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25X1A -"Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020801-4 CONFIDENTIAL NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES INTERNAL USE ONLY This publication contains clippings from the domestic and foreign press for YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use of selected items would rarely be advisable. NO. 23 4 DECEMBER 1972 Governmental Affairs.. ? ? . Page 1 General . ... ,, 0 .0 . Page 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 Far East. . .? . ? . Page 38 ...? 0 0 Eastern Europe.o o o o no 0 Page 59 0 0 . Western Europe.. . . . . Page 61 ... . 0 . Near East . .0 0 0 0 . 0?? 0 0 . . Page 63 Africa. . . Page 66 . 0 ? 000000000 0 Western Hemisphere.. Page 70 . 0 0 o ? 0 . ? 6 0 Z-4-`-j4 ? CONFIDENTDAL Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4 ? Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4 WASHINGTON POST 10 November 1972 ? era! Cha es By Spencer Rich Washington Post Staff Writer KEY BISCAYNE, Fla., Nov. 9?President Nixort.'s plans for reorganization of the government during his 'second term may reach far beyond the top Cabinet and White House level and affect thousands of jobs deep in the federal bureaucracy, White House aides indicated here today. ? "It's very extensive, there's no question about it," White House press secretary Ronald Before leaving Washington, L. Ziegler told reporters. Mr. Nixon summoned Cabinet Ziegler also said that the officials, White House staffers President's plans on the and other top officials to meetings at which he remind-, ed them their traditional res- ignations were in order. White House assistant H. It. (Bob) Haldeman is said to have reminded officials at the Meetings that they serve "at the pleasure of the President," and asked them to keep their resignations short?not flow- put the number of potential forced resignations at well over 2.000. "whiile matter of restructur- ing and reorganization during the second term" will be "quite far along by mid-De- cember ... he will be well along with this before the Congress convenes." Ziegler said that wherever legally possible, organizational changes will be made under the President's own powers, ery. without asking the assent of Mr. Nixon is said to have Congress. thanked the officials for their Ziegler initially announced efforts in his administration on Wednesday that top presi- and his re-election cam- dential appointees had been paign. He asked at least one group for their descriptions of the job each was doing, to- gether with recommendations as to how the job might 'evolve or a description of another post the staffer. Might want. Leading officials have al- ready begun requesting subor- jobs, the changes wouldn't ex- asked to submit pro-forma res- ignations to give Mr. Nixon reorganizational freedom. The announcement had left the im- pression that, while the Presi- dent might be planning a major shakeup of some Cabi- net offices and sub-Cabinet tend much beyond that. However, ? Ziegler empha- sized today that resignations had been requested not only of Cabinet , members and White House staff, as well as 'sub-Cabinet-level presidential appointees like under secretar- ies, assistant secretaries and some bureau chiefs, but also "all Schedule C (personnel), those who receive an appoint- ment by a department head or a Cabinet member." There are some 1,400 to 1,800 persons In Schedule C lobs?non-career political, pol- icy-making and , Confidential appointees distributed among the departments. , Usually they are replaced climates to prepare the resigna- tion letters. One such meeting was held' at the State Department on: Wednesday, where Secretary . William P. Rogers asked that all his top aides hand in the fro-forma resignation docu- ments. Further, State Department spokesman Charles Bray said today in Washington that Rog- ers had asked senior officials for ideas on how to promote promising younger officers to positions of responsibility. ????, As to Rogers' own plans, that is a matter between the Secretary and Mr. Nixon, Bray Said. % Similar requests for twig.' only when 'the Cabinet mem- /fattens were passed on by her whn appointed t h e m other Cabinet officers to pout- leaves or when a new Presi- teal ? appointees within ? their dent takes office. These 1,400 ' departments. to 1,800, coupled with direct ??:, Ziegler emphasized today presidential appointees and , ill, at absolutely no decisions 1 White House aides who have i had yet been made on what, been asked to leave,Apitific;evernerg afenalea W.91114 h, , e or e ease 2uu1/0-8707 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4 horganized or 'which of the Viousands of resignation let- ters would actually be ae- eepted by the President . "It goes beyond individuals. It's a change of form," he told teporters. "No decisions have been made." However, he said Mr. Nixon fiad been meeting with top sides on the reorganization problem and will be meeting again late today with two of his top White House assist- into, Haldeman and John Ehr- Iichman. "He intends to go through a very intensive as- sessment leading to reorgani- ation and restructuring dur- ing the second term," said Zie- gler. Ziegler said that after the President returns to Washing. ton from his home here, he will be holding a series of meetings with Cabinet mem- bers into December to get their thinking, and then will start formulating his deci- sions. "He has asked department heads, Cabinet heads, mem- bers of the White House staff to provide him with their thoughts." The objective, said Ziegler, is more efficient gov- ernment. Ziegler said many of the changes will be of a nature. that can be put into effeet by, the President himself, without; requiring submission to Con- gress, while others might re- quire congressional assent. He said the Office of Manage- ment and Budget is preparing a study to show the areas where the President can act by himself. "Where the Presi- dent can within the frame- work of existing leislation make changes by executive ac- tion, I assume he probably will," Ziegler said. He noted that Mr. Nixon had already sent some reorg- anization requests to Congress two years ago. None passed. These called for reorganiza- tion of the Interior, Com- merce, Labor, Housing? Health, Education and Wel- fare, Agriculture and Trans... portation departments?seven agencies in all.:?into five new, agencies: . Agriculture, Na- tural Resources, Community, nity Development, ? Human Re!: sources, Economic Affairs. Many of the changes recom-. mended by Mr. Nixon under that plan were first proposed,' two decades ago by a govern- ment reorganization commis- sion headed by former Presi- dent Herbert Hoover. On other matters, Ziegler denied "ns a matter of absolute fact" that General Motors Chief Edward Cole had 'peen offered the job of Secretary of Defense The present Secretary of Defense, Melvin R. Laird, and Secretary of Housing George Romney, are two Cabi- net members who had long been expected to ask that their resignations be accepted once Mr. Nixon was re-elected.; The President conferred. : with Sen. Henry M. Jacksoni (D-Wash.), leading to specula- tion that it was abbut Jack- son's becoming Defense Sec- retary. Mr. Nixon offered Sen. Jackson the job in 1968 and the senator turned it down. Jackson had left for Europe and could not be reached for comment.; . ' Ziegler also said there IS "no foundation" to reports, that former Attorney General; John N. Mitchell had advised, Mr. Nixon to fire the presenti Attorney General, Richard; Kleindienst. "As far as 1 know; he has not talked to or con-1 : I suited John Mitchell on thisi , ? i Ziegler also released a sum-i mary of the April 1972 report' of the Board of Visitors to thel U.S. Military . Academy, con- eluding, "The Academy is car- rying out its mission in a supe-:' nor' manner." The report re, 'commended more tenure Postt1 for Academy instructors, adOed pay for permanent pro4 fessors, and a modern hospitall for the Academy-. subject," said Ziegler. ? Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4 WASHINGTON POST 11 November 1972 !Nixon Assessing Fi reign Policy Agencies By Spencer Rich Washington Post Staff Writer KEY BISCAYNE, Fla., Nov.. 10?President Nixon has begun a major reassessment of the functions of all U.S. foreign * policy agencies, the White . House announced here today. . Deputy press secretary. Ger-' Aid L. Warren told reporters, , that the key question is the interrelationship between the State Department, which deals with foreign policy only, and other agencies such as the Treasury and Commerce de- ? partments that deal primarily. with other matters t ut also .have considerable, influence. over foreign policy questions. ; , Warren said, "It's a review . of the basic organization and i relations ... it involves organ- , ization. budget, personnel?all along the line." Warren said Henry A. Kis- singer. the President's assistan' for national security, affairs,, ha& met with White House, :aides H. R. Haldeman and John' ? Ehrlichman "into the night": Thursday on "the foreign pol- icy structure." Neither Secre- tary of State William P. Rogers', nor any other State Depart- ment representative was pre- Sent., Kissinger, Haldeman and Ehrlichman were part of the . presidential party that flew . here Wednesday for a stay of several days at the President's. Key Biscayne retreat. The foreign policy review is part of a broader reassessment of the functions of all federal agencies that Mr. Nixon has or- dered to start off his second term. "The basic thing we're talking about is how to make WASHINGTON POST 12 November 1972 government operate better," i said Warren, In order to give himself al free hand to realign functions and get rid of personnel un- responsive to his policies, the President has demanded that ? all persons holding direct pres- idential appointments to fed- eral jobs, and all persons ap- pointed to Schedule C jobs by Cabinet and agency heads sub- mit pro-forma resignations. - : Warren emphasized again that no -decisions ? had been ? - The problem of foreign pol- icy coordination in recent years has been a substantial one. Although the State De- partment traditionally is the arbiter of overseas and diplo- matic policy, other agencies, have enormous influence over foreign policy and the White House has increasingly taken a direct role in foreign policy through such powerful aides as Kissinger, who has been the President's chief negotiator on Vietnam affairs. Decisions made by the Treasury Department on inter-1 national currency matters, by the Commerce Department on I trade matters, by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Agency for Inter- national Development, the De- fense Department and the Ex- port-Import Bank may have as much or more impact on the U.S. image and real position in the world as anything the State Department does at a given time. The ealignment of Western currencies forced by the United States on Treas- ? ury recommendation after the August 1971 economic crisis, for example, was a foreign, policy act of the most critical nature. The objective of the foreign policy reassessment, Warren indicated, is to obtain better coordination and execution of broad foreign policy questions. Warren said Mr. Nixon had met with Haldeman this morn- ing to discuss various matters and had talked on the phone with Kissinger. He said Gen. Alexander Haig, Kissinger's deputy who has just arrived in Saigon, is 'expected ' be& In 'Washington "sometime this iweekend." He refused to dis- made yet on which of the res- ignations would actually be ac- cepted, or what plans for re- organization would actually be adopted. White House, press secretary Ronald L. Ziegler said Thursday' that the Presi- dent's thinking on these mat- ters would be "quite far along" by mid-December. Warren said that he couldn't quarrel very much with news- paper estimates that the total of persons required to submit Pro-forma letters of resigna-. ton was about 2,000, although he said this might be a?bit high. It is estimated that at least 1,400 to 1,800 persons', hold Schedule C jobs alone, Warren said letters of resig- nation aren't being requested of 'regulatory agency ,Appoint, esawith fixed tenni-es, but he believed they are being sought from "Foreign Service officers at home -and abroad if an- pointed by the President" and all U.S. attorneys. Warren said the President "will operate within the con- fines of existing legislation" and "intends to make use of all the machinery available to the federal government to :make it more efficient." Cols n lasts atergate By Peter Washington Post KENNEBUNKPORT, Maine, Nov. 11 ? Charles W. Colson, special counsel to President Nixon, tonight denounced the reporting of the Watergate case by The Washington Post as "unconscionable," and said that its impact was to "erode somewhat public confidence In the institutions of govern- ment," In a speech to the SocietY of New England editors meeting here, Colson said, "The charge of subverting the whole politi- cal process, that is a fantasy, a work of fiction rivaling only ost orts Osnos Sts f t Wril 'Gone With the Wind' in cir culation and 'Portnoy's Corn plaint' for indecency." ? Colson, one of the Presi- dealt with The Washington "Speaks to the press. He said that his remarks tonight were the first he had ever delivered to a group of newspaper edi- The bulk of the remarks dealt Wittli The Post, and Colson singled out Executive Editor Benjamin C. Bradlee for special criticism. He said that "Mr. Bradlee now sees himself as the self-ap- pointed leader of what Bos- 2 ton's own Teddy White [Theo- dore White, author of "The Making of the President" hooks] describes as the tiny fringe of arrogant elitists who infect the healthy mainstream of American journalism with their own peculiar view of the world." Colson, as other leading Re- publican did before the elec-, tion, linked The Washington Post's reporting of the we- were its "liberal" ties to George McGovern. He said; "The Post, I be- Veattittft heffteis (51 moo@ McGovern did that he was in. deep political trouble with re- spect to the real issues of the '72 election. . . . "So The Post, on its own 1 cuss the contents of a litteri which news stories had said Haig was carrying to South Yl etnamese President Nguyen: Van Thieu and said he had' "no information" on whether Kissinger will be leaving shortly for Paris or Hanoi. , Returning to the reorganiza,e thin theme, Warren said sto. ries that the President's reaS-, sessment of government func-1 tions is designed "to arrogate more power to the President"' aren't correct. "That's not the, case at all," said Warren. "The' reason for this reassessment la to make government work bet- ter." Report on Academy On . another matter, the White House released a sum- mary of the April 1972 report of the Board of Visitors to the U.S. Air Force Academy. ,?A similar summary on the U.S. Military Academy had been released a day earlier. The Air Force report called the cadet honor code "a viable working , part of cadet life," but called for care "to insure that the in- dividual rights of cadets un- dergoing investigation under the honor code be scrupu- lously protected." Higher pay,' for permanent professors, and improved runway and storage areas were also recommended., The report also recom- mended that if the constitu tional amendment requiring equal rights for women is ap-; proved by the necessary '38 states, "the Air Force be pre- pared to comply. . . and that planning for the admission of women be based on the prem., Ise that existing admission, and graduation standards be maintained." initiative, began a daily-Page 1 attack on the administration." He said that if McGovern wished to raise the Water- gate case, "then it was fair, enough for him to talk about t. What I do think is uncon- scionable is the way in which some elements of the media: . . . reprinted and eventually reported as fact that which Indeed was not fact." He said the "tragedy of The Post's handling of the Water; gate affair is that the net int' pact was probably to erode- adtrieWittit Militia Confidence in .the inatitutions Of eflaslettlelito and it also eroded as well the :confidence of a lot of fair.' 'minded persons in the ()Wee; ,tive reporting of The Wash.., ington Post." Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4 71, Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4 NEW YORK TIMES 16 November 1972 2A. on a By Anthony Lake and Leslie H. Gelb ? WASHINGTON ? The hoped-for Vietnam settlement, if it materializes, would be a triumph of personal diplomacy. It could only have been accomplished by Henry Kissinger , working with the President alone. But, will the President draw the wrong lessons from this experience, as Well, as from his Moscow and Peking "tri? umphs," about how to make policy? Whether or not these breakthroughs could have been achieved in a dif- ferent manner, the question for the future is how they can be transformed into the stuff of everyday poliey. This Will require the inclusion of the for-, eign affairs bureaucracy in the Presi- dent's plans. Who really knows what President Nixon and Mr. Kissinger are up to? : For three years, scholars, journalists,: legislators ? and even the President's own national security bureaucracy? have debated? the meaning of the Nixon Doctrine. Is it simply a guise ? to continue the same old world-police- man policies, a kind of cut-rate cold war? Is it a genuine effort to redefine' our world interests and refrain from military involvement in the Third*, World? Is it an attempt to construct' a "new alliance system" based on five major powers? If so, does it make' any sense to expect Japan and West- ern Europe to play the same kind of political-military role in the world as the United States, Russia and China? 'Who is privy to the Nixon-Kissinger , game plan? Who can carry on and, avoid "the petrification of the inter- national system"? Certainly not the State Department. When the Russians seemed to threaten making the Cuban port of Cienfuegos a, base for nuclear missile-firing subs, it was ? Kissinger who reportedly worked out secret arrangements with Soviet diplomats. When the SALT WASHINGTON POST 12 November 1972 And t hi e ta- By Murrey Marder Washington Post Staff Writer The following column ap- peared in Saturday editions. of The Washington Post with several paragraphs trans- posed or omitted. The com- plete, corrected story follows: "Some friction" is bound to exist between the White House national security ad- , viser and the State Depart. Mont, President Nixon ff. nally has said with refresh- ; ing candor. A degree of friction and "competition," the President (VI e" the Stat' Department talks sputtered, the President and Mr. Kissinger stepped in to bargain di- rectly with the Russians. The. China gambit has been. entirely their show, like the Vietnam negotiations. And so; :it goes down the line with every; major 'foreign policy issue. ? These moves may be counted as personal successes. But what about the professional? in the State Depart- ' ment who have to deal with these' issues on a day-to-day basis and who' will be around long after the '"mas- ters" have gone? They have been left. ? out in the cold. If they are not given, .to understand the underpinnings of: ,the Nixon-Kissinger diplomacy andaf, they are not brought to accept its 'wisdom, they will purposefully or in-, ?advertently undermine that diplomacy, 'in the future. ? Neither is the Defense Department: in a position to carry on. While the: 'President and Mr. Kissinger easily, ,have grasped the mantle of diplomacy from State, they have not begun to ;exercise control over Defense. The ,time requirements for personal di- . plomacy have 'left no time to watchl ',over Secretary Laird's department. Military officers in Vietnam can' : carry out sustained bombing 'raids, over North Vietnam without apparent ;authority to do so. And believing that, :massive spending on new weapons systems is necessary to his foreign policies, the President has failed to: exercise close control over the Defense' budget. What we' therefore appear to ? have is the confusing prospect of a peacetime foreign policy and a War- 'time defense budget. ' Nor is the Congress able or willing to provide institutionalized support .for the Nixon-Kissinger policies. The' Congress remains a multiheaded body with such diverse views and levers of power that it cannot be expected to lead. So far, the Congress has been' awed and cowed by the foreign policy successes of the Nixon Administration. But underneath, many Congressmen onse are mistrustful. Key Congressional committees have sought in vain to establish regular contact with Mr. Kissinger to find out what he is doing.', Secretaries Laird and Rogers will not do. Without a routine basis of consul.' tation with the "master," irritated Congressional leaders are bound to: lay in wait for a foreign policy failure on which to pounce. It is that time of year when in the headiness of landslide victory at the polls, the President will let little things,', like avoiding the "petrification" of% the system fall through the cracks. More than a reshuffling of Presidential, appointees is needed. If the President. and Mr. Kissinger believe that much, of what they have done is worth pre- serving, they should start institutionall; izing their policies now. These months; present an important opportunity to reveal and reinforce their vision. ' At the least, key assistant secre- taries and desk officers at the State Department should be briefed by the. White House on what has been with- held from them, given a chance to discuss the issues, and?most impor-; tantly?drawn into implementation 0f. the President's policies: The President and Mr. Kissinger should also question the assumption that higher defense spending is neces-? sary to a "generation of peace." In, fact, it will undercut it. Big power distrust thrives on spiraling defense, 'spending, as well as vice versa. While, :the President and his adviser devote' their time to personal diplomacy, in creased military spending will rein-3 )force superpower suspicions and con', fuse the American bureaucracy and' public about their leaders' goals. ' -"Leslie IL Gelb Was director of policy., :planning and arms,control in the De-, fense Department, and is now a senior fellow at, the Brookings Institution.. ,.. .Anthony Lake worked on the staff of .,Henry A. Kissinger. fare in June 1970. At the start of the Nixon administration there was an outside chance that the for- eign policy-making offices might function construc- tively with dynamic Henry IL A. Kissinger at the White House and genial Bill Rog- ers at State, if State had a strong man to run the de- partment with Rogers serv- ing, as the role has been de- scribed, as the President's trusted chief lawyer in for- eign affairs. Kissinger and Richardson,; who comes out of the Boa-, ton brahmin strain of intel- lectualism, respected each. other, worked together well. State was hopeful of devel- oping an institutional input in shaping policy, with no question, of course, about who was\ on top. The Na- tional Oecurity 'Council web of latithoPitv aor000 the ernment was controlled, as went on to say in his recent Health. Educatipn and We6-6 President Nixon intended, 1 Interview, "is not unhealthy," because out of constructive competition more effective foreign policy can emerge. Indeed it can. The reality, however, is that there has been friction without competition be- tween the White House and State Department for nearly three years, The State De- partment virtually has bean. out of the game since Elliot L. Richardson left se Statat, No. 2 man to become Secre- tary of the Department of ? in the White House, with Kissinger holding the strings. Rogers was not a nonent- ity. Indeed, his non-ideologi-, cal outlook on the world probably was far more sup- portive of President Nixon's turnaround on U.S. policy toward China, and the gen- eral abandonment of "con- frontation" in place of "ne- gotiation," than ever has been credited to Rogers. The vital No. 2 post at State vacated by Richardson, was filled by Rogers' nomi- nee, John N. Irwin II. Rog- ers wanted a quiet-working deputy; Irwin has been al- most unnoticeable in the post of Under Secretary. ? Rogers often has scoffed at the talk of "low morale" In the State Department, saying that has been elairned almost since the de- partment came into exist- ence, That hi corred au a Mooting', tna point of the present dismay.. Franklin D. Roosevelt often Approved For Release 2 /08/07 : cIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4 Approved V4oArsINER)g 24E08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4 24 AV vezber 1972 expressed despair with the State Department; John F. Kennedy called it "a bowl of jelly," and so on. The Nixon administration entered office with a double legacy of suspicion. Presi- dent 'Nixon was Vice Presi- dent in the Eisenhower ad- ministration, in which Rog- ers was Attorney General. In 1969 State was still trying to recover from the gaping wounds inflicted upon It during the Eisenhower ad- ministration from the bu- reaucratic terrorism of the McCarthy era. Still Crucial . Rogers attempted to allay the mutual disquiet. He commissioned a soul-search- ing study with the depart- ment on the bureaucratic couch for self-analysis. It cencluded, among other things, that "the role of top leadership in stimulating creativity is crucial." That le still true. The State Department to- day has tumbled Into de- spair. As one official said In the depths of frustration,: ,"We are something like! American Express?but without its prestige." Part of the slide was prob- ably inevitable under Presi- dent Nixon's style of opera-. tion, In which "so many inie tiatives . . . had to he tinder- Olken at the preeldential level.", The President's and Rog- ers' determination to pre- vent, above all, any State. news "leaks," has succeeded admirably; the department rarely knows anything worth leaking. Top officials, for example, were humiliat- ingly unaware for years of the secret Kissinger-Le Due Tho talks which began in 1969; even today most do not know what is in the draft Vietnamese peace plan, except for what, is in the press. Kissinger had told many associates he is very seri- ously concerned about the need to repair this damage in President Nixon's second term, and to help. "institutionalize" the future conduct of foreign policy. It Is ludicrous, Kissinger hair. said, to portray him, as: some crities do, as "despising" the Foreign Service, for the majority of Kissinger's staff is drawn from it. So everyone, pre- ' sumably, accepts the prob- lem. All that is still needed ? is a solution. Ms Time &69 Look .0 the CM By Stephen S. Roserafeliali MR. HELMS, director of the Central Intel- ligence Agency, was publicly summoned to Camp David this week to participate in what the White House terms its "major" reassess- , ment of the American foreign policy struc- ture. If his summons indicates that the United States' large secret intelligence es- tablishment is to undergo the same ExeCti- tive scrutiny being accorded the agencies , which operate more in the public eye, then . this is welcome and important news. Before saying more, I should perhapS' state that I am not one of those journalists with a close discreet working relationship with the CIA; for purposes of this article I . requested an on-the-record interview with Helms or his chosen representative and; did not receive one., It would seem self-evident, however, that is the United States moves from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiation, from ? ? a time when Russia and Communism were ' widely perceived as terribly menacing to a . ? time when' both the country and the Ideol- ogy are increasingly regarded as adequately ? neighborly, then the role, of the CIA has got '. to be reviewed. . ? Now, obviously a great nation must have a professional intelligence service. The imper- . atives of defense, not .to say elementary prise dence, demand it. A ease eini even be mado that a certain kind of technological Weill- , gence Is more essential in a period of in- cipient detente?In order to supply policy : makers and their publics with the assurance , they need in order to enter into 'new agree- ments with old adversaries. THE SALT-I agreement apparently is uni- ? que in granting explicitly each side's right to lob intelligence satellites over the other's ? territory to count missiles, tests and so on. ? Presumably satellites would be similarly useful in verifying and in nourishing public confidence in any shifts made as a result of , the forthcoming European force reduction talks. In all cease-fire situations, Mideast, Indochina or what-have-you, intelligence, can be vital. In at least two areas, however, intelli- gence needs review: for "dirty tricks" and ? .for its secrecy. ? The act of 1947 setting up the CIA sped-' . fled that, in addition to intelligence duties, It was to perform, "such other functions" as , the National Security Council might direct.., ? A "plans division!' was set up in 1951. Most CIA directors, including Helms, have come : up through Plans. The group seems to have .been active, and conspicuously so, through the 1950s, toppling uncooperative govern- ments, harassing wayward Communists,' ' etc. The whole atmosphere was permissive: It was President who ate up the James Bond books who let the Plans Division or-, ?...?ganize Cuban exiles (and a few Americans): to Invade at the Bay of Pigs. 4 It is now murmured around town thateh deputy director for Plans, an old Helm! ' matt, operates on a much tighter leash,: (doing no mhre, it is said, than the Republee cans are alleged to have done to the" Democrats); that the old problems of policy' :control and separation of intelligence from. operations are in hand; that the small and weak countries which once were the CIA'ife playgrounds are no longer so vulnerable to; its deeds. At the same time, one hears that the Pres-,: ident's old anti-Communist juices have not.. altogether stopped fermenting, and that he, receives and is responsive to reports time the Russians Still play some Pretty rottopl tricks and, by golly, we ought to show thine ,? they can't do that to us and get away with it.,4 WHATEVER THE TRUTH, I would sub-2 mit that the time is ripe for the Congress toe review the dirty-tricks mandate it gave to': the CIA a quarter-century ago as the cold I; war was beginning to dominate the Asneri-1 can outlook on the world. It is Inconsistent,e at the least, that the State Departmentit should now be zeroing in on measures tol combat "international terrorism" while the CIA retains a capacity to practice certain forms of it. Cuba's continuing lack of loveJ for the CIA, restated in its bid for hijacking talks last week, underscores, the point. ? ? ?ee. Secrecy is something else. No one who acei cepts the need for intelligence would argtie.i " that the whole process and products shouldi be made public. But no one concerned with the health of democracy can accept that con-1 dition with equanimity. The general sense o2.1 being at war with communism since World# War II has produced a far more secretIvel ; government than we would want or tolerate% in other times. With that sense of 'being at ' war danger fading, the rationale or spur for;. .1 secrecy diminishes accordingly. There la fur-.1 titer the claim that. the 8(!crety the CIA may have undermined the larger ) job of conducting a wise policy, I.e., one well discussed and debated. ? ee This is the principal basis on which iSente- tor Cooper earlier this year proposed that4 the relevant act be amended to give the forei eign relations and defense committees off,- ,both houses access to the information and4 analysis obtained by the CIA?exactly as.theq Atomic Energy Commission has given such; secret material for decades to the Jointe Committee on Atomic Energy. Preclietablye the President objected. The Foreign Rela-i tions Committee approved 'the proposed! amendment; the Armed Services Committeee otherwise preoccupied, did not act on it. Cooper is retiring but Senator Symington,, who has his own sense of the need to assert': the Congress' foreign policy responsibilities and his own record of concern for Improvinge congtessional oversight of the CIA, may be, prepared to receive the torch! He's No. 2 on Armed Services, too. ? A ? The CIA is out of the news these days. Itu usually gets into the news only when it fouls'i up. But a lot more about its place in the new; bureaucratic and international scheme ofe things ought to be known. Whether the- CIA's activities are all essential and whethere they are all organized efficiently are ques-e tions which a responsible Congress shoulde not want to leave to a Chief Executive hud- dling privately out, in . the woods at Camp David. Approved For Release 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4 WASHINGTON STAR 19 November 1972 go Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4 ;> ter a while that it is A good thing to enter into the life of the republic." A National Committee of Action for Peace and Con- cord, was created by the government Nov. 3 to carry out the government's prepa- rations for A cease-fire. Many of the Influential po- intent figures in Phnom Penh, including former Pre- miers Sisowath Sink Matax and Son Ngne Thanh, have lent it at least their nominal support, in a show of Khmer Lon Nol issued a procla- ? matfett on Nov. 4 in which he said that "circumstances are favorable for a union of hearts and spirits in the re- public .. Let all Khmers know that our National Committee for Peace and :Concord was born to wel.,! 'come everyone."' To his critics, who in- clude many foreign diplo- matic observers as well as his 'domestic opponents, this -is typical of the lofty pro- nouncements and ineffec. , tual appeals that character-1 ,ize the Lon Nol government; and does little to cope with, the reality of -'the Khmer' 'Rouge. In their opinion, the chief; obstacle facing the. Khmer ? . Rouge is its own lack of co- hesion and failure to' unite, behind a single leader, not; anything being done by the Phnom Peng government. AR viewed by these ann. lysts, the Khmer Rolle? 10' .'nnt A single force but cone sist,s of Sihanoukists seeking-, . his return from exile in Pe- . 'king, dedicated Marxist ide- ologues trained in Hanoi,, some genuine idealists and anti-corruption reformers,,' and just plain bandits. Nevertheless, many ob.', servers here believe the goy- . ernment faces a formidable' task in putting down the in- ? surgency and regaining its ; control over the country Side, even after North Viet- namese troops leave. For, one thing, there see large of OW vottfilo, w@iiv4 ganized and following new economic models after years portant fighting force but of Communist occupation. are only disorganized, noni Accommodations, if not alli- ances, have been made be- 149 Approve-d-F-or Release -Mt/08W . A=RDP77410432R0011100020001 -4 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4 tween the rulers of these areas and persons in govern- ment-held areas who find such arrangements useful.. Rubber and tobacco, for example,, are being prod- uced on farms in the Com- munist-controlled areas and marketed in cities under government control. In addition, the Khmer Rouge have developed, by some accounts, an effective fighting force. that may he capable of challenging the Cambodian army on its own. Reliable troop strength figures are difficult to ob- tain, but generally the Americans estimate the Cambodian army at 170,000, a figure regarded by other Western analysts as too high. Khmer Rouge armed strength is put at about 40,- 000. But the government's figures include support troops, such as transport. and supply units, some ana- lysts point out., while those for the Khmer Rouge do not, so the fighting strengths may be more nearly equal than the fig- ? ures indicate. "Some of the biggest oper- ations of this war have been mostly Khmer Rouge," one American said. 'The ques- tion is whether they could keep it up without direct North Vietnamese support." ? . One thing on which there' is general agreement here among government officials, opposition politicians and foreign observers is that the prospects for a return by Si- hanouk dwindle with each day the republic remains in power. But Sihanouk contin- ues to operate a government in exile, based in Peking, and to shop around the world for support for his claim to he the legitimate ruler of Cambodia. This has forced the Phnom Penh government to open a kind of third front, the diplomatic front, to go with its political and mili- tary -efforts. Representatives of Lon Nol's government, particu- larly Foreign Minister Long Borest, have been making' intensive efforts to establish diplomatic relations with. countries that have no in- trinsic importance to Cam- bodia but do have votes in the United Nations. Costa Rica and El Salva- dor recently agreed to set up relations with the Lon Nol government, the official news agency announced last week, and ? negotiations are going on with Guatemala. Gahnn, on the other hand, recently recognized Siha- nouk, an event, attribtiled by no i,t formed ell pi nrri attel source here to the fact that "Sihanouk's man got there first. Lon Nol had a men?on his way when it was an- nounced." JAPAN TIMES 12 November 1972 Sol Sanders A Sense a., Asi iTies Between Asians, Americans Not Like13i to Lessen: 14 HONG KONG ? There is an intimate relation between the American presidential elections this year and developments in Asia ? seemingly, more por- tentous than in past elections over almost two decades. It is not that the choice for the American voters between Mr. Nixon and Mr. McGovern involved a make-or-break deci- sion. Even were the outcome in less doubt than seemed ap- parent, the long-term itnplica- tions of American policies and events stretch' out far beyond the difference between -the two candidates dismissed in the heat of a highly partisan debate. Truth is that Mr. McGovern would have found, as all opposi- tion candidates for power in any society or Political system, that his alternatives once in the saddle were a good deal narro- wer than when viewed by' a dis- mounted rider. That, in pert at least, explains much of the in- creasing conservatism of ? Mr. ,McGovern's statements as the election deadline neared. What is crucial for Asia is the direction, and drift, of Ameri- can policies which is unlikely to be more than modulated by the American President after the election. And it is on that theme ? where American pol- icy in' Asia is headed ? that the election milestone gives us occasion to pause and reflect. Perhaps one should begin with the obvious: ?The relations of Asians and the Americans' are not really likely, to lessen in the coming decades. Controversial Position That may come as an ex- tremely controversial, position .against the backdrop of the Nixon Doctrine and' the almost universally held thesis, both in Asia and the U.S., that America is withdrawing from the Asian scene. I say that American-Asian re- lations will continue to be ex- tensive and intensive because of two situations which are vir- tually apolitical in Origin if not in result. ,The U.S. economy, still grow- ing at an enormous clip (in con- crete terms) despite its prob- lems of balance of payments and reordering of priorities, is likely to continue to be all im- portant for most Asian pr4luc- ers. The American maw will, in fact, chew up even more of the world's raw Materials and oth- er produce in the years ahead. It is hard to see how given any scenario in the next decade' or so ? except total economic paralysis or nuclear holocaust ? this factor will not' be a ma- jor determinant in the Asian scene. More debatable, but I feel equally important, is the role the U.S. plays as the avant- garde of modernization in the Asian scene. China may 'continue to, wear the blue suits of Communist or- thodoxy for years to come. But for most of the Asian world, U.S. fashions ? from clothing to intellectual: fads .? is likely to be the pacesetter. ? Whatever else George Mc, Govern's candidacy was, it.was profoundly the eXpression, this mood. His program comes out of those strains ot Amen- can history that produced the periodic populist explosion, the know-nothing-ism, the Bryan- ism, the Isolationists of the 1930s. It is a full blown emel? tional retreat from dealing with. the cares of the non-American, an attempt to return to home- spin virtues of a less COM- plicated world. Alas! That. world no longer exists ? either for the. Asians or the Ameri- cans. Hidden Persuaders The Americans with their vast- resources and weight in world attitudes, for better or for worse, are "hidden per- suaders" on the world scene. It is the U.S. news magazines who have set the pattern for much ? of what is printed today. Amer, jean food processors are ? for better or worse -- changing the diets of the world. Jeans are al- most as popular in Indonesia as in Tokyo as in Dallas. Ameri- can TV techniques, book pub- lishing, physical Mobility, and even methods of education (the explosion of institutions of high- er learning, textbooks, audio- visual aids) have when not been the pattern, the antithesis toward which foreign education- al and cultural programs have worked. The U.S. is swinging into one of its periods of intended isola- tionism?in a cycle as old as the country itself. It is rein- forced by a profound and naive disenchantment ? with 25 years of international economic aid giving which has produced relatively so little, ? with the bitter wars in Korea and Viet- nam ? with criticism which fluctuates from venomous ha- tred to boisterous raillery from "the otitsisle world.'! U.S. Activities Underlying all this emotional withdrawal is the hard fact of' the U.S. balance of payments. which I believe is with the world economy at least 'until' the end of this decade. It is: producing the kind of 'con- straints and restrictions on American overseas enterprise and cultural activities that have inhibited every other country (save Switzerland) for most of the post-World War II period.' : The days of American open- handedness for foreign cultural subsidies, however self-serving, are probably over ? at least for a while. 'That means that Asia's prob- lems are no longer the U.S.'_ ? except as solutions are products of the pursuit ,of exclusively American goals. Studies of problems of population control, agricultural productivity, re-. medies for pollution and traffic congestion, may lap over and help those Asian cultures which\ can absorb them. The U.S. will, not play a role relative to its size and power. It could be said that it wai ever thus. Certainly, the results of many of the American in- tended solutions to Asian prob. lems were often less than fruit- ful. Yet, at least for this observ- er, it is a sobering thought that. with the enormous problems ahead, Asia will be facing them with at best limited access to American resources ? what- ever their shortcomings hate been in the past. The licat.no, of thoso hO- got tat tons for Cambodia was underscored last. week when Senegal challenged the ere. dent ials of the cm-rent gov- ernment's U.N. delegation. The resolution failed, hut its Very Introduction mon0 res minder to Cambodia?mitten Is heavily dependent on U.N. assistance in several .fields?that the omena can still be read either way. Approved For Release 2001/08* : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4 ? Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001.-4 WASHINGTON STAR 15 November 1972 eds By TAMMY ARBUCKLE Star4Vm5 Speclid CmTcspondent PHNOM PENH, Cambodia? The war in Cambodia is go- ing well for the North Viet- namese, who have succeeded in completely restoring their Vietnam war sanctuaries in eastern Cambodia, informed military sources say. The sanctuaries are now at the same level they were in 1970 when they were invaded by American and South Viet- namese forces, the sources say, and the North Vietnam- ese military position is even better than at that time. This leads to the belief that the North Vietnamese are not presently interested in a Cam- bodian cease-fire. Since the allied invasion of Cambodia the North Vietnam- ese have gained control of Cambodian towns such as Stung Treng and Kratie on the Mekong River and now control all of the east bank of the Me- kong River in Cambodia apart from one or two small towns such as Svay.Rieng where the Cambodians are bottled up and kept inactive. The North Vietnamese also hold the border areas of South Vietnam contingous to Cam- bodia, a bonus from this year's communist offensive in South Vietnam. 'Going Full Blast' "The military situation here Is bad," an informed military source said "I don't like to be pessimistic but it's difficult' to find 'anything good. The sanctuaries are going full blast. The stuff is moving out of the big rubber plantations at Chu!) and down Highway 15 into the Seven Mountains and other places in South Viet- nam. It is coming from Laos down the Meking by Kratie." Some communist supplies are moving even onto the Me- kong's west bank, bypassing Kompong T ho m, swinging west around Phnom Penh, then east again across the Me- kong into South Vietnam. Informed military sources say the North Vietnamese are drawing on the Cambodian countryside which they and their Cambodian allies control for food to keep Cambodian sanctuaries and the North Vietnamese First, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Ninth divisions now mostly in South Vietnam going. The North Vietnamese ex- ert salmost total control of of East Cambodia while the Cambodian communists in western Cambodia feed and support them with fuel, bat- teries and other commodities, informed military sources said. Trail Terminus "Eastern Cambodia is just a staging area, rest and rec- reation center and trail ter- minus for Hanoi again," sources said. "All they have to worry about are further South Vietnamese incursions and the South Vietnamese are too hard pressed to do much in that line," sources said. North Vietnam has also been successful in building up the Cambodian communists in the countryside to the point where they can carry on much of the war against the Cambodian government, informed mili- tary sources say. It is no longer North Viet- namese or Viet Cong units which are cutting Cambodia's highways, Cambodian and other informed military sources admit. Now the units are most- ly Cambodian communist units operating in battalion strength for the first time with a few Viet soldiers seeded amongst them and supported by Viet Cong heavy weapon platoons and sappers. Informed military sources say the communist strategy for Cambodia is to harass roads and towns bottling up Cambodian government forces ? in the towns or forcing them to engage in useless road opening operations keeping them away from the country- side. Meanwhile in the coun- tryside the North Vietnamese are building up local Cambo- dian forces to fight the gov- ernment. Military suorces. said Com- munists succeeded in doing this because the Cambodian government forces are poorly led though composed of some excellent fighting material'. "They just will not get off their butts and go out there, get out of the towns," inform- ed sources said. Fighting this week In Cam- bodia has reflected this pat- tern. Cambodian communist forces cut highway 4 leading from Phnom Penh to its sea- port Kompons Som. Cambod- ian reds are in a good position on the heights overlooking the road passes and are now tying down a considerable Cambod- ian government force trying to winkle them out. Communits forces are shell- ing the towns of Takeo and Angtassom south of Phnom Penh penning in their Cam- bodian garrisons from inter- fering with communist traffic moving around them toward the Seven Mountains area of South Vietnam and tying up Cambodian relief forces. Garrison Encircled This weekend a mixed Cam- bodian Vietnamese communist force encircled and entered the town of Oudong 20 miles north of 'Phnom Penh. From what I saw they could have enered Phnom Penh itself just by driving down the highway. Just, south of Oudong a Cam- bodian villager, wet and mud- dy stumbled out of a swamp. He said he had. escaped from a village just outside Oudong and that communists encircled the garrison and there were no Cambodian troops between the communists and where we Were about 1,000 yards further back on the highway. The villager said commu-1 nists had arrived about one o'clock in the morning ,thatsc day and? about half were , Cambodians -and half were - Vietnamese. They were led by a Chinese who the villager judged from his accent livod. in Cambodia. They told:t.* villager to move to the "lib- erated areas" but he didn't want to go and dodged into',l, the swamps. Coming from Phnom Penh'. there there were only three small outposts on the road which communists could probably have bypassed. Cambodian- armor a n d reinforcements_; did not move in to reinforce the area till late afternoon 12,' hours after the attack. Cam? - bodian garrisons in Oudong apparently fought back well and by late Sunday an elite paratroop unit arrived and broke the communist en-s? circlement. All these actions,' however, are achieving their objective of keeping the Cam-i' bodians tied down to defend- ing roads and towns, inform-L. cd military sources compalin. This pattern is likely to con-k thine, sources say, till Hanoi' is able to boost the Cambod-, Ian communists up to regi- mental size and to integrate.' the various groups of Cambod- ian communists, pro-Prince Sihanouk, anti-Prince Sihan; ouk, and Hanoi organized forces into a single central' force united against the Lon Nol government. Once Hanoi" has achieved this?a strong' single Cambodian communist.' force able to defeat the Cam.' bodian government and hold most of the territory then North Vietnam will be inter-, ested in a cease-fire in Cam- ? bodia. NEW YORK TIMES 11 November 1972 BANGKOK SAYS 'AIDES SOLD MILK FROM U.N. BANGKOK, Thailand, Nov. 10 Agence France-Presse)? Thai- officials responsible for the dis- tribution of skimmed and pow- dered milk donated by a United Nations agency were accused today of selling it on the open market. The charge was made in a circular issued by the Govern- ment Health Division, inform- ing more than 30 clinics in Thailand that they would no longer be receiving the milk "because it is the only way to prevent , health officials from selling it for personal profit." The milk, which is donated by Unicef, the United Nations Children and Emergency Fund, totals two million pounds ad- rivally. The bulk of it goes ,to municipal clinics and health stations in provincial areas. ZA The milk is channeled through the United States Operatibn Mission, an arm of the Agen4y for International Development, for distribution through tlie Municipal Health Division. t's, A spokesman for Unicef bete refused to comment pending an inquiry. t; -Approved-For Release 2001108/07-:-CIA-RDP774rn432R000100020001-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4 ? .IIAlltrO11 N OV -1972-- PYRRHIC PLOY ? 2. KIPEEFFER Mr. Pleifier is professor of zoology -or the University of, Montana and a co-can/lop oi Harvest of Deem Chemical' Warfare in Indochina (Fra Press/Macmillan). He visite( Cambodia in 1969 and 1971 and was in Hanoi era 1970. While on a visit to Hanoi in June 1979, my two comoana ions and I met with Premier Pham Van Dong. During the conversation, I asked the Premier to evaluate Nixon's in- vasion of Cambodia which had occurred one month ear- lier. His answer was straightforward: "It makes things very favorable for the success of onr revolution." By "our revolution" it suppgscd,him to mean ?the revolution of the Indochinese people against foreign invader. ' . How well does Premier itham .Van Dong's 1970 , ation accord with the situation of Cambodia in late 1972?? Recent dispatches from Indochini suggest that he knew What he was talking about. Atcording to the A.P. (Sep- tember 1), only one-thir,d of Cambodia is Still under. "Khmer Republic" control. It has been revealed that the Inks used in the fall offensive against the An Loc area, (only a short distance from Saigon) came from the Chup Rubber Plantation and nearby areas in Cambodia. These are the very areas that President Nixon characterized . in April 1970 as "Communist sanctuaries" that must be cleaned out. ? Two factors have been principally responsible for the 'failure of Nixon's Cambodian policiei. First, the Presi- dent was badly misinformed about past U.S.-Cambodian- Vietnamese relations and about the situation on the Viet- namese-Cambodian border prior, to the March 1970 change in the Cambodian Government. For instance, in, his speech of April 30, 1970, announcing the U.S. ?in- vasion of the Fishhook region of Cambodia, Mr. Nixon stated: "Tonight American and South Vietnamese units will attack the headquarters for the entire Communist military operation in 'South Vietnam. This key control center has been occupied by the North Vietnamese and Vietcong for five years in blatant violation of Cambodia's neutrality." Mr. Nixon, standing in front of a map of Cambodia, put his finger on the little town of Minot as he made this accusation. That puzzled me a great deal, for I had spent two days in and around Mimot about four months before the U.S. attack, and knew it to be controlled by French and Cambodian rubber interests. Many Europeans were working there, and some of them (e.g., a Belgian plant pathologist) were in complete sympathy with the American effort in South Vietnam. These Europeans were living with their wives and chil- dren in an environment of complete tranquillity. We asked many of them whether they had seen any sign of North Vietnamese or Vietcong activity and they all answered no. My colleague A. H. Westing and I had visited the re- gion to inspect the damage done by a clandestine defolia; tion' raid carried out in April-May of 1969 over almost 200,000 acres of eastern ;Cambodia. ,ccording to a letter 'received some months later from Sen. Frank Church, ,the raid was carried out by Air America, a CIA airline, for what purposes we still do not know. After the raid, the Olhimetat regime aaked that AIMPietili ?MOMS Viat the region, with a view to making reparations for The aamag. Although the U.S. Government to this day offi- 52 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4 tially denies having carried out this operation, it did send a team of experts, inchnling Charles Minarik Of the Chem- ical Warfare Laboratories, U.S. Army, into the Mimot region-si'tortly after the raids. This team's report describes how they were flown over the region, driven Through it, and how they walked in it?just as Westing' and L did some months later. It is inconceivable- to me that the North: Vietnamese and Vietcong, who according to Isl,ixon controlled the area, would have permitted an official:ALS. Government team to wander through what Nixon celled "the headquarters for the entire Communist military op- erations in South Vietnam." After the invasion began it was widely reported that no key control center cold be found. Some arms caches were reportedly uncovered and, of course, a great deal of rice. The rice did 'not greatly surprise me, since at the time we were there, the main occupation, in addition to tapping rubber, was har- vesting rice. When speaking about the Cambodian "dammunist sanctuaries," Mr. Nixon failed to mention that, on orders of Prince Sihanouk, troops of the Royal Cambodian Army had in facto swept these areas about three months ,before his invasion. The troops were led by Prince Sink Matak, a loyal American prot? and one of those later involved in Sihanouk's overthrow. Sihanouk ordered Matak to search out and destroy all Communist-Viet- namese positions in Cambodia. Paul Bennett of the Cam- bodian desk of the State Department informed me' in an interview, March 22, 1971: "A Cambodian Army opera- tion began in January of 1970 in a northeastern province at approximately the time4when Sihanouk left for France and when Prince Sink Matak was Acting Prime Minister. They sent up a number of additional battalions among the better troops in the Cambodian' Army,' and carried out a series of small sweeps generally in this area. They did have, as I recall, a number of contacts with small V.C. and North Vietnamese units. They found and de- stroyed a number of small supply dumps, a relatively small campsite, but there was no major contact with the main North Vietnamese forces." Where were the thou- sands of North Vietnamese troops that Nixon said had occupied the area for five years? ? , Besides bring. mistaken about the nature of the so-called Coinmunist sanctuaries in eastern Cambodia, Mr. Nixon grossly misrepresented the facts whew he stated that "American policy since 1954 has been to scrupulously respect the neutrality of Cambodia. . North Vietnam, however, has not respected that neutral-. ity." The defoliation'of vast sections of the rubber plan- tations, mentioned above, was one blatant violation of Cambodia's neutrality, and there are many others. During' my first visit to Cambodia We inspected what was left of Dak Dam, a little town in the central highlands just across the border from the special forces camp at Bet Prang, South Vietnam. Six weeks before our visit this town, which was about a quaver mile from a Royal Camboe dian Army antiaircraft position, had been savagely at- tacked by U.S. fighter bombers. The' antiaircraft positiona were destroyed, as well as a school, a hospital and' an ambulance. Twenty-five Cambodians were killed and spy-, oral W?tottlad titlilf3 WittlA0 gepbmd by Mti AmovIeRa military in Saigon as having been carried out againstete North Vietnamese gun pcsition in Cambodia. ? Once again the goverm eerkt of Sihanouk inviteil,Mier- , Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4 jeans to see for themselves what they had done in viola- tion of the agreements signed to respect each other's neutrality. American and International Control Corn-. .mission officers visited the site and learned that all twenty-five killed had been Cambodians and that the attacks had damaged onlyiCambodian installations. West- ing and I were able to verify these conclusions. 'The Americans did Mit ?contect ?the original Saiion?assess- ment and the report on the 13ak Dam incident is. 'classified. The State Department later apologized and paid $400 for each Cambodian killed. This brutal attack occurred because the Cambodians had dared to open fire on American aircraft that were cantinually violating the air space around Dak Dam. The Cambodians had hit one of the American .airplanes, as they had every right to do, and the Americans retaliated, falsely calling it an attack upon a North Vietnamese position. This sort of activity had been repeated many times over the years by the Americans and their South Viet- namese allies. A? white .paper published by the Royal .Government pointed out that "all of the very serious in- cidents of the past years' committed by the American- South Vietnamese aggressive forces have been the sub- ject of. detailed inquiry by the International Control commission. They underline, the fact that the victims of, these attacks have always been only Cambodians, almost' always peasants at work. . . . No Vietcong body has ever bccn recovered on the sites of these ground attacks nor in the frontier villages machine-gunned, or bombed by American aviation." In addition to Cambodians and the International Con'-' fro! Commission, former American officials have reported American violations of Cambodia's neutrality. For in- Stance, a Captain Marasco stated on a 1970 NBC tele- vision documentary program that he had frequently sent teams into Cambodia from a base near the Parrot's Beak. Marasco said, "I'm sure that the CIA *and the South Vietnamese counterpart of the CIA had intelligence agents inside Cambodia." When I 'asked Mr. Bennett of the State Department if operations of this sort did not violate the neutrality of Cambodia, he answered: "I have no comment on measures that we take to insure the safety of our troops by finding out what threats exist." The United States could, however, have called upon the In- ternational Control Commission to determine what threats existed in Cambodia to its forces in Vietnam. ? Nixon, when affirming U.S. respect 'for Cambo- dian neutrality, failed to mention the part played by the United States and its Cambodian friends in. the.. Match 18th coup against Sihanouk: The official U.S. line was that it was "very surprising" when Sihanouk was de- Posed. I learned something about the coup when 1' .. ? -interviewed. the preschePremier of the "Republic of?Cam:.(! bedia," Son Ngoc Thanh, in August 1971 at his house in?Phnoin Penh. Me had been Prime Minister of Cam- bodia once before?when .the Japanese occupied ? the country during World War IL) Thanh sees hitnself as a devoted. Cambodian freedom fighter who began his struggle against the French: That led him to collaborate with the Japanese, and he now collaborates with the Americans in an attempt to destroy the Cambodian mon- archy and set up the so-called ,"Republic." Thanh organ- ized a group of expatriate and ethnic Cambodians living in South Vietnam and Thailand into a movement called the Khmer. Semi.. This movement began, according to Thanh, .as part of' the struggle against the Frepeln, but ?in..thi . late :1950s in Thailand and in South Vietnam these' groups began to receive American support. Again according to. Thanh, U.S. special forces began in 1958 the military training of Cambodians living .in Vietnam 53 and these Cambodians, many of them recruited from the Khmer Serci, were organized by General Harkins in What . was called "Mike Force,", a highly trained mobile strike 'force. Thanh says his Khmer Serci received some' U.S. money and all of its weapons from the United States in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In 1965 the Khmer Serei openly announced that it was carrying out a struggle against Sihanouk. Despite this, Sihanouk on January .5, 1969, granted an amnesty to all Khmer Serel. Shortly thereafter, Thanh told me, some 200 .Kltmer? Sere i soldiers crossed the border from Thailand and sup- posedly surrendered to the Royal Army. qp June '12, 1969, a second- contingent of several hundred soldiers also crossed into the northWestern pan of Cambodiaand were incorporated like their comrades into the Royal Army. One can. imagine that it was through the itifiltra- tion of the Royal Army by these U.S.-trained Oambo- dians that 'the CIA maintained contact with the 'forces involved in the coup. These men, .actually natives of 'Thailand and South Vietnam, formed the chief line of defense for the Lon Nol regime in-the early days of the coup. ? President Nixon stated that one reason tor' the American invasion of Cambodia was that the North Vict- namese had carried out a massive invasion after the over- throw of Sihanouk. He did not mention that thousands. of ethnic Cambodians from South Vietnam, organized as "Mike Force," were flown into Phnom Penh within 'days of the coup. It is important to realize 'that these men were actually Cambodian-Vietnamese,' just as for- eign to Cambodia as the North Vietnamese. This is proved by the following situation about which I learned during my vist in August 1971. In the days immediately after the.coup these mercenaries were paid in Cambodian money, but their families and ancestral homes were in South Vietnam where the Cambodian money was worth- less. U.S. Embassy officials in Phnoln Penh told me that this' caused considerable trouble. .It is obilrous. that the Americans had anticipated and prepared, for the overthrow of Sihanouk for years, and had developed a highly trained and mobile Cambodian military force in South Vietnam that they could use quickly to support the new regime?In the NBC program featuring Marasco, the captain was asked, "Do you think it is possible?that a man like Sihanouk could have ,been deposed by his own generals just on their own, or have you ever thought there was some other thing in- vowed in what happened to :Sihanouk?" Marasco: "I don't doubt that there was some other thing involved in his being deposed. I don't doubt ,that some other people have had something to do with it." NBC: "Like who?" Marasco: "Like other goyermnents, , other intelligence organizations." NBC: "American, South ,Vietnamese, both?" Marasco: "Both." In .my interview with him, Ben- nett of the State Department said: "There were so-called, , Khmer Serci groups headed by Son Ngoc 'Minh in. boll.' Thailand and South Vietnam operating along the borders. There was a group of about 100 people captured in Bat-. tambang province just over the Thai border in Cambodia, about June or July of '1969 who were .allekedly .Khmer Semi and recruited, as far as I know, into: the Royal Army, conceivably even into the police*as well. . . The special forces have for years helped train, organize and lead irregular forces used, among others, in areas along ,the Cambodian border. Many of the Cambodians re- cruited for this may have.'had Khmer Semi affiliations." - On April 6, the,eltiladelphia Inquirer published an se- count of an interview with Prime Minister Thanh,which confirmed what he had told nlc. the previou's year. M- cording to the Inquirer, "Beginning in 1965 the U.S. paid millions of dollars to 'train, arm and support his Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP-77:6043-2R00010002-0001-4 _ Approved For Release 2001/08/07 [Thanh'sj forces, most, oi whom were recruited from the Cambodian minority' living in South Vietnam's delta. ? Large-scale Khmer Semi defections to the Cambodian dovernnient were reported' in :11969 and may have been' part of Thanh's invasion 'plan to overthrow Sihanouk. Ac-, cording to reliable sourm, the repatriated Khmer Serei! units were serving in the Royal Army under Lon Not and spearheaded political demonstrations' in Phnom Penh just before the coup. After checking , with his American friends, Thanh committed his U.S. trained and financed forces to the Lon Nol coup. The CIA, he said, had Promised that the U.S. would do everything possible to. help." . Nixon's assertion that the United States practiced complete respect for Cambodian neutrality does not ac- cord with the facts. And these inaccurate interpretations. of U.S.-Cambodian relations led to incorrect predictions of what would happen after the coup and the American invasion. Three major factors upset the Administration's game plan for Cambodia. These were described to me at .length in a June 1970 interview in Hanoi with Xeng An, the Ambassador from Sihanouk's Royal Government of National Union, -which now controls most of Cambodian territory. Mr. An pointed out that the peasants had hate a g'rent loyalty .and respect for Sihanouk because he had kept war from their lives, They had known perfectly well what the war was doing to the people across the border in Vietnam. Secondly,' the Americans guessed wrong on Sihanouk's behavior. They had expected him to retire to France, as did the Emperor Bao .pai, the last Royal Vietnaniese ruler.'. Instead, the Prince joined his, former NEW YORK TIMES 28 November 1972 ? The Vietnam Handshake One month has elapsed since that dramatic White ? House briefing by Dr. Henry Kissinger. "We remain con- vinced that the issues that I have mentioned are soluble in a very brief period of time," President Nixon's negotiator said. "We have undertaken, and I repeat it here publicly, to settle them at one more meeting and to.remain at that meeting for as long as is necessary to complete the agreement." This undertaking to the people of the United States and of Vietnam has now been broken. Perhaps the reasons are technical, but there are ominous signs that more profound coniiderations may be promoting ruinous second thoughts. ? White House spokesmen now stress the quest for "a settlement that will last, not just for the short term but for the long term." This smacks dangerously of the inflated\ war aims that kept the Johnson and Nixon Administrations fighting so intensely in Vietnam long after knowledgeable strategists had concluded these alms were unattainable. Far from envisaging a disengagement of American personnel from Vietnam, the Administration is revealed to have embarked on a secret build-up or "civilian" per- sonnel under Defense Department contract to "advise" the South Vietnamese military establishment. And four , weeks after the White House declared that "peace is at hand," the United States carried out two days of what was officially described as the heaviest B-52 bombard- P77-00432R000100020001-4 .enemies?the Indochinese Marxists?and set up the United National Front of Cambodia and the Royal Gov-1 ernment of. National Union which he now heads. Thus;L: American actions forced a devout Buddhist and Communist .ruler, Sihanouk, into the hands of Nixon's I. Indochinese enemies; and the Prince brought with ihim thesupport of the vast majority of Cambodian peasants.' . If the. ,Nixon :Administration had left Sihanouk' Cam- : bodirf alone' II believe it would have been difficult, if .not impossible, for the revolutionary forces of Indochina to. launch the massive offensive with tanks that erupted from: the so-called sanctuaries that- Nixon had sworn t&cleara out. ' ? , . ? ; The. third factor that the Americans failed to predict correctly was the effect of inciting anti-Vietnamesil feel.: ings among Cambodians. Xeng Ani during his interview, discussed this point at some length, saying that it 'poses' irreconcilable contradictions for the American policy in Cambodia. He stressed that, in order to arouse the Cam- bodians against the so-called Vietcong and North Viet- namese, the U.S.-supported Lon Nol clique had needed . to arouse them against Vietnamese in general. To' expect then that they would welcome the Saigon Vietnamese as liberator's from the Communist Vietnamese 46's quite is-- rational, as events of recent months have shown. Pitched battles have been, fought between Cambodian .troops and their so-called South Vietnamese-Saigon allies. And, the relationship between the Saigon regime and the Phnom Penh regime grows increasingly strained. All of this must now be known to. the Nixon Adnaln- lstration, and that, probably, is why we hear so little to? day.about?Cambodia. ' ""? ? ment of North Vietnam of the whole war. Pressing the advantage which he has apparently gained in the past month of jockeying, President Thieu has sent a special envoy to meet Mr. Nixon this week, after which he is to accompany Dr. Kissinger to the renewed dialogue with Hanoi's Le Due Tho next week. Among the "clarifications" the United States0 is re- portedly seeking from North Vietnam is a specific pledge to withdraw some of its troops from the South after the cease-fire, thus soothing one of President Thieu's deepest fears. From the start, Dr. Xissinger's critics and sup- porters alike spotted the absence of any visible con- cession by Hanoi on this point as a critical element in the give-and-take that had gone into the basic accord; if it is being injected as a new element at this stage, what is left of the whole tissue of understanding? ' It seems impossible to doubt, from the statements of both sides, that Dr. Kissinger and Le Duc Tho reached' ,a handshake agreement a month ago to end ten years of war in Vietnam; the White House disclosed this tentative ? accord just before the American Presidential election. As every collective bargainer knows, the whole concept of negotiation is built on mutual respect for the integrity of such agreements, whatever minor difficulties may ' attend their translation into formal contract language. If a veto by President Thieu is leading to United States insistence on renegotiation of one or more of the most fundamental clauses in the agreement, the promised light at the end of the tunnel may once again be receding Into dim shadow. 54 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001:4 ? TUE WASHINGTON POST -11-1) ? fer., Sunday, Nov. 26,1972 ? By Don Oberdorfer Washincton Post Foreign Service SEOUL?Two decades af- ter American troops fought and died to save it from Communist el orninatio n, South Korea has taken a sharp turn toward one-man rule and an authoritarian. political System. . Presient Park Chung Hee's decision, formally vali- dated this Tuesday by 91.5. per cent of the votes cast in an elaborately organized and orchestrated national referendum, was motivated by a large number of ele- ments aside from Park's de- sire to stay in power. The decline of American involvement in Asia, the high-level negotiations be- tween North Korea and South Korea, declining pa- tience with the political op- position and the National Assembly, an economid scare due to a recent recession and his own spartan view of what South Korea should be like?these factors all ' ap- pear to have had a part in Park's decision to take the political system into his own hands through martial law and push through funda- mental constitutional_ changes. ? Pax* calls the new system "Korean democracy." But just as GI's of 1950-53 would hardly recognize today's Ko- rea as the threadbare and woebegone country they knew in those days, they would probably blink and scratch their heads at the political setup being labeled "democracy." As sketched out in pro- nouncement and propoaal, the new order is a split-level affair. Foreign businessmen and tourists, whose invest- ment-a' and purchases are es- sential to the swiftly devel- oping economy, are prom- ised unimpaired and even enhanced freedoms. As one of the innumerable handouts for foreigners, printed in English and Japa- nese, put it this week: "Dear visitors: Please feel free wherever you travel in the ? country under martial law. The warmer welcome and the better service await (sic)."- ------- South Korea is, and prob- ably will continue to be, heavily dependent for its prosperity and growth on in- teraction with the world . outside. ? At the atm(' time, the the, oretical and constitutional, underpinning of the pre- vious system of limited dem- ocratic government has been abandoned. Park can be elected forever by an easily- r., ham itagen d..L.ark's llie in 09-alth controlled 'National Reuni- fication Council" of more more than 2,000 supposedly non-political persons. More- over, he can appoint one- third of the National Assem- bly and name a supreme court to decide the most im- portant cases brought be- fore the judiciary. . ? - 'Efficient Rule' In the opinion of knowl- edgeable sources, Park has been actively considering the scrapping of the old con- stitution and the creation of a stronger and more "efffi- cient" rule since at least the midde of last year, shortly after his inauguration for a third term in office. Quiet study missions are said to have been dispatched to Tai- wan, Indonesia, Thailand, Cambodia, South Vietnam and the Philippines to look over their constitutions and political systems. Park's decision to move on Oct. 17?instead of in Do- cember as the U.S. embassy had expected?was evi- dently precipitated by two major events: the draft of a Washington-Hanoi peace agreement and North Ko- rea's anger at South Korean criticism of the high-level talks on reunification be- tween the two governments. - On Oct. 8, North Vietnam presented a drastically altered peace proposal to presiden- tial assistant Henry Kissin- ger in Paris, and by Oct. 12 the substance of a Vietnam peace agreement had been virtually agreed to. It is quite likely that South Ko- rea, with some 40,000 troops still on duty in Vietnam learned of the developments Within a day or two. The implications for Seoul would have been two-fold: first, that the US. troop withdrawal from Indochina ? and ultimately from Ko- rea as well ? would come even earlier than inticipated; second, that U.S. policymakers and the American public would be much too consumed with the Vietnam peace issue ? in addition to the presidential . elections ? to pay much at- tentien to goings-on in Ko- rea. The second important event took place on Oct. 12 at the truce village at Pan- munjom, whera south KO= roan CIA Chief Lee HuRak met North Korean Deputy. Premier Park Sung-Chul for the first high-level North- South talks since the dia- logue between the two Ko- 55 rean governments was made public July 4. Acrimonious Meeting According to a source who has seen the still-secret tran- script of the session, it was a vely acrimonious meeting "a very, heated argument went on for just about the entire session," the source said. . The North accused the South of fomenting anti- Communist propaganda in the South Korean press, and the South accused the North of antiPark broadcasts and editorials in official organs. Ironically, in view of later event, CIA Chief Lee con-* tended that the government in the South had no authority to tell the press what to re- port under a limited consti- tutional system. North Ko- rea wasn't buying this. There is no indication, ac- cording to the same source, that the South Korean side informed the North Korean side at the Oct. 12 meeting that martial law and a politi- cal change were close at hand. While the implications of this meeting are still un- clear, the conclusion in some sophisticated circles is that Park and his aides real- ized future progress in the North-South talks probably would be slow indeed, and- that the talks might even break down. The governments main selling point for the new "Korean democracy" has been the need for strength to compete with the North during the quest of unifica- tion. Should the North-South dialogue lose its lustre, the new martial law regime would be harder to justify to the people in the South and to the world. * - Once Park and his small inner circle of advisers had made the decision to move quickly, the organs of gov- ernment planning went into high gear. Military plans for martial law were dusted off and changed to fit the occa- sion. The working draft of the proposed new constitu- tion was quickly reviewed and prepared for publica- tion. Even Park's address to the nation announcing mar- tial law, the suspension of the old constitution and the other sweeping measures was pro-recorded on tape. Elaborate Scenario Ati elaberate scenario o_f who was to be told what and when was drawn up and put Into effect. U.S. Ambassador Philip Habib was called in 25 hours in advance to get the word. At the same time, ? . the Chairman of the joint , chiefs of staff gave the word tto the U.S. military com- mander in Korea, Gen. Don- aid Bennett.- . The -move from an Ameri- can:oriented constitutional democracy (at least in theory) to an autocracy with democratic trappings was to take place in stages betwee+ mictOctober and the end of the year. The critical period would be between the Oct. 17 announcement and the Nov. 21 referendum to ap- prove the constitution, and every precaution was taken to insure a good result. All political activity was theoretically banned under ? ? the martial law decree, and ? for the opposition this meas- . ure was strictly enforced. ' ? Ordinary citizens were tried and convicted at publicized courts.:martial for spreading "rumors" against what the government designated the "0 ct ober Revitalization" plan. - Even the green-and-white wrappers of "Eunha Su (Ga- - loxY) cigarettes produced by the state cigarette monopoly were imprinted with the slo?-? gan?"October Revitaliza- tion?Let's Plant Korean- Style Democracy. In ,Ctur , SoiL"? * ? Under ? these ' circum- stances, the question -was not whether the referendum would pass, but how big a margin it would command. The 91.5 per cent margin of , last Tuesday was about 6 per cent more than the 85 _ per cent target mentioned in advance by som., govern. ' ment .officials. The turnout of more than 90 per %ant of. the eligible voters, beyond most ekpectations, '-as , aided 'by :.a- massive caes: , paign to get out the vote. * ' ,"The National Conference for Unification" to pick the president will be elected by ? mid-December, with agents of. the state playing an im- portant screening role. This group in turn will elect Park for a six-year term be- fore' Christmas. Park is scheduled to be inaugurated about Dee. 27 as president for a six-year term* under the rew regime. The United States, which had been projecting ?a grad- ual withdrawal of troops from South Korea 'in line with a Korean army mauler- Maiden pregfatit, Mg go given no hint of a change in schedule. The Park govern- ment wants the 40,000 'U.S. troops to remain as long as possible. ? ? - ? ? a . - Nor is there a. sign Of - Approved For Release 200t/O8R1-7-:-CIA-RDP77-00432R000-1-00020001-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4 major change in the military- economic aid, credit con- sessions and GI spending which brought South Korea. aid and earnings of more ethan $650 million from the U.S. government last year- -a Major chunk of the coun- try's $8 billion ? Gross Na- tional Product. : As Korean sources close to Park tell it, the govern - ? ment was well aware that U.S. troop strength and U.S. aid would be declining over the months to come, and that the United States would be moving into a pas- sive rather than an active role in Asia. a-:. _ NEW YORK TIMES 28 November 1972 as Peace . At Hand? By Torn Wicker No matter what happens after the Indochinese peace ? talks resume on Dec. 4, it now seems reasonably clear that Dr. Henry Kissinger had little basis for his statement on Oct. 26, twelve days before the election, that "peace Is at hand," subject only to a few minor details of negotiation. lie had, it is clear, no real agreement with Hanoi and Saigon on encling the war; no such agreement seems to exist a month later; and it is highly question- able whether either Dr. Kissinger or President Nixon could have believed on Oct. 26 that they actually had reached an agreement that would bring what Mr. Nixon called that night In Ashland, Ky., "peace with honor and not peace with surrender." Quite obviously, there can be no cease-fire in South Vietnam until the Saigon Government agrees to a cease- fire, for the simple reason that that Government has in its army a million men, armed to the teeth by the United States. In the final analysis, the only way Washington can impose a cease- fire on that Government and that army is by threatening to cut off their military supplies. Is that a serious proposition? After having for four years maintained the war, at a cost of 20,000 American deaths, billions of American dollars, and incalculable Indochinese casual- ties, all for the stated purpose of giv- ing the Saigon regime a "chance" to., survive, is it really conceivable that Mr. Nixon is now prepared to ask Congress to shut off military support to that regime--thus throwing an "ally" to the Communists, even though Mr. Nixon has said repeatedly that it he did that, a gigantic bloodbath would ensue and world peace would be threatened? Yet, as recently as this weekend, President 'Flu's controlled new. ? paper, Tin Song, said in Saigon that before there can be a cease-fire, North ? Vietnam must withdraw its troops from South Vietnam, the demilitarized zone?in effect, a national border? JAPAN TIMES 10 November 1972 Vietnam Under Coaition Gov' By ROBERT S. ELEGANT Los Angeles Times SAIGON? The war in Viet- nam will end shortly. but the struggle will continue ? the struggle to unite all Vietnam under a totalitarian regime. The struggle the Communists have waged for 27 years. Hanoi has just reaffirmed its determination to fight in its comments on the secret talks that led to the North Vietnam- .ese-American draft. agreement. The Communists have in- variably used "united front" or ,"coalition" governments as the first, decisive step toward seiz- ing all power. No less an an- thority on revolutionary strate- gy than Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the Communist Party of China laid down the tactics in one of his most widely read ? works. "On Coalition Govern- ment." The United States is with- drawing from direct in- volvement in Vietnam. The de- cision is wise from the Ameri- can point,of view ? and prob- ably unavoidable. If America has not attained -every last one of its national objectives, it has equally not acceded to ?Hanoi's long-stand- ing demand that America make itself responsible for delivering, South Vietnam to harsh, author- itarian rule. But America would be unwise if it deluded itself that the draft agreement ac- complishes more than ending American intervention with relative grace, while starting a new phase in the unrelenting military and political battle for control of the South's 17,500,000 people. Hanoi declared recently its intention of "accelerating the struggle on the military, politi- and language 27 years ago. cal, and diplomatic fronts until the lofty objectives ? liberating the South, protecting and build- ing the socialist North, and ad- vancing toward peacefully unit- ing the country ? are achieved." In Hanoi's lexicon, liberation means imposing its own rule, af ter destroying "decadent, bourgeois democracy." Clearly, the objective has not changed, only the means. Hanoi no longer demands that, as President Nixon put it, "we withdraw and destroy the Government of the Republic of Vietnam as we go." A "coalition government," ex- cluding the present Saigon re- gime, will not be created simul- taneously with the ceasefire. In- stead, Saigon will rule its areas and the Viet Cong theirs, while a 'council on national reconcilia- tion and accord plans elections to choose a new government. The tripartite council will rep- resent Saigon. the Viet Cong, and the amorphous "neutralist" faction. The term, "coalition govern- ment," anathema to Saigon, did not appear. Nonetheless, Mab's "On Coalition Government," a report to the seventh congress of the Communist Party in April 1945, is the surest guide to Hanoi's strategy and objectives. Despite differences between Pe- king and Hanoi. Mao's revolu- tionary manuals are read avid- ly in North Vietnam. The political conditions Hanoi faces in 1972 closely resemble the conditions Mao faced in 1945. Besides, the negotiating tactics and even the language Hanoi now employs are almost identical with Chinese tactics As the war in the Pacific was ending, Mao faced the chal- lenge of winning political victo- ry in China. The Nationalist Government ruled much larger territories and commanded much more powerful armies than did the Communists. Mao's solution was a coalition govern- merit?which - menl?which would shOtly be- come a Communist government. As the the big war in Viet.: nam draws to a close. Hanoi must win political victory over a regime that controls 90 per cent of the population and de- ploys troops outnumbering the Communists several times. The North Vietnamese have chosen the same solution. In-1945, Mao made almost the' same proposal Hanoi has? now advanced. The Nationalist Gov- erntnent was to join a tripart- ite, united-front alliance that would prepare for a 'coalition government. But Mao told the secret party. session: "The politics of new democracy . . . consists in Over- throwing external oppression and internal feudal, fascist oppression and then set= ting up not he old democracy but a political system which is a united front of all demo- ? cratic classes, . . . This is- our minimum program, against our future or maximum ?pro- gram of socialism and commu- , nism . . . (every Communist i will fight for two clearly de- fined objectives) the new de,m0-1 mettle revolution now and So- cialism and communism In 'the' future. . . ." Mao's proposal was not., ac-, cepted. Instead, he fought al- most five years longer to win military victory. must be re-established at the 17th parallel, and the role of the National Council of Reconciliation and Concord ?envisioned in the Kissinger-Le Due Tho draft accord?must be more clearly defined. These are merely the central issues of the war; if they have to be settled before Saigon agrees to a cease-fire, then it follows that on Oct. 26 the Nixon Administration did not really have an agreement for a cease-fire that depended only on the ? working out of a few details. As another example, Dr. Kissinger said that the release of American prisoners of war by Hanoi was not dependent on the release of political prisoners by Saigon. This seemed to be confirmed in a statement by Xuan Thity, a principal North Vietnamese ?negotiator. Yet, since then, the North ilaWspaper, Nhan Dan, has asserted just the oppo. site view, and the North Vietnamese summary of the draft accord (with which Dr. Kissinger said he had "no ernment sources insist that Dr. Kissin- complaint") declared that "the return gera failure to secure an agreement of all captured and detained personnel for North Vietnamese withdrawal of the parties shall be carried out simultaneously with the U.S. troops' withdrawal." Since many political prisoners held by Saigon would be an important part of the so-called "third force" supposed' to be included in the National Council . of Reconciliation and Concord, is it realistic to suppose that Hanoi agreed to leave them to the mercy of Saigon? In any case, it is a legitimate question whether Dr. Kissinger was entitled to speak as specifically on the matter as he did on Oct. 26. By far the major question concerns the status of North Vietnamese forces In South Vietnam. The summary of the draft accord with which Dr. Kissinger had "no complaint" on Oct. 26 does not mention a withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces; evety commentator pointed raft that Oita WAS. 4 Miller American concession, Yet, Saigon patently is unwilling to accept this arrangement; and some informed Gov- Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA- DP77-00432R000100020001-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4 caused Washington?not just Saigon? to pull back from accepting his draft accord with Lo Duc Tho. To have accepted that draft, they say, would have given Hanoi what it had sought all along?an American withdrawal from the battlefield, while Hanoi was left free to settle Indochinese military and political affairs in direct and un- impeded struggle with Saigon. Now it is being asserted in Washing- ton, through studied leaks and calcu- lated statements, that the American side is pressing for further concessions only in order to be able to tell Saigon, honestly that further concessions can- not be had; even if that were .true, however, it still implies that on Oct. 26 there was no real basis for asserting that only a few unimportant details stood in the way of a peace which was "at hand." ? On that date, Dr. Kissinger?who was just back from Saigon?must have known that President Thieu did not accept the most important parts of the draft accord; he could hardly have been justified in asserting, therefore, that only a few minor details remained to be worked out with Hanoi; and if it finally turns out that the central issue of the renewed negotiations is the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces, the real question' will be whether President Nixon himself ever accepted the Kissinger-Le Due Tho draft accord, which was supposed to havOatasot tilmt peace was at hand. WASHINGTON POST nie,tho. 28, 1972 Only Japan Remains ? ollni noes Top?q,illog, One by-One ? By Richard Holbrooke . . HONG KONG?Where have all, the domi- noes gone? Toppled rightward one by one, tclimaxed in the last two months by?the proc- lamation of martial law in Korea and the. Thillipines. ? ? ? , In September President Marcos- moved -in the Phillipines. A month later,- President ,Park, feeling restricted by his Own cOnstitit- tion, which limited him to 'three terms. as The writer is managing editor of Foreign Policy. 'President, suspended the National Assent- bly, rewrote the constitution, and last week had the people of Korea certify his decision In a referendum. Korea and the Phillipines?two countries where the American role has been enormous in the last twenty years--thus joined Thai- land, Cambodia, South Vietnam and Indone- sia as members of that growing group of na- tions that arc coming under stronger milt- tary,rule. In the entire East Asian area, only 'Japan retains an essentially democratic goy-, ? ernment. ? -AND ALL THIS, of course, as Asians viewr what they believe is an historic turning point in America's role in Asia?its impend- ing withdrawal from Indochina, and its %opening of China. Where once we stood in 'Asia for' the gradual building up of strong "democratic institutions" to combat Chinese and Russian Communism (hence the peren- nial bureaucratic- 'rhetoric about "nation- building"), now America is seen differently: ler, less concerned with building a certain type of government in Asia, much mere in-' :terested in creating mutually acceptable ar- rangements with its.prime adversaries. This perception seems correct, and is rela- ted to the striking decline of democracy in %East Asia. In Vietnam's wake, we have lost /most of our unfortunate missionary zeal in Asia, our feeling that we had a responsibil- ity not only to undo colonialism but also to . build democratic societies. And, at the same time, our ability to influence events also de- clined. Thus, when Marcos moved in Manila, we restricted ourselves to an official statement' which amounted to "no comment." When :Park acted in Korea, we "disassociated" 'our- selves from his action. But what could we have-done? ' Intervention in the internal- affairs of other countries, which was once an Ameri- can commonplace in ,East Asia, has acquired' a bad name in recent years in the U.S. Al- though there arc still sortie people who ad- vocate U.S. action to promote democracy in ? such countries as Korea,/ our track record has been spotty at best and includes the old intervention that makes new intervention almost impossible. Our competence at that . sort of thing is not proven; on the contrary.. FURTHERMORE, the potential American influence (which was never as large as Asians, who saw the CIA in every rumor and 57 plot, believed) is declining rapfdly.,Ironically? in the case of Korea, our earlier succesSfa aid efforts have made a far easier for their, chief beneficiary, President Park, to igurire. :any suggestions we might want to malce.. American aid, once vit.( natty I he sole aup-1 port, of the Korean economy, has dropped. off sharply, and is no longer necessary to, the continued viability of that country. Nor, do they even need our troops at this lime, although their continued presence has some value in the larger game going on between, North and South Korea. For many. years, it was a standard liberal -belief that we should support democracies -and oppose. , dictatorships. Our - supportive; role in right-wing countries, like Spain and, Taiwan, and right-wing causes; like the cov. ert support to the 1958 revolt against Sti-,4 karno in Indonesia, understandably'ytoseti American liberals, and became scrinus,po 'ical issues in the years before Vietnam, Yet at the time we tended to overlookor,a0 least underestimate, the risks involved 'in!, strong action taken to promote democracy in countries of different traditions. Those 4 risks, we ultimately learned. could lead usi into inv)ossibly complicated roles in the ob- ?scurc and incomprehensible politics of cottn,:i tries like Laos, South Vietnam, and Korea., And once into such sl,uations,Where had influence 1;11. not cc.rol, the problems,i would multiply, and extrication would be- come constantly more difficult. Also, we could reap grave disappontment,5 when nr.0 like Park and Mareos .and even ; Thieu, rinsed to play any longei the rules or the democratic game that we. ?;.,0:10 urged on them. For the concerned American liberal, all,. this has posed very difficult problems. On one hand, we have supported and promoted tiemocracy in Asia, sometimes -with success.,) Its decline, even if accompanied by a rising economy, will certainly mean a loss of per-i sonal freedom for many Asians. ON THE OTHER HAND, our influencel :and our competence in restoring or preserv- ing democracy are extremely limited. ? Our, entire value system, in' win& we 'presumed:, to know what form of lovernment was rigtit ; for other countries, seep3 now a product of another age. No one who ;las served in Asia', should feel comfortable again,' when consid- ering the value of American adi cc, particu? ? larly political advice. And our national in-1 terest-7?whatever that is?does not seem rectly threatened by the unfortunate events;: . in Thailand, Korea, the Philippines. . , So the classic liberal position c: the lest;- 20 years?support democracy an oppose' rightwing regimes?a position over which r- great domestic debates were once fOught,i. has been swept aside by the harsh new realiA ties in Asia, and elsewhere. Intervention in support of democracy would have very limit Red success in Asia, and virtually no sup- : port at home. . Yet open embrace of such distastefult :events and regimes is unacceptable. So, wet ? seem reduced to private lan:4:ntations. pub., lie "no comments," and a scare, for a better" definition of our role in post-Vit.- nam Asia.) ?It will take time?and I hope ,a tional debate?to define that role: Ni.,,lne7 should view the recent setbacks to den'.'-" racy in this part of the world without co.i.4 cern, regret, and alarm. And yet it seetne - ? clear that American intervention is no, longer possible, and, what is more impor-] tant, not at all desirable. ? Approved For Release 2001/08/07-:?-CiA-RDP77-004:32R000100020001-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4 WASHINGTON POST 22 November 1972 Vie! d7" Zorza Rif ker0Or t Interest 8viets 'TIM KREMLIN is trying to find out what truth there is in the Washington stories . of a falling-out between President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger over the Vietnam peace settlement. Soviet agents in Washington have been making discreet inqui- ries about the. report, which first appeared in an ultra- conservative Washington weekly, Human Events, and was then briefly reproduced in The Washington Post. Human Events said that Kissinger had tried "to foist" the Paris agreement on Mr. Nixon. There fol. lowed "a bitter dispute" among top officials and sec- ond thoughts "even in the ' White House," about the agreement Kissinger had ne- gotiated, the paper said. The Washington Post, however, reported that White House officials had scoffed at such rumors. Faced with a White House mystery, Soviet analysts would attempt the kind of exercise that the CTA makes to find out what goes on' in the Kremlin. Only Soviet of- ficials call it Washingtonol- ogy, not Kremlinology. KISSINGER' 14AD SAID that only "minor" issues re- . mined to be resolved. But Mr. Nixon spoke later of "central" issues. Kissinger had said that only one more negotiating session would suffice. But the White House spokesman later spoke of several. Was there a genuine disagreement in the White House, the Krem- lin would ask, or had Mr. Nixon simply changed his mind? Washingtonology, when practiced from a Spviet van- tage point, has ohe advan- tage. It is not limited to Washington information, but ean be supplemented with insights from the other side of the fence. Why, for. instance, did Hanoi press for an immediate cease-fire some time before the election? "You'll have to ask , Hanoi," said Kissinger. The answer is not simply that Hanoi thought it could get better terms before the election than after. Once ? Hanoi had. decided, by late summer, to accept Mr. Nix- 011'q major demands, it con- centrated its efforts on the next most important negoti- ating objective; to prevent the rearming of the South , Vietnamese forces to the point where they could 'he414 come a threat to the regime ; in the North. ' Mr., Nixon called it "Viet-:'i namization," but a SaigOrC army made strong enough to,'! defeat the Communists hi.' ,the South might also, Hanoi would have reason to fear, ? be capable of marching .on. the North. Mr. Nixon kept telling Hanoi that it must'' choose between "Vietnam', zation," thus subtly rede- fined, and a "negotiated set- tlement," also redefined- to'' include major Communisti concessions. MOSCOW AND PEKING' got the message, and kept.! urging it on a reluctant' Hanoi. After the election,, .they would have argued,., even this choice might dis-' appear, because Mr. Nixon would no longer be under .pressure to seek a settle;, ment. Hanoi accepted. the " bargain. The Paris agree:.- ment stipulated that the flow of American arms Was, to end on November 1 , and, with it, the threat of Vietnamization. " So the reason why liana had been pressing for an iti. mediate cease-fire, even be- fore the election, was to avert a massive last-minute surge in the flow of arms which would nullify its con!, cessions. When Mr. Nixon rejected the Paris draft, and' used the time thus gained to do the very thing which.. Hanoi had paid so dearly to : avert, the Communist claimed that they had been cheated out of the bargain, , they made in good faith. ' ' The reason why Moscow wants to know whether Kis- singer intended this all along, or was overruled by Mr. Nixon, or whether, per- haps, it was a last-minute twist forced on the White ? House by a genuine change , in circumstances, far tran- scends in importance the im- mediate issue of peace in Vietnam, important as that is. What Moscow' is askingis . whether it can trust Mr. Nixon in the "era a negotia- tions," arid whether it can really march arm-in-arm. , with him toward the "goner- at poem" The White House cannot afford to leave the Kremlin with the wrong inlpression. CD 1972. Victor zerzu, THE WASHINGTON POST A 22 Friday, Nov, 24, 1972 China Lifts Lia dab' 011 Bo'oJk Read By Jean Leclerc du Sablon Acetic? France Prc3sa PEKING?After protesting to university authorities, stu- dents at Shanghai University Teachers' College have ob- tained the right to read for- eign books, including Euro- pean and American literature of the 18th and 19th centuries, the People's Daily reported. The newspaper said that Profesiors of the Chinese de- partment of the college had re- quested 18th and 19th century European and American nov- els for the college library, and this request prompted "serious discussions" in the university. After the discussions among atudents and professors, how- ever, the People's Daily said the conclusion was reached that "It is acceptable that readers should read certain Ideas that are erroneous or contain poison seeds." ? Observers in Peking said this thirst for reading among Chinese students seemed to mark an important new stage in university life after the Cultural Revolution.- T h e y. added that, during the last two years, university libraries had seemed to concentrate oh lending political and technical books, and that access to. clas- sical or foreign literal ere had aeemed to be more limited.. During the past year, how- ever, foreign classics have been reappearing on library shelves. This was seen as part of a general trend toward more cultural freedom, and the fact that the right to read such books was reaffirmed in the People's Daily gives it an official sanction. . The report in the People's Daily on the discussions was, carried on a page devoted to university problems. "Certain icomrades suggested that the books should be acquired; oth- ers resolutely opposed thila arguing that the reappearance of those books would be a sign', of restoration," the newspaper said. "Restoration" appeared to refer to the previous policy of allowing students access to Western literature, a policy, dramatically changed by the purge of Western books and, Ideas during the Cultural Rev- - -olution. - . - ? It said that "leadeV com- rades were very worried" by the fact that new stu4nts? young workers,' peasarks and soldiers enrolled in the univer- sity through reforms applied after the Cultural Revolution ?"were formulating new read- ership requests at the library.". It described the library offi- cials as "indecisive," and said some "even tried to hide the, books." Protesting students said that "the activities of the li- brary must be, actively placed In the service of the prole- tarian revolution in teaching Not to open books, or to run away from contradictions, is the same thing as refusing to, eat for fear of choking," thd newspaper said. "University and library Inv thorities were profoundly std.! prised by the students' eriti: eism," the paper said. They cautioned that "On the one band, we must trust most of the worker, peasant and sol- dier students?they are capa- ble of judging for themselves; But at the same time,'we must understand that they are still young and some of them are In danger -of being influenced or corrupted by poison seeds." The reforms adopted at the university were aimed, the newspaper said, at guiding stu- dents' reading and makin those who borrowed books "unsystematically" realize that "reading books is not a ? form of mental recreation." Stu- dents are also encouraged to' write commentaries on what they read, the paper said. , The University library con- tains more than 400,000 vol- umes, and the average dailY, borrowing rate is 500 books, according to the People's Daily report. On some days as many as 1,500 books will be' borrowed. The newspaper de- scribed these figures as higher than before the Cultural Revo- lution. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4 *Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010002000124 BALTIMORE stm 13 November 1972 13y.Product of Delente The Nixon Thaivi U.S. Reif-dims with E stern Europe: By JOSEPH R. L. STERNE Under the protective cover of American-Soviet detente, relations between the United States and 'Eastern Europe are relaxing and improving. This is a delicate diplomatic busi- ness, given the Kremlin's hyper- sensitivity about political develop- ments within the Warsaw Pact area: On all too many occasions, the world has seen how the Rus- sians react if they feel their hege- mony is threatened in the satellite states on their western border. Therefore, the fact that Ameri- can tics with Poland, Hungary, ,Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria. and even East Germany are on the upgrade, right across the board, must be rated one of the quieter achieve- ments of President Nixon's foreign policy. 0 0 To create the right atmosphere for this relaxation required more than a one-shot journey to Moscow and a series of American-Soviet ?accords that gave Eastern Euro- pean regimes added room for man- euver. The Russians first had to be convinced how much Mr. Nixon's approach to East-West affairs had evolved since the rollback, libera- tion posturing of the early Dulles years. In successive State-of-the-World messages and no doubt in private communications, the President sig- naled the Kremlin that he was will- ing to accept the status quo in divided Europe. This did not mean he Would condone the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, an event that chilled East-West rela- tions five months before he, took ? office. Nor did it imply he would cold-shoulder Romania's attempts to improve its links with the West ????? much faster than the Kremlin de- sired. But it did show that Mr. Nixon, like Chancellor Willy Brandt in Bonn, had come to accept the par- adox that the Iron Curtain could become more permeable only through acknowledgment of Soviet dominance to the east of it. In this context, it is interesting to note how the President dealt with Eastern European .affairs in his 1971 and 1972 foreign policy reports. "While the countries of (Eastern Europe) are in close proximity to the USSR, they also have historic ties to Western Europe and the United States," he said in the first of these messages. "We will not exploit these ties to undermine the security of the Soviet Union. We would not pretend that the facts of history and geography do not create siecial circumstances In - Eastern Europe. We recognize a divergence in social, political and economic systems between East and West." 0 0 0. It is difficult to imagine a state- ment that could have been more reassuring to the Russians. It came at a time when the Russians were stalling on the Berlin accord, the ice-breaking document in East- West relations that had been signed one year later when Mr. Nixon gave his 1972 foreign policy assess- ment. As a result, the President evidently felt lie could direct his calls for accommodation more pointedly toward the Eastern Euro- pean capitals. Listen to these remarks in his message of last February: "We do not want to complicate the difficul- ties of East European nations' re- lations with their allies; neverthe- less, there are ample opportunities for economic, technical and cultural cooperation on the basis of recipro- city. The Eastern European coun- tries themselves can determine the pace and scope of their developing relations with the United States." In May, only three months after those words were uttered, Mr. Nix- on made the first presidential visit in history to Poland as he headed home from the Moscow summit. 0 ? His appearance coincided with the signing of a consular agreement that the U.S. had sought for 10 years as a protection for American citizens. While no specific trade deals were completed, a bilateral commission was set up and nego- tiations were launched that could,, in time, bring Poland the U.S. cred- its, trade and technology it so eag- erly desires. The Warsaw regime has made a good-faith gesture by opening talks on the partial repay- ment of bonds sold by the non- communist government In pre-war Poland to hundreds of Americans of Polish origin. The Nixon trip to Warsaw was followed by Secretary of State Rog- ers'? July journey to Hungary, where relations have been grim since the 1956 uprising, and by Mr. Ftsogers' conversations last month with the foreign ministers of Czech- oslovakia and Bulgaria. The U.S. made headway with all three governments in its quest for ? consular treaties and, in return, opened trade talks that could lead eventually to the granting of most - favored - nation commercial arrangements?a top-priority mat- ter for these economically deficit nations. Hungary. responded to Washing- 59 ton's efforts by agreein 'to nego- tiate on a settlement orAmerican war-damage and nationalization claims. Bulgaria, a nation long ' content to stay deep in, the Soviet shadow, agreed to send a deputy prime minister to the U.S: next , year. Washington is waithing for a less repressive political mood in, 1 Prague. American relations With 'East Germany will have to remain in official abeyance until Bonn nor- malizes its relations with East Ber- lin and the two Germanys. enter the United Nations. However.,It Is now only a matter of time ,before the United States and East, Ger- many recognize one another and begin the process of developing po- litical, cultural and trade arrange i. - ments. In the meantime,, both countries are exchanging visitors at a cautiously faster pace. ? ? ? While American-Soviet detente N the major factor in Mr. Nixon's policies toward Warsaw Pact na- tions, there are other influences as well. One Is the approach of 'a Con: ference on European Security and Cooperation where the West will try to encourage independent Im- pulses on the part of Eastern Euro- pean nations. Another is the con- cern Washington shares with Soviet bloc nations about restrictive trade - policies of the Common ;Market. , Finally, there has been a change; a two-way change, in the feelings between the Communist reghties of Eastern Europe and 'millions of Americans of Eastern European ethnic origin. While ideological hos- tility remains, it is gradually being overtaken by a resurgence of na- tional sentiment that cannot fail but make ,reconciliation Approved For Release 2001/08107-rCIA;RDP77-00432R0001000200014---- Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4 NEW YORK TIMES 18 November 1972 ? Bal rice of Wi arut I ? By .Anthony Lewis ' LONDON, Nov. 17 ? The Russian State Choir performed the other night hi the Queen Elizabeth Hall, London. On the pavement outside there was a counter performance: Victor YOran, a Soviet Jew in exile, played works for unaccompanied cello by Bach and Ravel. Mr. Yoran was protesting the refusal of Soviet authorities over the last three years to let his wife, his son and his mother join him in Israel. .Others with him carried signs cori- .demning the treatment of Jews in the .U.S.S.R., for example the dismissal of .24 Jewish musicians from the Moscow -Radio Orchestra after one sought a permit to leave for Israel. The incident evoked a disparate -memory. One of the most bizarre moments in the 1972 Republican con- _ ,vention came during a film on the ; accomplishments of President Nixon.. When he was shown with Leonid trezhnev of the U.S.S.R., the hall in Miami burst into the loudest 'applause of the evening. The applause was doubtless for the .idea of d?nte rather than the person Df Brezhnev. Still, it was remarkable .to see thousands of Republicans applauding at the burly image of the Soviet Communist party leader, the imposer of a head tax on Jewish emi- grants, the author of the formal doc- trine that the Soviet Union may sup- WASHINGTON POST p 11 November 1972 ,1'103 press freedom in any Socialist country. The delegates' enthusiasm for friendship with the most powerful Communist countries contrasted with _their equally strong support for con- tinued American air and naval assault on one of the smallest, North Vietnam. ' Then Mr. Nixon, in his acceptance ? speech, made a tender reference to little Tanya of Leningrad, whose fam- ily died during the German blockade; he said nothing about the hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese Tanyas and other innocents killed, wounded and made homeless by his bombs. .IIow does one explain the difference in American attitudes toward Commu- nism in Moscow and Hanoi? Has Russian Communism been smoothed into something more con- genial? Hardly. The persecution of dis- senters, more cruel than of Jews, is too well known to need rehearsing? the punishment in mental hospitals and labor camps. One savage recent example is the death of the 35-year- old poet Yuri Galanskov in a camp this month. He was known to have severe stomach ulcers; but when his mother brought honey for him last June, camp authorities barred it, say- ing he was not sick but was "just a hooligan who shirks his work." Or perhaps we could say that the Soviet Union does not invade other countries, as North Vietnam did the South in the spring offensive. But that "invasion" was part of a war in what had been one country for many hun- dreth of years and is still regarded as such by most Vietnamese. The Soviet Union only a few years ago brazenly invaded a totally foreign country, Czechoslovakia. Have we for- . gotten already? No, the reason for the difference in attitudes is plain enough. The Soviet Union is big, powerful and dangerous to the United States. North Vietnam is small, weak and no danger whatever ?a country we can afford to abuse. Power is a reality in the world, and it is necessary wisdom for the United States to recognize that. We have no effective power to help the Czechs and would not improve things by delusions to the contrary. D?nte with the, soviet Union, as in the SALT agree- ment, serves important purposes what- everthe nature of Soviet society. The question is whether the reality of power ev :Ades more human con- cerns in foreign policy. Henry Kissin- ger might well say yes; he might indeed regard anyone who asked .such question as a sentimentalist. But Americans still do have to live with their foreign policy, so they ought' to iyiderstand its human consequences. A world balanced among the strong May have ,grave consequences for the Areak. That is because the balance is essentially an agreement by the power- ful to let each other have their own Way in their own spheres. Andrei Sakharov, the great Russian "dissenter, said in a recent interview that things had grown worse in the U.S.S.R. since Mr. Nixon's visit 'to fl Moscow: "The authorities seem more impudent because they feel that with d?nte they can now ignore Western public opinion." Limits on American influence in Soviet affairs may be an ' inescapable part of great-power agree- ment. But it does not follow that we must cease to care about what we do 'ourselves, in our wort'. lropovich: The Discord of Ddeute On Nov. 1, on the basis ,of his personal reply, -Thiel 'College .in Greenville,. Pa., announced that the great Russian cellist Mstislav Rostropovich was -to perform ti ere. on Nov. 16, and to receive an honorary degr.,,e. But yesterday the Soviet Embassy .in Washington: offering the patently phony excuse .that Mr. Rostropovich's schedule was full, told Thiei that the lcellist and his wife, soprano Galina Vishnevskaya, 'Prouldn't come. Obviously, he is be- ing humiliated', and caged by his government for his long and I onorable record of standing up for human rights in the Soviet Union. Ilk statement in defense of Nobel laureate Alexander Solzhenit- syn a year 'agt..- is perhaps the best publicized part of that record. There is, to sure, nothing new in the Krem- lin's treating i most distinguished citizens in this barbarie fasliliti. However, there is something new, mid sonintillip. extremely, disturbing, in the con- text of this last repression. Within the last year, Soviet-American relations have notably improved: They aro "the ..)est yet," the Soviet ambassador ob- served the otter evening. President Nixon cam- paigned effecti:/ely .for re-election on his contribu- tion to this .ad;,ance in Soviet-American relations. Political and sti.alegie dialogue is proceeding, trade is expanding, ,be atmosphere is bright. The ques- tion forced by the Restropovich ban is whether all of these considerable advantages are to be gained by a sellout of the values in which this na- tion, at least, kisupposedly believes. Does Moscow intend to use Soviet-American Approved For Reiease zu American concern for violations of human rights- 't in the Soviet Union? -? The issue, we submit, to the heart of the purpose and meaning of detente,-,; and of American public support for it., At the May summit in Moscow, furthermore, Mr 'Brezhnev agreed with Mr. Nixon on a set of "Basic, Principles of Mutual Relations." Principle No. 9 , states: "The two sides reaffirm their intention to , deepen cultural ties with one another and to en- courage fuller familiarization with each other's, cultural values. They will promote improved con; ditions for cultural exchanges." A case can be made i that the leash on Mr. Itostropc.vich does indeed , familiarize the United States with official Soviet cultural values, but this can hardly be what the Nixon-Brezhnev declaration , had in mind. H Mr. Nixon means to have the "Basic Principles" re- garded as more than a scrap of paper, then he can hardly fail to take appropriate official cognizance ? of an act which Is ii transparent violation of We would prefer to believe that the Rostropovich affair is the result not of a personal intercession'' by Mr. Brezhnev but of one of those bureaucratic' tradeoffs ? something for Moscow's ideological. hardhats?that are not entirely Unknown in Amer- ican politics either. Fortunately, there is still time arid polities' room ror the Miter low.ieval and Informal Soviet Embassy ban to be set aside. Mr. Nixon, himself an earlier recipient of a Thiel lion- orary degree, by the way, and Mr. Brezhnev, by all administration accounts a broad-minded man intent on detente, surely have a common interest in 60 As-?1515MtA3iiktittPrel s'J 200bels-41 to Thiel.' Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010002000114 WASHINGTON STAR 12 November 1972 CARL T. ROWAN 25 Years for Trans:706n Prat Madness to Sanity Out of Bonn comes the al- most incredible announcement that West Germany and East Germany will treat each other ? civilly, and as two separate,: respectful states. This is especially astonish- ing to anyone aware of the . many times during the last, quarter-century when rivalry, between the two Germanies threatened to plunge the world Into nuclear war. I remember a badly shaken John F. Kennedy returning from a Vienna meeting with Soviet Premier Nikita IChru; shchev, rushing desperately to beef up U.S. conventional military forces after the Rus- shins jolted him with an ulti- matum about Berlin. Kennedy would not have be- lieved that passage of another decade could bring the kind of detente we now see. Then there are the Koreas. Talking to each other for a change. Making noises sug- gesting that, despite the ob- stacles of willful, power-loving men at the top of each govern- ment, the same kind of thaw Is in the cards for them. A f ter the investment of scores of thousands of U.S., WASHINGTON STAR 13 November 1972 ' RAY CROMLEY Europ There is growing alarm within the Nixon administra- tion over, the economic pro- grams of our West European allies. What bothers the Nixon men deeply is a program now being worked out in the Euro- pean Common Market which aims eventually at a bloc of 60 countries, each giving the oth- ers trade preferences and dis- criminating against the prod- ucts of the United States and other nonmember lands. The first step aims at bring- ing in a group of Mediterra- nean lands. Quiet behind- the-scenes talks are going_ ahead on this first-step pro- gram now despite some con- cerned effort on the part of special U.S. trade representa- tives to stem the tide. This system of protection and discrimination would, of course, put the United States at a severe trade disadvan- tage. Worse yet, the Nixon ec- onomic-trade specialists here fear, it would set off a/ race Chinese and Korean lives and many billions of dollars in that ? fratricidal conflict, the pas- sions now wane somewhat. ? Then there is the People's ? Republic of China. In the first ? years of this last quarter- ? century even a word or ges- , tyre of civility by an Ameri- can was political suicide. The United States was caught up ? in mean recriminations over "who lost China" to the Com- munists. Emotionalizing over China's involvement in the, ? Korean war replaced any log- ical thinking about what must ? be the ultimate place in world society of a country inhabited by more than a fifth of the world's people. Only after more than two decades, when only rabid American conservatives were still spleenful in their view of ? Peking, was it possible for a ? Republican president to open a new dialogue and set about normalizing relations with China. We look back at the hours , wasted in angry rhetoric hurl- ed at China in the United Na- tions, in Congress, in U.S. ? political campaigning, and re- call how the bitter insults were ? duplicated in Peking, and eve ' shake our heads in sardonic laughter. Now there is Indochina. Another of those quarter-cert.. turylong abominations. Peace may not be nearly as close at hand as the American people have been led to be- lieve, but it seems clear that "reconciliation and concord" , among the people of Vietnam is under way. And once again we shall shake our heads in wonder- ment that we sacrificed so . many American lives, helped snuff out so many Asian lives, dropped so many bombs and destroyed so many people and 'things, only to see the princi- pals to the conflict shako hands and take the more ra- tional route of negotiations. Maybe there is a lesson in all this. Perhaps, just as nature establishes a nine- month gestation period? for humans and a 645-day period for elephants, a 25-year period Is required to convert Interna- tional madness to sanity. The lesson, then, would be that utter restraint is called for by the rest of mankind while Combatants ? are-- given time. to. come back to their senses. , You think of the many times when the U.S. and Night , could have gone to war per. the Germanys?and shu er. You think how, inviting was for the United States to take rash action after the seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo. - or North Korea's shooting down of our EC-121 aircraft, ? or the many periodic out- bursts of violence in the do- 'militarized zone between the' two Koreas. And you sigh in relief. This is not to suggest that there will not be more killing in Indochina or more crises in Europe. An observation of the current state of mankind , suggests that it is folly to ex- poet lasting peace?or even a generation of it. But it may be that if the . great powers keep their cool, these regional and internal squabbles need not blow -up into massive conflagrations. ? . And who knows but what man ; might cut the period of transi- tion from madness to sanity ' ? from 25 years to 20, Or even ? to 10? r e Bloc Bother IJIX? worldwide to set up competing protectionist trade blocs. This development would knock the props out of the free trade policies which American Pres- idents ? Republican and Dem- ocrats alike ? have pushed for the past two decades. However inconsistent our other policies from time to time, both politi- cal parties have united on the necessity for cutting trade barriers as a stimulus to pros- perity. The growth of these protec- tionist blocs might make it very difficult Indeed for the United States to recover from Its unfavorable balance of trade unless Washington too resorted to stiff import con- trols and set up an internation- al preference bloc .of its own. The Europeans tell Nixon's protesting representatives that the Tieing tide of UM, teolitio. logy Is forcing them Into Ode protectionism. The U.S. technology base is too strong, and growing too rapidly, they claim, for Euro- peans to compet e. First there's the vast U.S. market itself, which sparks new tech- nology and offers the opportu- nity for profitable exploitation of new developments. Then there's the worldwide spread of U.S. companies which en- ables this country to learn quickly, and to rapidly take advantage, of technological improvements wherever they're developed. The finan- cial strength of these interna- tional U.S. concerns provides them with the necessary capi- tal to put these advanced tech- nological discoveries into use with amazing speed, the Euro- pean Common Market men say. As a result, they claim, Europe must in self-defense expand its own base. Thus the plan for a 60-country alliance. But the Europeans are in- creasingly worried about Am eric an countermoves. Tiiny'vo mod W fflhtiWfl to end the war in Viet Nam and to build relations with the Communist lands and thus ease the cold war. Now that President Nixon is following this advice, they're worried their plans for discrimina4g against the United States 'may. drive this country, into eco- nomic alliances with Russia and China, and cause Wash- ington to direct U S. inveSt- ment and developmeat aid ern; phasis to Southeast Asie and the Far East in the next dec- ade, leaving West Europe (with its heavy need for? ad- vanced technology, invest- ment) somewhat out' !.:1 the, cold. ? ' The dilemma of the Europe- . ans is clear and sharp. They need U.S. advanced technolo- gy, yet they want to be free Of this dependence. They want to discriminate against the Unit- ed States economically, but not so sharply the United States will react strongly enough to injure their cconp-' ' mies. Thdlit fetirN 1110 the U.S negotiators some' le- verage. This problem has no solution so dramatic as the Moscow and Peking visits. But, it will occupy Nixon for some years to come. ? 61 -Approved For-Release 2001708107-TC1A:RDP77-00432R000100020-001-4" Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4 Newsweek, November 279 1972 ad raze . $v 3 0 1- py Weathe rt?- or once, Henry Kissinger's timing was off. Even as the President's national security adviser was deeply immersed in a final round of Vietnam peace talks, the U.S. foreign policy establishment was about to shift its attention to a different part of the world. "Nineteen seventy- three will be the year of Europe," Ad- ministration officials say?and to prove it they have scheduled a mind-boggling series of European negotiations that, in a quieter way, promise to have as great a global impact as Mr. Nixon's dramatic trips to Peking and Moscow in 1972. It all begins this week when the U.S. will join 33 other nations in Helsinki for a preliminary round of talks on the question of European security. At the same time, the U.S. and Russia will meet in Geneva to begin the second phase of talks on limiting strategic weapons. Then, after the first of the year, East and West will tackle the thorny problem of how to reduce military forces in Cen- tral Europe. And to cap it all off, next summer will usher in the vitally impor- tant "Nixon round" of meetings on Euro- pean trade. "Fasten your seat belts," one Western diplomat said last week. "It's going to be a bumpy Europe for the next four years." Indeed it is. During his second term in office, Mr. Nixon is widely expected to pursue a radically new kind of policy toward Europe. Essentially, there will be two major themes. First, the Presi- dent intends to treat both his old ad- versaries in the East and his old friends in the West with equal toughness. Sec- ond, he plans to use the economic might of the U.S. as his chief weapon in deal- ing with Europe?East and West. What all this means is that the U.S. is ready to launch its most ambitious diplomatic offensive in Europe in the past two decades. Below, NEWSWEEK examines the main issues and the likely outcome of this European strategy: DEALING WITH OLD ADVERSARIES Since 1964, the Soviet Union has been clamoring for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Moscow's hope is to obtain the seal of diplomatic approval on the postwar sta- tus quo?a divided Europe in which Rus- sia can exercise hegemony over the East- ern portion while penetrating the West politically. The West has been wary, but sonic months ago?after the Soviets offered concessions guaranteeing West- ern rights in Berlin?the U.S. gave its nod. Still, there was one hitch. The Nixon Administration insisted that sep- arate talks be held simultaneously on mutual and balanced reduction of East- ern and Western forces ? in Europe (MBFR)?a hard-nosed bit of bargain- ing that Moscow reluctantly accepted. The opening of the Helsinki talks on European security represents something of a diplomatic victory for the Russians. But the Western delegations, and par- ticularly that of the U.S., have no inten- tion of letting the Soviets get their own way in the Finnish capital. The major Ahead wrangling will come over the agenda of the full conference. The Russians would like the preliminary session in Helsinki to do no more than establish a vague agenda and set a date for the conference. But the U.S., with the support of its NATO allies, means to bold out for a meaningful agenda that could lead to- ward concrete agreements. "We don't want to spoil their party," said an Ameri- can diplomat in Moscow. "But we do want it to produce something more tangible than pious propaganda declarations." Along with its Western allies, the U.S. will make it plain that the "inviolability of European borders," about which the Russians are expected to make much fuss, should also apply to the countries of the Eastern bloc?a slap at the so- called Brezhnev doctrine of "limited sovereignty" that permits Moscow to interfere in the internal affairs of its sat- ellites. The West may even demand that the Russians discuss such embar- rassing questions as the free flow of in- formation and people and exit visas for Soviet Jews. And while the Russians hope to drive wedges between the U.S. and its allies, Washington believes it can en- courage a certain degree of independ- ence on the part of the Eastern Euro- peans. In exchange for support in the agenda battle, the U.S. is said to be pre- paring to offer huge American invest- ments to the Eastern Europeans. "In the end," remarked one American official, "the Soviets may kick themselves for having thought up such a conference." Balanced: The U.S. is expected to take the same tough line in the MBFR talks. Moscow will argue that cuts should be made on a man-for-man, tank-for-tank basis. But since the forces of the Warsaw Pact outnumber NATO's 1 million to 500,000?and since Soviet troops in East- ern Europe would be moving back a mere 500 miles into their own country while U.S. troops in Germany would withdraw aeross the Atlantic?the U.S. will argue for a "balanced" reduction in forces. This means the Soviet Union will be asked to cut its troop strength by a greater per- centage to make up for its geographic proximity to Western Europe. Despite all the possible pitfalls in these complex negotiations, high U.S. officials are confident that Washington is dealing from diplomatic strength. "The Soviets need us more than we need them," says one U.S. expert. "They know the tech- nology gap between the U.S.S.R. and the rest of the world is widening and they also need to acquire marketing and management skills. We can give them those things in exchange for a more lib- eral attitude toward East Europe and for a reasonable approach to troop reduc- tion. That's what d?nte could be about ?if they play their cards right." NEGOTIATING WITH OLD FRIENDS As seen from Western Europe, the whole question of European security and force reductions is a two-edged swoid. The West Europeans are concerned that 62 'the Nixon Administration will use the threat of a drastic and unilateral reduc- tion in U.S. troop strength in Europe to get the members of the expanded Com- mon Market to lower their, barriers to U.S. trade. Fearing a crisis in EEC-U.S. relations, the Europeans 'point to Mr. Nixon's recent statement that lp will take action to insure "that the W., can continue to get a proper break our trading relations with other nations.., Although the President did not liame the "other nations," he is known to he exercised over the system of trade prac- tices being constructed by the Common Market. A tariff wall around the Market was one thing and it was understandable that Europe's former colonies in Africa would get preferential trade treatment. But then came the concept of "reverse preferences," whereby the former col- onies pledged themselves to give EEC bidders preference in investment proj- ects in their area. Next, the EEC began to expand the concept of preferential 'trade treatment to huge areas outside its traditional zones of concern. Special deals were made for the import of citrus fruit from Spain and Israel and the talk in Brussels began to turn to the possibili- ty of associate membership in the EEC for Mexico and Singapore. At this point, the Nixon Administration trade experts blew up. "If the EEC keeps this up,' said one, "they will have a system that effec- tively fences out all competition from the U.S. and Japan." Rivalry: What moves the U.S. will make to counter the EEC remains to be seen. But it seems likely that next summer's "Nixon round" of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade will be a lively one, with the U.S. pushing hard for clearer rules governing trade be-- tween the U.S. and the EEC. Some Eu- ropeans, however, fear that the U.S. in- tends to go even farther than that in its trade rivalry with the EEC. "The U.S. is . planning a major trade offensive in the Eastern European countries," insists one EEC official. "They will try to set up au- tomobile plants there, taking advantage, of the cheap labor, and flood the EEC: countries with Eastern-made cars with good old American names." Unless some way is found to head off a full-fledged trade war between the, U.S. and the EEC, the former allies: might find themselves in a bitter rivalry. for the available energy resources in the' world. So far, the Nixon Administration:. has talked tough but done little to estab- lish a high-level dialogue with the EEC: about these problems. And many diplo- mats on both sides of the Atlantic are, fearful that the economic difficulties ? could one day lead to a political confron- tation between the U.S. and Western Europe. "Nixon," says one European, may go down in history not just as the . President who normalized relations with China and Russia but as the man respon- sible for the U.S. and Europe breaking their bonds and going their own ways." Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001:4 MANCHESTER GUARDIAN 4 NOV 1372. .VAJ1 t e fault e CIA? ? ? i -Walter Schwarz, New Delhi, on the genesis' of an Indian myth What goes wrong in India used to be blamed on the British, or the failing monsoons, or the Pakistanis, or ? the pro-Chinese Communists. Now, suddenly, it's ? the CIA. In the last few weeks Mrs Gandhi and her top party officials have named the CIA as responsible for riots in Delhi and Bihar, language disturbances in Assam, student demonstrations in Punjab and Kerala, unrest in Kashmir, hostile processions in West Bengal and, most sinister of all, the emergence of a grand alliance among opposi - tion parties. The fashion was born in Sept- ember when the Congress Party President, . Dr Shankar Dayal Sharma, said at a press confer- ence that "the CIA is creating conflict in my country and using its stooges for making peaceful demonstrations violent." Whether this was the opening shot in a deliberate campaign to make India spy-conscious is not clear. Perhaps having come out with it, Dr Sharma could not dis ? own it, and his Prime Minister could not disown hi in. Perhaps it was such a popular thing to say that Dr Sharma went on saying it and the others joined in. Whatever the reasons behind the timing, it is fairly clear that Mrs Gandhi, Dr Sharma, and a great many other Indians believe. the charges to have more than a grain of truth. What Dr Sharma thinks the CIA has in mind was explained at his next press conference. It meant "to show after all that India is not strong, but economically weak and politically disjointed and Mrs Gandhi's victory only an accident." For her part Mrs Gandhi said she agreed there was a "cult of violence" and that this was fomented by "foreign Powers which , hate to see India strong." More specifically, she said the CIA had "lain dormant" during the Bangla - desh war "because the people were united." Its activities had now been "revived." . After this stamp of approval, Chief Ministers and Party bosses all the .way from Kashmir to :Kerala came out with what the CIA had been doing to rock their 'particular boats. , 'Phe ? Chief Minister of Punjab found the CIA behind the demonstrations of the ultra -right-wing Alkali Dal Party, while his colleague hi West Bengal singled out the pro -Chinese Com - munist Party as the ? agency's stooges. Nobody offered evidence. It is not Up to us to prove it but it is up to the CIA to disprove it," said Mrs Gandhi haughtily. This remark provoked Mr Rogers into raising the whole matter with India's Foreign Minister in Wash - ington. Mrs Gandi now explained that she had meant that the CIA's doings were already well enough documented up and down the world. The Americans reacted quietly.. The Embassy in Delhi put out a two-line statement calling Dr Sharma's original attack "out- rageous and totally devoid of fact." Then it kept quiet, waiting for the storm to blow over. Mr Rogers assured Mr Swaran Singh that no CIA activities were harmful to India. Sceptics in Delhi put the whole thing down to political manoeuvr- ing. "Methinks the lady protests too much," said the Indian Express, while the Hindustan Times found it "difficult to resist the feeling that the Congress Party is casting about desperately for allies and scapegoats for its relatively poor performances in the economy." It was indeed a time of food riots after a drought, and of mount- ing popular exasperation over rising prices and corruption. The Congress Party was about to hold its annual committee meeting, where the leadership was expected to be attacked from within by the left wing. And both Left and Right opposition parties were planning nation-wide demonstrations. As a scapegoat and a diversion, the *CIA filled the bill. Politics may account for the, timing of the anti -CIA campaign. But the proposition that the United States is actively interested in preventing India from becoming strong is very widely accepted ? and Mrs Gandhi is clearly among the believers. For most Indians the final doubts were. dispelled :luring the Bangladesh .war, when toe Seventh Fleetfcarrier appeared in the Bay of Bengal. The correspondence columns of Delhi newspapers have been less sceptical than the editorials. Among scores of irate anti -CIA letters the least violent was 'from a kind sohl who sought to excuse the Embassy for its denial on the grounds that AmeriePu Ambas sadors never knewwhat the CIA. was up to. ' .The American role here has. been an object lesson in how to ? : give aid 'and win enemies. In the ? last twenty years India got more 'than ten thoUsand million dollars' . worth of American aid ? more ? than from all other countries put, 63 Approved For-Release 2001/08/07-:CIA-RDP77-00432R0001000200014? together. In one drought after another, American surplus wheat and rice staved off famine. The "green revolution" which has begun to make India independent of food imports was partly financed by American dollars, as was nearly every branch of education, welfare, industry, and development. The dependence bred resent- ment. And now that the aid has been cut off as a result of the war with Pakistan, there is fresh resentment. A veteran of the Con- gress ?Party's freedom struggle and now one of Mrs Gandhi's senior colleagues assured me that "Americans are far more arrogant than the British ever were. Aid was for their own benefit, not ours." This minister said he saw a pattern running through all the riots which suggested to him that the CIA was master-minding them. The wheat and rice used to be paid for in rupees which were banked here for American use. Some of the money went on internal aid projects. A lot of it paid for the hugely staffed diplo- matic and aid missions here ? and also paid the expenses of an army of visiting American scholars. These scholars did much - to lengthen the CIA's shadow het because they were always going ?- off to sensitive border areas like %Vest Bengal or Assam to write their theses. Some who were not CIA did not help matters by publicly declaring that the CIA had "approached" them. The American profile has now been drastically lowered. Even before the war the food stopped coming in because 'it was not needed. The war stopped all aid not tied to projects ? which stilt leaves about a hundred million dollars a year coming in. The. Indians themselves have put a stop to the wandering scholars by insisting that they operate in the framework of a local university. No doubt the CIA is still here, though perhaps it has pruned its numbers as drastically as the US Aid Mission has. The embassy still lists 108 diplomats in Delhi (the British 51, the Russians 67). The American mission includes a "defence supply representative" and two assistants, though no American arms have arrived here for many months. (An embassy spokesman said these people are being phased out.'!) In addition to fact-finding, the CIA may well give funds to political parties and individual political friends, just as . the Russians are widely assumed to finance the pro-Moscow Com- munists and the Chinese to help their own faction. But the notion that the CIA organises food riots and student demonstrations has yet to be proved, or even made to sound plausible. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4 CBRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 11 November 1972 \h/ 90 ITC - f \ CD Ion By John K. Cooley Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor Cairo President Sadat feels obliged to continue relying on Soviet military and economic aid, partly because the British and French Gov- ernments refused to deliver to Egypt their advanced Anglo-French Jaguar fighter plane, it has been learned here. Failure of the former Egyptian war min- ister, Lt. Gen. Muhammad Saddek, to obtain the planes may have been one reason for his resignation or dismissal by President Sadat last month, some qualified Egyptian observ- ers believe. Cairo sounded out the London and Paris governments about purchasing the Jaguar before President Sadat removed Soviet mili- tary advisers from Egypt last July, these sources say. Request repeated The request was repeated in more fortnal fashion after the Soviet departure and new Soviet refusals to supply the advanced MIG. 23 fighter-bomber. After the request had moved up to the highest levels of both governments, secret British and French Cabinet decisions rejected it for reasons that have not veen made public. What General Saddek and Egyptian Air Force commander, Maj. Gen. Hosni Emba- rek, evidently hoped was to obtain credit purchases of an entire Western-supplied defense system. This would have involved delivery of several squadrons of both the training and tactical-strike version of the Jaguar, as well as an integrated air-defense system of a type similar to that used by NATO in Europe. Retraining involved This would have meant phasing down Soviet help, five to six years of retraining the Egyptian armed forces, and new Western options to Egypt for purchasing other mili- tary equipment as well, it is understood. The Jaguar, developing Mach 1.7 speed at about 33,000 feet altitude, has shorter range and lighter payload than Israel's U.S.-supplied Phantoms, and lower ceiling and speed than the Soviet MIG-23. But it is comparable with, pt to WI NJaylefr, and some experts think superior to, the MTG. 21, the Soviet-supplied standard aircraft of the Egyptian and Syrian Air Forces. Israel claimed shooting down two Syrian MIG-21's in an air and artillery battle continuing through most of the day Nov. 10. Syria claimed it shot down four Israeli planes of unspecified type and admitted losing two of its own. Israel denied losing any of its aircraft, in the first air battle on the Israel- Syrian front since Sept. 8. Appearance of Syrian MIG-21's in combat was thought by some Arab observers to be evidence of new Soviet deliveries to Syria. Syria has mainly used the slower and much older MIG-17's and occasionally MIG-19's in past fighting. Final rejection A final Anglo-French rejection of the Egyptian request for Jaguars was one reason for Egyptian Prime Minister Aziz Sidky's trip to Moscow Oct. 16-18. During this trip Mr. Sidky was again told that Moscow could not presently supply the MIG-23. Careful observers of the Egyptian scene believe the Sadat government's desire for an advanced air combat system ? whether the MIG or the Jaguar ? is a quest for a prestige symbol proving that at least one big power has confidence in Egypt. Israel in better shape It is, however, not a sign that President Sadat really wants full-scale resumption of hostilities to expel Israeli troops from Sinai. Either the MIG-23 or the Jaguar system would require many years more of rigorous training. Egypt is estimated to have one trained pilot for each of the Soviet-made front-line combat planes it possesses, while Israel has more like three trained pilots for every aircraft. General Saddek's successor as War Min- ister, Lt. Gen. Ahmed Ismail, has quietly notified Western governments that the Egyp- tian Army command will never again allow Russian advisers to get key command. and advisory posts in the Egyptian armed forces. This was accepted as tacit reassurance that in case of a Soviet-Western confrontation in Europe or elsewhere, Soviet personnel or units in Egypt could not act against Western forces in the Mediterranean. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4 'Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001:4 CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 28 November 1972 e By David Winder Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor United Nations, N.Y. Nobody here expects the Middle East peace dove to be released during this week's General Assembly debate. If it is to be released at all, it will come next year with some possible American initiative for an interim agreement. One informed observer typified the rather languid attitude of the United Nations these days when he said: "People are waiting for the UN General Assembly session to fade into history; are waiting for the turn of the year to come and then they can look at the problem again.".. There is considerable expectation that after President Nixon has shaken down his new Cabinet some time in the new year, the administration will be forthcoming with some kind of partial agreement between Israel and Egypt for the reopening of the Suez Canal. No other peace plan ? not withstanding the UN's traditional role here or increasing European desires to play a settlement role ? is envisaged yet. As one European diplomat put it, "Nobody wants to cross wires with the Americans." Debate due for scrutiny The debate will be watched for any signs of flexibility in the parties' approach to any possible negotiations. As far as the UN is concerned, Israel is expected to take an even tougher position. For some time how there have been veiled warnings about the relevance of Security Council Resolution 242. Israel probably will let it be known that if it is pushed around too much at the UN, it may? drop altogether its interest in 242 as a basis for any future settlement. This 1967 resolution is considered the central core for any peace settlement since it was found acceptable to both the Israelis and the Egyptians. It calls for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories and Egypt's re- spect for safe, secure, internationally recog- nized boundaries. Israel's unsympathetic attitude to the UN , is well known, and Western observers feel that in spite of official Israeli denIals Foreign Minister Abba Eban's absence from this year's Middle East debate typifies Israel's back-of-the-hand attitude to the UN these days. Willingness indicated However, Israelis are thought to be respon- sive now to some diplomatic prodding from the United States. In principle at least, Israel has been, making such sounds as to suggest a willing- ness to make concessions. But the concern here is that Israeli concessions inevitably would be at a pace not only of their own , choosing but also at a pace unacceptable to the Arabs. ve may not ugiter Thus any American calls for major Israeli concessions such as vacating the Suez Canal east bank and the reopening of the canal itself could come up against stiff Israeli resistance. The other vexing problem for Middle East specialists is that both Egypt and Israel have of late been indulging in a game of diplomatic hide and seek. In short they are never simultaneously interested in seeking the same objectives at the same time. ? Israel for instance now appears more interested in an interim arrangement pro- vided there are no pre-conditions. Egypt, which had earlier professed an interest, cold shoulders this approach now. Officials disappointed Much of Egypt's disenchantment with the ? American formula is directly attributable to Cairo's sour feelings about Washington. One observer here said: "The Egyptians are bitterly disappointed with the fact that the Americans showed no response to the expulsion of the Russians. They desperately wanted some gesture to show appreciation." This perhaps explains Egypt's more than usual preoccupation with a UN-type settle- ment based on Security Council Resolution 242. Middle East peace watchers here hope that whatever resolution is approved in the 'com- ing debate will not be so tough as to present obstacles to the peacemaking processes they, see as inevitably restarting in the new year. RICHMOND NEWS LEADER 11 Nov 1972 Garbo and Insults: Relations between India and the United States turned sour last year when the Nixon Administration sided with Pakistan in the short-lived Indo- Pakistani War. Even so, the United States had so long. supported India's "experiment in democracy" that most observers felt that after a reasonable cooling-off period, the giant . of the West and the giant of South Asia 'would soon be smiling at each other once again. Not so. Under the peace-loving, iron-handed rule of Prime Minister In- dira Gandhi, India has created a cult of anti-Americanism that would do any two-bit African or Latin American country proud. According to Indian of- ficials, the United States is respon- sible for just about every ill imagi- nable, except perhaps the circum- stance that Mrs. Gandhi wasinot born a boy. Leading .the list of American bad guys is the Central Intelligence. Agency, that fascist-loaded organiza- tion which preys on poor, defenseless nations at every opportunity. Indeed, Indian Communists now ? HINDUSTAN TIMES 2 November 1972 Mody says he is CIA agent Hindustan Times Correspondent NEW DELHI, Nov. 1 ? "I am a CIA agent." With this Inscribed on a large bronze badge hung around his neck, the Swatantra Party Prest. dent and MP. Mr Piloo Mody, was today seen going round , the Central Hall of Parlia- ment. Mr Mody said he intended to wear the badge during the forthcoming session of Parlia- ment if for no other reason, at least to provoke the Gov- ernment which had suddenly discovered the dangerous act!-. vities of the CIA. As the idea caught on, Mr Mody said he had no doubt there would be a mad rush for the badges, particularly among the student community. His concern was whether those who might take to this trade would be able to pro- duce an adequate number of badges to meet the demand.4: claim that the United. States will post Ambassador Carol Laise from Nepal to New Delhi as part of an expanded CIA sabotage effort. Wife of that well- known CIA operative, Ambassador to Vietnam Ellsworth Bunker, Miss Laise was described the other day as a "CIA Matt Hari," whose appointment .to New Delhi would be "another insult . . to India"?an insult, no doubt, akin to the U.S. cutoff of aid to India : following the December hostilities. , . In fact, Indian ant-Americanism has grown in direct proportion to the number of days during which India has been forced to struggle on without sugar from Uncle Sam: fewer dollars, If more Charges of CIA interference. So all the United States needs to do is to'start providing providing fjnancial , support .again, and Miss Laise will not have to; -.- ? worry about being compared to Greta Garbo.. Then again, Mrs. Gandhi probably .would claim, even as she stuffed her -piggy bank, that the Nixon Adminis- tration was trying to Insult her with ; money. 6) Approved For Release 2001108/07 t CIA1RDP77-00432R000100020001-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4 WASHINGTON POST 19 November 1972 Gen .0 Amin Gqi, a Different Blessage 5q7PTINh Aid: An tr, 0 Eleettion Deeclition By Jim KAMPALA?Although the election has passed, an apparent attempt by the Nixon administration to use the executive branch to bolster the President's margin of victory continues to have impact in the deeply trou- bled East African country of Uganda. The effort involved a decision by the State Department to deceive the American public about its intentions to continue financial aid to the regime of President Idi Amin in the wake of Amin's sympathetic mention of Hit- ler's method of dealing with Jews last Sep- tember. After its spokesman, Charles Bray, told newsmen in Washington that a development loan to Uganda was being held up as a result of American displeasure with Amin, the de- partment cabled instructions to American Ambassador Thomas P. Melady in Kampala to tell Amin that Bray's straightforward?as- sertion had been "misinterpreted". Melady, who had beseeched Washington to continue aid, was also instructed to assure Amin that there was no connection between technical delays that had developed on the loan and Amin's statement on Hitler. , After Amin ignored Melady's plea that this assurance should be kept secret and re- leased it through the Uganda Press, Bray evaded direct comment on the conflicting American positions In Washington and Kam- pala. ? But he election is over now and the im- pact of Jewish votes on foreign Policy may have lessened. The United Stoles is clearly pushing ahead with plans to provide more than $6-million in aid to Amin's government, which has shown no sign of responding to any American attempts to moderate Amin's nation-destroying excesses. Moreover, the aid is being channeled to a government that with every passing day ap- pears to be less able to provide its share of the money and government manpower needed to administer aid projects. ,. Amin has allowed his army to slaughter off thousands of soldiers from tribes antag. onistic to his rule and has apparently en- ? cour-aged his security forces to eliminate many of the country's best educated men, whom he feared as a threat. The death toll since Amin took power in 1971 includes three Americans. Government ministers and civil servants, whom Amin publicly ridiculed last week as "weak" and "i tile" now refuse to make even minor decisions for fear of attracting the general's attention and losing either their jobs or their lives. The two loans the United States is on the verge of formally awarding to Uganda are, for building teacher training institutes and for an animal husbandry project. The fact that they are relatively small does little to mitigate their psychological importance, es- pecially In a time when aid is hard to come by in general and especially in Africa, where a number of other governments have shown themselves capable of administering such loans diligently. They will also follow a statement by .Amin last week praising the ? Palestinians for the intelligence they have shown. in hijacking planes. Tire United States, which has put it- self at the forefront of the campaign against Approved For Release 2001 110aglana international terror-lam, is not taken note of the new Amin statement. One of the two principal argun'q.nts that 'emerge from discussions with those here who support going ahead wii.h the loans are that they were originally offered several ,years ago, before Amin ousted President Milton Obote. There is a "moral obligation" on the part of the United Staes to go ahead with the aid, this argument holds. Only a few minor tech- nical details of signing the loans have been delaying them. The second is that by continuing aid the United States will have more influence with Amin and be in a better position to protect the 700 or so American diplomats, aid tech- , nicians, missionaries and businessmen who . have stayed on in Uganda. The implication of this argument is that it might be dangerous to displease Amin by stopping the loans. The Americans who have chosen to stay on are in effect hostages. Britain, which currently has about 3500 , citizens living in Uganda (more than 4000 ? Britons have quietly filtered out of the coun- try in the past few months) uses the same argument for its attempts to stay on good terms with the erratic Amin. Amin is set to take over Um tea estates of 28 British farmers in the Fort Portal area of Uganda next week, The clear signs here are that Britain has decided not to make an issue of this, even if Amin offers little or no compensation, as he did ?ot to the 42,000 Asians he has just expelled. While publicly hinting that Its policy to- ? yard Amin is based on fear for its nationals still there, Britain is known to have con- veyed to the United States its private view that any possible alternatives to Amin are so much more frightening that the West should continue to try to, work with him. The 'alternatives prestimahly are soldiers In ihn ranks bclow And n, who appear to be the only force capable of ending his rule. This is perhaps more than any other sin- gle factor the crux of the matter. For all of his erratic behavior and vitrolic words on. the Middle East, Amin has not struck at . strategic Western interests in Uganda, which because of its proximity to Kenya and Zaire and to the Nile is strategic country, by A Wean policy standards, 'rwo aid hums will probably have little ef- fect in protecting the 300 American mission- aries who undoubtedly will, want to see their missions through under even highly danger- ous conditions, from Amin's violent soldiers.' But they could help protect broader political interest. Diplomats in east Africa. already talk of the danger of the new interest shown ?in !. Uganda by Somalia, a major Russian aid , client. -Just as South Africa and Rhodesia have profited politically from Amin's irresponsi- bility, there will be American political forces that will want to deny American aid and support to Amin because his is a black government. But there are far more compel- ling and valid reasons for re-examination of a policy of cagerly providing loans that will give a boost. to man who has engineered an /1:09.1erla60''77-00432R000100020001-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4 CHICAGO TF,roliliE 1 9 NOV 1372 ky? f??? s.. BY PHILIP CAPUTO ? Rome Correspondent ChicangiTribune Press Service ROME, Nov. 18?The riddle Of the Red Arrow remains - Un- solved. ? Red Arrow is a freighter that sailed three months ago from the northern Italian port of La Spezia bound for the Li- byan capital of Tripoli. ? ..The merchant ship carried _110 armored personnel carri-- era and tanks, all manufac- tured by Italian arms comp- Inca, when it cast off. ? Their olive-drab color had been changed to beige for des- ert camouflage. The ams were destined for the army of ,Col.. Moammar Kadati, the Libyan president who has emerged as the most militant of Arab leaders: The riddle posed by the de- parture of the weapons is this: Is Italy becoming a major source of Libyan arms and is it seeking a greater role in the Middle East? Secrecy Shrouds 'Affair : Indications are that the an- swer is yes, but exact details are hard to come by. The Red Arrow affair, as it is some- times called, is shrouded in Secrecy and obscured by infor- mation that is a stew of facts, half-truths, and falsehoods. About all Italian officials are tivilling to say is that Italy ranks fifth among European arms exporters, having sold $23.5 million worth in the 1960s, and that the heart of the arms industry is La Spezia, where 13,000 civilians are em- ployed by arms makers. ? Anyone who tries to obtain . more than that is likely to end up feeling like a charaCter in a bad foreign intrigue novel. .! For example, a source who delivered a four-page memo- randum on the arms deals asked that the memo be shred- ded and 'burned after it Was read. of Red rrodlo rnthlp Libg? r` Friend May Saffer ? ? "If it should fall into the wrong hands, my friend might be hurt," he explained. !,Diplomals, politicians, and arms merchants who were in- terviewed abruptly ended the Conversation whenever the Libyan affair was mentioned. They gave replies such as, "It is a delicate matter. I can't discuss it," or "I'm not au- thorized to make any state- ments, and don't tell anyone you even talked to mc." The reason for all this cloak- and-dagger rests in Italy's percarious political situation and in the bitterness which many Italians feel toward Ka- deli. Shortly after he overthrew. the government of King Idris, in 1970, Kadafi expelled 30,000 Italian settlers from Libya and confiscated their property. "He even ?expelled the dead," said one right-wing Italian, explaining that Kaden 'sent the bodies of Italians bur- ied in Libya back to their homeland. ?? Libya had been under Rome's rule from 1911 to 1913. The expulsion enraged. con- servative Italians, who refer to the Moslem leader as "the lunatic of Tripoli." They form , a Powerful bloc in the current I government, which is a coali- tion of centrist and right-wing elements. Consequently, Rome is maintaining a lid of secrecy on its Libyan foreign policy to ! avoid another political crisis in .a country where political I event. crises are almost a daily(' The Red Arrow shipment ! was first revealed by II Seco- ' 16, the semiofficial voice of the S. I. Italy's n e o -Fascist party. The Foreign and De- fense Ministries admitted that armored personnel carriers were among the-cargo but de- nied allegations that the ship also carried 30 Leopard tanks, which are built by Oto-Melara, one of the country's largest arms manufacturers. Informed sources said the government's statement was substantially correct, altho a highly-placed military source said that about eight tanks of a different type?probably American-style M-47s?had been loaded on the Red Arrow. Question Is Tabled The press reports produced excited reactions from right- wing politicians, who brought the matter up to Parliament, which promptly tabled the question for an indefinite pe- riod. - Some Italian officials ex- plained that the arms deals were strictly between Libya and private companies, a doubtful hypothesis. One Oto-Melara ex- ecutive said recently, "Even to buy a nail we must request authorization from the govern- ment." ? The affair 'remained quies- cent until last week, when Il Secolo and other newspapers reported that the government planned to supply Libya with G-91Y fighters, and advanced aircraft manufactured by the Fiat Company in Turin. Knowledgable sources tend to discount this charge, tho they are maintaining a wait-and-see attitude. Privately, right-wing sources said that, in addition to fight- ers, shipments 'of -helicopters, tanks, and small arms are be- ing readied for Kahn's army. Moreover, a well-informed American with Libyan con- tacts said Italy is also consid- ering a contract to supply Lib- ya with 105 mm. artillery pieces.? Reports Called Fonndless All this was described by the Defense Ministry as "absolute- ly without foundation." In attempting to learn if the information is indeed ground- less, one finds himself .enve- loped by the mystery-cloaked world of international arms- selling and faced with contra- dictory statemetns. One execu- . 67 iiVC of Oto-Melara said all. the ,reports were false, but his boss indicated they were par- tially true. ? The latter then . said, "I would like to tell you what I know, but I am Chained by secrecy." It should be explained that /I Smolt) is not noted fur its ac- curacy, eke *a pt in military matters., "If you want to know what's going on with the military and arms shipments, they're the People to see," said an Israeli source. ? ' Why Arm Poe? The question some. Italians are asking is why their gov- ernment is arming its arch- foe, Kadafi. A northern indus- trialist provided this explana- tion: ? "Armaments must be -updat- ed . . . they become obsolete . However, for certain pur- poses, they are still excellent. This explains the conktant coming and going here of; for- eign uniforms and gentlemen wearing turbans. In La Spezia, they are no longer a curiosi- ty." ? - Other sources say that dis- posing of army surplus is not - the only reason for the appear- ance of turbaned gentlemen ,in .La Spezia. The other reason, they say, is oil. The voyage of the Red ar- row followed the signing of an agreement between the Libyan government and ENI, the Ital- ian-state-owned oil company. In exchange for drilling rights, ENT was to provide Kadafi's government with 51 per cent of all profits. ? The sources say that !arms were included in the exchange. "No, Leopard tanks haven't been sent to Libya?not yet," said an Israeli official. "But there isn't any doubt that Italy has sent arms to Libya and is catering to Libya in exchange' for the oil concessions to . ENI." ? Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001000200014--- Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4 To support this vieW,. they cite the recent appearance of Libyan Prime Minister Adbel. ?Jallud in Italy and France. Jallud spent last week in Par- is, where he offered the French government oil conces- W.A.SliliNGTON POST sions and asked for arms in return. The French accepted the offer. The French government, , Paris sources said, is "preoc- cupied with Italy," and knows that "the Italians have agreed to sell tanks to Libya." , ? ir Mr: evil's)? Nov. 29, :972 MacGregor ht Rit desia What in blazes is Clark. MacGregor, recently Mr. Nixon's re-election chairman and now a 'United Aircraft executive, doing in Rhodesia declaring that* Washington may soon recognize the white- minority-ruled state?the very .state which, in the considered judgment of the international 'com- munity, illegally .broke away from Britain in 1965? The State Department at once denied that the U.S. had such "plans," but those familiar with the ways of Washington will find it hard not to pay heed to the remarks or the well-placed Mr. Mac- Gregor. Mr. MaeGregor'S statement raises the question of whether he is doing a political job for the admin- istration by flying a trial balloon. If so? the balloon deserves to be shot down promptly. The United States should not be considering recognizing Rho- desia, and thereby conferring on Salisbury and on Salisbury's racial policies a significant new mantle of respectability, at this time. The timing is particularly 'important. For rea- sons of their own, the British and Rhodesian gov- ernments seem to be edging towards reconsidera- tion of a formula for a legal British grant of in- dependence in return for some prospects of Rho- desian progress towards majority rule?the formula rejected in 1971 but one for which no non-violent alternative has since been posed. Just ,as the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 13 November 1972 EcaLo y H Keny ern 111 si By David Winder Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor United Nations, N.Y. The successes of the Stockholm environ- ment conference are being dampened by the controversial decision of the UN General Assembly to site an environment secretariat In Nairobi, Kenya. On paper the decision to base this 23-man secretariat in Africa appears to have over- whelming support. But the conspicuously high number of Western abstentions is a clear Indication that the largely cooperative spirit that marked Stockholm has somewhat dimin- American Congressional decision last year to im- port Rhodesian chrome gave help and heart to those who did not want to hold Salisbury even to faint standards of racial justice, so a similarly negative and anti-black effect would be imparted '- by an American decision to recognize Rhodesia now. Should American' policy be guided by American ? standards of racial equality or, more bluntly, by .a political regard for the sensibilities of those Amer- icans?black and white?who are offended by Salis-1 ? bury's racial practices? Mr. Nixon's own standards. for relations with white-ruled African stateS? ex-?. ? plicitly grant that race should 'be' considered. The President believes, he has said, that the United I States should encourage "communication" between the races in Africa and 'between African and Ameri- can peoples. In fact, the proper question is not. ? whether but how race should be factored in. ',Tom- : munication" can have both positive and negative:1 aspects, depending on the situation. In this situa- . tion, "communication" ? meaning recognition ? could give?white supremacists in Salisbury a major boost at a critical period in their deliberations with other political elements in Rhodesia and with the British. This is exactly the wrong time for the United States to start such "communicating" with Rhodesia. ished in the follow-through at UN headquar- ters. Fundamentally there was a pull between Western countries, which, for reasons of cost and logistics favored a European secretariat and the "third world," demanding a bigger piece of the UN action. By acting in concert, the Group of 77, as the underdeveloped world is known ? even though its membership is well above 77 ? succeeded in having the first major global UN body located outside the industrialized Western world. It remains to be seen whether the initial advantage of winning broader environment support among developing nations will out- weigh the logistical objections to siting the UN environment secretariat in Nairobi. Cer- tainly before Stockholm, support for the conference among developing nations was hardly enthusiastic. One danger of Nairobi as some en- vironmentalists see it is that there may be some push now to emphasize development rather than environment. Poorer countries have long had their suspicions that the Western countries that Approved For Release 2001/08/04g# CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP77-00432R000106020001-4 have "made it" are anxious to impose enviromental controls at a time when the poorer countries seek rapid industrialization and development to catch up. Such concern ? lest development be given priority over the environment ? is still academic, however. A more pressing concern Is the political fallout, if not in Western Europe, then cer- tainly in the United States. The U.S., which has voted $100 million to the environment fund, voted against the Nairobi decision even though it subsequently pledged its support. The problem as seen here is not with the administration but with the mood of Con- gress. Few UN delegates need to be reminded that U.S. House ?Appropriations Committee member John J. ftooney, an arch foe of the UN, insisted on the withholding of U.S. funds for the International Labor Organization. While many Western diplomats concede NEW YORK TIMES 9 November 1972 it ? an Si By Hilary Ng'weno NAIROBI, Kenya?There are no sim- ple moral answers to the question of the plight of Asians currently being evicted from Uganda. Certainly, Presi- dent Idi Amin and his military govern-* ment are exhibiting a racism toward Asians which makes nonsense of much of Africa's righteous stand against the racist white minority governments of southern Africa. There are grounds for . genuine concern for the safety of any : Asians left in Uganda. Yet it is hypocritical of the world to try and look at this problem in ? isolation from its historical and inter- national implications. The fate of Brit- ish Asians in East Africa was put in Jeopardy first not by anything any African government did but by the cumulative decisions of various Brit- ish governments, starting with racially discriminatory colonial laws which placed the economies of East 'African nations into foreign, essentially Asian hands, and ending with the disgrace- ful passage by the British Labor Gov- ernment in 1968 of a law barring the entry of nonwhite British citizens into Britain. Admittedly the British in their rac- ism have not been as crude as Presi- dent Amin and his soldiers. They have not rounded up the Asians in their midst, dispossessed them, abused them, stripped them of their dignity and threatened their very lives. But then it has not been necessary. It has all been done for them by the Ugandans.. It is pointless for Britain to try and remind Uganda of her reepotleibIlltita 0 Uganda residents, whether citizens Or not, when Britain herself has in the lest five years been busy trying the need for some geographic distribution of UN agencies, there is concern among them . and environmentalists lest a Nairobi-based secretariat with coordinating-agency respon- sibilities be too isolated from European- based UN bodies. There are other logistical questions. Says one key environmentalist,_ not at- tached to the UN, on the possibilities of enlisting experts: "If you want a good man, and a good man is going to be pretty busy, and it's the best part of a day to get him there and the best part of a day to get him back, not to speak of the jet-lag aspect, then the whole logistical problem becomes grossly aggra- vated." African countries in turn say opposition to their site is primarily politically motivated and that the time when industrialized coun- tries could act as if the African countries were colonies and decide for them has passed. Racism to evade her own responsibilities to- ward British citizens. Altogether there are still more than 100,000 British citi- zens of Asian origin in East Africa, The British Government, until the. Uganda crisis, had insisted on taking them into Britain at the rate of three thousand entry vouchers a year. Even assuming that each voucher repre- sented five entries, this would mean that it would take more than seven years for all British Asians in East Africa to be absorbed into Britain. A convenient timetable for Britain, but hardly one which took into con- sideration any of the wishes of the East African nations concerned. And a timetable which was in effect a uni- lateral British interference in East African affairs. For what Britain was telling East African governments was: "Sorry, old chaps; we know the Asians are our problem, but you've got to take care of them until we are ready to take care of them and that may , not be for another seven or so years." Given such arrogance on the part of Britain, it is a wonder that no crisis in relations between Britain and her former East African territories erupted earlier than the current Uganda crisis. For this the British and the world can thank not the statesmanship of British leaders but rather the maturity 'and patience of the governments of Kenya and Tanzania. The real tragedy of Uganda is not the Asian problem, for that is Britain's tragedy rather than Uganda's. The real tragedy Is that President Amin has been able in a very short time to un- leash pent-up racist' feelings among the public which observers of the tigantlau wino bed thought won) MIA ? and gone. These racist feelings have provided the military government of Uganda, with a base for popularity 69 which it badly lacked and need-ed. But they will not solve 'any of the prob- lems Uganda is faced with. I The Asians have been odd-men-out in East Africa. They are hated because they are thought to be industrious,: wealthy, clannish; because they do,: , not mix with Africans; because they ' cheat and bribe to advance their busi- ness; because they are smarter than , Africans; because they are different; because they are Asian. But they will sooft be gone from the Ugandan scene:, The African will remain, and it is only then that the full scope of the Ugandan tragedy, will be realized. Already a number of prominent Ugandan Africans have disappeared. The former Chief of Staff in the Obote Government and one-time Uganda High Commissioner to Ghana, Briga- dier Opoloto, has not been heard of for months. The Chief Justice, Mr. Kiwanuka, is gone. So is the vice , chancellor of the country's only uni- versity. Disappearance as announced by the Government of Uganda is a, euphemism for all kinds of things, including murder at the hands of soldiers. Because of the pervading in, security and terror most of Uganda's Intellectuals would dearly like to leave the country if they could do so with- out arousing the suspicions and anger of the trigger-happy army. The long-term prospect for the coun-' try is bleak. Economically the current Asian crisis is disastrous for Uganda. The xenophobia which President Amin. has aroused among average Ugandans is bound to boomerang, with painful consequences for everyone. That is the real tragedg of Uganda, Hilary Ng'weno is a journalist and former editor of The, Daily Nation, Nairobi. ? AppraietIFOr Re1e-ai-e-200IT5S7OT: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4 THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW' Nov-Dec 1972 ' The capabilities for conducting effective intelligence gathering and paramilitary operitions have long been. essential tools in the conduct of national policy. Unfortunately, however, certain misconceptions regarding the manner and circum- stances in which they can be employed arose in this country after World War II and- led directly to setbacks like the Bly of Pigs: Rather than shunning the possibility of using covert operations in the ,future to gain policy objectives, experiences like the Bay of Pigs merely underline the fact that policyrriakerprraust be educated as to what Is possible, and the responsibility for this lies with' the career intelligent* community. 6 . CASE S F A lecture delivered by , Professor Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr. Y * I think that the usual caveat is necessary before I get into the subject at hand. What I am about to say today are - my personal views; they do not repre- sent the official CIA view nor the official U.S. Government view. This is an after-action reporoon an episode in our history which engendered perhaps the most intense emotions and public reaction we have seen since World War President Kennedy in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs made the comment that "Victory bas a hundred fathers; . defeat is an orphan." I would simply say that as Inspector General of the CIA at the time, I was probably in charge of the orphanage. There is a very specific definition of covert operations. In the broad litera-' ture of intelligence, covert operations are about as old as espionage, which has been called the world's second oldest profession. To be properly considered covert, an operation Must be designed in such a way that it can easily be dis- avowed by the originating government. The hand of the sponsor must not be visible. Covert operations, on the other hand, must not be confused with irregu- lar warfare. An example of irregular warfare that has received recent world- wide attention is the operation in Laos. Everybody On both Sides knows who is doing what to whom; the aid and assis- tance is obvious. That is irregular war- fare. A covert operation, however, to be totally covert must be so clandestine, so well hidden, that its true sources may never be specifically proven. Guesses, al- legations, speculations may be made in I ? the public media, but no proof or verifi- cation is permissible -if the operation is ,to be properly considered covert. At this point in our discussion I believe it will prove .helpful to simply list some of the questions that must be asked before a covert operation is, properly undertaken. O Can it be done covertly? Can the role of the sponsoring government be sufficiently concealed at each step so as to avoid disclosure and. thus either failure or a diplomatic setback for the sponsor? And if the cover of the opera- tion is destroyed at any stage, are alternative measures or withdrawal pos- sible? .0 Are the assets available to do the job required? Are the indigenous per- sonnel available who are secure and in the proper place to do the work re- quired? If not, are there those available who can be put into place? . O Are all of the assets of the spon- soring government being used? Can the operation be controlled? Will the in- digenous forces being used respond to direction or are they likely to go off on their own? Will they accept cancellation of the operation at any time? 8 If it *succeeds or fails, will they maintain silence? The maxim "Silence is golden" has never been fully accepted in this country, but it is still worth asking. Also, can it be handled securely within the sponsoring government? O Finally, and vthis is perhaps the most imp'ortant question the Onited Otate0 must eels, Is the Soh wowth the potential gain? Has there been a true evaluation of the chance of success or failure by ?an objective 'group not di- \ 70 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4 rettly or emotionally involved with its Implementation? Do the policymeiters hive a realistic understanding ,of" the . operation? These are some of the basic questions Iwhich must he asked -prior. to,,the ' mounting of any clandestine or covert operation. , BeCoie turning to the case Siudy itself, a brief review of recent Cuban history is appropriate. Fidel Castro landed in eastern Cuba in 1956 with what turned out to be 12 men. He gathered forces in the Sierra Maestra irt , 1956 and 1957. Even more important; ' however, was the growth of anti-Batista groups in the cities of Cuba among the, middle class, the professionals, and the elite. It was the erosion of Batista's vital' ipolitical support in the cities which led: !directly to his downfall. The guerrillas in the countryside served merely as a catalyst in this process. And eventually, on 1 January 1959, Castro stepped into the vacuum left by the fleeing Batista. . A fact which many people do not seem to recall was that despite our misgivings about Fidel Castro, and the U.S. tGovernment, did have them, we recg'?ized ....his government fairly promptly. The first cabinet of the Cas- tro iegime 'Was probably one of the ? finest in Cuban history. It is worthy to note, however, that-very few, of the new Cabinet members stayed very long. In addition to recognizing Castro, the United States continued its subsidy of Cuba's sugar, crop which at that time amounted to approximately $100 mil- lion. The three major U.S. oil companies doing business in.. Cuba advanced him $29 million because his treasury was bare when he took over. Batista and his cohorts had sees to that. Castro was not invited to the United States on an official trip, but he came here unoffi- cially to attend a meeting of the Ameri- can Society of Newspaper Editpts in Washington, and he did have an inter- view with the then Vice President of the ? United States, Richard M. Nixon. Then, one by one, the men around Castro began dropping off.. He speedily ex- propriated U.S. property worth $968 million. Even his closest barbados- the bearded ones-that had been with him in the hills started to turn against him as he appointed more and more Commu- nists, and by the middle of 1960 it became obvious that the United States wee not *rig GO be able to d@ intOititeie with Fidel. This, I might say, was a very ? great shock to Americans. Cuba was a country that we regarded as our pro- tege. We had helped liberate it from Spain; we had assisted it through the ? ? Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4 ' birth pangs of becoming a nation; we had helped it achieve independence. We had looked at it as one of our offspring, but perhaps we were ? guilty of having looked after it too closely and in too patronizing a manner. It was in 1960 that President Eisen- hower, based upon advice of his most ? senior advisers, made the decision that we should try to do to Castro what he had done to Batista. Here is the germ of the first mistake-no one seriously studied the question as to whether this ? was possible. Most of the anti-Castro ? people had left Cuba; they. were pouring into Florida and if there ivat a resistance to Fidel Castro, it was mostly in Miami. One of the realities of life was that Fidel Castro had shown unique abilities, to- .gether with his brother Raul, Che Gue- vara, and others, in developing a militia and armed forces of some consequence. Further, they succeeded in establishing one of the better intelligence services in Latin America. It was learned at a very early date that agents sent into Cuba spent more time trying to survive than carrying out their assignment. When this happens to clandestine agents, the situa- tion is obviously quite serious. President-elect Kennedy was first briefed on the Cuban operation on 17 November 1960. The basic concept was to recruit exiles, send them in by ones, twos, and teams to develop the basic ingredients for overthrowing a govern- lir!) t: an intelligence network first, and !ii '? sabotage nets, units for psychologi- cal warfare, and finally guerrilla bands- hopefully all sufficiently independent to be watertight and operable. It should be noted that these clandes- tine operations in 1960 were successful only to a degree. There were many brave Cuban exiles who volunteered even though they knew full well that anyone suspected of active opposition to the Castro government in Cuba faced the prospect of a firing squad. Anybody caught landing on the shores of Cuba, ? either by airdrop or by maritime opera- tion, could hardly expect alemency from the new Cuban authorities. On 29 November 1960 President- elect Kennedy was given a briefing at lenOth on a new approach to the Cuban problem. It had become fairly apparent, under pressures of external events, that perhaps there was not going to be sufficient time to build up a large enough underground in Cuba to do to Castro what he had done to Batista. 'Castro was moving .closer and closer to becoming a full member of the Soviet bloc, and the Soviets were sending increasing amounts of military equip- ment to Cuba- Cuban pilots had been .1 sent to Eastern Europe for training, and Moscow as supplying or planned to supply aircraft. The Russians y.vere also supplying or planning to supply ad- vanced Patrol boats which would make. ? maritime infiltration difficult, if not' impossible. Those, were grave 'concerns' because'it was felt that the 'pressures of time might soon eliminate any possi- bility of building up any clandestine operation. One cannot reasonably take slow aircraft in against jets, for if their air defense was at all adequate, C-47's and the like would Surely be shot down while trying to get agents and supplies in. Further, one cannot infiltrate a hostile coast if the opposition maintains extensive patrol activities in the sur- rounding waters. ? Rather than trying to build clandes- tine nets all over Cuba-particularly in the cities with guerrilla forces sup- ? porting from the Escambrays and Sierra' -Maestra-it was proposed that a more i.substantial force be landed in order. to seize a beachhead.' It was hoped that support from popular resistance within Cuba or perhaps, more importantly, that support from defections within Cuba's militia and armed forces would materialize, thereby contributing signit- candy to the anti-Castro forces momerie: turn and help assure their victory through more conventional military means. On examination of what the biogra- phers of President Kennedy have writ- ten, it can be concluded that the Presi- dent never really fully understood that this proposal entailed a military opera- tion in the true sense of the word. Instead of an assault landing consisting of some 1,500 men, President Kennedy seemed to think this was going to be some sort of mass infiltration that Would perhaps, through some mystique, become quickly invisible. Two major plans were considered. The original plan was directed at cap- turing the small town of Trinidad on the south coast. Intelligence available indi- cated it was fairly lightly held. There was an airstrip nearby, but perhaps most importantly, it was at the foothills of . the Escambray Mountains, and the. brigade, if it got into trouble, could head for the hills and theoretically live off the land. When this plan was re- viewed by the JointiChiefs of Staff and others, the reaction was that the capture of a town would be too visible and create excessive "noise." Therefore an- other locality should be picked which . would not be quite as conspicuous. The second plan was to land at the Bay of Pigs. Since the area was sparsely populated, the proposed lahding would 71 Approved For Release 2001108/07-:-C-1A-R-DP77-00-43-2R000100020001-4 - not involve capturing a town. The in- terior was swampy, and there was a limited road network. The area posed problems for the brigade; but it was. ,hoped that it would pose more prob- lems for the defending forces, particu- larly if the airborne men captureti a crossroads and blocked-off the incoming Castro forces, and the brigade with their large tanks and fairly heavy hand-carried guns could establish a beachhead. ?'D Plans envisioned two air raids which, in fact, were very critical factors to the potential success of the landing. It is not known whether the President examined in any depth the concept of the air raids or the attention they would attract. The' initial raid was designed to take place at D minus 2 and was directed at knocking out the Castro air force and particularly,' if possible, the Castro tanks. B-26 air- craft were to be flown by Free Cubans based in Nicaragua. This would allow the Cuban exile pilots approximately 20 to 30 minutes over target area. This strike was to be followed at H-hour by a second strike with the objective of destroying whatever remained of Cas- tro's ait..,forces. It was anticipated that the first ,wtnke, ?would be noticed ? not only inSuba, 'but elsewhere. Therefore, a light deception plan was conceived whereby one of the B-26's returning from the strike would?land at Key West and the pilot would announce he was one of the group of Cuban pilots who had decided they had enough of Castro, were leaving the Cuban Air Force, and had dropped some bombs on the way out. There was hope that this would provide sufficient cover for at , least a few days until the operation was. mounted, at which time I presume it ' was thought that either the cover would not be necessary or simply be merged. into the whole operation itself. . In mounting' such an operation, it was necessary to first train those rujio were to take part in it. There were more than adequate resources of Cuban man- power available in the exile colonies in , Florida and elsewhere. There was one exceedingly difficulCpolitical problem however, that being the strong desire not to use any Batistianos-people who had been prominent in the Batista mili- tary forces or close to Batista himself. This almost automatically eliminated anybody that had had any experience with the Cuban Armed Forces. The recruiting in Miami was done under goldfish bowl circumstances. There were 113 Cuban exile groups. Some of them' were significant and some of them were insignificant, but they were all active, they were all vocal, and . ? - ? Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4 they were all there. It was most daficult /or the State Department, the CIA, the Attorney' General, General, and others iavoived to persuade the Cubans to .work to- gether in a cohesive organization Simply because many of them did not want to work together due, to prior political associations. The system of recruiting was done as clandestinely as possible. The recruits ? were then taken to the deactivated Opa ? Locke Naval Air Station and were flown out "covertly" to Guatemala where a wealthy landowner had made a sizable portion of his mountainous finca avail- able for training. A training base had been hacked out of the wilderness. The President of Guatemala, Ydigoras, was aware of what was going on and co- operated fully. President Somoza of Nicaragua provided the airfield for the B-26?s. In retrospect, it might., have been wiser to have trained everybody in the .United States where they could have been isolated somewhere in the vast reaches. ? of a Fort Bragg' or. a Fort Benning. Latin America is not an easy place to do such training because in countries the size of Guatemala or Nicaragua nearly everybody knows what is going on. As early as 30 October 1960 an article appeared in the Guatemalan paper La Nora which described a mili- tary base in the mountains designed to train men for an invasion of Cuba. This was when the cover started to Oravel. Paul Kennedy of The New York Times, a very astute journalist whose circuit ran . from Mexico City to Panama, was not fair behind La Flora in producing a story on the base?who was there, what they, were doing, and what they were going to do. The discussioins' in Miami were such that in his book Schlesinger quotes three separate newsmen who upon re- turning from Miami were able to de- scribe exactly what was going on with- out being specific as to where the landing was going to be made, or when it was going to be made, but that there was going to be a landing, that it was going to be against Cuba, and that it involved a great number of the exiles. . The operation was exclusively under the direction of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were asked if they would provide'evaluations first of the feasibility of the plan and secondly of the quality of training. They also, of course, provided upon request both supplies that were neces- sary and manpower to assist in training and administration. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff 'were not easponoibin 'NI?' the plan. It was not their plan, and the postoperation blame that was placed on them was put on them by others run- ning for cover. It was a CIA operation. Frequent meetings with the President from January through March and peri- odic progress .rep-orts were wed to keep' the President informed. As the evidence of apparent Russian assistance to Cuba continued to grow, pressure was put on the President to mount the operation. Let me also note that there was a very considerable Cuban lobby operable. The Cuban exiles had considerable money. Many of them were apparently wise enough to have kept the bulk of their wealth in the United States prior to 1959. They were, acquainted with Americans and the ' American political system, and a steady stream of them descended on Washington to urge greater U.S. action' in support of the exile movement up to and including a .,full-scale invasion of' Cuba by the United States. During this period a serious conflict 'arose within the exile training camp as a result of some of the Batistianos being brought into the' brigade. These former, , members of Batista's 'army were profes- sional military men whose talents were judged to be useful to the operation. A mutiny occurred,' however, which quickly became known to the rest of the world. Twelve Cubans were arrested and incarcerated,' and the entire affair was written up in the press.' With a brigade of 1,453 trained Cubans in being, the Joint Chiefs of Staff assessed both the Trinidad plan and the Bay of Pigs plan as being 1 don fail. One of the aspects of the postoperation' inspection was specifir cally directed to the question of whether any of the U.S. personnel told the Cubans that U.S. military forces :would back thorn up. That, I 'weluld submit to you, is almost an imposqe question to answer. If you are training a group of men to go into battle, you aren't saying, "Okay fellows, go ahead, but if you don't make it, it's rough." As , an instructor you would give your , trainees every bit of encouragement, and if you say something like, "We're behind you all the way," does that mean that you are committing U.S. military forces? The best available evi- dence indicated that no U.S. national who was involved in training, assisting, or direction of the Cubans over prom- ised U.S. military assistance, but obvi- ously they were not discouraging the Cubans. On the other hand, the Cubans to a man as well as the Cuban Revolu- tionary Council, expected that should the brigade falter, U.S. Marines would pour out of Guantanamo, airborne units , would be dropped, and it would be over 'aleotit that:? ? As to President Kennedy's inten- tions, however, there can be no ques- tion. The President frequently. reiterated his statement' that no U.S. personnel. feasible. The U.S. military personnel who reviewed the brigade described them as well trained and , capable of doing their job. Here we run into what will perhaps throughout history be the most controversial part of the opera- tion: I label it what the Cubans thought, what the Americans thought, and what Castro thought. ? There are no available figures on Castro's intelliaencethe United States. However, given the great number of Cubans in this country, he undoubtedly had a fairly complete in- : formation flow from not only our press and radio, but from his own sources of information as 1/11. Castro was highly nervous in the spring of 1961, tesay the least. He was aware that an operation was being mounted. He was not aware of its size or whether U.S. forces would be involved. 14e feared the latter greatly,1 without question. The and-Castro Cubans in exile, on the (atheeliin, were eowingeci thee the, United States q wduld not let the opera- would be involved, that he wanted no Americans on the beach, that there would not be any commitment of U.S. forces behind the Cubans, that this was 4 to be an exile operation. The allegation has been made that "the operators" deceived the President. That is not correct. "The operators" principally involved were Allen W. Dul- les, Gen. Charles P. Cabell, and Richard Bissell. They are all men of honor and integrity. They were all very much involved in the operation. They wetse,all reasonably convinced that it would suc- ceed or had a good chance of success. Mr. Dulles has been quoted by both Schlesinger and Sorenson as telling the President that he thought that this operation had a better chance of success than the Guatemala operation. Perhaps he did not tell the President the Guate- mala operation only succeeded by the narrowest of margins. This was to be-a very close matter and entirely different from the operation against Arbenz, who had but a very limited force to support him as opposed to Castro whose 200,000-man army and militia were rapidly increasing In both quality and strength. 72 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP77-00432R0001600200?01-4 The method by which the President was oriented on the operation has been described as a series of meetings where ? three or more of the operators mould brief the President on the ?latest.develop- ? ments. The President would have one or two of his personal staff with him, the Secretary of State, and any others he. .deemed necessary'. There would be no papers left; there were no .staff papers circulated. The operation was very closely held within the U.S."Govern- 'Monday morning and asked whether the President could supply some U.S. mili- tary assistance, specifically sotto 'aircraft from the carrier Boxer to come in and. cover the landing. The President turned' it clown. ? The' landing went in as scheduled. Of the five battalions?I would call them .teinforced companies?that landed, only one landed in the wrong place;'it hit a reef. The rest got ashore, and the tanks got ashore. The airdrop was successful, and then Castro's jets appeared: two Sea Furies and three P:33's. Two of the principal landing Ships, one containing the bulk of the ammunition, were sunk. The others were driven away, not to return. And from ithat moment on, the operation was doomed. The brigade fought brilliantly. They probably took 10 to 1 casualties from the other side. But it was 1,453 men against 20,000 with another .80,000 in Terve. Not only were Castro's planes available, but all of his tanks started to move south from Camp Libertad out- side of Havana. Despite the Most strenu- ous efforts to essist ,the brigade and to get them additional. ammunition, they could not win against such odds l By Wednesday it was all over as the brigade- was out of ammunition.. At a meeting Tuesday night in the White House, after a congressional re- ception, the situation was described to' the President. He authorized two un- marked planes from the Boxer to' fly high cover in support of the 13-26's, but they were not to engage in hostilities unless attacked. There was a mixup in time. The B-26's arrived an hour before the Boxer planes; four of the .B-26's were shot down, and among the men lost was an Alabama Air National Guardsmen crew who had volunteered to substitute for the Cuban pilots, who were exhausted. ? ? The President was under the impres- sion initially that the H-hout airstrike was actually going to be made from the beachhead. But, of course, the airstrip ment. Similarly, it was very closely held within the CIA. ? ? Many aspects Of the 'operation were well done. The 13-26 strike on. D minus 2, despite having to operate at maxi- mum range, was successful. It did . manage .to damage the Castro air force; but the quality of the Castro air force had been underestimated. The Sea Furies were known to be there 'and were considered dangerous, but the, P-33's, which were ignored or -were not 'con'- sidered to be dangerous, did prove to be ? one of the more decisive elements. The cover on the D mirrui 2 airstrike; mentioned before, Was ripped off in a matter of minutes. Circumstances had this event occur on the same day that an actual pilot in the Castro air force defected and landed in Jacksonville. The press was all over both Cuban planes instantly. The Foreign Minister of Cuba in the United Nations denounced the .United States for open attack on Cuba. 'The U.S. Ambassador to the, United Nations; Adlai Stevenson, had not been thoroughly advised on the operation. He had been given what was later described as a rather vague briefing of the ,opera- tion. Ambassador Stevenson immedi- lately denied U.S. complicity, and prac- tically before the words were out of his ?mouth it was fairly obvious that they were not true. This then created a rising crescendo of concern on the part of the ? President, Secretary of State, and , Others. On Sunday night?the landing , was to be made on Monday morning? the President cancelled ?The H-hour strike. The 3-26's were already warmed up and ready to take off from Nicaragua when the word came in to cancel. 0 General Cabell, Acting Director of the CIA at the time, was given permis- sion to appeal to the President who was at Glen Ora in Middleburg, Va. Cabell decided not to appeal, but after going ? back to the operational headquarters and seeking advice from a representetive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he eelled the President in 'Middleburg at 4:0 a.m. ?' was never secured to that degree, and the concept of eight 13-26's bombing from the beachhead was simply not feasible. Also, there was no reserve available to reinforce the, brigade, and the rationalization that once the beach- head was securad then Cubans could pour in from Florida and that'assistance would come from the United States and i Latin American countries was not valid. ? The NW Itev@h4tieherY *tuna, ! which had been held incommunicado up to the time of the landing, was taken to Washington to see the President. They 'sited if they, could' be immediately rat 73 Apprcived For Release 2001/08/07-: -6-14-R6P77-00432R0001'00020001-4 to the beachhead?three of them had: ; sons with the br;gade?but by then the, operation had failed. , Now let us look at why the Bay Of Pigs landing failed. Why did we mount it in the first place? We mounted it for a! political objective, to -get lid of e gov-1 ernment that we disliked intensely that had cropped tip near our soutWrn shores. We mounted it with the thought that the objective would be accom- plished by a covert operation when we did not want to use our conventional forces. We had not been able to get rid of Castro by diplomacy, and our in- creasing economic pressure was not proving to be any more effective. All i intelligence reports coming from allied sources indicated quite clearly that he , was thoroughly in command ofMa., and was supported by most of the! people who remained on the island. ! About 2 weeks before the operation,1 the President had. announced that the I ? United States would not intervene in I Cuba. Nevertheless, shortly before the landing, the Castro security forces rounded up approximately 200,000 Cuban' and put them in concentration camp. 'These people whose commit- ment the Castro regime suspected were precisely the elements in Cuban society upon which the success of the landing depended. ? What we were really trying to do was ? to do something inexpensively that we did not want to do the bard way. Affecting this choice was a mythology about covert operations that had arisen after World War II. The brilliant exploits of the French Resistance, of the Danish Resistance, of, the Italian partisans, of Tito's partisans, of some of the opera- tions behind the' Japanese lines in Burma all helped create a belief that you could accomplish with covert operations what one did not wish, to do ,by conventional or overt means. Simi- larly, the operations in Iran and Guate-'. male had been vaguely alluded to and written about without ever the full details of the opdations being exposed either -in the government or elsewhere. These added to the mythology' that there was some mystique by which you could use a clandestine organization to neatly and cheaply remove most any. dictator 'you wished. This is inaccurate and dangerous. A clandestine or covert operation can be used to support mili- tary operations and can be used when you de not want to eommit regula9 forces. Such operations must be used however, with the knowledge that if unsuccessful .there will come a time Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4 o'when you have to end the support and be briefed on it, and was turned down. lose the indigenous forces-as well as Arthur Schlesinger says that he too your integrity-perhaps never to be ne- wrote a memorandum that was, oppos,ed gained.. ? to *the operation after he had learned , In looking back over both the about it. But these documents were not ;planning and execution of the Bay of given much weight. . Pigs landing, several important lessons The. question of whether the same can be derived-the most vital in which* organization collecting intelligence arises , from the operators' fa 'Lire to should be permitted to conduct covert secure accurate intelligence. In:ccurate intelligence was the basis for t1': Bay of operations has provoked continuing debate in the intelligence community disaster. There is no othei place to put the blame for that tha l on the over the years. It was a question which ? was addressed when the, National Se- was a totally erroneous tin ; te of the quality of Castro's fighting fc ces, a lack before Congress. It is a qbestion which of realism in evaluating the potential has frequently come up, and it is cer- , resistance, and therefore as i corollary, tainly one that is worthy of note. ? .a. lack of realism in esti itating the Within an organization such as CIA, it is e number of forces required tc lo the job. 'possible to compartmentalize it so that There was a lack of kno ,,edge about the intelligence evaluators ate separated Castro's control in Cuba even though' from the collectors, but in this instance .. i W ? the British and French ti telligence re. ? And then, finally; the covertness or . Belgian Croix de Guerre, and the European ports were available on ti i subject. . . ... e lacic of visibility of the operation must Theater Ribbon with five battle stars. ! Organizationally, a lace part of CIA be examined. It lost all of After the war he returned to the U.S. 'its veils, all was excluded. from the ; peration. The ?News as an editor of World Report Magazine. five, before it was ever mounted. By the In 1947 he went to work for the Central present Director of thc .:entral Intelli- B11061RAPHiRC SUMMARY , Lyman B. Kirk- ' , patrick, Jr., was born , in Rochester, N.Y., educated' -in public schools there an0 at Deerfield Acade'n,nr, Deerfield, Mass., /i5nd graduated from the Woodrow/ Wilson School of Public and International Affairs of Princeton 'University in 1938. After graduation he worked for the U.S. News Publishing Corporation in Washington, D.C., as an editor and personnel director. In 1942 he joined' the Office of Strategic Ser- vices and served in Europe with that organiza- tion and as a military intelligence officer on the staff of Gen,. Omar Bradley's 12th U.S. Army Group where he was the 0-2 briefing officer. He left the military service with the rank of major, and for his service received the Legion of Merit, Bronze Star, French and 'time the landing took place, it, was well ? Intelligence Agency where he served hi a gence Agency, Richard ? elms, who was known .an operation was being ar viety of positions, including Division Chief, ' , then Chief of Operatic;; for CIA, was mounted. It was. well 'known who As si/Int- sito the Director, Assistant Director, involved. It was well known that it was not involved in the cn' -nation. It was anspector?Genecal, and from 1962 to 1965 ' handled in a separate c :mpartment, and totally and.completely supported by the ? ,was Elcccutive Director-Comptroller. In Sep- tember 1965 he resigned from CIA to accept an appointment on the faculty of Brown University in Providence, Rd., as Professor of Political Science and "University Professor. , Professor Kirkpatrick was the occupant of the ? Chester W. Ninths Chair of National Security and Foreign Affairs at the Naval War College during the 1971-72 academic year and has since returned to the faculty of Brown Uni- versity. In 1960 he received the National Civil. Service League annual award as one of the 10 outstanding career employees of the Federal Government. In 1964 he received the Presi- dent's Award for. Distinguished Service, the highest award that can be given u civilian in , the Federal Service. He is the author of The Real CIA, pub-. lished by Macmillan in January 1968, and Captains without Eyes, published by Mao.. mitten in 1969, numerous articles, rakd has contributed to the Encyclopaedia Britannica itearbook. a very great portion the expertise in United States. And at some point along the agency was exch tied. In like man- the line somebody' somewhere around ner, the bulk of the n. litary expertise of the President should have said, "Mr. the Pentagon was excluded because ? President, this is going to create one hell of a lot of noise. It is going to be very obvious that we're behind it. If it succeeds, great; if it fails, we are in for deep trouble." Obviously most people thought it was going to succeed. In fact, most of those talking to the President thought it was going to succeed. . Also, trying to mount an operation of this magnitude from the United States is about as covert as walking nude across Times Square without attracting attention. (Although, I must say that the latter is becoming more of a possi- bility every day.) In retrospect, the use of the U.S. bases would have been more feasible because we did have the capa- bility for controlling access to a sizable look on them as some type of easy , geographical area. We could have, iso- , device whereby one can simply reach lated the brigade'; even the training of out and press a button and bang, a the B-26 pilots could have been done in ? resistance group comes up and suddenly the United States; and perhaps, only an enemy is destroyed. The obligation perhaps, it could have been done with- for destroying this myth lies with the out having been disclosed, career personnel. knowledge of the 01' retion was handled on such a close ba.;is within the Joint Staff. ? Now when I say that the bulk of the CIA was excluded, I mean that the operators running the operation were :assessing and evaluating the intelligence, not the intelligence directorate, where it should have been done. Much of the intelligence came from the Cuban re- sistance, which was not always an objec- tive intelligence source, and, as later in the missile crisis, their reports had to be scanned and evaluated based upon other information. The White House advisers have noted ? in their books that nobody in the White House was really being critical about the operation. They assumed that the Presi- dent was accepting the advice of quali- fied experts, and therefore they were unwilling to submit themselves to being .the opposition to the operation. To my knowledge only two docuinents were written in the Federal Government Policimakers must be educat&I as to There was nothing more secret about opposing the operation, one by Chester what is possible. I think they will be in the Bay of Pigs than about nuclear: Bowles the then Under Secretary of 'the future. The shock to President weapons. Yet it was handled as though , State?; who had, inadvertently heard Kennedy was great and he blamed the it was so sensitive that people who were about the operation and opposed it. CIA, but ha blamed Me military jot ea , tiontati with the higheet sands of the Roger Hilsman, then Assistant to the much. The latter was misplaced. Never- government could not be trusted vilah theless, it is very important that policy- it. Secretary for Research and Intelligence, makers 'be educated as ,to what covert The staff work must be complete. ? also heard about the operation, asked to operations can do; or cannot do and not Periodic assessments must be made, and Approved For Release 2001/08/07 7:16IA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4 , these, in turn, must be reviewed in the most tough, highly critical, and objec- tive manner. There must be those 'that are going to say "no" or at least express all, the warnings and let the President know the dangers that he is taking: While no one questions the absolute authority of the President. to make policy and to insure that it is properly implemented, the locus for the conduct of the operation is important. It should be at a much lower level of government. Having covert operations. run out of the White House or even out of the Office of the Secretary of State or the Secre- tary of Defense makes absolutely no sense whatsoever in any society. If the President males the policy, get rid of Castro, that is about the last he should hear of it. If something goes 'wrong, he can fire and disavow, which is. what a President should, do, not . ac knowledge and accept blame. Of course, I am being critical of the President, but I think that this is essential in this area. Mi. Dulles, incidentally, after the failure of, the Bay of Pigs, as he had done previously when the 1/..2 went down over Russia, said to the President, "If you wish, I will go." He was a very wise and able man, and he recognized that when an intelligence failure takes place, the first expendable person is the direc- tor of the operation; There is a further corollary to.what I have said thus far; a US. controlled intelligence base must be in existence. In this case it. would have meant an intelligence network operating in Cuba which was knowledgeable, controlled, and reliable. There was no such network' in Cuba at the time. Instead there were scatterings of intelligence nets. The in- formation, to a large degree, was con- trolled by Cuban exiles who, of course, wanted us to go into Cuba. It was not a U.S. controlled intelligence base: My final comment is that the Bay of Pigs experience does not mean we, should forget covert operations as a tool, for implementing national policy. In fact, that is the last thing it means. We Would continually examine the concept and doctrine and reevaluate all Covert operations and irregular warfare activi- ties, keeping the capability in being. .As has been the case with' our Military forces,. when a war is over, our immedi- ate instinct is to demobilize; the same is true in intelligence. But the capability for mounting a covert operation is an onoadingly inipotnant capabilitY to our government to have. It may not be 'used but, like certain military capabili- ties in peacetime, the expertise should be available and ready if needed.. .1 NEW YORK TIKES 19 November 1972 The - Cub if nnection By James Reston WASHINGTON?For the first time in many years, the United States and Cuba have a common problem, which may lead to reappraisal of the rela- tions between the two countries. President Nixon doesn't want Ameri- can commercial airplanes to be hi- jacked to Havana and Fidel Castro, ac- cording to the Swiss, doesn't want them to land there, and this is now under the most careful if oblique dip- lomatic discussion. Mr. Nixon's problem is very simple. ?He wants secure, on-time air traffic within the United States and abroad, but the American air traffic is not se- cure, it is not on time, for passengers are subjected to security baggage checks at every airport, ,primarily for fear of criminals who regard Cuba as a sanctuary. , Fidel Castro's problem is a little more complicated. He is waging an ideological war against the United States and Latin America, and vice versa, but most of the Americans who ,hijack planes are not Communists seeking sanctuary in Cuba but ordi- nary criminals stealing planes, de- .. manding millions in ransom money, and hoping to get both the money and freedom when they land in Havana. On the testimony of Swiss officials, who represent the United States in Havana, this is not what happens. They say that the Cuban Government is not sympathetic but very tough on the hijackers, who are, jailed under very severe circumstances. According to the Swiss diplomats, the Cuban Government is not only WASHINGTON "The skyjacking problem has forced the U.S. and Cuba to begin talking again." tough on the hijackers, but suspicious that thou ,hijaeklrig operations may be used' by the United States as a means to spy on what's going on in Cuba. : Accordingly, Castro is not sending back the hijackers to the United States 75 because he suspects them of subver- sive intelligence activities against Cuba, and he is keeping them in jail because ; 'he doesn't trust, them, even, if they 'have Communist backgrounds. Also, Castro, again according to the Swiss, is holding the ransom money ; .that.lands in Havana with the hijack-i ??ers; not because he wants ,to help the: ,hijackers but because the U.S. Trees:, :ury impounded between $60 milli*, and $70 million in Cuban assets wheVf Washington broke diplomatic relations t with Havana, and he wants to use this hijack money to get the $60 mhhlih, , to $70 million back. What troubles officials here in-' ' Washington is that one of these hi- ? :jackings to Cuba may end in a disaster' and that the American people, ,alreaay inconvenienced by baggage checks and long delays in air travel, may then ' revive the Cuban crisis by demanding ' that action be taken against the Havana sanctuary. , ; The Nixon Administration, annoyed'; as it is 'by Castro's anti-American prop- .. ' aganda and subversion in Latin Amer." ?ica, would prefer to leave bad enough , 'alone, and let Castro suffer in Isola- tion with his own economic failures -at home. But this will, not, be easy if Cuba 'continues to be a sanctuary for sky- 'jackets. The United States has been _paying little attention to Latin America' in the last few years. Meahwhile, the' Soviet Union has established a keep- out doctrine iri" Eastern Europe and ? :China will be doing much the same in " Southeast Asia, while,the United States ? no longer, tries to apply the Monroe :Doctrine in Cuba. According to onq diplomatic report, the Cubans may plit the latest three American skyjackers on public , 'partly to keep the diplomatic situation from deteriorating any further, and ? ,partly to discourage hijackers from 'landing there. In any event, the skyjacking problem 'has forced Washington and Havana to 'begin talking again about the future, . though indirectly through the Swiss 'Government, but while everybody., ,denies it, these indirect talks could :lead on to a new accommodation with - Havana as they did last year between .Washington and Peking. President Nixon' is very cautious about these things, but it is awkward for him to explain why he wants to . reach an understanding With Brezhnev in Moscow and Chou En-hal in Peking but won't even talk to Castro in Cuba.' :This is undoubtedly why, after the _most private talks with the Swiss in Washington and Geneva, 'Secretary of State Rogers has made clear in public that the United States now wishes to, try to reach an accommodation with Castro on this entire problem. Accommodations between nations , come about in strange ways as was 'obvious last year in the Kissinger visit fa Pekitift. has now forced Washington and Ha- vana to talk again, however indirectly, and it could result in a new appraisal of President Nixon's relations with Latin America, .which by his own admission is long overdue. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4 WASHINGTON POST 17 November 1972 ? Accommodation With Cuba? Accommodation with Cuba could begin, Latin hand John Plank speculated presciently in 1969, "with a serious bilateral United States-Cuban dia- logue about the hijacking problem, a matter of concern to both Castro and us and whose resolution would, immediately and tangibly benefit both parties." This is the larger significance of Havana's and .Washington's newly expressed interest in a hijacking dialogue. Handled properly, it could lead through cultural exchanges, claims settlements, trade talks and political relations?the familiar Tout?to an American detente with the only Com- antmist state (Albania aside) still out in the cold. . Bat given Fidel Castro's suspicions, not to say his political investment in portraying the United States as a devil, our manner in dealing with Havana is crucial. We do not stress this point only because .Mr. Nixon last week gratuitously observed that he anticipated no change in Cuba's policy and, there- fore, no change in his own. The success, which is to Say the potential, of the hijack dialogue is at stake. Cuba has asked to discuss not only the hijack- ing ,of American planes to Cuba but the hijacking o CUban boats to the United States and what it believes to be the closely .related issue of the "illegal" flight of Cubans by means not involving hijacking (by private boats, for instance). The State Department has responded positively but, in ac- cordance with past policy, only to the offer to ditctiss takeovers of American planes. We assume this response was a bargaining posi- tion, ? not a final position, because "the hijacking problem" cuts both ways. For the United States its essence is safety in the skies. For Cuba its essence is the security of the Castro government: By prevent- ing its citizens from departing?last year Havana halted the six-year airlift that had brought a quar- ter of 'a million refugees to Miami?Cuba means to give them no real alternative but to accommodate tci Communist rule. It could well be that a warmer Political atmo- Sphere would make negotiation of both halves of the problem easier. The fact remains that the Amer- ican interest in coping with plane hijacking until ? now has been subordinated to its interest in making life a bit more difficult for Fidel Castro. Perhaps Castro was looking anyway for a face- RE W YORK TIMES 1 8 NOV 1,972 saving way to start coming in from the cold. Per- haps the Russians, tired of the cost and nuisance. of supporting Cuba, gave him a nudge. At any rate, the last two hijackings have been notably different from most of the earlier ones;. the last two plainly. have. involved a large degree of. criminality and sheer danger. Mr. Castro seems to have understood, that the surge of American concern over the two'. hijackings gave him a certain oponing that ho not have or need when hijackings were the stuff of bad TV jokes. We think that, in his offer to bargain, he ought to be presumed serious until proven not so. We would further argue that It is not only the link between Americans' safety in the skies and Castro's legitimacy that should incline the United. States to bargain seriously with Cuba. If President Nixon can deal directly with Moscow and Peking, why should the smallest and weakest of the Com- munist states alone be held at arm's length? In the. dozen Castro years, the hemisphere has seen that neither the man nor his doctrine nor his disciples, certainly not his example in Cuba, has excited. "revolution" anywhere beyond his borders. Castro himself now makes no more than a ritual appeal for the cause which a few fearful Americans, but virtu- ally no realistic Latins, identify with his name. Nor in a period of detente with the Soviet Union, and of intercontinental and submarine-launched missiles,. does it make political or military sense to overdo, the old worry that Moscow will make Cuba a "base.", In reaching out to Cuba, there is a certain prob- lem in resassuring those American allies who, either in response to American entreaties or for reasons of their own, supported the political and economic boycott of Havana which the United States or-, ganized a decade ago. But just last June at the. Organization of American States, no fewer than - seven Latin states declared that each country should make up its own mind on Cuba. Some particularly. insecure or repressive Latin governments may need' some special handholding. But surely that problem; is manageable. . To be sure, Fidel Castro remains a very tough and fractious fellow to deal with. We would be the last to say, however, that he's too tough for Richard Nixon. :CoLAa MYSTERY: inoTaPiT'leTe1jor )low : to the Peruvian ; nornal. range, forcing awaythen-t3t teN'iCC economy. . . I;alciovies and curtailing of Economic Research and oh-I The C. I. A. also discovered l sharply. . pERu3s miclloviEs I tamed today by The New York', that the vagaries of the current' n o'm'Peenr ounv i aFnis Ninocal l d thise N a v epdhaed. i !Times, reported that the warm' are .already having an impact on . because it usually appears off 'current, known as "Elnino de worldwide prices of fish-meal- ; their shores during the holiday Agency Takes Up a Problem :Navedad' ("Christmas Child") . based livestock feeds. and, con- I season," the C.I.A. said.. had sentiently, on cattle and poul'- t anchoviesBut this year when an ex- of Sea Currents and Fish .... their feeding grounds and be.: try prices. It may even hurt cellent fishing season had been ,,yond the reach of Peruvian fish-. commodity dealers in the Uni- expected, the Humboldt Current ing fleets. . . I ted States and West Germany. twos particularly weak, "allow- The C.I.A. explained that an-. " Inasmuch as the processing' ling the Nino to last longer chovies thrive in the cool waters of the anchovies into fish meal than usual," the memorandum is Peru's foremost manuf of the north-moving Humboldt actur- .continited. ' . frig act way ? providing cm. Current.Every t enin m r, ' By June, 1972, the C.I.A. re- ployment Ole tens of thonsands Win" c,Orrents llin,Ye't?inuth tin ti od, the tnittittlYSt (PAW' "itiot tor workers aboard the fishing In faullIerll PORI. Put by WIWI' fallen to only about 10 per boats and in coastal factorieS they arc Pushed away by the cent of normal." . Humboldt Current. But every seven years the Peru had expected an outptft and supplying 30 per cent of. the country's foreign exchange of two million tons of fish earnings?the unustfally early warm currents. for unknown meal this year,, hut at the end of August the stocks had ? By TAD SZULC Spo!..1111 to The New York Tants WASHiNGTON, Nov. 17?The Central Inielligenee Agency's. thirst for tvorldwide intelligence has turned to Perittliot no- chovics and a "IIIVAPEkalS" warm current. In the Pacific that made the fish disappear this year. ' A lengthy classified Weill- arrival of the current is a ma-1 reasons, push far south of their - Approved For Release 2001/08/07 :VIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001:4 fallen to 325,000 tons and all exports were banned despite major export commitments. The C.I.A. study concluded that following the subsequent ban on all fishing, "the fleet and fishmeal plants will lie idle for many months and un- employment will swell." The memorandum warned :that many fish-meal companies 'might collapse "if not kept afloat b y new government loans" and unless the Peruv- tian Government ? allowed "the 'least efficient firms to go under JAPAN TIMES 17 November 1972 Churchme Assail By MAJORIE RYER While assuming their debts and offering other jobs to their workers." Furthermore, the C.I.A. said, Peru's revolutionary military government had relied heavily on fish-meal sales to cover the import requirements for its five-year development plan. which includes .oil and copper ventures and manuTacturing. Because Peru held large fish- meal stocks from last year's production, the C.I.A. said, she still may earn $270-million from these exports in 1972. Last yea sales brought'. $330-million. L1Tru Washington Post WASHINGTON ? A World Council of Churches (WCC) re- port charges that the present government of Uruguay has en- gaged in "widespread violation of basic human rights," in- clueing both physical and psy- chological torture of political prisoners, in its current efforts to wipe out Tupamaro revolu- .tionaries. ? ' A State Department ; official who conferred recently with the three-man team which compiled the report said that the church- men drew a grimmer picture of the situation in Uruguay than was generally reflected in diplo- matic sources. ? "They portray a deeper area of concern than I was aware of," said Charles A. Meyer, as- sistant secretary of state for in- ter-American affairs. The churchmen say in their report that "thousands" of Uruguayan citizens have been. arrested and held in- communicado without trial since April 15, when the Urugu- yan congress approved a 30-day "internal state of war" against the Tupamaros. "Persons arrested and held indefinitely are presumed to be guilty of subversion and pos- sible complicity with the Tupa- maro urban guerrilla movement and are subjected to military justice which is very slow (only three military judges in the country) and from which there' is no appeal, the report says. The 'report cites "impressive evidence" of the use of torture by both police and the military. While such measures are "pur- portedly aimed at the Tupa- maros," the churchmen charge, talk they are "in fact extended widely to broad segments of the population for political rea- sons." The World Council of Churches ?report was compiled by three U.S. churchmen who spent five days in Uruguay in June investigating. They,. are' Dr. William P. Thompson, chief executive officer of the United Presbyterian Church, the Rev. Dr. Eugene L. Stockwell, assis-. tent general secretary of the World Division of the United Methodist Board of Missions, and the Rev. Dr. Thomas J. Lig- gett, president of the United ,Christian Missionary Society of the Christian Church (Disciples of Christ). The latter two are former missionaries in Latin American and speak fluent Spanish. In their report they note, "strong suspicion that military and police assistance given to Uruguay 1(by the United States) helps to buttress the repression 01 . ? . Dr. Stockwell said in an inter view that during their visit to the State Department the churchmen urged "immediate cancellation of all, police and military aid to Uruguay as a minimum" and consideration of ending economic aid as well. - . H i s impression that .."we . didn't get very far" in that request appeared to be borne out by the State Department's Meyer. ??1 While stating that, "any pre-. gram we have anywhere is sus. ceptible to constant re-eval. uation," he said of the U.S.-fun- ded police training program: Still believe in a program de. Signed to teach police efficien- cy, ? in the best sense of that word, which includes moder- titian," 77 NEW YORK TIMES 19 November 1972 An penTog to. C ba ? Now that President Nixon has opened up a speaking relationship with Communist China, developed a commer-, cial and economic detente with Communist Russia and:: indicated a policy of peace and reconstruction for Come rnunist North- Vietnam, it would logically follow that he miss no opportunity to begin what may well be the most ' touchy of all such maneuvers ,vis-A-vis the Communist world: an unfreezing of United States relations with Cuba. Although in comparison to China, Russia or' even 4 Hanoi, Castro's Cuba is not much More than a roaring mouse, it is still?geographically, politically and emo- tionally?a major disturbing factor in the foreign policy spectrum of the Americas, particularly of ' the United ; 'States. That opportunity to embark on a new policy?despite ,. the President's rigidly adamant position toward Cuba expressed in a newspaper interview only a few days' ' ago?may be nearer than anyone had hitherto dared tri, believe. Ironically, it is the 'recent criminal hijacking- , of two American planes to 'Cuba that has, presented both the Cuban and United States Governments with the chance to test each other's desire to push, if ever so. slightly, slightly, against the immense barriers that still separate them. In reaction to these two hijackings?of an Eastern 'Airlines 727 on Oct. 29 and a Southeni Airways DC-9 Nov. 12?the Cuban Government has' now specifically;I.,' suggested the opening up of bilateral negotiations to deal with the problem, at the Same time alleging in its usual florid language that the United States had started It all by permitting a succession of "hijackings" of Cubart,-., vessels by Cuban exiles, defectors and refugees operating ' out of Florida. 0 * Nevertheless, it is apparent from the Cuban statement that Dr. Castro is ready and even anxious .to work out ' an agreement on the hijacking issue; and 'it is equally apparent from Secretary of State Rogers' unusually warm,' and personal response that the United States wants to do so too?whether directly or through third parties. If this opening is achieved, it would indeed represent a particularly high order of statesmanship on, the part of both the United States and Cuba to move on to other,: things. It simply makes no sense any more?and President,? Nixon as the supreme pragmatist surely perceives this , too?to persist in a pOlicy, of diplomatic and economic quarantine against Cuba 1.hat.Wai itAked by 'the Orgaril-: zation of American States nearly a decade ago under totally different circumstances from those of today. Peru renewed ties with Cuba in July. More recently,, four Caribbean nations?Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago?have decided to seek "the early estab- lishment Of relations with Cuba, whether, economic or diplomatic?or both." Ecuador and Panama are consider Ing doing likewise. Chile had breached the O.A.S. nomic embargo even before the election of a Marxist President, Salvador Allende, insured the resumption of , full ties. Mexico never adhered to 'the O.A.S. boycott, and Canada, which now has a permanent observer at the 0.A.S., has always maintained relations with the Castro regime. It is obvious that Washington will have increasing difficulty maintaining the O.A.S. quarantine. No dramatic Initiative is called for; merely quiet communication to 06 whin' Attietleati COVOttithelite Mit WItOillflann to , ready to consider negotiating with Havana on broadOP issues than hijacking, and a relaxation of the O.A.S. boy- cott. Ap-proved-ForReTease-20171/178/177?.-CIA-RDP77-00432R0001-00020001-4 ? Approved For Release 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4 WASHINGTON POST 14 November 1972 To Curb HU= gem, Inu,prove TeS With Havana Somehow passing the hijack screening, three armed men boarded and commandeered a Southern Airways jet in Birmingham Friday, picked up $2 mil- lion in ransom at one stop, forced the pilot to take off at another although the FBI had shot out the plane's tires, wounded the copilot, and finally landed on foam in Havana. The public should learn at once what flaw in the hijack screening let the three board. The FBI must explain why it took the con- giclerable risk of starting to shoot. The media must ask themselves whether, by their play-by-play re- porting of the 29-hour, 4,000-mile adventure, they did not scare or embolden the hijackers to act more rashly than they otherwise might. It seems a mir- acia no one was killed. In the end, however; hijacking comes down to what the .hijackers do in the end. No one can safe- ly- predict what angry and unbalanced men will do. But one can say that, if hijackers knew they had no haven, it could not fail to affect?their calculations. For hijackings in the Western hemisphere, of course, the cominonest haven sought is Cuba. Now, Fidel Castro has been far from all bad on the matter. He has quietly shipped some Amen- an hijackers hijackers back :through Canada and made life go miserable for others that they have tried to de- part. Cuba's ideological compulsion to remain open to political seulmates, however, and the notion still afloat that Cuba is about the only place to go, have drawn hijackers to Havana nonetheless. The past weekend's incident followed by only two weeks the flight to Cuba by a group including two Washington men linked to a. double murder in an Arlington bank.- One hopes Cuba will return all criminal hi- jackers.in due time, but the fact Is the problem of keturn would not keep arising if planes Were not hijacked and directed there in the first place. NEW YORK TIMES 30 November 1972 f' 0 The plain requirement is a known public firm guarantee of no haven for criminal hijackers in -- Cuba. There is only one effectiVe way to secure such a guarantee and that is for Cuban-American political relations to be normalized. Good sense and the whole drift of international affairs commends .such a development anyway. It becomes increas- ingly an anachronism in a time of detente for Wash- ington and Havana to remain at political sword points. Hijacking provides what should be the clinching argument?a good non-political argument, at that. From President Nixon, however, comes the stiff, stale old diplomacy. He told The Washington Star- News last week there would be "no change what- ever" in his Cuban policy "unless and until?and I do not anticipate this will happen?Castro changes his policy toward Latin America, and the United States." Why is Mr. Nixon so hard-nosed? These days his administration neither tries to demon- trate Castro is "exporting revolution" nor contends Cuba is lending itself to intol,erable Soviet military purposes. Officials pressed to justify the Nixon policy are reduced to citing harsh boilerplate rhet- oric sounded by Castro in such unlikely precincts as Bulgaria. President Nixon, as sore reports say,. may indeed have it in mind to improve relations with Cuba?the Florida vote is in?but evidently he wants Fidel to come to him on hands and knees. Negotiating, it's called. It's an attitude as unworthy of a great nation as it is unnecessary for a re-elected Chief Executive. ; Mr. Nixon insists he's deeply concerned about both promoting detente and eliminating hijacking. But here he has the chance to serve the two goals and he turns the other way. it Is All in the Eyes By Louis Wolf Goodman NEW HAVEN, Conn.?If one were to rely solely on U.S. coverage or news from Chile for an understanding of current developments in that coun- try, it would not be unreasonable to conclude that the Government of Sal- vador Allende is vastly unpopular, ille- gitimate, incompetent and repressive. One could further conclude that the Chilean left has been held in check only by the strength of the . army . rather than a commitment to democ- racy. Such conclusions are fundamen- tally erroneous and based upon a superficial understanding of the eco- nomic nod political struggles wog wititytt 1111(1 pro. nod onll-liinioroment fOret`!I In Chile. In our Julhunetit, tim U.S. press fosters misconception about Chile: 0 That the Allende Government is vastly unpopular in Chile. This asser- tion is a clear example of a class bias in press reporting. Information um*.:d by foreign correspondents in Chile tends to represent more accurately the attitudes of the upper class and seg- ments of the middle class than those or the working or popular classes. A September 1972 survey of Greater Santiago commissioned by the oppo- Lition-controlled weekly, Emilia, gives evidence about Government support *which differs from the view in the U.S. Press. These results indicate that close to 60 per cent of Santiago's population looks favorably on the present Govern- ment's performance, a majority feel that the strategies of the opposition era liannfill, Mid mrtpantile avonid vole for Allendo Imlay (U; per rent) than (lid in Saiithip,o in 1970 (34 per cent). Equally important, this survey shows that Santiago's small upper- income group overwhelmingly opposes Allende's Popular Unity coalition, the of Lu A- 11,, 1 middle class is divided and the lower class is enthusiastic. Moreover, Greater Santiago always trails the provinces in support for Socialist can- didates. No mention of the above ' findings was made in the U.S. press despite the wide discussion they re- caved in Chile: 0 That Allende's efforts to move the country toward Socialism are taus.; Ing widespread economic chaos and hardship. Allende was elected on a platform , that explicitly rejected the moderate reform path of development which characterized the previous Christian Democratic administration. The elec- toral support received by the. left was hardly an overwlieltning, Mandate. but it gtive pnpulan unity till-4 tIllpoiltinity to ?novo tho Oat lm Any suelt Junior change will protiii?a. dislocations. One question that must be asked is where in the social struc. tore these dislocations have been concentrated? Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-Fie0P77-00432R000100020001-4 - Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4 In Chile, the greatest economic dif- ficulties are being felt by those who have benefited most under capitalism, i.e., the upper and middle income sec- tors. There are shortages of consumer goods. It is now more difficult for the relatively comfortable sectors of the population to maintain their patterns of consumption. Last December's "March of the Empty Pots" was essen- tially a protest by middle- and upper- class housewives who found it diffi- cult to obtain certain desired goods in their own neighborhood stores. Similarly, strikes by shopkeepers in the central business district and work stoppages by professional people are middle-class protests. These store owners and professionals do not WASHINGTON STAR 23 November 1972 By JEREMIAH O'LEARY Star-News Stria Writer QUARRY HEIGHTS, Canal Zone ? Granted a respite from extinction by President Nixon himself, the U.S. South- ern Command is understanda- bly sensitive about its unique status as the world's most top-heavy military organiza- tion. Southeam, as the Army, Navy and Air Force area com- mand is called, has never been short of critics, largely be- cause it is basically a paper organization with no less than 13 flag officers in relation to a few thousand troops in the Canal Zone and a few hundred ? officers and men in the mili- tary advisory groups in 16 Lat- in countries. Critics in the past have charged that there were too many generals and admirals for so insignificant a force; that the advisory groups in the e various Latin countries served very little purpose for their ?? cost; that nothing was accom- plished here that could not be done as easily and less expen- sively from the Pentagon. ? Some new assessments are now bring made in view of some changes. The military groups have been reduced from 17 to 16 by Ecuador's request for depar- ture of the U.S. group there, and the number of officers and men in the groups has been pared from about 800 to less' the n400. Troops more Qualified The U.S. armed forces ap- serve the poor,- nor do they want the Government to continue its efforts to control distribution for the well-being of low-income sectors. While it is un- doubtedly true that these groups have experienced restrictions on consump- tion and wealth, others have clearly benefited. The opposition labels restrictions on the accumulation of wealth and prop- erty as attacks on democratic free- doms. Certainly it has been the Gov- ernment's aim to undermine the eco- nomic base of the monied classes, but It has respected the fundamental po- litical right of dissent by legal means. In every case of nationalization, intervention, or purchase of major in- terest by the Government in private companies, the administration has' used only legal means and controls authorized by already-existing (al- though sometimes obscure) laws. Chile's central importance today is ' that it is the first nation to attempt ? a Socialist democracy. This is a test of the strengths and limitations of democracy as a political framework and Socialism as an economic system.. _ Louis Wolf GOOdnian is tissistant pro- fessor of sociology at Yale. The article.; was written with the assistance of Jose Luis Rodriguez, Brian Smith, Van Whiting and David Apter, members of the Chilean Study Group. pear to have improved the quality of the in-country per- sonnel. Four years ago, many troops assigned to the groups came with little or no knowl- edge of Spanish or Portuguese, and often were picked without special qualification. Today, all of the personnel mist have a language competency of "3" on a scale of "5" ? iii other words, modest fluency. In the 1960s, the groups were caught up in the Ken- nedy administration's policy , of democratizing Latin Amer- ? ica, a lofty aim they did not seem able to achieve. Even so, the policy existing tended to isolate the group, personnel from politically ambitious military figures in the host countries. Military procurement has undergone a drastic change affecting the groups' role. In post-World War II years, all of Latin America acquired surplus U.S. materiel from , uniforms to aircraft, from weapons to naval vessels. It was automatic and expected. Gradually, the United States, becoming involved in the Vietnam wars took the view that the Latins needed only security equipmetn because they faced no serious external threat that the United States would not handle for them. The United States cut back drastically on what planes; ships and weapons were available for Latins. New Sources Found The Latins reacted by sim- ply going shopping elsewhere for their hardware. The French, Germans, Swedes, 0 Dutch and British, 'in ?iarying degrees, began flooding Latin America with salesmen and the Latins began spending their money on sophisticated Mirage jets, A MX tanks, Ger- man patrol boats and oven reconditioned British aircraft carriers. ? By 1968, the U.S. advisory groups had nothing to sell or grant, little influence on the Latin officer corps and the quality of their intelligence function was inferior to that available in other embassy of- fices. New Rationale Today, the war in Vietnam is nearly finished as far as the United States is concerned and, while there are still close restrictions on what Latin ar- mies can buy, Washington's policy is no longer, to try to steer, influence and cajole Latin capitals. Washington takes the more practical view that as long as the Latins are going to buy arms, they might as well get them from the United States. Given the changed world sit- uation, differences in U.S. poli- cy, and the facts of life about Latin America today, there are those who conclude that the small but better-trained U.S. military groups be main- tained as points of contact with the Latin military. The number of flag officers remains high in Panama head- quarters of Southcom, and there are two or three gener- als stationed in Brazil and Ar- gentina. Proponents of the present structure say the Unit- 79 cd States needs officers of ' general or admiral rank to deal with their Latin oppo- sites, since Southeom ls charged not only with defense of the Panama Canal but also with coordinating U.S. , tary activities ? including military aid ? throughout, Central and South America. Critics continue to charge that Southcom is a navy with- out vessels and an army with- out troops ? a full-fledged area command with a brass staff just as rank-heavy as the other seven regional world4 wide commands of the De- ; fense Department. These flag officers are expensive to , maintain with their staffs and privileges. Obviously, critics say, any,: major military threat against Panama's canal would be countered by naval, air,' ground or missile forces from the United States proper. The 193d Infantry Brigade here ; can protect the canal against any local threat, they say, and any attack on the canal by a world power would mean World War III. Approved For Release--2001/08/07-:-CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4 THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, NOVEMBER 29,1972 Bra.).zi easants Find Their4- ?rsens 1.0 By MAR VINE 110WE Sptci al tn. thttNe Ynric TItnes ESCADA, Brazil. Nov. 16 On some days the people on the sugar plantation called Provi- dence have nothing to eat, but like most farm workers in Bra- zil's impoverished Northeast, they appear resigned to their empty live. Attempts at modernization and industrialization have not solved the basic problems of the important sugar industry but only aggravated the situ- ation by increasing unemploy- ment. The Most Rev. Helder Ca - mare:, the outspoken Archbish- op of Olinda and Recife, de- plores what he describes as "the subhuman" condition of the rural workers, who lack de- cent. housing, clothing, food, schools or hope. "If something is not done to better their con- dition, inevitably there will be ferment," he has warned. The situation of the sugar cane workers is worse than it was a decade ago because their pay has lost more than half its purchasing power, according to the Rev. AntOnio Melo, one of the most vocal advocates of agrarian reform in the North- east. "erate existence because they Flight to the Cities are told they have been saved."1 "People are leaving the coun- For lack of any alternative, tryside for the cities, but they some 150,000 peasants are are going into the slums, not bound to the sugar plantations into industry," said the priest, of the Northeast in the hot, hu. who is director of the Agricul- mid coastal area. tural School of Escada. The school, run by the Feder- al Government, is a ray of hope amid the quiet desperation that characterizes the life of the ' cane fields at age 8, 'lire deter- the same time more enterpris- in an interview. mined to escape to a better life. mg businessmen in southern "I want to be a farm techni- Brazil started a sugar industry clan and take my father away that rapidly outstripped the from the plantation," said 16- year-old Manuel Jorge Tatares, whose father earns less ? than the minimum wage of $1 a day nineteen-sixties the Peasant to support 12 children. Leagues gathered a signifi- cant movement to change rural institutions, but they were i?cruehed in the 1064 take-over j by the present military govern- The Need for Reform Northeast in productivity. The workers suffered most in the decline. In the early Life is Increasingly difficult for Maria do Carmo da Con- ceictio, who lives with her hus- band and five children in two rooms in a row of wretched shacks- on Provielence Planta- tion here. The children cannot go to sehool because they don't ! The Government has been have shoes or clothes. aware for some time that re- A Consoling Creed form is necessary in the North- east hut seems uncertain how "We can't cat meat any more to go about it. in the mean- because dried beef has gone time subsidies are paid to the from 33 cents to $1.85 and my 'producers to hold the industry husband only earns $5 a week working in the cane fields," she together. When Juscelino Kubitschek said. "Some days we all go hun-1 was President he set up the gry because there's nothing to eat. All we have is the strength of God." ? Such fatalism is widespread among ? the cane workers ac- cording to a Recife. University and irrigation, but the sugar Superintendency for the Devel- opment of the Northeast in 1959, spurring the establish- ment of light industries as well as hydroelectric projects roads sociologist, who explained: problem was barely touched. "The Pentecostal Church has Father Melo got support in gotten a strong hold among the 1963 for a sugar cooperative hopeless Peasants who can that appears to be a valid if costly and limited .attempt to improve, the life of the cane workers. The 490 members 'earn three times more than .wortters on the plantations, ac- cording to the priest. Each re-, Se.veral agencies have been set up to bring about land re- form but are bogged down in orebanizational problems and landowners have openly op-, posed the efforts. A senater declared that the workers in the Northeast did not knew how to farm and were not ready for agrarian reform. Some warkere fear that they ree, lose their jobs. All large owners must sub- mit reports on the use of their and by Dec. 31. Unused hold- ings are to be put up for sale, preferably to the workers al- ready on the land, who will receive financial aid. The Sugar ,and Alcohol Insti- tute, which buys sugar from the mills and resells it on the domestic market and abroad, has embarked on a plan for reorganization of the industry. R. Parry Scott of the Insti- tute of Latin American Studies at the University of Texas, who has been engaged in social re-- search here, commented: "It is highly questionable that the present processes of moderni- zation of the Northeast Brazil- ian sugar industry will contrib- ute to a bettering of the situa- tion of the rural worker in the near future." Many workers have solved the problem by going to the cities. Recife, more than any other Northeastern city, has ceived 25 acres and credit for The industry, founded by the acquired the problems of the Portuguese settlers in the 16th planting at the outset, and sev- sugar industry, according to its century, was hurt by competi- eral have been able to buy Mayor, Augusto Lucena. Of its Lion from the West Indies. andtrucks, donkeys and cattle, population of 1,3 million, twice ,Cuba in the 19th century. It "We have tried to convince that of two decades ago, 40 sugar workers. Most of the 150 forced large owners to set 1-1P the Government that agrarian per cent are unemployed or boys at 1111 school, who gerter- ,sugar mills, but they failed to reform is not only necessary underemployed, with serious; ally sterted working In the ,Iteep up with technology. I..", but possible," Father Melo said problems of infant mortality,' malnutrition, sanitation, hous- ing and schooling. NEW YORK TIMES 12 November 1972 moy MT) 1, it r , n 11r. l'4;;;;,.?".11 es-eni to Tht tit w York Ttro,si UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., Nov. 11 ? Panama, unhappy March when it will be the in August was to reject the Panama delegate's turn to be $1.9-mil1ion annuity the Unit- president of the Council for the ed States pays Panama so that month. the "entire world" should Itroed Topic Likely know that the zone had not It is anticipnted that Pane- been bought, ceded or leased! tria will offer some broad topic but was being "occupied at- for the Council session, such bitrarily." as measures to enhance peace United States authorities in Latin America. But Mr. Boyd have acknowledged the legiti- said: "Not to talk about the macy of some of Piinama's with United States negotiating Canal Zone would he like go- grievances, and have offered terms for revising the 1903 ing to church and not praying.' to make conceesions in a new Panama Canal Treaty, is press- Negotiations between 'the treaty, saying they are ready ing for a Security Council two countries bogged down for negotiations whenever Pan- seven months ago en a new ama signals. treaty to replace the 69-year- However, the United States old pact under which the Unit- Says that a public and prob- ed States built the canal and 'ably rancorous , debate would was given jurisdiction in the tend to "freeze" pOrttilOVIS tnd 10-milc-wide strip "in perpe- would set s dangerous prece tuity." - dent of mine the Security . There has been increasing Council as a bargaining tool friction in recent years over in influencing, bilateral nego- the powers exercised by the tiations. United States in the Canal It also is simeested by diplo- Zone, where 40,000 Americans mete here (hat the meeting live-13,000 of them military could become an exercise to personnel?and where courts embarrass the United States. an the police, school and There is the chance that Cuba, stores and all facilities are run though not a member of the the Ameeteert aiithorities, eetmell, wi4coMP i?ft prof-get Brig. Gen. Omar Torrijos against the American naval Herrera, who has been the rut- base at Guantanamo or renew ing force in Panama for four her charges that the United years has in the past threat.- States keeps a "colonial" grip ened to "march into the zone." on Puerto }co. Both issues, the Council members come in His first act after his election have been heard many times Approved For Release 2001/08/078.(bIA-RDP77-00432R00010002000174 _ _ . _ meeting in Panama to present her grievances. Aquilino E. Boyd. Panama's chief delegate, hes flown home to report that the majority of the Council's 15 members have told him the.y were favorably inclined toward a session in Panama. The United States is not. lie plans to return. with A fOrMal I and an offer to share the costs of the meet- ing unless his Government is, persuaded that it would be wise to resume private negotia- tions with Weshingten Ai* fop 8o a public debate. Diplomats here see re- ssumption of the negotiations as unlikely nt the moment and ex- pect Panama: to propose that but airing them in i Latin-1 American setting would be dd.! ferent. Americans who have fo1. lowed the Panama develop- ments also believe that it could wind up antagonizing Admin- istration and Congressional leadere--the very parties Pan- am hopes to influence by call- ing attention to her long- standing grievancts. Disagreeing, Mr.' Boyd says that a Council debate would not interfere with the talks be- twcen Panama snd the United States, and that the presence of the "world community in Panama would help public opinion to appreciate the in- equities Panama has endured." He said he had received fa- vorable response for a Coun- cil meeting in Panama "in principle" from Foreign Min- ister Andrei A. Gromyko of the Soviet Union and Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann of Prance, and that the idea wn? APPFPved by Yugoslavta. In- dia and the three African court- tries on the Council.