DISCUSSION PAPER: 'SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND CHANGE: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00514R000100180008-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 4, 2004
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: February 2, 1972
• Content Type: MF

f2 WiL._ CHECK CLASSIFICA T ION TOP 1.t
Approved For Release 2004/ 117 ;: CIS-42pF~OQSI 'R01 0fPj?,(}?08-9
ILLEGIB
ILLEGIB
11 DIRECT REPLY I
? I DISPATCH
C:;^.:.::_T I FILE
;.;;c; Cc I IIIFORIMATICId
M:=L
Ilemariies :
ILLEGIB
RETURN TO SEv:Ji~::
{ z,, a
CONII, !"
Fo^:u NO. 2} J7 Use previous editions
1-a7 -j ,
Red's comments make sense to me. Let"s
do as he suggests in the last sentence.
0
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP75B00514R000100180008-9
 Approved For Release 2004/03Ii 7-:- CIA-RDP75B00514R000100180008-
DD/S&T#
2 February 11)72
25X1
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Discussion paper- "Science, Technology, and Change:
Implications for the Central Intelligence Agency"
and Change. " The answer to the ruestion of how to organize is c,aite
different in CIA from the military services and possibly even industry.
In the military, rotation of key personnel is frequent. The whole
scheme of things is geared to training large numbers of personnel to
command the same kinds of organizations. When a new commander
arrives, he knows exactly how the unit is organized and what trai :inc
and qualifications he has among his personnel. He really can't chan ?a
it very much. He also has very little to say about who the people occu-
pying the key posts will be. They come and go on orders from a-,-,ove
to command organizations for which they have been trained. Th,. co:
mander, of course, imposes his own style of leadership and can within
limitations reassign personnel within his unit. In a very real se.ase
however, he has no choice but to conform to the organization. enc
organization is extremely important.
In CIA, the situation is just the opposite. Without a doubt the
people dominate and the organization conforms. Here it is hart; ;:o n ,c
"the organization man. " We don't have the rotational prograrn to core,
with. Our organization, therefore, can be - and is - informal in the
extreme. We can, however, quickly put together a good team to soivo
a problem that cuts across organization lines. This is the reason whir
I think pragmatism has properly characterized our approach to oraan-
zation and I am inclined to think that it should in the future. It is~rela-
tively simple if you are starting from scratch to set up a new or`;aniza -
tion, putting like things together, etc. (It starts getting complicated
only when you begin to put people in the organization boxes. it is
quite another to change an existinn, and especially a successful, c.rg;a.,-
ization where all the boxes are filled with competent, hard- charE-i.;
people. One just can't ignore where he is today and how he not t._are-
The foregoing is not meant to imply that organization isn't iinpo
tant. It is - but of secondary importance to the people. Nor is t
meant to imply that nothing should change. It must. An "as is"
jS&T
FILE COPY Approved For Release 2004/03/17: CIA-RDP75B00514R000100180008-9
ILLEGIB
 Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP75B00514R000100180008-9
philosophy of management will be fatal. Everything about us
changing and so must we. The question is how and when. 1 don't
find a very good answer in the paper and I certainly 25X1
"is more specific about what is wrong organizationally wit
our research, development, testing and engineering program. Abc t
this, he may well be right. Our several efforts to effect authorita-
tive coordination of our total program have not been very successul.
Today, we've just about gone full circle with each of the four Director-
ates fighting for its share of the funds, carrying out its own program,
in accordance with its own priorities, etc. , a game in which the
Executive Director-Comptroller is the referee. We have no list of
Agency-wide priorities and I am not sure that we are getting the
mum out of this program. I do think that
paper might form the basis for a most interesting and hopefully pro-
ductive discussion at your Planning Conference if sufficient work is
done in advance to prepare for it.
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP75B00514R000100180008-9
 Approved For Release 2004/03/17. CIA-RDP75B00514R000100180008-9-
4 February 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
1. As I indicated in very sketchy fashion, I find this a most
stimulating survey, although it by no means provides all the answers.
I think it is particularly effective in its stress on the present accel-
eration of the intelligence process and the enormous quantitative ex-
plosion we face. I would say that this is compounded by the new
multipolar world w will face in coming years. In this light, I thtn:
stress on the need for new techniques of arai rsis
and the mechanization of many of our processes is well taken, as
the yellow pad and pencil alone really won't be enough to handle the
problems of the future.
2. I see the need for R&D of this nature not only in analysi.
but also in collection (including espionage as well as technical";, c.)e:r-
ational support, information processing and retrieval, and of cou--s1_
internal management. I have the same visceral repugnance that rZari-
have to the term "systems analysis, " but I think we will have to specs;
up our ways to consider the alternatives on complicated problerns ir_
the future through the use of technology. The technology can't
us the answers, but it frequently can help us to see the alternatives
and can pose questions we might not have noted for ultimate resolu-
tion by the ever-necessary gray indentations of the human brain.
3. On the organizational implication, I think the paper is sorr.c
what weaker. Kaleidoscopic or even psychedelic organizational for:;:
would in my opinion be more destabilizing than helpful in reacti--,g to
new problems. On the other hand, we all agree that we must nog :)e
frozen into the organizational rigidities of the past. The task force
idea is certainly appropriate, and so are some of the various wor::ir.:r
groups and boards that have been established on an ad hoc basis.
respect to R&D, I have in process a proposal to take a new look it
the way we are organized for Re, D, which I will shortly be offerin
for the review and comment of the Deputies before submitting it :c y:-,t ,
4. I concur with Colonel White that the modernization of the
Agency is well worth the attention of you and the Deputies at your
,..: .........,.E
Approved For Release 2004/03/1-7 :'-C1A-RDP75B0O514 ; Q00100180008-9
 Approved For Release 2004/03/17.: CIA-ROP75B00514R000100180008-9
x., teal conference. I believe, however, that we might be axle i s run.
a fOw specific aspects of the problem for a more detailed exar:ir.a`sicxn
within the overall context. I will put this on our tentative agenda and
see what I can come up with in terms of specifics for further disci,ssion.
o y
Executive Director- ComptrXller
Attachments:
A. Memo for DCI from L. K. White dtd Z Feb 72,
Subj: Discussion Paper: ''Science, Technology, and
Change: Implications for the Central Intelligence Agency''
B. Memo to DCI from DD/S&T dtd 28 Jan 72, Same Subject
W/ Paper
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP75B00514R000100180008-9