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Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320001-1 CONFIDENTIAL INTERNAL USE ONLY This publication contains clippings from the domestic and foreign press for YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use of selected items would rarely be advisable. GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS GENERAL WESTERN EUROPE NEAR EAST AFRICA FAR EAST WESTERN HEMISPHERE PAGE 1 20 Destroy after backgrounder has served its purpose or .. I L ii1 L 60 days. Approved For Release, 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320001-1 ]Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320001-1 any"-um for Imp moun~inq M It was a rough Watergate week for President Nixon. A grand jury report and a satchel of evidence on his role in the cover-up conspiracy were turned over to the House Judiciary Committee's impeachment investigators. Then, after a short delay, Nixon backed down and submitted to a subpoena for more ev- idence from Leon Jaworski, the persis- tent special prosecutor, rather than face a new, and probably losing, court bat- tle. Almost as surely, he will soon be forced to stop resisting similar requests from the impeachment committee for more tapes and documents. Those setbacks for the Pres- ident occurred under the pressure of rising public protests from members of Congress against what appeared to them to be le- galistic maneuvering by the White House to withhold evidence. Largely as a result of these tac- tics, impeachment sentiment was gathering momentum in the House-and even leaders of the Senate talked matter-of-factly about the probability of a trial in that chamber later this summer to determine whether Nixon shall remain in office (see box next page). The shift in sentiment was il- lustrated last week by the point- ed remarks of Mike Mansfield, the ever-cautious Senate Democratic majority leader. Mansfield ob- served: "I talk to House members, and they think the votes are there" for impeachment. This, he sug- gested, is partly because of "the dilatory tactics" of Nixon and his men in dealing with the Judiciary Commit- tee, headed by New Jersey Democrat Peter Rodino. Moreover, said Mansfield, he did not want the President to resign, as suggested by Republican Conserva- tive Senator James.Buckley, and indi- cated little enthusiasm for any legisla- tion granting him immunity from prosecution if he were to leave office. "This matter should take its course," Mansfield said, meaning a full Senate impeachment trial. "We should not have another Agnew situation," he added-a reference to the Vice President's being allowed to plead nolo contendere to in- come tax evasion, then to resign and be granted immunity from further federal prosecution. Other Senators spoke in a similarly ominous vein. West Virginia's Demo- cratic Senator Robert Byrd-a conser- vative whom Nixon once considered for a Supreme Court vacancy and who is highly regarded by the Southern Sen- ators Nixon is most ardently courting -charged that the President was trying "to mislead the people and to sabotage the legitimate and constitutional impeachment in- quiry." Republican Senator How- ard Baker, a member of the Sen- ate Watergate committee, de- clared that the "legalisms and narrow issues" adopted by Nixon had hurt rather than helped his survival chances and that he must surrender all "relevant" evidence to the Rodino committee. One of Nixon's most vocal supporters, Senate Republican Leader Hugh Scott, has also privately warned Nixon through the President's chief Watergate counsel, James St. Clair, that the President must yield all relevant evidence. Some other influential Sena- tors were not ready to speak out publicly-yet. But their attitude was increasingly unsympathetic to Nixon. Said one Senate Repub- lican: "Over the past ten days, the feeling has been pervading the Senate that there is going to be a trial. Individual Senators are studying the impeachment process. You have trouble getting the books out of the li- brary; they're all checked out." At a rally of Midwestern Republican leaders in Chicago, even Vice President Gerald Ford seemed to be criticizing the President. Addressing the Watergate is- sue, he declared: "Never again must Americans allow an arrogant, elite guard of political adolescents like CREEP (The Committee for Re-election of the President) to bypass the regular party or- ganization and dictate the terms of a na- tional election." Outwardly undaunted, Nixon con- tinued to court a conservative constit- uency. He invited Mississippi Senators James Eastland and John Sten- nis to the .White House for breakfast. He staged a ceremony for Southern Senators and Con- gressmen as he signed a $100 million appropriation for Missis- sippi River flood-control pro- jects. He addressed a Republi- can congressional dinner and hosted a farewell gathering for his departed aide Melvin Laird. But the rising congressional impeachment pressure could not be ignored, and Nixon gave up some tactical territory. He and/ St. Clair had for so long resisted a request by Jaworski for 27 tapes and various documents that the special prosecutor final- ly issued a subpoena to get some of the documents. St. Clair first asked last Monday for a delay in the subpoena's return date, and Jaworski agreed. As the new deadline approached on Friday, Presidential Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler offhandedly an- nounced without explanation that the subpoenaed evidence would be surrendered. The doc- uments, dealing primarily with the use and possible abuse of Nixon campaign funds, were delivered to Jaworski in a small brown package (no U-Haul trailer was required). Historic Turnover. The turnover of the grand jury's evidence, on the other hand, was transacted with lavish secu- rity and given all the attention of a his- toric event. No fewer than 22 uniformed police of the Federal Protective Services formed a double line as three members of the Rodino staff-Chief Counsel John Doar, Minority Counsel Albert Jenner and Assistant Counsel Robert Shelton -arrived at Washington's Federal Courthouse to pick up the evidence. The crush of newsmen, however, diverted the Committee lawyers away from this pro- tective corridor as they moved from their car up the courthouse steps. In a second-floor jury room off the chambers of Federal Judge John J. Sirica, two of Si- rica's law clerks arrived with the bulg- ing satchel (bought by the special pros- ecutor's office for $37.95) containing the grand jury material. The lawyers then examined the con- tents. These included a 1%-page letter from the grand jury requesting transmit- tal of all the evidence to the Rodino com- mittee; a 13-page list of some 50 find- ings of "fact" about the President's Watergate activities; and references to tapes and documents in the briefcase that support the findings. As each ref- erence was read by the attorneys, Todd Christofferson, Sirica's law clerk, pulled the appropriate file from the briefcase. After the two-hour check-off, Doar and Jenner signed a statement that they had received all the material cited by the grand jury. Under elaborate rules established partly at White House insistence, only i Doar, Jenner, Rodino and the JudiciaryCommittee's ranking Republican mem- ber, ber, Edward Hutchinson, had immedi-! ate access to the material. All four.spent hours studying it, but would not talk about its contents. Whatever the import of the grand jury evidence, the Rodino committee is still expected to push hard for 42 other tapes that Doar and Jenner had request- ed from St. Clair on Feb. 25. So far, ac- cording to Ziegler, no one at the White House has even listened to these tapes or, for that matter, determined how many of them actually exist. Some are certain to be nonexistent, he indicated, because they involved meetings on Sun- day, April 15. That is the date on which one conversation between Nixon and Dean was not recorded because, Nixon contends, a recorder wired into his Ex- ecutive Office Building hideaway ran out of tape. Deputy Press Secretary Gerald Warren claimed that it was "a matter of court record" that tapes of ten con- versations could not have been made be- cause of this. The court records, on the contrary, show that Nixon's telephone was not hooked up to the same tapeless recorder and therefore at most only five . tapes of requested conversations could logically be missing. Both St. Clair and Ziegler have in- sisted that the House committee must first specify the scope of its investigation before the White House will supply any more tapes or documents. House Repub- lican Leader John Rhodes last week en-' dorsed one possible compromise under) which St. Clair and the top Rodino staff lawyers would jointly review the re- quested evidence to seek agreement on what parts are relevant. If they cannot agree, the committee counsel's view would prevail. "The White House cer- Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-FMDP77-00432R000100320001-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320001-1 tainly should accept that," Rhodes said. Perhaps. But relations between the White House and the committee were hardly helped by yet another Ziegler at- tack, this time implying that the com- mittee was dawdling in its investigation. He suggested that the committee ought to be "working nights" to speed the in- quiry. In fact, the staff has been work- ing nights to index and digest the ma- terial that it now has. It includes some 700 documents and 19 tapes of conver- sations that Nixon had given Jaworski. It was only last week that the White .House completed the transfer of the ma- terial to the Rodino committee staff. The committee evidence also includes testi- mony from the Senate Watergate com- mittee and other congressional investi- gations, as well as the new grand jury lode. Once all this material has been studied, the staff will brief the full Ju- diciary Committee on its findings. _ Scandalous Conduct. Nixon sus- tained another blow last week when it was revealed by the Washington Post that former Attorney General Richard Kleindienst was bargaining with the staff of Prosecutor Jaworski to avoid in- dictment on a felony charge of perjury. At his confirmation hearings in the spring of 1972, Kleindienst had testified that no one at the White House had brought pressure on him in any way to influence the Justice Department's set- tlement of its antitrust suit against ITT. He later revealed that Nixon himself had phoned him and asked him not to Impeachment Timetable The uncertainties in the historic im- peachment inquiry now under way in the Congress are astronomical. But impeach- ment sentiment is rising, and a trial of the President in the Senate is increas- ingly probable. Senators and Represen. tatives are trying to determine how and when these momentous events will unfold. Assuming that there is no protracted wrangling or unforeseen delays-a risky presumption-and that the entire process will run its full course, the following is a rough but plausible timetable: By May 30. The House Judiciary Committee votes articles of impeach- ment against the President. First Week in June. Debate on im- peachment begins before the full House. Judiciary Committee Chairman Peter Rodino leads the debate, explaining each article. Second Week in June. The debate ends, and voting begins on each article, together with any amendments. Third Week in June. Voting is com- pleted. Assuming that some articles are approved by a majority vote, the Senate is informed by two Representatives cho- sen by the House that "In the name of the House of Representatives, and of all the people of the United States, we do impeach Richard Nixon, President of the United States, of high crimes and misdemeanors in office." carry the case against ITT to the Su- preme Court. Apparently, Jaworski's staff prosecutors are willing to let Klein- dienst plead guilty to a misdemeanor rather than a felony, giving him a bet- ter chance to avoid disbarment. Kleindienst thus could become the second Attorney General-and third Cabinet member-in the Nixon Admin- istration to face criminal charges. John Mitchell and former Commerce Secre- tary Maurice Stans are already on trial in New York on one campaign funding case (see story following page). A guilty plea by Kleindienst would be another dismal record for an Administration that is breaking all precedents for scan- dalous official conduct. Fourth Week in June. The Senate officially informs the President of his im- peachment and issues a "summons" for him to appear in the Senate to respond to the articles. Nixon's representative, probably Attorney James St. Clair, ap- pears before the Senate and asks for time to reply to the charges in writing. Second Week in July. The Pres- ident's "answer" is introduced in the Senate. The House of Representatives responds to the President's brief with a "replication"-probably a pro forma re- ply supporting the charges. The Senate informs Nixon's lawyers that they have about another week to prepare for trial, which will take precedence over all oth- er Senate business. Third Week in July. The trial be- gins, with Chief Justice Warren Burger presiding, and television cameras prob- ably allowed. The House presents its ev- idence through six or seven "managers" selected from members of the Judiciary Committee; they are, in effect, the pros- ecutors. The President's lawyers have the right to cross-examine any witness- es and call rebuttal witnesses. Senators can ask questions only in writing. Late September. The trial ends, and voting begins on each article of im- peachment. The Chief Justice polls each Senator, who must vote either "guilty" or "not guilty" on each article. If two- thirds of the Senators present cast a guilty vote on any single article, the President is removed from office. 2 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320001-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320001-1 r717 NEW Y0:?K R ~,11I ' OF ROOKS ii APRIL 1971 .I It is five months now since I left the Senate Caucus Room. Helms,- tihe former CIA director, was testifying before the Committee that Thursday- thin, elegant, debonair, the only wit- ness insouciant enough to smoke cigar- ettes in the witness chair. He was followed' by General Cushman, who was followed, on Friday, by General Walters, both CIA brass and beefy. The next week came Pat Gray, former Attorney General Kleindienst, and Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen, each in his own way 'art emotional witness, service-oriented and wearing Watergate wound-stripes. After that, the Committee went home for what was left of the summer-high time. Something had happened, probably during the Ehrlichman week, to destroy the "spirit of wonderful una- nimity" of which Senator Ervin had spoken so feelingly. during the early stages of the tapes confrontation. When the 'Committee resumed hearings in the fall, it was more disunited than ever. There have been reports and rumors of fighting within the staff between majority and minority ap- pointees, of dissatisfaction with Sam Dash, but these internal troubles may be mere localized symptoms of a general collapse. At the height of its success, seemingly in the prime of life, the Committee behaved like a broken man, and the public was quick to sense this and demonstrate boredom. The lie put about by the Nixon people during the exciting, electrifying months of June and July, that the public was fed up with the hearings and all the coverage, in due time became true. those who watched on television during late September (1 was no longer in America) said the low point came when Patrick Buchanan, the White House speech writer, was able to make fools of the senators. For me, the low point had come before that, in the failure to call Colson to testify. Colson was a key figure. in my view the key figure who could have unlocked the mystery, if there really is one, of who ordered the Watergate break-ins. Though he was not Liddy's sponsor (that was Egil Krogh), he had gone out of channels to press for action on the Liddy project, hack in February, when the other principals-Mitchell, Dean, Magruder-were dragging their feet. That is, if Jeb Magruder can be believed. The master of dirty tricks had called Magruder one evening "and asked me, in a sense, would we get off Mary McCarthy the stick and get the budget approved for Mr. Liddy's plans,.that we needed information, particularly on Mr. O'Brien." Unfortunately for Magruder, Fred LaRue, who he said was present during this conversation, had no recol- lection of it. Yet Dean accepted Ala- gruder's word that there had been pressure on him from Colson'and not just on that one occasion. Dean had the impression that Colson was on Magruder's neck. And even if onje wonders about Magruder, there is the fact that it was Colson who detailed Howard Hunt, his employee and long-time protege, to work on the Gemstone operation with Liddy and McCord, giving him time off from his own projects. Colson denied McCord's assertion that he had had prior knowledge of Gemstone and was supported by Hunt in an affidavit sworn to on April 5, 1973. Then, appearing before the Committee. in September, Hunt changed his story: he did remember one or' more conversa- tions with Colson about the Liddy plans and in fact remembered telling him back in January 1972 of his intention to recruit the same team of Cuban-Americans he and Liddy had used in the burglary of Ellsberg's psychiatrist.- With the addition of the Cubans to the original nucleus, the Watergate break-in became operational. Of all Nixon's coinselors, Colson thus appears to have b'een not only the most zealous in pushing for Gemstone but also-a further sign of zeal-the most familiar with the mode and staffing of the operation. McCord testi- fied that a typewritten step-by-step plan for the break-in, which Hunt showed him in his office, was being taken, he understood, to show Colson. This was more than a conjecture. ... at one point, he held this plan in his hands, and his words were, - he interjected the name of Mr. Colson into the conversation at that point, words to the effect, "I will see Colson." And he held the paper in his hand in this sense. From that statement, I drew the conclusion that he was going to see Mr. Colson and discuss our giving him the operational plan. - - , If Mitchell ever got any such blueprints or was aware of a Cuban component in the personnel, no witness has been able to say so. The same with Haldeman. Nobody, not even Magruder, has claimed that the Gemstone memos Haldeman received through Strachan contained any programmed "specifics." Possibly this is just a difference of temperament: Colson eager and pushy, the others prudent and incurious. The Senate panel's excuse for not calling Colson when hearings resumed late in September was that they had l heard him in executive session, where he had. taken the Fifth Amendment on every question put to him. Even so, the Committee. might have let the public see him take it, in response to counsel's questions: "I refuse to answer on the ground of self- incrimination," "I refuse to answer," "I refuse to answer," "I re-' fuse...." He would have been the, only witness before the Committee to: take the Fifth in open session. Liddy. had invoked it in executive session, just as he had refused to take the stand in his own defense in Judge Sirica's court. In jail he has maintained his silence, though he could bargain his way out if he would talk. The Colson- Liddy axis represents the irreducible hard core of resistance to investigation of Watergate, as on another plane does Nixon himself. It would have been educational for the public to watch the spectacle (martyrdom, he would have called it) of the recusant Colson in the Caucus Room and draw the analogies. .A. second (or third) low point was reached in October when Senator Ervin, summoned from New Orleans to the Oval Office, agreed to the so-called Stennis compromise, by which Nixon would give the tapes to Senator Sten- nis, an ancient, infirm, Southern re- actionary, to listen to and check against the summaries the White House would furnish the-Committee. Senator Baker, found in Chicago, agreed too, but this was not surprising since Biker for some time had been inching toward the Administration, having concluded (I would assume) that that was the winning side. The shock was Sam Ervin. Even though he soon retracted his agreement, declaring that the com- promise had been misrepresented to him (lie had understood that the Committee would get transcripts, not summaries, and had been allowed to think that Archie Cox had accepted the compromise), he sounded unlike, himself, befuddled snd vague. How could the old man, `poking benign and dreamy in that Oval Office rogues' gallery, have welcomed a Trojan horse into his so lone; and stoutly defended territory? A country lawyer looks a gift horse in the mouth. The answer, I am afraid, is that most men have a fatal weakness or-to stay in Tray-an Achilles heel, and Nixon had found Ervin's. Ervin is a hawk. We had forgotten or all but forgotten it in our affection for his love of liberty, Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIAJRDP77-00432R000100320001-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320001-1 Shakespeare, and the Bill of Rights. But Nixon had not. When the Stennis compromise was proposed, the Middle 'East crisis was at its height, a con- frontation with the, Soviets was looming, and the White House played on the old warrior's patriotic senti- ments, emphasizing the need for national unity in the impending show- down. Ervin succumbed. Well, every good man pays for his sins, and Senator Sam paid for a lifetime of being a hawk; he was diminished in the public eye and probably in his own. The sud- den loss of his heroic stature made him seem pathetic, a deflated windbag still tiresomely huffing and puffing.. Yet one would have to have a very short memory to join the ravens dining on his flesh. The Ervin Committee served the country well in an emer- gency, and if it has now outlived its function, that is hardly a reason for minimizing what it did. Rather the contrary: the proof that it served its purpose is that it is now regarded as obsolete. The accomplishments of the 'Committee can be measured by asking ourselves where we would be today if it had never held hearings. Nixon would be nowhere near impeachment or- resignation if the tapes had not caught him in their toils, and we might never have known of their existence without the Ervin Committee-if a junior staff member, routinely ques- tioning Alexander Butterfield, had not' chanced to ask the right question. And it was a passage in John Dean's testimony before the Committee that had led Donald Sanders, the deputy minority counsel, to put the question to ? Butterfield: Dean had got the feeling, he said, that his April 15, 1973, conversation with Nixon' was being taped. Perhaps Archie Cox and his staff would have uncovered, in time, the same information, bat that is not sure. Moreover, without the Ervin Committee, Cox, Richardson, and Ruckelshaus would no doubt still be in place: the Saturday night massacre grew out of the Butterfield disclosure. Indeed, without the Ervin Committee, there might never have been a Special Prosecutor Cox to fire. The tapes have always been the crux of the case against Nixon, and the public has always understood that, despite the pleas of liberal editorialists who begged for greater seriousness, concentration on the main issues, com- pared to which the tapes were a childish distraction, trivial sensational stuff out of a whodunit. The fear that the tapes would be tampered with, based on ordinary common sense, has been with the public since the very first day. The only wonder is that they were not destroyed altogether and then declared to be "missing," like the two under subpoena that the White House now says were never made. Why eight erasures in the eighteen-and-a-half- minute gap? Why not rub the whole thing out?* Nixon believes that there is material favorable to him in. what remains of that June 20 "meeting" with Haldeman, but how can scraps of a conversation exonerate him when the surrounding parts have been obliter- ated? The public, unlike Senator Hugh Scott, is not such a fool, why, as Nixon's spokesmen now state frankly, the public must never be allowed to see them. That the pursuit of the tapes was chasing after a will-o'-the-wisp is some- thing else. It took no prophetic gift. to foresee that even if captured they would not tell us what was on them, for the simple reason that they would not he permitted to. But the handling of the sought-after tapes by Nixon and his aides has told us a great deal or, rather, has confirmed our suspicions that something here is not kosher, Mr. Kalmbach, to quote Tony Ulasewicz. .The handling has turned suspicion into the nearest approximation to certainty one can have outside of signed con- fessions by Nixon and his associates. Of course there are still those who can believe that the tape erasures were accidental, that by had luck the June 20 telephone conver l on with John Mitchell was never recorded because the call v:as made on an extension not connected with the automatic re cording system, that during the April 15 conversation with John Dean in the -Oval Office the equipment, owing to another accident, was "malfunc- tioning" or had an "inadcgt;ecy." Such people will not ask why Nixon and Mitchell were talking on another exten- sion. i.e. a "secure phone," three days after the break-in: there could be a lot of innocent explanations, e.g., that unaccountable buzz, *The hypothesis published in Science magazine-that the panel of six experts appointed by Judge Sirica failed to take account of the possibility of electrical failure of a component in Rose Mary Woods's machine-may in fact. clear tip this little mystery. As the author of the Science article, Nicholas Wade, writing in The Washington Post, in answer to Joseph Alsop, points out, the Dektor hypothesis, even if proved right, would still leave the eighteen-and- a-half-minute gap or continuous buzz to be explained. How did that happen? Someone must have held the machine on "Record" for eighteen and a half minutes, thereby effecting the erasure. One big erasure, rather than eight little ones. If you accept Rose Mary Woods's explanation, that ' she accidently pressed (he Record button and kept her foot on the pedal during a five- minute telephone call, you are left with thirteen and a half minutes of Nixon, when the Mitchell call came, was answering a call of nature. Yes: It makes me- think of the old joke about the jealous Frenchman wanting solid proofs of his wife's infidelity: at last he catches her in bed with a lover, and his friend, to whom he relates the story, says "Eh Bien, enfin!" but' the husband shakes his head sadly-"Tou jours cc doule." Anybody ' who is satisfied that the tape erasures and the' missing tapes prove nothing would; probably not be satisfied by Mr. j Nixon's signature on a full confession and ask for handwriting tests, medical certificates stating that he had not been drugged or hypnotized.... Naturally, it would be a help if i Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Mitchell, and i Colson-or any one of them-were to turn state's evidence, and if Nixon falls we shall . certainly hear more from some of them. There will be a scram- ble to shift responsibility; like a foot- ball, Trom one member of the former team to another and back to the old quarterback, who was calling the si.- nals. But to hope that these men, singly or in unison, will talk and bring about Nixon's fall is. nearly as foolish as the hope that the tapes would talk. The tapes have talked, by now, to the maximum (one guesses) of their abil- ity; they have told us that someone with access to them- and that cannot be John Dean-is afraid of them. But then Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Mitchell, and the others have also talked; we heard them before the 'Ervin Corn- mittee proclaim their guilt by open equivocation and manifest lying. Though they left us to speculate on the degree of guilt in each case, they all plainly told us that they were afraid that the knowledge they carried inside them would inadvertently slip out. The great service of the Ervin Com- mittee was to show these men to the nation as they underwent questioning -something that would not have been possible in a court of law, where TV is not admitted. That the questioning was not always of the best, that leads were not always -followed up, is minor in comparison. The self-righteous, pedantic tone adopted by some mourn- ful analysts writing in liberal maga- zines, the triumphant pouncing on sins of omission by the Bard-worked sena- tors; are unpleasant reminders of the persistent puritanism and Zeal-of-the- Land Busyness in our national char- acter. The Ervin Committee was not out to convict the witnesses before it, to nail down their testimony with expert ringing blows, but to give us a basis for judging them and the Admin- istration they served. Who can deny that it did that? // T trial emerged from the hearings and emerges even more clearly from the Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320001-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320001-1 transcripts as they are published, with appendices (eleven volumes now), by the Government Printing Office is an overwhelming case for impeachment and conviction. To my mind, there can be no doubt that Nixon himself or- dered Watergate and was kept in- formed of the cover-up, which of course he did not need to order-as the testimony repeatedly brought out, the necessity of a cover-up was taken for granted as soon as news of the arrests reached the Nixon organization. No- body had to order it; it happened by itself and was inherent in the break-in. A covert operation is covered before it gets off the ground, and the process continues mechanically- to the bitter end, which is where we seem to be now. The mystery is not . in the cover-up-who took part and how. They all took part, each in-his own capacity: the ? money-raisers raised money; the petty bureaucrats shred- ded; the big bureaucrats got on the telephone to switch off the FBI inves- tigation. Everybody . (with two ex- ceptions) stood ready, if called upon, to commit perjury; nobody talked. The mystery lies in the original decision- who made it and under what circum- YAT v v ithout prejudgment, let us tick them off. Mitchell. He is the White House candidate, but that does not entitle us to rule him out of considera- tion. In favor .d17 :the Mitchell hypothe- sis is the fact that he was in charge at CREEP, out of which the conspiracy operated. Nobody in CREEP but he had the authority to order it-certainly- not his deputy, Magruder, acting on his own. And, according to Magruder, Mitchell did order it, at Key Biscayne, on March 30. The date, if not the fact, is confirmed by other testimony. Ac- cording to McCord, early in March the operation had not been funded; roughly a month later it was. All through March McCord was weighing the decision of whether or not to accede to Liddy and sign on; it took him thirty days to make up his mind, and during these same thirty days (Liddy told him) " _ .. the whole mat- ter was being considered and recon- sidered by Mr. Mitchell." Robert Reisner, Magruder's deputy, remembers Magruder saying to him, "Call Liddy and tell him it is ap- proved." He is uncertain of the exact 'date but feels it must have been around the end of the month since Magruder gave Liddy the first two weeks in April to get ready. Gordon Strachan, Haldeman's deputy, says Ma- gruder reported to him on March 31 or April I that a $300,000 "sophisticated intelligence-gathering plan" had been approved at Key Biscayne. Just before or just after April 7, according to Hugh Sloan, Liddy came to him with a sheet of raper representing a $250,000 budget on which he would soon be wanting "substantial cash payment." All this argues that if the decision was not made at Key Biscayne on I-larch 30 (LaRue says it was not), it was made within the next day or'two, and who could have done that but Mitch- ell? yet it does not sound like Mitchell. Magruder and Dean, who had been present at the two earlier meetings, both described Mitchell's very negative, pipe-puffing responses. At Key Bis- cayne, he was still "reluctant" (Magru- der), "not enthusiastic" (LaRue). Gemstone in any of its avatars was not in Mitchell's style. Dean says the Attorney General "was not interested at all" in its predecessor, Operatiori Sand-wedge, when it was presented. Nor can that dour realist have cared much for Liddy, an exotic product of Ehrlichman's brain work. Liddy and his plan were a bitter pill he had to swallow and, in the hearing-room, almost visibly spat out. McCord, who ,,vas not privy to the ins and outs of Gemstone's reception, gave his estimate of how it must have gone. I knew from previous contact with him that he was a very decisive man, that he _did not agonize over decisions, and yet apparently he took this one under careful con- sideration and considered it for some thirty days in making the decision, and frankly, I had it, my conclusion was that he took it as well to higher authority and got a final approval from his superior before embarking on this task. Again the sense of duress. Despite Mitchell's insistent denials, there is plenty of evidence to show that he was aware of Watergate before the morning of June 17, whether or not he had approved it, but everything points to a disgruntled, unwilling awareness. And the new awareness, coming to him late last March, of his now being set up as the "goat" for Watergate, must have increased his bile. If of all Nixon's counselors you were the one whq was a hold-out on Watergate, what a mock- ery, what an irony to sit in exile and bitterly. savor. In the Caucus Room, he was steeped in irony, like some horri- ble ,dark and yet congenial decoction brewed in his private still. If, against his better judgment, he did authorize Watergate, he evidently had not con- ceived it. Dean. Ile did not have the authority, and all the arguments q,.ainsl `Ftchcil's having been the "father" of Watergate would apply to Mitchell and Dean working together. If somehow he was behind Gemstone, pushing the plan forward despite Mitchell's tcsistance, it must have been as somebody else's representative and courier-in his char- acteristic messenger role. But what powerful figure could have deputized him to flit behind the scenes? tuts chief friiid, Krogh, had no more poweri than he. Against Dean, however, is the fact, heavily underlined by Senator Gurney and Minority Counsel Thomp- son, that lie had "recommended" Liddy to Mitchell, "introduced" him to the Committee to Re-elect. True, he had accompanied Liddy on his maiden appearance at the CREEP offices, and, true, lie had recommended Liddy to Mitchell for the post of General Coun- sel. But he was only passing on his friend Krogh's recommendation, and the transfer of Liddy to CREEP had been approved by Ehrlichman when Dean brought him to the office and introduced him to Magruder, his new boss. Unlike Dean, Ehrlichman had previous experience with Liddy, having kept him on his staff and used him (with Hunt) for the burglary of' Dr. Fielding s office. Ehrlichman hated Mitchell and vice versa. Two 'other counts against Dean as the author or main abettor of Water- gate should be mentioned. First, the fact vouched for by Magruder (and by Magruder only) that in the, fall of 1971, before the advent of Liddy, "some people in the White House" had been keen on an intelligence-gathering project: when asked to specify, the only name he could remember was John Dean. Finally, Dean had urged Magruder to try to stay oh terms with Liddy after a falling-out. Dean did not deny' this, but it scarcely constitutes proof of eagerness on his part to bring Watergate to fruition. He was.a natural smoother-over, and, in any case, Strachan testified that Dean had been acting on Haldeman's instruction. At worst, these small "damning" facts only show that Dean had more prior information about Watergate than he has admitted to. They might also show, however, that Dean, from the start, was being used as the uncon- scious agent of other people anxious to remain invisible: if the Liddy project went. sour, only Dean could he seen as instrumental in recommending it, per- forming the right introductions, smoothing its course.... Haldeman and Ehrlichman. Either or both had the power-if not technically the 'authority-to override Mitchell's objections and direct Magruder to proceed with Gemstone. Or Haldeman alone, invoking the presidential sanction, could have forced the recalci- trant Mitchell to initial the budget; from Ehrlichman, Mitchell would prob- ably not have accepted that. There is a faint possibility, which gets some tenu- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIS-RDP77-00432R000100320001-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320001-1 bus support from Robert Reisner's' testimony to communications between. Magruder and Liddy, that the opera- tion had already been approved by. somebody not Mitchell when Magruder flew down to Key Biscayne, in other words that Mitchell's signature was a formality that could be dispensed with if need be. Yet Gemstone, at least to my mind, does not sound like a conception that could have originated with Haldeman and Ehrlichman, though it is closer to their spirit than to Mitchell's. Even if it could not be traced to them in the event of failure, they would surely have' had their doubts. about the public-relations aspect of such an adventure, were the press to get hold of it. A simple CIA workhorse like Jim McCord could be persuaded that a break-in at Democratic National Committee headquarters was in the interests of national security, but Hal- deman and Ehrlichman, whatever their private convictions, would scarcely have seen national security as a plausi- ble public defense for a job against the opposition party. rn There Haldeman, at least, knew that a plan for electronic surveillance was in the works, but knowing and advocating are not the same thing. Probably he and Ehrlichnan, assuming they both knew, kept their fingers crossed throughout May and early June. If the operation got results, so much the better; if it failed, old John Mitchell would. be left holding the - bag. Apprehension, or their part, must have 'mingled with amusement-the amusement antici- pating Mitchell's grim predicament if Liddy's men got cit ght. This would account for Haldeman's "mellow mood" on the morning of June 20 when he checked into the office, fresh from Florida, where he had been during the break n. Gordon Strachan went in to see him, "scared to death," fully expecting to be fired for having failed to reach his boss, over the weekend and report to him on ?Magru-. der and the Gemstone connection. Instead, Haldeman greeted him 'half jokingly" with "Well, what do we know about the events of the week- end?" and calmly perused the file Strachan handed him. Colson. ?.lore likely, in all but one respect, th:n any of the preceding. When he heard of the break-in on his return from the Philippines, _ Dean's fist thought, he testified, was "Col- son." Asked to explain that reaction; he mentioned the Brookings Institution burglary by fire-bombing-a typical' Colson project that he himself, by flying to California, had managed to avert. In addition, he had remembered Colson's friendliness with Hunt. Dean was not the only member of the White House staff to have the name "Colson" rise out of the cloudy incident like a genie issuing from a bottle. Ehrlich- man, on ? the telephone, 'as soon as Dean got back to his desk in Nashin;- ton Monday morning, the nineteenth, told him "to find out what Colson's involvement was in the matter." If that instruction was given in good faith arid not merely placed on the record, it shows that Ehrlichman, far from being on the inside track about Watergate, was guessing like anybody else. In any case, it was an easy guess. After being debriefed by Liddy, Mardian thought so too. On its face, Watergate looked like pure Colson. There was only one catch: did he have the power to authorize it? The call to Magruder urging him "to get off the stick" seems to prove that he did not. That was an entreaty, not an order. The best Colson could do for Gemstone was to keep after Magruder in the hope that it would go through. If he was the mastermind, he must have had an ally more powerful than himself who interposed to put an,end to shilly-shallying. Nixon. By elimination, we arrive 2t the only suspect who had the power to authorize Watergate, and character traits to match. Unless we say "Nixon," we are forced to conclude that nobody authorized Watergate, that the directive to fund Liddv and his co-conspirators came to Magruder from a supernatural agency, identified by. some with' Mitchell, by' some with Haldeman, by some- with Colson, and by Mitchell probably with the Presi- dent. II It remains to try to analyze how and by what stages and through whom the pre .idcntial will was implemented. hrre we are in the dark, and Dean, our only guide, is in the dark too. lie does not know where the plan for electronic suneillance of the opposition party (as opposed to traditional spying) origi- nated and he offers no conjecture. Something happened, he thinks, he= twecn December 10, 1971, when Liddy went to work at CREEP, and January 27, when he showed his charts on an easel in the Department of Justice, with Mitchell, Magruder, and Dean watching in utter astonishment. The plan for intelligence-gathering on dem- onstrators discussed at the time of Liddy's hiring, to occupy only a small pail of his time (2 to 5 percent, Hugh Sloan understood), had. undergone a wondrous change. In the January 27 plan, the demonstrators are still there (to be kidnapped and held in Mexico till the Republican convention, then slated for San Diego, was over), but the main activity, inflated and grandi- ose, with a bugged yacht, call girls, and blackmail, now centers on the Demo- cratic convention it Miami. In the scaled-down second presenta- tion of February 4, the demonstrators have disappeared, and instead, as a sideshow to the big anti-Democratic attraction, there is a. burglary of }lank Greenspun's safe in Nevada with a Cloward Hughes plane standing by to fly the burglars to a Central American haven once the job is completed. In the final, Key Biscayne version, again no demonstrators, and nothing more is heard of them as the Watergate scheme develops except as justification given to McCord and the Cubans for entering Democratic headquarters to plant bugs l on telephones and photograph papers. The Latin American theme (perhaps .hunt's leitmotiv) persists, though pia- nissimo: in the end it is just money that is spirited to Mexico to be laundered. Thus the rational basis for Liddy's employment was quickly subordinated to irrational elements and soon van- ished fro:n. sight.. For the Republicans to be concerned about having their i convention broken up by demon- strators (as had happened in Chicago to the Democrats in 1968) was per- fectly natural and even sensible; to infiltr:;tc antiwar groups would be Standing Operating Procedure and an old. habit with the FBI. That Nixon was unwilling to leave the handling of left-wing protesters to the FBI and the police was not quite so sensible but understandable, in view of his fetid with J. Edgar. hoover and his general' dissatisfaction with the ordinary repres- sive agencies of government. lie wanted his own spies, paid by his own campaign people and under their super- What is function was added to CREEP's admin- istrative structure no more heed was paid to it, and it was allowed to atrophy, as though the expensive charms of electronic surveillance were too wonderful to be wasted on dime- a-dozen left-wingers. With the dynamic Liddy and his vision in the pay of CREEP, somebody, singular or plural, was tempted to divert this "capability" from powerless antiwar groups-who were . only a nuisance-to the still powerful opposition party. In this broader perspective, the demonstrators were even 'seen to have a certain utility, particularly if they, could be linked to the Democrats. Dean, a reasonable and pacific young man who well understood the realities of - the demonstrator problem (he had 'won credit as the Justice Department nego- tiator with the leaders of the big protest march on Washington in 1969), was baffled by the sudden delusion of grandeur implicit in the Liddy charts. Mitchell, for his part, on each presenta- tion, kept growling, in effect: "What about the demonstrators? What about Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-004328000100320001-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320001'1 our security? Why isn't this fellow working on that?" Several times in his testimony, Dean returned to the incredible transforma- tion that, in the space of a month and a half, had overtaken a project with which he thought he was familiar. "That has always been one of the great mysteries to me, between the time he [Liddy) went over there ... what hap- pened between December 10 and Janu- ary 27, and my conception of what his responsibilities were and possibly his own and others' conception dramati- cally changed." His mystification con-, tinued and embraced the whole se- querice of events right no to June 17. He had thought the plan was dead after January 27. When it resurfaced on February 4, he was alarmed enough to go to inform Haldeman. After this, he was told no more of Gemstone till he was called upon for his services in the cover-tip: "I have never been clear on what happened between February and June 17." All he could say was that "someone wanted the operation." Obviously this puzzlement of his may be specious. While admitting large responsibility. in the cover-up, he may want to dissociate himself in so far as he can from the planning of the break-in. That possibility must he kept .in mind, and yet it seems undeniable' that on January 27 both he and Mitchell were taken completely by surprise. Could they have been de- ceived from the outset as to Liddy's functions? Was "intelligence-gathering on denionstr tors" a cover under which the former Plumber was slipped into Mitchell's territory; with Dean, all unknowing, acting as his escort? The idea of electronic surveillance may have been in the White House air throughout the fall of 1971-the off- spring of group-think with no acknowl- edged paternity-and Liddy may have been chosen and sent over to CREEP to try it out on Mitchell. When Mitchell refused, then the pressure slowly built up, While House desire for the project mounting as frustration was encountered. The only evidence, though, for such a supposition comes from Magruder. According -to him, Liddy, early in December, on his first days at work, was already talking of a SI million broad-gauged intelligence plan that had White House approval. But of all the witnesses before tht panel the self- seeking Magruder is the most suspect, and in any case Liddy may merely have been boasting. The "something" that happened between December 10 and January 27 (assuming Dean is right that a new factor then entered) may have been simply Liddy. He had found, ready to hand, guarded by Sloan and Porter, the pot of gold at the end of his - dream rainbow. CREEP's campaign money, seemingly unlimited, may well have been the stimulus that set his brain working (who but he could have -named the operation "Gemstone"?), and even be- fore his charts had been submitted to Mitchell he had discovered a receptive audience back in the White House. It is not hard to accept Dean's puzzlement as genuine. Both he and the unimaginative Mitchell lacked the quality of "vision" and were incapable of grasping that what had been added to CREEP with the accession of Liddy was a new potential for transforming cash into power. In the unexplored field of electronics as a campaign accessory, Nixon and his corporate backers would have a clear advantage, almost a monopoly, since the Demo- crats were in no position to finance million-dollar bugging experiments, so poor in fact that they were defenseless against enemy hugging-Larry O'Brien guessed that his headquarters were being tapped but could not afford to hire his own team of experts to find and de-activate the bugs. Dean and Mitchell, thinking along traditional lines, were too short-sighted to see that this unique advantage, which could outweigh the Democratic numbers (the country was still basi- cally Democratic), should not be lightly discarded because of the risk element. Liddy ought to be given a trial, an initial dry run, to 'show what he could deliver. Unable to look at it this way, with. an open mind, they were at a loss when Liddy appeared; apparently as a missionary from some quarter, undis- couraged by orders to "burn that stuff," obediently cutting down his budget requirements (as though the price tag was the problem), inde- fatigably proselytizing, like a Jehovah's Witness who has got one foot in the door. Who had sent him, what could be behind him, they hardly dared speculate. And yet "someone wanted the oper- ation" or, in Mitchell's idiom, "some- body obviously was very interested." At Key Biscayne, the former Attorney General must have drawn a terrible conclusion: it could only be Nixon. Hence his spleen and misery. He was frightened by the project, frightened by Liddy, and frightened by the advice the President evidently was getting from an undetermined familiar. His suspicions must have veered angrily, back and forth between Colson and .Haldeman, touched on Ehrlichman and 1 reluctantly withdrawn. Since he has the primal virtue of loyalty, he would not have let himself blame the Presi- dent: those damnable others had got at hirn. Ile may have been told, straight out, and still half-refused to believe. One can imagine ' the telphone call to Florida, say on March 31. Haldeman: "The President wants this, John. I sympathize with your reservations, but vli.t can we do? He irurrrs it." Or else CL,'-on: "John, get your ass moving. That's an order from You-Know-Who.; If you don't like it, put Jeb on-it."! Mi.chcll, setting down the receiver, was maybe trying to persuade him;elf that the caller was lying-preten::ng to speak for the President but really pushing his own merchandise. In that case, why not ask to hear it from Nixon directly? But that was some- thing Mitchell was not going. to risk. As tong as he did not csk the President, he could retain a doubt. It may even be true that to this day lie, has refrained from askinz His categorical statement that he never discussed Watergate lvith the President, which the senators found incon- ceivable, was quite possibly a fact, though the reasons he gave (the ",White House horror. stories," "lowering the boom," and so on) were obviously fictitious., As so often happened in his testimony, Mitchell's weary lies and justifications did not seek to convince, which was perhaps astute on his part: if the senators did not believe his explanations, they did not believe the astonishing fact he was stating, which from his point of view was just as well. To go hack to Key Biscayne. When Mitchell recognized, before, during, or after the March 30 meeting, that he could not stop Gemstone, he capitu- lated. But not gladly. His "I am tired of hearing it ... let's not discuss it any further" (if that is what he said to Magruder) defined his position. His lack of stomach for the enterprise was evident in his subsequent behavior, which, stopping just short of total non-cooperation, must have appeared strange to others in the CREEP office. He left Magruder in charge of whatever Liddy was tip to and gave him sole authority over the moneys dispensed- to him. When Hugh Sloan, worried, begged Finance Chairman Maurice Stars to get Mitchell's sanction for the first outsize payment (S83,000) on_what Liddy said was an approved -SS200,000 budget, Stans drew a laconic answer: "Tell him to ask Magruder. He has' the responsi- bility." It was after this colloquy that'; Stars told Sloan, who wondered what the money was for, "I don't want to know, and porr don't want to know." Mitchell swears he never saw the Gemstone material placed in his file by Magruder. If "never saw" mean, "never looked at," that may well he true. It would be Mitchell's way of demon- strating that he knew in advance (and lie was right,? apparently) that the material would be 'worthless. if the spongy surrounding tissue of Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-F7DP77-00432R000100320001-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320001-1 lies can be cut away (which is now possible for a reader of the Iranscript), much of the testimony by Mitchell and about him becomes believable. once you accept the hypothesis that Mitch- ell knew (or feared) that Nixon had ordered Gemstone, nearly everythin; falls into place. Even his dour jests about wishing that he had shot certain people, wishing that he had thrown Liddy out of the Department of Justice window. The trouble was, he couldn't, but those are the wishes you entertain, cheerful murder dreams, when 'you sit by yourself, powerless. watching the fools take over. His exclamation (reported by LaRue) on, getting the news of the break-in-"This is incredible!"-suits up with explosive sincerity his feelings on the subject or, as he would say, on the subject matter. Incredible from the beginning and incredible in the finale. That they should have let themselves get caught was predictable, , but that McCord should have ~:betr' -.,with them! The. CREEP..secuiity officer! It blew your .,n ii3d- Mitchell testified that he had taken no part in the cover-up. Few believed him, but it was probably half true and it a;;pressed a whole truth of feeling: he scanted no part of the cover-up. Probably he had as little faith in the abilities of the cover-tip activists as he had had in Liddy's' capacities. John Dean had some sparks of judgment, but he w_as busy being a messenger boy for the others. Mitchell trusted only his own people: Mardian and LaRue. And to be forced to cover up for a crazy action that you had opposed from the outset was a bit much. In* trying to cover up, you might be digging yourself in deeper. Yet there was his loyalty to the President to remember, there was the election, and there was the fact that the faithful LaRue was being dragged into the business of paying lnish money to the defendants and Mardian had ?been driift^d into the role of Liddy's legal adviser, among other uncongenial Watergate-related tasks. Under the circumstances, Mitchell could not refuse to lend a hand. Though his opposition to Gemstone had probably cost hint the President's friendship,-he carried'on. - He seems to have drawn the line, though, at hush money. Somebody, no doubt, had to pay it, but let them tise White House funds and not come to .him about it. The last time anyone tried to enlist his help in pay-offs was in February, 1973, when his old friend Richard Moore was dispatched to New York: by Haldeman and Ehrlichman, in the unlikely hope that Mitchell could be persuaded to raise money for "lawyers' fees" from "his rich New York friends." Mitchell's answer; "Tell them to get lost." On March 21, LaRue was worrying about a $75,000 payment he had been directed to make to Hunt's lawyer. This was a large sum, the largest he had paid out yet, and he hesitated to use his own judgment on whether or not to make the delivery. At Dean's suggestion, he called Mitchell, "and he told me that he thought I ought to pay it." This can be construed as authorization (Mitch- ell, then, making an exception to the sour rule he had set himself), but it can also be. construed as private worldly advice.given to an old friend who had come to him for counsel. Anyway, that White ? House money was not Mitchell's. lookout; it came. out of a cash fund Haldeman had been holding to be used "for pol!ing purposes." Yet for all his disgust and' rancor, Mitchell, being human, must have blamed himself as well as the -others for the Watergate fiasco. Against any nominee. but McGovern, it could have cost Nixon the election, and Mitchell,' in that eventuality, would have had plenty of cause for self-reproach. If he 'had not stubbornly declined to know anything 4hout Gemstone, if he had not. heft it strictly to Magruder, in short if he had not been so unyielding, the burglars might still have been caught, but there would have been no Jim . McCord among them. Nor, if Mitchell had had any say, would a White House telephone number have been found in two of the Cubans' address books or sequenced CREEP bills in their pockets. So, at any rate, he may have argued "in hindsight," and here another bit of his testimony suddenly fits. into the puzzle and assumes a truthful look. On June 20, he spoke with the President, for the first and only time, about Watergate. You could hardly call it a discussion, since Mitchell was talking and Nixon was listening. Mitchell says lie apolo- gized to the President for not running a tighter ship: "I think I made it quite clear to him that I hadn't exercised sufficient control over the activities of all the people in the Committee." That this was all Mitchell had to say on the matter to the Chief Executive struck most people as unbelievable, positively grotesque. Yet it was about all lie could say in the circumstances: he was sorry. he had not- kept his eye' on' Gemstone, sorry he had left Ma- gruder to handle it, sorry he had let his opposition to the project get the better. of him.... The tape of that conversation is "missing," but we can assume that Nixon's response was icy. No wonder.the call was short. If we accept that the impetus for Watergate came from Nixon, still it must have been communicated through a channel or. channels. Someone be- sides Nixon was active in promoting the plan. Mitchell, in hi's testimony threw out a few morose hints as to who ? that might have been, but he would not be 'more definite. "You can almost take your -pick of quite a number of such influences." The obvi- ous choice is Colson. Magruder is a possibility, though mainly because of his eagerness to divert suspicion else- where-onto Colson, among others. lie authorized the funds, without refer- ence to Mitchell, and . he was very much up-to-the-minute on the break-in program. When Liddy called him, on the morning of June 17 in the Beverly Hills Hotel in Los Angeles, he came back from the telephone to the break- fast table and said in an aside to LaRue, "You know; I think maybe last night was the night they were going into the Democratic National Committee." But if he was getting orders from the Oval Office and feeding information back, it seems inconceivable that somebody was not acting as liaison-impossible to picture Nixon stepping into a pay , phone booth, depositing a dime, and asking for "Jeb." But this sends us back to wondering about Ilaldennan; Magruder was an old Haldeman boy. From some of Dean's notes written at Camp David and from remarks he made to the President. it sounds as if for a time Dean had suspected Gordon Strachan of being. the principal agent or intermediary. But either this sus- picion had been dropped in his car by Magruder (status rivalry: he had been Strachan's boss in Haldeman's office and now at CREEP he was getting orders from him), or "Strachan" was a pseudonym for the big boss, Halde- man, since of all the figures we have been discussing the thin high-voiced Strachan was the most powerless. But by the time of the hearings Dean had dropped Strachan or "Strachan" and seemed to be inclining toward Colson. One wonders whether, by now, the thought of Nixon as the prime mover is turning over in his mind. Colson, Haldeman, Haldeman, Col- son-the Moving Finger writes and, having writ, erases; the needle wavers; maybe the daisies can tell. It is a count-out game. But one thing is sure: Nixon cannot be counted out. Senator Baker's "searching" question, "What did the President know and when did' he. know it?". could not be - more incongruous. Ask when an arch- .conspirator first heard of his con-; spiracy or when out wicked Creator' got news of this wicked world. III Nevertheless, it ' is worthwhile to examine the circumstances' out of which Watergate emerged. The crucial date was probably June 1971. The publication of the Pentagon Papers was a turning-point for Nixon. At that moment, maybe at that instant, he 8 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320001-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320001-1 went around the bend, from normal politics (however dirty and ruthless) to the politics of irrationality. There had been premonitory signs, Already, in the spring of 1971, the installation of the White House monitoring system pointed in. the direction of Watergate, and the Huston internal-security plan of the summer of 1970 was -another road-indicator. Both of these measures were well-guarded secrets, and it was Watergate, significantly; that finally released them, along with a great deal of other material that had been kept from public scrutiny. The monitoring system and the Hus= ton plan were directed, in their dif-' ferent ways,'at a much tighter control of the environment and both were designed to make use of modern, up-to-date technology. An infatuation with the latest technology apparently went hand in hand with a passion for secrecy: according to John Dean, Tom Huston (whose hero was Cato the Younger) had a scrambler telephone locked in a safe beside him-he sounds like a more highly educated Liddy, a flamboyant conservative militant re- sponsive to the appeal of space-age gimcrackery. But the Huston plan had to be scrapped (or to go more deeply under- ground) after only a few days of service, owing to the resistance of J. Edgar Hoover, and this thwarting of the presidential will occurring within the extccndcd "family" of government must hav:: made Nixon sharply aware of his nuclear isolation. Just as he was moving to establish the .tighter control he de.?nta:l necessary to'ihe process of governing, he was forced to note, and not for the first time, his inability to control or discipline the agencies that were supposedly under him. lie was isolated, pent up, in the White House with his tiny nucleus of planners and visionaries, and against him were allied the inert and-from his point of view-reactionary forces of the nation: J. Edgar Hoover, Helms at the CIA, the Eastern Establishment press, the judiciary, most of the Con- gress, and the Internal Revenue Serv- ice, manned by Democratic holdovers who blocked all his efforts to enforce Iegitir'rtate authority through tax audits and tax harassment. it is important, I think, 'to realize that Nixon saw nothing wrong in the conception of governing through tax harassment of foundations and indi- viduals. To him, control of the IRS was one of the natural perquisites of the office, like the patronage dispensed by the Postmaster General, the par- celing out of contracts and embassy assign:;:tints as rewards to campaign contributors. As for the wire-tapping of dissenters and subversives, some people, he knew, thought it was illegal, but it was not wror;. And why shouldn't the CIA lend a hand in undercover operations against domestic radicals? Its charter from Congress specified foreign intelligence work only, but it was common knowledge that a lot of those radicals were :working for foreign powers. Yet t ese little natural . innocent things (how could a tax audit hurt anybody who had made an honest return?) were being treated as if they were crimes by the people over at IRS and by Hoover and Helms, who got legalistic when asked to do the slight- est favor. It had not been that way when the Democrats were - running things. The difference was Richard M. Nixon. Elected by the popular will to the highest office of the land, the President of the United States was thrust into the position of a conspira- tor if he was going to execute his mandate. A number of presidents--e.g., Roose- velt, Lyndon Johnson-have not been strangers to this feeling end have acted accordingly. It is probably in the nature of things that the Chief Executive will. chafe against the laws and institutions restraining him more than the average citizen and turn, on occasion, into the Chief La?.vbrca'.cr. But no Administra- tion before Nixon's can have lent itself so readily to a conspiratorial view of government. His secretive and un- sociable nature made friends with the underground methods he felt were L posed on him by an unsympathetic Congress (even his own party had its Javitses and Percys) and an un- cooperative entrenched bureaucracy. in 1970, conspiracy (the wrong kind) was much in the Administra- tion's thoughts. At Justice, Mitchell and Mardian were bringing dissenters to trial under the conspiracy statutes and creating more dissent among the judiciary, which complained' of loosely drawn indictments, tainted evidence, and the violation of the rights of defendants. From the Administration's point of view, those aborted trials should have been seen, nevertheless, as a qualified success; like tax audits, they constituted a harassment, very costly both of, time and money not only to those indicted but also to their supporters, busy raising funds, writing letters to the press, hiring halls, drafting appeals. But Nixon was dis- satisfied. - (A) With the judiciary and (B) probably, with Mitchell and Mar- dian. As he drew closer to the notion (unnamed by him, of course) of form- ing a conspiratorial nucleus within his own. government, he began to draw away from his old counselor Mitchell, who believed 'in "working within the system" by rapping on the right doors. The Senate's rejection of Haynsworth and Carswell-Mitchell's nominees for the Supreme Court and part of "the Southern strategy"-must have pro- duced the first signs of a chill on Nixon's part. Trying to work within the system, twisting a few arms (Sena- tor Margaret Chase Smith's for- instance) had caused him two public humiliations and anyway it was too slow. An analogy with the politics of the left comes to mind: the younger ideologues and actionists of the White House inner circle were revolutionaries, while Mitchell and his cronies (I ask Willy Brandt's pardon) were Social. Democrats. Both had the same goal- the rule of Nixon-and the differences were over methodology, but Mitchell's addiction to the old semi-legal methods, a habit be could not shake, was starting to prove, at least to Nixon. that he did not understand the goal any better, than J. Edgar Hoover or Randolph Thrower of the IRS. he disclosure of the Pentagon. Papers brought all this to a head. Their publication inflicted a symbolic injury on Nixon. Whatever disapproval he was bound to express in public, privately he might almost have enjoyed it. The documents had nothing to do with him. and cast discredit, to put it mildly, on his Democratic predecessors. Nor did the Pentagon come out well, which could have given him some satisfaction; relations, as we now know, were strained to the point where the Penta- gon was spying on him. It is under- standable that he should have been led to worry about leaks from his own Administration. Perhaps almost any president in his place would have formed something like a Plumbers' unit to' make doubly sure this did not happen to him. But Nixon's reaction of fury was far in cxcess of the cause and unaccounted for by his practical interests. He be- came obsessed with Ellsberg-a spaced- out academic who would never see the inside of a government office again. By all accounts, Nixon could not get his mind off him and talked about hi-n incessantly. Ellsberg was the goad that spurred- his thinking along security lines, - and the White House staff was aware of it, so much so that a sycophant like Colson, trying to keep pace with that thinking, actually directed a White House employee to set off a fire-bomb in the Brookings Institution in order to effect an entry and steal some documents they were using for a current study of Vietnam affairs. It is interesting that this project was a mirror image of the Pentagon, Papers "theft;' with arson, property damage, and possible loss of life added. -Nixon *s determination to see Ells- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIAgRDP77-00432R000100320001-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320001-1 berg punished, like a close personal enemy, hardened throughout the sum- mer. All his grudges and grievances now had a point to center on: his hatred of the press, his hatred of reds and pinks, his hatred of Hoover, his mistrust of the CIA and impatience with the judiciary. The FBI was re- fusing to conduct a serious investiga- tion because of a friendship between hoover and Ellsberg's father-in-law; the CIA "psychological profile" of Ellsberg was derisory; the judge hearing the case naturally could not be counted on, so he had to be "fixed" with an offer to head the FBI. I'ke furniture . being moved into place to set a stage, Hunt and Liddy that summer were brought onto the White House staff. Caulfield and Ulase- wicz, both with police backgrounds-of investigating dissidents, were already there. Caulfield, a former Bronx cop, had been hired by Haldeman; his specialty had been "monitoring" ter- rorists,..the. Communist party, Cuban militant ..or asiza ions; ~d a variety of tin ,domestic.rcvolutionary groups lsfro. ;Planned br were suspected of ;planning Serious kinds of unlawful activities." The burglary of Ellsberg's psychiatrist was coming. The Ellsberg-poisoned atmosphere of the White House during the summer and fall of 1971 is reminiscent of the Kremlin during the late days of Stalin and the chimera of "the men in white." Nixon could not tolerate the sight of an opponent, even the most harmless and peaceful demonstrator with a sign. The specter of Philby (called "Philbrick" by the preparer of the transcript, who is obviously not very spy-conscious) seems to have haunted the President, as though he were a nascent Ellsberg in British disguise. Like Stalin, Nixon was medi- tating a purge, but because the US was a democracy it would have to wait till after the election. In Washington, after the election, heads did not roll, as they did during the "doctors' plot," but helms went, early in 1973, death had taken care of Hoover the previous spring, and late last summer a big "reorganization" of the CIA was re-, ported. Ehfichman, moreover (this has just come to light), took a leaf from Yagoda's book: in 1971, he presented Admiral Welandcr with a prepared confession to sign that would have made "me admit to the wildest pos- sible, totally false charges of political espionage." Welander refused. Nixon's grim focus on Ellsberg is as easy (or as hard) to explain as Stalin's final paranoia, which combined his fear of aseassination with a phobic suspi- cion of Jews to fix on (lie doctors around him, and then struck out at Soviet Jews in general. Anti-Scmiiism was latent in the Soviet Union, just as red scares are endemic in the United States. Even Nixon, though, cannot have imagined Ellsberg as his future assassin except in a symbolic sense. The theft of those documents, their exposure to public view had dealt the Presidency a wound, and Nixon, in his own mind, had merged with the insti- tution, to become a single body. The publication of the Pentagon Papers planted in him a doubt of the inviola- bility of his person and the office and of the principle of "confidentiality" about which he evidently has deep- rooted feelings. It was as if his moni- toring system, which he had hoped would ensure permanent control of the presidential environment by putting whatever happened there on record for his own exclusive retention, had been defied, almost laughed at, by another set, of records compiled under McNamara's directions and spirited away by a private individual. At the same time there was perhaps something about Ellsberg, the man, the pre-Papers, clean, crew-cut Ellsberg, a defiant hawk in Vietnam, looking out, still, with a tight eager smile, from the cloud of hair, that reminded Nixon of some of the younger "modern con- servatives" in his own hard-driving office family, and the feeling of half- familiarity would have further dis- turbed his balance, making him look fearfully at the aide with a clipboard coming in the door. Hence the angry insistence on Ellsberg as a "traitor" and the obsessive memory of Philby. Late in the fall of 1971, after the unproductive Fielding burglary, as the courts prepared to try Ellsberg, the co-ordinates for Watergate were fixed, even if no brain as yet had made the calculation. The White House retained the Plumbers: "capability" in addition to Caulfield and Ulascwicz, but had no immediate interesting employment to offer them. Electronic surveillance, working out of Lhrlichilia n's office-, had hardly been given a chance to show what it could do: only a few taps on journalists and on Kissinger's aides. At CREEP there was money to burn. In September, McCord, on Caul- field's recommendation, was hired by CREEP as a security officer, part time. A former FBI and CIA operative, he had knowledge of "the art of certain technical devices ... listening-devices and so on." Liddy, who arrived on December 10, did not; his field was clandestine photography. On January 1, McCord went on full time. The idea of putting these elements together and plugging them into the campaign may have been Nixon's. If he diopped it into Haldeman's "suggestion box" during a chat at Camp David, it- .probably drew a neutral response: "I'll look into the parameters, Mr. Presi- dent, and report back." Alternatively Colson brought Nixon the idea, which either he had thought up himself or which had come to him via Hunt from Liddy-Colson did not meet Liddy in person until early February. Or maybe several people, separately, put it for- ward.- It is impossible to trace the routes by which it beat its way to Nixon's mind until finally it could not be dislodged. But some time, as early as December or as late as April 1, it achieved "worthwhile for go status." The conjugation of McCord and Liddy in' the CREEP offices, followed by McCord's going on full-time salary- facts not subject to dispute-point to a Christmas birth date. p At is impossible to foretell whether Nix?n will be removed from office, by one means or another, when Watergate celebrates its second anniversary. As I write, in late February, the prediction is that he will stay. Yet Watergate has a strange organic life of its own which, in my opinion, is more persistent than Nixon's desperate hold on power. Watergate has showed itself to be like an angleworm ?or a child's belief About an angleworm: if you chop it in pieces, each piece will,wriggle off and make a brand-new angleworm. Last September, everyone was sure that it had died. Then came Agnew. After Agnew, another "dead" period followed. Then came the Saturday night massacre.' Another brief suspension 'of breath, then the missing tapes, then the tape erasures. - This persistence is not an accident or just bad luck. Watergate returns, reas- serts. itself because it is 'a whole, consistent in all its parts' like the angleworm. It is a creation of Nixon and of Nixonian politics.. Agnew, -strictly speaking, had nothing to do with Watergate, but because he himself was a creation of Nixonian politics, he ,was a parallel phenomenon that could not- sustain scrutiny when brought out into the light of day. This organic wholeness of Nixon and his works, faithfully reflected in Watergate, has produced some ironies, nasty tricks of fate. But the irony results from the utter consistency of the whole-there are no spare parts; everything returns on itself. Because of Watergate, for example, Dan Ellsberg has gone free. And if Nixon gnashed his teeth over that, lie must at least have cursed when lie read McCord's letter to Judge Sirica. What had per-, suaded McCord to talk or had been at any rate a prime factor in his decision was his loyalty to the CIA. On this point, lie testified with a good deal of heat and at length. He was angry when he first heard of the White' house effort "to lay the Watergate operation off on the CIA," and -he had refused' to go along with the suggestion that he use the CIA in his defense. I could not use as my defense the story that the operation was a CIA 10 ''' Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320001-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320001-1 operation because it was not true .. - . Even if it meant my freedom, I would not turn on the organiza- tion that had employed me for 19 years.... "I was completely con- vinced that the White House was behind the idea and ploy which had been presented, and that the White House was turning ruthless, in my opinion, and would, do whatever was politically expedient at any one particular point in time to accomplish its own ends. I was also convinced that the White House had fired Helms in order to put its own man in control at CIA.... It appeared to me that the White House had for some time been trying. to get control over the CIA estimates and assessments, in order to make them conform to "White House policy." He went on to talk somewhat inco- herently about how Iiitler's intelligence chiefs had been obliged to lie to him in giving their estimates of foreign military capabilities-thereby losing him the war. Jim McCord was a fire-breathing patriot and seemed to have decided, post-Watergate, that the White house, through persecution of the CIA, was weakening the country 's defenses. It took all kinds of Ameri- cans, including (lie seven rather con- servative senators, to bring out the Watcrgate story: the press, the judici- ary- (Judge Sirica), even Pat Cray of the FIJI. Nearly all of Nixon's. chickens have come home to roost, but a few mo:c--(he last of the brood-may fin- ish the job. Postscript, March 7 written. the grand jury indicted seven of Nixon's associates :ind handed its sealed envelope to Judge Sirica. Water- gate has come to life again, and amain Nixon's days appear to he numbered. In Cincinnati, a Republican candidate for Congress has been defeated- another inroad on strongly held Re- publican territory. Senator tirvin's Committee has been voted some more money. Nixon has said- on television that when he told Dean, "It would be wrong, that's for sure"-his newest recollection of the words he used on March 21, 1973-he was talking about clemency for the men in prison. Not, as Haldeman had sworn before the Ervin panel, about raising a million dollars' worth of hush money. This would seem to "cover" Halde- man on one perjury charge: he had not been lying under oath to the Senate Committee but had only had a poor recollection of the context, under- standable since hush money and clem- ency were linked. in the discussion. Nixon_ went on to say that some people (was he thinking of the twenty-three grand jurors?) who read the whole transcript or heard the whole tape might put a different interpretation on the conversation, but "I know what I meant." We can now understand at least why the tape was not deep-sixed. The statement "it is wrong" or "that would must occur somewhere on be wrong" it, and to preserve those, three or four precious little words, Nixon evidently decided to, let the grand jury, if that was its mood, "misinterpret" the rest of the conversation: proof that he has a moral sense was scarce enough not to be jettisoned. he seven indictments for conspir- acy, perjury, lying, and obstruction of justice relate only to the cover-up. The grand jury apparently drew no con- clusions as to who planned and directed the original crime, LJless' those conclusions are contained in the sealed envelope. One can hardly blame the jurors for failing to pronounce on the matter since no hard evidence, so far as we know, pointing to the guilty party or parties has been produced. Those who had an interest in covering up are legion-virtually the entire Nixon apparatus-but the entire appar- atus cannot be guilty of ordering the break-ins at the Watergate. The plain fact is that the cover-tip is still going on: evidence in the form of criminal knowledge is being effectively hidden, justice is being obstructed. The grand jury indictments only confirm what. was already a certainty in most people's minds: that those seven men (though 1 must say that I did not suspect Gordon Strachan) were lying and/or conspiring to conceal when they gave testimony to legally constituted bodies. But what is not yet guess at, remains a secret shared among! a handful of men, not more than four probably. Three of these are now under indictment, and the prospect of jail may serve to squeeze some truth out. But it is more likely that the one who is still at large will he judged and condemned by another court-the Con- gress or what is left of the Republican party-before his accomplices can stand up to hear the- verdicts reached by their peers. p On March 1, since these thoughts were ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH EDITORIAL - 12 March 1974 bove 17 eproachrt: . Now that the Senate \\'at.ergate committee is holding its hearings in private; reports about the committee's closed door questioning of .,Richard Helms, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, do not suggest that the Senators are digging very deeply into the CIA's". highly questionable involvement in the burg-. lary of the office of Daniel Ell erg's psychia ' break-in and: trist, the Watergate building other crimes far afield from the agency's; law erged from one closed-door session with Mh' Helms to say he believes that Mr. Helms is "above reproach." If Mr. Helms is above re- proach, there is a lot of explaining to be done.. For while Mr. Helms was director of the in- telligence agency (he left in late 1972), the according to sworn affidavits in the . CIA , Watergate case, provided equipment and false ' s documents for the burglary of the psychiatrist office and of the Democratic Party offices at, the Watergate. The CIA, on Mr. Helms's orders, attempted to divert the FBI's Watergate investigation, The CIA was reportedly involved in the at- tempted burglary of the offices of the Inter- national Telephone & Telegraph Corp. in New' York, where incriminating documents concern-, ing the corporation's questionable dealings with the Nixon Administration were presumably on file. The CIA admittedly destroyed tapes which recorded conversations between its officials grid ' key figures in the Nixon Administration, including possibly the President himself. Sen- ators were said to be seeking some tapes as evidence vital to the Watergate investigation. None of these activities has been satisfactor= ily squared with the law, which supposedly bars the CIA from domestic operations. Unless the Senate comn?:ittee brings in a report with convincing evh once to justify its apparent in- dulgent attitude toward Mr. Helms, the com- wittee itself will be suspected of a cover-up, Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : Cjii-RDP77-00432R000100320001-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320001-1 MO13E, lie, York City April 1974 BY VICTOR L. NLt RC11ETTI AND JOHN D. Pr'LV1 KS Editor's note: In June, Alfred A. Knopf Inc. will publish The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence by ViciorL. Marchetti. who worked for the agency for 14 yours, and John D. Afarks, aforiner assistant to the Department of St *te's director of intelligence. The hook i?.?ill appear with 162 deletions demanded by the CIA. On the page opposite, Brit Hume, [,e?ORI:]'s 13rashtr:gton editor, explores the legal and censorship issues involved in a battle that dates back to the spring of 1972 when U.S. marshals arrived at Marchetti's home outside Washington rrdtlt a temporary restraining order. In their Nook, Marchetti and Marks deal at length with the CIA and the press. Thefo!lowing article is adapted front that material and other related research collected by the authors. On Sept. 23, 1970, syndicated columnist Charles Barnett was handed, by a W ashington-based o:uicial of ITT, an internal report sent in by the company's two representatives in Chile, Hal Hendrix and Robert Bcrrellez. This eight-page 'document--mar::ed? "Personal and Con- -f=,~iential -said that the American ambassador to Chile had received the "green light to move in the name of President Nixon ...[witii] maximum authority to do all possi%'.e-short of a Dominican Republic-type action-to keep Allende from taking pow. r." It stated that the Chilean army "has been ....,.red full material and financial assistance by fl-:: US military est:.b::shn;tnt" and that ITT had "I)ledged [its financial) support if needed" to the anti-Allende forces. Instead of launching an immediate in- ;~vestiga,tion into whit could have been one of the bigi;cst stories of the year. Bartlett (lid exactly what ITT hoped he would do: he wrote a column on Sept. 2S about the dangers of a "classic Corn- munist-siyle assumption of pow.vcr" in?Chilc. He did see some hope that "Chile will find a way to avert the inauguration of Salvador Allende," but thcuht there was little the United States could. "proitably do" and that "Chilean politics should be left to the Chileans." Inc did not inform his readers that he had a document in his possession that indicated that Chilean politics were being left.' to the Central Intelligence Agency and ITT. "I was only interested in the political an:'.?ysis." Br.rtlat explained in an interview. "I C:ii n't take seriously the Washington stint-the des.crii:tion of rn:rninations within the U.S. governimlent. [The ITT men who wrote the report] had not been in Washington; they had been in Chile." Yet by Bartl_tt's own admission, his Sept. 2S colu::a n was based en the 171T report-in places to the p~:int of paraphrase. He wrote about several incid cr.ts securing in Chie that he could not possibly have ve.ii;cd in Washington. Most reporters will not use material of this sort unless they can check it out with an independent source, so Bartlett was sho.ving extraordinary faith in the reliability of his informants. An ITT official also gave the same report to .Time's Pentagon correspondent, John Mulliken. :Mulliken covered neither the CIA nor Chile as part of his regular beat, and he sent the ITT document to. 1 i ile's headquarters in Now York for possible :action. As far as he knows Time never followed up ,on the story. fie attributes this to "bureaucratic stupidity-the system, not the people." He explains that Tittle had shortly bete:~c done a long article on Chile and New York "didn't want to do any more." Thus, the public did not learn what the U.S. government and ITT were up to in Chile until the spring of 1972, when columnist Jack Anderson published scores of ITT internal documents concerning Chile. Included in the Anderson papers, as one of the most important exhibits, was the very same document that had been given eighteen months earlier to Bartlett and Time. e?: J't:s::i ith a few notable exceptions, the American press consistently tiptoes around the CIA and its operations. And those fey; who do penetrate the secret organization find the going hard, indeed. Newsmen are physically. denied access to the CIA's }. Zvi'; guarded buildings in Langley, Va., except under tightly controlled circumstances. No media outlet in the country has ever assigned. a full-time correspondent to the agency, and very few report on its activities, even on a part-time basis. Except in those cases where the CIA wants to leak some information, almost all CIA personnel avoid any contact whatsoever with journalists. In fact, agency policy decrees that employees must inform their superiors immediately of any conversations with reporters. Back when Allen Dulles headed the CIA and Cold War anti-communis.n was still.rampant, two c:isa;ters hit the CIA that newspapers learned of in advance but reused to share fully with their readers. First came the shooting down of the U-2 spy plane over the Soviet Union in 1950. Chalmers Roberts, long the Washington Post's diplomatic correspondent, confirms in his book First Rough Draft (Praeger) that he and "some other newsmen" knew about the U-2 flights in the late 1950s and "remained silent." Roberts explains: "Retrospectively, it seems a close question as to whether this was the right decision, but I think it prof: bly was. We look the position tiiaf the national interest came before the story because we knew the United States very much needed to discover the secrets of Soviet missilery." Most reporters at the time would have agreed with former Clandestine Services chief Richard Bissell that prom lure disclosure would have tarced t`ie Soviets to take action." Yet li?:sell admitted that "after live days" the Soviets were fully aware that the spy planes were overflying their country, and that the secrecy maintained by the Soviet and American governments was an example "of t o hostile governments collaborating to keep Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320001-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320001-1 operations secret from the general public of both sides." When the U-2 =gas shot down, the U.S.- government lied about the nature of the plane's mission. After two days, the Soviets announced they had captured the CIA pilot, Francis Gary Powers, and the State Department issued a second cover story-also partially a lie. Finally President Eisenhower levelled with the American pc,- le and tool: the personal responsibility for the flight. The U-2 incident may well hatie been a watershed in the .gay the press and the American public looked at their government. For most, it was the first indication that their government lied, z::d it was the epening wedge in what would -grow during the Vietnam years into the "credibility gap.., But as the Eisenhower adimini'Stration Caine to an end, there was still a naiionad consensus that the tight against conniunism justi`ied virtually any means. The press %v as very much a part of t':e consensus, which did not start to crack until it became known that the CIA was organizing an arme.d?iinvasion of Cuba. Dive months before the actual landing took- place at the Bay of Pigs, The Nation published a second-hand account of the agency's efforts, to trap Cuban exiles for attacks against Cuba and called upon "all US news media \vit'.z col-respondents in Guatemala' (where tho invaders were being trained) to check out the story. The Nei-. York Times re ponded with an .!rfi_?le rn .'n. 1951, describing the trailing, with U.S. ,.:,ista ofai, a.llti-Castro force in Guatemal:-a.. At cad of the story, which mentioned neither the CIA no- a possible invasion, was a ch?^.r c by''the" Foreign Minister that the U.S. government :,.?s preparing "rnercena i.a' in Gti:.,c glad ...., i f. ici mi nary act!: u ?:,,ainst Cuba. '1`:i!'.._. .'. is th.n the in:lila~i editor cf the Ti,:,cs, dcclnred in his book, i\Ir Lrfr and The Times (l; _rp er a; :d Ru.ti), "I don't think that anyone :?ho'lc;d il:c story would have doubted that ..on!cthing was in the wind, that tI_. L?ni? c i St:...: v:. s cn':; vCl ?Cd, or_ 'lilt T:,c :c>1:? York ?irrtPS slur}?. As the date for the invasion apprnac:!cd, 7L?c New Rrpublic obtained a comprehensive account of the pr:parations for. the op ::ration, but the liberal r:1a aziac's editor-lIl-Cldef. Gilbert il::r:son, bec::n:c wary of the security I;' plicati i S and submitted it i-ior to public::{tior: to President 'r:c.::r,cti} asked that the article net be ri J':iitLd, and Harrison, a friend of the prr~si-len+, compiied. At about the same time, Ncl. York Times reporter Tz:.d Szulc uncovered :ica riy the complete story. and the Ti,ncs m:-ni p: to carry it on April 7, I;'51, under headline. But the Times pubii:;her, the late Orvil Dryfoos, and then. F:'ashington bureau cbJi_-fJa;oes Reston, both objected to the article on r.aticnal security grounds. and it s:as edited to 0:i.,,, :ate all .., mention of CIA involvement or of .ra:ni:;cnt'? invasion. The truncated story, which mentioned only that 5,000 to 6,Ga0 Cubans were being trained in the U.S. and Central America "for the liberation of Cuba," no longer merited a banner headline and was reduced to a single column on the front page. Clifton Daniel, then the paper's managing editor, later explained that Dryfoos had ordered the story toned down "above all, [out oil concern for the safety of the men who were preparing to offer their; lives or. the beaches of Cuba." Times reporter Szulc says he v:as not, consulted about the heavy editing of his article, and' he maintains that President Kennedy made a personal appeal to publisher story. Yet, less than a month after the invasion, at a meeting where he was urging newspaper editors not to print security information, Kennedy told Times' Catiedge. "if you had printed more about the Operation you would have saved us from a colossal mistake." . I he failure at the Bay Of Pigs cost CIA Director Dulles his job,. and he was succeeded in November, 1961, by John McCone.. McCone did little to revamp the agency's policies in dealing with the press. In McConc's first weeks at the agency, the Times heard that the CIA was training; Tibetans in paramilitary techniques at a base ink Colorado, but, according to David Wise's account' in The Politics of Lying (Random House), the Office of the Secretary of Defense "pleaded" that; the Tirnrs kill the story, which it did. Then in the; Cuban Missile crisis'of 1962, President Kennedy ag:+in prevailed upon the Times not to print a stow-this time, the news that Soviet missiles had been installed in Cuba-which the Times had' learned of at least a day before the Pres-' ident made his announcement to the country. In 1964, McCone was faced with the. prob'????. of how to deal with an' upcoming book about the CIA: Tl Invisible Government Mandoin house) by reporters David Wise of the Nc?iv York: herald Tribune and Thomas Ross of the Clric rr,~o.Snrr Times. Their work provided examples ofihc kind oftongh reporting; that other journalists consistently failed to do on the a rcrcy. As a result. McConc and his del,uty, Lt. Gen. ~5arshall Carter, both telephoned Random House to raise their i strong objections to publication of the book. Then, a CIA official offered to buy up the entire first printing cf over 1,000 books. Calling this action I "laugliaolc,?' Random House's president, Bennett Ccrf. agreed to sell the agency as many books as it wanted but stated that additional printings would he made for the public. The agency also ap- proached Look, which had planned to run excerpts from the book and, according to a spokesman, "asked that some changes be made-things they considered to be inaccuracies. We made a number of changes but do not consider that they were significant." When it became obvious that neit%, er Ra:ndarn douse nor Look would stop publication., the CIA started a v.hispeying campaign against the book among selected journalists. In one instance, McCone, at a party in his home, took columnist Marquis Childs aside. showed him the galleys Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CRDP77-00432R000100320001-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320001-1 (which the agency had obtained by covert means), and made derogatory comments about the book. iylcConc had misjudged his man, however, and Childs wrote a strong defense of the book in his nationally syndicated column. The CIA charged that Wise and Ross were exposing agency operations and endangering CIA employees by their disclosures. The authors' view was that no individual was mentioned in the book whose name had not already appeared in print or who was not already a public figure; that the operations described were history; and that the agency was trying to use the "national security" label to suppress legitimate criticism of the CIA. William Raborn took over the CIA in April, 1465, and was quickly subjected to a series of savage leaks aimed at discrediting him, and then to a series by the Times on the CIA. The leaks oc=curred because Raborn, a salty retired admiral, was extremely unpopular among agency professionals who spread unfavorable (and largely true) stories about him all over Washington. Perhaps the most well known was that Raborn, after listening to a briefing on the elite group that ruled Libya, asked to see the biographical file "on this fellow Oli Garchy." Obviously damaged by the publication of such tales, Raborn resigned after a little more than a year and was succeeded by his deputy, Richard Helms. In setting up the Times series, Washington bureau chief Tom Wicker talked to Helms, who promised the agency would try to cooperate. Then, according to Times reporter John Finney, the five or so newsmen who were working most actively on the story, went to CIA headquarters for a general briefing about- the agency's functions. Finney remembers there was a great deal of emphasis on the intellectual and analytical character of. the agency'and almost no mention of "dirty .tri`cks." While the series was : the White House and the State Dcpartmentwould not provide information on the subject for fear of giving the Soviets the impression that the U.S. government was behind a move to play up the threat posed by the Soviet fleet. Mullikin says that with Helms' authorization, CIA experts proved Time with virtually all the data it needed. Cor-ienting on the incident five years later, Mullik recalls, "I had the impression that the Cli't wassayirg 'the hell with the others' and. was taking p sure in sticking it in." lie never did find out exae'~Iy why Helms wanted that in"- fornation toe le out at that particular time when other govern--nt agencies did not; nor, of course, did Time's rc:ders, who did not even know that the CIA was the5aurce of much of the article which appeared one. 23, 1968. Dating back to the days of Henry Ln-mand Allen Dulles, Time had always had close re..;ons with the agency. In more recent years, the magazine's chief Washington corresponded. Hugh Sidey, relates that "with h"eCoae andOelms, we had a set-up that ivhen the magazine ti- doing something on the CIA, we went to tllcm and put it before them... We were never misled WhNeivsiceek decided in the fall of 1971 to do a covero story an Richard Helms and "The Nev. Espion.:. ." the magazine went directly to the agency for much of its information, according to a Newsweek staff member. And the article, printed on Nov. 22, gcnerally reflected the line that Helms was trying so hard to sell: that since "the latter 1960s...the focus of attention and prestige within the CIA" had switched from the Clandestine Services to the analysis of intelligence and that "the vast majority of recruits are bound for" the l Intelligence " Directorate. This was, of course. 1 s,rittcn at a time when over two-thirds of the agency's budget and personnel were devoted to covert operations and their support (roughly the same percentage as had existed for the preceding ten years). News-i'eek did uncover several previously unpublished anecdotes about past covert operations (which made the CIA look good) and published at least one completely untrue stater bent concerning a multibillion dollar technical espionage program. Assuming the facts for this statement were provided by "reliable in- tellit ence sources," it probably represented a CIA disinformation attempt designed to make the Russians believe something that simply was not accurate about U.S. technical ? collection capabilities. V-,' ie, ,,'nder Helms, the CIA has continued to intervene with editors and publishers to try to stop publication of certain books and articles which are either descriptive or critical of the agency. Early in 1972, Helms telephoned William Attwood, publisher of Newsday. According to Attwood, Helms was "unhappy" about an article submitted to his newspaper by one of the authors of this book. i For his own reasons, Att ood had already decided not to run the article, so Helm's intervention was academic. That spring proved to be a busy season for the CIA's book banners. In June, the number two man in the Clandestine Services, Cord Meyer, Jr., visited the New York of Ices of Harper and Row, Inc., which was scheduled to publish a work by Alfred McCoy called The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia, charging the agency with a certain degree of complicity in the Southeast Asian drug traffic. Meyer, whose previous literary achievements inc'. ".ided directing the funding of. several CIA subsidized publications (as well as the National Student Association), asked several old acquaintances al. erg Harper and Row's top management to provide him with a copy of the book's galley proofs. While the CIA obviously, hoped to handle the matter informally among' friends,. Harper and Row asked the agency for. official confirmation of its request. The CIA's+ general counsel, Lawrence Houston, responded! with a letter on July 5, 1972, statin, that while the agency's intervention "in no way affects the right of a publisher to decide what to publish. . .1 find it difficult to believe... that a responsible publisher would wish to be associated with an attack on our, Government involving the vicious international drug traffic without at ]east trying to ascertain the facts." McCoy objected strenuously to the request. He maintained that the CIA had "no legal right to Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIiDP77-00432R000100320001-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320001-1 review the book" and that "submitting the manuscript to the CIA for prior review is to agree- to take the first step toward abandoning the First Amendment protection against prior censorship." Harper and Row apparently disagreed and made it clear to McCoy that the book would not be published unless first submitted. Rather than find a new publisher at that late date, 1/,cCoy went along. He also gave the entire story to the press, which was generally critical of the CIA. The CIA listed its objections to Harper and Row on July 28, and in the words of the publisher's vice president and general counsel, B. Brook Thomas, the agency's criticisms "were pretty general and we found ourselves rather un- dcrwhelrned by them." Harper and Row ac- celerated its production schedule by a month and brought the book out-unchanged-in the middle of August. ' CIA officials obviously have the right to talk or not to talk to any reporter they choose. But a reporter, knowing full well that future scoops may well depend on being thought of as a "friend" of the agency, faces a powerful inducement to write stories pleasing to the CIA, which is perfectly ready to reward its friends. Besides such obvious news breaks as defector stories, selected reporters can receive "exclusives" on everything from U.S. government foreign policy to Soviet intentions. Hal Hendrix, described by three different Washington reporters as a known "friend" of the agency, won a Pulitzer prize for his 1962 reporting of the Cuban missile crisis in The Miami Daily News. Much of his "inside story" was based on CIA leaks. (This is the same Hal Hendrix who later joined ITT and sent the memo saying President Nixon had given the "green light" for covert U.S. intervention in Chile-the memo published by Jack Anderson in 1972 and not published by Charles Bartlett and Time in 1970.) Because of the CIA's adept handling of reporters, and because the personal views held by many of those reporters and their editors are sympathetic to the agency, most of the American press has at least tacitly gone along, until the last few years, with the agency view that covert operations were not a proper subject for jour- nalistic scrutiny. The credibility gap arising out of the Vietnam War however, may well have changed the attitude of many reporters. The Times' Tom Wicker credits the Vietnam ex- pcrience with making the press "more concerned with its fundamental duty." Now that most reporters have seen repeated examples of govern- ment lying, he believes, they are much less likely to accept CIA denials of involvement in covert operations at home and abroad. As Wicker points out, "lots of people today would believe that the CIA overthrows governments," and most jour- nalists no longer "believe in the sanctity of classified material." In the case of his own paper, Wicker feels that "the Pentagon Papers made the big difference." Yet as late as the spring of 1973, the Times-which with the Washington Post has championed "the public's right to know"-balked at printing an account of.... [three full lines in the manuscript are censored here]. The Times' Seymour Hersh uncovered the whole story shortly I after Martin's latest appointment as ambassador to Vietnam was *_:mounced in March, 1973, (and shortly after the Times had run a generally favorable profile of Martin). The paper's editors apparently felt that Hersh's material, although thoroughly verified, was unfair to Martin. Even when Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman J. William Fulbright asked Martin in a public hearing last May 9 whether he had l. recommended the renewal of the covert p: y meats, the Times still only printed a tiny back page article I saying that Fulbright had raised the question. Finally on May 13, at Hersh's insistence, the paper ran the whole story. he unfolding of the Watergate scandal apparently has opened the agency to increased M scrutiny. Reporters have dug deeply into the CIA's I assistance to the White House "plumbers" and the attempts to involve the agency in the Watergate cover-tip, and have drawn parallels between CIA operations overseas and the tactics used by the Nixon administration at home. Perhaps most important, the. press has largely rejected the "national security" defense used by the ' hite House to justify its actions. This, of course, is the same justi cation that the CIA has used for so many years to hide from public view, and, con- sidering the abuses which have been committed in its name, the press is now much less likely to be diverted by its invocation. Certainly, many reporters have passed the point where they consider themselves part of the government's "team." With any luck at all, maybe the American people can look for:ard to learning from the media what their government is doing-even its most secret part. 16 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320001-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320001-1 Editor: Richard Pollak Publisher: William Woodward III Designer: Samuel N. Antupit Advisory committee for this issue: Paul Cowan, Ernest Dunbar, Pamela Howard, J. Anthony Lukas, A.Kent MacDougall, Calvin Trillin, Mike Wallace. Traditionally, a new publication is launched with a Ringing Declaration of Purpose. The trouble with such noble manifestoes, however, is that you then have to live up to them. This often proven exceedingly difficult. Despite your best intentions, little old ladies from Dubuque do pick up your magazine. Or some newspaper editor (or even publisher) momentarily forgets the marble ad- monition in the lobby and gives the news partially with both fear and favor. Not surprisingly, this causes a certain embarrassment. But worse, it turns out to be quite costly as well. For, having fallen short of your R.D.P., you are forced to keep up appearances by noting your achievements in large, expensive adver. tisements on the back page of the Times and The Wall Street Journal. With luck, these advertisements will persuade your readers that at least you are doing something worthwhile. But then there's your staff. They're a pretty savvy bunch and they really know how far you are from the old R.D.P. 'So to bolster their morale, you have to give them air travel cards and thousands of pencils reminding them that they work for the world's most quoted newsweekly. Obviously, our budget will never be able to support such extravagances, so we have reluctantly put aside our own Ringing Declaration of Purpose (and a clarion call it was, too) In favor of a sentence or two on what we hope to accomplish. Our goal is to cover the New York area press-by which we mean newspapers, magazines, radio and television-with the kind of tough-mindedness we think the press should but seldom does apply to its coverage of the world. We hope to do this seriously but not without wit, fairly but not "objectively." Many of our contributors (though by no means all) will be working journalists in the city and we hope that their employers will have the common sense: to recognize that a journalist ought to be free to write about his profession without feeling his job is in jeopardy. For our part, we recognize the conflict of interest in asking a journalist to write about I his own organization and consequently have established an ironclad policy never' to commission or publish such articles. Beyond that, we would like to apologize for being so tardy. In that nether region west of the,., Hudson that the local press is so fond of disdaining, journalism reviews already exist in Philadelphia, St. Louis, Denver, Honolulu and Chicago. The Chicago Journalism Review in particular has made that city a better place for journalists to work and by following their example we hope to do the same in New York. (MORE) Volume 1, Number I is published by Rosebud Associates, Inc. Subscrip- lion rates: 1 year, $7.50; 2 years, $14.00; 3 years, $19.00. Subscription blanks appear on the back page. All subscription and other mail should be addressed to: P.O.Box2971. Grand Central Station New York, N. Y. 10017 . Copyright ?1971 by Rosebud Associates, Inc. Nothing in this publication may be reproduced in any manner, either in whole or in part, without specific written permission from the publisher. AU rights reserved. . f (CT) ML 0 I Playing the Nixon P.O.W. Game by Stuart H. Loory 3 Life in These United States by J. Anthony Lukas S Moynihan's Scholarly Tantrum by George E. Reedy Slicking Over the Oil Industry by Paul Cowart Reflections. on a Professional by David Halberstam 11 An Adventure in "the Big Cave" by Charlotte Curtis 14 Battling the Myths In Chicago by Ron Dorfman Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-R1QP77-00432R000100320001-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320001-1 WASHINGTON POST 2 April 1974 U.S. Judge Rebuffs CIA Pn Secrecy By Laurence Stern Washington Pout Staff Writer The Central Intelligence Agency has received a major setback in a court battle, to keep its cloak over its covert activities. in a ruling made public yes- terday, U.S. District Court ,Judge Albert V. Bryan Jr. held that the CIA had ex- ceeded its classification au- thority in ordering 168 dele- tions in a forthcoming book, "The CIA and the Cult of In- telligence." After having gone through the manuscript deletion-by. deletion. ,Mudge Bryan reduced the number of national secu- rity excisions to 15. On origi- nally reviewing the draft the CIA said 339 omissions would have to be made on national security grounds prior to pub. lication. I In his ruling Friday, Judge ,Bryan said the CIA had ,"failed to meet. the burden of. proving classification." The American Civil Liber- ties Union greeted Bryan's rul- Ing as having a "profound im- pact on secrecy in govern 'ment. "It is the first time that any court has ever held that the ,government's asserting certain 'material is classified is not sufficient to prove it is class- fied," said ACLU attorney Melvin L. Wulf, who partici- pated in the court arguments. The book was written by] two former government Intel- _ ligence officers, Victor L. Mar- chetti of the CIA and John D. Marks of the State Depart- ment's Office of Intelligence and Research. Both men have been out of the government since 1969. It was a case in which the government for the first time sought to exercise prior re.1 strain't on security grounds: over a manuscript written by former government employ. ees. In 1972 Judge Bryan upheld the. right of the CIA to prior review of the Marchetti manu- script, which at that time had not yet been written. When the book was finished, with the assistance of Marks, It was submitted to the agency for clearance and came back in September, 1973, with the original 339 deletions. 1 '-Marchetti, Marks and the l publisher, Alfred A. Knopf Inc., challenged the ciassifica. tion actions in a countersuit during which Judge Bryan heard testimony In a closed courtroom from CIA Director William E. Colby and his four top deputies.' received a bomb threat two week his own probe of the days following the Water- McCord papers-burning in- gate break-in. cident produced no evri- "We had had a near dis- dente that the CIA was in- astrous fire at night ,two volved or that anything sig- years before while the farm- nificant was destroyed. ly waw asleep ... When I McCord, who helped blow heard of the June 19th, 1972, ' the lid off the Watergate, bomb call, I advised my cover-up a year ago with a wife to dispose of newspa- letter to U.S. District Judge pers and other fire ha-iards John J. Sirica, has repeat- in the house which a fire edly accused the White bomb could easily ignite,"- House and its supporters of McCord said. trying to dump the blame for Watergate on the CIA. McCORD SAID "no clas- In his letter yesterday, sified papers" nor other McCbrd called Baker "a "sensitive documents" Joe McCarthy of the 1970s, were destroyed. Nor did he and said that "from the be- ever attempt to conceal his ' ginning of the (Watergate), CIA background, McCord hearings, Sen. Baker tried' said, noting he had told po- to drage the CIA in for the lice about it the day he was purpose of creating a di- arrested at the Watergate. version.". Rep. Lucien Nedzi, D- "CIA was the victim of ' Mich., chairman of the the President's efforts to House Intelligence subcom- cover up, not the culprit," mittee, said earlier this McCord said. WASHINGTON POST 4 April 1974 artel. Votes o Release CIA-Report, The Senate select Water- sate committee voted yester- 'day to declassify and release `p report prepared by its vice iI hairman, 'ben. Howard H. aker Jr. (R-Tenn.), concern- g the possible Involvement the Central Intelligence gency in the Watergate af. ir. The committee, meeting closed session, voted to of secrecy did not violate their' First Amendment rights. The CIA declined yesterday to comment on the decision.` But the decision, if left stand-. ing, could strip away sanctions; of secrecy covering many. operations it ' is seeking to keep out of'the'public domain. CIA Director Colby has indi-. ,cated that'he has drafted leg islation which would provide, explicit congressional sanc- tions and stiffer penalties to, buttress the agency's system of, classification should the isk the CIA to declassify a +umber of documents and ther materials that Baker as collected as part of his $nquiry. Chief committee 'ounsel. Samuel Dash and ,nu Inority conmel tared hompson wcrc asked- by the committee to work out actails with the CIA. ki In addition, the committee doted to invite former ape-' Eeial presidential counsel thacles W. Colson to testify t, cforc it. Colson appeared rpcforc the committee Sept.. A9 but invoked the Fifth ~Amcndment when ques- cioned under oath on the rounds that he was a target f a federal grand jury M. estigation. The final result was the Fri- whether, their respective oaths lease be lost in court. Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R00010U 20001-1 WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS Washington, D. C., Thursday, March 28, 1974 C/A MALIGNING CHARGED MCCOrd HItS 0=--%ker Probe Convicted Watergate con- spirator James W. McCord Jr. has accused Sen. How- ard H. Baker Jr., R-Tcnn., of "seeking to create a di- version for the President" by "maligning" the Central Intelligence Agency. , In a letter yesterday to all seven members of the Sen- ate Watergate Committee, McCord bitterly attacked a probe into the CIA role in the Watergate case which has been conducted by Bak- er, the committee's vice chairman. In his three-paged, single- spaced letter, McCord blam- ed Baker for recent news accounts reporting that Mc-. Cord's wife and a retired' CIA friend of his had burned' various papers and other materials at his house with- in days of the June 17, 1972, break-in. THE FIRST news story, published by the Knight ' chain earlier this week, said a CIA agent had been "dis- patched" to McCord's home to "burn anything linking, him With the CIA." McCord, who served 20 years with the CIA before. retiring in 1971, said the "agent" was actually an 80- year-old personal. friend who once had CIA ties. The man was "not sent" by anyone, McCord said, but merely happened to stop by at a time when McCord's wife was burning old news- papers and some other "fire hazards." McCord said he had in- structed his wife to burn the materials after the family 'day ruling which held, In es- sence, that a fact could not be classified simply by a CIA of- ficial declaring It'to be so. Judge Bryan said that the decisions on' what was classi- fied in the 'manuscript by each CIA deputy director seem "to have been, made on an ad hoc basis as he viewed the manu- script, founded on his belief, at that time, that a particular. Item contained classifiable In- formation which ? ought to be' classified." / The judge said that the gov- ernment should have' been, able to produce documents or evidence of other affirmative . actions to demonstrate that. material in the CIA book was, in fact, classified.' ? ; Both the government and, the authors hake a basis for' appeal, The CIA will presuma-; bly seek to again make the, omissions It ordered in the' manuscript. The authors may, ask to reopen the question of- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320001-1* r -~-- .-` rJ ?l-L'r? Rowcland.Evans and Robert Novak Sen. Baker and the CIA ? Sen. Howard Baker's fruitless inves ident contended he feared investiga- tigntion of gossamer links between the tion would uncover super-secret CIA Watergate scandal and the Central In- operations. If Baker developed even telligence Agency (CIA) seems un- tangential CIA connections with likely to help President Nixon but Watergate, Mr. Nixon would obviously threatens serious damage to the no- look better. tion's beleaguered foreign Intelligence Working toward that end, Baker late. operation. - last October noted a Harper's. maga- Despite accumulating newspaper tine article by Andrew St. George leaks and Baker's hints of knowing, ?,,nthat Helms had burglary. much more than he can tell, Watergate knowledge of the Watergate is not about to be blamed on the CIA, Baker eagerly dispatched the article to in part or in whole. Under close exami- nation. the leaks turn out to be red herrings. Objective investigators are positive there was no CIA role 18 Watergate. But conservative Republican Baker, Ironically, sounds ever more like left- leaning critics of the CIA who com- plain that senators linked too closely ... to the agency never do adequately probe Its inner recesses. What's more, the flood of innuendo seemingly origi- nating from Baker's investigation fur- ther erodes the CIA's tattered morale and prestige. Baker's motives are as shrouded as his overall Watergate performance. As senior Republican on the Senate Watergate Committee during last sum- mer's televised hearings, he achieved Instant fame. But the image of objec- tivity that made him a TV idol infuri- ated the White House and party regu- lars. Baker, a party man and a Nixon man, began hedging his bets in mid- summer. That was apparent Aug. 2 when Richard Helms, former CIA director, returned from his post as ambassador to Iran to testify bgfore the Watergate committee, Many senators believed the ? nous.CIA role in Watergate (though, highly respected Helms had been bounced from i he CIA for refusing to take the Water ate rap. But Baker was surprisingly hostile, his questions pre- saging his future investigation. Baker has heatedly denied that this course was dictated by senior White House aides. Even so, his actions were obviously designed to help Mr. Nixon. In explaining his conduct immediately after the Watergate burglary, the Pres- "Underclose examination the leaks turn out to be red herrings. Objective investigators are positive there was no` CIA role in Watergate." Sen. Stuart Symington of Missouri, acting chairman of the CIA oversite subcommittee. St. George, a journalis- tic swashbuckler, was summoned to Washington for a closed-door session. The verdic`.: he knew nothing. But Baker relied on more than flam- boyant journalism. The Watergate committee's minority staff, concentrat- ing on the CIA, has produced a class!-. fied report. Insinuating more than ac- cusing, It is the mother lode for pub-. . publicly, Baker, affirms Helm's innocence). The Watergate committee majority staff regards the report as next to use- less. Rep. Lucien Nedzi, of Michigan, ranking CIA expert in Congress, be- lieves there is no reason to change the Oct. 23 finding of his House subcom- mittee giving the CIA a clean bill of health. Federal porsecutors have found no CIA role In the conspiracy. Pub- The Wntihhlg tou I3 {eirry Go $?ull d ter JiT~f /0 a It e ~ ob"QftAe,,4&D-* Re ,lack An!!J6'rson? The Watergate has claimed a major victim in the Central In- telligence Agency with the 'forced retirement of its dedi- cated director of security, How- ard Osborn. A veteran of 26 years at the cloak-and-dagger complex. the 56-year-old Osborn was caught up in the suppression of a mys- terious CIA memo that de- scribed how documents were burned at the home of Water- bugger James McCord; an ex- CIA agent. The secret memo was based on information supplied by a former FRI inspector, Lee Pen- paid "consultant." Pennington, an old family friend of the'Mc- Cords', had visited Mrs. McCord after her husband was arrested inside Democratic National'( Committee headquarters in June; 1972. He found her burn- ing papers and documents. Ear- lier, she had burned typewriter ribbons. Pennington loyally reported the episode to his CIA bosses, and the CIA wrote it up in memo form. For more than a year and a half, it lay in the CIA files like a paper bomb. - Meanwhile, FBI sleuths were lished charges of such a role have all turned into red herrings. . Thus, recent newspaper accounts of ? internal tapes destroyed by helms in his last CIA days become hollow when it is learned they were unrelated to Watergate. Nor is - there factual grounding for insinuations, fostered by Baker, that prize-winning Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward was given Watergate information in return for steering clear of the CIA. The most recent red herring: a Chicago Tribune story, reflecting the Baker report, that a CIA agent was sent to Watergate burglar James McCord's house shortly after the burglary to destroy docu- ments linking him with the CIA; in truth, a CIA informant joined Mc- Cord's wife in burning his papers. Baker has been subjected to puzzled scrutiny by Senate colleagues, not only for his insinuations but for the way he conducts his investigation. When Helms was summoned from Teheran yet again last month, he faced in- tensely hostile closed-door questioning by Baker. The use of ex-White House aide Charles Colson, indicted In the Watergate conspiracy, as a major source of information in Baker's CIA investigation, is subject to criticism. Moreover, the investigation is begin- ning to echo old complaints from Sen- ?ate super-doves such as Sen. J. W. Ful- . bright of Arkansas: The CIA Is permit- ted to run wild by Symington and other Senate protectors. Adding con- servative Baker to the Fulbright camp further endangers the future of this vi- tal agency: When Baker on CBS's "Face the Na- tion" last Sunday declared "there's a great wealth of information" coming from his investigation (though he could not say what), his real message to the House could be: don't push too hard on impeachment because I am raising lethal new questions about the CIA. Actually, Mr. Nixon's problems seem too acute for Baker's warning to matter much. However he may hurt the CIA, Howard Baker can scarcely help the President. 0 1974, Field Enterprises, Inc. THE. WASHINGTON POST Tueeday,April 2, 1974 oast. from the CIA. -finally, Senate Watergate cutors, know ahout the memo. Nedzi, after full hearings with Pennington, McCord and CIA of- ficials including Osborn, con- cluded that the CIA had not dis- patched Pennington to burn the papers, as the memo seemed to `suggest. Osborn claimed that he had not even known of the memo. Nevertheless, Nedzi and Colby were both worried about the cover-up. "It led to the early retirement of Osborn," Nedzi told us. When we reached the ex-CIA security boss at his home near the agency he had served so long, he clung to his oath of secrecy. "Iliad punned for over a year to retire in June," Osborn in- ,ommittee vice chairman How- ard H. Baker Jr. (R-Tenn.) began snooping into the CIA role in the cover-up, and a middle-level CIA employee who knew of the hidden memo threatened to blow the whistle. After some debate, CIA Direc- tor William Colby was told of the suppressed memo and he quickly contacted Rep. Lucien Nedzi (D-Mich.), chairman of a House intelligence subcommit- tee. They agreed that the best about whether the CIA knew of sional committees involved in ddestrooyed documents fromtheWaterrgatteprobe, aswellas f~ ~p ~(,~ J~gg~tepl~, Se lnington, then with Fi rOVed'ror"retease1AP/ r i0 nd CIH-KUF'/ /- 'd ~P'ft ~ IUO~ iL~, 459 , - realized there was no ,,. la benefit to staying and 11 19 decided to retire . .." Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320001-1 11 -4 ILI 14:111. DR. KISSINGER'S latest trip to Moscow established that Russians, scarcely less than Americans, are Preoccupied by the ways in which President Nixon's domestic vulnerability may touch his foreign policy. Most directly, they wish to know if Mr. Nixon is politically competent to make and carry out agreements with them. Too, they no doubt wonder whether his weakness may' soften him for agreements he otherwise might reject, or push 'him'to drop detente 'for the sake of a ranks-closing" appeal to anti-communism. In brief, the prospects of detente, already made uncertain enough by the course of "normal" events, have been rendered even more un- leertain by the question mark hanging over the authority, mood and tenure of Richard Nixon. This unhappy new fact in East-West affairs has impli- cations for the conduct of policy. But before addressing these, we would draw an anticipatory bead on a.trouble- some contention that could well soon be raised in the 1'resident's impeachment defense. We mean the charge }fiat, the impeachment process Is subverting the Presi- dent's effort to build a "structure of peace." It would follow either that the impeachment drive should be set aside or that those who are pressing it, rather than Mr. 'Nixon, should be blamed for 'untoward consequences. that, might ensue. Presumably this contention would be Made only if the President felt himself in special duress, for. a crucial part of his diplomacy, as of his political defense, is to demonstrate that,his' capacity to govern has not been impaired. But the possibility is there, per- haps no further away than his next party rally. For a President long given to appeals for sacrifices and short- cuts in 'the name of "national security," it cannot be di's- tiiissed. go it needs to be said categorically that nothing and no one is undermining Richard Nixon's foreign policy but Richard Nixon. It is not his policy critics or political rivals or "the media" but his own deeds, or lack of them- his omissions as well as his commissions-which have . brought his presidency to such low estate. The first Watergate, disclosures were made almost two years ago.' :Since then Mr. Nixon has employed virtually every political device, legal strategem and delaying maneuver Imaginable to keep the relevant information from flow- ing to the appropriate bodies established to review it, tq .investigate charges, and to prosecute possible wrong= doing. If his diplomacy is now laboring under heavy; handicap, it is because Mr. Nixon -himself made impos- pibZe the prompt resolution of issues which could only. be resolved promptly by his cooperation.' The single 'reason why an impeachment and a summit must now be'mentioned in the same (breath is that the President for his own, reasons has refused to confront the challenge to his presidency decisively and forthrightly so that he could get on with the essential business of foreign affairs. ,,Tip Moscow summit, still scheduled for June, focuses the issue mercilessly. Impeachment proceedings may be well along by then, ' imposing upon Mr. Nixon harsh ressures either to play it too soft on the Russians, or too hard. We do not say ' Mr. Nixon will fall into one or another of these traps, but they are there. As long as his authority is uncertain, so will be public confidence in his performance in the summit crucible. For it is not only the substance of the negotiating position that must be well prepared before a summit. The 'integrity and solidity of the negotiator are equally vital pre-conditions th success. We understand why the President would not want to cancel out, if only because that would demon- 20 WASHINGTON' POST Susdny,Mnrch81.1974 Imveachment and Swnrnitr I a" strate incapacity. but he--and we-cannot avoid paying a price in the pressure his predicament puts him under, If he goes through with it. The more substantive problem is, of course, that de- tente is wobbling. Moscow's Mideast policy and its missile testing have led many Americans to question the depth of the Soviet commitment to better relations-or at least the conmitment to appreciably better relations any time soon. The slim results and somber accounts of Dr. Kis- singer's Moscow sojourn should probably be read in the context of the developing pre-summit bargaining posi- tions of both sides, but They hardly make one sanguine. Moreover, the Presiaent's political condition puts before the Russians the temptation to try to squeeze out short- range advantage, though they must-or should-know that nothing could more quickly unite Americans around the President than the appearance of such a gambit by Moscow. It should be noted, however; that the congres- sional attitude on linking trade with emigration and Mr. Nixon's own defense programs may well have induced some Russians to question the American commitment to detente, as the Russians see it. Overall, this is not the time for large and final conclusions about detente. It is enough to say that the issues on the agenda for Mr. Nix- on's third summit with the Soviets-control of offensive strategic arms, European security, and the Mideast, in particular are excruciatingly difficult. They would tax' the most conscientious and least distracted statesmen in the best of times. In pondering these difficulties, one cannot, blink the fact that this is the worst of times for the President to be heading to Moscow counting heavily on the nation's . .trust. That is part of the cost of Watergate. It forces upon Mr. -Nixon, we believe, three special requirements, if -he is to make of his diplomacy the effective instrument which all Americans would like it to be. First, he must vigorously spread as much information as possible, about the diplomatic steps he contemplates. Some things cannot be told--everyone understands that.' But in his administration there has never been a time when -a steady flow of information was more important: to offset the mistrust arising from Watergate; to give people some greater measure of assurance about a man in Mr. Nixon's' adverse position being at the negotiating table with a hard and sharp adversary. It is not enough for the public to see Dr. Kissinger give another of his expert briefings. It is Mr. Nixon who inspires unease and ;it'is he personally who must minister to it. Then, the President would be well advised 'to stop playing politics with foreign policy. Ile must stop stand,- ing up before hand-picked audiences and giving self- serving plugs for his own statescraft. Such appearances only feed an already pervasive public tendency to ques- tion his motives-which is the last thing his diplomacy, or his politics, needs. He does not encourage people to believe he is acting in the national interest by giving the impression that he is acting in his personal interest. The President may feel that foreign policy is his best defense against impeach- ment-and it well may be at this stage. But his diplomacy ivould be an even better defense if it were plainly being conducted in a disinterested way. Finally, the President cannot lay off upon 'those trying to impeach him the blame for any disabilities which may weaken his effectiveness to conduct foreign policy. For those he has only himself to blame. And for their remedy he must look to means other than diplomacy. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320001-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320001-1 NEW YORK TIMES 29 March 1974 Specter of Watergate at U.S.-Soviet Talks spondents traveling with Mr. By HEDRICK SMITH Kissinger about the likelihood Special to The New York Times of impeachment proceedings MOSCOW, March 28 - For against the President. In their the first time in two years, the private comments, they showed Watergate affair has had some new respect for the power and discernible impact on important autonomy of Congress. , Soviet-American negotiations. The Watergate factor waO During Secretaryof State Kis- undoubtedly one reason for singer's talks talks the disappointing results of the News here with Leonid Brezhnev-Kissinger talks.' For 1. Brezhnev, each ~ Mr. Kissinger came here with Analysis side went out of a weak negotiating hand and. its way to assure the Soviet leadershiR obviously the other that despite Mr. felt no compulsion to rush to- Nixon's Watergate troubles, it was still committed to im proving relations, regardless of personalities. The very need to make such commitments in public, through the ritualistic language of toasts and communiques sug- gested how much Watergate and Mr. Nixon's personal future are now on Moscow's mind as well as Washington's. Officially the final com- 1munique announced that both sides would push ahead with ? preparations for the visit of! well wonder whether Mr. Nix-I on would be able to persuade Icrete results he had sought. to which Moscow might ulti-I mately agree. Again, reason tol pause to see how the power' struggle over the Presidency is resolved. With Marshal Andrei A. Grechko, the? Soviet Defense Minister, now in the Politburo, Mr. Brezhnev must apparently move more carefully on the arms issue. Marshal Grechko's rapid return home from a visit to Iraq pointed up his impor- tance in the exchanges with Mr. ward compromise with aweak- Kissinger. . Rather consistently in the ened Administration. last three months, the 70- The tables have, turned draw (year-old marshal has taken a matically since the spring 'of more wary public stance on im- 1972 when Mr. Nixon's first proving relations than other top One implication is that the Kremlin hopes a more cordial mood with Washington, after obvious recent strains, may en= courage Congress to liberalize the terms of trade with the Soviet Union. As if recognizing Mr. Nix- on's impotence to move Corp gress on the trade issue, the Soviet leadership reportedly of- ferd some slight flexibiliy on the Jewish emigration ?ques- tion, presumably to see whe*-' ther Congress could be swayed. A Waiting Game But the Kremlin seems in- clined to wait to see what hap- pens on the bread-and-butter, issue of lower tariffs and big-' gar credits before striking any, Presidential visit was being eaders and has stressed thel major new deals with Presi- prepared. Then, the Russians need to push ahead withdent Nixon, perhaps with the strengthening of the Soviet thought that the pressures of knew privately that they were arsenal. He was invited to Mr. the next weeks may make 'his headed for a disastrous tar- Kissinger's luncheon yesterday own terms softer. vest and that they needed both but, along with a few other Once again, the Watergate American wheat and an arms (Soviet officials, did not attend. affair and Mr. Nixon's low agreement to signal formally Tonight, however American of- popularity ratings at home may to the world that the United ficiais said they attached "no have an impact on a kind of States accepted the Soviet Un- special significance" to.his ab-1Ideadline diplomacy by Mos- ? ' . Bence. cow. One theory here is that . as a nuclear equal ion . , ? This spring, Mr. Kissinger Despite the Kremlin's unveil- the Kremlin believes Mr. arrived not only with his Presi- lingness to make concessions Nixon will be ready to pay a hj h rice for a successful President Nixon. to Moscow.. dent trying to hold Cngress But ' at a Soviet reception for American correspondents, one Soviet official kiddingly asked an American journalist, "Are you looking forward to the visit of President Ford? Such jocular irreverence would have been unthinkable for Moscow a few months ago. Other Soviet officials were particularly keen to probe and question the Washington corre- lantic alliance. rent with fun- damental divisions'. ? This situa- tion undercut any chance. for him to act as interlocutor with Moscow for the divided West on such major East-West is- sues as reductions of military forces 'in the 'center of Eu- rope or terms for a European security conference. On arms limitations, Moscow knows that the Nixon Adminis- tration is divided and may WASHINGTON POST 2 April 1974 Victor Zorza Grechko-' Brezhnev Quarrel A last-minute piece of evidence which became available In Washington after Dr. Ilenty Kissinger had left for Moscow might have stopped him from making a fool of himself=but it was .not passed on to him in time. The evidence, the most authoritative statement of the Kremlin hardliners' position to appear for some time, made now insisting, in opposition to a line taken in the Soviet press by writers pushing lirezhnev's detente policy, that Lenin's formula that war was l.he continuation of politics was "to this very day" the key to strategic policy.. - ., The pro Brezhnev writers had ar- gued, although circumspectly, that 'the formula had become obsolete. They maintained that military strength alone would not ensure peace, and that the Soviet Union should seek the best political-rather than purely military -means to restrain the U.S. arms buildup. ? . Grechko drew the opposite conclu- *sion from Lenin's formula. The oiity reason the "imperialists" had not launched a war so far, he argued, Was the Soviet Union's military power, -and continued peace could therefore be as- sured only by an even greater "strengthening" of Soviet defense might. Coming on the eve of Kissing-, er's visit to negotiate an arms limita- tion agreement, this was a dcmand'to the Politburo by the military to resist his blandishments. , visit. But while some government ana- dently keyed to Kissinger's visit, par- While this assessment of the lysts In Washington now claim to have ticularly to the SALT negotiations, be. , Grechko message could be made usilig recognized It as such, and to have gan to raise doubts even among some the tools of Kremlinology, the reason urged that It be Ben Q[;,~A l t~j tteof, what he was rc~ o /~ce! -~9 04 It li# ' `~`~1dtfl;h to UN. pol- other officials thougl tCA~ fi r t~Re rev-W was irrelevant. 21 icy-makers may be found only by rising on the hard, practical issues, 'vigil, indicate a willingness to the Soviet leadership quite de- compromisa, and send Mr. liberately chose Mr. Kissinger's cimpr m back and Moscow for visit to take the recent chill off Soviet-American relations more negotiating. and to warm up the atm:os- The deliberately downbeat assessment of the talks in Mr. Kissinger's party as he flew phSoviet officials from Mr. Brezhnev on down fairly home ould be intended t& exuded good-fellowship and op- belie such a Soviet view, by timism during Mr.... Kissinger's signaling that the Administra- brier stay, though they let him tion was prepared to forgo go home without the ' crucial success when Mr. Nixon came negotiating breakthrough ' on to Moscow rather than make farms control or the other con-' unacceptable compromises. i Kissinger was thus allowed to go ahead to make -a series of headiitle- catching oi,timistic forecasts about his Moscow visit. It is in the light of these `forecasts that the visit seems to be an even greater flop than it really was.. The clue to the situation in ,the -Kremlin came in an article by Defense Minister Andrei Grechko in the lead-? .ing Soviet party journal, Kommunist. In the Washington "intelligence com- munity," there has always been isa- greement about the relationship". be- tween Grechko and party secretary Brezhnev, and the effect of this rela- tionship on Kremlin policy-making. , . Intelligence analyses of the Soviet leaders' statements made 'in advance of Kissinger's trip noted a January, speech in which Grechko seemed. to take a somewhat harder line than Brezhnev, but no undue importance was attached to this at the time. The Washington -Intelligence "consensus" has been based for some years on the,. unshakable belief that Brezhnev and Grechko are as thick as thieves. - But the latest Grechko article -evi. Approved For Release 2001/08/0 ~f~DP77-00432R000100320001-1 the even more esoteric arts of Wash- In The Washington Post are read as ?'ingtonology. Hardliners in the Wash- assiduously by the Kremlin's Washfng- ington establishment have long been tonologists as Pravda is by Kremlin- concerned to play down any impr s- ai n that Brezhnev and Grechko mi' ts. A Washington column by'; a at odds. They feared that any, ac- ' writer generally regarded as being',oa knpwledgement of the conflict , bq- the extreme right dismissed talk of' twQen the two could be used to r e. Brezhnev"Grechko rift as "barrels' of the' White House to offer Brezhnev the hogwash of al persuasion columnist n d more lib. con~essious he might need to keep eral per maintained that 'the Grechko at bay. "overwhelming evidence" derived fro" e6h a recent intelligence analysls-show- T~e tool of Washington In. Ing that all Soviet leaders line up be- fighting is tha leak, and in the weeks hind Brezhnev-suggested that they preceding the Kissinger visit coluln- were eager to cut a deal with Kis- nists, were offered rare peeks into .se. singer during his Moscow visit. cret intelligence analyses whicl