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August 31, 1973
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Approved -For-_Release-2Q0..1JG8/m C1A- RQeZ7--QM2R000100220001=2 INTERNAL USE ONLY This publication contains clippings from the domestic and foreign press for YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use of selected items would rarely be advisable. GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS GENERAL FAR EAST /uz2.G~cY' .Gtr L ~ZL`t2~ D'} GIJLt 1L Approved For Release 2001 FM~P77-00432R000100220001-2 'Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100220001-2 LOS ANGELES TIMES 31 August 1.973 , ? n ? r CIA Has".Its Virtues-=-as Kennedy Learned BY HARRY ROSITZKE ' The Central Intelligence Agency's connection to the Ellsberg and .Watergate affairs has again, raised: the question of the agency's proper functions in the foreign affairs oft: the United States. What does CIA'' contribute? Do we need intelligence,` secret or otherwise? Why spy?' .. ' The word "intelligence" in the. agency's title covers two widely' se- parate activities: academic-type re- search and analysis in Washington, and secret operations abroad. The CIA's main overseas mission.' 'is to carry on espionage and counter= espionage work, a mission that rare- ly warrants\ notice on the front; pages. Its principal function in. government,' however, is to provide' the President with estimates of! foreign events and situations that are as objective and as close to real-. ity as is humanly possible. r Such estimates are based upon a, solid foundation of evidence terpretation, the CIA's main day-to-, day business. What is happening to' the Chilean economy? What popular .support do the Greek colonels en- joy? What prompted Peking to wave. a friendly Ping-Pong paddle at Washington? What military and .economic pressures led Leonid I.:, Brezhnev into his opening. to the' West? Espionage reports per se normally;, contribute only a small share to.the'; pool of information with which the: CIA's intelligence analysts work,' but occasionally a single agent-re-, port makes a crucial difference. A Communist source delivered a., 'verbatim copy of Nikita S. Khrush- chev's 1956 "secret speech" that, alerted the world to the force and venom with which the new Soviet; regime rejected Josef Stalin and his policies. In another case, a.l few re ,ports from a Soviet colonel in Mos-' .cow "saved the-.Pentagon' at least a, quarter-billion dollars in research and development. Two agents in dif- ferent parts of the . world=both: Communist Party meinbers~--sent'in the first reports.. of border ' differ-' ences -between Moscow and Peking ,--as early as the winter of 1957-58.? The Cuban missile crisis was a- dramatic example of the confluence of basic research, analysis, predic- tion 'and agent-reports that gave President Kennedy the .information needed to make his decisions., Without a specialist' on. Soviet crates who could judge what was. inside the boxes on the decks of So viet freighters going to Cuba, with-'j, out experts on Soviet launching- . sites, without the previous U!2 Harry Rositzke worked for the., Office of Strategic Services and the Central Intelligence Agency for 26 years before he retired in 1970. He is author of the book, "U.S.S.R. Today." flights over the U.S.S.R., without de-.' ,tailed military-technical data from a 'top-level agent in Moscow, without a '.few. sound (among the many un- sound) leads provided by agents in-; side Cuba-without all these, the So-: viet missiles could easily have be- come operational before the Pres- .ident was able to take preventive ac- Lion. ' It is essential, of course, that the Intelligence 'analyst be:'as free as `possible from preconceptions thatf will prejudice his 'conclusions. His, 'task, like that of the academic his-'' ?torian or the journalist, is to let thgy~ A major threat to the exercise of unprejudiced analysis in the govern= ment is the distorting influence of so-called departmental -intelligence, ,-estimates m .a d e in the. Departe', mentsof State and Defense on mat ters 'of'. crucial policy interest' to; them.`-' The main virtue of central ihtel= ligence is to. produce independent; national estimates and not leave the. estimating function in the hands of. the policy-makers. Any department of 'the"govern-' ment.with policy-making powers is .bound on. occasion to use the-infor-. mation available 'to it in support of its own policies. The' Department of 'State, for example, may be inclined, 'to select or highlight facts and inter-, pretations -that support the depart-i ment's or?, the President's adopted :,courses of. action-say, in the Arab-' -Israeli conflict'drin'the India-Pakis-' ;tan confrontation on Kashmir and, Bangladesh. The Defense Department similarly will tend to. overestimate an enemy's capabilities and be constantly. 'alarmed-about his intentions. Gener-' ,als naturally want more' and better 'arms to meet these "threats," and it' in around budget tiniethat the mill Lary tells Congress and the public .about its principal worries: the, `alarming number of Soviet missiles; 'and launching sites,, the impressive ?size and quality of the enemy sub-:' marine fleet,,an. impending Chinese,, missile threat. ' On these and other crucial infor-' 'mation? questions, the -CIA's. index' pendent ' intelligence function ' has, ;served over . ' the; _ years to give the ,President.'as disinterested 'and -level-i `headed "estimates. of the situation", as only a separate intelligence agen.. ,cy can. % j It is not surprising, therefore, that! in the great game of counting Soviet-, missiles the CIA's numbers have. consistently been more modest, than' the Pentagon's.' , Some attack all Intelligence work, ,departmental or, central-as one ban Missile- Unsis writer did on this page some weeks , , . -ago. Such critics appear to be con-, vinced that the 'intelligence' function' ;serves no, useful purpose, since the. analyst always comes out with the. '` conclusion he subjectively wants. t In my own experience, this is` simply not true. The analysts I have known are not only extremely well informed but reasonably, self-criti-' cal, ahd, when they differ with each other, the .arguments that ensue are' r likely to shake out any hidden as-' `'sumptions or political. biases one or .another may entertain.. Intelligence) work is a profession, not a bureauc-: ' 'cratic game, ' and personal detach-' ment is a basic element in -the profession's ethic. Yet, intelligence analysts, like his- {torians or journalists, are ,human "and subject to the deeper social-pre. judices. of their time. ,t In the. hysteria of -the cold war. ,years, for- example, there were fe v' Americans who.. were 'not convinced of a real" Sovi6t,threat 'to overrun Western Europe or to blast the Unit ed States with atomic bombs. There was never. any rational evidence- then or now-that Moscow ever en= tertained such intention's. During .the 'S0s there were widespread-pub ' 1ic'and private fears-now-ludicrous: ,in retrospect-that the American. Communist Party threatened the se curity.of the nation. These were hu- ,,man, not academic or bureaucratic, aberrations. - All men, -of course, think' partly with their stomachs but, fortunate- the, CIA's analysts need not--;and ?do'not-think first of justifying poli-, Gies or fortifying budget requests:',:. What concerns me more than any built-in inadequacy . of the Lintel-. 'ligence system is the failure of'poll- cy-makers to make' better use of the, information they are given. The war in Vietnam is a tragic ex-, ample. A careful reader 'of the Pen- tagon Papers will recognize that-;the, CIA estimates on Vietnam were, far closer to reality than were the opts. mistic forecasts of the generals, 'It was an extensive,. detailed CIA stu dy in the, mid-'60s that first, con- '.vinced the secretary of defense that' the Vietnamese war would be a long, 'one and that it could not-be won on' the battlefield. ' Good intelligence does not auto. 'matically make for good, policy deci-,j sions, nor does it make up for bad 'decisions. Presidents do not make 'decisions on the basis of intelligence' alone, for they work under the. pres-' sures of allies, Congress, the Amerl' ,can public and domestic interest. groups., If, in the final analysis, the Pres-1 ident's decisions are subject to per.'-; sonal inclination or outside in- fluences, that is, not a fault of intel- ligence.. - , . ' - . Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100220001-2 THE PROGRESSIVE September 1973 The CIA's under Fire irty' ''ricks -at Last For the first time in more than two decades, Congress is beginning to take a hard look at the Central Intel- ligence Agency. In the wake of revelations of CIA com- plicity in the Watergate affair, a serious debate about the Agency is now taking shape, and it could develop into an historic battle over the role of clandestine oper- ; .,Lions in American foreign policy. "Clandestine operations" (which should not be con- fused with the gathering of foreign intelligence) in- clude a wide range of political,. propaganda, economic, cultural, and paramilitary activities known within the CIA as "covert action" and "special operations," or, more generally, Dirty Tricks. These operations have included, over the years, such practices as: S Hidden support and assistance to political parties in., foreign election campaigns. ? The establishment of dummy foundations to pro- vide funds for a number of private organizations en- gaged in scholarship, propaganda, labor, youth,. and cultural affairs. ? Establishing ostensibly independent,- private com- panies, including a number of airlines. ? Arranging coups d'etat; supporting, training, and leading private armies and air forces in foreign nations. ? Helping to establish security police organizations in a number of countries, and other Cold War ploys. The CIA operations amount, in, total; tq a clandes- tine American foreign policy under , the exclusive control of the President, insulated from public control and even from public scrutiny-not to mention Con- gress itself. President Nixon has given a clear signal that he places a high value on covert operations. His new Di- rector of Central Intelligence, William Egan Colby, fifty-three, spent his adult life in Dirty Tricks, begin- ning with OSS guerrilla operations in World War II and' culminating in a twelve-year stint as one of the CIA officials most deeply involved in the Vietnam war. Colby was CIA station chief in Saigon (and a staunch supporter of President Ngo Dinh Diem) from 1959 to 1961. From 1962 through 1967 he was chief of the Far East Division of the Clandestine Services, the formal title of the operating arm of the CIA. From 1968 to 1971 he was involved with the "pacification" program in Vietnam, first as deputy and later as am- bassador in charge. In 1971-72 he was back in Wash- ington again as Executive Director (number three man) at the Agency. When that post was abolished in a reorganization this year, he became head of the Directorate of Operations, which runs the Clandestine Services. Andrew Hamiliton is a Washington writer whose articles have appeared in many publications; including Congressional Quarterly, Science, The New York Times, and The Economist in 4ondon. Recently he served in the office of program analysis. of the National Security Council, where he specialized in the defense program and arms control plans. He wrote '"Helpless Giant," a study of the national de/en;e budget. ' Colby is a .quiet, undemonstrative man-"when he's really mad he's almost whispering," recalls a former employe-whose mild manner conceals the toughness and boldness of a behind-the-lines guerrilla fighter. He has the reputation of being one of the CIA's most re- sourceful managers of Dirty Tricks. He was responsi- ble, as head of the pacjfi ation program, for American participation in the Phoenix program' in which thou- sands of Vietnamese suspects were killed or jailed on suspicion that they worked for the Vietcong. Senator,. William Proxmire, Wisconsin Democrat, complained during the recent debate on Colby's nom- ination that, the Senate was being asked to cast a "blind vale:" He observed: "We don't really know who Mr. Colby is, We are not allowed to go back into his persopal employment history and judge his fitness. We do not know what jobs he has accomplished .. . And we, will be confirming him for a blind position [about which] we know very little...." Although the Senate confirmed Colby August 1 by a vote of eighty-three to thirteen, the decisive battle will begin this.. fall. Senator John C. Stennis, Mississip- pi Democrat, has announced that his Senate Armed Services Committee will hold hearings on the CIA's basic legislative charter to determine whether the Agency exceeded its authority in waging war in Laos and. in its involvement with the White House "plumb- ers".in the Watergate affair. Stennis's Committee is the one whose CIA Oversight Subcommittee has failed to meet for several years, and whose members have rarely expressed any interest in supervising the secret and powerful Agency. But the hearings come amid a growing feeling in Washington- expressed even by Chairman Stennis-that the CIA's Cold War mission as the clandestine action arm of U.S. foreign policy no longer serves the national inter- est, if it ever did. ' The man who founded the CIA in 1947, President Harry S Truman, reached this conclusion a full decade ago.. In 1963, he wrote: "For some time I have been disturbed by, the way the CIA has been diverted from its original assignment. It has become an operational and at times a policy-making arm of the Govern- ment . . . I', never had any thought that when I set up the CIA it would be injected into peacetime cloak- and-dagger. operations." Other Presidents have had qualms about the CIA. John F. Kennedy,' a former aide once said, wanted to "splinter it into a thousand pieces and scatter it to the winds" after the Bay of Pigs disaster, a CIA- ,planned operation which Kbnnedy'had approved. Lyn- don B. Johnson,'hardty a shrinking violet when it came to U.S. exploits abroad, was appalled by the ramifica- tions of some CIA operations. When he took office he learned, according to an account by Leo Janos in the July, 1973, Atlantic, that "we had been operating a 'damned Murder Inc. in the Caribbean." Even Rich- ard M. Nixon, in a 1969 speech to CIA employes,' acknowledged that "this organization has a mission that, by necessity, runs, counter to some of the very deeply held traditions in the country, and feelings, high Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100220001-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100220001-2 idealistic feelings, about what a free society ought to be." But President Kennedy, like his successors, soon came to recognize the immense potential of an organization whose acts could be neither traced by the victims nor? supervised by his political opponents in Congress. The Kennedy years, in the opinion of one former intelli- gence official, became "the heyday" for the CIA's covert political intervention in other countries. President Johnson followed by unleashing massive CIA oper- ations in Laos and South Vietnam. And President Nix- on, in the same 1969 speech, concluded that the CIA "is t necessary adjunct to the . conduct of the Presidency." What both troubled and attracted these Presidents was not the CIA's "quiet intelligence" activities, but its wide range of Dirty Tricks. In the decade since Harry Truman's warning, little has been done to curb the President's own Back Alley Boys. Except for a hand- ful of progressives, Congress continued politely to look the other way and ask no embarrassing questions. Now, in the lurid light of Watergate, Congress can no longer refuse to take a closer look. By their very nature, covert operations defy effective Congressional oversight. A handful of men in the House and Senate, senior members of the Armed Serv-. ices and Appropriations Committees, are the only members of Congress allowed to ask the Agency what it is doing. Their meetings have always been secret, and their deliberations are never disclosed even to, other. members of Congress. Their recommendations to the Agency, if any, have never been tested in general de- bate or put to a vote of Congress. ? From the time of its. inception, the CIA's name ? has been synonymous with secrecy; no outsider can hope- to obtain more than a rough map of its terrain. It is the Agency's practice neither to confirm nor to deny any allegations made about it. CIA employes take the most stringent secrecy oath administered by the Gov- ernment. This oath has been interpreted by the Agency as prohibiting a present or former employe from reveal- ing anything he has learned while working for the. CIA-an interpretation that has won at least partial support in the Federal courts. Victor Marchetti, a for- mer CIA official, is under court order to submit the manuscript of his forthcoming book about the Agency for review before publication, and the Agency has been authorized to make deletions, provided they are not arbitrary or capricious. But the Agency has found it impossible to remain wholly invisible. The picture I present here was as- sembled from the public record (which grows longer almost daily), and from interviews conducted over a period of several years with a number of present and former CIA employes, intelligence officials from other U.S. agencies, foreign service officers, Congressional sources, and Administration aides. (While I had a limited contact with CIA intelligence analysts when I servgd as a member of the National Security Council staff in 1970-1971, I had no contact with the clandes- tine organization or activities of the CIA.) The CIA has both a public and a secret charter. The public charter, on which Senator Stennis's hear-, I - ngs will focus, is found in the National Security Act of 1947 and its 1949 amendments (U.S. Code Chapter 50, Title 15, sections 403 ff.). It is the vaguest of char- ters, stating that the CIA shall "coordinate" intelligence activities undertaken in the interest of national security and shall: o Advise the National Security Council regarding national security intelligence activities. o Make recommendations to the NSC for coordina- tion of intelligence activities. @ Correlate, evaluate, and disseminate national se- curity intelligence. 0 Perform "for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies such additional services of common concern" as the NSC directs. 0 "Perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct." The last two provision's provide the official rationale for the CIA's clandestine activities, both in collecting intelligence and in performing covert operations.' ,These duties are detailed in the Agency's "secret char- ter"-a series of top-secret Presidential 'orders known as National Security Council Intelligence Directives, or "N-Skids." The Senate Armed Services Committee, which has jurisdiction over the National Security Act, apparently has never seen these documents, though they are essen- ? tial to an understanding of the CIA's 'clandestine op- erations. Colby, the new director, recently promised to make -the "N-Skids" available to the Committee, but there is no reason to assume that they will be disclosed to the public. Section 403(d) also contains two seemingly contra- dictory provisos regarding CIA activities within the United -States. One declares that "the Agency shall have no police, subppena, law-enforcement powers, or internal security functipns." The other states that "the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for' protecting -intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." The first proviso, which the ?CIA. apparently violated in extending assistance to the White House "plumb- ers," was intended to protect the FBI's turf from CIA encroachment and to restrict the CIA to foreign intel- ligence activities. The second proviso, however, seems to give the Director scope for a broad. range of domes- tic counter-intelligence activities. Whatever the justi- fication, the CIA has not ? been reluctant to undertake clandestine operations within the' United States. The Act also permits the Agency to keel) secret its budget, organization, personnel strength, identity of personnel, and other operational and administrative details, notwithstanding other provisions of law, and to spend money without regard for normal Government procedures. Three points about the ,CIA's charter stand out: FIRST, the Agency is answerable directly to the Pres- ident, and to the President alone. (The National Se- curity Council is merely an advisory body made up of Presidential appointees-the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director,of the Office of Emergency Preparedness.) SECOND, the CIA enjoys extraordinary freedom from public and even Congressional scrutiny. THIRD, its duties encompass much more than the routine collection and evaluation of information. "The powers of the proposed 'Agency," warned Secretary of State George C. Marshall in a memorandum to Pres- ident Truman in 1947, "seem almost unlimited and need clarification." The CIA grew rapidly from its first days in A947. ("Bigger than [the Department of] State by '48,".was a common boast.) The Agency now has about 16,500 employes (after a seven per cent reduction in force put into effect earlier this year by Director James R. Schlesinger, now Secretary of Defense). In recent years its direct budget has hovered around $750 million, 3 --------Approved-For-Release - - 220999-= Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100220001-2 including funds for direct expenses and covert projects, but it may now be slightly lower as a ,result ? of the winding down of the wars in Vietnam and Laos. Similar in size, budget, and overseas staff, the CIA- rivals-if it does not surpass-,the Department of State; as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy. ; In A Thou- sand, Days, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. wrote that in 1961 the Agency "had almost as many people under official. cover overseas (i.e., posing as employes of other Gov- ernment agencies, such as the Foreign Service or AID) as State; in a number of countries CIA officers out- numbered those from State in the political sections (of the U.S. mission). Often the CIA station chief had been in the country longer than the ambassador, had more. money at his disposal, and exerted more influence." This situation seems to have changed little' in the; last twelve years. Some recent U.S. foreign policy offi- cials ' :icve that the CIA's overseas employes, both direct and indirect, U.S. nationals and foreign, includ- ing those, operating under "deep cover"-that is, with no visible ties' to the U.S. Government-far outnum- ber those of the State Department. For a variety of reasons, the CIA's direct budget (including project money) does not begin to tell the full story of the Agency's size or role within the Gov- ernment: 0 In large overseas clandestine operations, such as. the war in Laos, covert activities in Vietnam, and the Bay of Pigs invasion, direct Agency costs and project, funds represent only a fraction of the total costs to the U.S. Government. The staff of the Senate Foreign Re- lations Committee found earlier this year, for instance,, that of the $375 million ceiling set by legislation for spending in Laos (until recently a CIA operation) dur-; ing the last fiscal year, only $5.5 million represented direct CIA expenditures, while another $60 million was distributed "by- the CIA as project money for support j of Laos and `Thai irregular troops. The rest ~of the, funds were supplied from the budgets of the Agency for InterIlational Development and the Defense De- partment. (These Laos program figures exclude addi- tional large costs for U.S. air operations in Laos, many of which" have, been in support of CIA-directed military operations.) SANDERS IN THE MILWAUKEE JOURNAL "No, dear, they weren't on trial ... they were the prosecuting team" ? Force intelligence agencies; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the minusFule State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research; and such miscellaneous 'other organizations as the National Photo Interpreta- tion Center and the. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, the latter of which transcribes and translates overseas radio. broadcasts. When the tactical military ,intelligence operations of the various military com- mands around the world are i.'cluded, the annual cost may reach $6 billion, according to some sound esti- mates. In cost, personnel, and influence, the foreign intelligence "community" ranks with 'or above several Cabinet departments. - The CIA is organized into four main divisions; known as "directorates," each headed by a deputy director. Until recently, these men reported more or less formal- ly to the Executive Director, nominally the Agency's number three man. Under Schlesinger's reorganization plan, the post of Executive Director was abolished, early, in 1973 and the incumbent, at that time William ?E. Colby, was made the head of the Agency's largest branch, the Directorate of Operations, which has re- sponsibility for all clandestine activities and for the CIA's eighty-five overseas stations. In recent years this Directorate (formerly called "Plans") has had about 6,500 to 7,000 employes and a budget of about $350 million, or nearly half the, Agency total. The other directorates are: ? The CIA has financed, and apparently controls, a number of private corporations which provide cover for covert activities overseas. Of these the largest and best known is Air America. Earnings from these activities are said to be available to the Agency in addition to the annual budget provided from general Federal rev- enues. ? The CIA has the use without cost, according to former officials, of U.S. military bases and "surplus" equipment, from which it is said to have built up a large worldwide supply and operational base network. For these reasons alone, the CIA has been called a. multi-billion annual operation. But, in addition, the Director of Central Intelligence, in his role as head of the U.S. foreign intelligence community, has respon- sibilities for coordinating the, activities and reviewing the budgets of all U.S. foreigrt- intelligence agencies and operations. In total, these activities-most of them under Defense Department auspices-cost between $3 billion and.$4 billion a year, not ,counting the CIA. These operations include the costly overhead recon- naissance activities of the Air Force (such as spy satel lates, U-2s, SR?71 aircraft) i communications and sig-' nals intelligence; which come under the direction of the $1-billion-a-year'National Security Agency; the analyt- ical staffs a4Id operations of the Army, Navy, and Air ? INTELLIGENCE, which collates, analyzes, and - dis- seminates intelligence collected by all U.S. foreign in- telligence agencies and also gathered from unclassified sources. The size of this directorate has been .esti- $75 million. roughly 3,000 persons; its budget, about ? SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, which oversees re- search and development of technical systems for collect- ing intelligence, such as spy satellites; analyzes scientific and' technical data collected by all sources, and circu- lates reports on its findings. The personnel strength is estimated at about 1,500; its budget at about $125 million, not counting large additional amounts (per- haps $500 million to $1 billion) spent annually by the National Reconnaissance Office and the Air Force on Approved For Release 2001/Q8/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100220001-2 'Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100220001-2 technical collection systems. # ADMINISTRATION, under which are lumped such functions as supply, finance, medical and personnel services, training, security, and communications. (Over- seas communications appear to have been transferred to Operatious under the Schlesinger reorganization.) In recent years,. the personnel' strength of this directorate has been estimated at roughly 4,500 and its budget at about $200 million a year. Former intelligence officials calculate that when sup- port costs are distributed, somewhere between two- thirds and three-quarters of the CIA's direct budget is allotted to clandestine operations. Of these funds, more than' half are said to go to various types of covert foreign policy operations-Dirty Tricks-rather than to intelligence collection and reporting by overseas stations. A separate staff known as the Office of National Estimates supervises the preparation of the intelligence community's principal long-range projections-the se- ries of National Intelligence Estimates which cover ,such diverse subjects as the strength and organization of the Vietcong and the size, trends, and doctrine of the Soviet strategic nuclear forces. The office is under the direction of the Board of National Estimates, a doz- en senior officials from CIA, State, and the military. In addition, a number of smaller staff offices are attached to the office of the Director. These include the inspector general, general counsel, legislative coun- sel, cable secretariat, and an office of plans, programs, and budgets. Perhaps the most important of these of- fices is the Intelligence Community Staff (ICS)., recent-, ly expanded by, Schlesinger and given a stronger role in coordinating the programs and budgets of the entire intelligence community. The Directorate of Operations constitutes the covert side of CIA, known as the Clandestine Services. Offi- cers of the Clandestine Services generally pose as offi- c4Is of some other U.S. Government agency or private organization, and sometimes use false names. Except for, some minor modifications that may have been in stitutad in the Schlesinger reorganization, the Director- ate is organized as follows: A. number of specialized, functional staffs oversee as- pects of clandestine activity. Their names provide some notion of the'range'of CIA work: Foreign Intelligence (espionage and political _ reporting) ; Counter-intelli- gence ('reporting the operations of -the intelligence' services of other nations) ; Covert Action and Political Action (secret financing of various youth, labor, cul- tural and academic groups, operating clandestine radiol propaganda outlets, large-scale efforts to influence for- eign elections) ; Special Operations (planning, support-' ing and directing paramilitary operations); ,and Tech-, nical Services (wiretapping, lie-detector operations, ille-' gal entry, false identities, disguises, and the like). Most work of the Clandestine Services is carried out by the large regional divisions and their field staffs'; abroad and in the United States. The major divisions, and some of their activities which have come to light,, are: DOMESTIC OPERATIONS DIvIsION, which allegedly re- cruits agents among foreign students and U.S. res- idents with .relatives in foreign-countries. It also in- terviews Americans planning 'to travel abroad for' pleasure or business and those who have recently re-, turned. (The Domestic Contact Service, which carries' out these interviews, was recently transferred from' the "overt" side of the Agency, where it was under the Directorate of Intelligence, to the Clandestine Services.) This Division also apparently conducts counter-intel- ligence activities among East European, Cuban, and other emigre groups in the United States. WESTERN HEMISPHERE DivisioN. Among the major known clandestine operations of the past twenty years are: ? Overthrowing the Guatemalan government of Jacobo Arbenz in, 1954. ? Setting up and supporting a special anti-Commu- nist police agency for the Batista regime in Cuba in 1956. The agency, known as BRAC, soon gained a reputation for brutality and oppression. ? Later backing anti-Castro'Cuban exiles in a variety of political and paramilitary activities, 'culminating in the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961. ? Helping to put down an attempted coup in Guate- mala in 1961, in part to protect the base of operations for the planned invasion of Cuba. ? Mounting a major covert political campaign to deny leftist Brazilian President Goulart cdntrol of the Brazilian Congress in. 1962. ? Advising and assisting the succcessful Bolivian ef- fort to capture Che Guevara in 1966-67. ? Intervening with covert financial and other sup- port for opponents of Salvador Allende in the Chilean Presidential elections of 1964 and 1971. FAR EAST DIVISION. Largest of the regional divisions, thin organization supervised: ? Large-scale clandestine operations by Nationalist Chinese and U.S. agents against mainland China from the Korean War period through the late 1960s. Agents were air-dropped into China-two, Richard G. Fecteau and John T. Downey, were captured in 1952 and freed after the U.S.-China rapprochement of 1971-and guerrillas and ? political agents were . infiltrated into Tibet in the late 1950s. ? The Philippine campaign against Huk guerrillas in the 1950s, ? U.S. efforts to establish the South Vietnamese gov- ernment of Ngo Dinh Diem after the Geneva settle- ment of 1954. CIA agents subsequently encouraged (at President Kennedy's direction) the generals' coup against Diem in 1963. ? An unsuccessful coup, against President Sukarno of Indonesia in 1958, in which an American pilot, Al- lan Pope, was captured. ? The arming, training,. and operations of an army of Meo tribesmen in Laos during the 1960s. ? Financing -and directing a wide range of clandes- tine and special operations during the 1960s in Viet- nam. These included cross-border operations into Laos and Cambgdia to gather intelligence and harass North Vietnamese' and Vietcong base areas, organizing and paying various mercenary groups, and setting up the Provincial 'Reconnaissance Units, special Vietnamese teams whose job was to locate and capture (or assassi- nate) Vietcong political agents. The latter effort, orig- inally organized under the "Combined Studies Divi- sion" of the U.S. military command in Vietnam, later became known as the Phoenix program, which Colby headed. NEAR EAST-SOUTH ASIA DIVISION, now reportedly be- coming one of the more active branches of the CIA. 'The best known CIA exploit in this part of the world was the coup which overthrew Premier Mohammed Mossadegh of Iran in 1953 and returned political power to the Shah. AFRICA DIVISION. Deeply involved in Congo affairs during the early and mid-1960s, when the CIA sup- plied pilots (Cuban veterans of the Bay of Pigs), me- Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100220001-2 chanics, and aircraft to the government of Moise Tshombe. ? The EUROPE and 'SOVIET DIVISIONS. One of the first major clandestine operations of the postwar period was the massive infusion 'of funds to prevent a Com- munist the 1947 Italian elections. According to, reliable' sources, CIA continued well into the 1960s toiprovide a large annual subsidy to the Italian Chris- tian Democratic Party. In Greece, the Agency became deeply involved I- .internal politics in the late 1940s, and its role, according to sound speculation, is un- diminished today. The CIA and its predecessor organizations also helped organize . anti-Communist labor unions in France and other West European nations during the period following World War II. The Washington of- fice of the Clandestine. Services provided funds to sup- ;, art an entirely independent underground network established under cover of the international division of For many years during the 1950s and 1960s the Co- vert Action staff in Washington ran one of the most .remark-able CIA activities: the large-scale subsidization of a wide range of youth, academic, cultural,, prop- aganda, and labor organizations in the United States and abroad. Among the long list of beneficiaries of the payments, which ran as high as $100 million a year, were the National Student Association, the Asia Foun- dation, the American Newspaper Guild, Radio Free Europe, and the Congress for Cultural Freedom (which sponsored Encounter magazine). The Covert Action staff, under Cord Meyer, Jr., now CIA station chief in London, set up numerous dummy foundations- to distribute the money, using a wide number of legiti- mate charitable institutions as cooperating go-betweens. (One of the dummy foundations was named, by strange and, to me, annoying coincidence, the Andrew Hamilton Fund.) These subsidies, exposed in 1967, were terminated, but the Covert Action staff remains in business. Accord= ing to informed sources, its annual budget continued at about the $100 million level in 1971. This list of operations is hardly comprehensive. It does not, for example, include such. large-sole intelli- gence exploits as the U-2 project and the first spy sat- ellites, both initiated by the covert side of CIA. But the list illustrates the wide range of political, propa- ganda, and paramilitary operations which the CIA' has carried out, in deepest secrecy, at White House behest. Two points stand out: These operations were often mounted not against hostile countries, but against neu- trals or allies. And they frequently resulted in creating and sustaining repressive regimes. The CIA has been. accused by well-informed U.S. officials of helping to establish "anti-subversive" police units in a number of countries which have then used them to repress all lib- eral, political opposition. Informed sources estimate that of the roughly $350 million annual budget of the Clandestine Services in recent years, perhaps $225 million-most of it project money-was allocated to covert action and special op. erations (including $80 million 'to $100 million for Vietnam and Laos). The remaining $125 million went to support the CIA's Clandestine Services in its es-, pionage and counter-intelligence activities. As the budgetary breakdown suggests, the road to glory' and advancement in CIA is through operations-Dirty Tricks-rather than the patient and often grubby work of collecting foreign intelligence. A number of former high-ranking intelligence officials have complained over the years about the Agency's tendency to mount "operations for operations' sake." In theory, CIA covert operations are tightly con- trolled, and can be engaged in only with the approval of the President, who delegates the task of reviewing suggested operations to a high-level NSC committee consisting of his assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry A. Kissinger; Deputy Defense Secretary William P. Clements, Jr.; Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson; and the CIA Director. But this-group has no staff facilities for a proper review- the,papers are handled at the White House by a single CIA official who acts as secretary to the committee- and, in any event, the committee would hardly be dis- posed to subject CIA plans to close scrutiny. CIA station chiefs, moreover, enjoy considerable autonomy. An enterprising, empire-building station chief, as one source pointed out, will be on the constant ;lookout for an opportuni y to mount a covert action, perhaps by bribing a foreit:: minister or a key legislator. With sufficient initiative, he can increase his budget and staff and enhance the standing of his station with Washington. In the process, the United States gradual- ly becomes drawn more and more into the internal pol- ities of that country. "The Clandestine Services," says a former CIA offi- cial, "never developed a philosophy that `our job is to spy.' They have always had the desire to manipulate events." The CIA's predisposition toward operations has been influenced by the fact that for most of its life the Agency has been headed by men who made their rep- utations in that field. Allen W. Dulles (1953-61) and Richard C. Helms (1965-1973) were both operators; so was the new Director, Colby. Colby'and Helms, be- . fore their respective appointments as Director, were both in charge of the Clandestine. Services, a job which has generally been filled by forceful men who wielded great, if unobtrusive, influence in Washington. By con- trast, 'the Agency's senior intelligence official,'the Dep- uty Director for Intelligence (DDI), has seldom been a man of comparable stature or influence. As long as the glory, power, promotion, influence, and White I-louse attention fall on the Dirty Tricks op- erators at CIA rather than on the intelligence special- ists, the inherently unmanageable predisposition of many CIA station chiefs toward operations rather than intelligence work is unlikely to come under control. And as long as operations are the principal source of his influence, the Director of Central Intelligence can hardly be faulted for taking a narrow view of his job. In theory, he weals at least three hats: He is the top operator; he is the nation's senior interpreter of foreign intelligence; and he heads the. vast but amorphous community of U.S. foreign intelligence agencies. In practice, however, recent directors have not fulfilled all roles equally well. For several years, White Hod'se foreign policy experts have sought improvements in intelligence analysis and management of intelligence budgets and activities. In November, 1971, President Nixon ordered a reorganiza. tion of the intelligence committees to address these problems. He gave the Director of Central Intelligence power to oversee the budgets and activities of all in. telligence agencies, including those under the Defense Department. The Intelligence Community Staff was expanded and an Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee (IRAC) was established with the Director as chairman. At the same time the National Security Council set up ar} Intelligence Committee to review the quality of intelligence reports. Director Helms, in the White House view, failed to make the reforms work. This was a factor in the deci- Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100220001-2 'Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100220061-2 sion to replace Helms (now Ambassador to Iran) with James Schlesinger, author of the 1971 reorganization plan. . . ' .~' Schlesinger's background seemed admirably suited to the broader concept of the Director's job. He was not only a management expert but also an economist and defense intellectual, with a background at Rand Corpo- ration, where he had a reputation as,a forceful analyst. But the Watergate scandal forced shuffles. -Schlesinger became Defense Secretary. Colby, his successor,. is not considered by intelligence experts to be as well- equipped to manage the intelligence 'community, or to improve the quality of analysis. His appointment ap- pears to have shelved or diminished the ambitious ie-' forms envisioned by Schlesinger. Instead the appoint- ment of Colby put the spotlight back on operations. When Congress confronts the CIA this fall, it should recognize that it is time for the United States to end all Dirty Tricks operations-by the CIA or any other organization. Such operations, a standard part of the U.S. foreign policy repertoire since World War II, have' become more than occasional embarrassments: They, are now a distinct liability to the nation's foreign re- lations. And they present a serious threat to constitu- tional government in the United States. The reasons for ending clandestine operations are not just moral but practical as well. The moral objec- tions to covert -action are obvious. Intervening in an- other nation's internal politics violates the principles to which the United States professes to adhere when it establishes diplomatic relations. And covert interven- tion offends the,general principle that nations, like in- dividuals, should be accountable for their actions. There are at least two practical objections. The first is that clandestine operations have a corrupting influ- ence on Arrierican politics and foreign relations. They undermine the credibility of the Government at home and abroad. Their inherent secrecy violates the princi- ples of accountability in the American political process.. Available recourse to clandestine operations breeds contempt -for' more arduous-but legitimate-methods of achieving objectives. As Watergate has demon- strated, an easy familiarity with clandestine operations and a ready access to persons and techniques used in clandestine' operations can become a direct threat to the American political and legal system. It has been'evident for some years that the American political establishment is deeply divided on the direc- tions and the tools of foreign policy. Politics no longer stops at the water's edge. No more vivid demonstration of this division is needed than the recent votes in Congress to end the bombing of Cambodia and to limit the PresidenX's war-making powers. In ' these circum- stances a clandestine foreign policy becomes a danger to domestic politics. To prevent leaks, the circle of peo- ple in the know is drawn ever smaller. In the process, the definition of the national interest becomes more narrow, and more directly associated with the political fortunes of the party in control of the Executive branch. .. As the confusion between the national interest and political advantage spreads, distrust of the opposition grows to paranoid. dimensions. Political operatives find it difficult to discriminate between, domestic opponents and foreign agents. In this paranoid state, they have no' difficulty justifying the resort to espionage and Dirty Tricks=-originally developed to fight a clandestine war against alien enemies-against their ' domestic political, opponents. The existence of occasional proof of sim- ilar skulduggery oyr the part oe.their opponents, merely intensifies the'psychosis. The result. is an indiscriminate intermingling of', domestic politics, foreign policy, and covert. operations=-a 'common theme in the Water- gate affair and associated cases. If the corrupting effect of. clandestine' operations is ,one practical objection, a second is that when they do not fail spectacularly, they -are often ineffective. The successes of the CIA in clandestine operations may be, as several Presidents have hinted, substantial.. But these' successes would have to be of phenomenal value to outweigh the general damage which results from the CIA's blunders, from the widespread assumption that the Agency meddles everywhere, and from the exposure of those operations which have come to light over the years. . An outright ban on the CIA's clandestine operations would result in a cut of as much as fifty per cent in the Agency's budget, an annual saving of perhaps $300-$400 million, not counting the savings of substan- tial additional funds diverted from other agencies for covert CIA activities. The more important effect, how-' ever, would be a much needed redirection of the ef- forts of the Agency's overseas staff (which could be greatly reduced in size) toward 'collection of ' intelli- gence. Since many CIA operatives already work under dip- lomatic cover at U.S. embassies, it might prove feasible to transfer activities devoted to gathering intelligence- not to operations-to the State Department. (The far smaller British Secret Intelligence Services come under the control of the Foreign Office.) Such steps would go a long way toward restoring the primacy of the Department of State in foreign rela- tions, and toward putting clandestine activities under an official directly responsive to the Congressional committees responsible for foreign relations. Under the present system, decisions on the use of the' Clandestine Services are made by the President, who is not directly answerable to. any committee of Congress, and oper-. ations are the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence, who answers to the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, neither of which has prin- cipal responsibility for oversight of foreign relations. Freed from his weighty operational responsibilities, the Director of Central Intelligence could begin to de- vote full time and attention to improving the man- agement'of the intelligence community and, upgrading 'the quality of analysis. Finally, it would be feasible to set up a more broadly representative system for Congressional over- sight of, intelligence activities by the CIA and other agencies, since the risk of compromising sensitive for- eign policy operations would no longer exist. This could 'be accomplished by creating new House and Sen- ate committees, as recommended by Senator Proxmire =and others, or by setting up a joint committee on intel- ligence, along the lines of the existing joint committees ' on economic policy and atomic energy. In sum, the Congress should: ? Repeal CIA's vague authority to carry out "other functions and duties related to intelligence," as directed by the National Security Council. ? Substitute, if necessary, language authorizing over- seas and domestic activities strictly for collecting for- eign intelligence, plus such counter-intelligence activ- ities as are required overseas (leaving domestic counter- intelligence to the FBI). e Consider placing the Clandestine Services under the,operational control of the Secretary of State, either by. requiring that he be responsible for reviewing and authorizing clandestine activities, or by transferring the CIA's intelligence collection functions to the, State 7 Approved For Rele asp 2001/0S/07 - -00432RO00100220001-2 Department. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100220001-2 o Deny CIA all project funds for covert action or special operations, but allow limited secret funds for intelligence purposes only. *Require the CIA to divest itself of ownership or control of such organizations as Air America. ' o Clarify and strengthen the statutory powers of the Director of Central Intelligence by giving him explicit authority in law to review and make recommendations to the President on the budgets and programs of all U.S. foreign intelligence activities. o Require disclosure of the overall expenditure of the CIA and other intelligence agencies, with reason- able accuracy allowing a little leeway for security purposes. a Establish a committee or committees of Congress o '?.?r-? ~e the-programs and authorize the budgets of i U.S. foreign intelligence agencies, including the CIA. An effective oversight committee is essential to insurd that a Congressional ban on clandestine oper- ations_ is honored by the President. Given the fine line between some types of intelligence gathering and the clandestine manipulation of events, it will be impossible to draft a law which c loses all loopholes through which small-scale operations will be undertaken. Thus vig- orous oversight will. provide the only reassurance that the spirit of banning Dirty Tricks operations is being observed. The committee should include, but not be restricted to, current members of the Foreign Re. lations and Armed Services Committees of the Senate, and Foreign Affairs and Armed. Services Committees of the House. The committee or committees should have automatic access to all finished intelligence reports published by; any intelligence agency, and these classified reporti should be retained at the Committee for review by all members of Congress. This would provide Congress with an intelligence library, which it now lacks, and could considerably improve the quality of understand! ing and Congressional action on foreign policy and, de- WASHINGTON STAR 25 August 1973 tense questions. It is by' no means certain that a majority of Congress .is ready to bar all clandestine operations. Such a step would signal a major shift from the way the United States has conducded foreign policy since World War` II, and opponents will no doubt argue that it would be' tantamount to "tying the President's hands" or. "unilateral disarmament." And' ii ihight"also be argued that a clandestine aetion agency is more necessary in.' the 1970s than ever, given the decline of the Cold . War with its clear-cut .antagonisms, the emergence of' a multi-polar world of shifting, alliances, and the devel oping contest among the industrial nations of the world for access to oil and other raw materials. Nor is President Nixon likely to abandon without a struggle' a tool which seems peculiarly suited to his approach to foreign (and domestic) antagonists. Finally, the job of defining clandestine operations to, they can be stopped without damaging the capabilityfor intelligence-gathering 'ctivities or leaving large. loopholes could prove difficult for legislative draftsmen.` These are all important practical considerations. Were' the nation really in a state of siege, were real . politik the only basis for conducting American foreign: relations, were there a genuine consensus on the aims, and methods of American foreign policy, and were- clandestine operations compatible with As eriean dem ocratic institutions and 'processes, then such reasons: might suffice to justify continuing such operations. Is the real world, they do not. The Administration's approach, and that of many' influential members of Congress, will be to cope with the CIA's current crisis merely by making its covert. operations even more truly clandestine, and by restrict- ing them in' size to reduce the risk of exposure. But' the only way to clear the nation's reputation, restore. credibility, and re-establish a basis for a.foreign poliq based on broad consensus-and the only way to creatt? a real basis for effective Congressional participation 4foreign policy-is to put a firm end to clandestine oper%; ations. The divorce must be clear and categorical, and' ought to carry the force of legislation-an outright bas on Dirty Tricks. assignment? The Watergate testimony has shown .that he was forced out because he would not allow. the agency to be used to cover up White House par- ticipation in the scandal. Now we learn that the Office of National Esti- mates is to be abolished. And the sin of this presti- gious group of analysts appears to be that it did its job too well, producing accurate intelligence esti- mates rather than ones that supported the prede. termined policies of the White House. Perhaps the saddest aspect of all of this is that the Nixon administration, which after all is with us for only eight years, can, if it sees fit, destroy the effectiveness of a continuing governmental institu- tion like the agency. We are all aware of the irrep- arable harm that has been done to the Federal . Bureau of Investigation. Now much the same thing seems to be happening to the agency. These insti- tutions are absolutely vital to national security, ' but they cannot function effectively unless they are allowed to function independently. One final note- Much has been made over the question of how much the President knew about ?' Watergate. I cannot believe that he would have. r accepted Helms' resignation unless he were fully aware of the reasons behind it. This certainly lends support to those of us who feel the President knew ? about the cover-up. He would not otherwise have let go of a man of Helms' caliber, Elliott Bunce. Alexandria, Va Nikon and CIA SIR: As a former employee of the Cerftral Intelli- gence Agency I am extremely concerned about the, harm being done to the Agency by the partisan at- titudes of the Nixon administration. The revela- tions in the' Watergate testimony concerning the' treatment of the agency and its former director, Richard Helms, and the more recent revelations. concerning the abolishment of the agency's Office' of National Estimates make it clear that the White: House will go to any lengths to bend the agency to, its designs, no matter how harmful those designs' may be to the national interest. Helms was appointed director during the period of my employment with the agency and he enjoyed an excellent reputation. It was particularly grati- fying to see the top post go to a career intelligence' man who would place the good of the agency and the intelligence community above any political considerations. Helms certainly proved his worth in this regard during his several years as director..' When he left the agency and became ambassador' to Iran I found it impossible to believe the change: was voluntary. Why would a career intelligence' than with his credentials - who held the top intelli- gence job in the world -- agree to such a lackluster Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100220001-2 'Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100220001-2 TIME 27 August 1973 THE LOSERS Watergate: The View from Jail Life behind bars has not been kind to Convicted Watergate Conspirator E. Howard Hiatt Jr. Only five months into his provisional 35-year sentence. lie has become noticeably thinner-25 tbs. by his own tneasurement-his hair grayer, his eyes listless, and the muscles of his left calf have slightly atrophied as the result of a mild heart attack. He emerg- es from prison only to tell authorities what he knows about the Watergate break-in; so far, he has testified 19 times before grand juries and congressional committees. For security reasons, on those occasions his legs are put in irons and his wrists are manacled to a chain round his waist. Much of the time, WATERGATE CONSPIRATOR E. HOWARD HUNT No end in sight for convicted legmen. however, Hunt broods bitterly in his cell. Last week TIME Correspondent David Beckwith visited him -raid sent this report: E. Howard Hunt shows little reti- cence nowadays in talking about those whom he considers responsible for the Watergate raid. "I guess it's obvious now," says Hunt. "that the Watergate thing was planned by a small group of people-Mitchell. Magruder. maybe a few others. We were just legmen in that operation following decisions made by others. and yet we're the, only ones who have sabered from it so faf`- The fate of Mitchell's depute' Jeb Stuart Magruder, who last week plead- ed guilty to obstructing justice, partic- ularly irritates Hunt. Says he: "".saw a picture of Magruder taking a river raft trip, visiting London, preparing to hit the lecture circuit and make some mon- ey." He shakes his head, looking down. "I can't for the life of me understand. Here are the prime conspirators walk- ing around on the streets, free on bond. But there's no end in sight for me. I think it's ironic and inequitable." Hunt still justifies his participation in Watergate and the plumbing activ- ities on grounds of national security. His view of national security, in turn, de- rives from his unabashed right-wing politics and his almost paranoid suspi- cion of anyone who criticizes U.S. pol- icies. The break-in at the office of Dan- iel Ellsberg's psychiatrist, he says, was not to discredit Ellsberg per- sonally but to find out wheth- er Ellsberg "might he a con- trolled agent for the Sovs [Soviets]." Says Hunt: "He spent a period at Cambridge, and a lot of defectors like -[British Double Agent Kim] Philby and others were from Cambridge." Farfetched. Watergate, similarly, evolved from a mixture of rumors and anx- ieties about security. Hunt still clings to his rather far- fetched explanation that Fel- Liddy told him "that he had heard from reliable authority that Castro funds were going to the Democrats in hopes that a rapprochement with Cuba would be effected by a successful Democratic pres- idential candidate. The main purpose of the Watergate break-in was a photographic job-to get lists of contrib- utors and check if any were blind fronts for Castro." Hunt is not convinced that the discovery of the break-in team at the Demo- cratic National Committee headquar- ters was an accident; he thinks he smells a trap. "There were just too many fishy things that occurred. What was the (plainclothes] mod squad doing out on the street -some two-three hours after they were supposed to be off duty?" Hunt also suspects that Alfred C. Bald- win, who was the break-in team's look- out and who na9nitored the bugs from a Howard Johnson's motel room across the street. might have been a double agent. "Baldwin was a very convenient fel- low. He had a girl friend at the D.N.C.. and he somehow came up with the floor plan of the D.N.C. headquarters. He was never checked out at all-McCord got hint off a job-wanted list of former Fill agents. He didn't do his job; he didn't alert anybody about the police until they were running around the D.N.C. with their guns drawn." As for James W. McCord Jr.. the conspirator who first started spilling the story of high officials' involvement. Hunt now portrays him as a bungler, electronic hitchhiker who shouldn't have been allowed on our operation." He says the bugging apparatus that Mc- Cord had bought was faulty and sec- ondhand. even though McCord billed Liddy for new equipment. While he was inside the Watergate, McCord turned down his walkie-talkie or turned it off. apparently to conserve batteries. "There were just too many things that went wrong for them all to be coincidence." says Hunt darkly. Hunt vehemently denies that he and his wife were attempting to shake down the White House for hush money. "Ev- ery time I hear the word blackmail it makes my blood boil. It wasn't black- mail or hush money ... It was main- tenance payments and lawyers' fees, the same sort of arrangement that the CIA gives its agents who arc captured. We had no silence to sell. We knew the grand jury would be. impaneled follow- ing the trial, and that we would be im- munized and forced to talk. Just be- cause John Dean thought he was paying hush money doesn't make it necessarily so. I never heard the term Executive clemency until it started appearing in the news media." No Concentration. Hunt, who once had five automobiles, riding hors- es and live-in servants, now leads a sim- ple existence. At Danbury the prisoners are awakened at 6 in their barracks- style rooms and immediately make their beds, shower, shave and breakfast. At 8 Hunt reports to work in the prison li- brary. At 10:30 there is a 90-minute lunch break, then another three and one-half hours in the comfortable li- brary job. From 3:30 to 5:30 is dinner and free time. when Hunt attempts to answer sympathetic mail. "Every clay you're in prison seems four times as long as a normal day. We have a so-called law library at Dan- hury, but the latest law books are dated 1947. It's a disgrace. I've read where I'm sitting up in Danbury getting rich. writing a novel about Watergate. But I can't concentrate, especially without a typewriter. "I haven't written a thing. I sit down .%ith a pad and try to write longhand, but I can't think and I lose interest. i can't believe the money I'm spending on attorneys. It costs me S 1.200-S 1,500 es cry day I'm in a hearing or legal ap- pearance. Luckily, my notoriety has sparked an interest in my books-i've had 19 titles issued this year. 17 reis- sues and two new ones-but all the money is going to lawyers." Is the truth on Watergate really coming out? "Well, it lot of it is, but it's distorted. The Ervin committee ques- tioning is erratic, but I'd better not crit- icize them because I'll be up there next month." STA~to~or Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100220001-2 WASHINGTON Washington, D. C, Sunday, August 1Z 1973' By Frank Getlein Star-News staff writer .,,by the now famous Watergate burglar and 'long-time CIA.opera. ,. tive, is technically an immense improvement over the earlier ,novels of his reviewed here short. .ly after his confession and con viction as a common criminal. - \ He is able now, as he was not in those works, to sketch out half. a dozen different sets of characters and intentions in a story and keep :them all going more or less simul- taneously up until their moments of impact with one another. MS PROSE IS better, though' his is still subject to imprecision and to what can be reasonably interpreted as a kind of 'institu- . tional self-glorification and self- pity, the institution being the men of the CIA, humble, faceless. agents doing their best for their, country and ending, like the hero, facing trial for murder in the be- loved country or, like the author, jail for burglary. - Although this book and a mem- oir to be published later this fall on the Bay of Pigs -- an enter- prise Hunt was deeply involved in - both bid fair to be best sell- ers before the year is out, the author still has a lot to learn ` about his chosen field from its masters: Le Carre, Chandler, Hammett, above all the -Graham 'Greene of the early novels, the "entertainments." Hunt is not a first rate spy nov- elist any more than he has been a first rate burglar or a first rate stager of counter-revolutionary invasions, but the novel is impor- tant in another sense: it offers us a chilling glimpse of the' mind and motivations of one of the- :principal architects of Watergate and hence, quite possibly, the essential relationale of the whole. apparently idiotic escapade. THE BERLIN ENDING. By E. Howard Hunt. Putnam. 310' pages. $6.95. THE HERO OF "Berlin End- ing" bears a number of resem- blances to his creator, besides the self-glorification-self-pity. already noted. Neal Thorpe is ex- CIA and dulled by the lack of ac- tion, of "romance" in his straight' life re-doing Georgetown houses. Through a chance meeting at : National Airport, he becomes involved in 'a far-reaching: scheme of the Kremlin spymas- ters to install their man as the . next secretary general of the United Nations and becomes' himself an agent of an America- led international effort by indi- vidual agents or former agents from Washington, Helsinki, Tel Aviv and Paris to thwart the dread Reds. It is in managing all these bits and pieces of a conspiracy and a counter-conspiracy that Hunt 'shows his chief inprovement over' the old days when he simply took a hero of his own type and fol- lowed him scene by scene. Also, once you get over the initial in-.' credibility of Hunt's premises, you do keep reading to see how the story comes out, which is ' more than the earlier work got you to do. The incredibility stems from the central Soviet device discov- ered by Hunt's CIA people, Thorpe and an aging, retired, almost legendary agent, Alton Regester. REGESTER HAS concluded that the Soviets employ "Agents of Influence" in other countries, people with long-established identities in their host countries but with some ancient Soviet connection that gives the Reds absolute power over them. The four principal Agents of Influence that Thorpe and Reges- ter fight against are a German foreign minister clearly modeled on Willy Brandt, the man the Kremlin wants as U.N. Secretary General; a French television commentator and hero of the re- sistance and the Spanish war, less closely based, perhaps, on Andre Malraux; a Spanish cardi- nal in, the Vatican who engi- neered Pope John's meeting with Krushchev's son-in-law, and fi- nally a New York Jewish private banker with a mutual fund bear- ing his own name: Your guess. The point, however, is that if a Soviet directed Agent of'Influ- ence is the only reason you can think of for Pope John's opening to the left, for Willy Brandt's window to the east, for Malraux's ' (?) assorted leftish views throughout his life, for a New York capitalist's support of non- reactionary views in general, then you are ready for Water- gate. IF ALL ACTIONS and state. ments in the West that can be interpreted as less than bitterly. implacably hostile to commu- nism are the result of Agents of Influence, then, clearly, George" McGovern, Larry O'Brien and Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist were all Agents of Influence: Bring on the red wig, the, bugs and the camera. Hunt may make his fortune from book sales based on his bungled burglary, but the real bonanza lies still ahead: Water- gate as a musical comedy: Only : .Hunt could write the book. NEW YORK TIMES 18 August 1973 PITTMAN RESIGNS AS HUNT'S LAWYER WASHINGTON, Aug. 16 (AP) -William O. Bittman, a Water- gate defense lawyer who tes- timony says was paid thousands of dollars in a clandestine cash, drop, ? withdrew ' Thursday as the attorney, for a convicted conspirator, E. Howard Hunt Jr; A motion approved by Fed- eral District Court Judge John J. Sirica gave no reason for the withdrawal, but said Hunt had approved and had retained new counsel. Austin Mittler, an associate of Mr. Bittman, also withdrew; Mr. Mittler said the withdrawal was a "mutual understanding". reached between Hunt and the two attorneys. . During the Senate Watergate hearings, Anthony T. Ulase- wicz; an undercover operative for the White House, testified that he paid $25,000 in fees by leaving the money in a brown envelope near a tele- phone booth in the lobby of Mr. Bittman's office building. He said he had called ? Mr.? Bittman and observed from'in-, side the booth while he picked up the payment. The money came from funds put together, by Herbert W. Kalmbach, then Presidents Nixon's personal at., torney. Hunt's new attorney, accord- ing to the motion and con- firmed by the lawyer's office; is Sidney Sachs of Washington. He was not available for com- ment . Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100220001-2 'Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100220001-2 BALTIMORE NID S AMERICAN 6 Auguot 1973 THE BERLIN ENDING. By E. Howard Hunt. Putnam, Reviewed by VICTOR WILSON Newhouse News Service For some 32 years E. How- rrd Humt has been trying un- ..., -le the liter- ary beg.-, ? a put of gold awaits any wrur-, -- make the climb. This month at last, the gold will start pouring In when Hunt's 44th novel is published by a top-rung publishing house with a heady roll of publicity drums. But by an ironic twist of fate that any author would scorn to use, Hunt will cele- brate his luck In a narrow cell at the Danbury, Conn., Feder- al Prison. As is probably known even In the steamy jungles of Gua- temala, where Hunt once op- erated tender cover for the CIA, he's in jail awaiting his eventual fate as a convicted principal conspirator in the Watergate affair. As Hunt paces his cell, his latest book will be published An. 2S. Perhaps before, or si- multaneously, eight of his earlier spy novels will hit the paperback stands. Another prestigious publish- er is rushing Hunt's 45th nov- el, based on his CIA expa,rl- once at Cuba's Bay of Pigs, toward the presses. And the word in publishing circles is that most of the rest of Hunt's largely Ignored earlier works on the art of spying and inter- national intrigue are being prepared for the paperback market. If thin"a turn out better than d'd the fiasco at l)en:o- cratic National Committee headquarters at the Water- gate Complex here June 17, 1972, Hunt just may prove to be the hottest literary proper- ty In the 1973-74 market. How much pleasure Hunt's realized pot - of - gold - at - last will produce is In the ~"'.nr+s t t I-cue; a' Court Judge Joiuia. Ju...>.? 1iF iudre sentenced Hunt and six co- conspirators In the break-in to Indeterminate jail terms, pun- ishment to be based on the de- gree of their co-operation (the CIA calls it "singing") with federal prosecutors. Rumor here has It that Hunt very probably will wind up eventu- ally as a willing witness be- fore Sen. Sam Erwin's Water- gate Investigating Committee. Meanwhile, other rumors report that the 20-year ex-CIA veteran either (A) tried to shake down the White House Criminals At Large The Howard Hunt who has written THE BERLIN ENDING (Putnam's, $6.95) is the E. Ho- ward Hunt of Watergate. "The Berlin Ending" is typical of his previous books, with cold-war elements, the C.I.A.. a touch of romance. And some of the stiffest writing this side of E. Philips Oppenheim. Hunt is a made rather than a natural writer. He has his little tricks. One is to drop place names: "Driving from the DST parking lot, he steered into traf- fic speeding west along the Seine. He passed the Tuileries, the Grand Palais and UNESCO and just short of the Trocadoro turned north to Avenue Kleber." C ils ~Jlll P Q ci .1103 r*~'k . C1. ~ for a cool million to remain si- lent, or (B) that he received $100,00 In hush money for himself and the other defend- ants but stashed It for him- self, or (C) both. One would.never guess after reading an advance copy of "The Berlin Ending" that its author would go in for such "dirty tricks"--except per- haps against Russian agents. The plot can't be discussed until publication date, though "Publisher's Weekly," al- lowed an advance peek for. guidance to book-sellers, de- scribed it as a "thorounnly professional, fast-paced work." While awaiting, his o::n fate, Hunt at least will savor the satisfaction that the two un- coming novels, as volt as all the reprints of pair. rhacks, will be under his ov,n name. Putnam's book, In fact, prints his name on the jacket in type as' tall as the title It-, self, calling It "A Novel of In- trigue By One of the Water= gate Seven." Only his first three books came out with Hunt's real byline, and then he went In for different paper- back pen-names. Hunt still prefers, apparently, to keep all but a few facts about him- self to himself. In Its advance A touch of French is always elegant: "Bon, mon vieux. Bien rdussi." On his own, Hunt has a flat style heavy with plati- tudes. "Five hours, Leroux said half-aloud. Five hours from now the stage will have been set. The time has come to study for my entrance" As for dia= logue, well: "'It never hap- pened,' she said huskily. 'Some- day' , It's all really pretty bad. At the end there is a completely unconvincing shift in the orien- tation of one of the main char- acters-a shift for which the author has not' prepared the reader or even (one imagines) publicity, Putnam says that prior to his 20 years with CIA, he served' with the Navy in World War II, saw service also during that conflict with the Office of Strategic Services- (which preceded the CIA), and that he worked for the March of Time, a defunct radio news funct Life magazine. The CIA never discusses former agents. But reports have It that Hunt, WhIlL . erv- ing In Guatemala, tried tk -.,- list troops training for the Cc ban Bay of Pigs adventure to help keep a right-wing Guate- malan president in power. And that earlier, on service in Uruguay, he attempted a deal with that country's president to intervene with the U. S. when his tour was up, and ask that Hunt be kept in Uruguay. But perhaps Hunt Is trying to tell us something by a spy's maxim, credited to one Gal- tier-hoissiere, which he uses on a separate page just after the frontpiece of his new book: "It is in the political agent's Interest to hervy all parties who use him, end to work for then all at the same time, so that he may move freely, and penetrate anywhere..,',' himself. This sequence is sup- posed to be ironical. Instead, it is merely grotesque. . The C.LA, also figures heavily in Blaine Littell's TILE ? DOLOROSA DEAL (Satur- day Review, $5.95). Littell is as sophisticated as Hunt is clumsy. He has come up with a lively novel involving a black agent, a fiery Israeli girl, a ra- cist demagogue and a close look at young radical leftists. Littell is interested in the relation- ship of Jew and Arab, but he never lets sociology or politics interfere with the smooth flow of his story. 11 P77-00432 8000 4SA22000'F-2 WASHINGTON POST 2 3 AUG 1973 Somethinj to Miss on a Rainy Day' Book World THE BERLIN ENDING: A Novel of Discovery. By Howard Hunt (Putnam's. 310 pp. $6.95) Reviewed by Laurence Stern The reviewer writes for the national desk of The Washing. ton Post. here of Arthur Bremer. (Hunt in 1960 proposed a plan to his CIA superiors for the assassination of Fi- del Castro.) One of the lessons of Watergate was that men like Howard Hunt is a loser Howard Hunt, Gordon wit .i humid fantasy life Liddy, Anthony Ulasewicz who was subsidized by the and the Cuban bugging American taxpayers, un- squads were circulating known to them until re- about like loaded revolvers cently, for the better part of at public expense under a quarter-century. By moon- vague White House aus- light, he has been a prolific pices, trying to savage the manufacturer of pulp-grade enemy. spy novels, nearly four Who is the enemy? To the dozen in all. - Cuban operative, Bernard He has emerged from the Watergate scandal as a bro- ken man, a convicted bun- gler, Instead of targeting on the enemies list, he came homing in, like a wayward missile, on the President and the White House. Failure is not new to Hunt. He played an impor- tant role in an overseas ver- sion of the Watergate fiasco, the Bay of Pigs horror. Hunt played with Cuban emigres as small boys do with dou- ble-edge razors. He and those closest to him always ended up getting cut. And so it seemed- neces- sary to have a vicarious life in which he succeeded, or at least didn't make such an i nominious mess of things. Howard Hunt escaped into bad novels. Neal Thorpe, the paste- board hero of "The Berlin Ending," is Hunt's fictional self-idealization. He com- bines the muscularity of Steve Roper with the politi- cal overview of Daddy War- bucks. "Without the condi- ment of excitement his life was as tasteless as boiled beef," writes Hunt of his fic- tional surrogate, Thorpe. "Excitement," it quickly be- comes evident, is the pursuit Barker. the enemy was whoever Howard Mont said it was-no holds barred. The enemy in "The Berlin Ending" was a suspected So- vict "agent of influence" who held the position of West German foreign minis- ter (the resemblance Hunt draws between his KGB di- rected villain and Willy: Brandt is almost too strong to he coincidental). The! scheme is to destroy the; 'West German principal by compromising him with his Soviet masters. Hunt is never very far from the Watergate mental- ity. His catalog of Commu- nist villains is worth de- scribing in brief: a pederas- tic, opium-smoking French count who is not above strangling stewardesses; a paunchy Russian Jew ("almost the 'prototype of Streicher's archetypal Jew,", writes Hunt with typically jangling redundancy) whose "front" is high international finance: and, finally, the treacher-m.rsly . liberal West German minister, who col- lur-les in t!;!- attempted as- sassination of his own daughter after she learns of his covert Soviet backing. Hunt's interior life seems to be spun of such stereo- types. How easily Daniel Ellsberg must have fit into this political demonology. . The spy novel that is writ- ten by an ex-spy or ihtelli-. of fantasies that most men leave behind with other memories of prepubescent life, such as their tenderfoot badge or first overnight. Thorpe-alias-I-Iunt is an in- .'-gence operative is common norent. lie appears, rather, to our fiction. It is a genre to be a case of arrested dc- that includes such outstand- velopmeut. He was bored Ing contributors as Graham and dissatisfied with himself and so he had to escape into action. There are shades Greene, John Le Carre and Ian Fleming. . the novel can only be viewed as a piece of psychiatric documentation for the Wa- tergate case. It is far more revealing than anything that Hunt and Liddy may have retrieved from the files of Ellsberg's psychiatrist. Prophetically, the counter- espionage scheme of "The Berlin Ending" falls in the end. A nice girl who hap- pens to be a CIA accomplice dies needlessly in the at- tempted execution of the plan. Thorpe has a moment of bitter reflection. Then he lapses into his familiar con- dition of boredom with him- self. This sounds suspiciously like Hunt's own predicament in his final years at the CIA when he had fallen into. dis- favor and was serving out the time required to qualify for a $20,000-a-year pension. He was rescued from his ennui by White ?I-Iouse aide Charles Colson, who was in- strumental in getting him on the payroll, wherein he got an official license to burgle, falsify documents and eventually provide the incriminating link between the Watergate burglary and the Oval Office. There are undoubtedly those who feel that Hunt, .,n' i,rcorrigible loser. de- serves some appropriate ex- pression of national grati- tude. Anything but a Na- tional Book Award. NEW YORK TIMES 31 August 1973 I cCord College Lecture Tour Is Halted by Order of a Judge` By JAMES FERON Spec- aL to The New Yovk Times NEW PALTZ, N.Y., Aug. 30 day before his next scheduled -James W. McCord Jr., a con-appearance, at Georgetown Uni- victed Watergate conspirator, in Washington. ended his college lecture tour McCord, appearing relaxed, tonight after his second ap-Ispent only 15 minutes outlining pearance. Ithe background of the Water- He spoke last night at Sanga-;gate break-in before answering mon State University in Spring-questions from an audience of .field. III:, and planned appear. ;AO students, faculty members .ances at 40 other schoolsiand townspeople. `across the countr. The former C.I.A. agent said' However, Judge' John J. Siri-,that he believed President Nixon ca, Chief Judge of the Uniled;had authorized the Watergate States District Court in Wash-!break-in and also the cover-up, ington, ordered him to end his,an assertion that was greeted lecture tour. Archibald Cox,jtilth applause. However, he the special Watergate prosecu-Isaid that he did not believe that tor, had said that additiunalMr. Nixon should be impeached publicity would be prejudiciabon the basis of the evidence to future defendants. 1presented so far. . Before addressing a packed! McCord said that former; lecture hall here, McCord said;Attornev General John N. in answer to a question put to; ditr.hell and two former Nixon him by a ne'',vsman that he; aides. Job,, D. El:rlichntan and would "certainly comply" with II. R. }laldeman, had committed Judge Sirica's order, He saidiperjury, but that John W. Dean that there would he a hearingi3d, former White House coun- on the order next Wednesday, a: set. had told the truth. WASE ITGTON POST 7 2 1 AUG 1973 The WVa4a;i;sgtoas 11ftwry.Goa .?.oannad By Jack Anderson and .Les Whitten 1, Spooky Censors -- So far, the , Central Intelligence Agency has successfully 'blocked publication of a CIA expose by ex-agent Victor l Marchetti. Now, State Depart- ,I Among the manuscript's, secrets: the CIA ordered an informal boycott of a Chinese restaurant in Washington be- cause "Jack Anderson is one of its owners" (In fact, I have ment censors are trying to get 'a small interest in a Chinese a copy of the manuscript from restaurant.) its co-author, John Marks, for. . The book also discloses CIA. merly a State Department em- "spooks" in Chile and CIA ployee. misuse of funds. This is not to suggest that, Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432 R000100220001-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100220001-2 MINNEAPOLIS TRIBUNE 19 Aug 1973 secret y CIA rates high in public esteem, poll finds By George Gallup Director, American Institute of Public Opinion Princeton, N.J. The Central Intelligence Agency received a "highly fa- vorable" rating from only 23 percent of the public in a recent Gallup Poll which sought opinions about law en- forcement agencies. Over-all favorable opinion of the CIA, however, out- weighs negative opinion by nearly three-to-one. Little difference was found on the basis of age or political af- filiation, as well as on the basis of other major popula- tion groups. Following are the national findings from the survey: By Frank Wright Staff Correspondent Washington, D.C. Every so often, the country rediscovers the CIA. This usually happens when one of its secret endeavors is disclosed under circumstances embarrassing to the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency and to the president it serves. No president has been exempt. Under Eisenhower it was the U2 incident. Under Kennedy it was the Bay of Pigs. Under Johnson it was South Vietnam and, at home, the CIA's financial ties with the National Student Associa- tion, labor unions, foundations, universities and myriad other domestic instl.utions. Under Richard Nixon it was the secret war in Laos. To name only a few. Each time the reaction has been the same. The agency, and sometimes the President, it is argued, have gone too far and must be brought under tighter control. Each time the outcome has been the same. Since the. agency was established a quarter of a century ago as one of our first lines of defense in the Cold War, approxi- mately 200 bills and resolutions have been introduced in Congress to either restrict the activities of the CIA or to at least give the public more. information about it. None of the bills or resolutions has passed. Only two ever have come to a vote before either the full House or Senate. The transitory pressure for change never has been enough to overcome the deeply ingrained attitude on, Capitol Hill,' and across. much of the nation for that mat- ter, that to tamper with the CIA and its secret role in our government is to tamper with the national security'and that to tamper with anything bearing the label of nation- al security is unthinkable. The push for restricting CiA,,a.Ctivities and for strong congressional oversight of the agency is on again, how- ever. 't'his time it stems from the disclosure during the past few months that the agency gave questionable as= sistance to the White House investigation of the Penta- gon Papers leak and from the claim that the White House tried to enlist the CIA in the Watergate cover-up. To be successful, the revision effort will have to amend the laws and directives under'which the CIA operates and alter the continuing committee operations of the House and Senate. Highly favorable ....................... 23 pct. Mildly favorable ....................... 44 Mildly unfavorable ......... ...... 12 Highly unfavorable ..................... 7 No opinion ............................ 141 The findings were based on interviews with 1,544 adults, 18 and older, interviewed in person in more than 300 sci- entifically selected localities across the nation during the period July 6-9. Interviewing was conducted prior to the appearance before the Ervin committee of Richard Helms, former director of the CIA. Gen. Vernon Walters. present deputy director, and Gen. Robert Cushman, for- mer deputy director. The laws The basic statute is the National Security Act of 1947, which was designed to centralize our armed forces and our spy activities to better meet the Communist threat of that time. The law created the Department of Defense and gave it control over the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines. The law also created the CIA to pull together a sprawl- ing intelligence community consisting of the National Security Agency, which makes and breaks secret; codes; the Intelligence and Reports Bureau of the State Depart- ment; the Defense Intelligence Agency in the Depart- ment of Defense; the intelligence components of the Army, Navy and Air Force; the FBI, the Atomic Energy Commission, and, less directly, the attorney general's of- fice and the-Departments of Treasury and Commerce. The CIA was made accountable to the President through the National Security Council. As passed by Congress and signed by President Truman, the law authorized the CIA: n "To advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the government departments and agencies as relate to national security; !4 'To make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activi- ties...; l "To correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security and provide for the appropriate dissem- ination of such intelligence within the government .:.; N "To perform, for the benefit of the existing Intelli- gence agencies, such additional services of common con- cern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally; .13 "To perform such otlfer functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the Nation- al Security Council may from time to time direct." The law also provided that "the agency shall haye no po-, lice, subpoena, law enforcement powers or internal secu- rity functions" except in protecting its "intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." Congress, according to CIA critics and to many students of the committee hearings and House and Senate debate, 13 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 ? CIA-RDP77-00-2 Approved For Release 091/0$/07 : Cl DP77-QQ432R, 00100220001-2 w to limit the agency to a co ec ion d the l i d a nten e intelligence information outside the United States, The . :a :< .. tended was to do only the kind of spying that would enable us to know what our enemies or po- tential enemies were tip to so we could avoid another Pearl Harbor. There was, it was contended, no intention of authorizing secret foreign military or paramilitary op- erations or other covert overseas activities designed to overthrow governments of other nations or violently but surreptitiously alter their course. Nor, it was contended, was there any thought that the CIA would apply Its tech- niques to life in the United States. Obviously, however, the. CIA has entered both of those supposedly forbidden fields. Its entry was' eased only two years after the agency was created, by passage of the Central Intelligence Act of 19;9. This law allows 'the agency to keep secret 'the' "functions, names, official titles, salaries or numbers of personnel" it employs. And the law gives the director of c.::. ,ra1 intelligence, who is the head of the CIA and the nation's chief spy, the unprecedented authority to trans- fer money from one intelligence appropriation to another on his own initiative "without regard to the provisions of; .law and regulations relating to the expenditure of gov-i ernment funds." The directives Despite the supposed intent of Congress, little time was. wasted in expanding the CIA Into clandestine activities at home and abroad that went far beyond the bulk of the precise language of the law. This was done by taking advantage of a loophole-the 1947 statutory authorization to "perform such other functions and duties" as the security council may direct. Over the. years the council has issued a number of se- cret intelligence directives, about 10 according to one source, expanding the activities of the CIA. One of the first, according to students of the CIA, authorized active overseas operations-the "dagger" as contrasted to the "cloak" of simple intelligence-gathering. The directive's two main guidelines for approving an operation, it is understood, are that the chances for maintaining secrecy must be good and that the President must be able to plausibly deny any knowledge of the operation if Its cover is blown and Its connection with the United States becomes public. The, theory of plausible denial permits lying to the public in the interests of national security. Control In addition to the president and the security council, internal control over the CIA and the remainder of the intelligence community is exercised by an advisory board or two, which reportedly have little effect, and by the cabinet-level 40 Committee. The committee, labeled according to the number of the decision memorandum establishing it, is composed of representatives of the State and Defense Departments, the president's national security adviser, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the direc- tor of central intelligence. The committee meets several times each month, primarily to pass judgment on pro- posed covert action programs. Externally, Congress has the main responsibility for overseeing the CIA. It is a responsibility which Con- gress has largely overlooked. The CIA and its friends on;Capitol Hill like to point out that the agency Is responsible to four different and powerful subcommittees. ? 14 The agency's overseers in Congress' Members of the CIA oversight committees in Congress: -Senatn Armed Services Subcommittee-Chairman John Stennis of Mississippi, Stuart Symington of Missouri and Henry Jackson of Washington, Democrats. Potor Dom- inick of Colorado and Strom Thurmond of South Caro- lina, Republicans. Senate Appropriations Subcommittee-Chairman John McClellan of Arkansas, Stennis and John Pastore of Rhode Island, Democrats. Milton Young of North Da- kota and Roman Hruska of Nebraska, Republicans. House Armed Services Subcommittee-Chairman Lu- cien Nedzi of Michigan, Edward Hebert of Louisiana, 'Melvin Price of Illinois and C. C. Fisher of Texas; Demo- crats. William Bray-of Indiana, Leslie Arends of Illinois and Bob Wilson of California, Republicans. House Appropriations Subcommittee-Chairman Fred Rooney of Pennsylvania, John Slack of West Virginia, Neal Smith of Iowa, John Flynt of Georgia and Robert Sikes of Florida, Democrats. Elford Cederberg of Michi- gan, Mark Andrews of North Dakota and Wendell Wyatt of Oregon, Republicans. Technically speaking, that is true. Subcommittees of both the Appropriations and Armed Services Committees in both the House and Senate are assigned to keep track of the intelligence community led by the CIA. And the subcommittee rosters include some of the most senior and most influential members of Congress. Chairman John Stennis, D-Miss., of Senate Armed Services; Chair- man John McClellan, D-Ark., of Senate Appropriations; Republican Milton Young of North Dakota, ranking mi- nority member of Senate Appropriations; and Chairman Edward Hebert, D-La., of House Armed Services are but a few of the 24 who serve. But the subcommittees have existed in name only for the' most part. They hold few meetings and sometimes go for long stretches, a year or more, with none at all. They have no permanent full-time staff of their own to do re- search or help prepare lines of inquiry. They often have taken the position that they don't want to know very much because of the terrible security burden that knowl- edge would inflict on them. And, with the exception of moderate Rep. Lucien Nedzi, D-Mich., chairman of the House Armed Services subcommittee, and Rep. Neal Smith, D-Iowa, they are to a man so conservative polit- ically and generally so supportive of CIA activities that no serious challenges ever have been raised. Stennis summed up the usually prevailing congressional attitude in November 1971, when the Laotian affair was rising to the surface: "This agency is conducted in a splendid way. As has been said, spying is spying. You have to make up your mind that you are going to have an intelligence agency and protect it as such and shut your eyes some and take what is coming." Change The two proposals for revision that have reached a vote In Congress involved Senate plans to alter the overnight committee structure. In 1956, a joint House-Senate com- mittee on intelligence proposed by Senate Democratic Majority Leader Mike Mansfield of Montana was reject- ed, 59 to 27. Ten year::-, later, in 1966, a plan fora new Senate committee on intelligence operations, offered by Democrat Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota, was killed 61 to 28. Similar proposals again are abroad in Congress. For ex- ample, Sen. William Proxmire, D-Wis., the most active Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100220001-2 'Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100220001-2 IVMAL TELEVISION 12:00 PM, EDT PRESS LOOKS AT CIA HEADQUARTERS, FIRST TIME IN 14 YEARS JOHN CRISWELL: In this era of Watergate investigations, news leaks, and secrets, big and small, the ever mysterious Central Intelligence Agency has provided a big surprise. Yesterday CIA unveiled to the press, for the first time ever, its 14 year old headquarters in Langley, Virginia. Correspondent Bill Downs has that report. (FILM CLIP) BILL DOWNS: Driving through the nation's most secure gate, the 50 million dollar super-secret CIA headquarters looks surprisingly like a well kept prison, which in a sense it is for the country's most sensitive secrets. Permission to film the seven story concrete and granite building came as a surprise, and marked the radical departure from previous CIA security practices, meaning the agency is worried about its public image. But any airline passenger flying west from Washington can look out and see the whole 140 fenced-in acres, in- cluding the more than 20 acres o/f parking lots for the 8 to 10,000 faceless employees. The agency auditorium, sometimes used for cloak and dagger briefing-s, looks like the top of an ice cream cone. The cafeteria, with its crenelated roof, can feed 1,000 anonymous people at a sitting. We were allowed to photograph only the outside of the agency headquarters, but this is the American'taxpayer's first look at his CIA. investment. We can report their--property: is in good condition. This is Bill Downs, ABC News, at CIA headquarters, Langley, Virginia. anus vocal CIA critic, has offered a resolution creating a seven-member Senate Committee on the Central Intelli- gence Agency. It would guarantee the pro-CIA old guard only two seats - by reserving a pair of memberships for' senators who also serve on Armed Services. Two seats would be held for members of the Foreign Relations Committee, which now has no viable oversight role. The other three would come from the Senate at large. There is talk of sharply cutting back the over-all intelli- gence community budget and personnel, estimated by- Proxmire at $6.2 billion and 148,851 persons, and of making public the long-classified figures for those cate- gories so that voters can weigh the big federal expen- ditures for spying against -other national needs. Sen. Edward Kennedy, D-Mass., and others are urging a shift in emphasis from "dagger" operations to long-range intelligence evaluation. Proxmire has Introduced legislation to narrow the two 3408 WISCONSIN AVENUE. N. W. WASHINGTON. D. C. 20016 244-8682, supposed loopholes in the 1947 law - those allowing the CIA a domestic function in this country and permitting clandestine and often-violent efforts to change the course of foreign nations. His bill would require written approval of such endeavors by the oversight committees. McClellan and Sen. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., acting chairman of Armed Services, have expressed interest in making a full review, apparently for the first time, of the security council intelligence directives that transported the CIA through the loopholes. Stennis, too, has promised alteration of the CIA charter "to fix it so they can't have all this false-face stuff, crowbars and burglary tools operating in the U.S." On the House side, Nedzi, who has received good marks from many of his colleagues for pushing steadily ahead since his appointment two years ago, plans more hear- ings to supplement those he already has had on secrecy classifications and CIA Involvement In Watergate. RADIO-TV MONITORING SERVICE. INC. THE SCENE AT NOON AUGUST 27, 1973 Washington Post Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100220001-2 26 August 1973 Curdy ." J From By William Claiborne Washington Post Staff Writer "I don't think you can get absolute security without almost establishing a police state, and we don't want that. You can't put security in a black groove or a white groove. It is a gray 'groove, and certain chances have to be taken." J. Edgar Hoover, May 14.1964 Ur?? ?? ,i,? for the already troubled FBI, !'resident Nixon uttered one sen- tence last week in which he, perhaps unintentionally, provoked a national ex- amination of -what past administrations have done to protect the Republic from its enemies, real or imagined. Standing before microphones In a parking lot adjacent to his San Clemente estate, Mr. Nixon was asked whether he, if he were a congressman, would entertain impeachment proceedings in light of disclosures that the plot to burglarize the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist was hatched in the White House. First denying that he had violated his oath of office, Mr. Nixon bristled slight- ly and said to newsmen: "I should also point out to you that in the three Kennedy years.and in the three Johnson years through 1966, when burglarizing of this type did take place, when it w, > authorized on a very large scale, there: was no talk of impeachment, and it we quite well known." The see once: sent newsmen scurrying to the r-1.icvs of almost every living former A;:.orney General who served in the past ;;ua1?ler of a century, and what emerged iin;t was a spate of indignant denial: into th?' top Justice Department :s of John F. Kennedy and Lyn- appoint r, don B. 1o111;;on. "I don't. h?'ltet-e it," said Nicholas deB. Katzenbm-h. who held, successively, the three top Justice posts in the years Mr. N i' on was talking about. Ramsey Clark, Attorrey General in -President Johnson's administration, said, "I don't know w0 hat he is talking about." Presi- dent I. enho::er's Attorney General, Herbert Brownell, declined to comment. Following the initial barrage of de- nials--::Mich indicated that the FBI may have cot:ducti;d national security burgla- ries N%'Wlout the knowledge of the at- torneys general - a pattern of such break-ins. stretching back to the pre- 1Forld War 11 era began to emerge. rea k-inst J 1V i it (0 it The former FBI officials, , vices, were subsequently ap- who declined to be identi- plied in varying degrees 'fied, said that the burglaries over the years to each new that were committed were. national security threat as it always authorized by Hoo-, arose. ver and not by attorneys, Those threats, the former general or other administra- bfficials said. included the 'tion officials, as Mr. Nixon American Nazi Bundists, suggested in his press con- suspected Japanese' espio- ;terence. nage- agents, Communists, said, involved foreign intel- ligence and were made at foreign embassies here and at consulates in cities across 'the country. Some break-ins were conducted in offices of tile Communist Party of the United States and in the homes and offices of suspected Communist ized crime syndicates. labor racketeers and radical anti- .war groups. While the broadening of the FBI's intelligence capa- bility was attributed by all the former agents inter- viewed to Roosevelt, one former FBI official at- tempted to put the bureau's agents. in the case of foreign mis? first foreign intelligence op- mer olftcials, the target of -. "We were at war. We were the burglaries was almost: fi0itin" for survival. Marty always cryptographic ma- thines had to be done for terial, secret codes. For ex- iimple, the Japanese code survival," he said. was broken months before. The former official cited the outbreak of World War. the relocation of thousands II because agents entered of American-born Japanese the Japanese embassy here to Western internment and photocopied code books., , camps, and said, "If that In some cases, the break-, Was considered uer.cssary. ins were necessary to plant then naturally other thines hidden microphones in em-. were consideered neces- bassies, a practice that for. sm?Y?" mer agents note has been During the Cold War of practiced widely in other the 1950s, according to for- countries as well as in the mer FBI officials, the num- ,United States. ber of "black bag Jobs" The genesis of the FBI's , (burglaries) committed by unusual intelligence opera-. FBI agents escalated as the tions can be traced as far I government sought more back as September, 1937, and more information from when after an 18-year hia-. Communist Party offices tus? the bureau was ordered . and the missions of Commu- back into the intelligence nist countries. field by President goose- One special agent who was Sett, fired from the bureau in ,:,,l3ctween 1919, when the 1961 for publicly criticizing old General Intelligence Di- 'Hoover, said he participated vision (GID) was abolished, in about 12 break-ins of for- and 1937, the bureau had no ! eign missions and Commu- intelligence assignment in . nist Party offices. relation to national sectti?ity. William W.? Turner, 46, By the summer of 1939, said in a telephone inter- when events in Europe ill-, ' view from his home in? San preasingly prompted ques- Rafael, Calif., that "burglary tions at home about foreign 'was a well-established tech- ined the velt ex anded t R h j h i " , p s, oose e o w en que p Accorc(in ; to former high officials Of agen ....,,..,.. ,..,,,. ? his' directive and made the FBI in 1951. ......1- ....., r:l 41, LOOT d to e an have since left the bureau, such activity began on the specific authorization of President Roosevelt as war loomed in Europe and con-' tinued until 1966, when the late FBI Director Hoover put an end to it. ? (Hoover, according to his f or m e r associates,: acted morn out of dissatisfaction with the risks his agents were taking on the behalf of another government agency -The National Security Agency-than out of any moral uneasiness over the break-ins.) 16 FBI responsible for all in- Turner said he acted as a vestigations of espionage, lookout during a burglary of counterespionage and sabo-. the Japanese consulate in tage. . Seattle in 1957 during which According to a former a safe was opened and rec- long-time agent, that man-. ords were photographed. date was the beginning of - "A guy flew out from .an evolution in which the Washington and spent four FBI-assisted by the mobili- or five hours up there. I zat ion for war-began to de- went up once, and he was :vclop its highly sophisti- photographing some stuff ?'eated intelligence tech- from the safe," Turner said. ,ques. Turner, now an author The techniques, which in-- and a frequent critic of the :eluded surreptitious entry FBI, said he also conducted 'and the use of complex glee- burglaries at the homes of a ttonic eavesdropping de- Seattle Communist Party leader and a suspected So- viet spy. He said such opera- tions were 'approved in Washington, but they were "never put to paper. You could never prove it was au- thorized." . The normal procedure, Turner said, was for agents to "case" a burglary target to determine when it was unoccupied, and then sta- tion a lookout to watch for anyone returning. Addition- ally, he said, an agent was stationed at the local police headquarters to monitor the police radio and "shortstop" ally citizen complaint that a burglary was in progress. 11'c would just tell the police we have an operation in this area and we want t1i male sure nuthir?' hap- pens," Turner said. i Turner said he 'could usu! ally tell when the bureau's most experienced "black-bag tnan'4 had committed a highly successful burglary "because you would read in the house organ that he got 'another meritorious award.; 'That's the only way they .could pay him." - Turner said he was 'trained in wiretapping in 1958 in Washington and that, ,he was instructed in surrep titious entry ~at the same time. As agents retired, he said, new glasses in burglar! dzing were held "to replen ish the guys in the field." i The classes were 'held,he 'Paid. In an attic room in the Justice Department here, and agents were instructed on how to make their own lock-picking tools with a grinding wheel. Each agent made his own kit of tools, and was instructed never to perform a break-in while carrying identity papers. Turner said burglaries "weren't really widespread" and almost always involved foreign intelligence. which he suggested was necessary to national security. This theme was echoed by the other former FBI offi- cials, who asserted that they knew of no break-ins that were comparable to the one to which IIlr. Nixon referred in his press conference-the Ellsberg burglary. That break-in, planned in 1971 by the special White House intelligence unit known as the "plumbers," was designed to obtain psy- chiatric records of Ellsberg, who was on trial in the Pen- tagon Papers case. Turner said he knew of no authorized break-in in which burglary was used to obtain material on a defendant in a criminal case. He said he was aware that some break-ins were author- ized In domestic intelligence situations, such as organized crime and certain black ac- Approved For. Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100220001-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100220001-2 WASHINGTON STAR 26 AUG 1973 tivitics, but that the purpose of such entries was to install electronic listening devices. Included among these do- mestic intelligence opera- tions were break-ins con- ducted to install listening devices used in recording conversations of the late Dr. I Iartin Luther King Jr. Part of his training, Turner said, i,ivolvca "how to? get into a place, put in a baseboard microphone, paint over the plaster and. get out of there quickly." . The disclosures by Turner -and other former FBI of- - ficials whb spoke anony- mously-has created an. "uptight" situation in the bureau, according to an FBI ? source. The public scrutiny of closely held operating se- crets conies at a time when morale in the bureau is al- ready low because of Water? gate. It also comes at a time when the FBI has just is- sued an expanded "employ-. ecs' agreement" requiring agents to acknowledge that leaking confidential infor- mation after they leave the bureau could result in crim- inal prosecution or civil in- junctive action. The pledge, according to an FBI spokesman, was is- sued Thursday, but stems from a June, 1972, Supreme Court decision upholding the legality of a secrecy pledge signed in 1955 by for- mer CIA agent Victor L. Marchetti. The FBI spokesman said yesterday that the new em- ployees' statement "updates and expands" the previous pledge, which simply stated, that agents were expected to keep the details of their work confidential, even of- ter lcavinn- the bureau. Other than confirming that Turn(.x served as an agent form 1951 to 1961 and had been assigned to Scat- tic, the FBI here has ref- used to comment on any of the disclosures of former bureau officials. - ens Secrecy Pe'dge .-By John M. Crewdson ject to criminal or civil resulted in the decision was New York 7lmes News Senics penalties , brought in connection with The FBI has directed its an article he had submitted' 18,000 employes to sign a ASKED whether the re-- -a few months earlier- tot written statement recogniz- wised statement was a re- Esquire magazine, ing that the work of the sponse to the continuing . ' ;i bureau is confidential and controversy over leaks of ONE SOURCE in the Jus?-' that unauthorized disclo- information from federal tice Department said that mation may result in crimi- nal prosecution. An FBI spokesman said the printed statements which have been distributed to bureau supervisory per- sonnel in the last few days,. were simply a revised ver- sion of the bureau's tradi- tional employment agree- ment "which indicated that the work of the FBI is confi- dential" and was not to be revealed except through normal channels. The only substantive change, the spokesman said, was the inclusion in the new version of the cave- at that the confidentiality of the FBI's work was protect- ed 'by federal laws that could make anyone violat. ing such confidentiality sub- Washington Post with respect to the investi- any similar statement cau-: gation of Vice President tioning against unauthorl Spiro T Agnew, the spokes- ized disclosure. man replied "no, not at Atty. Gen. Elliot I. Rich- ardson, he said, s,?;-ply' He explained that the warned his top officials '.?,~t bureau had decided to issue week that no one should ta,', the revised statement fol- about the Agnew case out-. lowing a Supreme Court rul- side the department. ing last December that up- Almost from the inception' 'held -the legality of a similar of the Watergate scandal in. affirmation of secrecy re-' June of 1972, federal law., quired by employes of the enforcement agencies, espe-' CIA. cially the FBI, have been In that case, the court accused of being the source prevented Victor L. Mar- of leaks to the press of con- chetti, a former CIA agent, fidential investigative infor- from disclosing classified mation about the case. information obtained during ' On Tuesday, Agnew pub- his employment there that licly accused members of had not already been made. the Justice Department of public. trying to "indict" him in the The government action press through leaks of infor- against Marchetti which mationo September 1973 Getting Paid by GOP for _6 nn ' dential race. "The basic facts in Ander- ton's story are correct, at-. though there was never any From News Dispatches question of espionage-I'm next year, he said. LONDON, Sept. 4-Ameri?I not really the James Bond Freidin, who worked for the can journalist Seymour type," he said. New York Herald Tribune be- Freidin today cheerfully ad. "i did pass on information fore it folded in 1966, joined. to the Nixon camp and I did Hearst Newspapers in Septem- emitted receiving substantial tecei~ a money-about 66,000 ber, 1972. :sums of money from the Re- 'in 1#63 and $11,000 in 1972. I He described his political al- publican Party for relaying in. was surprised by the size of legiances as "independent --formation from the Denio- the payments, but they were Democrat" and added with a cratic camp during the 1968 'all legal and aboveboard. The' laugh: "I've never voted Re- Internal Revenue has taken: :publican in my life". and 1972 .presidential elections. huge chunks of it." Anderson also 'claimed He was commenting on to. Freidin said he was merely Freidin was an informant for day's syndicated report by col- passing on- information that 'tile Central Intelligence umnist Jack? Anderson which would have been available to :,Agency in the 1950s and 1960s, alleged that during the 1968 the mass media within hours while lie was working as a :campaign Freidin filed three of his reports reaching the Re- newsman. publicans. "lt-hat. I contrib. Freidin said he was in eoti? reports a day from Huberti !uted was junk-they could tact at that time with CIA -per-i -Humphrey's headquarters. / /have read it in the newspa? i sonnel, but on an "exchange Freidin, now London bureau I pers." I of information" basis. ? chief of Hearst Newspapers, The book that Freidin had l "I know an awful lot of guys been researching was tempo who exchange information" said that during both elections i racily shelved when the with U.S. agents he said. he was working as a freelance Watergate scandal started to! He .writer and was engaged in re- break. "I reckoned the hook with thsaid that in his dealings ?eaaching a book on the presi- Istoocl no chance of success. Its with e CIA and with ovine shadowed by 1; 1 1stealing secret ' papers or breaking?in. There was noth- Freidin said. I IIt was now. hoped the book underhanded in any aspect, would be published sometime l of my work." - ? " , _ .i 17 Approved Fir Release 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100220001-2 "ASHINGTON POST 3 SEP 1973 a FI,erga tLe urn FBI, ~ny Feel WALL STREET JOURNAL 29 August 1973 Fly Me, I'm Spooky CIA Is Apparent Seller., Of a Charter Airline, But Nobody's Talking:., Southern Air Transport Sale Is Assailed by Competitors; Tier CAB Acts in Secrecy By Louis Harris ''`By 5? to l6 per cent, a majority feels the Federal Bureau of Investigation was 'used to its detriment in a cover-up of the Watergate affair, while a 46 to 33 per cent plurality feels the same way about the Central Intel- ligence Agency. On Aug. 18-19, the Harris Survey conducted interviews among a cross section of 1,536 households nationwide, asking about those alleged White House efforts to use the na- tion's two leading investiga- tive agencies: Do you feel the White 1-louse staff was trying to get the CIA and the FBI to cover up, the Watergate affair,. or didn't you think that was the case? Total Public Tried to eel CIA and Tat to corer 11D .......... 565'. .Yia>, not the case .......... 20 Not aura ................. .. 31 People were also asked: Do t'ou feel that the CIA was it.volved in the Water- pcta affair and other illegal don estic spying activities or rot? Total Public Ws, Involved ................ 454. Wag noL involved ............. 24 Not ore .................... 31 The cross section then was asked: .. Do you feel the reputation of the FBI was damaged by the way it was used in the cover-up of the Watergate affair, or don't you feet that trey? And, Do you feel the CIA's reputation has been damaged or not in the Water- gate affair? Not Not Damaged Damaged Sure Tnr.... .... 52'e .1t; 12's CIA' 4G 3:1 21 ?~c t273. The Chicago Tribune `Still Another Muddled' Deal BY TODD E. FANDLLL Staff Reporter of Tar; }v ALL STNTr,T JOURNAL All the guys In the air-charter business used to wonder why Southern Air Transport (unre- lated to Southern Airways) didn't fully exploit the mushrooming charter market. It had the money, it had valuable routes awarded by the Civil Aeronautics Board, and it was modestly thriving. Yet the Miami-based outfit never' really seemed to take off. Competitors suspected, and now they think, they know for sure, the reason: For 13 years, Southern has been secretly-and possibly ille- gally-owned and controlled by the Central in- telligonco Agency. This, is conning to 'light because of an at- tempt to sell the line and to get the sale ap- proved, secretly, by the CAB. So far, the CAB has appeared to cooperate. Despite legal re- quirements that public hearings be held on ap. plicatioas to transfer ownership or control of the companies it regulates, the CAB has with- held documents and conducted a closed-door heating on the sale application. The agency has gone so far as to require oaths of secrecy from wltnc nes who appeared in the five-day closed hearing In June. "We weren't even sup' posed to tell anyone how long the hearing lasted," says a. lawyer close to the case. The issue focuses on the attempt by Stanley G. Williams, 62-year-old president and a direc- tor of Southern, to buy 100ct, of the line for $3.1, i million. Mr. Williams has told the CAB he al- ready owns one-third, and he wishes to buy the remaining two-thirds from its other two dirce- tors, both former high-ranking government of- ficials. Evidence: Circumstantial but Spooky Distressed by the prospect of stiffened com- petition from a ]hie they say couldn't have sur? viven without CIA help, four major charter competitors- joined by eight scheduled airlines --ore opposing the sale. The protesting car. riers Insist that none of the three directors Is a true owner of Southern. They are nominees, the carriers say, for the real owner and seller rho CIA. One -':nnrce close to the controversy rays: "The CIA ho. maucttvct'c:?? ei iian:s? and In ore i:atance, they are l:no'.?n I) 1,::.c >?ta,hc.I lacui of No. 4 Indochina heroin- probably the strongest pro,- duced anywhere in the world-- f n the body of a dead `cobra dumped into a 'cage of live snakes en route to the States for sale to zoos. . '. That load,, incidentally, was stopped. But It is estimated as ttjuclt as 20 kilos of the 90 to 95 per cent pure Southeast Asian. heroin got to the United Slates from here last 'year with a street sale value of.SS.5 to $7 million. Largely thru the ei'fots of Chinese dope syndi- cates operating thruout Indo- chiile, Malaysia, the Philip- pines, and Hong Kong. HOWEVER, AN equally tough group to intercept are the 'independent American en- trepreneurs who figure on mating a quick, one shot kill- lug in the dru! market. ,Many of these are former GIs who had their first taste of heroin during the Viet Nam War_ in fact. American officials here report 93) per cent of the American citizens arrested on narcotics charges in this part of 'the world are ex'service- m^1t. six of v'hom are serving sentences in Thai prisons.' ',.'hat makes takhig the risks attrr.ctit e are the faiitastic profits to be reared from a minimal investment. Ffll: I?1,:11.WLT,,. an titrle pendent operatat can buy a 1st C118s ticket to I;an fkok for el,_ 0^0 In San (Francisco. jot hero in, a matter of a day. then p earl an average of 2(.0 a rl in hich living while spend- ing $100 for an ounce of the hir!t gqi:',c_ No. 4 heroin. With- in 21 hgtlrs. he can be on his tt?t:y hotite \~ to turn a $7j"00 ptoiit. 'Very of en . such ind^hand? clt!5 tone it,rrd t~ Idcnt!fy tc- C mi.=3 ,nL' lt'~t phefrc~lon- ?1 traffit'kcrs? !tear pre rt~en hard.'r to collar\'?iiile c.u?rt?i:kg :w;?'t're! titcly s atilt ritacai? 1!:ey midi: take as ounce of I:.t?'ruin coca cod inn h::'Turin, p`;: tic. F^:, ot? f1, :;t!c 1+i1l err:;c a i+f _atialu,r i!, t; tt laPe'rnca- .passed by their body until it is' safely back in the U.S. IN SEVERAL instances, rho, such schemes have failed with fatal results when the packet of almost pure heroin broke inside the courier's body and, the drug spewed into his sys- tem. The ,cal wheelers and deal- ers among the Americans are out to'make far greater prof- its, for if they can get just one kilo of heroin back to the U.S., they are assured, of a $25,000 to 550,000 profit before it is .diluted for street sale. A kilo can be bought for as little as $1,000 to $2,000 in Thailand. Thus, if an independent can smuggle, thru a cow Jo of loads like that, he can retire for life, probably at the age of 25., THE REAL professionals.' however, are the Chinesq wlto have continued, a more : than 2,000-year tradition of dope smuggling since being driven from their .homeland; by the 29 Communists in 1940. They know hdii to slip Iwo kilos of gold past customs fiffi- cials buried in a shipment of eight lebacrs. So there is no reason they Cannot smuggle it kilo of heroin 'in' a 100-pound sack of rice,. tons of which are in transit thr'uout this land every hour the day and night. Officials here ' ave told Rep. Morgan tiltrrphy Jr., (D., IILI that the Chinese merchants of death are in a sic'. t at the mo nient. ..furphy is, -onductin g his third intcrnalion, ? int'esti- gatioll of tile drug traffic, IrNI O CI':}Itr,:':f' c 1o Lhruout :iouthea';t Asia by ntuitinaiional alliance of ctls- t;uns and ' narcotics men is forcing the Iraffih;ers to final new ruu'.es. Narcotics are backing up' in such traditional outlets in the opium poppy growing areas of the Golden Triangle as Vicnti? one, Lars; Tachilck, Burma;, Chiang Mai;' and. Chiang Rai, in Northern ' Tiimiland, and ri!;ilt here in B n ;kok, the c; :tter of Gulf of iatn siitug- glin ; operations. Decently., Pedro Woo, the &inese operator of an ap art- ipt_nt hotel\,4it. the Vicnliat:c airport, was arrested with , $ million worth of morphine base, from which heroin is 'made. AGENTS R1*,PG'.T lie had been desperately stroit,'-arni- ing airline pilots who bunk at his hostalry to spirit' the : iuff out to Manila, h".I., or Bong I;On;;, but no one would touch (),.a load, even tho' it is more ? CCZiiy -tto~c;l is iiiat form than , rclinc'i l .,,? i't. _.Appraved.for-Release-20.0-'!/08/0-7-; -CIA-RRP77-004328000100220001 2- ._ Approved For Release 2001/08/07..: CLA-RD.P-7-7-08432R000100220001-2 Ci UCA00 'r1YBIJ'Nr; Bob 157; which in Asia 2 5 AUG 1973 f ~l 'v 1 it '.' J % r - 1 ~! is E J ~.j i r ~~~~ (~::/r+ 1-.n, ,++ V", i ~..s/ 1i i .rt -- Chtca:o Tribune Press Service BANGKOK, Thailand. Aug. 2.1-Southeast Asian Chinese drug dealers are mounting a frontal assault on the United States in frantic efforts to pump high grade heroes into the American market. In recent months, the'Chinese ,are kn %. n to have offered a fortune in payments to Ameri- can : ? ; c) er agents posing as po,u:ntial narcotics couriers in the deadly battle to stamp out the flow of heroin at or near its sources in the Golden o American narcotics agents are fighting an intensive battle iu Southeast Asia to plug the traditional methods drug traffickers have been using to get their deadly car- goes to 500,000 American ad- dicts. Their efforts are pay- ing off and have f o r c e d Chinese dealers to seek new pipelines to the U n i t c d States. Tribure columnist Bob 1i iedrich reports o n some of those new channels. In many cases, American agents have found that the clannish Chinese dealers will associate only with other. Chi- nese. --is a result, U.S. agents must devise a continuing se- ries of ploys in efforts to pene- trate the Oriental syndicates operating thruout IndoCnina and Malaysia. Often, they must rely on Ori- ental informers who are more readily accepted than the Cau- casian agents. However, some Asian syndicates and identify higher-ups. The real money makers are always well insu- lated from the lower level' traffickers. triangle area of Thailand, LARGE concentrations of prone' to deterioration during Laos, and Burma. overseas Chinese in Argentina transit than heroin, there is a The Chinese 'dope peddlers and Brazil also pose the threat trend toward moving the drug are seeking new routes to of a new drug smuggling con- in that form. mainland America as increas. nection to the states, agents Much of the bankrolling of ing pressure is brought on the here report. , And there is the narcotics traffic is also traditional heroin and opium growing concern that the influx' handled by the'Chinese, most pipelines thru Hong Kong and of Indochina heroin-the pur- of whom fled mainland China o t h e r major transshipment esf and deadliest in production after the Communist takeover points in the Orient. -may be joined by raw opium in 1949. THE MERCHANTS knorr from India, the world's largest They operate primarily thru the United States represents producer of legitimate opium black market banks thruout the most lucrative mark::t- for medicinal purposes. ' ... this part of the world, avoid- piace for their wares as opium supplies from the Middle East dwindle because of continuing American efforts in Turkey , France, and elsewhere in Eu- ' intelligence reports reaching ficult to trace. here indicate as much as 25 rope. American narcotics, agents per cent of the legal indian here know the Chinese are in- opium already may be being terested only in moving large I diverted to illicit channels. In- heroin shipments of 100 kilos than authorities 'deny the re- or more, fully aware the stuff Ports- is worth ;200,000 a kilo when The opium diluted for street sales in Chi- less morphine bass for the c a g o and other American manufacture of heroin than cities. the h i g h grade narcotics Thus, as the conventional spawned by the Golden TriaD- heroin routes are denied them, gle area. But when added to the Chinese are expected to the overwhelming onslaught of seek new channels, quite -pos- drugs from Southeast Asia, the sibly thru South America and ! total presents a serious threat Mexico, which already are 1! to the young Americans at heavily engaged in smuggling whom the traffic is aimed. drugs from Europe and Latin The Golden Triangle alone America. 1 produces over 700 tons of opi- Federal agents in Southeast um annually, an amount. copa- Asia fear the heroin smugglers ble of producing 70 tons of 30 may reach--an accommodation 11 to 93 per cent pure heroin for/ I the more than 500,0D0 Ameri- with South American organ- cans addicted to the drug. ized crime syndicates that; IT IS believed the illicit In- have connections in the Unitdd,.4tian opium is smuggl2~l into Mates and a long tradition of Indochina for conversion to morphine base and heroin. expertise in smuggling thru And because morphine base is Mexico and Southern Irlorida. I more easily concealed and less Americans have successfully gained the confidence of those Chinese whose' greed sways their better? judgement. And in such cases, the merchants have been packed off to jail and their shipments confiscat- ed here and back in the Unit- ed States. NO ONE really knows, how- ch of the drugs v w m h u er, o .e IN SOME instances, Chinese are being carried to the U.S. traffickers have been known to . by the so-called "mules" - carry a clandestine bank draft merchant seamen, traveling or representing hundreds cf thou- vacationing Americans, and sands of dollars in a series of others who take a one shot scribbled Chinese characters flyer into the narcotics traffic the size of a postage stamp. Their identities are difficult Reportedly, the drug met?- to ascertain and it is an al- chants also make liberal use most hopeless fast: to search of secret Swiss bank accounts every traveler to the United to disguise and safeguard their States, unless there is advance illicit profits. intelligence information of a As in many criminal enter- i shipment or cause to suspect prises, the Chinese assemble a them as couriers. group of investors to finance . Tomorrow: Two 27-year-old the shipment of a heroin load. former GIs relate in their own That way the 'risk is spread words from a Thai prison how among the shareholders and no one individual gets 'hurt badly or wiped out if the load of drugs is intercepted by au- thorities. And again, because of the devious methods used by the Chinese, it is often difficult for undercover agents posing as Amercan buyers or couriers to penetrate the Southeast 30 they-got involved in the drug traffic and wound up serving 5- to 20-year sentences in a foreign jail with no hope of parole, Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100220001-2 Rep. Morgan Murphy Jr. inn for the most part, legit- , [I)., Ill.), who is on his third mate banking channels. There- trip to investigate the Indochi- f o r e , even their financial na drug traffic, has been told transactions become more dif- iT Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100220001-2 CHICAGO'TIIBUNE 2 9 AUG 1973 Bob Wiedrich in Asia is o~ r- Kong rdLfwr hub Chicago Tribune Press Service . HONG KONG, Aug. 28 -' This British crown colony was founded in 1841 to promote the opium trade with mainland China. But now the problem has come full circle and the shoe is on the other foot. Opium addiction, for all practical purposes, is nonexis- tent in Communist China. But IIong Kong has the worst opi- um addiction problem per cap- ita of any place in the world - .at least 100,000 [some say 150,000) of a population of 4.5 million. drugs arriving 'here aboard Thai trawlers from Bangkok, the 'vessels must be stopped somewhere in the?.South China Sea. THAI TRAWLER traffic has Otherwise, once they are off- stopped in recent weeks be- loaded into junks and lighters cause of British and American on the far side of the Lima pressure here, plus Thai cf- Islands 60 miles south of here, behest of Amcri- the opium, morphine base, and {re cores in at the Bangkok. bpure heroin disappears into a mass of junks and other fish- However, British officials ing craft. There are 30,000 are not deluding themselves. such craft alone registered in They are certain the expatri- the colony. ate Chinese masterminding the Also, it seems almost impos- Indochina dope traffic will sihle to- stop the flow of drugs switch to airplanes or mer- fro-n Indochina by d i r e c, t chant ships if need be, if only search of aircraft, ships, and to supply the 100 tons of opium required to supply the colony's passengers, opium smoking and heroin ad- Annually, 20 million tons of (lict.e(1 population, cart o move thru the port; over For about live years, Thai 7,300 shipping movements oc- trawlers virtually ran a ferry Granted, the People's Re- public of China solution to ad- diction after the Communist takeover in 1949 was less than humane. Top dope peddlers were rounded up and shot. And the addicts - estimated at 10 million then - were giv- en a period of time in which to cure themselves or face jail, hard labor, or death. Of these, some 300,000 are said to have finally been exe- cuted as the Socialist solution to a pressing problem. Nevertheless, taday the Pe- king government has no addic- tion problems. Conversely, the British administrators of this colony do. And so do the Americans, whose Yankee Clipper ships got into the opi- un1 trade, too, hauling opium from Turkey while the British did the same from India thru their East India Company. Further, if there is tragic justice to be found in this his- toric turn o* f events, witness the fact many of America's more than 500,000 heroin ad- dicts were initially hookers on Turkish drugs. Now they face continued hell because of Southeast Asian heroin, much of which funnels ' thru hlon Kong en route to world mar- kets. IN ORDER to have chance of intercepting cur, excluding the junks, and y t at?service to the. colony. there are at least 21A W arc 1 host of the outgoin heroin, and r assenge .Ingilts_ eventual We in the United States. The 90.01)0 to 100,004 sallo s of the United States 7th Flea, who take shore leave here an- nually, also pose a drug prob- lem for authortttcs. - LAST YEAR there were sev- en deaths :.In-.o,-.g the Navy men from drug overdoses, six of them in the last four months of i`72. This year, there has Orly been one such death to (}ate. No one during t.iits Investiga- tion of ne.r devc'.oputg drug, routes to the G.S. from the opium r; l(:aci Golden Tri- ang:le area o, T`,aila nd, Laos, and Euru1;.t has charged Red China with inr;,lvcmcnt in tfe dope truth:,, TlTt- ::ation;tlist Cl i- p 1 u s 8.4 million travelers, ,:p by Americans flying direr- ONLY mostly by air. nC=c on Taiwan foztc'r t::-,is _to- ly here from the states. They C 0 U 1' L E TIIE SE figures concede, no, no ore. really 11'Y'. e'i:ich e`:cr;:r:;z we h re 1 (i'.tStIe;1C(1 coilsa; `r5 a n1,:,11. wit}1 the reported 30 elanecs- knows low much funneled , I r tine heroin laboratories so thru by ? other mcaiis. In ;act, itis a the exp ntri- simple they can be hidden in a ate Chinose narcotics r?ur- t;'IIIt.E WE were iicrc with !had in Southcast Asia are kitchen or bathroom of over- cell, Morgan Murphy Jr.. [D.. sl;..,;c'eted Of (?rcati g - t o.-n- populated Hong Kong's housing Ill.), the Chicagoan on his sc lv^_s in an atter.ipc to divert and one begins to grasp the the }tii'd trip 1nJC7tii~attug t. alten'(,on from. op;;ra- bl foe- ' f th e pro em mity o enor Southeast. Asia narcotics traf- ing authorities ],,ere. fie, a Hong Kong ship's cook The British and South Viet- t was arrested in hamburg. namcnc, plus American mar Germany, with 1.3 pounds of cotics agents stationed thruout inside IICi'elil strapped inside a trou- Southeast Asia, have (lone a 11 Sor leg. reniarhoble jcb iutLrecpting Dev'intis as that route may some of the narcotics loads stem, American agents k no", headed here by trawler. narcotics are being smuggled In recent mouths, a Thai ttkru li:a,l urn and miter \nrth trawler captured Off Viet Nom. Ccrinan }arts from u:c Middle yielded G tons of opium des- ? t r ri fit;i;:F in i;~ t'till I:ai1- tined for Hong Kong. Another at I contained one ton for Saigon a n d probable transshipment here. But once. the drugs; disap- pear into the rabbit warren of hots:;ng in this crowded, 20 Square mile colony, it'is vir s- ally impossible to ferret them out. Some of the heroin labs any are so simply (lcsigncd th(' the can be packed up and. spirited away within minute". of a warning of appmarhing }wh('t' snundcd by lonkcrt;ti. ? 31 t ion1s. Not 1;;:1, arm, a load of o ili- um a'';owrd a 1-Icag Kong junk pound to be l/ticked in C..^.t (ins bearin the la' :1, 1L:... in the Peoples Ili-i+.rever, the 1('ater-proof in- ner parka :in1; was exactly ,?r;s sane as Shipment, Lo m Thai(:.,,rt, I'C -. Pii Il,le CVi- (;i-.t(?C fiat : u,.:^ as try; n' Approved-Per---Release-20D-a-/08/07-CIA-RDP77- O432RMD 00770001-2. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100220001-2 WASHINGTON STAR 29 August 1973 By Oswald Johnston Star-News Staff Writer After months of seeming indecision, the administra.. tion has given its first tangi. ble sigh that it takes seri- ously .\rab threats to limit oil production if the United. Stn' ',es not cut back, military and political sup- port for Israel. President Nixon has cho-. sen for the next ambassador' to Saudi Arabia a recog-' nized expert on the world. petroleum market who re-' jects openly the official! State Department arrument that a Saudi threat to hold' J.S. policy hostage to its' immense oil resources is no: more than "press specula- tion. " The ambassador-desig- nate, James E. Akins, is the first diplomatic nominee to be announced 'since Henry A. Kissinger was tapped to take over as secretary of, State. In a news conference last week, Kissinger hinted that the Middle East is one area in which new depar- tures in policy might be necessary to bring a dan- gerous political stalemate to an end. Akins' nomination comes at a time of growing aware-' ness in the United States and the Middle East alike that increasing American:. dependence on Arab oil rep-. resents an increasing Arab leverage on American poli- cy, THIS HAS become doubly apparent in recent days. Egypt's President Anwar, Sadat has this week com- pleted an intensive diplo-,; matic campaign to harness Saudi oil wells to the Arab confrontation with Israel' and to ease his own depend, j ence upon the Soviet Union, Despite quiet disclaimers' from State Department offi-' cials,there is every reason to think that he has sue ceeded. In the past six months, there have been these sig-, nificant developments ? 0 A pointed warning by, Sheikh Zaki Yamani?, the Saudi petroleum minister, that he opposes the future increases in Saudi produc- tion that would be neces . sary if projected American ;fuel needs are to be met. TY e # at" t 5 U.S. support of Israel was -given as a prime reason for, his reluctance, C A more pointed repetition of Yamani's warning by. Accordingly, it 'is widely ` , ' policy, Akins sees his as- 'argued that the Saudis will(' signment as a two-fold task..' have to be given an overrid to persuade the Saudis not ing political reason to pump' their oil, and deplete their resources, beyond their Inierpretsid$On' need. U.S. support of Israel King Faisal - - the one man' who has power to decide how Saudi resources are to- be used. The Saudi monarch intervened earlier this. summer in a rare interview -granted jointly to the Chris- tian Science Monitor and the Washington Post. It is understood Faisal, ,`himself initiated the inter, views because, he feared. that secretary of State Wil-' tliam P: Rogers and his, Middle East deputy, Asst.; Secretary Joseph J. Sisco,' misunderstood Yamani's.' message.. 0 Reports from Cairo that" Faisal for the, past six :months has sought to step up the payments, about $100 billion a year, Egypt has been receiving from Saudi, Arabia under the Arab, summit agreement after the 1967 Six-Day War Reports. are circulating that Sadat' has agreed to move still fur-, ther away from Egypt's. 'earlier dependence on the Soviet Union, in deference' to Faisal's traditional' is obviously not that reason. The State Department has been reluctant to accept 'this argument, and officials reject its consequence that Saudi Arabia may emerge as the spearhead of a con- certed Arab dommercial counterattack upon the 'United States. State officials concede; that the Saudis can offer' Egypt even more support over the short run than can the oil-rich, but radically: anti-Western regime of Li- bya's Muammar Kadafi. "THE REAL task is not in Libya, it's eastward," one official remarked re- cently as he studied reports, of Sadat's just completed: visit to Saudi Arabia even, while the Sept.. 1 deadline for the scheduled Egypt-, Libya merger approached. Nevertheless, the State' to limit oil production, and, to persuade them not :o raise prices. In the present climate, one well-placed source' speculated, his chance of, "ccess is "about two per cent," and the real likeli- hood is not only that prices will go up, but that Saudi' production will be cut - not merely held back. EARLIER this year, Ak- ins, on State Department loan to the White House' . energy task force, sought to influence the administra-' tion's fuel policy by advo-' cating such stringent con- servation measures as im- posing a five cent a gallon. gasolint tax and establish. ing an automotive horse power tax. Those proposals were shot down by economic con- servatives who then domi- nated Nixon's domestic poli cy, and last'spring Akins and the White House staff Department attitude to' were barely on speaking Saudi warnings on oil policy terms. At that stage, Akins ? is that there has been no ' reportedly gave serious :tangible evidence that pro- ? thought to leaving govern-' duction will not'?continue to ment service. 1 :be increased to suit Ameri- , His return to prominence ' abhorence of 'Communism.' interview is discounted, and The quid pro quo, it is sug- his message is dismissed as 'gested, is the new Saudi '"speculation." ,campaign to influence U.S. Akins, now chosen to rep- policies: ' resent the United States at. .The estimation among' :Faisal's court, rejects this petroleum experts here is view. According to informed that Saudi Arabia must step sources close to the admin o up production to 20 million' 'istration's developing fuel. . barrels a day if American ?, .needs are to be met. Cur- rent daily production is; nearly nine million barrels,: up from an average of six, million last year. OIL EXPERTS have rec." ognized for several years' that increasing prices for; Middle East crude diminish; the economic need for the. Saudis to increase total. production. Too much pro- duction, it is recognized,-' will put. too much of the real wealth of a one-product economy into depreciable', currencies, while oil re serves underground can only increase in value per barrel in the foreseeable ;future with the nomination to the' Saudi post has been ru- mored for more than a ' month by`? sources close to ' the administration's reorga- nized energy management team. -? although such ru- mors were discounted by the State Department. 32 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100220001-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100220001-2 THE GUARDIAN, MANCHESTE 13 August 1973 JOHN GITTINGS reports on. overlapping,'. between 13 -of 17 under- water claims. by South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, with China ,, reserving her ~ rights S an tangle in cramble. _ .. for seabed of THE SCRAMBLE for oil in the East China Sea seemed to be at flashpoint three , years ago, when protests were flying between Tokyo, Taipei, Washington, and Peking over the disputed Tiaoyu Islands. Today, the dispute over con- trol of the potentially oil-rich underwater resources of this area is muted. The diplomatic thaw between the United States and China, with Japan in their wake, has made it an apparent non-issue, about which no one likes to talk too much. But the problem now is not who will protest at whom tomorrow, but how in the long run the whole sticky tangle can ever be sorted out. A recent map prepared by the US State Department shows considerable, overlapping between 13 out of the 17 underwater claims spon- sored by South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. China and North, Korea have not yet made any specific claims, but both have reserved their rights in general. terms According to a detailed study in the latest issue of Harvard University's Studies in East Asian Law, any. attempt to reach agreement on the con- tinental shelf off China will. make the, North Sea shelf' agreement seem bike -an ele- mentary exercise for inter- national lawyers. The author, Dr Choo-n-ho Park of the Iiar- vard Law School, concludes that " the problem of boundary delimitation here : involves almost every conceivable difficulty which the f 1.958 Geneval Convention was int'oded to prevent or solve." The only agreement reached so far has been between Japan and ''outh Korea, who in May this Y *.ar agreed to defer deci- sion :,n the area south of Chacju Island where sovereignty is disputed, and conduct explorations jointly. Four oil companies, including Royal Dutch Shell and Texaco, are now conducting seismic sur- veys off the Korean coast But the Seoull-Tokyo agree- ment was signed only weeks ,after a Chinese protest at the dri-liling operations of one 'of the foreign companies which, said Pelting, was part of the design of the " inter?nationail oil monopolies" to " grab China's coastal seabed reso?unces." And- it was followed by an even sharper protest from North Korea, who denies that the Sonth has "any ri,gIllt of competence to strike a bargain with anybody about Our con- tinental shelf." In its protest to South Korea, Peking referred to "the areas of jurisdd.ction of China and her netighbours in the Yellow and East China Seas as a matter 7 y:~ KYUSHU '`?? EASTCN/NA ? EA/: S r/AOY /SLAN a5 V ,.. .i] TAIWAN OK/AMA 7RMh' 0 Miles 500 Prospective oil and gas fields beneath the Yellow Sea. and the East China Sea. subject to future delimitation.; ' A second probil'em is,' So China does not deny that obviously, the Tiaoyu Islands this is a negotlab.le issue, and which lie 100 miles north-east in the Foreign Ministry in of Taiwan. Japan claims that Peking they are apparently well the islands come under the -informed on all the legal prece- junilsdii'ction of Okinawa and dents: But this is where, the have adwa?ys been associated ' difficulties only begin. with the Ryuku Islands. One problem is. that two Earlier this year Mr Naka- separate principles have now s'o'me, Minister of International been established in inter-' Trade and Industry, had tried national law to deal with the to cool the issue by saying that. division of sovereignty over the no Government sanction would. continental shelf,. The ' first, be given for any prospecting in, which is based on the 1958 Con-' the area until -tlh'e question of,' vention, lays down that the sovereignty was settled. But Mr bound?ainy shall generally be the Nakasone left the door open fors "median dine" between. two the gill companies, and for . , adjacent states. future conflicts, by saying tlhat; The second, anising out o.f- a; /any development "sihouhd be, North Sea decision by - the handled on a ,pri.vate batiis." International Court of Justice ' What the. Japanese would. in 1967, sees the shelf as ' a like is an agreement with China, " natu-rah proll'on,gation of . land ,to exploit the Tra'oyiu area, territory "? 'which does not, jointly, whidh would bypass (a's . ii cessarily have to be divided! does tlheir agreement, with, up eq.ualiy. . . ' . South Korea) the delicate issuer In this case the continental uliellif between China and Japan is . broken, closer to tiled Japanese side, by a deep.fiss,ure 'known as the Okinawa Trench. The "median line " principle would ive T? n ' ^tht h . d a rt t of sovereignty: But when Mr, Nakasone visited China lash year to negotiate the first. sales of Chinese oil (produced on the, mainland to Japan, Peking was adamant that s?u,dh a. shared- dead was not on. g , p ? s on e China's legal position on the maiatlarid side of thus trough. Tiaoyu Islands us, anyhow, very, The " natural prolongation " strop As an atlas will Shaw argument would limit Japan t~o g' an, a smablter slice on its own side the -islands. fail within the of the trough. ? 200-lyard.mark to.. the . west of 5th Okinawa Trench, A more ,exotic argument on Peking's side, which shows that the were traditionally thought of' as Chinese, is an, Imperial edict of 1893 in whnah ,the Empress Dowager Tzu Hsi awarded three of the .islands to a loyal minister " for the, pur. pose of collecting medicinal heilbs." Another problem is quite simply how any agreement can' ever be reached over the oil resources of the East China Sea' so long as Taiwan continues to exist as a separate entity, pur- porting to license prospectors in the area. Since well before Mr Nixon's visit, to Peking, Washington has tried to dis- suade American companies from taking up oil contracts. with Taiwan, but explorations continue in the area under, flage of convenience. The usual metaphor is inap- propriate. It is the otl which) troubles the waters in the Nast China Sea, and further south as well. In the last two months alone the regime in Saigon and - even. in its extremity - Phnom Penh have signed oil concessions with Western com- panies, over the protests of the .rival revolutionary govern- ments of South Vietnam and Cambodia. 33 Approved-~el< Release2404//8/0 : Cl n _RDP77-00432R000100220001-2- ;YEI LOW' Approved For Release 2001/08/07 NEW YORK TIMES 20 August 1973 U.S. Lags in Giving Support' to Banks,. Aiding Poor Nations By EDWIN. L. DALE Jr. Special to The New York Times WASHINGTON, Aug. 19-An unfinished highway in Ohio, the Japanese ancestry of a Senator and the. Chicano constituency of a Congressman are among the many forces at work in Congress that are threatening to f:,;sLrate what the Nixon Administration regards as an in--- part of its foreign The issue, which gets little public attention at home but a good deal abroad, is the lagging American contribution to the resources of the internation lending institutions that aid the economic development of the poor countries. The institu- tions are the World Bank, the inter-American Development Bank and the Asian Develop- ment Bank. For about five years the Ad- ministration has . encountered gradually increasing difficulty' in winning Congressional as- sent to the agreements estab- 'lishing the United States con- tributions, which are now far behind schedule. Four separate. committees,of congress are in- volved, and even if the commit- tee stage is hurdled, floor ac- tion in both House and Senate is increasingly unpredictable. With the United States for- eign aid program dwindling- the bill for this year barely passed by the House last month provided less than $1-billion in economic aid for the whole world apart from Indochina- the contributions to the interna- tional banks are seen by the State and Treasury Deparments as the chief remaining sign of United States interest in thei nearly 100 poor countries. "This frustrating business is complicating things for us else- where," says Paul A. Volcker, Under Secretary of the Treas- ury for Monetary Affairs. "It is subject to the interpretation that we are going isolationist. In matters like trade and mone- tary reform, the less-developed countries are less enthusiastic- ally with us than they might otherwise be." ' Congress, or at least an ap- parent majority of Congress, seems to be unimpressed. This is the current evidence. qThe United Staates is more than a year behind schedule in the current round of contribu- tions by the' rich countries to the International Development Association, the World Bank's subsidiary, which helps the very poorest of the poor countries with easy-term loans. The other industrial countries had to vol- unteer their subscriptions be- fore they were legally obliged to do so to prevent the asso- ciation from stopping opera- tions altogether last year. cCongress has still not ap- proved the United States pledge of $100-million to the comparable division of the rela- tively new Asian Bank first agreed upon three years ago.. Congress last year approved, only half of the pledged amounts .for the Inter-American Bank,! and a further cut is threatened! this year in the $500-million, requested. Laborious Talks on Share CIA-RRFJ7-f 8WFT9AW220001-2 19 August 1973 U.S. Shortages Peril World FoodAid Plan Supplies for 80.Million Needy Overseas Will Have to Be Cut Back or Abandoned By KATI.ILEEN TELTSCH Special tome New York Times , UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., 'Aug. 18-In Colombia's poorest; rural areas, a school-lunch pro- gram faces shutdown. Elderly patients in a hospital in Haiti will have to' go without ass extra daily hot meal. And in India, the promising develop,, ment of a new food for babies' his threatened. These operations. and hun- dreds more will be abandoned. or drastically cut back ing weeks because private .United States relief agencies, will no longer have the com modifies to continue helping 80 million to lb0 million needy people in 100 countries around the world. The agencies have been in- formed in the last week by Washington officials that the Department of Agriculture will not be able to purchase com- modities for the Food for Peace program during August and possibly not in September. Moreover, the agencies werei told the commodity situation was so unsettled that it was uncertain when they could again expect to , get supplies of wheat, flour, vegetable oil and other foodstuffs on?which' they have based their free dis- tribution of relief overseas for alinokt 20 years. The effect will be calamitous, according to administrators of in all of these cases, the United States share of the con- tribution was worked out in laborious international negotia- tions, conducted mainly by the Treasury.Department. The Unit- ed States share in the Interna- tional Development Association, for example, is 40 per cent. Why the Congressional hos- tility? One part of the answer is exemplified by the case of Rep- resentative Clarence F. Miller, 'Republican of Ohio, a member of the appropriations subcom- mittee that handles funds for the international banks. Part of Mr. Miller's district lies in Appalachia and President Nixon's budget austerity has resulted in the halting of con- struction on a 'half-finished highway there. Mr. Miller is fu- rious and believes that his dis-' trict should, come ahead of lit tle-known international lending agencies of which his constitu- ents have barely heard. Representative Edward R. Roybal, Democrat from Los Angeles, is another member of, the subcommittee. Mr. Roybal is said to have soured on the Inter-American Bank because, in his view, it has not hired enough Spanish-speaking Amer- icans. An ironic case is that of Senator Daniel K. Inouye, 1 Democrat of Hawaii, who heads the Senate appropria- tions subcommittee, Senator, Inouye, a member of the Water- gate investigating committee,' was called "that little Jap" by John J. Wilson, the attorney for H. R. Handeman and John D. Ehrlichman, the former Presi-i dential assistants. In fact, one, of Senator In- ouye's chief concerns about the international lending agencies is his fear that Japan Is coming to dominate the Asian Bank, which makes him reluctant to appfove a large United- States contribution. Meanwhile, be- cause of Congressional delays and doubts, the American share in the capital of the bank has dropped to only 9 per cent. ' - - Of deeper importance than these particular cases is the general apathy; and even hos- tility, in Congress about foreign aid in general, of which the international banks are an im- portant part. The House passed this year's foreign'aid bill by only five votes, and at one point last year the Senate voted to kill the aid bill altogether. .,One of our problems," says ,John M. Hennessy, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, "is that the people in Congress never hear from home about this." Mr. Hennessey and others .argue that the United States would take "real risks" if, by finally abandoning its contri- butions to the international banks, it showed a lack of interest in the underdeveloped countries. "There is a race for raw 'materials in the world," he points out. "We cannot be pushing for international solu- ".tions in the trade, monetary rand investment fields and fail to pick up our part of the ,burden in the `fourth area- ?proving resources for the de- veloping countries. I- I Meanwhile, most of the other industrial countries have ex- pressed a willingness ' to ap- 'proximately double their contrl- .butions in the next round. `Given the problem of Con- gressional attitudes, the United States negotiators have been n s able to make no commitriie t the voluntary agencies, as they are called. "I have not seen a situation like this in my 28 years in overseas assistance," said Fred W. Devine of CARE - the Co- operative for American Relief Everywhere. "It's going to be disastrous." CARE and Catholic Relief Services operate the two most extensive programs supplying' supplementary foods to the poor. The Catholic agency cares for 10 million of the "poorest of the poor," said Bishop Edward E. Swanstrom, executive director. The relief activities in more than 50 coun- tries will have to be terminated by the end of the year, he said, unless the Agriculture Depart- ment resumes buying and dis- tributing commodities. The voluntary agencies gee their relief goods for distribu- tion without cost under United States Public Law 480, which Is the basis for the Food for Peace program. The same legislation provides for assistance to such operations as the United Na- tions Children's Fund, the Aid Program for Palestinian Refu- gees and the World Food Pro- gram. So far they have not been advised officially of pend-, ing cutbacks. Under the law the Adminis- ,tration must first satisfy do- ~mestic requirements including aid for poor Americans, must meet foreign sales commitments and provide a carry-over of ,supplies before taking care of the agencies which are at the ,bottom of the list. When the law was enacted ,in 1954 there were surplus sup- plies of dairy products and free distribution to the needy-a humanitarian way of disposing i'of the surpluses. Later, with .bumper crops of wheat on ;Band, grains were added. i But all of the commodities !traditionally used for relief have been in short supply in recent years. The Soviet Un- ion's purchase last year of one- ' quarter of the United States twheat crop sent the market 'price soaring, but in trade cir- ~cles spokesmen maintain that tithe crisis in grain was brought , on by a combination of cu- `cumstances, including droughts, poor harvests and floods in many of the wheat-producing areas as well as the big Soviet purchases. Because officials of the vol- untary agencies have been anx- watching the commodity iously 34 market, they anticipated dif- Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010022000.1-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100220001-2 ficulties even before they were invited to a recent meeting with Daniel E. Shaughnessy, associate coordiilator of the Food for Peace office of the Agency for International De- velopment. At the meeting at the head- quarters of CARE the message was as plain as the luncheon -fare of hero sandwiches and coffee in containers. Mr. Shaughnessy said that the Agriculture Department had made no purchases in July or August and probably only small quantities of commodities would be procured in Septem- ber. ?e said that the depart- ment was not going into the grain market to make further purchases until it completely reviewed the commodity situa- tion'and assessed the needs for domestic use and foreign sales in light of a revised crop esti- mate. This estimate showed lower production of wheat and other grains than had been; forecast earlier. Some of the agencies coun- tered with an appeal saying they did not want foods to be diverted from American con sumers but asked that 1 per' cent be held back from alloca-1 tions for sales abroad and be! earmarked for Food for Peace. An extensive review of the commodities situation now is under way in Washington, and the decision will be made "at the highest level," according to spokesmen at the Agriculture and State Departments. Meanwhile, Church World Service has sent its representa- tives in the field a terse an- nouncement that shipments for October through December "will be nil." Most of the pro- gram goes to help preschool children. - The American-Jewish Joint Distribution Committee intends cutting back on some of its services so as to be able to buy bread for such operations as the soup kitchens run in Morocco. "But where -can we buy bread at prices we can afford?" asks. Abe Loskove, director of community relations. In Mo- rocco, the agency's program goes to Moslems as well as Jews. ` CARE already has been re- ceiving cables from field of- fices saying that reserve stocks have been exhausted, said Mr. Devine, the deputy executive director. After years as a field worker, a paralyzing illness has confined him to a wheel chair, but he still runs the agency's supply program for 30-million people in 34 countries. CARE will juggle what's left of its dwindling supplies as long as it can, but unless the Agriculture Department pro- vides new commodities by Sep- tember, there will be a break- down in the pipeline of sup- plies in 20 countries, according to Frank Goffio, CARE's exec- utive director. All of the agencies' directors stress that a delay of even three months in shipments risks the collapse of distribution services that have been developed over CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 30 August 1973 Narcotics use dedines in U.S. armed forces By Dana Adams Schmidt Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor Washington The ' Pentagon has asked for re- search on methods to test servicemen for the abuse of the two favorite drugs in Europe - mandrax and hashish. This was disclosed by Dr. Richard S. Wilbur, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health and Environment, who reported that the services were making headway against most types. of drug abuse in the U.S. military, but had no means of controlling these two. Mandrax is a form of methaqual- one, a type of sleeping pill, which' some servicemen have used instead of barbiturates. Hashish is a concentrated form of marijuana, derived entirely from the berries of the cannabis plant. Like many other drugs, it is easily avail-? able in Germany and has been more widely abused by American service- men there than heroin. Dr. Wii13ur showed satisfaction with the armed forces' performance in 'rehabilitation of drug abusers. His figures showed that of 83,874 individ- uals identified as drug abusers be tween June, 1971, and March, 1973, the armed services naa succeeded in returning 48.0 percent to duty. Still undergoing rehabilitation were 17.3*,' percent and discharged after rehabili- tation were 29.3 percent; 5.4 percent were transferred to veterans hospi- tals for additional treatment. "Rehabilitation varies a good deal," Dr. Wilbur admitted. "It's a relatively new program and we've had to train a great many drug counselors, but the ability to rehabili- tate is improving really ex ponentially. We feel that we will have, an entirely satisfactory rehabilitation program over a period of the next few months." To illustrate how many different approaches there can be to the matter' of rehabilitation from drug abuse, he described the method adopted by the Navy at Subic Bay in the Philippines """s"" i "They said, 'We first take the lab news conference this week empha- positives, eliminate those that have sized that overall statistics indicated. legal prescriptions, and then we ex- ;that drug abuse was declining among amine for needle tracks. American servicemen around the ; "'As you know in the drug taking in world. 11 'Southeast Asia most is done, by Although the worldwide percentage' mouth, by nose, by smoking. Very of drug positives among U.S. service- little is done by needle, so this is men and women was only 0.7 percent rarely ever found. during 1973, troops in Germany had " 'We look for evidence that he's considerably higher test results. under the influence, which is also Of those tested there, 2.8 and 2.9 uncommon when one has an appoint- ? percent showed positive in January ment with a doctor a day or so ahead. and February, gradually declining to' We then tell him that anything he says 2.0 and 1.8 percent in May and June. may be used against him and ask him The drugs most frequently abused' if he's a drug user. And they all say -, as indicated by these analyses - no. Therefore, he is put down as a, were amphetamines, commonly re negative and put on a surveillance i ferred to as "speed," which was taken by 51 percent of those registering program for eight weeks at three positive. Thirty-eight percent were urine tests a week. Very few-of the positives,for opiates, mainly heroin, men ever have a second positive.' " and most of the rest were barbiturate ' \Dr. Wilbur observed that the sys- positives. tem might not be statistically sound A special test in Thailand showed a but "I personally like the Navy decline in positives from 1.4 down to .6 ' approach, t b e percen etw en January and this year. . .many years. "We have tried to get peo- ple to learn to help themselves by' using food as a tool," ex-1 P Anthony Foddai of I WASHINGTON #gjTved For Release. 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100220001-2 19 August 1973 ?U? t StudyH::i t.t . O .. orpo Rio s porn? ; ' . ,Lich have been prai sc . nor developing the ned for subverting the politi- der the scrutiny, but probable "iiot the control, of the United !-Nations. ' To launch the study the United Nations issued a 195- 'ceeding the majority of the .U.N.'s member countries. The ,"flexibility" and "resourceful-1 I ness" of the . multinational corporations. At the same time .ble. ? r It calls for "some form of establishment of a code of conduct, and in a somewhat ,corporative activities. "Many key issues already identified do not lend them- .present world realities," the report stated. "An untimely The report traces the dra- the manufacturing and extrac- tive industries-since the end of World War II. It notes the thigh degree of concentra- the developed countries and investments gravitate towarrj other developed countries. At thQ role of the multinationals warning about their corpora- tive impact on their societies and their national aspirations. m "Eight of the 10 largest mul- tinational corporations are By Marilyn Berger ? Washington Poet Staff writer alone accounts for about at third of the total number of foreign affiliates, and together .itli the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and France, it accounts for over three-quarters of the to- tal . , .. Of a total estimated stock of foreign investment of about $165 billion; most of which is owned by multina- tional corporations, the United States accounts for more than ',half, and over four-fifths pfj Germany." . ' .report stated, have received only about a third of the total estimated stock of foreign di: :A measure of the size of the corporations considered In the study is seen in 'the decision by the authors to ignore enter- pl ises witl\i less than $100 mil- lion in sales. Included is a list of 211 corporations with sales totalling more than $1 billion cal interference in Chile by International Telephone and c*rn that the multinationals parative activity as former Un- der Secretary of State George company law for chartering ,But in a masterpiece of un- derstatement, the report noted powerful supranational ma_ o1i'aque about the alleged po- litical activities of the multi- Tensions," the report dis- pgration in international rela- !'Non.governmental bodies," actions of their own govern- ments, or by influencing the policies and actions of foreign governments; either directly or: through non-governmental entities in those countries. In the latter case they bypass their own governments, al- though the consequences may affect these governments' poli- cies and actions. Furthermore, modern communications per- mit non-governmental entities to affect the environment in which international relations take place by influencing taste, values and attitudes .. . Multinational ... corporations are often close to the centers of political ? power and can thus influence the affairs of nations." . . This appears to mean that the giant corporations' can 'make or break governments ? and can have a deep impact on economies; both in their coun- tries of origin and in countries where they establish subsidiar. ies. In a less roundabout way, the report also states that home governments may use the giant corporations for the 'implementation of their for- eign policy. The activities of the multi- national corporations and their impact on international finance, trade, politics and de- velopment, will be discussed .by a panel called the "Group of Eminent Persons." A 'two- week meeting is scheduled to begin at the United Nations Sept. 4. Included among the participants are bankers, diplo- mats and politicians. New York Republican Sen. Jacob - K. Javits, sometimes known as the father of the United States' Overseas Pri- 'vate Investment Corporation, -and J. Erwin Miller, chairman of Cummins Engine Company, Inc. will be the U.S. partici- pants. Sicco Mansholt of the Netherlands, former president of the commission of the Euro- pean Economic Community, Hans Schaffner of Switzer- land, vice chairman of Sandoz pharmaceuticals, and a.British professor, John Dunning of Reading University, an author- ity on multinational corpora- tions, will represent the indus- trial nations. From the less developed' countries come Mohammad' S'adli, head of Indonesia's For- teign Investment Board, and L. K. Jha, former governor !?pf tjlg Reser%' Bank pi' illf?jgi 36 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100220001-2 The Soviet Union is rejprg-,J senieci by I. l). lyppov of 111E 1$gvjet institute for U.S. fitud-- ? jss. jlrperjk Blum of Yugosla-, vj,a, bead' of Energoinvest, which has been called 'the .Communist bloc's only multi. national conglomerate, is also, on the panel. ? . At the September meetings representatives of some of the major multinational corpora- tions like International Busi- ness Machines and General Motors, as well as labor union leaders, . will deliver. state- ments. Further meetings pre'. scheduled for November in Geneva, And for March in New York. Although the U.N. study suggests possible Areas for in. ternational action it makes clear that individual countries of regional groupings can do much to harness the energies pf multinational corporations in order to take advantage of the contributions they can linalte -while controlling their power. Major areas for action, the report suggests, are in tax, ation and the transfer of funds. "The corporation, operating within several tax jurjsdle- tions," the report stated, "can minimize its overall tax bill by establishing an artificial trans. fer price which will inflate the profits of subsidiaries located in countries where the tax ,burden is lowest and limit the . profits earned in countries .where taxes are higher." The report cites other methods re- sorted to by corporations to- decrease taxes. It notes that individual countries-like the United States-are tempting to get greater con- trol over corporations for tax purposes but that shared data would help in the process. . The report also attributes to multinational corporations an 'important impact on the inter- national monetary system, stating that "the recent cur- rency crises have focused at- -tention on `hot money' move- ments." Although this has be- come accepted wisdom Deputy -Under Secretary of Treasury for Monetary Affairs Jack F. Bennett said in a recent letter to Sen. Harry F. Byrd of Vir- ginia that he had found no evi- dence that large U.S. corpora- tions were to blame for the massive attack on the dollar in the world's currency markets at the beginning of this year. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100220001-2 WASHINGTON POST 12 August 1973_. gr Barry Lando Lando is a Washington producer for.; the CBS news program, "60 Minutes." F OR YEARS, ONE of the best-kept of the many secret operations. of the Vietnam war was an o'rganizatipn, with the inoffensive name , of SOGt The Studies and Observation Group. .Recently, in scattered newspaper. sto- ries, then with the Pentagon's admit ting for the first time that Americans were killed In clandestine raids in Laos and Cambodia, finally with the testimony of former green. berets be- fore the Senate Armed Services Com-, mittee last week, some of the activities: of SOG have begun to surface. The full scope of SOG's operations, how- ever, may never be disclosed. SOG was a formidable operation, at its height involving more than 1,000 American soldiers and almost 2,000 In- digenous mercenaries. They ran almost daivy raids into Laos and Cambodia,. baked by helicopter gun ships, their own secret bases In South Vietnam, even a manned radio relay station in- side Laos itself. At times they could call upon U.S. tactical air units in' South Vietnam for help If they ran into trouble, and they frequently did. Official, U.S. protestations notwith-, standing, SOG's operations were not simple exercises in trail watching and. intelligence gathering, but often in volvc d sabotage and bloody combat. SOG was launched by a Democratic ,president, continued by a Republican, It first went into action Feb. 1, 1964, set up by Lyndon Johnson on the rec- ommendation of then Secretary of De- fense Robert McNamara. Its code name was Operation Plan 34A. Accord- ing to the Pentagon Papers, as Mc- Namara viewed the plan it would "present a wide variety of sabotage' and psychological operations against: North Vietnam from which I believe" we should aim to select those that pro- vide maximum pressure with minimum risk." A faint administration hope was that. by putting pressure on North VI-. etnam the United States would some-, how convince Hanoi to get the Pathet Lao in Laos and the Vietcong in South Vietnam to back off. During 1964, 34A teams of Ameri- cans and South Vietnamese cgnducted, wide-ranging operations into and over' North Vietnam:, U-2 ' spy flights, sea 'raids on coastal Installations, sabotag- ing bridges, kidnapping for Intelli- gence purposes, and carrying out prop 4aganda warfare. An analyst quoted in the Pentagon Papers concluded that the, 84A opera- tion "carried with it an implicit sym- bolic and psychological intensification' of the U.S. commitment., A firebreak, had been crossed." The analyst also, found that the,34A raids played a ma- jor role in provoking the 1964 clashes ` in the Tonkin Gulf. SOG Extension As- THE VIETNAM conflict ex- panded so did the SOG's operations,' first into Laos around 1965, under the ; code name "Prairie Fire," then into' .Cambodia about 1967 as "Salem House," three years before President Nixon's solemn assurance that the U.S. had always respected Cambodian neu- trality. "We weren't trying to spread ~ the war," says a former SOG com- mander, "but to increase our defense capabilities in South Vietnam. 'The idea was to protect our flank, to put, some eyes and. ears where we didn't. .have them." Support elements, such as medics' and chopper pilots, came from other units, but most of SOG's American field troops were drawn from Special Forces. Informally, they devised their; own emblem, based on the skull and, crossbones, which they hung in the base bar and put on beer mugs.' At their bases they continued to wear,. Special Forces' insignia and their' green berets, but once assigned to 'SOG they were no longer under Spe- cial Forces command. SOG operated as a special unit of MACV (Military Assistance Command, Vietnam), headquartered in , Saigon, .with some input from the CIA and the 'Department of State. Overall supervi-; Sion, though, come from the Secretary of Defense through' an office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff called "Counter. insurgency and Special Activities." SOG's forces were split into three base camps, with about 150 Americans ,assigned to each camp: Banmethuot and Kontum in the central highlands, Danang in the north. The field opera- tions were given the cover name of ? Command and Control and, to an out- sider, the camps looked like any of se -veral green beret camps scattered throughout Vietnam. The bulk of SOG's forces were na- tive mercenaries, about 600 based at each camp. "They liked to work for us," says a former SOG officer. "They weren't just mercenaries. They knew that if anything happened to them In action we'd bust our ass to take care of . them. It wasn't like being with the reg ular troops. -.'They were good soldiers '- Monta- gn'irds, Cholon cowboys (the long. ,haired studs from Saigon), lots of Cam- bodians. Many of them became fine soldiers. The good ones were as good as any, soldier anywhere. ' Te trained with, them for weeks at the base camps and those patrol units became as tight as brothers." Usually the patrol teams were made up.of. six to eight native soldiers and two or three Americans. According to the former SOG commander, "If we didn't put Americans on those patrols we felt- we really couldn't rely on the flnformation we would get. But we 'didn't want to put in large numbers that might get all shot up.", "Inserting" the Patrols F?rER INTENSIVE TRAINING for I- the Americans at a secret camp near Longbinh outside Saigon, fol- lowed. by more practice at the base. camps, the patrols moved to SOG's for- ward operating bases near the Cambo- dian and Laotian borders. Only four or, five patrols could operate from any 'of those bases at one time because they required an extensive force to be. safely-"inserted": two helicopters plus a.--backup to transport them, a mini- muzn pf two gunships to provide cover- InTg-:ire if they ran into trouble, a for- ward air controller and, often, a com- mand-and-control chopper overseeing the operation. The patrols lasted about ?a`week and there could be no resupply. The men carried all their supplies, :front spare radio batteries to Claymore mines and stripped-down mortars, on their backs. The choppers were un marked and the men wore plain uni- form's-without any insignia. At times, a te?ni'would try to pass itself off as a North' Vietnamese patrol, complete: with' full NVA' uniforms, and equip. ment. They were never able to figure out why, but almost invariably the dis- guise -failed. The NVA troops would open, fire as soon -ac they caught sight of the.SOG team. After "inserting" the patrol, the choppers would hover over the area for a few'minutes, ready to sweep back in case of enemy ambush. Then they left, "When they had gone," says a former SOG officer, "you lived with constant mental strain. The fear never left you. It 'was worse than for anyone else in the war because of the isolation. Six or seven other men and yourself and no one. else within 100 miles except the enemy.' Actually, the patrols, usually oper- ated up to 15 or 20 miles inside Laos and Cambodia, but not always. Some teams penetrated more than 100 miles on special missions. According to arti- cles by Gerald Meyer of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch 'and confirmed by Spe- cial Forces Veterans, SOG even estab- lished its own radio relay station, "Eagle's Nest," on a mountain peak 30 miles inside Laos. It was manned by -- - -------App oved--Far Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100220001-2 i By Joseph P. Mastran8elo-The Washington Post Sku'l-and-crossbones insignia mark?SOG's bases in Vietnarn. SOG troops, regularly resupplied by difficult. Sometimes our successes, helicopter. came when an NVA soldier would acci- dentally stumble into our arms and; The prime goal of SOG teams was "would be just too damned surprised to gathering intelligence: checking poten- be tial bombing targets such, as arms : SOG's teams often went far beyond. caches, truck parks and radio installs- ? :simply gathering intelligence. They tons, tapping North Vietnamese army would mine supply trails, attack small' communications, placing sensors on the trails, which were then monitored ',targets like radio installations or sup- from the air, calculating road and ply caches. "Usually you'd try not to. initiate contacts," says the Special,' river traffic. Forces off; er, "but some guys got, One of the best sources of enforma-, pretty gutsy. Three bikes coming down tion was considered to' be enemy sol- a trail. You toss out three grenades, diers themselves. One POW was worth search the bodies for weapons or docu? a,? ' ments Some guys took on much bigger four or with t th hein 'indays of digenous soldiers the getting ol patrol,, wng odds. cash bonus besides. The problem, says, a Special Forces officer, was to get the Bloody the Enemy's Nose prisoners. "We'd try to grab the last T TIMES the small patrol teams guy in an NVA unit, ambush two guys It were doubled in size to larger as they went for water, but it was "Hatchet" operations, aggressively seek-' ways to take ly seek- - ing enemy targets, armed with, stripped- a without thout losing over' ways w them or bringing everything down on down mortars, machine guns, even'. top of us. Those knock-out dart guns flame throwers. Occasionally, they ex- you see In the spy movies never' 'panded' to . company-size SLAM seemed to work in practice. We'd wind ,(Search Location and, Annihilation. up using a pistol or a grease gun with Mission) of 200 men or more; full. a silencer, aim for some non-vital part, blown combat operations. "The aim,", and hope the guy wouldn't die before says the former SOG commander, we got him out. Occasionally it .,w~ to bloody the enemy's nose." worked; mostly it was just goddamned t If a patrol ran into enemy fire, was frequently able to call in support not just from its own gunships but from regular tactical air squadrons op- erating in South Vietnam. The reports of those strikes, according to a former air liaison sergeant, were falsified to ap- pear as strikes within South Vietnam. SOG teams frequently were blood- ied themselves. The Pentagon now ad- mits that 102 Americans were killed during clandestine missions in Laos and Cambodia since 1967. That number may,. still go much higher. Because. their numbers were greater, the in- -digenous SOG forces lost three or four. times more men than did the Ameri- cans. No one talks about any Ameri- cans taken prisoners by the enemy durin^ SOG operations. Some of the sharpest actions were in 1967 in the Parrot's Beak area of Cam- bodia where NVA forces were heavily concentrated. Potential landing zones. were constantly monitored by the en- emy, then very much alert to SOG op-. erations. "One favorite tactic the NVA had," says a former SOG officer, "was to, wait until the patrol had unloaded and the choppers left the area. Then they, ambushed the patrol and let loose on the choppers when they tried to get. back in. At one point, we were getting' hit so often that we started blasting out our own LZ's, dropping a 500-' pound bomb; then landing the patrol even before the dust had settled. Even then we'd still get hit." Though very few congressmen were then aware of SOG or its operations, on Dec. 29, 1969, Congress passed a, military appropriations bill with an. amendment prohibiting the introduc- tion of U.S. combat troops into Laos' and Thailand. But SOG s operations continued. "As far as we were concerned," says the former SOG officer, "those restric- 'tions on combat troops never applied to us. We had been carrying 'out those missions for years. All the time the Communists were saying they had no men in Laos, no men in Cambodia.' .Okay, we were also saying we had no' `men there. But somehow we sure got ,into a hell of a lot of fighting." .Another Cover T A PRESS CONFERENCE Feb. it 17, 1971, President Nixon affirmed 'that "we are not going to use ground forces in Laos" and "we are not going to use advisers in Laos with the South' Vietnamese forces." Yet during last week's Senate Armed Services Com- mittee hearings, former Special Forces. Sgt. Thomas J. Marzullo said that "at, the time the President said there were no Americans in Laos whatsoever we had two teams inserted on the ground." When the Special Forces officially ; pulled out of Vietnam in the beginning of 1971, SOG found another cover for its, operations. The name of its units was changed from Command and Con- trol to' Task Force One Advisory Ele- ment. The men removed all Special Forces insignia; switched their green berets for baseball hats, and kept on 38 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100220001-2. 'Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100220001-2 patrolling. " . In December, 1970, one year after the prohibition of ground combat' troops in Laos, Congress passed a simi lar prohibition for Cambodia. But it was not until February, 1971, that " Americans In SOG were told to re- strict themselves to planning and sup- NEW YORK TIMES 27 August 1973 port and leave the actual crossborder; incursions to indigenous forces. That- :is, according to a Special Forces offi "cer who claimed that SOG complied. 'Other men who served with SOG, ,. though, claim that Americans contin- ued to lead raids into Cambodia. SOG's operations officially came to at halt in Vietnam when MACV shut down this February. "We had South Vietnamese counterparts," says the former SOG officer, "and they were supposed to be prepared to assume the operations. If anyone is doing anything like SOG anymore, SOG is nbt the name for it." ork More dirty By Stuart H. Loory COLUMBUS, Ohio-The revelation in recent days of clandestine cross- border operations by American ground troops in Cambodia, Laos and North Vietnam during the war reminds me once again that, somewhere in the United States, at least one Vietnam veteran has some important stories to tell. I do not know his name. I have heard from him only once. He wrote to me from the San Diego area on Feb. 2, 1971 in response to an article I had written for The Los Angeles Times. My article detailed the plane ning and execution of the November 1970 raid on North Vietnam's Sontay Prison, the famous abortive attempt to rescue American P.O.W.'s from a site just a few miles from Hanoi. The article exposed the bungled intelligence procedures used which meant that mission planners had no good information on whether. Ameri- cans were actually kept at Sontay, whether, indeed, it was even a prison. My anonymous correspondent ex- pressed incredulity and he offered enough detail in his letter to make himself credible. His detail exposed the fact that for years the United States had actually been carrying the war in South Vietnam, with ground : troops as well as bombers, right into the North Vietnamese heartland. He spoke of an organization called "SOG," which, at the time, was un- ' familiar to me. In recent weeks, SOG (Studies and Observation Group) has been revealed by articles in this newspaper and The New Republic as the military's own dirty tricks depart- ment. "SOG can put a recon team into any place in North Vietnam, utilizing Viet- namese who were born and raised in the specific area," my correspondent said. "I know this is true because I spent 23 months as head adviser to the waterborne element of SOG, and helped plan and, execute many such- missions. "It was not unusual on many mis- sions of this unit to have a man killed or wounded in the same hamlet in which he had been born.... " The letter writer then continued with some specifics about how SOG men, who had been commanded for a time by the same Col. Arthur D. "Bull" Simons who led the attackers into Sontay, could have parachuted into the Sontay region, checked out the camp and radioed a. one-word yes or no answer to the question of whether Americans were there. He told of special radios the unit used. He said the men were trained in HALO (high altitude, low opening) parachute jump techniques.. C3 And then, on page three of his letter, he penned the sentence that has haunted me for the two and one-half years since I first read it. It was added parenthetically: "SOG is not beyond sending in an armed chopper in a case like this and executing the 'scout/recon team by gunning them down on the ' LZ." LZ is military shorthand for landing zone. If Iread that sentence correctly, I was being told that once the American military had employed Vietnamese to do a difficult piece of dirty work, the commandos were rewarded with exe- cution rather than rescue out of the feeling that dead men cannot, like recovered heroes, live to talk of their-, exploits and ? compromise future miss sions. In other words, SOG disposed of its own Vietnamese like so many pieces of Kleenex. Even against, the back- ground of all the documented cruelty in the Vietnam war-the' free-fire zones, the carpet bombing, the use of white phosphorus and other antiper- sonnel weapons, the tiger cages, the torture,. the defoliation-the thought 39 Approved For Release 2001/08/07_ that Americans were cynically execut- ing their allies beggared the imagina- tion. The thought bespeaks an inhumanity that shames our country more than any Watergate, "plumbers" group or. enemies list can. My - instincts have told me the contents of the letter are true. How- ever, despite repeated efforts, I was never able to doublecheck and con- firm the veracity. Because of the lets ter's implications, I have refrained from publishing the information. Now that other activities of SOG have been exposed, I am more convinced than ever of the letter's truth and impor-. tance. My correspondent took me for a' better reporter than I actually was. He concluded his letter this way: "I could relate page after page of data on SOG but I feel you've probably heard much of it' or similar stories. ... So take it from an old scout-swim- mer and SOG alumni, Mr. Loory; some- body ain't telling it like it is." ' Old scout-swimmer and SOG alum- nus, wherever you are, if you should happen to read this, your page after page of data would be a welcome con- tribution to history. Come forward, please, as so many others have re- cently and, help the American people find the way. Stuart' H. Loory, Kiplinger Professor- of Public Affairs Reporting at Ohio State, is author of the forthcoming, "Defeated. Inside America's Military Machine." . Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100220001-2 Sunday, Sept. ',1973 THE WASHINGTON POST By D. Gareth Porter Porter is a research associate in Cor-, Well University's International Relations of East Asia project. His monograph, "The M,th of the Bloodbath," published 1cs. ;ear, challenged the administration's as::, -';, '.,; about the consequences of c.._ ..,~,,i&unist victory in Vietnam. CONGRESS IS NOW considering- an economic aid program for . South Vietnam which would continue, to maintain for an indefinite time' what one high U.S. official has called the "client relationship" with the Sai- gon government of guyen Van Thieu. The main purpose of the proposed' aid program, which the administration" has called a "reconstruction and devel- opment" program, is neither recon- struction nor development but the sub-, sid.ization of Thieu's military-police ap- paratus. By not only arming and equip- ping that apparatus but also by paying for most of South Vietnam's budget and artificially maintaining levels of consumption, the United States still: refuses to allow the Saigon govern ment to stand or fall on the strength' of its support among, the Vietnamese people themselves. The Thieu government remains to- day essentialy a creation of American military intervention In Vietnam. For it is kept in power by a military and a paramilitary control apparatus which. the South Vietnamese people never de- sired and would have been unwilling to finance themselves. It was in fact the U.S. mission which Imposed this political and economic monstrosity on South Vietnam. As the ' economic counselor to the U.S. em- bassy, Charles Cooper - the man cred-,~ ited with masterminding economic pol-, icy in Vietnam during the war - told' me in a 1971interview, "We've always ` been in the position here of pushing their expenditures up. We pushed; them on pacification, on increasing the army, etc.... We were actually satisfy- ing our own ideas...." As a result the South Vietnamese ground and air forces increased from: 216,000 men in 1964 to 1.1million in 1972; the police force increased from 20,000 men in 1964 to 120,000 in 1972. The official government budget in- creased from $219 million in 1964 to .$856 million in 1972. Inflation or Taxes N ORDER TO FINANCE such a. swollen apparatus of control, any independent state would have had to resort to runaway inflation or heavy'; taxes on the entire population, rich' and poor. The taxes required to sup- port this level of military spending; only could be raised successfully if the government In question had had rea- sonably solid support for its anti-Com- munist war effort - something which the Saigon government has manifestly ,lacked. But the Saigon government had an alternative to uncontrolled inflation or' burdensome taxation - which was to rely on the U.S. to pay for most of its' 'budget and to prevent any significant drop in living standards by providing massive quantities of imported goods. The main instrument for preserving the Thieu government's military and paramilitary apparatus while minimiz-' Ing economic hardship Is still the Com- modity Import Program, under which the government receives letters of credit which it then sells to the Viet- namese importers for piasters. It uses these aid-generated piasters to pay its budgetary expenditures, and when the' goods arrive in Vietnam, the customs taxes collected on them add additional' resources for the budget. Meanwhile, t Vietnamese are able to purchase im ported -goods which South Vietnam could not possibly afford with its own minimal foreign exchange reserves:, gasoline and parts for motorbikes, fer- tilizer, cement, sugar and other food- stuffs. In fiscal year 1974, the Nixon admin- istration has requested $275 million dollars for the Commodity Import Pro- gram and is adding a $50 million "development loan" for imports which Thieu can also use to help pay for his' military budget. This assistance Is esti- mated by the Agency for International -Development to represent roughly one- fourth the living standard of the aver age Vietnamese. If the artificially maintained stand- and of living has neither made the Thieu regime popular nor silenced opposi- tior'to the war in the cities, it has nevl ~ertheless helped to keep urban discon-' tent at a level which can be controlled through the massive use of police sur- veillance and terror. Millions of Viet- namese thus have been dissuaded from. taking to the streets or to the jungles 'to overthrow the Saigon regime. There is no doubt in the minds of U.S. offi- cials that Thieu's regime could not have, survived the political turmoil which would have occurred without the U.S.' subsidization of Saigon's state appara.: tus and economy. Gradual Reduction ESPITE ADMINISTRATION state menns paying lip service to the ob- jective of Saigon's economic independ. ence, the official rationale accompany- ing the 1974 aid program for Indochina makes clear its intention to continue the client relationshp with Saigon in definitely. Instead of offering a plan for the rapid elimination of American subsidization of the Thieu government 'the rationale suggests that the import subsidy can only be reduced "gradually" and that Saigon will "continue to require foreign assistance for the next few years to maintain the flow of ioods needed for production,,' invDstmedv an" consumption." It does not mentl"o. that this flow of goods is 'also necessary for Thieu to pay for his army and police force. The army lives off foreign aid rather. than relying on the support of its own people, and-any attempt to reorient it economically, socially and politically .away from the present American style of organization and operation would al- :most certainly end in disaster. More- over, for Thieu to demobilize most of his 1.1 million-man army would mean -relinquishing a convenient means of political control over them and, indi- rectly, over their families. Equally important, the Saigon re- gime has shown little interest In mak- ing domestic taxation its main finan- cial basis. For nearly 20 years, Ameri- can largesse has encouraged Saigon to avoid the taxation of domestic wealth in order to gain more fully the support of those comprising the taxable popula- tion. As a result, taxation in Vietnam has been feeble on the one hand and regressive on the other. The Saigon government has shown an aversion to direct taxation, which must constitute the backbone of any healthy fiscal system, and has focused its efforts instead on the taxation of soft drinks, beer and tobacco products, which fall more heavily on the poor -than on the rich and which. do not draw on the primary sources of wealth .in the country. For many years, well over half the domestic taxes collected, by the government came from only nine foreign-owned companies in Sai- gon which produced beer, soft drinks and tobacco. In 1972, direct taxes brought in only $37 million - 4 per cent of total income, including U.S. aid. There are two simple reasons for Sai- ,gon's persistent refusal to tax the real I wealth available to It. On the one hand, officials have always feared that such taxation would increase its unpopularity 'or lose the cooperation of those whose 'acceptance or support was crucial for pacification and political stability. On the other hand, the readiness of,the United States to provide whatever revenues were not obtained through taxation provides a lack of incentive for maximizing tax collections and 'an incentive for officials to exploit the most lucrative sources of 40 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100220001-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-004328000100220001-2 Taxing Isn't Popular THE GOVERNMENT, unable to ap- peal either to patriotic sentiment or a commonly shared vision of society,". has' implicitly admitted its own doubts about the legitimacy of the war effort in the' eyes of the Vietnamese people `in' avoiding direct domestic . taxation. When he was prime minister in 1909,- Trap Van Huong declared, "If we levy; here more unstable." Willard Sharpe, chief ?of the eco- nomip analysis branch of AID in Sai. gon, explained fears of reduction in American Commodity Import funds in 1971 by saying, "I don't think the gov- ernment feels it is, strong enough to, ask the people to pull in their belts. It's just not popular enough." Between one-third and one-half of the private wealth of South Vietnam' ,still lies in its agricultural production, primarily in the country's rice bowl, the Mekong Delta. American officials: have been pointing to the new prosper-; ity of commercialized farmers in the Delta, thanks to large inputs of ferti- lizer, new rice strains, and favorable rice prices. But Thieu's pacification strategy in the Delta has been based more or less implicitly on the idea that ? the government can give the farmers something for nothing, with the help of American generosity. ' One of Saigon's bright young Amer(.;' can-trained economists, who was then vice minister of agriculture, proudly asserted to me in 1971 that his govern- ment collected only a "very nominal tax" on land -less than 200 plasters, or 50 cents, on a hectare of` land! which brought an average of $180 a year in income, or about one-third of 1 per cent of gross income. "With our system," he pointed out, "the farmers themselves benefit fram land reform. With the Vietcong Pro- gram, the result is more revenue for the Vietcong." This was precisely the' difference between a regime depend ent on popular support for its military' operations and one dependent on for eign support. As the American tax ad- viser in Saigon, Paul Maginnis, ex- plained two years ago, "The national government is subsidizing villages and hamlets in order to purchase their loy-; alty instead of demanding money from., them to finance the war effort." Subsidies Increase THILE THE GOVERNMENT col-' W lected d a token 54 million piasters" ($242,000) in agricultural taxes in 1969, it was subsidizing the village budgets in the amount of 2.2 billion piasters ($9.8 million), for both local :govern- ment operations and village develop-i ment projects. And while agricultural; taxes rose to 3 billion piasters in 1972 ($6.9 million), the subsidy increased even more,. to 10.4 billion piasters ($24? .million). Whether or not the rural sec;; more taxes, the government will be un- popular and the political situation' tor of the society will ever contribute' more to the budget than it receives in subsidies is thus still open to question. Political considerations also have ,kept Saigon from taxing fairly the un-: salaried urban middle class which con- stitutes the most active segment of the U.S.-sponsored political system. The' traditional policy toward this stratum' has been summed up by one Vietnam-, ese expert on taxation as, "Leave it. ,alone as long as the circumstances per-, mitted." The American budgetary sub- sidies thus far have, provided just such circumstances: In February, 1971, Pres. (dent Thieu abruptly called off the, work of special tax teams, which were; trying to assess fairly the income of. the professional and business class in Saigon, after it complained loudly through the press and its representa tives in the national assembly. Later in ; 1971 the building containing Saigon's tax records was blown up. The. teams were never revived. The most important untapped source of wealth in Vietnam, however, are the 1 profits which were generated by; the war itself, which long has been the big-, Best industry by far in the country. Again, the U.S, subsidization of the` budget not only encouraged Saigon to`ti avoid taxing, the war profiteers but, ,gave officials an incentive to enter into collusion with them at the ex pense of the government's fiscal health. And more important than the" bars, nightclubs, brothels, laundries and other enterprises, which were offi cially untaxed but generated large in- comes for district and province chiefs,Si t was the import business. From 1965 to 1971, Vietnamese im-; porters were making enormous profits', because of the officially overvalued piaster in'exchange for the dollar and i the -rationing of import licenses. In;?, 1970 a secret government report which was obtained by the House Subcommit- tee on Foreign Operations estimated, ,that these "windfall profits" were run ping as high as $150 million per year. (An even more detailed study of wind-, :fall profits done In.1970 by Dr. Douglas Dacey of the Institute for Defense I Analyses on a contract with AID,,. which carefully estimated the amount of windfall profits each year on the bast. sis of official economic data, was sup. pressed by the agency before it could` be.published. Congressional efforts td. (obtain a copy have been systematically -refused.) Revenues Affected .'' r~HESF UNEARNED PROFITS werq all at the expense of revenues, since -they would have- remained in Saigori'4 treasury had the exchange rate kept up with the rate of inflation. Yet ac= .cording to the Ministry of Finance, the government collected only 100 million piasters ($250,000) in taxes on the 1969 incomes of those importers - an infinf, itesimal fraction of their illegitimate. Profits. The failure of the government to get; .more tax revenues from war profiteer8 was caused by the same situation which produced the windfall profits in the first place. Relieved of the neces= sity?to squeeze every bit of revenue possible from the South Vietnamese economy, powerful officials turned the' rigged import licensing and foreign ex; change system to their own advantage instead of reforming it. The officials who had power over,; the distribution of import licenses used. it to extract from the recipients a' :private "tax" in return for. the favor: Accorcing to business and financial ysource in Saigon, including a former high Economies Ministry official who 'now is in the import business and a Japanese businessman with 7 years' ex= .,perience in Vietnam as of 1971, import- ers had to pay 3 per cent of the total value of the license, or 10 piasters on every dollar of goods imported, to the minister of economics, Pham Kim Ngoc, who became known in Saigon circles as "Mister 3 Per Cent." Ngoc' ,was assumed to have divided "taxes" with other top officials of the Thieu re-' ,gime.? The 3 per cent rakeoff, if applied 'to the total volume of imports, would have netted $23 million in 1970, or 92 times the amount collected from them in the form of income taxes. Although, the threat of drastic reduc tions in U.S. subsidies to Vietnam fi- nally moved the U.S. mission to insist on an end to the system of overvalued currency and tight controls over licen- ses, the system had already' allowed importers to accumulate hundreds of ' millions of dollars, virtually -none of ,which ever was used for the budget, (The increased but still modest. amounts in income tax collection in 1972 from nonsalaried Individuals ($7.5 million) and corporations ($19 million), do not begin to scratch the surface of this wealth. Ending the Commodity Import Pro- gram would have the effect of making the government dependent on the sup= ,.port of the South Vietnamese people' ,for' the first time in its history.. It would then be up to the Vietnamese people themselves (as it should have been all along) to decide, whether or how much they are willing to sacrifice, in order to maintain the present mili-. ' tary and paramilitary apparatus. , To the extent that the population," wealthy or poor, wishes to see the Sai gon government survive, they can coil ,tribute their share through direct: (taxes, which Saigon ti unquestionably has the physical capability to cpllect. ? If the government cannot obtain the resources to support the present level, of military spending through this, ,means, it will have to reduce its ex=, ,penditures to the level that it can sup- port. In any case, the United States no. longer should be in the position of ar-. tificially maintaining a political and military structure through its assume- 'tion of the bulk of its budgetary expen- ditures and the subsidization of con= sumption levels. . rr~G Nk W YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, AUGUST 21, 1973 Those Papers That Survive 'in Saigon Are Subdued by Thieu's Harsh Curbs By JAMES M. MARKHAM `SDeclal to The New York Times SAIGON, South Vietnam, Aug. 20 - With the firm ap- plication of financial and po-; litical; pressures, the Govern-' ment of President Nguyen Van Thieu 'has tamed Saigon's once outspoken and contentious' press. Newspapers that more than a year ago got away with scald-. ing commentaries and irrever- ent cartoons -- a huge, hairy- hand' Ric ,a-d Nixon,-for ex-` ample, icaiing a diminutive President Nguyen Van Thieu and his people to slaughter on the battlefield - are now cen- sored or seized for publishing a vest-pocket biography of Leon id I. Brezhnev, the Soviet Com- munist party leader, or the dec- laration of South Vietnamese neutralist. "Freedom of the press does, not exist in Vietnam," declared Vo Long Trieu, a member of Parliament who publishes Dai' Dan Toc (The Great People), one of perhaps two news- papers that can be called anti-; Government. "Every day the Government can seize any paper for any reason it likes," Mr. Trieu said in an interview. "And the rea son it gives may have nothing to do with why it orders a con- fiscation." Some of Mr. Trieu's col- leagues disagree slightly. Free- Idom of the press, they say, has not been entirely' extin- guished in South Vietnam; jour-, nalists have been less political, elbow room in South Korea,i the Philippines and Taiwan --: not to mention North Vietnam. However,. after subjecting it self to a brief period of unin hibited criticism in the press,. the Thieu Government has cracked down on. journalists and successfully narrowed the. limits of acceptable opinion to its own.-variety of unwavering antiCommunism and antineu tralism.. Today no one questions the actions of Government policy.. No one criticizes President Thieu or any of his gen-' erals, unless these have fallen' into disgrace; colonels and- prov-ince chiefs may occasionally be criticized, if their identities are thinly disguised or if their cor- ruptions are particularly fla- grant, Cabinet ministers are generally immune from criti- cism, but civil servants are not: Officially, the Government is still constrained by the rather, liberal law of December, 1969, ,that declares press freedom to be "a fundamental right" and says flatly that "censorship is prohibited." The . law ushered in a period of press freedom, but late in 1971 Mr. Thieu began his crack- down. ' Then on Aug. 4, 1972, the President, buttressed- with spe- cial powers assumed during the Communists' spring offensive, promulgated Decree Law 007, which established a system of censorship and required news- papers to make deposits of 20 million piasters ($40,000 at the present rate) to guarantee the payment of any fines and court costs. At the time of. the decree, Saigon, which is the country's conly newspaper town, 'had 42 dailies many of them on the brink of insolvency. Today it has 28-16 In the Vietnamese language and 10. in Chinese, the English-language Saigon Post, which was found- ed in 1963 as America's com- mitment here deepened, and the French-language Courrier d'Extreme-Orient which caters to French expatriates and-mem- bers of the Vietnamese elite who consider Paris their second home. The printing run of all Sal- gon's papers is thought to be about 300,000 copies but only 200,000 are said to be sold- about half in Saigon and the rest in South Vietnam's other major cities.. _ ... _ _ . . Among the victims of the de- posit requirement . -- and the generally deteriorating South Vietnamese economy --- were several independent papers and the capital's most popular op- position daily, Tin Sang (Morn- ing News). ' The 1972 decree gave enor'-' mous powers to the Minister of the Interior, who can order the seizure and even the tem- porary suspension of newspap- ers that violate "national se- curity" or "sow dissension." Military courts are empow- ed to' try 'national securityl cases and can impose sentenc- es of up to three years and fines of up to 5 million. pias- ters ($10,000). For the most; part, the Government has re- lied on fines to subdue the press. Finally, the newspapers must submit copies to the Ministries of information and Interior,four hours before publication. As a' result, almost all Vietnamese' papers reach the stands late in, the afternoon - often after ;discreet "unofficial" calls have produced white spaces contain- -ing the words "voluntarily with-i idraw>ti: '~ ; WASHINGTON STAR 2 August 1973 By Tammy Arbuckle Star-News Special correspondent VIENTIANE:-American- backed operations by Cam- bodians operating from Lao soil have been completely terminated and all Canibo- dians involved in these op- erations have been returned to. Cambodia, well informed sources say. These operations were carried out by Cambodian troops based on an island close to the Cambodian bor- der in South Laos. Intelligence and harass- ment teams were inserted into Northern Cambodia in the Se Khong River area north of Stung Treng and around the North Cambodi- an town of Siem Pang. American aircraft were used for these insertions from contract airlines such as Continental. OPERATIONS WERE under the control of Lon --ol's departed brother Lon Non and run from the South Lao town of Pakse by Cam- bodian army Col. Lim Siso- wath. The operation was funded by the Central Intel- ligence agency but Ameri- cans who were dissatisfied with lack of results broke off from it about six weeks, ago. The Cambodian teams' were failing to reach their objectives. Usually they were spotted, by insurgent sentries hidden in treetops' who scanned the flat, thinly- forested terrain. The operation received its death blow when Premier Souvanna Phouma ordered it stopped and all Cambodi- ans involved to leave Lao soil. Possibly this was to 42 5 l avoid any Cambodian in- volvements which could ruin Lao negotiations with the Communists. A LAO AIR Force DC3 transport landed in Khong in late July and all Cambo- dians were sent to Phnom Penh, although some tried to hide from Lao authori- ties, well informed sources said. "Vietnam is still at war, sol we must maintain certain nec- cessary restrictions," observed 'Tran Huu Triet, the 30-year- old chief of the Information Miistry's Department for Co- ordination of the Press and the 'Arts. Mr. Triet. however, insist- ed in an interview that censor. ,ship-does not exist in Vietnam. Mr. Triet is ultimately re- sponsible to his relative by mar- iriage, Hoang Due Nha, one of `the President's closest advisers and the man who prepares Mr. 'Thieu's daily press digest. Mr. !Thieu is said to be an avid 'newspaper reader himself and soften pores over the papers, (even reading the classified ads. If Mr. Nha finds an article- or several articles in one paper -particularly offensive, orders are given to the Ministry of the Interior for it 'to be seized. If ,the offense is slight, a tele- phone call, and a white space, ,suffice. - -- i The one publicist who has totally ' resisted the Gov- 1'ernment's censorship efforts, the Rev. Chan Tin, a liberal Ro- man Catholic, priest, was tem- porarily put ' out of business last week when the police raid- ed his clandestine printing press and arrested 35 people - "among them. 10 deserters," ac- cording to an official state- ment. Father Tin, who has cham- pioned the cause of political prisoners held by the Saigon Government, was sentenced by a military court last October to five years in solitary confine- ment for .continuing .to publish his . leftist monthly, Doi Dien (Face-to-Face). After, that the publication' went underground, but the sen- tence against Father Tin, who enjoys the 'tacit protection of, the church, has not been. car, xied out.'' - In an interview, the jolly; round-faced priest hinted that the recent raid would not put an end to Doi Dien. "There are lots of printing presses," he said. "At the time of the French invasion of Viet- nam, our ancestors printed tracts on palm leaves."