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June 15, 2001
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October 4, 1973
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Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100240O6'1-0 CONFIDENTIAL This publication contains clippings from the domestic and foreign press for YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use of selected items would rarely be advisable. INTERNAL USE ONLY GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS EASTERN EUROPE WESTERN HEMISPHERE CONRDENT~AL Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100240001-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100240001-0 WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS Washington, D. C., Thursday, October 4, 1973 By Oswald Johnston Star-News Staff Writer In another phase of the administration's drastic' shake-up of the intelligence' establishment, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger is. giving serious thought to' abolishing the State Depart-' ment's small but influential Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Kissinger revealed this intention last month; during, a closed-door confirmation hearing before the Senate: Foreign Relations Commit-; tee. According to informed intelligence sources, Kissin-: ger has already begun to bypass his in-house intelli= gence bureau and has been giving the CIA assignments that the bureau normally would handle. Kissinger's disclosure of his dissatisfaction with the intelligence bureau, known' in the department as INR, came during a hearing Sept. 17 'that otherwise concen '' trated on his role in initiat-' ing wiretaps on 13 govern= ment officials, including Kissinger aides, and four newsmen. THE TRANSCRIPT, a :declassified version oft which was made available today, shows Kissinger. musing out loud on whether 1NR should be' abolished outright or merged with existing geographical bu- reaus in the State Depart- ment. "From what I. have seen of the intelligence product. ,of the State Department,*, the present function is not;, satisfactory, , Kissinger., told the senators. The : new secretary of; State is widely believed to, have held a' similar. opinion of the national intelligence estimates which had been' prepared under a 23-year- old system by the Board of National Estimates, an elite group within the CIA. Early last summer, in one of his first official decisions, newly installed CIA Direc- tor William E. Colby or- dered the abolition of the 10-' .man board, and, according' .to reliable reports, forced- its director, John W., Hu- izenga, into retirement. THE CHIEF of the 33S-' man INR bureau at State" Ray S. Cline, is a veteran of the Board of National Esti- mates. He could not be reached for comment on Kissinger's remarks in the transcript. Other sources in the intel ligence community noted,' however, that abolition of the bureau, if it takes place, would mark another breach in the wall between intelli-, NEW YORK TIMES ~!.. 29 September 1973' Kissinger Gives Aides Pep Talk; 'Tells Them to Be `Best in' Town" By . DAVID BINDER Special to The New York Times WASHINGTON, Sept. 28' - Secretary of State Kissinger gave a pep talk to about 1,000 State Department employes this noon, telling them he wanted their work "to be the best in town." 'Speaking in a 'faint drizzle in the , department's large courtyard, he said the United States was no longer in a posi- tion to "overwhelm every prob- lem with resources" or "sub- stitute resources for thought." "We no longer have over- whelming margins of safety and we no longer have overwhelm- ing margins of resources, -and therefore we have to be good " and we have to be thoughtful," he said. Mr. Kissinger said that it was not enough merely to on foreign policy issue that he expected "a clear-cut statement of choices" from the various bureaus. For a start he called fora report "by the end of next week" from every regional bureau on problems facing the United States in the coming year. His air, he' said is "to try to restore, the State. Department to its traditional role of advis- rig the President on foreign policy, to achieve preeminence." "With this attitude we can? do great things together with' gence analysts and the op- carry out policies which are. 'Supposedly based on*; "clean" and unbiased esti mates. , ,.,.In other sections of tran script. of the closed hearings on. Kissinger's nomination, these points emerged:' ? A confidential FBI report .on the 1969-71 wiretapping, 'which has not been revealed' in full even to the commit -tee, shows that Kissinger. .and the current White. House chief-of-staff, Alex ander M. Haig, then an, 'Army colonel on Kissin- ger's National Security Council staff, personally- 1, requested three specific' targets for the taps. But, Atty. Gen. Elliot L. Rich- ardson, who also testified in the closed session, insisted that this overstated Kissin-, ger's role. He emphasizes' that Kissinger did not "orig-' inate" the taps. Kissinger- himself insisted that the idea originated with then-! FBI Director J. Edgar Hoo-' ver and former Atty. Gen. John N. Mitchell and that the taps. were ordered in stalled by President Nixon. At Kissinger's request, 49 'consecutive pages dealing; with the wiretap issue were- 'deleted from the transcript.: - .10 A top-level White House, crisis team, the so-called' Washington Special. Actioni Group, was convened as, soon as news of last month's. coup in Chile was received here. But according to Kiss; singer, the group decided to avoid any appearance what- soever of U.S. involvement and passed the word so forcefully that "everyone was afraid even to express sorrow" at the death of Chi- lean Presiden Salvadore; ,Allende, reportedly a sui- cide the day of the coup,: This oversight was correct=! ed the next day, but not beef fore it brought the adminis-t tration a worldwide bad) press. WSAG decisions; Kissinger stressed, are per-' sonally approved by the, President. . ? Kissinger'defended the' decision-making procedures.; devised for Nixon adminisr' tration foreign policy as; "much more systematic. than those of President, Johnson." But he promised soon to bring the State Der, partment into policy mak-, ing in a major way by rein., vigorating its policy plan-; .ping staff and thoroughly shaking up the higher eche-< .Ions. "Some rather drastic, moves will be made to bring: 'younger men into key posi-. 'tions more rapidly," Kissin ger told the committee. The one reorganization he.; discussed in detail, howev. ' er, concerned the` INR and' its probable abolition. ' . 0A land. mystery of the universe.- The Secretary got a chuckle when he said the courtyard ,gathe ing was "the closest thing to a Nuremberg party rally that could be organized" and an- other when he suggested that it might be the first and last time most of ' the employes would ever see him. Trip to Europe Planned WASHINGTON, 'Sept. 28 (Reuters)-Secretary of State Kissinger is expected to begin a visit to Europe in about two; asm," he said, drawing ap-1 plause. As Mr. Kissinger spoke he faced a tall metal sculpture of a superhuman figure balancing two planets. The sculpture, by derick. Ma s VieR e f i o f s @dfifyo The department spokesman,' Robert McCloskey, said Mr.. Kissinger would meet the Brit-i ish Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, and also hopes to talk with the West German Foreign Minister, Walter Scheel, and the French Foreign Minis- 'ter, Michel Jobert. There have been reports, denied by Mr. Kissinger, that President 'Nixon is considering canceling his plans for a tour of European capitals this year. ,.,..,CIA-RDP77-00432 R000100240001-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100240001-0 HOUSTON POST 17 SEPT 1973 D By DONALD R. MORRIS Post News Analyst During the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings to confirm Dr. Kissinger as Secretary of State, several of the senators touched on the Central Intelligence Agency. in doing so, they inadvertently brought out several points. of the utmost importance, which - somewhat unfortunately for the public - were not. picked up. The first point during Sena- tor Symington's questioning came out not as a query but as a forcible statement, to which Dr. Kissinger indicated .a whole-hearted agreement. Symington, after mentioning in passing that he had been on the CIA sub-committee a 'matter of 15 years, said that in all that time, with a single exception, the agency esti- mates had been far more ob- jective than the military.ones, and that they had always proven accurate. He for one would sooner see the agency abolished than to have its es- timative function subordi- nated to political influence. In reply, Kissinger admitted the tendency of any intelligence estimate to deliver what the customer wanted, but In- dicated the tendency was hard to control in military es- timates. The agency, he felt, was free of It, and he empha- sized the pains to which he had gone not to exert pres- sure for specific estimates. In subsequent questioning, Kissinger outlined the struc- ture and functions of the "Forty Committee," which is almost unknown to the media and the public. Not because its existence is hidden, but because on the few occasions the name has been men- tioned, its significance failed to register. The Forty Committee, which one way or another has been in existence since 1947, consists of the deputy secre- taries of State and Defense, the Director of Central In- telligence, a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff -- NEW REPUBLIC 8 Sept. 1973 'Conversations in ie Court Reorganization of Intelligence "C.I.A. to Undergo, Major 'Overhaul" The New York Times, August 21, 1973 Lord Kissinger: I've brought Sir William Colby by, To tell us how our spies deploy, what word They send by secret ways, and finally how To use the stuff. King Richard: The latter, yes, my Lords, For in my need to know what's happening Beyond the realm each'day, 'I cannot spend forever browsing through The stacks of yellow foolscap just to find That wine from France is up in price, That peasants wear no shoes in Greece, That Chinese chopsticks take some time and in recent years Chairman Kissinger. It considers all proposals for covert action abroad -- from management of paramilitary operations in Laos to the clandestine inter- vention in the internal affairs of another country -- and passes its recommendations directly to the President. It is, in short, the precise mechanism of control for all our covert action abroad, and those who feel we should con- trol' such action more closely, modify it or simply abolish it would make far more prog- ress were they to devote their attention to the Forty Com- mittee rather than to the agency itself. Hounding the agency on that score is akin to hectoring patrolmen on the beat about the distribution of the beats, instead of going to the police commissioner. The exact nature of the problem was splendidly illus- trated moments later by Sen- ator McGovern, who tried to get Kissinger to agree that the agency should do much ,less covert action - should, in fact, eliminate it entirely. McGovern. specified police, training, assassinations and interventions in foreign do- mestic politics. ' ' Kissinger in reply refused to agree that assassinatiorjs h a d ever !' n approved, agreed that police training was only justified under spe- cial circumstances, and then startled McGovern by stating it would be "highly clan- gerous" to abolish the other functions, which would best be discussed in closed ses- sion. Throughout his reply, Kissin- ger did not tall( about what "the agency" did or didn't do, but about what the "com- mittee" did. The significance .of that usage, which was quite unconscious, seems to have escaped Senator McGov- ern, as it has been escaping -far too many people for far too long. It is a point that should reg- ister, however, and that soon, for as long as it doesn't regis- ter all rational talk about our role in covert action abroad is at cross-purposes and counterproductive. To master. Sir William Colby: The very thing you've set your heart Is my heart's chosen course. We winnow Day and night by river bank to blow the chaff From royal view, deliver whole the kernel of The honest truth. Lord Kissinger: Well spoke, brave. Will, we've had enough Of those surveys which place six warts On the left hand, and half a dozen on the right. Cleave to the center true! Sir William Colby: As all work of mortal toil, . One imperfection's raised its head. King Richard: And what, pray tell, is that? Sir William Colby: No news today. Robert J. Myers Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100240001-0 ? Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100240001-0 HOUSTON POST 19 Sept. 1973 iiy I)ON.1Ll) R. MORRIS Post News Analyst Probably no field Qf public affairs suffers as much from slicer niisinfot-malion as in- telligenc-o activities, and. this is especially true of the re- porting function - which is responsible for about 80 per- cent of. all intelligence activi- ty but which generates almost none of the publicity. Everyone knows that the function of intelligence is to inform command - those re- sponsible for devising and ex- ecuting policy. And when pol- icy goes wrong, the first cry from those who were execu- ting it is "Bad intelligence!" From the Chinese crossing of the Yalu in the Korean liar to the disaster at the Bay of Pigs, "wrong" intelligence has been used to lever re- sponsible leaders off the hook. -"Intelligence" is practically C) never wrong. It is, however, almost invariably incomplete. To begin with, intclligcnce agencies do not collect infor- mation gratuitously. They only collect in response to' ''requirements" which are "levied" by the "customer." In short, ask the right ques- tions and you will get the best answer possible (which will in 110 case be complete). Ask no questions, or the wrong ones, (or discard or fail to read the answers you do get), and in- %%-ill be of little ser- vice to you. Intelligence, moreover, can- not tell you what will happen, it can at best tell you what happened, and the job of de- ciding what that means in terms of what will happen to- morrow is the customer's, not the collection agency's. The collection agency will not even evaluate the material as "true" or "false" - this too is the customer's job. What the collection agency will do is evaluate the chances that the source of the report is passing on accurately the in. .. formation he claims he re- ceived, and it will also pro- v i d e an estimate of the ? source's track record for credibility. But what you make of all that is up to you. Collection agencies, there- fore, will not engage in "es- timative" functions - that is your responsibility as a cus- tontcr. The ha tie of their exis- tence is a customer who doesn't understand this (a depressing percentage don't) and who then points to the re- porting as an excuse for his fallible judgment. There is an exception. The Office of National Estimates is housed in and chaired by the CIA, although the if) or 13 people (assisted by a score of staff members) who compose it include representatives from all intelligence agencies. They have unlimited access to all intelligence sources, and perhaps 50 times a year they are called on to produce a "National Intelligence Esti- mate." usually in answer to a requirement from the NSC or TIMES, 1aneas City 8 September 1973 Buffeted C[!-~ L oks Bad" Mi.-I'd The Central Intelligence Agency has been un- der tough con?r'essional scrutiny this summer because of its involvement, clearly unsought in the Watergate affair. The impression from testi- mony before. two congressional committees is that CIA officials did not respond enthusiastical- ly to White House contacts concerning a cover- up anti did not want to have their organization involved in any way. But it was, although not in terms of specific wron' rloin- rriaLe't to Watergate. Probably the most r)an;aginr information brought out about the C'A was that it unwittingly provided techni- cal aid for the burglary of the office of Dr. Dan- iel Ellsherg's psychiatrist. Apparently the worst that the CIA can be charged with is unquestion- ing compliance with a request by a high admin- istration official i ithout insisting on full inform- ation. Now the CIA has a new director, William E. Colby. who is a professional in the field with 30 years of experience as'an intelligence specialist. Except. for a period when he directed pacifica- tion programs. in South Vietnam, Colby and his activities have not ' in the news, Undoubted- ly he would prefer that both he and his agency receive little public notice in the future. Ideally that is how it should be for this sf- the White House. Some are -standing requirements, others c r a s Ii ones levied on an hour's notice. Any customer can have a gut feeling the ONE estimate is wrong, bul,iit takes a brave (or a brash) statesman to ignore ONE esti- mates. JFK was notorious for it. ONE estimates. even with qualifications, are riot in. fallible, but they are the clo.- est facsimile of a cry;.tal ball the country is ever liable to get. They reflect he distilled results of the work of hun- dreds of sources (each pro[cs- siona)ly evaluated) ? and of h u in d r e d s of profccsion.-Jl analysts. :lost basic Aincri- can foreign i:olic?y rr s on, these es11;:.,tcs. ~~i;ich I why p o l i c N. is greyer rcvcrr cd abruptly when tine Out, re- place the At most such a strange effects the lac)ics of policy, rarely if ever the strategy. This is a major rcmron for 1he fact that our course in Vietnam continued through an In-Out-Out-In succession. lent arm of the government, The CIA hat. had intelligence successes since it was founded in 19,17 but it is always better that these not be heralded. The CIA's failures do become known, as in the case of the Bay of Pigs blunder. Amer- icans need to understand, too, that the CIA will often he blamed unfairly for developments that were not of its making. Tinhorn dictators around the globe have a habit of accusing the CIA when things go awry in a particular coun- try regardless of what really occurred. Contrary to several hooks that. have sold well, the CIA is not an invisible government that acts 'without reference to national policy. Its function is mostly the gathering 2nd analysis of mili- tarv and political information. Cloak-and-dagger work is very much the lesser part. of its opera- the CIA notoriety if something goes wrong o can cause it to be denounced when it is inno cent. Thus the CIA has had its troubles and probably will have more. But the disclosures oft the past few months have reaffirmed that 'they CIA must keep its nose entirely out of domestic matters and stick to foreign intelligence. No large objective of the new CIA director can be more important than that. *r, , pprove or Release 2DU'17U810T:- CIA=RDP7`7- 24OOO1- 0 ---- .Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100240001-0 RADIO TV REPORTS. INC. 4438 WISCONSIN AVE. N.W., WASHINGTON, M.C. 20018. 244-3540 PROGRAM Jack Anderson Report STATION 'WAVA Radio September 19., 1973 '5:05 P11 Washington, D.C. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS JACK ANDERSON: 11111 the Central Intelligence Agency continue to provide reliable estimates? I'll have an exclusive rpnnrt Fr v. .._ in en s to choose a dozen experts from the different divisions of the CIA. They'll be known as national intelligence officers. Kissinger, meanwhile, has told the CIA that he wants his. intelligence straight., without any ideological slant. He also wants to see the minority views. ., -Well, my CIA sources claim this is exactly what the Board of Estimates was sending to the White House. The elimination of the board, they say, is a signal that the White House really wants estimates which always support the President's policy. ominated by doves. My own White House sources say Kissinger got so upset that he refused to read the estimates from the CIA. Now the new CIA chief, William Colby, is preparing to abolish the Board of Estimates. In its place he t Nixon !and his foreign ' Henry s ave angered President policy adviser HKissinger. They complained that the board was d e V "%,U gency. re declared I afterward that he wanted'tosplinter the CIA in a thousand pieces ! and scatter it to the winds. When he cooled down he called in I. White House adviser Clark Clifford who had d.rafted the legislation establishing the CIA. As Clifford remembers it, Kennedy said, "I made some bad decisions on the Bay of Pigs. I made these bad decisions because I had bad information." Well, Kennedy appointed Clifford to head a civilian advisory board which recommended a great many reforms. To make sure the President. got good information, a Board of Estimates was established. However its estimat h ANDERSON: The late President Kennedy blamed the Bay of Pigs blunder on the Central Inte114 A IVASHI""TO.T, STAR .2 6 .SEP 1973 Ben Smith, 74; Fors en Acts CIA Retiree served with the Office of Strategic Services, a prede- cessor of the CIA, in London .and China. He was awarded the Bronze Star and the Medal of Freedom. Mr. Smith was. born in Waxachie, Tex. He was a member of the Players Club of New York. He leaves his wife, the former Roxana Stahl; a son, Patrick J., of New York; a' daughter, Mrs. S. Stewart of Washing. to n, a brother, a sister and five grandchildren. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100240001-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100240001-0 AIR FORCE TIMES 19 Sept 1973 Eaker's View u, 5 fl f By LT. GEN. IRA C. EAKER (USAF, Ret.) A HEADLINE in the Washington Star-News August 19 read. "Elitel CIA Unit to Be Abolished." On August 21, a New York Times headline staled, "CIA to Undergo Major Overhaul." The articles under these headlines expressed concern over a proposed plan to eliminate the Office of National Estimates, a prestigious branch of the CIA organization charged with preparing; th N ti e a onal intelligence Estimates. Obviously, sound defense planning must be based upon accurate estimates of the capabilities ,and intentions of all other major powers. whether prospective enemies or allies. The Office of National Estimates has led a deeply troubled existence for many years. Its critics accused it of imperfect forecasts of Soviet intentions; of being dovish about Kremlin motives: and of failing consistently to anticipate Russian advances in science WASHINGTCK STAR 21 September 1973 SECURITY THREAT FEARED 0`1A Mfantp t H By Oswald Johnston upon joining the agency in, 9-m?Nenssmuw,mr 1955 that he would ngver Victor L. Marchetti, the publish anything about',CIA one-time CIA agent who lost activities without prior a court fight a year ago to clearance. ? 11 write about his former em- The 530-page typescript ployers without their ap-' went to the agency Aug. 27, proval, is facing a new and reviewers there have problem. shared it with State Depart-. After a three-week study ment officials seeking to 'of a S30-page manuscript on impose their own censor. 'the activities of the agency, ship of the book. CIA lawyers have decided This is because a coau- technology, weapons and capabilities. ' There was also a widely held suspicion of bias. Some "Eastern Establishment" members of the Office of National Estimates apparently have long regarded themselves as the protectors, if not the initiators, of "detente." By watering down predictions of the Soviet threat they evidently hoped to reduce U.S. defense budgets and thus decrease Russian fears of U.S. military might. Their effort resulted in Russian numerical superiority of ICBMs. It also led to the agreement, in the first round of SALT, which now virtually assures Soviet scientific and military supremacy within a few years. THIS OFFICE allowed ideological fervor to color its findings. It became a captive of State Department "doves," articulate civilian bureaucrats and self-styled intellectuals who tended to see the world through rose tinted glasses. Throughout, their true motives were obscured in volumes of rhetoric. The National Intelligence Estimates they produced often exceeded 100 pages. Finally, the ? 'parity preconditions' to detente were achieves. The price was America's loss of her technical and strategic edge. The National Security Council evidently found the intelligence estimates prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency of the Department of Defense much more reliable than CIA's effort Increasingly, the national leadership has based its strategic decisions on intelligence provided by DIA and the National Security Council, disregarding CIA estimates. Dr. James It. Schlesinger, in his brief service as director of CIA, tried to remedy all this. It was he who decreed the disbanding of the Office of National Estimates. With his transfer to Defense, the revolution at CIA has lost its chief architect. The old bureaucracy remains essentially intact and one now wonders what will replace the Office of National Estimates. THE ARCHITECTS of intelli ence f t ...:~~ rrn.,. ti ., i th g o u ur e n that nearly 100 pages must thor who joined Marchetti? be., deleted in the name of earlier this year, John D... national security. Marks, a former Foreign Marchetti, who was hop- service officer, has been ing to publish his book in under similar pressure from' time for the Christmas buy- the State Department to, ing season, is now consider- submit the manuscript for' contest the CIA's' censor- State Department law ship. yers until recently denied knowing that the book' AMERICAN Civil Liber- Marks was working on was ties Union lawyer Melvin L. already under court order; Wulf, who has represented to be submitted to the CIA; Marchetti since the begin- for clearance. ning of his struggle to pub- lish his memories, yester- LAST JULY, the State; day disputed the CIA's con- Department legal office, tention'that its demands are formally requested that; merely a matter of negotia- Marks submit the manu-i lion. script for review. "We're going to negotiate Marks,, Marchetti and in court, to said, g Wulf, concluding that in this adding case the, State Department; that an earlier offer to dis- and the CIA were parts of cuss the manuscript with the same government, de- CIA lawyers last. month has cided to ignore that request. - been rejected. The State Department qui Marchetti's earlier strug- etly acceded by making its gle to publish without CIA own arrangement to look at fundamental issues of surviva . War, peace and-the grey areas ' to the Supreme Court where The authors are still not between involve a high order of uncertainty and risk assessment. 'his plea was rejected last sure what parts of the book William E. Colby, nominated to?succeed Dr. Schlesinger as head of December. the CIA wants to' censor.?T CIA, is able and experienced in the intelligence field, having been General Counsel John War with CIA since its founding and with its predecessor. organization, AS A RESULT, Marchetti ncr has promised to provide the OSS of World War 11. was under court order' to that information to Wulf But we shall have to wait to see whether Dr. Colby can meet the :fulfill the pledge he signed next week. challenge. Whether, in an age of increasing centralization and bureaucratization of power, he can reform . CIA's' defective ?-estimating.proccss. Copyright 1973 General Fealuee Corp. Approved For Release 2001/0.8/07 :-CIA RDP77=0 432R000t0024O0fl1 O" Approved For Release 2001/08/07 CIA-RDP77-00432R000100240001-0 NEW YOU TI:,lES 2 0 SEP. 1973 can1Ib or n The Katzenbabh Paper By Anthony Lewis ' BOSTON, Sept. 19-The United States should abandon all covert operations in foreign countries except the gather- ing of intelligence. That proposal is made by Nicholas dell. Katzenbach, the former Attorney ? General and Under Secretary of State, In an article ,:.just published in Foreign Affairs. "there 'should be no secret subsidies of police or counter-insurgency forces, no efforts to influence elections, no secret monetary subsidies...." The Katzenbach paper is a remark. able one apart from that striking recommendation. It comes from a man whom the left has criticized -as too establishment-oriented but who in fact combines a highly original mind with careful and wise judgment. What makes this article important is that it relates American foreign policy to the crisis of confidence in government, taking a large historical view. Katzenbach rejects the revi- sionist proposition that policy in the postwar years was built on bad motives. But he also rejects the notion, expressed wishfully by Henry Kissin- ger, that foreign policy can be sepa- rated from the domestic sickness of Watergate. Since the war, he says, the making ''of foreign policy has become more and more secretive and concentrated. Katzenbach traces a number of the influences: the postwar atmosphere of crisis in opposing conspiratorial Com- munism, the growth of the military. role, the tendency of The public wnen it feels' endangered by the outside world to put its trust in the President. "Unfortunately," Katzenbach notes dryly, "Presidents are inclined to think this blind trust in their wisdom is wholly justified." He adds the shrewd point that Presidents also became captives of - public anti-Communist passion, so that they dared not "lose" any foreign territory. and resorted to Presidential action unauthorized by the normal processes of law. The Bay of Pigs is an example. Katzenbach notes that when that invasion of Cuba failed, President Kennedy took public blame only for the failure, not for the attempt: "He felt no need to apologize for under- taking so extensive a covert 'activity on Presidential authority alone." Then came Vietnam. President John- son followed the form of law by ask- ing Congress for authority in the Ton- kin Gulf Resolution. But there was no real candor; and as Congressional and public dissent. made things increasing- ly difficult, secretiveness and decep- tion increased. That history suggests that the ex- cesses of the Nixon years-the Water- gate crimes, the secret bombing of Cam- ' bodia-had roots in the past. Secrecy had increasingly become, Katzenbach argues, a way "to avoid the difficulties inherent in our political system and hopefully to present the public with triumphant faits accomplis." ABROAD AT HOME p m eig poky. can e parochial, obstructive, . uninterested. But he rejects even reliance on select committees and private consultation. Today, he says, "there can be no sub- stitute for a general rule of openness with the Congress." There must also be "far greater openness within the executive branch itself," he says. Katzenbach calls most strongly for reducing the whole role of secret in- formation in foreign policy. The system of classifying documents has not worked 4nd should be drastically cut back, he argues; "bloated concepts of ? national security" should be dropped. -And then he urges the abandonment of covert operations abrq,?d, saying that their usefulness is outweighed by the fears they arouse and the impossi- bility of. controlling them. ' "However difficult and complex our foreign policy. may be," he concludes, "there is no license to free it from the mandates of the Constitution or the constraints of public views, inter- ests and wants." It is difficult to summarize all this in a newspaper column. The attempt .. seemed worthwhile because the Kat- Then what had happened gradually as a convenience "was converted into constitutional principle by Mr. Nixon." To an unprecedented degree the Nixon Administration excluded the public, Congress and even official Govern- ment channels from foreign policy consultation or information. Katzen- bach concludes: "Even without Watergate, personal diplomacy, conducted in secret, with- out public understanding or solid. In- stitutional foundation within the gov- ernment, should be insufficient basis for a viable foreign policy. And if,. , as I believe, Watergate has destroyed confidence in the President's cred- ibility, much more is now needed."' . The remedies that Katzenbach sug- gests all are designed to restore con- ' fidence in American policy and policy- making. Their common theme is. greater openness to discussion and criticism. Congress is naturally one part of the problem. Katzenbach has no illu- sion that it can easily be made a par- zenbach paper provides an ---ssential framework for the rethinking that Henry Kissinger-and all of us-must now do about the means and ends of American foreign policy. The Washington Post/Potomac/September 23, 1973 I When we last tuned in on Victor Mar- chetti,. ex-spook of the CIA, he was glad he'd quit, glad he'd written the novel about the guy who quit the CIA after giv- ing terrible secrets to the Commies, and hopeful that the courts would rule he doesn't have to show everything he writes. .about intelligence to the CIA,_ before he publishes it. The Supreme Court didn't come through. Marchetti has to show his new book to the blue-pencil squad in Langley- and the agency is terribly concerned with, its public image these days, with all this. Watergate business, you understand. "A lot of ex-spooks have contacted me. They, want me to write novels with their.- experience and my name behind them. I've got some good things going. I'm not so glad I quit when I look at the checkbook,. and my wife had to go back to work, and I expect a lot of court action over this new book'.. --:-Henry Allen Approved For Release 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100240001-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100240001-0 The New York Times Book Review September 30, 1973 Hunt on the C. I. A. Give Us This Day'. By E. Howard Hunt Jr. 365 pp. New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House. $7.95. E. Howard Hunt Jr., of recent Wa- tergate notoriety, has written a fas- ' cinating, highly personal and, at times, rather eloquent defense of himself and of the Central Intelli- gence Agency during the resounding burgle of the Bay of Pigs in April, 1961. It goes without saying that Hunt continues to justify the at- tempted. overthrow of Fidel. Castro's Government by the Kennedy Admin- istration with an invading Cuban ref- ugee brigade. Hunt's contempt is re- served, instead, for those who have "always cringed from American ex- ercise of power in our national self- interest." In the wake of the far more monumental American fiasco in Vietnam, Hunt's basic assumptions will no longer win wide support. Nevertheless his case is worth considering. Contrary to his disclaim- er that the book contains no clas- ? sified material of value to Castro, there is actually a great. deal of fresh informatics on the Bay of Pigs, if, sometimes, between 'the lines of this account by a very active part- ticipant, the liaison man between the C.I.A. and the Cuban refugees. In- deed Hunt's involvement in the Cu- ban project went back to the days of its prototype, Operation El Diablo, the misleadingly easy removal of the Leftist Arbenz Government in Guate- mala by the C.I.A. in 1954. There is new light on such controversial fig- ures as Frank 'Drecher-Frank Drol- ' ler, according to Arthur Schlesinger who was officially titled headquarters chief- of action, Cuba Project, and who, under the code name of Ben- der, now emerges as too socialist a Central European refugee in Hunt's ,view to be effective at restoring the old regime in Cuba. In any event the' Kennedy Administration from the ,President down, at least to the level of Kennedy's personal- friend, Dick Bissell, the C.I.A. operations chief for the Bay of Pigs, proposed to re- place Castro with a bona-fide lib- eral leader such as Manuel Ray rath- er than a conservative who might be contaminated in liberal Cuban and American eyes by previous associa- tion with Batista. Unexpectedly, that hitherto curi- ously opaque figure, Lieut. Gen. . Charles Caboll, Deputy Director of the C.I.A. in 1954, is portrayed as the true villain of Hunt's piece. For whatever reason, Cabell delayed a Trumbull Higgins is a' military his- torian at John Jay College, City Uni- versity of New York. WASHINGTON POST 2 1 SEP 1973 . CIA Seeking to Eliminate 100 Pages of Upcoming Book By Laurence Stern. Warner is negotiating the; straining order in U.S. District weshlnatou Post $te[t Writer !terms of. publication with Court in Alexandria in April, The Central intelligence i??ulf, but said 'that details 1972, to prohibit Marchetti: Agency' is seeking to expunge!could not be disclosed. "There from circulating an outline of 1100 pages of a 530-page ' book !definitely are security prob- the book to publishers. profiling the agency's opera- tions in the United States and !abroad, attorneys for the au- thors said yesterday. The book, "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," was writ- ten by former CIA analyst Victor Marchetti and John lems," the CIA spokesman A trial was held in camera, said. and attorneys for the a"thors Marchetti insisted yesterday invoked the defense employed that "there is nothing in this in the Pentagon Papers case: book that would jeopardize that censorship could be justi- the national security of my country. There is nothing in the book that would jeopard- ize the lives of any agents, anent intelligence officer and sink any ships or give away U.S. Senate aide. It is to. be any codes." ,published by Knopf. Among the subjects with Melvin Wulf, chief Ameri-iwhich the book deals are tl:e can Civil Liberties Union at- torney on the case, said he was informed by a CIA offi- cial yesterday that the agency -acting under a court injunc- tion-would seek to eliminate hearly a fifth of the manu- script. Wulf identified the CIA offi- cial as John Warner, the agen- cy's general counsel. A spokesman for the agency acknowledged yesterday that CIA's role in the 1970 Chilean election, the disbursement of CIA funds to a number of world leaders, alleged misuse of the CIA director's contin- gency funds and internal U.S. operations of the CIA. This is the first time, ac- cording to lawyers in the case, that a government agency has exercised prior restraint. over a book under a court order. The CIA obtained a re- planned second air strike upon Cas- tro's still surviving air force long enough for the Administration to cancel it outright, to the consterna- tion of its C.I.A. controllers. Unhap- pily for this standard charge against President Kennedy, there is no evi- dence that any number of additional air strikes would have enabled the 1,400-man refugee brigade to have conquered Castro's almost 200,000 'Soviet-equipped militia, should this militia have fought for Castro. Hunt is on surer .ground when he says that the C.I.A. never planned to rely upon the leak-prone under- ground in Cuba. Hunt's basic ,conclu- sion, Kennedy apologists notwith- standing, namely that landing of the small brigade without following it up with open and massive American intervention made no sense, seems to this critic irrefutable. As Hunt put it: "The [offshore American] task force, in addition to'the [aircraft carrier] Boxer, comprised Marine 'landing forces and logistic trainees. If the armada was not charged with ensuring victory, why else. had it been assembled?" Hunt's somewhat contradictory re-, marks leave us rather uncertain re- garding the controversial role of the distinguished United States Ambas- sador to the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson. Whether the idealistic Ste- venson actually suspected the Ad- ? ministration's covert sponsorship of the bombing of Cuba before his pur- portedly innocent do H 'ls at the fied only if it could be shown that there might be immediate and irrevocable injury to the United States. The court held with the CIA's argument that it could enforce the oath of secrecy that was a condition to Mar- chetti's employment by the agency, a decision that was ap- pealed. The federal appellate court found that the agency had a right to delete classified mate- rial from the book after a re- view prior to submission of the manuscript to its pub- lisher. The Supreme Court de- clined to take jurisdiction of the matter. United Nations of American involve- ment in the invasion is still open to speculation. But Stevenson's probably decisive influence in ' cutting back more air strikes against Castro is not sufficiently emphasized by Hunt. Fundamentally, Hunt's job was to cajole the confusing kaleidoscope of the Cuban refugees, whom he liked for the most part, into some sort of coherent and usable front to con-. ceal the American sponsorship of the Bay of Pigs operation. Here Hunt is replete with information. Hunt winds up his account with a fairly well substantiated interpreta- tion of the Kennedy Administration's attempt to blame the failure of the Cuban operation on the C.I.A. To be sure, as Hunt suggests, the Pen- tagon shared some of th e blame, but Hunt appears to be almost entirely unaware of how Kennedy had gutted Eisenhower's National Security Coun- cil shortly after taking office, let alone how this institutional failure affected the operation. In short, Hunt could have made a more damaging. attack upon his enemies among the' Kennedy liberals had he concentrated more upon the higher-level Washing-, ton scene. But his job and his personal . commitment was to the Cuban refu- gees in Miami and elsewhere and his bias and bitterness reflect their, rather than the American, interest. As a consequence, like so many oth- ers disappointed by the Bay of Pigs, Hunt does not understand that in military operations waged against a Approved For Release 2001/08/07 :-CIA-RDP77-00432R0001~ 4YOU1=J Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100240001-0 WASHINGTON POST' 25 September' 1973 By Lawrence Meyer and Peter A. Jay Washington Post Staff Writers t Convicted Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt Jr. told former special counsel to the President Charles W. Col-'; are really responsible for the Watergate break-in," according to a transcript of a .November, 1972, telephone conversation. The transcript was released by the Senate select Watergate committee as it,' resumed its hearings yesterday. In the conversation, which was recorded s by Colson, Hunt was repeatedly admon1' ished by Colson not to tell him any `spe cific details about the break-in and bug ging of the Democratic National Commit- tee's Watergate headquarters. "It's just that the less specifics I know';' Colson told Hunt, "the better off I am, we are, you are." Hunt told the committee yesterday that, he was unaware that Colson was. record- ing the conversation, the transcript of which the committee obtained from Col-; son by general subpoena. "I might say. that I feel, in retrospect I was set up on this one," Hunt told the committee. Colson has consistently denied any prior knowledge of the Watergate break-in or, involvement in the subsequent cover-up. The thrust of the conversation between' Hunt and Colson,. which Hunt said took: place on Nov. 24; wars Hunt's complaint that he was having difficulty getting funds for legal fees and family subsistence that 'he had been promised would be paid to him and the other six Watergate defend- ants. At the time of the conversation, the 'seven Watergate defendants were prepar- ing for.their January, 1973, trial. Hunt testified that after his wife,s death in a December, 1972, plane crash, he decided to plead guilty in the case. For the first time publicly, hunt yester-' day told how he became involved in both' the Watergate affair and the break-in at the offices of Daniel Ellsberg's psychia- trist. Hunt, who appeared pale, thin and phys- ically weak, told the committee that at the time he became involved in the Watergate break-in, "I considered my participation as a duty to my country." Hunt admitted receiving funds to cover his legal fees and. majority of the population of a coun- try, no mere improvement in tech nique works very well. Blaming the. techniques employed in Cuba, as in Southeast Asia, thus evades the point: Was the operation or war it- self justified in the first place? With 'respect to Cuba, at least, like Ken- edy before him, Nixon eventually' decided that it was not. family 'subsistence after his indictment and conviction but insisted that "I made' - no threats" In order to receive the money: Although Hunt was testifying under a. 'grant of limited Immunity from prosecu tion extended by the committee, he is also. under an admonition from Chief U.S. Dis. trict Judge John J. Sirica to cooperate' fully with any official investigative body: that calls upon him for testimony. Sirica last March sentenced Hunt provi-'` sionally to 35 years in jail and a $40,000 fine for his admitted role in the Water-' gate affair. At the time of sentencing, Sirica made it clear that he would weigh. the degree of Hunt's cooperation before: giving Hunt a final sentence. Hunt last week filed a motion with Si- rica asking him to set aside Hunt's guilty. plea and to dismiss I all charges against:" 'him because, among pother reasons, Hunt thought that top White House officials had approved the Watergate burglary. Although Hunt was speak- ing for the first time public- :ly yesterday about "the events ,which have befallen me" as he put it,' much of what he, told the committee has al- ready been reported as a re- suit of the several appear- ances he has made before other committees in closed, session and through the re- lease of his grand jury testi- mony. - Hunt, and his attorney, Sidney S. Sachs, both re- ferred to the burden that has been placed on Hunt under the provisions of the condi- tional sentence imposed by Sirica. "Since b e i n g sentenced," Hunt said, "I have been ques- tioned under oath on more than 25 occasions, often for many hours. I have answered thousands of questions by in- n u m e r a b l e investigators,, .prosecutors, grand jurors and staff members of this com- mittee. "I am informed that such intensive and repeated inter- rogation is a most extraordi- nary procedure and of dubi- ous legality. Even so," Hunt said, "urged by the court to cooperate fully, I have not contested the procedure. In fact, I have answered all questions, even those which involved confidential com- munications between my at- torneys and myself." testimony yesterday con cerned his dealings with his former lawyer, William 0. Bittman. Hunt received $156,000d nit In legal fees from Hunt. Bittman .Withdrew as Hunt's counsel In August after he became a subject of scrutiny. Hunt, 54, a CIA agent for ,.21 years before his retire. ment In 1970x, also cata- logued for the committee the troubles that have beset him since his sentencing, which he said may keep him imprisoned for the rest of his life. "I have been inca