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March 22, 1974
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/77f Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432*R0001003200024 TIME, MARCH 25, 1974 P s Richard Nixon is rapidly running out of options in his struggle to survive Watergate. Last week he exercised a fresh one. Pushing his Special Counsel James St. Clair out front in a political as well as a legal role, Nixon embarked on a drive to save himself by appealing directly to the public and assailing the tactics of the House Judiciary Commit- tee, which is investigating his conduct in office. It was much too early to as- sess public reaction, but the impact on the House of Representatives was im- mediate. The tactic backfired, and im- peachment sentiment rose. As both the President and St. Clair, a shrewd and highly successful Boston trial lawyer, moved boldly into the pub- lic arena, the outlines of the three- pronged White House offensive were sharply etched. The strategy seeks to: 1) Goad the House Judiciary Com- mittee into hastily subpoenaing presi- dential tapes and documents and bas- ing its enure impeachment case on a contempt of Congress citation against Nixon for 6bstructing the impeachment inquiry if, as he has so far, he refuses to yield the evidence. Nixon apparently be- lieves that such a charge would be too thin to enlist broad public support and that even if impeached by the House on that charge. he could muster the 34 votes necessary in a Senate trial to re- tain his office. 2) Delay any broader impeachment moNe by stalling in the delivery of re- quested evidence, continuing to raise legal technicalities, and resorting to time-consurning court action. Delay could erode public imerest in the whole sordid scandal. Stalling could also push the crucial impeachment vote closer to the November elections?thus making it more risky for any incumbent Con- gressman--and perhaps even cause the problem to be carried over into the next session of Congress. 3) Solidify the President's hard-core support and play on the more general public fear of forcibly removing any President from office. This is being done through a public relations campaign de- signed to highlight the President's achievements in office and the sanctity of the presidency itself. At the same time the effort seeks to obfuscate and obscure Nixon's own Watergate role and por- tray impeachment as a partisan move- ment spearheaded by political enemies. At a minimum, the aim is to build enough pressure on normally friendly Senators to prevent conviction on any House-approved impeachment charge. Most of this strategy was probably devised by Nixon himself, but it has both come together and reached its peak since St. Clair became his chief legal strategist early in January. Not only is Nixon being scrutinized by the Judicia- ry Committee but, more important, he is on trial in the court of public opinion. At long last he has a lawyer who?un- like his previous counsel?is a seasoned courtroom attorney. Moreover, St. Clair's Washington experience (see box page 12) goes back to the classic Army- McCarthy hearings of 1954, when he was an assistant to Joseph N. Welch, C'OT the Army's counsel. A poised and suave performer, he has brought an aura of ag- gressive confidence to Nixon's defense campaign. "Jim has been a bonanza for us," observes Alexander Haig, Nixon's overworked chief of staff. Haig describes St. Clair as a man who has "consider- able acumen" in the highly charged and shifting political atmosphere of Water- gate. "He intuitively understands the needs of the President." Last week the President carried his public relations drive both North and South. In Nashville, he helped open the $15 million home of the Grand Ole Opry. As 4,400 country music fans ap- plauded, Nixon said that their kind of music "radiates the love of this nation --patriotism." He flubbed an attempt at spinning a Yo-Yo given him by Coun- try Music Star Roy Acuff and played God Bless America and Happy Birthday on the piano to honor his wife Pat, just back from South America, on her 62nd birthday. In a relaxed evening, there was no talk of his Watergate agony. The President- was garrulous and high-spirited the day before on a visit to Chicago, where he made his first pub- lic appearance outside Washington or the South since July, 1973. He easily handled soft questions from a largely friendly gathering of some 2,000 mem- bers and guests of the Executives' Club of Chicago. He implied that he will not comply with the Judiciary Committee's request for White House tapes and doc- uments beyond'. those already turned over to Special Prosecutor Leon Jawor- ski. With much exaggeration, Nixon complained that the committee wanted "all of the tapes of every presidential conversation?a fishing license or a complete right to go through all of the presidential files." He said that "it isn't the question that the President has something to hide." But to let anyone "just come in and paw through the doc- uments," he contended, would destroy "the principle of confidentiality" be- tween a President and his advisers. Nixon was even more forceful in vowing once again that he would not re- sign. "Resignation is an easy cop-out," he declared, adopting his frequent rhe- torical device of posing an artificially easy-or-tough choice. "But resignation of this President on charges of which he is not guilty simply because he hap- pened to be low in the polls would for- ever change our form of government. It would lead to weak and unstable pres- idencies in the future, and I will not be a party to the destruction of the pres- idency of the United States." Third Version. Only when he dis- cussed a detail of his own Watergate role did Nixon's confidence seem to ebb. His voice grew tremulous as he described his increasingly crucial conversation with John Dean, his former counsel, on March 21, 1973. In a statement last Aug. 15, Nixon said Dean had told him that secret payments had been made to the original Watergate defendants only to meet their legal costs. On March 6 of this year, however, Nixon said flatly in a press conference that Dean had told him on March 21 that the cash was meant to buy the silence of the lowly bur- glars?which Nixon admitted was a criminal act. After a week of silence on the topic, Nixon made an attempt to bridge that direct conflict and it was a lame one. Dean, he said, had just "al- leged" that the money was used to keep the men quiet. This third Nixon ver- sion of Ole conversation was meant to clear him of any charge that he had known of a crime and done nothing about it. The main question of the impeach- ment inquiry, of course, is whether Nixon not only knew of such acts but participated in them as part of a con- spiracy to conceal the origins of the June 17, 1972 wiretapping and burglary of Democratic national headquarters. An event that could illuminate that fateful matter?and possibly blunt the entire - Nixon counterattack?was scheduled to take place this week in the Washington courtroom of Federal Judge John J. Si- rica. He was to rule that a Watergate grand jury report and a briefcase full of evidence relating to Nixon's own role in that conspiracy will be given to the House Judiciary Committee, headed by New Jersey Democrat Peter Rodino. Factual Findings. The grand jury package, given to Judge Sirica on March 1, when the jurors also indicted seven of Nixon's former official and political associates in the cover-up conspiracy, does not draw conclusions as to wheth- er Nixon acted illegally. But a summa- ry of the evidence in the briefcase lists a series of factual findings by the grand jury that do implicate Nixon in the wrongdoing of his aides. Any such trans- mission of the evidence to the House by Sirica is .likely to be appealed. John J. Wilson, the attorney representing two of the indicted conspirators, H.R. Hal- deman and John Ehrlichman, has vowed to appeal. The delicate way in which the White House has been handling the grand jury report shows the deft touch of St. Clair. He surprised many Washington,lawyers by raising no objection at all to the idea of Sirica's sending the report to the Ro- dino committee when the judge held an extraordinary hearing on the question on March 6. To oppose this move would make it appear that the President feared a revealing of the contents of the brief- case. But St. Clair well knew that Wil- son, whose clients' interests in many re- spects dovetail with those of Nixon, would fight to squelch the grand jury's findings. Wilson promptly raised objec- tions on the grounds that 1) the grand jury had no power to make such a re- port, and 2) the documents were likely to mention Haldeman and Ehrlichman, and any public disclosure could preju- dice their chances for a fair trial. While Wilson carries on the legal battle over the grand jury report, the President and his staff are expected to continue their public psychological war- fare against Watergate. That attack last week was well orchestrated. First. Ken Clawson, the White House director of communications, leaked to reporters a Feb. 25 letter from John Doar, chief counsel for the Rodino committee, to St. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RI1P77-00432R000100320002-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0 Clair. It showed that Doar was seeking not only six additional Nixon tapes, as generally believed?even by members of the committee?but also tapes covering six periods of time, from February to April 1973. Presidential Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler said that this involved 42 tapes. The White House disclosure made the Doar request look excessive, though it by no means supported St. Clair's claim that the committee seemed to want "hundreds of thousands of doc- uments and thousands of hours of re- corded conversations." The main aim of those White House revelations, however, seemed to be to try to drive a wedge between the Ro- din() committee's members and its staff, including Doar and the Republican counsel Albert Jenner. In an effort to prevent news leaks?as urgently de- manded by the White House?Doar and Jenner had been keeping only the com- mittee leaders, Rodino and ranking Re- publican Edward Hutchinson, posted on all details of their dealings with St. Clair. Clawson charged that Doar had tried to "hoodwink" the committee by keep- ing from the other members the extent of his request. Press Secretary Ziegler also assailed the Doar request. "The mere fact of an impeachment inquiry does not give Con- gress the right to back up a truck and haul off White House files," he told newsmen. Moreover, Ziegler said that for Nixon to comply with another Doar request?that the committee staff be giv- en access to the White House files of such former Nixon aides as Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Dean and Charles Colson ?would be "constitutionally irrespon- sible." Presidential Counsellor Bryce Harlow later protested to reporters that the Rodino committee members were acting like "children who are asking for another helping before they have eaten what's on their plate." The surprise in the White House campaign was St. Clair's sudden emer- gence in public and his accessibility to reporters. Until recently, he had been operating mainly in private. He had bar- gained skillfully and sternly with Spe- cial Prosecutor Jaworski over which White House tapes and documents the grand jury could be given. St. Clair had spoken out publicly on only a few oc- casions. On Feb. 4 he attacked the cred- ibility of John Dean and criticized Ja- worski for publicly defending Dean's veracity. As a result, Jaworski privately scolded St. Clair for "unprofessional conduct," and their cordial but correct relationship cooled. Legal Views. In his major court- room appearance in Nixon's behalf, St. Clair on Jan. 16 tried to shake the tes- timony of a panel of court-appointed acoustics and recording experts in a hearing before Sirica. The panel claimed that an l8-minute erasure in one key Nixon tape in all likelihood had been de- liberate rather than accidental. Though St. Clair, with his assured courtroom manner, was far more effective than such predecessors as the docile Fred Bu- zhardt and the ill-at-ease Leonard Gar- ment, he made little headway against the experts. Sirica found St. Clair's ques- tions repetitive and tedious and finally cut him off. In last week's flurry of activity, St. Clair expressed highly controversial le- gal views in two television interviews and several talks with reporters. He said that because Nixon was the nation's "chief law enforcement officer," he had not committed any crime in failing to re- port the hush-money payments. This was an effort to account for the fact that Nixon, by his own explanation early this month, had not reported Dean's hush- money confession (made at the March 21, 1973 meeting) to any law-enforce- ment agency or court. St. Clair also said that the charge in the indictment that a payment of hush money had been made on March 21 was doubtful. His reason: "sworn testimony" at the Senate Watergate hearings includ- ed no similar charge. He further con- tended that Dean could no longer be used as a credible prosecution witness because a tape showed that a conver- sation with Nixon that Dean thought took place on March 13, 1973, actually occurred on March 21. More broadly, St. Clair argued that the Rodino committee must determine just what kinds of presidential acts it considers impeachable before it seeks more evidence. He also claimed that he was not actually engaged in defending Richard Nixon, but in representing "the office of the presidency." None of those statements could withstand sharp legal scrutiny. Their shrewd purpose, however, seemed to be multiple-edged. They served to chal- lenge and fuzz up the indictment's strong implication that, at the least, Nixon had learned from Dean on March 21 of the illegal payoffs to defendants and had failed to cut them off. St. Clair's remarks sought to set the Rodino committee members off on a potentially divisive squabble over defining impeachable acts ?a point on which St. Clair knows the Congressmen hold sharp differences. St. Clair was trying to strengthen Nix- on's oft-repeated claim that the institu- tion of his office, rather than his per- sonal fate, was the overriding issue in the impeachment controversy. The new White House offensive was backfiring in its attempt to trigger pre- cipitate and self-defeating action by the Judiciary Committee to impeach the President solely on grounds of contempt of Congress. Committee members were angry?not at each other or at their staff ?but at what they considered the ob- viousness of the Nixon-St. Clair tactics. While they respect St. Clair's legal sav- vy, they think that he has ventured into essentially political maneuverings. At that game, they assume, they are far more adept and experienced than he. Cooling Hotheads. A few of the more volatile members of the committee almost jumped at St. Clair's bait. Such liberal Democrats as Father Robert Dri- nan of Massachusetts, California's Je- rome Waldie and Michigan's John Con- yers Jr. wanted immediately to issue subpoenas for every bit of evidence that Doar was seeking. But Chairman Ro- dino called a caucus of the committee's Democrats and urged the hotheads to cool off. There would be plenty of time to issue subpoenas, he argued, once the White House intention to cut off all fur- ther evidence was totally clear. Mean- while, the committee staff was awaiting a chance to examine all of the material that St. Clair and Nixon had promised, including the 19 tapes and more than 700 documents given to the special pros- ecutor's office. The White House attack seemed to unify the committee?against the Pres- ident. "It is not the White House's job to tell the committee how to discharge its constitutional function," declared Maryland Republican Lawrence J. Ho- gan, until now one of Nixon's strong de- fenders on the committee. "The Pres- ident's lawyer was off base when he stated the committee should first define an impeachable offense?there is no set definition. Each member will have to subjectively determine this in his own mind." Hogan contended that Nixon was getting "bum advice" and was in danger of losing those on the commit- tee "who are trying to keep an, open mind on impeachment." The release of the Doar letter to St. Clair, protested Texas Democrat Jack Brooks, was "an affront to the comity between the White House and the Congress." But he urged his colleagues on the committee not to let "the White House hucksterism de- tract from the decency and forbearance. of the committee. It is clear that the White House is not going to cooperate.' Rebutting St. Clair's demand that the committee state its charges against Nixon before it seeks more evidence, Republican Edward Hutchinson ar- gued: "There are no charges. We hope we will find none. We are simply mak- ing an inquiry." Added Hutchinson: "What we 'have asked for is very rea- sonable and very relevant." The com- mittee request, he explained, was aimed primarily at clarifying the "suspicion about the President's action in the so- called Watergate cover-up." Contempt Citation. The commit- tee strategy is to continue to move war- ily, maneuvering to avoid any court bat- tles. Not only are such battle i time consuming, but the committee is con- vinced that no court has any jurisdic- tion over any part of the impeachment inquiry and process. Impeachment is sanctioned by the Constitution as solely a congressional activity. The committee leaders expect to give St. Clair perhaps two more weeks in which to respond conclusively to its request for evidence. If he fails to do so, the request will be re- newed. If Nixon and St. Clair still re- fuse to comply, only then will the com- mittee issue a subpoena for the material. Meanwhile, the committee's inves- tigation will continue. First, all of the ev- idence given to Jaworski by the White House will be examined. Then the com- mittee intends to study the package of evidence from the Watergate grand jury. If St. Clair and Nixon decide to resist the subpoena, the committee will prob- ably seek a contempt citation against the President. The citation would become one of several?or perhaps many ?points in an impeachment charge. "I would make it the last article of im- peachment, not the first," declares a Republican member of the Judiciary Committee. Reports TIME'S veteran congressio- nal correspondent, Neil MacNeil: "St. Clair's strategy is offending the House's sense of itself?an extremely dangerous business for Nixon. He is losing South- ern Democrats and conservative Repub- licans by the dozens right now." And this is even before any of the potential impeachment evidence has been ana- lyzed by the Rodino committee. Always Smile. Despite St. Clair's problems, many legal scholars give him high marks so far for making the best ,2 ,Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0, of what they see as a very difficult case. Under St. Clair, observes Harvard Law Professor Alan Dershowitz, "the quality of legal representation has gone way up." St. Clair is following a predictable pattern of impeachment defense, says Law Professor Arval Morris of the Uni- versity of Washington. "The first thing is to narrow the concept of the impeach- able offense?that rules out a whole lot of evidence." The University of Chica- go's Philip Kurland views St. Clair's de- fense strategy as "to give only what he is forced to give and to delay as long as he can." Richard Donahue, a leading trial lawyer in Massachusetts, offers a more invidious assessment. He considers St. Clair's tactics much the same kind of de- fense that one would put up for "a drunk- en driver. If you have a guilty client, you make 'em prove everything every inch of the way, attack everyone in the room?the judge, the court officers, the witnesses?but you always smile." Har- vard's Dershowitz says that it is diffi- cult to rate St. Clair's overall effective- ness without knowing the culpability of his .client. "If Nixon is innocent, has nothing to hide, then St. Clair is doing a terrible job because he is making it ap- pear as though Nixon has something to hide. If he is guilty, then St. Clair is do- ing a great job." A strategy of delay, however, is a dis- service to the nation, argues Law Pro- fessor John Flynn of the University of Utah. He objects to St. Clair's "defend- ing this case on a petty criminal basis ?raising every technical objection pos- sible. This is a form of legal brinkmanship. He may be winning the legal battle but losing the more impor- tant battle of public confidence in the President." The University of Chicago's Harry Kalven Jr. agrees: "Delay has consequences for the whole country. It seems seriously inappropriate." It is also, of course, the opposite of what Nixon is arguing for: "I want a prompt and just resolution of this matter." Many of St. Clair's recent statements on more specific Watergate issues are se- verely criticized by legal experts and other persons who have detailed knowl- edge of the various investigations of the scandal. Generally stated, these asser- tions by St. Clair include: A President can be impeached only for crimes of a very serious nature com- mitted in his governmental capacity. As a practical?but not legal?mat- ter, a serious criminal act by a Presi- dent may have to be shown to enlist the two-thirds Senate vote for conviction and removal from office. Despite the views of Nixon and St. Clair, however, almost no reputable scholar contends that the "high crimes and misdemean- ors" cited in the Constitution as bases for impeachment were meant to be tak- en in the modern sense of those words. Chicago's Kurland says that any "breach of trust of high office" falls with- in the meaning intended by the consti- tutional framers. This was shown by one of the framers of the impeachment pro- vision, James Wilson. who said that what he had in mind was misbehavior, or what he called "malversation." James Madison added that impeachment was a protection against the "negligence or perfidy of the Chief Magistrate." The President can claim Executive privilege in withholding requested evi- dence from the House Committee. Disputing that, the University of Washington's Morris echoes the prevail- ing view among constitutional scholars: "In constitutional law, there really isn't any sort of Executive privilege that the President can raise against the House." The impeachment procedure was set up to cover a unique situation in which the separation of powers among the branch- es of Government can be broached by the Congress to determine whether an impeachable offense has occurred. Four U.S. Presidents?Andrew Jackson, James Polk, James Buchanan and Ulys- ses S. Grant?have declared that they would have no right to withhold any- thing from an impeachment proceeding. The House Judiciary Committee must determine what an impeachable of- fense is belbre it seeks the evidence. There is no legal requirement to do so. It is precisely because the Consti- tution is vague on what is impeachable that the committee wants to determine whether there has been wrongdoing be- fore deciding whether what it finds is im- peachable. Certainly, the multiple in- dictments and guilty pleas on criminal charges by 26 Nixon agents so far are reason enough to prompt a broad and deep inquiry into the President's con- duct in office. To carry out that inquiry properly the committee needs all the ev- idence it can get about the President's conduct in the Watergate and related political-espionage and payoff scandals. Because the President is the chief law-enforcement official in the nation, he did not have a legal obligation to report his knowledge of the hush-money pay- ments?a crime?to anyone else. He must only see to it that the judicial process was initiated. "The President is not engaged in the law-enforcement business," contends Chicago's Kurland. "It is a title that St. Clair has created for the situation." Adds Hofstra University Law Dean Monroe Freedman: "The contention is cute, but technically it's absurd." For a President merely to tell himself that a crime has been committed is not enough, many scholars point out. People in the White House are "no different from any other citizens" when they learn of a crime, says Attorney General William Saxbe, who has a greater right than the President to consider himself the top law-enforcement official. Far from ini- tiating judicial action in the Watergate cover-up, moreover. Nixon sought to block full disclosure. He withheld tapes and other evidence from investigators, fought vainly in the courts to keep this material away from the grand jury, and fired Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox when he persisted in seeking it. St. Clair is not representing the Pres- ident. He is representing the institution of the presidency. "This is at best superficial and at worst misleading," declares Norman Dorsen, law professor at New York Uni- versity. "It is not the presidency that is being investigated and that is denying Congress information. It is Mr. Nixon who is under investigation, who is not cooperating. It is not some abstraction that is advising St. Clair on the case. It is Richard Nixon." No one is counsel for the office of the presidency, asserts Kurland. "There is no such job. This is just rhetoric." St. Clair seemed to concede as much last week when he told TIME Correspon- dent Dean Fischer: "My client happens to be the President of the United States. In this sense, he's a unique client. There are certain decisions that only he can make. These decisions relate to the con- fidentiality of presidential communica- tions and Executive privilege. I can't make those decisions for him. They're his and his alone." Such a decision by Nixon was made when the President ruled that he would not give Jaworski any more White House evidence, including 27 tapes that the special prosecutor is still seeking. St. Clair has not heard those recordings. That puts him in a weak position in hav- ing rejected Jaworski's request on grounds that the contents of the record- ings did not justify violating the Pres- ident's right to protect their confiden- tiality. St. Clair has apparently not heard the 42 tapes sought by the Ro- din() staff either. For an experienced trial lawyer, St. Clair has made some specific com- ments on aspects of the Watergate cover-up case that appear odd. Par- ticularly baffling was his claim that John Dean would no longer be a wit- ness in Special Prosecutor Jaworski's conspiracy case against Nixon's former aides. Both Nixon and St. Clair were heavily depending on the claim that Dean had been discredited because he testified before the Senate Watergate committee that he had talked to Nixon about the hush-money payments on March 13, while a tape of the conver- sation shows that it occurred on March 21. Dean, who had testified without ac- cess to his White House files, later told investigators that he had been wrong by one week. Nixon in Chicago seemed to be grasping at a straw in citing that one- week error as significant. Dean will be a major trial witness. St. Clair also tried to undermine a key claim in the grand jury's conspir- acy indictment: that $75,000 in hush money had been paid on March 21, 1973, to William Bittman, the attorney for E. Howard Hunt, a Watergate wire- tapper. Hunt had been demanding money from the White House, threat- ening to disclose some of his seamy work as a member of Nixon's squad of secret plumber investigators. The payment was alleged by the grand jury to have been made just a few hours after Dean and Haldeman had met with Nixon on that day. St. Clair pointed out, however, that a large chart used in the Senate Wa- tergate hearings had listed no such pay- ment on March 21. That was hardly a conclusive refutation. Hush Money. Testimony at the Senate hearings was imprecise as to the time of this payment. But St. Clair had to be aware that the grand jury had strong evidence of the date before citing it as a culminating act in the chain of criminal conspiracy. Last week the Washington Post reported that Freder- ick LaRue, a former official of Nixon's re-election committee who has pleaded guilty to conspiracy to obstruct justice, had recalled handling the payment after dinner on March 21. The date was ver- ified by the travel records of one of La- Rue's out-of-town friends, who attended the dinner. Investigators have the credit- card records of his hotel and travel ex- penses. That is minimal documentation: the prosecutor has other evidence too. The payment date challenges Nix- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-ROP77-00432R000100320002-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0 on's repeated claim that. during the cel- ebrated March 21 meeting with Dean and Haldeman in his office, he flatly re- jected the idea of paying any hush money. The grand jury, which heard the tape of the meeting, cited Haldeman for perjury because of his testimony at the ? Senate hearings that Nixon had said such payments were wrong. This grand jury action suggested that Nixon must have been lying in his public claims that he told his aides the payments were wrong. If a payment was made after the talk, the President either did not dis- courage the payment of hush money, or he was misunderstood by his aides, or he was disobeyed. Nixon conceded in a press confer- ence two weeks ago that other persons who heard the tape might "reach dif- ferent interpretations. But I know what I meant, and I know also what I did. I meant that the whole transaction was wrong, the transaction for the purpose of keeping this whole matter covered up." Nixon said that he told Dean, "It is wrong, that's for sure"?and that the remark was meant to apply to both the promise of Executive clemency and the payment of hush money to any defendant. The President has refused to release the tape or a transcript of the conver- sation, but TIME has learned its gist. Four important words spoken by the President come through clearly: "It would be wrong." But these words are spoken only within the context of a dis- cussion about promising clemency. The subject of paying money to keep the bur- glars quiet comes once before the clem- ency discussion and two times after it. On none of those three occasions does Nixon say or suggest that such payments would be wrong. Among the tapes most eagerly sought by both Prosecutor Jaworski and the Rodino committee staff are those of conversations between Nixon and his top aides from about ten days before to ten days after this March 21 conversa- tion. The investigators wonder whether there was any more talk of the illegal hush payments in this period. Nixon has refused to yield any of these tapes to ei- ther of the investigating bodies. Two Supporters. An additional problem for the President is that any White House attempt to stonewall the Rodino committee by denying access to any further evidence runs the risk of alienating two of Nixon's most helpful supporters: Vice President Gerald Ford and Republican Senate Leader Hugh Scott. Ford seems to be opening a great- er distance between himself and the President. He still backs the White House view that Rodino is off on a "fish- ing expedition" for evidence and ought to specify "a bill of particulars" against Nixon before seeking the supporting documents. But Ford irked Nixon's staff by declaring publicly that Rodino is ful- ly entitled to see the grand jury's spe- cial report and evidence. He also said that he was "concerned" about Nixon's failure to report the illegal payment ofsi- lence money to Watergate defendants as soon as Dean told him about it. "I think I would have," Ford said. Scott is getting nervous because he went out on a limb to assail Dean's cred- ibility on the basis of tape transcripts and summaries shown to him by Nix- on. The failure of the White House to make the same information public dis- turbs Scott. His associates worry that he may have been misled by the one-week discrepancy in Dean's testimony about hush money, perhaps having seen a transcript in which no such discussion appeared. As for giving the Rodino com- mittee what it wants, Scott, too, is op- posed to "fishing expeditions," but he TIME MARCH25 1974 s:A Shocke 66 ? , Another big bombshell is about to go off under the President. The Con- gressional Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, which Nixon asked to look into two questionable tax entries that he had made on his returns for 1969 and 1970, is expected to release its pre- liminary report late this week or next week. Says one senior Senator on the committee: "It will be a shocker." Congressman Wilbur Mills; the in- fluential and powerful chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, added: "If Watergate brought pressure on Nixon to resign, our report will bring about a great deal more pressure. I don't believe that he will be able to withstand it." A congressional staff member said that Nixon may well wind up owing more than $500,000 in taxes and pen- alties. For the years 1970 and 1971 he paid less than $2,000 on a combined in- come of $526,000. ? The tax committee will not draw any conclusions on whether Nixon may have been guilty of fraud in filing his returns. It will leave any such determination up to the Judiciary Committee and Inter- nal Revenue Service, which is belatedly rechecking Nixon's returns. The report by the joint committee will merely in- dicate those deductions that it considers should not have been allowed and will _ _- CONGRESSMAN WILBUR MILLS cite other taxes that it judges the Pres- ident owes. (Though the committee's findings are not binding, the President has promised to accept their ruling and pay accordingly.) It would be wrong to allege fraud, Mills explained, "because half the members of the committee are Senators, and they may have to serve as a jury on impeachment." In other words. Senators should not accuse Nix- on if they also may have to stand in judg- ment of him later. The committee is expected to con- does not believe that the committee is on one. Noting White House objections to anyone backing a truck up to the White House for files, Scott suggests: "How about a station wagon?" As the President's difficulties con- tinue to accumulate, his public appear- ances look increasingly like an effort to go over the heads of the aroused im- peachers in the House and directly to the public. His vows to "fight like hell" and "not walk away from this job" may win some wavering doubters to his side. But his position is steadily grow- ing weaker. If the President is innocent in the cover-up acts of his aides, he could eas- ily gain adherents by turning over the 27 tapes that Jaworski wants and the 42 that the House Judiciary Committee is seeking. That would dispel many sus- picions, and it would certainly not "de- stroy" the presidency. Since he has given up 19 tapes and 700 documents already, why would turning over more tapes break the back of this most visible of U.S. institutions? If he is not innocent the current collision course with the Congress may be the only viable one for him. Gentler Approach. Perhaps per- ceiving new dangers in a showdown with the impeachment committee, St. Clair seemed to soften his earlier stand. "We are not seeking a confrontation," he told TIME. "It would not be good for the Pres- ident or the country. I think John Doar and I both believe that adjustments can be made to avoid it. I don't think the committee intends to have a fishing ex- pedition." If this view seemed more con- ciliatory than those expressed by his unique client last week, perhaps the gen- tler approach is merely a shrewd tactic. Or maybe Lawyer James St. Clair de- serves a more attentive audience within the confines of the Oval Office. elude that Nixon owes some $300,000 in back taxes for having taken a deduc- tion of $482,000 for the gift of his vice- presidential papers?a transaction that he has conceded may not have been completed before a law banning such de- ductions went into effect. While Nixon will not be accused of fraud because a deed and other papers completing the transaction apparently were backdated to get them within the deadline, the committee may put blame on those who prepared the returns. That could apply pressure on Nixon's lawyers to explain the transactions more fully in order to avoid criminal charges themselves. a Also certain to be cited as another Nixon tax error was his failure to re- port a $142.000 profit on the sale of his Manhattan apartment in 1969 and to pay a capital gains tax on it. Nixon had asked the committee to examine both this sale and the deduction for his pa- pers. The probers have gone beyond these matters and apparently have dis- covered other Nixon tax errors. Insists Mills: "People can better understand a failure to pay taxes than they can un- derstand Watergate. Overdeductions, failure to state income?this will be a re- port to the American people. And they can draw their own conclusions." The conclusions may be particularly bitter because the report will be released just at the time when Americans are paying their own income taxes. 4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0 THE WASHINGTONIAN March 1974 GuessWho'sTrying to be H ? enry Sup-Toy? Wh 's Who and What's Happening in the Spy BLsiriess ?A Long Look Behind the Ciz,ssiiied Curtain -By Tad Szuic ,ne day it is the controversy ever the sani Central intelligence Agency's role in Watergate. Another day it is a piece of inept C/A skulduggery in a remote province in .Thailand. Then it is the grudging admission that quite a few American newsmen have been operating as CIA .informants abroad. Or ?he discovery that the agency has been secretly training Tibetan guerrillas in Col- orado, and Cambodian and Ugandan irregu- lars at hidden camos in Greece while bank- rollin.7 colonels on the ruling Greek junta and financing (amous European statesmen and contriving to overthrow the Libyan re- gime. ? The CIA; it would seem, just cannot stay out of the headlines, which is a commentary con the agency itself and on the contradictions in our society. Though it obviously is one of the mot-.sberetive agencies in the United States government, the CIA probably re- ceives more publicity than any Washington bureaucracy except for the NN'hite House. Most of this publicity is negative, sometimes indignant, often' sensationalist, and fre- quently lopsided. The CIA's track record in the?? years of its operations largely accounts for this lavish yet unwanted coverage?it's done everything from stealing the text of Khrushchev's secret Kremlin speech de- nouncing Stalin and theilay of Pigs, to over- throwing foreign regimes, to running the Laos "Clandestine Army," and possibly out- fitting the AVatergate 'Plumbers"?but it is our endless fascination with espionage and cloak-and-dagger stories that makes readers unfailingly receptive to stories and books about the Cl:. , On a more serious level, however, our interest underlines the important point that a secret agency cannot function in .utter se- crecy in what still is a reasonably open soci- ety.- The CIA is the subject of continued public scrutiny and debate?even if the scrutiny is superficial and the debate seldom well informed, and even if it is true that the agency has been allowed to run wild and uncontrolled. There is a growing view --reinforced by the Watergate affair?i hat the CIA should be made more accountable to proper Congressional committees as is, for example, the Atomic Energy Commission, whose work also is secret. Yct there is no other nation where key intelligence officials arc as easily identifiable as in the United' States and where the head of intelligence is Approved publicly and extensively questioned by the Henry Kissinger. What is aviisue now is the legislature?never mind how thoroughly' effectiveness of our intelligence machinery ?as William Egan Colby, the new CIA Di . and the question of whether it is helped or y rector, was last year. And it is not all that hurt b Kissinger's decision to be the de hard for investig.nive reporters to track facto chief intelligence officer of the United down some CIA actions, much to the States in addition m serving as Secretary of ; State and :he President's principal foreign agency's annoyance. In Britain, the Official Secrets Act would make this impossible. In Policy advisor. , France, the top-secret Service .du Territoire First, however let's briefly look at the would prevent it. So would Israel's Shin Bet,, United States intelligence establishment. with the assistance of official censorship. In ? Communist countries, exposure of the In theory, the intelligence community is `i un curity services is. unthinkable., ified body presided over by the Unsatisfactory as it is to those appalled by United States Intelligence Board (USIB), the CIA%, excesses, the exposure that does which is directly responsible to the National - exist in our democratic society clearly is a Security Council at the White House and plus. Last year's discovery of the abortive consequently to the President. The USII3 is 1970 Mite House plan for domestic intel- headed by the Director of the CIA, who also ligence (Tom I /Liston, its author, praised the acts as Director of Central Intelligence and, CIA for its cooperative spirit in engineering again in theory, as chief Of the intelligence it) underscored the importance of such expo- community. William Colby replaced sure. So did disclosures of the CIA-run Op- Richard I (elms in this twin. post last Sep- eration Phoenix in' Vietnam set up for mur- tetnber (there was a five-month interregnum dering suspected Viet Cong agents. We are during which James M. Schlesinger man- highly sensitized to the role of intejligence aged to shale up the community quite con- agencies here and abroad. But mi strange is sideerably before moving on to be Secretary our morality that we usually tend to accept of Defense), but there are no indications so the national security need for building better ? far that Colby carries much more weight and better nuclear arsenals but flinch indig- with the Nixon-Kissinger White I louse than nandy at the notion of American involve- did I Mills. Ichns. now Ambassador to ment in global intelligence operations. Iran, was in deep disfavor With Kissinger. This is where the contradictions of our The White I louse tends to regard Colby as an: efficient intelligence bureaucrat and ad- society mine in. I lowever, the reality is that ministrator (despite his long career as a chin- classical foreign policy depends not only on classical .pol it ical and economic diplomacy, destine operator) who meets Kissinger's spe- ; but also on military deterrents and the cial requirements. So it is hard to think of availability of solid intelligence. To abolish Colby as the real chief of the intelligence our intelligence services would be tan- community in the sense that Allen Dulles tamount to unilateral nuclear disarmament, was when he was CIA director from 1953 to something not seriously proposed here. We 1961. There seem to be no giants nowadays must live with the reality that the CIA and in the spying business. It has been touched , its sister agencies will go on exist ing; "so will by the age of mediocrity too. The other agencies forming the USIII are the Soviet KGB's external operations. Having Said all these things, I should add ' the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), po that despite all the publicity about the CIA sup sedly the spokesman for the Pentagon,' b and company, the function of intelligence in hut not always in tune with the intelligence experts of the Office of the Secretary of Dc- thethe modern age is not always understood by fcnsc or the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Na- public or, for, that matter, by our top t Na- policymakers. In fact, the entire Americanional Security Agency (NSA), specializing intelligence apparatus?not just the CIA?is I in highly sophisticated electronic and icaltech- undergoing a major institutional crisis. This nolg intelligence gathering; the State crisis results in fairly equal parts from the Departments smallish but excellent Bureau profound politic' and technological changes of Intelligence and Research (INR), mainly affecting the world in the 1970S (perhaps not concerned with analyzing political and fully comprehended by the intelligence peo- economic intelligence; the Atomic Energy C plc themselves) and from the style of foreign ommission (AEC), which has its own policy as conducted by Richard Nixon and intelligence-processing capability in the nu- ? ? clear field; the Federal Bureau of Investiga- For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDFS7-00432R000100320002-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0 tion, contributing counterespionage func- tions; and the Treasury Department, a fairly recent addition, which is'involved in intel- ligence operations against narcotics traffic .and which also runs the Secret Service. Below the USIB, but connected with the :major intelligence agencies, are such specialized organizations as the National Re- connaissance Office (NRO), the most secret of them all. NRO's existence has been one of the intelligence comniunity's best kept se- crets. Its mission is to coordinate the so- called "overhead" reconnaissance conducted by Samos spy-in-the-sky satellites and high-flying planes like the SR-71, the suc- cessor to the famous U-2. The Air Force runs NRO with special funds?some esti- mates are that NRO spends $1.5 billion an- nually, about a ? fifth of the total United ; States intelligence budget?and it is believed that the Under Secretary of the Air Force, I currently . James W. Plummer, is . its im-1 ; mediate boss. Overhead reconnaissance is absolutely essential for the monitoring of I ; military deployments by potential adver- saries The Samos satellite, for example, is the so-called "means of national verification" for the 1972 Soviet-American nuclear con- trol agreements. It insures that the Russians , ? arc not cheating on the antiballistic missile (ABM) limitations or exceeding the number of land- or submarine-based missiles under the temporary accord on offensive strategic ; weapons. The Samos, with its high- !precision photography, keeps 1N'ashington I posted on every new missile site and type of weapon deployed by the Soviet Union. ;Thanks to the Samos we know that the : Soviets are busily building their strength. And the Russians, of course. have their own version of the Samos to keep us honest. NRO experts work closely with the huge National Security Agency (believed. to em- ploy more than 20,000 civilian and military specialists), both in actual overhead recon- naissance and in the parallel task ot telemet- ric monitoring of Soviet advances in the de- . vclonment of Multiple independently ; ; Targeted Reentry Vehicle (M IRV) t4warlicads. (These are multiple warheads, usually three, carried by indis:idual ballistic missiles. Each can be guided separately to its assigned and very precise target.). Develop- ing MIR \' was a major American nuclear . breakthrough, and for the last five years enormous effort has gone. into monitoring Soviet tests to determine whether the Rus- sians have it too. The American defense posture and disarmament negotiating stance depend on this knowledge. The intelligence community believes that the Soviet Union "NUR Ved" last year, but ? is uncertain just how precise the Soviet targeting system is. This information isthe raw strategic intel- ligence that NRO and NSA feed to the CIA and the DIA?and ultimately. to the USIB and the White House?for evaluation and interpretation. NS.A.also provides the intel- ligence community with a fantastic wealth of electronic intelligence?ELI NT in the pro- fessional jargon?in addition to. data on Soviet or Chinese military deployments and developments. NSA listening posts around the world eavesdrop on practically all the non-American (not only Communist) mili- tar)' radio, microwave, telex, and telephone traffic. They intercept conversations among Soviet N110 pilots; routine communications either in clear language or in code (one of NSA's crucial functions is code-breaking as well as code-making) involving Warsaw Pact military units, Chinese, North Vietnamese, North Korean, and other Communist de- tachments; and iust about everything of po- tential interest to the United States that can be overheard or copied. This work is done from secret land bases ranging from Ethiopia and the Indian-Himalayas to Turkey and the Aleutian islands an well as from ELINT ships (the Pueblo, captured by North Korea, was one) andtLINT aircraft flying all over the world. NSA-equipped and manned air- craft directed secret ground penetrating op- erations in Laos arid Cambodia, anti pre-, sumably do so now in other critical areas Middle East is probably one. It my one day be NSA's function to interrupt the worldwide United States military com- munications network with a message pre- ceded by the code word CRITIC (which automatically gives it absolute priority over all other traffic) to alert the White House, the North American Defense Command in Col- orado, and the Strategic Air Command in Omaha that enemy missiles or bombers' have been launched?or arc about to be?against the United States. The extra few seconds such a warning would provide before, say, a Soviet first strike would allow the United States to respond with a second strike from ? Minuteman missiles in North Dakota, ! Polaris and Poseidon nuclear submarines cruising under the oceans, and SAC 13-52 ' bombers on permanent airborne alert. But since a nuclear holocaust is not gener- ally anticipated, the value of strategic intel- ligence relates to the construction of our de- fense. and. diplomatic policies'. And this is where the intelligence community's Current internal crisis appears in its most acute form. To be meaningful, strategic and tactleal in- telligence must be properly evaluated and interpreted. The National Security' Agency and. the National Reconnaissance Office produce and supply the raw intelligence for the CIA, D1:\, and INR. But the CIA, DIA (and the individual military.intelligence Ser- vices), and 1NR also collect and produce in- telligence they obtain through non- electronic means. Each agency plays a dual role and. each has its own analyses, opinions, and biases. Each tries to influence policy, often for .self-serving reasons. The CIA, for example, is barred by statute from formulat- ing policies, but the CI; N obviously holds policy views and subtly, if not always suc- cessfully, tries to influence national decision-making processes. During the latter ! part of the Vietnam war, for example, the agency continually warned against military over optimism and against underestimating North Vietnamese and Viet Cong power: The CIA urged realism in "Vietnamization" policies. On the other hand, it miscalculated the advantages of getting rid of Prince Noro- dom Sihanouk in Cambodia because it ? minimized the potential of the rebel Khmer Rouge guerrillas. The Administration ac- cepted the CIA's Cambodia opinions with results that are less than felicitous. As will be seen,. the CIA also had views on strategic negotiations that differed from those of other ? members of the intelligence community. It played an important role in helping to un- dermine the Socialist regime in Chile?this included strong policy views in faitir of doing so?in addition to carrying out 1Vhite House instructions in this area. In other words, the CIA never simply cranked out intelligen.ce without adding policy views. The DIA, whose generals and admirals are concerned with the fortunes of the mili- tary profession, often seems to have a vested interest in "worst case" interpretations of intelligence .data. Put simply, military analysts tend to suspect the worst concern- ing the potential enemy's intentiOns because that justifies requests for bigger budgets and appropriations for new weapons systems. Politically, "worst case" conclusions may bring trade-offs. In 1969, for instance, the Pentagon's insistence that the Russians had "MIR Ved" (the CIA accurately concluded that they' hadn't yet) inrceci Nixon and Kis- singer to "buy it off": They promised ap- propriations for new weapons systems so that the military establishment .would sup- port the SALT I negotiations with the Rus- sians. And so on. Traditionally, the general idea always has been that the intelligence community, with all its various resources, would pre- sent the President with agreed estimates on everything from Soviet nuclear advances to Hanoi's intentions :n Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia; the likelihood of a Soviet- Chinese war; the chances of a new Middle Eastern conflict; the survival power of. the Socialist regime in Chile; and many other :situations of concern to the United States. When the CIA truly was Washington's pre-eminent intelligence organ, its Office of National Estimates prepared the so-called National Intelligence Estimates (Ni Es) on behalf of the entire intelligence community, although other agencies. dissenting views ? were duly noted. By and large, however, the ? NI Es were fairly sacrosanct. . But in June 1973, when Kissinger as the President's chief of staff for foreign affairs, the Office of Nationa: Estimates was abolished. John W. Huixenga, the Chief of National Estimates, was forced into prema- ? ture retirement by Schlesinger. The changes ? 'awe based on reorganization plans for the intelligence community that Schlesinger, ? then head of the Office of Budget and Man- agement, prepared.for the White House in November 1971. The new estimating iys- tem turned out to be more responsive to the special needs of the Nixon-Kissingr White I-louse, and this is veiry much part of what is happening to 111e intelligence community. ' instead of a permanent estimates body. ! Colby, acting as Director of Central intelli- gence, set up a corps of so-called National intelligence Officers drawn from the CIA and other agencies to work on specific intel- ligence projects. This staff has the logistic support of the whole intelligence commu- nity. itis headed by George Carver; desig- nated as Chief National Intelligence Officer, who operates direitly under Colby with three deputies and approximately 30 Na- tional intelligence Officers, although this figtire probably will increase as the corps . develops. Carver is a CA veteran and a I Victtiam expert. He first caught Kissinger's eye because he represented the CIA on the Vietnam Task Force, an interagency group, and occasionally on the National Security Council. In practice, Colby and Carver as- 'sign a specific project?it could he Arab at- titudes on oil or the likeIood of a North Vietnamese offensiw: in 1974?to a National Intelligence Officer, who nulls together all 6 ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0- c necessary intelligence resources to pro- cc a report submitted to Colby and then to e National Security Council, which means ear). Kissinger wearing the hat of Special residential Assistant and/or chairman of le top-secret "40 Committee" in the NSC tructure. This means. that different senior stimators. work on various projects rather han having thc Office of National Estimates pproving all the reports as it did in the past.' issinger and his staff have direct-access to he National Intelligence Officers when ? vork is in progress, so Kissinger can better ontrol the process of intelligence. This is the most important structural anti )Etical change to allvet the intelligence .oiniunnity since Helms was shipped to Iran ' .arly in 1973. Schlesinger's short reign at the CIA Langley headquarters produced some superficial changes: The staff was cut by nearly ten percent; scores of old-line .'romantics" in the .Clandestine Services were retired (E. Howard Hunt was retired by..?Helms in 1970); the agency was rein.- Ofized along more modern and efficient lines; and the imPortance of electronic intel- ligence was emphasized by bringing Pen- tagon "overhead" reconnaissance experts to ; Schlesinger's seventh-floor executive suite at Langley. But the really significant change in the intelligence community's structure came with Kissinger's decision to atomize it and therefore britig it under his own tight con- trol. Kissinger wanted to break the fre- quently artificial ,:onsensus of estimates and encourage a direct flow of intelligence from the various agencies to his own office in the 1Vhite 1-louse s,here he and his National Security Council staff made the final esti- mates and evaluations. This naturally led to a major contro-: versy?an academic one, since Kissinger had the last word?between Kissinger and the traditionalists in the intelligence commu- nity. In brief, the opposing positions were these: Kissinger believed that the agreed na- tional estimates were the *lowest common denominator reached by agencies that often disagreed on interpretation of data-4?in his own words, he had to fight his way through "Talmudic" documents to find their real meaning; the traditionalists' view was that Kissinger was disrupting an orderly intelli- gence procedure in favor of his own biases, , that he wanted interpretations to fit his pre- conceived policy opinions. Intelligence community veterans complain that Kis- singer and his people now use the intelli- gence product capriciously and unprofes- sionally. They resent what they consider hifi "sloppy" handling of intelligence and his practice of eliminating top intelligence peo- ?ple front the decision-making process. They say that under the new system, the intelli- gence comniunity, including Central Intelli- gence I3irector Colby, has no idea what hap-- pens to the intelligence product, gueli as the National Intelligence officers' contribution, once it is fed int(; the White I !Ouse machin-, 'cry. Even in Dick I !elms' day, old-timers say, the Director of Central Intelligence .rarely had a chance to defend his views at the White I louse because National Security Council meetings were increasingly infrequent and ' there was no other forum where he could ? 'speak. out. In his latter 'years .1 !elms had virtually no direct access to Nixon, while Kissinger made no bones about his low opin: ? ion of the CIA boss. Colby, as far as it is known, is not faring much better with the White House. For example, when Kissinger and Schlesinger ordered the worldwide United. States military alert during last October's Nlideast crisis, Colby was not con- sulted beforehand. He simply was sum- moned after the decision was made and in- formed of it. . CIA ? officials also think that Kissinger often ignores agency views and estimaies in favor of opinions more to his pragmatic lik- ing. This, they say, is what happens when ? CIA and military intelligence differ consid- . erably. The. 1969 MIRV controversy sea: the first instance of it. Later the White . 1-louse. Minimized CIA warninga that the Viet Cong was much .stronger in Vietnam ?than the US Command in Saigon claimed and that pacification was far from successful. Kissingei-, CIA people say, ne-er requested the agency's opinion on the soundness of the DIA plan to snatch American war prisont.r.: from the. Sontay camp in North Vietnam (the camp was enrt. t..y when the raiders landed). No questions, they say, were put to the intelligence community when the Ad- ministration decided on the Cambodian in- vasion in 1970 (the military insisted they knew where to find the elusive COSVS; command of the Vie.v Cong inside Cam-1 bodia; it has not been located to this No I questions were put to the intelligence com- munity when the ?Vilite iouse decided to support the South Vietnamese thrust into Laos in 1971 to sever the I 1u Chi Minh Trail (du; operation failed). CIA people wonder' why Kissinger never ordered the imelligence community to prepare studies on all these, plans before deciding to carry them out. Colby, a lifetime clandestine operator (he' fought behind enemy lines in France and Norway as a young OSS officer in World War II, then made a CIA career in Vietnam as station chief and later as chief he pacifi- cation program with ambassadorial rank), still chairs the USW as Diactor of Central Intelligence?US III now is mainly con- cerned with evaluating Soviet military and political strength. But Colby's power has been considerably eroded in comparison with that held by his CIA predecessors. Individual intelligence agencies now are increasingly in rivalry with one another (the difference is that in the past natural rivalries were discouraged by the White House; now they seem to be encouraged) for the attention of Henry Kissinger and thus the President. To put it simply, Kissinger, who distrusts all bureaucracies including the intelligence community, devised a series of sophisticited moves to weaken the intelligence -apparatus so that he could become the chief interpreter and arbiter of the intelligence product emanating from each agency. Kiisinger continues to control the Na- tional Security Council?he retains his post of White House Special- Assistant far Na- tional Security Affairs despite his new post as Secretary of State?and this preserves his control of the evaluation of intelligence. This is probably the most powerful function in the formulation of foreign policy, which can be evolved only on the basis of evaluated knowledge. That is what intelligence is all about. The Secretary of State has no such statutory j)ower; traditionally he is a con- sumer of intelligence. During Nixon's first term William P. Rogers simply relied on his ; own intelligence and Research Bureau?and there are regrets ot the State Department that he did not study that first-rate .product sufficiently?but Kissinger, wearing his many hats, is both chief producer and chief consumer of the to:al intelligence available to the United States government. His CIA de- tractors call hint the "syper case officer" in the intelligence community. f.(issinger also has a handle on major intelligence decisions through his chairmanship of the "40 Committee" in the National Security Council. This is princi- a policy body?the intelligence community, the Defense, State,. and Justice departments are represented on it?that mai-Ts broad decisions in the field of intelli- gence and instructs the appropriate agencies ? tt, carry them out through their own means. ;ts nrucu. is derived from the number of the I969 NSC memorandum that Set it up in its tnescnt form. Earlier, the Committee was !,nown as "5412," a memorandum number dating bacic to zhe Eisenhower Administra- tion., and tithing the Kennedy and Johnson , administrations as "303," this being the room number in the Executive Office Build- ing where the group met. Britain has a simi- , lar body known as the "20 Committee," but its name is a product of British whimsicality. Since the British group was called by insid- ers the "double-cross committee, its chiefs -translated the Roman numerals "NX" into the designation "20" for their outfit. The "40 Committee". decisions Must be personally approved by the President. Its agenda and the frequency of its meetings arc secret, but it is assumed that all large-scale operations (as distinct from ongoing stand- aid activities) are reviewed there. This was the case, it is said, with the CIA's clandestine arnly in ;..aos and with Operation Phoenix in ):ietnam. But it also is known that between 19; 0 and 1973 the ".10 Committee" has con- emu] itself on a number of occasions with the Chilean situation before and after the election of Salvador Allende, the late presi- ? den:, as well as with such recondite matters as whether the Norwegian government would grant concessions to American oil firms. In the case of. Norway, US policymakers felt that normal diplomatic pressures were inadequate and that intelli- gence resources were required. It is not clear just how the CIA went about this assign- ment. Likewise, the CIA's role in an abortive attempt to overthrow the Libyan regime some time in 1971 has nbt been fully explained?in fact, the whole operation re- mains an official sect et. However, responsi- ble sources claim the CIA was instructed to eliminate the radical government of Colonel Quadaffi when he threatened to nationalize U S oil companies. Given the scope of United States interests, there is no limit to the situations the "40 Committee" may, be drawn into. Odd as it may sound, the "40 Committee" under Kissinger early realized that Soviet ; leaders should have a better understanding; of the United States. The function of the, American intelligence community is, by def- inition, to ferret out knowledge about the Soviet Union, but sophisticated thinkers * here concluded that awesome policy errors in the Kremlin can be avoided if the Russians knew more about American attitudes and Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-ROP77-00432R000100320002-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0 potential reactions It would be an exaggera- tion to suggest that the CIA is engaged in educating the KGB (although a peculiar rap- -port between them exists in certain fields such as security at the time of Nixon's Mos- cow visit and Brezhnev's Washington trip), , but the intelligence community clearly was 'delighted some years ago when the Soviet Academy of Sciences organized its "USA" institute under Gyorgi Arbatote a specialist on American affairs. The is Ithat the new institute is performing a Politi- ;cal intelligence functinn in conjunction with , the KGB and the Soviet Foreign Ministry.. Speaking of the KGB, which is the CIA's : principal opponent in intelligence wars, the , private assessment here is that the So6et service has been improving over the years, . particularly with the advent of a new genera- tin of analysts and estimators. Americans think, however, that the Russians are far behind us ? in electronic intelligence even though they, too, have equipment like over- head satellites. Experts say that the KGB's internal de- fenses are strong. It is doubtful that the Cl: ever really penetrated it, although there was the case at:4one] Oleg Pcnkovsky, a senior KGB officer who -allegedly served British and American intelligence for years as a double agent. Despite claims here,. it re- mains aenclear what precisely Penkovsky really did for the West. Because it is both a domestic security service (in the FBI sense) and an international intelligence agency like the CIA, the KGB obviously is hard to pene- trate. CIA Director Colby made this point indirectly when he told a Congressional committee in executive session late last year that he was spending much of his time trying to penetrate the Soviet Communist party. ? It is presumed to be among the "40 Corn-. mince" functions to supervise secret intelli- gence agreements with friendly countries. Such agreements exist teith Britain, Canada, ? Australia, South Africa, and Israel, among. ? -others. The CIA and the British MI-6 occa- sionally exchange agents when it is conven- ient for one service to work under the cover of the other, but the principal aim of the agreements is the exchange of intelligence. A secret British-American intelligence group thus functions at the British Embassy in. Washington. There are extremely close tics with Canada; recent' published reports said that Canadianintelligence personnel worked hand in hand with the here and in Ot- tawa. Finally, there is an intelligence ex- change agreement within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, but this is a more lim- ited arrangement because of what the CIA sees as the dangers of leaks to the Soviets. Despite budget and personnel cuts, in- ternal divisions, rivalries, and -frustra- tions, the United States intelligence com- munity is a formidable empire. It is believed to employ around 100,000 people in all the agencies (not counting the FBI) and its an- nual budget is somewhere between S6 billion and $7 billion, the bulk of the money going to the expensive technological operations in the National Security Agency and the Na- tional Reconnaissance Office. Although the - CIA is overseen by special Congressional appropriations subcommittees, its budget- ing, like that of the NSA, DIA, and NRO, does not appear on the books. Instead, the Office of Budget and Management hides it in appropriations for other government agen- cies. Sometimes agencies like the Agency for - International Development spend their own funds on the CIA's behalf, a5 was done in Laos and Vietnam, to be paid back later. . The intelligence community, especially the CIA, also works through innumerable fronts, often supposed businesses, and channels funds for political operations through labor end cultural groups. At the peak of the Vietnam war the CIA owned at least two airlines?Air America Inc. (still operating) .and Southern Air Transport. (being sold). It also had contracts with sev- eral bona fide US carriers. Southern Air Transport carried out a- number of secret operations in the Caribbean in recent years. The Cl: still charters Southeast Air Trans- port planes to such agencies as AID to bring Latin American students and professionals to the US for conferences and other meet inge sponsored by the US government. In 1964 a special company was set up in Miami to recruit Cuban pilots, veterans of the Bay of Pigsefor secret operations in the Congo. In earlier years the CIA ? subsidized the Na- tional Students' Association, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, the Congress for Cultural Freedom; and a series of related magazines here and in Western. Europe. Al- though the CIA is barred by law from operating in the Urfited States (except at' its Virginia headquarters), the agency still maintains covert of in Miami, New 'York, New Orleans, San Francisco, and Charleston, South Carolina. CIA officials say these offices support foreign operations and, among other functions, help to debrief interesting travelers returning from abroad. But in the course of Watergate investigations it developed that Langley headquarters as well as the CIA offices in Miami and San Francisco provided logistic support for the White House "Plumbers." One employee, in fact, still was on the CIA payroll when he was arrested at the Watergate office building in lune 1972. ? Basically, the CIA is divided into two main departments: operations and analysis. There are experts in Washington who hold ' the CIA analysis branch in extremely high . esteem, but tend to ? be skeptical of the operators. The two departments are often at odds politically: the operators often dismiss the estimators as "eggheads" -while the analysts think of the operators as a wild bunch. This situation is changing as more and more old-timers, mostly OSS veterans, retire, a new generation of agents and analysts enters the CIA ranks, and the needs of intelligence, especially in electronic intel- ligence, change along with the rest of the world. But there also are stresses inside the clandestine services. "Action" officers?the "black" operators and paramilitary special- ists?--are more gung-ho than what the CIA? .calls covert political operatives, and this, too, leads to internal disagreements. Top specialists in their fields still are hired from the outside?the CIA has experts on everything from West African culture to Filipino tribal myths and the effects of the Humboldt Current on fisheries in the Pacific?bo the basic recruitment is mainly from colleges and universities. The decision whether a recruit should be assigned to oper- ations or analysis is usually made during an. initial stage at the CIA's "basic training" school on Glebe Road in Virginia. Recruitsi selected for operations are assigned to a! tough course at a special school known as 'The 7amne near tlearktown, Preeneteng analyeas reeet be sent back to uni- versiiiee for nostgraduate studies in various , Traditionally, the CIA has been run by men from the clandestine services. The most notable Cl: director with this background was Alien Dulles, probably the best intelli- gence cperatar the OSS had in Eurtme dur- ing the war. Richard Helms ran the clandes- tine services before rising to the director- ship. William Colby served briefly as deputy director for plans (the "dirty trick's" division) after his return from Vietnam and before being named Director iasr year. As CIA Di- rector and Director of. Centrai intelligence, Colby, a 54-year-old Self-effacing but tough man, is backstopped by LieutenandGeneral Vernon (Dick) Walter's, the Deputy Direc- tor of intelligence. Walters, an extraordi- nary linguist, spent much of his Army career as a military or defense attache overseas, but he is not considered an expert on either analysis or clandestine operations. It was Walters's lot, however, to be drawn into the Watergate cover-up controversy when the White I louse tried to get the Cr.\ to take the blame for the "Plumbers" and pay their salaries after they went to prison. Schlesinger and Colby reorganized the CIA structure to a Considerable extent. The old Plans Department (DDP) was renamed Directorate for Operations (DDO), absorb- ing the scientific and technical divisions. It is headed by William Nelson, a clandestine services veteran from he Far East, who took. Colby's former job. Colby, not being a pro- fessional estimator, has kept on Richard Lehmann, a highly respected official, as Deputy Director for Current Intelligence (DM). Lehmann works with George Carver in the new National tmelligence Officers' system. Major General Daniel 0. Graham, brought from the Pentagon by Schlesinger, is in charge of "overhead" intelligence, his speciality. He works directly with Colby, but he feels strongly that military intelli- gence at the Pentagon should become more sophisticated so that it would not lose influ- ence to the civilian agencies. CIA officials say that the new electronic intelligence systems have cut down the agency's clandestine work through agents. After all, enormous resources are earmarked for worldwide eavesdropping and celestial reconnaissance. But, they hasten to add, the CIA has not lost its capabilities in this field. It retains its paramilitary organization. Many agents arc involved in the new government-wide operations against the traffic in narcotics and against international terrorists. The agency, in fact, seeks to pro- ject an image of concentration in these areas. More recently, the CIA was 'asked by the new Federal -Energy Office to monitor the movements of oil tankers throughout the world to determine shipping patterns during the -energy crisis. Deeply involved in the corporate affairs of the oil industry, the CIA is believed to be the only government agency to have been able to compile a list of joint ventures in the petroleum industry. This is a top-seeret document beth frOm the view- point of the CA and the nil industry. eithere ts ne nuestien, (titian, that the CIA remains deeply involved in covert political action everywhere in the world. The latest example of such activities concerned the CIA. agent in northeastern Thailand who faked a letter to the Bangkok government 8 .Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0. from a guerrilla, leader proposing negotia- tions. -Iles was a classical example of the "disinformation" technique, intended to embarrass the guerrilla leader with his fol- lowers and thus weaken the subs ersive movement. But the. new Thai government took a dim view of the CIA's involvement in domestic politics and a scandal developed, especially because the American Ambas- sador, Robert Kintner, has a CIA back- ground himself. Intelligence specialists here think, the lintel-writing agent exceeded his authority?and did a sloppy job to boot- and this episode already has resulted in the recall of 13. I Iugh Tovar, the chivf of the big Cl. station in Thailand, and has compli- cated our diplomatic relations with the Thais. The Thailand incident also served fo undersct,re the extent to which the CIA op- erates abroad in conjunct ion with local se- curity services. In exchange for intelligence or whatever special las ors it desires from local police or counterinsurgency forces (often for reasons having malting to do With, the interests of the host country), the CIA may provide them with training or special equipment. Thailand, where the United States has vast interests and where there is a local instil gene y problem, is a case in point. But it also has been argued that this system has resulted in iLdirect CIA stipF.tut for police forces in rohtiCaily reyessive gov- ernments front Latin America to Asia and Africa. Last year, respk,--iding to Gin..;re,- sional pressures, ti'.e CIA promised lc end its secret programs Of actually training foreign police forces. r. made the point earlier that there are i! no giants in the United States intelligence community. This may be partly due to Henry Kissinger's forceful personality?he evershadows other figures in the intelligence establishment. And the recent quick turn- oyer in top intelligence jobs has lelf the community in flux and u.ncertaintv, aggra- vated by the Kissinger-imposed strictures on hs modus operandi. At the CIA, for example, William Colby still is new in his job and judgments are being reserved as to his efficiency and the value Of his innovations. The main concern in the CIA is that he assert his independence to- ward the White House, particularly in the area of estimates. Thus far his public image has not been bad. Ile is available to testify before Congressional committees much more frequently than I lelms did?late last year he appeared before two separate sub- committees to discuss the CIA's involve- ment (or, as he claims, non-involveme...1) in the Chilean situation. lie has testified on ?Vatergate as often as he was called. In the State Department, the new man in charge of intelligence is William I lyland, a former CIA official, a distinguished expert on Soviet affairs, and a Kissinger protege. He worked for Kissinger in the planning section of the National Security Council staff. But he has been .in his new post only since last December. The Defense Intelligence Agency, a 5,000-man operation; is headed by Vice Admiral Vincent P..dePoi,-;, an austere man who has held his joh since early 1973. The National Security Agency has a new Direc- tor in Air Force Lieutenant General Lewis Alien who was brought to the C/A from the DIA last year by Dr. Schlesinger, then ap- pointed to head the NS:A.1Jc is another top specialist in "overhead" intelligence. Both dePoix and Allen are career military intelli- gence officers with highly technical back- grounds. They are Pole known outside the professional intelligence community. Few Washingtonians recognize Admiral &Nix or General Allen on the rare occasions when either comes to lunch downtown. It is prOhahlV too cr1V to assess whether Kissinger's domination of the American in- ielligence operation is good for the country. But there are thoughtful intelligence specialists who have serious rei.ervations about it. Exyerienced intelligence people see a danger in the :Ana! role Kissinger is deter- mined to play: He [nay be tempted to inter- ? prct intelligehee data to tit his policy con- cepts. They think he did so last year when he apparently ignored CIA and IN R Warnings that the Egyptians and the Syrians were ac- tively planning an attack on Israel because of his conviction that the So% ieti wimid not abet an operation that would entlan:?,,T the dkenze they had worked out with hint., This, CIA people think, was a classic exam- ple of how a statesman can become the intel- lectual prisoner of his outu ideas, Finally, there is the notion that to be Use- ful, intelligence must be totally detached from the policy-making process. This con- cept of intelligence independence was a cor- nerstone .of the legislation that created the CIA in 1947. Yet Kissinger seems deter- mined to weld together the functions of intel- ligence and policy formulation, perhaps dis- regarding the profound difference between capabilities and intent of hostile parties. to WASHINGTON POST 18 March 1974 ir CI differentiate between them is, after all, the principal function of sophisticated intelli- gence. Kissinger's technique, possibly a plausible one under the existing system of government in Washington, is simply to throw specific hard questions at the intelli- gence people, receive the answers, and then make his own judgments. The question, therefore, is whether; American intelligence is more effective than before--in die most professional sense of the word. Allowing for the fact that it may still be premature to render hard judgments? the intelligence community, after all, is in i flux?there seems to be growing evidence ? that the present period is bound tube transi- tional because it does not satisfy the emerg- ing policy needs. The intelligence community itself feels shackled by the ?Vhite I louse in the intellec- tual dimension of its work. Being a bureauc- racy, it cannot function as efficiently as it should when it believes (rightly or wrongly) that fundamental concepts of the use of intel- ligence are being violated at the to of the Administration. This is something that Henry' Kissinger, whatever hat he may be wearing, is bound to discover sooner or later. -Ellis is not to say', of course, that every bureaucracy should not be shaken up period- ically. The perpetuation of old habits leads to sloppiness and opposition to new ideas. Quite possibly, the real change will come when the new generation of intelligence specialists replaces the "old spies" who still think in terms .of 1Vorld War II, the OSS, and the Cold War. Be that as it may, enor- mous care must be exercised to prevent the intelligence product from being misused politically, as often appears to be the case at this juncture, to satisfy grandiose policy.! concepts politically useful to the White House or the new -State Department under Kissinger. The tendency still is too strong to shoot the bearer of ill tidings?carefully con- structed policies are not challenged by cold r;vidence. Soviet cheating on the di:tente, a sacred Nixon achievement, must not be.ig- nored te prevent the daente from collaps- ing, Thic?is the principal example. There may be others. The object, then, is to make professional intelligence a respected servant of policy. And a final word: '1he surest way to demoralize the intelligence corinnunity is to try to involve it, as the Nixon Administra- tion tried to do, in such nefarious doings as Watergate and its cover-ups. 0 r"."T d)Ci'-' ? Z11 43 Anent the currant lw?itbiting among the Executive and the CIA and the Defense Establishment about inter- necine spying, the following excerpt from Margaret Truman's book about her dad, page 332, iG both human and enlightening; "Dad was even able to joke about se- rious things. One of his proudest ac- complishments as President was the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency. Before it 't7as Cstabliched, in- telligence was gathered by a half dozen agencies, and very little of it reached the President. One day he sent the following memorandum to Ad- miral Leahy and 7.ief.r Admiral Sidney W. Souers, the ?Ir. CIA chief: 'To My Brethren and Fellow Dog- house r Arens: By virtue of the au- thority :tc-I in me as Top Dog I re- quire ce. chn-ge that Front Admiral William D. Leahy and Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, receive and accept the vestments and appurtenances of their respective positions, namely as personal snooper end as director of centralized snooping. ... I charge that each of you not only seek to better our foreign relations through more inten- sive snooping hut also keep ma in- formed constantly of the movements and actions of the other, for without such coordination there can be no or- der and no aura of mutual trust.' H.S.T." NORMAN 0. TIESTENS, .yae,;.,. United Tint Court. WafiilLgten. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-IpP77-00432R000100320002-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0 CHRISTIAN SCIENCE Ele11:1-OR 19 March 1974 /- " , /,' \ ' ' ' ' ' , -r-?'1 Tens.:Ce.7--'"elteselneriond Staff correspondent cf The ati:i3tial Science Monitor ? 7SE:7-g leo I's, 7e nil n'.1161 Few essiane have much that is ",,'"C3C: to say about the U.S. Central in- telligenceAgisny. The e.entes :inspected of all sorts of nefar:ous schemes, and the schemes are not always believed to be directed against cur:sr/n:11113N. ai-iersceny had its, troubles etrn a 'dozens letter sent 13y a CIA ageat to the Thai Fresno Minister. The agent's action was. considered by me.riy Thais, to be an essample of 'clatant interference in Thailand's internal affairs. But one of Thailand's highest offi- cials caps thhat despite tin: intedent ? teli.lch the United States febsists was uneentherinc-cl ? tee CIA is rieeded in WASHINGTON POST 15 Mar ch 1g 74 Thailand and is of help to the Inesn Governeeenie l'ejcesftes'e "The T.:Tilted Stones Teas to ehtsin intelligence which nee den't have," said Deteety Tsintisten: Sultich Xinoreseel.e.ernin in en enter- view with this eepo:eter, "esncl ?Linie is some intel'igence. [01-nail-ed., by the CL 1 I which Ls' useful ? to us," he ss26. "This is sceeciaely tile when it ecesses tc wese s happening in Ls es, Cambodia, one,. Vietnam." the Then; official cad. "Sornetimes e.e.ople otrerstep their intellignesee-gathentsg role," he said, refee.rf rig to tile Poses lette "Fent it is 'elks ehee tongue read the teeth. Sometime:: the teeth lite, the tongue . but it is rot inte.ntionai." 0 . I The March Fyne .and Novak col- umn, "VW:es of Asniskica Speechless on t.C.,eng .e.seninelaltn" is a gross distortion aZ .che recore7. of VOA's covenage of T.,1:e. Leezhenitsyn, his buok, and th is dciii moyement in the Soviet Usien. VOA ha: covered :Misr and factu- ally the de.velepine, a!;-.' Mr. Solehen- itsyn and the peblic;tion ef "Gulag Archipelago," es it ',tar, cove-see: other aspects of the r'.,!..sif.a?qt nosveetent. Since the boo'n tee.: istenised on De- cember e7;, .nee sene Wee. Solzhen- i4:synie in. 'e Peen reposted al- roost l.seerly in Insesian laneu- age neweesets, and :nese: tlian l8f.." re- ports and features on fins Eub;; zet. have been Lroadeast, in othee nolitinai pro- granuning ? 337 times, coenting re.- pests through March G. These figures do not include net: items. Seeking to refleze a balanced pro- jection .of American and world seen- tion to events in the Soviet Union, VOA has given substantial coverage to the views of responsible American and other Western observers, includ- ing comments by the President, the Secretary of State, and members of Congress and to editorials Ls 711700r U.S. newspapers and stetcments by pnblic figures elsewhere in the world. In these broadcast:; there have been accounts of "Gulag Archipelago" as it has been described by reviewers in Ueited States and other countries. titles of some of these progranes give an indication of their content: "Sol.zheniteya Denounces Lies of So- viet Sy:sten," "Solzhenitsyn Biogra- phy,' "Nets 'York Times on -Solzhenit- syn," "Solzhenitsyn on. Soviet Law,' "Erpidsicn of Snlzhenitsyn. -eeseld Press," "Geleg 3cPr.; the and so forth. VCA': thorongh eznoztine e.n.e.- hessitsse.. arid "'.-2:r.7.3:.; esreineelene'' has been criticized on a core:inning basis by Soviet officials. LISLte's approach is enactIy Ves; sane new :se it was bcfeee the Seviat 1-.Treen ceased :sem:nil-1g he Sept 'tvialcut ou-z out exolsnation. Ileading iscre nneoee as the authors of the articls. uotoi. wculd be far net:ides the nosmalentseen of Voice of Aeterica nrogremming. Since 13U, ihc lick: ne.ennesieee operated under a set 3Y. Verne enes7e.:,,e principles. VOA': goal is to asses. ee "a consistently reliable- and at.'eler.,;ea- tive ecteece of news," tc neeeese S'ee balanced and nompreherisive pro:ince: lion of signiflcent Aneerican theuee.::: and institutions," and "es an eife-e. radio, VO,n will preseeit the pretielet of the, United States clearly anel. , fcctively." , Henze, the comment: se. 'fienises: Evans and leovalL that it le "shiseeeen'tt . . that 79A is being styli:cited :eters no-holds-barred rif.:713 pOlkj the U.S," :Landing of the ne.renteaj af th!:.1 ? Nir,0:- oi On the other hand, ::?eedio :ref:?iceen consistent with its oven. stein ?iced: if broadcasting the tent of ehs the pe.aple of the Soviet 7eniennetaClele Liberty, while also fundee ilss government, dee: noir sers,e fein, official voices, ,? -,--1077:A lit\..Y ? ? , (pdallo adOT222 1-2 ? 0 Washington. ^ ; - - ' 77seesieennee....t ecnnees in iSarigkok en:ed. ''Ceet Cese?.:: ens's: -17.7i.i2 rCeMtly abese e5e, 07e reente see:es:id:ago in ? s.'iss.e{:. an: been "serns" tetest rili:073 3r. eeducetee seesteenti.y :elates meetly tG elethockt ..,21 Lr :a. CTLP., ? F'!";,_";!-4.017.e.C7, ines'elan.e. Inners 'esseen, nnee stesne et the s sentc eels: need ';e: stipply teecnn ferfeenan C.0:7 ? 1/3y El T....aOtf07.A1 Ceeveennseee, Tee reduct1071 :10,E1 V277. r.fio,e7eig down of instaletaeions at a nue-re:el-at unereereeicd in Thai- lass , Inca:cc:Leg eo oemee source:. On: c.1C.C2 so E.:foe-nee was 17.7tieVe61 to or Sckol Naltorn inenetnesestein The third, eritenz the CIA antieo-, oiIiie:atnone "zs'et.t letteeneses nehe iet':er; eeeensting to be irons the Ceneseenesteled gent Move- ment, proposed te tree '.'-2-2;22. Govern- ment that it with the in.sur- gents. The fa."sa letter was aperarently meant either to encourage reelections front the ineu.rgent nanits or to im- press Thai officials with the sericu.s- no es in the illS0..gert ltreat. Beet in either case; when its origin: weee sesefeed by s Thai press:the leLi.nes succeeded :Deny lx esevoising ,Cseeteetsegr' th ren_e fe.:ires letter was 'Leaned to its nenden because e, eenee'. assistant to ? the Cie., agent ..;stiese,:enie.7 cent. the leteze 'ee; registeree mate thus reveal- ing the agar:::::- The egonc, Wil0Ee name was never disc:need, was cesfeneed to leave Thai- land by U.S. Ambassador William Kinteee almost ienmedistely ef' the irich'entu'c: -a for 21:117.11Z:1" later declared that the eznfiesse ef the letter had not been atienniatted by the U.S. :embassy sin Cia-. aCtiCee woutd, be taken against the ZIA agent. He assured Thei ofeicials that there would never he 2. cul-fance of an Incifent The incident triggered 2. protest dersionststs'flo:i. by several thousand sendeerte Lx C eat es?. ells U.S. .2 en esteGy hi ZEJ.).:/_Ya.71,37-;,. ?...`ejen tst 77%-' aeutus ? ZURICH, isiases. ti. ? The iesternationsi ?rose .enstitute. today described as "appalling" a aces re-port ihet more than aurnaiists 77 ore :se tie' esyrcli of the Centrze., 2F Agency.. '.1eLsectoi- Lie report, published in the 72'ashington Star-News, 5r:di- estect that sonic journa:Ists ssould betray their professica ees servins as the ears and en2e cc L . Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002:0 'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0 BALTWORE Sljn MAR 1974 14,0 T-1 ? _Yi:1 s'F :1'1- Or ,!,...?/.11 ,L .PC1.11 4-1 .1&? ?.? nefled Press Internal.fur,n1 ' Thr, Central Intelligence! Agency fired convicted water- gate Burglar Bernard L. Barker in the mid-1960s be- cause he was involved with "gambling and criminal Cie.! merits," according to former CIA director Richard Helms. . Barker is the man - ?vho worked for E. Howard Hunt ' Jr. during the Bay of Pigs in- vsaion of Cuba.. In the spring, of 1971 he recruited, at Hunt's ? request, the burglary team : that brolee into the Los Ange- les office of Daniel Ellsberg's. psychiatrist and subsequently; was caught in the 1972 Water- gate break-in. ' Barker and five others were indicted Thursday for alleg- edly conspiring to violate the civil rights of Dr. Lewis Field- ing, Ellshe.rg's psychiatrist, fie has served a year in ail after pleading guilty in the June, 1972, break-in of Democratic National Cominittite headquar- ters at the Watergate compiex. Helms' testimony, given to. the Senate Foreign Relations. Committee behind closed doors on Feb. 7, 1970, was made public yesterday. The hearings were held on the. nomination of Helms to be Ambassador to Iran. ? Barker's attorney, Daniel F. Schultz, promptly denied II elms' description of why Barker was terminated by the CIA. ? ' "Mr. Helms' testimony is in-. consistent with official infor- mation we have' received from the CIA. It is categorkfally de- nied by Mr. Barker and is sim- ply not true.." Schultz said.. Helms' statement on Batter appeared to conflict with -Barker's account of his rela- tions with the CIA given in sworn testimony before the Senate Watergate committee May 24. 1973, 3':2 months after Ilelms testified at the Foreign Relations Committee. Helms told the commit; about Barker: -During the Bay of Pigs he was one of the Cuban deri,..a- tiN es who was involved in that opc.i ation and it is my recol- lection that all lines with him on the part of the agency were eliminated some time in the middle 'ties. Barker, testifying to the Watergate committee, said lit' left the CIA immediately after the end of the Bay of Pigs op- eration in April. 1961: and had no further connection with it until Hunt approached him 10 years later. to set up the bur- glary team. CIA spokesnn,n said it would be ':difficult" to find out exactly when Barker left the agency or the circum- stances. Helm5 Tells of fi::ing Top U.S. 3tis? hi7ssotettl en Richard Helms, former di- rector of the. Central genee Agency, has told sena- tors he had a policy of going right to the tpp of Ai-aerie-1n business firing in trying to e et their cooperai.ion in gathering! intelligence o-,erseas. Helms now is ambassador to Iran. During ' a ? closed-door hearing on his ambassadorial nomination, before the Senate Foreign Relations Commitee in February. .1973, lIcilros?said the CIA aid not press busi- nessmen or others to pass on potentially useful information they may have obtained while visiting the Soviet Union or other countries. "There is no payment of money. There is no 'effort to twist anyone's arm. We simply are giving them an opportu- nity at. patriotic Americans to say %chat they know about this." Answering, questions about contacts with American busi- ness firms abroad under CIA:s Domestic Contact Service, he said: "It has been my own feeling that one should start with the chief executive offi- cer normally because it is not fair to these companies to met, up a relationship with some-; body down the lino that the chief executive officer does' not know about or a', least has. not indicated that this other. man is your point of contact." ? An estimated 290 persons are operating as int?Iligence agents under the...tuise of busi- ? nessmen, according to recent :American press reports quot- ing an unnamed American of, ficial who apparently is famil-, liar with the inner workings of ;the CIA. BALTIMORE SUN 19 March 1974 PT ?A ? ? 2a0-13 CII 11..RA ertheizect - n77,31 ensecrets Washington tili?Goveinment attorneys argued yelterday that the authors of a book critical of the Central Intelli- gence Agency have ariced a strained, inoperative" con- cept of how national f..Z.'2fetS are classified. ? They made the contention in final arguments on the case of "The CIA: The Cult of Intelli- gence." after which Judge Al- bert V. Bryan, Jr., in United States District Court in nearby-' Alexandria, Va., took it under advisement.. He. did not indi- cate when he will rule. , Attorneys for the authors, Victor L. Marchetti and Seen D. Marks*, argued that 'I:7e Jus- tice Department had ?Feilc.,d to prove that mates -i \el:lick the CIA has ordered deleted from the manuscript was actually classified secret. Floyd Abrams, representing Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., the pub- lisher, said that at the trial "we needed the man who clas- sified it, or some documentary evidence that it was classi- fied" to jestify its deletion. ; 1..112 4lepety assistant attor- ney general, Ire-in Gcldbloom, replied tha':, Me. Abranis had adopted "a strained, inopera- tive coecept" of how the clas- sification procedure works. It is ret ressi'ele, Me. Goldbloom I said, in feed questions into al computer and get hack data on who eless;Iicd re-:ter-Jai, or hen. At the 21.2-clay trial, :nest of it behind closed doors, four CIA deedty directors testified taf the deletions ordered tahen fm the manuscript. preece-.,y labeled secret, and remain classified. He said L':cir testimony, based on review of the menu- sc, ipt last - September, amounted to an updating of the classification. That is, he said, their testimony was that the material ?hould still be stamped secret or top secret. Melvin L. Wulf of the Ameri- can.- Civil ? Liberties Union, which -is representing the au- thors, said the case has impor- tant First Amendment implica- tions, pesing the queStion, "Are .the people going to be informed about-an important agency which lie said operates both overseas and dorriesti.. cally? - "The American people have been deprived, I think by de- sign, of a greet deal- of infor- mation about the CIA ... of activities around the globe un- dertaken in their nadie," he said. Mr. Wulf said it is Mr. Mar- chetti's stated purpose "to re- form the agency and not blow it out of the water." Mr. Marchetti, a. former CIA employee for 14 years, was enjoined by Judge Bryan 23 months ago from publishing any CIA secrets, without sub- Miffing the manuscript to the agency for review. Mr. Marks, a former State Department employee, has agreed to be. bound by the same terms. Knopf plans to publish the book within a few months ?with blank spaces for the 162 deletions unless the CIA posi- tion is overturned by the courts. The deletions range from single words to entire pages of the manuscript. C.; CC V.: V.,',1111.-gton 0. C., Sureav, March 17. 1974 rr, , . L-31: ETYdr About 7,Fad r3aelcer Assecistal Press The Central Intelligence Agency today said a had apologized on behalf of its former director, Richard Helms, fOr his testimony stating that Watergate fig- ure Bernard Barker was fired because of involve- ment in gambling and ether criminal associationk-, -.? CIA officials said Barker, onvicted, for-. the ? 1972. break-in of the Democratic National Committee head- quarters, had actually left the agency in good stand- ing. Helms, currently U.S. ambassador to Iran, told the Senate Foreign Rela- tions Committee on Feb. 7 that Barker had been dis- missed in the middle 1959's when "we found out he was involved in certain gam- bling and criminal ele- ments." The testimony was not released until last Monday. After its publication, Barker complained to the CIA. Agency officials said a check of the records showed lhat Helms was in error and after being informed of this the ambassador asked that Barker be extended an apol- ogy. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-F4P77-00432R000100320002-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0 THE 16 MariLl'.. FOR, ST".:K James, an aeros a c engineer. ageti; 3.3. twilight v..erl,-.; gical spying. He informant 017; t,:c-e?;; technology as v.ell Ls Lit and Whitney it-httrcf:t propuian who tra.,,ci!...?a scientific ,:rinferences fn places as Atli,..?ns, Belgiade, Venice, 7.7,1 There Jsmes with St;ciet then covertly r...ner-ttc hi: CIA cantat:t hat he learned. His v letters a conmendatiun tacit the air forc?s, thmn his employers, an," tiroto ..he CIA as well. .iart3es rm..: Ias ec..-i-i;! from the coiti, at tha mice both his job and his dna? :ffile as a CIA tri.i.rrmart. has given Cr,rigressrtn, force, the .F3J., and CIA an-d story of cloal.:--:a harrassment b7 an a.f-isn.r. military intelligence ;:gcncy ? the air fe?-r;e's cC77? t shnology City;turi. ATter James affatr, repel-tea; 29-page sworn sfiltzine;)t pe.!S exhibits to ths at lions, Senator called on Wednt:stlay for the abolition t.-1 the ;foreign ttichn;oler,y, The agede:i's misiion is to ,stihrie intelligence an partiedlarly .2,rt?f,taronnan. Felt trietIy Li: ftiaCt! aP.:11nia ii' as aaart 1.1a. its `.?1% .:r- Thre base in the ' Tniy etnoiti;ors of :;:rns arter into conlracis fi-rts in orc."-:-,1to anif ;teelthi 7O: ,tta?h ?ihay intelligence aperatif.-hn cii pro- Yid? rnio,ce et ;pain:fly." e is; irs th2 CiJ a'.r.tivatc cor7.irnrs ci-rt;ad. Torre have he. ;. es's reocd-ts, LI b?tte'l high ornd,ils, inat the Cf.d. utts smnt? abi; operati,-g ar 2ot nit: c cart. er ? indostric.; " not t.,a put into a of i'ercen complia.nee v arnasts from ? faii0,11,icence uci't 'au 1C.:;S j? rrac husincES." TIT alsti eite o7". "inteitigence - c':'lnL case to :'.oft.nce con- trctor3 *which proriclesan unfair gempetitive a,.1-.?aninge to 'he :?ooperalitte company." Seerett?rv 11. iai1e:i;sear tolc", duiing a lhating'nst that he world innl- imp the L7:1T)CkI TIMES 5 ch 1974 From Fred Emery Washington, March 5 With the return of a Lahour government, the Central Intelli. pence A?zency will be witlichirT Se,?irl missile testin2,, the Chinese anti-confuzius cam- paign, and ei...?cr the Middle East. It may also be interested in Britain and other West Euro- pean but as low priori- ties, and in the normal course of lioiness. rhey arc not :it& ?garde& as -banana republics. Tbis is imitited here with quiet force by and nor- mally inaccessii:,ie sources. They admit that they could he expected to say little else; that the CIA is unfortunate above all intelligence seri-ices in being expected to read Ltir people's mail and then talk about it. None-the-less these sources. with a slight ft own. deride The Times for first carrying und then failing to 'follow up its January IS story that ao to Jr.) extra CIA men had been drafted to Britain To watch o'er Indust! hal uprest. They arc not amused that Ore Am.,rican Lon. pai?I ;the air 7t-zte to his further, ,ne othc?.? 71f:',17e; hoc] to i'ne c._ IUT;tst.. OtiS liar I;T--;. s_ticc. CZ; v,-.1.?.n.y p:a ? Slit 1?J,..,?:4,.15u 5:: P.7.77%t arift ,a II ;C. 'or; c?-7. CT! to 71_10111.'a71. 110 5iLC L77. ' ? L 17:70'7., ..-7 -'71C 717 ?1-,7ji* ,-71:7111c Y;;;I:r.. iiD,_ihint?-? mac it, it tiler 3 ? ? tic i?,?',:es t: zinc; d' !1,13 . ,d t an. ? ; nyr, ; . ?.'h ? s;n:Ls. Jr1 175 1..-a= 10'S 7;t.:??th-Lr aim ...r:,- .10011 :.ere tiaa'aiit t_ 7_ ? : 17112S rt'1%tk71::.. 111-n,-2:c 01;-1%; 1.7 . ?. hussy dental has ?.akan isisrt ettilidrination of the ornal story. While unwilling to 2E1 on to thc record, they dismiss such reportin:.; as "siily" but -,vr;,?ly accept iz as part of :he CIA inirden. hit Richard Helms, former CIAdirct.tor, had a cartoon tin his r.:Fict atlt of it t-oit.ittio erupting rith te cap- 'on "The CI.% did ir ". Iwo specific points arc rotitle in rebutting The Times story. Firstly. President Nixon is mere interested in averting nuclear than in heariii: latest details of insinst-r:r1 unrest n coif ry---:C alone Britain. 5..ccondiy, fur asscr:s;ng the sitrAtion Britain the CIA has its cat;, a: hid: at headquatets in Larietc, Virginia?in I31 diffca-'ia academic specialities, it is v.rondly. The CI simuly does not rkteil ao -eine hi at or 47.; of its p,ople to co,ifirm ,?:hat it oun already get from iiritish smirees. It is adnintc.i. lOOVO. .:i131 r.ritoin is ;7- , place, for -sen7._reriecs ;IV if.nterna- .i.-_:,," ...a. ? ? .e.olz int it 74;1' :11" ciing `?.C1 C: )7k:1 a;iti?its. -1.?.rres ,77':1* so.::olt t.r s 1'f F C.11. Ta?I'C'era- ;. t .'71 ....lit_ The 7.;t: ' corn- ? .? ala 7 stir- r.1:;re o.116. nIt ,0 7c to the hook. '.r.eit to the I. the ? director ,osep,h ,?finf amct that ? _. 7t7photo- -.":" ore- . ; 'But .-itcriiev,'s con- , chuot z"iri: not 'flu'b act of , is ida ???-? ? ? been i3- 7co, "or his e was c, . corn- :1:0 o ;iLl t.. CO to lie ;1;71 fo: ,-?nierican liased round hergf ore 0-12 inference is rhat TI;c: Times sourer.' jumbled all t:tese vi.i-iters. into ail; ,i2Li-kisi io .Anw.11,?-? CIA 1731.i. in LuncIciii. it was not 7i1-- ) `iv uiIS i ii ;,111 C7-.C.70.7.17,C Of inform,T,tion ittid always 1,e,ri ntrtintaii-?:d. said, in an t-inierency "Linif.;:d. ? 75C7'e seen as ihrn some chi-act , a Ii r.?-? 'oc undertaken. "int cu. penetration ; h: ?-..on..ct_11:::6 from a ; "?thi,-d t_1111.1--v". he itlisted, air-ova the way it Ivas doito but 'lie Itnevc of oczao.1 it had a been ir. Pu To. r-t r-tile-',.??ed talk teocn? aiccUe' "-'as then he a riti'.itirdi s.,uni. by the n-ics. and the Ct.', slti..?.v .-1.1V 1,7;77 ..2.ined 10. 3.7 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0. .77,r? rT6`13 :-- Sen. Howard H. Plzer Jr. (11- Tcari.), the Senilte matinee %dol, ;Ina :n iin behind the icenes atoint- tled .:-White :7 aide Cherie:, Col7o1.7. jc?Lt ef- fort to .2lir!ate the Centeal.ln- telli!-:?,:- ?: A.:,?gc:muy i7 C! ? CAron exercLatii hie fidi AmetiLline- rights at the Ceaato 11-?&-zinz:-: :L2 has col- abm?ated cyi etly tBaker's top et,.en!inia..e L.-le, Fred Thq,:?on, in t'f erate at- pt ha 1.7ater- 3,h.e bheto th?-?C.. f..".?olsftn 17.a -i in touch with the CIA anq,le. ?.r.tE 26 picion Vliet the 2.: alaneuver may 13::".. House ploy to dive: ? at- teon from L. onre c! ti :Le': hotly served. THE WASHINGTON POST Tuesday. March 19, 1974 ('.(1Qe.etf deny that I Ainea.A.,:aticen is. ;? diA?oraier,ary action. They Lay he is hard at t.voi;.: cc de- tailir.d report, which y 'All he a "hustbshell." hints .va Lavr. gottcyl (*: ,s,if.n6C*3inr,..!:e:1; I:; (1 7:iir cic.N;erip- inn o; ,.!.oat ;7oi r L. dallieti ?viI.:1 the ih ttho CIA really Vit;thenert the celebrated breLloin at Derrkocratic head- for ic"?-?-?:,Tr er7.! ^,e.? 'qurity' ree:.:ot;?; 7mZi C::?T=.; pulled strings to hush it up. But ha !taLt never seemed to be able to get hia theory to jell. What lin tlly persuaded him +vc.s our sources say, "as t' acir-:ytCAoa .1.4a. 9 th;tt tarep: of CIA can ,or- sations v.'ere destroyed durl'all, the 7Tater5ate. Leader Me hcfield (D-Mont.) hes apecifi- ally requested that they be pre- r ? At Da::er-'s in;tiseten,. fer-; me:: CIA chief Herns, now ambassador to Iran, was; hauled befs:0 the coramittne a week ago under the most secret) conditions. In addition to Bakerand Thompson, the session was also attended b;:., Chai:-.:.'an Sam Jf.j Ervin Jr. (D-N.C.), cousel Sam! Dash and a few trusted aides.i ALo present, surprhingly, waa Sen. Stuart (D,77.e.)t who heads the Senatc.'s hush CIA oversight subcommit- tee. ? For four hours, the chain-1 :cinching Helms was t:xilled :al.,;-)ut the CIA's put in the :W,itergate events. We ilrwo lesencri that the carrot %rm. scrirts sho-.v that EtPael.; que];:- lions ,acre aimed at tmenvering a hidden CIA involvement. : Baker seemed convinced, for 'example, that Helms personally :ordered the tapes deetoyed. Oor .-.,c.nras say that 1,1:CCM:GAN STAT 2 NEW; (EAST LANSING, MICHIGAN) 117B 1971: . _ " 11 ? ' By AM dGSTRA State New Staff Writer Tt.venty to 30 people questioned, heckled and laughed at a Centra Intelligence Agency branch chief on campus Tuesday. Lhilip A. True, held of the East Asia Drench of the CIA Office of Basic and Geographic Intelligeme, was invited by the MSU Geography Dept. Colloquium Committee to speak o: applied geographic research in the CIA. The protesters, representing the Young Socialist Alliance and the Southern African Liberation Conmittee, packed the back of a small roam in the Natural Science Building and spilled into the hall. Approximately 25 other people attending seemed to be nonprotsters. Before True was L-troduced, Barbara Riemer, asst. profemr of psychology, stated the protesters' position that the CIA has no right to speak at MSU because of its active supprcssion of democratic freedoms. An older geography major who could not get into the roon said: "It's unfair, that these protesters ;_liould create a stir and take seats away fr:m those who want to hear. They should make their point at the beginning and then leave." A single page statenent handed out by the protesters at the dmr, claimed: ?The CIA is atterrpting to suppress publication of the book "Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia" by Alfred McCoy, which Eocuments CIA 11( 2 I 17 1 rit7" f (--)) participation in heroin traffic. OThe CIA?is in court to stop a former agent from publh,hing his memoirs. (-The MSU Vietnam Project from 1955 to 1961 was used as a front for the CIA, violating the Geneva convention. The handout also claimed that the CIA "subverts the basic human rights of life and liberty and democratic self - determination," citing "well documented involvement" in Cambodia, Laos, Chile, Brazil, Guatemala, Iran and Greece. True remained calm, ignoring heckling and giggling throughout his 25 - .minute description of what CIA geographers and cartographers do. When True finished, Bill Buckler, Geography Dept. graduate assistant, said: "On behalf of those here, I thank you for your talk and apologize for the disruptions." . ? Asked about geographical research behind the bombing of the Red River dikes in North Vietnam, True said no information on that had been requested from his department as far as he knew. After failing to respond to several long, complex questions from protesters, True was asked if he was under orders not to answer. ?? "If I don't know, I can't answer," True said. "The questions seemed more like statements to me." At the end, True thanked the group for an interesting and stimulating hour, and raid he would be willing to come back to MSU anytime. Several persons shouted, "Please don't!" Approved For Release ":;ier't3 !U)5- . a. did not ihcemirt.te the CIA Once the houring It-aa' Over, Pp7;7r a71t1 Tiomp5an ?vent to wor1/4on tlie revert. It probat.:7y will be ubmitted to Symi7 -;- trn's Subeenr 1.k.ittce for Seear:.1y if,teview. jlakor, c:eted t ilentand tlnit all CIA d.cetiments In the Watergate case be declasAfirl He lass claimed privately that tha...1 Da- rns will bolster his case. Oth- rs who have had access to the documents insist they may raise more questions than they an- swer. Footnote: Baker cruld net be reached. Colsin, Thompson and! Dash refused te provide any de- tails about the CIA invest17,a- tion. Thompson, however, acid: "Hopefully, the entire pic..7) will be made public. At that time, people can make teir own judgments." YEN YORK TIMES 10 ,March .197/4 LY r..bkSe 1\1 11 ainy Fr f Or; ff r? ? r\AA \,? Cdri The American businessman active in trade and investment matters in such politically sensitive listening posts as Hong Kong and Vienna may be?"Shhh!"?an American spy. That's not. exactly news to, the na- tives, ? who have developed a sharp . eye for the American?or, for that matter, English, Russian or any other ?espionage agent, but it's unusual for the spy industry's home office to let out statistics on this aspect of its work; as an unnamed official in Wash- ington did recently. Unbending with New York Times reporter David Binder and requesting, naturally, that his name not be used and his department not be identified, the official dropped these tidbits: There are more than 200 American Intelligence agents stationed abroad posing as businessmen. Some are full- time operatives, and the business con- cerns that proviod their "cover" re- ' ceive payments from the United States Government to help defray business overhead. Others are part-timers. Some are "a pain in the neck": They spend. "10 minutes a day" on intelli- gence and the rest of the time making money. But some, both part-time and 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77a10432R136078'8320002clErd very valuable. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0 NEW YORK 11 March 1974 iCt 27i,y When La.A.ritans ping calls through ;LA.-- markets: rot an et -them are aware that they are naw C.;i71- patIng fcv .ittlell of the fent,. ti,ey bry v./1th pacple in ,M,T)::?:, Western the !Loviet Uv ion., China a.r,f, most e.7. the- xes': of the 71:11; they are. LgricultlIa ar.f. ez.l.";erts over a major rn a?r.e. sharp, inc.:e.aze4.; in recent yearn 'raj:, 'Ise.21 The, s::..dde.;a and vas'.. 2;1 agficulturai axpoat..; 'Lanza tie! United States. In the fiscal yea' anrIrij June 30, 1972, the totni value of I American agriculture:. Emportsi was 59-billion. :or ilia year end- ing 'thin June 50, the 3ororn-4. ment is es'iln.ating total. cu/tural saloa; anrcr.:'; ;',;20-1 billion, 2% theta "We had a heilish crease ir quantity:, of! it was in prica,? k. rn.raj 0. Stepharin, deput,". sales manager' in the Depart-1 rnent of Agricritura'a. agriculture service.-`1?.?,:f....yhe 501 per cent of this vraEi ;Sr!!in That 'n'hen! a lot of are the existing 1cductn. a S' ternational :set. Discussions acres,: t.tipresetit?tf7a..a. ;foe':mdv s.ensu,s .C1E.`k: Z.-'5179E.IV:C-11 tural trade. Is :act Most Liner:I.:a:in v?,Ith the 350 millioa tha late cuma-,ez cf.' 1272. marked the. end of tha JnLte Si' tat. C,allily-SIZi.; t;?,- ; , Cr.f, in ',-?yer-.1-ncreasiug. 'Cr" sc;Ti.).-;:oa'tiO allipeacc Soucta.',' YC e,: jEa5:1 ',3utz .sna: ire:aping fare convin,:c-;; :that '',"1-1e .inoa: a", 'lel,-re. IL L' _ !can ,. leases a =_ Cr CTIMS ships,, ,ac;:s., and nec.. ,and. fish- .. :773 r_nc; c,s n. '33 . :and r. dn serva 111.1i1C Lcund Lcrri1e.' 'Jan ? 11.11]Oil, .ri_UCErTIS," _ "r in conri-_,.i:ny 0. CA t to get gran/ f.on as to deicit 7 '..:11C21.: ; , ? ? -? !,,72.St ? 30"' a.'? sp:-nt 'aii Ly icns tt: "71d :7-'3- 41- -? . ;C1I1I IaXEII 1740.; i:host. . CY:P. thEt is iTC,CCT; ,...5?2.r, a_.?,. LT-11:?-?-cha Anr.a Kansas City the: is to take grain ; it is in surplus and then l'a.,s1.,..buto it when it is no sr.rplus. nut's the business." *,?/.:.1. with :rd horn- "- c:: ? ,$)! tire don en;:dc inE-ati;,'n? ? 7.c :1;:z?t:,:-.; .ah ;-' ? an , , if 1,tha. ;:srica at a I,. in -a, city; atino, acle,:- considerably,' ta v.:no 2.7oensa a..feeding naultrii in! thit and event:la:1y to tho to consum- e:7r. Likewise, a. ..leveloptag tin lire for more meat al...):ead. may ."!eac.i to a ciras?tic Ltrz,E.:-..-; in e:;:ports of Americaar earn and . grains, thez pl.;ces As making the cost of' ozef and pork much :iigher yr LilO Uratei States. ;J. ?17-Lot?ric. :. L Yhc atiang,'; was :put-r.".:d by :auml-t.r at things, such on tha easing of restriction': ci-; T:ae with Ca,nmunist coon- ,in ?.-nany ?part9 ucar :.:".tch of ker ni-nteion in *.T.:..rf.rls; ?::.a.ri; ago, 7.-IsinT chavusid soy wLva: rat :?-out; cro-3 friiu1 as n: Asia axi, .':vo7'a1)aSiritio ova-: ira 7rist sin Oar, hi' yrid asnait; But it ? &bon:: s'ai t, : c3unti7: that it many j a;:rprine. Little eublic antics 1.??,-an :to the. s'r,iftlig rho. .'.nirrican 3al:afa saatigarifig the ZE.2;,:itrI.Eat of iigricu1turZ1 ho :le",7 the reco:d esresolinofl ',-;-,sat. The be.17.ers 7c.i.;ght thel of s'ome sort cansrng crini...rels? in oIrect, an arryougc; on ne aeies, lest the Stat.:', nu, cf nr. ? . . . u a 'bia, ' 'Sat aria a, ..",y )71 mailstry ...-uat are La trade in market the" ni ? g pries tar proaidai.a, :those that ars raiaaa. grea'a :surplus hares. C.07 :wheat, tn:.: tInter Statt;.: sumac only about a its annual cycn there ova non7u, obviouz; :71ziftts it mg the people' zat time of rising prices Snot :Lin; ,must bid against the ren at v,oild fey itry Dav:s. .cern.--y is yyit'g so a. hut lie'....H:?? 'lmbrace.. L1.17; ?11"..m.% Arre:ici.;; tora,?linz:ra are going (.ThrLi:,,? ir ? .s : as cr.5 net tie `nareila: Cl Sa.LndeTs. ?aransova.,:: via es.: L01-.1/7 C/11 divisivn, are faa.i?r, - new world It's :he: :;i?sina,,. ho oic'z. torn ar??ir, for zIt'ne:: an. "Since ,Ti cur biggest cus- bner. ilTncle Sam, but do much ;If that any ? vernon that the world: ? stocis.s tatrit, but in-i -.73a:tad t'cri ta-u United. States not ant o:i wheat. : "Ws really ben e s-7-,ocic to 'aI Mi.?. Saunders said. "Mel TAti 1: have been with Cargill a. nicrnbaralt yzars and nobody antis, any attention to our busi- ness. ATot-?',: we've been on radio ;.77, :''.e.ievislors and people corn- slain to st 'narties, 'You're 'the gut who sold all that v,rheat to the 71ussians.'" 'That .RuFsiar, grain deal is rnost reisu_r_derstood thing,' 7.-.d itt. Wii.Cdents, ``Ir..1.t it was 7u=;c mers than any- , ng. Neboeiy $3redictoC. the Imocic T.uirarouild." '? %.youlf.-? interject-d, "but -.;e thought it `,701.116 cv 1.0bCr..; rcta.d ,11e 17..Lra- trfs thags, so ? - tFike 2.rant? sales 1,13 sells grain (it reore "L;. sa 14 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 20 March 1974 Aid t rEVOr ed By'dem W. well The refusal in January of the Howe of Representatives to .authorize United States participation in the World F-2einins "soft loan" program ? the International Development Asso- ciation (IDA) ? was taken by many in Washington as one: more indication that would no longer sup- port any form of foreign aid. The vote also was seen as further evidence that the mood of the public was becoming increasingly isolation- ist. Now that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is about to open hearings on U.S. participarnon in IDA, it may be well to take a look at what Americans do think about the devel- oping countries. No one doubts that the mood in Washingten is unfavorable to foreign aid, or indeed to any inejoe Jnarlcsn role in :lel ping to solve that Rob eri: S. Maraneera celle the problems of "a.bsolute poverty." ? The annual passage of foreign-aid bills has some to resemble the "Perils of Pauline"; the legislation is con- stantly in peril and saved from immi- nent destruction only by the most incredible of feats. But does Washington reflect the mood of the public in this case, or as in so many other cases, is Congress only an imperfect mirror of what the public actually thinks? The latter may well be the case. Support for development is one issue on which the perceptions of the policymaker seem to be very differ- ent from the feelings of the American people. Americans sympathetic A recent survey published by the Overseas Development Council asked a cross section of Americans about attitudes on global development, U.S. LONDON TIMES 14 March 1974 7 7- 0 A 77 r-ri: (717 ? ' The omniscient as well as omni- present image projected of Dr Henry Kissinger is beginning to look exaggerated even for such an efficient and hard-working Secretary of State. Not that it is entirely his fault. Much of the world, east as well as west, hankers for Superman. The role was thrust upon him, although presumably he did not have to be persuaded. But the image is beginning to crack a bit, and not because the war, for the ending of whieb was awarded the Nobel 7cace Appr vpiliPtill?R&Vage'20134/68708af ' CIA rls'a- foreign aid end teada policies, and a range of other Issues concerning world poverty and development. The results indicated that the public has not become Leolationist. Rather .A.mesleana do have a basic sympathy for the problems of the poor abroad despite the fact that meat are unaware of the true anendons of world poverty and etroneonely be- lieve that this country is spending far more in terms of relative wealth then other rich countries. Americans consider world hunger and poverty a very serious problem. While they give higher priority to domestic poverty programs, they do not see- the solution of domestic and internatioeal problems as conflicting. Interce tingly enough, the cold war no longer provides any part of the rationale for development assistance; the basic reason for the concern of Americans with the poor abroad is moral and humanitarian. More than 68 pe.: cent. of the public supports the pri: providing assistance to the p :-..e coeetries; even when faced with nudgetapy choices, nearly 1 of every 2 Americans favors maintaining' or increasing the alloca- tion for foreign economic assistance. Nevertheless, Americans remain to some degree skeptical about official U.S. aid, feeling that too often in the past, assistance has been wasted, tied up in red tape, or siphoned off by corrupt officials in recipient coun- tries. This sympathetic attitude is re- flected clearly in support for private programs. Voluntary contributions to private aid programs have increased 60 percent over the past decade, the same period in which official U.S. aid has been declining. Why this discrepancy between pub- lie opinion and public policy? First, no channel to. mobilize this sympathy now exists. In the. 1950's and early 1950's, public support was mobilized by a partnership of the executive branch (which saw aid as an impor- tant tool in the cold war) and key members of Congress and private organizations who supported the pro- gram for a variety of reasons. Real neees disregarded Today the support of the executive branch is lukewarm. Many sympa- thetic congressmen and private lead- ers consider current American po- licies irreleaant to :-.?-cc3s of the poor countries and are, paying moreattention to domestic needs. Second, Congress has its own per- spective and, in the absence of any strong public pressure one way or the other, gives low priority to issues concerning the poor countries. The result is that both the executive and the legislative branches generally disregard the needs of the developing world. The survey shows Americans pre- fer programs aimed not at gaining short-term political advantage but at alleviating such basic human prob- lems as' hunger and malnutrition, disease, illiteracy. These, of 'course, are precisely the kinds of programs that IDA was designed to support. Therefore, when Congress again considers the issue of U.S. participation, it should under- stand that this is one case where wise public policy coincides with the wishes of the American people. John W. Sewell is vice-president of the Overseas,Development Council, a nonprofit organization concerned with the relations of the developed nations to the "third world." (r-4 fercity. Rather is because nf animosity towards Western Europe. His statement that the United States had its biggest problem in dealing with its friends and not its enemies was odd. His warning that in any competition with Europe Americans "are going to win because we have infinitely more resources" had a note of truculence impossible to under- stand. It was not the first outburst. His displeasure was no less P -1n, con t nue s with p?3,1,c markedlast year during the sons that later not bear did , cle.e. examination: One must assume that this animosity is a factor in European-American ? relations, and therefore worthy I of analysis by one of the American think tanks such as RAND or the Hudson Institute: ? Since this is unlikely, I shall have a go. First, the cause of his dis- pleasure. Clearly the perform- ance of the European Commu- nity has been disappointing. , manly because of France. The ether member nations are well disposed towards the United States, as Dr Kissinger must CWROY:771-108411S2RIMOVtin 0 ( ':. Ldr? they are as powerless as is the United States to do anything about France, but his condem- nation embraces the entire . Community. In the Middle East, the : United States was an active participant. Europe was not, and can hardly be blamed for looking first to its own inter- ests. For European countries Arab oil was vital. For the United States the embargo has proved to have been only an inconvenience. Europe could not afford to wait for Dr -Kissinger's atten- tion, and had he not been preoccupied with other conse- quences of the war he could not . have done anything about oil. 1 The Arabs had the pov?er to 20002-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0 nirn nil the te?es. the et.-nti;lo to recogne real- ity. At the time the Statc.,-; is- oil, end y?qui-ed to asse,..trieg7,i 1:1?.;-; ceee Euror, e, . Brita;n, would the Community C..asen te stand firm widi TrXi3si:Iger. Neverthelr.F,s. 7.t.t,erit, was rc-,ted at the Wr.shiT7,ton col3forenc.. :and. With 117"- tion of 1:7-.-anc:?., ivrtetl to cooperate.. This is necessarily a shart review, but pact from the French attic.ide fr.,:ac is little cause for Dr in- temperate lenynnt,e. Sc; 1...,:hat are the possible c-telanations fer his behavioer P It could be jet log or L;e'l_eal tiredness. A irtr,r, who is not in ,guorl phys;:ol 7hape can hardly ire; tnuch and esp;:ct to ri.:so:Irld -,?;,-:;1 to tile. admittedly tirecorto -arJbleins of alliance. politirs. Like John Fosttr Delics .before ?him, Dr ilZi;i?inr,4..- 71.t.s more or less divorc:d ? _'" from the State 7::_rx:trite.n. its bureaucracy can be tirtr.nln,-.. but it is,-,2t." class ce-:d JAPAN TIMES 15 March 1974 -- -7/ / WAINGTON ?- The Goverirnefit ? which is poying Turkey Il5 million c; her. the .growing of opiu ro ries has been quietly urging India to increase its opium production. T h a re- son: The Turkish opium ban, v.hich drug officials .say has helped rcluce the flow of heroin into this country, also has caused seribus shortages of opium ref...der:1 ior medical uses, such as the production of mor- phine and codeine. "In case you haven' said one Coverornant cificial, "There's now a worldwide opium shortage." Two Adrninistratice officials confirmed Teet.ntly that the U.S. has ap2roaohed r Liia, the world's largest producer of le- gal opium, through "normal diplomatic charnels" 7o an at- tempt to head-off an opium shortage. Both said that this was not. as much of a con- tradiction of its Torkish policy as it might appear. . They said that Ttehey, atere the U.S. Is amdor_s he beep the, opium ban in elite, rad been the source of to CO per cent of the illegal herci,1 bat fount; its way iCtI the U.S. :Little, :if .any, Indien ,epium e1er r>.:22.0;etI this crlintiz;:- thrti-JrhIke market. t"aey be bctiar tc: than ta;-?e 01 015t. of his irc t en+. r:Lite7f,e. Th:so o, ranrot he One 'star only to .cecall in circurnstarce?.3 .r !ulcsth,.-eatoned tcrope -vith. I vinssv: rcappralr.?,) and 01,o v?it r?,"eV..,Ssistaiice fcr the Dam. P.o'c the reznitma- spzeiy 'tics .in Br Kiisin- ger. s preocci7liz.sian with de- tente. Thi; is tw.derrnodabIe to some crrta.ot. Th-2 world, east and wo3t. .2)?ould he r,r3teful, but ha ha-3 10,:-.A:07110 intiC11.S;VeVe to es the New Yorker gently pointed oat when discussing ei.:palsion_ of AlundeCo17.iochitsyn krorn Russia. The maLavine observed that hr Solzheritsyn'.3 presence in the 1.%"est nro-'..airiti the moral uni'v of the: L-trti- end that Dr it,lissinral's career nroclaitue.d the a..opro3cl,in7, poiLical and cit; of the ti1C' Seen:tory C^ .!7;2r1 bent:1 the ;-11.1.,::sian triter he tri: cvosiv::- action. "1.V.? do not '!.t.i?se-o.3 enough 3-.:htnn. the smic;i7c, cireurn,tence.s dev,i-_,:r-dire of 7kfr ?Pat mach limo lii tl-?;-.t - ::.oncern ?e that nothing rausl he axia. interfere. .11: have the Impression that this especially ap;.7lies. to Europe. The C.orornunity Neto are .e?...mectod not to get in '.ay .31,3. to .%:-.:t,l,t,ate urTugst.'4:731-ytly ? Dr Ytisshieze eNtiticts toe,' much. Europa is ....7ot a coi:ec- tion of alicrt states, and Frence has been id-evoked i:ito further lz.aropet.ri countries bce mroathing offer. P.ftct Brancles achieved more than 25 -years of .`tnerica.t> diplo- macy diU. Is also merle tbe wider detente poliry passible for lie wift,:iti era c:cest tots. cc believes tha.: since the Ti NIVorlcl. War 7Surog.-een go'vero- rnen'il: have "very been fully lep,ititnate". t is an osid belief. They may ',lave 'ner:n waelt, hut they c.rliy elected. D.- 1:issiiigor rest kr:n-y tiret in:IL-Re:1,-1 :zit rarest -runirient NirP.t1 bane a the first '11::::er3:.:t2 in- vcrti7,otn.t? lt:st o.trumn. Jr the ert3.? ? e.ny agreroen'.: ncreos'e 1-c 'uctio,n ;317 o.' obtain metlicinui opium from India., rather th20 3:,EV2 opium growing resume in Turkey. A 1972 I..t..port, by President Nixon's Cabinet Committee on Internatioral :';',Tarcotics. Control showed 14-Idia was the w.wici's largest producer of leFtei opium, with an estimated total prodrc- tion of f".fl tr,eric tons in :i071, compared s.,?ith ,-tscimated.15,C metric tor,s pro "2eed in Tur- lc.ey. - The, warit on to note thst while the of Itercin isv ATheriC:ail. rdciicts had come ?krom Turkish opium 'flat had :been refined an French he- rein "most -:yoduc- ;;?on in s',1-1e 11-rj;.ia.1 . . is cer'sumed ir t ,ge.Geral rgYcn where it Is produced." One ai the so.7..,:-.2z-is saitl StaL 2:?apartraLrt c""ii7Ials tacted the past $i\ ....71ent..nS and u.,-.ged that opium producticn be htcreased is meet..m!4tical needs. The second source, hovievt:r, tibdicated that there hai lleert mere on out' - 7:cr L-1.!_-rEass, ' he said. think shad- irIfsic:h-c,, that ite-a would be a market for anyciiirtz they taaa76. Tiro- citice, but stressed thet. wouldn't v.tant ary 17. there was a dt-n.ssr of if maci- di-terierl bite the illicit .? Indian ...csponse bes been, era y 3 T2G- nor? nic z7,.;tr.a at be ";`?zy :r1 not cuitirm. te ''Tsose ctit J:st !:an lc bad taken spo:zes-man sakTi. are not hi abe riciLtz un this at the ei-nbooFy:' A acK1-7:-.37.-aaa.-_a:Lezo, a.ttornelf tea a z-.2ze::?-. linT, also said Department !Ye. increase been tinr,n o ?.,,ary 10 ? the " re: may ''.:Ortr...17.71 go e aware 7rnist also knew th tmlilte l'.1.asr.o..v and Pekin gsvernmen d;otrunotic tern t to say Tel: Co ri.o men': 0.1 at r:cCstttg er an 'flashino,t-t: is acer to 17.1ez-n tie'7.T3.1!;i.e ren at; F.F. arn.-Iiirtv,- 7a achie-tc :5Lor ret..,st te cc:1 T ar^ -3. ear to tut to neat 77."On ,ogint hy Yo;,?: 171:,7ie.c. yertex when it chai.zi ised r; diff.rercct tweet- he jolted trtcx a*: Itiaz:ket .-__Iit;;t to '27:ace rl-r teci in a ver brawl... . Or.771 ba event :right tilat tis r.2atitre lie lat:o:ons it-nz?ry' ?Trotri 'flr.).1 17:72, .1P-I-VP:7% acct.:rang to fticialsat Dreg Enrorcarnalril.;:...tlin .I,atration ? bed ext almost, 3 ;net:later.opsa.--:;t. They say ann j;."'; least partly respt sible ltr,ro.fA L'-aorta 1;E:" haltanje a,d.sts along aES cowl. '222:e baA "ZICL' elan ir-pnaWan: tii'e: aria tine atrug linac'. TI LeftTyitljacdli noa:Ao2o7v as a Tz.T.L.ra, aq6 platatthe fama-,-? ; of ? Lif'.17:7,3 -7.7!::T:LT;C.77. 'I cs-hate 62:1 caner .:;?!Ft. a LOSS an- ac - . Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003200024 The Administration sources said the U.S. is hoping to per- suade India and other poppy- growing nations to convert to a "poppy straw" method of culti- vation. This could result in" more Morphine for medical uses, with less risk of its being diverted into the illicit market. The traditional method is to obtain opium gum by slicing into a poppy bulb with a sharp knife and allowing the gum to ooze out and dry. The gum is then scraped off the bulb and refined into morphine base. In the "poppy straw" method, however, no opium gum is col- lected: The poppy plants are al- lowed to mature instead, and then are cut like hay and car- ted off in bales to a processing plant, where rao.Thine ? not opium ? is extracted from the stalks. The Administration bz..ileves that this piocessing method could he more tightly control- led. The problem, the sources say, is that India and most oth-. er poppy-growing countries do riat yet have the technology to do it economically, and, in the short run, could. increase pro- duction only by growing more poppies and harvesting gum in the traditional way. Another problem for the Ad- ministration is that the. new Turkish Government recently told U.S. Ambassador William, Macomber that it wads to re- open discussions on the 1971 U.S.-Turkey agreement that led to the opium ban. Some Gov- ernment sources believe the Turks may want to revoke the ban now, or at least want more money from the U.S. to keep it in effect. NEW YORK TIMES 18 March 1974 itj1N PRESSED OUR ?ME CURB U.S. Seeks Continued Ban on Poppy Cultivation Special to The New York Time& WASHINGTON, March 17? United States officials say they hope to persuade Turkey to continue her 32-month-old ban on the cultivation of the opium poppy, but the feeling in Wash- ington is that Ankara's decision will probably be based on internal Turkish political pres- sures. Last week the Turkish Am- bassador here, Mehli Esenhel, met with State Department of- CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 12 March 1974 Turke and the opium poppy The United States has good rea- son to be concerned over the new. Turkish government's intention to lift ? the ban on cultivating the opium poppy. The ban was imposed in 1971 under strong U.S. pressure. Be- fore then American narcotics agents estimated that 83 percent of the raw heroin reaching the U.S. had its origin in Turkey. In the past two years, however, there has been a significant decline in the amount of heroin smuggled into the U.S. ? Under the 1971 agreement the U.S. undertook to. compensate Turkish farmers for the loss of their opium crop to ,the tune of 35.7 million. The financial aid was intended to help the farmers convert to other crops, end also to encourage regional development. But the farmers complain that this aid has not reached them. Some 1CO,C30 farming families in four provinces are involved. Previously their opium was theo- retically . sold to the government for export for medicinal purposes. finials to discuss his country's desire to resume cultivation of the opium poppy, from which heroin is derived. A State De- partment official reported that the Ambassador had given as- surances that do decision had been mad yet and that even if the ban were lifted, no plant- ings would be undertaken be- fore the fall season. That means the poppy crop would not be harvested until June, 1975. United States officials here indicated that they would be trying hard to convince Turkey to continue the ban. And two New York Congressmen, Rep- resentatives Lester L. Wolff of Nassau and Charles B. Rangel of Manhattan, arrived in An- kara on Thursday to press the United States position. $35-Million in Aid Turkey ordered the ban on But in fact the growers 'made major cales to drug traffickers.. The two parties which make up Turkey's new ruling coalition ? the Republican People's Party. c.nd the National Salvation Party ? Tom.ised in last October's elec- tions to lift the ban on opium. growing. Most Turks do not see why their farmers should bear sacrifices because ? of the drug problem in another country, the more co since there is no drug addiction in Turkey itself, and Turkish laws are vei7 severe on drug smugglers. ? If Turkey goes ahead and autho- rizes the -planting of the opium poppy again this spi ing, the U.S. must make the best of this un- fortunate decision, and p2ess for enforcement of strict security measured with the goal of ensur- ing that the entire crop is handed over to. the government and none hidden away for the sale to traf- fickers. But admittedly it is not easy for the Turkish autliorltica to keep a tight check on all that goes on in the remote Ana.tollan hills where the poppy growers live. poppy growing in July, 1971, in exchange for S35-millica in United States aid. Th: aid was to compensate the Turkish Government for legitimate ex- port losses and to develop pro- grams to replace the income lost by the farmers. But elections in Turkey last October resulted in a new Gov- ernment that pledged to end the ban. The ban had been un- popular with the farmers be- cause of their economic loses and among others for national- istic reasons. Moreover, parts of the poppy provided the farmer with oil for cooking and feed for livestock. A State Department official said that he did not know what the United States would do if Turkey resumed cultivation. Al- though other measures are be- ing considered to block traf- ficking in opium, he said, it it 's grown in Turkey some if it is eound to reach the black mar- get. Half of Aid Unpaid The official added that other nations, including Britain, Can- ada, West Germany, France, Sweden, and Iran, were also ,trying to persuade Turkey to continue the ban. He said that he did not :mow what would happen to fre un- paid balance of the $35-raillicn in American aid if opium grow- ing resumes. Only $15 milliCn has been paid to Turkey .;:o far. The official also noted that reports last week erroneously stated that Turkey had already decided to resume opium grow- ing. Be said that the Turkish Government had only begun to permit production of seeds :or ;.ossible future Use. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-111:2P77-00432R000100320002-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0 NEW YORK TIMES 10 March 1974 - By iViartthall 7). Shnlman The United States is approaching a choice in the next few weeks about whether economic relations with the Soviet Unicn should be developed or discouraged. The forthcoming Senate debate on the Trade Reform Act, with its proposed amendment to prohibit credits and normal tariff- status to the Soviet Union unless that country per- mits free emigration, will have an im- portane 'effect on the future course of Soviet-American relations. Unfortunately, the ilebate has be- come polarized between equally un- realistic extremes. On one side is a strange alliance between conservatives who have ccrisiftently opposed a re- duction c: tensions in Soviet-American relations, and liberals who are react- ing to the collapse of their too-high .expectations for friendly relations with a liberalized Soviet regime. On the other are enthusiasts from the business community who are fas- cinated by vast new opportunities in Eastern Europe, and who see trade as the universal solvent of interna- tional conflicts. The .choice appears to be .between morality with continued high tension and detente with trade. It is not surprising that the course of recovery from 25 years of the cold war should be full of zigzags, particu- larly when the -biarhugs and cham- pagne toasts between President Nixon and Leonid I. Brezhnev have been overciramatized as the symbols of a new "structure .of 'peace." BUT we should understand, if we must use the word "dntente" (and it is probably inevitable, for there is no other head- line-sized word to describe the present mixture of competition and restraint) that detente. is .a process that may, at best, develop from stage one, 'where we are now, throegh the decades to stages two, three, and beyond. Stage one, or limited d?nte, means neither lees nor more than the partial codification of the terms of competi- tion. It does not yet mean that the rivalry is over, that the two societies have common goals or values, or that we approve of each other. The main business of stage one is to reduce the danger of nuclear war, by darnpng down the military compe- P'747-4, 17. 4 , I titien and by encouraging eosteatents In the continuing competition between the two countries. We should not for- gee that unless this objective is real- ized all other objectives lose their meaning. The development of economic rela- tions with the Soviet Union Is an important secondary aspect of the lim- ited d?nte. Among the most impor- tant Soviet motivations for seeking to reduce...tension is the strong desire for trade, technology and investment from abroad. Clearly we should neither slam the door on the trade agreement nego- tiated in 1972 (as we would do by paesing the restrictive amendment as it is now worded) nor open the door w'rle to a sudden expansion of trade an -1 investment with unrestricted Gov- esnment-sponsored credits. A more sensible response at this early stage of our emergence from the cold ?war would be a modest and con- trolled development of economic rela- tions, largely in consumer goods and machinery, with the prospect of gradual increase over a fifteen- or twenty-year period involving an in-' , creasing mix of advanced technology and. investinent ? in resource-develop- ment. This would serve to offer a con- tinuing incentive to the Soviet leaders to accept the constraints cf a tension policy, but could be regulated to insure ;that our resources are not used to strengthen Soviet military capabilities and that :the political Com- petition is conducted with restraint. ? This would require that the Admin- istration have the will and the means for coordinating and controlling credits and the transfer of technology on the basis of a national policy, and that the matter should not be determined by the separate actions of individual ccenpanica on the basis of the profita- bility of theca transactions to them. Our policy should be determined not by arguments about profits, job:, bal- ance of payments or the loss of trade to other. countries, nor by illusions that trade will democratize the Soviet Union, but by the hardheaded aware- ness that economic motivation can provide a continuing incentive to con- strain the terms of competition, and that it is in our interest to do so. ena F Vriat a:-.ctst:.%r., :Lights. cding the Jewish err!.rati.on? That beLtoviet system of political control to na:. able to coexist with freedom of isequiro 'end with intellectual and artistic creativity should come as no surprise, nce the present convulsive tightenina, ors-con- trols by the hardliners and the Soviet police apparatus, who fear the effects of prolonged low tension. . But there are also many :C.11',OLE tor change in the Soviet Union, noi: only among the handful of artiada.L: courageous dissidents, but by 1:C177,:.15 in a spectrum of pcsitions within the system who are seeking to rid selves of of atavistic methods and cum- bersome bureaucracy. The condition favorable to the ivo- lution they seek is a prolonged neriod of reduced tension, with the co-:a:pa- thetic attention and support of world public opinion. Public* pressures In this al?::-..tion combined with private diplomacy can be mord effective than f. L7:2- mantis upon the Soviet leacierg.,57 by our Government, whether o'er sesem tive or the legislative branch. - The restrictive trade ainendment has the character of an ultimatum deniand- ? log .unrealizable conditions, which Ill inevitably generate forces of resis'ance in the Soviet political leadership and will be counterproductive. If therefore the Senate situation is such that the restrictive amendment is inevitable, that measure should at least be cast in less uncompromising language deigned to encourage the objective of easing arbitrary discrimi- nation and harassment of those who wish to emigrate, and should put clis- cretonar authority in the han:Is of the ?resident to administer the provi- sion with some flexibility. The present alternative leads ?to- ward a return to the tensions of the cold war, which would not only in- crease the danger of war but -mould preserve the basis for controlled mo- bilization in the Soviet Union and diminish the prospect for that enolu- tion that we and many pe.opie in the Soviet Union ardently desire. Marshall D. Shulman is .d1c ii.Cte- venson Professor of Interruatiencei ia- tiona and director cl thp, .7?1:77?.91 Institute at Columbia T.InivercE.':; 18 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0 , 'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0. BALTIMORE SUN 20 March 1974 ?qPS for .3rnssets. A year ago the European Eco- nomic Community had just been enlarged and had einbarked on an ambitious journey toward full in- tegration. A musical and artistic "fanfare for Europe" -,ea's provid- ing the cultural accompaniment For 'he city's new task. A year later the European fire- m hs turned into a night- m^re o uncer'ain'y and inde- els'on and a funeral dirge would nn re appropriate background music. The intervening period has been marked by acrimonious bicker- ing; missed deadlines, external pressures and deteriorating eco- nomic and political conditions in most of the EEC member coun- tries. All this has paralyzed the Community's already sluggish de- cision-making process and caused many to doubt whether the enter- prise can survive. Whereas many dedicated Europeans in the past had been saying that there could be no going back in the construc- tion of Europe, the top Eurocrat recently observed that "there is nothing preordained about Eu- rope; there is no point of no re- turn." And some of the recently arrived British civil servants are beginning to cast about for other jobs. 0 ? This time disappointed Euro- peans cannot engage in a con- venient binge of "frog bashing" and blame French obstructionism as usual. This time there is a lot of blame to go around. France did deal the Commu- nity goal of economic and mone- tary union a crippling blow by withdrawing from the EEC com- mon currency float. And it has long stymied numerous other Community decisions ranging from formulation of an energy pohey to stecngthening the Euro- pean Perliarnent. But then there NEW YORK TIMES 18 March 1974 A p---. ......_ r? " ,,, ,e,...4"..?"-'1, .!..L.Iti.i.k It By DAVID FOUQUET was also the obstinacy of Ger- many in rejecting a large re- gional development fund for the Community's underdeveloped areas. Bonn, which in the past had been characterized as "very generous" in funding EEC pro- grams, has expressed a weari- ness at "playing the paymaster." This led to a clash with the Brit- ish Heath government, which des- perately needed a large regional pork-barrel program to bail it out economically and politically. Since it couldn't obtain the fund- ing . it, sought for the regional program, Britain blocked deci- sions in other areas. ? ? ? As a result, the Community has come to a virtual standstill in re- cent months. Even commitments solemnly made by the European heads of state in a December summit meeting in Copenhagen .have been largely ignored. If this weren't enough, the Community now faces the uncertainty of a new British government, led by a party that vowed to renegotiate the terms of British entry into the Coiranunity. Knowledgeable officials in Brussels forecast that the British situation will further paralyze the Community for at least a year, while the new re- gime sorts out its policy, while the Community concentrates on this problem and probably until new British elections are held. Internal preoccupations aren't the only thing endangering the Europeans. Just as important are the nature of the Community's re- lations with its former supporter and mentor across the Atlantic. "The Year of Europe," which was supposed to resolve problems between Europe and the United States actually created more. In- stead of merely having to deal with economic and commercial controversies, the two are now confronted with more serious ? AtlanticAsperity President Nixon's outburst in Chicago against.the Euro- pean allies makes it clear that serious difficulties have again overtaken Secretary of State Kissinger's year-long flickering effort to reinvigorate the Atlantic Alliance and establish a "special relationship" with the nine-nation Common Market. The vehemence with which Mr: Nixon wielded his bludgeon was apparently designed, to pave the way for yesterday's disclosure that he has decided to defer his projected April visit to those allies in Europe. Concealed behind all the rhetoric, there is one ember-, rassing 'fact. Mr. Nixon has been trying futilely for 7.7r7; v.41, questions of security and political trust. Henry Kissinger, who .has dis- played, such finesse in dealing with opponents and explosive sit- uations, has shown only spotty results in patching up relations with Europe. His call for a Year of Europe and a new Atlantic Charter was judged to have been ill-prepared and badly-timed from this side of the ocean. The situae tion was aggravated even further during the Middle "P'ast war and the ensuing energy disruption. His convening of the Washing- - ton energy conference served to isolate France in stubborn oppo- sition while gaining the support of the rest of the European Com- munity. However, it had a cata- strophic impact on Community tempers and relations. French Foreign Minister Michel Johert was moved to attack his Euro-. peen colleagues to the point that one Eurocrat in Brussels observed that "his attacks were so wound- ing that I don't see how they can work together in the future." ? ? . ? There are even-those in Brus- sels who feel that Mr. Kissinger, having glimpsed that a united Eu- rope could no longer be controlled by jthe United States, has decided to limit its development to a com- mercial group. Belgian Jean Rey, a former European commission president who has never been accused of being anti-American, recently ob- served "Henry Kissinger doesn't like the Europeans, that's a fact. Unlike many American leaders, he doesn't understand the Com- munity. He has never displayed interest or sympathy in it and he considers it like a foreign body in the Atlantic Alliance. Only the Alliance interests him and, at the heart of this, the American lead- ership." Many non-French Euro- peans, no less than Latin Ameri- cans at the recent hemispheric meeting, are suspicions of U.S. hegemony. - This Ins been the French thesis which, taghtly or wrongly, s being looked at more closely as a re- sult of Mr. Kissinger's recent tirade against the European fail- ure to consult before deciding to seek a conference between Euro- pean and Arab countries. The fact is that German Foreign Min- ister Walter Scheel discussed the matter with Kissinger before it was decided. This has led some Europeans here to wonder whether in Mr. Kissinger's vo- cabulary "consultation" is not synonymous with "U.S. veto." ? e If Mr. Kissinger feels at Herr Scheel's consulting style was in- ? adequate, he may be in for fur- ther disappointment in the latter ? half of 1974, 'when Franca and Michel Jobert take over the ro- tating presidency of the EEC. It :is no wonder that with so ? many internal and external con- troversies and pressures bet- 'thig, the. -Cominunity, its grave- diggers are becoming legion. The only thing certain at the mennent ,only that ?its, Custonis union .and other economic proarems are still functioning and will continue to exist Precariously. However, so many promises have been ? broken ? concerning greeter erne ? nomic and political unity that no e one would want to predict a re- sounding success for the future. - Despite all the uncertainty, at "least one Community official isn't panicking. "Just remember," be remarked retently, "in the 1,330's, more than one-hiuldred years after the end of the Congrese of Vienna, -there were still bureau- crats attending to the clean- ing up." - . . , ? ? Mr. Fouquet is a No-lance joanalist Iivg n 3rtwel,2. a year to obtain an invitation from the European Ece- nomic Community (E.E.C.) to meet formally with its nine chiefs of government in Brussels during his Euro- pean tour. The idea, originally suggested by West German Chancellor Brandt, has been blocked by France. It is agreed that there would be a summit-level meeting of the .fifteen-member NATO Council. Its purpose would be to sign a declaration of common purpose in defense. But there is no agreement on who will attend the signing. of a second joint declaration covering political and eco- nomic cooperation between the United States and the Common Market; which has just been redrafted by the Europeans. The :Tenure of the meeting to conclude this document is the primary cause of delay in scheduling Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-MP77-00432R000100320002-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0 President Nixon's trip, rather than such differences over the text as the American desire and French eefusal to speak of 'partnership." The United States wants Mr. Nixon to meet with the nine E.E.C. chiefs of government even if, as France insists, the document is signed on behalf of the Common Market Council by its President, a post that will be occupied by Chancellor Brandt until the end of June. But President Pompidou has refused to agree even to an informal dinner meeting with the Nine, lest a precedent be set for an institutional link with the United States. He wants a single spokesman to represent the Common Market in consultation with the United States. Otherwise, as he sees it, nine relative dwarfs would be meeting with the American dominant giant. * The American view is that improved procedures for European - American consultation are essential if joint policies are to be achieved for solving mutual problems. At present, Mr. Kissinger has charged, the E.E.C. countries are precluded from consulting with the United States until a common policy is shaped, after which "Europe appoints a spokesman who is empowered to inform us of the decisions taken but has no authority to negotiate." It was this issue that prompted Mr. Kissinger's ran- carcass protest early this month against the decision of the E.E.C. countries to meet separately with the Arabs. NEW YORK TIMES 16 March 1974 United States By C. L. Sulzberger PARIS?The petulance now featur- ing United States relationships with France is ridiculous and unnecessary. From certain remarks attributed to Henry Kissinger one must conclude he should never be indiscreet in private, which he now inferentially acknowl- edges. It is one thing to use the calcu- lated public leak for policy purposes but it is quite another to blow off steam and have it surface in a cloud of embarrassment Mr. Kissinger was quoted in a pro- American London paper Feb. 10 as having told a small group that Euro- peans are "craven," "contemptible," "pernicious" and acting like "jackals," to say nothing of appraising Saudi Arabia's King Faisal as a "religious fanatic," which neither helped pros- pects of trans-Atlantic amity nor facili- tated -easement of the anti-U.S. oil embargo. On March 6, the normally pro- American Paris Figaro reported the Secretary of State as saying the United States knew better how to choose enemies than friends and it was easier to treat with the former than the latter. These alleged opinions, added to those publicly enunciated, raised hackles; One result is that recent U.S. policy has proved counterproductive.. The Washington petroleum consumers meeting, at Which France was the odd-man-nut, was swiftly superseded by a :uropean Community policy that excluded America. And French Foreign Minister Michel Jobert, who admires .Mr. Kissinger's person More than his- -current views, has recently taken to zabbirn mustard into U.S. irritations. it is even reported that Washington has began re-examining policy toward .-V,:taally, few majct cecis!orls are taken hy the E.E.C. withoet lengthy argument in public view among the nine governments. The United States has only itself to blame if it fails to lobby effectively for its interests. France's eight Common Market partners did wisely- agree in Washington in February to act jointly with the United States on the critical oil problem, despite Paris's refusal to participate. Under 'those circumstances they could not risk further divisions in the E.E.C. by flatly rejecting the Arab contacts Paris proposed. Moreover, respondieg to President Nixon's letter this month pro- testing "rival activity" in the Middle East, Chancellor Brandt made it clear?as representative-of the Nine? that he would move slowly, in consultation with Wash- ington, and would seek to provide "flanking support" for American-political and oil efforts in the Middle East. These reassurances make incomprehensible President Nixon's Chicago accusations of "hostility" 'and "confron- tation" on the part of the Nine. His criticism of the new draft of the projected joint declaration?and his refusal to set a date for his European trip until agreement on its terms is reached?can be defended as efforts to assure a summit meeting with the Common Market, with or without France. But his warning that substantial numbers of American troops might be withdrawn from Europe unless the E.E.C. comes to heel on political and economic issues, can only be self-defeating. FOREIGN AFFAIRS France, which I take to be nonsense since things are certainly in no more critical state between the two coun- tries than frequently in the past and It would be folly to heat up the situa- tion. Mr. Kissinger has for years been, pro-French and a considerable ad- mirer of Gaullism, the philosophy represented today by President Pom- pidou and Mr. Jobert. Indeed, Mr. Kissinger?then a Democrat?had been brought into the Kennedy Administra- tion early as an adviser on nuclear strategy and European matters. He was often used as a secret mes- senger between President Kennedy and Chancellor Adenauer, an ardent Gaul- list and Francophile, and once was dispatched by the former "to find out what's gone wrong with our German policy." Mr. Kissinger replied: "That will be easier if you'll tell me one small thing: What is our German policy?" The present Secretary of State broke with Mr. Kenneciwy over France, especially on the question of de Gaulle's so-called force de frappe. He argued there was absolutely no escaping the existence of a French national atomic force. Subsequently, he became a Re- publican policy expert, first for Nelson Rockefeller, then Mr. Nixon. Now, one might ask, just what is our French policy as applied by the man who seemed an early U.S. Gaul- list and in the name of that avowed admirer of the General and friend of Pompidou, Richard Nixon? The answer is, things will pre:ably einrasee deals and our policy is already see'aing to anetth'-'-n Joe ,nza \ calm the situation, not exacerbate it. Mr. Kissinger certainly knows that foreign policy for one country means internal policy for another. Thus Mr. Nixon has been accused of reeking political coups abroad to strengthen his sagging situation at home. Like- wise, with Mr. Pompidou in Soviet Russia this week, it was reaseaehle to expect his journey to be preceded by a dash of French nationalism at American expense. Now that the French President is home one can anticipate a switchback, even if he isn't going to change his mind on dealing with the energy cri- sis, a subject viewed differently in fuel-poor France than in fuel-rich America. But the old French-American friendships retains plenty of vitality. In 1965 de Gaulle received Hubert Humphrey and told me afterward: "You know, in our conversation, Vice -President Humphrey and I were in agreement on this point?our coun- tries, the United States and France, have often been in disagreement over the lest two centuries. Certainly we were not in agreement over Mexico one hundred years ago. "And from 1914 to 1917 the United States had relations with Germany, while we were at war. After the Ver- sailles Treaty, the United Statesfailed to join in the League of Nations and opposed reparations for France. In 1940 the United States was not ready to go to war to protect France and England. "We have often been in disagree- ment and Humphrey sfnared my view that it doesn't matter, Despite our dif- ferences, our two nations have always remained friends, naturally and seen- taneonaly.' izzc., E?%. this should not cnntinins." 20 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0- WASHINGTON POST 19 March 1974 Joseph Kraft 7oreign Policy Showdown' 'Why did President Nixon take a gratuitoue shot at the European allies . in his Chicago appearance last week? And why, for the previous 10 days, did Henry Kissinger knock the allies in staterneuts to newsmen, senators and even coeg?essional wives? The answer is that the President and the Secretary of State are provok- ing a showdown in order to force the allies, once and for all, on to the road of Atlantic partnership with this coun- try. In the bargain, the allies would be put on the defensive and therefore unable to upset ongoing negotiations In the Mideast and with the Soviet Union. Which is very rice, except that the bold move is apt to backfire with adverse consequences both abroad and in the United States. Behind. all this is the slow, unsteady progress toward political unity which Europe has been making following the entry of Britain into the Common Market last year. The French have been using the process to build a Gaullist Europe?divorced from the United States. They have insisted on policy stands hostile to American in- tereets in the Mideast, and on a pro- cedure which forbids consultation with Washington until decisions are taken. Most of the other European coun- tries, and especially West Germany, want to stick close to the United States. So while going along with France on procedural questions, they have tried to cooperate with _ the United States on practical restters. In fact, during the past year there has been a rare degree of Inemony be- tween Washington and the European allies on such substantive busineee as trade, exchange rates and defcuse. Practical cooperation on speelae problems has not been good enough for the President and the Secretary of State. A year ago, in a speech which spoke of the Year of Europe, Dr, Kis- singer called for an Atlantic dialogue to foster agreement at the highest levels on a joint statement of betie principles. As predicted here and elsewhere, the dialogue resulted only in a highly generalized statement. Moreover Dr. Kissinger was furious when the Euro- peans, last fall, prepared a draft state- ment and presented it to the United States without previous consultation, as an accomplished fact. The consultation issue erupted again as a result of Dr. Kissinger's efforts to organize cooperation with the allies on the energy question. At the Wash- ington energy conference last month, he did prevail on eight of the Euro- pean countries to agree to work jointly with the United States in dealing with problems growing out of the energy crisis. France, which opposed any co- operation, was left isolated. But the French made a slight come- back by prevailing upon the other European countries, on March 4, to agree to a forthcoming meeting with Arab leadersajfrom which the United States would be excluded, Once again, moreover, Dr. Kissinger felt that he- was presented with a decision by the Europeans without serious advance consultation. Immediately thereafter, Dr. Kis- singer began loosing against the Euro- peans what the Economist of London called "Henry's Thunderbolts." The Preaident .then piled it on in Cilka4.0 THE NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, MARCH 10, 1974 _ - by indicating this country would with- draw troops from Eurepe if tie ares did not cooperate more in political and economic issues. Both men have a point. The habit of non-consultation is bad. Unless checked soon, it could harden over the years so that eventually the United States and Europe would drift apart on all major issues. Moreover, the occasion is not neces- sarily bad for a showdown. The French are uncomfortable in their isolation? hence the relatively conciliatory speech over the weekend by Foreign Minister Michel Jobert. The socialist governments in Germany and Britain are defensive about relations with the United States, and under strong in- ternal pressure to appease Washing- ton. If nothing else, tough talk now will prevent the Europeans from op- posing the negotiations Dr. Kissinger now has under way in the Mideast and with the Soviet Union. At bottom, however, I think the President and Dr. Kissinger are play- ing with fire. Advance consultation is not all that important?and they know it better than anybody. No present gov- ernment, not excluding the Nixon gov- ernment, is strong enough to make binding commitments about the future of Atlantic partnership. By forcing a conflict now, practical cooperation on specific issues is made more difficult. Worst of all, by raising the troop question, Mr. Nixon is only playing into the hands of those in this country who want to withdraw troops as a first step in an over-all thinning of relations with Europe. c test nblet Errt,,-prices. ,--? A Postage S tairip Rrexes 7 es i"..., G _ said "Aha!" a re:I political commitment. The threat, whether real 12ut it is not popular only ? A Communist Executed ill or imagined, of "radicals" Amen- infiltrating the Government among Germans. An Ameri- 1919 Is Commemorated through the Social Democrats can lawyer at the anti-estab- is a subject of constant dis- lishment Lawyers Military *cussion here, and to many - Defense Committee in Heidel- it seemed to become real berg put a Rosa Luxemburg again when 30 million of the stamp on a letter to a United C 40-pfennig commemorative! States Army colonel the stamps were printed other day and said, "We do rinted late last "We've never had a stamp it on purpose?it ought to so many people refuse to make them mad." The coin- take at the counter," said the mittee helps defend soldiers in mainly political cases here. Postmaster General, Horst 2,000 Protest Letters Ehmke. "But we've printed Mr. Elunke has received them, and we'll sell them." about 2,000 protest letters, A press spokesman for his tters, i ministry said, however, that . r which themes such as the 30 million stamps, nor- Bonn now takes orders from the Kremlin" seem to mally enough to last for six predominate. He countered with one of Rosa Luxem- burg's own quotations: "Freedom means the free- dom to disagree." Rosa Luxemburg was sum- marily executed on Jan. 15, 1919, after the failure of the Communist uprising in Ber- lin. Before she founded the Approved For Release 2001/08/08 :AIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0 By CRAIG R. WHITNEY Sp2TIal to The New Yc..."1: Timex BONN, March 8?Rosa Luxemburg, the "Red Rosa" who was executed in Berlin 55 years ago for her revolu- tionary activities, is raising political tempers in Germany again through that most con- servative of institutions, the Post Office. Since Jan. 15, she has been commemorated on the German equivalent of the 10- cent stamp. Although the basic color of the stamp is orange, not red, and Rosa Luxemburg is portrayed in black. many Germans who think.Chancel- lor Willy Brandt's Social Democratic party is crypto- Communist anyway took one look when it came out and months, would probably be sold out in five. One reason may be that ? buying a Rosa Luxemburg stamp is a way for those Germans?especially younger ones?who have leftist-liberal political views to show them, without necessarily =line Spartacist Union with Kael Liebknecht in 1917. she be- longed to the left wing cf the Social Democratic party. Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0 THE WASITINGTOti POST Friday, March 8,194 Ar LS. reTs, fiaez ea.}in ? _elk e taeo 0 /ne (Ala By Lewis M. Simons NEW DELHI, March 7? With Secretary of State Henry Kissinger expected to visit New Delhi in the next i'ew weeks, the government of In- dia is struggling to hold the lid on an anti-American tem- pest. brewing in a teapot. The flap, breught up by left- ist members of Parliament, concerns U.S. plans to de- velop its air and naval support facilities on the tiny Indian Ocean atoll of Diego Garcia. . Prime Minister Indira Gan- dhi and her government are anxiously trying to let the United States know in ad- vance of Kissinger's trip that while they are opposed to a major power buildup in the Indian Ocean, they are not overly upset with the Penta- gon's plans for Diego Garcia. The government fears that if the pot boils over before Kissinger arrives, hoped-for discussions on strengthening Indo-American trade and economic cooperation ? and possibly resuming some form of U.S. aid?will suffer. But Communist and other left-wing legislators are refug- ing to play along. Today and yesterday they forced Foreign Minister Swaran Singh to de- clare before Parliament that India was as resolutely as ever against a major U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean. The opposition members were using a remark made on Monday- by U.S.. Ambassa- dor Daniel Patrick Moynihan to prass their point. During a meeting, with Indian journal- ists in the southern city of Ma- dras, Moynihan reportedly said that U.S. interests in Di- ego Garcia were "more impor- tant" than those of India., which has no "fuundamental concern" in the island, located 1.201) miles south of the In- dian coast. Most New Delhi ilewspapers ran the story on their front pages. Moynihan was deeply' ? ng.ered. claiming that he and , the newsmen had agreed that ; the remarks were not to be st-1 tribeted to him. Communist parlirereeteri-i, Approved For ans jumped on the reports and one even demanded that MoY- niban be declared persona non grata and ejected from India. Swaran Singh prevented that but reiterated that the U.S. plan to spend S29 million on expanding the Diego Gar- cia facility was contrary to In- dia's aim of making the Indian Ocean a "zone of peace." Singh's statements reflect India's dilemma. As a prime mover in the nonaligned movement and the major power in south Asia, it must argue against a U.S.-S o vl e t arms race in the region. But the Indians must also temper their public protestations with private assurances to the United States at a time when relations between the two are gradually improving. Senior Indian government officials make the point pri- vately that they are prepared to live with an increased num- ber of U.S. Navy ships, ,subma- rines and aircraft moving in and out of Diego Garcia. "We're not anti-anybody on this," a ranking government source said, "and we want the United States to know that. But India, and all the coun- tries on the Indian Ocean for that mattet, are committed to making it a zone of peace." U.S. observers say Indian of- ficials are restrained because they realize that turning Di- ego Garcia into an important staging base cannot be con- strued as aiding Pakistan?eIn- (ha's constant and overriding defense worry. "Our hands-off policy on arms for Pakistan Is finally sinking in," one American ob- server said. "It's beginning to look like the Indians finally believe we mean what we say." Diplomatic reaction to the expansion plans for Diego Garcia has been low key. U.S. and British diplomats were not even summoned to the Foreign Ministry, a standard procedure when a government wants to register a com- plaint. Britain. which owns the 5,700-acre, coral island, re- cently agreed to allow the United States to expand its fa- cilities there. Some observers believe that lithe Kissinger visit, which is expected sometime before the middle of April, produces lit- tle or nothing concrete, India may shift its stand and launch a full-scale diplomatic attack on the United States. But the Indians do not ap- pear to expect Kissinger to ar- rive with a sack of goodies. The mere fact that he is com- ing for the first time since talk- ing office and will spend a couple of dzys talking to Mrs. Gendhi and others is consice ered important. BALTIMORE SUN 18 March 1974 21?,?7NT t ' ? 1v 1? 9 L A.A. 71- 36 ?1-711 orff PRAN SAMA3WAL New Delhi Bureau of The Sun New Delhi ? Ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan and the World Bank president, Robert S. McNamara, are under attack in India despite their efforts to help overcome the country's worst economic crisis. Both are being criticized in Parliament for their candid, but private, comments. Mr. Moynihan was criticized for his background interview with newspaper reporters, in which he said that the Indian Ocean base being built by the United States on the British- held island of Diego Garcia was more important to U.S. interests than to India's. He also commented, "Why call it the Indian Ocean? One may as well call it Madagascar Sea." The pro-Moscow Communists party criticized Mr. Moyni- han's observation, condemned him and his government's "sinister moves" in the Indian Ocean and called for his expul- sion. ? Given special attention All the recent efforts by the American Ambassador to re- pair Indo-U.S. relations, in- crease bilateral trade and eco- nomic co-operation and the writing off of India's debt in rupees was of little conse- quence when it came to attack- ing him on the Indian Ocean base. In the last six years, since Mr. NcNarnara became the chief of the World Bank, he has singled out India for spe- doing enough. a cial attention, pumping funds to help the country. Two-thirds of all the soft lending of the International Development Agency, an asso- ciate of the World Bank, was given to India. When President Nixon cut off all economic assistance to India in 1971 because of the Indo-Pakistan war, Mr. Mc- Namara continued assistance to India, despite the fact that the U.S. is the major contribu tor to the World Bank. The crime of Mr. Mc Namara, according to pro-Mc- cow Communists and others? including members of the rul- ing Congress party, is leakag of the World Bank report e the Indian economy in Wash ington which has some ver3 gloomy predictions about th country's future and question the Indian economic assess mcnts. The "leak." according to th critics, was deliberate and ha "sinister motives" of runnin down India. the World Ban acting on behalf of Amercia imperialism, was trying t pressure India to give up a efforts at becoming self-r liant, critics charged yesterda in Parliament. - The atiack Li on U.S. m tives. Leftists fear that th resumption of American ai would hurt Soviet influen here. The rightists, on t other hand, are complainin that the United States ic e Release 22 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77 ? -00432R000100320002-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0- CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 8 March 1974 3y Deeilel Getetreerlaned Staff correspondent of The Chrietisee Science Monitor Faeara oaTe, Cele:Jaffa . . The Urdtee i';':e.tea has managed to get Cambedien Army officers to reale eignif co reductetcns in the number of "phantom" soldiers on their payrolls, but the practice of collecting money for nonexistent sol- dieTS is far from eaded. In Jaeuray of last year, the Cam- bcclin n command claimed an Army .:strength of 3C:3,C:73 men. But everyone :knew that the Lemy di net have this many stile:lees anti telficers were pcalreting the pay cif a large number of ghost, or phantcm, aeldiers. The 1Jnitze2 Stetee eaf-eteed in r:72p- pszt.teatyrell aeore than 21.I0,050 m:a, and the. flare 7:a .3 cubsequently set at about 2ZO,C3.3. At the name time, a new CSIltiaIN:id payroll system was ntisiuced. Zventeally this system is to be computerized. /et aa.72n1 faln; Zni `ft.?,.e oaigitre of the phantom-soldier WASHINGTON POST 13 March 1974 as- 0 04 paya:fs go bach to the 'beginning of the war in Cambodia. * When the war erupted nearly four years ago, the Army consisted of only about 30,030 men. It had to expand rapidly, and battalion cornmenCers were authorized to recreit for?? own units. As a result, a decentralized and . corruption-ridden system of paying the troops emerged, wIth battalion, brigade end divieicn cominaaders mahinsteable profits. Reports of the s..ite talon caeated a stir in the 'U.S. Congress, and at one point a Cam- bodian Cabinet official candidly ad- mitted that there might be as many as 1C0.000 phantom troops. Under the new system, pay com- mittees rent out from the central level have taken over the function of paying the troops. Theoretically, this ought to eliminate the phantom problem. Salaes row' But as one high-renhing Cambodian Army ? officer explained to tete re- porter, the average officer ca anal get by cn his effete.! caLuy. r 7 i" C E: .7.C.777 S A e yr, 7 ea a-a ea L' -IT AO )4 ?1 _ By Elizabeth Becker saasiai so The Washington Post KAMPOT, Cambodia?Dur- ing the dark hours of ; dawn the Cambodian insurgents were lobbing mortars around the government's command post at Kampot. Inside. U.S. Maj. Lawrence W. Ondecker was showing the Cambodian officers how to mount a coun- terattack. "I want you to respond very quickly he said. -If even one mortar falls in your zone, you mast answer back with fire immediately." Whlie the American major was poring over maps with the Cambodian staff afficers,' the Cambodian aeneaal offi- cially in command of the post coastal town about 30 miles south of Phnom Penh is cait- ical, and Maj. Ondecker was flown down Sunday. "He was loaned to us from the 3d In- fantry Brigade," Lt. Col. Choey Yeun said. "He is at- tached to the 3d and nor- mally works in the field with ? tham, but he is needed here. ?I am surprised that you did not know him." In the past month rebel troops have moved within one ;to four miles of Kampot, cap- turing the city's main water supply and the country's only 'cement iactory. They regular- ly shell the town with 75-mm. .racoillesa rifles and 81-mm. mortars. I Although government intel- ligence officers warned of an ! ' was wrialng in his diary, alone impending offensive as early ; as January, the Kampot garri- ; in an adjoining bunker. son made no defense prepara- IThe U.S. embassy in Phnom! tions. Orr the past week the Penh has repeatedly denied Cambodian high command reports that Americans are sent r'inforcements?and they serving as military advisers in sent Maj. Ondecker. ' the field. Congress has passed "Protect this area in:medi- a law that prohibits the U.S. ately," Maj. Ondecker said mission here from direct in while the 51 rounds were fall- volvement in the conduct Gf lag in and around the city the war. l'flonday morning. "Good, per- But the sttuatitm in this feet," he said as a Cambodian int 'S a the , , . . This ciicer said that he allots 20 phantoms to each of his battalion commanders. This allows the battal- ion commander enough extra money ? about 140,G00 riels, or about .$230 a month to pay his expenees, eend his children to school, and rent a house for his family in Phnem Penh. The officer said that he thought this was "reasonable" compensation for- men who are expected to fight a long war on low salaries. What about complaints? But what if the paymansteas ob- jected to this, the officer was asked. "There are ways of threatening them," he replied. - The officer said that the problem was to prevent those who were profit- ing from the phantom system from being too greedy. He achnowlefged that sharp reductions had bean made In the total number of phantoms but said that the problem could never be entirely eliminated. infleea pointed on the map af tnr accepting the American's propcsal. The day before rebel gun- ners shot down one of the two helicopter gunships stationed hara. and the second one was recalled to Phnom Penh. Maj. Ondecker arranged with the U.S. embassy on the morning of the attack that additional gunships would be sent to; Kampot to support the infan- try. A member of the U.S. milia lary attache's staff in Phnoml Penh, Ondecker, is in Kampot; officially to gather informa- ' tion Chuck Bernard, known as' Monsieur Jacques. is the other U.S. representative in town.' Ile has approximately the same official duties as On. decker except that his area is! civilian matters. "Monsieur Jacques works with me," said Ker Sophay, ln;?? di- it has never been con:CI-mad.. In Kampot, hcwever, it is dila ficult to hide. Ondecker was in: and out of the command post, openly recommending miEi.rc' manuevers. Somethres he are- faced his proposals with "I suggest and the general also suggests that you immediately ; fire in this direction." The Cambodians were ob- viously pleased with the American's help. "Maj. On- decker was very good with the 3d Brigade; he will be good ; with us," said CoL Choey Yeun. Changes were made quickly' after Ondecker's arrivaL An- other infantry brigade was ' Called in to bolster the 2,030- man government garrison, and the top command was re- , placed within 24 hours. The city's defense perimeter was stabilized for the first time threnthout the siege. Villagers are still leaving rector of political warfare,. the town ? the population has I "He writes propaganda tracts! ;dropped from 50,000 to less with me. We have published; , than 20,000 in a month. and distributed 6,003 Pon-I !Though all private shops are phlets in the three weeks he I i closed, and mortars still land has teen here." ! !within the city, the city's While junior Cambodian nf- small open-air market re- ficaar sr:. Ameaizaas advise in ? opened Sunday with some the field around P111113131 Penh, fruit and flab offered .`:c: sale. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RRE77-00432R000100320002-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0 WASHINGTON POST 14 March 1974 Law t.7r1-ci1vc . 9 7:).70,7 'American personnel in Cam- '7 / s'.rl are limited by law ? 7 4.4"." 'to'20-0 men. Reuter The State Department said yesterday it has asked the U.S. _embassy in Phnom Penh for a full report on a Washington Post dispatch that said an American military adViSt: was working in the field with Cam- bodian combat trocps. The Washington Post identi- fied the officer as Maj. Law- rence Onciecker, and said he was advising Cambodian offi- cers in the government, com- mand post at Kampot, a coastal town 80 miles south of Phnom Penh. Congress has passed a law banning direct U.S. military 'involvement in Indochina, and the newspaper report prompt- ed an aegry Senate demand WASHINGTON POST 15 March 1974 sit iU,42SCI 000 .,Lqua rrt , 0 for an investigation. The State Department noted that military perearinel are re- quired 'ey law to maintain 'close liaison with Khmer offi- cials to ensure safe delivery of i U.S. military equipment. "However, I do acknowledge that (delivery personnel) are not assigned as advisers and they are not supposed to func- tion in a combat advisory role," department spokesman John King said. The Senate Foreign Rela- tions Committee made prelim- inary inquiries during a nomi- nation hearing for the ambas- , sador-designate to Cambodia, i John G. Dean, a career For- eign Service officer. But a bipartisan groan of nearly two dozen senators fcr- renuested aaArined Rzuter A U.S.. military attache in Carahactia has 'denied acting illeeally as a combat adviser tc Cambodian government troops, the State Department said yesterday, but :congrese sional demands for an investi- gation of his activity increased State Department spokes- man George Vest said the U.S. embassy in Phnom Penh had termed "unjustified" a Wash- ington Post story that said Maj. Lawrence Ondecker had advised government troops at Kampot, Cambodia, in viola- tion of U.S. laws barring mili- tary advisers from Indochina. Vest said: "The embassy has .assured us that the U.S. mili- tary personnel in Cambodia are fully instructed as to the legal restrictions on their! activities and are complying with these restrictions and that the allegations in the story are not justified." Vest did not respond to questions about exactly what was being disputed, saying only that the embassy reply is the official response. Vest did not say the article, by Elizabeth Becker, a cor- respondent for both the Post and Newsweek Magazine, was inaccurate. Post Foreign Editor Lee Lescaze said the newr.116per, stands by the story. Serelees Cemanteee eavesaine- tion, declarina, in a etatemert that "covert and illegal war cannot be tolerated by the Congress." ? Dean, until recently deputy chief of mission at the Ameri- can embassy in Laos, told the Foreign Relations Committee that the State Department had asked the U.S. embassy in Phnom Penh for clarification of the report. However, he defended main- taining Foreign Service and military officers in the field, saying they were "the eyes and ears" of the embassy in determining how American aid was being used. The committee approved !Dean's appointment as ambas- sador but not before he prom- ised to provide a list of the There was angry reaction on Capitol Hill to the story and 41 senators have co-spon- sored a resolution by Sen. Alan Cranston (D-Calif.) de- manding an investigation of Ondecker's reported activity. ? Becker quoted Ondecker as telling Cambodian officers under mortar attack at Kam-. pot: "I want you to respond very quickly. If even one mor- tar falls in your zone, you must answer back with fire immediately." The telegram from the em- bassy in Phnoin Penh said Becker had a "rudimentary" speaking knowledge of French and may have misunderstood Ondecker's conversations with Cambodian officers. "I made no suggestions nor in any way gave instructions , or advice to the Khmer." the telegram quoted Ondecker as saying. Sen. Frank Church (D- Idaho) the co-author of I.he 1071 Cooper-Church amend- ment barring U.S. advisers , from Indochina, disclosed that he had sent a letter to Secre- tary of State_ Henry Kissin- ger. If The Washington Post story is correct, the letter said, "this is a direct Viola- , tion of the laws of the land." Church said he had remind- ed Kissinger of his pledge to ' the Senate last September that the department would. not seek to circumvent legal obstacles to the U.S. military presence in Indochina: Church also called on Sec- retary of Defense .Tames Schlesinger 'to account fully and openly for this apparent violation as soon as nossiale." NEW YORK TIMES 20 March 1974 (Thlker:707, E,'1 L Sen. Alan ?:2eansian Cel:f.), a leadet ,:f last year's I congressional campaign to etecil U.S. military involvement in! Cambodia, said it apparently; was not enough for Congress; to pass laws. "Apparently we underrated the administration's cunning and determination to go its own way regardless of the law .... We must constantly moni- tor the implementation (of the law) and .me must police and publicize emery violation," be: said in a Senate speech. Sen. ;nib-. Stennis (D-Miss.),1 chairmen the Armed Sere- ices Comm.- lee, said the panel would consider the request for. investigation. rain The news from Southeast Asia is beginning to have a morbidly familiar ring. In an engagement Monday Vietnamese forces suffered their heaviest casualties since the signing, of cease-fire fourteen months ago. In fierce fighting on the same day Cambodiat insurgents captured a major city twenty miles from Phnom Penh, In Washington the Defense Department is asking Congress for urgent new military aid to South Vietnam, and the American Ambassador in Saigon is warning that the "people of the world" will be exposed to "enormous dangers" if the United States fails to provide whole- hearted support for President Nguyen Van Thieu. Those who dare to question the continuing United States military effort, says Ambassador Graham Martin, are only succumbing to the insidious influence of Com- munist North Vietnam. There is scarcely a pretense any more that the Vietnam truce agreement has brought respite from war. Pentagon witnesses told a Congressional committee this week that, unless a quick $474 million is sent off to Saigon, President Thieu's military operations would have to be sharply curtailed next month. And for the coming year, the Administration seeks $2.4 billion fa: Vietnam aid, plus another $463 million to support American military forces based in Southeast Asia. In the first year of so-called peace, the United States expense for weapons' and ammunition in Vietnam anas only 25 per cent below the level for corresponding programs in the heavy war year of 1972. . Neither North nor South Vietnam has shown any interest in implementing the elaborate and patently unwieldy political provisions of the Paris accords. 1 this comes as no surprise, what is ominous is the unstated assumption that the United States is com- mitted to 'keeping the war going, on President Thiee'e terms. Having successfully barred direct combat involve- ment in Southeast Asia-, the Congress is eettitle: new to be wry of continued drift into war by prcene. 24 . Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0. NEW YORK TIMES 9 March 1974 E.47nvoy in Saigon Charges zzies ArCiele Was Inaccz2r Special to Ma N -WASHINGTON, March 8? Graham A. Martin, the United States Ambassador in South Vietnam, has complained to the State Department that an article in New York Times on continued American involve- ment in Vietnam "contains nu- merous inaccuracies and half- truths." In a lengthy cablegram -made avrilable to The Times in Washington, Mr. Martin took strong issue with a survey article that was written by DiT.vici K. Shipler of The Times Saigon bureau and published on Feb. 25. . Me: Shipler wrote, in sum- mary, that American in:Litary aid to .the Saigon Government "continues to set the course of the war more than a year after the signing of the Paris, peace agreements and the; final withdrawal. of i....merican tr.ops." ? WASHINGTON POST 14 March 1974 m Vv.:tn./n.3 -"Whether the United States is breaking the letter of the agreements could probably be argued either way," Mr. Ship- ler wrote. "But certainly the aid ? directly supports South Vietnamese violatleins and so breaks the spirit of the ac- cords:" ? Hanoi Campaign Seen In a preface to a paragraph- by-paragraph , rebuttal of Mr. Shifler's article, Ambassador Martin said that Hanoi was planning an all-out campaign to persuade Congress to cut aid to ?Saigon and that efforts! would be made "to bring influ- ence to bear on selective sus- ceptible but inflvential elements1 of American communications media:" .A's an example of his objec- tions, Mr. Martin noted that Mr. -Sl,ipler had referred to S' igon's violations of the cee.,SE- fire accotd. "This is a classic," Mr. Mar- tin' said. "Shipler categorically, postulates 'South Vietnamese violations' without presenting a shred._of evidence, and alleges American military aid 'directly supports' such violations which thereby 'breaks the spirit, of tie accords.'" "It is quite true that to Hanoi ne spirit of the accords' was that the Americans would de- liver South Vietnam bound hand and foot into their hands," ithe Ambassador said. "Fortu- nately, only a handful of lAmericans would agree with ;that interpretation of the i'spirit of the accords." ; Mr. Martin acknowledged in 'his cabicgram that he and Maj. 'Gen. John E. Murray, the em- bassy's defense attache, had re- fused to meet with Mr. Shinier ;while he was preparing his ;article because "to do so would 'permit their own reputations for integrity to be used as a pIarCal-sr; for promoting a cam- 'i7 hose Ambassador? 7N GRAHAM A. MARTIN, President Thieu of South Vietnam has a warm friend and a forceful and highly relL zed advocate?a fine amhaesador, you might say. In- deed, Mr Martfefe recent attack on a New York Times report on American aid to Saigon?an 18-page attach which Mr. Martin asked the State Department to make public?could hardly have pleased President Thieu more. It mirrored precisely Mr. Thieu's own view that the fount of all criticism of his rule is Hanoi. The catch is that Graham Martin is not the ambassador of South Vietnam to Washington. He is the American ambassador to Saigon. This would seem to be an elemen- tary distinction but Mr. Martha, in his blin?dered devotion to President Thieu, has evidently lost sight of it. We have his devotion (and his low boiling point) to thank for the fact that he has come out from behind the wall of discretion, behind which professional diplomats ordi- narily work, in order to challenge a reporter for the Times. It is, first, outrageous that Mr. Martin should preface his challenge with the suggestion that press and con- gressional criticism of South Vietnam is being orches- trated by Hanoi The charge is false-.-and mischievous. That an American career envoy in the year 1974, should be sniping in a cheap political way at the motives of Vietnam policy critics is a sad commentary on how little the old cold-war-oriented hands have learned from our Indochina experience. Moreover, it is an old and un- worthy ploy for an official to disdain to talk with a re- porter on grounds that the reporter is "biased," and then denounce him for alleged errors. In short, Mr. Mar- tin is paying a heavy price for Mr.. Tlaieu's affection. Secondly, Mr. :`,72entin's critique is a throwback to the bad old claye cf eze-sided, self-seantesa over-simplified Approved For Release 2001/08/08 paign to grossly deceive the American Congress and the ;American people." I "In summary, Mr. Martin; 'said, "the Shinier article was; obviously not written to in- form New York Times readers but to give a slanted impres-, sion that the United States and South Vietnam are grossly vio- lating the cease-fire agree- ment." "It deliberately omits or ;treats skeptically the flagrant Communist violations of the ;Paris accords, all of which have ;been pointed out repeatedly to IShinier and The New York !Times Saigon Bureau by United !States and 'South Vietn.amese officials." Mr. Martin invited Secretary of State Kissinger or Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger to release his cablegram to the; Columbia School of Journalism; to expose "propaganda under' the guise of 'investigative re-I porting' than a respen- ible journalistic effort." reporting on Vietnam and, as ouch, is althcgather out ail line with the more nuanced requirements of a policy that no longer needs to depend for its effectiveness on misleading the American people. We had thought, or hoped, the objective now was to help move the Vietnam- ese parties toward a real settlement. By the evidence of Mr. Martin, however, the policy is to supply President Thieu the resources and encouragement to let him side- step the Paris accords and to keep pressing the war. For it is obvious that Mr. Thieu, seeing Mr. Martin's uncriti- cal devotion to him, can have little incentive to heed whatever cautions the U.S. Government may simultane- ously offer. We apparently have here a classic case study of how an ambassador loses influence with the government to which he is accredited. As to the specifics of the aid program as discussed by the Times and Mr. Martin, we believe, as we have pre- viously said, that Congress should itself go deeply into the whole program. The Times article charged that American military aid "continues to set the course of the war"; various American violations of the Geneva accords were alleged. Denying these allegations, Am- bassador Martin responded that the course of the war is set by "the continuous and continuing Communist build- up" and by Saigon's response to "actual military attacks mounted by the other side." These are, we submit, dif- ferences of perception which the Congress ought to try to clarify before it votes further aid for South Vietnam. The administration is asking for $1.45 billion in military aid in fiscal 1975?up from the $829 million approved in ? 1974. Whatever total it finally approves, the Congress should be convinced that the money is being given in an amount and in a way designed to ntieforce the Paris ac- cords, act to nr....i.'ermine them. CIAIIDP77-00432R000100320002-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0 NEW YORK TIMES 18 March 1974 27?.011r,:Sdy Cm plains to Kissingerl 731 Envoy in Saigon, 'elements of Arnerira r_cmmuni- 'cations media Ln-i. part:calar.y, WASHINGTON, March 17 (Reuters)?Senator Edward M. Kennedy has told Secretary of State Kissinger that a cable- gram from the United States Ambassador in South Vietnam has raised' the "worst kind of innuendo" about Congressional criticisms of American policy in Indochina. Mr. Kennedy made his March 13 letter public today as he and other members of Congress critical of the continued United States involvement in Indochina stepped up the campaign to cut off military aid to South Viet- nam. The 1Vlassachusetts Dern- THE ECONOMIST MARCH 9. 1974 carat asked Mr. Kissinger to ex- plain exactly what the United States was doing in Indochina with its continued military and economic aid to South Vietnam, Cainbodia and Laos. Mr. Kennedy's letter criti- cized a March 6 cablegram sent to the State Department by Graham A. Martin, the Ambas- sador to Saigon. The cablegram, which was published in part in the press earlier this month, said that Hanoi W'as trying to use "the remnants of the Amens can 'peace movement' to bring influence to bear on selective susceptible, but influential,1 on susceptible Congressional , staffers." "For him to suggest a tie," iMr. Kennedy wrote, "between alleged decisions in Hanoi and the views of members of Con- gress and their staffs about the course of American pnlicy to- ward South Vietnam and In- dochina is the worst kind of innuendo and regrettably ig- nores the many legitimate questions and concerns of the ,Congress and the American 'people over our commitments Ito the governments of Indo- china and over the continuing level of our involvement in the political and military noniron- Thisu's hoping for oil, too Saigon It needs three things to go President Thieu's way if he is to pull the South Vietnamese economy round. One is that the North Vietnamese do not launch an attack. The second is that America continues with its current rate of aid. The third is that commodity prices level off. In these conditions the country might get through 1974 with a payments gap of ?85m (or more than its own reserves), an inflation of 30-50 per cent, and a 10 per cent drop in real living standards. So even on the most optimistic assumptions South Vietnam's economic outlook is bleak. The war years, plus the huge sums spent by the Americans, pumped the economy up like a balloon. They also warped it in a way that is only now really being felt. At the height of the American presence in the mid-1960s, the money spent by the half million GIs and others amounted to ?170m??210m annually. It created a range of service industries and jobs for staff on canteens and bases, prostitutes, bar girls, un- official wives and so on. Out of a 19m population. 250,000 were employed directly by the Americans, and the South Vietnamese government amassed $400m (?170m) in foreign exchange reserves. With the American withdrawal these services have evaporated. The government's own reserves have run down to less than ?40m. And the war and the lure of easy money have swollen the town populations. They are now 40 per cent of the total; yet South Vietnam has very few industries. So there is mass unemployment. Unofficial spending by the remaining 7,000 or so Americans will probably total only ?35m this year. And on top of the withdrawal South Vietnam has been savaged by the rise in world commodity prices. Imports last year amounted to ?300m. This year they will double in cost, principally because of oil and fertilisers. For obvious reasons there are no oil refineries in the country. So, with some allowance for growth. the cost of im- ported petrol alone would soar from ?35m to ?85m. For the same reason there are no fertiliser plants either. But in most of the Mekong delta farmers have gone over to miracle rice as part of the much-trumpeted green revolution, and miracle rice needs lots of fertiliser. Fertiliser imports have therefore been eating up one-eighth of the country's import bill. Now fertiliser prices have doubled in six months. Besides the foreign exchange bill, farmers themselves have been badly hit. Some have been cutting back crop plantings. This could threaten South Vietnam's hopes of becoming self-sufficient in rice this year and even exporting 50,000 tons. Another -;.etions of the area." A sizable port?ni. of Mr.! Graham's cablegma contained, criticism of an article written' from Saigon by David K. Shin- ier of The New York Times., That article, which was printed; on Feb. 25, reported on United1 States military aid to the Sai- gon Government. - This said, the article said,1 "continues to set the course of t the war fore than a year after the signing of the Paris peace agreements and the final with- drawal of American troops." Mr. Martin, in his cablegram, submitted a paragraph-by-par- agraph rebuttal of ahe article, which he said contained "numerous inaccuracies and half truths." offensive by the North Vietnamese, of course, would be even more damaging. Exports have been rising?to ?10m in 1972, ?26m in 1973 and maybe ?43m this year?but not enough to dent the import bill significantly. The yawning trade gap would not matter if the Ameri- cans were prepared to foot the bill. But in the past three years American econo- mic aid has remained constant in dollar terms. In real terms this means a fall of 30 per cent this year alone. Last year the rate of inflation was 65 per cent. Yet the wages of important groups like the army and the civil service rose only 20 per cent. This year South Vietnam is expected to get between ?140m and ?160m of the ?190m that Congress has allowed Presi- dent Nixon for Indochina reconstruction aid. In addition something between ?64m and ?110m should be available in PL 480 commodity aid. Even adding ?43m which might spill over from mili- tary aid, as well as loans from Japan and France, this still leaves a nasty pay- ments gap. There is virtually no money available for development. Against this there is the country's main hope for the future?oil. The oil- men are well ahead with their pro- grammes. Prospects are good and off-shore drilling could start in the second half of this year. Eventually the dis- covery of oil could get South Vietnam off the hook completely, but even the oil search itself will improve confidence. In the meantime, all Saigon can do is keep its fingers crossed that world com- modity prices do not rise too rapidly. But as a good half of the budget goes on defence, until President Thieu can demobolise some of his army of lm? he will have an inflationary situation on his hands?and disaffection too as belts are tightened. 26 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0. BALTIMORE SUN 8_ March 1974 In Latin Armrica ?The Santiago. There is some argument over whether the corpse of Latin Areerican,Christian Democracy is interred in Caracas, Venezuela, or here in the New Chile. A few souls still believe that the "hope of the future," as Christian De- mocracy was called in Latin America only a decade ago, is still alive. If it is, it is not kicking. In Venezuela last December 9, the presidential candidate for the ruling Christian Democratic party, Lorenzo Fernandez, was soundly trounced by Carlos Andres Perez, of Accion Democratica. in an in- terview two days before the elec- tion, Mr. Perez made two pre- dictions: that he a ould win the presidency, and that Christian Democracy "was through as a force in Venezuela and Latin America." ? ? ? He won, and it looks like it is. Christian Democracy ene erged in Europe as a democratic com- promise between the conflicting tetalitarianisms of coinmunism and fascism. Those forces have Cashed as frequently, though not as Fiercely, in Latin America. In 1947 the trumpet was blown for Christian Democracy in Uruguay. It was heard in Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Peru, Bolivia, Colom- bia, Chile, end it even reached as far as Mexico. Even in Paraguay, ever squashed under the heel of Gen. Alfredo Stroessner, hope flickered and a nucleus of Christian Demo- crats took form. Less successful and viable aristian Democratic parties in some countries took heart in the success of their co- religlonaries in others. Thus, Christian Democracy was probably one of the most positive forces ever to thrive in Latin America. It beidged the disparate cultures of the various countries /47 of Chrir-b1-77 IL)-; Fcy By RICHARD O'MARA as no other force did, except perhaps Catholicism. But then, it was a political faith that sort of grew out of the spiritual one. Christian Democracy was most successful in Venezuela and Chile, where it won the govermnents. In Venezuela, Rafael Caldera won the presidency in 1933. He will keep it until March when he must turn it over to Mr. Perez, Eduardo Frei won the presi- dency of Chile in 1954, and as the first of his kind to reach the top be set the torch burning its bright- est. Mr. Frei a as a sincere re- former, intelligent, honest and determined to carry out policies aimed at distributing the wealth of Chile more equitably. In much he succeeded, and in much he failed. And in doing what he did he stimulated- the appetites of many dispossessed Chileans for more. Thus, we had Salvador Allende, the coup d'etat of last September 11, and now Gen. Agnosto Pino- chet. There are those who fear that General Pinochet and the extremists of the right who have his ear, will push the pendulum all the way back to pre-Frei days. It might be said that Christian Democracy got tired in 'Vene- zuela, got cautious in Chile and got crushed everywhere else. ? . . It was not clear to most politi- cal experts that the Christian Democratic party of Venezuela, COPEL had ceased to be a party of the people by the end of Mr. Caldera's term. In his earlier years Mr. Caldera had populist pretensions. The astounding de- feat of his hand-picked candidate and would-be successor, Mr. Fer- nandez, taught the experts a les- son, that COPEI had become lit- tle more than a smooth, slick machine, a 7sarty that seemed to have lost its heart. It is said that in the ? months preceding the overthrow and death of Socialist President Salva- dor Allende. Eduardo Frei had become a gOlpista, that is some- one agitating for a coup. That has not been proved, but it was clear that prior to the coup Mr. Frei had aligned himself with the right wing of the Christian Demo- cratic party, which had come to control it mainly through the per- son of Patricio Aylwin, the party's president. ? ? ? Mr. Aylwin's last significant po- litical act was to refuse to even talk with President Allende and the Union Popular government's representatives. . Some believe that . wes the strategy that iso- lated the Allende government and made the coup a certainty. Mr. Frei, it is believed, concurred with that policy, and in doing so one can see how far he bad trav- eled since he stood out as Chris- tian Democracy's shining apostle. Mr. Frei, Mr. Aylwin Pod Mr. Caldera are veterans of Chris- tian Democracy's struggle to suc- ceed in Latin Arherica. They have been personally successful, but in their success they have brought about a decline in the fortunes of the movement, or at least sep- arated it from its miler ideals. In other countries than Chile and Venezuela, Christian Democracy. was smashed from the outside: smothered in Argentina and crushed in Brazil. in Bolivia, the party leader, Benjamin Miguel, is In prison. Despite its general decline, .Christian Democracy is not with- out outstanding figures. Among these are Radomiro Tomic, of Chile, and Andre Franco Montoro, of Brazil. 'Mr. Tomic was the Christian Democratic candidate for presi- dent against Salvador Allende in 1970; he lost and because he lost his esteem ebbed within the party and control passed to Mr. Ayl- win. Now, because of Mr. Ayl- win's complicity in the coup? indirect, to .be sure?Mr. Tomic has ken rehabilitated in .the eyes of many Christian Demo- crats. It is significant, and indicative of the breadth and vision of the two men, that Mr. Aylwin blamed Dr. Allende exclusively for what befell him. Mr. Tomic spread the blame around, described the coup as a result of the failure of all to make democracy work. Obviously, Chile is not a com- fortable place for Mr. Tomic these. days, and for that reason he is sojourning in Texas. Brazil is also not a comfortable place for Mr. Montoro. 0 0 9 . Mr. Montero is a Christian Democrat in Brazil. He is also a senator, which does not mean intich since the congre.zs there is only a collection of puppets con- trolled by the military govern- ment. Still, Mr. Montoro manages to be about as. an effective critic of the military dictatorship as anyonee'Ogidelae; while living in that cotinti ? Trisfa0410' Athayde is one of BraziliS':ecatiOst astute political conniterators. Recently, writing in Journal do Brasil, he asked Ilim?elfPne of those rhetorical questions for which the writer professes to have no answer. The question was, is "Christian De- mocracy in a comatose state or a changing state?" No one can be sure, but one thing is certain: if it is changing it is changing into something not as exciting as it once W,11), Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIANDP77---00432R000100320002-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0 WASHINGTON PCST 11 March 1974 1-7,-L-aV7ger C?f;11.3 Find NeW Cs-17'7a 0 ein /7-7 ` See/ saahei eav By Terri Shaw Washington Post Staff Writer Disturbed by reports of con- tinuing political repression in Chile, many of the American groups that sparked the move- ment against the Vietnam war have begen to work together again to oppose the military '! junta that overthrew Chilean 'Preeident Saleador Allende. For Veresle. I masers, young radicals, chairch groups con- cerne-d about social justice and some trade unions have directed their attention , to Chile where the, right-wing . junt'a has done away with! most.dernocratic institutions. nSeveral of those organiza- tions have sent delegations to 1Chile to investigate reports of the torture of political prison-. ers and other violations of hu- !man rights. Others have been lobbying in Washington to !gain help for refugees from the new government and to j urge a cutoff of U.S. aid to Chile. The existence of this new coalition became apparent at a ;conference on Chile held re- cently on Capitol Hill under the sponsorship of several leg- islators. The conference, financed by ; the Fend for New Priorities ;for Arrierica, was intended to be a 5"eyeim for all points of view about the Lew Chilean eovernment and its re'saticn- ,F en te the United Steles. Hon. ever, all U.S. eo,....sna- rneet officials who had beerd invited to attend declined, and. Chilean Ambassador Walter, Heitmann canceled out at the lasttraornent. Several people involved in organizing the meeting said they had made a special effort to convince State Department officials to attend, but were told that the conference would be "biased against the Chilean junta.' ? "By not participating they left the conference even more unbalanced," one congres- sional source said. The admin- istration's failure to partici- pate "was seen by many peo- ple on the Mil as a slap by the Executive Branch at Congress trying to deal with a foreign policy issue," he added. William Meyers, president of the Fund for New Priorities which has sponsored about 20 similar meetings on other top- ics, said it was the first time the administration had boycot- ted one. About 300 listerners, many of them young, packed a large I hearing room in the .New Sen- ! ate Office Building to hear grim_ reports of torture, bun- . ger and repression from re- cent visitors to Chile, aca- demic specialists on Latin America and Chilean exiles. Meyer warned the partisan au- dience several times against loudly demonstrating its oppo- sition to the new Chilean gov- ernment. Paul Si:, nel, a professor of eclitteel :cis nce at Frineic- CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 15 March 1974 -..;17Yc(airl'n r ?.?, ? inmea Nelson 0c:sod:sell Latin America correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor Santiago, Calle Chile has long been the most politi- cized nation in the southern hemi- sphere. In fact, politics used to be a way of life here. But this is now a thing of the past. Six months after the overthrow of Salvador Allende Gossens' Marxist government, Chile's military leaders have, in effect, declared themselves the one political force of consequence in the nation. They expect ? and will brook ? no competition. Normal political activity is vir- tually in suspension. Not only have the Marxist parties been proscribed, but the non-Marxist parties, including those that supported the military takeover, have also been put into a form of limbo. Hard news for Frei L. :ton UnivEr!:.:ty rEn'iriJ ea the edeninistratiee has re- the eirereenee set an 'eSihieseez of church groups, independent !public se." tsrest groups and uni- versities" ageinnt the Chilean junta. "It really has been a na- tional movement," he added, pointing out that when U.S. Marines invaded the .Domin- can Republic in 1935 "theta was hardly a Murmur from the American people." Laurence Rims, of the New School for Social Research in New York City, predicted that American corporations who in- vested in Chile under the junta "will be tirelessly publi- cized" and perhaps face the same kind of demonstrations j as those mounted against com- panies 'manufacturing napalm during the Vietnam war. One of the ? Major goals of j opponents of the junta is a suspension of foreign assist- I ance to the new Chilean gov- ernment. An ally in this effort and; one of the sponsors of the con- ference is Sen. Eziward Kennedy (D-Mass.). Sen. Kennedy said that sev- eral international investiga- tions "and the innumerable personal 'accounts that have been submitted to my office disclose the grossest violation of hurnan rights" in Chile: Kennedy said that Ceseito provision in the new f.nrzigit aid law saying that Chile ; should get no mare rid unti ihuman rights are protected ig.77?Cec,a, s quested nese military aid for the junta and is backing new loans for Chile in the Interna- tional develcpment banks. Donald Anderson, assistant vice president for Latin Amer- ica for First National City Bank of New York, and one of the few at the meeting who was not critical of the junta, pointed out that Chile sill need large ens:sits from the in- I ternational leading eggeeciez- to get its economy moving again. An indication of the wide- spread concern about viola- tions of human rights in Chile came in a statement issued atee ter the Capitol Hill conference ! by a group of intellectuals, in- cluding Roger Baldwin of the International League for the , Rights of Man, and historian Arthur Schee:ginger Jr. The statement criticized the Allende government for "creating the situation which. led to the military action. of; Sept. ll." But it also called ces the junta "to move quickly to restore democratic rights and ? institutions." The signers of the state- ment, identified as members of the Inter-American ea ecia- tion for Democracy E.Ild Free- OM, urged the L. gsrerss- meat to provide aid -.Z.3 the junta; but also "to use its gry:r.T offices in all legitimate to urge on the junk, ?Lae. ur- gent need to rests,: e fuectice- ing democratic preceeses." This is particularly galling to the Christian Democrats, and most espe- cially to their world-renowned leader, Eduardo Frei Montalva, whose Re- formist Party has for a decade been Chile's largest single political force. They had expected to play a major role in the military government that seized power in the wake of Dr. Allende's overthrow and thus to be in on the ground floor for an eventual return to traditional political patterns In what they hoped would be the not- too-distant future. But they have been sadly dis- appointed. Individual Christian Democrats are serving in the govern- ment, but the party itself has been shunted aside and warned not to become active. . La Prensa closed down The Christian Democrats, angry over the situation several weeks ago 28 . Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0 sent a letter to the military junta headed by Army Gen, Augusto Pinchet Ugarte expressing their dis- pleasure ? an action, it is understood here, that incensed the military com- manders. In the wake of that incident, the Christian Democrats closed down La Prensa, the newspaper that had be- come the party's mouthpiece in San- tiago, indicating that conditions here did not permit the paper to operate in freedom. La Prensa was known to be having financial difficulties, but it would probably have been kept alive if it were not for the military-imposed press censorship that has cut San- tiago's 13 dallies down to 5. The military, for its part, in evolv- ing its own political philosophy, is clearly more and more in dis- agreement with the Christian Democrats, hlarnire them fcr much of the difficulty now facing this 'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0. nation. A document prepared under mili- tary guidance and published in the Santiago newspaper El Mercurio on the c re of the six-month anniversary of the Allende ouster outlines military thinking on the question. Arguing that "the long period of decadence" which Chile has under- gone can be blamed on party politics and sectarian governments "whose aims were . . . to increase their elec- toral base . . . and not in the common good," the document specifically sin- gles out the Christian Democrats, lumping them together with the Marxist parties that supported Dr. Allende. 'International' ties cited It even goes so far as to say that Christian Democratic philosophy is of foreign origin. "Marxism and Chris- tian democracy ? were 'inter- national' in many and important aspects," it states. In working out a new concept of government, the document indicates the military is interested in some- thing "not influenced by the concepts and attitudes that have brought us to decadence and disintegration." There is no doubt that the military includes the Christian Democrats in this along with the Communists, So- cialists, and other leftist parties that worked with Dr. Allende. In effect, what the military is saying, according to a source close to the junta, is simply this: The political ideas supported by more than two thirds of the Chilean electorate in recent elections are to be discarded. T-eiid long recogniz ed There never was any doubt that this was to be the fate of Dr. Allende's own Socialist Party and its close collabo- rator, the Communist Party, which together represented a good third of the electorate. But now it is clear that this includes also the Christian Democrats, whose political base is another third of the national electorate. This is bound to leave a major political vacuum ? but such concerns do not seem to worry the military. The military leaders are convinced of the rightness of their cause and they indicate they have the patience and muscle to sit out any opposition that the policy encounters. Moreover, the military displays a determination to take the program to the people and win them over. Whether such an effort will be successful remains to be seen_ But the military certainly is not going' to allow any organized political qpposidon in the effort. 29 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0 NEW YORK TIMES 10 March 1974 1 tl()RJ Standard By Tom Wicker . Two items from The New York Times: March 8, 8, 1974: "Secretary of State Kissinger told a Senate committee to- day that he would recommend a veto of the Nixon Administration's own trade bill if Congress refused to grant trade concessions to the Soviet Union because of its restrictions on the free emigration of Jews and others." Feb. 28, 1974: "[A high United States official] pointed out that the Central Intelligence Agency had rejected an offer by the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation of $1 mil- lion in September, 1970, to be spent in Chile to defeat the Socialist candi- date for the presidency, Salvador Al- lende Gossens., The offer was made to Richard M. Helms, who was then the Director of Central Intelligence, 03111128?10111?1011%.? .-4,160.11.1.M131:68=9.11111 - IN THE -NATION "The Chilean siozy is . . . in sad contiast to Mr. Kissinger's positipn on Soviet emigration policies." by the agency's former director, John A. McCone, who had become an I.T.T. board member." There is no particular connection between these two items?except that there is now an intensive effort in Congress to deny most-fav,ored-nation trading status to the*Soviet Union if it continues to restrict the emigration -of Jews; and that there was in 1970, and throughout his presidency, an in- tense effort by I.T.T. and others to prevent or destroy Mr. Allende's Gov- ernment in Chile. But the Nixon Ad- ministration that Mr. Kissinger repre- sented throughout the period did not threaten or disapprove the latter ef- fort; quite the contrary. The C.I.A. did turn down the I.T.T. money (although nothing seems to have been done about the scandalous attempt by a former-C.I.A. director to bribe the agency, with private money, to undertake interference in the inter- nal politics of another country). But the Nixon Administration restricted that Government's ability to get for- eign credit and cut off foreign aid to it, continuing only to supply arms and training to the Chilean military. Thus, it was troops trained by' the United States and armed with Amer- ican weapons who overthrew the Al- lende Government last fall end?as ? now seems certain?murdened Mr: Al- lende. There are numerous evidences .that the officers who ordered the bloody coup and the later execution of What appears to have been thousands of Chileans were encouraged in their planning by American supporters, both official and unofficial. Nor did the Nixon' Administration and its em- bassy officials in Santiago distinguish themselves in saving the lives of ref- ugees, including some Americans._ . The Chilean story is only gradually coming to light, but what is known is in sad contrast to Mr. Kissinger's po- sition on Soviet emigration policies. He said he regards detente as of such overriding importance that the United States must not endanger it by trying to influence- internal Soviet polities. On the other hand, in pursuit of what it conceived to be the national interest, the Nixon Administration-ap- pears to have been a considerable in- 'fluence in the opposition to, and over- throw of, the Allende Government.' Before that, of course, various Amer- ican Governments had had a hand in numerous interventions (for example, the overthrow of Guatemala's elected left-wing Government in the nineteen- fifties). ? - This reflects a double standard if ever there was one. It is a double standard' in the sense that Amerian interests (as perceived by the Admin- istration in power) may require inter- vention in one country's internal af- fairs but forbid it in another. It is an even more deplorable double standard in that it seems to permit interven- tion for certain selfish political or eco- nomic purposes but not for the pur- pose of upholding human rights.: This is not necessarily to argue that Mr. Kissinger is altogether wrong on the Soviet emigration question; There is in fact much to support his position. Anyway, to take a stand for human rights. in the Soviet Union might seem a bit ludicrous, since the Administra- tion has such strong ties to Greece, the Chilean junta, Spain, Portugal, Smith Vietnam, South Korea, the-Phil- ippines and other strong-arm govern- ments. The members of Congress who are demanding Soviet concessions on emi- gration, morever, have their own dou- ble standard: they are not so vocal about Chilean refugees, of whom only a handful have been admitted to this country, or about human rights iii the numerous other repressive gorern- ments to which they annually, vote military and other forms of aid. The Jewish emigration question, after all, is of interest to Many of them only for obvious domestic political reasons. Under the auspices of the Fund for New Priorities, some of the same mem- bers of Congress did take part the other day in public hearings on the situ_aticn in Chile. That would be an excellent place for them to show a more general concern for human rights ?as well as for the established Amer- ican double standard tat--.-ard these rights.