fiscal year 1975 may be used for the purpose of stockpiling war materials or equipment for use by any Asian country except to the extent authorized by title VII of this Act or by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or the Foreign Military Sales Act. (b) Any materials or equipment stock- piled by the Department of Defense on the date of enactment of this Act for future use by any Asian country may not be transferred to any such country except to the extent such transfer is specifically authorized by law. Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, this is an amendment that deals with the wax reserve stocks for allies. The amendment was initially accepted by the Senate last June, as part of the Defense Authoriza- tion bill, but it was dropped in confer- ence because of the opposition of the House conferees. Hopefully, they will have a different attitude this time in conference. Specifically, Mr. President, this amendment will prohibit $529 million from being used for war reserve stocks for allies. This ambiguous account is re- portedly used to obtain weapons and ammunition on a contingent basis for the support of forces in the event of a future war involving South Vietnam, South Korea, or Thailand. This new funding account, quietly built up in the last 2 fiscal years, has not gone through the authorizing com- mittees of the Congress. It is a back-door means of bolstering increased procure- ments by the Defense Department. When the disguised account was dis- covered by Senator FULBRIGHT last spring, the Defense Department ex- plained it as being used for supporting these three allies?South Vietnam, South Korea, and Thailand. At the same time, the Defense Department stated that the equipment remained in stock- piles controlled by the United States. However, the Department would not state that, in the event of hostilities, con- gressional authorization was required be- fore these weapons could be turned over to other countries. In fact, when the General Accounting Office reported its findings to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last month, the Defense Department objected to the GAO's use of the word "authorization" as being required prior to the transfer of stockpiled items to these Asian allies. The Department argued instead that only "consultation" with the Congress was required. I find this appropriation objectionable on two counts. First, it could mean that congressionally established ceilings?on aid to Vietnam, for example?could be- come meaningless if the Defense Depart- ment can circumvent those ceilings by comingling U.S. and allied reserve stock- piles, and thereby escape congressional control over their distribution. Second, it means that we are being asked?at a time of difficult economic circum- stances?to boost our own Defense budg- et for the purpose of meeting the future military needs of South Vietnam, South Korea, and Thailand. Clearly, this major item should be considered as part of the foreign aid request, not as a disguised account in the DOD appropriations bill. The Defense Department now argues that much of the new equipment Pur- chased by this account goes directly to the U.S. active military forces and the U.S. Reserves. If that is the purpose of these funds, then they should not be cate- gorized as "war reserve stacks for allies.* Moreover, the GAO has informed me that there is a circle at work: Even if some of these weapons go to U.S. troops In the field, the weapons that are re- placed go to the Reserves and/or to the stockpile. Then, once in the stockpile, there is a clear tendency for the supplies to be declared excess and turned over to South Vietnam, South Korea, and Thai- land. Thus, the will of Congress can be thwarted by the backdoor. The process is misleading in another way. For example, in fiscal year 1973, the Defense Department listed $24.3 million in excess stocks as going to South Viet- nam, $6.4 million as going to Thailand, and $8.3 million as going to South Korea.. But those figures are what the DOD calls actual value, not the acquisition cost of the supplies. The GAO found that the Department of Defense was listing those weapons at 8.9 percent of their acquisi- tion cost. Thus, the acquisition of wea- pons declared excess and turned over to those countries in fiscal year 1973 was approximately $390 million. In fiscal year 1974, the acquisition cost of equipment declared excess and turned over to those three countries was approximately $620 million. And in fiscal year 1975, the De- fense Department plans, according to the GAO, to turn over to those three countries weapons and equipment whose acquisition cost is approximately $738 million. I see no reason for the U.S. Congress to approve $529 million in an account listed as was reserves for allies and des- ignated for South Vietnam, South Korea, and Thailand, at the same time that the Department of Defense contemplates turning over excess items costing an estimated $738 million to those countries. If there are stockpile needs that are not being met for U.S. active duty forces, let the Defense Department ask specifi- cally for that equipment as it usually does in its normal procurement requests. If this is a legitimate foreign military aid request, then let it be properly con- sidered under the foreign aid bill. Mr. President, it is also important to note what this amendment does not do: First, it does not affect in aiirrarthe Department's service-funded program of aid to South Vietnam. The committee has recommended $700 million for that fund. Second, it does not affect in any way the level of assistance which may even- tually be approved by the Congress under the authority of the Foreign Assistance Act or the Foreign Military Sales Act? $300 million has been requested for South Korea and Thailand under those programs. This amendment is unrelated to congressional approval or rejection of those requests. Finally this amendment does not affect the approximately half-billion dollars worth of stocks which have already been set aside for these Asian allies in the past 2 fiscal years. But it does put a halt to adding another half-billion dollars worth of weapons to that stockpile this year, until the purposes of the stockpile are more clearly explained to Congress, and the implications of such foreign aid have been properly deliberated. Mr. President, I have grave doubts whether such foreign aid should be au- thorized at all. Certainly, it should not be done without the consent of Con- gress. But primarily, I wish to stress that such foreign aid does not belong in this bill. This is a budget bill to provide funds for the operation and maintenance of the Department of Defense. Foreign as- sistance appropriations should not be mixed with appropriations for the U.S. armed services. The only foreign assistance fund ap- propriated along with funds for the serv- ices in this bill is the assistance for South Vietnam. All other foreign assistance is authorized in the Foreign Aid bill, under the military assistance program. This is true even of the $2.2 billion in military assistance authorized for Israel last year. The Armed Services Committee report on the Defense authorization bill strongly emphasizes the same point: As it did last year, the Committee is again recommending reductions of the items in- cluded for war reserves for allies. The Com- mittee does not agree that these items should be procured for storage for allies in a title that is intended for the procurement of items for U.S. forces. In this year of the war powers bill and economic belt-tightening, Congress can- not avoid its responsibility to guarantee that such programs are fully justified in terms of foreign assistance, and that there are proper controls over transfer- ral of these weapons. We have had enough of Presidential wars. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent that the recent study prepared on this subject by the General Accounting Office may be printed in the RECORD at this point. There being no objection, the study Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP75600380R000700060017-5 8 15554 Approved For ReICONTattafg9BENAV1stanwoomaopp700060017-2, gust21. t- m- ordered to be printed 111 the RECORD. Z-; f ollows I /E.PARTMENT OF DEFENSE STOCKPILING OF WAlt PT:SERVE MATERIALS FOR USE SY UNITED ATES Ai ties 'oMPTROT I ER GENE RAT, OF THE IINIFED STATES_ -iai ?vinglon, D.C. J W FAILBRTGHT, 1,rman. Committee On Foreign. Relations. U.S. Senate. DP.AR MR. CHAIRMAN: This report Is in re- aense, to a May 6, 1974, letter requesting in on the stockpiling of war reserve materials by the Department of Defense SOD) for possible future use by Asian allies. inr study concentrated on the scope of the Program, the statutory authority being relied ,a,c by DOD for stockpiling these materials, eaci the authority under which they could be 4. road over to any of the allied forces. Our work was performed at DOD in Washington, Hecause of the short time allowed to meet the Committee's needs, we have been unable to verify the information provided by DOD or to obtain a legal analysis of the propriety or the program. However, we have included our views and interpretations and believe this report will be helpful during the up- coming foreign assistance authorization bearings. We have not submited the report to DOD for its official position; however, we have dis- cussed the observations with DOD officials tied have considered their views. SCOPE OF THE PROGR A NT ,'cording to a DOD directive, the total quantity of a defense item authorized for peacetime acquisition includes the quantity estimated (1) to equip and sustain U.S force levels in peacetime and in wartime for periods specified in planning documents, (2) to equip and sustain allied forces by satisfying approved requirements of the Military Assistance Program, the ap- proved requirements of the Foreign Military Sales Program, and approved wartime re- quirements for those allies specified in cur- rent program planning documents, and (3) to provide support for other US. Government departments and agencies. The term used to describe the above procurement requirement la approved force acquisition objective. 'Ibis objective includes a quantity to be aleickpiled abroad and in the United States or future national emergencies--war re- aerves. These reserves are intended to sustain operations until production can be expanded ao match combat consumption. ttl)l) believes that the war reserves are es- feudal to rapidly deployable combat forces so that the United States has. the future eapaoility to respond and be supported in combat for whatever period the national in- -airest; requires. We determined from DOD nlanning and programing documents that the approved iorce levels used to plan future requirements ineluded the estimated number of allied .orces that might need logistics support in future Asian hostilities. F.stimated allied re- imirements add to hut do not replace U.S A colurements. aap stocks of munitions end equipment have traditionally been available for transfer to allies pursuant to appropriate military as- eistance legislation, as well as for use by ii S. Forces. Specific identification of war re- eerve stocks for possible future transfer to -allies in DOD budget documentation plan- eine began with the development of the fis- eal year 1972 Defense program Some avail- able assets were allocated for this ptIrpose in 1-seal year 1973. However, funds were not re- eitested in budget submissions to the ('-on- eress until fiscal year 1974 Items held in reserve that arc planned for potential allied use are not secregated from other reserve stocks, and almost all the same kinds of items are also required as war re- serves for U.S. Forces. If necessary, the war reserves for allied forces could be nsed to support U.S. Forces. 130D considers that war reserve stocks for allies are not yet committed or authorized for transfer to any nation. They are for "al- lies" in theory only and, according to DOD officials, will remain U.S, property until the President, with appropriate congressional consultation determincs that such stocks should be released to a specific ally DOD officials said that the portion of lbs total war reserve stocks designated for future al- lied use is based on an arbitrary decision and it is the total (United States and allied) war reserve requirement that has validity. DOD planners for fiscal year 1973 allocated $23 million of its reserve assets toward the total allied requirement; for fiscal year 1974, $494 million was allocated. For fiscal year 1975, $529 million of the total procurgment request has been proposed for application toward allied requirements, Some of each of the follovving types of items are propo ted to be procured from the fiscal year 1975 .'unds. Armi Small arms ammunitim. Artillery ammunition. Tank recovery vehicleiti Portable radar sets? Minor miscellaneous items. Spares and repair parts. Mortar ammunition. Tanks.1 Machine guns. Rocket launchers., Landing boats.1 Air Force Air-to-ground muniticns. Tanks, racks, adapters, and pylons. .FOAL AUTHORITY CITED Br DOD FOR STC/CKPIL- ING AND TRANSFERRING STOCKS We were told by offic:.als of the oe ce of General Counsel, DOD, that DOD's legal au- thority to both stockpile war reserve assets and transfer these assets to allies is con- tained in: The annual DOD authorization and appro- priation acts; The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended; and The Foreign Militaiy Sales Art, as amended. No specific sections of these acts were cited. AUTHOR/TY FOR STOCKPILING AND TRANSFERRING STOCKS--0A0 VIEWS Time did not permit us to perfoim a search for all possible means available to stockpile war reserves and to transfer stocks. However, our brief look at the legis- lation mentioned by DOI) disclosed thali the general authority to procure U.S. deense material is contained ir, the annual DOD authorization and appropriation acts. This authority does not provide for the procure- ment of war reserves but rather for specific defense items (for example, Procurement of Ammunition, Army). Ne iertheless. through backup data submitted with appropriation requests and the testimony of witnesses the congressional committees responsible for DOD authorizations and appropriations were aware of DOD's program of stockpiling for All new procurement al' these items will go directly to U.S. Army active and reserve units. The older pieces .3f equipment dis- placed by the new- procurement will go Into the war reserve stockpile that could be used to replace U.S. or (with proper atithotiza- tion) allied combat losses in some fu :sire conflict. Therefore, this procurement, al- though labeled as allied reserve, modernizes the U.S. Army Force struc lure while increas- ing the total assets available as war reserves ; 4 possible future allied use. Thus, tie legis- lative history of the annual DOD authoriza- tion and appropriation acts suggests that the pcoilminmg.ittees intended to authorize tints stck- However, the congressional committees re- sponsible for authorising military grant and sales assistance to foreign allies apparsutly were not aware of the stockpiling program. We were informed that the Senate Pot sign Relations Committee was unaware of the planned stockpiling, even though lranefers to allies (as well as the transfer of any de- fense articles to foreign governments, except Vietnam) would go through programs inicier the jurisdiction of the Committee. Authority to transfer procured defense stocks is separate from the autlierity to stockpile war reserves. Authorizations relat- ing to transfers are contained in Various sec- tions of the Foreign Assistance At of 1961, as amended; the Foreign Military Sales Act, as amended; the Foreign Military Sales Act Amendments, 1971, as amended; and the an- nual DOD authorization and appropriation acts (Military Assistance Service Funded I. Some of the pertinent sections of these acts are discussed below. (See app. I through III.) Foreign Assistance Act?Military assistance Section 503(a) of the Foreign As;itilitnee Act of 1961, as amended, gives the P 'cattiest the authority to provide military as3istance to friendly countries and international orga- nizations. In fiscal year 1974, the C7ongress authorized the President to spend either through loans or grants up to $512.5 million for this assistance, although actual appro- priations amounted to $450 million. Section 503(a) provided that, when defense articles are loaned to foreign countries.or international organizations, under section 503(a), the military assistance appropriation will be charged only for out-of-pocket ex- penses and depreciation. In our repor, to the Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, in March 1973,i we indicated that previously DOD had leased defense articles on the biliSta of different law (10 U.S.C. 2667). This law authorizes leasing of nonexcesa defense articles when it is in the public in- terest or will promote national defense. How- ever, the law has no relation to foreign assist- ance and was enacted to authorize ti e leas- ing of defense plants and production equip- ment to private commercial Interests, In our report, we specified that articles were leased under law (10 U.S.C. 2667) at no cost to fur- eign governments or international Greenlee- tions and that it appeared the Use af this provision circumvented the Foreign Assiet- ance Act of 1961, as amended. Our view Wfti that such loans or leases constituted military assistance and should be subject to res trail II s imposed by the act. Additionally, under section 506(a t if the President determines it is in the security in- terests of the United States, he may order up to $250 million in defense articles frern stocks?in addition to the $450 million ap- propriated?and reiMbursement will he pro- vided in subsequent appropriations a v table for military assistance. He exercised a Is u- thority during fiscal year 1974 by authorizing the transfer of up to $200 million in defense articles to provide additional military teat-t- ame to Cambodia. Under section 614(a), the President al ii ina.y authorize assistance, in an amount not to exceed $250 million, without regard 'o an:v provisions of the act. However, the Pre,ident may only use funds already appropriated under other sect-ions of the act. During fiscal year 1974, the President exercised his author- ity under section 614(a) five times he p11.. poses of military assistance. The total amount "Use of Excess Defense Articles and Othst Resources to Supplement the Military s so I . since Program," Ei -163742, Mar 21, 197t/ Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP75600380R000700060017-5 August 21, 197-)Ipproved FocftWIRIENRYNAVRIMAIRPRZMNAW000700060017-5 S 15555 authorized by the President was $133.4 Mil- lion. These and other related sections of the act are shown in appendix I. Foreign Military Sales Act Although the Congress placed a ceiling on the total credit sales and guarantees under sections 23 and 24 of the Foreign Military Sales Act (see app. II), no similar restrictions are placed on cash sales under sections 21 and 22 of the act. Thus, an unlimited quantity.of defense stocks could be sold under seetions 21 and 22. During fiscal year 1974, DOD esti- mates that credit sales will amount to $730 million, the authorized ceiling, and cash sales will amount to approximately $7.2 billion. Military assistance service funded authority The provisions in annual DOD authoriza- tion and appropriation acts (see app. III) give DOD authority to use its appropriated funds to transfer any defense articles, includ- ing war reserve material, to support South Vietnamese forces, subject to the $1.126 bil- lion ceiling. Foreign, Military Sales Act amendments?Ex- cess Defense articles Excess defense articles are items in excess of DOD-approved force requirement level. The authority to transfer excess defense ar- ticles Is contained in section 8 of the For- eign Military Sales Act Amendments, 1971, as amended. (See app. II.) In our report to your Committee in March 1973, we indicated that excess defense articles were generated through modernizations of forces and changes in authorizations of ar- ticles to equip and sustain the approved forces. The decision as to what portion of the DOD inventory will constitute the approved force requirement level and what assets may be transferred as excess defense articles rests entirely with DOD. Excess articles are con- tinuously available in vast quantities and have been used in military assistance pro- grams since the inception of foreign aid. Use of excess articles to supplement the regularly funded military assistance program has in- creased since 1968 because of reduced mili- tary assistance appropriations. At the time of our earlier review, "value" was defined as not less than one-third of the amount the United States paid when the articles were acquired (acquisition cost). Since then, the law has been changed and value is now defined only as actual value plus the cost of repairing, rehabilitating, or modifying the article, which could range from as low as salvage value to as high as acquisition cost. A recent sampling by DOD showed the actual value of excess articles averaged only 8.9 percent of acquisition cost, considerably less than the one-third mini- mum required under previous legislation. Orders for excess defense articles are to be considered expenditures of military assist- ance funds. However, - those articles gener- ated abroad are charged to the appropriation only if the aggregate actual value during any fiscal year exceeds $150 million. Under the old definition of value this would equal about $450 million (3 x $150 million) in excess articles, based on acquisition cost. Now, how- ever, if DOD decides to use the 8.9 percent (1/11) figure as actual value, approximately $1.65 billion (11 x $150 million) in excess articles, based on acquisition cost, could be granted to foreign countries without charge to the military assistance appropriation. This is over three times more than the value of excess defense articles granted through the military assistance program during any sin- gle previous year. The proposed Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 would further liberalize the use of ex- cess items. Our analysis of the proposed act showed that the theoretical ceiling of $1.65 billion could be increased to $4.4 billion. We believe that consideration should be given to providing more congressional control over excess defense articles. The stockpiling of defense assets for po- tential Use by allies adds another level to the DOD procurement base. We previously mentioned that new Army procurement will modernize U.S. active and reserve units and the older articles being re- placed will make up the war reserve stock- pile. It is conceivable that once these U.S. Forces have been modernized, DOD will mod- ernize the war reserve, and thus make large quantities of defense assets excess and avail- able for transfer to foreign governments, in- cluding those for which the stockpile was originally intended. More importantly, however, is the fact 'that DOD has the authority to decide what portion of the DOD inventory will make up the approved force requirement level. Since 'the war reserve for allies represents a por- tion of the total war reserve in excess of U.S. 'approved force requirements, DOD can now stockpile older items that would immediately become excess upon replacement. If a future 'emergency arises over seas, DOD could reduce 'the approved force requirement level and im- mediately make the war reserve for allies 'available as excess for transfer to whichever 'country may need them. All this could be 'accomplished without adversely affecting the 'total U.S. approved force requirements. 'CONCLUSION ' In conclusion, we feel that the President and DOD at the present time have consider- able statutory authority to transfer reserve 'materials to allies if they are needed. It Should be pointed out that the authority to transfer U.S. defense stocks under these pro- 'visions applies to any defense item in the 'inventory, whether planned for future use by allies or U.S. Forces. ' The broad authority is especially prevalent 'in the area of excess defense articles. Under present authority DOD is permitted to trans- fer vast quantities Of excess items to foreign governments with little or no charge to any ?future increase in available excess items (1) because of the modernization of forces and/or the reduction in the approved force re- 'quirement level and (2) because of the pro- posed liberalization of the no-cost transfer ceiling, the Committee may wish to con- sider tighter controls over the quantity of ekcess articles that can be transferred to foreign governments. This may include re- taining section 8 of the Foreign Military Sales Act Amendments of 1971, but modify- ing it (1) to establish actual value at not less than 331/3 percent of acquisition value and (2) to require that excess programs be 'stated in congressional presentation docu- ments in terms of acquisition cost. We recognize that there is legislation pend- ing on the DOD procurement authorization bill that would forbid the stockpiling of defense assets for possible future use by allied forces. Although passage would elimi- nate the war reserve for allies, it would not strengthen control over excess defense articles. ' We plan no further distribution of this ?report unless you agree or publicly announce its contents. ? Sincerely yours, ELMER B. STAATS, Comtproller General of the United States. EXCERPTS FROM FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961, AS AMENDED MILITARY ASSISTANCE Section 503?General Authority?(a) The President is authorized to furnish military assistance on such terms and conditions as he may determine, to any friendly country or international organization, the assisting of which the President finds will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace and which is otherwise eligible to receive such assistance, by? (1) acquiring from any source and pro- viding (by loan or grant) any defense article or defense service; or (2) assigning or detailing members of the Armed Forces of the United States and other personnel of the Department of Defense to perform duties of a noncombatant nature. (b) In addition to such other terms and conditions as the President may determine pursuant to subsection (a), defense articles may be loaned thereunder only if? (1) there is a bona fide reason, other than the shortage of funds, for providing such articles on a loan basis rather than on a grant basis; (2) there is a reasonable expectation that such articles will be returned to the agency making the loan at the end of the loan period, unless the loan is then renewed; (3) the loan period is of fixed duration not exceeding five years, during which such article may be recalled for any reason by the United States; (4) the agency making the loan is reim- bursed for the loan based on the amount charged to the appropriation for military assistance under subsection (c) ; and (5) arrangements are made with the agency making the loan to be reimbursed in the event such article is lost or destroyed while on loan, such reimbursement being made first out of any funds available to carry out this chapter and based on the depreciated value of the article at the time of loss or destruction. (c) (1) In the case of any loan of a defense article or defense service made under this section there shall be a charge to the appro- priation for military assistance for any fiscal year while the article or service is on loan in an amount based on? (A) the out-of-pocket expenses authorized to be incurred in connection with such loan during such fiscal year; and (B) the depreciation which occurs during such year while such article is on loan. (2) The provisions of this subsection shall not apply? (A) to any particular defense article or defense service which the United States Government agreed prior to the date of en- actment of this subsection to lend; and (B) to any defense article or defense service, or portion thereof acquired with funds appropriated for military assistance under this Act. Section 504?Authorization?(a) There is authorized to be appropriated to the Presi- dent to carry out the purpose of this part not to exceed $512,500,000 for the fiscal year 1974: Provided, That funds made available for assistance under this chapter (other than training in the United States) shall not be used to furnish assistance to more than thir- ty-one countries in any fiscal year: Pro- vided further, That none of the funds ap- propriated pursuant to this subsection shall be used to furnish sophisticated weapons systems, such as missile systems and jet aircraft for military purposes, to? any un- derdeveloped country, unless the President determines that the furnishing of such weap- ons systems is important to the national security of the United States and reports within thirty days each such determination to. the Congress. Amounts appropriated un- der this subsection are authorized to remain available until expended. Amounts appro- priated under this subsection shall be avail- able for cost-sharing expenses of United States particiaption in the military head- quarters and related agencies program. Section 506? Special Authority?(a) Dur- ing the fiscal year 1974, the President may, if he determines it to be in the security in- terests of the United States, order defense articles from the stocks of the Department of Defense and defense services for the pur- poses of part II [military assistancer, sub- ject to subsequent reimbursement therefor from subsequent appropriations available for military assistance. The value of such orders under this subsection in the fiscal year 1974 shall not exceed $250,000,000. (b) The j Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP75600380R000700060017-5 '1Z:A Approved ForIWRFRipai/jigf93 : imm75BRI0eA000700060017A-57 U US,. 1 _or.rtriient of Defense is authorized to in- : or. in applicable appropriations, oblige- joie; in anticipation of reimbursements in enounis equivalent to the value of such ,i,t,r1.; under subsection (a) of? this section. npria.Lions to the President of such sums y be necessary to reimburse the ap- mtble approoriation, fund, or account for een meters are hereby authorieed. ,.11A PROVISIONS 7-;i1:11iurn 61(). 'Transfer Between Accounts.? ' tenenever the President determines it Lieseessary for the purposes of this Act. exceed 10 per cent urn of the funds mem available for any provision of this - (except funds made available pursuant ?it IV of chapter 2 of part I (Overseas !vaiii Investment Corporation!) may be ii rred to. and conscsidated with, the .,.ons made available for any other provi- ion et this Act, and may he used for any of tire purposes for which such funds may be esed, except that the total in the provision en. the benefit of which the transfer is made . min not be increased by more than 20 per .nti,t1Dit of the amount of funds made avail- ? oe tor such provision. * * ? nection 614. Special Authorities.?(a) The emsectent may authorize in each fiscal year ire use of funds made available for use un- aar t,17,(,7 Act and the furnishing of assistance mider section 606 in a total amount not to :metal $250,000,000 and the use of not to ex- ,06 $100,000,000 of foreign currencies ac-, ? a under this Act or any other law with- tett regard to the requirements of the Act, y law relating to receipts and credits ac- es-ding to the United States, any Act appro- priating funds for use uncier this Act, or the mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of M51 (22 U.S.C. 1611 et seq.), in furtherance ;r. Any- of the purposes of such Acts, when the nresident determines that such authoriza- tion Is Important to the security of the eoiled States. Not more than $50,000,000 of the funds available under this subsection may SE1 allocated to any one country in any eseal year_ the limitation contained in the preceding sentence shall not apply to any rountry which is a victim of active Commu- Diat or Communist-supported aggression. (e) The President is authorized to use amounts not to exceed $50.000,000 of the ILTRIS made available under this Act pursu- nnt to his certification that it is inadvis, able to specify the nature of the use of such tilinds, which certification shall be deemed to be a sufficient voucher for such amounts, s he president shall promptly and fully in- tone. the Speaker of the House of Represent- Aver and the chairman and ranking minor- My member of the Committee on Foreign e,selations of the Senate of each use of funds ender this subsection. Section 652, Limitation Upon Exercise of tnseciai Authority.?The President shall not exercise any special authority granted to elm under section 506(e), 610(a), or 614(a) this Act unless the President. prior to the note Sie intends to exercise any such author- e-,y, notifies the Speaker of the House of Rep- resentatives and the Committee on Foreign nelations of the Senate in wrding of each such intended exercise, the section of this Act under which such autleori0; is to be ex- :sect-led, and the justification for, and the extent of, the exercise of such authority. nection 653. Change in Allocation of For- ,tign Assistance.?(a) Not later than thirty nays after the enactment of any law" appro- eriatnig funds to carry out any provision of Act (other than section 451 Contin- cuter.' Fund or 637 [Administrative Ex- a:rises Ii. the President shall notify the Con- less of each foreign country and interna- tional organization to which the United nfates Government intends to provide any portion of the funds under such law and of tie amount of funds under the law, by cate- gory of assistance. that the United States Government intends to provide to each. Not- withstanding any other provision of law, the United States Government shall not proeide to any foreign country or international orga- nization any funds under that law which ex- ceeds by 10 per centum the amount of mili- tary grant assistance or security supporeing assistance, as the case may be, -which the President notified the Congress that the .d States Government intended to pro- eide that country or organization under that Iftwe unless the President (I) determines that it is in Hai security. interests of the United States that such country or orgnni- estimi receive funds in excess of the ammint inemded in such notification for that ectim- try or organization, and (2) reports to Con- miens, at least ten days prior to the date on which such excess funds are to be provided to that country or organization, each such determination. including the name of the country or organization to receive funds in excess of such per centum, the amount of ennds in excess of the per centum which are eo be provided, and the justification for :pro- viding the additional assiatance. (b) The provisions of this section shall not apply in the case of any law making continuing appropriations and may inn be waived under the provisions of section CM -of this Act. APPENDIS II?E'