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January 15, 1973
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Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001000EM CONFIDENTIAL NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES INTERNAL USE ONLY This publication contains clippings from the domestic and foreign press for YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use of selected items would rarely be advisable. NO. 29 6 FEBRUARY 1973 General. . ? 0 0 ? ? ?0 0 ? 0 0 0 0 Page 1 Far East . 0 0 0 00?0 .. . Page 16 Eastern Europe . 000000000e Page 52 Western EuropePage 58 . . ? . . . . . . Near East. . . . . ? O? ?? ? 0 0 . Page 62 Africa . . . ? ? ...?... . . Page 70 Western Hemisphere . . ? ? ? . . . . Page 71 25X1A Destroy after backgrounder has served its purpose or within 60 days CONFIDENnAL Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 25X1 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8? GE EMI A LOS ANI-LES TIl'ES 1 5 JAN 1973 The Dangber. of Terrorists Getting Illicit A-Bombs BY LOWELL PONTE . In DK when I was editing a satire magazine, a "think tank" hired me. Its masters :needed someone ,to write reports, :they said?someone with a bizarre mind. The reports. it turned out,'. were commissioned by the Pen- tagon. The first dealt with "non- national nuclear threats"?what if atomic bombs fell into terror- ist hands? My gothic fantasies on this theme filled half the re Port. . f one scenario, young radicals After all, the sullP"se'll-Y "se- In_ ,...?..,..,?___ ,..,,,,. _,0?,- act" technical information was 'i'c'-";::0;11 lili'lis'lik,?.dgau"h',:!' 1;11('-)cli's openly available, and so the ex- plosive materials, in criminal from the Capitol in Washington hands, could be converted readi- . D.C.. and an hour later destroveti ly into crude atomic bombs. the heart of the 1? .5. gfivernnient by remote on ml. The security precautions are ? In another, the teriurists?were . extort ionists. holding New. york still lacking in 1973, and the : City for :s10 billion ransoni..chance of terrorists acquiring Their demands refused, they .atomic bombs grows daily. ? . " ? . war. he saw my fantasies as pro- tonium sells for about S10,000 phecies that could begin coming per kilogram. it is thus five true at any moment. The source of such weapons. in times as costly as heroin and 10 his estimation. would not he nth- times as expensive as gold. What er nations but a criminal black its value would be on. an illegal :market supplied by thefts from market is anybody's guess." our "peaceful" nuclear rea:tor Nevertheless, criminal penal-:' ? program. Thus the second half of ? ? ? ? I fl Ow iaci - ties for mere theft of radioactive materials are milder by far than precautions would siinplify the theft of plutonium and uranium from our electricity-generating reactors. . loaded an A-bomb and timer into a small privz.n-. airplane on a Canadian airfield, flew into the Cnited States, .p..irachtned out :10 -miles from their target?and let (h.'? craft's automatic pilot carry it over Alanhattan Island. In a third scenario, the terror- ist.; were pacifist scientists who secretly put together A-bombs in suburban basements around the country, booby-trapped them to , thwart. defusing attempts. then : demanded that, the government, dismantle its missiles or Jose : cities,. one by one. In April, 1971. with Taylor's help, the journal Science eval- uated the prospects for a crimi- nal black market in -plutonium. By the year 2000. Science esti- mated. the United States.will get 705, of its electricity from nu- clear reactors, most of them "fast breeders" .khat use plutonium as fuel and Produce more of it as a byproduct. By them civilian plutonium supplies will top 720,000 ? kilo- grams. any five kilograms of wbich could make a bomb com- parable in size to the one used on those for heroin pushing. Sonic materials are already ? listed as missing. According to,. Science, the AEC reported one. Arkansas reactor facility defi- cient in "a few kilograms"r of plu- tonium and a processin,, facility in Pennsylvania unable to ac- : count for 6 of its materials ? over a six-year period. In Brail- Eng_reactor workers were caught hauling 20 loaded fuel rods over a fence, apparently to ' be picked tiP by accomplices. , If security is pom? at reactor ? facilities, it is worse on 'chicks ? carrying radioactive materials' from site to site. The AEC. has made it a common practice to smut large raclioactive shipments ? on ordinary airliners and trucks, usually unguarded. On one flight in the late 1960s, : 703 kilograms of enriched urani- um were transferred to the Selni reactor in Italy: had this, ship- , ment been hijacked, it could 'have provided the fixings- for 25 ? uranium A-bombs of 20 kilo- grams each?the sort and size This last fantasy troubled 1)1?. Nagasaki. (V that destroyed kilograms of Theodore -Taylor, head of the plutonium. come to one handful, One nuclear power specialist "think tank," more than the oth- weighing II pounds.) insists that railioactive airliner - em's. After a few cities were According to Atomic Energy shipments have been hijacked to buried under mushroom clouds, commissioner Clarence Larson, ? Cuba and at least one truck ship. he conceded in 1969, the govern- the reactor industry will proba- ment has been diverted to Mexi- : ment would "undoubtedly" bly always have an "unavoid- co. ? knuckle under to terrorist de- able" loss rate of -1 to 2f;;, in In these cases, says Dr. Dean , mands. radioact ive materials?the per_ Abrahamson, director of the ? Taylor had been deputy direc- centage that, Without causing Center .for Studies of the Physi- ? tor of the Pentagon's Defense alarm. can "disappear" in proc- cal Ellvirehmeht at the Ulliver" - Atomic Support Agency during ? essing. ? sit' of Minnesota. the shipments. , the mid-1960s, when a newly nu- were recovered, along with the. By the year 2000, a 1% hiss in vehicles. si n c e their presence.- : eleatized Peoples Republic or plutonium stores would involve abroad had not become known.. China was talkhig?loosely cr enough t ? ? 1 missing ma el o ? spreading atomic weapons to I he AEC has denied Alwaham- ma ke 1,140 A-bombs. ? many Third World powers. Hav- .. ? ? son's report on the Cuba hijack- ing come to view terrorism by A- is strong to divert ings, but as of this writing it has Ps even to al' not denied a similar Cuba hijack- ?! bombs in private hands as more materials," probable than global nuclear range "accidents," to account. for ing report this month lw nuclear larger-than-usual losses. . specialist. Lawrence Sheinman Said Science: "At present, plu- ? of Cornell. nor has it denied the ? ? possibility that such incidents Lowell Pattie lives in nor.; hinds. Ile i$ a former defense. researcher and has often written about tempottry. 1 -Appcoved-for-Release-2-004/08/07-4-CIA-RDP-77-00432-R000-10008000-1-8 - Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 could happen in the future. Last January, a. poorly shield- cil shipment. aboard a Delta .; ? Airlines plane "leaked" radioac- tivity at 11 American airports...! 'The AEC said the amounts were not hazardous to people. which ? may be true. hut the incident de- monstrate.3 the limited care that , such shipments receive. Taylor's think tank now works ' - on en vironMental concerns, hut his nightmares. continue. .Last November. he said some small steps were being taken to pre- :vent. thefts?automatic alarm; ? In shipments. tor example, and surveillance at facilities. In addition. the AEC Is slowly . adding stricter regulations to ? licensing agreements with pri- vate reactor and procesking com- ? panics, and it is moving toward a U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Jan. 22, 1973 policy of "dedicated vehicles" whose sole job would be the transporting of plutonium and raniu m. presumably under guard. But the AK is moving at a snail's pace. Taylor added. in , part because reactor companies 'resent and resist paying the cost of security measures. Complete safeguards. he estimated, would raise the consumer cost of nu- clear..: generated electricity by !less than I r , but, in the abSence. of public .demand for theiri; the risk persists of uranium and phi- .tonium being stolen and con- Ceded Into weapons of almost Inestimable danger. , (Two years ago. ;Taylor warned: "If the AEC doesn't get some kind of safeguard system and operating system set. up by NOW: A IN IN SALES ,.107:1, there ill he leaks of radioactive material that would be very hard to stop." for the losses by then would have grown routine. "Then" has be- come "now.") After a year submerged in think-tank thinking, I took my' bizarre mind elsewhere. Iy nightmares, like Taylor's,. were, too real for comfort. Then, as now. I found It deeply unsettling 10 dwell on this plc scenario: that the average American millionaire, regardless , of race or creed or sanity, might, . buy the makings of 20 atomic . bombs and then, for less than - $15. purchase the know-how for producing nuclear hombs.from-,- no, not from spine underground tipster--i-the U.S. Government Printing Office. , ? ? ' LDWIDE BOOM RiViS Talk of peace is in the air?but nations today are dealing in weapons as never before. Selling of military hardware, vital to some countries, is hotly competitive and expanding rapidly. B? uying and selling of military weap- ons around the world is surging to rec- ord levels-and no end to the boom is in sight. At latest count, international trade in aircraft, missiles, ships, tanks, small arms and other hardware totaled nearly 7 billion dollars a year. That is about double the amount sold a decade ago and does not count bil- lions in arms given away free each year, mostly by the United States. What's more, says one leading arms expert, the weapons trade is likely to double again by 1980, approaching the 15-billion-dollar mark. Big-power play. It is a fiercely competitive business, with the U. S., the Soviet Union, France and Great Britain the principal suppliers. "International anarchy" is the way one authority describes the competition, with each nation setting its own rules, offering equipment on generous credit terms, moving in quickly when another seller pulls out of the market for diplo- matic or other reasons. It is a business, too, which has seen many of the small private dealers all but squeezed out of the market. Private sellers who deal chiefly, in small arms and ammunition account for about 200 million dollars annually in sales. The great bulk-about 97 per cent -is sold by one government to another or by large private manufacturers, with the encouragement and blessing of their governments. The rapid growth in the arms trade comes, at a time when na- tions all over are sinking more and more of national incomes into their military establishments. Arms and men. In 1971, accord- ing to the ?U. S. Arms Control and Dis- armament Agency, 120 nations spent 216 billion dollars on defense, an in- crease of 82 per cent since 1960. Over ? the same span, the number of men under arms worldwide increased from 19 mil- lion to 23 million. 2 It is the developing nations that are the main purchasers of weapons from the industrialized countries, accounting for about 4 billions of annual sales. Na- tions of the Middle East, India and Latin America are the principal buyers. The chart on page 52 gives some idea of how much is sold by the chief arms makers and who their major customers are-as well as can be determined in a field wrapped in secrecy. The figures were compiled chiefly by "U. S. News & World Report" correspon- dents based overseas and with the aid of experts within the United States Government. The U. S. sold 2.8 billion dollars' worth of arms in the year ended June 30, 1972, up from 2.1 billion the pre- ceding year. The Soviet Union sold an estimated 2.2 billions' worth in 1972. The "Big Four" suppliers account for about 90 per cent of the sales, with the rest divided up mostly among Sweden, Canada, Belgium, Israel, West Germany, Italy and Czechoslovakia. Aircraft lead off. Warplanes are the No. 1 sales item, accounting for roughly half the arms sold. Tanks and armored vehicles, ships, missiles and ammunition Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 , Ai5proved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8? are other big-selling items in interna- tional markets. Why the urge to sell more arms? One reason is purely economic?to improve a country's balance of payments, or to help a particular industry. Often though, officials say, sales are regarded as a matter of "national interest"?that is, to improve the seller's influence in the pur- chasing nation. Russia, for example, supports Iraq, the United Arab Republic, Syria and Libya, not for ideological reasons, but to gain a foothold in the Mediterranean basin. It also is in a position to threaten oil supplies to the U. S. and the Far ? East. The U. S. supports Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia, not only to offset these So- viet moves, but to counter the growing Russian presence in the western section of the Indian Ocean. In recent years, the mix of "give- aways" and sales of U. S. arms has moved sharply in the direction of sales. From 1950 through 1965, this coun- try gave away 31.7 billion dollars of military goods to other nations?and sold just 6.5 billion. Since 1965, however, the U. S. has provided 4.5 billions in military aid while selling 11.1 billions' worth of hardware. The arms network. The U. S. arms- ? sale network involves about 10,000 mili- tary and civilian attaches around the world. Through these "agents," the U. S. learns what the "customer" wants. Trans- actions themselves are generally handled on a government-to-government basis. Before a big transaction has been signed, more than a dozen agencies with- in three Cabinet departments may get ? involved. At the Pentagon, a special agency must approve a sale. Then another one seeks credit for the buyer through the U. S. Treasury or major private banks. At the State Department, one agency gets involved in licensing exports, while a host of others determines such things as whether the sale is in the nation's best interests, or whether it involves the transfer of military secrets. For other nations?. Elsewhere among arms-selling nations? For France, the manufacture of arms is vital to its economy. Only automo- biles and textiles rank ahead of arms among its exports. The French arms industry provides jobs for 270,000 people, of whom 15 per cent are involved in producing arms for export. There are enough orders now on the books to keep the industry busy for years. Of late, however, incoming orders have been declining, e'en as deliveries of arms have been rising. What worries many French officials is that recent "breakthrough sales" in Latin America and the Middle East, as one expert recently put it, "may have been one-shot affairs that will not continue in the future." In the Persian Gulf re- gion, the French sales pitch is based on the offer of well-trained Pakistani personnel, experienced with France's Mirage air- craft, to provide technical help in flying and servic- ing the supersonic jets. In Europe, French arms salesmen offer to share technical know-how with customers if they sign con- tracts to buy French aero- nautical products. For Great Britain, the arms trade, according to a London economist, is "no longer just a welcome shot in the arm to the bal- ance of payments. In many sectors of the de- fense industry, it has be- come vital to staying in business." Britain's arms sales, esti- mated at 700 million dol- lars in 1972, have doubled since 1965, when the country began overhauling its whole overseas sales effort. Now Britain is chal- lenging France to regain its former position as the world's third-biggest arms- trading nation. A major change: mak- ing sure that a new weap- ons system has a potential for foreign sales before the Government buys it for the country's own defenses. Old marketing methods have been revamped, and , sales campaigns intensi- fied. Embassy posts, for example, have been cre- ated in five key capitals? Washington, Paris, Bonn, Canberra and Ottawa?to deal specifically with arms trading. Exhibitions of British wares are put on at major international air shows. Weapons' capa- bility is demonstrated in Britain and abroad for foreign buyers. Twice a year, a comprehensive cata- logue is published, showing what equip- ment is available. Another move increasing arms sales: Since coming to power in 1970, Brit- 111====allk., WHAT U.S. HAS SOLD OR GIVEN AWAY From 1950 on? U.S. sold $17.5 billion worth of arms, including- 209 bombers 521 cargo planes. 1,492 fighters 580 helicopters 45 destroyers 15 submarines 11,270 armored personnel carriers 4,351 tanks 627,233 rifles and carbines 19,199 missiles U.S. gave away S36.2 billion worth of arms, including- 184 bombers 1,027 cargo planes 9,683 fighters 714 helicopters 100 destroyers 24 submarines 2,034 other ships 19,855 tanks 403,439 trucks 4,967,844 rifles and carbines 271,291 machine guns 27,012 missiles Note: Dollar totals are through mid-1972; details on arms through mid-1971, latest available. Source: U.S. Dept. of Defense 3 Copyright dO 1973. U. S. News & World Report leo. ain's Conservative Government has lifted embargoes on arms deals with South Africa and Spain. In West Germany, where the Govern- ment's policy has been to restrain arms sales to other countries, a build-up in volume is expected in years ahead. One -- --Approved For-Release-2001408107--C4: A RDP7-7-00432R000100080001-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 reason: Many NATO countries will be re-equipping their forces with new gen- erations of weapons systems. West Ger- many's "Leopard" tank is expected to be introduced within NATO in growing numbers. Hard facts on Russia's arms sales are difficult to come by. As well as Western experts can piece things together? Not counting! shipments to Vietnam I y either 1.1,ussia. or the U. S., the Soviet U nine has probably !become the ;largest supplier of weapons to developing countries. , Until the recent break with Cairo, ? Egypt was the chief recipient of Soviet arms, getting weapons valued at 250 million dollars in 1970 and 420 million in 1971, chiefly aircraft and missiles. Next came India, which has been li- censed to make MIC-21 aircraft, includ- 1. !mg the missiles and engines with which he craft ; are equipped. Soviet ship- ments to India include planes, antiair- 6aft missiles and tanks. Since 1955, the Soviet Union has provided an estimated 22 billion dollars of military aid to its clients and cus- tomers, the great bulk of it in the form of sales. Roughly 10 billion dollars of that amount has gone to its East European satellites. Of all the arms dealers, Czechoslo- vakia is, in the words of a former U. S. arms-control official; "the nastiest, with- . out a doubt." The Czechs have estah-' lished an arms-sales firm, Omnipol, which is. an agency or the Ministry of Foreign ATT4 .1144itaLiibtkli8LUPIVICW1 1141.141loiainal,444 MA, e? r Trade. 'Wherever there is trouble in the ,world, officials say$ Czech arms usually can be found. When terrorists can find weapons nowhere else, they can always turn to Omnipol. Arms on the cuff. Most suppliers sell arms on fairly liberal credit terms. Russia, for example, offers loans for mili-. tory purchases at an annual interest rate of 2 to 23; per cent ; for periods of six to 12 yearS. Fr?rich and British deals gen- erally. Involve loan of 53i to 0 per cent. The V. S. charges one 'half of 1 per cent above the Cost of borrowing by the U. S. Treasury,' which now conies to about: the charges leveled by the French' and British. .The repayment period is six to 12 years in most cases. ; It's in the Middle East where the mar- ket for arms is growing most rapidly? even though some Western nations claim they. have imposed restraints on sales to the region. ! 'Iii Italy, newspapers' a few months age published reports that military equipreent, !including armored cars, were being 'sold to Libya. Italian. au-' thorities first' denied these reports, then ? 3 ! later admitted .they were true?and, . ; fact,; that an -agreement had been reached ?11 year earlier to provide mili- tary arms to Libya. France insists it will not sell offensive weapons to any of the Mideast belliger- ents.. It has, however, sold 114 Mirage fighters to - Libya?which is a staunch supporter of Egypt. The arms-trade business can produce some ironic situations in the Mideast. Israel has a 500-million-dollar line of credit with the U. S. for the purchase 'of weapons in its struggle against sur-,' rounding Arab nations. Yet Great Britain, a close ally of the United States, is reportedly in ;the proc- ess of concluding a 236-million-dollar deal with !Israel's chief enemy, Egypt, for Cairo's acquisition ? of light, tanks, pafrol boats, armored cars, short-range antiaircraft missiles and helicopters. Two good customers. Among Mid- dle East nations, Iran and Saudi Arabia represent perhaps the largest arms mar- kets for the immediate future. Both are building their forces 'rapidly to fill the vacuum left by the British withdraWal , from the .area. Iran's Air Force has already taken de- livery on more than 100 U.S.-made Phan- tom fighter-bombers, valued at around 340 million dollars. It has placed orders with Britain for somewhere between 700 and 800 tanks. There are reports that Bell Aerospace Company is negotiating the sale of 580 helicopters to Iran at a cost of 720 mil- lion dollars. From the Soviet Union, Iran! is buying; jeeps, trucks, personnel carriers and artillery and air-defense systems. Saudi Arabia signed a 350-million- dollar contract earlier this -year for the. purchase of Northrop Corporation's su- personic F-5 fighter-bombers. It is setting aside' another 145 million for its Navy? in all likelihood for the purchase of !pa- trol boats and possibly some submarines from the U. S. The French are reportedly negotihting an .80-million-dollar, tank deal. ? 4tru war:7444, ' ?2E13 V1/4101-111,1)90 ALTID20 SILIPM112110 Based on estimates for 1972? , UNITED STATES Total sales: 2.8 billion dollars. riaajjOir customers: 1\1,TO countries, plus Israel,'Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Australia, Thailand, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan. Major itesitas sold: Aircraft, tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, ammunition, missiles. 1144111 LAW,a. dita It)wkr4 'SOVIET Ulk11014 ? Total sales: 2.2 billion dollars. Milfjor etastotiners: Warsaw Pact countries, plus ? Egypt, India, Syria, North Korea, North Vietnam. , Maijor items sold: Aircraft, missiles, tanks, armored personnel carriers. EDI:UTAIN Total sales: 700 million dollars. DlaDor customers: NATO countries, plus Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, South Africa, Australia, India, Ecuador, Brazil. DIalor items sold: Aircraft, missiles, helicopters, ships. ktarimrariicammema===sarzsna=ca 1.11:1 i.? a 1111 Total sales: 700 million dollars. MaLor custornero: South Af. rica, Greece, Spain, Turkey, Argon. tina, Venezuela, Lebanon,. Libya, Algeria'. Mallor items scan: Aircraft, engines, tanks, armored vehicles. 4 Mrl:TrIr t , 1-itt Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 In both Iran and. Saudi Arabia, rapid- ly rising revenues from oil production are providing the' wherewithal to spcnd more heavily on arms. !! i ' In Iraq and Syria, it is the'. SoIiet Union that is the chief arms suppller.', One authoritative estimate is that 111;os-' I sin has sold more than 500 million Jars of arms to Iraq since the 1907 N? if, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Jan. 22, 1973 and roughly the same amoirm to Syria.1 "Back to strong exports." As aims experts see it, competition is going to get tougher in the years ahead?with the U. S. a'formidable foe. One .assOss- ment 'from Paris: "The end of the war in Vietnam, along with the Soviet-American agree- ment to limit, strategic nuclear weapons; is expected to bring the U. S. back mOre ? 1: '.1/INERE ARMS BACKFIRED ON U.S. ? Latin America is one part of the world where the U. S. is trying to sell fewer, rather than more, weapons?a policy that is coining under increasing fire. : The big clampdown on U. S. arms to Latin America, imposed by Congress in 1967, has been so successful that Euro- pean suppliers have been outselling U. S. arms manufacturers by 5 to 1. Top officers in the Pentagon call this arms-control 'policy a military blunder. Diplomats say it has failed in its polit- ical goals. Executives of U. S. arms firms complain that it has diverted prof- its to foreign suppliers and worsened trade woes. Members of Congress, as ' well ' as national-security officials, are voicing serious second thoughts. Heavy Ceiling. U. S. restrictions now in force, place a 100-million-dollar ceiling on U. S. Government military grants and sales to all nations in the . Hemisphere combined. The regulations ban shipments of "so- phisticated weapons systems" of all kinds ?including supersonic jet fighters?and forbid military assistance to governments of the region which are deemed to be dictatorial. All of this represents a sharp depar- ture from the sort of co-operation in the arms field that marked U. S. inter-Amer- ican policy earlier. Until the 19(37 clampdown, the U. S. ' had been the No. 1 supplier of arms to , Latin America ever since World War II.' It was after the U. S. gained a near stranglehold on the military-aircraft market in Latin America in the 1960s that Washington began a tacit policy of regional arms control. Hold-down on expenses. Policy ! makers explained at the time that they wanted to prevent underdeveloped na- tions of the Hemisphere from wasting . scarce funds. Equally important, said Washington officials, was a conviction that no na- tion in the region needed such sophis- ticated weapons as the new and costly supersonic jet warplanes. Latin-American military men had .been pressing for such jets in seeking to modernize and to get rid of World War II surplus aircraft. Congress .first imposed a ceiling of 75 million dollars on total annual arms sales in the Hemisphere. Later, boosting the ceiling to 100 million, Congress provided that the President could raise it by up to 50 per cent if be deemed this to be in the interest of national se- curity. Other restrictions followed, led by the Conte-Long amendment to for- eign-aid legislation, barring use of U. S. funds for buying advanced ? military equipment, and the Symington amend- ment restricting aid to countries that may be determined to be spending an "unnec- essary" amount of their financial re- sources on military equipment. Cutoff to dictators. When a num- ber of military coups took place in Latin America in the 1960s, Congress reacted by passing the Reuss amendment. This provided for cutting off aid to countries ruled by dictatorial regimes "denying the growth of fundamental rights or so- cial progress to their own people." Recalls one U. S. official: "America's sudden case of cold feet stemmed from more than just fears of an arms race. The U. S. at that time gtill had high hopes for the Alliance for Progress. "There was a feeling in many quar- ters that by delaying or denying Latins supersonic jets, they might be pressured into spending more of their available re- sources for food, roads, hospitals." Not too successful. But things turned out differently. Lt. Gen. E. B. LeBailly, the U. S. Chairman of the Inter-American Defense Board, describes what has. hap- pened under five ,years of arms restric- tions in this way: "Attempts to have the Latin-Ameri- can governments concentrate on nation- al-development projects to the exclusion of military needs have not been very successful. Our restrictions have not re- sulted in a direct switch of funds from 'guns to butter,' but only in a switch from the U. S. to Europe as principal arms supplier." Chile led the way by buying 21 sub- sonic Hawker Hunter fighters from Brit- ain at a cost of 9.6 million dollars. It had -sought to purchase F-5 Freedom Fighters?a relatively low-cost supersonic 5 strongly into the export of conventional' weapons. .: "Many of the sophisticated weap(in developed by the U. S. for the war it n, ; Vietnam will then become available or sale to buyers around the world." . . In short, while world leaders talk hopefully of a "generation of peac:,'t the world goes right oil buying and T- ing weapons at a record rate. . . . ; jet developed with U. S. official encour- agement as suited to the needs Of de- veloping countries. But Chile was .turned down on this, and refused Washington's counteroffer of subsonic Skyhawks or F-86 Sabers. The Chile-Britain deal?made by a reform Government carrying out just the type of social programs favored by U. S. Alliance for Progress officials?marked the beginning of the turn toward Eu- ropean markets, away from the U. S. The first sale of supersonic warplanes to a Latin-American country came a year later, in 1967, when France concluded an agreement to deliver to JPeru 14 faster- than-sound Mirages. That plane is said by military men to cost about five times as much as the F-5 Freedom Fighter that the U. S. was de- clining to sell. Repercussions from that sale brought about a partial retreat by Washington. In an effort to salvage some part of the jet-warplane Market and maintain some control, the U. S. Government offered to relent and sell F-5 fighters after all. But the U. S. offer proved to be too late. Then?more vendors. The French have followed up their Mirage sales to Peru with similar deals in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela. British shipyards have obtained frigate orders from Brazil and Chile. West German yards have sold mine-sweepers and sub- marines to Brazil and Argentina. All told, the Latin Americans have in five years turned to. Europe for 1.5 billion dollars' worth of arms free of any restrictions. These arms sales often have, been followed up by a rash of commer- cial deals. The U. S., which once made 70 per cent of the total aims sales, now is down to 6 per cent. No wild race. In spite of unlimited opportunities to buy in Europe, tio mas- sive arms race has taken place in the re- gion as American lawmakers feared in voting for the 1967 clampdown. Hemisphere officials say that, even with the increased purchases of recent years, Latin-American countries spend less of their gross national product on arms?about 2 per cent?than any other region in the world, including Africa. Says Gab o Plaza, Secretary General of the Organization of American States: "Actually, we have a kind of balance. One country buys some Mirages, so an- other country feels it must do the same. But the second buys only about the same number as the first. So there is no real Approved For Release-2001/08/077CIARI)P77-00432-R000100080001-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 race. "It's simply a matter of prestige, of the military establishment in each coun- try keeping up with the times." With nationalism on the rise, Latin Americans are increasingly resentful of what they regard us unwarranted inter- ference by the United States in their in- ,ternal affairs. As one U. S. authority puts it: ' "Our generally paternalistic approach and denial of military hardware has tended to alienate a largo segment of Latin-American leadership?civilian as well ,as military. They all deeply resent ? our implication that we know better than they what's best for them." The Nixon Administration recently has made known that it opposes some of the arms controls and has urged their repeal. Outgoing Defense Secretary Melvin Laird, who as a Congressman helped push through some of the controversial measures, says he has changed his mind. In testimony in 1972, Mr. Laird said the "restrictions have worked to the dis- advantage of not only the countries in- volved, but also of the United States." Secretary of State William P. Rogers appeared to sum up the present official mood for change when, in seeking to boost the ceiling on arms sales to Latin America, he declared that such a stop will enable the U. S. to "secure import? ant economic and political advantages." WASHINGTON POST 19 JANUARY 1973 U.S. Snrpriced Heroin in Bags Made in China United Pratt International State Department officials yesterday expressed disbelief that heroin seized In New York City Werineeday was from meinlend China, New York authorities said the confiscated heroin was in bags made In the People's Republic of China. State Department apoke. man Simone Poulain said, "Our investigations of prey. bus charges of People's ie. public of China Involvement.. have not producted evidence to substantiate the allegation. 1We find It difficult to believe that any country shipping !legal narcotics abroad would , carefully label it so that every-1 one would know who was Involved." NEW YORK TIMES 30 January 1973 A Top Ecnin &nut; ece Cavan 20-Year Senzence, Ohe Maximoya ? By PAUL L. MONTGOMERY Auguste Joseph Ricord, whom the Government called the larg- est trafficker in heroin ever brought to trial in the United States, received the maximum 20-year prison sentence in Fed- era Court yesterday for con- spiracy to smuggle narcotics. Ricord, a 62-year-od Argen- tine citizen of Corsican extracl tion, had been found guilty at a jury trial last month. The small, bald restaurateur, known as Monsieur Andre, had been accused of being the master- mind of a many-tentacled ring operating from his Paris-Nice motel-restaurant on the out- skirts of Asuncien, Paraguay. In imposing the harshest sen- tence he could, Judge M. Can- nella noted that Ricord was not an addict or a pusher accused of making a few sidewalk sales. Suffering and Death - "This is a sale of a very large quantity of heroin," the judge said. "The end product in suff- ering and mortality from this quantity would probably equal the recent figures given for the war in Vietnam." Walter M. Phillips Jr., an as- sistant United States attorney in charge of the narcotics unit in the Southern District of New York, said that Ricord's rings were responsible for bringing in at least 2,000 pounds of pure' heroin a year into the United States. Mr. Phillips said he had evi- dence that, in the three years before his arrest in 1971, Ri- cord had changed between $350,000 and $400,000 from American to Paraguayan cur- rency at just one of the ex- change shops he used in Asun- In addition to the 20-year prison sentence, Judge Can- nella imposed a $20,000 fine? the maximum under the law? and directed Ricord to pay the costs of prosecution. Ricord Questions Locale In a statement before sen- tencing, Ricord said that he had never been in the United States until his extradition from Paraguay last September. "It is entirely possible that I never committed any offense in the territory of the United States," he said, consulting handwritten notes. Ricord said that in his years in the restaurant business "some traffickers" had been among his customers. "But I never, never was an accom- plice to anybody," he said. He said he was a "victime of an intrigue," which he did not 6 NEW YORK TIMES 28 January 1973 .--'011:11111 INDONESIA min9IS BlARINANA FIELDS MEDAN, Indonesia, Jan. 27 (Reuters)?The police have burned off more than 240 acres of marijuana plants around Medan in the last few months and farmer in this north Su- metre area have been sternly warfaal about growing it. 'rho crackdown was brought about by north Sumatra's sud- den popularity among young Westerners and a growing 'struggling trade along with signs that young Indonesians In large numbers were starting to smoke marijuana. But supplies show no signs of drying up. All the police ap- parently did was to force the sources of supply farther from the city. Marijuana grows In profusion hero and residents have used it for years?to spice their food and cure upset stomachs and sore, feet. For years govern- ment officials ignored its sale and purchase. 110101MMNAOMMENNIMMEMMI? specify. lie also said' he was sick with kidney stones, ulcers and diabetes. Ricord's lawyer, Herbert I. i Handman, said n his pica that his client had.a "complex and difficult background" because he had "grown up in Europe in the turmoil of war." IVIarseilles Background The records show that Ricord began his career as a small-- time hoodlum and pimp in Mar- seilles and was an agent of the French Gestapo during World War II. He fled to Latin America after the war and, it is believed, began his narcotics activities in the nineteen-fifties. Judge Cannella was critical of the presentence probation report prepared for Ricord. He noted that it leaned heavily on an interview the probation of- ficer had with Nathan Adams, an investigative reporter for the Reader's Digest who has done more than a year's research on Ricord. His 30-page article, "The2 Hunt for Andre," is to appear' in the March issue of the magazine. The judge said that he did not think the interview was proper material for a probation report, and that he was ignor- ing that portion of it in fixing the sentence. Mr. Adams, who works in Washington, said that he had given his information to the authorities because he felt strongly about the case and Ricord's implication in it. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080901-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100086001-8 CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 25 January 1973 we 0 A provocative book ar- gues that the benefits of modernization too often do not filter down to the people in most developing countries. The reason: lo- ? cal citizens are not in- volved in the decisions that affect them nor do they have access to the money, skills, and infor- mation they need to take. advantage of local re- sources. By Richard Nenneman Business and financial editor of The Christian Science Monitor Washington COTT FITZGERALD ONCE SAID TO ERNEST Hemingway, "The rich are different from us." Hemingway is supposed to have answered, "Yes, they have more money." Now Edgar Owens and Robert Shaw, two devel- opmental economists, also are saying that the rich are different from the poor ? only in another way. The poor, they argue, lack access ? access to the means of production, to credit, to the market, and to technical knowledge. And all the foreign aid the United States might continue dispensing and even major increases in the gross national products (GNPs) of Third World countries will neither relieve poverty nor increase the lot ?of the average man if there isn't the political decision to give this access. There is no dearth of discussion about the developing countries. The talk has focused on the disappointments, which have outnumbered the successes. Edgar Owens has been with the Agency for Inter- national Development since 1660 and has served in both the former parts of Pakistan, in Thailand, and in South Vietnam. Out of his experience in AID he began to piece together the reasons for the limited success of many Third World development projects. Along with Mr. Shaw, a young Briton working for the Overseas Development Council who has done extensive work on employment problems in developing countries, he has written "Development Reconsidered." Strong case for new type Their book makes a formidable case for a new kind of development. It goes to the heart of any economy, to its people. And while they argue that jobs are the important thing (since jobs create purchasing power and raise the lot of the average man), they say that something else comes even before jobs. And that is the organization of a country so that (1) the proper decisions are made at the right levels of government, (2) as many people. as possible are involved in decisions that affect their own lives, and (3) there are effective links between the different levels of decisionmaking. "The creation and diffusion of sufficient political power to enable govern- ments to govern is the great political problem of development." Messrs. Owens and Shaw divide the Third World into what they call "modernizing" and "dual" societies. By dual, they mean any society that is still essentially split into a group who do the ruling and a group who are ruled. This is not a Communist vs. democratic split, they argue. ? One must look below the label and see how power is ? really exercised in any nation. The modernizing societies are those which are to some extent learning to trust their own people and share deoisionmaking. Taiwan comes out as their prize example of a country that is successfully modernizing. Several other nations ? are mentioned as good examples in at least part of what they have done ? Egypt, Yugoslavia, the part of Pakistan that is now Bangladesh, and both Koreas. On the other hand, Mexico and India, even though ? democracies, get rated as the old, dual-type societies, since the authors don't find the necessary input into decisionmaking at the local level. _ Having established that the organization of a society is of prime importance and that power must be widely diffused, the authors then go on to argue, as does an increasing amount of development literature, that the emphasis from now on must be on developing the small farm and small-town industry. Cities unable to provide jobs The cities have shown themselves incapable of putting to work the landless peasants who migrate to urban? areas. The spread of urban slums all over the world demonstrates that the type of capital-intensive devel- opment going on in the cities does not alone generate enough major new employment opportunities. ? It has been a mistake, Messrs. Owens and Shaw argue, for the West to emphasize the kind of capital-intensive industrial development that was appropriate at another time to the Western nations and particularly for the United States, which did not have a large surplus of labor. This type of development in most Third World countries has only served to create a new class of urban elite (which includes some of the urban workers, too). While the incomes of this elite have grown, the gap between them and the remainder of society has widened. Thus the aims of development, or at least of the foreign aid that supported much development, have been at least '7 -A-pproved-Fiir Release 2001 . -Ri3P7-7-00:482R000-1-0008000-1-8- -.?_. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 partly thwarted. It is more appropriate, say Messrs. Owens and Shaw, for the developing nations to emphasize the resource with which most of them are blessed ? people. Even in crowded India, there is potential work for today's population if it were organized along these lines. Messrs. Owens and Shaw suggest specifically that labor-intensive, small farming (using large inputs of fertilizer, miracle seeds, irrigation, and multiple crop- ping) make it possible in tropical areas for a single family to make a living on one hectare (2.5 acres) of land. But to do this they must have access to all the information, credit, physical inputs, and marketing knowledge that the large farmer has. And there also must ,be either honest land reform or equitable land- tenure arrangements. Heartened by receptivity in India They argue that if the government would make it possible for this to happen, the poor would learn to organize their own lives very well. It is one variation on the thesis that the poor are not basically different from other people, but that individually they cannot fight a structure that keeps them down. And in this case, Messrs. Owens and Shaw argue,the structure that keeps them down may even be a central government that calls itself a democracy. I watched Mr. Owens "selling" some of these ideas in India a month ago. In one of his talks, he said: "The distribution of GNP is profoundly influenced by the manner of its production. If GNP is produced by a few it will be consumed by a few, and the gap between rich and poor will continue to widen. If GNP is produced by many, then people in general will share in the material benefits of economic growth." What is most important, he said, is creating the "conditions of access" so that the small people have an equal chance to create their own wealth. Mr. Owens was heartened by the degree of receptivity he found to at least part of the Owens-Shaw thesis in India. Some Indians say that three hectares would be a better minimum size farm, and that in some parts of the country one must have at least 20 hectares. Simple arithmetic shows that with today's population in India, which is smaller than tomorrow's, there is only one hectare of arable land for a theoretical family of four. In any case, the method would seem to assure vastly more employment and spreading of income in the rural areas than there is today. The increased income that would come from honest land reform and intensive small-scale farming would need to be spent. This would support the creation of village industries, which in turn would offer employment for more rural workers. The most interesting part of this small-farm and small-town industry concept is that neither requires the spending of much capital per person ? both emphasize putting people to work, and people are the resource that is in abundance. And today in many cases they are a resource that is being wasted. This small-town industry would produce wares that people needed in rural areas ? building blocks and other building materials; simple consumer goods; retail serVices; and a limited number of luxury goods as well. 2 "If," they write, "we accept the premise that development should consist of a continuous succession of small advances, millions of individual actions by millions of individual people, then small, much more than large industry, suits the psychology of people in transition from traditional to modernized methods of production." The development of small towns also would relieve the big cities of the world from pressures that otherwise may make them uninhabitable by the end of the century. (For instance, a-United Nations study estimates the combined population of Bombay and Calcutta at 92 million by the year 2000.) Messrs. Owens and Shaw claim that instead of haphazard growth of the tiny farming villages, there needs to be a national polify in developing countries that identifies certain crosroads towns as natural market centers and fosters their development. Taking the experience of other countries, they say that each 75 square miles of farming area needs a market town. (They are not advocating making every rural village a prosperous center of activity; they are saying that rural society needs reconstructing.) Applying these figures to a country like India, which has 565,000 villages, they find India sadly lacking in market towns. They say it should have from 12,000 to 14,000 such centers, whereas it has only 3,000. Ten thousand new towns of 10,000 each would absorb an additional 100 million people. One major result of this - type of wide-based devel- opment, they say, would be a decline in the birthrate. They note that family planning programs have not been successful in nations in which there is little prospect of economic improvement. But as soon as the incentive of a better life lies ahead, the birth-control techniques that are available begin to,be used. Emphasis on spreading of incomes There is a new emphasis in most of the aid agencies on job creation and the spmading of incomes (instead of looking' at what can be misleading GNP statistics). In this sense, the ideas of Messrs. Owens and Shaw complement the new thinking. Where they are boldest in their approach is their insistence that a people must be properly, organized before the job of development can succeed. And the idea of doing through local organization, not everything, but those things that can best be done there and involve the abundant local talent should sound pleasingly familiar to anyone familiar with the pattern of American westward development and the role not only of states but of county and local government. These institutions all played a major role in giving U.S. citizens a feeling of having at least some control over their own destinies. The implications for U.S. aid programs are, clearly, that the United States should concentrate its future foreign aid on those countries that try to lift themselves out of the "dual" society classification and modernize themselves along the lines suggested by Messrs. Owens and Shaw. They make no guesstimate of what demands this might make eventually on U.S. foreign aid. For the moment, they say, "the crucial starting point is ideas, not the amount of money." Approved For Release 2001/08/07': CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 WASHINGTON STAR 20 January 1973 4 ,4 r' ,;i: , By Anumt OTTENBERG Star?News Staff Writer : The top federal narcotics in- telligence official said today ' that a concerted law enforce- ment effort has "turned off the open faucet of herion" into the United States. "It's still dripping," said ' John Warner, assistant direc- tor for strategic intelligence of , the Bureau of Narcotics and ? Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), but we've stopped the flow." That's the most optimistic assessment yet given by a knowledgable federal source about success in the war ? against drug traffickers. In an interview. Warner said he could document a real hero- in shortage in this country now. He cited fewer heroin over- dose deaths and hospital ad- missions, lower quality heroin and less of it, steadily rising :? prices and the less-preferred brown Mexican heroin show- ing up in New York because . that's all that's available. "A Helluva Shortage" "We've queried all our of- fices," he said. "We've come to the conclusion there's a hel- . luva shortage. We've made a real dent." The official attributed the ' situation to an increasingly worldwide law enforcement ef- fort, supported by good intelli- gence programs, diplomatic ? efforts and the White House ; emphasis on doing something. What it finally gets down to, though, the narcotics agents ' themselves, he said. "Whether they wear French,' British or American badges, they are the ones who are ' doing the job, turning off the fauce t," Warner said. "They're penetrating the traf- ficking organizations, making ! arrests and seizures." Latest Seizure , The latest seizure came with the announcement that Thai- land's special narcotics orga- nization has seized 28.6 pounds of pure heroin and arrested a ' woman courier on a bus near ? Chiang Rai. The heroin was a consign- 0 ? meat of No. 4 Asian heroin, the kind closest to the Europe- an variety of injectable heroin, with a street value of more than $7.5 million. The task force in Thailand, working close to the opium producing "Golden Triangle" where Thailand, Burma and Laos meet, gets BNDD train- ing, financial and technical as- sistance and intelligence. Since it started operating last spring, it has seized more than four tons of opium. Another substantial opium seizure was made recently in India, where a BNDD agent is now working with Indian po- lice. ? Widening Attack Pakistan, too, s typical of the widening attack on the drug traffic. Warner disclosed that a study team of U.S. Cus- toms, BNDD and State De- partment officials is now help- ing Pakistan ? establish a cen- tral narcotics investigative bu- reau. Warner gave this assess- ment of the present world nar- cotics traffic: o Although growing opium has been made illegal in Tur- key, the drug business there is not over. No effect has been noted yet because there was a large quantity of opium and its derivatives in the pipeline and because farmers withheld enough opium to provide dow- ries for t he (laughter and luxuries in the days ahead. These supplies are coming on the market now. o There's no change yet in the movement of the opium from Turkey to France, but the drug traffic has been hurt between Marseilles and the United States. o Recent arrests in France, MIAMI HERALD 3.6 January 3.973 Latin America and the United States have "scared the hell" out of traffickers, who are be- coming extremely cautious, Warner said. Five major traf- fickers were captured in France in the last few months. A 400-kilo seizure in Mar- seilles, seizure of 60 kilos of . heroin hidden in sheepskins aboard ship at Janeiro and a seizure of similar size in Argentina also were cited. Risk Increasing These people can't move without our knowing about it," Warner said. "Fewer and few- er shipments are getting through. They're losing a lot of money and the risk is getting to be too great for them." But so much money is in- volved that the traffickers will try new routes to evade cap- ture, and that's what BNDD is checking on now. Agents know there's illicit cultivation of opium in eastern Turkey. ? To get it to the mar- ket, BNDD ,predicts, the traf- fickers will try to go through Syria and Lebanon and then by ship to the heroin laborato- ries in Marseilles. That would be a new route since most of the traffic so far has been through Yugoslavia and Ger- many to France. BNDD will continue to work with Turkish police to beef 'up border control between East- ern Turkey and Syria. BNDD intelligence also is aware that Asian traffickers are seeking new routes to avoid ? a squeeze in Thailand. There's a developing pattern of shipping opium from the "Golden Triangle" to Rangoon and Moulmein in Burma and Penang , in Malaysia, where there is access to the sea. "We'll just have to do some By FREDERIC SI ERMAN Herald Editorial Writer THERE is at Yale University a doc- toral scholar who would like to believe Richard Nixon is trying to cut loose from Vietnam because of ev idence that American involvement in Southeast Asia is a ? major factor in the increasing problem with heroin addiction here in this country. ? Alfred W. McCoy has offered such evi- dence in his book enti- tled The Politics of Heroin in Southeast 9. ? 11 3 C." r7,7? *-17) more plugging up," Warner said. What narcotics officials are determined to block is a major flow of Southeast Asian heroin' Into the United States. "Southeast Asian heroin is coming here," Warner pe- knowledged, "but it's in small quantities, usually no mere than five or 10 -*kilos, often body-packed by Chinese sea- men. But the traffic is not wtell organized, and we're not 'al- lowing it to become organized. "We can't eliminate it but we can prevent it from becom- ing a major problem. Propor- tionately more heroin is com- ing out of Southeast Asia, but these traffickers don't have the long-established 'traffick- ing and consumer organiza- tions of the Frenc h- Latin-American-U.S. traffick- ers." Warner sees Increasing evi- dence that the world is rising up against drug traffickers. As an example, he noted that Af- ghanistan's new prime minis- ter has announced that one of the major programs he hopes to initiate is elimination of op- !um production. . It's the first time an Afghan- istan official has taken such a stand, and, \Varner indicated, it stems from the work there of a BNDD agent and the U.S. ambassador. Afghanistan's attitude is sig- nificant because American "hippies" had been trafficking in hashish from there. In a recognition of the lead- ership of the United States in the world-wide struggle against the illegal drug traffic, the 25th session of the U.N. Narcotics Commission, now meeting in Geneva; has elect- ed BNDD Director John Inger- soll as chairman. 1 . ? ? a 11 ttji ? ? .14- ir -rr . ? "1-41 or.-1-1,/r?tkyi ? Sherman Asia (Harper & Row). Those who support American intervention in Vietnam as a selfless act in defense of freedom will judge the McCoy book as a spurious indictment filled with wild .and baseless charges. But. there is too much iti this book for it to he dismissed as anti-Vietnam propa- ganda. Eighteen months of study pro- duced the names, the places and; the dates of trafficking in the poppy gtvo that is turned into the powder of white death. ? Sources of opium and heroin are V' Approxed Eox ReJlease_20111/08/07 :_CIA7RDP_IZA10432R0110100_080001-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA4RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 traced through the politics and the econ- omies of the military dictatorships in South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand. . Aircraft controlled .by General Ky in , Saigon transported from Laos the hero- in that was pushed on tens of thousands of American servicemen. It was sold, cheaply because there were more than ? 500.000 potential customers. It was General Kv's sister who directed much of the traffic in heroin from the Sc:clone lcJloteHn Pakse,. a city in Western Laos near the Thai border. The?Cambodia invasion did not ac- complish the capture of the North Viet- namcse headquarters, but it did enable the Saigon Navy to expand its role in the heroin traffic. Up until the invasion of Cambodia, there was no surface tran- sit for heroin from Laos. But with the protection of American air power, the Vietnamese admirals were able to run .their heroin in competition with General Ky's aircraft. ? THIS is a book the ,.QA tried to sup- press because it dOcuMairthe use of American money and American ? airplanes in the heroin traffic. This again is more of the political expediency on which Washington's stumbling in Southeast Asia is based. The loyalty of ? mountain tribesmen could only be bought by purchases of their poppy crop and transport of the opium gum to pro- cessing. plants. controlled by political leaders in 'Laos and Cambodia. It was a repeat of the game invented by French ? intelligence officials who use profits from heroin traffic to finance political machinations. ? On Page .263, McCoy writes, "With- out air transport for their opium, the Mc? (tribesmen) faced economic ruin.. There was simply no form of air trans- port available in northern Laos except the CIA's charter airline, Air America. And according to several sources, Air America began flying opium from moun- tain villages north and cast of the Plain of Jars to Gen. yang Pao's headquarters at -Long Tieng." This, then, is the major factor in the so-called secret American war in -Laos: traffic in opium destined for pushers in Saigon and for the smug- glers coming into the United States by ? way of Miami from Latin America. THE BASIC problem, as McCoy out- lines it, is that American officials in ' Southeast, Asia who know the inside story of the heroin traffic cannot or! , won't .do anything about it because of fears that their actions would somehow4 harriper the war effort. z/it If agents of the U.S. Bureau c$:?? Narcotics, for example, were to get tough with Thai leaders mixed Up witl heroin in Bangkok, American command crs of the airbases in that country would, suddenly find it impossible to get, jeti, ; fuel delivered or other vital supplie delivered. i< This is why McCoy called his book The Politics of Heroin. sairien.f, 4. T "a laISIVW)Cilorkesomemr.s. emeg?air.lomo....:nwa WASHINGTON STAR 31 January 1973 'WHITE HOUSE MOVES IN 11 13, Cr4r, By OSIVALD JOHNSTON Star-News Staff Writer As the strategic arm limita- tion talks with the Soviet Un- ion enter a new and crucial phase, the Nixon administra- tion is taking steps to concen- trate all phases of disarma- ment policy in the White In a series of moves culmi- nating in this week's budget, the Arms Control and Dis- armament Agency has been ? stripped of many of its re. sources much of its au- thority to do its job. The budget announced Mon- day shows that ACADA, a I semi-autonomous a gene yt housed in the State Depart- ., merit, would lose a third of its operating funds next year ?.a cut from $10 million to $G.7 million. ? Much of the cutback, it is understood, is in the agency's research budget. It used to let / out contracts for up to $2 mil- , lion ?a year; Next year, the research fund will be only $500,000. White House Project At the same time, informed sources disclosed that the White House itself has quietly let out a research contract on disarmament to a krmer president of the Hudson Insti- tute who is an outspoken oppo- nent of last summer's arms- control agreements with the Russians. The researcher is Dr. Don- ald G. Brennan, a strategic arms specialist who testified in Congress against the agree- ment to curb an anti-ballistic missile and against its interim five-year freeze on offensive nuclear weapons. Brennan has been engaged by Henry A. Kissinger's foreign policy ap- paratus in the White House, the National Security Council, to assess the political impact of the arms agreement on UEurope. Symptoms of Mistrust These developments are only the most recent symp-. /' ? toms of a mistrust in the ? White House of ACDA profes- sionals that has been apparent ' since the first arms-control agreements were concluded in , Moscow last May. One arms expert close to the '? administration viewpoint ex- plained it this way: "The prin- ? ciple at stake is whether the responsibilty of negotiating . these arm treaties should be in , the hands of an interested ? agency ? one whose mission is to promote arms control." - Kissinger himself moved publicly to take over from ACDA in Moscow last May, when he took charge of a press / briefing scheduled to explain the details of the treaty and left Gerard C. Smith, the -ACDA head and chief negotia- tor during two-and-a-half years of talks, standing in the background. Smith's sudden relegation to the shadows has been cited by sources close to ACDA as a factor in his decision Jan 3 to resign from the agency. ACDA, has remained with- out a, chief since. But a new chief negotiator to SALT was ? quickly named in an evident move to keep the SALT negoti- ating team separate from the arms control elperts. The new thief negotiator is V. Alexis Johnson, the former undersecretary of state, who has also been designated am-1 bassador-at-large in President Nixon's second term. ' The White House announced yesterday that the next round of SALT negotiations with the Soviets will begin March 12. Johnson has been character- ized as much more receptive to hard-line Pentagon views on arms control than any of the ACDA professionals. roil American allies- in Western Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100086001-8 WASHINGTON POST 23 JANUARY 1973 ',Marquis Childs Unsettling Signs for Arms Control: To return to thiS capital .from even a .brief absence is to feel like Rip Van ,,Winkle confronting a world utterly ,1?changed. Questioning those who have +- lived through the Nixon upheaval is of little help. - ? Why has se much of the -government been turned upside down? We don't knew.' Only the secretive man in the White House now entered on his sec- ond four year term knows the answer. i:And; in a. voice dropped to a whisper, :we're not sure he.knows. The most dismaying change. . in many. .?:\vays the. most mysterious; is the dis- mantling of the disarmament and arms ? 'control apparatus. Inaugural rhetoric ' cannot conceal the damage done to be 5"effort that for a decade has made in- !'ereasing progress toward controlling and- to some degree scaling back the , Mountain of imam armaments 'With the judgment of life and death over all mankind. WHAT MAKES this more mysteri-, ? pus is that one of the great achievements 'clear arms agreement culminating in Of the Nixon first term was the nu- the President's mission to 'Moscow.. With a limit on defensive missiles and a five year agreement to restrain fur- , ther, building of offensive weapons, it was a small beginning hailed, around the world. , A dedicated public servant, Garard C. Smith, with 20 years experience in the nuclear jungle, worked tirelessly for four years as chief American negotia- tor in the SALT talks at Vienna and Helsinki. When he went back at the start of 'SALT Ii he was without any clear and finally arrived at. position 'ap- . NEW YORK TIMES 25 January 1973 ' Will Momentum Be Loa?, ? proved by the White House. On return- ing from Geneva, the new site of the talks, Smith resigned. ? .IN HIS PLACE the President ap- pointed U. Alexis 'Johnson, under sec- retary of State for political affairs. Johnson is a career diplomat with no experience in nuclear matters. Griev- ously 'overworked, suffering from ill health, he is within a year of retirement age. The private word is that his will be a temporary appointment. But this can mean that the momen- tum growing out of the modest success of last year will be lott. It can also. mean that the Joint Chiefs of Staff who have reluctantly gone along with arms limitation will have the dominant voice. Arms control specialists with long knewledge of the tortuous process of arriving at agreement with the So- viet Union are dismayed ? by the John- son? appointnient. They say that. he has been in the lap of the JCS for 10 years. ? A further .handicap is that Johnson will not be head, as. was Smith, of . the Arms Control and Disarthanent Agency ACDA)'. The semi-autonomous agency' created in 1961 has played an impor- tant part in developing programs and conducting research on the techniques of control and the verification of limita- tion agreements. A recent agency .study showed that in 120'countries sur- :veyed $207 billion was spent in 1970 for military purposes as against only $168 billion for education and $80 bil- lion for health care. The Arms control agency now seems in the process of being dismantled. A budget slash of 30 per cent will cut the agency back to $6.7 million. Divisidn heads with long experience in disarm- ament wore asked to submit their resignations. They have thus far had 'no response. Happening throughout ernment, this is. a sure fire prescrip- tion -for demoralization, MEMBERS of the General Advisory Commission on disarmament also were asked to submit their resignations. The commission includes distinguished men, concerned over the years with the growing nuclear burden one of them. being William C. Foster who for seven ? years was' head of the arms control agency. Chairman of the commission' is John J. PlcCloy, a Republican with. long time credentials in Public life. McCloy has been trying in vain for several weeks to see the Presi- dent and present the commission's, view. The President has made plain his in- tention of paring down one domestic program after another?education, poverty, welfare. But these parings, will not, bring the budget into balance. The only real economy can come out of detense with a total somewhere above $80 billion including all the' costly new toys for the three services.' The only way is a verifiable agree-Y ment with ? the Soviet Union to scale back this appalling burden. 6,) 1973, United Feature Syndicate Some Suggestions for the sistance in economic development. impartial protection and impartial as- This kind of framework would be very New, Man at tae U.N. petition, intrigue and instability, rather By Charles W. Yost As a new Ambassador prepares to represent the United States at the United Nations, it is a good time to , reflect on what the essence of his job should be, that is, on what these two great unions might do for the other in the nineteen-seventies. ? We might begin by recalling that when Franklin Roosevelt and Cordell Hull helped set-up the United Nations they did so in the firm conviction that the old-fashioned "balance-of-power" system had failed to prevent World Wars I and II, and was bound to keep on failing simply because no strong nation is ever satisfied with a "bal- ance" unless it "tilts" in its direction, unless each nation believes itself a little better armed, a little more potent than its rivals. So "balance of power" is really a deceptive formula for corn- than for international order, coopera- tion and peace. Roosevelt and Hull certainly never , imagined that the United Nations would solve all these problems nor that all foreign relations should be ' conducted through it. It should com- pose one side of a three-sided struc- ture, of which the others would be a much closer association of the devel- oped democracies and a more compre- hensive series of accommodations with our adversaries, most particularly in strategic arms control and reduction. The main role of the U.N. in this three-sided structure would be to pro- vide the framework for relations be- ? tween the great powers and that two- thirds of mankind that lives in devel- oping countries, to deter the former from the sort of unilateral action the United States so foolishly undertook much in the national interest of both ,large and small nations, especially the , United States. - Unfortunately this has not been the conception of the U.N. role held by recent U.S. Administrations, including the present one. They have tended, as in Vietnam and in the East Pakistan crisis of 1971, to bring threats to the peace to the U.N. only when the tra- ditional expedients of diplomacy have, failed and when it is too late for the U.N. to act effectively. It should be Mr. Scali's first task, therefore, for which he is well equipped : as a recent member of the White House staff and confidant of the President, to persuade the Administration that ' it will henceforth be in our national interest to take much of our inter- national political action multilaterally through the U.N. rather than unilat- erally 'in naked and vulnerable isola- tion, as we have become accustomed. ? It will be claimed that the U.N. is in Vietnam, to provide theiatter Nyith.,, ineffective to take such action. The : --- Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77:013432Rq0111-011080001-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 reply is that it is ineffective primarily because it lacks U.S. support. During its first nineteen years it had U.S. sup- port and it grew steadily stronger. During the last eight years U.S. sup- port has diminished and the U.N. has declined. . Mr. Scali's first and most difficult' job, therefore, will be not in New York but in Washington. If he can prevail there, 'he will soon find? that the U.N. structure and the U.N. members are ready to work seriously with the U.S. not only in dealing with the environ- BALTIMORE 17,71S AMERICAN ? 2 1. JAN)973 . ralicte-to- 11-Ireroin Fit)w k). r-1-1(1 CiPo " ? d IL, A .? 1? . By JOHN HARRIS ? ?. ? ment and with economic development but, even more important, in making the U.N. Security Council what Roose- velt and Hull intended it to be, the main instrument both for keeping the peace and for keeping the great pow- ers together. If vigorously used for this purpose, it can be far more effec- tive than separate national security councils, each working in secret to tip the balance of power "just a little bit" its way. On the other hand, if the U.S. like some others, uses the U.N. mainly as a propaganda forum, a place to de- ? nounce terrorism we don't like while ? indulging in terrorism we do, a con- venient scapegoat when "the games , we play" don't work, an international assembly where our principal triumph this year was to reduce our assess- mept by $13 million, then the U.N. will conform to what we do, not What we say. . Charles W. Yost was formerly Ambas- sador to the United Nations. F: ? As a result, Murphy said, the availability of f-, heroin - has dwindled drastically in the United Et.. States, especially since last July. Street prices sz: of .heroin have "doubled and tripled," he add- ed, to the extent that, to an addict, it is often i "not much more than aspirin." Murphy produced a recent U.S. government Fa" report that quoted the "Wholesale" price of lei heroin, "delivered in New York City," at S3,000 P. to $7,501 per pound early last year. The report . LI added that since the shortage beginning July, ' prices up to $17,000 are being quoted in New Special to The News American ? - York.' Murphy attributed these developments to a ?. PARIS ? The "French Connection" is in massive, combined U.S.-French anti?narcot- elisarray, according to an American narcotics ics drive that began in France after former enforcement official here, and a "classic" drug U.S. Ambassador Arthur K. Watson, who re- flow from France to the United States may be Coming to a halt. ? . . signed last August, assumed office in 1970. In the process, Nturphy added, a growing drug-use . The official disclosed that during the past problem has been curbed in France, too. . two years U.S. Air Force planes, Navy vessels we've made more progress - and the Central Intelligence Apency have been "In two years used in Europe "with the cooperation of local' ethxaanin.the last 40 years," Murphy saisl. "For example, 'authorities" to achieve this. lie said this use .0 f 1 five beroin?producing laboratories were smashed in Marseilles in 1972, compared U.S. military, and intelligence elements in nal% to six in the entire previous 21 years. cotics enforcement outside the United States " syas "absolutely unprecedented." The importance of France in the interna- tional drug traffic was stressed by other The official, Thomas P. Murphy, is "narcot- ?, sources here, v.lio noted that Marseilles was a ics coordinator" at the U.S. Embassy Per" "traditional smiteeling way station." It Was With the title of special assistant to the ambas- also pointed out that Marseilles was close to sador. Murphy said he plans to return to-pri- vate life in the United States next month, after yra. nce,'s tmajor perfume-producing region, a setving in his drug enforcement post here for tact. Nvoicii gave it a Wee supply of skilled two-and?a?half years. ? chemists who could often -be recruited td work "For. 40 years the narcotics flow from , in heroin laboratories for high returns. France to the United States has been far and ' "Ambassador Watson simply felt the U.S. away the classic drug route to the U.S.," Mur- should bring every area of government that phy said. "Today the operators of this traffic ? could help into the fight against drugs,' Mur- popularly known as the 'French Connection' ? phy said. "As a result, we have used U.S. Air are frightened, demoralized and on the defen- Forte planes, U.S. Navy vessels and even the sive 'for the first time." Cattral Intelligence Agency ? the CIA has big 12 files, you know. '?!`All this has been done in cooperation with European authorities. ? and is absolutely un- precendented outside the U.S.," he added. de- clining . to elaborate. "But it is a battle we have to win, and the ambassador felt that every re- source the U.S. has should be used." , Murphy noted that outside the United States the State Department has overall responsibility ! for other U.S. government agencies. , :"So our thought was to support the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs with other U.S. resources ? and what I've done is pull thee others in, and hit them with everything we've got," he said. -Other sources noted that U.S. narcotics . Wits began to work undercover in 'France, airengside French agents, during the past two years, too. The sources said that despite offi- cial French reluctance to concede it, the U.S.! agents frequently go armed on antidrug opera- tions f., s ohfer,e, "or they might get their heads b Official figures also attest to a dramatic ex- pansion of French narcotics enforcement agen- cies. In 198, for example, the "Police Judi.: ciare" drug force consisted of only 11 officers but by 1970 this had grown to 63, and in 1972 to 170. Murphy said cooperation between French and U.S. drug forces was "distant in the old days," when French officials tended to look on the narcotics flow to the U.S. as an American, not -a French problem. "Now we even share office space, particu- larly in the U.S. consulate in Marseilles," Mur- phy said. "In addition, one top French narcot- ics officer has visited.the United States so often recently that he's become addicted himself ? to cheeseburgers and sundaes with chocolate sauce." Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 LOS ANGELES TIMES 14 JAN 1373 PUTTING IT TOGETHER AGAIN oreit n LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD The New Left's assault on estab- lished U.S. foreign policy has been often misinformed, sometimes male- volent, always intemperate. But it has also carried with it an element of enormous potential value to the nation, if we know how to use it. The single greatest contribution the radical critique has made toward a generally better American foreign policy is in raising questions about the fundamental assimptions con- cerning this nation's role in the Prof. Bloomfield, II former State l)partnunt 1.A. njjnirs plan 11 Pr, teaches political science at 3111. Ilis article. is adapted front Foreign Pol? . icy. a new quarterly ant to be con. fu,ed with the venerable Foreign Affairs. world and about the world itself? assumptions that are rarely recog- ;.rized let alone challenged inside the i system. I recently made a list of the pre- mises underlying U.S. foreign poli- cy, assumptions that seemed to me to lie beneath the foreign policy con- sensus as it prevailed frotn 1945 to, say, 1963. Some or all of these basic ' assumptions are Still shared, con- sciously or unconsciously, by many , in the "foreign policy community," particularly inside the government. I myself held many of them and ? still share some. But I now believe , that at least some of them have caused great damage to America ; and sometimes to other people as well. What worries me is that, by . and large, most of these underlying assumptions continue to go unchal- lenged within the system. If this list appears painfully recog- nizable, my point will be made. La- ter on I will suggest some-places where I think we should change. But just in case anyone starts mut- tering about "straw men," consider my comments in parentheses. ? 1?Communism is bad: capitalism Is good. (Don't almost all Americans believe this?) 2?Stability is desirable. instabili- ty threatens U.S. interests. (This is indisputably the 'underlying premise of U.S. policy toward the Third World since the r505.) ? 3?Democracy is desirable. but if a choice has to be made, stability serves U.S. interests better than democracy. (This represents the chief political, moral and spiritual problem of our foreign policy.) 4?Any area of the world that "goes socialist" or neutralist is a vic- tory for the Soviet Union and, a loss for us. (A boxscore mentality long dominated U.S. postwar policy and still may.) 5?Every other country, and par- ticularly the poor ones, would bene- fit from American ."know-how." (One .of our greatest shocks was to. learn that we frequently don't know how.) 6?Nazi aggression in the 1930s and democracy's failure to respond ? provides the appropriate model for dealing with postwar security prob- lems. (Read Dean Rusk's speeches as secretary of state.) ? 7?Allies and clients of the United ? States, regardless of their political structure, are members of the Free World. (This may be just rhetoric, but friends of mine in the govern- Ment get red in the. face if you ask them to define "Free World.") 6?Western Europe (a) is indefen- sible ? without something like the current U.S. military presence and (b) would not be defended by the people who live there because (c) they don't understand the threat. (For details, apply to NATO head- quarters or the Pentagon.) 9?The United States must pro- \-i d e leadership because it (reluc- tantly) has the responsibility. (This one has fallen from grace, but is still believed by many.) 10?The United States has vital interests. in (a) the Pacific and (b) some or (c) all of the offshore terri- tories and (d) or some parts of the Asian mainland. (Easy to show? hard to analyze.) ? 11?Foreign aid (a) rests on an al- truistic concern for the well-being of foreigners, (b) should inspire grati- tude and pro-U.S. feelings, (c) is only justifiable if it promotes socci- fie U.S. interests. (Phrased this way to illustrate our schizoid approach to foreign aid.) 12-1n? negotiation the United States has a virtual monopoly orC., sincerity. (Americans since Ben Franklin have believed this, at least until recently.) 13?Violence is an unacceptable way to secure economic, social and political justice?except when vital U.S. interests are at stake. (Most Americans like the revolutions of 1C86 and 1776 but deplore those of 1917 and 1949.). 14?Depending on the extent to which U.S. interests are at stake, 1,:e United Nations is either the noblesi:,.. hope of mankind, or a nuisance. '? (Ask aayone.) 1.1--1n southern Africa the United States favors racial equality but not at the price of (a) instability or (b) economic loss. (Not necessarily hy- pocrisy, merely a policy premise with an irreconcilable internal in- consistency.) 16?Incipient foreign conflicts warrant top-level U.S. attention only when they threaten to become violent. When they become acute, only diplomatic and military con- siderations are relevant. (If this isn't true, why does U.S. decision . ma- chinery spring into action only when violence breaks out?) 17?However egregious a mistake, the government must never admit having been wrong. (Eisenhower admitting the U-2 spy flight is the only example of admitting wrong- doing. No one admits having been. wrong.) ? 18?Challenging underlying as- sumptions is "speculative," "theoreti ical." and a one-way ticket out of the'll inner policy circle. (Read a few memoirs. Ask why the Policy Plan- ning Staff is no more.) If at one time a full consensus ex- isted on these propositions, either on conscious or unconscious levels, it ? 1.$ Approved For Re1ease-20=08/074-CM R0P77-00132R000400080001-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 has substantially crumbled so far as many in the "foreign policy commu- nity." are concerned. But a number of these articles of belief are still re- flected both in U.S. polices and in the arguments made by defenders of the policy status quo. Those with short historic memo- ries might well ponder the durable . theme of a supernatural calling for this nation. It was not an invention , of power-drunk cold warriors, nor 'even of those -imperialists intoxicat- ed at, the turn of the last ?century ; with ;the heady Wine of overseas em- pire. * ? Rather, it goes hack to the 'very birth of this nation and even earlier. Ft* almost 2,00 years from Jonathan Edwards through Adams, Clay and Lincoln, through Wilson and Kenne- dy to Richard Nixon, the theme has recurred of a unique, even divine American world role. ' But this strain in American belief. and American rhetoric strikes a jar- ' ring note today, It combines an em- barrassing self-righteousness with what Raymcind Aron (speaking, in- ? eidentally, of Karl Marx) called "catastrophic optimism." Yet this ; nation in fact did furnish a beacon for many people and it did provide a . model for new democracies and it was for generations unself-seeking in relations with others. In redefining the U.S. world role, what has to be resolved is not to be found in cost-benefit calculations nor:at the level .of diplomatic style ' and maneuver where a "Matter- ' muck" competes with Wilsonians. ' Beneath all that, the deepest con- flicts in our body politic are over conflicting beliefs about the nature of man. and the 'meaningof morality in public policy. The sickness in American foreign policy reflects this underlying tragedy of the human condition. Demoralized in the face of failures and .disillusioned about the validity ' of its self-image, America seems to me ,paradoxically ready to move de- cisively to fresh "commitments," not In this or that tin-horn dictator who . ;claims anticommunism, but. corn- - figments to redefined purposes ; such as economic equality and con- flict. prevention along with such val- id older stands as disfavoring naked , military aggression. Reconciling economic gain with ? human values demands renewed ded- ication to partnerships, free trade, and -a purging of the ideological Con- . stipation that blocked such solutions as commodity agreements on which depend the very lifeblood of humans eletvhere, ? Revulsion at the "mad monien- turn" of arms races or at Strangelov- ian analysis needs to be accompa- mied by a renewed commitment to genuine rationalism. Clearly, isolationism is-a nonpolicy for the United States in the 1970s, the. 1930s. and until the end of the century despite the mood of Many Americans who want to put domes- tic problem-solving first and .believe .the way to do this is to downgrade.. .foreign affairs. Their urge to decou- ple America from the giobalism that has turned sour is understandable. But the linkage between troubles abroad and troubles at,home turns out 'to be a tricky one. The "inside". world at home may be profoundly altered, but the out-- side world is a separate system with ; its own constants 'and variables, mostly.'unsusceptible to manipula- tion by any single state, even a su- perpowerful one. U.S. domestic life is long overdue for some basic re- forms, and U.S. foreign policies need to change to conform to altered realities and perceptions. But if the national perspective gets too much out of register with external reality it will become as ir- rational and inappropriate as pre- vious policies which led us astray. ? In recent years we often looked like unprincipled pragmatists in our own sphere, and pious moralists elsewhere. We need to returnnow to the tradition of an America that dealt realistically with the world while giving primacy to its demo- cratic commitment wherever it's own writ ran. This is not a return to isolationism any more than it is a prescription for renewed military interventionism. It is a step beyond both. The American task is to decide afresh what is vitally important to the nation, while nht abandoning our link! on external reality. But lastly, in suggesting some spe- cifics of policy, I would echo George Romney. perhaps the only honest ; man in the United States or any oth- er government, when (speaking of the equally refractory urban prob. lems) he said, "The truth is, none of tis are sure what are the right things to do." ? The list that follows is my own "decalogue"?a short catalog of re- vised fundamental assumptions that in my view should underlie U.S. pol- icy today: 1?Neither states nor ideology nor things but people represent the highest value for American policy. While men (not women) who are today in their 50s and 00s will -con- tinue to run this country for a few more years, others ,are coming up who believe that the human beings 14 who :live in this country, and for that matter .people everywhere,rep- resent the irrefragably highest value for American policy. This has to belhe.rentral point in. a restatement Of Our -ideology. It is linked to the;spirit for which Ameri- ca used to stand. It tan refurbish: a tarnished image: Above all, it is ety- ? cally right. 2?Nuclear weapons -can destroy 'the United States, ' However conifortably ' strategic analysts and indeed almost every 'one have learned to live with M - f clear weapons they still could de- stroy civilization as we know i. This inherently suicidal possibility twill persist as a threat until amid- thing basic is done about it, such as ' genuine -reductions in stockpiles of H-bombs, and basic turndowns in the military budgets of the major ; nations. SALT I was the application of brakes. But we are very far from going into reverse gear. 3?The United States has a major world foie, but no God-given man- ? date. We have no divine commission.' Tither to right all assumed wrongS (Or to impose our version of right or wrong on others, whether in their defense or not?and neither (lees ; any other country have that right. The United States is still strong empigh to blow up the world, and 01. most. rich enough to buy it. lint somehow we haven't proven to be smart enough to run it, so goodbye . (and, for my money, good riddance) Pax Americana. At the same time, Our influence and power in the ser. vice of genuine war prevention, gen - tithe humanitarianism, and genuine collective security, will be desper- ately needed. 4?The major forces affecting' ? Jut- man life are increasingly transition- al. Society does not exist to support? bureaucracies but vice versa?Max Weber and all governments to tlie contrary. The things that affect hu- man life at the human level are what it is really all about. (I confess to having sometimes forgotten that myself, in 16 years in and out of uni- form, gripped as. I was with what might be called the glamor of the In- Basket). The' greatest single les- son for leadership, and the heart of the needed transformation in Ameri- can attitudes about its world role turns on this: The air, the water, the quality of people's lives. the commu- nications that enrich them, the wars and diseases that kill them, the con- sequences of affluence and scientific discovery?every single one of these Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8' will turn out on analysis to be large- ly indifferent to a single nation's boundaries a n d effectively ap- proachable only on the basis of re- gional or international cooperation ; and eventually international regula- tion. 5?The balance of power mecha- nism still keeps the peace. : On the most fateful matters of na- ; tional security, the governing me- chanism of world politics, so far as I can see, is still the balance of power. ? Events which are likely to upset the overall balance are perilous and ? should be resisted and corrected? although not by ourselves alone. By the same token, events which do not really upset the over-all balance should not be portrayed in terms of ? Munich, fighting on the beaches of California. or the Apocalypse 6?Hostile or incompatible forces remain in the world. Only someone on a very powerful trip could fail to notice that the cold war is not fully ended, that there still exist plenty of groups in the world, some ruling powerful coun- tries, whose notions of how to orga- nize and "improve" mankind are dif- ferent from ours, and- that some of these people are deeply hostile to this country. How we ourselves change is going to reduce this ten, sion to some extent; in other cases it Is not, and we had better maintain good intelligence and some dry pow- ; der. 7?Worldwide strivings for eco- nomic, social, and racial equality will intensify. All projections into the future confirm the cynical proposition that ' "the rich get richer and the poor get children." The GNP gap will create ' a built-in source of tension. On a scale of probability and imminence, led by Latin America and trailed by central Africa this tension will per- sist until the poor gain a greater measure of equality with rich, white, Western man. 8?On the surface world order tendencies are weak, nationalism is strong. The forces that make for conflict, ' such as virulent nationalism, are in- creasing in Africa, Asia, and Eastern , Europe, and in pockets within the allegedly advanced northern coun- tries. There is nothing to indicate that, the present rate of about 1.5 new ; conflicts per year won't continue ; and even increase. As the 1970s be- gan, half the nations of the world? about 70?were either engaged in conflict or preparing for it. 9?Military power remains rele- vant to some?but by no means all? national strategics. Blame for the recent U.S. ?obses- sion with Military solutions primari- ly rests not on military men but on civilians who forgot that their busi- ness was diplomacy, conflict preven- tions and compromise, and went whoring off after shiny toys of pow- er, subversion, and force majcure. But given the other realities, milita- ry power still remains a crucially important element that is relevant to some but by no means all policy problems. 10?Technology is not a frill but a growing determinant of world polit- ics. As a nation we have thought of exported technology and technical, assistance at root as pragmatic in- struments for our own national ad- vantage. But the corollary of my premise is that all three have to be Confronted on fundamental moral grounds. It was not very long ago that one could derive the external objectives of America by simply looking around the world and seeing what we were doing. It could be'added up and synthesized into a reasonably coherent whole called the "United States national interest," at least as of that year. For a time that worked as an in- ductive method of defining national interest. But a list of what we have been actually doing everywhere, in different parts of the world or at home, is no longer acceptable by even a majority of Americans as en- abling them to infer a valid state- ment of American interests and na- tional purpose for the period ahead. Indeed we have been badly served by the invocation of something mys- tical called the "national interest" as a substitute for the hard, painful analysis needed to devise coherent national policies. Some Americans?including Pres- idents?talk as though American na- tional interests were immutable. But of course, apart from sheer sur- vival, they are not. We may have preferences ? a demoe rat icallv ruled, contented, admiring world around us?but we are forced to de- cide as a nation what is vital to us and what is not. To this extent atti- tudes, rather than geography or di- vine law, determine interests. If Southeast Asia became a new Tonkinese Empire under Hanoi, neutralist at best .or allied to China or Russia at worst, many people now believe the average American could still live out his life quite happily. Unless the domino theory or the Munich analogy can be more persua- sively demonstrated, what. vital U.S. interest was really involved in the Vietnam war? There is, widespread agreement now that the answer is: None. How can this be? Is nothing vital. except our own survival as sentient human beings? I suspect the answer to this is "yes"?that nothing is vi- tal except what is truly vital, mean- ing affecting life itself. And so it must be unless we want to let every corner of the world be defined by one or another politician or agency, of government as "vital" and therer. fore deserving of a total American commitment. To make "vital" mean the sarrt thing as "important" or "desirable or "appropriate" (or possibly annoA ing or just interesting) not only der grades the language but may need- lessly kill a lot of Americans. The se- mantics here involve not simply making words mean what you want them to mean, a la Lewis Carroll. Words may wind. up changing the lives of a lot of people. "Vital interests" can only refer to the danger that the United States can be destroyed or mortally hurt, This may be the first element of cla- rity in sorting out what we have. been calling "vital interests" all over the globe. The people who run governments, at least our own, are neither male- volent nor stupid, despite a distur- bingly widespread opinion to the contrary. For my money they are peo- ple who are both bright and devoted to the national well-being as they see it. I believe the Nixon Administration has made some substantial gains in foreign affairs. But the added ingre- dient that is needed is to overcome what this President liked to Call our failure of nerve. I am afraid he was usually thinking of nerve in the sense of acting unilaterally, if neces- sary, in defense of what is construed, as the national interest. It can perhaps be seen that for me the needed recovery of nerve is for the purpose of imagining bold and creative designs for a more unified. and cooperating world, and then have the courage to push them to- ward reality. It remains true that without vision the poeple will per- ? ish. But with only vision and no fol- low-through, idealism becomes hy- pocrisy. Let me suggest a final litmus-pa- per test for policy. After we ask "Is it strategically important? "?which we must?and after we ask "Is it po- litically feasible or viable"?which we must?and after we ask "Is it . cost-effective?"?which we should-1 perhaps the greatest lesson of Viet.' nam for the United States is that we should also ask "Is it humane?" I This is not a substitute for the other questions. But only with this additional question, or so it seems to me, can we cure the sickness that has crept into the veins of American foreign policy. Approved -For -Release-2004/08/07-:-GIA-RDP77 00432R0001-00080001-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 1, I BALTIMORE SUN 24 January 1973 ' 0 iL cu.) fur at (7,10.)0 di By SCOTT SULLIVAN Paris Bureau of The Sun Paris?On March 31, 1968, President' Lyndon B. Johnson announced to the American, people that he was prepared to meet with North Vietnam in "any forum, at any time to discuss the means of bringing this ugly war to an end." In the interests of peace, the President continued, he had decided to withdraw his candi- dacy for re-election, had or- dered the "unilateral" cessa- tion of bombing raids north of the demarcation zone and had appointed W. Averell Harri- man, the 77-year-old former Governor of New York and diplomatic trouble-shooter, as his persOnal representative in the coming talks. Tet mocked U.S. words The President's dramatic an- nouncement came after more than 18 years of American in- volvement in South Vietnam, after 8 years of overt partici- pation in the war. More than 20,000 GI's had died in action in the conflict, and total Amer- ican troop strength in Indo- china had reached half a mil- lion. The Commuhists' bloody, if inconclusive, Tet offensive two months earlier had'brought the war to a new pitch of intensity and horror, making a mockery' of official American estimates that the United States and South Vietnam were slowly "winning the war." In Arnerica, the war had divided the country and made Mr. Johnson the most unpopu- lar President in recent mem- ory. At first it was the young ' ?because of their -radicalism, because they ran the risk of fighting and dying in the far- off rice paddies?who ex- pressed th-ir opposition to a war they perceived as unjust and deg. aqing. ? Then, little by little, older and more conservative Ameri- cans began to follow the young. They could not under- stand hew, the patently undem- ocratic regime in Saigon could serve the cause of de- mocracy. They could not jus-; tify to themselves the expense of American blood and treas. They grew heartily sick of the war and wanted to get cut of it. So, President Johnson's evi- dently sincere bid for peace was greeted, except on the extreme right wing, with sym- pathy and relief. The Presi- dent's personal standing im- proved and the American peo- ple Settled back to wait for peace within a reasonable span of time. Their hopes were to be bit- terly, cruelly disappointed. Nearly five years passed be- fore another President and his special representative finally patched together a treaty that did little more than register the military stalemate in the war-torn land. Meantime, 29,000 more Americans lost their lives in battle, about 580 American. prisoners prisoners languished in Hanoi's ? prisons, the Communist side unleashed a major offensive unparalleled in the previous history of the war, and the United States responded with massive bombing of the North and mining of its ports. The official Paris talks:. which grew out of Mr. John- son's initiative, developed into an exercise in pure futility. As the fighting and the dying went on and on, representa- tives of the United States, North Vietnam, South Vietnam and the Viet Cong met weekly to trade repetitive insults and propaganda, restate invariable arguments and boast of their own "good will." So manifestly fruitless were' the public talks that President Nixon opened an entirely dif- ferent channel of communica- tions to the Communist side, sending Henry A. Kissinger, his globe-Circling personal envoy, for 21 separate "se- cret" sessions with Le Due The, the charming but rigid plenipotentiary of Hanoi's Politburo. October movement For more than three years, the private talks proved as frustratingly useless as the public forum. Each side tire- lessly repeated its unvarying demands and rejected the op16 - TO 0 Aro 0 /T1 ? 7711 tr/ ponent's arguments. It was not in fact, until Octo- ber 8 of last year that the secret talks began to move at all. On that day, Mr. Tho pro- posed a formula that, in effect, separated the political from the military aspects of the Vi- etnamese situation. Dr. Kissin- ger, in turn, agreed to accept the Communist contention that there were "two governments, two administrations, two ar- mies" in South Vietnam. ' Futility inevitable From that moment on de- spite the tensions and suspense of the previous months, the process of Compromise and eventual agreement ineluc- table. The almost five years of fu- tility and frustration that pre- ceeded the treaty were also in a sense inevitable. ,f In the very speech in which President Johnson called for the talks, he added that the United States "will not accept a fake solution." And he assured his country- men that the solution reached must include "political condi- tions that permit the South Vi- etnamese ? all the South Viet- namese ? to chart their course free of any outside domination or interference, from us or anyone else." . Mr. Nixon held to that same principle, to the end. And to the end the North Viet Vietnamese and their Cong allies rejected it?at least the in the sense in which Americans meant it. Choice of venue The endless, pointless wran- gling that was to surround the, talks throughout their life got off to a quick start. In the first week of April, 1968, American and North Viet- namese representatives in Vientiane, Laos, sat down to choose a venue for .the peace talks. The. Americans sug- gested Geneva, New Delhi, Rangoon, Jakarta, Indonesia, and Vientiane itself. Hanoi held out for Phnom Penh, Cambodia or Warsaw. Gen. Charles de Gaulle, still president of France, felt that the only logical site for the _LE11 r Tri)etEce talks was his country, with it; own long history of intimatt .relations with Vietnam. It said so loudly and often an , after a period of uncertainty, his view prevailed. Gestapo setting It was May 13, 1968, when Mr. Harriman sat down with Xuan Thuy, the former poet and journalist who was to rep- resent Hanoi through the al- most five long years of the talks. That first meeting .took place, like all the others, in the ground floor grand salon of the old Hotel Majestic on Par. is's Avenue Kleber, the once- splendid hostelry that was commandeered by the Gestapo as its Paris headquarters dur-' big World War. II, then re- verted to the French Foreign Ministry that uses it for all sorts of international confer- ences. , The massive old building, somewhat worn with age, was to become a familiar sight to televieWers the world over and a symbol of the morass into which the talks would slip and founder. No common view That first meeting, which took place against a backdrop of a general strike and student disorders on a grand scale, took place in an atmosphere of pleasant courtesy that was al- most immediately to dissipate. On the business side, there was no evidence of a common view. Mr. Harriman spoke of "mutual de-escalation of the war"?an idea that'would have required the North Vietnamese to do the unthinkable by ad- mitting their direct involve- *ment in the South Vietnamese conflict. Mr. Thuy accused the United States of "sabotaging" the 1954 Geneva agreements., So began a long summer of stalemate, and with it the growing realization?on both, sides?that the bilateral talks were insufficient, ' that some- how the government of Presi- dent Nguyen Van Thieu in Sai- gon and the Viet Cong, or National Liberation Front, must be attached to the nego- tiations. But Hanoi demanded a stiff Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 price for the enlarged negotia- tions, the admission of the front on the same basis as the Saigon government and cessa-* tion of the bombing of the demarcation zone. Throughout the? summer; 1 President Johnson refused to pay the price. Mr. Harriman 'Continued to meet in fruitless semi-public sessions with Mr. Thuy, while Cyrus Vance, No. 2 man in the American delega- tion, handled most of the se- cret parleys on enlargement. Finally, on November 1, just a week before the American elections that would see Hu- bert H. Humphrey, the Demo- cratic vice president defeated by Richard M. Nixon, Mr. Johnson declared a halt to all bombing of the North. The move came just too late to save Mr. Humphrey. / Nor did it immediately bring the four parties to the bargain- ing table. Under the tacit agreement reached between the U.S. and North Vietnam, the Americans felt they had accepted a "two- sided" conference. Hanoi maintained the talks were to be "four-part." The dispute on principle led to the farcical problem of the "shape of the table," which delayed the actual negotiations for three months. Round table accepted During that time, the Americans and North Viet- namese, each verging on rup- ture with its own principal ally, met in public and private,, again and again, and argued. whether the table should ? be four-sided or not, whether there should be two tables or one. At last, on January 16, it was , agreed that the table would be round. Delegates could sit where they wished.' The U.S. continued to describe ? the affair as "two-sided talks." For. the Communists, it would remain a "four-part confer- ence." On January 25, the four par- ties met at the Majestic, with Henry Cabot Lodge, the for- mer ambassador to Brussels, replacing Mr. Harriman as the American spokesman. For the next four years, the bitter for- mer American envoy, was to criticize ceaselessly the handl- ing of the conference, arguing that the United States missed ecurring Communist peace ignals. From the day the four par- ties first met, the history of the Paris conference began to lose the few elements of relief, that had characterized its first oaths. The endless process of prop- gandistic argument and re- crimination began. The world stened less and less. So often were false hopes raised, so ' often were they dashed that observers feel it possible some real signals were missed. Indeed, the conference devel- oped more as an affair of personalities and setting than of issues. Permanent smile There was scrappy little ; Nguyen Thi Binh, the pleasant, Ibig hearted foreign minister of the Provisional Revolutionary Government that the National Liberation Front founded in June, 1969, brimming with na- tionalist fervor and outraged indignation at the American "neo-colonialists," but charm- ing all the same in her well cut Ao Dai. There was Xuan Thuy, with 'a permanent smile pasted to his face, capable of calling his opponent a liar and smiling as he said it. There was Le Due Tho, the enormously impres- sive, white-thatched revolution- ary leader, who held the real power from Hanoi and left the name-calling to his subordi- nates. There was Pham Dang Lam, the scholarly but rigid chief of the Saigon delegation, who wrote out his own speeches in longhand though they were rarely listened to, and spent endless hours explaining his government's positions to the Western press. ? Insult for insult On the American side, the popular, vigorous Mr. Lodge, a Boston blueblood with a long political past, gave way to David K. E. Bruce, whose Bal- timore blood was just as blue and whose diplomatic finesse was legendary. But Mr. Bruce was aging and ill, and his interests ran to painting and fine wines. He wanted badly to crown his fine career with a Vietnam peace, but the cards were against him. Finally in mid-1971, the Pres- ident transferred the hopeless task to 'William ?J. Porter, a younger but widely experi- enced diplomat who believed that the Communists under- stood tough-talking and gave it to them, trading lecture for lecture, insult for insult. Behind the principals, a crowd of colorful supporting players provided a back- ground: Philip C. Habib, the long-time No. 2 in the Ameri- can delegation, more hawk-like than the hawks of Washington ?after- his long career in Viet- nam; Nguyen Thanh Le, the scholarly,6much-liked but pro- foundly deceptive press spokes- man for Hanoi; Le Chan, the chief of the North Vietnamese news agency who kept up friendly contacts with his Western 'journalist "col- leagues" from the beginning; Thich Nhat Hanh, the saffron- robed Buddhist, who with his neutralist co-religionists, of- 17 ---A-pprove-d -For Releas-e-2001108/077-elA=ROP77--00432R0001-00080001-8 fered highly moral- but ineffec- tive advice from the sidelines; the well-intentioned squads of American Quakers, students and . priests who paraded through Paris, listening with naive credulity to the Commu- nist delegations' presentations and automatically proclaiming that peace was near; Senator George S. McGovern, who did the same thing. Of all the visitors and minor figures, none were more touch- ing than the wives and moth- ers of American pilots who arrived singly, then in larger and larger groups to try to gain some news of their lost loved ones. Comforted by the Ameri- can delegation, they were regu- larly turned away by the North Vietnamese, who politely, but firmly, told them they had no news at all. Some of the distraught women camped outside the 1North ? Vietnamese compound at suburban Choisy-le-Roi. Oth- ers haunted Avenue Kleber, stopping Hanoi's representa- tives on the street and begging for a scrap of compassion: None of them received the slightest satisfaction. Meantime, inside the old: hotel, the. routine ,wore on,: morning meeting, lunch-break," a ?round-table discussion, end- less press conferences, ? in which reporters from around the world sought to elicit the. slightest nuance in either side's presentation, the faintest ray of hope for peace. . On the surface, the confer- ence abounded with events. But,, with the passage of time, most .of them revealed themselves ,as classic pseudo-events. On May 8, 1969, the Viet Cong offered a 10-point peace plan. A week later, President Nixon replied with an eight-point plan that included the unacceptable demand for a mutual pullout of troops. Points' and clarifications On September, 17, 1970, Mrs. Binh produced a, "new" eight- point plan, which the United States saw little new in. On October 7, President Nixon re- .formulated the American posi- lion in five points, and the Communist side lost no time in 'rejecting it. July 1, 1971, saw the Commu- nists proposing a seven-point plan that provided for release .of all American prisoners of , war by the end of the war, if ? all American troops were with- drawn by that time. Mr. Bruce admitted there were "new ele- ments" in the plan. But it, , finally, went nowhere. The same fate awaited the Viet I Cong's two "clarifications" of February 5, 1972. The rhetoric that ? embel- lished the weekly meetings varied and the subjects shifted, but the substance re- mained the same: . Through 1970 and most of 1971, the United States concen- trated on the fate of the' pris- oners. The Communists replied that the prisoners would be released when Ainerican troops left Vietnamese soil. Mrs. Binh and Mr. t_Thuy hammered at the "fascisrna- ture of the Thieu regime ,and demanded that its president be deposed. To do so, the Ameri- cans replied would mean deny- ing the South Vietnamese peo- ;pie the right to the government they had "freely chosen" 'The Communists laughed out 'loud :at the defense. ;i , Mr. Lam, Mr. Thieu's'.-repre- isentative, described thelNorth Vietnamese as invader's and called on the Viet Cong tp meet ; directly with him to resolve 'South Vietnamese problems "between South Vietnamese." Propaganda window Systematically, the Commu- nist side used the Paris forunk to comment upon and criticize events in Vietnam: in Paris,? they denounced the "farcical" election that returned Presi- dent Thieu to power, they boasted of battlefield victories, they condemned American bombing raids and, on several occasions, called off sessions of the talks in protest against them, they accused the United. States of bombing the vital' North Vietnamese dam system' and practicing "genocide. American officials com- mented drily that the Commu- nist side needed the Avenue Kleber talks as-a propaganda , window on the world, and. slowly began to follow suit, hammering away at such sub- jects as the treatment of American prisoners and the presence of Northern troops in the South. President Nixon appreciated the propaganda value of the talks to the other side. He also recognized that, "before world public opinion," the United States was obliged to stay at the apparent negotiating table. 11 meetings Together with the policy of Vietnamization, the President sought, almost from the begin- ning of his term in office, to exploit the possibility of pri- vate contacts with the North Vietnamese. in Paris, Mr. Lodge met privately with Xuan Thuy on 11 separate occasions in 1969, but to no effect. ? And, on August 4, the same year, Dr. Kissinger held his first secret meeting with Mr.I Tho and Mr. Thuy. Communist sources have de- scribed the early Kissinger-Tho meetings as exact reproduc-? tions of the semi-public talks, with each side twitirtg OXAttly the same positions that his :country was advancing before, Ian the world. No. progress occurred, but Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-004 those meetings, which began in the downtown Paris apartment of Jean de Sainteny, a long- time French representative in Indochina, served at least to develop some sympathy and familiarity between the two plenipotentiaries. The meetings continued at intervals over the months and years, as 'the process of Viet- namization moved into full gear, as the Communist side ' consolidated some positions and lost others, as the Saigon government regained its con- trol over much of the country- side, as the semi-public talks ground on, growing shriller and less useful with each pass- ing session. Intensive round By midsummer of 1971, the Vietnamese situation had al- tered radically from? that of March, 1968. American troop strength had dwindled to 230,- 000 and was falling rapidly. According to American and Vi- etnamese claims, the vast .ma- jority of the country had been "pacified. "The Communist ? side had mounted no major' offensive for 31/2 years. Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Tho ? began an intensive round of negotiations. They met in Paris on July 13, August 16, September 13 and October 11. BALTIMORE SUN 25 January 1973 There was still little agree, meat on the principal subjects: .the institution of a cease-fire and the form of political ar- rangement to be provided for postwar South Vietnam. Chapter closed But Mr. Tho was talking. The North Vietnamese had of-. fered a new peace plan and offered it secretly. The United States had also offered a new. Tian, which provided for !Presi- jent Thieu's resignation a month before new elections and for a United States troop withdrawal within four months. Further secret talks ' were scheduled for November 20. On November 17, Hanoi called them off, pleading Mr. Tho's "ill health." A chapter had closed. Throughout the winter, Mr. Porter alternated between re- fusing to talk to the Communist. side at the regular weekly ne- gotiating sessions and scathing them with his own particular brand of sarcasm. The peace talks reached their lowest point. China visit I On January 25, President Nixon revealed both the exist- ence of the private talks and' ;the content of the two secret , peace plans. North Vietnam tand the Viet Cong howled "foul," and "rejected" the American offer publicly. In February, the President visited China. On March 30, North Vietnam unleashed its largest, most overt attack on the South in all the history of the long war. For weeks the possibility seemed to exist that the North might overrun the South and finish the conflict with a clas-, sic military victory. On May 8, just days before - he was to leave on his state visit to Moscow, Mr. Nixon announced his decision to ming the North Vietnamese harbors. Sort of peace The public talks remained gs they had been for two months, "indefinitely suspended." But, at last, the long process. that would finally produce a' sort of peace had begun in' earnest. The United States agreed to resume the public talks July 13. On August 1, Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Tho met for t,he 15th time. New meetings followed August 1 and September 15. Inconspicuous villa On September 21, somewhere in Vietnam, the leaders of the Provisional Revolutionary Gov- ernment met and adopted their "two governments, two armies" statement, which was to be the key, ultimately, to peace. Mr. Tho presented a peace treaty draft to Dr. Kissinger on October 8. Together with their staffs, the two men worked over it in an inconspic- ous villa in Choisy-le-Rol, until October 11. There was another meeting October 17, after which Presi` dent Nixon told Pham Van Dong, the North Vietnamese, premier, that the text could' be regarded as "completed.," . North Vietnam asked foMnd said it got an American prem- ise to sign the document on Halloween. Reluctant ally But peace, so elusive,- so nearly unattainable'was ;not to-, come that quickly. ' In Saigon, President (Mien', raised basic objections to the' treaty draft. Washington asked for a delay in signing in order to talk around its reluctant.. ally. Exasperated, the North Viet-, namese published a shortened, version of the treaty October. 26. Embarrassed; Dr. Kissin- ger told the world that "peace. was at hand" but that there were still matters of detail to be sealed. ? Nothing could be achieved before the American election: After it, the Communist sided. for the record, accused the U.S. of "bad faith" and said the existing treaty "should be' signed immediately." ? AT (-5.1 (F8,grz(T- .c5 TlyitirliPrete 0 By JAMES S. BEAT Wo51Lington Burrell/ oj The Sun Washington?The. Vietnam agreement that vill he signed Saturday is a vehicle that can carry the warring' parties to peace if they all decide to get aboard.,., Given the history of Indo- china in the past 25 years, it would be foolhardy to .predict that a true peace is in 'the offing. There are many signs that it is not. But it could be.: , Close reading of the agree-, .ment and accompanying Troto-1 cols that were made public yesterday disclose many pit- falls, ambiguities, snares and fragile safeguards But, as Henry A. Kissinger, ,one of the authors of the agreement, insisted yesterday, the agreement can work if the Vietnamese want it to work. With his customary clarity ,):iut without his usual humor, pr. ,Kissinger neatly outlined the dilemma. The agreement relies 'heavily on goodwill, and ,that emotion Is almost totally lacking 'among the Vietnamese. How can two parties, the Saigon government and the Viet Cong, who will ?not even formally acknowledge each other's existence at Saturday's Aigning ceremony, be expected observe the provision in Article 11 that they "immedi- ately . . . end hatred and en- mity" and foreswear acts of re- ,prisal? The suggestion is absurd and I; its authors know it. However, the fact remains that, both the South and North 'Vietnamese, however reluc- tantly, and for whatever differ- 'cut reasons, have agreed to Jay down their arms and try to work out a political settlement. The factors that induced them to reach that bargain might induce them to try to keep it, rat least for awhile. , , Aside from the deep animosi- ties that would hamper even the most cleverly designed peace machinery, . some ob- vious' difficulties are in the agreement itself: . 1. The rule of unanimity that' governs all of the peace-keep- ing - 'and reconciliation organs.' 2. The careful contradictions built into the pact that paper over the argument whether all Vietnam is one nation or whether there are two Viet- nams. 3. The relegation of all but the most temporary political; arrangements to negotiations. between the Vietnamese them- selves. '18 4. The continued presence of-' North Vietnamese troops in parts of South Vietnam. 5. The assignment of far fewer international truce su- pervisors than the United States sought. 6. A lag of as much as two weeks before any substantial' number of truce supervisors take positions in the field. . 7. Uncertainty over the es- tablishment of an, effective cease-fire in Laos and Cambo- dia. The provision that the Na- tional Council of National Reconciliation and Concord, composed equally of govern- ment officials, Viet Cong rep- resentatives and neutralists, as well as the three truce supervi- sory groups, function by unani- mous -agreement can be a curse or a 'blessing to each ide. On the, one hand, it provides President Nguyen Van Thieu of South Vietnam with some assurance the council will not evolve into the coalition gov- ernment he fears and permits him *to veto any long-range political solution for his nation that does not suit his purposes. On the other hand, he rule of unanimity is bound fil blunt the effectiveness of the ?oint mili- tary commissions liat are to ente vet') will' supervise the truce in its ini- tial stages and the new Inter- national Commission of Control and Supervision that gradually akes over that task. That drawback, in Washing- ton's and Saigon's eyes, Is tempered by the fact that the international commission's members will be able to initi- ate investigations on their Own and to report their findings even if the other members do not agree. The four members are Can- ada and Poland, which have' served on the old international control commissions created in Indochina 'by the 1954 Geneva accords, plus Indonesia and Hungary. Canada, in particular, was concerned about the unanimity rule, which hamstrung the old commission. Mitchell Strong, the Canadian foreign minister, said yesterday his country will supply troops for,the new stk.. pervisory group at least in the initial stages of the cease-fire: The supervisory force will be spread very ? thin over South Vietnam. United States offi- cials were understood to want between 2,500 and 5,000 observ-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP7 -00432R0001000800014 APproved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-IRDP77-00432R000100080.001-8 ! ers. Instead they settled for 1,160. This force, not all of whom can be in the field at the same time, must guard against cheating on the truce, supervise the return of prison- ers, help search for Missing 'soldiers and guard the borders' against infiltrators and, smug- gled munitions. ? ? Although the, headquarters contingents of international .truce supervisors are to reach their posts in the day or two 'after the cease-fire takes ef- fect, field units- are not sched- ?uled to be deployed for as much , as two weeks later. ,In the interim joint government and Viet tong patrols are to enforce the truce and agree On 'what , territory 'each controlS. ? . The' political provisions 'in the agreement are equally, re- plete with the potential for. ;trouble. Dr. Kissinger ?.ex- plained that it has always been Vnited States policy to:, leave NEW YORK TIMES 27 January 1973 FEAR IS EXPRESSED FOR THEIR PRISONERS Spend to The New York Times LONDON, Jan. 26?Amnesty International expressed fear to- day for the safety of political prisoners in South Vienam. ? "The Vietnam peace set- lcment has failed o provide adequate safeguards for he esti- mated 100,000 civilian detainees in Souh Vietnam," he London- based organization tha cam- paings against religious and poliical persecution said. "There is real danger," it contended in a statement, "hat key members of the South Vietnamese non-Communist op- position who are detained will be killed before the supervisory commissions come into opera- tion." ? It said that there was "evi- dence hat selecive elimination of opposition members had begun." The statement said that last month, "267 political prisoners were sent from Chi Hoa na- tional prison in Saigon to the notorious prison on Con Son Island, home of the "tiger cage" detention cells." It also said that "300 prisoners travel- ing on a boat 'from Con Son to the mainland are reported to have been killed." ' V the political future of SoUthietnam to its own people 'to I determine. And that is what the agreement does. The agreement calls for free elections, internationally super- Vised. Somehow the'govern-' iment and Viet Cong?which at the 'moment' refuse even to acknowledge each other's legit-- imacy-Lare to agree in 90 days on a niutually acceptable 'elec- tion'prOcess. Fabric of government In effect, the agreement calls on these two old foes; fearful and rnistrustful of each' other, to agree on what amounts to a new constitution for South Vietnam. Although this point is neatly' buried, the, pact provides in Article 12 that the 'government arid Viet Cong must agree on the "institutions for which. general elections are to? be held:" ' ?i BALTIMORE SUN 26 January 1973 To ,an'aeademic olitithilSci-si enlist like Dr.' Kissinger, the I term institutions has only onel meaning in' that context: the fabric of * government. He tacitly acknowledged that point in his press -conference yester- day by: saying that the elec- tions Would be for "offices to`, be decided by.two parties:" From Mr:',Thieu's point of view, the feature is 'likely' to be' regarded 'as a plus. 'Agreement; on new political institutions i's'i not a, likely Prospect in the 901 days earmarked fol` the first, steps toward a permanent litical settlement. As' Dr. Kissinger carefully 'noted, the piesent Saigon gime retnaing in *Office ,until it agrees to sten aside. With the right Of veto in All organs cre- ated by the agreement, Mr., Thieu can maintain the status' quo, which 'on balance favors Saigon. . ' 1-1OWever, one of Mr. Thieu's, predecessors, Ngo Dinh Diem, was in a Similar position. in' 1956, when he decided not to' hold the reunification electionl 'Called for in the Geneva agree-. ment ? two year earlier. ?The election' was not .held, but the second 'Indochinese war ? the one which is to end this week- end?had RS genesis in that ' The , so-called sovereignty, issue, which Dr., Kissinger Songht? to deride as a funda- mental questionin the recent stalemate,left at a standoff.' It is 'best illustrated by the preamble to the agreement, whiek speaks. of the "Vietnam- ese people's fhndamental na7 tionaI rights,implying'qt is single . nation. as Hanoi insists -?-taild. 'the South Vietnamese People's right to self-deternii- nation," Which is Saigon's in.: I cortiPa tible concept.. t? Cease-Fire: Some Questions The clearest facts of the Vietnam cease-fire agreement have to . do with America's role, an". end of direct American' combat military participation. Though we will con- tinue to supply replacement mate riel, to the South Vietnamese, we are.. at last pulling out. For us in the large sense the war may be described as over, Beyond that, most provisions, of the agreement depend for ;implementation on the decisions and the will of the re- niaining parties: Because it was only through elaborate legalistic- academistic ambiguities that an agreement could be reached at all; ambiguity is the tone of the bulk of its provisions and the bulk of the accompanying :protocols. Before we came to those,, how, ever,'one question about America's role in, its late stages cries for an' answer. Since the dooument finally agreed to differs in no way that can Properly be 'called essential from the accord almost reached in October, is there anything even today to explain adequately, much less to justify, the massive Ameri- can bombing last month? The only explanation offered at all is. mili- tary;., that the bombings damaged North Vietnam's potential for an arms buildup in advance of a cease-fire; and after. a ? cease-fire, making Hanoi stronger than' it otherwise would have been for the internal ? Vietnamese struggle, ahead. ? Like, most claims for . heavy bombing since the institution of heavy bombing,: this does not press us much. Tlie great and costly attack on the ball-bear- ing plants at Schweinfurt in World War II Comes to mind as one case in point:After the raid, in the Air Force's phrase, ball-bearings were rolling all over Germany, and ?a vital element in Germany's war production had been. virtually knocked out:, yet on the day years later when American ground forces captured Schweinfurt ball-bearings were still being made there. . In the Indochina -war the story has been similar, with variations. Attacks from the 'air on industrial targets never, despite all the claims in Saigon and Washington, managed to cripple seriously North Vietnamese capability of action, nor did the "interdiction" by air of North Vietnamese routes of sup- ply in any "decisive way serve their purposes. As to the terror aspects of bombing, particularly of the December bombing, what ef- fect did they have on the enemy's will to resist? To judge by the terms of the`cease-fire agreement, very little, if any. It may indeed have worked the 'other way. The North Vietnamese say it did, *and in this experience backs them. Turning to questions about the agreement itself as it may affect the Vietnamese future, one large one can be singled out as an ex- ample of matters not resolved,, or even' fundamentally dealt with. In early talks, by all reports, the future of South Vietnam was seen as depending on the'coopuation of three elements, the governira.,:tin Saigon, the VietsCong and the nc..- tralists?those who, in one defini- tion, though anti-Communist , in sentiment held themselves apart from the Thieu government.. believ-' ing that the best future for Vietnam lay in conciliation and a policy of ? neutrality. Sonic of these are fre:.. if quiet, today in South Vietnam. be- cause the Thieu- regime 4'.\:uates- neutralism with, are among the tens of thous' nds of people still held as political ;Iris- oners. With them the cease-;, -e agreement does not deal at a. Kissinger says that this dilemma, because of the difficulty of sorting' out political prisoners from others,: was deliberately separated from the question of prisoners of war, and will have to be settled by the parties of South Vietnam- among themselves. It provides a likely source of immediate and bitter disagreement. To have swept it under the rug is to have evaded an issue with an important bearing on Vietnam's future. Thus with this as With much else the 'cease-fire agreement, except in the important matter Of an end to ; direct American military Participa- tion, may raise more questions than it answers. 19 Approved-For-Release 2001-M8107 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010-0080001-8---- Approved For ReAnk?Ociltiggffp:H91/140BR7-00432R000100080001-8 28 January 1973 /TORE than three months have a passed since Dr. Henry Kissinger arrived in Saigon with the first draft treaty to end the Vietnam war in his liriefcase and the news that Hanoi had capitulated on all major points. For 24 hours the euphoria persisted ix-and then President Thieu and his -Principal advisers saw the draft treaty f Or the first time. They were shocked. The Demilitar- ised Zone between North and South, which they wanted enlarged, was aban- doned. No provision was made for Withdrawal of the North Vietnamese Army that had invaded the South in such massive force at Easter. And, niore serious than anything else, the Council of National Reconciliation and concord, to which the English version Of the draft assigned the administrative function of supervising and organising elections, appeared in the Vietnamese version as a coalition Government. , I spent several hours, a day, or two Wer, with ,one of the few people who attended the talks between Kissinger and Thieu, and was briefed in detail on the draft treaty and Vietnamese reactions to it. On the basis of that briefing, there is no doubt that Thieu's ?dogged resistance to those original terms has given , South Vietnam a greater chance to survive as an inde- pendent sovereign non-Communist State. But this is the third time in the post 19 years that the war horse in Indo-China has been brought to the trough of peace. Is it reasonable to believe that circumstances are now more propitious and that this time it really will drink? Are we about to see genuine peace with genuine honour? '1 Peace euphoria about Indo-China is not new. On December 11, 1962, Malcolm MacDonald, British chairman of the 1.4-nation Geneva Conference working to bring peace to the Kingdom of Laos, opened the day's session with a brief review of past progress and future prospects. "We are in fact on the point of creating a practical and just system of international guarantees which will assure to Laos neutrality, untroubled peace and sovereign inde- pendence," he said. A week earlier William Sullivan, acting leader of the American delegation, called it: "A pattern for peace not only in Laos, not only in South-East Asia, but through- out the world." Not long after the agreement had been signed and both the world and Laos were singularly unmoved by the prospects I was waiting at Vientiane airport for the return from abroad of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma. Next to me was a Polish officer from the International Control Commission. "How do you think the new Govern- ment will work?" I asked him. "Government!" he snorted. "This is not a government. It is a comic opera. It cannot possibly work." In the long sorry story of Indo- China these comments merit Special place. For what Geneva created for Laos in 1962 produced neither an effec- tive system of international guarantees nor any sort of pattern for peace, but only a brief breathing-space while pre- parations for renewed war went on apace. It is not that the Indo-Chinese people are more warlike than their neighbours, but simply that neither in 1954 nor 1962 had either side established such mastery 23 Both Vietnamese sides are expected to cheat on the ceasefire agreement signed in Paris yesterday. The North has even codified methods in a party directive. If President Thieu is to win a real future for South Vietnam, he will have to fight for it, reports r,-.07-^0-111(77, nriri r"\ nr\nr?vr?Th IL \I on the battlefield as would entitle it to dictate the absolute terms of the peace. "Peace with honour" provides the Americans with the opportunity to.with- draw in good order from the war as the French withdrew before them. It also provides South Vietnam with some sort of chance to survive. How much depends on a num,ber of factors, includ- ing the capacity and intentions of the North Vietnamese, the ability of Presi- dent Thieu to hold the South together once the reassuring weight of American support has been withdrawn, and what happens in those often forgotten theatres of war, Laos and Cambodia. In the view of one of the closest students of North Vietnam, 1972 was a year of immense strain there, with new pressures developing and old ones, worsening in virtually every sector of, its society. The Easter offensive, with its massive demands on manpower and material, failed to deliver decisive victory, and the resumption of American bombing raids and mining of Northern ports and rivers caused great economic distress. Heavily reduced imports added to the already heavy burdens of life in the cities and towns. Agriculture suf- fered from chronic manpower shortages and past errors in the allocation of, resources. ? ' There were pressures from Peking and Moscow to end the war by negotia- tion, and strong divisions in the Polit-' bur? and among party members about whether to continue the war or to embark on bold new strategical gambles. It would no doubt be comforting to read into this the notion that North Vietnam was beginning to crumble. There is no evidence on which to base such an assumption, but much to suggest that a protracted war 'was becoming unduly protracted. 'And so we come to the Easter offen- sive. This abandonment of the Maoiat principles of revolutionary war and the:, refined techniques devised by the late General Nguyen Chi Thanh of operations by big units, small units and guerrillas working in conjunction was caused both by Hanoi's need to accelerate the pace and its legitimate fears that Vietnamisa- tion and pacification were threatening? the entire cadre and indigenous Viet Cong network in the South. Without doubt Hanoi hoped to cap- ture Hue and at least to reach Saigon, but as usual its targets were political rather than military. Political power, it ?continued to believe, grew out of the barrel of a gun. ? ? According to this view every military victory would be a political gain, a bonus, but the primary intention of the offensive was to put North Vietnam's battle corps into South Vietnam and then to talk peace. Junior party cadres learned of this decision only in September, when ?C.O.S.V.N:, or the Central Office for South Vietnam, through which Hanoi has run the war, issued Directive Six, which instructed that "cadres and party members must be made to realise that the party's resolution to launch a general offensive to end the war and to bring the South Vietnamese revolution to a new (political and peace struggle) stage is appropriate. It is sound- and timely." . This did not in any way imply retreat by Hanoi. To the party leaders there the war is a guerre sacree, its goal one Vietnam under Hanoi's banner. To the achievement of this end everything in the past has been subordinated and everything will be subordinated now. Even so it cannot but suffer from the wasted years and lack of proper poli- tical organisation. I have no doubt that Thieu would win comfortably in any straight two-way political election with' the National Liberation Front, but the addition of a "uoutriiiitit" otomoot Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 ensures that the election, if it can really be organised,mill be fought out between :at least three elements, and this will inevitably diminish the non-Communist vote. , . The movement of population that will inevitably follow the ceasefire also seems likely to erode the Government's ,authority. Hundreds of thousands of refugees will insist on returning to their home areas and most of these will be in regions where the Viet Cong claims authority and where the formidable presence of the North Vietnamese Army will be a potent reminder that it pays to be with "the strength." Both sides may be expected to "cheat." C.O.S.V.N. Directive Six says, "Although the war will stop with the ceasefire and the big guns will fall silent, the small guns will 'remain in action and such activities as tyrant; elimination, abduction and assassina- . , tion will continue under various dis- guises." Secret armed forces, partly Northern and partly Viet Cong, have been established for the purpose. The South has been aware of this since the end of September, and its own arrange- ments have been made accordingly. International supervisory teams can- not hope to police the ceasefire agree- ment. That there will now be 1,160 men instead of the 250 demanded by North Vietnam means that the Corn- mission will learn more about the Violations, especially if it is allowed to move with freedom in both Communist , and non-Communist areas, but it has no enforcement powers. It will be able to do no more than to note with regret. In fact, .if the Laotian .experience of a three-power Control Commission counts for anything, the Canadian, Indonesian, Hungarian and Polish observers might aS well stay at home. Perhaps, as the Canadians suggest, publication of violations might bring world opinion to bear against the offenders, but that is scarcely a basis for hoping to preserve the peace. , Most of these considerations are for the short term, and this is not the period in which the Government, of . _ . South 'Vietnam has most cause for concern.) The long term is what will matter?and the long-term outlook is scarcely 1,hopeful. . The agreement provided that both National Liberation Front and Govern- ment forces should be reduced and troops progressively demobilised. Since all theretically indigenous Viet Cong units in the South have now been padded out with up to 80 per cent. of North Vietnamese recruits, the Govern- ment filces the unhappy prospect of seeing s bine Northerners demobilised in the Smith and sent not to the North but to Sknithern villages to reinforce the local cadres. It also faces the prospect of becoming weaker militarily while North Vietnam becomes stronger. The South must begin to disarm. There is no limit to the rearmament of the Ned h. Perhaps this has been settled by ,agneement between Washington, , Moscow ,and Peking, but unless details .are made public the effect must be to undermine . the morale of non- Commtuaists. Finally, the situation in Laos and Cambodia must have a strong bearing on South Vietnam's future. Since the beginning of the war and even long before it began, the struggle for South Vietnanx? Laos and Cambodia has been one amPindivisible. Ho Chi Minh never botherea to conceal this. As long ago as 19304 when he created the Com- munist rplarty of Indo-China, he rejected the suggestion it should be simply an ' Annarnite party and insisted it should embrace not only Tonkin, Annam and Cochin China, three component states of Vietnam, but also Laos and Cambodia. One of his first acts after seizing power in Hanoi in 1945 was to send Prince Souphanouvong, whose Vietna- mese wife worked as his secretary, and 10 'of his officers to Vientiane to lead the resistance to the French in Laos. Though Ho dissolved the Com- munist 'party of Indo-China as a poli- tical expediency in 1946, links with Laos were maintained, first through the National; United Front of Vietnam, Laos arid Cambodia under the leader- ship of his successor, Ton Duc Thang, and subsequently through the recreated Laodong (Communist) party, whose members include key figures in the Pathet Lho movement in Laos. From the outset, in the Pathet Lao the controlling authority of the Vietminh was clearly set out and understood. A Vietminh invasion of Northern Laos by two regular North Vietnamese established the " Government " of Prince Souphanouvong in the two northern provinces of Phuong Saly and, Sam Neua in 1952. A second invasion in 1953 and 1954 dissipated French reserves before the decisive battle for Dien Bien Phu, and a third invasion in 1959 marked the beginning of the second Indo-China war. Having decided to ,seize South Viet- nam by force of arms, Hanoi saw the capture of the strategic Plain of Jars in Laos as essential. to the protection, of the myriad Chi Minh trails along which military supplies and later troops were to be sent to feed the war effort. As the South Vietnamese discovered when they attempted to cut the trail at Tchepone in February, 1971, the North Vietnamese attached the highest priority to the defence of their Laotian positions. With heavy American air. cover, South Vietnamese forces reached Tche- pone on February 8. On March 25 they fell back over the border with heavy losses. If anyone had doubted it in the past, it was now clear that Laos ,was essential to the North Vietnamese in South Vietnam. Initially Cambodia was of peri- pheral importance. During the first Indo-China war the principal Vietminh actions were confined to Tonkin and the Central Annamite Chain. Cambodia and Cochin China were too remote from sources of supply in China. When Hanoi began to build up its strength in South Vietnam for the 1968 Tet offensive, however, a helpful Cam- bodia had become as important to the successful implementation of General Vo Nguyen Gia.p's plans as a secure cm,- ridor in Eastern Laos. The Ho Chi Minh trail could not carry all the sup- plies needed for the offensive. ' By agreement with Prince Norodom Sihanouk, North Vietnamese forces which had already been given sanctuary rights in Cambodia now received sub- stantial shipments of arms through the port of Silianoukville. Cambodian army trucks ran supplies from Sihanoukville to Phnom Penh where they were taken over by a Chinese trucking firm. The Chinese trucks, operated by a man named Hak Ly, ran the supplies south along the Bassac River end across the Mekong River ferries at points close to the Vietnam border, and delivered them direct to the North 21 rt NNORTH %.? VIETNAIVI HANOI ? 0 \ DEMILITARISED ZONE .r C AMB 0 IA KOMPON PHNomni4 G ? P Bassac R.+ 2;.? 1 1n-"1"1\IAK ?lif a . FEAUNK6; SIHANORVILLEJ Miles 20r" 'Vietnamese bases. Every night lines ' of trucks waited at ferries on their way , to the border areas east of the Mekong River. "Sometimes up to sixty trucks a night crossed the river here,' the chief of the Gendarmerie post at Neak Leung told me. "Not always sixty," said a, major who commanded an infantry battalion on the opposite bank. "But sometimes." At Kompong Chant a British resident had seen up to twenty of the Hak Ly trucks waiting for their turn to use the ferry. "A hundred trucks were going out at a time with rice for Charlie," said Eu Ly In, at that time chairman of the Economic Committee of the National Assembly. "Fifty trucks at a time made ; the military run." I No country has ever been less pre- . pared for war than Cambcdia was when? the North Vietnamese struck. I saw children in uniform covering banana fronds with earth in the hope of getting some protection not from the heat but from the North Vietnamese mortars. At Kompong Charm the populace used park benches as barricades to block the road. Outside Phnom Penh they relied on earthenware jars filled With stones. In those days the Khmer Rouges. counted for little. North Vietnamese did the job. Today things are very different. Forty thousand newly trained and blooded Khmer Rouges are capable, not only of going it alone but also prob- ably of taking over the country by . themselves now that the Government is denied outside support. In Laos the situation is not much better. General Vang Pao and his guer- rillas, a couple of battalions of Thai artillery and the American Central Intelligence Agency have helped to maintain some sort of balance at least in areas not regarded by Hanoi as too sensitive. "What do you hope of the Amen- Approved For Release 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 WASHINGTON STAPproved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 31 january 1973 CARL T. ROWAN Ws No Time With the fighting stopped and American GIs and pris- oners coming home, Ameri- cans will rejoice for a long time about the diplomatic achievements regarding Viet- nam. And well they should. The Nixon administration has squeezed out of Hanoi just about the best agreement possible, given the obvious reality that the American public long ago lost the will to wage that war. But there are two dangers that we ought to avoid: 1. While the joy and euphor- ia last, we might be foolish enough to take seriously all the 'peace with honor" tallk and the other rhetoric that is little more than sugar- coating to make the Alfieri- can public think a bitter pill is a lemon drop. 2. When the happiness and giddiness fade, a lot of people will start asking what ?we really got for over 45,000 dead, 300,000 wounded and $150 billion washed away in the swamps and paddies. There could be a foolish orgy of recriminations. We can avoid both these pitfalls if we simply remem- ber that for at least 28 years NO top American official has always been right, or meant everything he said, about Vietnam. There is no reason to assume that anything has changed yet. It was in February 1945 that Franklin D. Roosevelt told Joseph Stalin that "the Indochinese are people of small stature ... and are not warlike." From that gem of American sagacity, things went steadily downhill. Five years later Philip C. Jessup, a U.S. ambassador- at-large, declared that "Ho Chi Minh is a Communist agent trained in Moscow ... He is not representative of r:e7rt ir:25efievEllui the Verb sit the nationalistic aspirations of Vietnam." With that made perfectly clear, it surely was not strange that John Foster Dul- les would say, in December 1953, that the Vietnam war "might be successfully con- cluded in the next calendar year." But, during that calendar year, 1954, a new generation of American voices w a s heard. In April, Sen. John F. Ken- nedy, D-Mass., asserted that "no amount of American mil- itary assistance in Indochina can conquer an enemy which is everywhere and nowhere, 'an enemy of the people' which has the sympathy and covert support of the people." Ten days later Vice Pres- ident Richard M. Nixon would say: "There is no rea- son why the French forces should not remain in Indo- china and win. They have greater manpower, and a tremendous advantage over their adversaries, particular- ly air power." Less than a month later the Vietminh clobbered the French at Dienbienphu. A few years later Kennedy, as president, was committing at least 16,000 U.S. troops plus "military advisers" to South Vietnam. And on Feb. 18, 1962, his brother Robert was in Saigon saying: "We are going to win in Vietnam. We will remain here until we do win." If FDR thought the Viet- namese were small of stature and "not warlike," President Lyndon Johnson and his ad- visers seemed to think they were small of heart. Secre- tary of State Dean Rusk believed that if the U.S. "bloodied their noses" the North Vietnamese would "leave their neighbors alone." And there was Johnson himself in 1996 saying that "a cans if they pull out?" I asked a leading Laotian Cabinet Minister not long ago. "If they take everything else, I hope they leave the C.I.A.," he replied. With the departure of the C.I.A. and the Thais there will not be much left. It would take half a million men to police the ceasefire here. In effect we may expect to see Laos and Cambodia become outer provinces of North Viet- nam, and with no bombers to interdict use of the Ho Chi Minh trail South Vietnam will be outflanked and vulner- able not only militarily if the North Vietnamese decide to " cheat " but also politically whether they cheat or not. Peace now is an extension of the war and further war will, if necessary, be an extension of the peace. It is not yet game, set and match for Hanoi, but it is scarcely "peace with honour" for South Vietnam either. 0 0 Communist takeover is no longer just improbable ... it is impossible." And Nixon saying a year later that "the defeat of the Communist forces in South Vietnam is inevitable." And the U.S. commander in Vietnam, Gen. William Westmoreland, say- ing still a year later that "the enemy has been defeated at every turn." Well, it has taken the enemy five years to wake up to his defeat. In fact, the silly fel- low is crying, "Victory, vic- tory," as he waves his peace papers. The horrible truth is that neither the U.S. nor Hanoi has "won" yet; the war is far from over insofar as the contest for control of South Vietnam is concerned. But in case you're inclined to rely too heavily on the rosy rhet- oric emanating from the White House, here is a samp- ling of Nixon's previous track record: Jan. 26, 1965?"We are los- Ing the war in Vietnam." 22 Sept. 12, 1965?"It will take! two or three more years of: intensive activity to win mili- tary victory over the Viet- , Cong." April 17, 1967?"The defeat of the Communist forces in South Vietnam is inevitable.; The only question is, how soon?" It was two decades ago, in Hanoi of all places, that Nix- on said, "It is impossible to. lay down arms until victory is completely won." All of which proves that, in arranging the present ? cease-fire, Nixon knows that it is sometimes right to be wrong. Certainly enough of us Americans have been wrong, about those "small ... not: warlike" Vietnamese for us to tolerate a little more hy- perbole, excuse a few more ? mistakes by others?and most - decidedly to believe only a little bit of what we see and. damned near nothing of what we hear. NEW YORK TIMES 24 January 1973 Strike by Pilots for the C.I.A. In Loos Is Reportedly Averted Special to The New York Times VIENTIANE, Laos, Jan. 23? A strike by airline pilots in Laos that would have severely impaired support of anti-Corn- mun,ist forces fighting there has apparently beer averted. The dispute involves Air America, a quasimilitary airline used by the United States Central Intelligence Agency, in Laos to supply irregular troops, many of whom depend on parachuted or airlifted supplies. A company spokesman said tonight that the pilots involved in Laotian eperations had been ordered by their union or- ganizer to call off the walkout, that had been scheduled to begin tonight at midnight. -The dispute apparently re- mained unsettled, but the local chapter of the Airline Pilots Association reportedly decided against a walkout at this time. The spokesman said he did not know whether the strike would go into effect in the other area's of Asia where Air America operates,. such as Taiwan, Japan, Thailand, Oki- nawa and South Vietnam. In Laos, Air America oper- ates 31 planes and 35 helicop- ters. It has 112 pilots stationed here, nearly all of them Ameri- can citizens under contradt to the company. The pilots are seeking higher salaries and other benefits. The airline ? also has six planes based at the nearby Udon Thani base in Thailand, including two C-130 transports, that are sometimes used in Laotian operations. The United States 'withdrew direct military air and advisory support from Laos after the Geneva agreement of 1962, which theoretically ended the war here and neutralized the country. But as the war expanded. the C.I.A. took over many of the functions normally assigned to military units, ,including, in some cases, the direct com- mand of Laotian irregular units. Laos is sparsely populated, mountainous, and has few roads or navigable waterways.. Dur- ing the fighting in, the interior, especially near the Plaine des Jarres and toward 'the North Vietnamese frontier, units can be supplied only by air. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 s CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 19 January 1973 THE ECONOMIST JANUARY 27, ?973 Men against. machines ST OUR OEFENCE CORRESPONDENT Vietnam has been a war of profligates. The North Vietnamese have been prodigal in the use of men, the Americahs in the use of machines. General Giap flung troops away at Dak To in the autumn of 1967, at Saigon and Hue in the Tet offensive ,in 1968 and; once again, in the attacks around' Quang Tri last spring. He bled ? the youth of his country white and destroyed 'many of the , Vietcong cadres as well. The 'Americans always sought to keep their own casualties low (though they did not always succeed in this) even when they had as many as 500,000 troops in South Vietnam, as they did in 1968 when General WestMoreland asked for more. He did not get them. By that time the Americans were , firmly hooked on? a doctrine' of their i own choice and . making. ?To save American lives, they had come to rely on massive ' tactical 'concentrations of firepower. Often' these i concentrations of fire took the form of heavy, sus- tained bombing attacks from the air, sometimes of artillery barrages and occasionally of 'sudden raids 'by helicopter-borne troops.' : ' President Nixon brought the soldiers home but the bombers carried on., Throughout the war,_ the popular impression Was that the key factor was the use of air power. And so it was. Air supremacy of a kind so 'total not pen the Israelis would dare dream of it gave. the Americans an, ability to concentrate their fire i practically where they liked when they liked. But , however much they bombed Indochina the Americans failed to knoCk the ? North Vietnamese out of the war. Decisive success through the use of , machines eluded them just as it elucled . General Giap through ,the use Of men. What air power failed,' to I do in Vietnam was to destroy the guerriflas! ?as long as they operated iri small, , dispersed bands, emerging briefly, imt of hiding to spring ari' a.mbtith,,.: to intimidate a vilhge or to lauli:di .ii mortar or rocket attack. il,itral giO?ri; rilla operations, phase two of i.:enetal. Giap's concept of revolutionai f Vilin? fare, could not, it was distove ?ed,`be defeated by attack's from tic air. Bombs save the blood of itlio!;e who drop them ; but they da not, I.;,eat guerrillas. Similarly, raids!, by . hell,- copter-bOrne troops had Only ? a, temporary effect. They droye-' the, guerrillas deeper :into cover. But, once the helicopters and their ski, FavallY, had been withdrawn, the Iguerrilias! were soon at work again.. .,, What the bombing attacks' did achieve however, was, first; to impose a persistent strain on North Vietnath's . primitive industrial tconomY and, : second, to impede but never t.4 check ' completely the flow of reinfordements A Eiwar group FON, Tr roge r.f Vial peace canes ii By Trudy Rubin Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor Boston While U.S. antiwar activists, skeptical about the prospects of a cease-fire, continue with plans for counter-inaugural demonstra- tions this weekend, in the capital, they are also beginning to plan what they will do if such an agreement is signed. Discussions have centered on ways of pressuring Congress to ensure that the United States does not "break the peace"; publicizing any continuing U.S. presence in Indo-China; pressing for release of political prisoners in Saigon jails; and broadening current campaigns to replace bomb-de- stroyed facilities like the Bach Mai hospital In Hanoi into full-scale American reconstruc- tion brigades, a postwar idea which activists say has the approval of Hanoi. Spokesmen for all of the various antiwar organizations remain skeptical about the reality of a cease-fire. "For many years there has been such a desire for war to end that people have prematurely tried to believe ' it," says Tom Hayden, a founder of Students for a Democratic Society in 1962 and co- founder with actress Jane Fonda of a new antiwar group, the Indo-China Peace Cam- paign. The IPC is working on educational programs on Indo-China in nine industrial states and on encouraging local pressures on Congress to end the war. But should the cease-fire be genuine, Mr. Hayden believes the way in which the war ends "will determine the future of radi- calism. How the Korean war was ended determined the '50's. If the war ends with the peace movement in jail and disintegrated and Vietnam in ashes, that's one thing. But if It is ended with the conscious participation of the American people, that will cause a tremendous upsurge of hope." Mr. Hayden's group, echoing themes brought up by other activists, hopes to publicize "the role the U.S. continues to play" In Indo-China. This includes, according" to Mr. Hayden, "working on getting congres- sional hearings on the thousands of political prisoners in South Vietnam." The IPC also hopes to focus on reconstruc- tion in Vietnam, and how the funds provided for North Vietnam in the original draft peace agreement are administered. It and other groups would like to broaden the Bach Mai efforts into "more general reconstruction brigades," according to Ira Arlook, a Boston organizer of the IPC. "This would be important in trying to build ' ties between individuals in this country and North Vietnam," he says, "and it would make it harder for the government to reestablish hostilities." Representatiqs of Medical Aid for Indo-China, the group spon- soring the Bach Mai appeal, say the North Vietnamese have expressed interestAn this idea, but only after hostilities have ceased. The focus on Congress may take other tacks as well, Prof. Sidney Peck, coordinator of the People's Coalition for Po.ace and Justice, one of the two co-sponsors ts." Satur- day's counter-inaugural march, says o ctiv- ists will try to push Congress to marain some kind of watchdog committee to obSe..,-1 the administration of cease-fire agreements.'. He adds that activists will try to get such a committee of their own, composed of promi- nent Americans "like Telford Taylor or Ramsey Clark." Dr. Peck says also that he would like to see activists move "on the whole issue of war crimes. The (Sen. Edward M.) Kennedy subcommittee ori refugees should get out the data theY have on war crimes ,:ommitted by the United States."' Antiwar leaders, just beginning to think through post-cease-fire plans, admit are uncertain about forms of future protestt; public response. "Obviously there will be greater difficulty in maintaining sustained interest in Indo- China after a cease-fire, just as there was after the draft ended and large troop with- drawals went on," says Dr. Peck. But he adds, "We feel there is a mood about this war which runs very deep. Any event which challenges the administration's credibility in seeking peace will arouse a response." This skepticism was echoed by most an- tiwar leaders who insisted that a renewal of the war might yet once again call forth protests. "We think there's not going to be a moment of stability in South Vietnam, even if, an agreement is signed," said Jerry Gordon, coordinator of the National Peace Action Coalition which has staged the biggest mass marches in the capital and is co-sponsoring the current one. "The U.S. Government has repeatedly said it will go back in if it thinks there has been a violation of the treaty. People won't be inclined to go out in the streets after a cease- fire, but then, things could blow up at any time." and supplies to the south. Ind 0d, the and the Quang 'Fri offensives an out build-up of forces the North Viet.; of ? steam. Moreover, it was ex. c tly at namese were' able' to achieve both in the point where the North 'Vic namese 1968 and 1972 'was impressi c. But 'the effects of .the bombing rai s were sufficient to ensure that any major assaults by the North Vie namese .against troops . or Cities 'in South !Vietnam . were comparatively short- lived. The initial punch was she, 'but . the North Vietnamese lack $d the 'logistic breath .to . keep the fight gOing for very long: ? . After a fair beginning, both he Tet 23 grouped their forces together at ?mitted them to open siege or the third anti decisive phase of Giap's concept ,of war,' that b d con4! battle,' ;eneral mibing attacks by the Americans ,wcre tactict ?ally : most effective. Because theI Amer, 'leans ruled the skies, QcneraI ; Gap' .could . not repeat his ;1954 success against the French : at Dien Bin Phu and snatch victory !? :',fron the r America ns. I The use of air nowcr in Virtikarn liaS ApprovedFiarReleas-e 2001108/077-M-RDP77-004-32R0001-00080001-8 TIMES Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 NEW YOliIC 27 January 1973, For- the Vietnamese, No Cessation of Pain] ? By MALCOLM W. BROWNE Special to the New York Times ? SAIGON, South Vietnam? ince of Kien Hoa, and her 35- year-old daughter-in-law, a slightly built woman named For most of the people of South Lang. Vietnam the end' of the war?if, Abroad, people receive news it is the end of their war?is, reports on the ending of war coming far too late for rejoicing. in Indochina, but neither Mrs.' ! Few Vietnamese can even re- T. nor Lang took any interest call without a kw moments' reflection when the war began. Most have spent the largest part of their lives at war. For many Vietnamese the three decades of strife have worn away, the old passions of nationalism, political hatred, revenge and even sorrow. There remains only a feeling of numb resignation . to whatever, the future may bring and a strong urge to escape into the tradi- tional Vietnamese diversions of chess, gambling with cards and drinking baxide, a powerful rice liquor. With probably around a mil- lion Vietnamese killed just in the time since 1959,?when war began anew, there is scarcely a family that has. not lost at least one member. Many more have 'been Injured or. maimed: Nor will the killing and maiming cease with the end of hostilities. .Despite the passing of a generation, farmers are still killed on Okinawa and . , secure. Vietnam had a wealth of other battlegrounds of World food and has a warm climate, War II by old mines and bombs. so that in the old days at least Vietnam has been seeded with it was spared the suffering that , far more of these lethal lega- has afflicted much of the rest cies than any other land. of Asia. The shock of change, which has been continuing ever since, 'first hit Mrs. T., along with mil- lions of other Vietnamese, when the Japanese arrived at the be- ginning of World War II. "The real surprise," an old Vietnamese said, "was not so much that a .foreign army was invading us but that it was systematically locking up the French authorities who many of us had taken for granted would be the masters of Vietnam for- ever." In North Vietnam the Japa- in such things. When they are not busy preparing meals on a kerosene stove for the many children living with them, they pass the time in silence, gam- bling with the tiny cards, marked with lacquered Chinese characters, that are universally used in Vietnam. The big occasions of the year, even the normally joyous sea- son of Tet, the lunar New Year, are mostly associated now with rites that must be performed at the cemeteries where their men are buried. It is the same for most of the other families in the crowded middle-class Saigon neighbor- hood of Tan Dinh, where, Mrs. T. lives. ! In common with many older Vietnamese, she looks back with warm nostalgia to the days of the French colony be- fore World War II. There were political stirrings in the nine- teen-thirties. But they had lit- tle. impact on the lives of. most Vietnamese. The rigid patterns of tradi- tional family life kept existence for most people unexciting but The main victims of the war have been men, and in many ways SoUth Vietnam now seems to be a 'nation , dominat- ed by hard-minded, lonely and sometimes ;bitter .women, for whom idealism ? and even per- sonal feeling appear to have been largely extinguished.. Two such women,' both war widows,' are Mrs. T., a 64-Year- old former teacher originally from the Mekong Delta prov- been decisive, but in a nego tivd, rather!, than a positive sense. It has not j)rc+1 vented the communists from running a guerrilla campaign for as long as they chose. But it has denied them the opportunity of inflicting an irrevers- ible defeat on their opponent in the open field of battle. And, unless that. happens, by General Giap's own analysis ?f revolutionary war, military victory has not 'been achieved. Long after the ceasefire, air power will go on having a potent influence on mili- tary and political calculations in Vietnam. The Americans will continue to station bombers in Thailand , and aircraft carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin. They will remind General Giap how difficult .it is to move from phase II to phase III in a "people's war" to secure a "people's victory." 24 nese occupation is remembered as harsh, although Vietnamese .have never forgotten that Japan gave Ho Chi Minh his first chance to govern. In the South the Japanese yoke was com- paratively mild. Mrs. T.'s chil- dren remember. friendly Japa- nese soldiers, sharing their lunches with them. Opening Path to Independence The important thing about the Japanese occupation, in the. eyes of many Vietnamese, was that it raised the possibility of throwing off Western colonial rule for good. While Vietnam, though under the Japanese yoke, was free of French colonial administra- tion for the first time in a cen- tury, the Vietminh came into being, with stirring songs of independence, a red flag with golden star and, incidentally, Communist ideology. Even Viet- namese officials who had spent their lives working in the French civil service were deep- ly stirred. Mrs. T.'s husband- was such an official, working as an ad- ministrator under a French province chief before the. war. Mr. T. chose not to join the Vietminh because his sus- picions had been aroused by the overbearing ways of some of the local leaders, but he.' stronglysupported the cause of independence. A family living in the house next door?a house smaller than that of the T. family?, embraced the Vietminh com- pletely. It happened that the head of this family; Mr. N., was an enemy of Mr. T. be- cause of quarrels over property boundaries, an old financial dispute and a certain amount of jealousy. Such quarrels between neigh- bors, taken for ' granted in peaceful nations, have tended to become blood feuds in Viet- nam, spurred ?to violence by civil war. After World War H the Viet- minh ruled the Mekong Delta until the French finally came back in strength to drive them underground again. Before the French returned, Mr. .T.'s hos- tile neighbor suddenly emerged as a provincial commissar, with the power of life and death. Among his first acts was to denounce Mr. T. before a ses- sion of. the provincial people's tribunal as a French stooge and spy. Vietminh soldiers arrested Mr. T., released him some weeks later and then rearrested him.. His family never saw him again and has assumed that he was among the thousands of civil servants executed by the Communists. The family?mother, two daughters and five sons? dedicated itself to the lifelong cause of destroying Com- munists, although none had a clear idea then of what Com- munism was supposed to be. The following years, parti- rularly the early nineteen- fifties, were hard for both the T. family and its enemy, the N. family, which . had, gone underground. Mrs. T. had received a modest pension from the French, paid in opium, which at the time was regarded as a much more stable medium of exchange than paper currency. Using the opium she purchased a few acres of rice land in An delta and sent several of her older children to France, where they subsequently worked their' way to college degrees. ? A Nation Polarized Mr. N., for his part, h4d, taken his sons into the under4 ground to join the growing corps of guerrillas dedicated the destruction of "foreign in perialism." - The war for independence was on, and the nation was becoming polarized, not only 'by political ideologies but' by blood debts and the hatred they ent!Pntlered. Most Vietnarnese. accepted the need to gamble their lives on a struggle to throw out the French, whose army was equipped with the latest American weapons. The first Indochina war prob- ably cost the Vietnamese peo- ple a million lives, but it ended in victory in 1954. With peace and the division of Vietnam along the 17th Parallel, the people had to decide whether to cast their futures with the Communist-led North or the anti-Communist South. In Saigon a new Government came to power under Ngo Dinh Diem, a Roman Catholic, who was installed through United States influence largely because of his strongly anti-Communist convictions. His Government became pre- dominantly Catholic in an over- whelmingly Buddhist country. Because of the new influence of Catholics?an influence that often discriminated against non-Catholics in assigning con- tracts and jobs?there was a wave of nominal conversions to Catholicism. ' I The conversions deeply split the T. family. Buddhists charged their Catholic brothers with being mercenary traitors to their faith; to this daY the family remains divided. No such division affected the N. family, which had dedicated itself to the Communist-led ap- paratus that succeeded the Vietminh in South Vietnam. Mr. N., head of the family, died of tuberculosis, but he had ex- tracted pledges from his sons and daughters to continue the fight. Among the children too young to participate in the pledge was Lang, who ended up on the other side. Some North, Some South Some of the N. family went north, to join the new Hanoi Government. Some remained in the South to join the clandes- tine organization called Mat Tran Giai Phong, or National Liberation Front. Later, when the Saigon Government came to realize the gravity of the threat posed by the front, it devised the supposedly insult-1 ing sobriquet Vietcong to de- scribe it. Under the 1954 Geneva ac- cords ending the Indochina war?both the United States and the Diem Government re- fused to sign them ? Vietnam was to be unified and to hold Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 ? Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 VIETCONG ACTIONS AGAINST CIVILIANS IN SOUTH VIETNAM (Civilians killed En or abducted since Ms. source: U.S Defense Department) 13,000- 12,000 11,000 ? 10,000 9,000 ? 8,600 7,000 ? 6,000 5,000 ? 4,000 3,000 ? 2,000 1,000 ? 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 Totals: 31,463 civilians killed, 49,000 abducted 12,000 SAIGON GOVERNMENT'S ACTIONS AGAINST CIVILIAN VIETCONG ('Those killed J, jailed Ea or induced to back Saigon aunder U.S.-supporterPhoenix program. Source: U.S. Agency for International Development) 11,000 ? 10,000 9,000 ? .13,000 7,000 ? 6,000 5,000 ? 4,000 3,000 ? 2,000 ? 1,000 ? f 0 7 1968 1969 1970 1971 (through May) Totals: 20,587 killed, 28,978 jailed and 17,717 induced to back Saigon The New York Times/Jan. 27, 1973 general elections within two years. After President Diem re- fused to participate in such elections, the second Indochina war began. Among the first moves by the Vietcong was to carry out a sweeping land-reform program in the Mekong Delta, effective- ly blocking the half-hearted re- form attempted later by the Diem Government. The land seized by National Liberation Front guerrillas included Mrs. T.'s plot, which she has never been able to visit since. De- spite that, the Saigon Govern- ment continued collecting land taxes from her on pain of crim- inal prosecution. Initially the war involved po- litical underground work on the part of the Vietcong. Members of the T. family were constant- ly being stopped at roadblocks and asked to listen to lectures or to give small donations. In the villages, the Vietcong (sometimes employed terror but ,generally sought to ingratiate themselves by being helpful with farming chores, health andi education. The guerrillas also; 'sometimes sought to protect villages against the excesses of the Saigon Government's mili- tia, which often acted like shtt- ple bandits. Meanwhile, the war began to become more noticeable as mili- tary cemeteries filled and ter- rorists' bombs exploded not only in the provincial towns but in Saigon. Great Flood of Americans Then the Americans began coming, almost imperceptibly at first.but later in a great flood. With . themcame post ex- changes, the black market, tele- vision (for the Vietnamese as well as the foreigners) hundreds of thousands of jobs, more money than anyone had known existed and the demon of rising expectations. For. the most dedicated na- tionalists, non-Communist as well as Communist, things be- gan to look too much like colo- nial times. In the cities Vietiaa- mese could no longer persuada taxi drivers to stop since the, Americans were able to pny more. There were too many "big nose" soldiers walking around with too many Vietna- mese girls. Most South Vietnamese ac- cepted the American presence, although few of them really Eked it. In 1963 the whole nation passed through the worst crisis since independence, when the non-Communist opposition to Mr. Diem's increasingly repres- sive Government suddenly co- alesced behind the leadership of a group of Buddhist monks, several of whom had commit- ted suicide by immolating themselves. In many parts of the country the Vietcong were achieving smashing victories, and it seemed that the country was dissolving. In the midst of it all, a group of generals led by Duong Van Minh united to stage a coup d'etat, overthrow- ing and murdering Mr. Diem and his brother and close ad- viser, Ngo Dinh Nhu. The unstable mix of religion and politics was in turmoil again, splitting Mrs. T.'s family into Catholic and Buddhist fac- tions. But the heaviest blow to Mrs. T. that year was the announce- ment from her favorite son that he intended to marry his child- hood ncighbor, Lang?daughter of the man who had ordered his father's death. ? Spectacular Attacks Staged By Tet in February a 1965 it seemed apparent that the Viet- cong would win in a matter of weeks. A spectacular series of Communist attacks on Feb. 7 prompted the first landing of American combat troops and the first sustained bombing cam- paign against North Vietnam. " The American presence rose to over half a million men over the next four years and North and South Vietnam were car- peted by the heaviest rain of bombs the world had ever seen. As the Vietnamese were mo- bilized, all of Mrs. T's sons were finally drafted,, most as officers because they held col- lege degrees. The loss of the civilian jobs they had held, coupled with growing families, imposed desperately heavy fi- nancial strains on all of them. For the first time in their re- cent history the Vietnamese were no longer growing enough rice to feed themselves and were 'dependent on American charity. The price of every- thing. including rice, rose rap- idly while soldier pay remained' small. On the other side of the war, the late Mr. N's family was fighting hard. His sister had lost a leg in an American air raid, but as late as July, 1972, she was still believed to be: leading a Vietcong district com- bat unit in action in the delta. Some, of Mr. N.'s sons were also active in the Vietcong, one serving as a field doctor. The new soldier-husband of their sister Lang was assigned by the Siagon Government in 1966 to fight in exactly that part of the Mekong Delta' where his brothers-in-law were on the other side. He was killed 25 ---AF3priffifed-FOY Releate-20171108/07-:-CM-L-RDP77410432R000100080001-8-- ? a few weeks after Tet. ' The conflict wore on. Presi- dent Nixon changed the U.S.. ' stance and the Americans be- gan to leave in large numbers. They will be remembered among other things, for the window they provided on the world. The military forces and civilian contractors built tens of thou- sands of miles of roads and made it possible for many Viet- namese to see their country for the first time?at least for a while. . American and Vietnamese economists decided in the late nineteen-sixties that there w4s, . too much money floatipg around in the superheated wai-- time economy. To soak somei`of . it up Saigon agreed to r ax ' the import duty on mo r- cycles. The result was a flood of Japanese-built vehicles that, have changed the social struc- , ture. . Even the peasant families of' poor soldiers could often afford the new Hondas and Yamahas, and a family too poor to afford one was subjected to a certain amount of snobbery and even ? derision. , , Those who could not afford , them took to stealing them: f The police attached little seri- ous interest to the resulting ? crime wave, devoting most of their energies to political ae- ? rests. ? Another aspect of the Arneri-' can impact was television, at *first broadcast from airplanes that circled major cities for hours at a time. It has also given the Vietnamese a broader view of the world, in addition to strong social pressure to own television sets. "Our Vietnamese women are among the greatest materialists in the world," a Saigon sociolo- gist said. "Vietnam has always had a semimatriarchal society, and now, with so many men dead or economically disabled. by being in the army, the women have all' the real power, ' and when a woman demands that her husband get a televi- sion set or Honda, he is under ' the heaviest pressure to do so. "In my opinion, this is one of the chief reasons for the in- credible amount of corruption and theft we have in Vietnam at every level of existence. We are to blame, but you Ameri- cans certainly have not helped." Now the city jobs are drying up, and the easy money has 'ceased to flow. To go on living the .South Vietnamese will have to return to the rice fields. Thenr is general agreement it will Le a traumatic experience. As for tl?e Communists, their approach it.. communities occu- ' pied since their spring offen- sive has been to confiscate most of the new American fradgets, especially the motor- cycles. In the course of the long war, 1 and particularly since 1965; the population has been turned up- side down. Since April alone, :there have been roughly a mil- lion refugees. Entire provinces. Quang Tri among them, have been stripped of population. Cities have grown to the bursting point with refugees or .people interested in making. more money than they could as Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 NEW YORK TIMES. 26 January 1973 farmers. The population of. Saigon, never exactly known, probably doubled to about three million. . Centuries of family tradition, often associated with the grave- yards of ancestors, has been shattered. At least one of the mountain tribes of the central plateau has ceased to exist as a distinct ethnic group. The Government moved its people hundreds of miles from their ?homes and forced them to con- form to the tribal patterns of another, larger group speaking ia different language. ? The dislocation of life will have such staggering effects that some political experts, be- lieve only the Communists will be able to,impose order harshly enough to rebuild the nation. Mrs. T's family, in common. with most South Vietnamese, will stay, come what may. "At this stage the Commu- nists cannot hurt us," she said. "We are just small -people: Be- sides, where else could we go?" ? Mrs.,-T. and Lang picked up their cards.' Neither has any political views about anything: any more, and the blood: feud between their families IS.: longer important. Life must go on. NEW .yoRK. TIMES ? 23 January 1973 .Saigon Draws a Blank On Truce-Talk Photo SAIGON, South Vietnam, Jan. 22 (UP1)?South Viet- namese newspapers are for- bidden by Government order. to publish the names or the pictures of North Vietnamese leaders. So today when they placed the picture of the North Viet- namese and American dele- gations meeting in Paris on- the first page, most cut the picture in half and printed, only the half showing' the Americans. Dai Dan Toe, a pro-Gov- ernment newspaper, ran the entire picture on Page 1 but -blanked out the pictures of the North Vietnamese with white ink. As a result the Americans ?seemed to be sit- ting down to the negotiating table with a collection of ghosts in while sheets. Saigon Is Over - Equipped in Planes By JOSEPH B. TREASTER SprolAl'to The New York Times SAIGON, South Vietnam, Jan. 25?Racing against the time when a cease-fire goes into effect, the United States has 'swamped the South Viet- namese Air Force with hun- dreds of warplanes it can neith- er fly nor maintain. The new planes and thou- sands of tons of supplies and equipment started flowing into South Vietnam late last year after American military officers learned that the draft cease- fire agreement stipulated that the replacement of war ma- teriel after a formal cessation of combat would be on an item-for-item basis. ' Anticipating that the final agreement would contain the same stipulation?and it does ?the United States has sent South Vietnam 350 new fighter- bombers and transport planes. Most of the new aircraft are in storage hangars, and some South Vietnamese offi- .cers say that it may take' as- long as two years to recruit and train enough pilots and ground technicians to put all of the planes into full opera- tion. Expansion Accelerated The United States had ac-, celeratcd its program to ex- pand the South Vietnamess Air Force as American troops were being rapidly sent home in 1971 and 1972. By the end of last summer the air force had reached the size that the United States had. expected it to be by 1974. The air force had 50,000 men and 1,000 to 1,200 aircraft?a combination of propeller and jet bombers, propeller and jet- assisted transports and roughly. 500 helicopters. One well-placed South Viet-? namese officer said that in or- der to handle the latest aircraft and supplies?as well as some additional planes that are ex- pected to be turned over by departing American units?the air force will need a 30 per cent increase in personnel?to about 65,000 men. The' officer said that 1,000 pilots were needed im- mediately and that several thou- sand men must. undergo basic and advanced training in main- tenance and supply-handling techniques. Most of the training is noW done in the United States It takes a minimum of 14 months for the basic jet fighter pro- gram for pilots and nine to 10 imonths to learn to fly a hell- c-opter. Technicians and me- chanics must spend nearly a year in school. There are only a couple of hundred South Vietnamese air- men training in the United IStates now. Training programs in South Vietnam are being ,stepped up, but even so, the already greatly overextended air force seems unlikely to meet its immediate manpower needs. To fill the gap, American civilian technicians have been hired by the United States Gov- ernment and groups of about 500 are believed to have been assigned to the principal bases in South Vietnam.. Some of the civilians are run- ning classes in aircraft main- tenance while others are carry- ing out complicated repairs themselves and also assem- bling the new aircraft that Ihave recently arrived. Other American civilians have been teaching Vietna- mese airmen who have expe- rience in transport plane's how to fly the larger C-130 cargo aircraft that arrived toward the end of last year. Since the late nineteen-six- ties, when the air force began growing at a spectacular rate ?in 1967 it had 16,000 men and 400 aircraft?the biggest problems for the service have been getting 'spare parts and equipment to where they 'Were !needed and keeping the planes lin flying condition. Even, with the help of the American civilians, the air force has been unable to keep up with the maintenance re- quired for its aircraft. A spot check one day this week showed that in about half of the squadrons in the air force only about 50 per cent of the planes assigned' to the unit were operational. With a few exceptions, where as many as 75 per cent of the planes were available for use, the rest of the units reported that far fewer than half their planes were operational. In one transport unit with 15 planes only two were' fit to fly. A helicopter unit with 32 planes assigned also had only two aircraft that were op- erational. Another helicopter unit with the same' number of aircraft assigned had four that could be used. In a fighter squadron of 20 planes, four were in safe working order. The standard in the United States Air Force is that at least 71 per cent of the aircraft in a Unit be ready for service. "We have just been growing too fast," one South Vietnam- 26 iese maintenance officer said. "It's just not possible for us to do as you Americans. We do not have the manpower and we lack many skills." One high-ranking American Air Force officer said that the problems confronting the South Vietnamese should not be a: surprise to anyone. "We ate really forcing upon them in a very short period, things that took us years ti): work out," he said. "For thk? South Vietnamese to have' adapted as well as they havkl has been a fantastic phenome!? non. But they've got a hell, or, a long way to go." The South Vietnamese Air Force is a volunteer service*. and generally gets better echt,:, cated men than the army. 131.4t even so the standards are much' lower than in the United States:: where enlisted mechanics must, have high school diplomas and" the pilots are college graduates. Enlisted men in the South Vida namese Air Force must have at least nine ? years of schooling: and officer candidates are re quired to have the equivalent of a high school education., With the ? exception of the: Chinook and Huey helicopters ,and the C-130 transport, the United States has- given the' South Vietnamese some of the most basic and easy-to-main- 'tamn aircraft in its inventory In the latest shipments, the South Vietnamese reportedly have received about 200 F-5! Freedom fighters and about 9,0" Cessna A-37's. Both 'are tiny, compared with the American main fighter-bomber?the FA, Phantom?or the principal So viet attack plane that the North: Vietnamese have in small num'''. bers?the MIG-21. The F-5 and the A-37 are also much slovid.' er than the F-4 and the MIG; 21, and they have no tracking', radar or other complicated'. electronic equipment. Many South Vietnamese pP'. lots complain that they hal,* been given second-rate planes; to fight with, but all acknowl-, edge that the ground crews' could not cope with the The main military reason for providing the F-5, American`, officers say, is that it was de-: signed primarily as an air-de-- fense plane. The thinking American strategists strategists is that af,;' ter a cease-fire the South Viet;.* namese would be better served with a plane that could coun-` ter an enemy attack than by one that could carry a heavier: bomb load for an offensive, strike. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 LONDON OBSERVER 28 January 1973 THE IMMEDIATE beneficiaries of ? the ceasefire in Vietnam are most of ' the Vietnamese people, as well as the remaining American and other foreign soldiers directly involved in the war. A. terrible burden is lifted from Ahem all. But the end of the war and the kind of peace to which it may lead will inevitably have repercussions far be- yond the borders of Indo-China. For, ? internationally, Vietnam has become, in however confusing a way, a symbol of ideas and ideologies in conflict. The war has also been an obstacle to con- tinuing the attempts to build a more rational world system based on peace- ful co-existence in which rival ideologies and interests may 'compete without ., military conflict. , Domestically,' in the United States the war diverted thought, energy and resources away from internal problems of race, poverty and modern, urban distress. It burned up ?the .radical minority and broke the hearts of the . silent majority.' It weakened' Ameri- ca's reputation among her allies in 'Europe?but those in Asia may have .been encouraged by America's prodigal fulfilment of her commitments to Saigon.. In a world in which colonialism, '.militant Communism and Great Power .conflict-7-which provide the mixed .origins of the Vietnam conflict?were .elsewhere all apparently on the wane, the continuation of the war began to appear increasingly as a horrible night- mare. Yet because of its complex .origins the war was for long one which honest men on both sides could consider as being fought in a good cause. For .the war developed as a tragic conflict between two right ideas, which local conditions and the timing of history turned into half-truths. On the one side was. a Vietnamese struggle to free their land of foreign ,.control, perhaps the most heroic episode in the great twentieth-century revolu- tion against colonialism and imperial- ism. On the other side was the resolve , of the US to apply another great' twentieth-century lesson : that the prevention of world war depends on the readiness of nations to organise and operate' collective security against aggression. It was the failure to do just this in the twenties and thirties, first in Manchuria, then Abyssinia, the Rhineland, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Albania, that led directly to the colossal tragedy of the Second World War. This was the principle that the US applied in placing obstacles to further Soviet advance in Europe; they applied it ? Successfully in Korea; they believed they were applying in Vietnam.. What turned sound principles into shaky half-truths in Vietnam was the - accidental confusion of nationalism'. and anti-imperialism with Communism ? in this case. The main leadership of ? the Vietnamese independence struggle against the French was Cornmithist.' , 'This not only split the' Vietnamese nationalist movement along ideological lines. It also later encouraged 'the' ' . US to identify the Vietnamese Communist - nationalists with , .what most European and Asian States-saw as an expanding ? militarist ment directed from Moscow. , This ? movement had been held at bay half- way across Europe, with notable diffi- culty 'at Berlin. It had already shown in Korea that it was prepared for war where it thought it could win,- just as in Hungary and Czechoslovakia it was ? to demonstrate its readiness to crush ?any nationalist revolution in its own . imperial orbit, by force where neces- sary.. . So, ..eventually, the. Vietnam war, con- tained three elements: a drive' for national liberation from foreign con- trol; a conflict between the Vietnamese ? themselves about the kind of regime they wanted; and the American pursuit of the Korea-like aim Of holding the frontier of a threatened State (South Vietnam) against aggression (the North Vietnamese troops sent into the South to help the 'Vietcong being regarded as aggressors). Any peace settlement 'thus had to fulfil three conditions. It had to lead' to the withdrawal of foreign troops. It had to produce some agreement among the people of South Vietnam, divided . between Communists, anti-Communists and those in between, about what kind of regime they would live under?even if they could only agree on different areas coming under different regimes, so that South Vietnam was for a time a motley confusion with two Govern- ' ments. It had finally to promote nego- tiations between North and South Viet- nam, even though' the North wants a .united Vietnam and the bon- Communists in the South do not. The framework for this kind of prolonged Vietnamese argument had to' be the neutrality of all the Indo-China Stptes, which means a commitment of non- interference by the Great Powers. The ceasefire agreement signed 'yesterday, settles at least' one point. The American troops and bases will be withdrawn, and for the first time for over a century Vietnam will be without foreign forces'. 'There is agreement on non-interference in Vietnam's internal affairs. . The proposed international conference, to be held within the next month, will presumably endorse the principle of a neutral Indo-China. The very first article of the ceasefire docu- 27 ment. , proclaims ' the principle of a united Vietnam, and later articles pro- vide fOr reunification to be negotiated between North and South by stages. ? But all this really turns on the ability of the rival parties within South Vietnam , to work out ? some kind of political arrangement between :them- - selves. Here?is the hard core pf the problem. The prospects are notivight and the temptations to resort :tb arms :again Will be greai., For as Le Ltini Tho, ,?the North Vietnam.?.3e negotiatOr, said, ?it cannot be denied ti', there now exist in South Vietnam administra- tions, two armies, two of control ? and three political forces.. ? settle- ment will depend' now' on thL,'\''ility of these Vietnamese factions to a way of living together. The forces of the chief rivals are roughb similar. ,This could incite them to re- sort to more .fighting or it' could deter them from doing so. One new factor which might encourage them not to fight immediately is that all the major Powers closely concerned?America, Russia and China?clearly want peace. What lessons can , be learned from. the Vietnam tragedy ? , This will be argued for years. One as. certainly, the importance of appreciating the ten- acious fOrce of national liberation movements. Another may be the grow- ing diversity of. Communist ? move- ments. There will be other opportuni- ties for repeating?or avoiding?the mistaken analysis of Vietnam. There are already other, national liberaiion movements, fighting or preparing fight, for instance in Southern Africa. And it is more than likely that Com- munists of one sort or other will be involved in their leadership. They may also turn to Russia and China for help. What should we do? Certainly not repeat the same mistake. . But another and equally important conclusion must be drawn. America's mistake in Vietnam does not invalidate the vital principle that countries invaded by their neighbours should be assured of international help. The more certain it can be made that such help will be instantly forthcoming, the less likely is it that recognised frontiers will be crossed. Successive American .Presi- dents thought that in Vietnam they were upholding this basic principle of world order. The United States has now withdrawn from the disastrous conse- quences of making a political misjudg- ment. It would be an even greater disaster if the US were now to con- clude that the principle itself was fool- ish. For without American active participation there can be no solution to the greatest political problem of all: how to build an effective system for peace. -Approved-For-Release-2O01/08/07 : C-FA-RDP77-00432R000100080004-8- - DAI LT; : TELLuR4H Londoli 26 January.3.9pr0ved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 CLARE HOLLINGWORTII reports from Saigon grim post-cease-fire problems, administrative rptiE Cease-fire due to begin early I. next Sunday morning through- out North and -South Vietnam . may provide the respite which- is. essential to enable these war- weary countries to negotiate a lasting ,peace. But the .omens ate. not auspicious, and, according to local tradition throughout Eastern Asia, the year which opens at Tet, (Feb. 3)* passes in the mood of its beginning. The mood nere now is generally one of bitterness and pessimism in which few people believe that the peace 'will endure for more than a year or two at ,rilOSti. Fifteen North Vietnamese and two Viet Cong Communist divisions could ?physically .stay within. South Vietnam. It is, however, certain. that Gen. Giap, the North Vietna- mese Minister of Defence, will need to bring some troops home for militar.V reasons?the morale. of the population?as well, as to assist with the work of reconstruction ,- Yet it is reasonable. to assume that the. majority, say ...areund. 80,000 soldiers from the North,' will. be deployed indefinitely in the South: And the long-term 'objectives of this force will be not only to re- unite Vietnam but to _establish a Communist regime throughout the. country. During the next 24 .hours these " main " North Vietnamese forces are expected to make attempts to improve their positions and extend ? their terrain. tut when the cease- fire comes Into. force it will be observed, except on the village and hamlet level where old political and military scores are likely to be paid , off during the 60,day period while .the Americans and the two Korean divisions- are withdrawn and prisoners of .war .returned. Unwelcome to both.. But the workings of the: "two- party joint 'Military Commission" described in the agreement On end- ing the. war are unlikely, to be smooth. According to one general. it would be. like trying to ? arrange for the administration of the Mid- lands from .London all the motor- ways were open .during daylight. but subjected to harassment from villages on either side .which were frequently in enemy hands and' supported from large enemy bases in the Welsh mountains, Malvern Hills and 'the ANorfolk_:Broads. Further, the four-party Joint Military International. Commission. of ?control and supervision of the cease-fire, composed of 1,160' Canadians, Poles, Indonesians and Hungarians, will not be effective in the eyes of the Saigon Govern- ment and all neutral' military ex- perts. Certainly they Will be tin- - welcome on both sides: The, Control Commission \Yin be hampered by a rapidly increasing anti-foreign atmosphere in South Vietnam throughout- urban areas but especially in the Forces. Basi- cally it arises from a belief that the Americans have let them down, but 'the, antipathy has grown to include Japanese and other Asians. ObViously the Control Commis- on the and political rr -1111 ne e n6r),Ip. tna,m now: sion which was established after the 1954 Geneva conference which terminated the war between France and the Viet Minh?which is still in theory in existence?set failure as avrecedent, Saigon recognises the "South Vietnamese Provisional lievolution- ary Government," of which Mine I3inh is Foreign Secretary, only as the National Liberation Front ? just another political party in South Vietnam, President Thieu is willing to negotiate with the N L,F, which controls two well-trained divisions as well as hundreds of ,small units on a regional and. village level, for, among other major issues, the re- lease of prisoners, The Communists claim the Saigon Government is holding around 150,000 political, military, and guerrilla prisoners, but the real figure is likely to be just under 100,000. The Viet Cong hold 108 Americans and unknown nuinbers of Vietnamese. . ? In the past, President Thieu has said the. only elections. he would. allow were for a new .President. But now .his Government is willing to consider. "village" and "legis- lative" elections if 'they can be negotiated with the N L F. Al- though .few observers believe elec- tions as. envisaged in the agree- ment 'Will take place in three months, President Thieu is vigorously preparing for them; .It is not quite true that. he in-. Sias an. a one-party State for. he will, after all, be negotiating with the Communists in the N L F:. But. ho does not want to see the for- mation 'of a second non-Commu- nist party. which .?could rival his own DeMOCratiC .party. Further, ? it, is becoming. more necessary to ? join Thieu's Demo- cratic. party not onlylor men who want to s advance In Government service but for those who merely wish to . retain a modest job, in the Civil Service, Thus-, as in Com- munist and. other .semi-dictatorial countries,' the party as well as the. administration ?controls the masses and hands out the favours. In view. of the truly immense amounts of aid.' in.' cash and kind.:' which are expected here ? for reconstruction work in the, immediate future, there is -every incentive for Viet- namese to join the Democratic party. - The three milliOn Roman Cathe4 lies fear Communism. but are un- able to satisfy the requirements' demanded by the present. GoVertIA merit to form.a recognised political party. President ?Thiett is. far ITIOr0 secure in his position than he would appear from outside South Vietnam. Although he has deeply disappointed many American dip. 28 lemats arid soldiers biy turning, from the path of true democracy, he has the vital support of the. Forces, The desertion rate is hig but this is largely because me feel the war is over and they wan to go back to the paddy field There is no general or young colonel preparing for a coup d'eta The South Vietnamese officer class will be useful on internal. security duties whether or not they are transferred to the police. Outside pressure? Despite the obvious problems of maintaining a cease-fire under pre- sent military conditions in Vietnam, there are some reasons for slight optimism that a peace treaty may eventually be negotiated. The Chinese Government wants the war to end and is doubtless putting pressure on the Politburo in Hanoi; - Further, once the fighting has endelt, the Northern Communists ?other than the military units who remain in the Southwill be wholly. occupied for the next year or two in rebuilding their ruined towns and restoring the ravaged coun- tryside. Hanoi, like Saigon, expects massive economic aid?and finan- cial problems which may well cause a dramatic drop in the value of the currency (a factor' more important in capitalist Saigon than the Com- munist North). Even ? Communist children' will rebel at having their lessonsifl dug-outs when the fighting is over, and the pressure to rebuild houses, hospitals, bridges and roads will be difficult to resist. The burning question of the rival; 'South Vietnamese Governments? that of President Thieu and the N 1,F?remains the most difficult to overcome. ? Optimistic officials suggest .that the vague wording of the agree- ment, which has already been in- terpreted di.fferently by Saigon and Hanoi Radio, may provide flexibility as well as difficulties. President Thieu has demonstra- ted that he alone can lead the country to an election, He is de- termined to survive longer. Despite the American protests that they will not interfere on the ground that they are providing economic aid, the men around Thieti fear future . Washington pressure, Indeed, after a briefing at the Foreign Office here on the agreenient, those few diplomats who came out believing la a peace that will last for several years were those who. though t that, at the international conference which is envisaged, China would pressurise Hanoi arid Washington Saigon, Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 BALTIMORE SUN 30 January 1973 Intemaggcnag pawky on truce hr7q. SCOTT SULLIVAN _Paris Bureau of The Sun Paris?Among the vaguest clauses in a Vietnam cease-fire agreement shot through with intentional ambiguities is Arti- cle 19, which calls for "the convening of an international conference within 30 days of the signing of this agreement." The purposes of the confer- ence, the article says, are: "To acknowledge the signed agreements, to guarantee the ending of the war, the mainte- nance of peace in Vietnam, the respect of the Vietnamese peo- ple's fundamental national rights, and the South Vietnam- ese people's right to self-deter- mination, and to contribute to and guarantee peace in Indo- china." Conference members The agreement names the conference members as: North and South Vietnam, the Viet Cong, the United States, Brit- ain, France, the Soviet Union, China, Hungary, Poland, Can-' ada and Indonesia (the last four being members of the postwar peace-keeping com- mission) and Kurt Waldheim, secretary general of the United Nations. The conference is mentioned ?significantly, if only appar- ently in passing?in Article 18. This is the context: "Until the international con- ference ... makes definitive arrangements, the Interna- tional Commission of Control and Supervision will report to the four parties [in some in- stances, to the two South Viet- namese parties in other cases) on matters concerning the con- trol and supervision of the im- plementation of ... provisions of this agreement." Beyond these few lines, the agreement itself remains, mute. Thus, any prediction of the real weight and importance of the coming conference can be based only on the previous statements of both sides, ob- servation and inference. ? Taken extremely seriously One inference is extremely easy to draw?that the,interna- ,tional conference, and the guarantees it will produce, are taken extremely seriously by all parties to the agreement. Provisions for such a confer- ence?usually described as covering. Cambodia and Laos as well as Vietnam?appeared in virtually identical language in One peace plan after another from both sides of the bargain- ing table. g7, -Wh a teve r?. else it may have Vietnamese parties?the Sai- been, the Vietnam conflict was go a government and the Viet incontestably an arena of Cong?acting ultimately as the proxy combat between the real guarantors of the peace. U.S., on the one hand, and The international conference China and the Soviet Union, on will examine this machinery, the other. I and may revise it, creating a permanent body With interna- tional status to rule on treaty violations. Even if such a move is blocked by one or both of the South Vietnamese par- ties, the conference will at least give international sane- tions to the machinery that exists. Tentative detente Without the colossal contri- bution of arms, supplies and men provided by the super- powers to their allies or clients, neither the Saigon gov- ernment nor, the "liberation forces" could conceivably have carried on the conflict on the scale to which it ultimately developed. And, as in 1954, it would be inconceivable to expect , the conflict to die out without the agreement, implicit or explicit, of those same competing giants. No serious observer contests the theory that the chances for peace suddenly developed after President Nixon achieved . his tentative detente with Moscow and Peking, nor that the deci- sion by the two Communist ? superpowers to liquidate the mar contributed directly to the 'willingness of Hanoi and the Viet Cong to accept a less- than-victorious cease-fire. , The primary goal of the in- ternational conference -then -will be for the major world Powers, together with Britain and France, to stand up pub- licly and pledge themselves to do what they can tO avoid a new outbreak of the war on an international scale. What form those pledges will take is not now clear, but they will no doubt follow generally the lines of similar engage- ments taken by the powers in the 1954 Geneva accords which ended French colonial rule in Indochina. ? . Tighter language . American officials hope the language will be even tighter than 1954, with specific pledges to limit aid to the two Viet- nams to purely economic sup- port and to the strict replace- ment or wornout war material as outlined in the terms of the agreement. , , The second chief goal of the , conference will be to "cap" , the complicated peace-keeping machinery that already in- volves the four-nation interna- tional commission, the two- party military commission and the four-party military com- mission. Under the terms of the cease-fire agreement, these groups, in effect, report to one another, with the two South Coordinate economic aid A third objective of the con- ference, alluded to in the agreement itself, will be to mobilize and coordinate eco- nomic aid to the two halves of the country. The model for the whole af- fair is clearly the Geneva Con- ferences of 1954 and 1962, which sought to settle the af- fairs of Vietnam and Laos. But there will be some sig- nificant differences with the 1954 model?not least of all, the sincere hope that 1973 will prove more effective than its two predecessors. The coming conference will be more limited in scope. Though the agreement speaks of guaranteeing "peace in In- dochina," Le Due Tho, the chief North Vietnamese archi- tect of the cease-fire, stated categorically last Wednesday that it will deal exclusively with the Vietnam situation. American officials obviously hope that cease-fires will inter- vene in Laos and cambodia before the 30-day period for the conference's convocation 29 is up, so that the Powers .may at least take the situation in those countries into account. Vietnamese Communist off i- eials, in public as in private, have expressed considerable Skepticism on this point. The new conference is also expected to be considerably shorter than the 1954 affair, which lasted from May 8 to July 21. In 1954, it was the conference itself that worked out the peace terms after an- other long and complicatqd war. Vienna or Paris A final question mark hoveis over the conference site. Although observers had long assumed that Paris would be the city chosen for the confer- ence, as it had been for the negotiations, very high French diplomatic officials told news- men Tuesday that the parties had decided on Vienna instead. The U.S. had opposed Paris from the first, feeling that French policy leaned st me- what in favor of the Con fist side. side. North Vietnam ,,lso developed some strong z French sentiment in Decembc when President Georges Porn- pidou did not speak out pub- licly against the American bombing of Hanoi and I-Tai- phong. Since Tuesday, however, the Parisian candidacy seems' to have re-emerged. , Both Mr. 'Tho and Henry,L, Kissinger, his American nego- tiating partner, said Wedges- day that a site has not been set. Meantime, Maurice Schu- mann, the French foreign min- ister, has held meetings -With representatives of all the infer= ested parties and has reflect:: edly argued strongly the case' for the French capital. - - WASHINGTON POST 5 February, 1973 Maneuvers Hit TOKYO?Radio ' Pyon- gyang reported the North Korean government has called on the United States and South Korea to cancel their combined maneuvers scheduled off the coasts of the Korean peninsula later this month. North Korea branded the maneuvers "bellicose and i mperia lis- tic." Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000-100080001-8 - Approved For Release 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 NEW YORK TIMES 24 January 1973 -War Leaves By JAMES RESTON Special to The 'Sew York Times WASHINGTON, Jan. 23? America is moving out of Viet- nam after the longest and most divisive conflict since the War, Between the States. But Viet- nam is not moving out of America, for the impact of thej war there is likely1 to influence Amer- can life for many years to come. Though it is probably too early to distinguish between the temporary and the enduring consequences, one thing is fair- ly clear: There has been a sharp decline in respect for authority in the United States as a re- sult of the. war?a decline in respect not only for the civil authority of government but also for the moral authority of the schools, the universities, the press, the church and even the family. There was no cease-fire on this front. Vietnam did not start the challenge to authority, but it weakened respect for the ekftutives who got the nation inyolved in the war in the first place, for the Congress that let it go on for more than a decade and for the democratic process of debate, which failed to influ- ence the course of battle for years and which finally de- clined into physical combat and sporadic anarchy. " Even after a cease-fire, there will still be considerable con- tention in the country over whether the challenges to au- thority are good or bad. Many Americans have main- tained that it was precisely the dissent and the defiance that forced social reform at home and a settlement abroad. Others have argued that the war produced a whole new rev- olutionary climate in America, which encouraged the Cornmu- nists to prolong_ the conflict and disrupted the nation's unity and the. previously ? accepted attitudes, standards and re- straints in American public and private conduct. But few Amer- icans challenge the proposition that for good or bad, something has happened to American life ?something not yet understood or agreed upon, something that is different, important and probably enduring. Even at the' moment of the Vietnani compromise, for exam- ple, there was a rash of teacher strikes in several of the great cities of the nation; one-timo members of the Central Intelli- News Analysis gence Agency, some former White House ants, were confessing of them. consult- in court Deco Mark on U.S. that they had been involved in deer) involvement in Vietnam, a conspiracy to spy on the Democratic party and its lead- ers during the 1972 Presidential election canipaign; and there was a coritroversy at Madison' Square Garden over the playing of the national anthem before major sports events. . The direct costs of the war to the United States are easier to estimate than the indirect. Vietnam cost 46,000 American lives and, at a minimum, $110- billion. That does not take into account long-range obligations to veterans, which may add up to $50-billion more, nor does it include the costs of the fighting in Laos and Cambodia and the continuing military 'establish- ment in Thailand. Nor does it take into account the cost to the peoples of Indochina in dead, wounded, ,maimed and homeless, and in the destruction of their lands, which are almost beyond accu- rate calculation. Significant Imponderables The imponderables ? the changes in attitudes and as- sumptions, for example, and the decline in truthfulness and self-confidence?promised to be even more significant for the future than the financial strain. Among other things, Vietnam changed the nation's way of looking at itself and the world, reduced its willingness to get involved in distant continental land wars for ambiguous rea- sons, and envenomed the rela- tions between the political par- ties and between the president and Congress. The American people seem less confident about many things they took for granted. They are not so sure, for ex- ample, that the United States always prevails in foreign con- flicts, that big guys always lick little %guys, that money and machines are decisive in war, and that small states would rather? surrender than risk American military might. Even the two World Wars of this century did not have quite the same effect on American society. They divided Western civilization, destroyed its old empires, broke its domination over world politics, and changed the lives of Britain and Germany, but they did not challenge quite so many as- sumptions of American life as the long struggle in Vietnam. An 1937 Munich became a symbol of appeasement and the dangers of nonintervention, dangers that, in turn, encour- aged more overseas commit- ments by the United States than by any other nation. In the nineteen-seventies, on the other hand, Vietnam became a symbol of the dangers of inter- vention and led to American withdrawal and even to fears of American isolation. The tone of President John F. Kennedy's inaugural address in 1961 at the beginning of the land the tone of President !Nixon's second inaugural dur- ing the last phase of the cease- 'fire negotiations illustrate the change in the American mood and commitment. Prudent Pledge by Nixon "Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill," Mr. Kennedy ,said in his oft-quoted promise, "that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, sup- port any friend, oppose any foe, to assure the survival and the success of liberty. This much we pledge?and more." After the disappointments. and disillusions of the ensuing 12 years, President Nixon was more prudent and modest in pledging what the American people would do. "We shall do our share in de- fending peace and freedom in the world," he said. "But we shall expect others to do their share. The time has passed when America will make every other nation's conflict our own, or make every other nation's future our responsibility, or presume to tell other nations how to manage their own af- fairs." Moreover, the disillusion- ments of Vietnam not only led to a more modest estimate of what the United States could or should do to help maintain freedom and order in the world, but they also seemed to encour- age a downward reappraisal of what government could do to 'maintain the health and wel- fare of the poor at home. . Yesterday, when former Pres- ident Lyndon B. Johnson died, with the Vietnam peace agree- ment near completion in Paris, the heroic themes of his Admin- istration ? his Great Society, his war on poverty, his bills on civil rights and voting rights ?were very much in the news. But by this time the emphasis if not the direction of Ameri- can policy at home was under- going a marked change. "A person can be expected to act responsibly only if he has responsibility," President Nixon said at his gecond inau- gural. "So let us encourage in- dividuals at home and nations abroad to do more for them- selves. - Let us measure what we will do for others by what they will do for themselves." In short, after Vietnam the emphasis is not on what gov- ernment can do but on what it cannot and should not do; not on welfare but on work; not on a compassionate society but on a competitive society in which the comfortable major- ity will pay less in taxes and everyone will rely mere - on himself and less onthe Federal . . Government.. Perhaps these are Merely changes in style and rhetoric, due more, to Mr. Nixon's philosophy than . to the ex- periences of Vietnam; but par- ticularly in the field of .foreign affairs America after 'Vietnam is likely to regard the world as a much more com- plicated and diver;. place than it did in the fifties and sixties. For most of the last decade this country has been preoc- cupied with Vietnam on the assumption that the 2 per cent of Asia's population that live there were critical to the worldwide struggle between the irreconcilable forces of darkness and light. This and many other illusions have been: modified if not rejected. It was widely believed, for example, that Communism was a monolithic force working on a vast and centrally controlled strategy to change the balance of power in the world and ;threaten the vital security 4nd !commercial interests of the 'United States. ? Reshaping Foreign Poll , The Communist threat' to Greece and Turkey in the late forties, the invasion of South Korea by North Korea, ' the blare of Communist pronounce- ments and the expansion of Soviet and Chinese influence all encouraged the belief?which persisted even after the Chinese-Soviet split?that the United States was confronted by a vast conspiracy that could be turned back only by its power and countermeasures. Furthermore it was widely believed in the fifties and sixties that the system of col- lective-security alliances thatl had helped preserve and re- construct the advanced ndus- trial nations of Western Europe could be adapted to primitive societies lacking in industral and poltical tradition. Part of this popular belief was that if American commitments were not met in one place?say, Vietnam?they could be re- garded as worthless in other critical areas?say, Europe? and that if Vietnam fell other nations would fall?"like dom- inoes," as the popular saying of the day went. Even' before the cease-fire agreement drew near, Presi- dent Nixon had begun to; ques- tion those assumptions and shape foreign nelicy to the changing situation. The split between Moscow and Peking and the need in both China and the Soviet Union for surplus grain and modern technology gave him the opportunity to renew diplomatic contact with 'Peking, and, despite Vietnam,' to negotiate new agreements i with Moscow on trade and arms control. The likelihood' is that the trend toward limited coopera- tion between the maior powers will be even more marked with the final withdrawal of the United States from Vietnam. Thus the United States, the Soviet Union and China all seem to have learned sonic of the.lessons of the Vietnam war, limited their use of power and avoided a direct military con, frontation. 1 Role of Public Opinion A major question here is whether the Russians will again be tempted to assist in another "war of national lib- eration" in the belief that Viet- nam was so painful for the United States that no President of the Vietnam generation 30 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 would be tempted to intervene. The experts in Washington are divided on the question, but a majority seem to believe that for the foreseeable future Peking and Moscow will de- cide that they have more to gain by, cooperating with the United States than in risking another Confrontation. It is less clear ?that the les- sons of the war have been learned in Washington. Presi- dent Nixon has clearly reduced overseas commitments and tempered the cold-war rhetorie, but the habit of centralizing foreign-policy decisions in the White House, where so many of the Vietnam blunders were made, is persisting, as is the heavy influence of the military on foreign policy. Charles W. Yost, one of the naton's most experienced diplo- mats, observes in his book "The Conduct and Misconduct of Foreign Affairs" (Random House, 1972) that in the first three years of the Vietnam war American public opinion did not exercise either a stimulating or an inhibiting effect on United States leaders, but that Mr. Kennedy, Mr. Johnson and, at first, Mr. Nixon were so afraid of what public opinion might do if they "lost" the war that they misjudged both the prob- lem in Vietnam and attitudes at home. . ."There are many depressing examples of international con- flicts,' he writes, "in which leaders have first aroused their own people against a neighbor' and then discovered to their chagrin that even when they judged the time had come to move toward peace, they were prisoners of the popular pas- sions they had stimulated." President Nixon's argument that the United States had to keep following his policy or look like "a pitiful, ? helpless giant" is' only one of many illustrations to be found in Viet- nam policy; but the chances are that this sort of thing will not be heard again for some time. Meanwhile, Mr. Nixon. does have to deal with the conse- quences of the war at home: with .a kind of spiritual ma- laise, with the continuing op- position to his theme that the end of the war will not release additional funds for social ;reconstruction at home; with ;the resentment of policies 'reached in secret and not ex- plained to Congress or the people; with the dangers of re- turning soldiers facing unem- ployment and exhortations to be self-reliant; and with an American conscience troubled over the bloodshed and sorrow. The guess here is that it will take some time to restore the self-confidence of the pre-Viet- nam years, but it may be that the destruction of, many popu- lar misconceptions in Vietnam will produce a more mature, if sadder, nation. NEW YORK TIMES 31 January 1973 ? , . 011S irlieA. By David E. Lilienthal PRINCETON, N. J.?Perhaps for the very first time after any major war the factual and technical groundwork for an immediate start on the task of reconstruction and development has already been prepared in advance of the end of a war. In published form, the study is known as "The Postwar Development of the Republic of Viet- nam." (1970) The decision to proceed with a post- war development strategy Was ? made, in the very midst of hostilities. In, 1966, President Johnson, with the Premier of Vietnam, directed ' the writer and his calleagues of Develop- ment and Resources Corporation?an American private . company?jointly with a large group of nongovernmental Vietnamese, to spend three years pro-, paring for the day of reconstruction and development, now at hand. It was the late President's hope that this might avoid a repetition of the chaos and confusion of the postwar period. in Korea, in Europe and in Japan. The report ranges ,from fiscal policy and taxation to an over-all proposed growth pattern for the postwar eco- nomy. ? Neither the fantastic bombing since 1970 nor the use of defoliants has permanently impaired the potential of the land for the growing of crops; in a tropical country nature soon heals such scars. ' In sum, .the physical destruction and tragic human suffering since the pub- lication of the report in 1970 do not materially change the basic economic premise: that though very hard' days lie immediately ahead, in a decade or less South Vietnam can be economi- cally stable and self-supporting. The fundamental question is Whether as a people we feel a strong sense of responsibility to ourselves, a recommitment to our histbric and, I believe, unimpaired traditions of compassion to those who suffer the consequences of war, and a concern for those who suffer the wretchedness of poverty,. homelessness, sickness and despair. ? Many, specific questions for Ameri- can decision are raised by the report which I delivered to President Nixon and to President Thieu. How, much '? should nations other than the United States?,-especially Japan?contribute? Should North Vietnam be included in the design?as President Nixon has, suggested and as-I believe? Who will administer the program? Since the World Bank is under some handicaps for such, a' task, should a special reconstruction and develop- ? inent corporation be organized, on an international basis, but one free of the incredible bureaucratic inertia of the United Nations Organization? Or should the enterprise be operated by a ' Japanese-oriented Asian development bank? Or should there be created an 31 ii y s international consortium of distin- guished public-spirited private citizens? What should be the first things un- dertaken? Should it be the relief of the refugees, the immediate repair of war damage, or restoration of com- munication and mail between South and North Vietnam? The greatest single, specific op- portunity 'is development of the majestic Mekong River. Its more than 2,000-mile course flows through sev- eral nations; its source is in the mountain gorges of the People's Re- public of China. Of the hydrology 'of this great stream, the Development. and Resources Corporation's technical staff developed new knowledge and, concepts. But more than hydrology is involved: Can the Mekong be made to serve as a, unifying political mecha-. nism for gradual political and joint action in that region? But all questions are subordinate to the main one for Americans: Why? Why support reconstruction Of a part of the world that' has already cost ? us such agonies? What possible mo- tivation have we? ? I suggeSt that we participate and contribute to reconstruction and rehabilitation because we are a mbral 'and humanitarian people. I believe the American people will respond to this impulse so deeply ingrained in our his- tory' and traditions to heal, to rebuild,, to develop, after the end of this war. , I Say this even of a War about which there has been and still is such bitter division, such an outpouring of almost hysterical self-denigration of America,, such mutual_ enmity and' vilification of Americans by Americans--even of two Presidents of the Republic and some of the most dedicated public servants of our time. Before we con-. tinue mutual recrimination over Viet- nam we should be Warned by the sordid story of Civil War reconstruc- tion days, when for many years America punished and vilified and penalize fellow Americans of. the South to. the injury of the whole na- tion's values. In the great task of reconstruction that lies immediately ahead there is an opportunity to join all Americans in. a common task of mercy, creative, effort,.an opportunity not for revenge' and fault-finding of those with whom we have differed, but for reconciliation. This could serve as an example and an inspiration for the Vietnamese, North' and South. And without their recon- ciliation "the end of the, war" in which , we now rejoice might well turn out to be fragile ; and temporary, a peace that is no peace. David E. Lilienthal is chairman and: president of the Ddvelopment and Re- sources Corporation, forMerly chair-, mart of the Tennessee Valley .1uthority and of the Atomic Energy Commis- sion. -4-pro-vet:I-For Release--2001/08/0-7-1--C-K-RDP-77--00432R00010008-0001-8 WASHINGTON POST 28 JANUARY 1973 Miss FitsGerald's beak on the Vietnam war, year. ir AST WEDNESDAY Dr. Henry Kiss- inger took two hours on national television to explain the document 'known at the "Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring the Peace in Vietnam." In those two hours of explication, clarification and de- tailed textual analysis, two questions remained unasked and unanswered: Is the Vietnam war over, and if so, who has won it? The qUestions were perhaps too dan- gerous. For as Kissinger spoke, it be- came evident that the changes that he ' had negotiated between October and January had all been designed for the purpose of avoiding a U.S. commitment on the central issue of, the war. The "clarifications" he sought and obtained were in fact more per- fect ambiguities?phrases cut and polished to complete opacity. If the agreement is meant to end the war, then the great victory of the United States is to have denied all responsibility for its outcome. The' United States will have left the war' as it entered it, closing the' circle of deception around its stated aim of ,"self-determination for the Viet- namese." If the administration wants peace, It will slowly allow that phrase to become the truth. Meanwhile, it is impossible to tell what the United States will do, for the intentions of the administration remain, buried with- in the deception. In principle, at least, the Paris agreement opens up a wide and clear path to peace. The first sentence reads: "The United States and, all other countries respect the independ- ence, sovereignty, unity and terri- torial integrity of Vietnam." Subse- quent articles state that the "South Vietnamese people shall' decide them- selves the political future of South Vietnam through genuinely free and democratic general elections," and that the reunification. of Vietnam shall be carried out step by step through. peaceful negotiations between North and South. By Frances FitiGerald "Fire in the Lake," WO published last This article was written for Newsday. These sentences would seem to indi- cate that the United States had agreed to the main principles of the Geneva agreement that it refused to sign in 1954?thus repudiating two decades of U.S. policy in Vietnam and removing the major cause of the war. The ac- cords, however, do not guarantee this. According to the text, the principal signatories undertake responsibility. only for the military aspect of the settlement; the United States and North Vietnam. agree merely to cease hostilities and to implement A cease- fire in place between two nameless "South Vietnamese parties." A Brief, Fragile Truce HILE THE AGREEMENT repre- sents an advance over the at- tempt of both sides to obliterate each other, it is a truce rather than a peace.. And, as was not the case in Korea, it is a truce that by its very nature must be both fragile and short-lived. ,In strict military terms it is almost impossible to maintain a cease-fire along lines as numerous and as com- plicated as those drawn across the face of Vietnam. Then, in a war that is at base a political struggle, even .a cease-fire does not constitute a standstill, for life?like politics?con- tinues even though the killing stops. As a result, the truce in Vietnam cannot last more than ,a few months: It must end either with the renewal of hostilities or with the beginning of a political contest that, grounded in the realities of Vietnamese politics, can eventually lead to peace. The choice would seem clear enough. But it is not. For in order to maintain the deception of the U.S. role, the Nixon administration has managed to make the second path as difficult as possible for the Vietnamese. The accord it has negotiated leaves the resPonsibility for working out a po- litical settlement in the South to two parties, neither of which recognizes the existence of the other and only 32 ne of which can possibly benefit rorn it. Looked at in the abstract, the text of the accord would indicate that there are two South Vietnamese parties Of; relatively equal stature. But that is not. .the case. The "parties" differ in size; Jut more important, they do not even belong to a single class, like apples and aranges. They are qualitatively differ-, ant, like apples and theorems. One Of, *them, the PRG (Provisional Revolutioni ary Government), i a political pa.4 pith a relatively small military forcl,' even including the North Vietnamee troops, but with strong roots in tille iountryside of the South. The other Is a product of the American pacifica4n' of Vietnam, a vast military administra-'. ;ion containing most of the draft-age rnen without a political direction except the vague negative of anti-comnitinisin. Drawing all of its support from the United States, the Saigon regime has no responsibility to its own people and no coherent interest except in main- taining the flow of American aid. It occupies the country rather than gow, erns it. And since the success of this occupation depends largely on the use of its great weaponry to keep the Popu- lation concentrated in a few places and locked in a state of economic de- pendency on the United States, any reduction in the use of force must serve only to erode it?and by com- parison, at least, to strengthen the PRG. Fighting to Survive INCE THE announcement of the Li draft accord in October, the Thieu regime has done nothing but resist any language that would fall short of giving it complete sovereignty over South Vietnam. In the future it can be counted on to resist any .and all steps that would lead the country toward a permanent end to the fighting. With the- three months of grace that President Nixon allowed him, Thiett has already promulgated new laws that in effect suspend the American-style constitu- tion. of the regime and with it most of its civil liberties?including the right to buy pieces of blue cloth that might be sewn into the flag of the PRG. Saigon has made an extensive series of arrests, filling its already crowded jails with people who might be ex- pected to take an independent political, stance. Once the cease-fire is declared, its energies will be concentrated on: preventing the mass of refugees from returning to their land in the PRG- controlled zones, so long made un- livable by the bombing. Its efforts will also go into discovering, provoking or inventing cease-fire violations by the other side in an attempt to bring the United States back into the war. Unless pressured by the United States, Saigon will refuse to make any form of political agreement that gives the PRG or any other group a share of power; it will resist the demobilization' of its troops, and it will oppose every single provision for the achievement of "national reconciliation" contained in the accord. And it will do so not for 100080001- Aliproved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 mysterious Oriental reasons?not ir- rationally?but because its very survi- val depends on maintaining the state of hostility. Without that one unifying principle, the regime would burst open like a ripe fruit, releasing people of every political group from Catholics to Cao Daists to Buddhists?but mainly a mass of uncommitted people who might .provide recruits to the PRG. No Quick Takeover rflHE PRG CAN BE expected to take 11- the opposite stance for similarly actical reasons. Its line?already an- nounced to the Vietnamese?is that it favors reconciliation and concord, that it has worked for peace (alongside North Vietnam) while the Thieu gov- ernment has resisted it. In the next three months it will certainly press for a restitution of all those freedoms spelled out in the accord, most particu- larly freedom of movement from zone to. zone and freedom for political pris- oners (the vast majority of whom are held by the Saigon regime). It will press for demobilization and the hold- of elections within the framework of a Council of National Reconciliation and Concord. Contrary to the fears expressed by U.S. officials, both the PRG and Hanoi will do their best to prevent truce vio- lations by their own forces. In fact, since the United States can blame any truce violation on them in the expecta- tion of credence by the American pub- lic, they will attempt even to obscure minor violations by the troops of the Saigon government. The PRO will do so because, as a political organization BALTIMORE SUN 25 January 1973 with a relatively small military force, the transition from a military to a po- litical conflict can only favor their cause, even if it means confusion and the emergence of new political parties in the short run. In the near future?that is, for the next several years?the aim of the PRG is not, as Americans and Saigonese of- !idols claim, to replace the Thieu ?egime and take over the government )f the South. As Pham Van Dong, the gorth Vietnamese prime minister, said n a recent interview: "The political dtuation in the South is such that one must have a government that reflects :he realities. You must realize that war in the South has meant that an entire generation has known no other way of life. There has been terrible suffering in every family. No one has been spared. Families are divided, father on one side, son on the other. Those are the realities. One must now try to abolish those divisions and not by imposing our will. That's why na- tional reconciliation is paramount." An Ungovernable Country 710 BELIEVE Pham Van Dong it is not necessary to believe that the "PRG and the North Vietnamese are More humanitarian than any other group in their country. It is merely to believe that they understand their country. After 13 years of a major war, South Vietnam has become ungovern- ; able?a mass of refugees, an ecological disaster and a catalog of social and economic ills. Those who pushed?or are pushed?into taking responsibility for this anarchy are bound to be repu- diated in the long run, be they as wise and well-intentioned as the angel Gabriel. At the moment, therefore, the PRG wishes merely to call into ques- tion the dominance of the Thieu re- gime and to set into motion the politi- cal process which, as Marxists, they, are confident will end with the victory of their particular revolution. Since Hanoi will back the PRG in this endeavor, there remains only on party to the accord whose intentions are not entirely predictable, and that is the United States government. What does Mr. Nixon want? The answer to that question 'May not be known for certain, for sqypral months. If Mr. Nixon wants a."con- tinuation of the war, that is !'4sy: He need only accuse the PRG or ganoi of a violation of the accords and re- sume the American bombardment of Vietnam?a move that no Internation- al Control Commission in this world can prevent. Alternatively, he has the option to declare the "truce violations" a Matter for settlement betworp:, the two "South Vietnamese partfDs" and continue to fuel the conflict with American aid while disassociating him- self from the results of the struggle. But if Mr. Nixon wants peace? peace with honor or peace with mus- tard or just plain peace?he has to force the Thieu regime step by step , all the way down the road toward its own dissolution. For ()illy its disso- lution will provide the condition for a peaceful settlement and ? restore meaning to that long ill-used phrase, "self-determination for the South Viet- namese." . The Cease Fire ire Agreement From Americans the cease-fire agreement now ready for signature In Paris on Saturday draws a sigh of profound relief. It is not a feeling of exaltation. This war has been too long, and too mean, and too dubious in its purposes, and too wearing on mind and spirit, for its end to arouse any such emotion. And of course it is ending, for us, as none of our wars has ever ended before, not in jubilant vic- tory but in cautious compromise. But there remain, in American terms, the great facts that this country is to be no longer involved In direct military action in Indo- china, that American prisoners of war are to be returned and that those missing in action are to be accounted for, when possible. As President Nixon said, the agreement is designed to create a peace that heals, a peace, in Dr. Kissinger's elaboration, which it Is hoped will move the participating parties from hostility to normaliza- tion and from normalization to reconciliation. They were talking of ApprovedForRelease 2001/08/G7-4-CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080004-8--- the broad scene, but still as to course the purpose of each was to America we in this country need a special healing of the domestic wounds the Indochina war has in- flicted on our body politic, a clos- ing of the divisive schisms it has created and a repair of the doubts it has raised about our very na- tional character. That is as to America alone; but except as we chose to make it so the Indochina war has not been an American war. Physically, in death and devastation, our sufferings have been as nothing beside the sufferings of the people of Indo- china itself. Then too, our actual sentiments of hostility have been mild in comparison with those of the antagonists in the region. Amer- icans can, perhaps, forgive and for- get?though to forget the real les-, sons of our part in this fantastic war would be to leave us open for similar error later, and with worse results?but the Indochinese cannot forgive so easily. , The cease-fire agreement, if ad- hered to by the Vietnamese signers on both sides, may help, though of gain as much advantage as pos- sible for the period after the firing ceased. Both did gain some points. ',South Vietnam, with the assistance of the United States, firmed up its status as in fact a country, for now. And, North Vietnam secured 'the long-term designation of Viet- , nam as united, and to press home its definition of unity managed to prevent a stipulation that North Vietnamese troops in the South be withdrawn. This may well be what Le Due Tho is talking about when he calls the agreement "a great. victory for the Vietnamese people." \ Much depends, for Vietnam's future, on how the agreement' works out there, on the scene; how firmly the cease-fire holds, how well the erstwhile combatants .on the joint committee to 'arrange elections cooperate, and how di- rectly developments in Indochina lead toward the projected Inter- national conference. It is all extra- 33 ordinarily chancy. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 THE, GUARDIAN MANCHESTER 26 January 1973 1'i --(-;- )'t ? Tv't1 II_ ? 1 j , t-11 len Ncxt weck Pri!icc, Sihanouk of C;.,mboelia publishes a hook giving his side of the evPnts th,t led to his overthrow by a military coup in 1970. Wilfred Burchett, co-author of the book?' My War with the CIA,' Micn Lane, ?1.60?has had close contacts with Sihanouk before and after his . flight to Peking. Here, he puts the ncw Vietnam peace treaty into the context of the continuing' Canbodian civil war?as sceri from Sihanouk's camp. WHERE DOES a Vietnam peace agree- ment leave Cambodia ? .They are ' unrelated questions at least ? as far as ,a ceasefire in South Vietnam applying to Cambodia is concerned?according to Prince Norodom Sihanouk,. who 'heads the Peking wing of the Royal 'Government of National Union. This was set up six weeks after Sihanouk -was depOsed as Head of State, in ? March 1970. Together with the National United .Front which he heads it directs the -resistance struggle against the Phnom Penh regime of Marshal Lon No!.? "Armed ?'struggle will continue," Sihanouk told me recently, "until the Lon Nol .regime and ? whatever is left' of its armed forces have been. 'completely - crushed. There is no question of a ceasefire or negotiations rwith them. If President Nixon :insists 'ort saving Lon Nol and, the handful of itraitors who still support him, then he .can send a plane and fly them into exile. If they fall into our hands, they will suffer the ? fate of the Quislings and Lavals after World War II." Sihanouk claims that the resistance ,forces now control 90 per cent of the 'territory and over 5 million of Cam- bodia's seven million inhabitants and ,that, were it not for US air strikes and the continued presence of Saigon 'tritons, the-Lon Nol regime would have been crushed long ago. Any attempt to equate the activities of Saigon troops and the US air force with the presence of North Vietnamese troops Is vigorously denied by Sihanouk and the leaders of the resistance strUggle inside the country. Apart from instruc- tors sent by North Vietnamese at the personal 'request of Sihanouk to Premier Pham Van Dong and General ?Giap, the only North Vietnamese troops in 'Cambodia have been in the remote and !sparsely-populated North- -eastern border areas where the "Ho 'Chi Minh Trail " enters South Viet- 'ham from Laos, according to Sihanouk, who says that the instructors were all Withdrawn within one year, by which time their training rele was completed and the resistance forces were organ- ised into a regular army of battalion- sized units 'plus regional troops and village self-defence guerrillas. This three-layer 'structure is identical with, that adopted by the Vietcong across the border in South Vietnam. Sihanouk puts the strength of his. regular army at 72,000, supplemented by several hundred thousand irregular troops of both sexes on the regional and guerrilla units. The latter repre- sent a virtually inexhaustible reserve for the regular units with a constant movement upwards from guerrillas to. regional units to the regular forces. The B52s are the best recruiting agents for the self-defence guerrillas, accord- ing to Sihanouk. Every time they cut a swathe through the rural areas, there are hundreds of angry volunteers who demand gunS and a chance for revenge. ? Opposed to these are the US-financed troops of Lon. Nol. Officially they amount to. 200,000, but Sihanouk's Staff officers say this is .a payroll figure a. more accurate estimate would be iiouL 160,000. The dollar paychecks for the 40,000 " phantoms" are said to go into the pockets of a Sew divi- sional commanders and bureaucrats at headquarters. The Lon Nol troops are well-equipped but have notoriously low morale and would be utterly useless .without massive US air support. They have not, in fact, won a single battle since the ? fighting started but have. seored up some notable defeats. No-one denies that there are many Vietnamese in the ranks of the resis- tance forces, but these have been recruited from the approximately 600,000-strong Vietnamese residents in Cambodia?most of them there for several generations. By his savage massacres and persecution of the Viet- namese, in the first days after seising power, Lon Nol left them with little choice. Either wait to 'be shot down in cold blood or be deported as cannon- fodder for the Saigon army?or take to the 'rjungle and join the resistance ',forces. If the B525 were the best recruiting' agents for the Cambodian peasants, Lon Nol and his even more bloody- minded younger 'brother, Colonel Lon Non, were the best recruiting agents for the Vietnamese community. Upwards of 90 per cent of them sym- pathised with the Vietcong in any case and front the' start Of the fighting in South Vietnam, there was a steady flow of volunteers for the resistance forces from the' Vietnamese minority in Cambodia.. After the Lon Not coup and massacres, many of them had what they term " blood debts" to settle with the Phnom Penh regime and very 'quickly developed the lighting quali- ties that have earned their compatriots in South Vietnam the reputation of the world's finest guerrilla fighters. As to how the resistance forces so quicklY became an effective fighting organisation with modern weapons at their disposal, there were several reasons. For years prior to the Lon Nol coup, embryo resistance bases had been set up in half a dozen strategic? areas in Cambodia's jungles and mountains.. More correctly, old resist- ance bases, set up during the resistance war against the French were reacti- vated. As far back as 1963, but especially from 1966 onwards there had been a steady trickle of young people, , mostly intellectuals at odds with the regime, moving out of Phnom Penh and aher cities, to these bases. Immediately after the Lon Nol coup on March 18. 1970 and Sihanouk's appeal for armed resistance five days later, it was assumed by the NFL that there, would be a drive by the US-Saigon forces in cooperation with Lon Nol's army into the frontier areas to wipe out the NFL base's there. So there started a massive distribution of arms to the rapidly-developing Cambodian resistance forces from the huge stocks in the frontier bases. By the time the Americans arrived six weeks later -the cupboard was bare." ? "We got away to a good start," Sihanouk told me later. "Unlike.our Vietnamese brothers who had to use hoes and clubs to wrest arms from the enemy when they started their resist- ance struggle, we had ample quantities of modern arms from. the beginning ?not to mention the example and experience of the Vietnamese and the magnificent instructors that Glop sent 34 us." ? As the armed forces expanded, Chinese arms began to arrive, the Vietnamese diverting supplies intended for them from the "Ho Chi Minh Trail" pipeline. Many American weapons were. captured from the Lon Nol and Saigon troops. Another vital source of supply' was revealed by Sihanouk to a recent '?,` visitor. to his Peking headquarters with ; his characteristic candour, namely the .purchase of arms on the spot. The Chinese provided $2 millions for this purpose .in 1970 and 1971, 10 million in 1972, and Sihanouk said he expected about $15 millions for 1973. "Apart from helicopters?forrn the time being?we can supply you with 'anything you Want, for cash in dollars,'' Sihanouk quoted one of his main arms .suppliers iin Phnom Penh as saying: some months ago. Sihanouk added : "And he insisted that 'for the time being ' was the operative phrase 'as far ? as helicopters were concerned. Obviously it is a great relief to the transport system to provide dollars on , the spot rather than to send quantities. of arms down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. And for the American arms we buy, we. have vast quantities of captured ammunition." This original type of military logis-- tics was not new to Sihanouk. In the years prior to the Lon Nol ?coup, had? been supplying -large quantities of rice and medical supplies to the Vietcong, paid for at world market prices, in dollars, by the Chinese ! The situation 'in the regions con- trolled bylSihanouk's partisans is quite different ?to that of the areas con- trolled by the NLF in South Vietnam. Vast areas to the north and north-east of the capital, well over half the terri- tory of Cambodia, are completely in the hands of the resistance forces, including the provincial and district 'capitals. In these areas there .is no trace of the ? Lon Nol administration. in other provinces Lon Nol holds the provincial capitals, the rest including the district centres are 'held by ,Sihanouk's forces.. Phnom Penh itself ' is surrounded, with each .o f the seven highways and the railway into the, capital either firmly controlled by the resistance forces or, as is the case of Highway No. 1, leading to Saigon, cut- table at Will. Sufficient food supplies are allowed into the capital to avoid undue hardships for the popul?ation, swollen by ?almost three times by refugees from the bonabings. The resistance government is orga- nised in a highly original form. For every Minister in Peking, there is a Vice-Minister in the jungle head- quarters; for every Minister in' the jungle headquarters there is a Vice- Minister in Peking. For the three key Ministries of Defence, Internal Affairs, and Information, the Ministers are on the spot, directing the resistance struggle. Khieu Samphan as Minister ? for Defence, Hu Nim and Hou Youn? for, the other two Ministries, are French-educated left-wing intellectuals ?the only left-wingers elected at the legislative elections in 1966, the last to be held under Sihanouk. They were among those who left for the restatonee bases in the 1966-7 period. These three, together with Ieng Sary, Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RbP77-00432R0001000800014 who had left for the embryo resistance' bases as early as 1963, and who now serves as a liaison between the jungle bases and, Sihanouk at the Peking headquarters, form the hard core of the resistance leadership. They are among those with whom Sihanouk had his .differences in the past, but who never wavered in their belief that Sihanouk was a true patriot devoted to preserving the independence of his .country. They supported his foreign policy of neutrality as the best means of keeping the war in South Vietnam front over- flowing into Cambodia and his general line of riendship with the Socialist world and support for the resistance struggle in South Vietnam. When Sihanouk appealed for the formation of a National United Front and armed resistance to the Lon Nol regime five days after his overthrow, differences on internal policies were buried and a remarkable form of national unity from peasantry to the. monarchy was very .rapidly forged. Sihanouk has explained this as largely due to the fact that .historically, Cambodia has had to unite and struggle to survive as a nation, jammed in, as is, between two more powerfusl nations and traditional enemies?Viet- nam and Thailand. Cambodia's history ha S mainly been a fight .for survival, with princes and Buddhist monks at various times directing armed struggle supported by the peasantry. Sihanouk claims there is plenty of evidence to prove that US plans for Cambodia include dividing the country up, with Thailand taking everything to the west' of the Mekong river, South Vietnam everything to the east, and that- had the Cambodian people not launched a vigorous and successful armed struggle this would already have taken place. Ideological questions are of infinitely less importance to him than the ques- ?tion of national survival. This is the meeting of ?the minds between what are roughly known' as the "Khmers Rouges" (Red Cambodians) and the Sihanoukists. Sihanouk is very Philo- sophical about this. In a recent interview with Irwin Silber, executive editor of. the Ameri- can Guardian (a small radical New York weekly) he said : "Some Western friends who came here to sec me asked me why in my Government I have so few Sihanoukists and so many Marxist Cambodians?so many Reds and so few Sihanoukists. For instance, among the 11 members of .my Government inside Cambodia in the liberated zone there are 10 Communists and one Sihanou- kist, my cousin Prince Norodom 'Phouri'sara [for several years prior to the March 1970 coup, Cambodia's Foreign Minister]; "The. most dis- tinguished Sihanoukists are Lon Nol and Sink Matak, those who betrayed me . . . I proposed that they be neutralist, progressive, but they pre- ferred to be reactionary and to be pro-American, to be capitalist, to be very bourgeois. They do not like revolution. They do not like progresSivism.. " The Cambodian Communists first, are very patriotic. They are Cam- bodians and they refuse to be named ' Communists. They say they are pro- gressive, they are Marxists. They like ithe theories of Karl Marx and want to have a good socialism for the people in order to wipe out social injustice, to have a strong, independent economy. Sihanouk for them means independ- ence and .neutrality, non-alignment for Cambodia. And they know that I have always fought for the independence of my country. I am a nationalist. "The title of our state?republic or kingdom?is not important. What is important is the substance. The royal regime in the liberated zones is very democratic, very popular. In fact, no prince rules the liberated zone, only the people .rule." This is a rare public statement of what I know, ' from many private conversations on the subject,, to be Sihanouk's inner thinking on his relations with the Left, Patriotism for him is , everything. For many years he identified support for the monarchy with patriotism. If Lon Nol, in charge or internal as well as external security in the old days could fabricate evidence that the Left was turning against the monarchy, then Sihanouk turned against the left. Now he sees things differently. "The future is not with ?me,n he Once told me. ." It is certainly not with Lon Nol and his clique of traitors either. It is with our young Leftists. They are pure and patriotic." He was explaining at that time why be would go into retirement after the victory of the resistance struggle ---? a victory of which he has remained absolutely certain. For a? considerable period, 'he -rejected that idea of remaining Head of State. It was only when Ieng Sary arrived from the jungle headquarters late in 1971 and persuaded him that it was the Unanimous desire of the resist- ance leadership that he continue as Head of State after victory that he accepted. ? Contrasted to the degree of national unity?rare for any country?achieved within the resistance government is the disunity in the ranks of the Lon Nol ?regime. No matter' what merits apologists for Lon Nol find in his regime, they cannot deny that it.has been riven by dissensiong at the;top from the first months of the seizure of power. Sink Matak, who co-authored the plot with Lon Not and became Prime Minister, was soon dumped. Cheng Heng, ? former governor of Phnom Penh's central prison chosen by Lon Nol to succeed Sihanouk as..Head ;of State is also in disgrace. SontNgoe Thanh, head of the CIA-financed "Khmer Serei " who provided the shock troops for the March 18 coup and who aspired to be Head of State,, was east aside after a brief iperiod as Prime Minister. In Tam who succeeded Cheng 1-Teng as president of the National Assembly, now in open oppo4 salon to the regime.. ? The heads of ; WASHINGTON POST 6 February, 1973 Secrecy Shrouds Laos Air War United Press International; A Pentagon spokesman said yesterday new De- fense Secretary Elliot L. Richardson is still trying to find out why the air war in Laos should be kept so secret. ? Spokesman Jerry W. Friedheim said policy on the air war in Laos trans- rival clans have been at each other's throats throughout the three years since Sihanouk was overthrown. The coup against Sihanouk was ostensibly because he had allowed the Vietcong to enter the frontier areas. It was the main charge at the trial " in absentia " at which the former Head of State was sentenced to death, But within' six weeks, Cambodia was invaded by tens of thousands of Saigon troo?ps, looting, raping," killing and destroying in order to maintain Lon .Nol in power. Sihanouk was accused of having permitted the Vietcong or 71 Vietminh to entrench themselves in bases along the frontier regions. But Lon Nol has ceded, or at least. not resisted the takeover, large areas in Svey Rieng and Prey Vent, provinces to the Saigon regime, which are nowi' included in South Vietnam's postal disi tricts. The South Vietnamese base at: Neak Luong some 40 miles east of , ? Phnom Penh is now known as Little Saigon. No Cambodians can enter the area. It is with the certainty that he has .the whole 'country behind him and that the Lon Nol regime cannot sur-. .vi?ve withotit foreign intervention that Sihanouk rejects any proposals for a ceasefire in Cambodia or negotiations with Lon Nol. In Section 7 of the Draft Agreement, finalised between Dr Kissinger and Le Due Tho on October 17, 1972, and which presumably remains the basis. for whatever new agreement has been negotiated, it is stated that: " Foreign countries will cease all military .activities in .Laos and Cam- bodia, will withdraw from these two countries all their troops, their mili tary advisers and military personnel, all arms, munitions and war material and will refrain from reintroducing them. The internal affairs of Cambodia and Laos will .be settled by their res- pective peoples without foreign inter; ference. The final agreement, published on Wednesday, is in the same terms. If outside military aid for the Lon Nol regime ends, it cannot survive. nor (hes it deserve to? survive. The Royal Government of National Union,. on the other hand will not only survive but will flourish once the not, are - halted and life in the rural areas returns to .normal.- The fable that the Khmer resistance movement is a "North Vietnamese invasion force" will be exposed for what ,it is worth. It is because of this that President Thieu in Saigon on Lon Nol's behalf has protested so strongly at the provisions of the Draft Agreement concerning Laos and Cambodia. As Thieu knows only too well, a regime propped up by, foreign arms - and dollars, inevitably falls once the supports are pulled out .from under, ? It is doubtful that an agreement contains anything which can provide much comfort for Lon Nol and his collaborators at the top in Phnom Penh. cends this building," indi- cating that the State De- partment and the White House are involved in the matter. Friedheim said B-52 bombers and tactical air- craft have continued their strikes in Laos every day since the Vietnam cease- fire Jan. 27. Day by day, announcements of the strike are all that the Pen- tagon will make public. 35 --Approved For -Release-2001/08/077-CIA-LRDP77:00432R000100-08000T-8- NEw, yom Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP177-00432R000100080001-8 31 January 1973 ITIV-12c21- TT:Pr Has Meant tb Saibofi By CHARLES MOHR special to The New York Times SAIGON, South Vietnam; ,Jan. 30?What did more than a decade of war accomplish for South Vietnam? North Vietnam's Le Due Tho has already called the Paris "Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet- nam" a victory. President Nixon called it peace with honor and asserted that News "the people of Analysis South Vietnam have been guar- anteed the right to determine their own future without outside interference." Whatever the ultimate ver- dict of history, it seems evi- dent that the prolonged con- flict really changed very little in Vietnam. - The catalyst of war, of course, did bring many subtle changes and some major changes to South Vietnam and South Vietnamese society. It is easy to cite just a few. ; Vast numbers of people moved ? into Saigon and other cities and towns. Large parts of rural Vietnam became sparsely populated and a largely peasant society be- came increasingly urban. Armed Forces Multiply. The South Vietnamese armed forces grew vastly in size until today about one in every 17 South Vietnamese carries a gun for the Govern- ment?a staggering mobiliza- tion of military manpower. A whole generation of non- Communist members of the social elite entered Public life or the army, were discredited and discarded. Vietnam seems to have more retired generals and politicians Ter capita than any other country. The years also brought a degradation of the quality of the Vietcong opposition. Al- though directed by. Hanoi and ideologically loyal to it, the early insurgents were almost wholly indigenous to the South. Although few in numbers, they were impressively motivated, well led and subtle. Today the leadership is heayily Northern, more brutal ?. and less effective politically, many ,here believe. Comparison of Assets A scoreboard of tangible as- sets enjoyed by the competing Vietnamese factions is some- what .difficult to make?and, more important, tends to be misleading. South Vietnam's armed forces now total about 1.1 million then, including 525,000 regular troops and 294,000 fairly well- trained Regional Force units. The United States estimates that 145,000 regular North Vietnamese troops arc in the South, but Saigon says the number is about 300,0(10. There is a higher percentage of fight- ing riflemen among the Com- munist' forces. ? In any case, one lesson of the war was that numerical superiority meant little. Neither .side has been able 'to achieve decisive results. The Saigon army and 'para- military' forces are much better equipped than in the past. This does not mean that they are significantly better led or bet- ter motivated. The collapse of some large units during last year's enemy offensive illustrat- ed that old problems remain, One thing that has seen as- tonishingly little change is the attitude of the South Vietna- mese elite ? the upper middle class that monopolizes power and privilege. Before his death last year, an able American adviser, John Paul Vann, remarked to a friend, "The South Vietnamese are paying a price for years of stupidity. Some of them don't seem to learn." The bourgeoisie, after having lived through years of "revolu- tionary" or political warfare, gives virtually no sign that it has recognized the need to make, or will make, any sig- nificant social reforms. A modest land-reform pro- gram has been pushed, but one reason for this is that urban economic opportunity, war- born, corruption and other priv- ileges have made land less im- portant to the ruling Clite. Their attitudes toward edu- cation, authority and privilege seem unchanged. The old Amer- ican advice to "win hearts and minds" is hardly, even given lip service anymore. South Viet- nam remains what it was in the late nineteen-fifties, an in- equitable society that functions poorly. One weakness of the Ngo Dinh Diem Government was that it had no coherent ideol- ogy except a Confucian attitude that authority should be re- spected and an impenetrably complex philosophy called "per- sonalism." which the public did not understand. All these years later, the Government still does not have, or even claim to have, any ideology, except anti-Commu- nism. This will be a matter of ma- jor importance in the political struggle that will follow the cease-fire. It is widely believed that non-Communists and anti-Com- munists made up a large ma- jority of the South Vietnamese a decade ago and that this is just as true today. However, this seems to grow out of Viet- namese attitudes toward prop- erty, toward the intrusion of coercive authority and a gen- eral peasant conservatism. That such attitudes can be changed under the impact of political indoctrination has been shown in many Commu- nist states, such as North Viet- nam, and in parts of South Vietnam as well. One really major change in South Vietnam during the war has been the gravitation of a large majority of the popula- REFUGEES FROM INDOCHINA WAR ? (Sources: U.S. Agency for International Development, for figures on South Vietnam and Laos; Cambodian Government, for Cambodian figures.) , NORTH VIETNAM. No figures available LAO 1964-130,000 1965-129,000 1966-128,000 1967-118,000 1968-137,000 1969-240,000 1970-270,000 1971-234,200 1972-268,400,;? CAMBODIA 1970 (from April) ?1,000,000 1971-600,000 1972-400,000 .(through Oct..) SOUTH VIETNAM 1964-66-2,400,000, 1967-463,000 1968 ? 2,144,000 1969? 590,000 1970-410,000 1971 ----136,000 1972 ?1,288,800 In camps as 1973 Cumulative Total: began-641,000 South.Vietnam? More than 6.5 million officially listed by U.S. Agency for International Development since 1964. U.S. Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees says 2 million more should be added to this. ? Cambodia?More than 2 million (a "very conservative" figure, says Senate subcommittee) Laos? More than 1 million. tion into areas of "relative security" under some measure of Government control. , If the terms of the cease-fire are honored, the Vietcong side will have a small population under its direct influence and ;will have to resort to clandes- tine activity in areas prepon- derantly controlled by the Gov- ernment to achieve political conversions. There is a great question, however, whether the South Vietnamese Government will?be able to exploit its advantages. It has never shown an ability ? or a recognition of the need?to respond to poptilq aspirations. Like the late Prenident Vern, ?President Nguyen ?Van Tblett 36. Tho Now York Times/Jan. 31,1973 has placed a premium that lamounts to a priority on loyalty to the presidential palace 'Pin 'selecting military and civil i4 ,ministrators. (Many of the?proL vincial administrators are' Mili- tary anyway.) This has led .t great attrition among official but not to any notable improve- ment in the quality of govern, ment. The Vietcong political structure also does not seem to function well and has .lost much of its old elan. As an informed American said some years ago, "This is not a service Government?it doesn't sec its role as ,doing ;things for people." I South Vietnam's enemies have not done well either; in tho lilfit deCt14.41, nists won a great psychological victory in their 1968 offensive,' Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 NEW YORK TIMES 26 January 1973 serlotisly eroding American support for the war. But they have never won a single stra- tegic military victory, and rel- atively few tactical ones. One of their worst failures was that they could not prevent the slow drift of population away from lamas they held. That many people moved out of fear, .,a allied bombs and firepower was true, but does not reduce. the Communists' problem. ?,--i'r. The amount of territory ?"held" by either side has gone up and down like a fever chart. Right now the amount,, qf countryside not under Govern- ment control is quite large. A)) of this has a special relevance because of the cease-fire, .iird;- visions, which essentially ?for- bid further seizures of land The relevance of control., is limited, however, becanse,,,?f factors that much of ..the world's public has never clearly understood. There has always been?a necessity durino, the war . for troops to pull into tight defen- sive perimeters at night.. They cannot occupy a "line" as?in wars with fronts. There: has also been a need in many in-,-.. secure areas to patrol or move in large units. The result is?that In large areas "control" has a limited definition. ? If the cease-fire provision :prohibiting all armed patrolling; is honored, it will make it difm ficult to detect, much.- less,, deter, clandestine movements. The most significant part of the agreement is the provision 1 that the two South Vietnamese parties should agree to general elections to be conducted ,byfa. National Council for Natiorlal Reconciliation and Concord:7. There are so many dangers in this procedure for both sides that it seems difficult to believe that such an agreement.. wilk. ever be reached. As long as the elections can. be delayed, the Government's police forces may well be strong' enough to prevent serious polit. ical gains and subversion by the Communists. But the Govern, ment's position seems to' p9'7,.' litical observers less strong' if the elections are scheduled'.` Presumably, no agreement would be made by the Vietcong. unless the agreement abolished& those restrictions written, int% South Vietnamese election laws, that tightly limit competition:. among South Vietnamese'- factions. :I i In a free atmosphere, .the.- Communists would stand unitedz and the non-Communists would. probably split into many relai? tively weak parties. And, if ther elections are intolerably do, layed or evaded, the North Viet:: namese and Vietcong would. have an excuse to resort ' te''. war again. ? ,,,,... After a long war, Sotith Vietnam is in some ways stronger than it was in late: 1961 when American advisers. and helicopters began arriving:: Despite great losses and arcl suiting loss in the quality , of personnel, the Vietcong have, been heavily reinforced- ., by, North Vietnam, and are :also. strong. ., The second Indochina wan; 1 therefore, cost much blood ? and suffering but settled altnest; nothing. . .1 .2.! The South Vietnamese Economy: epression and Joblessness Ahead ' By CRAIG R. WHITNEY Special to The New York Times SAIGON, South Vietnam, Jan. 25 ?The peace agree- ment between North Vietnam and the United States has one provision that stood out as im- probable when the Communists oroadcast it in October. "Peace and national independence must be closely linked with the exercise of broad democratic freedoms," the Hanoi radio-said, "including guarantees for the right to private ownership and for freedom of enterprise, as provided for in the said agree- ment." Communist broadcasts do not often include such thoughts. Thus the economy of South Vietnam will apparently be al- lowed to function in peace as it has been during the war ? a concession that, on closer examination, seems as full of pitfalls as the peace agreement itself. For most of the last decade, South Vietnam has been on a war economy. This has not meant price controls, con- straints and shortages for any- one except the poor and prop- ertyless, for, buoyed by large amounts of American aid, mili- ary spending and free-wheel- ing currency inflation, South Vietnamese and American en- trepreneurs have made a great deal of money. U.S. Money Withdrawn As American troops and American money have been withdrawn over the years, how- ever, the Government has been hard put to find new sources of money for investment or indus- trial development, and the pros- pects for either of these will re- main dim for at least as long as South Vietnam's political future is doubtful. The economy was dealt a severe blow when the North Vietnamese offensive began last April. Since then, despite a number of economic reforms begun in the last part of 1971, local businessmen and invest- ors have held onto their money, done little building and laid off large numbers of factory work- ers while presumably waiting to see how things turn out. A million refugees, driven from their homes by the fighting, went on the dole. Saigon is in what can only be called a depression, with many people out of work and short of money. Prices have continued to rise at an annual rate of 23 per .cent and most incomes have not risen correspondingly. The outlook is that the econ- omy will remain rather un- healthy, though not in danger of collapse. Defense Spending Is Heavy Why is this? First and most important, the national budget is heavily weighted to defense spending. Next year's budget of 436.5 billion piasters. or about $1.6-billion, includes 324 billion piasters for defense. according to official Government figures. According to South Viet- namese officials, the Govern- ment does not plan to scale down its military establishment until at least another year has gone by. With 500,000 men in the regular army and more than a million carrying arms, the effects of sudden demobil- ization of large numbers of men for whom there are no jobs would be catastrophic. A second reason for pessi- mism about the economic future is that, the budget deficit this year, was $400-million and Government economists figure that it will be almost $600-mil- lion, next year. American aid has made up the difference in the past and presumably will have to continue to fill the gap between the Government's tax collections and its expendi- tures. In 1971, when there were hundreds of thousands of American soldiers here, they spent $400-million at one time. There were 140,000 Vietnamese employed by Americans in jobs from laundresses? and chauf- feurs to interpreters, clerks, and office managers. Now about 50,000 are on American payrolls. Troop Withdrawal Continuing The Vietnamese have been adjusting to the gradual with- drawals of the last three years, however, and American offi- cials here do not expect the catastrophic results from the withdrawal of the 23,700 Ameri- can servicemen who are still in Vietnam. Until alternative sources 4of income can be found, Ameri- can aid will have to continue to make up the difference, ac- cording to officials here. "It is the responsibility of the United States Congress to do that much if they vote to ratify this settlement," said one, speaking of the peace agree- ment. What about foreign invest- ment? This has been courted by the South Vietnamese Gov- ernment for the last few years, hut so far the biggest poten- tial investor ? Japan ? has not risked anything substantial. The Japanese Honda motor- cycles that clog Saigon's streets were imported not by Japanese entrepreneurs but by American and Vietnamese economic of- ficials who needed them to soak up the floods of piasters that were being printed by the Government to finance the war during, the peak years of the late nineteen-sixties. Now no Hondas are being imported. Japanese newsmen and .Jap-. Ianese Embassy officials here 'were agreed that their Govern- ment would take a hand in providing aid after a cease-fire, 37 but all doubt that businessmen would join in with private in- vestments until much later. "The economy will follow, not lead, political and military events," one American official said. "Businessmen will wait and see, make a judgment on (what's going to happen before Ithey risk capital." I Before the war, South Viet- nam's principal exports used to be rice and rubber. There is little international market for rice any more because other .countries can grow enough of their own. In any case, In- ,cause the war has driven', so ,many people from the country- side into the cities, this coun- try does not even produce enough for itself now. The rubber plantations have been theaters of war this year ?notably around An Loc, about 80 miles north of here, which used to be a rubber-processing town and is now in ruins? and in any case they provide only $7-million to $8-million In exports even before the war expanded in 1972. So the postwar economy of South Vietnam is likely, for a while, to be more or less what it is now ? an economy of subsistence, of small markets in the towns, of transportation of rice, vegetables, pork and fish; from the rural hamlets into the population centers, with a re- turn flow of piasters and light manufactured goods back to the countryside. Unforeseeable Factor The unforeseeable factor in, the future is this: With a cease- fire in place, will the flow be allowed to continue from, say, Owns under Government con- trol to villages under Commu- nist control? This worries Gov- ernment officers with respon- sibility for economic matters.i "What do we do about all these 'leopard spots'?" one Vietnamese economist asked. "Even with the war this year, anywhere a commercial truck could go, the economy carried on more or less normally. What happens if the other side in- stitutes its own currency in the areas it controls? "We've just begun to think about things like that," he added. Probably even that would not be insurmountable for the Vietnamese, who have been trading through currency bar- riers for years along the Cam- bodian border ? trading goods, piasters and riels without any, great difficulty. "We hope to be ready, by the time the cease-fire takes effect," one Cabinet minister said not long ago. "I doubt If we'll make it." -Approved For-Release-2004/08/07--:-GIA-R-DP7-7-0043-2ROG0400080001---8 WASHINGAT,nd For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 31 January 1973 SMITH HEMPS TONE Tik. Peace of P Gins Is a Sec Knocking the Peace of .. Paris, which will extricate the United States from Vietnam and secure the release of the American prisoners of war. affords no pleasure. And yet when one reads the fine print in the agreement and its four attached proto- cols, and studies the tran- script of Henry Kissinger's marathon briefing of the press, one can only come to the conclusion that President ' Nixon and the good doctor have produced a peace which passeth all understanding, that they are peddling a sec- ond-hand Edsel as 'a Rolls- Royce. One understands Nixon's predicament. He has said re- peatedly that he will not be the first American president to "lose" a war, that he will not settle for anything short of an "honorable" peace. Therefore it follows that any Nixon peace is "honorable" by de- finition, that the Vietnam war has not been "lost." ? Yet the Peace of Paris of LONDON TIKES 13 Jan. 1973 1973 bears an alarming re- semblance to those earlier protocols on Indochina, the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1992, both of which were vio- lated by the Communists virtually before the ink of the signatures was dry. Aside from the unworkable monstrosity called the Nation- al Council for National Recon- ciliation and Concord (in which each side will have a veto over the other and which can confidently be expected to produce neither reconciliation nor. concord), there are two aspects of the agreement that really rankle. One is the minor oversight in which no mention is made of the presence of 145,000 North Vietnamese regular troops within South Viet- nam and hence no require- ment is made for their, with- drawal. Kissinger shrugged this off by saying that since the presence of foreign troops is forbidden in Laos and Cam- bodia and military movement across the Demilitarized Zone between North and South Viet-' nd-Han Edsel nam is not allowed, "there is no way North Vietnam can live up to that agreement without there being a reduc- tion of the North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam." Well and good. But who is going to see to it that these troops are not reinforced, re- equipped and resupplied in violation of the agreement? There will be a grand total of 48 Canadians, Hungarians, Poles and Indonesians to su- pervise the thousands of miles of the Ho Chi Minh trail through Laos and Cambodia. There will be another 12 to oversee the DMZ. Hardly an airtight arrangement, which ? perhaps is why Kissinger laid such emphasis on "the spirit" with which the provisions must be implemented if they are to be successful. The truth is, of course, that diplomacy can do more than reflect conditions on the ground. Since we and the South Vietnamese were un- able to force the North Viet- namese out of South Vietnam militarily, there was no way. .Haeritan fuel Oil f u d ins r peak.bOthibiiig From Ian McDonald Washington, Jan 12 One factor prompting Presi- dent Nixon to halt the intensive bombing of North ? Vietnam t above the twentieth parallel, it was learnt here today, was the 'strain the Offensive was throw- , ing on the .already severe short- age of fuel oil. in the United States.. ? ? The Administration bad est.:i- inated? that it would be neces- sary to make an initial purchase of between four million and 43 million barrels of fuel for the Air Force to maintain an all-out offensive against North Vietnam. To continue the offensive until March, it was cal- xulated, would require a total of between seven million and 7.5 million barrels.. Because .of the already drastic shortages of fuel oil, in ? the United States. however, the Ad- ministration found it could only be assured of an initial supply of some 800,000 barrels, less than sufficient to keep the air war at its peak 'level. The strain that the Vietnam ?war has thrown on fuel reserves in the United States has been one of the less appreciated side- effects' of . the ? conflict. It reached. a peak this' winter because a wave of unusually cold weather has prevailed through. 'out much of the country, sending the domestic demand for 'fuel oil soaring. fficient N Vietaa ? In New York recently three major airlines had to curtail 'operations because of shortages of fuel and the Middle West has been badly affected by restric- tions on the supply of fuel oil for homes. ? President. Nixon's , forthcom- ing message on energy resources will it j8 reported, recommend that' many of the nation's elec- tric'poWer plants should be con- verted from oil :to coal burning. This, coupled with the "selec- tive and temporary relaxation" , of some air pollution standards, ? could result, in a saving of some 22 million barrels of oil ,a day 'by 1980. according to an estimate of the Office of Emergency:Pre- paredness. . _ - Peter Haxeihurst ? writes from ? Saigon : 'After employing their giant B52 bombers on raids over ?North Vietnam in recent weeks, . the Americans have suddenly -been forced to divert most Of :them on to. targets 'only 30 miles away from Saigon-- - A Spokesman for ? the United States. Command announced to- day that the majority of the available B52 bomber force was yesterday engaged in dropping an estimated 1,260 tons of bombs over communist advance posi- tions in five square miles of jungle 30 miles north-north-weft of Saigon. Against these targets in.Binh Duong province 14 mis- sions were flown -from the B52 38 bases in Guam and Thailand. (A mission consists of three ? B52s, each capable of carrying 30 tons ,of boinbs.) This announcement .coincides with reports that the -South Vietnamese expect a communist' offensive in the area and from :the adjoining province of Tay Ninh before a 'ceasefire -comes Into force. Both provinces ? 'adjoin the border of Cambodia: ? The spokesman said ?that the remainder of the B52 force available in 8outh-East Asia flew 12 missions over targets in North Vietnam -and another seven over Other areas of 'South' ?Vietnam., Richard ? Wigg lirrittaS? ?? frOM ? Paris : Another marathon ses- sion lasting six hours was held today by Dr Henry Kissinger 'and Mr Le Due The, in *their search for a ceasefire agreement 'in Vietnam. The optimisin sensed after yesterday's six hour meeting was further encouraged today by a visible welcome from North-Vietnamese official when Dr " Kissinger and -his team 'arrived for today's session. The chief negotiators have now ne- gotiated- -for more ? . than 27 hours since they' resumed con- tacts' On Monday ? ? after the American bombing of North Vietnam. ? . There ? will be no weekend break and the two men are to meet again tomorrow. we could do it diplomatically. But that doesn't mean their presence increases tha. chances of peace. The second point upon' which one gags is Article 21 of Chapter VIII: "In pursu- ance of its traditional policy, the United States will con- tribute to healing the wounds of war and to postwar!recon- struction" of North Vietnam.- This danegeld reportedly will amount to $2.5 billion 'ever a five-year period, although, Kissinger maintains that "the definition of any particular sum', has not been arrived at. ' This means that pant of the, federal income tax of Nay. Lt. Everett Alvarez Jr., who for more than eight years re- fused to give the North Viet- namese more than his name, rank and serial number, will, be earmarked for the rebuild- ing of his captors' country, a country against which 46,. 000 other Americans died fighting. The situation is not analo- gous to those which obtain- ed in post-World War II Ger- many and Japan. These na- tions had surrendered to us unconditionally and we were directly responsible for their economic, social and political well-being. For a parallel, one has to go back in Amer- ican history. to the years 1795-1801, when a weak and newly independent United States paid large sums of pro- tection money to the Barbary pirates in a vain effort to safeguard our shipping in the Mediterranean, a situation which led an exasperated Charles Pinckney to exclaim, "Millions for defense, but not a damned penny for tribute!" The terms which Nixon and Kissinger obtained probably were the best that were to be had, if only because the war had been lost politically here at home long ago, if not on ? the battlefields of Indochina. We can be grateful, then, that our prisoners are com- ing home and that America is finally extricated from a war she lacked the will to win, The Geneva accords of 1954 ended France's eight-year struggle against communism in Indochina. The Paris agree- ment of 1973 ends the 10-year American involvement. Now the South Vietnamese are go- ing to have to hack it them- selves. But to pretend that the Peace of Paris is "hon- orable" or that it is likely to end the fighting in Indo- china is, well, stretching things a bit. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 WASHINGTON POST 1 February, 1973 Victor Zorza ... And an iinb 1 ? WITH VIETNAM out of the way, the Nixon administration has embarked on the slow and intricate task of building the world balance of power that is to preserve the peace "for a generation and more," as Mr. Nixon hopes. The balance, to be made up of the world's five major powers?the United States, Russia, China, Japan, and Eu- rope?is, at best, an uncertain and unstable thing and, at worst, in the view of the administration's critics, downright dangerous. The mutual in- terdependence of the five powers could, in the event of a breakdown iri the balance between any two of them, cause the trouble to spread throughout the whole international system like wildfire, more rapidly, More uncon- trollably than ever. Mr. Nixon's answer to "those who scoff at balance of power diplomacy" Is simple. "The only alternative to a balance of power is an imbalance of power, and history shows that nothing so drastically escalates the danger of war as such an imbalance." Speaking with the end of the war in Vietnam in sight, he explained recently that the rare opportunity to create an interna- tional system of stability and lasting peace arose from "precisely the fact ? that the elements of balance now ex- ist." But what are these elements? The few remarks that ? Mr. Nixon and Dr. Kissinger have allowed themselves to make on the most important subject of international politics are so brief, so uninformative, as to defy intelligent discussion. If serious students "scoff" at the administration's grand notions, it is because they are allowed to see only the shadow and not the substance. The secrecy which might have been justifiable in the ease of Kissinger's NEW YORK TIMES 26 January 1973 nee of Power? trips to Peking and to Moscow, and in the Paris negotiations, has been stretched to cover the broad concepts of foreign policy which ought to be, in a democracy, open to public debate and challenge. It is becoming almost as difficult to analyze the administra- tion's thinking ? as the Kremlin's? which may be fun for Kremlinologists, but is hardly conducive to. the shaping of sound policies. The "elements of balance" about which Mr. Nixon is so reticent are to be found in the belief of administra- tion officials that the Vietnam settle- "What the Nixon-Kissinger diploniacy did ...Was not to balance Russia and China, but to,play them off against each other." meat was made possible by China's fear of Russia. Kissinger's closest asso- ciate in the Paris talks, Deputy Assist- ant Secretary of State William H. Sul- livan, believes that Peking promoted a settlement because it feared that Indo- china might come to be dominated by Hanoi and susceptible to Moscow. He omitted to add that Russia promoted a settlement for precisely the opposite reason, out of fear that China might come to dominate the area. What the Nixon-Kissinger diplomacy did, with consummate skill, was not to balance the two, but to play them off against each other. Is this the pattern for the "balance of power diplomacy" in the world at large of which Mr: Nixon speaks? Before his visits to Mos- cow and Peking, he sought to reassure Vietnam Aftermath It's over. Or at least it is supposed to be tomorrow; completion and announcement of agreementbetween the United States and North Vietnam did not deter final, senseless acts of combat just before the cease-fire is to take effect. The very notion of an end to the Vietnam war is hard to comprehend in the abstract, so accustomed have we all become to the outpouring of spirit, wealth and manhood which the decade past has demanded of us. This Republic has learned much about itself, about its leaders, about the world and the meaning of power from the ordeal it suffered in mountains and rice paddies half- way around the globe. Not all the lessons are comforting ?in fact few of them are. ? If Vietnam is to have any meaning at all, these lessons must be defined and absorbed by a coming generation just as the problems of the war dominated the sensi- tivities of the generation now maturing. "No More Viet- nams" has already become a sort of national battle cry. It is now the country's great task to ensure that this expression of hope will be turned into reality. ? Vietnam spanned the era of American foreign policy after. World War II, from the epoch when the prime objective was "containment" of international Com- munism, to the present day when co-existence with Corn- his hosts by declaring that he did not want to set them at each other's throats. The fact remains that their mutual hostility was the most important factor in making both his visits a success. The United States is hardly likely to forego the opportunity to exploit their enmity so long . as it continues. The "structure of peace" between the Com- munist powers and the United States in the post-Vietnam world rests in the shaky foundations of the Sino-Sovitt quarrel. ? . The balance betWeen the five gre-ot powers is often viewed as a state Of ' equilibrium in which their previously conflicting interests hate been brought into correspondence. BLit. the classical notion of the balance ce. nower in- volves a dynamic relationshi; lietwen three countries of varying ::',.ength. Where one power strives for s. ?.!.em- acy, and looks like achieving it ?`-vsr the second power, the third play,'? adds its own weight to that of the weaker country, in order to prevent a dangerous accumulation of strength in the hands of the first This is, by its very nature, a constantly changing and, shifting relationship, which is made much more changeable by the rapid pace of economic and technological growth in the modern world. So the first condition for the manip- ulation by the United States of the world balance of power is the mainte- nance of imbalance. This is what the other ;four powers, including Japan and Europe, will increasingly suspect, with distrust rising to hostility, unless the United States offers soon a de- tailed explanation of its thinking in support of its claims that such suspi- cions are groundless. 1973 Victor Zora munism is seen as possible, necessary and desirable? for mutual benefit and survival. The Communist world, too, has evolVed. The United States might not have gone into Vietnam had the depth of schism between the Soviet Union and China been clearly perceived; it could not have come out safely if this schism had not become the dominant' reality to both Moscow and Peking. Some will argue that America's firmness in Vietnam has hastened the growth of a less overtly menacing form of national Communism; it certainly did not retard this evolution, as pessimistic Americans feared it would. When President Kennedy led the nation into what became an open-ended military commitment to a strug- gling small state, the United States Government was confident in its own power and skill, and it enjoyed the confidence of the American people. As President Nixon succeeds finally in extracting the nation, poorer and wiser, from the commitment, confidence is not a senti- ment in surplus across the land. Americans today have learned to distrust the notion. of a war to end wars. Yet it is possible to retain a certain faith. It may not be empty rhetoric to believe that the scars of Vietnam can bring new strength as they heal, strength gathered in a clearer definition of the priorities for the use of national power. strength can come from a more precise evaluation of the possibilities and limi- tations inherent in that power. And strength can spring from understanding, from tolerance and from humility. 39 - - ---Approved-For ReteaSe-200-1/0-81P77-0043-2R000-1-0008000-1--8 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 WASHINGTON STAR 1 February 1973 CROSBY S. NOYES emocracy in Asia Conv:'llnues Pla SeId Dell7fiLe Is it an inevitable part of the American retreat from Asia that democracy in that part of the world is doomed? There is evidence enough to support the argument. Since the proclamation of the Nixon doctrine of limited commit- ment, since the reduction of American military power in the Western Pacific area, since the' withdrawal from Vietnam and the end of Ameri- can predominance in Asia, the trend against democratic gov- ernment has been impressive. Not that there were so many democracies to begin with. In South Korea, democratic gov- ernment under Syngman Rhee and his successors always has been a fragile flower and now, under President Park Chung Hee, apparently has been defi- nitely discarded. No one could ever have accused the Nation- alist Chinese bastion of Tai- wan, for all its achievements, of respecting the rules of self-government. The ,philippines has had a go at it, and it has been a misera- ble failure. The proclamation of martial law and the as- sumption of one-man rule by Philippine President Ferdi- nand Marcos are hailed by most of his countrymen as an inevitable and desirable devel- opment. WASHINGTON STAR 26 January 1973 The same pattern applies to the rest of Southeast Asia. Anyone wile looks forward to the development of the demo- cratic ideal anywhere ? in In- donesia, in Singapore, in Laos and Cambodia, in Thailand and Burma ? probably is nourishing a dying illusion. ? Everywhere, it seems, the move toward totalitarianism as a defense against commu- nism is the order of the day. Oddly enough, the exception so far among the Southeast Asian states is South Vietnam. Listening to American liber- als, one could well come to the conclusion that the Saigon re- gime is the least democratic in the area. But the fact is that for a nationimminently threatened in its existence, the record of the Saigon regime has been extraordinarily ? in Asian terms ? liberal. In the midst of mortal war, constitutional conventions have been held, elections orga- nized, an opposition tolerated in politics and the press. In one of the very few instances in history, the authority of a government fighting for its life has been severely circum- scribed in the measures that it has been able to take in its own self-defense. This, to be sure, may not last much longer. The depar- ture of the American presence has been marked in Vietnam, Philip ph 'Tragedy The saddest thing about the death of democracy in the Philippines is that Ferdinand E. Marcos is probably right: A very great majority of his countrymen want him to run the country indefinitely as an absolute dictator. At any rate, he has accommodated them with a vengeance. By proclama- tion, Marcos has now extended a nation- al state of martial law and abolished the parliament indefinitely. Elections that were scheduled for next November will not be held. By his own order, he has assumed the offices of both president and prime minister which he proposes to exercise for at least the next seven years -- or until "normalcy" is restored in the country:Martial law, says Marcos, will be maintained "only as long as necessary," which, on the record, could mean for- ever. Many will say that the people of the Philippines have asked for it ? Marcos, for one. He is only bowing to what he claims is the overwhelming mandate of as elsewhere, by a move to- ward authoritarian govern- ment by those who are being left on their own. It is fairly predictable the government in Saigon will become increasing- ly. centralized ? and also quite possibly increasingly repres- sive ? in the months to come. And, distressing as this may be to the liberal community in this country, it will appear as elementary common sense to , the great majority of Vietnam- ese. There are exceptions, to be sure. In South Vietnam, as in the Philippines and Korea and elsewhere, there , are some who deplore the demise of the demorca tic idea that flourished for a brief peri- od of American predominance in the postwar era. There are even some who believe that the present trend toward total- itarianism is not irreversible and that the United States has an opportunity and an obliga- tion to do something about it. I have a letter from Kim Dae Jung, the young South Ko- rean legislator who unsuccess- fully opposed President ?Park in the elections of 1971,,, bitter- ly protesting Park's recent seizure of dictatorial powers and blaming American policy to a large degree. The problem, as Kim sees it, is that Asian democracy is lit- tle more than a byproduct of the people, given him under, a govern- ment-organized "opinion poll" in which several million Filipinos expressed their approval by a show of hands. More total contempt for the democratic process would be hard to imagine. To be sure, the Philippines have nev- er been the showplace of Asian democra- cy that Americans havefl liked to think their former colony represented. Corrup- tion in politics and in the everyday life of the country was rampant. Anarchy was the order of the day and a total disregard for the elements of law and order was more or less taken for granted. Marcos has provided a remedy ? of a sort. By suppressing every element of the press he may be able to assure effective government and even possibly bring about the new, reformed society that he has been promising. Yet Marcos himself is now the victim of the greatest corrup- tion of all ? the corruption of absolute power. And his countrymen, very surely, will suffer for it. 40 American victory. in? World War II and that the United States has been highly undis: criminating in backing any government which proclaims itself to be anti-Communist, regardless of how dictatorial it may be. As a result, "demo- cratic forces in Asian cOun- tries have been attacked by communism on the left and by dictatorship on the right And were unable to take root." ' .The effort of the NixonCad, ministration to normalize rela- tions with Communist China and the withdrawal of Ameri- can power from Asia have ac- celerated the trend toward au- thoritarian government. In Kim's view, this has "tended to hasten 'democratic' leaders of Asia to take drastic meas- ures to consolidate their pow- ers along the line of military, dictatorship in dealing with Communist leaders in the, course of political Confronta- . tion instead of developing the' growth of democratic institu- tions." In the case of_South Korea,. Kim is quite right. President Park's seizure of power cer- tainly was precipitated by the uncertainties provoked by the shifting American policy and by developing contacts with the Communist North which pose a potential threat to polit- ical stability in the South. To some extent, it also is true of the Philippines, Thailand and South Vietnam, all of which seem headed down the path cf military dictatorship. Kim remains mildly hopeful that in time the combined influ- ence of the United States and, Japan may swing the pendit; lum back toward a revival of Asian democracy. The alterna- tive, as he sees it, is that .la-, pan itself will relapse into mil- itaristic authoritarianism, with consequences for Asia and,. the rest of the world that can- not be foreseen. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 WASHINGTON POST 31 JANUARY 1973 Robert II. Johnson Will 'Peace With Honor' Lead to Peace ith Bombs? "I said . . . tliatI did not want to speculate on North Vietnamese motives; I have too much trouble analyzing our own." ? Henry Kis- singer at his January 24 press con- ference. From one point of view, the Vietnam cease-fire agreement is a magnificent achievement. Its bewildering array of organizations, principles and processes permits us to argue without fear of contradiction that ? as the President - said in his speech to the nation ? the U.S. has achieved "the goals that we. considered essential for peace with honor." At the same time, it allows the Communists to claim victory be- cause it removes the U.S. from the ground in Indochina while leaving Communist political and military ele- ments in place and offering them ex- cellent prospects for future success. The agreement seeks ?to initiate a series of processes leading eventually The writer . is the Charles Evans Hughes Professor of Gov- ernment at Colgate University. He was a member of the State Department's Policy Planning Council from. 1962-67. to reconciliation and peace. But it is upon cooperation between two anta- gonists who refuse to recognize each other's legitimacy. The prospects are that disagreements will lead to the stalling and rapid breakdown of the various joint commissions and super- visory bodies; no elections will be held;? no agreed reports on cease-fire viola- tions are likely, and so forth. SAIGON MAY TAKE the initiative, through assassinations and other ac- tions against Communist elements, to provoke Communist responses. The. Communists, in turn, may revert to a, program of assassinations of govern- ment officials and other kinds of low- level guerrilla activity. In this situa- tion the temptation to raise the mili- tary ante will be strong, especially for Saigon which may believe that it has a temporary military advantage. In view of U.S. responsibility for the situation in _ Indochina, no morally sensitive American can contemplate the likelihood of continued hostilities with equanimity. But the key question for most Americans will be whether the cease-fire agreement will end our military involvement in the struggle. For an answer, we must examine the issue Dr. Kissinger refused to? address in his press conference ? the question or the-motivations of North Vietnam and the U.S. WE CAN ASSERT with assurance', on the basis of history and the state- ments made by the North Vietnamese. leaders since the announcement of the agreement, that Hanoi will not give up the. struggle. Moreover, it seems genuinely to view the new context of the struggle as one promising ultimate victory for the Communist cause. Re- ports indicate that Communist ele- ments in the South have been directed to lie low for the next two to five months. . That period evidently is judged to be the interval required for the phy- sical and the psychological disengage- ment of the U.S. from the war. (On' the same reasoning, the. Saigon govern- ment may see the two-five months as the period during which it must re- assure itself of continuing U.S. support by engaging in provocations to produce Communist "violations" of the cease- fire; violations which will be utilized ? to stimulate U.S. reprisals.) . As Dr. Kissinger's statement implies,, there has been, and continues to be, a great deal of ambiguity as to ultimate U.S. purposes. Ever since the Nixon administration first announced its basic Vietnam policies in November 1969, there has been a serious question as to whether President Nixon gives priority to ending ALL U.S. involve- ment in the war or priority to ensuring the indefinite continuation of a, non-.. Communist regime in Saigon.' IN THE U.S. government, this kind of question is seldom answered in the ? abstract, at least in a meaningful sense. Rather, policy-makers develop certain predispositions which become evident only when they confront concrete sit- uations. One such concrete situation was the conclusion of a tentative agree- ment last October. That agreement, like the final one, suggested, if taken at face value, that the U.S. was giving priority to ending its involvement through a "soft" settlement. But it was precisely this softness that appears to have evoked the President's con- cern and led to the devastation bomb- ing of Hanoi-Haiphong. Kissinger ? evidently had read the. President's. motivations somewhat inaccurately. Reading U.S. motivations as they affect our future actions in Indochina is a science that is little more advanced than Kremlinology or the reading of tea leaves. But during the months of negotiations there have been some in- dicators. All tend to suggest that we take the agreement very seriously and? that we can .be expected to react strenuously to significant "violations" of it. Some of these indicators are these: ? One of the issues over which the tentative agreement broke down was the size and freedom of action of the 141 international supervisory force. The President evidently sees that force as a significant deterrent to violations and as a mechanism that will provide. the rationale for U.S. unilateral en- forcement action should violations occur. ? In the late fall, several hundred , .Foreign Service. Officers with prior , service in Vietnam were alerted for , return to Vietnam. They were to pro- ' vide the ? U.S. with a unilateral in- spection force for the post cease-fire period. Emplacing Foreign Service of- ficeri in the countryside may make a great deal of sense if you want to cite the Communists for every violation and intend to counter, or retaliate fog, such violations. It makes no sense all if you expect an ultimate col*: munist takeover ,and hope it will prq- ceed relatively quietly and unnoticed.; ? It was reported in the fall that the U.S. would put its substantial mili- tary advisory group into civilian cloth- ing and leave it in Vietnam, thus by- passing in a formal sense the require- ment for removal of all U.S., military personnel. This tactic has been em- ployed in Laos and it offers the'same prospect for continuing U.S.. engage- ment. in Vietnam .as it did in Laos.. ? It was reported last week that sub-' '- stantial American air forces will be retained in the Indochina area for the indefinite future, thus assuring us the means for military retaliation for violations of the agreement.- These actions suggest that the 'ase- fire agreement is not intended X_ a veil behind which we will quietly st,\1 away with our POW's, but as a ously enforceable arrangement which could ensure the peace of Indochina and offer very substantial hope for the survival of a non-Communist gov- ernment in Saigon. If this is an accurate conclusion? and if, as it appears, Mr. Nixon Is very sensitive to the possibility that the adverse actions of others consti-' tute personal and national challenges of will?then the continuation of the military and political conflict in the three Indochinese states will mean a 'very high likelihood of .U.S. military 're-involvement. We shall be bombing ? do keep the peace. It could be argued that the cease- fire agreement and the rhetoric that has accompanied its publication have .shifted public opinion in a way that .restricts presidential freedom of ac- tion'. But can one be sure of a neg- ative public response to a presi- dential appeal that bombing or other military action is essential' "to pre- serve the peace" that the cease-fire, agreement had supposedly achieved? Perhaps the most powerful deterrent to U.S. military re-involvement is the certainty that renewed bombing would ' produce new American POW's whom we would have to extricate through new negotiations and new agreements. -Approved-for-Release 2004/08107--:-C-71A-R13P77-00432R000100080001-8- ?WASHINGTON PO_Appro For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-8 b-T ved 27 JANUARY 1973 "77 ytJ'i 11i By Jonathan C. Randal washington Po 3E Forcian Service . PARTS, Jan. 26 ? Free elections are supposed to provide South Vietnam with stable and lasting institu- tions. But there is good rea- son to believe that meaning- ful elections of any kind will not take. place for a ? long time, if ever. The timing and type of . elections are left up to the two rival South Vietnames administrations to settle by, "unanimity." ? The body designated to or- ganize elections, the Na- tional Council of Reconcilia- tion and Concord, is sup- posed to indlude equal num- bers of Saigon, Vietcong and neutralist members. But, ? both South Vietnamese, sides have reiterated their ' seem in gly irreconcilable - views on what kinds of elec- tions they want. Presidential Vote Saigon Foreign Minister Tran Van Lam again this week announced that his government favors presi- dential elections within three months. This is a natural enough option since Presi- dent Thieu figures that the Vietcong could not manage. to win such a contest so soon after the cease-fire. Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh, the Provisional Revolution- ary Government (Vietcong) foreign minister said she ' favors elections for a con- stituent assembly. That im- plies 'lengthy haggling to 77. (rYrf