SENATE RESOLUTION 404 - SUBMISSION OF A RESOLUTION TO ESTABLISH A SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE POLICY

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CIA-RDP76M00527R000700070014-2
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RIPPUB
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K
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3
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December 9, 2016
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August 24, 2001
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14
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Publication Date: 
September 17, 1974
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UNCLASSIefewed F(DeRign01/08/30 : CIA-RDP7N0011MODIUM0014-2 J SECRET ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET SUBJECT: (Optional) FROM: Legislative Counsel 7D43 EXTENSION 6121 NO. DATE TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building) DATE OFFICER'S INITIALS COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.) RECEIVED FORWARDED 1 . i Acting Director 7/kb 4-/ For your signature, the interim reply to Chairman Stennis in response to his request for our comments on S. Res. 404, introduced by Senator Mondale, which would establish a select committee in the Senate on intelligence policy. We are coordinating with OGC to formulate an Agency position on the bill. eo ge L. Cary Legislative Counsel STATINTL . )1.- 1 4. 5. . . 8. . 10. 12. 13. 14. 15. Approved For Release 2001/C8/30 : CIA-RDP76M00527R000700070014-2 FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS INTERNAL 3-62 EDITIONS SECRET 0 CONFIDENTIAL 0USE ONLY 0 UNCLASSIFIED Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP76M00527R000700070014-2 S 16742 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE September 17, 1974 paid from the contingent fund of the Sen- ate upon vouchers approved by the chair- man of the select committee. Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, I can only describe as unbelievable the Presi- dent's statements last night concerning the role of the CIA in Chile. His state- ment that the United States was spend- ing $11 million for the purpose of pre- serving the opposition democratic ele- ments, including the newspapers and electronic media, from being suppressed by the Allende government was wholly unconvincing. I can only conclude, with great sadness, that after only a month in office, President Ford is headed down the same road toward a credibility gap that has ruined the Presidency of too many of his predecessors. ? When will the leaders of the executive branch of this Government realize that the American people and the Congress and the press will no longer tolerate hog- wash as a response to legitimate ques- tions about the behavior of the U.S. Government, either at home or abroad. There is nothing in the record of the previous administration, nor of the CIA, for that matter, which lends credence to the cover story perpetrated last night at the President's press con- ference. If we are so concerned about the exist- ence of opposition elements and the pres- ervation of democracy in Chile, do we now have a program to help support the democratic politicians and Journalists who have now been muzzled, banned, and jailed? Has' the Forty Cominittee taken this issue up? How many millions of dollars are they now spending to "destabilize" the military Junta in Chile? Mr. President, I doubt that a dime is being spent to restore democracy in Chile; just as not a penny is being spent to support the opposition elements in Saigon, who might provide a viable al- ternative to both the depredations of the Vietcong and the oppression of the Thieu regime. Mr. President, we have been battling for 2 years to restore public control over secret operatives in the White House. It is now clear that we also must restore public control over foreign policy. Our foreign relations can no longer be han- dled by a handful of elitists in the Cen- ? tral. Intelligence Agency and the State Department, who are no longer mindful of the basic values and traditions of the United States and whose main qualifi- cation is that they hold an exotic secu- rity clearance. President Ford drew attention last night to the fact that the Forty Commit- tee has been in existence since 1948. That may well be the most compelling argument for it to be drastically over- hauled. In 1948, the United States and its Western Allies were in the midst of the Berlin Airlift; the Czechoslovakian Gov- ernment had fallen to Communist sub- version. The Communist were spending . huge sums to win elections in Italy. There was a clear and present need in the United States to be able to respond to the covert operations of the Soviet Union. We undertook those operations reluc- tantly: not because we were anxious to compete with the villany being per- petrated at the time by the Stalinist re- gime in the Soviet Union, but because we held the basic values of democracy and freedom to be worth fighting for against Soviet tyranny. Now, however, we find that these op- erations have taken on a life of their own; regardless of changes in the rela- tions with the Soviet Union; of the de- clining ideological attractiveness of So- viet communism and of the painful lesson that we are not the world's police- man. The CIA's covert activities have not declined. The number of operatives that it employs does not seem to have di- minished. Is it a mindless bureaucracy, fulfilling itself by seeking out democratic regimes to topple, undermine, subvert and co-opt? Or is it an irresistible temp- tation for Presidents and their advisors? who, after all, bear the real respon- sibility for covert operations? There is a legitimate role for the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency and even for some select covert operations. There is a requirement to gather intelligence on threats directly affecting the physical security of the United States. It is nec- essary to protect our war plans, to con- duct counterintelligence operations and monitor arms control agreements. But on the level of political action, the long history of covert Operations, from the Bay of Pigs through the Phoenix Assas- sination program in Vietnam, in Chile and in Greece, the record of America's use of covert operations is a shameful failure. But the Central Intelligence Agency must not become a scapegoat. It needs to clean house, but the fact that it is di- rected against democratic regimes can only be rectified by house cleaning at a higher level. The real responsibility for the perver- sion of the CIA and its functions must lie with the political leadership that directs It. Indeed, with the Forty Committee it- self and its principals and, with the President of the United States. The issues that have been raised by the revelation about Chile and Greece, are whether our foreign policy reflects and pursues the basic values of this Na- tion; and whether these values are being subverted by the way intelligence opera- tions are managed and supervised. The American people will no longer tolerate violations of the Constitution in regard to domestic affairs; it will not let the fog of national security protect male- factors and break ins, bugging and other operations which are contrary tO what this Nation stands for. It is now time that we had a thorough examination of the operation of our foreign intelligence agencies, how they are controlled and co- ordinated, how they support Govern- ment decisionmaking. At the same time, we have to expose the policies these op- erations are designed to carry out. We need to find a better way for Congress to be involved in decisions relating to intel- ligence activities, and to establish legal and legislative safeguards in order that the intelligence operations conducted abroad do not disgrace us here at home. For this reason, Mr. President, I gm, today, submitting a proposal for a special committee of the Senate which is de- signed to examine these issues and return within 24 months with proposals to the Senate of the United States on possible reforms in the organization, structure, and political control of our overseas in- , ligence operations. Many resolutions and proposals have been submitted to the Senate on this issue. Almost all of them propose certain answers to the questions that I have raised here today. I do not claim to have these answers. All I know is that there Is a very serious problem. Because of the secrecy that surrounds these issues, it is not even possible to tell whether the over- sight function of Congress has, in fact, been working well or poorly. The juris- diction over the intelligence operations is scattered among four separate com- mittees dealing with Armed Services and Appropriations in the House and Sen- ate?but completely unresponsive to the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees of the Congress. Clearly, what is required is a new special body, with membership from both Armed Serv- ices and Foreign Relations, as well as membership outside of those bodies, which can dig into the urgent issues of what our overseas intelligence operations are for, how they are managed, and how they can really serve the American people. The Select Committee will not take on the functions of the existing oversight committees; they will continue to per- form their present tasks. The purpose of the Select Committee will be to prepare a report so that Congress can act to make necessary reforms and correct deficien- cies and abuses. Mr. President, in the earlier part of this century, there was.. a Secretary of State who abolished foreign intelligence gathering operations with the smug re- mark that "gentlemen don't read other people's mail." Everyone can agree that this remark is naive. But embarking on vital intelligence-gathering activities and, even some covert action, to counter real threats to our security is a long way from the kind of mindless hooliganism and wholesale intervention that have re- cently come to light. That only under- mines necessary intelligence activities. The time has arrived for the American people, through their representatives and in the context of necessary security requirements, to pursue relentlessly the truth of our overseas intelligence opera- tions. Because of the nature of these activities, we cannot simply spread everything out on the public record. Peo- ples, lives, literally, can be at stake. But this does not mean that our representa- tive form of government cannot deal with these issues. Indeed, it is one reason for representative form of government?so that the people's elected officials can per- form functions that would not be possible by the people at large. If we fail to take this step, if we fail to bring our overseas intelligence opera- tions and, indeed, our foreign policy under domestic control, we will not only be failing our trust, but we will become party to undermining the basic values or which this great country stands. Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP76M00527R000 7 Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP76M00527R000700070014-2 eittber 17, 1974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SEN upli notification when he deter- ter due notice and opportunity for rig on the record, that the entity has Into compliance with such criteria. Whenever an ?facer or agency of the Slatea receives notification from the tnry that a federally recognized ap- Ping entity fails to meet the criteria pre- /bed by the Secretary, he shall, until such lineation is rescinded, discontinue re- ince on each entity's approval or accred!- Alan of postsecondary educational institu- fens or programs, but Institutions and pro- trams wa ieh such an entity has approved br a.ccredited prior to receipt of such noti- ncation may (In the discretion of the de- partment or agency) continue to be con- sidered to be recognized through the end of the cu :Tent enrollment period. (a) During the period that subsection (b) is applicahle to an approving entity, and the Secreeary determines there in no other nationally recognized approving entity quali- fied to approve the institutions formerly approved by such approving entity, he shall appoint an advisory committee, composed of persons specially qualified to evaluate education provided by postsecondary insti- tutions formerly approved by such entity, wbich shall prescribe the standards of content, scope, and quality which must be met in order to qualify such institutions to participate in programs in the area with respect to which such approving entity operated.. Sec. 8. :rf the Secretary determines, after affording due notice and opportunity for a heaxing, that (1) a student who is pursuing a program of postsecondary education with the assistance of a student loan which is guaranteed by the United States has been denied the primary educational benefits for which the loan, was obtained by reason of the insolvency of the institution or its failure to provide the education or training stipulated in an agreement between th student and the institution, and (2) in t case of a denial of such benefits by an in tution eligible after the establishment criteria under section 6, the Secretary tertnines that such institution shoul ot have been eligible under the standa of the federally recognized approving My which approved or accredited the titu- tion, the United States shall (A) fo e the student of any obligation to repay e loan and loan ..nterest when the Uni States is the holder of the roan, and ( pay any other holder of the loan any ount due on the loan if it releases the dent from further obligation to repay loan, and (C) pay to the student an a nt equal to an payments he may have on the loann This section shall apply ?cases of in-- solvency and in cases of ure to provide stipulated education o training which' occur less than live ye after enactment of this Act. SEC. 9. Section 553 o le 5, United States Code, shall apply to romulgation of cri- teria by the Secre , and sections 554 thrcrugh 553 of such. e shall apply to pro- ceedings under sect 8. SEC. 10. The ary shall publish bian- nually in the Fed 1 Register a list showing the following: (1) The app ing entities which our-. rently meet riteria established by the Secretary pur: 'nt to section 6. (2) The econdary educational insti- tuticms whe e approved or accredited by such appro entities including a particu- larization y the departments or courses of study wh are approved or accredited at the instit oils. (3) T institutions which have lost ap- proval screditation and those whose ap- plicati or approval or accreditation were not Sec. 11. IL is the sense of the Congress that the several latatea should enact for th approval or accreditation of p tseconda educational institutions and thorizatio to grant degrees. awn taws (.1 establ standards for approving eat es that w insure proper busineas pzoc within industry and could utilize 1 legisIatio plans and the wealth of cent study drafting staaues for thin urpose. FEDERAL CO OL SEC. 12. Section 432 o General Educ tion provisions Act is ended by inser after "the Emergency hool Aid Act;" following: "the Pori econdary Educe i Consumer Protection ct of 1974;". ADDITIONAL C PONSORS OF BILLS A Sep. AND JOIN RESOLUTIONS . 3234 f Mr. HUMPHREY, the orida (Mr. CHILES) VMS ponsor of S. 3234, a bill vigorous Federal program and development to assure on of solar energy as a major our national energy needs, to r the development of suitable s for rapid commercial use of hnology and to establish an Of- ar Energy Research in the U.S. the request of Mr. Jonwsrow, the tor from Hawaii (Mr. Fonc) was d as a cosponsor of S. 3234, supra. his own request, the Senator from LTOna, (Mr. GOLDWATER) was added as cosponsor of S. 3234, supra. S. 3941 At the request of Mr. Domaxicr, the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BAKER) was added as a cosponsor of S. 3941, a bill to authorize payment for one com- prehensive physical examination per year for each person enrolled in medi- care.At the ram Senator fro added as a to authoriz of researc the utiliz source fs provide lucent solo. flee Gov ment. S. 3981 At the request of Mr. HELMS, the Sen- ator from Mississippi (Mr. STEMS'S) was added as a cosponsor of S. 3981, to limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States and of the district courts to enter any judgment, decree, or order, denying or restricting, as un- constitutional, voluntary prayer in any public school. SENATE RESOLUTION 403?ORIGI- NAL RESOLUTION REPORTED AU- THORIZING SUPPLEMENTAL EX- PENDITIMES BY 11-ini COMMIlenhei ON THE JUDICIARY (Referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration.) Mr. EASTLAND, from the Committee on the Judiciary, reported the following resolution: S. RES. 403 Resolved, That Senate Resolution 255, 93d Congress, agreed to March 1, 1974, as amend- ed by Senate Resolution 858 of that Con- gress, agreed to August 22, 1974, Is further amended as follows: (1) In section 2, strike out "$4,085,500" and insert in lieu thereof $4,141,600". (2) In section 3, strike out "$377,800" and insert In lieu thereof "$433,900." and "$5,000" and insert in lieu thereof "$433,900" and "$25,000", respectively. PILE S 167 SENATE RESOLUTION 404?SUBMIS- SION OF A RESOLUTION TO ES- TABLISH A SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE POLICY Referred to the, Committee on Armed Seevices.) Mr. MONDALE submitted the follow- ing resolution: S. RBS. 404 Whereas, revelations concerning the role of foreign intelligence operations of the United States Govermnent in undermining the stability of democratically elected gov- ernments have raised serious questions con- cerning the management, policies and pur- poses of United States intelligence opera- tions and their compatibility with the au- thority of the Congress and the values of the American people: Now therefore be it Resolved by the Senate. That? :3E0=0H 1. There is hereby established. a select committee of the Senate, which may be called, for convenience of expression, the Steect Committee on Intelligence Policy. J3C. 2. The select committee created by tins resolution shall consist of 15 Members of the Senate, composed of three majority and two minority members of the Commit- tee on Armed Services, three majority and teat minority members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, and three majority and two minority Members of the Senate, to be selected In the same manner as the Chair- man and members of the Standing Commit- tees of the Senate. For the purposes of para- graph 6 rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate, service of a Senator as a member, chairman, or vice-chairman of the select committee shall not betaken into account. SEC. 3. The select committee is authorized and directed to examine past, present and projected intelligence operations and policies of the United States Government, and to de- termine the role of such operations in sup- porting the decision-making of the United States Government, and the impact of such operations on national security and the con- duit of foreign policy. The select committee shall melte an interim report to the appro- priate committee of the Senate not later than Jinn 30, 1975, and shall make final report findings not later than January 31, 19 Such finet report shall contain the find of the Com- mittee together with recommendations re- specting the management of intelligence op- erations within the Executive branch, the appropriate role of Congress, the appropriate function of varying types of intelligence ac- tivities, and recommendations requesting any appropriate legislative action. SEC. 4. Ti) enable the select committee to make the investigation and study authorized and directed by this resolution, the Senate hereby empowers the select committee as an egency of the Senate to employ and fix the compensatioh of such clerical, investiga- tory, legal, technical, and other assistants as It deems necessary or appropriate: to sit and act at any time or place during sessions, recessescand adjournment periods of the Sen itei to hold hearings for taking testi- mony on oath or to receive documentary or phy ;real evidence (including classified infor- mation respecting clandestine operations, which shall be made available to the select committee and senior staff designated by the select committee) relating to the mat- ters it is authorized to investigate and study; and to expend to the extent it determines necessary or appropriate any money made available to it by the Senate to perform the dunes and exercise the powers conferred upon it by this resolution and to make the inveatigation and study it is authorized by this resolution to make. Svc. 5. The expenses of the select commit- tee under this resolution shall not exceed $750,000 per annum. Such expenses shall be Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP76M00527R000700070014-2