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January 1, 1973
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CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 0 1 : CIA-RDP76M00527R000700200001-1 INDONESIA "There are 400 ways to topple a government, among them the employment of children to block streets and roads." --Sukarno, in conversation Summary Indonesia's youth and students traditionally have been active in times of political crisis. The incip- ient independence movement of the 1920's, the revolu- tionary period following World War II, and the post- coup period of the 1960's have all provided clearly defined goals and methods. Indonesian students have now entered a period of quiescence. Although they have returned to their classes, they continue to monitor government opera- tions, paying close attention to economic stabiliza- tion, the forthcoming five-year economic development program, and preparations for the 1971 elections. In the meantime they remain both the army's strongest ally and staunchest critic. They sit in Parliament, operate their own press and radio, and organize educa- tional programs. Recent Past The attempted coup of 1965 heralded the appearance of youth and students as an independent political force which helped bring down a 20-year-old regime. Prior to this, Indonesia's youth had not shown themselves particularly independent or inquisitive. They were closely channeled by their adult political parties. There were exceptions, of course. ANSOR, the youth affiliate of the Moslem Scholar's Party (NU), took a strong anti-Communist, anti-Chinese position far more forthright than its parent organization, which has a long record of opportunism. Christian students, many educated under missionary auspices often managed to es- cape the stultifying ideological indoctrination that permeated the state schools. Such exceptions were often obscured by the clamor- ous leftist mobilization of students and youth against foreign powers "threatening" the Republic of Indonesia. Indones D ia - 1 Approved For Release 260/VJ ~~iv1200527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release 20~~'T011~9I]~ki-RDP7`GIVF00527R000700200001-1 By late 1965 however, non-Communist students were exhibiting a remarkable ability for organiza- tion and independent action, often encouraged and supported by the army. Their actions were now primarily directed internally against a discredited political machine, President Sukarno, the PKI, and rising prices. Long-standing animosities aroused by Commu- nist influence broke out in the wake of a Commu- nist-inspired attempt to seize the government. Communist China's alleged involvement surfaced re- sentment of Chinese economic "domination." Sukarno's early attempts to shield the PKI nurtured suspicion of his involvement and tarnished the state phi- losophy so closely identified with him. The students who took to the streets were not all anti-Sukarno, of course. Some supported the embattled leader. Sukarno had early recognized the need to mobilize his own youthful legions and leftist student activists took a lead in forming mass pro-Sukarno federations. Eventually, however, these were proscribed by the military government on the basis that they were being used by Commu- nist elements. Traditional Roles The Indonesian educational system has under- gone an extraordinary expansion since independence but the concurrent population increase and a ris- ing demand for education have outstripped avail- able facilities, In 1968, 35% of Indonesia's 112 million population were of school age; less than half attended class. Enrollment in higher education has increased at a faster rate than in primary and secandary schools. The current en- rollment of Indonesia's 40 state and 150 private universities is estimated at 278,000 with about 8,000 graduating annually. With 42% of the popu- lation under 15 years of age in 1961 and a current growth rate of 2,3%, severe pressures are certain to continue. The major universities are government fi- nanced and located in urban areas of Java. They are composed of individual faculties which are Approved For Release-6 P~L6 M 00527 R000700200001-1 i*f r Approved For Releaseco02/D`IIT FCJ b M00527R000700200001-1 geographically scattered and separatistic. The shortage of teachers and materials is acute. Salaries are low and most professors have other jobs, reducing tnei r effectiveness in overcrowded classes. An official 1967 survey of 24 state universities conducted reported a ratio of 1 fac- ulty member to every 728 students, Textbooks are not available or are prohibitively expensive` while libraries and laboratories are totally in- adequate. Universities usually do not have residence facilities and students must rent rooms or live with relatives. Most come from the families of government officials,, army officers? pensioners, and teachers, and are two to three years older than their Western counterparts when they enter college. Many attend part time, working to defray expenses. Because of this situation, the lack of a standardized curriculum and an arbitrary examina- tion system, it is difficult to complete a degree in the scheduled time of 5 to 7 years, and attri- tion is high. A university education traditionally has been the passport to a secure position in government and a means of ensuring social prestige. Students, therefore, tend to study law and the social sciences. While a medical degree is highly re- spected, most aspirants lack preparation to com- plete the difficult course of study. Limited academic interests and the value placed on a degree rather than educational train- ing, have produced graduates who have little in- clination to change the bureaucratic system. This has meant a bloated? largely underemployed, over- extended civil service. The first Indonesian student associations, formed in the early Twentieth century; quickly evolved into nationalist pressure groups. Some- times they provided the genesis of political par- ties; members of the Bandung Study Club ? under the chairmanship of Sukarno founded the Indonesian National Party (PNI) in 19 27 . As the Dutch became aware of the political nature of these associations, Indonesia - 3 Approved For Release 2 / WT JA00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release 2002 IP ;NPPT 00527R000700200001-1 student activities were curtailed and many leaders were exiled. The student associations were dormant throughout the 1930's until the arrival of the Japanese who sought to gain support for the war effort by creating numerous youth and student or- ganizations which emphasized Asian nationalism and Indonesian culture. At the same time, anti-Japa- nese university students, while effectively pene- trating the Japanese-sponsored organizations began overtly and clandestinely to advocate independence. At the end of the war opinion was heavily against any association with the Dutch, and Indonesian students enthusiastically fought in the revolution. Independence and the departure of the Euro- peans left many vacancies to be filled by Indo- nesians in the universities and the government. The first students---a handful compared with today's enrollment--to enter the universities after inde- pendence were highly motivated by job prospects, the social value of a university degree previously reserved for an. elite few, and personal identifi- cation with the spirit and goals of the revolution. Most students from 1949 to 1957 had full govern- ment scholarships and living costs were relatively low. STUDENTS OUTSIDE SUKARNO'S PALACE I ndone s - kP_nP&fM00527R000700200001 - 1 Approved For Release T1A r r Approved For Release 2691MRC:TA R1~,N VI 00527R000700200001-1 As this revolutionary generation graduated, however, it was replaced by another whose prospects were not as favorable. The rapidly growing stu- dent population increased the demand for govern- ment jobs, and political connections, always help- ful, became even more important in obtaining civil service appointments. In addition, as the revolution faded and liv- ing costs rose more than wages university students became frustrated and more opportunistic. Under Sukarno While the Communist student and youth organi- zations have often loudly touted membership figures other organizations have been reluctant to do so. Membership requirements are often ambiguous. The term "student" is rather loosely defined and Indonesia, too, has its share of students without universities. Both youth and student organizations have included members from 14 to 40 years of age, while student organizations count not only enrolled students, but also recent graduates or people who contribute time or money. Because of social taboos and the early marriage of girls, female participation has been minimal and usually confined to auxiliary groups. Most of the student and youth groups are af- filiates of adult parties and reflect the major or- ientations that are found in political life--religion, nationalism, and socialism, which included Marxism until 1966. Prior to October 1965, the major Indonesian parties were the Moslem Scholars Party (NU), the Indonesian National Party (PNI), and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), all of which had student ad- juncts. Sukarno's gradual move toward the left facilitated the growth of Communist and leftist na- tional groups, while moderate political and reli- gious groups were increasingly on the defensive. In 1963 the leftward thrust greatly intensified, and by mid-1965 only the army offered even minimal resistance to the nation's move into a Sukarnoized version of Communism. Indonesia - 5 Approved For Release 2~0Wi/J F2~00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release gW01(P'tI'A`-&dF M00527R000700200001-1 Communist Youth and Student Movements The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) courted youth and students to counter the traditional values and behavior that often deadened adult political life. As with other Indonesian political organiza- tions, the PKI differentiated its youth groups by age, sex, and education. Its most successful mass organization and the only one with which the party maintained open ties was its peasant-based youth organization, The Peso les Youth (PR). Less successful were the PKI's high school and university student front organizations, the League of Indonesian High School Students (IPPI), and the Concentration of Indonesian University Students Movements (CGMI). In the early 1950's Communists gained covert control of IPPI4 . a student organization that had grown out of a wartime fusion of nationalist high school and university students. This resulted in a split which, by 1957, had resulted in two rival IPPI's--neither of which was effective. Local university associations were begun by the PKI in 1950 in Bandung, Bogor, and Jogjakarta. In November 1956, these were brought together to form the Concentration of University Students Move- ments (CGMI), with about 1,200 members. Growth was moderate and in early 1960 the CGMI claimed 7,000 members, although the actual figure probably was closer to 4,000. By 1963, CGMI was claiming 17,000 members but this figure was padded by "stu- dents" from the Peoples University and other PKI- established academies. The CGMI never acknowledged its tie with the PKI, and only a small percentage ever realized it was a PKI front organization. Many members who dis- covered its true affiliation withdrew. CGMI exerted considerable influence during the early 1960's thanks largely to a convergence of national policy and PKI sentiment, which made it easier for the Communists to manipulate the organi- zation. Indonesia - 6 Approved For Release ~"ttgl)]qR-",B,7L6M00527R000700200001-1 r r Approved For Release 206)?/0V!aAJ4914kY0527R000700200001-1 CGMI was the only national student organization open to students with no political affiliation or strong religious feelings. Most others joined or- ganizations affiliated with the national political parties such as the PNI or the Masjumi. CGMI served to recruit and season young Communists. The organiza- tion was banned early in 1966 and many of its members slipped into leftist national groups where they would not be so readily noticed. Much more successful was the general youth arm of the PKI, the Peoples Youth (PR) , which had its base in the Socialist Youth of Indonesia and had been sponsored by the Socialist Party. The So- cialist Party split in 1948 and many of its members formed a new Indonesian Socialist Party. The So- cialist Youth of Indonesia, however, remained with the old Socialist Party and many of its leaders and members were involved with the ill-fated Commu- nist-led Madiun rebellion of 1948. Its name was changed in 1950 to Peoples Youth because of the Madiun affair. PR claimed 30,000 members in 149 branches throughout the country and embarked on an extensive membership drive. By 1955 the PR claimed a total membership of 616,605--of whom 80% were peasants, 15% workers and clerks, and 5% high school and university students. Only 5% were female. By 1961 the organ- ization claimed 1,250,000 members, of which 7% were girls. Claimed membership had reached 1.5 million by early 1963 and at its peak prior to the 1965 coup attempt, PR claimed 3 million members, although this figure probably was inflated. It is difficult to estimate the number of full-time cadre active in the PR. Many doubled as cadre for the PKI or for one or more of the party's other mass organizations. Indications are, however, that the PR had more full-time activ- ists than any other youth organization. As the PR grew, it placed increasing emphasis on travel to the Soviet Bloc, both for education and as incentive. What attracted members to the PR was not so much its political activity as what its then Secretary General called the fight for youth's "everyday in- terests" and the appeal to "the everyday needs of Indonesia - 7 Approved For Release NIbT t p1X V100527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release SOD'21110'3EA=F676MO0527RO00700200001-1 every section of youth, in workshops, factories, offices, harbors, urban quarters, villages, estates, schools, etc." Political activity meant little to the ordinary peasant or worker. The comprehensiveness of the PR's program was exemplified by demands raised during its Fifth Con- gress in 1956. On behalf of young workers, for ex- ample, the PR demanded improvement on wages, social security and working conditions,, abolition of wage differences because of sex or age, low-priced dis- tribution of essential commodities, and scholarships from employers and government for technical education. The PR also set up mutual aid groups to assist members in time of need and organized local "civic action" teams to repair roads and irrigation ditches. Through sports and social events, the PR provided ac- tivities in villages usually beset by boredom as soon as the sun went down. All of this did not divert the PR from its po- litical function. It sought to raise the "progressive" awareness of many Indonesian youth and students and passed on members to the PKI and its mass fronts. The PR, along with S-OBSI, the PKI's labor front, took the lead in mobilizing the September 1963 sack- ings of the British and Malayan embassies and the sub- sequent takeover of British enterprises in Indonesia. Because of its long known affiliation with the PKI, and its direct involvement in the coup attempt, the PR was hit heavily in the anti-Communist purges after 1965. It was banned in March 1966 along with the PKI and other front organizations. The PKI's youth program has not yet recovered from the 1965 purges. The party has attempted to establish a covert recruiting program, operating through its Central Committee Youth Department--mainly on East and Central Java. Leftist sentiment remains strong in these areas and there are latent animosities stemming from the purges. Indonesia - 8 Approved For Release QbWYbPbi)UA'-R&J6MOO527ROO0700200001 r r Approved For Release 2 091OUP&N-'r1761100527R000700200001-1 Indonesian Students Abroad During the early 1960s an increasing number of Indonesian students went abroad to study, predominantly in Communist countries. At the time of the attempted coup there were approximately 1,500 overseas. About 1,000 were in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Some 60 were in Communist China. There were about 800 graduate students in the United States. Japan and Australia accounted for the remainder. Communist governments attempted to influence the students' political development and sought to dominate the local Indonesian Students' Association. Where an association's leadership might.not be sym- pathetic,, the host government. would set up a rival rump leadership which could often count on substan- tial support from among the members. The group most seriously infiltrated was that in Communist China, most of whose members refused to return home after 1965. They remain in Peking, shrilly de- manding armed revolution in Indonesia guided, naturally, by the thoughts of Chairman Mao, Of the 400-500 Indonesian students in the Soviet Union, about 100 remained loyal. to the Suharto govern- ment and returned home. The remainder, staunchly leftist (either PKI or left-wing National Party sympathizers), had their passports revoked and either remained in the Soviet Union or drifted away to Peking and even to Albania. The Indonesian Govern- ment has reported the existence of 700 fugitives undergoing guerrilla training near Peking, although not all are former students. It is difficult to tell, owing to Djakarta's inadequate screening techniques, how many anti- government students returned and are active against the Suharto government. There is very little oppor- tunity for "underground" elements in Indonesia to employ propaganda tactics on anything but a limited, regional scale. Indonesia - 9 Approved For Release k0O1 Ibb NNbbMM00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release OM*-(LI)EKIdEk M00527R000700200001-1 Post-Coup Little attention has been paid to the genesis of the post-coup student movement and the establishment of anti-leftist student federations known as "action commands." Catholic and Moslem student leaders ap- pear to have taken the initiative late in 1965. Their university student groups came together to form KAMI, the University Students Action Command, one of the most important coalitions of this period. While KAMI drew its strength mainly from religious student organ- izations, it regarded itself as nationally rather than religiously motivated. KAMI may have been largely the brainchild of its first. secretary general, Kosmos Batabura, who was at that time also chairman of the Catholic University Students Association. It has now been generally ac- cepted that KAM7: had the early support and protection of the army. A government assessment in February 1966, when KAMI's activities hit a high point, placed its hard- core membership at 7,500. However, the group was highly effective in rallying thousands of students and gaining the support of many labor and professional groups. Not unnaturally, student groups proved most ef- fective in Djakarta. In many areas beyond the capital they often collapsed in the face of opposition from leftist, pro-Sukarno students and elements of the military, especially the leftist-oriented Marines. The post-coup youth campaign was a fluctuating thing, often reacting more to the mood of the time than to any preconceived plan. Student hostility focused on Communists, then on Sukarno's ministers and close associates, economic deterioration and finally on the Chinese. Insinuations that the CPR may have inspired the coup became more and more widespread. On 21 October 1965, 50,000 demonstrators protested China's "intervention" in Indonesia's domestic affairs. Foreign Minister Subandrio was charged with being Approved For Release ei t P M00527R000700200001-1 r Approved For Releasec~WhE` J-I a "Peking Dog" and if he did not run to Mao's bidding, it was enough that he occasionally had sat in his lap. The students' tactics during this period were those so familiar to the West. Beginning with street demonstrations, mass meetings, and roll-calls the students turned to more direct action. In early January 1966, students had initiated the boycott tactic. All university activities were struck until the government retracted price boosts in gasoline, kerosene, postal rates and train fares. Sukarno's installation of a new cabinet in late Feb- ruary 1966 was protested by thousands of students jammed into the streets of Djakarta, overturning vehicles and blocking the streets to keep the newly appointed ministers from attending installation cere- monies at the palace. Traf- fic was brought to a stand- still and Sukarno was forced to bring in his new ministers by helicopter. Pamphleteering, radio, news- papers, grafitti, rock- throwing, the "liberation" of official buildings, and student arrests of govern- ment officials became reg- ular occurrences. Fights with rival student groups alternated with demonstra- tions either supporting or condemning the "old order." Student efforts at or- ganizing often took a mili- tary tone, with the forma- tion of brigades, regiments, and squads usually named after compatriots wounded or even killed during con- frontations with pro-Sukarno troops or youth groups. While all this points to a certain amount of guidance from the Army, an anonymous. student leader has said: Indonesia - 11 Approved For Release 0MQM]P1 ' II M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release 2O?ANIb IdAVtF MA00527R000700200001-1 "We learned how to organize and demonstrate from the Communists.. We have watched and studied their methods for ten years. Unfortunately, we are a na- tion trained in Marxism... We have also learned a lot from the Japanese Zengakuren movement." Sukarno angrily demanded that the students, especially KAMI, be disbanded, but his demand went unheeded. KAMI increased its coordination with KAPPI. its high school counterpart; and guided thousands of students in demonstrations. With the army's support, the leftist nationalists and other pro-Sukarno forces were largely neutralized. The Communists had been destroyed as an overt political force. The transfer of executive authority to General Suharto in March 1966 was preceded by three days of violence and demands that diplomatic relations with the Chinese Communists be broken: from 9-11 March, students invaded the offices of NCNA, the Chinese Consul General, and the Chinese 'Trade Of- fice. Foreign Minister Subandrio's offices were also sacked. In May the students finally breached the walls of the Chinese Embassy. A feeling that they, perhaps, were the new protectors of the public welfare, had taken hold. Sukarno's fall and General Suharto's subsequent appointment as President relieved the students of their major thrust. They are now largely concerned with matters of economic stability, corruption, and a rediscovery of the world of which they are a part. The search has led them to parliamentary partici- pation. In early 1967 they were giver. a total of 18 seats in a revised parliament, divided among students and worsting youth. How many they currently hold is obscured in the confusion of nomenclature, reconstituted parliaments, and obtuse statistics. More important than numbers, however, is the influence they exercise. Through approximately 140 "amateur" radio stations they bombard the gov- ernment and populace with anti-corruption and economic stability campaigns and dated western Approved For Release4 Q~'_ QIL6M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release N l1'd ?El dPk1M00527R000700200001-1 music. Their major newspaper, Harian KAMI, enjoys a paid circulation estimated at 9,000 and it is no doubt read by many more people. It is regarded as a highly professional effort and offers some of the best editorial comment of any Indonesian newspaper. The Role of Ch~nee e Students The attitudes, activities, and organizations of the Indonesian Chinese, both citizens and aliens, have been influenced by specifically ethnic interests. The majority have remained largely apathetic and passive, focused largely on day-to-day concerns. However, during the pro-Chinese and pro-Communist Sukarno era the Chinese became important as a political sub-group., While alien Chinese were prohibited by law from engaging in political activities, Indonesian Chinese became involved with such "integrationist" organizations as Partindo and Baperkio The latter ostensibly was established to investigate ways of assimilating Indonesia's Chinese. While these organizations were essentially Indonesian and In- donesian Chinese, alien Chinese--especially the staunchly pro-Peking among tham--found ways to in- filtrate them. The national and provincial lead- erships of Baperki came to be dominated by Chinese Communist agents and sympathizers. The leftward course of Indonesian politics in the early 1960s was felt most by the young Chinese who were prone to identify with Communist China and more anxious to engage in political ex- pression,, Sukarno's concept of a "Djakarta- Peking Axis" made the policies of Djakarta and Pe- king increasingly indistinguishable and political commitment to one became commitment to the other. This virtually eclipsed the moderate or pro-Na- tionalist Chinese. Many of the Chinese youth in the Baperki af- filiates also joined th PKI's student front organ- izations. In early 1965 a Baperki official claimed that 5,000 members of the organization's youth af- filiate had joined the PKI's high school students' Approved For Release 200 0 Vdi*%rCklk-RDl 7 M00527R000700200001-1 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 260?XYOI:IOIA [ 11, iN90527R000700200001-1 front, IPPI. By mid-1965 it had become unpatriotic for Chinese youth and students not to engage in pro-Peking and pro-Communist activities. The at- tack on the USIS cultural center in Djakarta in February 1965 was largely carried out by students from Chinese high schools, both Indonesian and alien. The reaction to the attempted coup of 1965 largely undermined the position of t1.e Chinese and while they took to the streets with other pro-Sukarno elements, they were often placed on the defensive by charges of Chinese involvement in the coup and Chinese economic domination. The Chinese will remain a problem for years to come. While several thousand were expatriated to mainland China following the coup and many more remain in detention camps, the Chinese population is still engaged iz the day-to-day struggle of making a living. This has been made all the more difficult by increased government restrictions on their eco- nomic and social activities. Nationalis China has cast covetous glances their way but i:s desire to influence this large group of overseas Chinese, estimated at approximately 3 million all told, has been thwarted by Djakarta's desire not to get involved with National- st China and risk losing what few strands of a "non-aligned" foreign policy remain. ANTI-COMMUNIST DEMONSTRATORS BURN CHINESE- SPONSORED UNIVERSITY, OCTOBER 1965 Approved For Release 204210WOS!,9C[A-RDP96M00527R000700200001-1 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release/D9/IP`9-DAMO0527RO00700200001-1 Indonesian Chinese students are subject to all the uncertainties of a period in which the Indonesian government is trying to assimilate the Chinese com- munity into the national fabric. For this reason, Chinese political attitudes seem to have entered a period of suspended animation, a retreat into ethnic non-involvement in the face of continuing apprehension. Most student activism in Indonesia is today chan- nelled through the political parties and through stu- dent representation in parliament. Much of the united spirit that marked the immediate post-coup period has been eroded, particularly by the strains of Christian- Moslem frictions. Moslem and nationalist political parties are waiting, anxious to advance their interests. Leftist nationalist youth and student organizations hunger after political respectability. While they are still in limbo, and their rehabilitation will depend in large part on the discretion of their parent organiza- tions, they nevertheless provide a locus of unrest. Indonesia now finds itself with a strong president, a somewhat weak parliament and an army that holds the key to stability. The student population has settled down after the excitement of Sukarno's ouster. The Suharto government has placed a partial moratorium on political activity which has somewhat undercut student activism. National elections have been put off until 1971. It is unlikely that student activity will erupt in such force as to paralyze the country as has hap- pened in France. Youth and students in Indonesia are largely accustomed to prescribed roles and operate within the security and discipline of the extended family and a highly personalized society. Even their often violent protests following the attempted coup were subject to these conditions. One side effect of this is a tendency toward di- vided loyalties--especially on the part of Moslem stu- dent organizations, who feel the pull between religion and government. In the long run, much depends on the Suharto government's ability to convince the populace that Indonesia - 15 Approved For Release 201 1$4 66AL400527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release Z O 17O f OIA AAq A00527R000700200001-1 it is working toward economic development. Failure to do so could lead to serious disaffection among the nation's elite, especially the youth and students. Such disaffection would, of course, make it more difficult for the government to obtain popular co- operation and could produce a spiralling coercion- disaffection ]_nteraction that would intensify antagon- ism and open a breach between the student front and the army, its main ally up to now. The resultant loss of army support would leave a vacuum in the student movement which could be exploited by political parties. Much of the same can be said about working youth, althouch they are not as politically active as the students. The Communists, who had the most success in organizing youth, are destroyed as an overt political force and many of the leftist nationalist youth organizations which belonged to the Sukarno-inspired Youth Front are mending po- litical fences. It would appear that youth organ- izations active at the present time, sometimes in conjunction with the students, are somewhat more closely connected to political parties and labor unions. In the meantime, the student front, KAMI in particular, continues to provide a platform for a new generation of political leaders. Approved For Releas~ ~ X19- APJ6MOO527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release 2002/0? & -'DP76M00527R000700200001-1 No Foreign Dissem I RAN Summary There has been an upsurge in student unrest dur- ing the past year. Recent demonstrations appear to have been aimed primarily at redressing localized edu- cational grievances and police reaction to student ac- tivities, and to have had no broader political over- tones. Background Political activism among University of Tehran students has, until recent years, been endemic; there were few years between the early 1950s and 1963 not marked by rioting and often bloody demonstrations. Traditionally, the activists have been nationalists, supporters of former Prime Minister Mossadeq, of his National Front or one of the offshoots of the National Front. The Tudeh (Communist) Party has also been heavily involved; Tudeh Party cells were active on the campus for 15 years. A few of the early Tudeh Party leaders were university professors, who retain a shadowy party-in-exile in Eastern Europe. In the past, student demonstrations were almost all antigovernment. The Shah provided a natural tar- get and the demonstrations were for the most part un- abashedly political, with little attempt to use genuine student grievances as a pretext. The Shah's increas- ing confidence in the rightness of his domestic and foreign policies was accompanied--and perhaps made possible--by a strict suppression of political dis- sidence, including that at the university. Student leaders who promoted demonstrations were jailed, and officials of the National Security Office were openly ensconced on campus. Such measures, together with a generally more optimistic feeling in the country, have operated to produce a less openly militant stu- dent body. Present Student Attitudes Many young Iranians apparently feel no sense of identification with the regime and its development No Foreign Dissem Approved For Release 2002/OR1DP76M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release 2002/BjR kDP76M00527R000700200001-1 No Foreign Dissem efforts which are decided at the highest levels of government. Anti-establishment sentiment is probably intensified by the lack of an effective political opposition either in the universities or in the society at large. No political organizations are permitted on campus and the security organizations and their informers keep a close watch for potential troublemakers. Outspoken opponents of the regime have been expelled and drafted. A university education is today probably the most important requirement for success in Iran. Despite their dissatisfaction with the political system, therefore, most students are unwilling to jeopardize future job security by any confrontation with the police over political ideology. In the past, many university graduates were unable to find jobs, and therefore had less to lose. Now, however, many of the brightest graduates are absorbed into a burgeon- ing bureaucracy as participants in the reform pro- gram, and the problem of an unemployed, disgruntled educated class is beginning to fade. Current Unrest Recent student unrest and demonstrations, there- fore, have been aimed primarily at complaints about the educational system and defects within Iran's uni- versities. A?proximately 30,000 students are enrolled in nine institutions of higher learning. All but one of these institutions have experienced student demon- strations during the past two years. In May and June of 1967 and a-gain in January and February of 1968 inci- dents resulted in arrests at the universities of Tabriz Pahlavi, and Tehran. Pahlavi was closed for several weeks in February. The students demanded, among other things, abolition of newly instituted tuition fees, upgrading of degrees, higher university budgets, and better facilities. The demonstrations had a number of proximate causes. Tabriz University, one of the first to erupt, was subjected to a complete administrative overhaul and reform following local disturbances--probably leading many students elsewhere to feel demonstrations could produce results. Students in Tehran struck in r 70, No Foreign Dissem Approved For Release 2002/OSf Rt1cPDP76M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release 2002/0F/W RJ -' DP76M00527R000700200001-1 No Foreign Dissem protest against alleged police brutality at Tabriz in June 1967 and again in sympathy with the Teachers Training College strike early in 1968. Students from Tehran University reportedly visited Isfahan University and encouraged demonstrations in February 1968. Some government and security officials contended that Chinese Communist sympathizers were behind the activities, but this has not been confirmed. A few Tudeh Party cells do continue to exist at the Univer- sity of Tehran, but there is no overt manifestation of their presence and their covert activities are directed mostly at staying alive. Iran's universities are in transition, changing from a system of memorization and learning by rote to a more flexible, creative approach. Conservative, re- ligious-oriented students find this modernization threatening. Thus Pahlavi University's demonstration centered around dissatisfaction with "foreign" teach- ers, and "insults to Islam." Other students undoubtedly believe that modernization is not coming fast enough and that their training still is not relevant in the modern world. The universities have had difficulty in attract- ing competent and dynamic faculties, despite government efforts to recruit better qualified teachers. At Tabriz, for example, until this year's reorganization, the university was dominated by conservative, long-en- trenched native Azerbaijanis with questionable quali- fications. Although the apparent student/faculty ratios at Iranian universities are not too bad, these figures are deceptive. At Tehran University, for example, where the ratio was 28 to 1 in 1966, faculty members have been only part-time teachers--medical professors with private practices, economics professors with their own businesses, etc. Some top professors reportedly have not shown up for classes in years. There has been virtually no faculty/student relationship. Professors traditionally deliver lectures and depart with little or no exchange with their students. The government now has banned part-time teaching, but it is not known to what extent its ruling has been enforced. No Foreign Dissem Approved For Release 2002/(8BCICLATDP76M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release 2002/gJMR( fRDP76M00527R000700200001-1 No Foreign Dissem University chancellors generally have won their positions on the basis of their ability to maintain order. Many are poor administrators, with little ability to conununicate with the younger generation. Students are well aware of the attempts to keep them quiet; rumors at Tehran University that the chancellor was about to create a university-controlled student organization resulted in a pamphlet declaring that "we boycott any imposed trade union." Outside In luencej There is little evidence cf off-campus influence on student activism. Security officials, and in some instances university officials, charged that Commu- nists were active in recent demonstrations; 20 of the 100 students arrested in the Tehran area in February 1968 were alleged to be pro - Chinese Communist. This has not been confirmed. There is some Communist ac- tivity, consisting primarily of the circulation of a limited amount: of Soviet and Chinese propaganda. Some students may be receptive to this propaganda, but generally its effectiveness has been undercut by rapid economic.; and social development. Many students turned out in February last year to mourn the death of a famous wrestler associated with Mossadeq's National Front, but the front itself has been effectively silenced by the Shah's reforms and by security measures. The US Embassy believes that in universities such as Pahlavi, which are located in less urban areas, Muslim religious leaders still have an influ- ence over youth. About 50 religously conservative Shirazi citizens were arrested follDwing disturbances at Pahlavi in February 1968 on charges of fomenting the strikes. There is no evidence that student revolts in the US, France, and other countries have influenced the Iranian students, or that Iranian dissidents abroad have had an irlpact on the local. scene. GovernmentApproach_;o St;~dent Problems Iranian officials, from the Shah on down, are aware that the regime has not been accepted by many intellectuals, They are anxious to keep youth satis- fied and to encourage students to support and partici- pate in the government. There is no visible effort to Iran - 4 No Foreign Dissem Approved For Release 2002/@ok9RDP76M00527R000700200001-1 r r r 1 r Approved For Release 2002/OSBCI . DP76M00527R000700200001-1 No Foreign Dissem train youth for political responsibility, however; in fact, the government attempts to keep students from engaging in political activity altogether. The government is trying to improve and modern- ize Iranian universities through increased enrollment and expansion of facilities, improved and enlarged faculties, establishment of technical institutions, and a more creative and relevant method of instruc- tion. Further improvement is slated under the new five-year plan, but progress is slow--particularly when change threatens the university's status quo and is fought by elements both in faculties and student bodies. The regime-sponsored Youth Organization has es- tablished a Youth Palace in Tehran elaborately equipped with sports facilities, a snack bar, and occasional entertainment. There are plans for similar facili- ties in other Iranian cities and for centers open to nonuniversity youth, as well. Political and social pull--being a descendant of one of Iran's "1,000 families"--is still important in the rise to success, but less so than before. More middle-class youth are attending universities, and with the government's increasing emphasis on skill and technical competence, more of them are now able to get jobs without political connections. Of greatest impact, however, has been the increasing availability of government jobs. Both high school and university graduates are employed in large num- bers in the Literacy, Health, and Development Corps. Iranian Students Abroad Iranian officials estimate that some 25,000 to 37,000 Iranians are studying abroad, including 5,000 to 12,000 in the United States. Surveys have shown that many of the best do not return home because of better opportunities abroad, while average students are likely to come back. Most of the sizable number of dropouts and failures (only 50 percent of the Iranian "students" in the US are thought to be ac- tually enrolled in schools) get nonprofessional jobs with good pay abroad and do not return to Iran. No Foreign Dissem Approved For Release 2002/DP76M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release 2002/911191'RDP761000527R000700200001-1 No Foreign Dissem A degree from a US or European university is considered tax mere prestigious than cane from an Iranian university, and many youths go to fantastic lengths to study abroad. For example, private enter- prises in Iran sell admissions to small, often unac- credited universities in the US to students who are unable to gain admission to better US schools. Poorer students often seek education abroad because they are unable to gain entrance to Iran's universities, A small but vocal segment of Iranian students abroad an estimated 500 are in the US) engage in ac- tive anti-Shah activities. They hoi..d meetings, issue sporadic publications, and make grandiose plans, but their major activity is to harass the Shah when he travels. Anti-Shah demonstrations, cined by radical students in the US, Germany, Austri&, and England, among other piaces, have been a macr irritant to the Shah, have strained relations with list governments, and have often red to supersecrecy and extremely tight security during his journeys: The largest organizations of Iranian students abroad--the Iranian Students Association in the US and the Confederation of Iranian Students in Europe-- appear to be a conglomeration of Communist sympathiz- ers, National Front - oriented leftists, middle-of- the-roaders, and religiously oriented rightists. They have no ideciogical cohesiveness; only opposi- tion to the Shah and the present regime unites them. The leftists, who tend to be more active, almost al- ways assume conti3i but do not necessarily reflect the attitudes of the maocrity,. Most of the funds apparently come room membership dues Those who are in the forefronr A anti-Snah activities are well known to Iranian authorities and most of them find it impos- sible to return to Iran. The government is also concernec by the so-called "brain drain" problem. During the last year, it has initiated a number of steps caiculated to lure over- seas residents ba'k--draft exemptions, the promise of good jobs in government and private industry, and ac- tive recruiting for teaching jobs at Iranian universi- ties. The regime may also be making it more difficult for Iranians to g: abroad in the first place. r r r ,. ioreion Dissem Approved For Release 2002(,0 ?/O~PFq-4RDP76M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release 20028?RIT-RDP76M00527R000700200001-1 No Foreign Dissem The Long View There will likely be no dramatic changes in stu- dent attitudes over the next ten years, assuming that the. Shah's economic development programs continue to provide challenging employment to increasing numbers of university graduates. It is also unlikely that many Iranian students will risk political activism while economic and social advancement appears possible. Nevertheless, as long as political activity is pro- scribed--and it is likely to be for as long as the Shah is in power--the regime will probably not win wholehearted student support, and resentment of its authoritarianism, however benevolent, will pervade university life. No Forei n Dissem Approved For Release 2002/(84Q?1J,.DP76M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release 2002/9LJC9R(P7r'RDP76M00527R000700200001-1 No Foreign Dissem ITALY Summary Student agitation during the past 18 months ex- tended throughout Italy. Except for the summer vaca- tion hiatus of August and September, demonstrations, sit-ins, marches and other agitation have characterized the student scene. In recent months, secondary stu- dents have followed the example set earlier by university students and increasing numbers of them have agitated for their own reforms. Student violence is not new to Italy. There was violence, reportedly concerted at several universi- ties in 1962-64, 24-hour strikes in a number of univer- sities in 1965, and clashes between right and left extremists in 1966. The last year and a half, however, is the first period when student unrest has involved the whole peninsula. Recent disorders began with a sit-in at the Cath- olic University of Milan in November 1967. The most violent demonstrations, however, have taken place in Rome. On the first of March 1968, there were serious disorders and clashes with the police near Rome's School of Architecture. Both police and private vehicles were destroyed by demonstrators. On 27 April 1.968, some 2,000 university and secondary school students demonstrated in a central plaza against the arrest of several School of Architecture students. The students used iron bars, chains, Molotov cocktails, and stones as weapons against the police. Serious student dem- onstrations, sometimes involving as many as 10,000 marchers, have also taken place during the past 18 months in Bologna, Florence, Genoa, Milan, Naples, Padua, Palermo, Trieste, Turin and Venice. Several hundred people have been wounded in clashes with the police. Degree of Participation An average of about 10 percent of the students in the 34 Italian universities has been active in Approved For Releas~109116 f1b?f9c i* fk6M00527R000700200001-1 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/01/09 : CIA-RDP76M00527R000700200001-1 r r r r Approved For Release 2002/01/09 : CIA-RDP76M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release 200E1-RDP76M00527R000700200001-1 No Foreign Dissem the demonstrations. Proportions have varied con- siderably, however, from a third of the student body at Palermo to a few isolated students at one of the very small universities. The majority of studenta are not activist, but they have either been sympathetic with the minority or silent about their opposition. Press and public opinion have generally been sympathetic to the students, largely because of the recognized inadequacies of the univer- sity, but are now becoming somewhat impatient with the excesses of some demonstrators. The Objectives Student agitation is directed primarily toward educational reform, but there is some evidence of a broader dissatisfaction with the "system." Possibly in line with modern anarchist thought, young Italians often seem uncertain of the objectives they seek, and lack both organization and over-all leadershirn. Their specific demands are an admixture of local complaints-- which provide a spark for trouble--and deep-seated, often long-discussed grievances over the antiquated character of the curriculum, the inadequacy of build- ings, and the crippling lack of facilities for scien- tific and technical training. With these complaints go demands for far greater participation by the students in the actual running of the university and criticism of the government's inflexibility. Causes of Student Agitation A basic cause of agitation in Italy is the rise in the number of university students. While in ele- mentary school the increase in students is only slightly in excess of the general population growth,20 percent more enrolled in a single recent year for the first year of study for university degrees. The relatively static number of professors and an outdated curriculum have added to frustration. At Rome, for example, many students believe that it is absurd for them to be forced to achieve competence in the Latin of ancient Rome; but the requirement cannot be abolished except by act of parliament. In a smaller school such a requirement can be evaded by faculty-student collusion, but at Rome with 60,000 students evasion is impossible. Italy - 3 No Forei D' Approved For Release 20 ~N A-76M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release 20~2~,1iR IA-RDP76M00527R000700200001-1 No Foreign issem The general mood of restlessness has proved in- fectious. Disaffected youth, known locally as "capelloni" (the long-haired ones) were first notice- able in mid-1965. Some 200 of the capelloni gathered from all over the country to demonstrate at Carrara in June 1967, with the support of the Federation of Italian Anarchist Youth. They were also in evidence at the small International Anarchist Congress at Car- rara in September 1968. The extremists, with their rejection of all po- litical order, their exasperated search for "direct democracy," and the weight they attach to the social and political criticism of Herbert Marcuse, have gone beyond the limits of homegrown Communism. outside Aqitat,,.on There is no evidence of foreign instigation or guidance during the seemingly spontaneous demonstra- tions of 1967-68. Television coverage of demonstra- tions elsewhere contributed to some degree, as did the exchange of literature and "experience" with foreign students and between Italian student groups. The ex- tremist leaders of two university demonstrations in northern Italy in May 1968 had just returned from France. In Italy, as in France, the orthodox Communist Party was surprised by the student outbreak and proved unprepared to endorse the aims or methods of the stu- dent agitators. The Italian party, with a membership of over one-and-a-half million, has been in the fore- front of those free world Commun--st parties that have struggled to minimize their subservience to Moscow and to attain the role of a more or less regular po- litical party. The Italian Communists have reacted ambiguously to the student disturbances, trying to capitalize on the move of events while refraining from taking an official position on the violence. Leaders of the party's left have argued for a more militant stand, rather than backing away as they believe the French did, so that the Communists might take advantage of disorder. But most of the party, particularly its right wing, has been afraid that involvement in the student demonstrations would disrupt the party's long- term goal of winning a governmental role by peaceful means. The party also fears that the disorder, coupled Italy - 4 Approved For Releas 2Od 1 -nCPAif?60 '6M00527R000700200001-1 SECRET Approved For Release 200'i?]OV,ETA-RDP76M00527R000700200001-1 No Foreign Dissem with the restiveness evident in the Communist youth or- ganization, could loosen its hold over party members in the universities. Communist youth increasingly are of the opinion that parliamentary reform is too slow a process and that the "Italian road to socialism" supported by the party's leadership "will lead in- evitably to social democracy." The Extreme Left The political organizations that fall to the left of the orthodox Communists all have sought to profit from the student movement and to stimulate its protest activities. The Federation of Youth of the Proletarian Socialists is reportedly the most popular political organization for the student ex- tremists. The Proletarian Socialists have put their propaganda and organizational apparatus at the dis- position of those in the university movement who would accept it. Many of the young people attracted by this party have concurrently put themselves at the head of anti-imperialist Castroist groups called "Che Guevara clubs" or at the head of associations of pro-Chinese or Trotskyite inspiration. The pro-Chinese movement, represented by the three competing organizations--the communist Party of Italy (Marxist-Leninist) the Federation of Marx- ist-Leninist Communists of Italy, and the League of Marxist-Leninist Communists of Italy--of late has obtained an unprecedented degree of support in the university milieu. Previously, little success at- tended these groups' demonstrations, which were usually built around the theme of US involvement in Vietnam, complete with little red books and Maoist banners and maxims. The Trotskyite movement is represented by two feeble groups and has profited little as yet from the student agitation. In one city, however, several university students have founded the "League of Revolutionary Students" which proposes to link student and worker power and to organize street demonstrations. Pro-Castro sentiment has not given rise to any disciplined organization in Italy. There has, however, Italy - 5 Approved For Relea420&9 ~ 6P~6M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release 200JR1:AA-RDP76M00527R000700200001-1 No Foreign Dissem been an increase in the number of "Che Guevara clubs," where protest of a variety of ideological tendencies is reportedly expressed. A left-wing Italian pub- lisher distributes a considerable volume of liter- ature romanticizing Castro and Che Guevara and also disseminates texts on guerrilla methods and tech- niques. Several people in Italian Government circles have expressed fear that the spread of such literature could lend an increasingly violent cast to student demonstrations. Th_a Extreme Right The extreme right--particularly the neo-fascist movement--is divided between those with a nostalgia for the past and others who stress political survival in a time of rapid social evolution. Thus the rightists are torn between the dangers of adopting so reactionary a line that they will be separated from the mass of students, and an association with the far left that might lead to their absorption. In some universities the far right led actions to evacuate or to prevent the occupation of the schools. In others, the rightists competed with th extreme leftists in occupying build- ings. In general, however, the far right has not been a major factor La the student demonstrations. Attitude of Moderates The Italian students may have a better chance of winning high level support than student agitators elsewhere. For example, Ami:-itore Fanfani, a key Christian Demo- cratic leader, has given lectures at Rome which were based on his con-:emporary experiences as foreign minister and were designed to meet: student demand for academic work relevant to the present day. Civilta Cattolica, the influential Jesuit weekly, stated edi- torially that protesting students were substantially correct in their demands and new forms of democracy would have to be found to give everyone a meaningful role in society. By early 1969, however, the attitude of the es- tablishment toward the student demonstrations had be- come considerably more critical. Italian observers generally believe that reform of curriculum, administra- tion and student--teacher relations is inevitable, given Italy - 6 Approved For Release aW2kg l( :r!'.aJA P76M00527R000700200001-1 SECRET Approved For Release N200?($1JtkT2DP76M00527R000700200001-1 0 oreign Dissem the increase in the student population. Demonstra- tions have given the government a sense of urgency about reform in education, but unfocused extremist agitation may now be delaying progress on legisla- tion. Prospects Both university and secondary students are likely to continue demonstrations for some time to come. The extent and seriousness of their actions probably de- pend on two factors: the prospect for sympathetic government enactment of school reform and the degree of student-worker cooperation. This last in turn probably depends at last in part on the stand the orthodox Italian Communist Party will take toward stu- dent unrest. The incumbent government of Mariano Rumor, which took office only last December, has given priority to educational reform in its program. It is generally ex- pected that reform will eventually take place but that considerably more serious student agitation will occur first. Even after legislation is passed, the students on the extremist fringe are expected to continue con- spicuous agitation. Italy - 7 No Fore n p Approved For Release 20021FB6M00527R000700200001-1 25X6 Approved For Release 2002/01/09 : CIA-RDP76M00527R000700200001-1 Next 14 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2002/01/09 : CIA-RDP76M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release &%iV/IP.16N-lbAM00527ROO0700200001-1 PAKISTAN Summary Localized student unrest has periodically dis- rupted the universities in Pakistan but has only recently become an actual threat to the government of President Ayub Khan. The violent student-led riots of the past three months that have occurred in both wings of Pakistan are an expression of frus- tration and dissatisfaction with the status quo-- political, economic, and educational. Ayub's so- called "Decade of Reforms" has stultified develop- ment of political leadership and a feeling of un- ease throughout the country has created a receptive climate for student grievances. Background on the University Set-Up Pakistan has 12 universities, each with a broad network of affiliated colleges. Theoreti- cally autonomous, the universities receive offi- cial funds and are more directly influenced by cen- tral and provincial governments than any other part of the educational system. The total university and college enrollment is approximately 300,000. Pakistani universities are organized on the British model. The titular head is the chancellor, usually an important dignitary and most often the governor of the province where the university is located, i.e. East or West Pakistan. The vice chancellor is the actual administrator, and over- all control is exercised by a Senate made up of university and non-university personnel. Since the Senate meets only occasionally, the immediate work- ing body is the Executive Council--senior university staff members, representatives of the affiliated colleges, and representatives of government. The Student Community The Pakistani student community is as diverse and regionally varied as other sectors of the soci- ety. Although students are generally more leftist Approved For Release fi&i)]Fchi-WM00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Releast_ ' /b1lb1EbfAT-lk6M00527R000700200001-1 than the rest cf the population, there are pockets of intense conservatism, such as in Peshawar. Across the country, students seem to have a paro- chial outlook and a simplistic and emotional view of the outside world. The causes that have stirred them to action in recent years have been political, regional, personal, or religious rather than social. The dissidents have always represented a small per- centage of the enrollment, but support for their opposition views has been increasing as disenchant- ment with the Establishment has grown within the student community. Many serious students have recently become frustrated with the third-rate curriculum and in- struction in Pakistan's pseudo-British educational system, which is designed to educate a small ruling elite. They recognize that the system is inadequate for educating large numbers of people in many dif- ferent fields and that it does not provide the skills needed by a modernizing society. A very basic grievance underlying the general student dis- satisfaction with the status quo is uncertainty about jobs after graduation. Students somewhat unrealistically expect that a college degree guar- antees prestigious and remunerative employment. They inevitably run up against the hard reality that most jobs in government, as well as in busi- ness, are awarded on the basis of family connec- tions rather than merit. All examinations are considered to be subject to manipulation and fa- voritism, and cheating has assumed the proportions of a national :scandal. Disenchan-:ment with the entire corrupt estab- lishment has made some students receptive to the appeal of a radical solution--Islamic "socialism" or even a Chinese--style "socialist" experiment--on the assumption that it would be more equitable. (Although Communism per se has made few converts among Pakistani students, Communist countries, particularly Communist China, exercise a consid- erable attraction.) The students' desire to change the system sets them apart from many of the older opposition leaders who want to throw the rascals out" and take their places in a substantially un- changed social order. This accounts for the appeal Approved For Release "PY'RpP,-CM00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release II iPkN 2 M00527R000700200001-1 of younger, more radical opposition leaders such as Bhutto, the former foreign minister, who has be- come one of the government's sharpest critics. The regime is reportedly worried about Bhutto's increas- ing influence on the campus. Bhutto's arrest in mid-November for inciting violence has only aggra- vated student discontent. Student Organizations Student organizations have existed in Pakistan since partition. Established to pursue both polit- ical and educational goals, the organizations have lacked full-fledged programs and generally accepted goals. They have tended to lie dormant until stirred by major emotional issues. They have found effec- tive allies hard to come by, with the exception of a student-labor opposition tie of some significance in East Pakistan. Most of the effective student groups are subsidized by particular political parties--or the regime. Pakistani student organization is fragmented and varies widely among regions. The arrangements are most coherent in East Pakistan where student political involvement is much greater than in the West and where violence among student groups is a routine occurrence. Three province-wide student organizations serve as campus arms of adult polit- ical groups. The largest and oldest of these is affiliated with an opposition party preoccupied with provincial autonomy. The second significant organization is affiliated with the Communists, but is split between pro-Moscow and pro-Peking factions. The weakest of the three is sponsored by and almost entirely dependent upon government support. In Karachi, the two largest student groups are influenced by factions of a leftist party that has been heavily infiltrated by the Communists. Other Karachi student unions of individual colleges typ- ically go their own way, although the fundamental Muslim parties exercise some influence. Karachi students are given to intermittent activity, but they can generate considerable pressures on issues to which they are committed. In Lahore, there are numerous opposition- and government-sponsored youth Approved For Release DOXIV(K).EKWdPkLMO0527ROO0700200001-1 Approved For Release 2002/01/09 : CIA-RDP76M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release 2002/01/09 : CIA-RDP76M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Released2 dJ1 14T 6M00527R000700200001-1 movements. Lahore students have been militant on issues which have engaged their emotions, such as the 1966 anti-government demonstrations following the Tashkent Declaration. Elsewhere in West Paki- stan, student organizations are usually organized as college or department unions and are generally inactive. Weak and transitory student groups come and go with little fanfare, typically being sparked by a few activists with an apathetic following. Students and the Current Unrest The present anti-government unrest, which is presenting Ayub with the greatest challenge of his decade of rule, was initiated by West Pakistani students in November 1968. Students had begun marching and striking in a number of urban centers in early October. The demonstrations took on an increasingly political and anti-government flavor, although at the outset they were based primarily on legitimate academic grievances. Violence erupted on 7 November when a student was shot in Rawalpindi as police tried to disperse a crowd waiting to greet former Foreign Minister Bhutto. Bhutto, at the time was engaged in a political tour of West Pakistan, criticizing the government and apparently beginning a campaign for the presidency. Rioting broke out throughout West Pakistan as other disaffected elements joined the students in the following days. President Ayub and his regime came increasingly under direct attack. An alleged attempt on Ayub's life on 11 November sparked a round-up of troublemakers, among them Bhutto, who has been in jail ever since. His arrest further aroused the students and aggravated the protests. The disturbances continued intermittently, finally spreading to East Pakistan. Schools were closed much of the time, a usual procedure in times of unrest. All the while, students were involved, although attention shifted to the adult politicians when several former government officials joined the opposition. Still, the most active, unpredictable and volatile element in the protests continued to be the students, whose leaders increased in compe- tence and control as they gained experience. The Approved For ReleasC/pl/"Ei jS JWIkFL76M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Releas b i1A3 ikh i 76M00527R000700200001-1 activists remai:zed only a small percentage of the student community, but their colleagues joined in- creasingly in agitation against the establishment, especially in East Pakistan. The demonstrations appeared to be running out of steam late last year. In mid--January 1969, the aging and quarrelling East Pak politicians were cowed by government threats and did not go into the streets for a scheduled opposition protest day. Furious, the students seized the initiative and the government reacted with repressive measures. The death of another student exacerbated the situa- tion and rioting again spread across the country, with West Pak students overcoming regional antago- nisms and taking up the banner of their East Pak colleagues. The army had to be called into most of Pakistan's major cities to restore order. During these three turbulent months, the regime has used both carrot and stick tactics, offering the greatest number of concessions to the students in hopes that educational reforms would make them forget political demands. The repressive West Pak- istani University Ordinance was repealed and the Student Union--a body of elected student represent- atives--was re-established at the University of the Punjab in Lahore. An education service on the pat- tern of the civil service was set up to provide in- centives for the teaching profession. The conces- sions were too little and too late, however; the students' academic grievances had long since been eclipsed by their political demands. They are now vowing to continue pressing the government until all their demands are met, and they will almost certainly be unwilling to accept any compromise which results from the recently proposed government- opposition dialogue. Prospects The generation gap is an acute problem in Pak- istan where Ayub's "Decade of Reform" is regarded by the students more as a "Decade of Corruption and Disparity." A new batch of student leaders has emerged from the current turmoil--leaders who com- mand the respect of fellow students and who appar- ently are able to exert a degree of control over Approved For Releasc VW6M00527R000700200001-1 ~M 11-7 Approved For ReleasC: X11/ NX' Z6M00527R000700200001-1 demonstrators. The protests have provided a way to develop leadership in the absence of more normal channels. Although the opposition leaders have happily ridden the wave of student discontent and espoused student demands against the regime, there is little evidence of student admiration for any opposition leaders except Bhutto. For the first time, students probably believe that they have be- come, on their own, a viable and effective politi- cal force. What this realization will mean for fu- ture student activities is as yet uncertain. The various student groups are temporarily collaborating in opposition to the regime, but Pakistani students have never been able to establish a lasting nation- wide organization. Fragmentation among student groups will certainly become the dominant feature again. It seems likely, however, that disorders will continue until there is some drastic change in the political system. Pakistan - 7 Approved For Release., MF_:N1 iNE76M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release 2 I J T M00527R000700200001-1 POLAND Summary Polish youth has shunned open conflict with the regime for over a year, but is as determined as ever to press for recognition, responsibility, and a role in shaping the country's future. It is do- ing so against a regime which young people view as opposed to change, jealous of past "achievements," and increasingly repressive. The crisis between gen- erations now facing Poland will grow worse. Fifty percent of the population is under the age of 25 and sixty percent under the age of 30. Polish youth do not oppose the basic economic or social tenets of East European Communism as such. They do not, for example, favor a return to private ownership, nor the reintroduction of the pre-war social system based on wealth and semi-feudal in- fluence. They do, however, want far-reaching changes in direction of a more democratic model of "social- ism," and the fulfillment of some of the promises originally held out by the country's leaders. The bleak, grey facade of the Communist estab- lishment seems effectively to exclude youth from meaningful participation in the country's future. The regime, constantly harking back to a history which today's youth did not shape and much of which it wishes to forget, is viewed as an anachronism. The youth appear most to oppose the stagnation and the lack of movement, the exclusiveness, and the corruption of the establishment. The Communist frame- work within which these features emerge, with its totalitarianism, significantly reinforce these attitudes, but do not appear to be a root cause of them. This is particularly true of the ideologically unmotivated members of the younger generation who have left school. Most appear to regard Communist ideology as irrele- vant to the issues facing the country--a dead letter with only its institutional forms still prevailing. Approved For Release t 0CEN' j4)13I)T't1IV71 100527R000700200001-1 Approved For ReleaEd l'176M00527R000700200001-1 Versus Commitment Faced with the coercive power of the establish- ment, youth have become apathetic to the regime's goals and to Communism as an ideology promising consistent development. They view the established Communist regime in Poland today as a negation of the very ideas on which it theoretically rests. More than other segments of the population, youth have long been aware that the Polish party, like other Communist parties in power, has become the core of a stagnant society rather than a dyanamic stimulant to change. This was made clear by the party itself, when politburo member Kliszko warned last summer that "anarchist-leftist" youth leaders in the "contemporary world" only fulfill a "diversionary role" on behalf of conservative elements against the "real" revolu tionary forces of the.left. In the eyes of Polish youth, the party's fear of "anarchism" neatly under scores its total identification with an intolerable status quo. Generally, educated Polish youth tend toward a form of Western European social democracy as a po- litical and social order, nonsectarianism in reli- gion, and experimental freedom in art. They favor individual rather than collective responsibility in social relations, and their nationalism is tempered by vague feelings of supranationalism and a strong allegiance to Europe as an entity. In terms of specific domestic policies, they make it clear that they want a free interplay of ideas, and above all, a regime responsive to public opinion. This whole range of demands was clearly embodied in a declaration passed by dissident Warsaw Univer- sity students ir. March 1968, in the wake of the first major student disturbances since 1957. The most suc- cinct of numerous such resolutions passed by various student bodies that month, the Warsaw University thesis called for freedom of assembly and expression, freedom of political association, legal and institutional guarantees for such freedoms, true rule of law in the judicial system, the repudiation of and guarantees Approved For ReleaFs Oj1 t: - 76M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release?9441I N1 ''- J6M00527R000700200001-1 against abuse of governmental power, the abolition of censorship, and the repeal of repressive legal codes. It also called for popular representation in parliament, although it stopped short of calling for free elections. Finally, the students demanded an overhaul of the economic system and a thorough shakeup of the bureaucratic establishment'. Although student demands during the initial stages of the unrest were limited to issues of aca- demic freedom, the 28 March declaration illustrates the degree to which these demands were widened under the stimulus of stern repression by the regime. The government and the party were faced with no less than a demand that they divest themselves of a monopoly of power. The "March Events" The student disorders and the violence from 8 through 23 March 1968 gave climactic impetus to a po- litical struggle already under way within the regime and paved the way for a slow but irreversible infu- sion of new blood into the Polish party leadership by year's end. The demonstrations began largely as a spontaneous expression of genuine grievances in the academic milieu and related issues of individual liberties. The students, however, clearly were aware of the almost simultaneous political events in Czecho- slovakia, and had been emboldened by the resistance of the Warsaw Writers Union to dictates of the regime a month earlier. The relative uninvolvement of Polish students in previous regime crises stemmed from the wish not to be sucked into the intricate power rivalries within the party. Most of the party's factions, from (omulka's old guard to more hard-line rivals, appear aware of the "mischief" potential of youth and the uses to which dissident youth can be employed to advance a partisan cause in any factional infighting. Some party groups have courted youth's favor, even to the extent of placing themselves at the head of the party's critics. Others, correctly, see youth as the spearhead of a movement which could threaten the bureaucracy and as the driving wedge of "ideological subversion." Poland - 3 Approved p For Release.2QQ2/Al1ft9 ~6M00527R000700200001-1 ID6 Approved For Release g0f/T?)I=F,P,P,7PM00527RO00700200001-1 Thus, until March 1968, the youth tended to avoid actions that would have been exploitable by the party factions just as they had rejected occasional court- ship. In fact, the inability and unwillingness of the youth to view any party faction as a true champion of their interests was the fundamental reason that student disorders in March lost momentum. Students maintained action as long as the whole regime, i.e., all the party's factional strata, was, "shaken to attention." It soon became apparent, however, that the student movement was being exploited for intra- party factional purposes. Conclusive evidence emerged when clearly excessive police force was used and "hooligan" provocateurs were employec among the stu- dents. This, together with the early and false allega- tions of "Zionist" instigation o= the riots, reportedly convinced most of the student dissidents that the party's hard-line faction, which controls the police apparatus, was more interested in having the disturb- ances run their course than nipping them in the bud. By the last week in March, most of the student resolu- tions and declarations passed at various universities throughout the country specifically included denials of "anti-socialist' intent and expressed strong desires to remain outside the framework of the "oolitical arena," i.e., party factionalis:-1. Approved For Release 2~g ~16M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Releasc2002t0jpcJE'C11 6M00527R000700200001-1 Another major factor in ending overt student action was the failure to secure worker support. The regime's propaganda blaming the riots on Jews and revisionist intellectuals skillfully played to the residual anti-Semitic and anti-intellectual bias of the average Polish worker. Although there were strong expressions of moral sympathy from work- ers and other strata of the population, active sup- port was limited to scattered instances of collect- ing funds to pay jail fines. The absence of an im- mediate economic issue around which worker discontent could coalesce also dampened labor support. In addi- tion, many of the students--mainly those who did not take part in the disturbances--were working-class children whose parents evidently were fearful of jeopardizing their educations. Regime Countermeasures The impact of the regime's countermeasures against the students and the educational system in the wake of the "March events" has been uneven, and in some areas remains unclear. No complete totals for arrests and trials have yet been published, al- though it appears that the lengthy piecemeal trials AUTO WORKERS CONDEMN WARSAW UNIVERSITY STUDENT RIOTS. MARCH 1968 Approved For Release fO6l bWg P78M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Releas'W'MktW.~,IT 6M00527R000700200001-1 of several score of student leaders begun, last fall may soon be ended. Party boss Gomulka revealed on 19 March of last year, in the midst of the student disturbances, that a total of 1,208 persons had been arrested up to that time. Only 367 of these reportedly were students. The remainder, according to the regime, were "hooligans" and other "misguided elements." Over half of the stu- dents arrested reportedly were released within two days. Additional information provided by the Ministry of Education by :mid-1968 indicated that "disciplinary procedures" had been initiated against. 424 students, of whom 111 were "temporarily suspended." This data, however, apparently does not take into account the 1,600 Warsaw University students who were required to re-register after the cessation of the student riots. Most sources conservatively estimate that over 70 of these were expelLed. The cases o:= another group of students numbering about 200 were dealt with piecemeal by government authorities throughout the summer, with the majority gradually released. Most of those released, however, have been reportedly expelled from their schools, many conscripted into the armed forces, and others required to take up blue collar jobs in areas of the regime's choosing. A minority of this group, apparently including those considered the most active of the student ring- leaders, have been dealt with in a series of relatively unpublicized trials since late last fall. This course of action apparently suits the government's inten- tions to keep individual trials inconspicuous enough to prevent a potential revival of those issues which sparked the student riots, while at the same time driving home the point that no repetition of last year's events will be tolerated. What may be the last of the trials was in progress in Warsaw in mid- February. Most of the trials so far have resulted in relatively light sentences of 18 months to three years, with parole provisions after half the sentence is served. There is no evidence that the trials and other restrictive measures against student activities within Approved For Rele MPPQ 1A1pP76M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release 2COfi r- 9- fPIAlh0527R000700200001-1 universities have generated meaningful new unrest among the students. The majority of the students appears to have understood the message and, with most of their leaders incarcerated or otherwise out of circulation, appear demoralized and apathetic toward any renewed anti-regime activity.. Despite this revival of apathy in the short term, there is considerable evidence that Polish youth re- main on the watch for another chance to lend impetus to change within the system. In this sense, they are both evolutionary and revolutionary in their thinking. For the time being they appear to view open rebellion as counterproductive, given the repres- sive tools and determination of the "establishment." They are convinced, however, that the government has neither the desire nor the capacity to evolve without carefully channelled external pressure. Polish youth appears anxious to provide such pressure at the appro- priate time. Student Coordination and Foreign Contacts Although there is abundant evidence of rapid co- ordination between groups of dissident students through- out Poland soon after the outbreak of demonstrations in Warsaw on 8 March 1968 no information exists of prior planning. The peak of coordinated action ap- pears to have come between 11 and 14 March, when sym- pathy demonstrations and student meetings in pro- vincial cities closely echoed the action and demands of the Warsaw dissidents. Then, after 13 March, when tactics in Warsaw were changed to concentrate on dec- larations and resolutions rather than on street ac- tion, student response at Krakow's Jagellonian Univer- sity was quick. Elsewhere, however, sporadic demon- strations continued until 17 March. Student couriers traveling throughout the coun- try during the demonstrations apparently were the principal means of contact, although there was one unconfirmed report that technical students in Wroclaw had attempted to use a shortwave raio. By 14 March, the regime had curtailed student travel, in order to prevent coordination; some student couriers report- edly were arrested. Approved For Release ? fqpy pt k6LM00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Rele sa( IV/D1D N YAUP76M00527R000700200001-1 Despite the arrest or intimidation of many of the leaders of the student disturbances in March, a viable, if tempo:=arv, underground network between students in Poland probably still exists. Following the cessation of all overt student action by 23 March, when sit-ins in Warsaw and Krakow were peacefully broken up by police, there were again reticrts of more sophisticated nay:ionwide coordination, probably be- cause of the relaxation of travel curbs. The fruits of such coordina-:ion have not become apparent, however, and it is probable that either dissension among stu- dents over the practicality of further action or in- filtration of their ranks by provacateurs has short- circuited any plans. In recent months virtually no open resistance has been evident. There is no hard evidence that prior contact with students in Czechoslovakia or elsewhere played a major role in sparking unrest in Poland, although during the initial stages of the student demonstrations in Warsaw slogans o: "Greetings to our Czech brothers" and "We need a Dubcek too," were heard. Nor is there convincing evidence that Polish students sought or that Czechoslovak students were anxious to provide any "export" of their experience to Poland. Indeed, by March 1968, Czechoslovak stu- dents were caugh- up in supporting and consolidating the new regime in Prague, having little in common with the problems faced by their Polish counterparts. Nevertheles,3, the Polish regime, in late March and early April, added stringent travel curbs on all but official travel to and from Czechoslovakia to the general restrictions and visa curbs on foreign- ers, specifically Western journalists. Most of these restrictions appear to have been lifted by mid-April, although a careful screening of student travel con- tinued until the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the five Warsaw Pact powers in August 1968. There is little information to suggest that ex- changes among Polish and Western European students influenced the ferment. Although Polish universities maintain lively exchange programs with several European countries, Polish students have remained relatively Poland - 8 Approved For Relea /3CIA-R[7)-P76MOO527ROO0700200001-1 r r r r r r r Approved For Release 2'1T/b4DLEtmW*Ih00527R000700200001-1 uninfluenced by the various student movements in the West. They are well aware of the writings of Marcuse and the ideas which motivate student syndicalist groups, but there is very little evidence to show that these have taken hold in Poland. Many students con- tend that the daily reality of "alienation" in Poland and specific indigenous issues facing Polish youth dictate goals, strategy, and tactics which can borrow from Western student experience only in the broadest possible terms. The reaction of Polish youth, as that of intel- lectuals in general, to the invasion of Czechoslovakia-- and more specifically to Poland's role in the venture-- was one of shame, disgust, and in some cases frustrated rage. As positive and strong as these emotional reac- tions were, however, they appear to have been superseded in most cases by fears of cumulative violence in the Eastern European area perhaps leading to a world con- flict. Later, these fears, in turn were displaced by a shame-laden but apathetic reaction to the event, especially when it became evident that both, Washington and Moscow were intent on preventing the Czechoslovak issue from seriously affecting their long-term rela- tions. In some cases, the reaction of Polish youth to the invasion was similar to the more simplistic view of average Polish workers and peasants. The lingering bias of these groups against the Czechoslovaks, whom they tend to view as "Teutonic Slavs" facilitated an attitude that the Czechoslovaks had never really ap- preciated the voracious side of Communism, and that for the first time in August 1968 they were forced to face a reality much more familiar to, say, the Poles. Students and the Educational System Despite the rapid growth and democratization of the educational system in interwar Poland, schools of higher learning before World War II were still characterized by exclusiveness and overemphasis on legal and humanistic studies. Interwar Poland, therefore, had its problems with a qualified, unem- ployed, and "alienated" intelligentsia long before the term became popular elsewhere. Approved For Release 2e?3"fqII00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Rele/b%NcVAP76M00527R000700200001-1 One of the few real achievements of the postwar Communist regime was the rapid expansion of mass education. Universities and other schools of higher learning increased -in number from 32 in 1938 to 76 in 1966 and the student body from under 50,000 to more than 250,000 over the same period. This virtual explosion in the numbers of educated youth within the framework of a system unable and unwilling to satisfy either their material or spiritual demands is central to the regime's current: problems. Children of the workers and the peasantry have made significant gains in higher education, although the party continues to decry their relatively low percentage in the total student body. Only 27 per- cent of the students are children of workers, and less than 17 percent are children of peasants. Since students from these backgrounds apparently were the least involved in the March disturbances, one of the regime's current goals is to increase their num- ber, at the expense of the sons and daughters of the "affluent" or of middle-class background, who have been singled out as the ringleaders of the unrest. Rumors that children of prominent party and government personnel played key roles in the March disturbances have been plentiful, although evident bias on the part of many of the sources of these rumors casts some doubt on their reliability. The children of influential Jews, for example, have been singled out for condemnation by the hard- line party elements for clear political reasons. It is true, however, that students of middle class and intellectual backgrounds did, in fact, play a central role in the unrest, and they have formed the majority of those who have been penalized by the regime. Repercussions on the educational system of the student riots and to almost year-long intra-party crisis that followed. were quick in coming in some areas and laggard in others. Influential liberal professors, other academicians, and scores of graduate assistants were pureed during April of last year, with less publicized purges continuing up to the present. Many of those di =missed were Jews. In;tit:utional 7 1 Approved For ReleMgflfJtQfI ftFLDP76M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release 2D'0"I/0'It09C1'A-R 61VI00527R000700200001-1 changes have been slower in coming, but piecemeal legislation affecting higher education has been passed over the past several months. Its main impact has been to increase party control over the internal organiza- tion of universities, in most cases by abolishing the autonomy of institutional subunits in many university faculties. For instance, the virtual elimination of the traditional system of chairs, which permitted pro- fessors holding these positions significant independence, has been coupled to other measures that tend to central- ize control over both faculty staff and curricula. Organized Student Activity The regime's main effort to prevent a repetition of the March 1968 disturbances is likely to center on propaganda activity by the mass youth organizations. The largest of these, the 900,000-member Union of Socialist Youth (ZMS), and the 850,000-member Union of Rural Youth (ZMW), have long been under the re- gime's direct control, and their effectiveness has been hampered by bureaucratic bungling and the un- responsiveness of the youth. The ZMW caters mainly to peasant youth in rural areas; while the ZMS has "academic" branches, its main appeal is to working youth for whom membership is a means of job advance- ment. Although the regime has tried to use both organizations as instruments of indoctrination, in- ternal stresses and strains have gradually polarized their memberships into a handful of Communist zealots on the one hand and a mass of apathetic opportunists on the other. Most university students belong to the 145,000- member Polish Students Association (ZSP), which has concentrated on catering to their material and recrea- tional needs and has succeeded in functioning without undue regime interference. The ZSP appears to be divided into an officially approved leadership and a rank-and-file membership which pays little heed to directives issued from above. Approved For Release 6e RIf FNPM00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Releasee280210lWfl I741R5576M00527R000700200001-1 The ZSP's leadership prides itself on its "cos- mopolitanism," reflected mainly in the organization's membership in the Prague-based International Union of Students (IUS). A ZSP member receives an IUS identification card when travelling abroad. More importantly, there appears to be some interchange between ZSP and IUS leaderships. The present ZSP chairman, Jerzy Piatkowski--not a student, but a re- gime-installed leader--previously held the post of secretary in the IUS. He was replaced in this post early in 1966 by another ZSP functionary, Wlodzimierz Konarski. Most students consider the ZSP, and to a lesser degree the ZMS, as useful vehicles for contacts among universities both within Poland and in foreign coun- tries. Much of the students' more significant politi- cal activity, however, has taken place on the periphery of the ZSP--in various "discussion clubs," only a few of which are sanctioned. The small minority of stu- dents taking active part in these clubs nevertheless have proved infectious sources of dissent for the rest of the student body. The most active student political groups are thought to exist at the Universities of Warsaw, Krakow, Poznan, and Lodz. Although the political views of student members range from "democratic" through "revisionist" to various shades of unorthodox Communism--including idealistic Trotskyism--they share opposition to various aspects of the present regime, and concern themselves mainly with discussion and promotion of political, social, economic, and philosophical alternatives to the present system. According to one source, in 1967 there existed at Warsaw University seven generally "democratic" groups, two "revisionist," and five "Communist," to- gether totaling about 500 students. Other groups have been identified only when the regime broke up their activity. Among these were a "national-demo- cratic" group broken up in April 1961, a small al- legedly pro-Chinese "conspiracy" broken up in late 1964, and a Troyskyite "revisionist" group dissolved r r r r r Approved For Releasg / "ER FL76M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release 2&g17hLDF4M00527R000700200001-1 in 1965. During the student unrest in March of last year, the regime charged that students belonging to a "Zionist" group at Warsaw University, the "Babel" discussion club, were the ringleaders of the unrest there. It is these leaders who have been prominent among those singled out for trial this winter. It is likely that the heavy hand of the regime has descended on all of these groups, perhaps forcing them to go underground. There are also hints that the regime may be planning to expand its previously sporadic and generally unsuccessful use of officially sponsored "political discussion clubs" loosely sponsored by both the ZSP and the ZMS. These clubs were generally regarded by students either as safety valves approved by the regime or as centers where students', political, opinions could be monitored by the security apparatus. Approved For Release 20M I]qI f 00527R000700200001-1 Approved For ReleasCkdi/ '*&-6[ATIt 6M00527R000700200001-1 SOVIET UNION Summary Soviet leaders have, to fudge by their speeches, worked themselves up into a state of high distress over what they call "the apolitical attitudes" of the country's youth. This "political apathy" con- travenes the ideology of the Soviet regime, which defines every aspect of life in political terms and demands the active political support of all members of society. Moreover, the leadership seems to re- alize that what they choose to call "apathy" often represents absorption in less approved concerns, even with political questions of an unofficial na- ture. As best it can be generalized, the attitude of Soviet youth is expressive of two aspects of its psychological condition, a mood of political pes- simism and a preoccupation with personal discovery. The young suffer from disillusion with the political regime, despair over the possibility of working ef- fectively through the political system, and lack of belief in any alternative to the system and its de- mands. At the same time, the young have been launched into a realm of individual discovery of personal values long repressed and of material comforts and pleasures long denied. While speaking with a West- ern journalist in Moscow recently, a young Soviet intellectual observed that for the past century in Russia every new generation has interested itself in something outside of itself: either revolution, or religion, or some special purity in relationships. Now, he said, for the first time members of the new generation, born about 1945, are interested above all in themselves. The young in this regard, and also by their general acceptance of the basic elements of the social order, represent a force for stability. Interest in themselves, however, may grow into a desire to have the concerns of the young recognized within political councils. In early 1968 some young people Approved For Relea % PQ f , 4 ,REIP76M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release 2002/01/09 : CIA-RDP76M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release 2002/01/09 : CIA-RDP76M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release g0619OIF,dIiM00527R000700200001-1 joined a petition drive--the first organized, broadly based attempt at political action. There is little doubt that the young generation would make itself felt politically if controls were re- laxed. How long the regime persists in its harsh enforcement of controls will in large measure de- termine whether the future holds evolutionary change or repression and violence. For most of the young generation of the Soviet Union today, those roughly between the ages of 15 and 30, politics is keyed to the revelations of Stalin's crimes in 1956. The message of Khrushchev's "Secret Speech" to the Twentieth Party Congress affected no group of Soviet people more than the young. It is the central cause of their disillusion with the Soviet regime, their alienation from the generation of their fathers, and their loss of purpose in national and world affairs. Stalin's mystical and terrible image commanded the allegiance of the people more than could any ideology or principle itself. Then, in 1956, those who had written verses in grade school dedicated to Stalin's "glory" were told at Komsomol and party meet- ings that they had been duped. The desanctification of Stalin caused an emotional and political trauma. A God had slipped out of their universe, and the question remained: what can be believed? The question went to the very heart of the re- gime's legitimacy. Young people wanted to know how the Communist Party had permitted the sway of such a tyrant for so many years, whether his tyranny was not the product of the system rather than of particu- lar circumstances and an aberrant personality, and what guarantees there were against a repetition of such tyranny. Acknowledgement that these doubts per- sist twelve years after the "Secret Speech" can be found in the report of First Secretary I.I. Bodyul to the Plenum of the Moldavian Republic Party's Central Committee in May 1968. Among a catalogue of prob- lems concerning ideological work with youth, Bodyul Approved For Release(?@ 1M MAL6 M 00527 R000700200001-1 Approved For Releast l 1jI j RPi1ffkF)76M00527R000700200001-1 noted that an improper attitude of the young toward authority is compounded by a treatment of the Stalin question that does not adequately instill respect for ""revolutionary veterans and leaders of our Party and State." The problem was not helped by the, public disgrace, including charges of administrative misrule, subjectivism, and "hare-brained schemes," heaped upon Khrushchev after his fall. According to its own history, the Party has been dominated during most of its years in pcwer by a cunning demon and a willful bumpkin. The doubts extend beyond the regime to the ideo- logical foundations on which it rests. The revela- tions of evil have undermined the Russians' conception of themselves as the elect and their belief that they have a unique mission to remake the world that de- rive from the Revolution and their Communist scriptures, as well as from their earlier Slavophile traditions. Soviet intellectuals under Khrushchev were like missionaries withcut a mission. Furthermore, it will be difficult for them, and more so for the younger generation of intellectuals on whom the main burden will fall, to re-establish that mission. The moral problems of guilt and sacrifices with- out justification have turned the young away from their elders and in upon themselves. "The campaign against the cu --t of personality," said one student, "did more than just unmask a dictator, it unmasked a whole general-ion." The only heroes that remain for the young are the survivors of the Siberian prison camps and a few writers of their grandfathers' genera- tion. The camps are an obsession with the young. They collect the songs that have come out of the camps and their own poetry returns constantly to the sub- ject. They respect writers such as Boris Pasternak, Ilya Ehrenburg, and A.T. Tvardovsky, who have dealt with the moral problems posed by the camps and ques- tions of individual values and personal responsibility. While de-Stalinization has been central to the disillusion of the young generation, other developments have aided the process. In general, the trend has been to discredit the official dcology and the pol- icies that go with it by reveal:-ng the enormous gulf between theory and reality. The young generation has Soviet Union - 4 r r r r r r Approved For Release 2002/01/09 : CIA-RDP76M00527R000700200001-1 (X)NFIDI;NTIAL Approved For Release 26 O~dFl-AiD0527R000700200001-1 the advantage of a better education and a growing so- phistication. In 1962 only 29 percent of the popula- tion in the appropriate age group was enrolled in gen- eral secondary schools. This percentage rose to 36 per- cent in 1964, and to an estimated 45 percent in 1966. Eight years of schooling are now compulsory, and the regime has the goal of universal 10-year education by 1970. In 1967-68, the total enrollment in higher educational institutions was 4,311,000--1,887,000 full- time students, 654,000 in night schools, and 1,770,000 in correspondent courses. The awareness of the young has also been expanded by increased contact with the West through the medium of Eastern Europe and directly through tourists, students and cultural exchanges, and foreign radio broadcasts. Ac- cording to figures, the Soviet Union was visited in 1967 by 1,5 million tourists and 189 youth delegations. Student travelers to the USSR number 180,000 yearly, and 24,000 foreigners are enrolled in Soviet schools and colleges. The Soviets claim that 200,000 young Russians travel abroad every year, presumably for the most part to Eastern Europe on vacations, in delega- tions, or with the armed services. Delegation tra-iel between the Soviet Union and East European countries, although based on careful selection and a programmed itinerary, can involve large groups. A Czechoslovak Cultural Festival traveled to the USSR in the spring of 1968 reportedly with 500 performers, and appeared in several important cities; 800 Soviet students went to Czechoslovakia in June for the Second Festival of Czech-Soviet Friendship. Western literary works are translated (in 1966 Ionesco's Rhinoceros and Capote's In Cold Blood, for example) and reviewed in Innostrannaya Literaturnaya (Foreign Liberature), a popular publication among students. Za Rubezhom (Abroad) is a Soviet magazine that reprints a broad range of articles from the West- ern press. The choice of Western newspapers on Moscow nev.-Fstandsis limited to those published by Communist parties, and many of these disappeared after the in- vasion of Czechoslovakia. Students seize what is a- vailable. An American exchange student remarks how students at Moscow State University used to rush down in the morning to get the British Communist Party's The Morning Star, the French Party's L'Fumanite. and Approved For Release 2"0Wnr5y~MNFJI00527R000700200001-1 Approved For ReleasS/F4T/i4ELN"6M00527R000700200001-1 the Italian Party's L'Unita. They also bought papers from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. The Morning Star WEELS the first paper to inform Soviet stu- dents that Western Communists had condemned the trial of Andrey Sinyavsky and Yuly Daniel. During the trial, copies of The Star and L'Humanite were snatched up im- mediately. The US exchange magazine, Amerika, is popu- lar with students, but the number of copies put on sale does not meet the demand. Most other information from abroad comes by foreign radiobroadcasts. Jamming of Radio Liberty was extended to other stations, including the VOA and the BBC, after the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, the stations still appear to have an influence throughout the terri- tories and among all the age groups of the Soviet Union. Nowhere is their influence greater than among students and intellectuals. Radio Liberty estimated that in 1967 40 percent of its audience in Communist countries was 30 years old or under and that another 28 percent was 31 to 40 years of age. The intelligentsia, including members of technical, scientific, or cultural professions and university students, comprised 58 percent of its audience. Soviet students report that foreign stations provide a chief source of information on events such as the defec- tion of Svetlana Alliluyeva, the trial of underground writers Aleksar.-dr Ginsburg and Yury Galanskov, and un- rest in Eastern Europe. Attempts to ensure the ideclogical purity and zeal of this new generation have failed woefully, a fact attested to by the constant laments of officials. Some students in secondary schools and universities are plainly bored with the compulsory courses in ideology and party history, and with the study sessions on the same subjects conducted by the student youth organiza- tion, the Komsomol. There are reports that they converse, write letters, or sleep during classes, if they go at all. Excitement comes only when the students take to baiting the lecturer and to displaying what officials call their "snorting skepticism." At one institute, this note was handed to the propagandist presiding over a dispute on the theme "Communism and I": "I want to in- terrupt you. Who needs your primitive philosophy inter- laced with little quotations--your examples so distant from real life''" Complained one party secretary: "Today's youth is certainly different from those.. .of ten or fifteen years back. They have a different level Approved For Release 9f"E f W 76M00527R000700200001-1 r r r r r r r r Approved For Release 2~0'2"/fl' WPG- 00527R000700200001-1 of knowledge, a different view of the world. They don't like trite and outdated forms of political work." The lack of relevancy to their own lives is the primary cause of the indifference of youth, whether workers in factories with incomplete educations or graduate students at universities, to the doctrinal lessons of the Party. Belief in the party line is eroded by its own flip-flops and by a knowledge of al- ternative interpretations gained through studies or contact with the outside world. Finally, for the more sophisticated, it is increasingly clear that Marxism- Leninism simply cannot answer the changing and com- plex problems that challenge society in such fields as economics, science, and sociology. The political pessimism of the young generation is fostered also by its exclusion from political processes. To some extent this is an exclusion tra- ditional to the authoritarian government that Russia has-always known. Many, however, had been able to experience in the early years after the Revolution a sense of being part of the great enterprises of the time; such feeling of participation has since been largely lost. An American who spent most of the 1930s working in the Soviet Union at a mill in Magnitogorsk notes that his fellow workers used to talk of our mill, our government, and our Party, but now speak only of the mill, the government, and the Party. In the thirties, young people could plausibly identify plants as "theirs" because of the good chance of becoming executives while still very young. Now the plants are more complicated and more highly "organized"; controls are more perva- sive. The same is true of the political institutions, including the Komsomol. An American describes the Komsomol of the 1930s as a vigorous organization with a largely voluntary membership whose activities, particu- larly at the factory level, were supported by large numbers of young people. There was an esprit de corps, a feeling of belonging to the elite. There was some spontaneity and not a little enthusiasm in the organiza- tion and its activities, even though everyone knew that the Komsomol was run by the Party. Mass membership and stultifying bureaucratic control have ktlled off these feelings, and the enthusiasm of the few has been replaced by the apathy of the many. The Komsomol has some 23 million members, including most Approved For Release POJN1 .P@Q '1P PM00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Releass1go0) 1U :CIA-R6IL76M00527R000700200001-1 urban youths between the ages of 1.4 and 25, all those enrolled in school at those ages, and 80% of the army conscripts. In official eyes the purposes of the Kom- somol are to monopolize the field and -Prevent any other spontaneous youth organizations from springing up, to organize youth for "voluntary" participation in con- struction jobs in remote areas of the country as well as production caripaigns nearer hoc.e, and to cajole, inspire, persuade, or force Soviet. youth into absorb- ing Marxism-Leninism and becoming loyal servants of the Party. A huge bureaucracy, including many paid functionaries, has grown up to enforce the Komsomol's program. Leadership in the Komsomol appeals mostly to the very naive or to the would-be party careerists. Most young people keep their distance from those who take these posit:.ons, and they especially despise the druzhinniki, the volunteer auxiliary police, whose duty is to maintain a "revolutionary" discipline among the young and to fiqht against Western cultural influ- ences. The young fully understand the power of the author- ities and their own helplessness. Innocent attempts to form groups the control of the party as well as more purposeful attempts to demonstrate or petition authorities are quickly suppressed and have disastrous results for those involved. Simple dis- missal from a un:_versity, for example, can mean banish- ment from cities such as Moscow and Leningrad, and the loss of any chance for more than a work-a-day career. Outward conformity is thus the rule. More- over, it is the response encouraged by the entire educational system, which is based on theories that stress the importance of the conscious in human con- trol and the ability to manipulate it ;chile scoffing at the subjective aspects of human behavior. In short, ii: is precisely this emphasis on the political (and political sanctions) and the state's monopoly on the exercise of political power that has caused the young to turn their backs on official pol- itics. Common responses by young people to questions of national or foreign policy are, "That's a political question," and `Yh,3i will decide it." Most of all they wish to be Left alone, free t:o occupy themselves in activities of personal interest and to have pol- itics intrude as little as possib_e. Soviet Union - 8 r r r r r r r r Approved For Re least 0 /P1j/p9p.gPf-F DPf76M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release 2d Wd9Iidiklgd I7*k00527R000700200001-1 Finally, the political pessimism of youth is in- duced by the absence, in their opinion, of any attrac- tive alternative to the present social order. If the regime has not been able to rear a generation full of ideological fervor and the conviction that they live in the best of all possible worlds, it has accomplished something equally, if not more, important to the stability of society--the rearing of a generation that does not seriously question the basic elements of the social system. There seems to be no signifi- cant body of opinion among the young that would favor scrapping collectivized farming, the de-na- tionalization of industry, alteration of the wel- fare state, political independence for the nation- alities, or, even, an end to generally centralized and authoritarian government. There is a relationship between boredom and ac- ceptance in the attitudes of youth toward the govern- ment and its policies. When an American exchange student remarked to a Soviet friend how little Pravda was read by students at Moscow University, he was warned not to leap to the wrong conclusions. "Pravda is a dull, pompous paper full of propaganda," said his friend, "and you must read our more serious journals to get a more objective view. But that doesn't mean that Soviet people don't believe a lot of what's printed in Pravda. They simply don't like to wade through all of it every day. It's as if you had to read a Fourth of July oration every morning. You'd be bored, but you'd accept most of it." The young do not want to have anything to do with capitalism, despite all that attracts them about the West. Although well aware of the high standard of living of the American worker, they are con- vinced that Soviet workers enjoy, for example, better and fairer medical care through their state health service. Although they will admit that full employ- ment in the Soviet Union is achieved in many in- stances by underemployment, they believe that this is better than no employment at all for a segment of the population. Students cannot conceive of the private or otherwise haphazard means that an Ameri- can must employ to finance his college education. Soviet Union - 9 Approved For Release 201/fql5"R7o6F1100527R000700200001-1 Approved For Relee6s4IZ/I1L)(NNfXI4 IDP76M00527R000700200001-1 In thinking about an alternative to basic ele- ments of the social order, the Soviet youth is ham- pered, of course, by inhibitions in his mental proc- ess, by unfamiliarity with modern developments in the disciplines of political, social, and economic sci- ences, and by ignorance of real conditions in the rest of the world. The catechism taught in the school does not encourage creative thinking along political lines, the social science disciplines remain at a woefully primitive level by Western standards, and the many bar- riers maintained against the flow of information from the West obscure a person's vision. Thus, a student may mock his "choice" when it comes time to vote in an election. But when he replies to a question by an American about the two-party system with the ob- servation that the system is meaningless in the US because both parties represent the ruling class and that it would be purposeless in the USSR because one party already stands for all that could be desired, he is, in addition to repeating the party line, probably also presenting the only understanding that he has of the subject. Whether it derives from indoctrination, moderate satisfaction, or ignorance, the acceptance by the cur- rent youthful generation of the basic elements of So- viet society has profound implications for the future, far more so than the generation's present disaffection from political processes to which it contributes. It indicates that whatever political turmoil arises from this generation 1l7il1 be directed at modifying the system and will not be an attack on its essential features. ,1wa_:eninq Interests In frustrat=_on over political. issues, the young have tended to w-.thdraw into more personal worlds. This flight has been encouraged by the lifting of Stalinism and the consequent awakening of concerns long repressed in Soviet life. The "socialist morality" of their parents discredited, the students have undertaken a search for more personal, humanistic ethics. The fact that their parents made enormous sacrifices, often to no good end, has engendered among youth no gratefulness or desire of imitation, but, rather, an Soviet Union - 10 Approved For Relee 0V#qYJIfNP76M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release 7d92/OTI%(iJ)ttA-kDAN00527R000700200001-1 insistence that a better and more just life must be had in the here and now even at the cost of ignoring ideology and distant goals. Rare is a young Soviet who accepts his low posi- tion in society, who is not trying his desperate best to struggle up the stairs. There is often acute em- barrassment among the lower classes over their humble status. The young display an aversion to physical labor and have a clear idea of what constitutes "dirty work." A 25-year-old worker, in his fifth year of correspondence courses at a technical institute, bluntly admitted: "I am studying only because I don't want to be walking around in dirt and swinging a sledge hammer forever.... I am tired of being shoved around, of being assigned dirty work. So much easier to command others." "To know how to live" (umet' zhit', a favorite expression of Soviet citizens "on the make") means to achieve status, a comfortable home, a car, and other tangible symbols. The results of this attitude are the flight of young people from the farms; conniving to be allowed to live in the major urban centers, especially Mowcow; fierce competition for admission to universities, especially those of great prestige; and widespread study in technical schools, by correspondence or on a part-time basis if necessary. These efforts, whether undertaken by workers in the factory or graduate stu- dents at the university, are directed toward achieving competence in science or engineering, fields that offer the greatest prestige, remuneration, and freedom from politics on the job. To the extent that mobility remains possible, the competition is open and just, and talent and work receive their reward, this "rat race" effectively channels the energies of the young and, to a considerable extent, satisfies their ambi- tions. Frustrations arise, however, because of several flaws in the system. Entrance into institutions of higher education is a highly competitive process. In 1965 there were vacancies in higher educational institutions for 20 percent of the appropriate age group in the Soviet Union (39 percent in the US, 14 percent in France, 7 percent in Denmark, and 7 percent in West Ger- many). For some of the more prestigious Soviet institu- tions there were as many as 26 applicants for one vacancy. Approved For Released ~Y'%bi)26M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Rele~ e)1Nkfd4 reI} P76M00527R000700200001-1 The competition as intensified by the popularity of certain courses, and many applicants have to accept positions in the social sciences, or, worst of all, in agricultural sciences. In addition, the fair- ness of the compcti}ion is undermined by the influ- ence the party, covernment, and intellectual elite are able to wield on behalf of their children. The situation is the subject of many complaints and the cause of much bitterness. Even for those who are admitted to the university and are awarded diploma, happiness does not neces- sarily follow. There is a general dislike of the three years compulsory service that awaits every graduate of an institute of higher education. Often the assignments take students out into the provinces and involve work which they feel is inappropriate to their training. There is universal conniving by students and their parents to avoid the worst hazards of the system. Those who graduate in the less fav- ored fields find that their pay is low and prospects for raises unpromising. Even engineers complain that their superiors assign them to dirty work in the plant instead of the administrative or research work in clean offices they think they deserve. Many, of course, are excluded from higher edu- cation by their lack of talents, ambition, or "pull." Those who must work find themselves bored with dull jobs in the factories without recreational facilities and amusements after work. These young people soon begin to contribute to the drunkenness and hooli- ganism that plagues the regime. A growing number of youths from better families do not have to work and can live off the affluence of their parents. These the regime rails against as "idlers," and they are apparently another source of crime and unapproved behavior. Beyond their preoccupation with material wants and career advancement, Soviet youth are Involved with the rediscovery of themselves as individuals. Throughout society, but most strongly among the youth, there is a growing and self:-conscious return of the repressed--a rediscovery of. the personality denied during the long night of Stalinism. The 3ov:Let Union - 12 Approved For Relezp~V W/ppl(Ip Ngl RIpp76M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For ReleaseCT/k4a -t iT-'F 46M00527R000700200001-1 values of individualism, of questioning, of the re- ligious spirit, of the ethical personality, of human relationships transcending party comradeship are returning to the Soviet psyche. Youth's fascination with things Western--clothes, gadgets, music, slang--and their attempts to imitate Western styles are apparent efforts to break out of the impersonal mold decreed by the authorities and to assert their individuality. They appear to be trying to create something of a youth culture simi- lar to those that adorn Western societies, but which has been long impeded in the USSR by the Party's con- trol over youth organizations and dictation of be- havior. Similar urgings probably account for the popularity of the poll or questionnaire which is enjoying great vogue in the pages of Komsomolskaya Pravda. The polls offer anonymity and an opportunity to speak one's mind not available at official gather- ings, where conformity is the rule. The concerns of youth are reflected by their cultural tastes. Two of the most talked about re- cent films at the universities were Twelve Angry Men and Inherit the Wind, in which the individual was shown in conflict with the collectivity, and in which the collectivity turned out to have been wrong. "Surprisingly, the most popular and respected writer among the general public is Somerset Maugham," notes the radical Yugoslav writer, Mihajlo Mihajlov. Above all, the Soviet reader finds himself fascinated by such of Maugham's heroes as Strickland in The Moon and Sixpence, who forsakes bourgeois society for the "heavenly beauty" of Tahiti, "still yet un- trampled by the iron heel of civilization." An Amer- ican professor who spent some time at a leading Soviet university noted that Salinger was popular and that in the fall of 1964 everybody suddenly dis- covered Kafka, whose works had been banned until the early 1960's. It was too early, however, for students to grasp all the implications of the worlds of Salinger and Kafka in terms of their own so- ciety. Nikolai Berdyaev and Mikhail Bulgakov (Master and Margarita) are the most popular Russian authors. Bulqakov, a brilliant playwright and novelist of the 20's and 30's, died in disgrace in 1940. Some of his works were finally revived in 1966. There is Soviet Union - 13 Approved For Releasc(26Wd'IJ1144l6M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Releasef 2 (fiJd T MI ,6M00527R000700200001-1 a crush to get into lectures on Bulgakov, whose biting satire, flights of the absurd, and Stalin parodies are widely appreciated. The popularity of Berdyaev (1174-1948) , one of the foremost rep- resentatives of "Christian existentialism," and of his message concerning the world of the spirit and the creativity of the individual indicates the survival of religious values, One of the most striking failures cf the re- gime has been its inability to instill l a fighting atheism among youth. Atheism is a satisfying creed so long as one is fighting Z 'in fame, an oppressive clerical. organization, But when Z'zrz fame is gone, and one simply has one's irreligion to live by, a certain disaffection arises with atheism, along with a distaste for its dogmatism. The result. is an evo- lution toward ca kind of religious agnosticism. There are reports of growing numbers of young people at- tending religious services,, apparently more out of curiosity and for the atmosphere than out of belief. At the same time students do admit to their own or their friends' religious beliefs. Religious urgings are felt perhaps more strongly among the working class. The Baptists have gained since the end of the Second World War. Much of the interest in religion stems from a potent nationalism not connected WLth the Soviet experience? Arlong Russian youths such nationalism expresses itse:_f in a fascination with prerevolu- tionary Russian history and culture, A citizens' group devoted to restoring architectural monuments of old Russia received publicity in iomsomoZskaya Pravda during ..965. Youths from all over the Russian Republic:; in a rare example of voluntary endeavor, enlisted in projects to restore and preserve old churches. The Party seems to have been taken aback by the mass appeal of the movement.. for it quickly subsided,, suggesting official dispLeasure- Nationalistic feelings are evident among most of the minority groups of. the USSR: Here however, they take on a more serious anti-Russian character. Non-Russian youths, like their Russian counterparts, are annoyed by the bureaucratic control imposed on every aspect o:1 their lives. But precisely because this control comes from Moscow, they resent it all the more and speak of it as Russian-made, In Soviet union 14 r r Approved For Release 0W11$6)10X=kbA716M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Re1o Q0P]DIUTA-RDP76M00527R000700200001-1 Georgia a graduate student and a young playwright, angered by'their inability to obtain Moscow's ap- proval for a subscription to the London Times, com- plained: "Why should Moscow decide everyth ni g?" and "These Russians are impossible. They want everybody to be like them and what Georgian wants to be like a Russian?" Greater bitterness is engendered by Moscow's official policy of Russification. Pamphlets and leaflets circulate in the Ukraine filled with hostility over the educational and job favoritism shown Russians and the discrimination against the Ukrainian language enforced in the fields of educa- tion, publication, and official usage. Among the cultural intelligentsia of the na- tionalities, the struggle to transcend the con- fines of "socialist realism" dictated by the Party is combined with an effort to play up the national heritage and patriotic feelings, which results in both an anti-Soviet and an anti-Russian literature. Champions of this cause in the Ukraine during the early 1960's were a group of young poets, prose writers, and literary critics who became well known as the shestydesyatnyky, The Men of the Sixties. The mood of protest is also apparent in demonstrations that frequently occur on the birthday of Taras Shevchenko, a nineteenth century national hero in the Ukraine. Soviet youth have elaborated no well-defined philosophy behind which they can rally a majority of their numbers Their opinions, however, contain common elements which suggest a basic similarity of outlook. An American exchange student came to the conclusion that the majority wanted "a more humane, more democratic, more efficient Communism, which would live up to its own promises, obey its own strictures, and abide by its own constitution." The suggestion that there should be more than one party, made to a Communist official at a Moscow University meeting, startled students in the audi- ence who replied. "Dont ask ridiculous questions. Don't be naive," The American student found that Kosygin is particularly respected because of his frankness in admitting the need for economic Soviet Union - 15 Approved For Rele~ VA9jq TP76M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release 26 d1JJ ~~&lF i46M00527R000700200001-1 reforms and his, caution in predicting future achievements--in contrast to Khrushchev. The outlock of students varies, of course, most generally in accordance with field of study and geographic location. Progressives are more prev- alent in the physical and mathematical sciences, which admit the brighter individuals and offer greater freedom of inquiry. Progressives may also be found in some of the humanities and in recently rejuvenated sciences, such as sociology, cybernetics, mathematical logic, and genetics. In general, the youth one meets in the provinces are more conserva- tive and cautious than those in Moscow and Leningrad, while the Komsomol activists are more strident and dogmatic. Scientific universities and institutes at such provincial cities as Novosibirsk and Dubna, however, are centers of more liberal thinking. Rad- icalism at Kiev, Lvov, Tallinn, Tbilisi, and Yere- van is linked tD nationalism. Any attempts by the young to influence govern- ment policy are hampered not only by the vagueness of their political concepts, but also by their lack of organization, leadership, and plan of action. Re- ports of clandestine organizations, whether devoted to the study of Berdyaev or to terrorist activity, indicate that they are easily broken up by authori- ties before the', can achieve much even organization- ally. Perhaps the most successful sustained activity conducted without official sanction has been the underground circulation of unpublished literary works and polit_cal tracts. For years such materi- als, written by prominent intellectual figures as well as by budd__ng artists, have been passed around and recopied individually or gathered together and printed in various underground magazines. The magazines appear to be the product of loosely knit groups of young nonconformist intellectuals such as the well publicized SMOG group in Moscow. (The initials in Russian stand for "courage, youth, form, depth.") Official crackdowns on traffickers in this trade have failed to stop it. The American exchange student. said "everybody" at Moscow Uni- versity reads the underground literature, although r Approved For Releai6( d1U/Y'.NIIAJF~OP,76M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release 26Q Wit 2Elh1Vf00527R000700200001-1 he knew of no one who would acknowledge membership in any underground group such as SMOG. It may be as- sumed that this traffic, by providing a means of com- munication and a common enterprise, helps to foster a feeling of community among the young of nonconformist leanings. In some ways it was out of this situation that an open and, by Soviet standards, widely supported confrontation between young people and the authori- ties developed during the past year. The widely re- ported trials of the past three years have been conducted against writers connected with the literary underground who sent materials abroad for publica- tion: Andrey Sinyavsky and Yuly Daniel in 1966 and Aleksandr Ginsburg and Yury Galanskov in 1968. The first trial aroused general disapproval among the young, but no unified response. By the time of the second trial in January 1968, however, a form of protest was being elaborated and was gaining wide support. Its substance was a protest against the illegal and unconstitutional nature of the pro- ceedings and a warning of the dangers of a return to Stalinism. Petitions were sent to government and party officials and passed to the West for publicity. The movement seems to have developed out of the trial in August 1967 of a demonstration leader, Vladimir Bukovsky, who pleaded the consti- tutional right to demonstrate and to criticize the government. Before the trial in January, some prom- inent intellectuals circulated a petition calling for open and legal proceedings, and at the trial a few perennial agitators audaciously distributed ringing declarations to the Western newsmen. Within two months after the trial at least 17 documents had reached the West containing the names of over 300 signers. At least 10 of the signers were intellectuals of national stature whose names would be recognized at once by the man in the street. Another twenty or more would probably be recognized by other intellectuals. Otherwise, large numbers of the signers were students and young teachers, research- ers, and engineers. The majority were from Moscow, but Leningrad, Magadan, Kharkov, Dubna, and Novosi- birsk were also represented. An appeal on behalf of the rights of man was presented to the Budapest Approved For Release 20 a"rlg" 7AT00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release(2Q i ' M00527R000700200001-1 consultative conference of Communist parties in February. The petition episode indicated the willing- ness of youth -zo enter political battle. For the first time an open, spontaneous movement was able to attract support among various elements of youth and the intelligentsia and to gain a life and momen- tum of its own. Motivation came not so much out of sympathy for the accused as out of an emotional reaction to the repressive turn of government pol- icy and to the specter of Stalinism reborn. De- mands and tact:.cs were elaborated that could unite many groups and that seemed to have some chance of success in :.nfluencing the political powers. Regime's Response The latest demonstration of official concern over the state of Soviet youth was the creation in December 1968 of standing commissions on youth af- fairs in both houses of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The commissions will be involved in drafting legis- lation on the education, vocational training, work, and recreation of young people. By Western standards, it is difficult to ex- plain the regime's anxiety over the current activi- ties of Soviet youth. The distress is apparently a measure of what the regime thinks it owes to ideology as a justification of its rule. Implicit in the indifference and personal preoccupations of youth is a protest against the official order. The regime seems tc fear that even the small, demands for change that may arise out of such attitudes will work in the long run to undermine the fundamentals of the system and the prophecy of its doctrine. A totalitarian system regards any erosion, however small, as being of cosmic significance. Further- more, Communists, always future-minded, are deter- mined not to leave the development of their doctrine either to chance or to objective laws. Important, finally, is the character of the collective lead- ership that now rules in the Kremlin and the con- servative bent of their personalities. At any rate, the regime has not hesitated to answer the Approved For Releas~J~~~ff76M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release -%ii)bAkM00527R000700200001-1 smallest fault that it detects in the younger generation with more ideological indoctrination and more police control. One official explanation for the shortcomings of youth argues that, because they have not suf- fered the hardships and struggles of past genera- tions, they are not sufficiently appreciative of past achievements of the Soviet Union and have unwarranted expectations for the present and future. This official analysis lies behind the patriotic campaign launched in 1965 and directed specifically to the Soviet period of history. During the year 10 million youngsters allegedly visited bat- tlefields, talked with old Bolsheviks and war heroes, and gathered materials for local patriotic museums. In August 1966, thousands of youngsters marched in Moscow with World War II weapons to climax the af- fair. The theme was, nevertheless, continued in saturation portions during the fiftieth anniversary celebrations of the Revolution in 1967 and of the Komsomol in 1968. A series of measures has been taken since 1965 to improve the ideological training of the young. The role of the Komsomol has been expanded and re- peatedly underlined in official pronouncements. In 1966 the entire system of ideological instruction in Marxism-Leninism was revised to put more stress on reading the "classics" rather than secondary sources. There is growing emphasis in military training on improving political discipline and attitudes. A new military law that went into effect in January 1968 makes premilitary training compulsory for all Soviet males under the age of 18 and, by shortening the length of military service, assures that nearly all young men will experience the ideological benefits of service in the armed forces. Most recently, apparently under the influence of events in Eastern Europe, the role of the West in subverting Soviet youths has received special atten- tion. Official pronouncements have named the young and politically immature as the special target of Western propaganda and have complained of Western attempts to split the generations by theories that Approved For Release 9 I PA7j M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release kabiYOi1k4TD 1100527R000700200001-1 replace the class struggle with the struggle between generations. The efforts to promote ideological pur- ity and to root out any bourgeois tendencies were focused on the young in a series of nationwide youth and teachers' meetings during the spring of 1968, after the Central. Committee plenum decreed an ideological crackdown in April. Where preaching has not been successful, the regime has not hesitated to employ the police. In July 1966 the internal police administration was re- centralized in a new national Ministry for the Pre- servation of Public Order (MOOD) to deal inter alia with the problem of hooliganism. The same decree also strengthened the hand of the police in dealing with youthful criminals and specified harsher penalties for common crimes such as disturbing the peace and assault. Simultaneously, pressure was brought to bear through the press against those factories, farms, and other institutions which seek to protect members of their collectives who have :=alien afoul of the law, and judges were urged to levy sterner sentences in cases of hooliganism. In November 1968, MOOP was re- named the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), a title that recalls Stalinist repression, and additional measures were announced to strengthen the police forces Dissidents of a more intellectual cast have suf- fered a series of trials and sentences to prison camps. Over twenty Uk:raini~zn intellectuals were tried in various cities ueginning in 1965. Their activities apparently involved the circulation of underground literature and materials that branded them as na- tionalists in the eyes of the authorities. Censor- ship has been applied with an increasingly heavy hand since the ouster of Khrushchev and has been backed up by ?rosecution of writers who circulated materials surreptitiously or passed them to the West. Protests over these proceedings have been met by of- ficial demands for recantations, denial of privileges such as trips to the US and showings of modern art, and dismissal from professional and Party positions. Authorities, finally, have sought to limit con- tact between Soviet citizens and foreigners. The vigilance campaign has stressed that all visitors r Approved For Release VB1 1 p-I AIM00527R000700200001-1 Approved For ReleastgbYMIWi:'CIA,W76MO0527RO00700200001-1 CROWD AWAITS VERDICT ON DEMONSTRATORS AGAINST INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, OCTOBER 1968 from the West are potential spies and subversives. Newsmen from Communist and non-Communist countries were warned in early 1968 against unauthorized con- tacts with Soviet citizens. Similar warnings to Soviet citizens have practically dried up the Ameri- can Embassy's contacts with young intellectuals. A Polish cultural counselor in Moscow has complained that relations between Poland and the USSR in the fields of music, sculpture, and the theater have dwindled to almost nothing. Two things may be noted concerning the tactics of repression: they are aimed across the board at intelligentsia, young and old, and they are designed to keep the symbols involved smaller than the message conveyed. These characteristics are well illustrated by the case of Ginsburg and Galanskov. The regime chose to move against younger dissidents, of little prominence, involved in the not entirely honorable business of smuggling written material to the West, on charges of subversive activities in collusion with an "enemy" emigre organization. All these factors limited the appeal of their case among the population Approved For Releas4NDVt4th91',b11AJIII76M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release 2baNkiD&XF~II00527R000700200001-1 at large. Protests were nevertheless heard, but they were confined to questions of legal, procedures. The trial, however, was understood by all segments of the intelligentsia as a signal to maintain strict discipline in their own profession or activity. The regime did not hesitate to react to the protests, and, according to reports, did so most swiftly and severely against the prominent signers of the peti- tions. What punishment, if any, was suffered by the students and young professional people is not known but, after witnessing the submission of their better established elders to the administrative rod, little was probably needed. It is evident that students are the target, net of a particular policy of repression, but of a general policy. While this fact works to unite the generations of intellectuals and youths, so far this has been a unity in weakness. There has been no repetition of students assaulting authority in the streets while professors in the conference room stay the hand of authorities, such as occurs in other countries, both Communist and non-Communist. The authorities' hand will not be stayed. By April 1968 the petition offensive had halted. With the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, the completeness of the rout of the dissenters became more clear. In a sense the invasion was the sort of ulti- mate consequence that the narrower and legalistic pro- tests had bee:z designed to forestall. In the face of this actuality, the majority have stuck to silence. Two of the best known leaders of previous protests, Pavel Litvinov, grandson of Stalin's foreign minister, and Larisa Daniel, former wife of Yuly Daniel, organized a small demonstration against the invasion on Red Square on 25 August. They were promptly arrested and in Octo- ber sentenced to exile. While the trial was occasioned by outspoken denunciations and political arguments on the street outside the court, little attempt was made to put objections on paper for the record. At this point the dis:3affected, young and old, seem to be over- come by the realization of the futility of their ef- forts and fear of the penalties that their continua- tion will likely provoke. Prospects As a whole, the young generation in the Soviet Union is not out to force sweeping changes in the Approved For Release ?eQ"R1 fp k PAiM00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release /bl11Abi6M00527R000700200001-1 Soviet system. This does not mean that they are pillars of the status quo or that the modifications they may encourage will not in the long run produce some fundamental changes. But their role will likely be an evolutionary one--one of reform, rather than revolution. Pressure is building, however, to carry this role onto the political stage. This is a natural consequence of the conditions, the disillusionment with the political regime and its ideology and the development of personal ethics and concerns, that led originally to a withdrawal to the wings. Organized political activity on the part of the young, as the petition drive has demonstrated, is showing its first stirrings. Its realization is obstructed now only by the repressive power of the regime. Political action by the young, therefore, will have to wait until there is either a change in regime policies, the appearance of a faction within the leadership willing to champion the cause of the young, or a weakening of governmental authority until it can no longer hold off the young. The likelihood of such transformations occur- ring behind the Kremlin Wall is a matter of specula- tion. The regime, however, is running some definite risks by its current heavy-handed exercise of power. Compromise with the young generation and their as- similation into the power structure becomes !r!ore difficult. There is the danger than under present conditions pressures may build and antagonisms may fester to the point where they may carry the ranks of youth to extremes of action far beyond their essen- tially conservative concepts. The current leader- ship's policy of retrenchment, following a period of compromise and hope, has already sharpened the urgency felt by many for guarantees and reforms. It is also encouraging the use of demonstrations and broadsides to attain these ends. Soviet Union - 23 Approved For Release * ~ I pD~ 1~QM00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Releas 0 J?1 $-jMOO527ROOO7OO2OOOO1 -1 SPAIN Summary Student demonstrations began over a decade ago in an effort to gain recognition for autonomous stu- dent organizations to replace the government-con- trolled student syndicate and to promote university reforms. During the 1967-1968 academic year, the demonstrations took a political turn when protests against the Franco regime itself were added. The government reacted by closing the universities in- volved for varying periods, arresting students, and using the police to put down the demonstrations. Police violence, however, only led to usually apa- thetic students joining the demonstrations. The threat of loss of academic credits if the university remained closed temporarily cooled the students' enthusiasm, but after new demonstrations.'in Jan- uary 1969, the government closed indefinitely the universities of Madrid and Barcelona and declared a state of emergency to give police added power to head off rising student and political unrest. Now confident that it can put down any future demonstra- tions, the government plans to reopen the univer- sities soon. Background The current unrest in Spanish universities goes back more than a decade when students began to agi- tate for reforms in the official student organiza- tion and then for organizations of their own. By 1963 the movement to break away from the constric- tions of the official student syndicate was well under way. Illegal student organizations of various political colorations were formed, and student dem- onstrations and strikes were conducted. The regime responded by imposing academic sanctions and by some use of the armed police. In 1965 the government transferred disciplinary control of the University of Madrid from the Minis- try of Education to the Ministry of the Interior. The expulsion of four professors for taking part in a student demonstration, the closing of some schools, No Foreign Dissem Approved For Release 2002/cYoC:Pc'RDP76M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release 2002/FJA:RDP76M00527R000700200001-1 No Foreign Dissem the occasional use of military courts to try arrested students, generally stiff civil penalties, and the regime's obvious unwillingness to meet all but mini- mal student requests slowly opened the way for the student protests to take on political ramifications. Antiregime attacks, especially in the more important universities in Madrid and Barcelona, followed. In 1967-1968, demonstrations, now supported by growing numbers of students, perhaps sometimes as many as one thousand, were prolonged and intensified by the brutal tactics of the police, especially in Madrid and Barcelona. The students shouted anti- Franco slogans, and a bust of Franco was defiled. The demonstrations became so violent that the government closed the University of Madrid several times, and various university officials resigned in protest over police tactics. Barcelona had similar demonstrations, and the eleven other major universities had protests also, although on a lesser scale. Finally a new minister of education was appointed in April 1968, and an agree- ment was worked out to keep the police off the campus unless summonec.. These re- forms, however, were not enough. Student demonstra- tions began ag&in in Decem- ber over dissatisfaction with the university author- ities, the government, and the police. Fearing an in- crease in violence, in Janu- ary the authorities closed in- definitely the universities STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS, UNIVERSITY OF BARCELONA, DECEMBER 1968 Spain - 2 T r r r r r r No Foreign Dissem Approved For Release 2002/O tI DP76M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Releasej40?/(qY&91-PE7M00527R000700200001-1 of Madrid and Barcelona. The government also pro- claimed a state of emergency, suspending certain civil rights in order to permit the police more easily to control student and political discontent. Some students were among the approximately 1,000 persons arrested, and many were later released. But about 35 individuals, including at least 17 in- tellectuals and professors, were deported to remote Spanish provinces for the duration of the state of emergency. Government sources said that the authorities wanted to avoid a crisis such as occurred in France last May. The universities, the government announced, would reopen in a few days but no new efforts to cause disorder and revolution would be tolerated. A govern- ment white paper on university reform was also prom- ised soon. Objectives In addition to free student associations, the students want university reforms to correct the prob- lems of overcrowde( : classrooms, the system of life- tenure chairs fille r)y professors who are rarely seen by their students, lack of a student voice in their own university councils, and too little stu- dent-professor contact. On the international level, students have protested the presence of US military bases in Spain and the US role in the Vietnam war. The students are not seeking power. for themselves, but do hope to help bring about radical change and, in some instances, the destruction of existing prac- tices. Groups Involved The old picture of the average university stu dent as an apathetic individual who takes to the streets only when urged on by a tiny minority of activists is being modified. The regime's recalci- trance and repression have brought a growing realiza- tion that a considerable number of students are de- manding reforms. In the last few years, activists have appeared from extreme right-wing groups, moder- ate, democratically oriented groups, Social Christ- ian groups, Social Democrats, Socialists, Marxists, Spain - 3 No Forei Approved For Release 200240 n Dissem R1 W DP76MOO527R000700200001-1 Approved For Releay~g 2PJJW %I- 76M00527R000700200001-1 Communists of all persuasions, and anarchists. Al- though official Spanish sources maintain that at the University of Madrid, for example, only about 200 students form the nucleus of the troublemakers, many more students have appeared willing to join the demonstrations. international organization does not play an active part in Spanish student outbursts, but a sense of fraternity with rebellious students else- where in Europe is growing and contacts with French students have been made. These links are giving concern to the Spanish Government, which has taken step-s to monitor and limit contacts. So far there has been very little cooperation between student and labor organizations. The fact that most university students are from the upper classes has made dif- ficult the establishment of close relations with the workers. Government Reforms In May 1968, the government approved a decree aimed at urgent reform of the university structure. Key measures include the creation of new universities in Madrid, Barcelona, and Bilbao, new polytechnic centers in Barcelona and Valencia., and new schools in several other universities. New facilities, addi- tional professors, and scholarships were announced, and limited student associations are to be permitted. Prospects Given the rapid politicization of students, the moves toward university reform may have come too late to prevent further trouble. Several years may well elapse before any meaningful progress toward meeting the problems of students can be made. Thus the chances of renewed student unrest are high. But the regime's readiness to use extreme measures to control the situation may reduce the level of overt student demonstrations. Spain - 4 r r No Foreign Dissem Approved For Release 2002/o' 9 RC"," DP76M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release 2002/0' / .BIE bP76M00527R000700200001-1 No Foreign Dissem TURKEY Summary Youth became a potent force in the last days of the Ottoman Empire and reached their zenith during April 1960 in the antigovernment demonstrations that opened the way for the military revolution the next month. Turkish youth are well-organized, al- though not united, and have a high degree of political awareness. They have repeatedly demonstrated a will- ingness to take their cause--whether local, national, or international--into the streets. In general, the young intellectual elite is sanc- tioned through government subsidization and is conse- quently subject to a degree of government control. Politicians of both the left and right, of both govern- ment and the opposition, and incipient subversive elements all make overtures to the "Young Turks" in the hope of attracting their support. Nature and Scope of Youth Activism in Turkey For nearly four decades--1923 to 1960--the Republic of Turkey maintained its independence under relatively stable civilian government and also moved constructively, if somewhat sporadically, in the direction of economic, social, and political modernization. There were no coups d'etat and only one major domestic eruption--the anti-Greek riots in Istanbul in 1955, which were apparently govern- ment inspired and, at least in part, government engineered. The students ~pe_r se were not a major factor, but the youth certainly played 'an important role before the rabble took over and armored military units were required to restore order. But this event, which virtually all Turks regard as a blemish on Turkish history, was an exception. Nonetheless, Turkish youth frequently have been an element of dissidence. They have used public ral- lies--usually at Taksim Square in the center of Is- tanbul or at Kizilay Square in Ankara--and- fiery speeches, followed by attempted marches on the centers of government or to embassies and consulates, to make known their grievances. Placing a black wreath at some strategic location, as at the Ataturk monument in Taksim Square, is often a symbol of opposition. This tactic has been used in recent years by leftist students to protest No Foreign Dissem Approved For Release 2002/Q pkR RDP76M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release 2002/gj ,l R RDP76M00527R000700200001-1 No Foreign Dissem visits of units of the U.S. Sixth Fleet. Leftist groups opposing NATO or the U.S. presence in Turkey often are countered by rightist student demonstra-' tions--sometimes leading to clashes and police inter- vention. Recent grievances have included the Cyprus amnesty for political prisoners from the 1960 revolu- tion, Turkey's membership in NATO, labor troubles at American installations, and close ties with the United States. Except for antigovernment demon- strations during the last days of the Menderes administration, the student organizations generally have remained aloof from strictly domestic politics. Individual stuc.ent leaders allegedly have been linked from time to time with subversives, but the student movement as such has not been involved. The students are generally agreed on the need for extensive educational reform. Even Prime Minister Demirel has publicly acknowledged the need for extensive changes in the educational system, especially at the college and university level. University Conditions The quality and, indeed, the quantity of institutions of higher learning, especially the universities, have failed to keep pace with the demands of a rapidly changing society, particularly since the end of World War II. These changes have included rapid population growth, increasing contacts with foreign countries, extensive foreign economic input which has brought the economy al- most to the "take-off point," the spread of literacy and urbanization, and the growth of the middle and working classes. A social-cultural lag has led to tensions among all elements of society but especially among the youth. These tensions are aggravated by the growing disparity between the need of a rapidly developing society for highly trained manpower, and the limited number of qual- ified graduate, from schools, colleges, and univer- sities. Another source of tension is the limited number of universities and technical colleges avail- able to the swelling ranks of lycee graduates. Turkey - 2 Approved For Release 2UG2/6fYg@iC b@M00527R000700200001-1 SECRET r r r r Approved For Release 2002/6Tt09'`IA'--R DP76M00527R000700200001-1 No Foreign Dissem In recent years only about one third of the qualified lycee graduates have been able to enter college or the universities. Other student grievances, some of which surfaced in the June 1966 student boycott and sit-in, have been the badly overweighted pupil-teacher ratio (many university lecture classes have over 1,000 students, many regular classes have 50 students, some laboratory classes have as many as six working together on the same experiment) overcrowded classrooms; lack of text books, stereo- typed lectures, poor testing programs, virtually no chance for personal attention by members of the faculty, accompanied by a serious "brain-drain" of those students who graduate. It is estimated that out of a total of some 12,300 medical doctors trained in Turkey, 2,250 are working or studying abroad. About 500 engineers, architects, and scientists are believed to have left Turkey for more promising prospects. Despite the great need for trained specialists there is also a lack of flexibility and receptive- ness on the part of the universities toward students who have graduated from foreign schools. It is difficult to gain admission to a Turkish university because of space, quotas, entrance ex- aminations, and lack of housing. Once admitted, the chances of graduating are slim. A study of Istanbul University between 1957 and 1963 revealed that the percentage of graduating students never was higher than 28 percent and has been as low as 11 percent. While the students, and would-be students, contend that reforms are necessary, university professors and administrators insist that the institutions long-standing ills can only be cured by cutting down on the number of students, and by insisting on higher levels of performance. This year students representing practically every university and school of higher education struck for two weeks to protest the archaic methods, lack of facilities, the system of fees, and gen- erally to indicate their united displeasure with Turkey - 3 No Foreign Dissem Approved For Release 2002/01/ft #TP76M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release ?002/O'It0 `~ RDP76M00527R000700200001-1 o Foreign Dissem higher education in Turkey. They occupied univer- sity buildings, boycotted classes, sent representa- tions to Prime Minister Demirel, and allegedly even threatened to burn down the University of Istanbul. Government and school administrators finally promised that the students' demands would be studied and changes would be made. It is worthy of note here that while there were rumors of involvement by opposition parties and attempts by both the Marxist Turkish Labor Party and the clandestine Communist radio station Bezim Radio (Our Radio) located in Leipzig, East Germany, to exploit the situation, there is no firm evidence that the unrest was planned, organized, or promoted by politicians at home or abroad. it was a bona fide student action aimed at correct- ing legitimate grievances; student leaders agreed to call off the strike when they were satisfied that an honest effort would be made to improve the educational system. There can be little doubt that the student erup- tions in Europe, France particularly, and in the U.S., encouraged the students to resort to a boycott and the occupation Df school property. Turkey's univer- sities are autonomous, for the most part; therefore, the government remained aloof. If the demonstrations had become viol-ant or had spilled into the streets, the security forces undoubtedly would have moved to bring them under control. A more typical example of Turkish student ac- tion on substan-:ially the same grievances took place in 1964 when students got their message across by stretching a black ribbon across the main entrance gate to Istanbul University. The ribbon bore the words "OLD FASHIONED IDEAS." The student leaders then symbolically broke the ribbon and placed a black wreath in front of Ataturk's monument within the unversity grounds. Educational deficiencies are equally bad at the secondary level where there is also a serious shortage of teachers. Basically the problem is one of tradi- tion and cultural lag. The Ottoman heritage of rote learning pervades contemporary Turkish education, as r Turkey - 4 Approved For Release 20 qp M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release 2002/?&MATRDP76M00527R000700200001-1 No Foreign Dissem does the authoritarian role of the teacher. Little value is placed on discussion and deductive reason- ing. Program content, especially in the social sciences, is the product of Turkish ethnocentrism and the deliber- ate effort of the government to instill a sense of nationalism. In a 1960 report, the Turkish National Commission on Education underscored the major deficiencies in the educational system. These included: imbalance of male and female students; need for program diversifica- tion; almost total lack of extracurricular activities; failure to encourage individual initiative; unsatis- factory teaching methods due in part to poor training; overemphasis on factual memorization at the expense of personality and character development; and the rigid examination system. The Commission expressed the fear that frustration and discontent, resulting from an inability to continue their education, might render some students "dangerous to society." Turkey's System of Higher Education The fundamental distinction between peasant and elite in Turkey is one of education. Traditionally speaking, few doors were ever closed to the Moslem youth of whatever origin who could write and speak properly--and few were opened to those who could not. This was especially true by the end of the 19th century when Turkish society was divided between the ruling elite and the peasant masses. To a large ex- tent this same division is present today, although there is greater opportunity to attain the educa- tional prerequisite for membership in the intellec- tual elite and a high government job. Among the educated elite there are those who hold high office in government, and those who think they should. The history of westernization or modernization in Turkey is largely the history of the development of secular education. It wasn't until 1900 that a civilian university was opened to train students for other than official careers. The French Lycee, ex- emplified by Galatasary, became the model for edu- cational institutions at the secondary level, and French culture soon became the dominant influence. Turkey -.5 No Foreign Dissem Approved For Release 2002/01gpciqDP76M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release 2002/Q"1RDP76M00527R000700200001-1 Foreign Dissem In the universities, however, German concepts pre- vailed. (Now after more than, a decade of US assist- ance, includinq the establishment of a new university in the northeastern city of Erzurum, American edu- cational concepts have become competitive). By the end of World War I, and he ensuing Turkish War for Independence, the Turkish educa- tional system contained, at least in rudimentary forms, all the basic components of the educational systems in what were then regarded as the "advanced nations." Ataturk closed the religious schools in 1924 and a natianai Ministry of Education assumed responsibility for all levels of public education. Today most of t.e universities are autonomous. The largest university, the University of Istanbul, was established in 1933, and Ankara Uni- versity, a consDlidation of several previously un- related faculties, was chartered in 1.946. The growth of the university system has been accelerated as demands increased for university training. A university degr;?e is a virtual prerecuisite for a high-level gove:^nment job; and teachers and bona fide students constitute two of the highest status groups in Turki:3h society. But it is the lycee de- gree which has become the dividing line between the upper and lower ranks of Turkish society. By Turk- ish standards, =he graduate of the academic high school is an inll_ellectual. There are over 100,000 students, out of a total population of about 34,000,000, pursuing higher edu- cation. There are over 68,000 students enrolled in eight state universities, and about 26,000 others attend private, mostly technical colleges. Another 8,000 attend teachers colleges and theological schools, and several thousand are enrolled in technical schools at near-college level. While autonomous, Turkish universities are chartered by the Grand National Assembly, and receive the bulk of their financial support from supplemental appropriations attached to the budget of the Ministry of Education. Only a nominal fee is charged, but the cost of books and room and board must be borne by the student. These are not too onerous for those who can live at home but clearly are beyond the Turkey - 6 Approved For Release-'20G2iU GSjnClAte?@ffi6M00527R000700200001-1 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/01/O IR- 76M00527R000700200001-1 No Foreign Dissem resources of the youth whose family does not live near a university. Since 1946, Turkish universities have been pat- terned largely after the German model with each sub- ject within a faculty being grouped around a chair held by a professor, who in turn is supported by a cadre of junior faculty members. This method of or- ganization, combined with the absence of a mandatory retirement age, severely limits promotion possibili- ties and lowers morale. Enrollment is determined by each university faculty, which administers its own placement tests. A candidate often registers for several separate ex- aminations. Students with lycee diplomas contend they are automatically entitled to admission, and the resulting clamor often forces university offi- cials to allow still more students to enter already congested faculties. Over-enrollment is probably the most serious problem. In a law faculty at the University of Istanbul a teaching staff of 40 at- tempts to instruct 8,000 students. Existing re- sources such as libraries are often underused because of the emphasis on lectures. Except for a small core of able teachers, the bulk are mediocre and under- paid. Istanbul University is the largest and most influential educational institution in Turkey. Built to accommodate 12,000 it has an enrollment of more than 30,000. According to the rector of the uni- versity, there are only 14,000 "real" students at the university; most of the others enjoy the fringe benefits of student status. An estimated 3,000 Turkish students attend for- eign universities each year, with US schools attract- ing a number second only to West Germany. Since World War II Turkish students abroad have concentrated on science and engineering courses. None are official- ly enrolled in schools in Communist countries, al- though probably there are some Communist exiles at- tending schools in Eastern Europe. The government has discouraged students from traveling in Communist countries but concedes that a few probably go via in- direct routes. Student exchange may become an area of Communist exploitation now that relations with Turkey have become somewhat more amenable in the new Turkey - 7 No F W4# Approved For Release 2002/P7g#00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release 20,,7"49'pIA-RDP76M00527R000700200001-1 Jo Foreign Dissem age of detente. Jnderlying Turkish suspicions of the Russians, however, will probably hold down the number of students studying in the USSR National Youth Organizations in Turkey There are three major youth and student organiza- tions. While most youth are affiliated with one or more of the national organizations, there is no acknowledged central leadership among the nation's youth. In addition to the student unions, there are also youth branches of many of the national polit- ical parties, especially the ruling Justice Party (JP), the major opposition Republican People's Party (RPP), and the Marxist Turkish Labor Party (TLP). There are also smaller, somewhat less organized groups, possibly cutting across party lines, drawn to individual political leaders. The three national organizations are the Na- tional Youth Organization of Turkey--(Turkiye MiZZi Genclik TeskiZati--TMGT), the National Student Fed- eration of Turkey--(Turkiye Milli TaZebe Federasyonu-- TMTF), and the National Turkish Student Union--(Milli Turk TaZabe Birligi- MTTB). The TMGT, officially recognized in 1960, includes both student and other youth organizations such as the Boy Scouts Union, the Women's Union of Turkey, the Turkish Reform Hearths and the Textile Workers Federation. It has nine member bodies, of which the TMTF is the most important, and is government subsidized. In 1964, the last year for which we have statistics, the TMGT claimed a membership of some 274,000. The TMGT is leftist dominated, despite persist- ent government efforts to gain control. Most of its present leadership is said to be friendly to the op- position, hostile to the Demirel government, and, al- though basically pro-West, critical of the terms of Turkey's relationship with NATO and the US. With a membership at least of 100,000, and chapters on all college and university campuses, the National Student Federation (TMTF) is the larger and more politically active student organization. The TMTF was founded in 1946, has its national head- quarters and over half of its members =n Istanbul, where the Istanbul University Student Union (IUTB) with 21,000 members often is able to p_ay a dominant role in TMTF affairs. Approved For Releasle 200WO1i1Ot: OIiiaRD 76M00527R000700200001-1 SECRET r r r Approved For Release 2002/01 / . '6P76M00527R000700200001-1 No Foreign Dissem The TMTF is today split into left and right fac- tions--both of which elected slates of officers in separate congresses in 1966. Since then, the Federa- tion has been rent by internal strife, court action, and open clashes. Leftist control of the TMTF was temporarily ended in January 1967 by a court order which appointed trustees to administer it. The leftists subsequently defied the court and were arrested. They nonetheless established a rival TMTF headquarters in Ankara and probably have the larger national following. The Istanbul leadership reportedly continued to control the organization's teletype system, bank accounts, and the bulk of its files. The government has an- nounced that it will seek legislation to end control of student organizations by "professional student" politicians. A similar attempt to tighten control of the student organization leadership in 1964 failed. On 18 January the High Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court and returned control of the TMTF to the leftist leadership. The youth struggle now appears to be polarizing between the far left and far right groups represented by the leftist Federation of Idea Clubs--sponsored by the Marxist Turkish Labor Party (TLP)--and the young "commandos" being trained by the rightist Republican Peasant Na- tion Party (RPNP) led by neo-fascist, retired Colonel Alpaslan Turkes. The National Turkish Student Union (MTTB), founded in 1916, is the oldest student organization and with some 60,000 members in 27 separate affiliated organizations, is more conservative than the TMTF and is comparatively free from government control. Whereas the TMTF is more interested in student problems, the MTTB is oriented toward such political questions as Cyprus, East Turkestan, and the Orthodox Patriarcate. It tends to be strongly nationalistic and has tried to maintain close bonds with the military hierarchy. Both the TMTF and the MTTB utilize press con- ferences to proclaim how the "Young Turks," in the sense of the Youth of Turkey, feel about hot issues of the day. Both publish periodicals and both, on Turkey - 9 No Foreign Dissem Approved For Release 2002/01LOff P761VI00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Rele a r0kV* o oreign i76M00527R000700200001-1 occasion, send deputations to the prime minister or other government officials in an attempt to make the influence of youth felt by the leaders of government. Talks regarding the merger of the two national student organizations have been going on intermittently since 1963 with the conflicting ambitions of the various leaders apparently constituting the chief obstacle. The development of a strong leftist movement in the TMTF would seem to preclude any serious hope of merg- ing the two organizations in the near future. It has beer suggested that leftist influence among the teaching staff at Istanbul University has grown in recent years and that newcomers have been variously identified with the left wing. It has also been alleged that these leftists have sought, with some success, to take over the leadership of the stu- dents as one element of the so-called "alert" or "standing forceE" which include the intellectuals, the press, and the military. Little factual inforMAtion is available on sus- spected Communist groups although they probably exist and are probably concentrating on recruitment, in- filtration of existing groups, and exploitation of student interest in left-wing ideas. But Istanbul University is no hotbed of Communism, and any such groups are probably very small. Prospects Turkish youth have the incentive, the political awareness, and the organization to play an increasing role in the country. They lack only a full sense of direction and a full awareness of their capability. In contrast to the youth of many countries, Turk- ish youth generally appear to be little affected by cynicism or alienation; nevertheless, they do seem to be experiencing a growing uneasiness probably due in large part to the frustrations inherent in an outdated educational system, which are enhanced by leftist propaganda. The student disturbances in Turkey last spring appeared to have no obvious political overtones, except for the Tioient demonstrations against the Sixth Fleet uni-:s that visited Istanbul in July 1968. Turkey - 1.0 r r r No Forei n Dissem Approved For Release 2002/q - R(Ri-RDP76M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release 2002/018)].bP76M00527R000700200001-1 No Foreign Dissem The violence then may have reflected both the frus- trations of the student boycotts and the indeci- siveness of the police; the most important factor, however, probably was agitation by leftists who ex- ploited the fleet visit to embarass the Demirel government and to demonstrate leftist opposition to Turkey's membership in NATO and to the US military presence in Turkey. Widespread fear of serious trouble at the Turkish universities when classes resumed last fall did not materialize. Some students apparently were satisfied with the conciliatory attitude shown by school authori- ties; others were probably impressed by the firm public warnings by both government and opposition leaders. A few feeble efforts to resume student boycotts as a protest against continuing educational grievances soon faded. Nevertheless, in marked contrast with student activities the previous spring, by the time school re- opened in November the student activist movement had taken on a distinct political coloration. Furthermore, student leadership appeared to be better coordinated, targets had been broadened to include "economic im- perialism" and "foreign investment," and there were increasing indications that leftist leaders intended to try to exploit any student demonstration into anti-regime and anti-US affairs. Following the So- viet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, the anti- NATO campaign became unpopular and was temporarily silenced, but it was by no means abandoned. During recent months, student leftists, almost certainly under the general guidance and direction of the Marxist Turkish Labor Party (TLP) and with at least token financial support from Soviet representa- tives in Ankara, tried to mount several major anti- American demonstrations. These efforts were largely frustrated by government restrictions, by close police surveillance, and by the lack of popular interest. Not to be outdone by the leftist students, right- ist youth groups, such as the National Turkish Stu- dent Union (MTTB) and the Struggle Against Communism Society, are trying to become organized for more effective counteraction. Rightist "commando" groups have been organized and reportedly are being trained Turkey - 11 Approved For Release ZOBA WW"00527RO00700200001 -1 Approved For Release 200gfI(gR:-RDP76M00527R000700200001-1 No Foreign Dissem by the Republican Peasant Nation Party headed by neo- fascist retired Colonel Turkes. This polarization of leftist and :-ightist youth groups increases the danger of serious incidents growing out of any demon- stration. Some political observers believe the leftists are pu::posely promoting such a polarization in order to enhance the political tension within the country. The recent burning of Ambassador-designate Komer's limousine by le:=tist students on the campus of the Middle East Technical University in Ankara, while probably a target of opportunity, appears to have been in line with a calculated leftist. campaign to under- mine US - Turkish relations. Some observers see the real objective of the leftists as the creation of suf- ficient dissension within the country to fragment the government. They further theorize that a weak coali- tion would become a necessity, which in turn would foster further polarization beneficial to the extreme left. There also seems to be a general consensus that the leftists in-:end to attack the Demirel regime by undermining US ?- Turkish relations, that Turkish offi- cials generally are not yet fully aware of the inherent dangers in the situation, and that Ankara's handling of the leftist -problem thus far has been inept. The apparent shift in focus from purely academic grievances to political targets points to the probable manipulation of the students by elements outside the universities. The presence of outside influences is further indicated by the increasing polarization among the students, some of whom reportedly have joined pro- left organizations for self-protection. This growing polarization almost certainly will lead to a marked increase in the number and intensity of student clashes and isolated acts of terrorism, and may encourage isolated leftist attacks on US property and nationals. An added danger is that religious fanaticism among some of the supporters of the right may spill over into the streets thus heightening the atmosphere of unrest. The government is preparing legislation designed to help control the spread of extremism within the country and has ordered provincial governors to Turkey - 12 Approved For Releas4`202O1 OgFC1 -R 6M00527R000700200001-1 SECRET Cl Y, Approved For Relea o2VA J76 M 00527 R000700200001-1 tighten law enforcement within their jurisdiction. With memories of the student demonstrations that preceded the 1960 revolution firmly in mind, how- ever, Turkish officials probably will be somewhat less than enthusiastic in any action that they may feel forced to take against the student left. The current mood of a major segment of the Turkish youth, and of leftist-inclined students in particular, is anti-American. In the absence of firm action by the government, demonstrations of anti-Americanism probably will increase both in num- ber and intensity during the coming months. Under the influence of anti-Americanism, the student left will view the periodic visits of multiple units of the US Sixth Fleet to the port of Istanbul as parti- cularly attractive targets. Forty-two percent of the population of Turkey is under the age of fifteen; and the youth are, and will continue to be, a major factor in the country's political life. The youth of Turkey have been given a heady assignment--to be the ultimate "guardians of the Revolution." Where this leads to responsible political activity it is an asset. Where it leads to narrow, chauvinistic nationalism or leftist ad- venturism, as in the near catastrophe over Cyprus, it remains potentially dangerous. The bulk of the politically active students can be expected to remain anti-JP, anti-American, and to call for closer relations with the socialist countries. Turkey - 13 No Foreign Dissem Approved For Release 2002/($1 }UDP76M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release f 'U1d.EaWliA M00527R000700200001-1 YUGOSLOVIA Summary A decade of apathy on the part of the youth of Yugoslavia ended last June, when Belgrade Univer- sity students rioted and a week-long university sit-in followed. Although partially inspired by the example of rioting students in Poland, France, Czechoslovakia and other European countries, the Belgrade riots were, as Tito admitted on 9 June, largely domestic in origin. The regime's slow re- action to a deteriorating economic and social situa- tion and its sluggishness in dealing- with youth and educational problems had been at fault. Yugoslav students left school following their demonstrations last June in a triumphant mood. They were, however, quickly disillusioned during the sum- mer when the regime cracked down on liberal univer- sity elements and took no action to meet student demands that Tito himself had labeled legitimate. Students and party'authorities appeared to be on a collision course likely to erupt into large scale disorder when school reopened in September. The invasion of Czechoslovakia on 20 August eclipsed this problem, as nearly all Yugoslavs united behind Tito and the party in the face of the potential threat from Moscow. The record num- ber of young people that joined the party during this period leavened the youth movement and Yugo- slavia's youth organizations may gradually divide into smaller more autonomous units in order to ac- commodate divergent views. Events in Czechoslovakia have also made participation in international con- ferences by Yugoslav students increasingly diffi- cult and have led to serious public clashes with their counterparts from the Warsaw Pact states. Students Versus the Regime The June riots started with a trivial clash between young people at a musical performance on 2 June. The disturbances soon took on a politi- cal character when student anger at police tac- tics and pent-up frustration over the lack of job opportunities resulted in sweeping demands for Approved For Release RWj j 2PR~6M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For ReleaO( (pgZq". , *I 76M00527R000700200001-1 change. An ad hoc student action committee quickly formulated a four-point program which demanded: --Removal of all antisocialist manifestations and economic and social differentiation. --Steps to remedy unemployment and reduced job opportunities for university graduates. --Greater democratization of all social and political organizations, a more independent press, and quicker removal from office of antireform "conservatives." --A thorcugh reform of the university, to provide greater autonomy, a student voice in university affairs, and improvement in the living conditions of students. The regime opted for conciliat_.on combined with firmness: Its spokesmen were quick to concede the justice of the students' demands, but deplored the demonstrations and violence. Several Serbian officials, including the presi- dent of the Serbian parliament, were appalled by police brutality and promised to investigate and punish the guilty. Cognizant of the developments in Paris, the regime set out to keep the students and workers from uniting on the basis of mutual eco- nomic grievances. The Belgrade press was filled with telegrams--probably regime-inspired--from factory committees who supported the students' "just" demands, but denounced student violence and pledged ad- herence to the regime's programs. The regime succeeded. No workers joined the students or started sympathy strikes. The sit-in at Belgrade University did not end, however, until. 9 June, when Tito admitted on tele- vision that there had been delays in implementing the economic reform, in eliminating "shocking" salary differences, and in dealing with youth prob- lems and educational reform. Reminding his audience that the party had been debating all these problems for many months, he asked the youth to push his re- form programs. Tito promised new party guidelines r r r Yugoslavia - 2 Approved For ReleaseU3Q ffiy ti,,." 76MOO527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release f0W ' / EI WdP M00527R000700200001-1 to deal with domestic problems--indicating that they would be final and non-negotiable. Although Tito implied that if he and the rest of the lead- ership could not solve Yugoslavia's problems they should resign, he gave no hint that he would bow to the students' demand- that those responsible for police brutality be sacked. The economic guidelines, in preparation since 20 May, were published five days later. In part an elaboration of the themes in Tito's speech, they called for economic reform and reorganization of the party. They also echoed student demands for limits on income acquired in a "nonsocialist" way (leasing of villas, for example) and a reduc- tion of differences in wages. They allowed for educational reform and more student participation in the management of the universities. Again there was a note of firmness. The resig- nation of incompetent officials was implied, but there was a clear warning that "enemy forces," such as antiregime emigre groups, antireform conserva- tives, and ultraliberals, were seeking to undermine Yugoslavia. Emphasis was put on using and improv- ing the existing Yugoslav system, albeit with a major effort to make room for more young people. The guidelines re-emphasized the party's determina- tion to oppose the creation of the multiparty system proposed by some liberal intellectuals. Student unrest had occurred at a trying time in the regime's three-year-old drive for economic reform. Although the students exhibited no separat- ist tendencies, the regime in meeting the students' demands had to take into account the tense nation- ality situation. Republic economic rivalries had increases. Many Serbs believed that they had suf- fered by the reform, while the Croats generally be- lieved that the process should be speeded up. For the first time in many years Tito was under pressu.: from both the conservative and liberal wings of the party from the first to go slow and from the second to move ahead faster. Economic reform brought increasing unemploy- ment and labor unrest, with workers resorting to Yugoslavia - 3 Approved For Release 2e #QIDTJP~ELM00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release(2~6 1I ' b *6M00527R000700200001-1 short strikes to push their grievances. Both the Belgrade students and many workers were angry at the high salaries and large bonuses paid factory administrators while workers in some enterprises remained poorly paid or paid only after long delay. 9arI Summer The leadership's approval and support of stu- dent demands, highlighted by President Tito's con- ciliatory television address of 9 June, was a major factor in calming disorder during the student riots last June. After the students had dispersed for vacation, however, the regime became increas- ingly critical of the student movement and worked against more autonomy for the universities and a greater student voice in university affairs, both promised in June. During July virtually every major Serbian party organization launched attacks on certain individuals and party organizations at Belgrade University. A session of the Belgrade party city conference developed into a major indictment of "liberal elements" at the university, and Belgrade party chief Vlahovic made it clear that all necessary steps would be taken to eliminate these elements. The session concluded on 19 July by dissolving the party organization within the departments of philosophy and sociology for their antiregime be.Zavior during the student riots in June. The hardening of the Serbian leadership's posi- tion on dissident intellectuals and students who support them was echoed by the Croatian party. The faculties of philosophy and political science at Zagreb University were the targets of a succession of stormy party meetings resulting in mutual recrimina- tions and threats of disciplinary action against professors and students. Diss:_dent professors, how- ever, continue to have a significant- influence within the university's basic party organizations, and Croatian party officials have not been able to re- gain complete control over there. Certain issues of the Belgrade and the Zagreb University's student reviews have been banned and Yugoslavia - 4 Approved For Release(2 f"lPffL6M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Releas 41lDE&ALOPksM00527R000700200001-1 continued pressure to close down or shake up the editorial staffs of these publications could es- calate student-party tensions. Suppression of some student publications has continued at Zagreb University but has been abandoned at Belgrade Uni- versity. After Czechoslovakia The occupation of Czechoslovakia and the fear that Yugoslavia was to be the next victim of the Russians completely overshadowed internal problems as the populace rallied behind the federal aut.1,or- ities. Appealing to patriotism, unity and internal strength, the party launched a successful'drive to bring in more youngsters. It is rumored, also, that militant student leaders have been called into mili- tary service. The kind of street action that erupted at Belgrade University last June will not be re- peated as long as alarm over a possible invasion continues in Yugoslavia. It is currently estimated officially that about 75,000 young people joined the party following the invasion of Czechoslovakia. These figures do not include new members in the Yugoslav armed forces, and is impressive when compared with last year's very modest figure of 23,235 new members. This up- surge marks a sharp reversal cf the process which had seen Yugoslavia's party membership steadily de- clining,, it will add new vigor to the party, give it a more youthful composition, and strengthen those elements who support the party's reform programs. Many students realize that joining the party will detract from the effectiveness of continued student opposition. Those students who have joined the party find themselves effectively neutralized and at the same time alienated from those who re- fused to join. As a result, there are no realistic possibilities for concerted student action in the near future and the party can afford to be tolerant. Yugoslavia - 5 Approved For Release 61&RP"WfM00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Releas6""6i&i/kNA7-76M00527R000700200001-1 The GeneratioYi Gam The students' demands for jobs after gradua- tion reflected more than a narrow-minded self-in- terest. There is a profound difference in outlook between the ycung and old, and the regime must cope with a widening generation gap. The bulk of the leadership at all levels in Yugoslavia has remained the same for over 20 years. Despite the purges of Cominformists in the years immediately following 1948 and the ouster of Djilas (1954) and Tito's former heir apparent Rankov.ic (1966), the hard core of the party still has great numbers of older ex-partisans and prewar members. The upper levels of the party hierarchy are parti- cularly laden with this older generation. "Older generation" here, is relative: Most of these "older" people are in their fifties, some still in their late forties. Tito at 76 is by far the oldest of the hierarchy. The regime has attempted with only limited suc- cess since 1963 to enforce a policy of "rotation" in office in order to bring up younger men. While the average age of the party leadership has declined slightly, the old guard has departed only slowly in a Yugoslav version of political musical chairs. Thus the party reorganization of October 1966 re- sulted in an executive committee (politburo) of relatively younger and less politically influential men, while almost the whole old-line leadership was shifted into the policy-making presidium. What has been true of the top leadership has been even more evident at the lower levels of the economic and political ladder. Many factory directors and lower leve.L bureaucrats owe their positions to their prewar party and wartime partisan service. Many are ill-educated and not equipped to deal with the sophisticar_ed socialist market economy which the regime hopes to create. Understandably, they do not wish to give up the income and status they feel that they deserve. Yugoslavia - 6 Approved For ReleaK3fql"q[ P76M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Releases?NM Bt6M00527R000700200001-1 Partly as justification for its privileged position, the older generation for years has ex- ploited wartime sacrifice and glory. The values of many of these older people are an admixture of unsophisticated Communism, middle-class aspirations, pride in what they have accomplished, and, in some, a residual local nationalism. Meanwhile, universities have been turning out thousands of better educated young technicians. Many are impatient with the bungling of their elders and with the barriers to jobs and influence which the latter have created. Tito himself has publicly admitted many times that the Yugoslav economy badly needs thousands of better trained men, and has com- plained that many enterprises refuse to hire them. The slogan "Down With the Red Bourgeoisie" which appeared at Belgrade University in June under- lined the younger generation's disenchantment, their wish for an end to privilege built on party or par- tisan service. This demand was not new--it simply became louder. In the months after the ouster of Rankbvic the Yugoslav press burgeoned forth with re- ports of illegal building of villas and the accumula- tion of art treasures and private wealth by party functionaries. The restlessness of Yugoslav youth reflects the success of the regime in its liberalization program. The curtailment of the power of the secret police following Rankovic's fall, the enhancement of parliament, more open elections, and curtailment of direct government control of the economy--all have fostered a more permissive atmosphere. Many of the students' demands were inspired by the hopes engend- ered by the liberalized Yugoslav constitution of 1963 and by promises implied in the current party pro- gram. Conversely, the regime's compromises in the face of opposition by conservatives who still hold influential positions and the objective difficulties of the economic reform probably seemed intolerable obstacles. When the chief of the Belgrade party organization, Veljko Vlahovic, a leading ideologue and presidium member, attempted to speak to the rioting students last June, he was howled down by the cry of "Enough words--action is needed." Yugoslavia - 7 Approved For Release l'gt)LC' A7"00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Relea (2 f11.Ei` I I 76M00527R000700200001-1 It can be assumed that some children of party officials were involved in the riots. Their pres- ence did not inhibit the police, but it may help explain the reg:_me's forbearance in the face of the sit-in at the university and the release of all the students arrested earlier during the riots. The ,'oath Organzzar.ions The student: unrest reflected in the June riots revealed the ineffectiveness of the two main regime- sponsored youth organizations--the Federation of Youth of Yugoslavia (SOJ) and the Federation of Students (SSJ). Both federations originally were created to per- form as "transmission belts" for party directives and propaganda. Numerically at least, the SOJ has been a success--its membership (2,034,523 in Decem- ber 1965) includes about two thirds of all Yugoslavs between the ages of 14 and 25. Resentment over the Federation's position as "transmission belt" has grown steadily over the years, and much of the organ- ization's membership is pro forma. The SOJ became a byword for careerism and a haven for young party hacks. The party's decision in 1965 to change its role from that of an all-powerful, operational organiza- tion to one of ideological leadership led to confusion. Many young people wanted the Federation to reflect the views and interests of its membership, not those of the party. The SOJ, however, was not organized to respond to pressure from below.. Its leadership, moreover, was all over 30 years of age, which led to charges of ov9rprofessionalization. In the aftermath of the fall of Rankovic the youth federation secretariat was dissolved (November 1966) for incompetence and heavy handedness. The Federation was put into a form of "receivership" in order to prepare for its reorganization, which took place over a year later at the Eighth SOJ Con- gress in Februar( 1968. r Yugoslavia - 8 Approved For Relent Q(2yMlpfP76M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release i"01i(g~b1'A;Ad46M00527R000700200001-1 Tito's speech opening the Congress offered noth- ing particularly new. It was a call for more of the ideological guidance the young had already come to dislike. Indeed, instead of innovation, Tito pointed with alarm to the need for the SOJ directing more ideological political work toward intellectuals, among whom he detected apathy and "alien concepts." To restore the SOJ's effectiveness, a new sta- ture was enacted decentralizing administration, pre- sumably to make the federation more responsive to its membership. What emerged was a compromise between the old strongly centralized organization desired by the conservatives and the loose coordinating body called for by the ultraliberals. The age limits were widened to include 14 to 27-year-olds; a 27-year-old was elected president. The considerably smaller (110,000 members in 1966) Federation of Students suffers from much the same malady as the Youth Federation. If the regime grants the SSJ the autonomy necessary to attract large numbers of activist students, the party risks losing control. Tight regime control, however, re- sults in further alienation of the future intelli- gensia and technocrats and an organization steeped in apathy. Regime control of the students through the SOJ and the SSJ broke down at the time of the Belgrade riots, when the groups were reduced to supporting, ex post facto, the student demands while condemning demonstrations and violence. Effective leadership had passed to student action committees not in the party's sway. The organization of the youth movement in Yugo- slavia is rapidly decentralizing. Youth organiza- tions are reducing considerably their connections with their former parent body, the SOJ. Last Decem- ber members of the SSJ in Serbia and Macedonia sent observers instead of delegates to the Youth Federa- tion Congresses of their respective republics. This tactic was designed to emphasize the independence of the SSJ. In Slovenia the students have gone a step further by announcing their intention to with- draw from the SSJ to form their own independent Slovenian student federation. Yugoslavia - 9 Approved For Release d IIQ]bDI-)INfM$M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Releas&.' 'STIF*bEbIT t6M00527R000700200001-1 These actions have drawn sharp criticism from several fronts, but some higher authorities appar- ently are willing to tolerate such an emancipation rather than contribute to unnecessary conflicts with the students. The Slovenian threat tc withdraw has not materialized yet, but it is likely that the even- tual resolution of the matter will take the form of a significantly democratized student movement. The students want an organization more responsive to its membership and consequently less a vehicle for trans- mitting party policy. This trend may also lead to the fragmentation of the youth movement into students and nonstudents, which might be accompanied by in- creased militancy on the part of the purely student organizations. The Students and the Schocis Early in 1968 the youth periodical Mladost re- vealed that out of 3.5 million employees in Yugo- slavia, about 200,000 have had no schooling, over 1.2 million have never finished the eight-year ele- mentary school, and only 800,000 have an elementary school education. The drop-out rate for elementary schools is about 50 percent. The illiteracy rate remains high, about 20 percent, with about 50 percent of the illiterates under 50 years of age, In part, the problem stems from limited finan- cial resources. Under legislation passed in 1966, local communities are responsible for financing most basic education. Local enterprises are encouraged to contribute loans and scholarships. Decentralized financing has resulted in uneven quality in the pri- mary and secondary school. systems, Poorer areas naturally have inferior schools, particularly in the villages, Peasant youth are at a disadvantage if they wish to pursue university studies. University education is tuition free. Cost of living grants are available and many students receive loans, repayable over a ten-year period after grad- uation. The debt is reduced for those with good academic records and those who finish their studies early. Poor preparation and personal financial prob- lems probably are the main reasons so many students take extra years to earn a degree, Yugoslavia - _L0 Approved For Releast /fq/"Egg`IZAFi76M00527R000700200001-1 r r r Approved For Release WbW/b: bJ6M00527R000700200001-1 The increased cost of living since 1965 has been another factor barring the way to higher education for the children of workers and peasants. In 1965 the average stipend for students at Zagreb University, in comparatively wealthy Croatia, was 15,000 old dinars (OD) per month. At the current exchange rate of 1,250 old dinars to one dollar, this amounts to $12. Living expenses, however, reached the level of 29,000 OD (about $23). In the past three years stip- ends have not kept pace with the cost of living. The average worker's wage (not including self-employed peasants, the bulk of the rural population) in Janu- ary 1966 was 57,000 OD (about $46). Moreover, the highest average salaries were in the more developed northern republics. This economic inequality is transforming Yugoslavia's universities into preserves for the children of highly paid business managers, professional men, and party and government bureau- crats. According to one Yugoslav source, in February 1968 only 13 percent of the children of blue collar workers were receiving higher education. Student discontent also has been stimulated by the party's reluctance to loosen its grip on the universities. Although "self-management" and uni- versity control of its own finances has been con- stantly ballyhooed, university party organizations have usually had to bow to the wishes of their LCD:' superiors. Party influence in faculty appointments has resulted in providing sinecures for second-rate but "safe" intellectuals. Only in the past four or five years have liberal professors become more pub- licly outspoken in their criticism of the regime's policies. Yet as late as June 1967, a dogmatic, authoritarian, second-rater, Dr. Dragisa Ivanovic, was elected rector of Belgrade University over his liberal opponent, Dr. Veljko Korac. Korac had made the mistake of publicly doubting the ability of ill- educated workers to manage increasingly complex busi- ness enterprises and to contribute meaningfully to the solution of complicated social and economic prob- lems. Korac is an example of the type of critical intellectual who is anathema to the anti-intellec- tual elements in the regime. The party has been particularly vehement in denouncing those who at- tempt to transform the intelligensia and students Yugoslavia - 11 Approved For Release 2g0j4jVjD7 A-4~]DIP00527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release ii)-lbi716M00527R000700200001-1 into an elite t.nat would usurp the leading role of the party. It is ameasure of the regime's desire to win support through liberalization, however, that such critics have been given ever freer reign, despite periodic threats by Tito to deal with their "alien concepts." I2*enational Relations According to the Yugoslav press, the Ninth Con- ference of Representatives of European National Stu- dent Unions held in Budapest 3-7 January largely foundered on the issues of the intervention in Czecho- slovakia and the ideological differences in the so- cialist world emphasized by that event. The chief Yugoslav representative Vladimir Gligorov, who is also chairman of the Commission for International Cooperation of -:he Yugoslav Student Federation, characterized the conference as a failure, noting that no final communique was issued and the date and place of the next conference were left very much up in the air. Gligorov c:sossed swords with the Polish repre- sentative over the question of the danger to social- ist countries fi_om internal reactionary forces and with the Soviet delegate on the limited sovereignty issue as it relates to the "socialist commonwealth." A speech by the Hungarian representative at a re- ception following the Conference, condemning those who came to break up the meeting with "subversive acts" caused the Yugoslav delegation to walk out. Gligorov also c'aimed that the Hungarians had at the start attempted to blackmail the Yugoslavs into si- lence on the Czech issue by threatening to discuss the nationalist demonstrations in. Yugoslavia's autonomous province of Kosovo. At about the same time as reports on the Buda- pest Conference reached the press another clash be- tween Yugoslav and Soviet youth organizations was disclosed. In the 9 January issue of Mladost, weekly of the Yugoslav Youth Federation, the Youth Federation replied sharply to a letter sent by the Soviet Komsomol in early November in reply to a Youth Federation statement of its position on the Czechoslovak intervention. After replying to specific Soviet points the Mtadcst statement notes r r Yugoslavia - 12 Approved For Release(~(JpjST?4l"EggqFWF?M00527R000700200001-1 Approved For ReleasS T/W'f1PEE AT-A&T6M00527R000700200001-1 that the uncompromising Soviet concept of unity in the socialist camp is not a desirable foundation for cooperation between the Youth Federation and the Komsomol. Conclusion The past year has been a critical period in the relations between Yugoslavia's impatient youth and the Yugoslav establishment. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia has allowed Tito more time to estab- lish the reforms that both he and the students know are necessary if Yugoslavia is to continue to pro- gress. Tito wants to channel the youthful vigor stirred by the June demonstrations and the Czecho- slovak crisis into the implementation of his reform programs. Tito has made it abundantly clear that the party needs new blood, and all signs point toward a major rejuvenation of the party leadership at the Ninth Party Congress in March. The ascendancy of a young, competent, and generally liberal leadership in the Yugoslav party apparatus will be applauded by the youth and should in the long run lead to the solu- tion of many of the problems that could have caused a direct confrontation between party officials and the younger generation. Meanwhile, the Yugoslav Youth Federation will continue to be condemned as too "progressive" by Soviet-sponsored student associations, while its own members deplore its conservatism and "bureaucratic centralism." Yugoslav youth organizations probably will decentralize gradually under the watchful but tolerant eye of the party. This trend does not represent a spectacular departure from the norm in Yugoslavia and parallels similar moves toward local autonomy by the party itself, the government, the military, and other mass organizations. Yugoslavia - 13 Approved For Release i E d4 MOO527R000700200001-1 Approved For Release 2002/01 L.EB'P76M00527R000700200001-1 No Foreign Dissem Sensitive Sensitive No Foreign Dissem Approved For Release 2002/019 (:qkt~TP76M00527R000700200001-1