REVIEW OF OVERFLIGHT RECONNAISSANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00621R000200070001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 17, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 27, 1962
• Content Type: MF

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27 July
MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance
SUBJECT: Review of Overflight Reconnaissance
1, Attached for. your information are papers on
the above subject prepared-by Mr. Ray Cline, Deputy Director
(Intelligence), Central Intelligence Agency, in response to a
request of the Director of Central Intelligence. These papers
in a draft form were reviewed by the Committee on Overhead
Reconnaissance at its meeting of 16 July and proposed changes
were made,
2> These papers$ it is understood were considered
by the Special Group at its ;meeting on 19 July, its decision on
them being recorded in the' Minute of the Special Group meeting
of that dated 25X1A
Attachments:
Subject Papers
Copies 2, 3--State
4.--DA
5,6,7--DIA T
8--OACSI TCO
9--ONI TCO
10, 11 --AFCIN TCO
12
,13--NSA TCO
Jar/hes Q. Reber
Chai:rman
verhead Reconnaissance
I
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : Overhead Reconnaissance
1. Attached are four memoranda on reconnaissance
prepared according to your instructions and my understanding
of General Taylor?s wishes.
2. The net recommendation in these four memoranda
is as follows:
a. Two flights (one weekly) in the
Taiwan Straits area during the remainder of July 1962;
b. Regularly afterwards, if the situation is
unchanged:
i. Taiwan Straits: subsequent coverage
as the military situation suggests;
ii, South China: cove:rage bimonthly,
requiring one flight monthly;
iii. Remainder of China: completion
of initial coverage of the highest priority targets,
requiring three flights, to be made approximately
monthly,
iv. North Vietnam: coverage bimonthly,
requiring one flight monthly;
v. Cuba: coverage monthly, requiring
two flights monthly.
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c. The total requirement, beginning
l August 1962, is for two flights monthly over Cuba,
one flight monthly over North Vietnam, and
approximately two monthly over China until initial
coverage of highest priority targets has been com-
pleted, which should take only two or three months.
Obviously another comprehensive review should be undertaken
about three months hence?
RAY S. CLINE
Deputy Director (Intelligence)
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 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : Photographic Reconnaissance of
Taiwan Straits Buildup Area
1. At your direction,, with the assistance of all Central
Intelligence Agency components concerned, I reviewed the
outstanding USIB requirements for overhead reconnaissance of
the Taiwan Straits buildup area. This review took into account
the overall substantive intelligence picture, the contribution of
other sources and the continuing need for the type of information
that may be expected from this activity. The Committee on
Overhead Reconnaissance has considered this report on the
program for reconnaissance and concurs with.it.
2. Responding to Presidential instructions of about
a month ago, a reconnaissance program was inaugurated 20 June
to cover the buildup area along the Taiwan Straits into which
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anese communist troop deployment had begun during June.
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flown. The results were considerably below maximum reasonable
expectation because:
a. Weather, normal for this time of year
in this area, was poor on several of these missions,
diminishing useful coverage.
b. These missions were not inaugurated
until the troop movement was substantially completed.
c. We lacked an adequate base for comparison
to show new developments in the area, since our last
coverage was in 1958-59 and of a relatively limited
character.
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3. Despite these deficiencies, this photography has
furnished the following intelligence of value which was unavailable
from other sources:
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4. Additional intelligence is needed which requires
U-2 photography:
a. There is a requirement for thorough
coverage of the area to provide a base against which
to compare barracks construction and concentrations
of naval craft.
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b. There is a requirement to pinpoint
location of redeployed and regular troops and
military installations.
C. A :periodic check is needed to insure
that railroad traffic and aircraft movements into
the area do not indicate a further major deployment
beyond the one which.. has just taken place.
5. At present there is relatively little risk in the
coastal buildup area. The Chinese Communists track the aircraft
but they have no interception or SA missile capability in this
area of China.
' 6. Acs ordingl=, it is recommended that the program
be continued on a scale which will provide weekly coverage of
the Quemoy area and adjacent coastal areas and hinterland
within.an. approximate 300 -mile arc for two weeks, requiring
two Um2 flights. After accomplishing these two missions,
COMOR will study the coverage achieved and reevaluate the
subsequent coverage needed.
RAY S. CLINE
Deputy Director (Intelligence)
*The State Department concurs in the statement of the requirements
and the order of priority indicated. However, the Department of
State representative abstains from the recommendations
inasmuch as the recommendations imply political approval
which is beyond his competence.
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Photographic Reconnaissance of
North Vietnam and South China
1. At your direction, with the assistance of all
Central Intelligence Agency components concerned, I reviewed
the outstanding USIB requirements for overhead reconnaissance
of North Vietnam and South China. This review took into
account the overall substantive intelligence picture, the
contribution of other sources and the continuing need for the
type of information that may be expected from this activity.
The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance1oa considered this
report-ion the program for reconnaissance and concurs with it.
2. Since the beginning of the North Vietnam program
in January 1961, there have been 14 U-2 missions, the most
recent having been flown 23 June 1962. In March 1962, one U-2
mission was flown in South China to cover priority targets
along, the North Vietnam and Laos borders plus military
installations and transportation lines immediately supporting
any troop buildup in this area.
3. This photography has furnished us complete
coverage of North Vietnam's military installations and trans-
portation net on the average of once a month,, providing the
following intelligence of value which was unavailable from
other sources:
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5. At present there is little risk over North Vietnam
and South China. The flights over these areas have been tracked
but there is no weapons capability against the U-2 in the area.
6. In view of continuing requirements for intelligence
weighed against the fact that a good photographic intelligence base
for comparisons is now available, it is recommended that the
program continue on a reduced scale that would call for coverage
of the entire North Vietnam area and priority strategic targets
in South China once every two months. This :.requires on the
order of one U-2 mission over North Vietnam monthly and one
U?2 mission over South China monthly.
RAY S. CLINE
Deputy Director 9Iligence)
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* The State Department concurs in the statement of the requirements
and the order of priority indicated. However, the Department of
State representative abstains from the recommendations inasmuch
as the recommendations imply political approval which is beyond
his competence.
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MEMORANDUM FOR- Director of Central Intelligence
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SUBJECT : Photographic Reconnaissance of Priority
Strategic Target Areas in Communist
China Other Than in the Taiwan Straits
Buildup Area and South China
1. At your direction, with the assistance of all
Central Intelligence Agency components concerned, I reviewed
the outstanding USIB requirements for overhead reconnaissance
of priority strategic target areas in Communist China other
than in the Taiwan Straits buildup area and South China. This
review took into account the overall substantive intelligence
picture, the contribution of other sources and the continuing
need for the type of information that may be expected from
this activity. The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance has
considered this report on the program for reconnaissance and
concurs with it.
2. Since the beginning of the program in January
1962, there have been five U-2 missions
over priority strategic targets in China
other than in the Taiwan Straits buildup area and South China..
3. This photography has furnished intelligence of
great value which. was unavailable from other sources:
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4. Additional intelligence is needed which, particularly
in view of the relative paucity of information from other sources,
requires U-2 photography to supply:
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5. At present there is little risk from hostile action
over China except in the few areas where operational SA-2
missile sites are deployed. The Chinese Communists track
U-2 flights accurately but have no present capability for air
interception. This relative invulnerability of the U-2 may be
comparatively short-lived; it will certainly be reduced if
additional SA-2 missiles are deployed.
*6. It is recommended that we proceed immediately
with coverage of the rema.i der of the strategic targets in
Northeast China, completing the task about one-half done
by the very successful0 One additional mission
will probably accomplish this. Next it is recommended
that the highest priority targets in Central China not previously
photographed, principally the Szechwan Basin, be covered. It
is possible that two missiozis, achieved under optimum conditions,
could accomplish this and thereby complete initial coverage of
all the highest priority strategic targets in China. Certain of
the strategic targets in China, particularly the missile test
range and the Lanchow area, may require subsequent coverage
but it is recommended that determination of this requirement
await study of the intelligence resulting from the complete
initial coverage.
RAY S. CLINE
Deputy Director (Intelligence)
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* The State Department concurs in the statement of the requirements
and the order of priority indicated. However, the Department of
State representative abstains from the recommendations inasmuch
as the recommendations imply political approval which is beyond
his competence,
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : Photographic Reconnaissance of Cuba
1. At your direction, with the assistance of all
Central Intelligence Agency components concerned, I reviewed
the outstanding USIB requirements for overhead reconnaissance
of Cuba. This review took into account the overall substantive
intelligence picture, the contribution of other sources and the
continuing need for the type of information that may be expected
from this activity. The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance
has considered this report: on the program fo:r reconnaissance
and concurs with it.
2. Since the beginning of the program, 27 October
1960, there have been 39 U-2 missions over Cuba, giving us
photography of high quality for the entire island.
3. This photography has furnished the following
intelligence of value which. was unavailable from other sources:
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5. At present there is very little risk over Cuba.
There is no evidence that the Cubans have ever detected a U-2
mission and they do not now have a weapons capability against
the U-2.
* 6. Accordingly, it is recommended that at this time
the program continue on its present scale, which calls for
coverage of the entire target area monthly. This requires two
U-2 flights monthly.
RAY S. CLINE
Deputy-Director (Intelligence)
* The State Department concurs in the statement of the requirements
and the order of priority indicated. However, the Department of
State representative abstains from the recommendations inasmuch
as the recommendations imply political approval which .is beyond
his competence.
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