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October 1, 1971
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25X1A APproved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001000601:161--1T? CONFIDENTIAL NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES INTERNAL USE ONLY This publication contains clippings from the domestic and foreign press for YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use of selected items would rarely be advisable. No. 27 22 JANUARY 1973 General Page 1 Far East Page 9 Eastern Europe. . 0 ? ? 0 OO Page 40 Western Europe ....... Page 42 Near East . . 0 0 6 .... ? Page 47 Africa Page 55 Western Hemisphere Page 56 Destroy after backgrounder has served its purpose or within 60 days CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 2 Sep,-Oct. 1971 I BNDD Bulletin Diirector's PurJe-,',01e It has become increasingly clear that BNDD's role on foreign soil has changed considerably during the past two years. Experts both within BNDD and other agencies agree! that the most effective way to diminish or stop the supply .of illicit drugs into this country is to work as closely as possible at the source of the drugs. It is easier, for example, to identify and destroy an Illegal opium poppy field than it is to stop a caravan of several hundred horses and men. Or, it would be more effective to immobilize a clandestine heroin processing, laboratory than it would be to try to detect concealed; heroin being smuggled' into the United States. Striking at the heart of the traffic, namely the source countries, poses many new challenges to BNDD and dictates that we develop?and implement imaginative and effective programs and participate as integral members of numerous American foreign missions. This is what we are doing. During the past few weeks, I have set in motion the mechanics of a major reorganization of BNDD's overseas operation to meet new challenges and take advantage of new opportunities that we never had before. My first step, was to appoint George M. Belk, a veteran BNDD executive,! to a new position. on my staff. Mr. Belk, reporting directly! to. me, has sole planning and operational control over, BNDD's overseas program. Within the coming weeks, BNDD's overseas Special iSep.-Oct. 1971 1 BNDD Bulletini ? Agent staff?in Latin America, Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East?will be increased to 123, or more than double its present strength. We are also increasing the ' number of our offices in these four areas of the world from 25 to 46. ? At the heart of our reorganized overseas operation, however, is how we carry .out our job. It is obvious that our activity will vary, ji not from one country to another, certainly among definOle geographical regions. With this in mini, we will develop 'a specifidally designed program and a manager to carry?it,out in each country or area. In one country, it may mdan working for the elimination of raw materials, in another, it may mean apprehension of , processors Jrid distributors; and in other countries, dif- ferent !programs. To. carry out this wide variety of activities, we are selecting management and Special Agent personnel for these positions who are considered exceptionally com- petent and versatile. They will be able to recognize when and where training is needed, where foreign assistance might be best tendered, the value of intelligence, the necessity for and i processes of case-making or, when not to resort to traditional enforcement measures. I! think' this new initiative by BNDD will have 'a' dramatitic impact at the most vulnerable part of the illicit drug raffic?the source. JOHN E Olrocto NCIERSOLL BNDD Strengthe0s, Expands Overseas Mission Wit I-differences," he said. "If wi are barred George M. Belk To Head On August 14, BNDD Director John E. Ingersoll announced the formation of a new Office for International Af- fairs. Appointed to head the Office, as Program Manager, was George M. Belk. The following story by Ron E. Moxness, staff writer for the Interna- tional Press Service, is based on an interview with Mr. Belk subsequent to the announcement. The story, which was released through the United States Informalion Agency, is an accurate re- port on this important facet of BNDD's total mission. ? (Wathington, Sep. 2) Last June 17 President Nixon announced an increase in U.S. efforts to prevent illicit narco- tics from reaching the United States from otlfCr countries. i? ' "The drug problem crosses Ideologi- cal boundd ? ari cs an surmountsnational4 * tic D Approved For Rel ase in any Way in our .effort io deal with ? this miter, our efforts will be crip- pled, an our will subject to question. I intend to leave no room for other nations o question our commitment to this matter." In an interview this week, a U.S. ? official outlined steps being taken to , strengthen the investigative capacities 1 of the .S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerq s Drugs abroad. These will include' he Bureau's ability "to assist host goi,ernments in the hiring, train- ing and deployment of petsonnel and the prq urcment of necessary equip- ment fo drug abuse cortkol." The 'strengthening of the investiga- tive capacities" of the Bureau has in- volved the creation of a new office? Program Manager for International Af- fairs?under the direct supervision of 1 John E.,Ingersoll, Bureau Director and , l Chairm h of the U.S.Delegation to the ations Commission on Nam*. United The new office is headed by George M. Belk, a veteran of the U.S. war against I the narcotics trafficker. He served as Chief of the Criminal Investi- gation Division of the Bureau before his current assignment. Mr. Belk participated in a meeting of the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) at Ottawa,Sep- tember 7-13. At that meeting, as In others -with his foreign counterparts, Mr. Belk summed up, through a Bur- eau memorandum, the U.S. official view of drug abuse: "The mood of the American people, the Congress, the administration, and the President is that the United States . should and will take whatever actions are necessary, both domestically and internationally, to remove this blight from our I society. Internationally , these actions will include, if necessary, a reassessment of our foreign policy and economic relationships with those countries which intentionally or inad- 1/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432Regten*OrEleitiatteOthe traffic." , '4;7; ;?`,1-tt'f!,17,?Tzi riFfli.7 ;-r vh. 1734 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 Mr. Belk does not view language such as this as blunt because, as he noted in the interview, "The people we are working with are just as dedi- cated, just as determined as we are to put a halt to a traffic which, in the United States alone, has produced more than 300,000 heroin addicts and In New York alone causes the deaths,1 annually, of more than 1,000 per- sons?many of them teenagers." At the outset, U.S. Special Agents overseas worked from their own head- , quarters, often separated from the ' broad streams of diplomacy. Now, Mr. Belk said, "This office will be respon- sible for the coordination of the vari- ous facets of our activities relating to the foreign scene. It will also work closely with the other major U.S. agencies in foreign areas. Mr. Ingersoll has now directed that Ave become a part of the U.S. country teams to fight the illicit traffic in narcotics?particu- larly those destined for the United States." This job, Mr. Belk noted, is the Bureau's primary missicli7to interdict the flow of drugs illegally destined for the United States and to reduce drasti- cally the availability of narcotics in the nation. To accomplish this mission, the number of Special U. S. Narcotics Agents working overseas will be doub- led during the fiscal year ending next June 30, to a total of 123 men. They will be posted in Europe, the Middle East, Latin America and Asia. The borders of what the Bureau calls "control areas," have been shifted. The present Paris Headquarters was originally designed for a region made up of Europe, the Middle East, South Asia and North Africa. Because the number of regional headquarters is being increased, Paris now will have under its jurisdiction Europe and North- west Africa. Ankara, Turkey will be the regional headquarters for the Middle East and Northeast Africa and South Asia. Bangkok, Thailand will be head- quarters for Southeast Asia. Tokyo will be headquarters for operations in Japan, Republic of Korea, Hong Kong, the 'Philippines and points north of Okinawa. Saigon, because of its em- phasis on military channels, will con- tinue to be an independent operation reporting directly to Washington. Mr. Belk said negotiations are under way through the State Department to broaden the number of Bureau posts in Latin America, The Bureau has offices in Mexico City and Guada- lajara. New offices have been opened at Hermosillo and Monterrey. An office In Panama is responsible for part of the northern and western I coast regions of Latin America and an office in Buenos Aires covers the Eastern portions of the hemisphere. The Bureau hopes to open new offices in Caracas, Quito, Ascension, Lima and Rio de Janeiro. Mr. Belk pointed out that the new offices "will greatly increase ?tic abil- ity to work with the Latin American countries on mutual problems." South America is one of the world's largest cultivators of the coca leaf, from which cocaine is made. Peru grows the coca leaf legally for the production of medicinal cocaine but It is not legal in other countries. Mr. Belk explained Oat heroin from Europe enters the United States by various routes. Some of it is shipped to smugglers along the East Coast of South I America and moves by various routes via Panama and Mex- ico to the United States. It also moves from illicit laboratories in France to Canada, and thence to the United States. And, of course, some is smug- gled directly through U.S. ports from Europe. The Bureau has, had Special Agents, in Montreal for a number of years. Mr. Belk said the Bureau hopes to have, more agents stationed in Toronto and' in Vancouver, British Columbia. He said the Bureau has a close and harmonious working relationship with the Royal Cardian Mounted Police, a relationship which became official- ly closer when Canada joined a Franco- I American Joint Working Group in November, 1970. The last meeting of the working group was in Ottawa and the next one is scheduled for 'Wash- ington. Concentration is on technical prob- lems involved in the legalities and machinery of narcotics operations. Mr. Belk said cooperation is equally close with the French Central National Bureau, an arm of the Surete. Similar close working relationships exist between the United States and Mexico, with the Attorney Generals of both countries credited with crea- tion of the Mexican-American work- ing group. Meetings are alternately held in Mexico City and Washington, with the next meeting in Washington in Octoirr. Mr. Belk said that, while few prob- lemstexist in Africa of direct relation to the United States, the Bureau is plahning to open an office in Rabat because of the flow of hashish, the strongest form of marihuana, from Morocco to the United States. A long-term need, in Mr. Belk's view, is treaties with foreign nations to ease extradition for prosecution of third country nationals caught in illegal narcotics activity. This step, together with others ex- pected to irri:n Narcotics, will help the United Nations Commission bring into being the framework of I international controls sought by Pre- sident Nixonra framework the Presi- dent believes Will help all nations participatidg.a 2 i 'NEW YORK TIMES I 6 January 1973 What Other Countries Do ? A ,severely punitive approach to addiction is not un-'. : known in other parts of the world, where traffickers are occasionally shot. ? Since 1969, Iran, which has an estimated total of '400,000 opium and heroin addicts, has been executing smug- glers, who usually slip over the porous border with Afghan-' .istan. About 150 smugglers, many of them simple Afghan. 'tribesmen, have been executed in Iran. Thailand, which has a long history of official involved ment in the opium business, has on occasion executed trait- . ? tickers. China has provisions for three-year to life sentences' for drug dealers. Taiwan has a death penalty for trafficking, ..,even in marijuana. 4: The classic instance of a law enforcement crackdown, on a drug epidemic was the Japanese response to the wide-. spread abuse of amphetamine and methamphetamine after. World War II. By 1954, when the use peaked, two million Japanese were estimated to be injecting amphetamines. Under the Awakening Drug Control' Law in Japan, mandatory prison sentences were meted out. Possession Of, the drugs drew an automatic three-month sentence; traf-. ,fickers and underground manufacturers went to jail for, as long as 10 years. , In 1954, 55,664 persons were arrested. In following ? years, the arrests declined, down to a low of 271 in 1958. The tough enforcement approach was universally cred- ited with breaking the back of the use of the drugs, although 1. studies of it have emphasized the homogenous and disci- plined nature of Japanese society, which generally supported the Government's efforts. Approved For Release 2001/08/071i CIA-riD1377010.0i7R0006:1331-actibbT-TiTliTR Ai3proved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY: JANUARY 10, 197! VVorldSurveyShowsNewsmenFaced Growing Censorship Problems in 1972 ? ' Also:fated Press In the last year foreign corre- Spondehts have faced growing censorifhip problems around the world,?mostly through arrest or expulsion, the threat of expul- sion or the denial of entry visas.. 'they also encountered in- creasitik refusal by officials to provide; facts and were ham- pered by state ? control or cen- sorship:, of the local press on which foreign reporters often depend for news tips and back- ground information., The Associated Press's annual survey of the flow of news across international boundaries shows that formal censorship as such?the government 'man reading dispatches moving into and out of a country?grew only slightly. This is the way Associated Press correspondents overseas describe ? the. current interna- tional .censorship 'situation: AFRICA In September, 14 foreign re- porters were arrested and jailed In Uganda during an invasion by foes of the Government of President Idi Amin. Never told why they were detained, they surmised it was because they Would not accept uncritically the official pronouncements on , the fighting. All eventually were released and deported. ?A form' of heavy-handed censor- ship continues. 'There is no official censor- ship in Nigeria, but fear of arrest and detention without trial inhibits press freedom in black Africa's most populous nation. Foreign correspondents are free to report and comment on Nigerian affairs without re- itriction, but face possible de- portation if officials do not like what they see published. Several other countries in Western and southern Africa do not exercise advance censor- ship, but the threat of expulsion Is widely, used against Foreign newsmen. Therd is no formal censor- 'ship of incoming or outgoing news in South Africa, but resi- dence permits' for foreign news. guerrillas in Northern Ireland, patches was lifted Nov. 2, but times under the,catah-all law correspondents were left with of security, but the courts the new guidelines for Mass turned down most of the cases. media. These guidelines, among While internal censorship M- other things, forbade corre- mained strict under Brazil's spondents to write anything military Government, foreign "which , impurs, discredits, newsmen encountered little dif- questions or criticizes any psi- ficulty sending neWs.out 'of the tive' effort of the Government country. The lack of basic civil itself or any of, its duly consti- rights for Brazilians and ??in- tuted authorities." ; ternal censorship, however, ? On the . whole, foreign join-- Made it difficult for correSpond- nalists .Were able to report obtain information, Lo- events in South Vietnam pretty cal newspapers, a basic source much las they saw them. There of information for foreign cor- was ad widely held view, how- respondents in, Brazil, had to ever, that this situation might contend with Government cen- end with the final withdrawal sors lin their newsrooms. of American troops. . ? Argentina's 'ruling 'military The internal Vietnamese Junta formally restricted news press was subject to a crack- coverage from Aug. 22, the day down under a law granting guards at the Trelew marine special powers to President base jail shot and killed 16 Nguyen Van Thieu for six leftist guerrillas who were said months. He imposed financial to be trying to escape. The de- requirements, that , put ?? more cree prohibits publication of than . 5.0 'newsPapers ?Out: cof news ? or ? photos. "attributed or busineSs. ? ' "" attribiltable..46 'illegal associa- In South Korea, President tions or persons., or groups Chung Hee Park imposed mar- notoriously dedicated to sub- tial law, including strict press versive or terroristActivities." censorship, late in 1972. This In the Caribbean, Cuba con- censorship was lifted after two tinned to censor incoming find months, and Seoul authorities outgoing news dispatches. made almost no effort to censor Western newsmen deemed un- outgoing dispatches formally, friendly by Premier Fidel Cas- EUROPE ; ? tro's Government could not ob- In Spain, the foreign press tam n entry visas. 'Entry was was not subject to censorship denied two ChileAur newsmen of outgoing news, except by the assigned by The. 'Associated threat of expulsion. But no per- Press to. '?cover ;the. Chilean manent correspondent has been President's 'visit to 'Cuba, ? expelled in four years. Spanish MIDDLE EAST , news Media,..' however, con- ' tinued . to be. censorecL. In Lebanon, a free-wheeling national press demanded*--and Dispatches' of. , foreign cor- usually grit?a lot of freedom. respondents were not censored In 'Greece, but the Government But,in,Septeniber,;the Lebanese Government, imposed censor- cOntrolled Athens News Agency censored incoming news before ship , during Israeli attacks, made in retaliation for the distributing it. The agency de- Olympic killings in Munich. leted anything that might em- barrass the Government. Censorship does not officially exist in. Egypt,' but every for- Britain is freer of censidrshr15 eign correspondent knows that than most c6untries, but a Gov- a censor is the first person to ernment committee urged re- forms of the Official Secrets Act read his story on its way out that, would have the effect of of the country. A major prob- lem for foreign correspondents permitting more investigative In Cairo is the lack of access reporting similar to that done in the United States. Though to officials. ?? the British army is battling In Israel, news concerning military security, army, oil and some stories of the occupation of Arab territory remained on the military censorship list. But I were being relaxed. there were signs that the rules1 SOVIET UNION No American newsmen were expelled from the Soviet Union in 1972, perhaps an indication of Government 'reluctance to disturb the process of improv- ing. Soviet-American relations. A British correspondent was expelled in May and a Japanese newsman was told in. October to, leave "voluntarily" or be ex- pelled;He left. News dispatches leaving the Soviet Union were not cen- sored. Photogra hs howeve men are carefully controlled. The Government is understood to "be prepared, however, to grant. more visas for visits by newsmen. from publications critical of the Country's policy of racial segregation. ASIA The Imposition of martial law In. the Philippines resulted In the . banning of reports from abroad that were critical of the country, temporary censorship of outgoing dispatches, the sus- pension of about 10 major Manila daily newspapers, 30 radib. stations , arid four teievi- skin stations ? and' the arrest without charges of 23 Jour- nalists.. Censoithip' of outgoing -? ?? no attempt was made to inv. pose, censorship. ? LATIN AMERICA-CARIBBEAN Nevi's agencies and foreign correspondents in Chile were told that they would face un- specified difficulties unless they complied with a Government order to submit copies of their dispatches to the presidential press office. Chilean authorities also admitted to the monitor- ing of correspondents' copy. Chilean courts stood as prtection against many of th moves taken against the media within the country. In two years in office, the administra- tion of 'President Salvador Al- lende ,1Gossens has sued orko- EPP.613.r.,9 9, NEW YORK TIMES 1 January 1973 PRESS INSTITUTE ? ; IS CRITICAL OF US It Charges Courts Are Used to Chip Away at Freedom , Special to the Plew York nines GENEVA, Dec. 31?The in. temational Press Institute as. serted today that the Nixon Ad. Ministration was "attempting td chip away at press freedom through the courts and by the threats of court action." ? In its annual world review of 'press freedom, the institute said I that the Nixon Administration apparently intended to make , the "journalist timid In re- search for the facts and the public nervous when confront- ed by a reporter asking for them. Nevertheless, the study by the institute's French director, Er- nest Meyer, found that in the United States the "foundation stone of freedom of speech and the press edifice that has been built on. it remains almost tin. scathed." ? ? . ? : The institute, ribngovern. mental organization with head' quarters in Zurich, is supported by 1,700 editors and publishers in 62 countries. , More Curbs Seen , Reviewing press develop-= Ments over the last year, the Institute said that the trend to restrict press freedoni. was stronger than In 1971. Barely one-fifth of the 132 Members of the United Nations "enjoy what can genuinely be called free- dom of information," it re-. ported. The survey also cited what it termed the "continuing efforts of governments to erode free- dom of expression through in. timidation of journalists and manipulation of mass media.", The aim, it said, is to "give the impression that the inter- ests of the country are neces., sarily Identical with those of .the government in power." , But the "true danger," thd review continued, "lies in the, fact that a ,growing number, of governments,' parliamentary ,representatives, citizens and even some members of the press begin to accept that at- tacks on freedom of expression are legitimate and justifiable.". Marcos Assailed The most serious attack od this freedom in the last year, .according to the institute, was the "silencing of the most cow- rageous and frank press in Asia, that of the Philippines." ' Actions by President Ferdi. nand E. Marcos, following the establishment of quasi-martial rule in the Philippines, amount- ed to a "deliberate dismantling of the free mass media in his ? FLINOVAUFfe0e77e01044 RthacifewegbtP11-OnveY said,-. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 The review listed what it ;called the "notorious decision" lof the United States Supreme ' COurt in the case of Earl Cald- Iwel, a New York Times report- ier, among last year's "threats tto the freedom of the press." ( In the case the Supreme 1Court ruled that reporters did snot have the right to withhold 1,from Federal grand juries the sources of information given in Confidence or to refuse to testi- WASHINGTON POST fy. about criminal acts their had been told about under a pledge of secrecy. The institute noted an in- crease in press complaints of government secrecy and eva. sion by Government officials in the United ,States. But it said that there was also a growing number of Government "se, crete being given to the presi by anonymous official sources. JAPAN TIMES 27 December 1972 Arab Narcotics iSmuggling Claimed. TEL AVIV (AP) ? An Israeli newspaper claimed Tuesday Arab 'guerrill'a organizations were smuggling opium and oth- er dangerous .drugs for a Leba- nese Cabinet Minister in ex- change for political support. The Jerusalem Poo, newspa- per identified the Minister as' Sabr: Hamatiphi Minister Of ,Public Works and 8-4tio Foreign Relations' Secrets: Less Reyealing Than Enriching PROBABLY the loudest complainers , about executive branch secrecy, pArtic- li ularly in the area of foreign affairs, w are members of the Senate who serve on the Foreign Relations Committee. , / Yet none have guarded 'mere sedu- lously its own private documents than those same committee members. Now, at long last, a change is under way and consequently a bouquet is appropriate, ?? small one at least. / Some years back Chairman Ful- bright, himself a one pres- ident, began what he calls educational hearings by his committee which were largely the product of his frustration *, over executive branch policy on China ;t And Indochina. Many figures .of history ' past testified at these hearings and t While much of what they said was use- ful historically much of it was more useful politically as a prod to the r President of the day. Fulbright and his committee, how- 1, ever, never opened their own files to the public though they were dipped , into from time to time for useful clues (- for the hearings. Now, however, for the first time the committee is printing for public distribution some of its own ' closed-door hearings of years past. The f first ones off the press cover the Tru- man Doctrine and the Greek-Turkish aid program of 1947. There are no star- tling revelations but the words then of Dean Acheson, James Forrestal, Rob- , ert Patterson, Vice Adm. Forrest Sher- man and others and those of such sen- ators as Arthur Vandenberg and Tom Connally will enrich the history of that crucial time. THE BIGGEST skeptic on the com- mittee about such publication has been --the Senate's senior senator, George Al- ken of Vermont who came to the Sen. ate in 1941 but who did not become a committee member until 1954. He fi- nally agreed to publication provided any living senator or ex-senator gave , his approval. In the instant case that meant only former Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. State Department clearance, as well, was required. It is Fulbright's hope to continue the r publication of such hitherto secret tes- timony. But the committee lacks the 1. funds to do the job adequately:\ for ex- - I ample, to publish testimony from ear- lier years. If Aiken will permit it, pub- lication of testimony from later years ,will gradually occur. Hopefully, the full Senate will give the committee' some more money to keep this highly useful venture alive and to expedite it. It was, of course, the row over Publi- cation of the Pentagon Papers, and the . attendant argument about over-classifi- cation of executive branch documents, that has sparked this Senate move. The same row also has helped speed, at least a bit, publication of the State, Department's historical series of docu- ments. THE STATE SERIES began back in 1861 and, unbeReVable as it now seems, the documents during the rest of the 19th century were published no later than two years 'after they were writ- ten, including a great many sensitive papers. The first World War slowed the process so that between the wars' publication was about 15 years from current. After World War II docu- ments fell 20 and then 25 years behind. Currently State is about to issue the last of eight volumes covering the year 1947. After the Pentagon Papers row Pres- ident Nixon asked for and got more money to speed declassification and publication of State's series. William Franklin, State's chief historian, says that "we're desperately trying to gain on chronology" and he hopes by 1976 to be exactly 20 years behind, a five year 'gain. Of course, State doesn't publish ev- erything even from a quarter century ago. Some documents are omitted be- cause they deal with persons still in power: the Shah of Iran, Chiang Kai- shek, Franco, Mao and Chou En-lai and some Latin leaders such as the SOMOZA family. But the bulk of the material does get published to the benefit of history. Since 1861 some 200 volumes have been printed. FULBRIGHT'S COMMITTEE has published several studies on Indochina extracted chiefly from the Pentagon Papers. These well annotated staff Studies relate the raw evidence of the Pentagon Papers to various memoirs /4 porter of the guerrillas in the, Lebanese Government. The Post said it received its, Information from an American! writer, Ed Hymoff, who it said was researching the - flow of' drugs from the Middle East for an American senator. , T h e guerrillas smuggled, opium, morphine base and hashish, into E. pt and several the Post rn tieirtielO tetetireh The Post said he ,was "known' to have good connections", with' t h e Ahlerican intelligence , agencies.. and and other published material' to pro- vide a well balanced perspective. One staffer, Robert M. Blum, has even sue-7:,' cecded in dredging up some interest- ing old OSS documents of 1945-46 which are being published for the first ,time. Whether the committee will have the courage to permit publication of., Its own secret hearings dealing with 'Indochina in the Eisenhower-Kennedy- Johnson years is an open question, What seems to worry the reluctant senators is not wifether, publication' would embarrass the various executive branch witnesses; who presumably. were speaking with more candor in a closed rather than.. an open session.'' The worry Is ,over how senators would look today in the light of current views and knowledge of the long American inyolvement. Whether, in short, some of them would look foolish. ' From the public record His obvious that some senators, both the departed and some still serving; indeed would not look very good. Fulbright has publicly recanted his earlier views and Sen. Mansfield has come close to doing so. But a claim of consistency is the more usual senatorial posture. IT IS OBVIOUS to arty student of history, whether he is dealing with In- ,dochlna or Europe or almost' any other problem area, that the legisla-, tive-executive relationship, plays an Im- portant role, sometimes a key role. The executive often bases its plans on what it thinks will be the nature of the congressional reception, 'first of all that by the Foreign Relations Commit- tee. And of course party political con- siderations seldom are absent though equally seldom conceded to be present. In short the historical record is not complete unless this interplay is also made public, as far as it ever was put , down by a committee stenographer. Committee hearings often are con- fusing, usually disjointed, frequently repetitive and frustratingly incomplete ? because the wrong questions were , asked or even when they were they, Were not followed by further ques- tions. Still, they are a very important part of history. So we award that small bouquet to Foreign Relations in hopes ? of awarding a big one biter on. r .ty /11777,117,771 Approved For Release 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP7742I0432R00019 - Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010006d001-0 WASHINGTON STAR 7 January 1973 Chinese rug5 u.gglers, Tired to 'Dutch .C.Onnectioh` FRANKFUR'I\, Germany (AP) ? Two U.S. congress- men said yesterday that Chinese sailors have estab- lished a "Dutch connection" at the ports of Amsterdam and Rotterdam for smuggling most of the heroin peddled to U.S. 'servicemen stationed in West Germany. Reps. Morgan Murphy, and Robert H. Steele, R-Conn? blamed the Dutch government for laxity in nar- cotic enforcement resulting in a "distinct Increase in heroin availability and use among 'U.S. soldiers in West Germa- ny." They said the heroin ' other Vietnam drug situation ' develop among our troops in (West Germany." Steele and Murphy said drug use among U.S. soldiers in West Germany increased from about 1.3 percent of those test- ed in December 1971 to be- .tween 4.2 and 6.3 percent in October 1972. They classified 6,000 to 8,000 of the 195,000 army troops in West Gexrmany as "users and abusers" of narcotics, includ- ing heroin? amphetamines i and barbituates. ? .1 came from Hong Kong. "We urgently need th'e coop- eration of the Netherlands to , stem the flow of heroin origi- nating in Southeast Asia," , Steele told a news conferefice.'. "We cannot afford to let an- ' ; Another 2,000 troops have been identified as drug users and are under treatment by , Army authorities, said the congressmen, who are mem- 'bars of the House Committee ;on Foreign Affairs. Steele and Murphy said they learned the extent of the Dutch connection in heroin smuggling during talks the 1 last three days with the West German police and govern- ment and with officials of the I Central IntelligenceAgency ;land the Army's Criminal In- vestigation Division. , Didn't Visit Holland Although the congressmen did not visit Holland, Murphy I said American officials there II told hini a year ago that the , country was becoming a ma- , ' jor I transit point in heroin smuggling following withdraw- als of U.S. troops 'from Viett nam. ? Steele and Murphy gave this pidture of the Dutch connec- ; Hon: Peasants in the remote I and hard-to-police border re- I glens of Laos, Burma and I Thailand ? the ? su-called i "golden triangle" ? harvest poppy seeds under direction of ; "ethnic Chinese" warlords I driven out of their CouMny by I WASHINGTON POST 11 January 1973 t. Response on Russia's Space technology. In a report from Moscow (Dec. 13) ":Robert G. Kaiser writes that "despite all its scientific achievements, the So- viet Union is a second or even a third- 1 rate technological power." As proof, he t. gives examples from cosmonautics, avi- ation, automobile industry, computing i'l techniques and even silrgery. Not be- !.? ing so erudite and being a specialist ionly in one of the listed fields, namely ? t", In cosmonautics, I will take the liberty c'. ? of dwelling on Mr. Kaiser's assertions i concerned with this area. The U.S. planned its first soft land- ' 1. ling on Mars in 1976, that is, five years, r later than the U.S.S.R., and its first soft landing on Venus in 1977-or seven .'s years after the U.S.S.R. What is more, , , I; ,an authoritative report of several re- ' f, search divisions of the U.S. Library of Congress (1971) says: "While American ; ! space efforts continue winding down ... , . the overall Soviet space program re- , t mains a strong and growing enter- it: prise." For Mr. Kaiser, this document f.. Is evidently not very authoritative. n (As for manned flights which are in the main considered by Mr. Kaiser; 1971 saw the creation of the world's,. first manned orbital station Salyut i that opened up a qualitatively new, stage in cosmonautics. Does Mr. Kaiser really believe that the death of the cos- monauts upon their return in any way belittles its importance? After all, the death of American astronauts in 1967 did not call in question the Apollo pro- gram that is a generally recognized . . achievement of the U.S.A. The U.S.S.R.'s abandonment of manned flights to the Moon cannot be consid: ered, as Mr. Kaiser does, at evidence of its lagging behind. Soviet specialists Think it more expedient to explore the moon by automatic devices, with the present level of world technology. Be-. _ sides, manned flights to the moon In..voive tremendobs? expenses. That Was ., precisely the reason why the Apollo 'program had to be stopped at the "most interesting place" when it began acquiring not only Prestige and techni- cal importanCei- but also great scien- tific value. As fot the Soviet automatic devices, they will be steadily improved .as they continue their planned studies of the moon, "as is evidenced from the ' recent launching of a craft towards the moon last Monday. Evidently In an attempt to *Mind Seviet scientists, Mr. Kaiser ',Unites:- the Communists. The poppy seeds are sent to ; Hong .Kong, where heroin is ',produced and smuggled i aboard ships by Chinese sea- men. Deliveries then are made , tliroughout the world with the , I help of Chinese living over- seas. 4 Increasing amounts of the IlAsian heroin if appearing in' I the West Coast of the United ;States following crackdowns' Hon the Turkish and French supply routes. Heroin coming , , into Europe arrives "priming- , ly through the ports of Am-, '? sterdam and Rotterdam, al- though some enters through the Scandinavian countries." r The 're resenetatives de. scribed I Scribed the European heroin , ;traffic as a natural transfer , market from Vietnam to, 'America's largest seeSeas 'garrison of troops in West Germany?some 212,000 sol- diers and airmen. "Soviet spa'C'e scierltists are' deli ahted: that they now have a'Chance to share , America's success through the. joint/ Soviet-U.S. space flight scheduled foH 1975." Dr. James Fletcher, NASA direc. tor, has a different view. He thinks that the experiment is important for .1 both countries. It will perMit the A . U.S.A., among other things, to fill the A gap in manned flights between 1973 1 ,.and 1978, not to dismiss highly trained. 1 specialists and not to mothball the fa.: cilities. James Fletcher also believes Is possible to use a Soviet orbital sta- tion and is in principle for a joint tian expedition. (His interview with .1 ,UPI, Nov. 26, 1972.) Thus, contrary to Mr. Kaiser, the NASA head considers it Worthwhile:, for the U.S.A. to cooperate on an equal '.. footing with a "third-rate technical ' power." Or maybe for Mr. Kaiser the,i opinion of Dr. Fletcher is also not au.:; -thoritative enough? ? ? I do not doubt that Mr. Kaiser fat equally "competent" in the other field': of Soviet technology which he is NV, boldly discussing in his article. ? ? YURY MARMOT,: ? &knee Commectstor V cputrr mateli ,Novest.1 Press Mew. Moscon. , ,4-4, ? Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 it"' r If YILIM/11,1Yilti:',/Prf;))1) ? ? Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 WASHINGTON POST 14 JANUARY 1973 , Chalmers M. Roberts DL Contro A A Bad Time 1317 ? inii? or Disarray, ,m, ti IT NOW HAS been nearly 17 years ' since President Eisenhower appointed Harold Stassen to the post of Special Assistant to the President for Disarma- ment, with Cabinet status. In 1961 the i job was institutionalized with congrets. sional creation, at President Kennedy's ,,.request, of the Arms Control-and Die- armament Agency. William C. Foster became head .of ACDA and the chief* negotiator, as well, on arms .control measures. In 1969 President Nixon chose Gerard C. Smith to head ACDA, t and later to be the chief negotiator for (.; the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Now, as the second Nbton term begins, Smith has departed by his own choice and the President has tap- ped U. Alexis Johnson to be the negoti- ator. No one has been announced-as Smith's successor to head ACDA,a . quasi-independent agency housed and ? supported by the State Department but with its own congressionally ap- l? proved budget. It is evident, in retrospect, that all , the Major decisions ,in the arms COn- i? trol field since the initial Bartich Plan . In 1046 have been presidential deci- Mons, but it also is evident that prest? ! dentin' choices have been circum- scribed by the quality and extent ririf t' the bureaucratic machinery which has . examined the problems and possibili- ties and thus, through various layer* BALTIMORE SUN j 10 January 1973 of the government, served up the/ Op- tions. Stassen, Foster and Smith .aU were effective, or ineffective, to t.iut degree that they could establish an,inr dependent input from an office or ,an agency that was beholden neither ,to the diplomatic views of State, the mill- tary views of Defense, or the viewsrqf the White House staff. It is for such reasons as these that the appointment of Alex Johnson 'hes ? done more than raise eyebrows among those in and out of government, Who concern themselves with arms control, above all with the SALT II negotia- tions which resume in Geneva for a second session on Feb. 27. Johnson is widely as a temporary appoipp ment. He suffered a heart attack It while back and his doctors have warned him against excessive work. For that reason, it appears, he turned down a Nixon offer to succeed Ambas- sador Bunker in Saigon. The top cit- ,reer man it State, Johnson is now 64. He has had only minimal acquaintance with the complex arms control Issues.', ' THE ISSUES at SALT -11 are going to be very tough to resolve. Henry KIS- singer, the generalissimo of SALT "I here in Washington, has had no finite for the problem because of Indochina and now his own continuation in the ,and House is uncertain. By all 8?. counts, then, the U.S. Is in a holding pattern on arms control and thik likely to last for some time. President Nixon's separation of the two posts' Of ACDA head and top negotiator adds an additional uncertainty. It was widely believed when SAL' II began that there would be no pre*. sure from either Washington or Mos- cow for speedy new agreements.' The interim pact on offensive weapon* runs for five years and most people felt that not until about the fourth year would negotiations become int**, sive. 13ut from what is now learneil about the first go-round of SALT II. this may not be necessarily true; deed, a major opportunity for a Ain's/ new phase in arm* Control just 7711i1V be present, if the U.S. is prepared 'to' grasp it. , This is because at the recent Geneva ' talks, all behind closed doors, the So- viet delegation expressed an interest 4 in the- control of multiple warhead ! 1 MIRVs. This came as a surprise t i Smith and his delegation but therel . ' no doubt that Moscow did indicate such an interest. It is true, however, ' that the other anticipated problem 'notably the Moscow demand for limits ' on the American forward based *ye. tems (FBS), in any new agreemeir) ) were put forward by the Soviet sid . But the Soviet talk of MIRY contii4 ' added a new dimension to the meet, .i Ings. At this first session neither laid down any formal proposals.. I,"t ' Quite obviously tile Kremlin intere0 in MIRV control must sining from Oil, enormous American lead in such wap heads thOpgh the Soviets are ahead 1.4 . , numbers of missile launchers and' 1 throw weight of warheads. It wail . take some very difficult trade-offs ! to, reach . any form of MIRV agreement, I and monitoring of such an agreement; 1 beyond monitoring a ban on further I tests, would be equally hard t&' achieve. ? I achieve. But if there is no agreements i multiple warheads will be a major el.- ; ment in both arsenals. THUS IT APPEARS this is a very ',bad moment for the American arm* control establishment to be in such a state of disarray as the Johnson api ? pointrnent, and the Kissinger situationt indicate it to be. Only President Nixon can change this state of affairs,' al. though the Senate disarmament sub. , committee of Foreign Relations could ? do some prodding. The opporttielty to ebntrol MIRVii fii judged, at best,?to be a long shot. %it so were many other opportunities' hi ? past years that finally reached fruititila I through the perseverance of sudh m'eti as Stamen, Foster and Smith. The US.1 can do no less than try?and there'll, currently no sign it is ready to do that.1 Our Energy Needs: What Can Be Done? News releases from the Maritime *Administration have been empha- sizing what has been recognized generally for some time: The coun- try's "demands for petroleum and natural gas will progressively ex- ceed domestic production capabili- ties with each passing year," this . under present conditions. The news releases then point to the Mer- 'chant Marine Act of 1970 and un- ? derscore the steps which have been taken under it to improve and ex- pand that section' of the U.S. flag fleet which transports "energy im- ports." Reference is made to oil ' tankers, very large crude carriers and ships to carry liquefied natural gas. (which now carries the label LNG). The impression is given that the country's maritime interests, backed by the federal government, will provide the country's share of the ships needed to transport oil and LNG from abroad. All of which Is reassuring but then in one news release this paragraph catches the eye: . "Energy imports have very great ramifications on the nation?in terms of our national security and the economy. There is an under- standable concern about being heavily dependent upon foreign suppliers who could turn off the spigot in the event political dis- agreements arose between 6ur two countries." - ? 6 As immediately noted in the news release a presidential task ; force is examining all aspects or ;) the country's energy deficits and,: considering various alternates to alleviate shortages. But the problems here seerh im- measurable. On this score a Mari- time Administration news release reports that "even if substantial increases of domestic energy sup- lilies are brought In over the next 10 or 15 years their impact will be blunted by the fact that domestic consumption will have doubled within that same time frame." ' Shall wonder then that some claim that our only hope for a sufficient d energy supply is the run. ? , =r-aruarz-c-mr-mv,w.i. _...Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA4tuiatt!-wAJzrl,u0010,Clubou0T-w j ' , Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 , NEW YORK: TIMES, SUNDAY, JANUARY 14, 1973 ? . 'Drug Panel Concludes 6-Nation Latin ? By MARVINE HOWE I Speclel tom, New York lime* alq DE JANEIRO, Jan. 13? Vile 'Chairman of the United States National Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse saidl here today that the war on,1 .drugs should be stepped Up on three levels?education, reha- bilitation and police action. The, chairman, Raymond P. Shafer, former Governor of Pennsylvania, made his remarks in response to qtiestions on Governor Rockefeller's proposal for increased narcotics penal- ties in New York. "I have not seen the original Rockefeller recommendations' and so am not prepared to say whether mandatory sentences, is the answer," Mr. Shafer told a news conference in a down- town hotel. "But I am in favor of. increasing the war on driigs On all three levels." Report Due March 23 Mr. Shafer 'cited Latin-Amen. lean and particularly 'Brazilian cooperation "at the highest level" in the drive on narcotics. 'the commission also visited Venezuela, Colombia, Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador and talked here yesterday with a drug Tour; Asks Stepped Up Drive expert from Argentina. of drugs and drug traffic, Mr. "from Prance and the, Middle The commission, which con- Shafer said. East have used Brazil as a eluded today a tour of six Latin-American countries, will deliver its final report on the world drug scene to President Nixon and Congress on March 23, Mr. Shafer said. Members of the commission visited 36 nations, Brazil being the last on the list?to study the con- trol, misuse and abuse of drugs. A major gap in the report will be first-hand information from the Communist countries. The commission did not visit the Soviet Union, China or any other Communist country be- cause it had been given to un- derstand informally that it would trot be welcome. 4'Officially, the Soviet Union says it has no drug problem, but unofficially our sources say they do have w problem," Mt. Shafer said, adding, "I would assume they have the same problem as all of us." The new report will maiptain the same general premises as did the report in :March, 1972, in which the commission tee- 'There should be a new pol- icy in the United States to dis- courage the use of drugs and punish the traffickers, the mer- cenaries who are profiting from ,the situation," he said. 1 The commission visited South Vietnam in June and noted "a 'transshipment area and are probably still trying to do so, he said. He could not confirm reports that there was a new Latin-American connection from ,ASia but did not exclude that 'possibility. ' ' "About 90 per cent of the marked change for the better," world's cocaine comes from In the attitude of United States military there over the last BthoeliviAa,ndes Mountains?Peru, Ecuador?where it is two years, Mr. Shafer said. "At one time, the use of legally, grown' and there is nothing we den do about drugs caused dishonorable it? charge;dis- now, drugs users are except crop substitution in the treated as people who need long run" Mr. Shafer Said. He Help and are given. help," he said that the United States im- ipo ? tries coca from those court-, said: All the nations of Latin es for cola drinks, and that America are awakening to the the local Indians ate coca' leaves to help them to With- fact that drug control is a new stand the altitude, cold end national problem and want help hunger. in handling it, he said. He added that some countries, haMr. Shafer concluded "There however, we unable to co- in s definitely been an increase re , operate in the effort because 1 wrsotht a of all odtrucocgs_abinurtho,the their internal structures were use oll marijuana is leveling' not yet set up for the task, off and probably going dawn. , , He said that Latin America ------.?.--,-4----.? was important both as?a drug ommended that a distinction be, smuggling route and a source made between the private use of drugs. Organized treffickeri NEW YORK TIMES 1 10 January 1973 ? ' SON7ereignty in the Skies ? By Karl Loewenstein ? AMHERST, Mass.?Dontestic and in- ; ternational efforts to prevent air. Piracy deal with the fait accompli rather than with the crime in progress.1 So far the vast majority of hijackings haVe succeeded because the demands of the air pirates were not resisted, 4 whether for ransom money, safe con- duct to a willing foreign country or* 'even the release of duly convicted compatriots. In the face of the near- ritualistic threat to blow up the air- plane, humanitarian motivations to save the lives of innocent passengers , and crews are given priority. .; I submit that something more im- , portant than even human life is at ;stake. To put it bluntly: if a few !armed terrorists can defy the might.' ;of the state in which the piracy is ;being committed, the state and its ? :authorities forfeit their sovereignty, ?that priceless possession with which i civilization as we know it stands and falls. , - The only, effective answer to this ' deadly threat to human civilization' is to fight fire with fire: Instead of honoring the Sermon on the Mount the society 'under attack must become militant, and this even at the risk of endangering the lives of innocent by- , Astanders or the loss of airline property,' (that is insured, anrkay). , Are we totally incapable of learning , from history? Once before the United , States had to face humiliation by Arab terrorists. For more than thirty years, from the Continental Congress to the aftermath of the war of 1812, the, "rascally potentates of the Barbary States?Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli? 1 ? had preyed on American merchant shipping in the Mediterranean with impunity. There was no protecting, navy. They forced our Governent to pay annual tribute, called "presents," and to ransom captured Americans. ,? ? that in reality the dilemma is cons siderabiy ,lessened. A terrorist who',` demands ransom money and safe , conduct abroad is hardly ever pre-.4. 'pared to die himself by blowing up the : plane. He wants to live and enjoy? the , loot. Hence the ground rules are: No ? ransom must be paid. The victimized. .plane must not be flown abroad. Neither our threat to declare war ' nor naval demonstrations proved ef- fective until a naval expedition under Commodore Decatur enforced. peace 'without tribute or ransom. ? t To resist blackmail by force seems a tremendously hard decision for all Contented. However, experience shows Far more difficult to deal with are the piracies staged by the Arab terror-,1 ists and foreign associates, such as. the Japanese kamikaze, who are prel ? pared and willing to die for' their -4 . cause. But even in such case their demands must be denied, particularly ,,i if aimed at the release of convicted.. criminals of their own stripe. Since i 'no self-respecting state can be ex-1 1 pected to bend its neck to foreign : blackmail, the humanitarian con- siderations must be subordinated tW, the higher end of the self-preservatibti i of state and society. ? ? Rarl Loeweniteitt Is Professor Ernerl-) ? otus of Jurisprudence at 'Amherst Col-,,1 , lege. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIAIRDP77-00432R000100060001-0 41. .ft L 771.17-13:r,75117,1 " ) J,, Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 SAIGON POST 1 December 1972 'Conduit Pinto Drpst' ge Of Living Death' There is nothing Impres- sive about the bridge. It is what It represents that demands attention-this two. lane bridge which j oinsth border of Thailand and Burma at Mae Sal district and Tachilek. It is called the Mae Nok bridge. ?They Bridge of Liv- ing Death* would be a more appropriate name. For through this bridge Opium, heroin and Morphine are transported from the nolo'rious (Golden Triangles through Thailand to the Underground markets of Indochina, Hong,, Kong, Eurupe and America.* , ? As the cargo of death on the shoulders of dozens of *smiles Makes its way to trucks parked nearby, a ? thirtyish, dapper man wat- ches with seeming curio- , sity or unobstrusive ' inn ocence. Lo Hsing-han carries ?? 4ne-r,e opium today,* whis- per men in a stupor as thoy sit and look across the bank of the river on the Bur- mese side. There is glad- nes, 'almost reverence, in the toices of these heroin addicts who speak cs1 the man with the air of inno- cence. ?? The others keep inhaling ? heroin, awaiting flight of the mind to the realm of fantasy, They dd not know ? 'Lc, nor his bro. ther, Lo Hsing-min, heroin *kings* of the Golden Triangle, the til?bot dot- NEW YORK TIMES 14 January 1973 Soviets on Disarmament 'to the Editor: , N. Loginov 'of the Soviet Mission to the U.N. criticized (letter Jan. 7) your' editorial for omitting "for some reason ? or other one of the key items on the ; -Assembly's agenda." Mr. Loginov claims that this item? :"nonuse of force in international rela- tions and permanent prohibition of the use of ? nuclear ? weapons"?was, ? 'adopted as a result of "vigorous and constructive discussion." This item, ? and the two weeks of discussion in ; November, was, in the words of Dutch , Ambassador Fack, "a nonstarter." ?? In the first four meetings (of eight), ,only eleven states talked, and of these six were socialist. Whole meetings were canceled for lack of speakers. 4 ; When 'a revised resolution ' was adopted, the vote wai 73 to 4, with 46 abstentions. This divided vote . ? scarcely fulfills Ambassador Malik's I. prediction that the adoption of this resolution will enable the 27th session , to "go down in history as the Assem- ; -bly that liberated mankind from the threat of nuclear war." Of the five nuclear powers, only the, :soviet Union 'voted in favor of the f. resolution, with China voting against L"and 'France, ? the U.K., and the U.S. la?stbstainIng. Some of the nuclear pow- ers might be expected to resist giving '.up -use of their expensive nuclear armory, but two states which have led 1, U.N. disarmament efforts?Sweden , and Mexico?.also abstained. , ? area straddling Thailand,' Laos and Burma. i n A silent witness to the Le A brothers' shipment of des- 9 traction is a boy not quits . 10 years o:d. Near the bridge on the Burmese 'Side , " he sits in the shade with grownup addicts after par- ? ling at heroin cigarettes. ? One. looks at this boy floating in a heady," giddy world of dretims and ' wonders how long it will A lake him to waste away in body And mind. One also wonders how. many many more like him are ?' 'doomed to painful, mean:1,i ing:ess existence andl eventual death wherever ; the Lo brothers' dembnic drugs find their way. a It is a tragedy that, 27 years 1nto'4 . the atomic ,era, the use of nuclear,, 'weapons still is not prohibited = ternational law. However, there ap- pears no easy route to this process and negotiations must include all nu. clear powers. An expanded Geneva = .Disarmament Conference would seem , the best forum. Two weeks of debate' in:, a General Assembly ? cannot 'perform : this task, for closely associated with banning the use of nuclear weapons ? S is a ban on their development, produc; tion and stockpiling and the destruc- tion of existing stockpiles. A 'second forum might be current efforts to draft additional protocols to the 1949 Geneva i Conventions which would prohibit the use of certain weaprms, ? ?? ? ? ' The Soviet Union bag .taken impore ? tont initiatives for disarmament in the."' past. This item was not one, since it ? served no purpose except to isolate" China on this issue, with the latter ' voting against the resolution with such.1, 'strange bedfellows as Portugal and., , South Africa. This Rein ?caused the; Chinese at the end of ' the debate to,. .aceuse the Russians of having "honey;i on lipa and dagger in-heart," passing.; ''fish eyes for, oearls." After stimu-;' sating this rhetoric, this resolution is hardly, as Mr. Loginov suggests4; ? "a significant contribution of the .t:ta the catise.of.further detente," ? ??., . . ? ? HOMER. A. JACK,111 Secretary Generafh World Conference of.'i : ? Religion for Pea* ' New, york, Nian. 81.1973v, *. ? '2'061%68/0 T76 .1"41;iii?Of '71'2cidii :?Approved For kelease i6M16466701iid , Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100066001-0 For East SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, london January 1973 lt/TY Vietnam War notebooks date back to 1949 LU Piled in boxes in my study, they are filled like the forgotten diaries of childhood, With -faint' and gornetimes unintelligible writing but 'also with the tinder to fire old memories. I have beeh going through them, trying' to find '13'otne scene or incident that might in itself illumine , ate the past and help to explain the present. ,Friends dimly remembered have stepped from the pages, along with many of the events, credible and Incredible, that went to make the war. ? "I hope so," I have General Henri Navarre aping in 1954 on the eve of the battle of Dien Bien Phu .in answer to my question whether, he thought the Viet Minh would attack. And at the '?other 'end of the scale, ethe chilling remark of a Young Viet Minh soldier whose name asked the day the Communists took over in Hanoi. "Sir," he replied, "I have no name. I am a soldier in the reople's Liberation Army.", 'That was a day to remember'. No One who was there is ever likely to forget 3. The victors came in their sandshoes, trudging thrdugh the mud with 'their ammunition slung on bamboo poles, their nl sig. it t i I h i di iI t ?,if It On the eve of the new Iv ,4 '1 peace talks due to begin r, in Paris tomorrow, a , I ? correspondent with uniquir experjience of Vietnam looks at the truth to be ? distilled from alniost ' 25 years of reporting the war there. The record, he ' finds, emphasises for him , ? '?, a fundamental aspect:pf ' the savage tragedy: itl by Denis! arner s w e on r cyc es, t e r spatch. riders on , :pushbikes: The vanquished went in tanks and 'Vietnam,s,future rests", ? armoured cars and half-tracks and trucks, trail-, finally in ? ? their howitzers and other weapotis of convene' ? tional war, humiliated And beaten by an enemy Vietnamese hands. they never really did under- ,,stand. The eOup that overthrew 'Diem.... Tet,.19613, and the ; ,iawful scene I saw with Sir fl obert Thompson and' ' 'Michael Charlton when, .after. the curfew had closed ? us in, we watched a police- limn drive a naked and 'hysterical infant from the teps of, the National Assembly, building with a and dumped it far off among the rice- lighted 'newspaper Bad operations fields, they had split k with trenches. With ARVN (Army of the Republic or Troops could make their way along it :Vietnam) . . . . Good operations with- with some difficulty, but it was impas- ARVN, . . . Days of compassion among sable even for the most agile of jeeps, , the refugees with that best of men, Dr: and unrepairable since quarries were Pim ()liana Dan. . . Stories late at night from defectors. . . . There is no end to it, but nothing, I find, so relevant to much of what has happened since, than the first action / saw with theFrench in the Red River, delta in the spring of 1952. On too many occasions it ,was repeated in South Vietnam, and every time it helped the Viet Cong to find recruits among the peasants. ? , The death of General de I,attre de: Tassigny had brought General; Salan. a veteran of too many years in ? Indo-China, to command the French; forces. His Tongking subordinate was General Gonzales de Linares, who had ' established hts field headquarters in the southern delta for an operation dee' signed to throw the Viet Minh infiltra- tors into the sea. For the task de Linares had five mobile groups, each a baby division of about regimental strength, with ancil- lary armour and artillery. The axis of the advance was along a road headed east to the coast from the town of Thai Binh, where battered mud-and-plaster houses, roughly thatched with rice straw, clustered around an immense, barn-like, Roman Catholic church. The artillery was sited Mthin 'a 'stone's throw of de Linares's 'headquar- ters, and at all hours of the night and ,day it pumped shells into the rice-fields and villages ahead. The advance itself was painfully slow. Where the Viet Minh had not cut the road into sections non-existent in the flat rice-plains o the delta and the Viet Minh held the hills beyond. , The ,French crept. forward, .usirig, the debris of villages knocked down in ,the advance and steel matting to makel a new mad alongside the old. In the course of one morning they demolished a complete village, loaded it into lorries and rolled everything from kitchen, tt utensils to iron bedsteads into the mu' to make a path for the tanks and ;armoured cars. ter to the story of delta despair.. It.Wat one of hundreds of forts, differing in no essential detail from all the others,' which stretched like, pylons across the delta. Frorp its brick tower the look- out could. sec his neighbouring forts,' the one hehind and the one in front, and what remained of the road that linked the two. Beyond these were' ,others and others again. \ The fort was commanded by a young French officer who had completed his two-year tour of duty in Indo-China and was overdue to sail for France. Under he had French and Vietnamese ,sergeants and Corporals, 'and, a total garrison 'Strength, mostly Vietnamese, of 35. All around him the Viet Minh dribbled in. His daytime patrols, link- ing up with those from neighbouring forts, were fired on by snipers, then by4 regular formations of Vie Minh troops. At first the Viet Minh had just a few guerrillas. Then they had sections, platoons, companies, battalions and finally regiments. They brought bazookas and some 75-millimetre moun- lta guns. They wanted rice, recruits salt and the machines and consurrneij , goorls that the French (had to izrovide tO Every now and then from the rice- maintain the economic life of the delta., fields a single shot hissed among the But above all they wanted to establi'shj troops. Young lieutenants from St. Cyr bases in the enemy's rear and to exten With their map cases and binoculars their political grasp, 'and badges of rank were the snipers' l The,fort commandor knew it woul primary target. Occasionally a spotter i ? he ever left something of a mira plane saw movement in a village ahead, on miracle if and fighter-bombers and artilleralive. The telephone lines with hi nt; wo Id begin work again, perhaps kill- .neighbouring forts were cut. He could lag a few Viet Minh but doing nothing no longer travel 'by road to Thai DinIC to win friends?among the local people, For a time he maintained communicae who in this area were almost-all Roman tion with Ms neighbours by radio, bitt.. Catholics. - 'S that also ceased to function. A fort . The relief of a French fort ten miles close to the east coast was the first to Bi h added its own fall. The Viet Minh ,east of Thai n a own chap-. throughIptitsgtritts i211 Approved For9Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432MdbiliSieddlitib tower rq)1 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 a bazooka. The walls crumbled and' collapsed. With sub-machine-guns and grenades, the Viet Minh followed up. Next morning the red flag of the Viet Minh replaced the Tricolour. A week later another, nearer fort fell. This time the Viet Minh used one of their mountain guns. They wheeled' it into position in the adjoining hamlet mi and, over open sights and? at almost zero ' range, blew a hole in the fort` through which the assault party forced its way. One by one the other forts felt funtil only this one remained, an island, in a hostile sea, a lonely outpost with' zero life expectancy. .1 ; :Each .night Viet Minh closed in The attack opened from a village eight hundred yards to the south. acihine-guns raked the fort and drew eavy fire in return. The commander thought .his fort was well designed, but was no better, if no worse, than Others whose fate he had seen ,ma by smouldering piles of rubble. 1" It stood on an island in ti narrow' stream, joined to the banks by two, 'bridges heavily protected by IGOOMS and blocks. The rushing waters served as a moat. On both banks and on the island itself were rows of barbed wire festooned with tin cans to give warning of the intruder's approach. 'nig tower was vulnerable. Its bricks were not stout enough to withstand artillery or :bazooka fire. But the 'thick bunkers underneath were well provided with ammunition and food. Each dawn the .Tricolour waved defiantly from the # ?I ,flower. Each night the Viet Minh came closer. They fired at any sign of move- ment, chipping the walls of the fort with their bullets. The climax could not be long delayed. ' L! But in March, 1952, the big French' military convoys began to move to- tward,s 'Thai Binh. The Viet Minh mined 'the main road, sniped at the forces ,moving by day and kept them off the, road altogether at night Operation Mercury pushed off from 'Thai Binh in the last week of March:' 16 infantry battalions with tank, artil-. lery and air support, moving in a great semi-circle extending from the swollen' Red River to the coast. On its main axis' of advance was the fort, its Tricolour' Still flying. The French relieved the fort on, the, .third day of the advance. The bearded , :commander, with bloodshot eyes,'. , rushed to kiss the advancing infantry captain on both cheeks. Everybody,' shook hands with everybody, congratu- lations, tears, stories, smiles. "I had it boat to catch in January," the corn; 'mander kept saying. "I am very late."? He left next morning end hits place Was taken by another young lieutenant ." We shall pull down the tower and put, 'more concrete, much more concrete, 'round the sides," be told ane. "We have cleared the delta before, you know. Perhaps we shall have to do it again." But the delta was never cleared, and. ' by October of that year French reverses 'here and elsewhere had so changed the military and political situation in Indo- China that the shadow of defeat was ,everywhere. I cabled. The Daily Telegraph: "Neither the French people nor their Government will tolerate for ever such losses as are now being suffered in a war which holds out no ,promise Of victory and no prospect of . 10 reward." I had no idea that I would be writing very much the same lines 15 years later of a much greater power, the United States. At the beginning in 1946, when the French bombarded Haiphong and Ho Chi Minh took to the hills, the Americans were ambivalent towards, the war. Secretary of State George C.' Marshall had scant regard for what he regarded as France's "dangerously out- ,moded colonial concepts." At the same time, he was not interested in "seeing' colonial empire administrations repjaced by a philosophy and political organisa- tion directed from and controlled by the Kremlin." I doubt that anyone born after the year 1940 will ever really understand the Indo-China War or the Vietnam War, or why the Americans moved in when the, French retired in defeat. It is not easy to explain in this era of disillusion and d?nte that the generation which fought and prevailed in the Second World War against the Nazi tyranny had no intention of surrendering to the 'tyranny of the paranoid Stalin. Indeed, because of the rewriting of history that is now going on ? America, things have reached the ridiculous stage where Marshall and Truman / and Acheson are blamed for the Cold War. This is, of course, preposterous rubbish. No Tsarist leader could have been more demanding, or more imperi- alistic, than Stalin at Yalta. He wanted the railways and the window to the east at Port Arthur and Dalny that had so blinded the vision of Nicholas II. He/ clamped down the iron curtain along the 38th parallel in Korea. Two years later a Russian sponsored conference,, in Calcutta decided that the indigenous Communist parties of South and South- East Asia should attempt to seize power by armed uprisings. They tried 'in countries that were still' colonised and in those that had won their ,indepen- dence as well. China was already aflame when Ho Chi Minh launched his campaign agairist the French. There were revolts in Burma, in India, in the Philippines, in Indonesia and, of course, in Malaya. Then came the direct challenge in Korea. This was the era of the Com- munist utopia and a Communist mono- lith seemed as attractive to the true believers as it was terrifying to its foes. Chins believed .in Stalin's Russia. Ho Chi Minh was allied to both. Against ,its wishes, but to protect what it regarded as its vital interests, the 'United States became involved, but not before it had refused Frenth requests for American planes and ships to transport troops to Indo-China. In the final 18 months of the Indo- China War, however, when the need for Communist containment seemed more urgently necessary than the disband- ment of colonial empires, the United States delivered two million tons of war material to the French at a cost of more than 1,000 million dollars, and came perilously close to intervening when the entrenched camp at Dien Bien Phu, wag seen to be on the point of collapse. Thereafter, its aid to whichever Government promised to hold the line in South Vietnam was in- evitable, and, in the context of the times, desirable and necessary. ? I find it difficult even with hindsight to decide whether the United States was well or ill served by President Ngo Dinh Diem, around whom American ? hopes centred for nine years. In many ways Diem did perform miracles in the 'Smith, but that period of quiet that lasted from 1954 until the end of 1959, avqs not just his doing, but conscious decision the rt of Hanoi The second Indo-China War when it began, showed only the tip of the iceberg.1, Unseen was the vast programme of pub- s teal preparation that had taken place., in both the Laotian and South Vietna-i mese countryside, the organisation of,', the cadre system and all the rest of the detailed and careful planning that Ho, ,Chi Minh always insisted on. Diem was dedicated, selfless and' bard-working. No one, certainly not the Americans, understood the nature of the', Viet Cong political tactics better than' he. Yet he was so narrow, so pessi- mistic, so deeply suspicious of men of goodwill that he surrounded himself with his abominable family, Who were driven on by the madness that led in Aueust, 1963, to the attack on the" Buddhist pagodas. A deep personal regret Of this period is that I knew long in advance of the detailed planning for, the attacks, but because of the blandi denials of Ngo Ilinh Nhu, Diem's bro71 'ther, I 'could persuade no one in thet official American community to pay any, .attention. . Some of the things that happened int those days would not be credible in fiction. I arrived back in Saigon after a brief absence to find that the firstt .draft page of along article I had writ- lien in the 'home of a senior Americati official with whom I was staying 'had been photocopied and found in thou- sands in the Xa Loi pagoda, and reptc!7 thiced in the Times of Vietnam as evi? dente of a foreign conspiracy, against .Diem. ? It had been "borrowed," we learned later, by my friend's servants, who were 'running a Buddhist printing press in one of his spare rooms. ? That Vietnam was headed for, disaster at this time was apparent. Nothing could -have stopped a coup or a counter coup. But the American involvmeilt, /one would haye expected, would hive takCn note of What might" happen after Diem and brother Nhui .were removed from the scene. This omission must go down as one of thel Major 'blunders of the war. A was noti a case of the king is dead, long live thei king. The king was dead?and there was no other. With the whole apparatus of govern. ment in ruins, it was no cause for sun, prise that the situation fell to bits in, 1964, or that by the beginning of 1965 the war was all but lost. The Amen-'1 cans either had to opt out or to opt in,i 'They. opted in?and promptly com-I 'mated two more major blunders. ? The Kennedy confrontation 'with?1, Cuba had convinced many senior offie cials in the State Department and the; Pentagon that Vietnam could be handled to the Cuba formula, "If we, can show without an ounce of 'bluff that' Vietnam is as important to us as Cuba: ,,and that we are prepared to risk a major war in its defence, then we shall, succeed," I was told,by U. Alexis John son, who had gone to Saigon with Henry, Cabot Lodge as deputy ambassador. But the trouble was that Vietna was not Cuba. What Washington would appear as a full hand prov, AO be a pair of twos. It was prepared to abandon all restraint to prevent Cuba from becoming a Russian missile base; To the end it was restrained in Viet- nam. Cuba was vital: Vietnam was not ut in trying to bluff Hanoi, the) United States S11130MINI in bl itself, and this led to the &mond- the major blUnders to which I have re; A lAiibTfiialiFib 0 1 goigbi 01'' 1 7717771 ,Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : - ? - . ,1- .1. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 lerred?the tionviction that prevailed until the Tet offensive in 1968 that the (United States could shoulder aside the ,Vietnamese and successfully take on, the war by itself. The idea thet it .might not be successful was an almost treasonable notion to the U.S. Army int 'those days. Yet, after the sudden shock, caused' ,by the massive American intrusion of), ;forces, Hanoi showed remarkable con-i .fidence in the outcome. Pham Van, Dong, The North Vietnamese , Pri?me, Minister, in a talk with a Japanese 'newspaper editor in April, 1967, said he believed the Americans would lose' because they had failed to achieve their1 two main objectives: the destruction of' the National Liberation Front, and the expansion of the pacified areas in; ,South Vietnam. ' As Hanoi saw it, 'Saigon had failed :to achieve the strong rear that General ,Vo Nguyen Giap always regarded as the decisive factor in a revolutionary (war. Other things were going for them the North Vietnamese reckoned: bet- ter and more experienced leadership and training for ..this type of war; the 'advantages of fighting on one's own terrain among one's own people; morale; the too rapid rotation of U.S. forces and their lack of familiarity with local and tropical conditions; political and other problems encountered by the Americans in pouring large nurn- hers of troops into 'Vietnam; the strain on the U.S. economy in supplying forces 'fighting thousands of miles, from the' home base; and the excessive proper- tion of reafr-line American troops. General Nguyen Ohi Thanh., who commanded the Oomrnimist 'forces in the field until his death in 1967, set out to force the Americans to split and scatter' their forces and to fight in areas' where there was no dlear-cut line and no targets. He hoped to prevent them from bringing their full combat effici- ency into operation and to deny them the opportunity to gain strategic advan- tage. By the tactic of hitting the !Americans in many places while keep; Ing sufficient forces m reserve to mass heavy fighting power in key areas, by concentrating and dispersing quicklyi by fighting big battles or combining .big battles with small battles, and; by avoiding at all cost the normal Set- piece action, he believed that Victory could be denied to the United States ,however large the force it committed,' Until at last it tired of the war. Then came the Tet offensive. It shattered the indigenous Viet Cong forces and their vital cadre system in the hamlets, caused fearful casualties among the North Vietnamese ranks, :and dismayed Hanoi when the general uprising failed to materialise. ? But it also ? had the much-sought-after effect of causing the war-weary Americans to demand an end. Everything that happened thereaftd ?the declaration of personal surrender by President John- son, the protracted halt in the bombing, the Paris talks, the' Guam Doctrine, Vietnamisa- tion, and all the rest?repre- sented the signal lowering of -American sights, the abandon- ment of American hopes of winning u military victory and of , reinstating .South Vietnam as a "pearl in the crown of the free: world." to borrow one of the, descriptions of the offi-1 dal American propagandists in the late 1950s. Despite all these unfortunate consequences, however, Tet put the 'emphasis, where it should Approved have been all the time?on the Vietnamese people. If they could not win the war themselves the United States was no longer. willing to try to do it for them. Without ' American air sup- port and the blockade of the' North Vietnamese ports, it is improbable that the South could have held the Northern blitzkreig that Giap launched with his Easter offensive in '1972. After a poor beginning,: 'ARVN, and especially the elite marines, paratroopers and Rangers, fought extremely' ' Whether it could do well, enough to hold South Vietnam ;without American fire-power; we may know only if a ceasefire eventually collapses; .and a third Indo-China war, ,emerges from the second as the second emerged from the first. ,Certainly, nothing has yet been, .decided. There will be no de-, cision until one side or the 'other is in undisputed control ibf Saigon. ; Whether the war has held the line long enough for the rest of South-EastAsia. to put its fences in order also remains to be shown. "If we all gear ' In with each other, we may get; something akin to what has happened in Western Europe with the Marshall Plan," Lee Kuan Yew said to me in Singe-. pore in 1967. "Finally, you got' there a Western Europe that. :was so independent, as repre- ,seeted by de Gaulle, that it could do without the Americans, While we can't hope at this stage to create that kind of non- Communist Asia, that must be the direction in which we have 'to go." ; That is the direction South- 'East Asia has been going. In 'assessing future prospects; 'changing times must also be taken into account. The Vietnalli 'War began whea Russian and 'Chinese relations were close and cordial. It ends?if the peace talks are successful?with 44 'Russian divisions on China's horthere btirders?and demon- strably they, are not there because of mutual trust and. friendship. Obliged to choose between al non-Communist South-East Asig! and continued tensions that the, Russians would certainly attempt to exploit there, Peking may be! disposed to forget its evangelical mission to help create new wars, of national liberation. IL', hope-. fully, this is the ease. ? the Vietnam War will not have been without positive value for those who have lived so long in its shadow. , WASHINGTON POST 16 JANUARY 1973 ? A leading member Amnesty International's Kat rean section, the 'Rev. Myung?ki, has been arrested by South Korean authori-- ties, Amnesty International- snnounged In London. ? 1 Forifkelease 2001/08/07 NEW YORK TIMES 14 January 1973 Vietnarni Quest for Peace ? A. World ? Waits? In Hope And Fear Henry A. Kissinger, arriving in Peri* aboard a special Air Force plane, said:1 '"President Nixon has 'sent me back ,to make one more major effort to, conclude the negotiations," Le Due The, arriving from Hanoi' by wa3/ of Peking and Moscow, sai4 "The decisive moment has come either' ; to sign the agreed-upon accord or ? continue the war." Once again the White House advi:.* and the Communist revolutionary, plunged list week into the intricacies! of the draft agreement that seemed last , October. to offer the. United States 11,1 ,way out of Vietnam. This time there 'was 'a sense that their new round of meetings would either rescue the mil cord and bring it to fruition or leacc' Ito a final collapse. As the talks, begun Monday, worei on, the North Vietnamese Communist; party newspaper Nhan Dan reportedi "bad signs" of American intransigence. But there was no real news, and few clues, as to whit really was going o behind the dosed doors in Paris. . Yesterday ,evening Mr. Kissinger flew back to report to President Nixon at' the Florida White House at Key Biscayne, amid indications that the ;talks had made at least some *ogress. From Washington; Bernard Gwertzman 'of The New York Times supplied the ,following assessment: 'That's His Message' One Republican Senator who at- tended a White House breakfast meet.: ing on the eve of the new round of talks in Paris was impressed by Mr., Nixon's determination not to be de- terred by Congressional or public critl-, ;clam in his pursuit of what he called "the proper kind of settlement." "The; 'President obviously sees himself thrusts into a critical moment in history," the Senator said.' "He believes he is doing the right thing and believes that his-, tory will bear him out. That was his message as I saw it." Many thought, in fact, that the .situation was producing for Mr. Nixon another of the personal crises that have been a feature of his political life. Nothing would please him morel 'than to surprise the world once again', ?this time with a Vietnam settlement! on the eve of his inauguration.; Not'i only would such an announcemen0 clear the capital's streets of the war; protesters who are gathering their,: ,forces for Jan. 20, but it would. purg? the atmosphere of the poison that hay/ : CIA-RDP77-00431flikeiii fromr ateppeared on the olitical scenLiti i..71,71-177("1,;7:77.77r. ('I .'f1777?7717.7-777, Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 esterday mean that Mr. Nixon wouldi be able to offer some welcome newt. on the eve of his inauguration? No harcP, information was yet available, buti -Ronald L. Ziegler, the White Hous61 press secretary, clearly Intended to leave an optimistic impression when he told newsmen early yesterday morn- ing that the negotiations in Paris had: been "serious."' ? In the White House jargon, "serious", has taken on a meaning of its own. It has been used to signify progressl When the White House has wanted td signify the opposite, it has charged Hanoi with a lack of "seriousness" at the negotiating table. Moreover, the Administration has said the bombing raids north of the 20th parallel woul `remain suspended as long as the neg 'Cations were conducted in a "serious" manner. ? Mr. Kissinger, talking briefly wit reporters at Orly airport before board , Ing his plane, said he had had "veryi extensive and very useful negotiations' with Mr. Tho. Hanoi's special envoy will remain in Paris, Mr. Kissinger saidcj and the two will keep in touch throug diplomatic channels. The North Viet names? delegation issued a brief state ,ment of itt own, saying the secre 'talks "have made progress." Mr. Kissinger's remarks implied-that the final decision was now President Nixon's. He said he Will meet with Mr. Nixon, and "the President willethen decide what steps should be taken to speed a peace of justice and concilivi tion." , What are the issues Mr: Nixon deems enicial to that kind of accord? Mr. Nixon, at the breakfast meeting, , named three: the release of American' prisoners, an effective cease-fire and? the right of all South Vietnamese to :decide their own future. These point have been at the heart of the negotiat. Ing,process ever since it began. ? ., , PRISONERS ?On what terms should' the American prisoners be returned?. In return for the withdrawal of the 'remaining American forces, as sped.' fled in the nine-point October accord, 'or in return for the release of all mill- 'tary and political prisoners held by the Saigon Government, as suggested subsequently by the North Vietnamese? CEASE-FIRE Should the tease. fire be limited to the two Vletnams4 as stated in the October accord, or broadened, ? as sought now by the United States, to include Laos and Cambodia? Should the demilitarized zone between North and South Viet-'? nem be re-established, as urged by Washington, even though Hanoi does not want to recognize a permanent division of the country? What kind of International supervision? The 5,000- man force wanted by Washington or the small 250-man team proposed by Hanoi? . VIETMAN?No question has ? proven more difficult to solve than this One. What should be the scope of , the Council for National Reconcilia- tion provided for by the October? accord? Should the agreement recog- Anize the Vietcong's claims to being a government in South Vietnam, or recognize only the Saigon Govern- ment, or both, or none? What about ? North Vietnam's troops in South Viet., ? nom? Should they have legal status? In Paris, observers could find little . to go on about Just where matters stood.. After six dayi cif talks, Flora, Lewis of The New York Times had this': to say: 'Squaring the Circle' Still the negotiators raced across Paris behind their motorcycle escorts to and from their alternating meeting ,pltkces. Still the bombers dropped their, loads on North Vietnam below the 20th 'parallel and Hanoi kept strengthening: Its air defenses for the day when, per.), haps, that line will, again be breached.i Still officials spoke anonymously4 about the current "sticking point" , ,which, with a little more effort, might soon be hurdled with a compromise' that would bring peace. It was a repetitiOn, in many re- t spects, of October and November and December, when the tame people had expressed the same hope for a cease-.; fire?by Election Day, they thought. at first, then by Thanksgiving, then by ; Christmas, then before the opening of Ithe new Congress. And the "sticking point" has shifted from the presence of North Vietnamese troops in the South to the Saigon government* sovereignty over all Sotlth Vietnam to the precise definition of the larized zone that cuts Vietnam in two. These are different ways of defining: the same Issue ? whether the peace' accord is to divide the Vietnamese. nation into two states with conflicting ? social systems or whether it is to per, mit the South to be moved gradually, into Hanoi's orbit and eventnally, absorbed. That is the political issue .over which the war has been fought. from the beginning. The permanent delegates of ? the three, Vietnamese delegations?Hanoi., the Provisional Revolutionary Govern., meat (Vietcong) and Saigon?set aside, all the lesser questions at the public' meetings that continued last week/ parallel to the secret ,Kissinger-Tho talks. All three delegations restated, the central political issue--firrnlyi to? make clear that their positions had not changed. Only the American delegate, urged "moderation" in language. , Therein, experienced diplomatic ob.' servers believe, has been the negotlat-' lng problem. Mr. Kissinger has been seeking language that would permit14 the United States to get (tut of the war without appearing to have fought: In vain and to have abandoned its ally ?language that each side can inter- pret to its own satisfaction. He needs Saigon's assent to get the' kind of neatly packaged settlement he wants from Hanoi. He needs concessions from Hanoi to get Saigon's assent. The October draft satisfied Hanoi because it undermined Saigon's goal, of art independent, insulated, anti-, Communist South Vietnam. The nego. Cations since then have been an at- tempt to win equal satisfaction for. Saigon. The formula for squaring the circle has been the tough job confront.. frig the Paris negotiators." ? If President Nixon does reach 'art agreement with Hanoi, he will doubt- ,less try to obtain Saigon's acceptance' .of its ternis, in line with his promisel not to "impose" a settlement on the South Vietnamese ally. And from Sai.' ? gon yesterday Craig R.. Whitney of The New York Tittles reported on 4' certain shift of attitude: 'President Nguyen Van Thien concluded that he has won the most, he could hope to get in the way of,1 ;concessions from the Americans?and,1 ,even .more important, that he won three months' breathing -space by stalling on the draft accord of last October. That is the word now thong Government officials close to the Pres.; idential Palace. ? ' Mr. Thleu, according to these men, Is. now confident enough of the Amer- ican bargaining position to expect that ? anylinal agreement will include,guar- anteet of a relatively leak-free demill. ? tarized zone between North and South , Vietnam and a strong international force to supervise the cease-fire and ? keep an eye on the 145,000 North, 'Vietnamese troops scattered about the South. " That, and a statement of some kind :about the legitimacy of the Saigon Government' below the 17th parallel,' will probaby make it easier for hbni to accept an agreement that does not ,call for the withdrawal' of the Corn. Munist troops. The best estimate here is that he/ will not raise new objec-i :tions if Mr. kissinger obtains that kindi of agreement from Hanoi. _ Acceptance of Saigon as the legit1-1 mate government of the South, hoW4'1, ever, looks from here like a confession( 'of 'defeat by the North Vietnamese, and few realists belieVe the Commu- E nists have been defeated. There's the41 .catch: Is a formula possible that will '.. satisfy both sides? Mr. Thlen's aides apparently are dubious. `. What it boils down to is that Pres17',; deft Thieu now feels the Americans: are not going to compromise his .`posi.. tion as drastically as they would have, 'if the October agreement had been4 signed, So he's resigned to a cease-fire( ?if the Americans can get it: The Government, at any rate, W preparing either'for suecess or failure of the Paris talks. If there is no peace fairly soon, Mr. Thieu is afraid the United States Con-,1 grese may cut off all military and eco-; .nomic aid to South Vietnam as a way: of forcing President Nixon to with-1 draw from the War. That worries the South Vietnamese leaders almost as much as the possibility of an unfavor.: able agreement. ? It is for that reason that Mr. Thiel', is sending 20 pro-Government legis-1 fators and official escorts to Wash- ington to lay his pleas for continued'.' support before individual America& Senators and Congressmen. As one 'of4, ? the envoys put it, "We will try to ei- plain to them how complicated things are in South Vietnam and why it isn't that easy to end the war." On the other hand,' if there Is a', cease-fire, Mr. 'Mien will be up against' stiff Communist political competition.' The Government is laying plans to' clap Communist sympathizers in, prison, impose strict controls on the: domestic press and foreign corre.' spondents, and maintain a strong mili- tary posture against any Communist, violations of the cease-fire. The Gov.. eminent is even turning back bolts, at blue and red cloth at the Saigon docks because MO can be made Int? VietcOng flags. ? ", 12 .11/1 MY, PTITT7711 fp rrrt-i? ? Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDPnLoo432Root)1000600Q10t%''l ? Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 ? WASHINGTON POST I 16 JANUARY 1973 ? ? anot. Only Balk by U.S. or South Vietnam' ? Could Halt Cease-Fire, Reports Say By Murrey Marder Waeliltitton Post Staff Writer HANOI, Jan. 18 (Tuesday)--:-Even before President Nixon announced the halt in ; ('offensive action against North Vietnam, ' f,this capital had begun churning out a t sudden flood of reports apparently in- tended to accelerate a full cease-fire t :accord. ,) The message being put out here by r 'various sources is that only a last minute Itbalk by either the United States or the f; Salg, government could once again frustrate an agreement.' Art Officially the North Vietnamese gov- e ernment has said nothing so far except ? that there has been "progress" ,in the Paris talks, but that it is maintaining Its "vigilance." ? With Gen. Alexander M. Haig's trip to Saigon, North Vietnam's concern has mounted that South Vietnamese Presi- dent Nguyen Van Thieu may again seek to block an accord unless world pressure ' is brought to bear on him That pressure has been greatly stimu- lated from here since Saturday, the day U.S. envoy Henry A. Kissinger left Paris to consult with President Nixon. Three antiwar delegations now here have issued statements appealing for a peace accord. The visiting delegations t They met with Hoing Tung,' talk of progress on both' ; editor of the party newspaper sides of the negotiations and 1 Nhan Dan, and reported that Kissinger's consultations in he told them that in Paris Florida and President Nixon 'the United. States -and North re-echoed here only among I'Vletnam "had been able to those with independent ac- agree oh a draft treaty whigr' cess to the world outside. (mainly was based on the prin- This includes North Viet- ', Oct. 20, 1972. , dios. The group's statement said on, ciples and points elaborated, namese with short-wave ra-' I I 1 But whatever hope or, i that Hoang Tung added "that skepticism the news aroused t w''' the agreement had been able to as kept invisible in this de- eliminate some remaining terminedly disciplined soci- ' ' doubts and ambiguities in the , ety. To this moment, the , previous , draft agreement.? North Vietnamese govern- ment has held off telling Its' The Stockholm group con- own people even what its , 2. eluded: "It is our conviction own delegation spokesman, ; that the North Vietnamese said in Paris when talks re- ' aide Is serious when saying 3 d 'it is prepared to achieve peace , The response here today on the principles of the agree- to all inquiries is, "It' is all ment reached in Paris. There- up to Nixon.? ' fore, time has come for the- To a newly arrived visitor, whole of world opinion to turn however, Hanoi outwardly , to the American side in urging appears more placid than the American government to any capital would be ex- ? make use of this opportunity,' pected to be after a genera- 'of peace unbroken." : tion of war. ' The whole thrust of the On this Sunday afternoon, 'North Vienamese position is the streets are lively with i? that the decision is up to Presi- thousands of cyclists, the ? dent Nixon and North Vietnam markets are crowded, the ? wants the world to know in ad-.I vegetables plump and ? the ; vance where it will place the meat, chicken and other ri blame if there is another foodstuffs seem ample. The t failure, people by no means look tin- in a delayed dispatch , dernourished, and now that sent from Hanoi Sunday, the bombing is suspended. Marder reported the Jot- ? there are children rolling , lowing: , hoops on the sidewalks. Despite the halt in the ; pretty girls strolling and ? American bombing of the ; flower stands in the center Hanoi- Haiphong regio n, t of the city. 4 throughout the nation a con- children rolling hoops on the tinuing state of siege is main- o sidewalks, pretty girls stroll- tamed regardless of day-to-. big and flower stands in the 14 day prospects for a cease-fire -4 center of the city. accord.? There is also a remarks- ble silence. It is punctuated only by the rumble of army, trucks, usually hauling road- building supplies, or the oc- casional horn of a car or , truck ? weavin "We have had too many bitter experiences to relax our vigilance now," said a North Vietnamese official.. "Our antiaircraft are con-. stantlY prepared to shoot. The news of U.S. negotia- through the omnipresent bi- * tor Henry A. Kissinger's de- cyclists. parture from Paris with new"Even the presently intro.. ; represent the Stockholm Peace Confer.41 ence, the World Pence Council and a Japan-Vietnam friendship association that includes members of the Japanese Com- - munist Party. The Stockholm group said in a state- ment last night that it was informed by a member of the Central Committee of ' North, Vietnam's Workers (Communist);', Party that the Paris talks are at "a new`4 crucial phase" that will produce peace or,i intensified war. 4 The Swedish delegation is led member of Sweden's Parliament, 13ertill., Zachrisson. The group also includee another Swedish' parliamentarian, 041 Ullsten, and a Canadian member of Part-0 lianient, Andrew Brewin. ? - ? h?4; quent nterrup ion of an air- alert warning produces no break in the pattern. Be- cause the announcement , identified only a reconnais- sance flight, no one even ' broke stride over it. The people in the streets seem- ingly have complete' confi- dence in the ability of the alert system to distinguish t between a reconnaissance flight and an attack. The , system is said to be refined enough to advise if a recon- naissance flight is hy a pi- , _ loted plane or a drone. War has by no means scar- : it quickly see even while red all of this city or even i he major portion of it, one awaiting a closer inspection of the air raid damage. , Much of Hanoi's city cen- ter is still lined with stately trees in full foliage, al- though the weather is gray and chilly in this season. 'The bomb damage is in pockets or strips where American B-52s dropped an unprecedented tonnage of destruction on this capital : between Dec. 18 and 29. Nevertheless, the immedi- ate impact on the arriving visitor is a scene of devasta- tion on landing at Gialam Airport on the weekly Soviet Aeroflot flight. For the Gia- lam area in general, an the east bank of the muddy Red River opposite Hanoi, was a prime target with its indus- try, railroad repair yards and k other installations, some of them near or virtu- ally surrounded by the poor- est residential sections. Here, casualties were report- edly high. Men and women workers methodically, are picking through the ruins of crum- I bled buildings and resi- dences on that side of the river salvaging everything possible, brick by brick. Desolation continues to Approvrg For Release 2 01/08/07"!tirkgbP911-01132K18001 : broken skeleton .of the fa- . mous Longbien Bridge (formerly the Paul Doumer , Bridge) looms in the di-, tance, once North Vietnam't ' ? prized artery to tAc east and , 'forth. 1 It withstood "Johnson," the interpreter wryly notes referring to the ? war years of President John- son. "But not Nixon. But we 'have many pontoons." Soon you. are on the pon- . . toon bridge after a line of, trucks perhaps half a mile,.' long allows your passenger. , car to squeeze through, zig-l: , zaggipg perilously acrose ? the remnants of a roadway. ' Improvised Bridge , car, even if it is a punish& :: across the Red River is a hazard itself for a passenger: The improvised bildge', .11 hie Soviet-built Volga. No , longer straight under the : jarring truck traffic, the ; pontoon bridge, held by ca- f: bles anchored to the river j bed, presents an obstacle at each joined section where ; heavy planks tie it together. The passenger car mounts % each section as a new chal- .., lenge. 1 On the Hanoi side of the river, the roadbed is still 4 i pocked with craters being filled with dirt and gravel., As the river area recedes, '2 however, so does the scene of continuing bomb damage. t Hanoi is officially display- ; ing its wounds far more ' than it is cringing from ), them. No outsides, eve- J cially a non-Vietnamese , t speaker, can know what the Vietnamese people really think about their war plight. The official presentation portrays the bomb scars as 1. battle ribbons for heroismCi under fire. The people act ., as if they agree. Glancing I . away from their roadbuild- . ing, they look at the passing .-; forellin visitor, unable to igge6namis French. Ituto'i . ? ? I C'ITY7:77L( rir WON ;i Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 elan, Swedish, tast erman, 1 ?or a rarer American?with "whole country" means [ " calmness i 'rather than misery, as if !I they were saying "Look, ' what we survived." All they , . can read or hear in the offi- ',- chit media tells them they , arc heroic. By official invitation, ; peace delegations are now , coming into North Vietnam 4 at an increased pace to in- spect the American war idamage, te deplore and con- .4, demn the strategy that ,in- flicted it and to extoll the 1, fortitude of those Who sur- ".?, vived. p , Billboards . and banners across Hanoi's wide, shaded t streets hail "Victory" over, [ the 12 days of American Ti 52 raids and exhort the pop- ulation to "Sacrifice All, But Never Submit" To "Amen- can aggressors." , , North Vietnam's statist'. cal,claims to victory in this :period, about double the ac- i: knowledged American I; count, abound in signs and !, posters ,across the city: ' ;, "Planes down 81, including 1. 34 B-52s, 5 F.111s and 42 oth- ers." ' i Across the front of the city's closed theater a red, i ,banner abbut 50 feet high proclaims: "The people and 'army " of Hanoi have won i'.,. great exploits to be worthy t of the people of the heroic ' capital of the whole coun- ? aneScpression of try!, The reference to the , North and South Vietnam, the unity of which is of course Hanoi's ultimate ob- jective. As Kissinger conferred with President Nixon, one of North Vietnam's leading ex- ponents of national unity. talked of the ability of North Vietnam to persevere in war or peace to achieve the goal of unity. He was Lutz Quy Ky, who bears the disarming title of secretary general of the Association of Vietnamese Journalists. Ky, among other things, is the author of 16 books about Vietnam. The "secret of Vietnam," he said, is "how to endure." Ky, a southerner by birth, relished recounting the his- tory of Vietnam's repulsion of foreign invaders, during two millenia. ,"We will not talk optimism about the Paris talks", he said. "But we are optimistic about even- tual victory. If you conceive that to fight for freedom is a happiness, then you can fight for a very long time. "How can we fight a na- Von that can send men to the moon *hen we are still using buffalos to plow?" He asked rhetorically. "We are not producing one gram of , steel," he said, but "we win victories because of our courage and our. intelli- gence. We have studied the limits of 'human '1 THE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER 9 January 1973 he said, and have practiced ?, it. ; During a two.and-a-half. hour conversation Marxism went unmentioned except , once indirectly in answer to a question about outside aid to Communist North Viet- nam, which he zpaintained is now adequately supplied by: Its socialist allies. Questions about North Vi- etnam's extraordinary pro- tests last summer that "big powers" (meaning the So- viet Union and China) were succumbing to President Nixon's attempt to make them abandon the "National Liberation Movement" were met by the disclaimer today that "Nixon has , been de- feated" in that strategy. , His thernes, Instead, were , nationalism, endurance, per- leverance . and the convic- tion that no one can deter-, mine North Vietnam's des- tiny for it. tenacity. If there are skep-1, tics or 'doubters, they were i informed by today's official government n ew spa perA Nhan Dan that "all the. ? youths of Hanoi are very 4 happy to be chosen as sol- , oilers. The leaders of theit :g 1 street councils encourage them to join the army. Many write letters to the army common( expressing. their willingness to fight." ' What has; been the toll for 1 the last generation of wall,'1 including what North Viet-1 , nam calls 13 years of Contin-,' war with the United States? Ky gently replies that , "We have not calm:, lated this figore." ? ' , The population of North l Vietnam, however, has nev- ertheless increased, despite' the toll from about 17 mild ,lion people in 1960 to an es7 1 timated 21 million today as the result of a high birth rate. . ., ' "We eagerly want peace," the assertion comes. "But 1 we also are prepared for in- definite war if necessary." The first glimpse of Uni1 t underdeveloped, battered,),, ? but somehow still function.' ing, country indicates that this contention of endurance ?a vital ingredient in the nation's psychological war- fare, both for its own popu- lation and for its bargaining, in the world Outside-4a' widely believed by the popu- lace,, I . .. The population of metro- politan Hanoi, normally about 1.2 million, is still Only a third of that size. This is a result of the evacu- ation of residents during the B-52 bombardment. But even though the bom- bing halted two weeks ago, North Vietnam is constantly preparing for a possible re- sumption. The people see and hear nothing but victorious war claims or reports of world acclaim for North Vietnam's ? Is the bombing to return? Dr Kissinger's "one more major effort" to negotiate a settlement to the Vietnam war has a ring of "or else "'about it. The terms in which President Nixon finally talked to the. Congressional leaders after apparently con. suiting nobody. for some weeks ? suggests that he has sent Dr Kissinger to negotiate along lines predetermined in Washington. This must Increase the chances that the talks will again fall Obscurity clouds the reasons why the murderous bombing Of Hanoi and Haiphong was stopped on 'December 30. For the sake of. face, President Nixon has to believe publicly that the' Ms :blasted the Vietnamese back to the negotiating table. This in turn increases the temptation to use the same tactics again. Statements from the VVhite House suggest that renewed bembing north of the twentieth parallel Is a certainty if the talks fail. ? The damage inflicted by the B52s has been appalling. Their use is a lasting stain.on President Nixon's record. Their devastating power may well have forced the .North Vietnamese to call for a ,bteather, since there is a limit to the amount of Materia) punishment that even they can absorb. The frightening aspect Is that, if the 1152s are used again, it could be from a greater height and with, no cencern for the nature of the targets below Some reports suggest that part of the high loss rate came because the' 1352s. were. 1 3.4 flying lower to achieve (with tragically little ? ? l success) accuracy in hitting strategic targets. By- ordering a' mass evacuation of the city, populations, ? the North Vietnamese. ' have. Indicated that they are taking* this possibility seriously. It shows too that, battered as they' are, they will be unlikely to buckle to Ameriedn, demands at the negotiating table for a settlement which, to North Vietnamese .eyes, is meant; to leave President Thieu inaccessibly in. place.. To support this reasoning, they can invoke the extraordinary conduct. of ,Mr Nixon during the period of the bpmbing. 4 President Nixon's deliberate isolation from ; the press. from all but a handful of his 'oWn4' advisers and, until recently, from the leaders of Congress lends weight to the belief that his order, to unleash the B52s stemmed from tantrums of disappointment when Dr Kissinger failed to brihg; about a settlement. It is possible that his secrecyi was a cover for truly 'secret talks with Hanot,'' but his behaviour encourages no confidence In! that. It looks merely as if President Nbion shutting himself off from both advice and; criticism: As a ;result he appears increasingly, as a man who has worked only to make the wart acceptable ? at home by ? withdraWing ? a' large number of US troops from the ground still appears to think a victory can be salvaged.; It Is a dangerously mistaken approach to delicate talks. and it has hideous implications for What may follow; if the talks fall ? Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : ClARDP77OO 0db1B0O&biTO '!1' V/17 IP 1 ? Apiiroved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 THE ECONOMIST JANUARY 6, 1973 'Scandinavia Northern lights Sharp reactions to last month's resump-? tion of tull-scale American bombing df North Vietnam were widespread in Scandinavia. Shortly after the new B-52 attacks began on December t8th, ,the Danish prime minister, Mr Anker joergensen, issued a strongly critical comment and added that he might , press for a discussion in Nato of Mr. Nixon's actions. The Finnish foreign minister, Mr Ahti Karjalainen, declared that the ease for the bombing raids was "especially difficult ' to understand." The Swedish foreign minister' Mr Krister Wickman, condemned the bombing as "blind and brutal." The chairman of the 'Danish trade union Ifederation, Mr Thomas Nielsen, called 1,for a Europe-wide boycott of American i products. The Norwegian foreign minister, Mr Dagfinn Vaarvik, 'served warning that his government would have to consider what action it should take if the bombing bn. But it was the ,emarks irkile on December 23rd 1-/ Mr Olo' Palme, the prime tair;?ster of 5.;weden, that echoed Lidest. The fir press reports made Mr Palme Rear to have directly likened the /4.--nencan action to such notorious' ? atrrjcities df the past as those linke I the ?nrames of Guernicb,, Oradou ;'Lidice, BaAyi Yar, Katyn and SharpcL ville The State Departoidnt Made strong protest to the Swedish ambas- sadort in "Washington, and, announced that the 'charg?'affaires who nor Iheads the American embassy in 'Stock- holm i(there has been no ambassador, there since 'August) would nOt, for the present, return to his post from home leave. Although fuller ,versions' of Mr Palme's Words showed that hit-refd, ences to past atrocities had been som ' what oblique, Washingt n follow ,through with the request, 4Icsctbed b ,Mr Wickman as astonish; g, that n new Swedish ambassador should, 'sent there to succeed MIj Hubert d Besche, who is due to rctirj on Janua 8th ' Mr Palme has a reputation for out- spokenness, but, the bad feeling that has now brought Washington and: Stockholm close 'to a breach of diplc-; ,matic relations had set in before he became prime minister three years agO,! ,and indeed before Mt Nixon became,l, %President. The solidarity lof Swedish) 'feeling about Vietnam wai demonstra-!I 'ted on December 28th when an appeall Tor an immediate bombing halt and 1,a :peace settlement was issued jointly by , the leaders of all the five parties rcpt.& sented in the Riksdag ; two days late. 275,titio Swedes had added their Itignti-. "tures t(1 this-appeal. tok signilar appeal ;was made on January and :I)P .the heads .1of all Norway's political prunes. NEW YORK TIMES 1 5 January 1973 'What Can We Do?' . By V ercors PARIS ? Where-rs the difference? Between the devastation. of Guernica by the planes of Hitler and the devas- tation of Hanoi by those of Mr. Nixon, where is the difference? Between the? raids of terror over Hanoi to force the Vietnamese to surrender and the raids of terror over Warsaw to fdrce the -Polish, over Rotterdam to force the Dutch to surrender, over Coventry to force the British (but Churchill did not . surrender and the Vietnamese do not) where is the difference? Between the shredded infants of Spain and the shredded infants of Hanoi? At the time of Guernica, Warsaw, Rotterdam and, Coventry what raised the world's con- science with a sacred horror was the recurrence, by the will of one man and his military advisers, of the most barbarous, the cruelest, the most hor- rifying, the most homicidal means to win a politiqal design. It was the return to Sardanapalus and to Nero ,multiplied by ten, multiplied by a hun- dred. The world fought five years against that, against the incredible return of forgotten practices, that one thought had disappeared forever. America was not the least fierce nor ? .the least sincere in that struggle to establish between nations a minimum of civilized relations. It was AMerlda which by its initiative (the creation of the U.N.) showed most visibly that will of healing. And now it Is Ameriea today that brings back Guernica, War- saw,' Rotterdam?that brings ? us the equivalent of Hiroshima. In order to i make an adversary surrender and to make a political design succeed. , During more than'twent years, how many have' not been able to return , to Germany because they would not !, know what hands would be offered th re to grasp, if those that would be , held out to shake would not be stained' by the blood of the innocent. For a whole people were silenced by Hitler, hid submitted at first, then accepted ,and covered up his crimes. A. cour- ageous resistance had Strtiggled there ) in the 'beginning, a few months and ' then' there was no more resistance. And that is recurring?this time in , : America! There have been without' doubt a few beautiful and courageous , movements of protest, of opposition? 4 but now? One listens closely, but If anything remains it is very weak, and, In spite of the few brave ones still left, they are obliterated in the soft : silence of a consenting population.' And will it happen that we will not be able to shake the hand of one of these Americans as we could no longer shake the hand of a German not So very long ago? But ,if this is true for us what c rt. we do? We weep and I weep, that comforts. You will say to me what else can we do? I don't know, I don't know. Seeing that Russia doesn't dare anything, that China can't, that Europe doesn't virant to, Mr. Nixon and his Pentagon feel themselves all powerful, and this power intoxicates them. They feel they are masters Of the world. They know they can, if they want, do ten times worse than Hitler without risking the same fate, and this .power intoxicates them. And we know that at least for the near future, they will do what they want without anyone opposing it. For the momenti they are content with transposing an entire land' into a lunar landscape and; an entire people Into deadmen from'i out of the Stone Age. And perhaW before having totally arrived to thatl point, they will have in effect, byl means of blood and suffering, Imposedl their political design on Indochina, as Hitler did on the Spanish, the Polish, l, the Dutch. And if that ever happens It will be more horrible. Because the Nero-like shadow of Nixon will hover? over all, of' us ..who will have done. nothing tp have stopped him. And we , will believe we are free when* it will no longer be but the surveillant free- dom of vassals. Vercors is a pen name for JeamBruller,' author and engraver. *This originally. appeared ' In the Frehch paper, U.; Monde., ?. 3 NEW YORK TIMES 11 January 1973 , ffrriisi",7416s heston implied' bicOrriattiiitai:secrakiiy isol State Rogers refused to invite Prancis Sayre, dean of the Washington dithe- to. an official luncheon because the dean had led an antitvar , march to i)he White Nouse. Mr. Rogers says he did not even know Dud Dean 4ayrit 1.parittitxtted in audit it, demenikatton. *Mr, Reit,ott, regret the InTot. is Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 ,,,r7Tr7-7-9,77-77 ' Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 HINDUSTAN TIKES ' January 1973 '.The World. And Vietnam flANOI has been in flame from the nagitious4 bom- bardment by .American air- craft and death-dealing wea- pons. There is no comparison in all history for this kind ef Si vagery in war. Even the eighteen By S. Sharawadiy called Socialist camp, the 'weak kneed mumbling, of the once lou and eloquent non-aligned and th Afro-Asians, and the growing ir- relevance of the United Nation as an instrument of peace and jus tics in the world, the little De- - - Vietnam. The Soviet Union ha d ,rupported this move, but Pekin ? stood adamantly against the idea. Not that the Soviet Union woul a have embarked upon an adventu - roue confrontation with Washing- -ton over Vietnam, (that migh have been welcomed by China) But a minimura of Sino-Sovie unity over Vietnam would have rendered it impossible for Mr Nixon to exploit the Peking-Mos- cow conflict to the extent that he is doing in 'Vietnam. Though Mr ? Brezluiev has spoken out a little more strongly' than Mao or Mr Chou Zn-lai in This crisis, there has not been popular or govern- mental reactions from the Soviet ? Union to fit the outrage that is be- ing perpetrated on Vietnam. Mesmerised Nations Great powers are always moved mainly power The smaller ones need not be. That was the value of the Asian-African land non-aligned nations in the Oast in international relations. Today, however, even this vast interme- diate group is not only amorphous but divided by rivalries and jea- lousies and dominated by paro- chial issues so that they are un- able to express theft protest in unison against what is happening In Vietnam. One recalls how Nehru reacted in 1954 to the crisis in Indo-China and put forward proposals which found acceptance In the Geneva agreem4nts, Times have changed, of course, but what are the other fathers of non-alignment. if ows may use such a phrase, doing in the pre; sent crisis/ Have the non-aligned nations been so mesmerised by the fear of American might that they have not so far concerted any serious efforts to arouse and organise world opinion over this pre-eminent 'moral and political issue of our times? Or, are some or other of this group of nations so pre-occupied with not embar- rassing Washington or Moscow' or Peking that they have considered discretion to be the better part of non-alignment and not audacity which distinguished it in its effec- tive days? Or, is it that some of them find the diplomatic leverage provided by the Sino-Soviet. rift much too valuable In their na- tional interests to do anything for Vietnam that might upset that happy state of affairs? If the Asians, the Africans and he non-aligned are not powerful- ly stirred by the ? then it cannot be expected that g other peoples and governments will be. It concerns Ahem more d vitally than the European and the - American powers. What is involv- ed is the principle of the right of t a small nation to resist dictation . and bullying by a super-power, t apart from the utterly hutnan as- pects of the Vietnam situation. Some of the smaller countries of South East Asia who are Afraid of Hanoi's expansionism and are eagerly trying to play up to Pek- ing or Moscow, or Washington might remember that they have more at stake in this principle than /any other countries in the world. ( One most unfortunate feature of world reaction to the Vietnam cri- ? sia is that Asia has not taken a stand as Asia on this poignant and predominantly Asian issue. The nations of this continent ' have referred to be ruled b mutualfears of their own wee neighbours than of those Great Powers who really pose the poten- tial threat to, their freedoni and " indepeedence. The absence of Asian consultations on Vietnam is conspicuous evidence of this. Aus- tralia and New Zeeland under their new Governments appear to have done a little better in their butspoken stand.e World Opinion The Vietnam lame has es fit evaded the attention of that august international forum, the United Nations. Hitherto one could have argued that intervention by the United Nations would have only complicated the problem rather than helping to solve it None of the parties concerned, in- eluding the Democratic Republic, of Vietnam, was in Savour of tak-. tug the, matter to the United Ne- tons. But had not the moment come, when the world had no other ,c,hofce, fpr a simple and massive demonstration of world public opi- nion against the Amertcan bomb- ings, spontaneously and powerful- ly expressed in the forum -of the UN General Assembly/ day annihilation of Carthage by the Romans was done in a strug- gle between equals and there was perhaps more honour in that carnage than in what has been happening in Vietnam. Salvage Operation 'the Vietnam war is one between the elephant and the ant?between the electro. dynamic -mechanical might of a super-power and the Indomitable will-power of a small undeveloped nation. In the long and dismal history of violent eon- Bleb, it is the nearest one could ? get to the Gandhian type of con- frontation between soul-force and brute-force. And the war is not over any great issue of power or Ideology, but over the pride and prestige of the President of the greatest power on earth. Western t writers have written so much on ;oriental face, ? but has there ever been in history an example of face-saving carried to such .nor- mous and tragic proportions. ? The Americans first went Into Vietnam in what they proclaimed to be a glorious crusade against Communism represented by the Imonolithic Sino-Soviet bloc, though at bottom it was really even then, a dirty -pro-colonial I salvage operation Later when they found that the Soviet Union wee interested in a peaceful set- tlement in Vietnam, they said that ' the crusade was against Chinese Communist expansionism. Later still when they discovered that the Chinese devils were only too eager to parley and make peace with them, they have Come to the conclusion that what they have been fighting against was Vietna- mese Communism and its imperi- alist urge to dominate Indo-China! One may safely predict that soon, and not too late, they will find out that what they have been and are up against is Vietnamese nationalism, passionate and un- conquerable. There in Vietnam, political na- tIonalism has been converted into an incandescent spiritual force. Nothing else can explain the extraordinary fact that after all this overmastering application of military pressure, this callous 'sus- pension of effective supporting action by !ha divided and the so- e am s still fighting valiantly and is bound to. come out of this cruel conflict "bloody but unbowed." World reaction to the resump- tion of bombing of North Vietnam I, a mirror of the temper. of our times. A few years ago there were massive demonstrations and protest marches of youth all over the United States which nearly brought the administration to its knees, at least psychologically. Where are the protest marchers and the flower-children of yes- terday, when today even more horrible and unjustifiable crimes are committed against a heroic people simply because they will not surrender? No doubt the New York Times has made an appeal 'to Americans "in the name of conscience and country" to "speak out for sanity in Washington and peace in Indo-China." But the sad fact of the matter is that American public opinion is a weak reed indeed to lean upon. Once American boys are not ? dying in the battlefields, but only Viebia- opese are massacred from ,the air, there is no swell of humanitarian mass opinion in the United States against the Vietnam war as be- fore. One is forced to question 'fundamentally the liberal core in American life and politics. Supine China ? The behaviour of the rest of the world in this crisis is not very admirable either. The Chinese used to proclaim their unbreak- able solidarity with their Vietna- mese brethren. Their favourite simile for solidarity was "the lip and teeth" relationship between the Chinese and the Vietnamese. Some lip, some teeth!! Certainly, Mao Tse-tung and his great wer- riors of national liberation strug- gles are today doing nothing more than lip-service and even that in a very subdued measure. The root cause of Vietnam's helplessness and the apparent tri- umph of the bullying tactics of President Nixon is the Sino-Soviet conflict and the all-too-supine will. Ingness of China to allow Wash- ington to exploit this split. From 19e5 onwards Hanoi has been ad- t vocating united Socialist action on .Vietnam tragedy. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 11 January 1973 Canadian sadness ? The Canadian Parliament's unanimous resolution deploring the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong was an expression of national sadness over recent devel- opments in Vietnam. All parties in the House of Commons supported the government-sponsored resolution. ? This mark of disapproval of American policy does not constitute a precedent. In 1971 the Canadian House unanimously adopted a resolution condemning the American nuclear test at Amchitka ism land in the Aleutians. ? None of the. Canadian parties has , 16 supported the American administration That might have provided that extra little push necessary to make the parties move on to the final act of settlement in Vietnam, and might also have had the effect of. giving a shot in the arm to the United Nations which ha i been fast becoming a pedestrian debat- ing society where pale bureaucrats from all the corners Of the earth come to perform as Pompotei In- ternational diplomats. over the war in Vietnam, and the Trudeau overnment has privately ex- pressed its regret over continuation of the war to Washington. If the Parliament's Vietnam resolution was no great surprise, its adoption as- sumes greater impact when added to the wave of denunciations of the bombing of Hanoi coming from friends and allies of the United States around the world, and particularly from Europe, and from Aus- tralia.and New Zealand. ? It is part of a worldwide sadness at. 4: seeing a great power like the United States get caught up in a situation where It finds it necessary to use its bombers against civilian centers at a stage in the war when peace seems within its grasp. r? rtl r r IT)T7 IT "rTIr'll*" ij"T o 7717' f Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CI,A-RDP77-0043 ROO 100 6 0 1-, f,,f Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 WASHINGTON POST 14 JANUARY 1973 11;1 ce.t .111,1 By:George P. Kalumn tirtint Ann; f AM SURE,' many besIdei .not; question thle fact: Otteition its tele.. ;`? myself Who:aware of the Inadequacy :vanee; The world ha. no Thal Of truel end' it,bi unreaionable people.' It l I' Own knowledge of rhat iii 'going oh; . e tioC out' tehle4' to put them all in their place, noti Would it: thei :have remained silent thus;far in the face df ' , , be In our powets to ?Alo so And if the argn ' ?? ;the ireneareid:heavy bombln ' ' gs Iii ',Vietnate, ? ment *be that Uhreasoning cruelti 'on their .;ho I., ping that the Peesiciehti and. his advisees Port inatIfies the same on burs r It milt , then ' - i' had some .. , hood reason, Invisible tolis, for; , be. asked: Since !when briiie o a IS kit; eonduct been ..,defined d Intl; UM nbY ( our; JtuPPosing '.that ' these ptheedures Would' ' t t tki ?ti ? ihAe tit Ilik tittleis Of thlbgs littler i Menne . t I; otiotilli stiiii ils wt ha4. :i'i ''', 11;1 ' ,,1 4,1 l' ? '; '; dense Of :011,ain ' 41 ?.: I I' ' . .iltiti .6,4111/4thi, Y,1-:bot: iii:.oftein!'.11& ':vant tt ptiblielY Nit presumably present ii ''ntirilber . Of,; govkntrientol : minda, ? the Or of betg atitised 4t:If "lcising" a war. On ?riders h w itinch real Meaning the terms ' vi, tory'', I tied 'defeat ' . have . in the face. of ' ertit'Oepo it lin contempotary pOlitl. al deVelonie 'te. i' ere- pen be wars . so i, itt rorinsiak t at: the had better ,be "lost," CI, his Mier s ! termi ated,11 than eantihued ti.the Vald Pu . tilt of somethingcalled "vie- 64" ;Gem ,tie Gaulle did not worry about hOte Seniantic sYnibb)s when he wisely put lend 10 the rem ' involvement in ,Algei- ' I ' I , I it 1 . 1 .enk,ohly repe_t W tat I said setreti years 1 . . . 6 In he course of 'a Nil days? testimony bring the 'war to an early Conclusion, Be-j :iand traditionb,that?Otir Obligation lies?tiotibefoie A troubled Settate'Torelgn Relations Yotid this, there wait little,. reason to exPeet. to theirs.: .1 -1., :Cointriiite: that dthere Is more reaped to ? , , ? ? , . 1 that an administration so plainty nncon-; ., We must, It I? cialtnid,! beloyal hi Our 5? tvon,In tihe opinion bf this world by a rest,. ! earned for domeatitt opinion abont the war, Ines. What would the ',World think Of tis if W6 nit 'all etirageous 'liquidation of Unsound 'not to mention the opinion of friends and 'were not? One could, ;perhaps, tinswer thlii: iiositlo s than by the niost stubborn pursuit Well-wisher In other .? parsts of the 'globe,' iwith another question:; What does the world OtextilaVahant or unpromising objectives." would be Uppreelably moved by ? one more think of tit as it 10. 1 11..; ' .' '''I'i ' ; ' ,''' 'L ', : ' 01411164 ;ti great senie ofjutility in stating C i ? ? I 'tritieal Voice, and particularly' that of 'a' pa. i ? But Moro eentral to our .PrObicin I? tile Such Views, One cannot hope, I reiterate, that .litleally inactive 'person, from within thia: lad that our. South Vietnamese "allies!' have they Will effect Abe dispositions of a govern. ;.country, But there are times, and thia,would ialreadY had froth iiii Many titnes!over, all Ment to which solitany more important and ' seem to be 'one of them, When, pip ,has to that any -keiPernMent could rtaionably eal anthorilative critical voices (one need men- make a view known, if for no other reasod .:pect from ..4 political: aasdelitt(' on the ether lion only the unanimous disapproval of the than for the sake of clarity of the record.' ..' Ride of ,the globe; to which most hO added' hombinh by the Canadian House of Corn- ". The adverse effects of these bnirlings are ,the reflection that Waldo help can never be Mons) appear to tnean ad little: One ran i. ,lObvious. A number of arguinents haVe been :effective beyond the, limits &tilled i byhe hope only that they i may serve to remind I 'offered, or' suggested, for their pursuance; 'Vitality .and ? resolution and ,effectIVceess 0( sone of our frlends, In other Countries that 'None of theie argu th ments strikes ina as even' 'e' regime to which it is' addressed: 'I?hh.;th se bomblns; f r, tolch the recent elec. remotely petatiasIve. It Is said that only ,bY, world is well awar6' of what we' have BdtidiltIon! (+HAW did tiot give a mandate, are 'these means can' we bring our adversary ,to for the South, Vietiminest, ; tt, elnea not ie' notHprodendlrig without arousing the deep. engage in serious' negotiation? ,and to accept Hove that aillancei' are an end - in tlierh', est isoti i of unhappiness, and even shame, ti '1,'reasonable" . settlement, tiy which Is selves. Its main concerti, at thit point, Is tO , attiong thoughtful People in this cOuntry, and Meant, mipmently, one which would commit; see OI8. dreary, slaughter brotight profin 03i ? that, there ;hi here; for the future if not for Hanoi to the assormice Or the future. pothi- to a halt.1Vhat it' Would weleettie; onIntlir the hreaeift, Seinething more to build on than: id c ? seenrIty df the snigon regime. . Aside part is not tint continued blindOtirsuitoi IV jtIst' the . Official outlooks, ihd approithes froth the fact that dome of us, Considering obligation 010tidY; aimily intlafled,but Itilli; that have IshaPid Lkmericnn policy, in Met; the nature of Communist regimes generally, iii61.11116141tr.ithiriiilh 46; the lete.eittili! 01 j,ninti at fir 4rsiii ritige Iti rTriig; c;, I as well as the customary twocesses of pond. I' ti(41,1 tot; urns ale d' f '0190 II 0 140 lett I g 6 . cal change In that part of the World, have; pl e. an 'doubted from the start the feasibility of any ' such undertaking. It is hard to believe that little sort of bombing Would In any ease be !adequately conducive to Its achievement. ?, ? If anything has ever been amply,. demons ignited in military experience, it Is the ex treme Inefficiency and relative ineffective. ness fit the strategic bombing weapon as a Means of military and political pressure. If, iii particular, one wishes to influence the be- ?-havior of an adversary at the negotiating till ,ble, the 'bombing of residential centers, Aside frtitn being 'dreadfully offensive to: World btditititi, stirely the most expensiVe ? ; reallY necessary or Us'to make war upon 66! , and unpr.OmisIng way "t? dn. it: it Wittrel North VlettuumekC, Which tnanY of ns OM.; phatIcally dlSbeileic5 then we .allotild iItivC the conviction :and ennsisten& to appli..a. balanced emPloYttient 6t.nli ,branches Of, ?ut conventional armed forces. In the Attempt to' k; achieve -by this "single arm tht aim's' We icon:earned:to. achleVe, there'is a fietlitiusifil icorigrulty of Meana trdI- '4 I 11 :ITIS ARGUED that our opponents,. the. Roiih Vietnamese, are not 'Mee that they are cruel land iinitir841del FdlriRelease Ant gitd tO t1teJ SInughie Z.71, ; NEW YORK TIMES 9 January 1973 i, ,1120 Dutch Celebrities Ask Recall of Envoy to the U.S. is. . AMSTERDAM, the Nether- lands, Jan. 8 (AP)?one hun- dred twenty prominent Dutch scholars, artists, writers, jour- nalists and broadcast person- alities asked today that the Dutch Ambassador In Wash- ington be recalled if the United States did not stbp its partici- pation in'the war in Indochina. In letters to Premier Barend Biesheuvel and to ? the presi- dents of the two chambers of Parliament, they said: ? "As long as the United States, carries on a war in Indochina in which nothing and nobody' Is spared," the, Netherlands should not be represented in Washington at the ambassa- dorial level. ? " , . . . ' LONDON 'I , Jan. group of American religious ? fAP)?A I I figures, appealed to lirtish, churches and politicians t ay to pres the United State for peace .in Indochina. The group,''. headed by0Dr. Harvey Cox, a professor: of theology at Harvard Univerity is . touring Etitopean capkals, including Rome, where it hitpes's to see Pope Pout VI. Tcttlay,-, rd of and vek t the mission saw the fish London, Dr. Rob rt Stop and talked with 'a ritish C cil of Churches representa 17 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 ", T7'1' 777777737171,111 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 WASHINGTON POST 15 JANUARY 1973 Australio-U.S. Viet Raids Rift 1 By H. D. S. Greenway ; I. Wastifoston Post Staff Writer Last week Australia's mark time unions ended a 124ay; boycott of American ship-, ping, which had been im- posed in protest of U.S. Christmas bombing of list;i and American long-, rnhoremen ended their - :counter boycott, which hati-1 tiled up some $20 million Rvorth of Australian goods in. {U.S. ports. The renewed bombing ;Precipitated the closest ;thing to a crisis in Austra- lian-American relations that hilplomats could remember !?but by last week boths ,aides were tying to restore, the atmosphere of good will ,which the two countries have so long enjoyed. 1 Three ministers in Austra- Ha's new Labor government, which came to power last Month after 23 years in op- position, had publicly criti-- Icized U.S. bombing policy. 1Tom Uren, .Australia's new ttninister .for urban and re- gional development, accused President Nixon of "arro- gance and hypocrisy." I In the United States,' where the Australians had been hoping to get; in on a ' bonanza created by a tempo- rary increase in the import' quote for dried milk, it was announced on Dec. 30 that the increased imports would be bought on a first-come- , &et-serve basis only until' Feb. 15. Since it 'takes about six . weeks to ship goods from 4 Australia to the United j States, the ruling seemed tailor-made bY the Nixon ad- ministration to shut the Australians out. The State Department, however, went out of its way to play down the difficulties. ;The State Department's of& dal spokeman was in- structed to express only .! "concern," rather than pro- test over the boycott, and he iipoke of the long and I "exceedingly close" relation- Ships between Australia and the United States that was based on "respect and even ! itdmiration" between the, two two conntrles. Last reek Australia's new prime minister, Gough Whit.? lam, also went out of his ! way to 'disassociate himself; from personal attacks onj President Nixon, and said that had it not been for the renewed bombing, "relations between the present Austra- lian government and the :United States government . would be better than they, ' have ever been since the 'Second World War." Beyond the bombing and, the boycott, there were .clear indications that Aus- trails was planning 'a new j and more independent role,i .in world affairs. ? Since the Labor govern'? snent came to power in De- cember, Australia has ended', , conscription', pulled torn-1 .pletely out of the Vietnam., war and cut off all military; aid to both South Vietnam find Cambodia. ? Prime Minister Whitram also said that the Austraii'aitj 'battalion of troops in Singe. pore would not be replaced *hen it becomes due for ro- !teflon at the end of 1973. The troops are there under, a ,five-power defense agree? ment between Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Sin.' gapore and Malaysia. Whitlam left his optiona open, however, and 'said's, nothing about the Austra- lian squadron of Mirage jets ,in Malaysia. On the diplomatic front the new government has recognized China and ended: relations with Taiwan, rec- ognized East Germany and taken a much tougher stand: against Rhodesia in the United Nations. But when Australia's am- bassador, Sir James Plim- loll, returned here last week from consultations with the: new Australian government, he told Secretary of State , William P. Rogers that the "Anzus" defense treaty be- tween Australia, New Zea- land and the United States I still remains the corner. , stone of Australia's defense planning, and that the new government had no immedi- ate plans- for withdrawing' from the now moribund Southeast Asia Treaty Or- ganization. There have been two dis- tinct periods in Australian' foreign policy since the Aus- tralian states were feder- ated in 1901, and the coming to power of the Labor Party last month may signal the beginning of a third. The first dates from April 25, 1915 when Australian and New Zealand forces' landed on the Gallipoli pen-' Insula of Turkey as part of the allied Dardenelles cam- paign in World War I. The date, "Anzac Day," is a na- tional holiday in Australia. The campaign ended up a disaster for the allies, but ,the Australians and New Zealanders fought well and, as in the case of the Light ? Brigade in the Crimea and, Dulikirk in World War II, ? :plucky defeats are often. I found more worthy of com- memoration than /here vie.' tory. To Australians, participa- tion in World War I meant coming of age in world af- fairs. But foreign policy was still closely linked to Brillsh policy. Thus when World War ir ,broke out in Europe, Austra- lia sent her divisions to 'the iNorth African desert to 'fight alongside the British. With the coming of thej Pacific war and the fall of Singapore, Australia found 'herself with her armies half! j-a, world away and the mill- tary might of Japan sweep-, j.Ing down upon her. I' Against Winston Church.: lira wishes, Australia or, dered her troops home. The, :Battle of the Coral Sea in' !May, 1942, marked the be.' :ginning of a new era in Aus- tralian foreign policy. In that battle, American ; naval air power turned back the Japanese fleet off the Queensland Coast, and Aus- 4tralia decided then and there that her best defense lay in the closest possible al- liance with the United States. It 'hae been said that Pres- "dent Lyndon B. Johnson - collected on the Coral Sea debt when he asked Austxa.. 18 Eases Ha to join in his Vietnam enterprise. But at the time, there was popular support' Ifor the Vietnam war in Aug,' tralia. ' In the early 1960s Austra- lia had been watching the 'growing Communist influ.' ?ence in Indonesia?Austral la's closest neighbor with 10 times her population. Thel .Peking-Djakarta axis had; Convinced Australia thatl Asian communism was a d1-1 rect threat. Mr. Johnson was a popue? Pltir figure in Australia, and; his visit in 1966 was greeted. }with more' popular enthu., ,arasm than most royal visits., ' The most unpopular as-, pect of the Vietnam war for Australians was conscription.; Until. Vietnam, Australia! had never drafted soldiers,' to fight overseas, not even In both World Wars. Ps J33, the mid '60s, horever,1 4115 Indonesian Communists !bad been crushed by the In- donesian army, and Indone. ala has maintained a pro- , Western neutrality ever t since. ; The dragon of monolithic' communism that the United States and Australia ; thought so menacing is no 'longer apparent. The Soviet split has replaced the !Cold War as the dominant- ibig,,poiver sonfrontation in A s ia In the 1970s Australian foreign policy will no longer, so closely follow Washing., ton's lead, but Australia's new independence merely' reflects new realities in 'Asia. The measures that theft new Labor government hasi 'taken so far are basically in line with the Nixon Doctrine' and new age of detente. : The, 'renewed bombing Ot Hanoi clearly 'offended pub-, lic opinion in Australia, as it did in malty ether countries.1 'But in the long haul Wash.: ington hopes Australia 'will, remain, as James Miehener ,wrote 20 years ego, "an ally', that can be trusted, a Wen- did people that can be eet lied upon." Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA:R61:77F0043?ii-007017:0661i076011,1d7r !) Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 6 January ,1973 Ameriarts. aid for Hanoi ihospital: unique' By Trudy Rubin ? Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor ? ? Boston: ? The recently announced campaign by U.S, antiwar activists to raise $3 million to rebuild , the shattered Bach Mai Hospital in Hanoi is; 1? the latest and most dramatic episode in' a ' small but growing phenomenon: Sending humanitarian aid by American ; organizations to a country with which the : United States is engaged in battle. Moreover, some of this aid has been officially licensed by the United States. Treasury Department with the approval of f the State Department, Department of De- fense, and the White House, creating a Situation \vithout known precedent, accord- ; ing to Treasury and other government 1 sources. \ , 1, , These sources make quite .clear that the major purpose of granting the licenses is the ? hope of gaining information on prisoners of war via the organizations transporting the aid ? mainly medical supplies ? into North yietnam. 890,000 in equipment The Bach Mai campaign is being run by , i Medical Aid to Indo-China (MAI), A Cam- , bridge, Mass,-based group formed about 18 months ago by a group of Boston doctors, ( \ health workers, and antiwar activists to send medical supplies to the civilian health ser-1 vices of North Vietnam and the Communist.' I controlled areas of South Vietnam, Cam- bodia, and Laos. MAI says it has sent nearly $90,000 of ? equipment *to these areas,' including pace- ' makers and electrocardiograph machines. MAI requested information from the Trea- sury Department on licenses, but never , applied for them, and has sent its material ; without them. ? This renders the group. liable for prose-' cution under the 1917 Trading With the + -Enemy Act. (There has been noindication of, possible prosecution, but MAI sources say 1 the Department of Commerce has requested specific details about two shipments of ! American-made medical supplies to North Vietnam.) $3 million sought MAI hopes to raise $3 million to rebuild Bach Mai, including more than $250,000 raised over the past two weeks. But the . spokesmen also say no decision has been ? reached about applying for licenses for the , Bach Mai materials. The other principal group sending medical , supplies, however, has applied for, and been granted, three licenses totaling $115,000 by . the Treasury and Commerce Departments * (one in 1969, two in 1971, and a renewal in 1972), after being refused a license in 1968.: . (Treasury issues license8. for monetary re- tnittaneee to hostile countries: ,Commerce. issues them for American-made goods.) The American Friends Service Committee? (Quaker), with h tradition of humaitarian giving on both sides of a conflict that includes, the Spanish Civil War and the Chinese civil, war, has delivered open-heart-surgery mate- rials and electrocardiographs to the Viet Duo hospital in Hanoi and to the North Vietnam- ese Red Cross Society. (The AFSC also runs a rehabilitation center in South Vietnam.) Funneling via Geneva In addition, the United Presbyterian '1 Church and the Episcopal Church of Amer- ica have begun fund drives, starting in latil 1972, specifically aimed at medical aid for Nprth Vietnam. This money, in addition to funds raised by the National Council of Churches, is funneled , through the Geneva-based World Council of Churches, thus avoiding the need for U.S. ,) licenses. The U.S. contribution since 1965 by the National Council has amounted to $75,000; the Presbyterians in their 1972 drive have so ? far raised $18,000; and the Episcopalians, : $1,000 so far. i? A combination of striiigent U.S. regulations and lack of access to Germany made humani- tarian giving impossible during World War I II, while North Korea, according to State ' Department sources, would not' grant access. to U.S, voluntary agencies during the Korean 'war. ? 'Two conditions posed Granting licenses during the current con- , filet, however, is not without some ostrings, ? which MAI has so far declined to accept. j According to Stanley Summerfield, acting ,! director of the Foreign Assets Control Pro- !,? gram of the Treasury Department, which ? ; licenses remittances to North Vietnam (with specific time and dollar limits), the basic requirements are two: First licenses are issued on a "huma:nitar; ian basis," he says, provided there is "satis- factory assurance that an impartial observer ' will be able to witness the distribution" of the supplies. The second request (Mr. Summerfield says that"requirement is not the correct word ? ;-'it might be a hope") is that "the shipment 1 will increase our information about the', POWs." He adds' vigorously, "We're non 'interested in helping North Vietnam for the. sake of helping North Vietnam. We want something out of it." Only AFSC has applied ; So far only the AFSC has applied for a; North Vietnam license. Mr. Summerfield declined to comment on whether a license : might be granted if applied for to a group like ' MAI, which identifies itself more openly with the North Vietnamese cause. "I would have to look at the case," he said. Until 1971 the Quakers carried letters for POWs on their visits with the knowledge of the State Department. But since the forma.' tion of the New York-based Committee of. Liaison, the antiwar group that is recognized Approved For Release 2001/408/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 ' 191 1.7,71 r .../ . , Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 by the North Vietnamese as the only U.S.. group dealing with POWs, they have ceithed ;. to carry mail. L. Though some antiwar groups argue, as do Some Quakers, that there should be no cooperation with the U.S. Ooverninent . sending humanitarian aid, Martin Teitel, Asian program director of the AFSC, says, "We think we can withstand being co-opted by the State Department." Attempting to witness deliveries has " proved troublesome to some would-be donors who say the North Vietnamese have been reluctant to allow Americans to accompany THIS ECONOMIST JANUARY 6, 1973 \ the donated supplies. According to Mr. Tel tel, the Quakers were refused permission to . 'accompany their first ? unlicensed ? ship- ment to. National Liberation Front territory. ' 9 ? But since then they have insisted success:; .fully ? as part of their emphasis on "a ? concern for people" ? that they send Quaker. representatives ?yith their medical supplies to Hanoi. North . Vietnamese Objections, he says, centered on claims that it would be too ' dangerous' for ciVilians to accompany the goods. The cost of the bombing They say that it takes between 50 and 6o of the Russian-made Sam-2 rockets to hit one or the high-flying B-52 bombers that the Americans are still sending from Guam and northern 'Thailand to attack North Vietnam. If 'so, Hanoi must now have better air 'defences than most other capitals, since American losses during the raids north of the 20th parallel, which were called 'off last Saturday, came as a shock to the Pentagon. According to American official figures, the North Vietnamese knocked out 15 B-52s' and a further six or seven are said to have been made unflightworthy. Whether these figures are entirely ? reliable is open to doubt; American ' spokesmen fumbled their statistics several times after the bombing of Hanoi began on December 18th. Hanoi 'radio claims that 81 American aircraft /were brought down over Hanoi and ',Haiphong between December 18th and December 29th, of which 34 were B-52s. 'Those figures should be taken with an even bigger pinch of salt. But the financial cost to the Americans is not to be sneezed at, since the B-52s cost about ?.3m apiece. And it has /now been established that they are no longer invulnerable in the skies over Indo- china. Nor, it seems, are they particularly accurate. It is hard to gauge the effects of the missions flown over Hanoi and Haiphong, since Pentagon sources have been reticent and the only reasonably objective sources in Hanoi were the reporters of the Agence France Presse. But the B-52s were apparently not 'accurate enough to single out their "strategic targets" (mostly, communi- cations and supply centres such as warehouses and port facilities) without inflicting serious damage on residential areas and civilian installations such as the Bach-Mai hospital, which is repor- ted to have been completely destroyed during the attack on the neighbouring airfield, or the embassies not far from the main fuel depot, which was also destroyed. Instead of using the remote-control- led "smart bombs,", the Americans appear to have relied mainly on carpet. pattern bombing. Under these condi- tions, it was inevitable that many NEW YORK TIMES 15 January 1973 While Thousands Weep. .By Anthony Lewis PARIS?In the Vietnamese way, his voice remained soft and conversational i despite the emotion of his thoughts. "This time something has to change," Ihe said. "There has. been too much suffering?now there must be recon- ciliation. The people in Saigon see it, the Provisional Revolutionary Govern- ment sees it, Hanoi sees it. They have , . all. suffered. If the Vietnamese do not , reconcile themselves, the Americans ? can do nothing for real peace no , matter how long they stay." , It was one of Paris' many Viet- - ,namese poIlocat exiles speaking: Ho iThong Minh, minister of defense In Ngo Diem'S first Government, , way back in 1954-55. He resigned because, as he puts it, "I found that Diem was a backward, reactiOnary man, and saw no hope for Vietnam." He slipped out of Saigon, past Diem's security men, and came to Paris. In his person Ho Thong reflects the tragedy of his country and of Amer- ica's involvement in it. His aim is the ' one that Vietnatnese political. figures ' of all views avow: an independent . Vietnam, free of foreign control. But, la a lifetime of working with this force, And that he has not found the means to the end. . He was 19 years old, in 1939, when' he first joined the struggle against the , colonial French. After World War Ft, when the French returned, he was og. civilian casualties would result, as Pentagon spokesman conceded just after Christmas. The only estimate of total civilian casualties provided so far 'came frort/ the director of a' Hanoi hospital, who claimed that, on average, 200 civilians had been killed and ,200? injured during each day of. the 'raids north of the 20th parallel. The North Vietnamese also say that during the 12 days, 1,318 people died in Hanoi alone. These raids were suspended on December 3oth, and on New Year's Day the North Vietnamese announced that they were ready to return to high- level peace talks with the Americans. President Nixon's decision to suspend the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong was probably influenced both by the protests from many prominent Euro- peans and by the declaration from the North Vietnamese that they would not resume talks?even at a purely techni- cal level?uniil the raids were stopped. Mr Kissinger is expected to meet Le Duc Tho in Paris next week. The military effects of the Hanoi raids will be tested only in the event of a new communist offensive in the south, but American official sources have suggested privately that their cumulative effect had been to set the country back two years. On Tuesday the communist daily Nhan Dan urged the evacuation of the cities by all North Vietnamese whose services were not "essential to combat or production." , But North Vietnam's arms and ammunition, and an increasing propor? lion of its food, are brought in from Russia ? and China. So the destruction' of local industry will count far less than the American attempts to stop supplies'' being shipped in by planting m13re mines in Haiphong' harbour, and to stop supplies reaching the North Vietnamesb troops. in,' South' Vietnath by 'disrupting! land tommunic.aticmsg ? - , ? the general Oaf? of the resistance, movement in the far south of Viet- nam. But he found "the Communists wanted to take all power for them- selves," so .he left the movement for? civilian life as an engineer. Diem 'made him deputy defense. minister In 1954. After a month, he, says, "The Americans. urged Diem to: I Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDF'77-00432R0001000b0001;20 APproved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 e7"put me in full charge; 'arid he did.",,' ' So there is special Ire* in what has 1 ?the Tee offensive started, he Was put- , in jail and kept there untilhe went oni 'happened to his view of the United ? ? ' States. ': ? ' : . - - - ? - ? ? . ; : a hunger 'strike two months later. ' rr ' "In 1954,". Minh says, "I had greatl - - 1 ? ,',hope in America?a great anticolonial : ''';'? . Today, like so many of the exiles in: country.' But as time went on, I saw, ' Paris, he is In the middle. He is one of i'.that that was not so. j i ? the ?neutralists who might be serving .? .. ... '..e i. "In Washington in'1993 one of your j i. now with Saigon and P.R.G. members ... neutralist Vietnamese politiCiatis 'If .. generals told me that all the ? Amer!- ' ,,,. in the Council of National Reconcilia- Paris. They are naturally appealing to ... ',? ? 'cans would be out of Vietnam by the: :, ition if President Nixon had carried out ? Americans, who mostly dislike the'' f ' -gbt ;end of 1965.. Then in 1965,,the day the t. the terms negotiated by Henry Kissin; extremist politics of ideology and . , ?',first American bombs fell : on. North , ger, last October. ? for the middle .of the road. But there', , ., ; !t. is no . middle . of the road in Vietnam . il Vietnam, I heard that the Pentagon . '' "Certainly the people of South Viet-. , - ? noW. .? , f( said they would be on their knees in ? "'tam do- not want 'Communism," he ei six or eight weeks. But I knew that says, "but neither do they want an . .,... The American Government decided I'long ago to oppose' any move toward would not be so, then or ever. 'army dictatorship. Our way. of life has ; ' 'After that my confidence: in the. ,:., neutralism or political accommodation drifted from our origins. We must' be -. ' Americans went. I told my friends ..more -ourselves.. We cannot ' live an in South Vietnam, staking all on the: , that ,we, would have to do it, by our- '. 'American way- of. life.. :?. .. $ , survival of.Nguyen Van Thieu and his "'autocracy.It id so not fon the sake of; , selves." ? . , ., ."It- all tells in ,our economic lin& . the Vietnamese #but out of concern for, 'lib Thong Minh has made one ,visit military d 'social . ... ' anstrength. The occi-? its own face. That is why the destruc=i Ito Saigon Since 1955, in 1968` The ,'' ;dental eye looks at us now and says ? ? , tion has hail to go on for so long,1 ' thieu Government allowed him' 1h":' that' ? ' Saigon can stand lup against the because his father had. died. But when! , North. But it is. a strength from out- ' side?artificial." ?, ? ! ' lie believes that only a "third-force ? t Government" led by neutrals can save ' South Vietnam from more suffering, lie says, "The only way to have peace. peace there may be Is not likely WI ? f in Southeast . Asia, is reconciliation `Create Ho 'Thong Minks vision *of til : among the Vietnamese ?first in the ? reconciled Vietnitin, free 'cif, sufferInt -. South, then between South and North.", at lat.. , AT HOME ABROAD The 'way to peace ? ...? is reconciliation of the Vietnamese. 'DAILY TELEGRAPH, London I5 January 1973 ' 'PETER GILL, in Saigon, 'consequences of America's ?1311,ESpENT bombing:' offensive against the Indus- trial heartland of North Vietnam rapidly achieved its dip- Monistic purpose. When Hanoi last Nteek signalled its willingness to North and South. ? s .? Now thd signs' that a cease-fire may really be at hand. The decision isl up to Richard. Nixon,, and this time the approach, of Inauguration pay ,may, concentrate his mind. Biit whatever ,return to the conference table in :Paris, the United States was satis- iltlieC1 that. this time the Vietnamese ,CtintrritiniSt leadership was in earnest. . What remains at issue after the , 10-day air war over the Red River Ideltd is.. whether the destruction lhaN.inaterially altered the political 4 and Military balance between the Communists and their opponents in. Vietnam itself1., ? ' In, strict , military terms, the :tobjective Of' the catnnaign was ;Clear.' From April to October last . 1Yeat',1 Aitierltari? ' fighter-bombers qMpried with electrOnichlly guided tombs' were 'sent into ?North Viet-, main to destroy bridges, sever pipe- lines and cut irailway, lines. On ,occasions. they, , took on larger Itnilitary, Installations; .But when Mr Nixon. ordered the resumption,: Of ,; bombing north of the ? 20th parallel ;on :.Pec. 18; ?? American iebmmaiiders, in. Saigon Were told ,td",,? :deploy. ,. more than ? half 'America's ,entire strategic bomber ;Orce.againSt the intractable North ? ietnameSe. ; . ? ? was a decision entirelyin keep-, ing with a..long---some.,would say igreatrrAmerican Presidential tradi- tion.,.. President Truman ordered the dropping of. the ,atom bomb _os? Approved For R ? - 'It Is always iso gad to meet the ?? considers the political anil military air raids on North Vietnam Has the 13-52 41 bought .'peace? .... ... the japan- , around the world 'Was itself ifonic.'1" 9 two. Japanese cities, and the Japan- '' There is strong evidence to indicate:, pse 'Surrendered: President Eisen- that the campaign was in I face hewer ordered intensified bombing. planned :from llit beginning to end , of 'North Korea 'to include the when it did because there was then I dykes, ? and a, ' , ceasefire was: nothing else of military t. con-1 arranged: Mr Nixon' himself' sequence to hit.. , . , .. ,. i 'Ii . .. , ordered' the mining of NOrth.Viet- . - The' NOrth Vittnarriese leader-1 riamese harbours last May, and the ? ship reacted predictably -to the re-I Communist spring offensive against, hewed bombing, as ?Well as to its1 the South was at least slowed down., ctssation. , They. fulminated against:. This time, formetionS of green-:. American "terror.", They vowed-`i 'and-brown B-52 bombers, originally never to be bombed into submiSsion.1 bUilt to deliver the . atom bomb, and finally laid .claim to ".a? victory,, flew against targets within a mile of strategicisignifiCance in forcingii, 'or so, of the centre of , Hanoi and , America to call off its boniberS for k Oyer Haiphong and Other cities. . , fear of invitin?g'unacceptable losses.,' They struck at *marshalling yards, ', Much of this can be dismissed as; ,docks, power plants, radio trans- propaganda, It is, for instance,it ntitters barracks and airfields?the, certain that American commanders.i 'very vitals of an apparently already, i . . . .Sagging War economy. '' anticipated considerable losses in ! "To . witneSs a 1315Z raid," a re- the B-52 force, and that sending , cent 'American university 'study of ., more than 70 professional airmen:A the Indo-China air war .coolly ob- ; _to their death or to internment in 1, :served, " is to. WitneSs.,a: disaster ., Communist prisoner-of-war camps' of major proportions."," '. ;1 '.was considered' a risk worth taking.: When the bombing stopped lase' ,The real outcome of the bombing7 Saturday, morning, North Vietnam's i r-victory, 'defeat 'or continuing industrial and conventional military, i. stalemate?will , be gauged. only .1 capacity .lay in ruins. The relief from the fine print of the document i , that finally emerr from he B i *IA 20068* htbabef-gufittitib tlibb6to which begin: "I`194' 'Ir.:71.117FrifTrn. t'r Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 Itgain. on Monday. ? But it Is quit el !possible that the North Vietnaraese ! !claim to be in the stronger bargain- : 4ng position will be vindicated. '\ ? ? ' 1, The public stance of the Hairi leadership continues to be that !America should sign a peace agree- . me pt on the terms?unfavourable ': to the ? Saigon Government ? .! ,!ori inally worked' out last October.? Washington now considers these : :terms neither fair nor just, and.. ? threatens that renewed persistence ;on, Hanoi's part will be met by 'renewed bombing of Hanoi and , Haiphong. But that threat appears- Ancreasingly hollow; and, if imple- 'Inented, would certainly be difficult .. 'to., justify in military terms. ' The privately-stated view of the . ' American command in Saigon is : ;that the bombing over Christmas' !,set North Vietnam back two years, and that there is no chance of the' ?North mounting any major ? offen- sive against the South for months. 1, ,..., Washington has stuck 'to,' the . .view that bombing waa a military !necessity and that the raids were not punitive. Facts of war Mr Nixon is !also aware, ,of the 'huge civilian 'casualties involved in sending heavy- bombers over densely-populated areas. , That Ithey are not intentional is a fact: but they .are also inevitable. The euphemisms employed. among !American officers in- Saigon bear leloquent testament to this. To !kill civilians is unacceptable: but !i, 4 collateral damage" ? or, in .''the case of B-52s,?? "circular error ,probable," are facts of war. ! . So when Dr Kissinger sits dosVit ?on Monday in Paris with Mr, ilDue Tho to settle, the remaining,, issues preventing peace in Vietnam, ,he will not be. a victor facing the, THE ECONOMIST DECEMBER 2, 1972 Camb odia The new force 1.1tilesS Mr Nikon it't indeed prepared to use yet more ?! frightful' weapbris .of war to, force! Cat settlernetit; and hid, action's? far ?is mild in' comparison 'with allied t' enenty air -tactics in.* the" 'Second World War, ! America.' caitl incite eaSily be cast in the role, ail ' the .enthained and impotent giant,,,,i It is" this View 'of, things that is! r: spPertnost in the ',Mind of saigta Iiifficiala. President Thieu of. South '?Vietnam was kept, closely informed the' developing, ,air offensive! against the North; but there. is little evidence to suggest that he was :particularly impressed by the likely:, !political outcome.. r In his ,New Year messages to diplomats in' Saigon 'and to people, there' was no reference to the bombing having, brought a favourable peace any nearer. The old objections remain: that the North Vietnamese stould withdraw their "300,000 troops" from the South befOre an honourable peace can be concluded and that a cease ? fire "in place," leaving the North Vietnamese invaders in occupation. of parts of the South,' can, at best ! be considered a temporary affair;' A few weeks before the bomb.' ing began over Hanoi ? and Haiphong, the Americans com- pleted a frantic programme tqi ship fresh war supplieS to Saigon.1 They included .400 M-41 andi M-48 tanks, 350,: warplanes' and more than 30 Hrcules trans-, ? port aircraft, With an air force of more than: 2,000 aireraft, Southl Vietnam now has' the doubtful ?tinction of being. an Asian' super-- Power. p ' Then came the bombing. In 101 days of, air raids North . Vietnam's', .'capacity tti wage' conventional War I was destroyed. In Western terms,,, :.and that is' the rub, ?Hanoi could. FROM OUR INDOCHINA CORRESPONDENT ! Whatever the North Vietnamese have -done, or failed to do, in South Viet- nam this year, they have certainly managed to organise a genuine local insurgency in Cambodia. A year ago the Cambodian government could I argue with some justification that ! Cambodia's troubles would fade away when the Vietnamese communists withdrew from the country. It is now accepted, however, that most of the fighting on . the roads leading into Phnom Penh since the late summer has been the work of communist-led Cam- bodian guerrillas. The North Vietnamese seem to have decided to build up the Khmer Rouge forces, and help them to acquire more territory, during the rainy season., in the -summer and autumn of 1971. This -may have been connected with the 'offensive they were planning in !lin longer be consider?d '1 mI1itai power. But the coming battles in4 7 South Vietnam will not be fought, !!?in Western terms. A Communist' assassin ? or his' Government counterpart does not need the backing of an industrialised Power to do his work. Political indoot trination teams?on both sides?' need only, an ideology and: w1111', power.. ? The Communists have already demonstrated their greater, strength in both fields. If South Vietnam 'is' obliged -W continue the ground war, its. numerical superiority in the field will count for little. Even a one- million-man Army, supported, by its . own armour and aiecraft, can, be paralysed by a large and deter-. mined ?giierrilla 'force. The North Vietstamese aftd their Viet Cong allies, in the South, who un- r? wisely chose last March to launclt a convehtional war, cart just easily, revert, to the guerrilla' tactics 'which have cost South Viet- nam dear in the past. ' ' ; !' I . A South Vietnam snider predOrniS! nantly military,leadership remaing, afraid of the consequences peace?and snore wary Still? after) the bombing,' of 'AmeriEa's ness to impose al unfavourable' ' agreernent on her. ! ? ? ? Thicu ,Beltictantly, Presidentf ',probahly follow his ? ally into' a peace of Ameriean Manufacture: "But he will know that the bombingl ,of the North 'and the' arms ?pJ i:plies to the'Sotith have dont MU& to shore up his regime.; 'They ikilV haVe.' simply, and perhaps 'finally, t, demonstrated two basiefattS about' the current lphak of the Yitttiaiiii .rwar: that 'America rernainsfor the being :the moit' paroierful: r.nation directly 'involved in the 'cetri:!1 flict ,and. that?she no longef Min& 'to be' a: party to it. Vietnam for 1972, Which was -going to use most of their own troops in Cambodia. Anyway, by late this summer intelligence reports put the Khmer Rouge's strength at 40,000 men ?not all front-line soldiers, but including 40 to 6o battalions of 200 or more men each, with Cambodian commanders. The big question is whether these amount !to an organised movement. Certainly the rebels in the maquis got there by very different routes. The majority are probably peasants impressed by the North -Vietnamese as coolies. Others are remnants of the old anti-Sihanouk Khmer Rouges. There are villagers who took to arms after suffering at the hands of the South Vietnamese army, and some common or garden bandits. But the available intelligence points to North Vietnamese-trained communists as, the chief force among the guerrillas. Since Prince Sihanouk's overthrow in 1970 some 2,000-3,000 of these men 22' ?,?? have come back from North Vietnam, where they went in 1954 or soon after. wards. They and like-minded later converts, including some intellectuals who rebelled against Prince Sihanouk, together with the North -Vietnamese, have organised the aggressive Khmer Rouge units that went into action this summer. It is hard to get a clear idea of how much of the country they control. Much of Cambodia is no man's land, and has been for two years. But there is evidence from some areas of well organised villages with their own home guard. The relationship between the Cambodian guerrillas and the North Vietnamese will be very important if there is a ceasefire in Vietnam. Will North Vietnam want the guerrillas to ? stop fighting and try for a compromise, political sdlution, with or. without Sihanouk? They are a new factor in - the situation, which the Cambodian government cannot ignore. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432140001000600014) Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 THE SUNDAY STAR' 'and DAILY NEWS ysioshington, D. C., January 14, 1973 litzkrieg in Southeast By I. F. STONE ,1 election victory is still bright, President Nixon has show n that he knows the opportunity Is Almost everything Nixon has done since his thpro ire-election, whether at home or abroad, in small ' ? ways as well as large, fits the portrait of a crafty, new faces in what old agencies? The suspicious and vindictive man: Isolated and dis- trustful of those around him, and with that touch roller coaster, leading casualty of the Great (of megalomania virtually inescapable when one ! Conglomerate Bubble of the Sixties, to ovemee sits at the buttons which can unleash thermo- .through OMB (Office of ManageMent and the , :nuclear thunderbolts. Budget) the biggest conglomerate in the world." The real probldm, as the coming weeks will t the U ?S ? government? 'Make clearer, is not just to ,disengage America The shift of Nixon's sharpest cost-cutter, "Cap the Knife" Weinberger, 'to HEW, where he': from Southeast Asia but from the increasingly can pare social welfare, and of the administra- one-man rule of Richard N17(on. He can undo t with one plunge of his bombers months of slow ion's softest liberal patsy Richardson to the progress toward detente. He can unite the world ,Pentagon, where he can front for the $4 billion against us in hate and fear.. increase already announced in military expendi- ' tures? ? ? # HOW RAPIDLY the scene has changed! It t The replacement at Commerce of the admin-,. was only seven days before Nixon ordered the ,istration's ablest new figure Peterson by a non-'? .B-52s over Hanoi?hut it seems a vanished age? entity out of Southern textiles? The packing of when Sen. Edward Kennedy told a Los Angeles sub-Cabinet jobs with plastic men out of the', 'audience, "There is more good will in Congress. White House staff, all tried and true one-dimen-1 now toward Mr. Nixon than perhaps at any sionals? - time in his career" and offered Democratic co- Neither in the reshufflings nor in Nixon's ) t operation "in launching a new and effective era rhetorical inanities about the Protestant work of progress. . . ." ethic was 'anything visible but an effort to rein- ? A day later, six days before the bombing be- stitute for the Seventies a Coolidge-type govern", gan, Sen. Humphrey told a Washington press. meat inadequ'ate even a half century, ago, as ! conference on his return from a 15-day trip to the stock market crash of 1929 proftd. " Moscow, Warsaw, Bonn, and London that no; ,? How easily Nixon could have kepb the Demo-' where had he been' asked a single question about crats quiet. If only he had proceeded softly, it Vietnam?except by one stray American reporter. he hadn't?in his own favorite phrase?blown ? The . absence of questions even then indi- his cool and resumed the bombings of Hanoi and cated an appalling absence of astuteness on the' ; Haiphong. Thanks to the B52s, that proved the ,part of Humphrey and his interlocutors. He had' shortest era of good feeling in American politics.;1 had three hours with Kosygin in Moscow, and ? talked with Prime Minister Jaroszewicz in War- THE BOMBING ENDED with the strangest , saw, Willy Brandt and his rival Barzel in Bonn," ' White House press conference of all time. What and both Heath and Harold Wilson in London; the' newspapers failed to explain is that the That none of them asked about Vietnam shows presidential announcement for which correspon- 'how easily taken in they were. So was Teddy Ken- dents were hurriedly summoned to the White, ?nedy with his lightheaded reference in his Los House Saturday morning, Dec. 30, never men- , Angeles speech, "Now that peace is near in Indo.' tioned the end of the bombing. This came out j 'china . . . America as a nation has a new hori- bnly in response to questions from startled cor- zon of unparalleled opportunity." respondents. Only readers of the New York Times, which ran the transcript, could realize:4 In a world that spends billions on intelligence, these statesmen don't even seem to read the this. The announcement by Oerald Warren, the I 'newspapers. They had only to skim the Wash- deputy presidential press secretary, simply said: ington dispatches of the past few months to see "The President has asked me to announce .1 ? that the U.S. has been making long-term military this morning that negotiations between presi- , and economic aid commitmeas to South Viet- Aleatial adviser Dr. Kissinger and special adviser nam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand, and that, Le Due Tho, and Minister Xuan Thuy, will be '1 American air and seapower were being repos', resumed in Paris on Jan. 8. Technical talks be-1 tioned for . intervention from Thal bases and by ? tween the experts of the two sides will be re. the Seventh Fleet. Preparatons for a new and sumed on Jan. 2. That is the extent of the an-1- 'prolonged stage of Nixon Doctrine warfare were + ? ammcement." already visible even before the renewed bomb- Nothing was said about any suspension of the bombing. The very first question seemed to 4, THE MYOPIA is not limited to foreign policy, assume that, since no stoppage had been an- Kennedy's references to the domestic front in that nounced, it must be going on? same Los Angeles speech were downright school- Q. "Senator Saxbe has said and been quoted girl gushy. "We can find new directions for old quite widely that the President 'appears to have approaches," he said, whatever that means. "Al- left his senses.' And he described the sort of ready bringing' new faces into old agencies, at bombing going on in Hanoi as an act of 'arm . time *hen the glow a his -almost Incredible,. gance and Irresponsibility.' Gerry, can you reply , Approved For Release 200148107 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 7?.`;r1, ,f? 7717777-777 7171F Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 to that? Is there any eaction from the Presi--Z,1 ' dent?" A. "No, I wouldn't reply to that." .It was only then that somebody though to ask the 'question and drew these stingy responses? i) Q. "Will there be a halt to the bombing of ? North Vietnam?" A. "The President has ordered that all bomb- ing will be discontinued above the 20th Parallel 1, ' as long as serious negotiations are underway." `1 Q. "Effective when?" A. "I can't discuss ,the timing of military operations." Q. "Are we bombing right now, this minute?" , A. "I really can't discuss military operations from here." The press was still in the dark, and tried a f- new tack? Q. "Did you say 'effective negotiations'?" A. "No, 'serious negotiations.', " Q. "You are implying then that it wouldn't halt until they actually start and we decide that ); they are serious?" , To, this' Mr. Warren finally replied, "No, aS soon as it was clear that serious negotiations could be resumed at both the technical level and between the principals, the President ordered that all bombing be discontinued above the 20th Parallel." But the sparring continued, and after t three more questions and answers we had this? r rs Q. "Se the order has been made. In other I words the bombing halt is in effect?" A. "The order has been made." ? * * * * ? ' Q. "Has the order taken effect?" A. "I cannot discuss that." . Q. "But it has gone out?" " A. "That is correct. . . ." And after 13 more questions, which still shed r no further light on what had happened, the brief- ing ended with this? ; Q. "Gerry, since you won't discuss the mili- tary aspects, is it possible the Pentagon can tell us whether, like, from midnnight on, there was no more bombing? A. "It is possible. I just don't know." With the whole world waiting and on edged that is all the White House woulld say. The bare - record seems to reflect an ?arrogant contempt ? for the press and for world opinion. , GERALD WARREN did not claim that the bombings had forced North Vietnam to the ne- gotiating table. The North Vietnamese walked out on the negotiations because of the bombing, but said all along they woulld return when it . stopped. On the other hand when it did stop, , Vo Van Sung, their representative in Paris, de.' dared that the result of the large-scale bombing had been "a military and political defeat" -for the United States and "a strategic victorY forlur people." The bombing was undoubtedly a moral ? and military defeat for Nixon. He not only sue-, ceeded in making the United States look like a bully in the eyes of the world but a bully who had suffered a well-deserved bloody nose. Like so much else about this disgraceful epi- sode in our national history, most of what led ; up to the bombing is still secret. When the North Vietnamese and the PRG delegations walked out of the Paris talks on Dec. 21 to protest the ' bombings, they charged that ever since the talks resumed in November the United States had threatened "two or three times daily" to break off talks and resume bombing north- of the 20th Parallel. The North Vietnamese spokesman, Nguyen ? Thant' Le, told a press conference that day, "The 1 241 snore good will we showed, the more the Nixon ,j? (;Administration adopted an unreasonable attitude; t: the more we proved our flexibility, the more it ,) demanded fundamental modifications (of the 5 agreed text) and the more the Nixon Administra- tion used military pressure to (try to) subjugate If the other side's account is correct, these threats explain North Vietnam's order of Dec. 3 , to begin evacuating all schoolchildren from Hanoi.' The United States has hot denied that threats 3 , were made, but its propagandists have twisted ; the evacuation order to prove that "as of bee. 3, Hanoi already was pimping to scuttle the ne- ; r gotiation." t This is on a par with Pentagon claims that 7 if civilians were hurt in Hanoi it must have been their own fault because (a) Hanoi had shot down American planes and the debris had hit icivillans or (b) they were hit by debris from all those t SAM missiles. As the mugger said, if the victim .1 hadn't resisted, he wouldnt have been hurt. IT IS HARD to decide which is worse?the ! ? vindictive cruelty of the air raids or the lies told,' to excuse them. The most transparent of these lies was that the attacks on Hanoi and Haiphongi were needed to disrupt a new offensive. When g Nixon suspended the bombing above 'the 20th Parallel in October to express his satisfaction (then) with the agreement disclosed October 26, Aviation Week (October 30) carried a two-page summary of the results. It said the seven months of "Operation Linebacker," which Nixon launched last May 'II, bad "proven more effective, more crippling than the years of the Rolling Thunder operation" that Lyndon Johnson ended In October 1968. "Even should the cease-fire effOrts fail,"" Aviation Week reported, "they (i.e., U.S. military officials) believe the Communist supply. network has been so severely crippled that it will requirel months to repair." Similarly Michael Getlero Pentagon correspondent of the Washington Post? reported in that paper (Dec. 24), "Prior to the i renewed bombing no U.S. military commanders , were expressing any fears of a new North Viet- namese assault." Intelligence reported that the other side was preparing for political rather than., .military action. No doubt great suffering was imposed on the civilian population and great damage on corn- munications and transport as well as on remain.; Ing industrial and power facilities. But the price, was high enough to be humbling to the world's strongest-military power. To 'see the losses in perspective one mustt recall that the-B-62s were intended for the nu- clear bombardment of the Soviet Union. Air ? Force sources said the average losses over Hanoi were no greater than expected?from 2 to 3 per- cent of the planes participating. But reporters : could not find out whether this was the margin of '? loss expected in all-out nuclear war or in conven- tional bombardment over the heavily defended Hanoi-Haiphong area. In nuclear war, even if only 2 to 3 percent get through the results would be terrible. One'; B-62 can carry enough nuclear weapons to wreck , a moderate-sized city. But in conventional war, a 2 to '3 percent rate loss is high, particularly when you are talking of a virtually irreplaceable aircraft like the B-52. A 2 percent rate means that in fifty days of concentrated bombing the entire fleet would be lost; a 3 percent rate would eat up a 11-83 fleet in 33 days or a llttle twee than ? .j1 fr'LL I !=.0149'11.111 1'17 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 :*CIA-RD1).77100482RoOolupsuppwriv,j,77,7f:1) .,0T ? ;.;f fri month. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100066001-0 IN THE 11 days of concentrated bombing over Hanoi and Haiphong, he Air Force ad- mitted to 15 B-52s shot down and later added that six more B-52s made it back but landed as wrecks. That is 10 percent of the 200 B-52s sup- i posed to be assigned to the Far East theater and 20 percent of the 100 B52s supposed to have been used daily. No definite and final official figures? *, have been given. ? The loss in pilots was worse. When Johnson called off the air war in October 1968, the Penta- gon said "more than" 450 airmen had been killed, j I captured, or were missing since the air war be- gad in 1961. In 11 days of bombing Nixon lost 93 airmen, or 20 percent as many in 11 days as were lost in the first eight years. It would. be most enlightening if a congres- ? sional committee could learn what exactly was I gained in strictly military terms for all this ex- penditure. A Saigon dispatch in the New York , : Times, Dec. 31, noted reports that a textile fac- tory and a noodle factory in 'Hanoi had both been heavily bombed in one of the final raids. The complaint in the Korean war was that "we were , 4. trading B-26s (the predecessor of the B-52) for trucks in a most uneconomical manner." We t ! wonder bow many no9dles Nixon got per lost , pilot. WITH VS AMERICANS aerial bombardritent ) is more than tactical or strategic: it has become i? a disease; it is downright maniacal, a compel- sive twitch. The year-end compilation out of the .. Pentagon says we have showered about 7 million ? tons of bombs and rockets on Southeast Asia : since we set out to make it safe. for something or other on Jan. 1, 1961. This is more than 2 mil- lion tons greater than all the bombs we dropped ; on Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Pacific in World ! War II, and more than 10 times the-135,000, tons dropped on Korea. , If victory-by-airpower were more than. a `delusion, Korea long ago would have been united In desolation. We literally left nothing standing above the 38th Parallel. We bad Overwhelming ? air superiority yet we were pushed back to. the 1 parallel and North Korea was re-established. 1. Bombing surveys after World War II showed that; gn industrial countries output expanded and .4 ' morale rose as the bombs fell. But delusions are: not cured by rational demonstration. In underdeveloped countries like Indochina's, the cost of every peasant killed is by now many - times his weight in gold, but life?and the war? goes on. ? NOW BOTH SIDES are back at the negotia- ting table, but there is no sign that either has " changed. My guess is that Nixon is more frus- trated, Hanoi more determined. Nixon has shot another bolt. He is unlikely soon again to risk ' B-52s over Hanoi, not with conventional weapons at least. So far he has bought every military 4 recipe for victory-by-demolition except wholesale destruction of the dikes?and "nukes." How much f' more will our gambler gamble, and how muck,. more can his new friends in Moscow and Peking take before they begin to think their own security endangered? NIXON'S FRUSTRATION must be all the I greater because be began calling in 1968 for the g mining of Haiphong and the bombing of liana der - Approved For Release 2001/08/M: ,./.."Sure ways "to win the war in Vietnam and to end 4 it," as he said on "Meet the Press" in December ? of that year. We now know from the Pentagon j , Papers that this was what the Air Force asked , ,.,, for in March 1968, in a last attempt to stave off h ` the bombing halt that year by Lyndon Johns'. Never was bdrbarity put forward more suav..,3 ly. Dr. Harold Brown, then Secretary of the Air, Force, now the "liberal" member of our SALT negotiating team, argued in a memorandum in, March 1968, that intensified bombing of the "re- maining important targets" (already few) around, Hanoi and "neutralization of the pert of Haiphong by bombing and mining" would "permit bomb- ing of military targets without the present scru- pulous concern for collateral civilian damage 'and', casualties." And just in case anyone missed the point so antiseptically suggested, or thought these civilian casualties were merely tangential 'and! accidental, Dr. Brown's concluding paragraph on: the objective of this exercise began, "'The aims: df this alternative' campaign would he to erode', the will of the population by exposing a wider, area of NVN to casualties and destruction. . . "Erode the will"?what stylistic delicacies are cultivated by these Pentagon Flauberts. Thisl , erosion, plus the destruction of import and Iran-i sit facilities, Dr. Brown argued, "would be ex-,, ' pected to bring NVN to negotiation of a compro- ' , muse settlement, or to abandonment of the ROCA ' in SYN." That's the blueprint Nixon has been fol.. , lowing for the last eight months, and in his final ? fierce spasm of terror%for-Christmas. Just What happened to the earlier compro- mise announced in October nobody, outside of an ever smaller circle, knows. Nixon's is becoming, ?. government-by-soliloquy. In the two weeks before, , the Christmas bombing, the visitors' record ati the White House showed only three,persons who had conferred with Nixon?Kissinger, Kissinier's' - aide Haig, and the Republican Senate Majority, 4 Leader Scott, who later said he had been urging? the White House for days to end the bombing. Despite the momentous gambles Nixon hasp been taking, there has not been a meeting of the) , National Security Council since May 8, of the, Cabinet since Nov. 8, no press conference at ." which he allowed questions since Oct. 5. He came out of isolation only for the Truman funeral and , to see the Redskins coach after their victory, an event he seemed to consider earth-shaking. The' , free press in the capital of the free world has been largely dependent on Hanoi radio and Thieu's personal newspaper in Saigon, Tin Song., for news of what's going on. ' 1 ? 1)1 All we know is that on Oct. 26, Kissinger Said' "peace is at hand" and that Nixon in a series of' pre-election barnstorming speeches in various . small towns around the country repeated Mei same theme. At Huntington W. Va., Oct. 28, he - spoke of "a significant breakthrough" in the' peace talks. In Ashland, Ky., the same day, he even com- pared this with the Armistice in 1918. At Saginaw, Mich., two days later, he said, "Vietnam being over, we are proud of the fact that our trips to Peking and to Moscow have paved the way not' just for ending this war but for a generation of, peace." In a nationwide radio broadcast on Nov. 2, hel, said the "major breakthrough" would "accern-' plish the basic objectives" be set forth last May 8, when he ordered the mining and bombing. These Were the return of all POWs, a ceasefire CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 / 1 , 1 T,T;.!T-T's .t, Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 throughout Indochina, and the right for South' Vietnam to determine its own future "without k having a Communist government or a coalition ? government" imposed upon it. No mention' of 4' course; of the one-man dictatorship we have been helping Thieu to fasten on its 17 million people.t Even on Dec. 16, the day Kissinger appeared to let it be known, though as opaquely as possi- ble, that peace was no longer at hand, Herbert: G. Klein, Nixon's top PR man, released for pub- lication a lengthy survey of "Nixon's Four Years ?Change That Works," which repeated the same' 1, theme that peace was at hand, except for a few' final details. "Peace"---Nixon told Garnett Horr ner of the Washington Star in an interview re- leased just after the election?was near: "You can bank on it." If Kissinger's 'deliberately obscure' and one,' sided presentation is read side by side with Xuan Thuy's ? appearance on ABC's "agues and swers" on Dec. 24, what has happened ,Seems I , reasonably clear. Hanoi and the PRG were will- ing to swallow a' bitter compromise in October WASHINGTON STAR 7 January 1973 CROSBY S. NOYES ' Nixon Keeps' Us Guessing?and Maybe He Should, wliich enabled Nixon to appear es a peace candl-'1 date. !i The other side then accepted what until last , October it had always said was unacceptable? the "two-track approach" by which Nixon would get the POWs in return for a ceasefire, while leaving Hanoi to .negotiate a political settlementi ki with Thieu "on the other track." That track, ail i, I have argued, is made for more collisions, not fore U.S. disengagement. But now, with the election over, Nixon Is going for more. Now he wants a one-track settle- ment, a cease-fire and a political Settlement in; one package, which will force Hanoi to accept a divided country permanently, under pain of re-?: ? newed US. bombing and shelling. This would: mean that Many more years of involvement 1114 Indochina are "at hand." 'S s ? ?, ,I. P. Stone Is a contribidipg editor. o Thei CI !few York Review of Books. ; Copyright ty73. PIY2UFV. r, ? ' My friends are all furious about the way that democra- cy is going to the dogs in this country. A good many of them are paid to know what's going on. And when they can't find out, it gets them very . tipset about the people who aren't telling them. You really can't blame them. A good many things are obviously going on that . people are interested in, and President Nixon hasn't been ; willing to give them the time , of day. Apart from George Allen, the only . person he seems to be talking to these days is Henry Kissinger. And Kissinger is a genius at talk- Ing to people at great length without telling them anything , that they want to know. Congress, apparently, feels the same way?sort of left out , of things. ; Naturally it makes people 1,frustrated and annoyed, and there is a lot of talk going around about how the system Is being perverted by one-man I rule. The only trouble is, of course that the presidency i has been the dominant force In the goverment for close p to 200 years now and there Isn't very much that Carl Albert or anybody else is like- 13'to be able to do about it. Nixon may be somewhat more secretive than some of our presidents in the past _ and he doesn't seem to care very much about his relations with Capitol Dill, but he hardly can be accused of in- venting the idea of an inde- pendent executive. Come to think of it, quite a lot of things have happened that we weren't much con- sulted about beforehand. I don't recall ;icing asked, for instance,,what I thought about Invading Normandy, or drop- ping an atomic bomb on Hir- oshima, or sending troops to Korea, or invading the Bay of Pigs. It could be that the notion that this country normally op- erates by a system of unre- stricted information, consulta- tion and consensus is some- thing of a myth. Most of our recent presidents, at any rate, have had a way of acting first and consulting afterward in matters of primary impor- tance to the country. It may be that Nixon is more susceptible to this use ?or abuse?of presidential authority, being at the begin- ning of his last term and therefore less "accountable" to the Congress and public opinion for what he does. One suspects, however, that this supposed non-accountability Is more impressive to the anxious critics of Nixon's policies than it is to the President himself. An y president, including this one, is ultimately ac- countable for everything that he does. If his policies fail, no amount of prior consulta- tion and public relations will redeem his reputation and historical standing. If they succeed, it will probably intake very little difference that the country was largely in the dark about what he was Up to at the time. The people's much-asserted "right to know," furthermore, has never been fully sub- scribed to by any government that ever existed. What the ? people don't know much of, the time is a lot. And quite often there are perfectly valid reasons, aside from the nat- ural furtiveness of chief ex- ectives, that make it imper- ative to leave them in igno- ,rance. Something of the sort may be the case today. What everybody is so worked up about, of course, are the ne- gotiations on Vietnam and the chances of reaching a settle- ment of the war in the near future. Among other things, 26 they want to know whether and why it was necessary, to "I bomb the hell out of Hanoi awl Haiphong at such a high cot in lives and public an- ? guish. They are asking' what or who it was that blocked ? the settlement that Kissinger said was at ?'hand and what. the the real prospects are today: The questions are pertinent and so, perhaps, are the rea- sons for not answering them. The most detailed knowledge by the public and the Con-1 gress. on the state of the ne-i gotiations probably would not bring a settlement nearer. And Indeed, it might foreclose the possibility of arriving at I any settlement at all. It is hard to ask people to I live with their frustrations and their ignorahce, but for the time being it may be nec- essary. Because the simple fact is that Nixon and Kissin- ger are not negotiating with,., the White House press corps1 or, the Senate Foreign Rela- tions Committee but with the North Vietnamese.' Everything that has beehr said and -left unsaid so far,4 is a part of that negotiation.,i Until it is concluded, the, President has the right?and; perhaps the duty--to keep the, country guessing. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : dAjR1:iP177'-brai2R60.7671aRaTIT Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 WASHINGTON POST 14 JANUARY 1973 . ? ., 'Fight. Till Death,! ?, ,, .3 ? No Peace in Sight 14r Hamlet , ?.. By Thomas W. Lippman ?. ? %Ireithineton Poet Foreign Ser4iice I1AHA, 'South Vietnam? ? Ninhdiem to the district cap-1 i The struggle for control of ital of Ninhhoa and the resti r this cheerless hamlet is a pf Khanhhoa Province Inter- grim and vengeful feud that sects Highway 1, the coun-' has been 'going on with spo- try's main North-South road? radlc violence for over* a 'about five miles inland. At I, , decade. As in so many of that intersection is the head-1 ' South?Vietnam's rural back- 'quarters of South Korea'a 1 waters,. the conflict Seems Tiger Division, whose troops , t ? unlikely to be ended by any occupy firebases throughouti International agreement. , the district. 1 - It was a Korean unit that . captured. a? document 10 thonths ago that caught the i eye of U.S. officials when it ! tas forwarded through ahannela'to Saigon. i : It bore names of 81 Ninh-1 diem residents identified as i 'puppet government .and ) &fitly officials," listing each4 af them by name, age, placej '"And as for the VC?if they . of birth, occupation, social 1 . !eapture me, they will kill . alias, present position in the t .ine.". . government, criminal acts'! 4. Life, has been like that for ,00Mmitted, and "measures 'a long time in Baha, one of trPosed." A typical exam- the seven hamlets of .Ninh- P ewas the description off diem Village, an isolated one Nguyen Van Co.: .Age ' :fishing and salt-producing , 35, born in Baha, tailor,' ,(community nestled against :petty bourgeois, special in-1 Lihe 'coati, of?the? South China telligence agent. . ,Sea 25 miles north of Nha- : Twenty-two of the names , i'triing. , :* ' . ' ? .., ? were from Baha. For 20 of ? ? Palm and pitie trees wave them, the entry under) an', the cooling breezes, but *"measures proposed" was ,the sandy soil yields little "to be killed." For the other-7 and the villagers take their two, it was "to be submitted' 'living from the sea. The to long-term thought-re- boat is to Ninhdiem what form." , ?the water buffalo is to most ' Two of the 22 had already', of the country, and the air is seen killed at the time the ?,iancid with The odor of tens list was captured. One more, i .of thoussnds of tiny shrimp the hamlet chief, has beeni .drying In the sun. assassinated since, as has The entire village, which the wife of his successor, and another on the list has. ).1tis 6,630 residents, was un- been wounded in an am-i l.t9der Vietcong control in the bush. Six have fled to the i'bfirly 1960s. Government district headquarters town. ? ,,troops fought their way into Three of those who stayed; IA0 village in 1965, but the sleep elsewhere at night. No argument in Vietnam , !Jaen' government and seen- is more threadbare than 1.1rity set up at gunpoint still that over whether there / appear to be tenuous at would or would not be mass ; Ibest. . executions If the Vietcong 1 Vietcong. Propaganda . took over, and the bottom-4 t less well of "captured en-1 emy documents" is often: scorned as a , source of , worthwhile Information. , For the people whose names are on the Baha list, however, or . at, least for; those who could be found for interviews,. those ques- tions are irrelevant. The is- sue for them is one of sur-, viva', of an unending strug- gle with "them," devoid of ideology but no less threat- , ening to themselves and their families. The Saigon government,' of course, has its own lists, and ? thousands of ? persons , have been rounded up on: .the Merest suspicion of dl-, "'of ? ? it resembles a vendetta of mountaln? clans more than war, and has created a bit- terness likely to linger long 1 after the mechanized divi- sions have fought their last big battle. .. "I personally must fight ' against the Vietcong 'till ' death," one of the hamlet's 'prominent residents said. Last. spring, during the North Vietnamese offensive, !Vietcong pamphleteers .moved freely through Nin- : hdiem, distributing propa- ganda leaflets. Samples can ' still be seen at the village office. ? ? 1 The ? two southernmost ,1 hamlets, at the foot of a for-, !bidding chain of hills that !intersect the beach, have been all but abandoned un-. fier continuing Vietcong has.' :fitment. In the other five, an American with years; 1.0f experience in the area laid, "It only takes one in-2 clesion a month to keep up, ;the psychological pressure." 1.? The rough road that linkal Approved For Release 2001/0 joyalty. In a place like Baha,1 'where neither side'is strong enough to achieve complete, ,domination, ,the continuing .?struggle breeds fear and re- sentment on both sides. , The first name on the V12 etcong's Baha list was that of Nguyen Tot, who was: hamlet chief for ? several, fyears. He was slain list 'March. The man who holds, that post is Nguyen Bon, a,i sad-eyed man of 36 whoset name was fourth on the lis0 A former Vietcong, he wag deputy hamlet chief for se- curity from 1967 to 1971. Death of Bon's Wife He said?and sources at the district headquarters, confirmed?that shortly af- ;ter he became hamlet chief 'last fall, his wife was killed One night while he was out -on gatrol with the local mili- tia. 33on is a civilian but car-. ries ries a carbine even during the day, and says he seldom sleeps at home. He was left with six children when is, wife died; a sister cares for them. "Any time the Vietcong /come into my hamlet they ',can kill anybody they like,": 'Bon said. "I don't know ev, actly the people they'll at- tempt to kill, but I am hap- let official and a nationalist, so I must take precautions for myself." Bon said he had not' seen the Vietcong list previously, and noted with surprise that; It ,contained names of ,per sons who he believed "live in neutralism or are pro- 'Communist and supply food, for the Vietcong. Thanks to, that document you have shown me," he said, "I think I have a better understand- ing of ? what needs to be 'done." Bon was asked why the, houses of Baha have neither the pictures of President 'Thieu nor South Vietnamese t flags which are found in: int* government-controlled' areas. "We only have enough to distribute them to village 'cadres and officials," he said. "But ? even if Ho had .enough to give to each fam-; ,fly, I don't think it would be' useful, because the hamlet , is insecure at night. A fewt ;days ago, the VC came in' and tore down Thieu's eture and some paper govern-4 ment flags. So we don't have 'any more." Bon said that if there is ti" i'cease-fire, "Vietcong who understand government pol- icy .and return to live in f' peace" will be welcome, but "the others, who do not know or understand the pol- icy, shotdd live separately.", After that, he said, !a do my job, the Vietcong do their ,b," 8/0jo7 : CIA-RbP77-004320100060001-0 ? A hundred yards away if; 'the house of Huynh ?ian unsmiling man of 50 det; nounced on the Vietcong list; as a "special 'secret security, agent" who "opposes the , revolution." As is accurately noted tm-,, !ler "remarks," Phan is a: 'Cham, one of the few survi-1 ling descendants of the. Cham Empire that ruled much of what is now Viet-4 nam centuries ago. He fat i-also a fomer go'vernmenti lax collector. /1 ' Phan said that he taket his wife and the three of hial lour daughters who live at ?home to one of the othert hamlets at night. "The VC have said theY Would like to kill me," :lek said. "In December they; ea,me to gate of' my I house, and when no one swered they jumped the fence and came into my house. We were not thereo but I know that means they: wanted to kill me." ; He knew from neighbore that the Intruders were Viet-; cong and not North Viet- namese, he said, because; they spoke with the familiar local accent. phan's wife was men-) Honed by several local ' cials as a Vietcong sympa? ithizer because she ha a pro- .7vided burial services for Communist soldiers. "If they find anything to 'show my wife is on the !other side;" Phan said, "I'll, let them come in and take have, and burn my house. She is a kind woman.; /She buries the corpses, the 'burns the incense over, !them, she doesn't care, whether the soldier is gov4 iernment or VC." ? Doan Hut is a 57-year-old fisherman marked for death . by the Vietcong because he is believed to be a "specialf security agent." A former 'village chief, he said that he had been dodging the VC, for years and finally fled tti a nearby island after Tot. was slain. ,4 Only the inability to make enough money from fishing: on'the island brought him back, he said, and "I do not stay at home at night." Hut said his younges! brother and three other rel- atives had been killed by the Vietcong, and "I don't filare to live in this hamlet iany more. I have to find / some secure place to live." W. Six Move Away It is not easy for the ordi." ,nary Vietnamese peasant or:' ,fisherman to leave hit na-': ?tIve hamlet and move to a ?city, especially if he is not' . an official refugee entitled / to some government assist. ance. But six of those named on the list have gone 4 ,t1,173 r.-1; , r yit!tir Approved For Release 2001,08/11117(3/oREDFIW0432R000100060001-0 12 January 1973 Brutal Politics of War o Ninhhoa district town to' ye. . ? One of them is Nguyen' In, the young deputy ham-1 et 'chief who was attackedi y the Vietcong while out in Is boat on Jan. 20, 1972.! he date is clearly marked on the )(trays he proudly ex- hibits to show the bullets. One of them Woke his ight leg, and he is still bed- ridden with a cast over the break, but he acknowledged ith a grin that the leg had healed once, only to be re- fractured when he fell off his motorbike. "I'm riding the back ot the tiger," he said of hisi dealings with the Vietcong., "I've served the govern- ment, so I've no choice but: to go on with it. If I can't do the big jobs I'll have to do the small ones." Another who has moved to Ninhhoa is Nguyen Tro, the deputy hamlet chief of Baba and government in- formation officer. "I still have those jobs," he said, "but I only go to Baba from time to time. I don't like to let the Viet- cong know what time I'm coming so they, can't set up an ambush." Tro said that he, like ham-; let chief Bon, had been men- tioned specifically on Viet- cong leaflets that had been circulated in the hamlet.' 1 "Their leaflet listed my, tterrte,'my birthday, my num- ber of children, and said I; Was accused by the Revolu-' tionary Committee because support the government." His opposition to the VC, he paid, is not really political. They kidnapped his wife erlefly in 1965. Tro was scornful of the Methods by which the Viet- cong select those they be- lieve to he cooperating with the government. "Let me tell you how the VC work," he said. "Suppose you're a hamlet, chief and ,I'm just a villager" and you Come to my house.' Of course I must receive: you, but hi reality I'm very reluctant 'to welcome you , into my home. If you only. come once then nothing ha-' indeed North Vietnam's first real 'vic- , pens. But if you visit. me ;tory over the United States in the more than three times, the ,Indochiati war, and that the American . Vietcong will accuse me of I :bombing attack on Hanoi and Hal-: working with you. The Viet-', phong in December, 1972, despite cong are stupid ? innocent demonstrable Communist losses in people will hate them." striking power, provided them a sec- The district chief of NM- ,ond major triumph. hhoa, a tennis-playing lieu- , tenant colonel named Do Huu Nhan, said Baha writ one of the places the Viet- cong were planning to seize when they were operating' under an Oct. 31 deadline, for cease-fire last year. . Since then, according ?to fAmerican sources in thei province, the threat to the little hamlet has been eased by the death of five of the local Communist troops who? were caught in an ambush In December. . "What I think is going to happen if there's ?a ceased fire," said one American fa-, miliar with the area, "is that there will be a night of the lent' knives," a phrase that Is heard often in Saigon these days. "It will be very brief, and I think the gov- ernment will win." What will happen if the period of bloodshed is not brief, or if the Saigon 'goy- erntnent does not win, is far. from clear. Authoritative U.S. soUrceS in Saigon have made it clear that 'the United States is prepared to tolerate the oc- casional assassinations of hamlet officials after a cease-fire, but it is not known how the United States will react if it goes beyond that?or how ? North Vietnam will react if Sai- gon's forces try to Move 'against the Vietcong. t By1 C. L. Sulzberger . PARIS?It may prove historieally correct that the Communist Tet of- fensive of 1968, a military failure, was Neither conjectural assessment can "yet be regarded as conclusive, yet, in 'both 'cases, it is apparent that purely "material aspects of strategic actions turned out to be secondary in im- portance to psychbiogical and political aspects. 7 The Tet offensive was disastrous to the Communists from a battlefield - F viewpoint. After their initial successes 'and repression in the temporarily cap- 'lured South Vietnamese city of Hue,. the Coirunist forces were defeated/ With immense casualties. Saigon's 'army and regime proved they could :fight. But incalculable damagi done in the . ' cial sector of U.S. public opinion ..cru .and criticism of President Lyndon John- son set in motion an intedse reaction.. that favored Hanoi, starting with in- tellectuals and university students. This ended', with Mr. Johnson's political -.retirement. President Nixon subsequently initi- "ated U.S. bombing of the northern centers after an original tough re- 'sponse to Hanoi's March,. 1972, offen- sive and also after attacks on Commu- nist positions in Cambodia and Laos ;which had kept alive the savage oppo- ? . ''sition of those who detested the war's . 4impact, on America itself. The bombers struck following,' a' :breakdown in Paris peace, negotia- tions and during, a lapse. in Congres- sional sessions. But, just as the defeat 'of Communist forces in' 1968 was politically counter-productive, the 'December, 1972, air raids also were politically counterproductive. NEW YORK TIMES The American and West European 10 January 1973 press filled swiftly with stories about "murder bombing" and "terror bomb. helms 'Reported to Say China ing." Since most humans laudably favor any underdog, within little time emotional adversaries began to com- pare Mr. Nixon with Hitler and the 'raids wth Nazi siaughtehouses. Special tame New York Timm Hanoi's official figures, according WASHINGTON, Jan. ? Senator Symington, Demo- to the North Vietnamese delegation in , ' 9 Richard Helms, the director of waadt ir:?,efen Missouri, said IT Paris, say that 1,318 people were Central Intelligence, has re- I believe is arPrbeitsteder word" toe' Killed in Hanoi by the December B-52 raids. Haiphong municipal authorities, iportedly told Congress that learn from the Helms testimony ccording to Agence France Presse, China may be approaching the "how close another power is be_ to becoming a superpower." ay 305 were killed in Haiphong. Blood status of a "superpower" Thurmond Also 'Surprised' cannot be measured; nor can the ex. cause of advances in weapons After the hearing today an. quisite and precious gift of life,. other committee member, Sen- ator Strom Thurmond, Republi- can of South Carolina, told' newsmen that the reference had been to China. He said that he, too, had been "surprised that Red China is making prog- ress as fast as they are" in the development Of both nuclear weapons and delivery systems. According to Mr. Symington, the disclosure by Mr. Helms "reduces the practical effect iltichardson as Secretary of Delof the strategic-arms limitation !tense. negotiations between the Unit,. Nears Status of 'Superpower' technology. His statement came to light Alter a session of the Senate Armed Services Committee to- day. Senator Stuart Symington, a committee member, when speaking to newsmen, referred to Mr. Helm's testimony yes- terday. The committee is considering the nomination of Fillet L. o? ed-States and the Soviet Unioii. Neither Senator would speci- fy details of the briefing. Mr. Helms declined to describe his testimony afteethe hearing yes- terday. ? A Pentagon spokesman said. that the Department of Defense, 'merit in a report to the House _would not elaborate on the as-,, 209 Armed services Committee. FOREIGN AFFAIR'S Nevertheless, certan comparsons' must be made. North Vietnam's' offi- cial statistics of 1,623- persons killed' in. the "murder bombing" ow Decem- ber , compares with Saigon's official statistics of 5,800 persons slaughtered, principally by .throat-cutting or burtd alve, dumg the Commurist occupation, of the South Vietnamese city of Hue' in February, 1968. The second 'point in this Coldly: dreadful numbers game is in terms of comparison with other bombardments.. During World War II, 135,000 deaths were caused by Allied bombing .of Dresden on Feb. 14 and 16, 1945, and' .83,000 in Tokyo on One firebomb raid In March, 1945: This does not mention. ,the ghastly ,results of atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. " ' There are certain dismal deductions to be made. U.S. raids on North Viet- -nam obviously avoided use of those Incendiary bombs 'which so easily. 'destroy Asiatic cities like Tokyo?or Hanoi., Secondly, ?although the aces'- mous tonnage dropped by 5-52's blatantly exceeded World War H loads, they produced' relatively lesser, reiults.? They certainly weren't aimed, at North Vietnam's vulnerable dikes.; These subjects have not been ade- quately dis'cussed in the angry Western press. One .has enormobs distaste for quantifying pain. Yet the fact remains that, in contrast, with spirited criticism published, in democratic organs, the' Soviet and Chinese expressions have seemed relatively restrained. All this having been Said, there isn't 'the' slightest doubt that the United. Stites is edger to end' thin unfortunate War,' so tarnishing to its image. It seems doomed to the distasteful' choice, between' accepting an unhappy come, promise?even less palatable than that, hoped for before the bombing started-'?, or an, even unhappier fallback strategy, ? The North Vietnamese have erne ployed all kinds of devices such as mistranslations of the Wird "mien" Or.. "zone" of Vietnam to obfuscate even the implication of a South Vietnamese authority in Saigon, in order to con-' fuse. any agreement. ; They have guilefully used 1.J.S. pris- oners to blackmail Washington Into. exercising pressure on Saigon?prefer- ring to press for a United States role ; of open hostility to President Thien _rather than a mere U.S, withdrawal. , At this moment, the American people , seem stuck with an awful choice et conditions. They possess Immense mill. Lary power to Impose their national,. policy, and they possess little politicalc will or inpral desire to Use this poviet4 aertiOn yesterday by the 'out: going Secretary of Defense, Melvin R. Laird, that "the Chi- nese are moving forward rapid- ly" with development of liquid- fueled missile systems. Mr. Laird made the state- . Approved For Release 2001/08/07? : CIAJR150177:00iiiiiEkiloiadbolif-'677717,7"--7.1';"' BALTIMORE SUN 16 January 1973 or eease It Peace blueprin has altered hill over the Meaning of softie pro- `visions. Each side accused the I other of trying to modify points already agreed upon. President Nguyen Van Dieu of South Vietnam bitterly op- posed some features. ? Three long negotiating ses- By JAMES S. KEAT V , Washingtert Bureau of The. Sari. . sions and two weeks of inten- sive bombing later, Dr. Kissin- ? Washington?If peace IS . ections. A Coiincil of National get and Mr. Tho, a member of it ,again "at hand" in Vietnam, Conciliation and Concord, the North Vietnamese Poht- its framework appears to be :consisting of representatives buro, again appeared to have .In . most essentials the. ,from the Saigon government, negotiated the framework of :aborted October draft agree- ' , the Viet Cong, and neutralists an agreement, subject perhaps tnent. 1 ,, 4 . , will organize the elections, to acquiescence in Saigon and 5: The guardedly optimistic'' . and oversee the implementa- to some final tidying up _ in reports from United States ; ,dicate that Henry A. Kissin- , i Hoes of the agreements. The Paris. ' ! Saigon regime and Viet Gong In one form or another, the will discuss the formation of central dispute since the end of land Vietnamese officials lti-' similar councils at lower lay- tger and Le Duc Tho have .4', October seems to have in- worked out a tentative pact ers of the governnient struc: volved the Crucial element of )' . 'very much along the Same ? ture. the agreement?in fact, of the , A reduction in the size of whole tragic conflict: who will illnes as the draft that raised',1 ' 1, such high hopes little more , Vietnamese armed forces in retain how much political an- than two months ago. , the South will be negotiated by thority in South Vietnam. 1 . Not wholly clear , the two South Vietnamese par- The October .draft left the political of the South a 1 ties. The two South Vietnam- '. Precisely how the October ese parties will try to settle calculated ambiguity. It was to Y draft has been changed in the country's internal affairs be resolved by the South Viet- namese ? government and the ;. detail is not yet . wholly" 4within six months. Viet Cong's provisional revolu- 0:Clear. In at least one respect 5. The unification of Vietnam tionary government. This Mr. i the very heart of the peace ? will be achievedf ll peace u y. ,Thieu would pot accept. ' plan was involved... , 6. Military committees, coin- , , . The October draft never -1 , Some support posed of just the two South ,.was made public in full. The PI North Vietnamese broadcast., Vietnamese parties in some While Dr. ki`ssinger contin- ? cases and joined by U.S. and i ues to insist that the United a nine-point summary of the , 'long document October 26 North Vietnamese officers in ' States does not intend to settle that the United States agreed ,other instances, will oversee the South's _political future in -was essentially accurate. It prompted Dr. Kissinger, the cease-fire along with an the agreement, he has indi- . international supervisory body. cated softie snpport of objec- : ',President' Nixon's national se- . . An international conference on lions by Mr. Thieu that under- curity adviser, to announce: Vietnam will be convened in 30 lie that fundamental point. Iti !,that "peace is at hand." days. In his last news conference i The nine points, In Hanoi's . 7. All patties will respect the December 16, when the, nego- aummary, were: . . . . sovereignty of Laos and Cam- tiations seemed to have broken t' . .' 1, The United States recog-: bodia, as provided in the 1954 down, Dr. Kissinger said a nizes the sovereignty, uni11-1 and 1962 Geneva agreements, major stutnbling block was cation and territorial intev had pledge not to use their Hanoi's insistence on its right t!,tity of Vietnam as provided territories for hostile activities to intervene in the South after ,in the 1954 Geneva agree-'1 against any other nation. All a cease-fire.. He said the ?ments that ended the . foreign forces will be with- United States wanted some .4Prench-Indochinese war. . drawn from Cambodia and provision that the two Viet- , Pullout within 60 days ;. 2. A cease-fire will be pro- 'claimed, and 24 hours later the United States will end all. , Military activities against 1.'North Vietnam. U.S. forces . will be withdrawn from 1, , South . Vietnam within 60 : days. No advisers or war materiel can be sent either, ; to government or to rebel 'forces in South Vietnam, ex- cept for replacement of .worn-out equipment on an , equivalent basis. The United States will not intervene. in ,South Vietnamese internal , affairs. ? 3. All captured personnel **will be returned while the U.S. troops are leaving." 4. The South Vietnamese ;people will decide their own' ',political future through free, Internationally supervised el- LTh will be no further nams would live in pdace with aos. er e foreign interference there. each' other, eschewing the use IL The end of the war will of force. mark the beginning of a new This issue has surfaced in relationship between the recent weeks in several forms. United States and North Viet- nam. The United States will contribute to the rehabilitation of North Vietnam and the other Indochinese nations. 9. The agreement will be- come effective after it is signed... : Although the draft quickly became known as the nine- point agreement, U.S. Officials say the nine points are simply Hanoi's summary of a text that contains far more articles. They also have remarked that the summary is skewed a bit to favor Hanoi's views. Hardly had the draft been completed about the middle of October than differences arose 29 One has been the so-called sovereignty issue, in which the two sides are purported to be arguing who is sovereign, five policing of the cease-fire over what In the South. An- other is the sanctity of the old demilitarized zone along the 17th Parallel :and whether it constitutes a permanent bound- ary or a temporary demarca- tion line. ? Goes blick,to 1954 These questions raise the 'Issue that first was posed in ? 1954, when the French agreed ? to -leave their colony and di- china and 1,339 missing and, vide it temporarily into two finally, the uncciunted thou zones, to be reunited two years later after elections were held. South Vietnamese leaders have insisted from: the start that their part of the old colony 19 distinct and independent, while Hanoi has insisted that all Vietnam is one, eventually .to be re-unified. If the demilitarized zone re-established, Hanoi's ability to intervene in the South would, be severely limited and to maintain its troops for very; long impossible, regardless of what agreements in principle .are reached on these points. ? If the line at the 17th Paral- lel .is temporary, 'all Vietnam is an entity, artificially sundered. If the line is a per- manent political boundary, all Vietnam is divided in two parts for as long as one can foresee. ? , Other issues Other issues have been iden- tified as troublesome points, but each loomed less large ,than the dispute over Vietnam' as a polity. One is the nature of the National Council of Rea onciliation ahd Concord, wIileh ' Mr. Thleu feared would be- come the coalition government that he has vowed he will not accept. Will the couheil make politi- cal decisions, or will it simply be an administrative organ? Will councils be set up at local levels; giving the Viet Cong political footholds in areas that they do oot now control? What freedom to move around in government-controlled territory will the Viet ,Cong 'officials have? ?? ? Another stumbling block, aci cording to Dr. Kissinger, was the size of the truce supervi- sory force that will be provi- ded by four nations?Canada, Indonesia, Hungary and Pa land. The United States wanted 5,000 men with' their own means of traveling throughout the country ? to investigate truce violations. Hanoi report- edly wanted only 250 men with no independent facilities. Ob- viously the 'real issue ?was whether there would be effec- or a bobtailed operation that would be unable to cope with widespread violations. Hanoi's troops in the South Intertwined at one point In the negotiations were the fate of North Vietnamese troops in the South-125,000 of them by U.S. count, 300,000 of them by Saigon's reckoning?the 577 known U.S. prisoners in Indo- sands of civilian prisoners in South Vietnamese pile. , The October draft, according to Dr. Kissinger, left the fate Approved. For Rckerat 2G01/08/077,1,61A,RADP7777f00:199f:of!PP91171;,1r Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 if Saigon's prisoners, mostly Suspected Viet Cong agents but ,Including some non-Communist 'dissidents, to be worked out with . the Viet Cang after a cease-fire. The U.S. prisoners were not linked to them. l' When Dr. Kissinger returned ii i Paris in November with his I, roposed revisions in the draft, e apparently was met with a refusal to free the U.S. prison- ers conditional only on the H WASHINGTON POST 1 10 JANUARY 1973 withdrawal of the g4;000' U.S. troops remaining in South Viet- nam. This may have been a gambit to counter Saigon's de- Maori for a reduction of North Vietnamese power in the South or to assuage Viet Cong anger over the neglect of their cadres in the October deal. Finally, there *as another calculated ambiguity? about the fates of laoll and Cambodia. While each .presents special problems, essentially they are side issues in the Vietnam con- flict. The October draft did not prcrvide, as far as is publicly known, for a, cease-fire in those two countries. All that was required was the with- drawal of foreign troops and neutralisation of their territory from outside interference. '? Ilawever,, Mr. Nixon said in late October that a cease-fire must be effective throughout /Indochina, which would include Hanoi's indigenous allies in Laos and Cambodia. Both could continue fighting for a while if deprived of outside support, but not indefinitely. The 'issue here would appear to, be one of an eventual ceage. fire in fact versus a proclaimed. truce simultaneous with f.hii liirger conflict. ; Secretary Laird and th,e ,tar-News Are Right Not a week has gone by since the President had a Minion lash Congresa for daring to suggest that the ttline to get out of the Vietnam war is now. And yet 1Melvin R. Laird, who, has been Mr. Nixon's own Defense ; Secretary the last four ytars, reports that the success of '?,"Vietnamization" makes possible "today . . the corn- . plete termination of American involvement in the war!! ;.Like those in Congress 'supporting a war-fund cutoff, Mr. Laird adds only one condition: the safe return of ;American prisoners of war .and 'an accounting of the missing. Listening to Mr. Laird, House Armed Services chair- man F. Edward Hebert, entirely an administration loyal. '1st on the war, replied, "we have got to get that honor- peace." And what is that? "The hbnorable peace," Chairman Hebert explained, "depends solely on the re- turn of those POWs and an account of the missing and I ' think you share that opinion." , "I do," answered Mr. Laird. ? , We have not heard the White House lash Mr. Laird or .Mr. Hebert for undercutting the Paris talks by their suggestion that, -as the Secretary put it, the United States ,has done "the 'most any 'ally could reasonably expect, for no nation can provide to another the will and deter- mination to survive." Nor do we expect to. (Mr. Laird's ? prepared remarks on Vietnam are excerpted elsewhere on this page.) Look elsewhere, at, for instance, -newspapers which 'have been sympathetic to Mr. Nixon on the war. Last . Friday, the Wall Street Journal said that "the one thing ,the Americans ought to insist on" at Paris Is ""bare minimum of good faith in Hanoi . . . In blunt terms, the barest minimum of good faith means first .we .get . the prisoners back, then, if they (Hanoi] like, they have their offensive . . . By now the United States has done everything that could reasonably be expected of an ally; Saigon does not in fact survive the fault .clearly will be, its own." On Sunday the Washington Star-News declared: "we, .'would urge that, if an acceptable and honorable political iiettlement appears impossible, both parties tat Paris] 'aibandon the search and secure what is in. their power , to achieve: the end,. now and forever, of U.S. air and, naval attacks against North Vietnam and the withdrawal, of the remaining U.S. forces in South Vietnam in return'il for repatriation of the American prisoners Of wars' Is not the point clear that it is not simply policy critics or political rivals,of the President, but friends and sup-, porters who are urging on him a course he apparently; resists. Consider the list: the Secretary of Defense, the chairman of the 'House Armed Services CoMmittee, the, Wall Street Journal, the Washington Star-NeWs? These are not parties which can be easily accused of being "Irresponsible," the designation put on Congressional Democrats last Sunday by the President's communical tions director, Herbert Klein. (That by his uncommuni- cativeness, Mr. Nixon has earned italics for that title, appears incontestable. Last Saturday, for instance, an!.4 other editorially friendly newspaper, the Chicago, Tribune, said: "The situation cries for candor on thel part of the President, and for explanations which have' been lacking.") Mr. Klein went on to 'claim that the President's 61 per cent victory in the November elections had given him "a -very clear mandate to proceed the way he has on Vietnam." It is a claim so flimsy and specious we ' question whether Mr. Nixon would dare make it for, I himself, should he deign to appear in public. For a good deal more than a judgment on Mr. Nixon's Vietnam, policy went into that 61 per cent. In so far as such al judgment did enter in; the vote was in our view a man.; date for the "peace" which the electorate has just been t assured was "at hand." It was not a mandate to level' downtown Hanoi, or to continue putting American blood treasure and, yes, honor at risk to a questionable politi- cal outcome in Saigon. Certainly it was not a mandate for Mr. Nixon to heed 'again, as he evidently did last month," the pleas of the wily President Thieu and let go of the'l agreement that his and Hanoi's negotiators had put within his reach. Mr. Nixon said last year that the war is no longer an Issue among the American people. He Is right: they all' want out. For ourselves, we'll stand with Secretary Laird, and the Star-News and, this time around, we fervently' hope Mr. Nixon will too. 30 'Approved For Release 2001/08/07': CIA'214151;177'=0154732146010-rj6V6bEF-FT:1 . - Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 Use of airpower, THE13140MIST jAtitiMiY 13, 197i , r 1! 11,A; ii:11'1,1 ' ? 1 il ' lifliii' ;) 1 ,,,,. The smoke over Hanoi should not Obscure the attemrit'io:Work out li.. , rational rules for when bombing, is, and is nOt, justified , ' ?I 1 ., . It 10016 aS if both PreSident Nixon and the people who : ,acquiescence,t and the point is that nobody who Would ' have been lambasting his bonibing policy may have to :, 'accept something as a legitimate target for artillery shells , take another look at the morality of air power. By Thurs., or mortar bombs can argue that the same place B out day, the fittt fod days of the new round of Paris talks had : of bounds for attack from the air. It has also come zi brought no clear sign '; of change in North Vietnam's be accepted that there is such a thing as excusable negotiating position. No doubt the North Vietnamese , inaccuracy, when the airman is honestly trying to hit .sant to make sue that any concession they do eventually the target but misses because his instruments let him produce Will not look too obviously like the result of, the clown, or his finger prods the button a moment too soon,' Or he is just bombing of 'Hanoi and; Haiphong. But until, and unless ' too frightened by his own quite possibly imminent death to get the calculations right. That applies. they do produce a cbncession, Mr Nixon's main argument in defence of the bombing will not be valid ; and the particularly when the targets lie withiq a populat.,7d area, mond argument on which the Americans have now fallen as many of them do. It is 'not generally held that. the m back, that the boinbing has ? further damaged North a accidental killing of civilians'in such circumstances mi..Ires? Viettiatri's war-Making capacity, will hold good only to i it wrong to have attempttd to hit the target at all. So far as any line can be drawn in the fighting of a the elcttrit that Mr Nixon 'can' persuade the Russians th, g 1 k . o SIOW With' aid' tO make' the damage goodV ' 4 ", i 1 war, it is drawn for most people at the moment when the killing of large numbers of civilians is done delibera- , On the other hand, even if the bombing has I not Yet tely, or when ,the methods used make it inevitable. Of 'done what ,Mr Nixon probably hoped it would, it has course, not even that distinction would be accepted by ?SISo become clear that it wits .much less bloody thhti most , everybody, or even by all those who have condemned people thought it wai while it was going 6n, aid than the bombing of Hanoi. It would have ruled out the Royal pante of the wilder comparisons With the second wocld 'Air Force's whole 'area-bombing policy against Germany War are still making it sound. Air' power remains alMoSt in the second world war, and although the Americans the only means left to the United StateS to influence the did try to use prepision bombing in Germany it would: ; outcome of the Vietnam War. It is therefore Useful to also have ruled out what the United States did to Japan's), :i'epeat a number of things about the ways in v171-4ch it cities, including the nuclear obliteration of two of them, ' ionship in 1944. and 194.5. It is by no means universally accepted that those British and American . bombing campaigns', bomb , Were unjqstifiable as a means of winning, or shortening,' a guii., that war. And those people ,whb would say even today, on tb that the bombing of Germany, and Japan was justifiable ; anH cannot now say the opposite about North Vicinam?:-?. to fti unless they also say that they do not believe North target, and likelier to be able to see it, than the longer- Vietnam's war aims 'to be worth opposing, which Means range sort of artillery is. The fact that the gun is it is not only the bombing they should object to, or unless stationary, and the plane is moving, makes people assume they are certain that the bombing has failed the effec- the gun is more accurate ; but modern methods of aiming , tiveness test by doing nothing to shorten the war. bombs have removed most of the , difference, and But for many people there is still a feeling that the anyone who has worked with artillery knows that there bombing of Germany and Japan went too far; and it is a fair amount of hit and miss before a gun can be is this feeling that has coloured most of the reactions to' brought on. to its target. It is not reasonable to regard what Mr Nixon did at the end of the old year. The raids' one as an acceptable instrument of war and not the , on Hanoi and Haiphong were compatible with most of other. The questions that have to be asked about both the accepted rules of what can be ,done with air power. guns and bombers are whether the target itself is a , There are legitimate targets in both cities ; the bombing' legitimate one, and whether it can be attacked with an orders seem to have been confined to those targets; some acceptable degree of precision. ; ii legitimate to use air ',ewer, and about the rela between ends and means in such a war as this.' , There is no difference In principle between dropped from an aircraft and a shell fired from 'They are both methods of putting hip explosi :it 'target to far. away to reach by other' mCaii fact e4en 'higheSpflying bornber is diose of the bombers were apparently even instructed to fly , ,t lower than usual, and face a bigger risk ? of being shot The dividing line down in order that they should be as accurate as possible. ? It has come to be accepted by most people in the The real objection, for most people, lies in the fact that twentieth century that a target is legitimate if it can be the attacking force included one particular kind of plane, shown to have a direct bearing on a country's ability to the 13-52. The trouble with the B-52 is that even when make war; that includes the harbours and railway it is being used with maximum care it flies so high and' systems that bring in war supplies, and the factories that so fast that the bombs it drops fall in i long sprawling directly or indirectly produce the materials of war, as line that spills over the edges of all but the biggest targets. well as the men in uniform who use these things. The It is what this built-in overspill does in cities that has,' eighteenth century did not see things that way, but then caused most of the criticism of Mr Nixon's decision to the wars of. the eighteenth century did not involve any- attack Hanoi and Haiphong, . thing like as much of a country's total economic capacity Even so, the number of casualties the B-525 caused as today's wars do. It may be wrong that the range of does not seem to fit in with the widespread belief that permissible targets has been allowed to grow as wide as this was just plain terror bombing. One of Hanoi's leading . it has; but it has been allowed to, by pretty general doctors said on December 29th?the day before the raids Approved For Release 2001/08/07 ? C1 A-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 31 y, 'if f 77-97-7717"-.1177-7177M71777""?..- Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 encird?that about 2,000 peoplehad been killed in the city: Other reports from Hanoi' since then put the total at between 1,300 and 1,600 in the whole' fortnight of bombing. For between a thousand and two thousand people to die in great pain, or in sudden numbing horror, is not something that can be shunted out of the mind with the argument that worse things happen in war. But it is worth remembering that the German air force killed ? almost as many in a single night in what now seems to ,be the relatively mild bombing of Britain in 1940 and 1941. The British themselves killed 20 and, 40 times as many in a single night's firestorm bombing of . Hamburg and Dresden and other German cities. As 'it happens, the Hanoi death roll is smaller than the number of civilians killed by the North Vietnamese in their artillery bombardment of An Loc in April, or the toll of refugees ambushed when trying to escape from Quang Tri at the beginning of May. That is-what makes the denunciations of Mr Nixon as another Hitler sound so unreal. There are proportions to ' be kept, even in ;tallying the horrors of war. , ' , The issue that hasn't changed Of course, a sense of proportion alone does not ansWer NEW YORK TIMES 9 January 1973 , One 'Man's War all the questions. But even if Mr Nixon was wrong to uset B-52s over Hanoi and Haiphong, because they were, inevitably going to kill too many people, there is still ; something that needs to be said about the relationship 1 between means and ends in the policy he is, trying to follow. A mistake of this sort cannot be explained away' by saying that the purpose it was intended to serve is a good one: the end does not justify any and every means, although it justifies a good many. But the argument works the other way round too. The use of an unjustified McallS does hataby itself invilid4e the did. That. seems to-havo been , forgotten by :a ,. geod many peop16 who . do, not believe either i that ,Nor.tqVietnam is in the right in 'this' ver, .or i that' it' does' not matter 'whether it , is right or Wrong. Fr those who do 316t?believe either of thosethings,! it Is , fair to say' that .Mr Nixon.' ought not to, love. used' this particular ,weapon in this. way. It is not fair to sat'. . . i that, by .using it, he has destrined the reasons fin. believing', Ithat . North , Vietnam should /leave the, pc:aides of 'Saudi ',Viethani. ii, the people of the south,. and, :.that it..thoul . be constrained', to put.iti!arniy in the sodthUnder 'eget& .,ittpetvi on,:. $t); .164 ? +4 'the'Paris.,,talksi.a0ii Ott!, 'tivetiti'.. 'on, that' iiqstilt the i heart 444 the Matter: 41.1irt '141,fill1;16:; I By Warren D. Manshel Vietnam ha a become one man's war. Whether it is his crusade to prove that he, personally, cannot be "pushed ." around," or that our inevitable even- tual departure is "honorable" does not matter. What matters, aside from the supreme consideration , of the human losses' and suffering caused, is that the President used the period of Congressional adjournment and pre- , occupation with the holiday season to ' intensify the war far above any pre- 11' vious level. He has been able to do this without the encumbrance of Congressional ' advice; he did not need to consult , anyone outside of his own staff and !: of the military. The malaise begun during World War II with the belief that politics Should end at the water's edge, the concept of bipartisanship in foreign policy, has now reached its fever point In the absolute power Of the President to make total war. All the requisite powers to do so were delegated long ago. Now politics is not even involved: neither party shares in the responsi- bility of. this purely Presidential deci, Sion. ,In four years in office, Mr. Nixon has shown a persistent taste for per- sonal diplomacy. Summit meetings with the heaciS of the Communist hierarchies in Peking and Moscow are a central ingredient in his style and sign of an overwhelming confidence in his personal abilities and influence. The Constitution assigns to the Presi- dent predominance in the direction and conduct of foreign policy and they necessarily reflect his temperament , and character as well as his view of ' our national interest. This is probably ; no more true of Mr. Nixon than of either of his immediate predecessors although he seems to have made fuller use of his prerogatives for personal initiative in the context of foreign policy that did Mr. Johnson, and at least as much as did Mr. Kennedy. Control over foreign policy has been concentrated in the White House p. an extent probably unprecedented in this century except during the Presi- dency of John Kennedy and the war- tittle days of Franklin Roosevelt. Only a few members of Mr. Nixon's official family appear in a position of full Presidential confidence. It would be hard to imagine the Nixon Cabinet as a' forum fot a general discussion or deliberation of the major Nixon initia- tives relating to Vietnam: the "incur- sions" into Laos and Cambbdia (decided upon in the Rose Garden of the White HOuse), the mining of North Vietnam- ese waters (announced dramatically by the President On TV), and the bombing. Mr. Nixon seems far too conscious of his vast prerogatives and too confident of his ability to discharge them, to share them. He has taken literally Truman's dictum that the Oval Rooth -of the White House is where the buck stops. Far from evad- ing responsibility, he seems to enjoy It and to glory in his reputation as a man of tough fiber, a man who cannot be pushed around, an unpredictable man. And that is where the ultimate ? danger rests: in the conflict between restraint and unpredictability. As a matter of constitutional princi- ple, the management of foreign policy, while largely a Presidential preroga, jive, should at every point involve the express or tacit approval of Congress and the support of public opinion. the conference table in Paris, evidently decided to bomb North Vietnam into submission, he timed his decision shrewdly: with Congress adjourned, he could not be hampered by possible Congressional reaction. His decision to send Henry Kissinger back to Paris and stop his awesome bombing cam- paign neatly undercut incipient moves to legislate an end to the war. Although , ? it is hard, after thesq many years and the broad powerg'slready'delegated to ' the President by Congress in this con... filet, to believe that Congress might take some definitive action now to end this war, that possibility is far more ' real today than before. U.S. military activity in Vietnam no longer involves ground troops, and the argument that we should not cut off support of American troops in the field conse- quently holds much less meaning. If legislative restrictions seem no threat to the President's initiative in - undertaking whatever military meas- ures he wants in Vietnam, neither do the normal requirements of practical politics. Of course, neither Mr. Nixon ; nor his two predecessors have felt ; obliged in the course of this conflict to keep domestic reaction to our Viet- namese policy constantly in view. The American people have never shared in , r the decisions that committed our na- tion to war in Vietnam. To the con- trary, it seems far more reasonable , to assume that the majority of those 3. who voted for Mr. Nixon last Nov. 7 voted as much to end the war as did r. those who voted against him. 13ut it is now January and Mr. Nixon IS his own man, and he cannot be held to ; account for quite some time. In the meantime, the bombing halt will con- tinue, or it will be resumed, as Mr. ; Nixon alone determines. warren D. Manshet When the President, dissatisfied with Foreign Policy. the achievement$ of his negotiator at 32 is co-editor of Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA:RDP7F--043432k01.601't1var60r0i4i1417?" Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-0' HE NEW YORK rags, MONDAY, JANUAAY 2, 1973 ? if OW. Swedish Chilliness Toward U.S. Ls Limited to ie ? Hy ALVIN SHUSTER ? , Special to Th. Nrw York Times !, STOCKHOLM, Jan. 6 ? 'Swedes are out this weekend 'enjoying the mildest winter in 400 years and gathering signa- tures on a petition backed by all political parties calling Mr an end to the Vietnam war. There is rare January ? sun- shine on Stockholm's rivers and canals and no snow, and the ski dealers are unhappy. there is also an Unusual' dip- Ihmatic chill in the air? Swedish-American ? relations have fallen, to a new low as another casualty of the Viet- 'nom war. . ? As of Monday, neither ,tountry will be represented by an ambassader. The Americans ,have not had one since August and the Swedes have been told 'to hold back in sending a re placement for their ? envoy, who is departing this weekend I This latest and most severe strain in diplomatic relatidns between Washington and Stock- holm, long at odds over the war, developed quickly after the resumption of Americari bombing of the Hanoi and Haiphong areas, with 'the col. ;lapse of peace talks Nat month, The reaction of the Swedes, among the most vocal and ac' 'five opponents of the war the West, was one of revulsion land shock. Sheeked by Hospital Damage L Their anger intensified short- ly, before Christmas, with the news of the damage to a hos. pltfil in Hanoi that had been partly equipped by Sweden. And that night, after 9P.M., with his sons in ?bed upstairs, Premier Olof Palme sat down at the Aitchen table and wrote out it 'Statement that linked the Arnerictin 'bombing , of Wirth, Vietnam with Nazi massacres in World War II. He set it snide, reread it In the morning,' consulted n few aSsociates?but not his Foreign Ministry?and then issued it to the press. The result was a violent reaction from Washington and a sharp 'diplomatic slap, ' ?? President Nixon heard of ,Mr. Palme's words just after they moved on news agency ;wires .on Dec. 23 and ordered diplomatic retaliation. The Swedes were Add that .their new Ambassador, 'irneve Mtg. ,ler, would not be welcome for the present and that the American charge d' Wakes, John C. Guthrie, would not be returning to Stockholm. 'Not en Instant Reaction' Premier Palme reflected' on the crisis in an interview in his office as he smoked his favorite American cigarettes. "It was not an instant reaction." he !mid. "It was building up inside Of me' since the bombing re- sumed. We had many discus- dons on it over a period of five days or so. And then, that even- ng, I knew what I had to say about it.. "I don't regret It because In this world you have to speak out fairly loud to make anyone listen. I can't keep . site% ? this issue and won't be pres- turized into silence. ? ? ' "I would prefer if the United States 'would recognize the fact that one can have a deep- seated difference of .'opinion with Washington that balls for arguments'. rather than diplo- matic rebuffs. They., serve no useful purpose. 1 ? , Mr.. Palme, who has not been a favorite politician in Wash- ington's eyes since he walked with the North Vietnamese envoy in an antiwar , demon- stration here five years ago, sought to remove some of the sting from his controversial statement, which called the bombing a "form of torture" reminiscent of atrocities corri- mated at Katyn, Lidice and Treblinka. _ , He said that the fist repre- sented "symbols of meaningless human suffering and violence" and did not intend to imply "literal comparison" between the, bombing and thhse past events ? and the politicians re. sponsible. ? . The 45-year-old Premier, who traveled widely in the ' United States as a student and attend- ed Kenyon College in Ohio, insisted in his excellent English that Sweden was not anti- American but anti-Vietnam War. ? In his view, close and friendly ties Would be resumed once the war, was over because Sweden was "probably the most pro- American country in Europe." ,Many Swedes, stopped on the' Streets or in casual ..convers,a4 tion in bars 'and shops, Make the same point. They 'talk of three million. Swedes who emi- treted to America, of the sim- ilarity in life-styles, and of the hetivy . injection of American ft ulture ,into filieS, 'television,' Musid'and other areas., ? ? ' 1 But they are strong Appo- stenta, of the American role in Indochina, with the depth ,of 'feeling depending largely,. on their age. The young here are 1 'active and vociferous, raise Money for the "liberation front" in South Vietnam and applaud Mr. Palme'S positions. 'Many in the older generation are more reserved, largely be- cause of their memories. " - "I think Palme was toe strong, although 1 am- against 'the war," said Lars Hansson, a 59-year-old who was strolling 'along the banks of one of the many fingers of the Baltic Sea. "I don't think we should be so tough of the United ?States. I remember what it did during the Second World War, what it did for Europe afterwards. It's a good country." Several Opposition politicians took the view that Mr. Palme had gone too far in the refer- ence to Nazi atrocities, and his Foreign Ministry . probably agrees. But they- also feel. as does Mr. Palme, that the Amer- ican Jeaction -tb his criticisms Went too far, as well. All Parties Oppose Bombing There, is. however, a gener- ally unified. position on Viet- nam within the politic!' parties. All five parties from, the C,Ori- oAtillio1414@1 P 2ovrtlft% agreed to support the petition ,now circulating, calling on the United States to stop all bomb- ing in Vietnam and on "all par- ties" in the conflict to sign a peace agreement. Mr. Palme hopes that two million of Swed- en's eight million people will ? sign the petition. ? One result of the present dis- pute has been to .strengthen Mr. Palme's political position. His Social Democratic party, in power for 40 years, is in some trouble now because of infla.' tion, ,running at up to 7 per cent a year?coupled with vir- tual economic stagnation, with a growth rate last year:of about 2 per cent,' one of the lowest IC Europe. The polls show that an dee- 'tion today?it is scheduled for iSeptember?would oust the So. ,cial Democrats. Mr. Palme needs all the- support he can muster, and as a long-standing critic' of United 'States war policy, he clearly reflects what Most Swedes !ed.., , ? U.S. Helps Palme "Most of us did feel that the bombing was an outrage," said ,Lars Eric Thunholm, president' 'of the Scandinavian Private Bank, One of the largest in Europe. "Many also think that Pelmets wording was too strong in protest. But the United States helps him by taking such actions in return. He receives sympathy from people "who might not give it otherwise. The United States should have done nothing in response." "The fact that the bombing has stopped around Hanoi, and that talks are about to resume has little bearing," said Gunnar Helen, the head ,of the Opposi- Mon Liberal party, as' he sat in ,the futuristic new Parliament: building. "Hundreds have: changed their position from' tt 'sort of balanced silence to a' 'Clear outcry against the bomb- ing. And 'that includes many o 'the older 'people who are now 'divorcing their memories of postssar America from whati going on now.". ? , ' ; A History of Tension ? The recent' history of diplo- matic relations between Wash- ington and Stockholf has fre- quently been marked by ,ten- sion. Sweden was the first Western country to give full diplomatic recognition to North Vietnam. She has' granted asylum to more than 400 Amer- ican deserters and has repeat- edly attacked United States war policy in a spirit that Washington often regarded as one-sided for a nation' that, has professed neutrality for 150 years. ? Moreover, Stockholm has sent large-scale relief and aid to North Vietnam. It does not do the same for South Vietnam, nor does it have a diplomat in Saigon. 'We technically recog- nize the Saigon regime as long as it is in power,' Mr. Palme said. "But It would not be ac- ceptable to public opinion to' have an ambassador there. We never had one and it's too late 7 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0??1 r now." The repeated attacks on United States' war policy by Mr. ?Paltne hardly surprised, Washington in recent months,, and it probably would not have reacted so severely had the Premier not implied a compari- son between', Mr, Nixon and Hitler. In 1968, after Mr. Palme. ?then a Cabinet Minister?ape peered at the antiwar rally with the, North Vietnamese envoy,' President. Johnson called home, William Heath, then the Amer. lean Ambassadot. The post was not filled for a year, although' Sweden maintained her envoy In Washington. ' Tension began building again1 as the, war continued tied the statements tly Swedish officialt alspeared... to . grow stronger.' Washington was particularly, angered by a speech made' in: May' 'by the Minister for, Edu- ?tation, Ingvar Carlsson, who appeared at a demonstration. ,sponsored by, the active nem-. :tion-front group here and the Swedish 'Committee, on Vieti ,nam. ? .. "The war is not the only example, although the most brutal . one, of the American craving to dominate otherl countries,",' he said before it! 'crowd.. of 5,000: "The samd feature, economic and techtio.', logical ,supremacy?which easi ily turns to unmasked physical violence?.-is' evidenced also; within the American commun., ity in the relations between dif ferent groups' of people." As read by American offi- ciaTt, the tpeech went clearly beyond an antiwar speech and represented strident anti-Amer- ican sentiments. Mr. Palme has denied that was the intention, but Washington remains un- convinced. Moreover, there is unhappi. hess about some Of the school 'workbooks distributed through- out Sweden: The book on Brit- ain features on the. cover a double-decker bus and guards at Buckingham Nike. The one on the Soviet Union shows lit- tle Russian dolls. The United States cover has black children' behind a fence,, suogeSting a concentration camp. . A Conservative party politl-, cian disputes theSe American objections. "I've ? always fol- lowed the view that the Swedes. were antiwar and not anti- American," : he said.. "Rut sometimes ? I do-worry about the young genration. ? They, may grow up in an atmosphere where . they won't be. able to make that distinction. But the' sooner the war ends, the better chance of heading off future problems , with America'd image." ? , As it is, Americans who have long lived here- report that they. never encounter unfriendly actit from the Swedes. This Is easily. confirmed :by visiting, Amer., icans. . Meanwhile,' as the: SWedee' geGomptue they Ali:their 7;1777 `71' 1 ' ' . f '111 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 WASHINGTON STAR 14 January 1973 "kreen' winter," one 'of the un- happiest men in town is Mr. Moller, the Ambassador-desig- nate to Washington. At 60, he Was about to start a new career after 25 years as the editor of suburban ? Social Democratic daily. He quit his Job, resigned Ills seat in Parliament and Worked this week in a fourth- floor office Of the Foreign Min- istry 'preparing for his neW as- signment. , "Fm a little disappointed,". he said. "I had hoped to go to ? Washington and improve rela- tions. And I'm still looking 'forward ? to 'it. I hope to go, soon." ? , ' ? Another Ambassador did'; 'leave this weekend. Jean Cris- ,tophe Oberg said good-by to ,his wife and children after his ,Christmas vacation. He ? re-.' :turned to Hanoi. WASHINGTON POST 11 January 1973 Hanoi Says Thanks ;to Bomb &ides', ?' 1 , Pratt% Nevis Dfirpatobot 1 The Hanel press yesterday thanked the five Seandinavian' countries for their criticism of ? the U.S.' bombing of North Vi- etnam' at 'the end of Decem- laer. , . . ; A commentary. in Nhan Dan, 'the , Communist Party daily, 'singled out Sweden, Norway, :Denmark, Finland and Ice- land. , ;? '? at said the Peoples and gov- ernments of the ,fiVe countries gave "tt :* brilliant example of international solidarity, and of the vigilance and determina- tion of the 'peoples against American Imperialism, man- kind's most ferocious enemy." -. Observers. In Hanoi noted that the North Vietnamese so far have not voiced their grati- tude in this respect to any other group of countries, not 'even those with Communist 'governments. ? ,1? .1 In Bonn, meanwhile, West Gernian churchmen sp.. :plauded five 'American reli- 'gious leaders touring Europe to mobilize protests against U.S. policy in Vietnain.. - ..; Dr. Harvey .Cox. of Harvard, ?leader of ..the group, asked 300 :delegates to a state synod of 'the Evangelical Lutheran 'Church to "tell our President About the concern with which this' war fills you." ' i 1 In an incident attributed to pposition to American policy in Veitnam, vandals broke into ulthe 'America House 'library in r?Erankfurt, West Germany, and 1 et it afire.: In Lyons, Frinee,:a gran]) of , nil-Vietnam war demonstre- tors;invaded the U.S. consu- , te,:f pulled down the :Stars ' *di Stripes,,, and 'raised a ..tlwastika ring. , ' # ,,, t ? Americans' Leiters to Palme Support S By ROBERT SKOLE Special to The Star?News STOCKHOLM ? Americana are giving Sweden's Prime' Minister Olof Palme his staunchest support in his criti-' cism of the United States: bombing of North Vietnam. "I've never received so, 'much mail from abroad particularly' from the United States ? and letters are over- whelmingly positive to the ' stand we have taken," says ; Palme. ,To find out just what kind of' snail he was getting, I,went to . Government House, and there looked through the Incoming letters. In Sweden, this can be, done: - all mail sent to a public office, once it has been "regis- tered" as having been re-. celved, becomes a public docu- ment. And public documents . are readily available to the press. ' Palme describes the mail he4, Ins been receiving, comment- ing on his sharp criticism. of the Christmas bombings of, , Hanoi and Haiphon g, "deeply personal and emotion- al." "You'll see that they' are not Just filled with slogans or catch-phrases," he told me. Frustration Expressed He was right. I read through' about 300 letters ? most' of' ,them from the United States.' If there was any 'common tone, it was one of deep frus- tration and anger. And great, respect for Palme's speaking. out. Indeed, many of the lettersI made Palme's now well-known speech ? comparing the Hanoi !Christmas bombings to "deeds of, horror" of World War Two ? appear mild. For ,,many ,years, Palme has said that He and other Swedish opponents to the U.S. war in Indochina have gotten their main argu- ments from American 'oppo-, nents to the war. He says that his first speeches attacking the American war in Vietnam, ? delivered in the mid-1960's, , were largely based on argu- ments used by Sen.' William Fulbright. . Today, Palme need, simply go up a flight of stairs from' his office, and there in a foot-high stack of mail, find Inspiration. Palme reads all mail, which, will come as a surprise to ' many Americans who started their letters with the words, ?"You will probably never get to read this., ' ' Common Theme The letter on the top of the stack I started through, ex- .presd a common wede's War Stance ?., iound in most letters: 'Thank ,whr. Keep on speaking out."1,1 you for speaking out on the ' Letters included a number' .. i subject of the barbaric bomb- from well-known a n t i -w a ing of Vietnam by the United leaders. One was from Cyrusl 'States," wrote Mr. and Mrs.;; 'Eaton, the chairman of the,; Philip Augerson of?Los Ange- 'Chesapeake and Ohio Railway.I les. "We wish other world. Eaton sent his letter a week leaders had the courage and 'after Palme's statement on. the 'sympathy for humanity; the Christmas bombing, and' that you have to express them.; urged him to present "a. pelves as you had." , ? strong public statement of dis-: Mrs. Lester Neuman of approval" which he said would,; Washington wrote, "We wel- have "World-wide influence! come expressions such as. and would be especially effec- 'yours, hoping they will be tive in Washington." '. heeded Where we, who should : Another letter was from 1 , be, are not. In sorrow. . ." ' Robert S. Bilheimer, execu2, ' . A number of letters ex- tive director of the Nationat pressed anger at the State De- :Council of Chtirches. of Christ.i ?partment's announcement that 'There was one from June Eis-i Sweden's newly appointed am- ? iley of Wilmington, Del., chair-; 'balsador to the United States, r Yngve Moeller, was not wet; woman of Mothers United For , Peace. Jack Baker, president: 'come at this timedJerome R. of the student . association of: Noss of Columbia, Md. called, the University of Minnesota, i this "petty, dictatorial sent a cable in Swedish. imacy. A letter by Stanley R. Ro- ' ? A Mayor's Letter senberg, a New York archi- One letter was from Eugene , tect, was typical of many ex- s, Daniell, jr,, mayor of' pressing frustration: "I beg Franklin, N.H., and a member i you to centinue to make pllblic. 'of the state legislature. Writ-1 these outrages against human- ing on mayor's office letter.: ity, at the same time letting -head Daniell said, "It is sails) the world know that there are ,fying that you should lead the .many here, frustrated and civilized in the condemnation, powerless, who deplore these, 'of the most misguided leader- vicious actions." , : ship in the history of man- Only about a dozen letters, kind. As a. very small person were sent to Palme protesting: in this turbulent world, 1, his statement. '(In 1969 and thank ypu, as I feel millions 1970, when relations between of my countrymen wish to.": 'Sweden and The United States A number of letters were' were' likewise strained over from people connected with 'the Vietnam war, most of the ! letters Palme received from universities. "Despite any-7 the U.S. were critical of the thing the State Department. may say, you spoke for many Swedish stand.) One letter, un-: , Americans in likening the signed, among the "negative" bombing of Vietnam to Bahl- your Volvos to Hanoi." Anoth- Yar, Lidice and Kaytn," wrote. 'mail, simply said, "Go sell er, signed by Mrs. R. O'Brien Prof. Bernard K. Johnpoll of. of New York City, said: "In- the State University of New; , stead of telling lies to the York at Albany. . 4 'world, why? don't you mind Peter Christian Hausewed-! 'your own business? You have en, who works with the Cornell a rotten country. Why don't University Southeast Asia Pro-I you use your time on doing ,gram, wrote : "I want to as-, something for Sweden. You sure you .that your action 181 won't get any more tourists; well recognized and appreciat-: ed here among friends and ac- ademic colleagues and that we, support you fully." Nguyen Thai, central com- mittee member of the Move- ment for National Reconcilia- tion in Washington wrote, "AS a Vietnamese, I would like to congratulate you. You have' been a source of encourage- ment to all of us." from here." ? 'Not Itaditals' ? A number of letter writers took special pains to let Palme 'know they are not "radicals." "This is not a letter from a -crack-pot radical as we may be depicted by the administra- tion?I am 53, and vice presi- tient of a moderate-sized com- pany," wrote Bernard R. Four. New Yorkers, Dr. and Aronson of Minn e apoli s, Mrs. Joel Hartley and Saul Minn., who added, "I am end Ruth Dancourt, asked if ashamed to be an American their names could be added these days." to the national Swedish pe- Irving Schactman.? of Short. titlon condemning the bomb. Hills, N.J., put it a little more ing, and taey added "we are bluntly: "I am not a child. j four native-born, loyal U.S) am 62, and operate a business 'citizens." doing over s2 million in sales The national petitions haveit annually. I am against alt 3460 far been signed by 500,0001 Approved For Release 2001/08/67 ;' CIA-RDP771-601T32140' f71177? Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 Versone, as estimated at a' `meeting of the five political, party leaders. Palme, in looking over the pile of letters, said, "Evident- ly, a small country must speak'. Out very clearly and plainly in, order to be heard. Actually,. ?when / made my stlitement on the Christmas bombings, I didn't realize the enormous ef.. ? feet it would have. The re- sponse from -so many Ameri- cans supporting the condem-: 'nation clearly shows that ther 'point I raised was an enor.. ziloits human problem." NEW YORK TIMES 18 January 1973 U.S. Exhibits Stoned in Sp sin MADRID, Jan. 16 (Reuters)? Youths stoned windows and threw gasoline' bombs at two 'American automobile , shoW;? rOoths here today in protest ,against the Vietnam war, police I sources said. ? BALTIMORE SUN 17 January 1973 Saigon's Politicial Prisoners A reasonable guess is that .a new iV etnant accord, if indeed one does come, will amount in most of its essentials to the agreement that , went bad in October. Among these, it is conjectured, may well be the provision of a Council of National Conciliation and Concord, consist.' Ing of representatives from the South Vietnamese government, the Viet Cong and neutralists, who ' jointly would organize free, Inter- nationally supervised elections, and oversee the implementation of the agreements. , Whatever the details, the central Issue, as James S. Keat notes in a dispatch to The Sun from Wash- ington, is likely to remain in-rone fohn or another the issue of "who will retain how much political au- thority" in' SOuth 'Vietnam. Dear- ing importantly on this point, and to be watched/ for sharply in any agreement, is the question of the civilians held as' political prisoners by Saigon. , Mr. kept sOs they number 'un- 'counted thousands" Some esti- 'Mates put Iheni at 80,000, others at 200,099. Some are held as suspected Viet Cong agents, and many. un- doubtedly are. 'But others, them- selves in the uncounted thousands, are detained under law's-by-decree by which,li.deelared unlawful, the' practice of ? "communism or pro- Cqmthunlst neutralism." the government of,'Saigon equatesneu- POST ? .1 ?7 WASHINGTON 12 JANUARY 19 7 3 Behind the- Rift With Sweden The current diplomatic rift between the United States and Sweden is disturbing in itself and even more disturb- lag in what it portends for the leadership role which Mr. Nixon would have this country take after , the war. "Mr, Palme, the Swedish Prime Minister, has a long record of vigorous open opposition to American policy in Viet- nam. To protest one of his gestures, Mr. Nixon did not replace the American ambassador who retired from iStockholm last summer. In response ,to Mr. Palme's latest outburst, an extravagant statement placing the Christmas bombing of Hanoi among the century's worst "atrocities," the President responded even more sharply. There is no :record that he attempted to explain to the Swedes the purpose of the latest bombing, any more than he has to 'Americans. But he did tell Sweden not to replace its retiring ambassador. "We aught as well face it," a State Department official thoroughly caught up in the Nixon spirit told Newsweek. "We are dealing here with an Unfriendly country." , This is, of course, nonsense. That an American diplo- mat could apparently believe it suggests just how far the Nixon administration has gotten out of touch with the rest of the world. For Sweden, is anything but an unfriendly country. It is, in the natural scheme of things, a close friend sharing the deepest associations and values with the United States. It is also, obviously, a country whose leader, along with 'a substantial portion of its citizenry, happens to disagree with a particular American policy. But the way to cope with a friend's disagreement Is, at the least, to get in closer touch, to try to explain, not to react in pique and close off the symbolic channel of communication between nations, the'exchange of am- bassadors. Passing off political disagreement as an ex- pression of calculated hostility is simply wrong-headed. Here we introduce a point so obvious as to be almost embarrassing to hive to make. It was not Olof Palme's words that shot almost a score of B-52s out of the skies of North Vietnam during the December raids: it was I ' tralism per se with comrriunism,'1 :this inians that s great many people whose sentiments are tral, or who have spoken in favor ); of neutralism for Vietnam, are con- fined In prison, along with others .merely ..inspected, by. someone, of ..; 'harboring such sentiments. A law of the. names are wed known, belonging to men without' ,.whose participation a tripartite council would have. little meaning:. . Most by far are obscure, from ham- lets and villages; but If these' ,!!' 'people also are to be held In prison he chaticd of a, neutral Vietnaiii, ',which may be the best of the de"'', cent, honorable chantes; have been severely, vitiated. ? ? II ? missiles supplied to Hanoi by the Soviet Union. The two million 'signattires Mr. Palme is trying to rally for ' an end-the-bombing petition are not killing South Viet- namese: the bullets sent to the Vietcong by the Peoples Republic of China are. Yet Mr. Nixon keeps his ambassa.,! dor in Mescow, and Moscow's envoy stays in Washingtonl As with the Russians, he contin6es efforts to 'broaden! ties with the Chinese. How can the President countenance? this measure' of illogic in his policy? , The Swedish attitude?which is, let it be noted, shared, In some more or less considerable degree by practically; ? eVery friend the 'United States has?expresses essentially; we think, the bafflement with- which so many people' everywhere view the extended and continuing America& ,involvement in Vietnam. The attitude may not arise so, much out of compassion for the Vietnamese, or hostility, ` to Americans, as out of cold self-interest. Mr. Nixon would like the American stand in Vietnam to be seen' . by friend and foe as a testament' to the United States': ,devotion to an ally and to its dedication to the principle of national self-determination. But many people in many lands see the American stand as evidence that the, United States has lost its balance and undermined its own pen.: chant and capacity for a leading world role. Many4 foreigners?not all, to be sure?look at the United States. and see a nation harshly divided within itself, one whose; will and readiness to make good on other international commitments have been put in shadow by its costly and disproportionate involvement in Vietnam: From the view- point of their own self-interest, they must necessarilyi wonder if and how the United States has been changed' by the war, and whether it is wise to count on the United', States in years ahead. This is to us the real issue involved in President'l Nixon's reaction to Olof Palme. We cannot conceive how, ? It is to the President's or the country's advantage for .him to pursue his particular line of response. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 :041X-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 r7. r? Fir :r,r: 1 17.77 m7.17.711`,71771711117,777 Approved For Release 2001/083/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 LOS ANGELES TIMES 12'1373 Viet Economy Crisis Feared. if U.S.. Cuts Aid ?IX CQUES LESLIE ' ? ? Times Staff Writer SATGON?While. Wash- ington lawn-W.:ere threa- ten to cut off military sup- port for the war, another prospect that Congress will end or reduce eco- ?nomic aid to South Viet- pam--is deeply worrying allied officials here. The economic. situation In SOuth Vietnam is al- ready so serious. that off i; Claist say American. aid for fiscal 1074 must be In- creased substantially If South Vietnam is to avoid severe dislocations. if*U.f;l4 aid continues at the pre- sent rate, a high-ranking. American economist said, "that would be short of to- tal disaster but close to it." The reason for immedi- ate concern about econom- ic aid is that Congress must make a decision on it. within two months, since the present allocation ex-. piree Feb. 'A Officials fear that cong,resamen will be facing the issue at a time when their mood Seems untisually antiwar, and when the South Viet- ameat economy is feeling the impact of Atneritain military withdrawals. ? The ? economic: is:atte ii undoubtedly a major tea.- son why President Nguyen Van Thieu has sent a score of is misaa tie a 10 argue Snu I. h Viet nam't case in Waahiegton. The government announced Wednesday that a delega- tion or tower-11011.4! (kiw- i it's and one senatoravoubl join five senators and two former ambae;adora a t. ready in Washington. Officials tlyctilied Some. American officiate here ail? somewhat mysti- fied becanae U.S. con- grefsmen seem to he fo- cusing on lagislation to end the war when the.ofti- dais Suggest by simply withholding economic aid they could probably achieve a similar result. While President Nixon can veto any bill passed by Corigree, he cannot au- thorize funds net allocated by Congress. The officials are prepar- ing for the visit to Saigon next week of live *U.S. sen- ators led by Daniel Inouye CD-Itawaiie chairman of the . appropriations sub- committee on foreign operations. The officials %vitt explain to the senators why they want roughly SL")00 million In economic aid for fiscal 15M, about S160 million more than South Vietnam will recek e this year if the present. aid resolution. is extended three months to cover fiscal 1.97:. It is po4sible that. offi- cials are overstating the gravity of the economic si- tuation here to coax more aid out of Congress..ritit if that is so. they would be flying in the face of the iinofficial policy of opti- mism which has long dom- inated America it pro- nouncementa on S o u t.h Vietnam. In addition. the facts cit- ed by the officials seem. con% hiding. Withdrawal Blues . T h e bigeest problem now facing the South Viet- pamese economy is how to make up for the departure of American troops, who with civilians spent from ,00 million to .0f1 mil- lion each year from IffiG to 1971. The influx of this, money into the economy enabled the South Viet- naniese government to fi- nance an equivalent amount of vital imports. But in 1972 the 14ntre fell to million. and in 197: ii is expected to fall Idelow MOO million. Thus the government of Viet- nam must quickly find a new source or income to conlinne importing at the same level. 36 . One method would be to enlarge exports. In fart. South Vitnamese exports doubled in 1.97:.! despite the Communist offensivp. but the amount ($24 mil- lion) le still insignificant ('nm pared in Import e ($7:1 million). Economists are hoping that within four years 'exports will reach $100 million, but even that figure would still be dwarfed by imports. T.11 C other al) vious source of funds is Ameri- can economic aid. Of the $340 million figure for fis- cal 1073, $60 million is for ,programs administered by the Agency for Interna- tional Development and fcitS0 million is for some- thing called the Commodi- ty Import Progrbm. ? Under the CIF, the U.S. government pays Ameri- can exporters to send pro- ducts to South Vietnam. But because of inflation the same allocation buys fewer and fewer American products each year, Inflation Aspect. ? In, the last two years prices of products %sent to Vietnam under the CII' in- creased 15'.; /a year. Offi- ,eials estimate ? that infla- tion of these products will drop to in 1073. but that still means that a Increase in CII' funils would he required simply to buy the same quantity of goods. To avoid inflation-ridden American prOdUlai, offi- cials here would like to have more aid funds., With no strings attached. One American economist said he hope.d that 8100 million in mxt year's aid package wont(' not he tied to pur- chiises of American pro- Olivia. Needless, to say, such a measure would not be popular in Congress, since the aid than could not be justified for its hut- ireszing effect on the U.S. economy. ? ? The only other alterna- tive for South Vietnam is to cut its imports. Ameri- can economists say that at, most$lOQmjj1jonin nonessential imports - 'could( be cut. A large per- centage of imports consists of such necessities as fad- . lizer and petroleum, the. absence ? or which would ? have an immediate ad-, verse impact on the econo- my. In addit ion. banning , products might only in- duce smuggling, a prob- kin which recently has been declining in signifi- Vance. 'South Vietnamese peo- ple are already suffering economic woes. According ' to one economist, real per- sonal income dropped 10!.; . in 1972, as both unemploy- ment and i inflation in- et;ased. Unemployment in I? the Saigon area is above ? Exchange Rate In addition, sins ? of the economy's instability are rtnppearing. For example, the black market piaster exchange rate, which sev- eral months ago dropped below the official rate. (now 463 piasters per dol- lar). has jumped back to about 10c,i, above the offi- cial rate. In Hong Kong where speculation is more Intense, one U.S. dollar buys more than COO piast- ers. Asked what would hap- peri'bif U.S: economic aid continued at the same, rate, one American officai said: . "You'll have a stagnant ? economy with a lot of un- 'happy people in it. Prices will go up sharply, invest- ment will be very small, real wages in the govern- ment sector' will decline ? and you'll have a harder time managing the econo- my. Problems that we've already solved will reap- pear." "If imports fell front $700 million to S300 or $400 million, you'd have a grad- ual decline in output and an increase in unemploy- ment, emoted with a huge increaie in inflation," an- other official said. 'With a war going on, it's hard to see any government sm.- %lying under those condi- : lions." ? Asked to assess the eco- nomie situation if aid tvere eliminated entirely, the Of- ficial said, "Some filings arc too horrible to think about. We're still planning . on getting the aid because: . there's nothing elle ?wt. ? could do.*, Approved For Release 2001%08/07': CiA'40171-01343210-001i006076fITZT77(711 , , Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 ' NEW YORK TIMES 7 January 1973 CIIIITESE POKETUIT U.S. IN VIETNAM Comics Ridicule Adviser, but Understanding Is Evident ?Dispatch of The Times, LandOA ? PEKING, Jan. B?While the Vietnam peace talks resume in Paris, Chinese children ? are reading a cartoon strip book- let that portrays the Ameri- cans in Vietnam as more pa- thetic than fearsome. .? At a Peking bookstore, ' a Small Chinese ? girl, her chin barely higher than the counter, surveyed the range of children's booklets and Said: ."What's new?" One item she could have bought is called "Southern Blaze of Wrath." The chief villain in the books yet,e published in September, is an -American adviser called Iones4 He wears the dress uni4 form of World War H, even when sweatily inspeCting for./ tilled villages in South Viet.' ham, and is perpetually har,, assed by the demands of hia tsuperior officers for betteri results. . The other villains are the; . "puppet troops" of the Salgoq Government. Jones prevents them from massacring the in4 habitants of a village with ? Vietcong sympathies and says; '''Hop't shoot up decent villag- ers. If there are some prob- lems we should sit down and ,discuss them in accordance With our civilized American custbm." i Jones is portrayed as a ri- diculous person, but there also ? seems to be an understanding ',of the American dilemma in Vietnam. ' Meets Vietcong Heroine , Later Jones invites the. im- prisoned Vietcong heroine for an interview at which a sen - for' officer Of the, South Viet.! namese Army is present. Jones says; "We ,have corn to your., honorable country to promote mutual friendship and security. The United States Government would like to xpend large sums of money to help your country to develop the MekontRiver.' ? But the heroine tells him to shut up and she is tortured in ,in electric chair. 'The torture scene itself is not portrayed, and she survives the experi- ence, escapes and takes part In a general offensive on Jones's headquarters. American Phantom jets are shoWn being shot down by or- dinary carbine fire, and a pi- lot wearing an old-fashioned leather helmet is captured while he pathetically waves a Bale-conduct leaflet. Jones is last shown sitting Contrite but unharmed amid a group of sem and victorious Vietcong. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 13 January 1973 Pentagon ban ,on Viet news tit's press By Dana Adams Schmidt Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor Washington. By explicitly declaring a "lid" on informa-' lion on the bombing or non-bombing of North Vietnam and the Paris peace talks, the 'Pentagon has raised some basic issues about freedom of speech and the public's "right to know." The matter came to light Jan. 5 when ,Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, during an awards ceremony, volpteered the informa- tion that "those negotiations are so important that we are not going to be placed An the ' position where information from this building could in any way be blamed for the lick of v success on the negotiating track." Pentagon spokesman Jerry W. Friedheim' documented this policy on Jan. 9 by dis- closing a directive he had issued on Dec. 30, the day President Nixon ordered the end of bombing 'of the Hanoi-Haiphong area of North, , Vietnam and the 'resumption of the Paris 'peace talks. , The directive, which some correspondents believe originated in the White House, was `angry in tone. It ordered that "there must be 'no, repeat no, comment of any sorts from any , ?Department of Defense personnel, civilian , and military, or whatever rank" concerning' "the resumption of peace negotiations and a' Suspension of some military activities in :Southeast Asia." "Thera is to be no comment, nor' t. speculation, no elaboration and no dis- ? cussion on the subjects involved in the White House announcement," the direc- tive said. It went on to direct all inquiries to the :Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. , The directive was made public as result of inquiries by Aryeh Neter, execu- tive director of the American Civil Liberties Union, who Wrote that he had received complaints about it from De- fense Department employees. Mr. Neier's letter said that "if the Department wishes to limit' office' 'pro- nouncements to authorized spokesmen that is certainly appropriate, but there, can be no possible justification for sus- pending the civil liberties of millions Of - citizens who are employed by'the Depart., ment of Defense." , The Neier letter elicited an answer)1 from J. Fred Buzhardt, the department'S chief legal counsel, who effusively, thanked the ACLU official for recogniz- ing the proper role of offical spokesmen, t He said the department fully recognizes. individual rights under the 1st Amend- ment "and obviously the public affairal guidance message did not apply tti; 4 unofficial expression of personal views. , Mr. Buzhardt asserted that similar; restrictions had been imposed at the time of the SALT I and the beginning of thei SALT II negotiations, and previously, during Middle East negotiations. To this Mr. Neter replied whet, reached, by telephone that he would like to 1.?,,e the' department's recognition of 1st t. mend-1 ment rights disseminated to all rm.Otary, commands in the same way as the, original ban. on comment, ppeculativz, elaboration and discussion. , While this was going on Admiral Isaac A. Kidd and Gordon W. Rule, former Navy irrocurernent official, were appear-, ? ing before a Senate committee headed by! Sena. William Proxmire. The admiral" 'angered Senator Proxmirety refusing to testify about the reasons why he had), ',demoted Mr. Rule following his clticism of President Nixon's appointment c Roy L. Ash of Litton Industries as head of the, ,Office of Management and Budget. Fulbright rebuffed . Some days earlier, on the congre,\ sional scene, Secretary of State William P. Rogers and presidential adviser. Henry Kissinger, acting under White House orders, had declined a summons' from Sen. W. Fulbright, chairman of the" 'Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to' explain policiis related to North Viet- nam. Mr. Kiissinger also begged off from, a commitment to brief Republican mem-,! ,bers of the House. Finally Herbert G. Klein, liead of the, White House Communications .Office, ? ,Jan. 7 got after critics of the admirds.: tration in Congress. "Some of the more Irresponsible members," he said, "have been critical in a way which could slow 'down" peace negotiations. Some newsmen discern a common', thread running through these devel-, opments, whether they apply to journal- ists, Congress, or the bureaucracy. While the administration, in the light of ' Mr. Buzhardt's explanation, undoubtedly I did not intend to ban low-level, unin- formed comment, the 'newsmen ditO cerned an effort to dry Up high-level, ? Informed information and critical conitl Ment about much more than the adminin, itration's Vietnam policies. 4 :.1.1 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-A77-00432R000100060i01-0 ? ' ,,,r7T,rt,7,977c,TrYTTriTrritr,7177r777,77,77--777; Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 WASHINGTON STAR 16 ,January 1973 Military Doubts Firm Peace By ORR KELLY -* Star?News Steil Writer Peace now seems to be "at hand" in Vietnam, but Penta- gon officials are ftankly pes- imistic that it will prove to be a broad or lasting peace. They expect an agreement in the near future that will ,provide for the return of all 'American prisoners of war and an accounting of those 'missing in action, withdrawal of American military 'forces from Vietnam within 60 days following the signing and a cease-fire. ? But, despite the cease-fire, they do not expect the South Vietnamese and the North VI- , etnamese to stop shooting at 'each other for long and they ido not expect the contest for icontrol of the southern portion of the country to end. This generally pessimistic iassessment of the chances for ?Iasting peace in Indochina is (given by officials who say they !are not fully familiar with the terms of agreement now under consideration. But there is ev- ery reason to believe that top 1Pentagon officials fully famil- iar with the proposed agree- ment also share this view. Laird's Earlier Goal Throughout the first Nixon administration, the emphasis at the Pentagon has been on the Vietnarnization "track" as an alternative to the negotiat- ing "track". Defense Secre- tary Melvin R. Laird, In con- ? gr e salon al testimony last week, emphasized that the Vietnamization program had been successfully completed and that the United States could "terminate" its involve- ment in the war if the prison- ers were returned. Last night, during an awards ceremony at the Pen- tagon, Laird refused to specu- ? late, on whether be would reach his goal, set several years ago. At that time he said he would consider he had been successful as defense secre- tary if, when he left the office, no American serviceman was shooting at any one or being shot at anywhere in the world. He expects to leave office at. noon on Saturday. Despite his refusal to com- ment on the negotiations, he emphasized that the number of Americans in South Viet- nam -is still declining ? and is now well below the number in Korea, nearly two decades aft- er the end of the Korean War. Pentagon officials feel the President's decision to halt all mit and naval attacks on North Vietnam Involves little mill. -tory risk. "This Is obviously not going, to ? g.o on very long," one offi- cial sari. "Either there is going to be a deal or there is not. If there is a deal, the North Vietnamese are going to begin rebuilding .their roads and bridges so what difference does it make if they get start- ed a week earlier?" If the bombing halts should' continue for several weeks and the planes then be sent against the North again, there would be some risks, according to military officers. Any pause in ' aerial attacks gives the other ,? side a chance to rebuild air defenses and communications lines. Thus, if the attacks should be renewed, losses in the. first few days to the reju- venated defenses would be ex- pected to be relatively high. There is much less concern abOut any "surge" of men or material moving to the South during a bombing pause. After the beating North Vietnam has taken in the last 'month, it is assumed at the Pentagon that the respite would be devoted to reconstruction rather than tn.qn all out effort to move men and war material south. As part of its "goodwill ges- ture," the United States has stopped low-level manned re- connaissance flights, as well as attacks over the north. When RF4 photo planes have been sent over the north, they have normally been escorted by armed fighters prepared to respond with bombs, rockets d machine gun bullets to any attack on the recon plane. No Land Grabs Seen But the possibility of' such "protective reaction strikes". has been reduced by the deci- sion to rely on information gained by drones dropped from C130 transport planes and SR71 recon planes which streak over Vietnam above the range of anti-aircraft guns and at more than 2,000 miles- per-hour. In the Laotian panhandle, in Cambodia and in South Viet- nam itself, the -Communist forces are still under-continu- ing -air attack. Pentagon offi- cials say they see no sign at this time of a major effort on either side to_seize significant chunks of territory in prepara- tion for a cease-fire. "What you see on both sides Is an awful lot of I-don't-want- to-be-the-last-one-to-4:11e," ,one general at the Pentagon said. If the fighting should-contin- ue at some level in the future, top Pentagon officials are con- NEW YORK TIMES / 11 January 1973 vinced that the South Viet- namese are now prepared to defend themselves without any' direct American military help, including air power. But they do say the South Vietnamese will continue to require re- placement military equipment If the fighting goes on. etin.. ins g..Wat- Crime gressor would be a war crime ? ? a" ? view put forward and rejected, I be. ' lieve rightly, at Nuremberg. It would also follow that the North Vietnamese..1 By Telford.Taylor The North Vietnamese Government who on their assumption are not ag- ihas consistently charged that Amen- gressors, would be legally justified In can military operations in Vietnam bombing Saigon into bloody ruins:? arc "wer crimes," and this accusation Their second and more substantial plays a'very important part in the way response is that the laws of war can; they describe the war, both to them- selves and to others. In 1965 and 1966, when American bombing in North Vietnam began; their Government re- peatedly threatened to try captured American-airmen as war criminals, un- der the Nuremberg precedents, but in recent years this intention, if ever se- riously, entertained, appears .to have been abandoned. However sincerely the North Viet- namese today hold the belief ,that the American bombing is "criminal," I think it is clear that the, practical val- ue of this concept for them is Primari- ly for internal morale and external propaganda putposes, and there is lit- tle likelihood that the American pris- not remain frozen at the Nuremberg level, but must respond to the march of events, and that by now the futility and inhumanity of "strategic" bombing has been so clearly demonstrated that It must be outlawed, much as poison gas was after the First World War.' To this I can only, say amen, but objec- tivity obliges the response that efforts to formulate such a law have failed for over half a century, and that the demand for it has-come chiefly from countries that do not have strategic air power at their disposal. I am, fear, too much of a legal traditionalist' to accept this argument in its Nth sweep. ? 7 But surely the bombing of Hanoi( oners, will ever find themselves on does. raise eermus legal questions un- trial before a North Vietnamese court der the principle 'of "proportionality" While the North Vietnamese war- crimes literature covers American mili- etary operations in both North and South Vietnam, in recent months, the emphasis has been almost exclusively on our aerial bombardments in the North. ? The Vietnamese case 'does not rest exclusively on the antipersonnel bombs, but rather embraces the en- tire program of aerial bombardment, with emphasis on the civilian casual- ties. To assess this charge carries the judge into highly controversial areas ?the rule, that there must be a reason.' able relation between the military ob-: jective and the. damage and suffering which its attainment will entail. A' single enemy soldier is a legitimate target whether he is in the ,frontline' or on home leave, but to level a city' block to kill him at home is beyond the bounds of proportionality. It is under this principle that ourl bombing operations at Hanoi appear, most vulnerable ,toethe charge of crim- inality. The military objectives, even' as described by the Pentagon, seem so, in which the "law" is far from clear, trivial, and so remote from our shores,-' and requires that Hanoi and Haiphong that the death and destruction we be considered hot in isolation, but in flict appear as wanton. This impres- conjunction with other cities that have Mon is underlined by the. to me, Mei- suffered the same or Worse fates? plicable use of B-52's, with their car- Coventry, Hamburg, Berlin, Dresden, pet-bombing technique, to strike fit Tokyo, Hiroshima and other memorials small targets in urban areas. to the art of war. The results of our bombing unde- niably are horrible, but Hanoi is not tthe only city that has undergone such 'horror. Immoral and senseless' 'this .bombing may, well be, but where is the ? law under which to call it criminal? When I put this question to the North Vietnamese lawyers, they gave two answers. The first was that our !bombing is part of an aggressive war ,launched by the United 'States against their country. Even assuming the truth, 'of the premise, this is not a satisfac- -tory analysis, for if aggression alone is the test of criminality. every mili- 38 :toy operation carried out by the ag- Confronted with the appalling 'con- sequences, i legal approach to these events is bound to provoke Impa.,, tience. Whether or not Bach Mai and Khan Thien are "crimes" is of small: moment to the victims. Why are we: doing -what we are doing? Both' at. home and abroad millions are asking that- question, and it is the gtave tr e sponsibility of the American Chief Exe ccutive to answer it. ' Telford Taylor, .professor of' law At, Columbia and former chief U.S. prosi?n- cutor at the Nur?eMberg war crime', trials, was IN Hanoi during the rem& ?! bombings?. ? c.,,, Approved For Release 2001/08/07': CIAL141313i7-604-3211i6.661 6oRtibbiLjtir :117177-7' " r it Ap.proved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060801-0 WASHINGTON POST 18 JANUARY 1973 routicat Arrests 'Expected. By Peter Osnos ? ' Washington Post Staff Writer , SAIGON, Jan. 17 '? Pres!-' .dent Thieu has' given his prov- ' Once chiefs', 'wide latitude to. oinake political ? arrests after kthe' Coming cease-fire and hat' t also empowered them - te ii!'shoot troublemakers" on the !spot, reliable South Vietnam., ?en fources said tdday. herever possible, Amert-' !ifin sources added, those ar- ireated are to be charged witliC common crimes instead of. po- Ilitical ones .because, it is RC- ? ; knowledged, the prisoners are. easier to deal with that way. The. Communist demand for.) release of all political prison:), era has been a sticking point in the Paris negotiations and a. the government's intention, hotirces said, is to keep the Imbiber of prisoners down, at? leant on paper. , Thicu's hard line Is in keep- ing with his conviction that, f after the cease-fire, his govern. meat will remain fit war with - the Communists by all means short of big-unit firepower. ,"The Communists are prepay- ingjo destroy the cease-fire,".' , a Thieu aide warned a gather-? lag in Kientuong Province yes- - 4erday. Government officials in the provinces say they have been - told the Communists will vio- late the cease-fire with terror-, Ism and assassinations and ? they must be ready to protect, themselves.. ? .Thieu's response to this dan-'; .ger is evidently to harass and intimidate known and sus- .peeted Communist sympathiz- ers, as they have been for -years. ? The. province chiefs have, been instructed, South Viet- namese sources said, that the only condition of the arrests is that local prosecutors be in- formed within 24 hours. Once' that is done, the sources said, the suspects can be detained' for as much as six months. Because of the vagueness of the way it is worded and the nncertainty of how the situa- tion after the cease-fire will 'develop, Smith Vietnamese of- &leis have no clear idea of low the authority to "shoot 'troublemakers" will be inter- ;1preted. f, During- his one-man presi,i. dential 'Campaign in 1971, Thieu gave police officials per. mission to shoot anyone caus-,' ing a "disturbance," but thel threat was never carried out.i Recently, Thieu authorized po-t, lice to shoot thieves caught in the act, but that, too, Mai never been done,.as far as is. known. The broad arrest powers, given to province chiefs appar- ently differ from past practice ,.n that there is to be no direct coordination from Saigon, as, whs the case, for example? with the campaign of arrests' after last spring's Communist' offensive. Top-level Ainerican officialr, who say, they are in- formed even on the most sen-: sitive aspects of Thieu's prepa- rations for the period after the post-cease-fire, insist that there is no similar national plan for widespread political arrests. - They did acknowledge, how- ever, the existence of a plan called F-6 that went into effect after the start of North Viet- nam's Easter offensive 'and' was a.gdin carried out when a cease-fire appeared imminent in October. They said the plan finally, expired just before ,Christmas. The number of civilians ar- rested in organized, military- style sweeps was 26,000, ac- pording to one senior U.S. in- telligence source, of whom 14,- 000 have been released. What set F-6 apart from rou-, tinei political arrests was its !scope and the change in the, standing practice that had re- ,quireci three separate accusa- tions of a suspek before he was picked up. Under F-6, now tended, only one accusation?a, l'casual denunciation by an ag-: ikrieved neighbor, for instance a e?was all that was needed for an arrest. 9 Government critics havei ;charged that the arrests were "often used as a means of ex: ttortion by police, who then. tsold the prisoners their free- dom. There are also recurring, substantiated reports of harsh! interrogations and even- .tor-. ture. Phoenix. which was revisedi by the central Intelligence, Agency in 1967 and iS now un- der the direction -of the Viet-' namese police Special Branch, will apparently ? continue un-' changed after the cease-fire. Ii is not known as yet whether province chiefs will again have to obtain three ac- cusations of Communist links before 'arresting civilians, but Vietnamese sources believe, there will be virtually no re- strictions placed on what % done In the name of politicil security. . 1 The number of political Orli.' be around 30,000, The Comme oners at present is thought to nista say there are sevettil hundred thousand. ; Tuesday, an 16, 1973 THE WASHINGTON POST Saigon Fears" Post-Cease-Fire' Deserter Surge By Thomas W. Lippman %Washington Post Foreign Service SAIGON, Jan. 15?Some South Vietnamese officials fear that once a cease-fire is signed the army 'could be so , decimated by desertions. it , would have difficulties help- ' ing the Saigon government maintain control of the coun- , Far from demobilizing, South Vietnam is planning, to keep.most of its armed forces intact after a cease-fire and is , counting on the army t9 play a major role in running the country. , ; At the end of October, just after U.S. negotiator Henry A. ' Kissinger said peace was at hand, the "net desertion rate" reached almost 27,000 men per month?up from 15;000 to 20; . 000 a month during most of the summer, according to un- official but *ell-informed bources. ? The net desertion' rate is the number of soldiers who leave their Units and do not conte 'back, either, voluntarily or in custody, and must be replaced through recruitment and con- scription to maintain the mili- tary at 1.1 million men. The upsurge in the autumn desertions presumably stem- med from expectations of peace. Some Vietnamese be- lieve the Communists actively encouraged desertion after the 1954 Geneva accords were signed _ and expect them to launch a similar campaign af- ter a new cease-fire., This is not to say the South ? Vietnamese army is melting sway. By U.S. standards the figures are staggering, but they must be measured in the Vietnamese context.This is a tire& low-paid army of peas- ants with strong ties to family and home village, men to whom going home is a natural impulse. , The Monthly desertion rate, which is at best an informed estimate, has been in five fig- ures for years. But it is a phei itioinenott the cotentry .has' so far been able to cope With. Vietnamese, American and ,6ther Westelrri sources. agree A enough volunteer or are drafted to keep the ranks full, All but a handful the coun- try's military units u.. 7,!: full strength, despite the pouia?:-s they took hist year. "When the war is on," one high-ranking military official said, "we have to fight against the Communists to protect our lives and property, but when the cease-fire is declared that seems less important. The sol- diers' first reaction is to take a little rest." A colonel, who' was a lieu- tenant at the time of the 195,1 cease-fire, said his men left their units, abandoned their' weapons and went home to their families, and "there wad no way to prevent them," "There is no problem f1ztd4; Ing enough soldiers so long at the war goes on," one Westerni analyst said, "but if there is a cease-fire that is another mat- ter." He also said, however, that, it Will be difficult to make any assessment for some time be4 cause of the difficulty in get-, ting 'accurate 'statistics. Some deserters, for example, re-en- lift under assumed names in other units to obtain an enlist- ment bonus. Others -are never reported as deserters because their commanders continue. to draw their pay. ?. In the absence of any ideo- logical commitment to the war; there is -a pertnisAlve cial attitude toward deserters and draft dodgers that, compli. cates the government's ea, forcement efforts. At 'the moment, the 6t seems to have -the upper hand in the cat and mouse game played by -the military pollee and the reluctant warrlors?a reported 40,000 deserters Were seized in Saigon alone over the past year?but what Would happen if the shooting sto0.; ped is another matter. , Once a cease-fire Ia signe0 family obligations trio tippe more pressing than trtillta duties?especially for OM scripts assigned to units fn-' from their homes,. . Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA48P77-00432R000100060001-0 a #r,y.frfi tpr,,,, rriTp7i-0 t,, (17,7rTiTcyri79-,747-rtirrrynTril-r117,77-7,----,-.- Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 Eastern Europe Gr Aleksandr SolthenItsyn has been ' 'of' a, pictUresque. river amidst white' , ',deprived by Soviet authorities of all , birchs stripped of their green coats , normal 'means of financial support. . by, cold. ,i He Is not permitted to publish in the - This' sturdy, two-storied building ' Soviet Union. Funds due from abroad with a garage and a garden can hardly , ; may be transferred only through the ' be squeezed into the "modestly little; 1, Soviet State Bank which pockets a . house" definition. This building' is ; large per cent as "tax." Several Amen- Solzhenitsyn's property which he calls , can writers who have large sums of Borzovka. The photographs of Bor- , r; rubles ? due 'them in Moscow have of- zovka were published in Paris Match t,fered these funds to' Solzhenitsyn for and Stern, which, obviously; upset and t Ms support. The following commentary, irritated its owner. i j: ,by the official Soviet Novdsti agency, At a closer look; Solzhenitsyn's , ., p seeks to counter 'the facts- -of the "housing ? problem" disappears like nt ). Solzhenitsyn case, painting a picture soap bubble. If the writer gets bored': ik of him living a life of ,"luxury and' ,with his white birch idyll he may leave leisure." ,.Borzovka and go to the city of Ryazan i ? 8 ' ?? lotated near- Moscow. There his first By Semyon Vladituirov , :. wife, Natalya Reshetovskaya, is wait-4 ing 'for -him'In his two-'bedroom flat 3. ; which- he received from the state. But ? ; if he doesn't feel like staying far from 1 . mOscow?A Nobel' Prize winner r ' ' .Moscow he may. get there in three without a roof over his head or a. hours and join his second wife, the j . cent in his pocket?such is the pathetic .33-year old Natalya Svetleva, in the i " portrait of the writer Aleksandr, ' comfortable four-bedroom flat in Gorky : Solzhenitsynd by the American' ;--,Street, the main thoroughfare of the ' , writer Albert Maltz. In his letter, to i The New York Times, Maltz. offers to the allegedly starving author of "Au- , city. ? . However, Solzhenitsyn prefers to ? : gust 1914" a lump sum of money, . live in other people's homes and con-. ? true, not from his own bank accounts $ tinue to persuade the world thfit he,? ' but from certain "Moscow fees" only 1?,, has "neither house nor home." ? , he knows about. ti Having so many residences, Solzhe- T, Solzhenitsyn promptly responded to j nitsyn, as it seems, must face. the I the offer. In his statement published ,r . problem of transportation. But. he ' j in the West the "deeply touched"'writ-.. j, solves this problem with amazing suc-,j vi er literally, makes his readers shed . ?'cess despite his "desperate" financial i i tears over the gloomy picture of his; ,situation. The officers of the State ' ;!.."desperate" financial situation. For hei ,Traffic Inspection showed me register has neither roof over his head, nor- lairds for three Moskvich cars. One of' personal car, nor any means to buy, ? them (License No. 11-10 RYAI) was 7 as he puts it, "only a modest little recently bought with his mqney at a 4 house." "1 am ready to borrow the foreign-currency shop by his first wife, ? F, money [offered by Maltz] although it and the second one (License No. 98-19.: r is most embarrassing for me," Solzhe, MKM)?by his mother-in-law. The r ' ,? nitsyn says at the end of his lamentful. wriler himself, who claims literary ! letter. , ' laurels equal to those of Leo Tolstoy, Is it not the natural embarrassment does not ride Tolstoy's bicycle. True ' that a proud and deprived man must i to- his tactics of dressing up in rags ' feel? , ? and tatters of a poor man before the ':? "No, it isn't," say all those ivho I West, Solzhenitsyn pretended that he ,) happen to travel the Moscow highway had, sold his car (License No. 98-04 ;. where,. near- the town of Narofominsk, ; RYA!). But, actually, he continues to !the suddenly materialized dream of the drive this ear which now has the LI- t' Odeprived" writer stands on the bank, cent(' No. 05-38 MICP. > ? .. . NEW YORK TIMES 8 January 1973 $01zhenii8"yri.: .A Financial. 'Staiemene 40 I This fact is most eloquent. Solzhe nitsyn deliberately pretends to be de-s prived. !caring' his "last shirt" for the public in the West to see. I believe.,1 that a sharp fall of his scandalous , ? popularity With the readers in the, West makes him do it On Dec. 18 the UPI press agency' circulated 'the followieg information from its Mos,eow correspondent: "West, ern diplotnats who had a talk with the, 54-year-old author several days ago,, feel skeptical about his complaints.., More tAan once they met Solzhenitsyn at the Moscow stores which sell goodai for foreign currency." . the diplomats did not mistake some- 'body else for Solzhenitsyn, ,It is easy to explain why this allegedly impov- erished writer often visits such stores.1 ?As is. known, SolzhenitsYn's capital -deposited at the Swiss banks exceeds $1.5 million, according to Western c$ pitess estimates. Those who would like $ to have more precise information. may ?-? address Fritz. Heeb, a' SWias 'lawyer 'who looks after his capital and sends1 ? money orders to Moscow following the,i 'Instructions of the owner, You , may ? write to Fritz' Heeb at the followings i address: Zurich, I Swperland, .8001, ; 'iBahnhof Str. 5iC. ' ! It should be 'Sainted out that during 1 the divorce proeedure Solzhenitsyn : declared to the court that he would ' . pay: Natalya ,Reshetovskaya it lump sum of money he had at the Soviet' , savings bank, by way of ?compensation-,:4 '.Later, as ReshetavskaYa's friends very-, well know, he gave her several thou- sand dollars fearing that she would ' demand half of his million-worth ? capital. . In one of his articles devoted to'.jas the writer's calling, Albert Maltz said:- "Life is not a puppet pgrforrnanee,".,? and spoke with indignation about the superficial observers who studied thq, reality through .thick window panes. .1 It is a pity that Albert Maltz. has been ' drawn into the puppet performance ino? which a very poor Pierrot is the main, character.' Semyon Vladimirov is a commentator jar the Novostl press 'agency. , Approved For Release 2001/08%07 : CIA-RDP77-070432"kiigibif bi(47,7 T.1.7,717.97,777- Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 BALTIMORE 10 January 1973 President Tito's Tightrope ? President Tito of Yugoslavia is said to feel that his current meth Ods of trying to hold the country together are misunderstood in the , ? West, and unfairly criticized In the Western press as a partial rever- sion. toward authoritarianism, with An ,accompaniment of purge. Tito himself insists that his purpose 'aver the past year or' sO, when he has been quite Augh on Commu- nist 'party. leaders In Croatia, Sb- , venia and Serbia, and on editors In Belgrade, is simply to turh the party again into a "cohesive force" within Yugoslavia's lively mix of republics and nationalities. ' The emphasis, It. has been said, Is on a shifting from republican regional autonomy to Interdeend- ence, with an insistence that re- sponsibility does not stop at re- gional borders; and serious doubts have been raised as to whether co- hesid can be achieved in the ways currently employed. , The fact of course is that Tito is 'walking a tightrope; and viewing him as a veteran tightrope walker 'It would be a bold vide who could say at this moment that he is any less steady than has been his-wont. ' Ile has, in the face Of %mat 'diffi- culties, created a country, and so. far has held its diverse elements ; together. fished, to a remarkable if alviay's More than that, he has estab- somewhat frail degree, a position 1 of International independence for Yugoslavia, and .an atmosphere of ) comparative individual freedom un-,1 matched in any other Communist: region. It is true that he now grows I old, and 'that the factors that make ?? for ,division in Yugoslavia may after his departure turn out to bel unmanageable by anyone else. Buil It is true also that he is tough, and canny, and that this is not the first , 'time his methods have come .Under' question, only to have the 81!tiatioll fail to fly apart after , ? .1 ? DAILY 'IELEGRAPH, London 23 December 1972 HAIL fiONECKER ? EAST GERMANY has now been recognised by Austria, Sweden, Finland and SWitzerland, and several non- , Communist countries outside Europe had already taken this step. Britain and the .ot,her Nato countries, after the,, ,signing of the East-West German treaty on Thursday, have lost no time getting int0 touch with the previous diplomatic! lepers in East Berlin with the Same objective. The actual , exchange of Ambassadors will not take place until the East-West German treaty has been "ratified, probably in . April. But the actual recognitions ma' come considerably, sooner, as there is pressure from those.who fear that delay could have economic and. diplomatic disadvantages. Herr HONECKER IS not only respectable but'courted! , . On the: other side of the globe. China, which is approaching the completion of the process that East Germany is now beginning, is scooping up the few remain- ing laggards?among them Australia and New. Zealand, yesterday. ? The biggest of all, America, must inevitably. follow before long. But from the viewpoint of Western,' ; interests the recognition of China is a very different matter,1 from that of East Germany, although they are both munist--yet of different kinds. ? . ? 02. China's Communist dictatorship ,is at least exercised by Chinese. In East Germany an utterly alien tyranny is , Imposed by Russia and maintained by 22 divisions of Russiantroops. China is a welcome asset In the world balance of power against Russia's military .superiority, While, East Germany is Russia's main springboard. Russia and East Germany ate in flagrant violation of agreements ,? Over Germany and Berlin?the blood-stained Berlin Wall and the illegal use of East Berlin as the East German capital are,examples. Now the Nato countries will further. connive... :in this by appointing Ambassadors to East'Berlin?instead. of to,* Potsdam, ? Leipzig; Dresden; - or soma other East, Gelman equivalent of, Bonn.. Approved For Release 2001/08/074CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 I 117: I ,t I 1 c11177 r:TrR '11 '771TIT Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 Western Europe NEW YORK TIMES I 12 January 1973 FA Spanish Jesuit's Best Seller L Hails Mar and Attacks Rome' By PAUL HOFMANN Special to The New York TIrnet rrives, the books are snapped alp by eager buyers, mostly .priests. s Although the volume A so ';far available only in Spanish, there is a waiting list for it in Nt.least one bbokstore here: An ,Italian translation is to be pub-.1 lished In a few weeks. ?-? Father Diez-Alegrfa's book does not carry the imprimatur, :the prescribed church authori- ,tation for publications con- $ ROME, Jan. 11?The current ',best. seller in ecclesiastical ik bookstores here is a slim ? vol- p ume by a Spanish Jesuit ' who !teaches at the Pontifical Gre- gorian University and praises Karl Marx as a "prophet." ' The author, the Rev. Jose ,Marfa Diez-Alegrfa, also ac- lcuses the Roman Catholic Church of '"visceral antisocial- ism," suggests that the Vatican divest itself of its ,riches, and arescribes priestly celibacy as, Verning faith and morals. The " factory of madmen."' . ? ') ;author also did not submit his Father Diez-Alegrfa, . 'whol manuscript to censorship by his eaches sociology ht the :tinier, the Society of Jesus, be. church's foremost institution .ore having it published. '? of higher learning, has pub- Vatican 'Establishment before :,?? Order's Leadership Worried ? icly criticized the conservative , ,, The Jesuit ordcr has not so 6 In March of 1970, he and Mr reacted, although its leader- ;two other Jesuits of the Gre- t hip is reliably understood to; orian University faculty, i in.ane worried about the, ithpres-; newspaper interview, de-"?n that the book will make ounce(' the Vatican's opposi- 'at the Vatican. The Right Rev. ion to the divorce bill that redro Arrupe, the head of the, l was then before the Italian :Jesuit order, who is a Spaniard ' ;Parliament as undue meddling In the country's domestic af- fairs. , 4 Long Close to Leftists l' Father Diez-Alegrfa, who is '01 years old, has long been otiose to groups of left-wing Catholics in Italy, Spain, West iGermany and other countries. 0 His new book, entitled "Yo 1itreo en la Esperanza" ("I Be- leve in Hope"), has been pub- shed by Descice Brouwer, in ilbao, Spain. The publisher orannot send enough copies to Rome; as soon as a new batch end his assistants are known4 to have read and clisctissed kfither Diez-Alegrfa's work. "Our Curia knows that it is bitting on a volcano," A Jesuit naiolar said . today. "Father pliez-Alegrfa's book is going to standalize the Vatican even rhore than Father Kling did." e Rev. Hans Kling is a swiss theologian who teaches at Til- pingen University in West Ger- many. In recent books, he has Vestioned papal infallibility apd other traditional church doctrines. Father Diez-Alegtlia, An his 'CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 15 January 1973 Stalin's ? final victory By Laszlo T. Kiss The Western press almost unanimously welcomed Willy Brandt's success in gaining the approval of the West German electorate 'fot his Ostpolitik. With the exception of C. L. Sulzberger (the New York Times), who had stated that Honecker won the peace "at no price," most of the columnists and editorial 'writers from Paris, through London to New York, were jubilant. Belying this happy mood Is the actual fact that Stalin's dialectic- historical will has prevailed in the heart of Europe (Pankow deliberately chose his birth- day, Dec. 21, for signing the treaty of normalization), and that, therefore, these free views and sentiments are neither wise nor justified. ,1. A candid analysis of the conspicuously , and defiantly totalitarian nature of the German "Democratic Republic" ? with the Wall as the scene of an open Brechtian theater, constantly displaying the morbid political reality from within ? should lead to the conclusion that its full recognition will be a severe, perhaps ultimate blow to the book, says that he owes Much' tt) Marx although he does not subscribe to the materialistic ythilosonhy of Marxism. With Marx and Jesus .,:"Marx has guided me to re- discover, Jesus Christ and the me- lining of His message," he Orites. Aild, he contends that tae Roman Catholic Church, s it has existed in history, pontains little that is Chris- tian." Father Diez-Alegrfa says that. firistianity must not become d political instrument of Marx- ft socialism, "but neither must itabecome a politital instrument of anti-Communism, as it has Pen." a:According to the Jesuit. "Acceptance of the Marxist analysis of history, with Its elements regarding the histori- cal meaning of class struggle and the necessary overtb,row of private ownership of the means of production, not in any way opposed to faith and to the Gospels." Father Diez-Alegrfa adds: "In the present world .situation, an increasing number of Chris- tians happen to reach the con- viction that they must , make common cause with all those who commit themsefveS to the revolutionary cause of social- ism." ? A Bourgeois Anti-Christianity 'The author charges the church and its "apparatus" with "vis- ceral antisocialism that is not Christian but anti-Christian in principle of self-determination in the under- privileged half of Europe. (The precise and profound metaphysical quality of the word principle ? as opposed to utilitarian political dealings ? must be stressed here.) This dramatic regression has not, however, been a sudden or exclusively German development. It has become apparent during the '60's that the legacy of FDR and Churchill ?the fighting protagonists of "sovereign rights and self-government" ? has been quietly rejected by a new generation of sophisticated political pragmatists, who rose to govern the countries of the West. The new men at the top have haughtily dismissed these grand states- men's lofty political creed ? the Atlantic Charter ? as "rhetorical," and while they continued to pay lip service to the United Nations Charter, evidently they have be- come much too impressed by the Soviet Union's might to go on protesting the subtly permanent suppression of its satellites. ? Primarily, this cold, calculated change of Western hearts and minds in high places had a bourgeois way." ' Speaking about the Vatican's reputed wealth, Father Diez- Alegrfa says that no one knows the balance sheet, but referring to estimates that the Holy See has assets of $500-million to $1-2 billion, the Jesuit remarks that such riches in the hands of the successor to the Apostlei Peter, the Fisherman, is pleasant and disquieting." ' ,If the Pope reduced his ow capital base to, say, $50.4on. lion, "he surely would not?b ,e-, tray either Christ or Peter," Wei author observes. The present Pope, Paul VI, Is never men4 tioned by name In the book'S 197 pages. , 'A Certain Extrapolation' ' Discussing ,teachings of the Pope's primacy and infallibility; the Jesuit scholar remarks that they are "founded on a certain extrapolation from various, 'passages in the New Testa- ment." Extrapolation means In- ference, and is less than cer- tainty. ? In a chapter on priestly cell- bacy, Father Diez-Alegrfa advo cates making it voluntary rather than mandatory, as it Is now. For priests to whom chastityt means Heroic effort and ascetic, sacrifice, the Jesuit scholar says, '"Celibacy for the realmi of God becomes a factory of madmen. and I advise all those who find themselvps caught in this trap to free themselves as soon as possible of it." ? in Eastern Europe and led to the German anticlimax: the formal acceptance of the Stalinist status quo. (It would be a mistake or a false progress sive illusion to assume that Brandt might have made a "leftist" deal, i.e., between Socialists and Communists, at the expense of the historically notorious Prussians. The Junkers are extinct; only the toilers are left ? dreaming probably of Hebei and Kautsky and their visions about true socialism.) A 2. The main argument on behalf of this unequal treaty has been that the polemics of the cold war have not brought about mean; ingful change and that realism dictates a new, more flexible course. However, this nevi "realistic" approach (with some of its fea-, tures calling Ftapallo to mind) has taken place at the time when the exodus of the Soviet troops to the Chinese frontiers- his begun. Therefore, even with a moderate amount of resolution and insight, Bonn and prepared the way for an unbalanced detentr Its democratic allies could have achieved 42 Approved For Release 2001/08/07: CIA-RDI4T-004,iiIi00640006/001071,V1 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 ' ?Itnuch more than what Honecker and his arbitrary backers have given. There are ample indications that the intensifying Sino-Soviet conflict will grow Into the most colossal and mutually exhaus- tive great power confrontation in the history of the world. Despite this, the Russians were ipermitted to clear their Western flank in 'return for banal concessions, and even 'Without being pressed to restore at least some ,Substantial elements of their satellites' sover- eign rights. ji ? ? 8. Mr. Brandt was right when he said that the acceptance of his Ostpolitik will mean the end of the cold war. However, he failed to add that the end has come with complete Soviet triumph. Stalin's original intentions have been finalized in the eastern half of Europe,! and a quarter century of ardent dialectics ?*; based on the implicit Stalinist rule that: persistence plus might create unlimited WASHINGTON PO S T 14 JANUARY 1973 By John M. Goshko Wiinhimiten Pelt Forel,* Berrie* ONN ? While East Germany's r Ell long drive to win international t recognition Is finally on the brink of 'Success, the Communist state is likely to find that its new-found respectabil- Ity carries With it an enormous price 'tag. ? Among the Western countries lin.' Ing up to begin negotiations on diplo- matic relations with East Berlin, ,many will also be presenting sizable bills for money they claim East Ger- many owes them. So far, East Ger- /many has tended to dismiss most of these claims as unjustified. But the signs are that the Western govern- ments aren't buying this argument , and that East Germany will have to :make some kind of settlement as the ?price for widespread recognition. The alleged debts fall into two broad categories: claims for war dam- ' ages and crimes committed by the 'Nazis under the Third Reich, and 4. compensation for foreign-owned prop- /'erty expropriated by the Communists rafter the war. The war-claims issue has long been ?onb of the thorniest legal problems .:/of the Cold War era. Under the 1945 :Potsd:m Agreement, the Soviet Zone rights ? have worn down the West's theta: .rical commitment to freedom. Since these matters seem remote to the ? average American, one would attempt to bring them closer to home with the following #conclusion: Western societies should not ;delude themselves, that (in hasty retreat from the global totalitarian trend) they can abandon their principles abroad without ,eventually paying the price of contradictions at home. Terrorists, some of whom are already active within, are thriving on cone Itradictions, which herald a-state of Imtxuth 'and prepare the grounds for anarchy, or ,worse. Laszlo Kiss is a Hungarian'who was a' ; political prisoner in Hungary during the ' .1 '50's as a youth activist in the Democratic . People's Party. He is a candidate for a doctoral degree in European histoty at Porlham University in New Yore City. A Poland, while the Western sectors (now West Germany) were to com- pensate the countries of the West. In 1953, after the breakdown of the ,Potsdam accords,: most Western na- tions gave up their reparations claims against West Germany, pending a fi- nal peace settlement with Germany as a whole. Nevertheless, Bonn dyer the years has paid out approximately ;$12 billion in individual and other ;war-related, claims. , Payments to Moscow 'O ON THE OTHER SIDE, East Ger, many made substantial repara- tions payments to Moscow, the only one of the four wartime powers to de- mand payment from defeated Ger- many. The &est Germans also paid some compensation to Yugoslays used as forced labor by the Nazis. ?Despite these precedents, East Ger- many quickly adopted the position that it is a totally new state rather than a successor to Hitler's Reich. Therefore, the East Germans argue, they bear no responsibility for deeds committed i1r Germany's name prior to East Germany's creation in 1949. Any war-related claims, they add, should be directed to West Germany. Unlike the East Germans, Bonn has always regarded itself as the govern- mental continuation of the German 4 . Now, the situation has been corn.? plicated by the recent basic treaty that provides for a new relationship' between the two Germanys. It is the ,treaty, with its recognition that the I two states are autonomous, that hasi opened the way for recognition of ? East Germany by Bonn's allies in the4 , West DU its acceptance of two separate nations on German soil also implies ? that there are now two successor ' states to the Reich under interna-,.. lionar law. That, in the Western view, establishes a basis for claims against 3 East Germany c.e.lating Ao the Nazi era. Finally, there Is the question, of what happened after the war.; The Communists seized substantial amounts of property, businesses andit bank accounts belonging to foreign tf nationals and firma, and during then two decades when the West held East I Germany in diplomatic Isolation, there was no way to press eompensal tion claims. 4 The United States, for example, is: not among those countries with the/ biggest bill to present, but some ex- perts estimate that Washington has potential claims against East Ger.: many in excess of $50 million. U.S.; officials so far will say only that the i matter is "under study" and that no : decisions have been made about pre- cisely what Washington will* do, but the expectation is that the United' States eventually will ask for some! kind of payment. ' ? t/ The Question of Israel "I MOST OF THE POTENTIAL U.S. claims involve postwar nation? alization of American-owned bus!. ? nesses, factories and funds. However,, there is also the question of property compensation claims on behalf of of Oc upation in Germany (later to nation and, until recently, claimed former German Jews who were forced to flee Germany under the Nazis and 'become East Germany), was to pay that it was the only true German who later became American citizens. !reparations to the Soviet Union and state. /Gibe Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : -RDP77-00432R8RAtreatthisCris) One ? 1/ 1610=611M Approved For Release 2001/0r8/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 Several countries that in prewar < times Maintained their Berlin em- hassles on then fashionable tinter Den Linden (now locked securely ,t inside East Berlsin) and that theoret-? Jeally still 'either own the property ?or, are due compensation for the lost land and buildings. The United, (States is not very likely to get the'', old embassy site back, since it lit-I ,erally juts up against the Berlin Wall. ? Another potentially interesting problem involves Israel, which will be seeking compensation on behalf of thousands of German and other European Jews persecuted by the dl The East Germans have curtly re- ? jected the idea of reparations to , .Israel on the grounds that the Jew- ish state didn't exist at the time of . World War II and is therefore not ' :.entitled to speak on behalf of vier Victims. In ,fact, East Germany's ardent championing of the Arab cause in the Middle East conflict , Will almost certainly cause it to , apurh the idea of diplomatie rela- tions with Israel. ? However, the Israelis have ma"de clear that they won't be easily put ' off, Israeli experts are quietly try- ? ing to assess the extent of the finan- eial claims that Israel as a state' :Might level against East Berlin and ' are also accumulating evidence about former Nazis in East Ger- , county to 'refute the Honecker re- ' ghne's claim that it has totally purged the country; of Fascist ele- meats. ? , ' The Israelis have also served now ? tice that they will ask approximately 20 "friendly" governments, which ? 'rare expected to have relations with) ?!, the East Germans in' the near fu- 'tine, to represent them in pressing their claims. A Joint German Stance? OR DOES THE LIST of potenr 1. tial envoys with bills in their I, briefcases end there. The Nether- lands, one of three NATO countries that have already extended recogT ration, and Britain want to talk. about about payment for extensive twill.- ties taken away from their jointly awned Royal Dutch Shell and Uni-?1 IC?ver companies. Switzerland* will demand more than $25 million for 'property and capital confiscated by the Nazis. Finland is asking both Germanys for an unspecified sum to cover ? damage done by the German army during the war. In the case of Finland, the East, Germans have offered to negotiate.' ' But here Bonn has demurred, plead- ing that it is bound by the 1953 . agreement to put off settlement of ' national reparations claims until ?.completion of a World War IT peace ; treaty. This attitude ?points up the inter-. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 6 January 1973 ? ant "defends life' she left behind in the Soviet Union; ? Distressed by West German politics, she says: , 'It is better to have only one party, as in Russia' By David R. Francis I they were discussing issues before the Mee,' Staff correspondent of tion, also onitelevision'. That's not good. It is The Christian Science Monieor much better to have only one party, as In / Russia.". 1 Bonn' Speaking in heavily accented 6erinan, she < According to the usual stereotype, the pew told of Attending aa election rally Of Chane! eniigre from the Soviet Union is panting or cellor Brandt. freedom. "I was shocked at what I saw," she said. Many probably are. But not all. "Brandt had to be guarded by four men. In Take the case of Mrs. Strauss, who recently Russia the politicians can go freely on the: moved from Estonia to West Germany. Strauss is not her real name. But she did not ? want that used for fear of hurting her brother's chances of getting an exit Visa from Soviet officialt and joining her. Mrs. Strauss watched and took part in the , Nov. 19 election in West Germany, voting for Chancellor Willy Brandt. ? One party better street." Mrs. Strauss further held that after the earlier postwar years, she felt free in Ettonia. "We .said what we wanted," she said. "After the war," she added, "we had tO I stiffer very much because we were Germans. At that time we were suppressed. It was very ' - difficult, because Hitler caused the war." ?' She says: "I think it is not good to have Work camps, prison three big parties as you have here. I ka,vi how! Indeed, her husband spent years in prison and work camps) ?? But under ttie present government, holds eating fact that West Germany, for Its part, is not exactly enthusiastic about its friends in the West making'', restitution claims against East Ger- many. Bonn officials, fear that 114 could establish a precedent anC prompt the Communist bloc coun-t tries of Eastern Europe to make Similar demands on West Germany..'1 Within recent days, there already have been calls from Poland for West German compensation to for-; mer Polish prisoners of war and'l resistance fighters. Now, with all of the Western 'demands against East Germany, Bonn is nervously,. expecting increased pressure from ? Nazi victims in the East. ? The West German government' would like to reestablish the old Potsdam principle that, in general, claims by Western countries should be handled by Bonn, and those from' Eastern Europe addressed to East. Germany. . Some officials here even think that Bonn and East Berlin should actively cooperate in working out a joint stance toward reparations claims. If that happens, it would', mark the first' instance in Europe's postwar history where the two Ger- ? manys found themselves on the same side of an international argu- ment. ? 1,4 Mrs. Strauss, everybody has a gtibd living. , What they say here that the people in the ?k Soviet Union do not live well is not true. We were having a good life. We had our own , house." She also owned a television set, a radio, a washing machine, and a refrigerator. Mrs. Strauss's comments are a reminder that even in a tightly controlled regime like the Soviet Union, different individuals have varied experiences. It shows that those accustomed to one- party politics do not necessarily find free.' debate a pleasant, stimulating affair. Possibly Mrs. Strauss also found annoying' the exaggerations and half-truths that politi- cians use man election campaign. Those who have long lived in a democracy have become,: somewhat immune to the hyperbole. But it I may bother newcomers. . Quality area A Soviet expert further pointed out that Mrs. 8trauss comes from the Soviet "repub- lic" with the highest standard of living of all.' Because of its history as an independent nation, it also has a somewhat freer atmo- ? sphere than some other areas within the . Soviet Union. What is more, the Strauss family Wei entirely nonpolitical, she a bookkeeper, her husband a building craftsman. The state. ' should have had nothing to fear from them; ' speaking openly with a feu; friends. The Strauss family are five among OW rrrPrrrrrr,7171' kV 71 'T rvi r?-a. " Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001'00080001-0.1,i..i' Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 ?T, :*ethnic German immigrants from the' Soviet Onion to come to West Germany this year (up to just before Christmas). ; It is customary to think of the United States 'and Canada as homes for migrants. But perhaps it is not so well known just how many ? "foreigners" now are living in West Eu- ? , ropean countries. Foreigners in Germany ? West Germany, for instance, has more than 2.2 million foreign workers, plus ,about 1 million of their dependents, mostly children.' ? The workers make up 10.3 percent of Ger- many's total working population. Then there are another 400,000 foreign self- ' employed individuals, ,pensioners, and stu- dents here, giving a total foreign Population , in the region of 3.6 million. ? %. That total, it is estimated, could swell to 5 ' million in a decade because more families are joining their bread earners here. More of ; ,the foreign workers are putting their roots down in Germany. In addition, the arrival of new foreign workers continues. Switzerland has? about 817,000 foreign ?Workers, comprising. about 28 'percent Of ,its Itotal number of workers. Comparative figures for France are 1,254,000 and 647 percent; for the 'United Kingdom, 1,543,000 and 6 percent; for Swe- den, 191,952 and 5 percent; , for Belgium 181,555 and 5 percent; and for the Nether- lands, 83,500 and 2.2 percent. : Special classification 1' The Strauss family is not classified as "foreign," but as returning Germans. But ' Mrs. Strauss, like probably many of the returning Germans, does not really feel at home here. ; She, like many of those classified as foreigners, has a problem of loneliness. ? Mrs. ? Strauss was born in the Ukraine, came to Geiman territory ?during the war, and then settled in Estonia. In the German 'community there, she spoke "our German"? , as learned from her mother. It is an antique German, dating back several generations to the time when German settlers were invited to the Ukraine to farm. Mrs. Strauss finds modern German ? diffi- , cult to use. In Estonia her older boy had a German lesson once a week at school. The family spoke German at home. But Mrs. Strauss wanted to come here "to live with the ? Germans and raise our children in Ger- many."' Others migrate Besides the ethnic Germans coming from the Soviet Union, 13,120 have migrated from ? Poland, and 2,070 from other countries in 1972. Altogether, Gerrnans returning from the '"East" have totaled 18,484 this year as ; compared with 28,828 in 1971. The main reason for the decline is the drop in the number getting permission to leave Poland. , Poland has used administrative procedures ?: to brake the number leaving. For instance, those wanting to go must draw up a list of all their property, indicating what they plan to leaye, what they plan to take. The officials 4 now find more grounds for refusing per-. tnission to leave. , 4! Since the re-election of Mr. Brandt, the i Soriets have slowed the flow) of German- speaking emigrants. But at least those wile do get an exit visa have more time to prepare their move ? about six weeks instead of approximately a week earlier. Few belongings brought 1 Mrs. Strauss had to leave "from one day to the other," as she put it. ''The family came with only two suitcases each full of belong- , ings." ? But as the family 9f a Heimkehrer, a :returned soldier, the Strauss family has received considerable financial aSsistance from the German Government. Not all of those coming out of the Soviet Union receive quite so handsome subsidies. "I always weep when I am at the office for ' refugees," she says. "They are so god to ilk and help us with anything we need." Mrs. Strauss's remarks on religion may be a little surprising to Westerners. - "In the Soviet Union," she said, "only the 44 old people are going to church. We have always heard that there is no Geld, so we have believed it." }laid to adapt ? Since coming here, Mrs. Strauss has gone to a church service once. She sends her boy to" confirmation lessons. "He was asked if he believed, in God and , replied 'no.' So he had some trouble. tiut he can't 'adapt so easily and just say, 'now I believe in God.' Just because he isn't in Russia anymore. ' ' , ? ? , "We will also baptize our baby and send our : girl to the Lutheran Church." Evidently the tendency, for many people tO conform to their society.-- free or not ? is , Strong. . Approved For Release 2001/08/07 4. 1A-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 7777jy .?-.? .? Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 13 January 1973 Relations with Europe: while Russia's opportu By Joseph C. Harseh 1 Is 1973 to be the year of Russia's golden opportunities rather than President Nixon's "year of Europe"? ' Any appraisal based on today's pattern of relationships among the Western powers and, Itussia would have to conclude that never, ? since World War II has the United States been ? so unpopular with its European friends and allies and the opportunities for Russian; diplomacy and trade with them so promising., It is almost as though the West European ? perception of its two great flanking neighbors 163.c1 been reversed,. ? , ? Less than five years ago Russia had ? ravished Czechoslovakia andappeared in the eyes of people to the west of that unfortunate country to be the primal monster, red in tooth and claw, ready to devour. West Europe was ? , so shocked by the repetition in Czechoslo- ? ,valcia of what had ?previously been done to Hungary that even Communists in France and Italy were alienated, and the Italian Communist Party publicly condemned what: Moscow had done. U.S. Ls in the doghouse' ? nities appear ()right' tion between Washington and Peking. At the moment of of that reconciliation Moscow was in danger of becoming the most isolated of the great powers. But the fact that Russia's benign posture of the moment was won by Anierican eiplomacy is obscured from West European eyes by the' Sharp contrast fades , At that time the United States was the , benevolent friend, ally, and protector whose sturdy right arm held a bright, pure shield :over the good peoples of Western Europe and , kept the monster at bay. ? No Western artist would paint the neigh- bors in such contrasting colors today. Not since Czechoslovakia has Moscow done any- thing . comparable to alarm or seriously" worry the peoples of Western Europe. On the contrary, Moscow has come to terms with the West Germans, has accepted the present enlargement of the European ? Common Market, has turned some of its nuclear weapons and its divisions away from .Europe and faced them instead against China, and, just this past week, was treating the 'President of France like an old family . ? friend. ? By-product from Peking Among sophisticated diplomats this benign behavior in Moscow was recognized as a by- product of an American act of initiative. Moscow's "love Europe" posture dates from , Richard Nixon's visit to Peking. Moscow has ever since been investing in a, *est European insurance policy to balance att the ,Implications of the great reconcilitt- Pattern of diplomacy continuation of the Vietnam war and the still ' vivid memory of the bombing of Hanoi. That one ileed substantially equalized the pictures Of America and Russia a% perceived in 'Europe. ? ' .41 The contrast between the ravenous mon-,: ster and the good protector is forgotten. For ; the moment at least Russia almost seems.. once more to be a European country withl which the Europeans can deal on a friendly and neighborly basis. Where will all this lead? Can the 'men Moscow capitalize on their opportunities? They have had similar moments of oppor-, tunity in the past, and soiled it by heavy- handedness. They could blow this as they; have blown so many Previous opportunities. And there is no damage to the America- European relationship which could not be' repaired by a swift end to the war and a true' turn of American interest back to Europe.' Yet the ties that have bound the grilled States to Western Europe have been coming gradually unraveled. The process of weak.' ening started way back. The. closeness of the early "cold war" period was damaged by the Suez crisis (1956) when Washington sided, with Moscow against London and Paris. The Old Anglo-American "special relationship" never fully recovered from the shock of that : event. 'And the American-French relationship was hurt by the American refusal to come to French aid in Vietnam at Dien Bien Phu. The unraveling has continued of recent - weeks and months. The process has reached the point where something inconceivable a year ago is conceivable today. The Western alliance, essentially that close relationship between. the United States and Western Europe which is formalized in NATO, is no longer to be taken for granted. It: can be saved and revived if all concerned do their part. Yet, it could also fall apart and ; disappear into the pages of history. The year 1978 will probably see, which way it goes. 6 , "r7,7771711.7jr17,7r7:17 Approved For Release 2001/08/07?: CIARlir.'77-00432R000-1.000puuTk.0i Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 Necir East [VIE WASHINGTON 00ST ' &middy, Yon. 7, 1973 Pi edwarCi Luttwak E 1 Luttwals is author Of "Dictionary of I j 'eel: umbra:Li ;witteritetnctZe etUratniteedgieStas States, ? f Modern War." , Squaring The Circle 1-?? EVEY HAVE DONE IT so many times that the whole elaborate ma-? rlietiver has become a well-practiced,! !Tata*. At the United Nations, talks with complaisant diplomats .And Atsponslve journalists, Egyptian offi-.1:. eta% are once again .unvelling' their'', lans for the forthComing campaign., Oeason, Which invariably follows the. Annual General Assembly debate. ort' ?(he Middle East. After quickly conced- ? frig that Israel retains a crushing ? tory superiority in all dimensions of,. Military power, Egyptian spokesmen ? go on to say that Arab patience is at ? at:rend; they will go to war, and soon, , and 'in a big way?even though they Oily expect defeat. "We will lose, but "yott. (Europeans or Americans or fIy, 'the West,' depending on the i4udience) will also lose, since we will i? .0set the Middle East on fire, and your. 'interests will suffer in the conflagrit., Itjori." ? , Minor variants of thii rationality-of: the-irrational strategy introduce ? the well-worn theme of internal political,;; ,tfiressure: "We are reasonable and pru- dent. but our soldiers are -straining at !Cie leash. So far we have, managed to ftlold them back but unless you force lkra el to, . ." Dark hints that U.S. oil companies will be expropriated are' itiotttine, as are threats to .cut off the .ow of oil. .The typical news Story that carrieS gie message invariably ends with the , Moral; The Arabs are about to go to war (irrationally), and the only way we can stop them is to extract some major ;concessions from those rational but ,stubborn Israelis. Caught as they are On a multi-year leadership contest that . makes an American presidential race '1ook; like a brief picnic, the Israelis obligingly supply all the wrong diplo- .1inatic noises by allowing ministers ,.itich as Yigal Anon and Moshe Dayan ito voice their competitive annexation- ,ist claims. For Israeli intransigence is 4 vital part of the Egyptian script. . All things considered, Arabs and ,Jews have done very well in keeping Western interest in the perpetual (Middle East crisis, with help from the media .men who manage to retell the 'same old stories with 'remarkable , freshness year after year. Neverthe- leka, behind the flow of words there ire only more words; there is no .nifictint action in sight. ? 1 Those who would have us believe *that the Egyptians are eager to repeat the, catastrophe of, 1967 in an even more painful form assume or pretend !that President Sadat and his followers line fanatical desperadoes, totally irra- ltional or just plain mad. In reality, the Egyptian ruling elitt is as reasonable !as any, entirely disillusioned and with- .,out a spark of fanaticism. Every ar since 1967 they have said that they mere about to set the Middle East on but even during the 1969-70 "war of attrition" the Egyptians were in fact ? very careful to control their escalation in order to avoid provoking an all-out ? Israeli resrionse. As for the sub-theme ? of "the soldiers straining at the leash," this Is, of course, a fabrication. Egyp- tian soldiers have never yet exhibited ; ? any trace of the kamikaze spirit and ? their officers are as prudent a group . of men as one could hope to meet any- where. Replaying Suez .IN THE ABSEI4CE of a genuine readiness to go to war, the war scares orchestrated from Cairo, are a vital ingredient of Egyptian diplomacy. Its goal?to recoup the losses. of 1967 without either military success-or dip- ? lomatic concessions?is unique in the annals of diplomacy. Refusal to negoti- ate with a hostile party is of course quite common, but it does imply a re- nunciation ,of all attempts to extract /Concessions from that party, unless by means of war or the threat of war. Such a refusal is entirely inconsistent with ;$ the combination of diplomatic activism and military weakness, and it is a ' great tribute to Egyptian diplomacy that its attempts to square the circle littve gained such wide credibility. ? ? t gyptian diplomatic strategy since ' 1967 has been to stage a reenactment of , the aftermath of the 1956 Suez crisis, ' when Israel surrendered her territorial gains under diplomatic pressures from third parties, including both the Soviet Union and the United States. But since 1967 there has been no third party with the will and leverage to replay 1956, although the 'Russians did their very best in 1969-70, with valiant help from Washington. While the State Department played its part by giving well-timed "back- ;grounders" to remind all con- cerned that the DS, commitment lo defend Israel did not extend to its oe cupied territories: iik?e' Russians staged I a classic threat maneuver, sending in --air force squadrons complete with Ci !' point defenses, air conditioning and ,four-star general. The Israelis at first behaved as the 'Russians had expected. They, pulled , back their own air 'patrols as Russian? air patrol coverage gradually ex. panded towards the Suez Canal. But' before the critical ,canal line was 'reached, the Israelis turned to. fight; For the Missians It was their first air, , battle inee May, 1945, and,1 as one',' , Egyptian aCcount put it, "Five of their premibr Mig-21Js were shot down irt ' less than a minute." For a while it seemed as if there was real danger of Russian escalation, but' within two weeks the bureaucrats Who now run the Kremlin had Instead ae41 cepted the U.S.-sponsored cease-fire,A and by Aug. 7, 1970, the canal was quiet , again, as it has been ever since. 1, Israel Sits Tight, 1 FROM THIS devaluation of Russian , military support in Arab eyes to the erosion of Soviet influence in the ? Middle Eas and the Russians' expul- sion from gypt, the path was down, 'hill all the way,?and a direct repetit tion of the "eoliapse of the post-war. Anglo-Arab alliance. But the failure of the 1956 re-run did'', have at least one significant effect: It 4 solidified Israeli resolve to see the cri- sis through until the Egyptians finally give up their strategy of avoiding a di- rectly negotiated settlement. Not too much should be made of the :1 annexationist claims voiced by Allon, Dayan and whoever else is seeking Mrs. Meir's job. The tough old men and women who hold the reins of power in Israel, whose entrenched posi- tion in the party secretariat has no,1 parallel outside the Soviet Politburo, have yet to make any formal tonal claims except for East Jertt- salem and the Golan Heights; if ordyi'l for social reasons, they oppose thei integration of Arab-inhabited areas. , Having lived through two genertt lions of conflict, including the last five years in which the cyclical nature of American diplomatic support, the ; short-sighted pragmatism of the Euro., peans and the ephemeral quality of , Russian military adventurism have all' lieen exposed, the veteran politicians who run Israel have become more de. termined than ever to stick it out: in' other words, no territorial concessions ? without a settlement, and no Settle-4 ment without direct Arab-Israeli tiego- tiat ion 47 ? 'N Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDI;77-010:132'14000-1b0060/01LCC;' f'!' ? Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 ? POSITION is not so oblivious' I. of Western interests as it has sometimes been made out to be. The last five years have proved that the threats of expropriation of U.S. oil in- terests emanating from Cairo are hol- low. The Algerians, Libyans and Iraqis have indeed expropriated U.S. oil corn- , panics, and will do so again if the move Is to their advantage, regardless of what the U.S. secretary of state Says, or does not say, about Arabs and ,Jews. When oil industry conditions are , such that expropriation is a poor bar- gain, they will not expropriate. For the Libyans, whose rate of inter- est on discounted future income is .only 4 to 5 per cent, it makes perfect :sense to curtail oil production, since ,prices are expected to rise and their reserves are not infinite. For the Alge- rians It has also made sense to expro- priate the pro-Arab French while sign- ? ling a Major natural gas contract with U.S. interests that includes solid and tangible guarantees against any politi- cally motivated interference. As for the truly Important il pro- , ducers in the Persian Gulf, it is obvi- ous that Egyptian influence on their j policies has now declined to the point where calls for retaliatory action ' against U.S. oil interests would Simply , be ignored. After all, an American oil company has operated Egyptian oil fields for a decade, enjoying the most , cordial relations with the Egyptians? regardless of all the Anti-American fulminations out of Cairo. Difficult as it is to accept the fact, after endless statements to the con- trary, the inescapable truth is that there is no linkage between the con- /duct of foreign policy and the oil situa- tion in the Middle East?though there imay be reverse linkage. The French were awfully popular ' with the Arabs after 1587, but they paid $L40 per barrel of crude just like the ,unpopular Americans. De Gaulle earned much Arab praise for having ditched Israel, but French gains in the oil sector have ben insignificant: alt exploration permit for a part of Saudi Arabia long since given up as dry by the U.S. Arameo company and a eopro- , duetion deal for a small Iraqi oil field, which makes U.S. Savings Bonds look , like a racy investment. As against this, at the height of their popularity, the French lost their valuable Algerian oil concessions, as did U.S. oil companies, which nonetheless received better 'compensation for their much smaller investments. ? if there is no real linkage between U.S. policy towards I Israel and the fortunes of the oil industry, why is it that U.S. oilmen regularly preach the need for a more "evenhanded'? policy? For one thing, some of them ? still retain a charmingly simple view of the Soviet Union as bent on physi- cal expansion; but perhaps the main ? reason is that on their next trip to Bei- rut or Jidda their Arab friends will be grateful. ? We all like to please our friends, and we all want to be liked, but the fact ? remains that unless there is direct mili- tary damage to the wells, pipelines and tanker terminals?which is most im- probable?the oil industry will remain unaffected by the political situation in the area?or even by a new war. If the , Russians want to buy oil, they too will - pay the going?and rising?price, and ; the oil business is too well organized to ? allow deft, operators to make a idIlirig,. . as the Russians ,did on the U.S. wheat market. A Ikaiwalsk DAILY TELEGRAPH, London 3 January 1973 UPHILL WORK FOR SADAT EGYPT began the New Year inauspiciously with further signs of malaise and uncertainty. President SADAT'S announcement of preparations for the final battle sounded less convincing and fell flatter than ever before, which is inevitable in view of excessive repetition and non-fulfilment. Another familiar aspect of the depressing cycle of futility is the demonstrations by frustrated war-eager students which have been going on for the past few days. As before, the police took vigorous action and made some scores of artests, with the result that the students are now deMonstrating for their colleagues' release?albeit in the university precincts, which is safer than on the streets. 1 The rift caused by Mr SADAT'S expulsion of 20.000 PITS BEING SO, in the Middle Eatt 't U.S. policy need only to pursue its traditional goals: to preclude a recov- ery in Russian influences in the region, to guard the political flanks of NATO, and to avoid entanglements in Israeli military gambles or Arab ' political ; maneuvers. The days when foreign service officers set out to play politics In the drawing rooms of Arab poten- tates are over; it may be a pity that all those desirable assignments to Bagh- dad, Cairo and Damascus have been ; lost, but it makes no concrete differ- ' ence to U.S. interests. 1' To play a straightforward and low- risk balancing game, the U.S. already has reliable allies, including Jordan 'and the mat efficient state in the area,, Israel. Even if it had no stronger ethnic i connection into domestic policies than 1, Ruritania?American support for Israel, would be still a worthwhile investmest. The survival of the pro-Western Arab regimes in the Middle East has ironi- cally depended on Israeli military pow- er; Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and 4. the Persian Gulf states would have all ? been drawn into the anti-Western or, obit' of Egyptian policy had Nasser won even a qualified defensive victory in 1967. Similarly, in the absence of a 'powerful Israeli air force, the Russian .adventure of 1970 could have been successful, thus providing the basis' for for an inclusion of the area in the Russian sphere of .influence. In fact, U.S. policy toward Israel' should be guided by the same hard- headed coaideratiOns that have guided U.S. Miley toward Turkey4nd Iran. If so, genuine American interests will be served, while Israel will receive: its'due without having to undergo the ,! ,,electoral cycles in U.S. support that' 'were such an Undignified feature or U.S. politica in 1968 and lea. ? Russian military helpers last July is very far from healed. The numbers that have since returned are altogether smaller than was expected. Mr SADAT is still " shopping around" for foreign arms and backers. It was announced yesterday that during the next few weeks half a dozen countries in Asia and South America will be sending theW* Foreign Ministers to Cairo. The fact that China is among them seems calculated to needle Russia, but she gives no ? sign of reacting. Much more important is the belief that America will shortly start a fresh attempt to persuade ? the ,two sides to reach an agreement 'for the reopening of the Suez Canal and a partial Israeli withdrawal in Sinai. Mr SADAT, while rattling his somewhat rusting sabre, May, well be scanning rather more eagerly the Western horlittittri 'for signs of President Nixon's emissaries. ? Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : A-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 Tr .sr-e-r1-7-77 ',7 .777,-^0 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 GUARDIAN/LE MONDE MELT Manchester, 30 Dec..1972 , Sadat's .'indecisiVe year , ARAB WORLD by David Hirst 1 Last year, 1971, was to have been President Sadat's "year of ? decision." By the end of it he was 1 to have settled the Middle East crisis by military or diplomatic means. It turned out to be another , year of indecision and ? although, - apart from an occasional "zero hour", he has steered .clear of setting more deadlines ? 1972 has proved quite as indecisive too. The taking of a real decision implies a real measure of control lover the political environment. In I the Arab world only a ruler of Egypt, as the local great power, Icanin ,heevearreaaspai rse at, om wholeoul dNeavsesnetrs, in spite of his immense prestige,. I eventually lost his grip. Sadat never really had one. Unquestion- ; ably the great event of 1972, and ostensibly the great "decision", I was Sadat's expulsion of 20,000 ; Russian experts. As a result of it, I he is no better off, diplchbatically, : at the end of the year then he was ; at the beginning. Militarily, he is i far worse off. The expulsion was : largely triggered by the Russians' ; refusal to supply Egypt with the "offensive" weapons which the ? army considered they needed and ? deserved. But it left Egypt ' not only without offensive weapons but without a reliable defensive system which is the indispensable prerequisite for a renewal el fight - ; ing across the Suez Canal.- ? It was to be expected that such 1 a move ? one of the most dramatic - changes of course in modern ' Egyptian history ? would have , formed part of a grand design meticulously planned, carried out and followed up, and that the whole ruling apparatus would have been ? geared to securing the maximum ? payoff. In forfeiting the military support of the Russians Sadat ' should logically? have sought the diplomatic ? the hopefully much more effective diplomatic ? support of the Americans and the West Europeans. But this was not to be. For it had not been so much a bold decision, maturely thought? - out, as a desperate gamble. It turned out to be an another lurch , on Sadat's zigzag course, another ? landmark on his slide into inco- herence. Sadat rules from day to day, gimmick to gimmick, promise to false promise. He cannot decide from strength; he only reacts from growing weakness. On this occasion the pressures came from inside Egypt. They were the natural consequence of his failure to keep his "year of deci- sion" pledge. Student riots in January were the first of a series Of internal convulsions. In July getting rid of the Russians was the only way to appease his army commanders, openly chafing at what they regarded as the Rus- sians' contemptuous ways, or even to head off an army coup. It did buy him a certain popularity; but he himself foresaw' that it would +es . . not last long, for even as he basked? ' in a little meretricious glory, he , passed his draconian "national unity" law which was designed to cow the regime's growing army of critics.- Of course he did try to give his gamble' some kind of coherent follow-up. He launched into a bid ' to win friends and influence in Europe. But his European offensive suffered a grave setback, not this time from disruptive forces in Egypt itself, but from a quarter which can -always be counted upon to foil others' ambitions even if they are quite incapable of adfieving their own ? the Palestinians. True 1972 saw a further decline of the Pales- tinian guerrilla movement. Yasar Arafat and the Fatah leadership continue to dominate the Palestin- ian scene. But, once hailed as a break with the old Arab order, he and his colleagues look and behave more and more like just another Arab regime. Arafat has shown, like Sadat, that he is in- capable of putting through the real structural reforms that alone can ultimately save him. In October this year, after a number of rum- blings through the year, he faced what nearly became a full-scale mutiny in the Fatah rank-and-file. ; But out of the decline of conven- tional guerrilla action, Black Sept-, ember, and its brand of pure, anarchic terrorism, has arisen. The , idea that the world is going to be engulfed in an ever-expanding wave of Arab ' terrorism can be ruled out. In spite of all the investigatory efforts, not much was learned about the organisational ' identity of Balck September. In . the nature of things, operations like Munich ? which was just the most "successful" of a series dur- ing the year ? suffer from a law of diminishing returns. However, designed to achieve maximum ef - feet with minimum resources, they have so far managed to produce an emotional backlash which amply ensures that they fulfil their strictly negative purpose: to ? foil the peace-seeking efforts of Arab re- gimes and the "liquidation" of the Palestinian cause which they in- evitably foreshadow. Sadat's Euro, pean offensive would probably have failed anyway, and his American one never got off the ground, but Munich pre -empted both. It is not only the guerrillas, by, definition outside the framework of "official" inter-Arab relations, who foil Sadat's purposes and wreck his decisions. All of a sudden, Syria, Egypt's partner in the tri -party Federation of Arab Republics, began in the second part of the" year to take a dis- ruptive, wilful course of its Own. Partly it was the effect of Munich. The Israeli retaliatory raids had gone on regularly during the year, but after Munich they turned into ? the more destructive "strike-first" strategy. Hundreds of civilians died in raids ostensibly aimed at ; guerrillas in Syria and Lebanon. President Asad came under strong pressure to retaliate. Partly, too, it was the effect of the Russians' expulsion from Egypt. Asad began to fear that Sadat will go it alone in an American-sponsored partial settlement which will leave him high and ? dry without the return of the Golan. Evidently with Rus- sian encouragement, Asad sought to demonstrate 'to Sadat that he could not hope Or a settlement at Syrian or Russian expense. After ; years of caution, Asad began to ? warm up the Syrian front with Israel in a, way which reminded people that it was the self-same 'Baathists who did so much to trigger the war of 1967. !, Jordan, the third Arab country; ' with territory to recover, continued to seek its own salvation. King Hussein, having apparently de- cided that a "military solution" ' is out' of the question, bent over backwards to prove himself Israel's good neighbour. Alone among Arab ?leadership he denounced Black September ? the work of "sick minds." He continued his all-out Opposition to the guerrillas. He kept his army deployed against ? Syria. He inaugurated -a three- year development plan in which .the Jordan valley, devastated in 'the guerrillas' heyday, will have ? a key place. Sadat has had little more suctess in the rest of the Arab world. King Faisal, leader of the conser- vative Arab camp, has shown, in , his quiet way, that there are de- finite limits on what Sadat, who , has tried so hard to cultivate his good will, can expect of him. Throughout the year Cairo con- stantly returned to the old re- frain ? an admission of military weakness ? that the Arabs should use their oil weapon against the Western backers of Israel. But the emergent American- energy crisis offers Saudi Arabia, holder of the world's largest oil reserves,. an opportunity Faisal apparently intends to-seize with both hands. Oil Minister Ahmad Zaki Yarriani" announced that his country was , planning to increase production to a fantastic thousand million tons a year by 1980, and he urged the United States to offer Saudi oil a "special place" in the U.S. market. This would bind Saudi Arabia to the United States, more effectively than any Russian-style "treaty of friendship and coopera - tion", with indissoluble bonds of economic and commercial self - interest. The Sudan, once a candidate for membership of the Federation of Arab Republics, has reasserted its African identity; this has brought the end of its long and bitter civil war in the south, but helped bring President Numeiri Into open conflict with, Sadat and 00432R000100060001-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/0,K1 CIA-RDP77- "r117777771-'7?? P 7717 Tr ?ii7771,17: 77,77177 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 Colonel Gadafi who resent the ,"ingratitude" of the man they rescued a year ago from the jaws. of a Communist conspiracy. Num - eiri has had the effrontery to re- establish relations with the Ameri- cans. So has North Yemen, another country in which Egypt once had a, powerful influence. Iraq, whose Baathist rulers have more or less turned their back on the Arab world since 1970, continued to keep very much to themselves, deeply preoccupied with their partial na - tionalisation of the Iraqi Petrol- eum Company, their menacing Iranian neightbour and their re- newed troubles with the Kurds of North Iraq. Only Colonel Gadafi sticks faith- fully by Sadat-- but. at the price of .what promiset to be a diffi- cult unien of relatively advanced; populous Egypt zWith backward, oil-rich Libya: This was Sadat's only real success 'ofthe year But THE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER i 5 January 1973 Sadat adrift in the fog how long will that last? , In October, Sadat, driven from pillar to post, was already going , back on his great "decision", seek - ing a new modus vivendi with the Russians. As the year drew to a I close, faced with growing internal unrest 'and the newly militant Syrians, he is in danger of having to take the supreme "decision",, the decision for war, 'just at a time when, as a, result of earlier '"de4 cisions," he is least prepared to wagelt. ?? t , As one year ago, Egypt Is troUbleci. Then as now Cairo's stndents were demonstrating and. being arrested. Then as now' the pressure of a prolonged situation of no war and no peace in the Middle East was having its divisive effects on Egyptian society. A scurrilous placard carried in last year's deMonstration asked, " What did you ,rio in the war, Father? I gOt lost in the fog." The reference was to President Sadat's Unfortunate explanation' why he had failed to Make true his promise that ipm? would be the year Of military or political decisioh. lie elaitned the decision had been taken but had become lest in the fog of the Indo-Pakistan War, The student protests exemplify a widespread feeling that foggy policies persist. , It Must be admitted that Presideht Sadat has been operating on a narrow margin. thOhig 1971, he went farther than his predecessor in his offers or making peace with Israel, Israel brushed these Sadat waS, ferther disappointed by the US Overestimation of its ability to coax a more flexible position out of Israel' over an interim ;settlement centred on the Snez Canal. f.3nt within ;these circumstances, Sadat forgot the hasic rules of the gamesman under pressere7r-rthe fewer errors the better. ? The decision taken in July to expel the Soviet advisers serving with the Egyptian armed forces CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 12 January 1973 :11 1 , in the short term took the wind out of opposition! to Sadat. But?this largely personal decision (taken', under pressure from General', Sadek, the War., Minister until his dismissal im October) whsi ipeptly timed in relation top the US presidentialli , elections and thus to the US ability to do anything about the Middlp East. Egypt presumed tdo that Europe would be able to take up even in part the burden' of the Soviet arms or political I support for Egypt. Its hope sank without trace': under the repercussions of the killings at the', ? Munich Olympics. The only resort was for Egypt' to somersault back to Moscow. In military terms,[ ? the expulsion exercise had left Ekvel in a still' weaker state facing Israel. 'Th-e student demonstrations by themselves do' not constitute a direct challenge to Sadat's' position. They ,essentially reflect divisions induced in a society erratically governed and under stress. These strains have shown elsewhere', In the conflicts between Copts and Mosleins. But the warning that others May follow the students ? is there already. Journalists, lawyersn arid workers. 'are also reported to have been "arrested.,There't have been student disturbances at Zagazig in thet. Delta, and at the industrial centre in ifelWan,'; Yet others could take up the warning, aggravated) , by the use of force against the students, that at year adrift in a fog is enough. ' A Afghanistan's war on 'poppies By the Associated Press Kabul, Afghanistan ?Afghanistan's new Prime Min- ister, Mohammed Musa Shafiq, says he wants a "crusade" to stop the growing of opium pop- pies and drug smuggling in this land-locked kingdom. Mr. Shafiq has declared he will not let traditionally backward power groups block changes de- signed to bring the 20th century to Afghanistan. Only eight years ? ago it began to experiment with a system of representative gov-. ernment. Not a war In referring to the power groups, tribal leaders, land- owners, and mullah ? Muslim preachers with a grip on the countryside ?2 Mr. Shafiq, him- self the son of a mullah, ob- serves: "But you do not have to declare war on them." Mr. Shafiq, a dapper diplomat who affects long hair and wide, mod ties, says about poppy culti- vation and smuggling: "This is something I consider our cru- sade here." He notes the United States, West Germany, and the United Nations have offered money to help, but the amount can not be determined until the ,govern- ment, consulting with UN ex- perts, can produce a blueprint., So The United States and West,' .Germany are working with At.., ghan officials on checking the flow of narcotics. A Referring to the U.S. programs to. buy the opium crop of Turkey,' Mr. Shang said: "You just can- not distrubute money to peasants to ask them not to grow opium. You have to make a program for them." Previous prime ministers have avoided comment on the growing ; drug trade in Afghanistan. Until two years ago, the government refused to admit that opium poppies were even grown here. Drug control experts believe from 150 to 800 tons of opium .are produced illegally here every year. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 :CIA-RD 77- 042R00O1 bo O 1- t'i Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 I WASHINGTON POST 11 January 1973 Pakistanis See Chill in U.S. Ties ? By Arnold Zeitlin ? Aenoclated Press RAWALPINDI?Pakistant 1President Zulfiqar Ali ? Bhutto is showing anxiety t, about an apparent chill in ."`, his country's relations with? ir the United States, just aa Washington and New Delhi 1, teem to be preparing'to , mend their relations. 4, In conversations with ? American diplomats, he has Iv questioned U.S. intentions . I-, toward his hostile neighbor, India, especially after Presi- dent Nixon appointed his former adviser, Harvard so- ciologist Daniel Patrick / Moynihan, as ambassador to New Delhi. The appointment., 1,, prompted one Pakistani offi- cial to refer to a celebrated - Moynihan recommendation concerning American atti- tudes toward blacks. "I hope `I this does not mean we are In for a period of benign neglect," the Pakistani re- marked. r?, Bhutto has complained about Nixon's delay in fill-. Aug the U.S. ambassador's post in Pakistan. There has been no official American envoy for six months, and virtually no effective repre- sentation since Bhutto took office in December 1971. fie also has complained', publicly and privately about, ,1 the amount of American. ' economic assistance to Paid-. Stall and the leek of Ameri.C, resionse to requests fk.i t the reaOmption of the supli plY of military equipment. .. According to authoritative/ il,American :sources, Bhutto, has been told that they United States regarded Ini$ die as the "pre-eminent"; Power on the SubcontInent;. I And sought normal relitions:: with New Delhi, It was American backing for Paid- Stan in its war with India zone year ago which cooled Already strained U.S. rein- .CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 15 January 1973 Mass trial in Turkey draws concern in Europe By a staff correspondent of , The Christian Science Monitor Beirut, Lebanon Europe and the Middle East observers are ; watching with anxiety the new mass trial that ' has just opened in Turkey. It appears to be yet another sign of the power of the Turkish armed forces in the 'nominally parliamentary regime. Even before this latest millitary trial of ? . . scores of alleged leftists began Jan. 10, there had been increasing criticism in the Council .! of Europe of the repression of nonviolent ; dissenters in both Greece and Turkey. Both countries are members of NATO, and both would like to exchange their present asaoci- ' ation with the European Common Market for rn full membership. On the other side of the Turkish coin is the frequent eruption of urban and rural guer- ' rilla violence. One example was a Jan. 3 incursion of guerrillas from Syria into Hatay ' Province. . Hostages taken Like other guerrillas active in Turkey since 1970, these may have been members .of the , Turkish People's Liberation Army. This group has taken hostages aitiong American, British, and Canadian personnel serving in Turkey and in 1971 killed ,the Israeli consul general in Istanbul. The concern in Western European opinion about Turkey, however, stems not from Turkish Army action against guerrillas but ? against what it regards as the arbitrary arrests of nonviolent critics and the subordi- nation of democratic rule to orders from the military. Lash month the Council of Europe's Nether- lands delegate, Pieter ,Dankert, was invited by the Ankara government to undertake an ? investigation in Turkey after Turkish For- eign Minister Hayuk Bayulken denied pub- lished charges of the frequent torture of political prisoners. 'Unfavorable reaction possible Stec? Mansholt, the outgoing chairman of the Commission of the European Commu- nities, said last month that the commission might react unfavorably to Turkey's appli- cation for EEC membership if Mr. Dankert's time with the government it thitinates the region. ? 'of India's Prime Minister In-, The U.S. sources ,said the ' dira Gandhi. - .United States would not per- , 1 The Americans assured,, mit itself to be "bit lc- BhUtto that the United,: nailed" by /Attie `over an , States did not regard India , eventual decision to give as "dominant." This distinc-,. - economic or arms' aid to tion was important because Matto has said it would not Pakistan. But high Amer!- ' 4reePbjndian insigtence ?Alb grba0eigtOPRIftgatie Attl findings back the charges of torture and other ; arbitrary acts. , For this latest mass trial in Ankara, 267 alleged members of the extreme leftist Turkish Revolutionary Workers and Peas- ' ants Party were indicted. Some 185 of these are reportedly expected to stand trial on 1 charges ranging from the capital offense of seeking to overthrow i1 the government to, merely insulting officials. Since the Turkish armed forces moved into a more active role behind President Cevdet ' Sunay in running the country in March, 1971,: and imposed martial law in 11 provinces a ' month later, about 3,400 people accused of terrorism, subversion, or "propagating Com-,i munist ideology" have faced military courts. Severe sentences given Unusually severe prison sentences have been imposed on many of the hundreds of intellectuals, lawyers, writers, journalists, ands students arrested. Last month a mass trial in Ankara jailed 52 teachers for periods ranging up to eight years for "transforming their union into a clandes- tine Communist cell." , ? Another conviction was that of Prof. Ugur ? Alacakaptan, a respected Turkish jurist, who was sentenced id six years and three months ' in prison and an additional 23 months' exile. . Eight other defendants convicted with Professor Alacakaptan had taken part in a protest march in Ankara in June, 1970, after . shooting between leftist and rightist univer- sity students. Turkish liberals alleged gov-'i ernment agents had provoked the trouble. Examples reported Professor Alacakaptan also was convicted of "insulting military authorities" during his . court defense of Prof. Mumtax Soysal, now' . serving six years for having included eX.1 planations of Communist forms of govern- ment in a standard text on constitutional law. The book was used for three years in universities before the military authorities ' filed charges. Many newsmen have been arrested and at least 10 imprisoned for their writings. Tinzj, mass circulation Istanbul newspaper Hurri.; yet was suspended for 10 days recently in two southern provinces for describing a guerrilla , attack by infiltrators from Syria in which three-persona were killed and nine wounded..1 dealing with -the PrOblenta "between the United States ?and Pakistan" Would take months and indicated that these problems did not hove' Immediate priority in Wash- ? ington. Tile Pakistani an ? ' ? xiety con- &esti with the aisiassirtie IA*7 aaCIAPRO . 'Nifty:at sent 'the.tth Fleet to - the Bay of Bengal as an ap- parent wanting to India to ! halt the war. 1 -Bhutto said several times l that aid year at - he Wanted' ? tp.make no deniands on the ' United States until after the Novembe ? . ential elec. 2Rup; 1 iy:-. P -4,taia.d what Si T"71r11 t 77,177.7"- 1177"7"77,77177: Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 lie had in mind when he iisaid?partly joldrigly?that he hoped to finance his 1,home reforms by "milking ,Uncle Sam." . 0, The lack of an ambassa- Odor, since the departure of '4..Toseph S. Farland for the :Post in Iran last June has, WASHINGTON STAR i 14 January 1973 rankled 'Bhutto, Now Mr.' Mil:in has made a prestige appointment to New Delhi and even named asoambas-1 .sexior , to langlade-1, al. thigh the appointment was 11 withdrawn because of the 1 Illness of the diplomat. ? JAMES J. KILPATRICK Raising the Double Standard Over Greece 7 A House subcommittee filed bitchy little r porte two , weeks ago, complaining pet- ulantly of the Navy's decision to homeport a part of the Sixth Fleet in Greece. But , the thrust of the report wasn't directed at American admi- rals; it was directed at Greek , colonels instead. The authors of this report agreed that the United States has legitimate military anti' security interests in .Greece, ' relating both to NATO and to the Middle East. They could, not convincingly challenge the Navy's choice of Athens in terms of the city's hous- ? ing facilities and the like. This was their point: "The circumstances of that ' choice indicate that our gov- ernment is more concerned about obtaining the minor ? advantages and conveniences of homeporting in Greece , (instead of Italy, for exam- ple) than about expressing our opposition to the Greek dictatorship through a policy i of minimal and cool relations until democracy is restored . in that country. The world looks to the United States to 'stand up for democratic prin- BALTIMORE SUN 7 January 1973 ciples and if we shirk that ? responsibility, we are negat- ? ing the most important prin- ciple on which this country stands." Members of the subcatn- mittee,. headed by Benjamin S. Rosenthal of New York, ? took a lugubrious view of the present government in Greece. It is not, they believe, "stable." There may be some short-term advantage in the homeporting decision, but "our long-term need is for a stable Greek government which will come through a democratic restoration." The Navy, they insist, should have chosen Naples, Livorno or Taranto instead. The authors' conclusions, viewed on their merits, have no merit. Whatever else may, be said of the government in Greece, like it or not, it is stable. The colonels have been firmly in power for nearly six years. Their oppositi6h is divided, disorganized, and im- potent. Restoration of what is euphemistically, known as "democratic rule" would in- vite a return of the chaotic conditions that obtained prior to 1967. If forces of the ex- Greek regime lacks 'fly STEPHEN 3. LYNTON Sun Stoll Corre3pondent 'Athens ? A 'former politician 1, with a conservative rural con- k StittlenCy, who bitterly detests the military-backed regime, 'groped for a word in English ?t with appropriate Greek over tones to describe his own pes- simistic outlook., Finally, he said he was a "fatalist," "It's a kind of a Greek drama," he remarked. "What we need is an anti-event that iwould initiate catharsis. What he _meant was that nothing on (.the political horizon ? except ,perhaps an unforeseeable act ;of fate ? could remove the &present rulers.from. power and open the Way to parliamenta- ry-styledemocracy. ? ' ,From him and other oppo- nents at well as from a gov- ernment spokesman, from' a man who quit the regime and now criticizes it as well as from a politician who once opposed the regime but now who supports it, from diplo- mats and from journalists ? from almost every political direction ? there is one re- frain: The regime will retain power as long as it wants because ,there- is, no -alterna- tive. , ' - :Critics say they expect no free elections in Greece unless Premier Oeorgq Papadopoules treme left wing should gain power, it could well mean a swift end 'not only to demo- cratic rule, but also to Greek's participation in NATO. By contrast, if; "stability" is the desideratum; one may re- call that Italy has had 34 gov- ernments since World War H. Never mind the merits. ,What is baffling to the ob- server of foreign affairs is the double standard one constant- ly encounters. Indeed? when it comes to our relations with the rest of the world, we seem to have double standards for double standards. " Surely this is true in the matter of Communist re- gimes. This past year saw the President of the United States toasting the Conununists of China and Rbssia, and bomb- ing the Communists of North Vietnath. It is equally true of dictatorships. Rosenthal and his colleagues despise the dictatorship in Greece. They never cease to mourn the absence of democracy in Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa. But you will not see them standing up for demo- cratic principles, in Zambia, Tanzania, and the Sudan. We see the same double ' ?'itandard id the matter of moral outrage. When U.S. ' bombs fall on Hanoi, it Is barbarism; when Soviet mis- sites fall on Quang Tri, it is no more than the fortunes of war. The history of the bloody conflict in Vietnam is in part a history of the torture, =tile- tion and murder imposed by terrorists from the North upon. peasants of the South. This, part of the history seems to affect congressional liberals not at all. We ought to weep for the dead of war, whoever they are, however they die. And when it comes to dealing with, governments we find distaste- ful, we ought in charity to give some account to the, taste ef others. ' lit some' millennium, all nations will be as democratic as the Eighth Congressional District of New York; mean- ? while we ought to work with governments as they are. We ought to tolerate Greek cola- nets, Spanish generals, African despots, and everyone else. After all, they tolerate us?or' most nations do?and that in , itself is no easy job. effective opposition/ quits, dies or is overthrown' cisions .are often open to co More detached observers say flicting interpretations ? 45. that, in any case, there is no miniscule steps toward dem evidence to suggest any will be racy or as Mere ploys to allay held soon. A supporter of the criticism, as signs of weakness regime predicted elections or of strength, ?as indications might occur in two years, but that of, will some day step Byron Stamatopotilos, the gov- down or that he means to rule ernMent's chief spokesman, for life. t . ??? t would go no further, when In November, the' regime al- pressed, than to say they lowed Students, to elect their would take place within five leaders for.the first time since years. , the .1967 coup. But critics and t Mr. Papadopoulos, a retired More' heutral observers view Army colonel Who led a mill- the polling as rigged anti say Wry coup that seized power that .governnient supperte April 21, 1967, remains in swept' the votes in, all the fee- Many' respects an enigmatic ulties except for two the ruler who seldom tips his only .,,two where invarti hand. His occaiional._public de- 52 , ? r , , T ,,TrrIrr Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-ROP77-00432R0001'00pqptoi4Y1' ? , Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 Judges watched the balloting. Last month, Mr. Papadopou- los announced the lifting of martial law in the northern district of Salonika. But his ' opponents and most observers, say the shift means little se; long as Athens itself remains under martial law and they add that, even if it were lifted In Athens, the change would be , slight since a military-sup- ported regime rules the cotta-' I In November, in what was 'viewed as a deliberate govern- ment leak, the Athens newspa- iier Acropolis reported that Mr. Papadopoulos would an- nounce limited elections for !.1973 in a pronouncement either I last month or next April. His speech last month omitted any such declaration and, although :observers here now think he May proclaim elections in a t speech on the sixth anniver- sary of the coup, the rumored ' elections are expected to be. contrived to choose only gov- ernment-approved candidates. -,for a rubber-tamp Parliament., Intimidate critics Mr. Papadopoulos is believed; likely to make occasional pub-1 lic appearances in the rural sections of the nation this year, similar to his visit to Crete last. month.. These apparently would have the makings of a preliminary political cam- paign. His supporters say he was warmly received in Crete but opponents dispute this, calling the response a facade. Alide from such limited de- velopments as these, the re- gime has permitted little politi- cal change. The former politi- cal parties remain outlawed. A constitution ratified ;in 1968 has not been put into effect. news- papers operate under a vague press law designed to intimi- date the government's critics. The government acknowl; edges holding about 250 politi- cal prisoners ? although it: objects to- describing them as such ? as well as about 15 others imprisoned pending trial. Observers here say, how- ever, they know of at least 20 jailed without trial since Au- gust. The government disputes allegations that political pris- oners are tortured. ? . The Greek political opposi- tion remains in disarray, and the regime seems largely indif- ferent to criticism from other nations, such as the mild pres- sure for moves toward democ- racy from the Nixon adminis- tration, sharper attacks from two U.S. House of Represents- ' fives subcommittees last month, Greece's forced with- drawal from the Council of Europe and its partly curtailed , dealings with the European Common Market. Both Euro- pean organizations acted on political grounds. ."Our course is not going to be influenced by anything," Mr. Stamatopolous, the undersecre- tary of state for information and the press, said hien inter- view, calling outside pressure "political blackmail." Mr. Pa- padopoulos had also denounced similar "blackmail" last month in his most recent major address. The' regifne still rests its claims to success on grounds O? economic progress and in- ternal security. The economy, has grown at a hdalthy pace? although inflation hasrecently become a problem, some econ- omists view the regime's cur- rent economic policies as' mis- guided and many attribute the economic growth to Steps al- ready begun, before the, mili- tary takeover. The consumer price index, Which had been growing at a rate of about 3 per cent pre- tously, jumped to ,5.9 per cent. in, November, ,and the more sensitive, wholesale price index I roit to 8.2 'Pei cent. Fresh meat has been in short supply and a form of .black market has appeared for meat and veegetables. ? Inflation is a touchy issue both with the regime and the public, which remembers a' drastic devaluation of the drachma to half its Worth 1953. Some economists say no cent government moves to, curb inflation may actually eel' i celerate It. ? Greece's internal security?' though it has been accompanied' by a curtailment of political' freedom?has , helped attract! foreign investment. Despite the Nixon adminis- tration's complaints about the absence of democratic features under the Greek regime, the United States continues to pro- vide about $70 million a year In military grants and credit to Greece as well as additional excess weapons. Stock American exports to Greece are rising rapidly, U.S. officials here are "targeting" Greek markets for further American exports, and they say they expect considerable U.S. investment in an airport and subway that have been proposed for Athens. WASHINGTON POST 3 JANUARY 1973 , Turks Said to Torture Dissidents , cided to make the Visit after By Laurence Marks receiving written' assurance ? London observer . from the Turkish embassy . ,t0NDON ? Amnesty Inter- in London that they would national is convinced that poll. be permitted to visit prisons Heal prisoners have been 'tor- and talk to 'prisoners: , hired in Turkey and that there , The day after they 'arrived It no evidence that torture has in Ankara, they met with ceased. , '1 Minister 'of Justice Fehmi? : This announcement by the Alpaslan and other officials. . International organization The mission handed over a' ' which , campaigns for' list of prisoners whom they "prisoners of conscience" wished to interview. Alpas- 'contradicts the statement Ian said they could do so. made by the Turkish foreign He also appeared to agree Minister, Haluk. Bayulken, that they should receive a to the Council of Europe in copy of the Turkish govern. Paris that prisoners had not ' ment's own report of its in- been tortured., quiry into torture .allega- , A- mission from the . Brit-tions. :,ish section of Amnesty In- ; Two days later, they'were .ternational visited Turkey told by the Turkish foreign In November to investigate ministry that all but me of the prisoners on their list allegations of torture. It was were under the control of i? composed of Muir Hunter. a i the Turkish general staff prominent lawyer, and two , and that the ministry of jos- magistrates, his wife Mrs. .i tice had no jurisdiction over i. Williams. Muir 'Hunter and Sir, (1s- ' them. (Eleven provinees of Mond - " Turkey ' have been tinder 4, Htinter said thAtplitelevlardi cilt littileasibe26104408/01Zg 1A-RDP77-00432R000130trekri Itil 0 was quite cm*" , martial law since the middle erat L_phraim blrom. and 1 refused access to these pris- oner,s. .?At, Sagmalcilar Women's ; prison, the mission had a two-hour interview with Mrs. Ilkay Demir, 26, medi- cal student at Istanbul Uni- ,,versity, the only prisoner on the list now said to be under . the ministry's jurisdiction. . She corroborated a state- ment made by her husband, Necmi Demir, 28, an eco- nomics student at, the uni- versity accused, in May, . 1971, of "trying to change the Turkish constitution by force." The statement had been taken from the files of the Third Extraordinary Military. Court. It alleged that he was beaten on the soles of his feet for six hours in a cell. in the Istan- trodes had been applied to:i bul police headquarters on the head and body, includ- I May 28, 1971. . '1 ing the genital organs, and Mrs. Demir also signed a police truncheon trust into copy of her own statement, I the vagina or anus, She he. , taken ftom the same court 4. ileved that it was because .4 files, that , she had been she alone had not been tor- forced under threat of tor-tured that the Mission hat' tore to accuse her husband been allowed to interview falsely of having taken part her in the. kidnaping and mur- , ivIem)iers of the mission (ler of the !sae!' consul-gen- said that throughout the in-.' 7. that she had seen her htu1,-1 ' ban in police headquarters on May 28, 1971, when he' was carried out of the cell In which he had been tor- tured and laid on a desk. The mission said 'she coni, firmed that On this occasion ,the tended her 'husband's : . she tended ,feet and those of another priSone r, Wan .Ucar, 25, an engineering stu- dent at the Technical ,Uni- versity of Ankara, accused of refusing to give inforination, about a 'resistance organiza':' tion. She said that the floor,, of the eellin which they had - been tortured was covered, with blood. She also told the mission about tortures of other polite Ica! prisoners. She said elec?C:1 ? ? I-7 Tir7r Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 ?Posed, and' answered ques- tions only, after considers- !,! tion. If she had any doubt in her mind, or if her knowl-' 1. edge was from, hearsay, she said so, according to mission methbers... The,mission later tried to bbtain permission to inter- Mew the prisoners SRN to be k.itrider Military control, but' they were refused,. They were told that, under a law passed about six months I ago, all these prisoners t (although mostly , civilians before' their arrest) are- no* ?,. considered to. be soldierS; The 'mission was unable to obtain a copy of the Turkish. government's own inquiry / report. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 11 January 1973 ? U.S. and Greece sign port pact Athens spokesman says facilities on par ' with other NATO aids By John K. Cooley Staffkorrespondent of . The Christian Science Monitor Athens United States and Greek naval officers ' 'have signed a new "technical agreement" on , home port facilities used by the U.S. Sixth Fleet here. Byron Stamatopoulos, Greek under- minister for the press, specified that Greece, , under arrangements already begun when six , destroyers of U.S. Destroyer Squadron 12' arrived arrived here last fall, "is granting the same 2, 4, kind of NATO facilities as France, Italy, and ' ohters grant to the United States. A ? "The agreement has no other significance. This will not be an operational base or a naval arsenal," Mr. Stamatopoulos insisted. ' No ownership involved Official U.S. sources here stresa that the. United United States is not acquiring ownership or title to any facilities in Greece. The ships are using existing anchorage and berthing facil- ities. Later, a mobile naval pier may be provided at Elevsis, about 10 miles west of ! Athens. Procurement of food, fuel, and other supplies and services is by local contract. Some 1,700 officers and men of the de- stroyer squadron, about 450 American fami- lies in all, including some 1,000 dependents, are already living in private houses and ? apartments rented in the Athens area. This number is expected to rise eventually to 6,000 military personnel and 3,100 dependents. They are to be joined here later by an .1 aircraft carrier that will also use Piraeus, the port of Athens, as home port. There it ' speculation here that the carrier and its personnel ' may be covered bi the new arement. Press is eritioal Last Oct. 14, the Greek alternate foreign affairs minister, Phaedon Anninos-Kavalier- atos, said negotiations beginning in January, 1972, led to signing of "minutes of under- 4 standihg" in August, 1972, covering the , destroyer squadron. 1 The home porting adcord, signed Jan. 8, is ,1 "under fire in the Greek newspapers. Almost i daily, they play up incidents between U.S.' 1 sailors and Greeks. bpposition columnists take the U.S. to task for supporting the 1 , authoritarian, Army-backed regime of Prime ' Minister George Papadopoulos. 11 Two subcommittees of the U.S. House of Representatives said in a joint report re- leased in Washington Dec. 29,, that ,the' ' 'decision does "serious disservice ,to Amer- ' ican relations with the Greek people, our ties i , to our 'NATO allies, and 'to our own demo- cratic Institutions.' 'Six subcommittee mem- ' bers dissented from the majority and sup- ported the accords. I Danger seen f, A typical comment from the Greek opposi- tion is that of John Pesmazoglu, a liberal, , ' 'pro-Western economist and former governor. !4 of the Bank of Greece. He was released last s month after seven months of forced banish- ment in a mountain village. r In an interview here, he told this reporter: i "It is an extremely dangerous and definitely 1 harmful action by the U.S. to discuss, negotiate, and conclude such an, agreement i with the present regime. "The regime has no representative charac- ' ter in Greece. By all criteria and evidence it is strongly opposed by the overwhelming r majority, of the Greek people. "The fact that the U.S. relies on making such arrangements with non-representative ` rulers who exercise power in violation of their own Greek legislation is an extremely dlIngerous and inimical action." Approved For Release 2001/08/07: diALkiD0'7171-664i$ziiiii,iiiibT66ii:iyiL*',',:4,,,i(,),!Ti`i,' Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 Africa WASHINGTON POST 17 JANUARY 1973 I Racial Collision: Rhodesia and Zambia ? ,? Guerrillas based next door in Zambia have now pro- ifoked the uptight white minority government of Rho, desia to partially close its border with Zambia; only 2ambian copper, on which Salisbury earns important hard-currency revenues, is to be let through. But whether these "sanctions in 'reverse'! will put enough' economic . pressure on Zambia to make it alter ? its deep political commitment to the guerrillas, and to leash them, is dubi- (Sus. The examPle. of Rhodesia, which itself has managed 'to endure international sanctions for more than seven .14 years?though. not without cost?would seem to be rele- . ,President Kaunda' Of ' Zambia has given hospitality, (raining grounds and sanctuary to the three main guer- rilla groups operating in -Rhodesia. No doubt he once hoped to postpone .11 full showdown with Rhodesia until Completion (expected in 1975) of the railroad the Chi- nese are building him to Tanzania's Dar es Salaam?this 'Is a project undertaken precisely to give land-locked ',Zambia a port outlet not dependent on White good will. `t ven so, Mr. Kaunda says ie will stop using the Rhodesia 'rail link. The alternatives 'are limited but they exist. Trucks already cartY Some Zambian copper to Dar es 'Salaam; other Zambian copper goes out by rail' to PorJ (tiguese Angola's Atlantic port of Lobito. Rhodesia will 'Atirely press Portugal to join the blockade but Lisbon has Its own reasons to equivocate and spin out its response. The new collision is a prime example of racial tighten- 1rig in southern Africa. Though small in number and lit- eral effect (their victims are counted only in twos end threes), the guerrillas have forced' Rhodesia to a far- NEW YORK TIMES , reaching step, Imposition of sanctions by Rhodesia has3 already stirred some public white doubts in the country.: . Moreover, it mocks Salisbury's objections to the sanctions': which the United Nations voted against it in 1965 when ? it .broke from Britain without offering -guarantees of ' 'eventual' Majority rule. Some Rhodesian whites even have,,? , acknowledged that the guerrillas, far from being the out-, Side, provocateurs portrayed In official Salisbury prone, , ganda, have, been given aid and comfort by blacks in Rhol desia. It has been one of the energizing myths of white ,0 minority rule that blacks liked it that way. Salisbury'sv sanctioM, then, seem bound to,intensify the already pres- , .sure-laden atmosphere in rhich the Salisbury govern-,1 . 1 ment is trying tO prolong and legitimize its rule.. Let it be clearly understood 'that it is the whites' con':.1 tinuing refusal to take gradual legal steps towards ma- jority rule that has brought into being the guerrilla move-4 ment based outside Rhodesia in Zambia?and in Bot-t, . ,swana, to the west, and Mozambique, to the east, now as well. No other legal political avenuesv have been open.1 Indeed, recently the Smith regime in Salisbury began introducing certain., "apartheid" measures. These .can: hardly fail to stir further black opposition and to ensure; . that such, opposition Is expressed in increasingly militant- '. 'ways. So far the Urilted States has not been called upon ? . publicly to take. sides in the Rhodesian-Zambian collision. ? But something like a Zambian request for trucks in I which to carry out more copper to Dar es Salaam could 'I force the issue. It would be interesting to se the Nixon) administration's response. 17 January 1973 Churches Press Businesses on Africa By ERNEST HQLSENDOLPFt Six Protestant church organi- zations are renewing a cam- paign for full disclosure' and close Scrutiny of American corporate investments and,' ac- tivities in southern Africa,', it was announced yesterday.. The' organizations, all. Insti- tutional investors, are trying to exercise their privilege as shareholders to compel 13 cor- porations to disclose their deal- ings in South Africa and other couptries where what they con- sider "oppressive conditions" ? prevail for blacks. ' The groups, which include theNational Council of Churches. ? have filed stock, holder resolutions 'to be in- cluded in corporate proXy state- Ments. ? At a press 'conference Yester- day at the Church Center for the United Nations, 777 United Nations Plaza, spokesmen stop- ped short of threatening to withdraw their investments in the companies doing. business In ' southern Africa, but said they hoped to change company policies' through public pres- sure. , ? ? ', 'Huge Profits' Are Seen The 'United States companies "ha-Ye made huge profits there while paying their black work- ers pitifully inadequate wages," the Rev. W. Sterling Cary, presi- dent of the National Council of Churches, said. , "They have provided prod., ucts for the white government and military, thereby strength- ening white control." Mr. Cary said. "TheY,have helped create a flourishing economy7 ? for whites." . ' ' The religieus 'organizations; described as "substantial insti- tutional investors," include boards and agencies of .the American Baptist Churches, the Protestant Episcopal Church in the U.S.A., the United- Methb; dist Church, the United Presby- terian Church in the U.S.A. and the Unitarian-Universalist , As- sociation as well as The Nal tional Council. Burroughs Said to Agree The targets of the groups are' the Burroughs Corporation. the 'Caterpillar Tractor Company, !the Chrysler Corporation. the !Eastman Kodak Company. tivl Approved For Release 2001/08/07 First National City "Bank of New York, the General Elec- tric Company, the International Business Machines Corporation, 'the International Telephone & Telegraph Corporation, the Minnesota Mining and Manu- facturing Company, Texaco, Inc., and the Xerox Corpo- ration. The Burroughs Corporation has already agreed to supply the information requested, a spokesman said. Iti a separate action the Unitarians have' filed a resolution asking the Exxon Corporation to set up a special committee to investl-? gate the implications of a pi-g- oosed investment in the Portu- guese ?African territory of An. gola.? ' ? . Suing Up Position, ; Last Year a group of. re-1 ligious organizations made de- mands for disclosure upon the Gulf Oil Corporation, the Geed,' year .Tit'e Rubber ,ComPany; :the General Motors Corpora- Ipternational Business Ma- chines Corporation and the. Mobil Oil Corporation. Spokesmen yesterday claimedi Icredit for clisclOsures .andi "some policy,changes" by duff and General Motors, but they criticized Goodyear as having flatly ref Used to cooperate. ' Summing up the chute groups' arguments, Dr. Gene Bartlett, president of the AmerP can Baptist Churches, said: "If our corporations make some of the highest profits in the world While doing business there, and we as institutional investors benefit from those profits, we then directly profit froni tpartheid. ? ? ? Spokesmen said they did not, know the value of combined; church, investment portfolios; but . estimated that church. organizations control less than 3 per cent of company shares.', It is estimated that there are. 18.5 million members among the six organizations in the, campaign. Appearing with Mr. Cary andi Dr. Bartlett for ? the 'announce- ment were the Rev. Stewart MacColl, chairman of the Corn-' mittee on Mission Responsibility through Investment of the GenL eral Assembly Mission CotinciV and Miss Florence Little, treas. urer of the Women's Division of the United Methodist Church,j CIA-RDP7400432R000100060001-0 - rt,yrIr: .71,11-.77r7T-71777"? ,I!,1 I ..).sf173-)',', 7; Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 Western Hemisphere NEW YORK TIKES 11 January 1973 mericart Th 1:lets 1 ': fly Bolivia as A Gucrrilia By DEMDRE CARMODY , A former American min, ar- country until' 1902, when* she was transferred to 'La Paz for parish work.' In In .1967 she and another Maryknoll Sister, -without 'dis- closing their affiliation, took Jobs in a factory in one of the poorest areas of the city to try to help people there. They lived on $20 a week in a' small room with no running. water, .elec- tricity or heat. Lost Her Factory Job ? / rested in Bolivia for belonging ;10 a *subversive organization, hat been held In jail or more than five weeks because she not reveal the identities :of other members .of the clan- destine group. . . Ile 40-year-old woman, Mary 'larding of Fairhaven, Mass., ,hitS admitted that she is a mem. 'her of the, Army of National 1Liberation, a guerrilla organi- c,zatiori that grew out' of the ilnoVement founded by Ernesto Che Guevara in 1967, 'Accord- ing to the State Department, Miss Harding. told by the Boll- ' vian authorities that she would ;be released as soon as she (gave information about mem- ;berg of the terrorist organiza- tion, replied that she would 'never do so. Triends of Miss 'Harding, here from Bolivia te try to stir c Interest in her case in the hope that it will expedite her release, say that she told 'a priest who Visited her that she had been 4f beaten with a hard rubber mal- Jet during -the first '72' hours after her arrest on Dec. 5. ? AecOunt by a Visitor 1! ' i Juan Jos4 Loria, Minister i Counselor of the Bolivian Em- bassy in Washington, said in , an interview that reports that : Miss Harding had been beaten , Vete "clearly not true." He i cianfirmed that she was being , held "because she has to con- : form to our laws as any citi- * ze)i," but he said he 'had. no information' on the possibility other release. t We have no information to . stibstantiate that she was beat- en'," said Jack 11. Binns, Bolivia : dfsk officer in the State De- pti)tment. "Our consular offi- cer asked her if she had been ? nfistreated and she said she had nOt." ' ,ACcording to a man who has , ju,st arrived from La Paz and . who does not want to give his -Ilene for publication for fear hwilt nbt be allowed to re, ,e ter Bolivia, Miss Harding is b mg held in the city jail in a small, damp room that has little ' other than a mattress on the ifleor. She it visited about once ?,a "week by someone from the 'ertbassy. Two nuns were al- lowed to see her on Christmas and a few people have man. t 1 aged to see her unofficially. i ,114iss Harding went to Bolivia 41W' 1959 as a member of the OVIlrylinoll order. She worked ias; a teacher in the tropical In 1970 Miss Harding left the sisterhood, telling a friend, Gail Kelley, 1that she ,had become involved in political attivity and "did not want the Mary- knoll order Compromised." Dater she lost her factory job because , she had 'failed to change her status on her pass- port when she left the order ahd ,was working illegally. She then got a position as an Eng- lish teacher in the American Cultural Institute, -a United States Government agency. , On her way to 'work on Dec. 5 she was arrested for being a member of the liberation army, which is known as E.LN. 'According to Dr. Loria, the organization is "planning to overthrow our Government and is trying to create a Viet- nam in South America." Sources in the State Department de-, scribe it as a terrorist organ4' ization. It has actively mounted guerrilla campaigns-against the three military Governments Since then. According to the State 'Department, it apparent- ly switched its strategy from rural insurgency 'to urban ter- rorism about two years ago, and recently officials uncov- ered' an attempt to assassinate President Hugo Banzer Suarez, whose right-wing Government has been in power since a coup d'etat in August, 1971 ? the 181st coup in the turbulent 147-year history of Bolivia. On Nov. 23 President Banzer imposed a state of siege throughout the country, assert- ing that there was an open conspiracy to overthrow his Government. As a result cer- tain individual rights were sus- pended under the Constitution and a modified form of martial law is in effect for the popula- tion of more than five million. It is this that has complicat- ed the Harding case. State De- partment sources say that under the martial law both na tionals and foreigners may b held in "indefinite detention itIrthetstem a,ection ,6f, ,the for ,Interrogation? if they,* suspected of terrorist adtiVitiett.1 Charges do not have to be filed. ' According to Miss Kelley; also a former nun ,0 who lived here now, more than 1,000 Bolivians are being held as political prisoners in Viacha, Achacalla and Coati. She said that prisoners were being tor- tured and others had been shot "while trying to escape." Miss Kelley said her informa- tion came from a document published in exile and another document that had probably been written by priests and was 'smuggled out of Bolivia. Asked about political prison- ers, Dr. Loria" said that he did not have a figure but that , it wass nothing like 1.000. Several' hundred were freed last month,; he added. He acknowledged, that prisoners were ,being de-' tamed in the areas , cited by Miss Kelley. In a letter to a friend here in July, Miss Harding said the sit- uation in Bolivia was "fear everywhere?and there's reason for fear everywhere." She spoke Of -'arrests without authoriza- WASHINGTON STAR 14 January 1973 TX-Nun Placed rtion?,". surrptestion-''of.' MOW 'corpus, tortures?at least two cases I know of personally: a ,man and a young woman have died' under torture?and( how many more there must be; in. human conditions ?in the con, jcentration camps where people are held." "Please, we are desperate," she wrote. "I try not to say toO much in my letters home; but I want my mother to be a littlei prepared .psychologically 'just in case." Both . Miss ' Harding's friend who is here from La Paz and Miss ,Kelley sai4 they felt that the United Stats Embassy had net tried hard enough to win Miss Harding's release. 'According to the State De- partment, she has requested neither deportation nor coun- sel. During the weekly visit by an American from the.ernbassy, she is asked if anything can be done .fOr her. A State Department spokes4 man said that as \ far as he ,knew Miss Harding was the only American being detained as a political prisoner in Bolivia: In U.S. Custody LA PAZ? Bolivia (AP) ? Mary 'Elizabeth Harding, a former U.S. nun arrested last month and accused of guer- illa activities, was released yesterday to the custody of ,the U.S. consul. Interior Minister Col Mario Adett Zamora said she would remain in the custody of Don- aid Mudd, the consul, until, her expulsion. He did not say i when she would be ousted. 2 Adett Zamora said Miss Han.) dingo 40, from Worcester,' Mass., had confessed to being a member of the National:, Liberation Army, a guerrilla': group founded by the latei Ernesto (Che) Guevara. Shei was arrested Dec. 5 by thdt political police. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 17 January 1973 tin America gaiyi on ,U.S. envoy ) 56 By James Nelson Goodsell Latin America correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor Latin Americans .are casting somewhat " wary glances at Washington these days over the imminent vacancy in the State Depart- ment's top Latin-American post. At a time when United States-Latin.' American relations are none too warm, one ofi the few bright spots in the relationships, as far as Latin Americans are concerned, has ,been the role of Charles Appleton Meyer, who , currently occupies the post as assistant: Secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs. Mr. Meyer is held in warm esteein through-1 ; out the hemisphere, in rather sharp contrast., with most of the post's previous occupants. , A onetime Sean, Roebuck executive, Mr. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77.0O4 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060b01-0-' ' Meyer's resignation was not uhexpected. NEW YORK TIMES , When he took the job in 1969, he did to with 10 January 1973 ? the understanding ,that he would stay only. 1. four years and then return to business. ; '. Actually Mr. 'Meyer has held the post . longer than anyone else since,it was created ? after World War II. For a long time, the . ? assistant secretary's job looked something like a revolving door, with one occupant after, another serving a few months and then , resigning. " - . , The fact that Mr. Meyer remained in the ; post as long as he did impressed' Latin . :Americans. But it was his way of dealing with ; thorn that impressed them the Most. Fluent in Spanish, he has enjoyed the role , of a personal diplomat ? which was impor- tant in a period of "low profile" adopted by President Nixon, who is personally not too warmly received by Latin Americans. Many, Latin Americans equate the, "low profile" strategy as a euphemism for a do-nothing Throughout the past four years, Mr. Meyer was able to get across the message that he, at" least, cared about Latin America ? and this / proved of tremendous value in many hemi; sphere conferences where he was able to tone 'down Latin-American criticism of United' States policy. ? ? ? Now the Latin Americans are wondering just who will take over the post and what the new occupant will do for relations between the United States and thd rest of. the. :hemisphere. "We're none too hopeful, given the past. , record of assistant secretaries and the lack of interest President Nixon has shown for this ,part of the world," a leading Latin-American, diplomat in Washington said. "But then we do , have the record of Charlie 'Meyer ? and so perhaps there is some reason for hope." A number of names have been mentioned. Joseph S. Farland, onetime ambassador to Panama, and John M. Hennessy, an inter-. national affairs , specialist at the Treasury , Department, are most frequently suggested; ;as top candidates for the post. But all indications suggest the White House, has not made a decision and indeed, in the Mew of several Latin Americans in Washing.:, ,ton, there is a feeling that the post could go: vacant for some months before being filled, if past performance is a criterion. Mr. Meyer, 1 for example, was not tapped for the job until:. ,Several months after Mr. Nixon's first in- ;auguration. There will be other changes in the Latin- NEW yopg TIMES, ,American team at the State Department. John Crimmins and Robert A. Hurwitch, the ? razil Bans Sale of Picasso's Erotic Prin tion between the two." Miss Soares saia. Brazil's television programs, she said, were much worse in , their way but the censors neg- By MARVINE HOWE Special to The New York TImes RIO DE JANEIRO, Jan. 9=-- Brazil has banned the sale of, Picasso's erotic engravings in what appears to be a new wave of eultUral puritanism. Brazilian intellectuals I ex- pressed general dismay today over the Government's action, Which they felt would only tar- nish this country's image abroad. There ihas been increasingi concern here over official cen- sorship of the arts. Rip de 'Janeiro's leading daily, .Jornal do Brasil, published a devastat- ing report Sunday .on culturall censorship. The ban on the Picasso prints by the federal police follows the seizure of the Christmas Issue of Playboy and refusal to authorize the sale of Playboy's new magazine, Oui. Bookstores Surprised ' The Picasso engravings are 'Contrary to public morals and good behavior," according to the Ministry of Justice. This judgment came as sur- prise to bookstores where the $5 Picasso portfolios 'have been on sale for three years. "It's absurd and ridiculous and 'quite incomprehensible," 'said Dilze Soares, a leader` of 1Brazil's erotic-surrealist school lof painting. Miss Soares, who is known as Zama, said that she had had no trouble with the censors 'but-that. other members of het school had' not been allowed to , exhibit their works in Belo Hor- izonte on the, ground that the paintings were a threat to the traditions of the family. ."The erotic is part of nature; pornography is a human inter- pretation and I make a distinc- I lected "that kind of commercial pornography that isn't even ar- *tistic." Movies have been hard hit by censors, according to Jornal do Brasil. New political films, par- ticularly from Italy, pa well as flims from the United States, based, on sex and violence, were threatened here. , Recent banned films ?include Stanley Kubrick's "A Clock- work Orange," Michelangelb Antonioni's "Zabriskie Point," Pier Paolo Pasolim's "Decam,ehr on" and Ken Russell's "The Devils." Other films have been released after heavy cuts. In 1971, censors prohibited the showing of 35 films-13 Brazilian and 22 foreign?for 'containing "matter subversive or contrary to public morals and good behavior." There has been an increase in censorship in the theater, according to a successful play- wright and director, ? Flavio Rangel. "The censors want to reform humanity and so they exert a dual action, preventing any analysis of 'the Bra'?iliari situa- tion and exerting an excessive control over morals," Mr. Ran- gel said in an interview. . The ban on the Picasso en- gravings did not surprise Rio's artistic community, which is becoming accustomed to the rigors of censorship, the play- wright said. He said that last year censors banned a poster of a. painting by Michelangelo. Book publishers also testify fb new intimidation by censors. Most publishers prefer not to invest time and money in works that run the risk of be- ing seized for political or erot- ic content. WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 17, 1973 Iwo top aides to Mr. Meyer, are expected to 'receive ambassadorial appointments. The new team members, headed by who- ever is named to succeed Mr. Meyer, are, UNITED MATINS, N.Y., Jan. Important. But Latin Americans also watch 16 ? The Security Council de- with interest for signs of Latin America being. cided today to hold a series of ' accorded a greater priority in the White ,meetings in Panama City begin- House. Despite past promises that Latin , ning March 15 on matters con- America is top on the White House list, most cerning Latin America. hemisphere diplomats say that this has not The action was taken with- proved to be the case, out a formal vote and despite ? Over the long pull, improved trade rela- , serious reservations expressed lions and increased economic aid are, in the by the United States and Brit- ' View of Latin Americans, the key to better lain. Neither, however, was pre- pared to exercise its veto to relations between the United States and the block what was clearly the will rest of the hemisphere. Still, they ate very "of the 15a. ember betty. hecretary post. Approved i-or Kele5r 2attirdft.ocokbotop Concerned about who occupies the asalstant ?IV? ounct o o to i anama n 4 I By ROBERT ALDEN . Special to The New York Times said he did not feel it was wise of the Council, in the event of a sudden world emergency, to be separated from its base, its records, its communications and other facilities unless (her were , other overriding reasons. These reasons do not exist in the case of the proposed meetings in Panama City, Sir Colin said. Strong support for the Pana- manian proposal came from the Soviet Union, France, China, Guinea, Peru, India, Keny,i the Sudan, Yugoslavia and Indone- sia. The United Staes was part. WYMNYeigetittrimitf. 't7 ' I F7,1777177r777r71-77,77.7.7"TrPr1717T " Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0 Sion ordisapproval of the hold- ing of the meetings in Panama City, Since it will bring about what is expected to be abra- sive airing in a hostile atmo- sphere , of the dispute between Panama and the United States over the matter of the Panama Canal Zone. Aquilino E. Boyd of Panama, who extended the invitation for the meetings in Panama, said today that a "semi - co- lonial" situation existed in all Of Latin America and that it existed in particular Via "the so-called Panama Canal zone" where "a colonial situation di- vides Panama into two parts preventing the political, eco- nomic and social integra- tion" of his country. ?Mr.' Boyd called the zone "a hotbedt of international ten- Mons, where a dangerous sit- :nation, potentially explosive, ,exists." "Panama claims effective Sovereignty and exclusive jur- isdiction over the area in- valved," he said. "A power ,foreign to the territory of Pan- ama occupies the area and the, :Council is needed to eliminate' Iconflict" regarding the canal. Speaking for the United States, George H. Bush replied that it was essential for the proper functioning of the Council that? a meeting not be conceived as a means for bringing pressure on bilateral Issues not currently before the Council. , "Ambassador Boyd," Mr. Rush said, "has raised such an issue in mentioning the Pan- ama Canal, the status of which Is under active bilateral nego- tiations. With due reference to the history of the area and the issues, we, of course, do not accept the contention that the Canal Zone is an 'inner colonialist enclave." Mr. Bush recalled that mem- bers of the Council had earlier expressed concern about hold- ing meetings where public opin- ion could affect the work of the Council. "In this case, it is already evident that the prospect of this meeting is stimulating a heated propaganda campaign In Panama, which will not be con- ducive to the kind of atmos- phere needed for Security iCouncil meetings or be helpful for the future course of bilat- eral negotiations," he said. Meetings of the Security Council away from United Na- tions headquarters in New York ,have been rare. In 1948 and ,again in 1951 meetings were held in Paris, concurrently with the General Assembly, which Was also in session there. Early last year, the Council, Met in Addis .Ababa to discuss matters of concern to Africa .as the result of an invitatioo ifrom the Organization of ,Aft-i. can Unity. . LONDON OBSERVER 7 January 1.713 le run by computpr tat by NIGEL HAWKES, our Science Correspondent ;THE FIRST computer system puter's analysis. Any anomalies , Although the control room designed to Control an entire can quickly be detected and was then incomplete, the Gov- economy has been secretly brought into operation in Chile. The system has been designed for Chile's Marxist Government by a British management expert, Mr Stafford Beer, a former Re- search Director of the Inter- ' national Publishing Corporation corrected by issuing instructions ernment was able to use the to the industrial sector invelved, system to see clearly what was Mr Beer was asked to hell; happening and to work out the Chile by the young Minister of effects of possible anti-strike measures. The computers also Finance,. Sr Fernando Flores, work. He. showed that there were more an admirer of his jumped at the chance of putting United States dollars floating his ?ideas into practice, after about in the economy than there , and president of the Operations . years of official neglect in s iou d have beeu?evldence of Research-Society. For the past Britain. By June last year, he a still-flqurishing black market 'e in dollars. year he has been commuting says, 60 ' per Cent of Chile's . between London and Santiago economy was being monitored Although no public innounce- , to advise the Chileans on the iby the system. i ment of the system has been design of the system.' - The computers used are made, its existence was dis- . This is the first time that American IBM 360 machines, closed last week by dn under- 'futuristic schemes for control- plus some French and British ground science newsletter,Lddies, published in London. ling a country's economy by hardware. At its simplest level, Mr Beer, somewhat taken aback computer have been put into the system provides up-to-date d operation. The system has been information about how the at the isclosure, says he will assembled in some secrecy so as Chilean economy is performing. be giving further details of the to avoid opposition charges of ...Production figures are fed into system in a lecture in. Brighton . I Big Brother" tactics, the computer on a daily rota, next month.He is trying haid to avoid the The system works by gather- so economic Ministers always charge that the system is elitist fag information daily from have at their fingertip i rma- nfo . . . or technocratic by trying to 1 Y Y ? > 'Chile's. factories. ? and, Copper .the industrial data used by the mines, and processing it in a' Treasury Treasury in making decisions 'central, ' control room ' hi -- are eight months old/ - Satniago. , The; inforniation . The system also . makes it .reaching the central Vro ? om . is possible to test economic processed through the 'computer policies by feeding them into t6 work ' ' Out ' riutomaticaff i the computer and watching their whether' production.: in I any T. effects on the screens. This has sector of the economy has varied ..4 already paid off, Mr Beer says, significantly from iire-Set nerres. in. the recent " bosses' strike,' ,Itt I the Iteintrial ' foorti; Chile'Cluriiett, Owners of lorries tried to ,bdinititniq Controllers watch. pro. I bring' the country to . a halt in jectors and visual, displays ,that, protest against the Government's show the Aiming' of - the VeaPt-- 'itolicies. 58 Approved For ReleaSe 2001108/07 : al ? develop ways in which ordinary people can use it. Whether it will work is perhaps a more valid criticism?similar systems on a much V smaller scale in in- dustry have varied enormously in effectiveness, from highly efficient to almost useless. And Chile,Aespite the idealism of its Government, is scarcely the idyl laboratory for testing Dr "Beer's ideas exposed as it is to unfriendly influences from the 113S, the multinational corpora- tions and the World Bank. 07p86"47.741kdaWfralOp" " ,:,!