COVERAGE OF NORTH KOREA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00621R000200100001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 12, 1962
• Content Type: MF

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COMIREX-M-6.3
Control Number Date C2
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Document Number and Subject
'12 Oct 62 32 COMOR-D-63, subj: Coverage of
North Korea
ARCHIVES
COMIREX-M-64
Control Number Date Copy
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Document Number and Subject
12 Dec 62 34 COMOR-D-64, subj: Possible
Deployment of Soviet MRBMs and
IRBMs Outside the Eurasian-Soviet
Bloc
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12: October 196Z
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance
SUBJECT: Coverage of North Korea
The attached paper was referred to the Working Group and
is sent to you for your reference and information.
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Acting Chairman
Commi ttee on Overhead Reconnaissance
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Attachment:
Subject Paper
4---DIA
Copies:2, 3--State TCO
5, 6, 7, 8--DIA TCO
9--OACSI TCO
10--ONI` TCO
11, 1.2--AFCIN TCO
13,14--NSA TCO
15--NRO TCO
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Coverage of North Korea
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1. You will recall the difficulty under which we labored
in interpreting recent photography of the Taiwan Straits area because
of the long time that had elapsed since our previous photography. Our
base lines were too old to be useful and we we_ce unable to determine
whether or not certain of the facilities photographed represented new
construction and were indicative of a recent buildup. This experience
highlighted for us the importance of getting periodic coverage of
certain critical. areas including those which might be temporarily
quiescent. North Korea is another example of a critical area in which
Soviet Bloc and Western forces are directly opposed. It is, therefore,
one of the places in which drastic action might occur during a period
of heightened tension.
2. In spite of the potentially explosive nature of North Korea,
there has been no real photographic coverage for almost ten years.
We have some recent KH coverage of North Korea and some peripheral
photography. These holdings, however, are limited and do not re re-
sent the complete and up-tq- a e coverage that we should have.
Recent deliveries of Soviet jet
bombers and new radars, such as TALL KING and SPOON REST, which
the Communist Chinese do not have, underscore the Soviet Bloc's
continuing interest in preserving a capability for mischief in the area.
We lack, however, the necessary information on the numbers and
locations of such equipment and there are serious gaps in our know-
ledge of military installations such as airfields. We have no evidence
to connect the SPOON REST to a potential surface-to-air missile capa-
bility and no knowledge that short range surface--to-surface missiles
may be deployed in North Korea. However, it is our belief that only
overhead photography will give us this information. In view of the
current buildup of tension over Berlin and Cuba, it would be highly
desirable to provide. ourselves with a good up-to-date base line of
photography covering North Kor ea in order to be able to assess changes
in order-of-battle, to serve as a basis for estimating the general
state of forces in the area., and to provide the military with detailed
information for contingency planning.
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3. I feel strongly that we should take the earliest practical
opportunity to cover North Korea with good quality U-2 photography. On
the other hand, in view of the recent loss of a U-2 and the threat to the
U-2 from surface-to-air missiles, I believe that it would be unwise
for us to schedule a mis sion;,.over North Korea in the present world
situation without having a reasonably clear idea about the existence or
non-existence of surface-to-air missiles in the area. We could probably
determine whether such missiles are present and the nature of their
deployment from good TKH cover. I recommend, therefore, that we
proceed to get full coverage of North Korea on the first CORONA mission
that can be programmed for this purpose. (I assume that we will have
achieved coverage of Kamchatka by the time that this can be done. In
the event that this has not been accomplished, however, I recommend
that Kamchatka remain the prime objective until the advent of winter
weather and high latitude darkness.) Once we have obtained CORONA
coverage of North Korea we will then be in a position to:
a. determine how many of the required answers
can be obtained from it;
b. the importance of getting more detailed
coverage; and,
c. the location of any surface-to-air missile
sites and other elements of the North Korean air defense net
to permit sound planning for any subsequest U-2 flights in
the area.
Once these steps have been accomplished, I believe that we should
make a new assessment of the situation to see whether we should make
a recommendation for U-2 coverage at that time.
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ARW HANDLE VIA C-OMINT
TA.L.,FNT KEG' HOLE SYSTEMS
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Copies: 1--DCI TCO
16; 17--DIR NPIC
18- -C /CIA/PAD(NP].C)
19--C/DMD/NP.IC
20- - LS /CIA/ PAD(NPIC)
21--TSO CIA
22--DDI TCO
23--OCI TCO
24--OSI TCO
25--ORR TCO
26--DDP TCO
27--DDR
28--AD/OSA
29--Intel/OSA
30- -SO /OSA
31-33--C/SRS/DDR
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