LETTER TO MR. WILLIAM E. COLBY, DIRECTOR FROM SAM J. ERVIN, JR.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00380R000800060021-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 18, 2004
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: May 3, 1974
• Content Type: LETTER

SAM J. E{IVIIAp.ptQwM KEor Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR0008000 06 021-9 -
JOHN L. MCCLELLAN, ARK.
R!ENRY M. JACKSON, WASH.
EDMUND B'INUSKIE, MAINE
.ABRAHAM RIBICOFF, CONN.
LEE METCALF,.MONT.
JAMES B. ALLEN, ALA.
I.AWTON CHILES, FLA.
SAM NUNN, GA.
WALTER D. HUDOLESTON, KY.
CHARLES H. PERCY, ILL.
JACOB K. JAVITS, N.Y.
EDWARD J. GURNEY, FLA.
WILLIAM B. SASE, OHIO
WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR., DEL.
BILL BROCK, TENN.
ROBERT BLAND SMITH, JR.
CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR
CO M M ITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
May 3, 1974
Mr. William E. Colby, Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C, 20505
Dear Mr. Colby:
S. 3393
M-1 W-~nq
Attached is a copy of a bill which has been referred to
this committee for consideration.
It will be helpful if you will give the committee the
benefit of your views regarding the provisions of this bill, and
your recommendations as to committee action before May 22,. 1974.
Please transmit your reply in quadruplicate.
Thanking you for your cooperation, I am
Sincerely yours,
Sam J. Ervin, Jr.
Chairman
Enclas ure
'ail rtif eb .State-0 ,senate
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
S. 3393
FROM: OLC
EXTENSION
NO.
.7D35
~
DATE
1 May 1974
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
'
OFFICER
S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
RECEIVED FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
Senators Edmund S. Muskie
(D., Me.) and Jacob K. Javits
(R., N. Y.) have introduced
a bill, S. 3393, "Government
Secrecy Control Act of 1974,
which establishes a Joint
OGC
Committee on Government
Secrecy in Congress and a
Registrar of National Defense an
no S
Foreign Policy Information in
L 5. /
the Executive Office of the
President.
6'
The Joint Committee would over-
see classification practices as
7,
they affect the Congress. In
addition it can order public
disclosure of any classified
8.
information. The Registrar will
oversee classification in the
9.
Executive and assumes the
responsibilities of the present
Interagency Review Committee
10.
established under E. O. 11652,
which would be abolished. The
~~
bill also establishes procedures
for the automatic declassification
of information.
12.
It is suggested that you initiate
a review of the bill (excerpt from
13.
Record attached) since we will
undoubtedly be called upon to
14.
submit c mments.
ST
TINTL
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 ":1974 Approved Feb1/3/&f2P'PHPOR000800060021-9
pushed a year behind schedule because brine
in ;Elie 'uinderground water fouls the heat
eiiangers.
PA WOOD. Mr. President, r' ec-
Mr.
erance of the energy oligopoly-I am
roduciilg1e4Islation which will prevent
gsping aril controlling geothermal
C l~etitlon Act simply stated would
pr nt any person engaged in extract-
In rude petroleum from acquiring any
geo enlist energy production asset. It
Is 1 s Mon that anticipates a condi-
tion h3-h` if unchecked will surely be
the s ec of congressional investigation
and -"-uproar 20 years from now;
for 3 as we, find ourselves in an oil
tlile today, it will be the geothermal
Dontro yythat shall surround us to-
maro less we look to the future
with ke e"r vision.
T ask animous consent that the text
of the , be printed at this point in
exq _d no objection, the bill was
ordered - e printed in the RECORD, as
,tleprese1 6.i
America' iri
Act may 16
arc !--Me A
sent x#sfine
"(b) (iy'It shall b
Son described in su
control any, asset, ?th
by him is prohibited
enactment of the Geot
try Competition Act.
"42) Each such perso
of enactipent of the Ge
dustr7 dompetltion Act
asset which that person
after the date of
rural Energy Indus
time toitne file such a
relating to those assets as t
eral may require.
itional reports
Attorney Gen-
under thissubsection may be
district court of the United
shall have jurisdiction to restrai
tion an? to _require,compliance.
ing ten
e court.
eemed
direc-
ordered r'done any of the acts consti
the violation in whole or is part.
S. 3392
by the Senate and'House of
of the United States of
press assembled, That this
Any action
ught in the
"'(e) For purposes of this section, the
term-
-1(1) 'geothermal energy production asset'
means any asset used for the exploration or
development of geothermal energy or used
for the extraction of geothermal energy; and
"(2) 'asset' means any property, whether
real or personal, and includes stock in any
corporation which is engaged (directly or
through a subsidiary or affiliate) in the busi-
ness of extracting or producing geothermal
energy."
y Mr. MUSKIE (for himself and
Mr. JAVITS) :
S. 3393. A bill to provide for the estab-
lishment of a new office in the Executive
Office of the President and of a joint
committee in the Congress in order to
supervise policies and procedures with
respect to the development and review
of national defense and foreign policies
of the United States and the protection
and disclosure of information'relating to
such policies, and for other purposes. Re-
ferred to the Committee on Government
Operations.
GOVERNMENT SECRECY CONTROL ACT OF 1974
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, the prac-
tice of Government secrecy gives a higher
priority to confidentiality than to candor.
It encourages deception instead of dis-
closure. And it feeds the suspicion of
many Americans that their Government
will not tell them the truth.
Yet, as we all recognize, a certain de-
gree of secrecy is essential to protect our
defense and to promote the success of
our foreign policies in a world where na-
tions hostile to our interests hold both
the power and the intent to undermine
our cause and that of freedom,
In our democracy there is an inherent
conflict between the need for secrecy and
the need for a fully informed public. The
only answer to that conflict is to find the
balance between a society that is open
and one that is dangerously exposed.
That balance is not easy to strike or
keep. In recent years especially, as Presi-
dential authority to determine our na-
tional security interests grew without ef-
fective check, the balance was upset. Se-
crecy-often self-serving, often unjusti-
fied-expanded at the expense of public
knowledge and public trust.
Mr. President, the legislation I Intro-
duce today with the cosponsorship of the
distinguished senior Senator from New
York (Mr. JAVITS), the Government Se-
crecy Control Act, is an effort to restore
the balance between secrecy and ac-
countability by restoring the balance be-
tween the powers of the executive and
legislative branches over national secu-
rity policy and the information essential
to its determinatiofl.
I view this bill as part of the broad,
historic effort by the 93d Congress to re-
dress the constitutional balance between
the branches. It is a companion measure
to the war powers legislation enacted
over the President's veto and to the ex-
ecutive privilege and impoundment bills
the Senate passed last session. I also see
it as complementing the intent of the
Budget Reform Act . we recently ap-
proved, another means to strengthen the
Congress by organizing it to inform It-
self and act effectively on vital issues.
There are pending in the Senate and
the other body many interesting and
important proposals to reexamine and
restructure executive secrecy practices.
Some would fix the time thati informa-
tion could be kept secret and restrict
the numbers of officials who could im-
pose secrecy. Some would vest extensive
powers of review over the administra-
tion of information classification prac-
tices in a new, independent authority-a
proposal I introduced in December 1971.
And some would create in Congress a
committee with power to declassify any
information it found worthy of disclosure
in the public interest.
The legislation I offer today incorpo-
rates some of the features of other bills.
But it approaches the problems of se-
crecy from the perspective of sharing a
constitutional power, the power to with-
hold or disclose sensitive information.
By default and inaction, responsive to
the perceived, leading role of the Presi-
dent in dealing with cold war tensions,
the Congress has permitted that power
over information to lodge exclusively in
the Executive. And the result of our one-
way grant of discretion over secrecy,
policy has, inevitably, been abuses of
power, a system of information classifi-
cation which serves neither the interests
of intelligent policymaking nor the re-
quirements of an informed citizenry.
I do not need to review here the rec-
ord of secrecy abuses in this administra-
tion and its predecessors. It is enough
to note that standard classification
stamps on documents no longer serve to
protect information from disclosure. On
the contrary, a "secret" marking on an
official document often makes officials
and journalists suspect that the con-
tents are being hidden from the public
more to conceal mistaken or questionable
actions, than to promote national
security.
The administration recognized this
widespread disdain for the classification
system in 1972 and issued Executive Or-
der 11652 to reform the system. On the
whole, the intent of the reforms is good.
But their implementation has been hap-
hazard at best.
The Government-wide machinery es-
tablished to police the reforms, the In-
teragency Classification Review Com-
mittee, has not proved as effective as it
should. One reason for its Inadequacy is
simple: it has no bureaucratic power.
The full committee meets once a month
In the White House, but its real work is
carried out from an office in the Archives,
where the committee staff consists of
only two people: an Executive Director
and his secretary.
If we understand that decisions on re-
quiring or dropping secrecy are essen-
tially matters of individual judgment
where precise standards cannot be auto-
matically applied to every case, then we
realize that the surest way to regulate
the thousands of officials who must make
such judgments daily is to subject their
decisions to continuous, impartial re-
view. The review procedures in Executive
Order 11652 are a step in the right direc-
tion, but the step is incomplete. All of the
review is carried out inside the executive
branch, and most of it is carried out at
the lower policymaking levels of the
very agencies where the volume of, clas-
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sifted information--and of information
improperly classified-is greatest.
The Government Secrecy Control Act
would strengthen that review process
within the executive branch. But, more
importantly, it would expand the review
power to Congress. By sharing the discre-
tion to impose and maintain secre(S, the
legislation would assure that the difficult,
delicate, individual judgments about
secrecy are checked and rechecked Only
through such thorough review can we
establish that elusive, essential balance
between secrecy and openness.
The review would begin in the execu-
tive branch, where it new office--will the
power and staff which the Interagency
Committee now lacks-would be estab-
lished in the White House for the Reg-
istrar of National Defense and Foreign
Policy Information, The Registrar would
a Presidential appointee, confirmed by
the Senate, with power to oversee and
regulate secrecy practices throughout the
Federal Government.
He would also have the key funct:.on of
compiling a monthly index, a register of
classified information from every agency.
It would be his responsibility to -.neck
the entries on that register to see that
they actually describe the records being
kept secret and their origin and location,
and to see that the duration of secrecy
imposed on them meets the policy srand-
ard of the act.
The bill, additionally, will link the
Freedom of Information Act and it;, in-
tent of broadening public access to offr-
cial information directly to the reformed
classification system. No information re-
lating to national defense or foreign
policy could be withheld from the public
under the first exemption from discl-:) sure
in the Freedom of Information Act, un-
less the documents or records containing
that information had been indexed on
the register.
Under the provisions of the National
Security Council directive of May 17,
1972, implementing the Executive order
such indexing is supposed to be standard
practice for classified material judged to
have "sufficient historical or other value
appropriate for preservation," melt ding
all top secret documents and all secret
and confidential documents which are
exempted from the order's general de-
classification schedule. In fact, some
agencies are indexing all of their classi-
fied material. But the Defense Depart-
ment, which generates the largest
volume of such information, is only now
beginning-late and tentatively--to
establish any such index at all.
In compiling a Government-wide c m-
tral index, the Registrar will act as the
first line of defense against classification
abuses. Able to know what is being :inept
secret, his office will also be able to cor-
rect improper agency secrecy practices.
Without such knowledge, no one can
hope to bring the classification system
under control. With an effective in-
dex in operation, officials will be able to
inspect the system, trace its ,be
and
make it stronger.
The Register compiled in the White
House will also be transmitted every
month to the New Joint Committee! on
Government Secrecy, in effect, the sec-
ond line of defense against unjustified not the broader, more inclusive and less
secrecy. The :3rst of the committee's precise concept of "national security."
specific tasks will be to review the The proposed narrowing of the standard
monthly Regisi;er as a way of reviewing reflects my concern that too loose a
the performance of the Registrar and of terminology in the past has permitted
the agencies under his supervision. many of the abuses of classification au-
The committee will have explicit au- thority. The tighter language should
thority to obtain documents or records serve both to protect secrets which are
listed on the Register and, if it finds vital and to encourage the flow of in-
them improperly classified, to direct that formation which must. be shared among
they be disclosed or that the date of their our policyjnakers and with the public.
declassification be changed, If this legis- One of the most serious concerns with
lation would make the Registrar a "se- excessive secrecy is the role it plays in
; recy czar," it would also make the joint bureaucratic gamesmanship, enabling
committee a powerful watchdog over his one official to keep his proposals and
office and authority actions hidden from others who share his
The committee will be authorized to concerns, but not necessarily his views,
take "necessar;' or appropriate" action It is essential that policy be made after
to enforce compliance with its subpenas the most exhaustive examination of
or directives o:i a recalcitrant agency. alternatives and the fullest debate. When
Specifically, the committee will have the secrecy is used to short-circuit' dissent,
power to go to the U.S. district court to when policy is shaped by only a select
seek judicial enforcement of its will, just few, it becomes doubly difficult to con-
as the Watergate Committee is now duct policy or insure support for it even.
doing in the matter of its contested sub- within the Government.
pena of President Nixon's records. Unlike similar legislation offered in
The co:mmitt ee's second specific task this Congress, the Government Secrecy
would be that of developing procedures Control Act dictates few specific prac-
for congressional handling of secret in- tices to the Executive with respect to the
formation.. Few of our committees now length of time information may stay
have precise rules for handling classified classified or the agencies or officials who
records, and none have their own stand- may classify. The bill would establish the
ards for security clearance of congres- presumption that any classified material
sional employees. As a result, Members more than 10 years old be considered
of Congress and their staffs are really at declassified unless the registrar, with
the mercy of executive decisions as to prompt, specific notification to the joint
who may see o:' , discuss what informa- committee, decided to enter it on the
tion. The joint committee, would be able index. It would also give agencies 4
to establish the basic ground-rules for years in which to,review their files of
the entire Congress in this respect and, classified material originated within 10
in consultation with the Registrar, would years of the enactment of this legislation
act as arbiter between Members or com- and to decide which records in those files
mittees of Congress seeking access to should be put on the Register and which
classified information and agencies seek- should be declassified.
ing to withhold :.t or to dictate the terms But I regard declassification schedules
of its disclosure. and classification authority as being pri-
More broadi3, the joint committee marily housekeeping concerns which can
would have the role of overall congres- best be regulated by the executive itself
sional monitor of national security pol- under the review Of an informed Con-
icy. With the information available from gress. One problem with mandating such
the index, the ommittee will be in a limits now is that we lack information on
position to steel other committees, for- the actual operation of the classification
eign relations and armed services most system. After the joint committee has
obviously, into areas of inquiry and over- been at work for a time, we may be in a
sight they might otherwise' miss. But the better position to legislate in detail. --
joint committee S own oversight should One danger in fixing secrecy time lim-
extend to assist: ng the coordination of its by law, rather than encouraging flexi-
policy by often c3rnpetitive executive de- bility in practice, is that maximums be-
partments and to assuring a channel of come miniraums. Thus, if a document
full communication and current consul- classified "confidential" is required to be
tation ?betaveen those departments and declassified 4 years after its origin as the
the Congress. Present Executive order mandates, it will
Finally, the legislation sets a standard stay secret for 4 years, even if the infor-
for secrecy embodying both the positive mation it contains only needs protection
finding that information is permitted to for 10 days.
be kept secret only when its disclosure Those who originate classified mate-
"would harm the national defense or rial should think of its declassification
foreign policy" and the negative rule less in terms of months or years and more
that information shall. not be concealed in terms of the events to which the mate-
to hide "incompetence, ' inefficiency, rial relates and the need of the c