BLACK RADICALISM IN THE CARIBBEAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP76M00527R000700200009-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 26, 2001
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: July 6, 1970
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
Sensitive
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Black Radicalism in the Caribbean
Secret
6 July 1970
No. 0524/70
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP t
!7[CLODED FROM AUTOMATIC
On AND
DECLANYIFICATION
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s~
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
6 July 19 70
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Black Radicalism in the Caribbean
Summary
Black radicalism suddenly became a politically
disruptive force in Trinidad early this year. The
disturbances there sent shock waves throughout much
of the Caribbean.* Other states and territories
associated with the British Commonwealth appear vul-
nerable, as do the Netherlands West Indies. The
various black-oriented groups differ widely from place
to place in their programs and tactics, and as yet
there has been little liaison among them. They share
in the goal of stimulating greater economic and polit-
ical participation by the black masses, who remain at
the bottom of the economic and social ladder in most
of the area. Black radicalism appears to be largely
a homegrown phenomenon in the Caribbean, though ties
have recently begun to develop with militant black
organizations in the United States. (For a discussion
of this, see paragraphs 16 to 23, pages 8 to 11.)
*Black ra icalism is a real or potential factor in
the area's four independent members of the British
Commonwealth (Guyana, Trinidad-Tobago, Jamaica, and
Barbados); in the still dependent British island in
the Caribbean (the Windward and Leeward groups) and
in the nearby Atlantic (the Bahamas and Bermuda);
and in the Netherlands West Indies. The French
islands do not seem to have been appreciably affected.
Cuba, Haiti and the Dominican Republic are not
affected, at least directly.
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by the
CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current
Intelligence and coordinated with the Directorate
for Plans.
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The Nature of
Black Radicalism in the Caribbean
1. Black radicalism in the Caribbean today often
carries the overtones of a protest movement against
"the establishment." In many places it also has a
strong nationalist content. And in some respects it
is a facet of the search for national or group identity
by the black majorities in the newly independent or
still emerging nations of the region. Radical black
organizations in the Caribbean are difficult to cate-
gorize ideologically because their revolutionary ante-
cedents (Marxism? African socialism, and the civil
rights movement in the United States) are mixed and
poorly digested.
2. Neither political independence in Guyana,
Trinidad-Tobago, Jamaica, and Barbados nor progres-
sively increasing. internal autonomy in most of the
other territories has significantly altered their
socioeconomic structures. In many ways, the social
patterns that developed in the plantation economies
during the days of colonialism persist today. Blacks
still make up the bulk of the lower classes (except
in Guyana where just over half the population are of
East Indian descent and only some 45 percent are
black.) The relatively small middle classes are
composed largely of "coloured" (i.e. mulatto) people
with an admixture of East Indians (especially in
Guyana and Trinidad), Chinese, and whites. The apex
of the social and economic pyramid is occupied by a
small white or near-white elite, accounting for less
than one percent to about four percent of the popu-
lations. A highly disproportionate share of the
agricultural estates, businesses, commerce, banking,
and industry is controlled by the white minorities--
and by foreign-based companies.
3. Changes are, of course, gradually taking
place, and the barriers to black progress are no
longer as impermeable as they once were. The biggest
changes brought about by the movement toward self
government are, of course, in the political sphere.
Blacks now have won political office throughout most
of the area, though lighter skinned "coloureds" have
generally done better than they. In the economic
and social spheres, however, change has been so grad-
ual as to seem nonexistent to many blacks. For these
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reasons, even black-run governments are often ridi-
culed as mere "black fronts manipulated by white
power."
4. The fruits of independence in the four coun-
tries mentioned above, or of greater local autonomy
in most of the others, have not generally lived up
to popular expectations. Widespread poverty and high
unemployment levels continue. The governments have
seldom shown themselves able to bring the kind of
progress that would be meaningful to low-income blacks.
Popular dissatisfactions sometimes become manifest
in racial frictions, which in several places are al-
ways close to the surface. When racial tensions erupt
into violence between blacks and whites, or between
blacks and browns, political and economic progress can
be set back seriously. Another manifestation of popu-
lar malaise is rising crime rates. Crime has been
particularly disruptive in recent years in the densely
peopled slum areas of Kingston, Jamaica. The islands,
particularly the smaller ones, have some of the highest
population densities in the world, a factor further
contributing to economic stagnation and popular unrest.
5. Popular grievances, often real and compelling,
are of course susceptible to exploitation by political
demagogues who promise the impossible or by revolu-
tionaries who advocate destruction of existing poli-
tical, economic, and social structures. Few, if any,
black radical leaders currently on the scene are yet
able accurately to claim more than relatively few
followers. If the trends of the past year or so are
meaningful guides, however, this could change.
6. The past year has seen a growth in the poten-
tial of "black power" as a political and social force
in much of the Caribbean. New black-oriented groups
have appeared, and a number of others that existed
earlier have shown signs of becoming more active.
They vary widely in their purposes, tactics, and pro-
grams. Some are primarily educational;. they stress
promotion of an enhanced awareness among blacks of
their cultural heritage and identity. This kind of
group, probably the majority, is only seldom involved
in politics. Some groups are semi-religious, and
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others act primarily as political pressure groups
urging a better deal for the black man. A few, how-
ever, are militantly revolutionary.
7. A vaguely articulated notion common to the
more radical black leaders is that the roots of
British and other colonial cultures must be broken;
new social, political, and economic structures com-
patible with the needs of the black majorities must
be fostered. Black radical leaders become more
specific when they discuss economic issues--and these
issues are often the most inflammatory ones and the
ones most easily understood among the less educated
in the radical followings. Black economic control
is often made to seem a panacea for the problems of
poverty and unemployment of the black communities,
where irritation is prevalent over the obvious display
of white affluence. The foreign-based companies
(primarily US, Canadian, British, and Dutch) are
also targets of black radical leaders. Like national-
ists in other parts of the world, these leaders resent
the fact that such companies dominate many of the
economies for (as they see it) the benefit of white
foreigners.
8. The most disruptive recent employment of
black political action occurred early this year' in
Trinidad-Tobago, where black radicals suddenly emerged
from near obscurity, without funds or effective organ-
ization, to pose a formidable challenge to the stability
of the government. Geddes Granger, a 35-year-old
student now in his last year at the local university,
had formed the National Joint Action Committee (NJAC)
in early 1969 as a pressure group to secure "black
people's rights." The NJAC became a loose amalgam
including several preexisting black groups and attracted
support from leftists in the labor movement--notably
George Weekes' oil workers' union and Clive Nunez'
militant Transport and Industrial Workers' Union. In
February of this year Granger launched a series of
demonstrations to support a group of West Indian students
who had come to trial in Canada. Black power themes
emphasizing economic nationalism quickly came to dominate
the protests, however, and dissent focused on the govern-
ment. After continuing demonstrations had sparked spo-
radic disorders, the government in April declared a state
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of emergency and arrested many of the protest lead-
ers, including Granger. This triggered a mutiny in
the armed forces, and it was more than a week before
the government was able to reestablish control of the
military.
9. Although the Trinidad-Tobago government has
now firmly reasserted its authority, Prime Minister
Williams' prestige has probably suffered irreparable
damage. The extent of popular support generated
by the protests made evident a deep underlying
resentment against the government's failure to
promote speedy socioeconomic change. Granger's
NJAC, radical from the beginning, seemed to move
even further toward a revolutionary position when
the opportunity arose to ride a strong current of
popular discontent. Unlike black radical groups in
most of the rest of the area, the NJAC has made some
effort, thus far without success, to secure coopera-
tive arrangements with non-black groups, in this case
with the large East Indian minority.
10. Elsewhere in the Caribbean, there are other
radical and potentially revolutionary groups, though
none of these has yet been tested in action as has
the NJAC. Most of these groups are small, and few of
them seem to have the advantage of effective leader-
ship. In Jamaica there are several competing groups.
One of them, the African National Union, is led by
Marcus Garvey, Jr., son of the man whose "back-to-
Africa" movement early in this century created some
stir in the United States. Another Jamaican group,
Jama-Youth, calls for revolutionary change and the
exclusion of non-blacks. Still another group in
Jamaica, a semi-religious cult called the New Creation
International Peacemakers Association, is headed by
Claudius Henry, who seems to be trying to use the
group as a springboard to enhanced political influence.
In Guyana, the newly formed Ratoon Group, composed
primarily of radical university students and faculty
members, probably comes close to being a revolutionary
group. It is much smaller, however, than the more
moderate African Society for Cultural Relations with
Independent Africa (ASCRIA). The latter is led by
Sydney King, who has Africanized his name to Eusi
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Kwayana. This group, which has several hundred
members, is influential within the governing polit-
ical party.
11. Black radical organizations draw their
support from a wide variety of sources, and the com-
binations differ from place to place. Branches of
the University of the West Indies in Jamaica, Trinidad-
Tobago, and Barbados are important sources of support
and inspiration. In Bermuda, the most prominent
exponent of radical black positions is Roosevelt Brown,
an opposition member of Parliament. An important
political leader and a former member of the prime
minister's cabinet in Trinidad, A.N.R. Robinson,
may become an important black leader in that country.
In the small island of St. Vincent most of the
educated young people, mainly teachers. and other
civil servants, belong to the Educational Forum of
the People, the island's strongest black-oriented
group.
12. The various Caribbean governments have
reacted in different ways to the black radical chal-
lenge. Following the trouble in Trinidad in April,
many Caribbean governments showed fear, uncertainty,
and then a tendency to crack down hard on potential
troublemakers. Many attribute Prime Minister Eric
Williams' difficulties in Trinidad-Tobago to his
failure to recognize early the threat of black
extremism. Prime Minister Hugh Shearer of Jamaica
stated flatly that if disturbances similar to those
in Port of Spain should erupt in Jamaica, he would
not hesitate to crush them. Prime Minister Barrows
of Barbados has strengthened his country's security
controls and banned a scheduled regional black power
conference. Officials on the islands of Grenada and
St. Vincent have reacted similarly.
13. In Guyana, Prime Minister Forbes Burnham
has sought to maintain a cordial and consultative
relationship with his country's largest "black power"
group, Eusi Kwayana's ASCRIA. The recent series of
rather drastic nationalist economic plans announced
by Burnham were coming anyhow, but the wily Burnham
surely recognizes that they have helped take the wind
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out of some of the black radical demands. In Jamaica,
Barbados, Trinidad-Tobago, and the Bahamas, govern-
ment leaders also seem to be becoming aware of the
political advantage of acceding to some of the
nationalist demands of black pressure groups. The
large US-owned bauxite operations in Jamaica and
Guyana, foreign banks in the Bahamas, and other
foreign interests throughout the area are likely
to be pressed to relinquish some control to local
citizens or governments. Prime Minister Williams
has privately asked that the US give up its remain-
ing assets in the Chaguaramas military base area.
Intra-Regional Ties
14. The growth--however uneven--of black radi-
calism in the Caribbean suggests a definite potential
for development of a regional movement. The four-
day First Regional Black Power Conference, held in
Bermuda in July 1969, may prove to have been a begin-
ning in this direction. The conference was organized
by Bermudan opposition legislator Roosevelt Brown.
Some 1,100 people participated, but about 90 percent
of them were from Bermuda itself. Only about 110
participants, including some 40 from the United
States, represented "black power" groups elsewhere
in the area. Part of the reason for this was the
comprehensive controls imposed by the British. Known
or suspected agitators were prohibited entry to Ber-
muda just prior to and during the conference. Con-
siderable enthusiasm appears to have been generated
at the conference for a continuing regional association,
but the conference seems to have produced few concrete
results, and ties among the disparate "black power"
groups of the area remain very loose.
15. It was decided at Bermuda to hold a Second
Regional Conference in July 1970 in Barbados. The
conference was banned by the Barbadian Government,
however, after the recent disturbances in Trinidad-
Tobago. Conference organizers have decided to re-
schedule it for this autumn and to hold it in the
United States, tentatively in Atlanta, Georgia.
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International Ties--US Black Militants
16. The evidence shows that there is no con-
certed effort by any significant black militant or-
ganization in the United States to control the amorphous
black radical groups in the Caribbean. Black militants
in the United States have provided an inspirational
example to black radicals in the Caribbean, and this,
of course, is stimulated by the heavy Caribbean press
coverage of black militant activities in the US.
Some personal contacts do exist between US and Car-
ibbean "black power" leaders. Thus far,. these con-
tacts do not seem to have resulted in more than
limited guidance and some material support to the
Caribbean groups. These contacts do, however, have
symbolic importance and contribute to the morale of the
Caribbean extremists, while alienating the established
black political leaders.
17. Perhaps the most significant contacts de-
veloped in relation to the Bermuda conference of
July 1969. Roosevelt Brown, the Bermudan organizer
of the conference, had come to the United States in
July 1968 to attend the Third National Black Power
Conference in Philadelphia. At that conference he
proposed that the next such meeting be held in
Bermuda. His suggestion was rejected, but Brown was
appointed Regional Black Power Coordinator for the
Caribbean Area--evidently a recognition of interest
among US blacks in developing contacts in the Carib-
bean. After that, Brown proceeded to organize the
Bermuda conference. In so doing, he contacted var-
ious leaders of the US movement, including the organ-
izers of the US Black Power Conferences. He appar-
ently received some assistance from them. The
Bermuda conference was organized along the lines
of the conferences in the United States, and some
of the literature available in Bermuda was identical
to that used during the US conferences. As noted
above, some 40 participants came from the United
States. In March 1970, Brown was back in the United
States seeking assistance in organizing the Second
Regional Black Power Conference, then scheduled
for July in Barbados.
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18. Another contact of a different--and cov-
vert--nature developed last December and early
January when Geddes Granger, the militant black
leader of Trinidad's NJAC, visited New York and Mont-
real, Canada. Before his departure from Trinidad
on 23 December, Granger said that his
trip would be on "black power business an that he
wanted his travel to be "as clandestine as possible."
After his arrival in New York, Granger contacted the
local branch of the Black Panther Party. He is re-
ported to have asked for financial assistance "to
help bring about a revolution in Trinidad." Report-
edly, he was refused until the NJAC had "proven it-
self worthy of help by creating some serious internal
disturbance in Trinidad." From New York, Granger
went to Montreal, where some West Indian students face
trial for participating in serious riots at the Sir
George Williams University there in February 1969.
After a few days, Granger returned to New York, leav-
ing for Trinidad on 23 January. At a gathering of
NJAC leaders a few days after his return, Granger
stated that the NJAC must "do something" to gain
recognition. The demonstrations, it will be recalled,
began ostensibly in support of the students in Mont-
real but evolved into a violent antigovernment pro-
test movement that nearly toppled the Trinidad-
Tobago Government. Granger was arrested in April
and at last word was still in jail.
19. One point of continuing contact between
US and Caribbean blacks is Professor Cyril L. R.
James, who has been on the teaching staff of Federal
City College in Washington since early this year.
The 69-year-old James, a citizen of Trinidad-
Tobago and long-time resident in England, seems to
be widely regarded among advocates of "black power"
as a learned "elder statesman" of the movement. A
self-styled "independent Marxist," he is a sociolo-
gist and historian and the author of several books.
At the urging of Roosevelt Brown, James delivered
the rousing keynote address at the July 1969 confer-
ence in Bermuda. During his period of residence in
Washington, James has developed contacts with the
Center for Black Education, which is headquartered
here. This organization, in turn, has recently es-
tablished some kind of "working relationship" with
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ASCRIA,.the larger and more moderate of the two
black-oriented groups in Guyana.
20. Other contacts have developed from the
travel of US black leaders to various points in the
Caribbean, although these trips are usually said to
be purely for vacation. There is no evidence, for
instance, that H. Rap Brown's trip to Nassau in Aug-
ust 1968 was for any other purpose. On the other
hand, some of the several Black Panther members who
visited Jamaica in 1969 and 1970 are known to have
distributed their party's literature in Jamaica and
to have tried to proselytize there. Last January,
James Forman, of the Student National Coordinating
Committee (NSCC), was expelled from the French West
Indies for delivering a "racially inflammatory STATOTHR
speech." Another SNCC officer, was
STATOTHR apparentl more discreet during a visit to the same
place in In February 1970, just as the
NJAC demonstrations were getting under way in Trinidad,
two US black militants, Leslie Campbell and Everard
Mason, visited the island and addressed a demonstra-
tion. This led to a charge by the chief of police
that the visiting Americans had tried to foment a
black uprising in Trinidad. There has,. of course,
been some travel to the US by Caribbean militants.
Marcus Garvey, Jr. returned to Jamaica last Septem- 25X1C
25X1C ber after a visit in the United States.
Garvey boast e o
having friends in the US Black Panther Party who
would be willing to help him financially if he deci-
ded to overthrow the Jamaican Government. In April
1970, the British High Commissioner in Barbados
claimed that Eric Sealy, a black Barbadian activist,
was being financed by Black Panther sources in New
York. There is no confirmation of this.
21. The greatest amount of travel by US blacks
has been to Guyana. ASCRIA, the larger and more
moderate black group in Guyana, sponsored (jointly
with the Government of Tanzania) the Pan-African and
Black Revolutionary Conference that was held.in Guyana
in February 1970. Several US militants attended, and
there was a follow-up meeting in New York in late
March. There was talk at both meetings of establish-
ing a permanent secretariat, possibly to be based
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somewhere in the United States. It was agreed that
ASCRIA would edit and publish a Pan-African journal
in association with the Center for Black Education
in Washington, D.C.
22. The most prominent US black militant in
the Caribbean area is Stokely Carmichael, whose
origins in Trinidad-Tobago give him a certain accep-
tance and rapport in the area. (Last March, at the
height of the antigovernment disturbances in Port
of Spain, Carmichael was cheered as "the next prime
minister of Trinidad.") Carmichael's most recent
visit to the area was in May, when he went to Guyana.
This visit, which was sponsored by the radical
Guyanese Ratoon Group, was a mixed blessing to black
radicals. His, speeches, stressing Pan-Africanism
and the separate development of the races, may have
alienated more people than they attracted in Guyana's
multiracial society. On this swing through the
Caribbean, Carmichael was not permitted to visit
Trinidad, and his stop in Barbados was cut short and
heavily controlled by the Barbadian Government. In-
terestingly, one of the men who often appeared with
Carmichael during his appearances in Guyana was
Roosevelt Douglas, a West Indian student who is said
to have been a ringleader of the Montreal riots of
February 1969. Chedi Jagan, Jr., son of the Commun-
-ist.opposition leader, was a leader of the riots. He
has sought to capitalize on these "revolutionary
credentials," but not in any black power sense.
23. The sum of available information suggests
that relationships between US and Caribbean area
black militants are only beginning to develop into
significant contacts that might prove helpful in the
continued development of black radicalism in the
Caribbean. If the Second Regional Black Power Con-
ference is held in the United States next autumn, as
is planned, these ties would in all likelihood become
much closer and of greater value to the Caribbean
militants. US black militant involvement in Carib-
bean affairs would also be likely to increase if the
permanent secretariat for the Pan-African and Black
Revolutionary Conference is set up in the United
States or if it is staffed to a considerable extent
by US blacks.
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International Ties--Cuba and Communists
24. Concrete information is lacking on signi-
ficant Communist ties with black radical groups in
the Caribbean. Some black radical leaders and organ-
izations, such as the Ratoon Group in Guyana, pro-
fess to be Marxist, but certainly are not disciplined
Communists. The leading opposition party in Guyana,
Chedi Jagan's People's Progressive Party, is Commu-
nist-led, but the members are almost wholly East
Indians for whom black radicalism is a racist threat.
Guyanese students have traveled to the USSR on
scholarships, and some have gone to Cuba, but avail-
able evidence does not link these travelers to any
black radical movement. Neither the Soviet Union
nor any other European or Asian Communist country
maintains diplomatic or consular-relations with any
of the Commonwealth, Dutch, or French Caribbean ter-
ritories.
25. Cuba maintains a small consulate in Kings-
ton, Jamaica--the only such Cuban installation in
the Caribbean. At present, the consulate seems to
have only a passive interest in the black radical
movement in Jamaica. The most frequent visitor to
the consulate, Robert A. H. Hill, is apparently in-
volved on the fringes of the Jamaican black radical
movement. Hill, who attended a "cultural congress"
in Havana in January 1968, made an extensive two-
month vist to the United States in April and May of
this year. Purporting to be an authority on "black
power," Hill spoke at a number of US universities
and did research of some kind at various US librar-
ies. But Hill does not appear to be prominent in the
movement in Jamaica or anywhere else. Roosevelt
Brown, organizer of the regional conference in Ber-
muda last July, reportedly made a brief stop in Cuba
in May 1969 when he was seeking support for the con-
ference. Nothing is known to have resulted from his
Cuban visit. Two of the men involved in the regi-
mental mutiny in Trinidad in April, Reginald Lassalle
and Raffique Mohammed Shah, had reportedly received
three weeks of guerrilla warfare training in Cuba
in 1968, but there is no evidence that Cuba had any-
thing to do with the mutiny.
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26. Cuba has not been represented at any reg-
ional meeting on "black power" themes, nor has Cuban
propaganda paid much attention.to such regional
meetings. The Castro government, in fact, seems
anxious to avoid inflaming the "black power" issue,
perhaps because this would hinder Cuba's efforts to
expand diplomatic and commercial contacts in the
region and might create dissidence among Cuba's own
sizable black population. In 1968, when Walter
Carbonell, a Cuban black author and a friend of
Castro's, tried to promote black radicalism in
Cuba, Castro had him arrested and imprisoned. Al-
though Castro gave asylum to Eldridge Cleaver, he
did not permit Cleaver to promote black radicalism
while in Cuba. When Cleaver's presence in Cuba
became generally known, Castro had him sent to
Algeria. There has been occasional contact between
Cuba and the Black Panther organization in the US.
Conclusions
27. Black radicalism in the Caribbean is grow-
ing as a political and social force, especially when it
is contrasted to the stagnant old-style leadership that
is politically dominant in most places. In some
places it may become a threat to political stability,
as it already has in Trinidad-Tobago. The extent to
which black radicals become an important force for
political and social change, however, will depend
on the effectiveness of their leaders and on improved
organization and better finances. In both these two
vital areas, most Caribbean black radical groups are
presently seriously lacking.
28. Much will also depend on the ability of
the local governments in the Caribbean to de-fuse
the social and economic conditions that otherwise
could give radical leaders the mass support most of
them still lack. Some governments are.. already at-
tempting to undermine the potential radical follow-
ing by instituting popular measures of economic
nationalism, but these measures could in time fur-
ther weaken economic and political stability.
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29. Serious efforts to develop a regional
grouping of black radical groups did not begin un-
til last summer at the First Regional Black Power
Conference in Bermuda. The disparate black radical
groups in the Caribbean are'still only very loosely
associated, if at all. Future regional gatherings
are planned, however, and liaison among the various
groups is likely to improve.
30. Ties between black radical leaders in the
Caribbean and their counterparts in the United States
are only beginning to develop. The prospects are
for closer ties, beneficial to the radicals in the
Caribbean.
31. Communist influence, and the influence of
Castro's Cuba, appear from all available evidence to
be negligible factors in Caribbean black radical
affairs at this time, though the opportunity for
playing a role certainly exists.
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