SUGGESTED RESPONSES TO SPECIFICS OF PROXMIRE LETTER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP76M00527R000700230004-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2001
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 1, 1974
• Content Type: PAPER

Approved For Release 2002/01/10 :CIA-RDP76M00527R000700230004-5
SUGGESTED RESPOI~YSE5 TO SPECIFICS OF PROXMIRE LETTER
1. The DCI currently has no power in domestic police and law enforce-
ment matters and the proposal requiring an act of Congress is enforceable by
the Executive Branch only through the Department of ,justice and in no way
involves the authority of the DCI.
2. The proposal does not grant censorship authority to anyone--it
permits the Attorney General to seek a restraining order from a court on
the basis that the conduct to be -restrained is being undertaken by an individual
who, as a condition precedent to his engagement with the Federal Government,
agreed to receive certain information in trust, protect that information and
not to disclose it at his own initiative. Comparable statutes exist in many
fields, e. g., Agriculture--cornmodiL-y information, Census Bureau--confidential
information, Internal Revenue Service--tax information. Moreover, there is
no prior restraint issue present since only the offender who has the relation-
ship of trust with the Government is subject to any of the features of the
proposal--an unauthorized recipient, such as a publisher, is specifically
exempted.
3. The National Security Council would have no role in the operation
of the statute. .
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4. The recognition of my responsibilities under tre National SecuriL?y
Act is appreciated. What is involveu here is a limited and constitutional
sanction to deter the unauthorized disclosure of information which would be
harmful to citizens of the 1.Tnited States and helpful L?o potential enemies, in
keeping with my statutory responsibility.
5. We are a Crovernment of laws and if conduct by a Federal employee
is harmful to the body politic, such conduct should be subject to the sanctions '
of law enacted as a result of deliberative congressional and Executive action
and enforced and adjudicated by the coordinate Executive and Judicial Branches.
This proposal recommends this action.
Passive devices will not solve the problem of unauthorized disclosures.
Every effort is made to assure that those exposed to sensitive intelligence
sources and methods information fully appreciate the need for its protection.
.An Agency employee can be terminated, of course, if he makes an unauthorized
disclosure. But there is no satisfactory way to prevent further disclosures
and the same would apply to other former employees and reL-irees. As a
group CIA employees are dedicated professionals, but as to the disgruntled
or others the controlling factor in the protection of vital sources and methods
information, given the present state of the law, is the individual's personal.
assessment of what best serves the nation's interest.
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6. The National Security- Act imposes a staL-utory responsibility
upon the Director to protect intelligence sources and rnethods. IL? would
only seem to be a logical extension of this responsibility to require tre
Director to notify the Attorney General if impending criminal conduct of a
Federal employee, most likely under L-he Director's jurisdiction, might
endanger sensitive .intelligence sources and methods.
7. The precedent for all of the basic features of this proposal,
including the injunction provision and the absence of burden of proof as in
the case of the espionage statutes, is found in existing law (Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 and the Communications Intelligence statute and the Scarbeck
statute). Moreover, there are countless statutes on the books which subject
the unauthorized disclosure of information received by the Government in
confidence to a criminal penalty. Further, the offending Federal employee's
motivation and the need to prove harm in such cases is most lilcely irrelevant
under the law. .
8. Neither the Agency`s action .vs Marchetti or the provisions of
the proposed legislation involve constitutional rights or prior restraint. The
legal theories involved include contract, secrecy agreements as a condition
of employment and a privity of relationship and confidence with the Federal
Government.
9. See answer to number 7 above.
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10. The Attorney General would be the only officer of the Executive
}3 ranch with authority to institute action under the proposed legislation. Any
individual, including the :,~irector, aware of a violation or intended violation
of any .Federal criYr.inal statute has t'ne responsibility to call that matter to
the attention of appropriate o~fieials.
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