Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 21, 2001
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
August 1, 1974
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0.pdf6.43 MB
25X1A ? Approved For Release 2001/08%08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330IM-0- CONFIDENTIAL NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES INTERNAL USE ONLY This publication contains clippings from the domestic and foreign press for YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use of selected items would rarely be advisable. NO. 12 23 AUGUST 1974 GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 1 GENERAL 16 EASTE1i411ATE 18 WESTERN EUROPE 19 NEAR EAST 25 AFRICA 29 EAR EAST 33 WESTERN HEMISPHERE 40 Destroy after backgrounder has served its purpose or within 60 days. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RbP77-00432R000100330001-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0" CONGRESSIONAL RECORD 1 August 1974 - AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT LIMITING CIA INTERVENTION IN THE INTERNAL , AFFAIRS OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES HON. MICHAEL HARRINGTON OF MASSACHUSETTS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Wednesday, July 31, 1974 Mr. HARRINGTON. Mr. Speaker, I ma offering amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act limiting CIA covert op- erations which manipulate and inter- vene in the internal affairs of foreign countries. I consider the Foreign Assistance Act the natural piece of legislation for at- taching these amendments. For there can be no doubt that when the CIA intervenes in the internal affairs of for- eign countries, the CIA is usurping Con- ress' role and responsibility for formu- lating foreign policy. Such executive abuses of power must now be ended. In the last couple of months, particu- lar attention has been given to unlawful CIA intervention into this country's do- mestic affairs. CIA intervention into the domestic affairs of foreign countries is simply the other side of the coin end deserves equal congressional attention. Such intervention is equally illegal and is a?manifestation of the same drive for unchecked power on the part of the ex- ecutive branch of Government. . This committee should feel a particu- lar obligation to limit CIA activities which intervene in the internal affairs of foreign countries. As reported in the Washington Post on October 21, 1973, CIA Director Colby in hearings on the Chilean coup told me that he would not testify before this committee to specific CIA operations. Yet, it is this committee which formulates foreign policy. If the CIA will not tell us exactly how and in what respects the CIA is in- fluencing foreing policy, this commit- tee's only choice is to prevent the CIA to the extent possible from anyway af- fecting foreign policy determinations. The CIA now enjoys the best of both worlds. It tells of its intervention in for- eign policy only to those Members of Congress either not interested or experi- enced in formulating foreign policy; on the other hand, it tells those Members Interested and experienced in formu- lating foreign policy that CIA meddling into foreign affairs is none ig their busi- ness. This clearly cannot continue. I envision these amendments as only a first step in regaining for the Foreign Affairs Committee power over the CIA's direction of foreign policy. Certainly, full support should be given to that part of the Bolling committee reforms which give the Foreign Affairs Committee some oversight powers in regard to the CIA. Independently, it is also necessary to work for reform which will create a CIA oversight committee which would in- clude members of Foreign Affairs and would have the necessary powers to pre- vent CIA abuses of its charter. According to President Truman, whose administration created the CIA, the agency was intended to gather, central- ize and analyze intelligence and was never intended to to be a "peacetime cloak-and-dagger operation." The Na- tional Security Act of 1947 authorizing the CIA gave it permission to engage only in those activities "related to in- telligence." Yet, the evidence is clear that the CIA in conjunction with the National Security Council has taken upon itself the role of directing a secret for- eign policy distinct from the one au- thorized by CongreSs. ? Almost from its inception, the CIA has arrogated to itself the power to secretly intervene in the internal affairs of for- eign countries. According to a series of artcles written collectively by the New York Times correspondents Tom Wicker, Max Frankel, Bud Kenworthy, and John Finney and published in the Times from April 25-28, 1966, in the early 1950's, the CIA funded defeated Chinese Na- tionalists and encouraged them to raid Communist China-. .Iii Guatemala, the article noted that the CIA has admitted that it funded and engineered the revo- lution against the Communist-oriented President Jacabo Arbenz Guzman. As is well documented, the Bay of Pigs opera- tion was planned by the CIA. According to the Times, it is now doc- umented that the IA operated the Phil- lipine campaign against link allerniw';. The CIA organized an unsuccessful coup against President Sukarno of Indonesia in 1958. According to Vincent Marchet- ti's book, "The CIA, the Cult of Inlolh- gence," the CIA spent an eXCen::j ye amount of energy in hunt lug down Cit,' GIACVeril in 1966-67. All of these opera- tions clearly affected this country's for- eign policy. In Chile, according to an April 6, 1973, Washington Post article by Laurence Stern quoting knowledgeable official sources, major intervention by the CIA helped to defeat Allende in the 1964 elec- tion for President. The CIA funded trade unions, farmer organizations, st mien I. groups, and the media in order to defen t, and discredit Allende. According to testi- mony given before a Senate subcommit- tee and printed in the October 21, 1973, Washington Post, the CIA earmarked $400.000 to support anti-Allende news media shortly before the election. In tr,s- timony before this coin! n Mee anti printed in the Washington Post, Director Colby refused to say that this money was not spent. The latest CIA manipulative attempt exposed by the press and ad- mitted by the Government was t he fak- ing of a letter to Bangkok government by 1 a CIA agent.. The agent accredited the letter to a guerilla leader in order to discredit him. CIA interference in other countries' internal affairs through military assist- ance has also been egl.egious and docu- mented. The CIA has now admitted that it armed, trained, and olvrated an array of Meo tribcomen in Laos ? duriirr the 1960's. The Times articles on April 25-23. 1966, documented that the CIA supplied .pilots, mechanics, and aircraft to time government of Moise Tshombe in tile Congo. CIA involvement in training the mili- tary and police forces of other Countries has also recently come to light. In Jack Anderson's column of October 8. 1973, he exposed the existence of papers possessed by Senator ABOUREZK which documented that the CIA was training foreign police- men under the auspices of AID in a re- mote desert camp in Texas. Foreign countries being trained included Chlie. Brazil, Guatemala, the Dominican Re- public. Bolivia, and Uruguay. The CIA taught these policemen the use of explo- sives, electric priming, electric firing de- vices, explosive charges, and booby traps. That the CIA is still involved in these operations today is evident. A pattern of intervention in the internal affairs of foreign countries has been clear since the creation of the CIA. There is no reason to believe that the CIA has suddenly stopped these activities. Moreover: ac- cording to Marchetti, 1,800 CIA agents are still working in the covert activities unit of the CIA-engaged in financing youth, labor, cultural groups, operating clandestine radio propa gouda outlets, and conducting hare-scale efforts to i?- fluence foreign elections, Andrew Hamil- ton, former program analyst for the Na- tional Security Council, reported in the September 1973 edition of the Progressive that according to informed sources the ? 1fr71 CIA budi:et couttnwd at nl,out $100 ? , m ll'211 for cove) t operation in 1971. ' Fins it should he briefly noted that pot only is there the abundance of evi- denre Mentioned previously tieing. the CIA to the formulation of foreign policy. but there is also evidence that seine CIA f un dine comes direct ly from FAA money. there are the police trAning pro- grams already mentioned. Marchett?i re- ports in his book that AID's Public Safety Division regularly provides cover for CIA operatives all over time world. In addition, the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee revealed that the Loatian war was financed from the budgets of AID and DOD. These amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act limiting CIA activities offer Congress an opportunity to reassert "- those powers, which through neglect, have been usurped by time CIA. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 HE NEW YORK TIMES, THUR,SDAY, AUGUST 15, 1974 xcerpts From the Draft of Hou_se judiCiary Special to The New York Timex WASHINGTON, Aug. 14- Following are excerpts from the draft of the final report by the House Judiciary Com- mittee that contains facts ?supporting Articles I, II and Ill of impeachment of former President Nixon: ARTICLE I Conclusion After the Committee on the Judiciary had debated i whether or not it should rec- ommend Article I to the House of Representatives, 26 of the 38 members of the committee found that the evi- dence before it could only lead to one conclusion: That Richard M. Nixon, using the powers of his high office, engaged, personally andl through his subordinates and agents, in a course of con- duct or plan designed to de- lay, impede, and obstruct the investigation of the unlawful entry, on June 17,1972, into the headquarters of the Dem- ocratic National Committee: To cover up, conceal and pro- tect those responsible; and to conceal the existence and scope of other unla?rful cov- ert activities. This . finding is the only one that can explain the President's involvement in a? pattern of undisputed acts that occurred after the break- in and that cannot other- wise be rationally explained. The President's decision on June 20, 1972, not to meet with his Attorney. General, his chief of staff, his counsel, his campaign director, and . his assistant, John Ehrlich- man, whom he had put in charge of the investigation -when the subject of their meeting was. the Watergate matter. [2] The erasure of that portion of the recording of the Presi- dent's conversation with Haldeman, on June 20, 1972, which dealt with Watergate -when the President stated that the tapes had been un- der his "sole and personal control." 131 The President's public de- nial on June 22, 1972, of the involvement of members of the Committee for the Re- election of the President or of the White House staff in the Watergat burglary, in spite of having discussed Watergate, on or before June 22, 1972, with Haldeman, Colson and Mitchell-all per- sons aware of that involve- ment. [4] The President's refusal, on July 6, 1972, to inquire and inform himself what Patrick Gray, acting director of the F.B.I., meant by his warning that some of the President's Panel's Final Report on Impeachrifen't aides were "trying to mor- tally wound" him. 151 The President's discussion with Ehrlichman on July 8; 1972, of clemency for the Watergate burglars, more than two months before the return of any indictments. [6] The President's public state- ment on August 29, 1972, a statement later shown to be untrue, that an investigation by John Dean "indicates that no one in the White House staff, no one in the Adminis- tration, presently employed, was involved in this very Bizarre incident." [7] The President's statement to Dean on September 15,- 1972, the day that the Wa- tergate indictments were re- turned without naming high C.R.P. and White House offi- cials, that Dean had handled his work skillfully, "putting your fingers in the dike every time that leaks have sprung here and sprung there,' and that "you just try to button it up as well as you can and hope for the best." [8] The President's discussion with Colson in January, 1973, of clemency for Hunt. [9] The President's discussion with Dean on Feb. 28, 1973, of Kalmbach's upcoming tes- timony before the Senate se- lect committee, in which the President said.. that it would be hard for Kalmbach be- cause'"it'll -get out about Hunt," and the deletion of that phrase from the edited White House transcript. [10] The . President's appoint- -ment in March, 1973, of Jeb Stuart Magruder to a high Government position when Magruder had previously perjured himself before the Watergate grand jury in. or- der to conceal C.R.P. involve- ment. [11] The President's refusal to act on Dean's statements of March 13, 1973, that Mitch- ell and Haldeman knew about Liddy's operation at C.R.P., that Sloan has a com- pulsion to "cleanse his soul by confession," that Stens and Kalmbach are trying to get him to "settle down," and that Strachan had lied about his prior knowledge of Wa- tergate out of personal loy- alty: and the President's reply to Dean that Strachan was the problem "in Bob's case." [12] The President's discussion on March 13, .1973, of a plan to limit future Watergate Investigations by making Colson, a White House "con- sultant without doing any consulting," in order to bring him under the doctrine of ex- ecutive privilige. [13] The omission of the discus- sion related to Watergate from the White House edited transript, submitted to the Committee on the Judiciary, of the President's -March 17, 1973, conversation with Dean, 'especially in light of the fact that the President had listened to the conversa- tion .on June 4,. 1973. [14] The President's instruction to Dean on the evening of March 20, 1973, to make his report on Watergate "very incomplete,' and his subse- quent public statements mis- representing the nature. of that instruction. . [15] The President's instruction to Haldeman on the morning of March 21, 1973, that Hunt's price was pretty high, but we should buy the time on that. [16] The President's March 21 statement to Dean that he had "handled it just right," and contained it," and the deletion of the above com- ments from the edited White House transcripts. [17] ? The President's instruction to Dean on March 21, 1973, to state falsely that payments to the Watergate defendants had been made through a Cuban committee. [18] The President's refusal to inform officials of the De- partment of Justice that on March 21, 1973, Dean had confessed to obstruction of justice and had said that Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Mitchell were also involved in the crime. " [19] The President's approval on March 22, 1973, of a shift in his position on executive privilege "in order to get on with the cover-up plan," and the discrepancy, in that phrase' in the edited White House transcript. [20] The President's instruction to Ronald Ziegler on March 26, .1973, to state publicly that the President has "ab- solute and total confidence" in Dean. [21] The President's actions, in April, 1973, in conveying to Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Col- son and Kalmbach informa- tion furnished to the President by Assistant Attorney General 2 Petersen after the President " had assured Petersen that he would not do so. ? [22] The President's discussion, in April, 1973, of the manner in which witnesses should give false and misleading statements. [23] The President's lack of clemency to Mitchell, Magru- der and Dean. [24] The President's lack of full disclosure to Assistant Attor- ney General Henry Petersen between April 15 and April 27, 1973, when Petersen re- ported directly to the Presi- dent about the Watergate investigation. [25] The President's instruction to Erhlichman on April 17, 1973, to give false testi- mony concerning Kalmbach's knowledge of the purpose of the payments to the Water- gate defendants. ? [26] The President's decision to give Haldeman on April 25 and 26, 1973, access to tape recordings of Presidential conversations, after Assistant Attorney General Petersen had repeatedly warned the President that Haldeman was a suspect in the Watergate investigation. [27] The President's refusal to disclose the existence of the White House taping system. [28] The President's statement on May 25, 1973, that his waiver of executive privilege, announced publicly on May 22, 1973, did not extend to documents. [29] The refusal of the Presi- dent to cooperate with Spe- cial Prosecutor Cox: The President's instruction to Special Prosecutor Cox not to seek additional evidence in the courts and his firing of Cox when Cox refused to comply with that directive. [30] The submission by the President to the committee on April 30, 1974, and the simultaneous release to the public of transcripts of 43 Presidential conversations and statements which are characterized by omissions of words and passages, mis- attributions of statements, additions, paraphrases, dis- tortions, non-sequiturs, de- letions of sections as "ma- terial unrelated to Presiden- tial action." and other signs of editorial intervention: the President's authorization of his counsel to characterize ,these transcripts as "accu- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001'-0 rate:" and the President's public statement that the , tanrscripts. contained "the ? whole.story" of the Watergate. matter. In addition to this evidence there was before the commit- tee the following additional evidence. ? [1] Begirming immediately after June 17, 1972, the in- volvement of each of the President's top aides and po- litical associates, Haldeman, Mitchell, Ehrlichman, Colson, Dean, LaRue, Mardian, Mar- grader, in the Watergate cov- er-up. [2] The clandestine payment by Kalmbach and LaRue of more than $400,000 'to the Watergate defendants. [3] The attempt by Ehrlich- man' and Dean to interfere with- the F.B.I. Investigation. [4] The perjury of Magruder, Porter, Mitchell, Krogh, Stra- chan, Haldeman and Ehrlich- man. ? In addition to this evidence, there was ,before the com- mittee a record of public statements by the President between June 22, 1972, and June 9, 1974, deliberately contrived continually to de- ceive the courts, the Depart- malt of Justice, the Congress and the America.. people. On August 5, 1974, the President submitted to the Committee on the Judiciary three additional edited White House transcripts of Presiden- tial conversations on June 23, 1972, which confirm the find- ing that from shortly after the break-in on June 17, 1972, President Nixon personally di- rected his subordinates to take action designed to delay, impede and obstruct the in- estigation of the Watergate break-in: to cover-up, con- ceal, and protect those re- sponsible: and to conceal the existence and scope of other unlawful covert activities. In violation of his consti- tutional duty to take care thet the laws be faithfully executed, contrary to his trust as President and un- mindful of the duties of his high office, the President adopted a course of conduct, which caused illegal surveil- lance for political purposes, and the concealment of re- sponsibility for that surveil- lance: obstruction of justice: perjury, destruction of evi- dence?all crimes. For more than two years, the President engaged in a course of con- duct which involved deliber- ate, repeated and continued deception of the American people. The committee finds the President's course of conduct to be to the great prejudice of the cause of law and jus- tice and subversive of our Constitution: and the commit- tee recommends that the. House of Representatives ex- ercise its constitutional p 'reprove power to impeach Richard M, Nixon. ARTICLE II Article 11 charges that Richard M. Nixon has vio- lated his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed and the obligations he assumed when he took the constitu- tional oath of office as Pres- ident. The article is based upon the constitutional standards governing the President's conduct of his office, and charges that he has misused powers that only a President possesses. Using the powers of the office of President of the United States, Richard M. Nixon, in violation of his constitutional oath faithful- ly to execute the office of President of the United States the best of his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States, and in disregard of his constitu- tional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully exe- cuted, has repeatedly en- gaged .in conduct violating the constitutional rights of citizens, impairing the due and proper administration' of justice and the conduct of lawful inquiries, or contra- vening the laws of Govern- ment agencies of the execu- tive branch and the purposes of these agencies. Five areas of misconduct are included -within the ar- ticle, each of them suffi- ciently substantial to war- rant impeachment. Each in- volves repeated misuse of the pov.Trs of the office. of President, over a continued period. Each focuses on im- proprieties by the President that served no national pol- icy objective and cannot be justified under the most ex- pansive view of the dis- cretionary or inherent pow- ers of a President. Each Central to Article II is the charge tha tthe President misused the power of the Presidency-. He misused thtse powers by directing or au- thorizing his subordinates to seek to interfere with the administration and enforce- ment of the Internal Revenue laws in order to advance his political interests, contrary to the constitutional rights of citizens. He misused his powers by authorizing the Federal Bureau of Investiga- tion and the Secret Service, as well as agents of his own office, to undertake and con- tinue electronic surveillance and investigation of citizens for which there was no law- ful purpose; by permitting or authorizing the use of in- formation obtained from this surveillance for purposes that .were beyond the authority of his office; and by permitting a secret investigative unit within the office of the Pres- ident to engage in unlawful and covert activities, in vio- lation of the constitutional stantial reason to suspect that they were interfering with the -proper administra- tion of the law. He knowingly misused the executive power to interfere with the proper and lawful functioning of agencies of the executive branch, including the Depart- ment of Justice and the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency. In some of these instances his attempts to misuse execu- tive agencies proved un- successful. The impeachment process is designed to deter- mine whether the President is fit to remain in office, -not whether he should be pun- ished for past misdeeds. In this connection, a violation of the President's duties the objective is no less serious because the improper objec- tive is not achieved. [foot- note: the applicable principle was stated by Supreme Court Justice William Johnson in Gilchrist v. Collector of Char- leston, 10 F. Cas. 355 365' (No. 5, 420) (C.C.Z. S.C. 1808): If an officer attempt an? act inconsistent with the duties of his station, it is - presumed that the failure of the attempt would not exempt him from liability to impeachment. Should "a Pres- ident ?head a conspiraty for. the usurpation of absolute WASHINGTON POST 17 August 1974 Claim Made By McCord :* Against U.S. United Press International James W. McCord Jr., con- victed Watergate burglar and former security chief for the ?Committee for the Re-election :of the President, has claimed 'damages of $1 million from the White House and $1 million from the Justice Department. In a 13-page memo ad- dressed to the President and the Attorney General and en- titled "Federal Tort Claims Against the Government," Mc- Cord claimed that his civil, power, it is hoped that no one will contend that defeat- ing his machinations would restore him to innocence.] ARTICLE III - Conclusion The undisputed facts, his- toric precedent, and applica- ble legal principles support the committee's recommenda- tion of Article III. There can be no question that in refus- ing to comply with limited, narrowly drawn subpoenas? issued only after the commit- tee was satisfied that there was other, evidence pointing to the existence of impeach- able offenses ? the President has interfered with the exer- cise of the House's function as the "grand inquest of the nation." Unless the defiance of the committee's subpoenas under these circumstances is considered grounds ? for im- peachment?it is difficult to conceive any relevant evi- dence necessary for Congress to exercise its constitutional responsibility in an impeach- ment proceeding. If this were to occur, the impeachment power would be drained of its vitality. Article III, there- fore, seeks to preserve the in- tegrity of the impeachment process itself and the ability on Congress to act as the ulti- mate check on improper pres- idential conduct. 'rights had been violated. The claim was contained in the memo, but was not filed as a court action. It was dated Aug. 14 and mailed to the White House. "By deliberately withhold- ing" Watergate evidence, Mc- Cord said, "President Richard Nixon committed extreme pre- judice against McCord, deny- ing him a fair trial, due pro- cess and equal protection of the law, and denying other constitutional and civil rights, privileges and immunities 'guaranteed him under the Con- stitution." McCord was the electronics. expert on the team that broke into Democratic National Com- mittee headquarters in the Watergate complex June 17, 1972. He was convicted in the original Watergate trial in battery, 1973. rights of citizens. He failed to perform his duty to see that the laws were applied Ciwtednit dlgkes01,11M0 8 : CIA-RDP77-00432R001/100330001-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08: The New York Times Book Review/August 18, 1974 The C.I.A. and the Cult of Intelligence -RDP77-00432R0_00100330001-0 me New York Times Book Review/August 25, 1974 Best Seller List General This By Victor L. Marchetti and John D. Marks. ? Week 434 pp. New York: _ Alfred A. Knopf. $8.95. By WILLIAM MILLER Victor Marchetti and John Marks took as the frontispiece of their book the motto inscribed on the wall cf the C.I.A. -headquarters in (Langley, Va.: "And Ye Shall Know the Truth; And the Truth Shall Make You Free." Ironic, since their book "The C.I.A. and the Cult of Intelligence" is the first book cen- sored -with court sanction before publication in the Republic's 198- years. This edition includes blank spaces. where 168 passages, 27 derived from identifi- ably classified sources, have been-deleted by court order. An additional 177 passages, printed in bold face type, were reinstated by` the courts'. . The court applied no test of the merits of classifi- cation, accepting only the fact of it. The reader has no way of knowing whether deleted material would, in truth, "cause grave and irreparable injury .to the United States." The book's legal history and actual merits raise separate .but -related questions. There have been many other exposes of the , C.I.A., and there is considerable scholarly litera- ture on intelligence services available. With the exception of some details' and what may be in the deleted por- tions, there is little new information in the Marchetti-Marks book. Effective bureaucracies that require operational- secrecy are uneasy part- ners with egalitarian democratic gov- ernment and ideas of individual liberty. Marchetti and Marks agree there is no alternative to their precarious Coexist- ence. This hook represents a serious breakdown in the internal discipline of the agencies so dependent upon discipline and secrecy. The authors accept responsibility for the contents of their book and argue that failure to publish would itself adversely affect national security, as the failure of the press to publish information about the Bay of -Pigs was, in the end, against the national interest. Thus they come; indirectly; to the larger questions of conflict of institutional issues. Both authors held sensitive intelli- gence positions, and had, indeed, signed agreements pledging not to dis- close confidential information learned in the employ of the Government. (Jus- tice Department lawyers, arguing for the C.I.A., claimed the issue was not censorship and the First Amendment, but a simple breach of contract suit.) In the context of Watergate Wash- ington there have been repeated ex- amples of unquestioned loyalty to the Executive -personally or to organiza- tions such as the C.I.A. specifically, that were in violation of the Constitu- tion and other laws of the land. As a political gesture based on their under- standing of constitutional responsibil- ities Marchetti and Marks deliberately violated bureaucratic loyalties. The claim of "national security," - Last Week Weeks On List ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN, by Carl Bernstein 1 13 -- and Bob Woodward. (Simon & Schuster, $8.95.) Here's how it all began .. . 23 THE MEMORY BOOK, by Harry Lorayne and Jerry Lucas. (Stein & Day, 87.95.) Ingenious exercises for jogging your memory. 3 THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO, by Aleksandr I. 2 Solzhenitsyn. (Harper & Row, $12.50; also avail- able in paper, $1.95.) Raw, impassioned attempt to wrench the secrets of Soviet prison life into the light of history. 4 ALIVE: The Story of the Andes Survivbrs, by Piers 4 18 Paul Read. (Lippincott, $10.) A moving, true story of young men pushed to their limits. YOU CAN PROFIT FROM A MONETARY CRISIS, 5 27 by Harry Browne. (Macmillan. $8.95.) Mr. Browne has. .6 PLAIN SPEAKING, by Merle Miller. (Putnam's, 6 31 $8.95.) Candid, taped reminiscences by Harry Tru- man on his life and contemporaries. 7 THE WALL STREET GANG, by Richard Ney. 3 (Praeger, 86.95.) Advice for the small investor on beating the stock-market insiders at their own game. 8 THE CIA AND THE CULT OF INTELLIGENCE, 9 by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks. (Knopf, $8.95.) Revealing insights into the world of intelli- gence and clandestine activities. , V TIMES TO REMEMBER, by Rose Fitzgerald Ken- 7 nedy. (Doubleday, $12.50.) Mama Rose has her 21 turn and supplies the Fitzgerald side of the story. 10 THE WOMAN HE LOVED, by Ralph G. Martin. 10 (Simon & Schuster, $9.95.) Gossipy but balanced 2 story of the romance of the"Windsors. foisted alongside unreviewable classi- fication, is being battered now from many -directions. Washingtonians are, adept at reading between the lines of Congressional hearings when long passages are deeted by the executive branch on "national security" grounds. Lately the world has been treated to the - bowdlerized Presidential tran- scripts. The Pentagon Papers and the Ellsberg cases were clear warning that the Nixon Administration intended to press its 'claim of exclusive right to determine ."national security." Thus the court test of pre-censorship for the first time in our national history with this book was presaged by other events. In the preface, Marchetti ob- serves, with remarkable detachment, "I cannot help wonderink if my govern- ment is more concerned with defend- ing our democratic system or more intent upon imitating the methods of totalitarian regimes in order to main- tain its already inordinate power over the American people." While the underlying issues of cen- sorship, accountability, conflict of loyalties, and balance between na- tional security and constitutional proc- esses are compelling and have made the Marchetti-Marks book an item of national political interest, it also pro- vides revealing insights into the world of intelligence and clandestine activi- ties. The authors systematically lay out the anatomy of the intelligence com- munity which employs over 150,000 people and spends more than $6-billion annually. The C.I.A. itself spends ae relatively small proportion ($750 mil- lion) for a- staff of 17,000. The authors briefly document the activities of the principal parts of the intelligence community and con- William Miller is staff director of the Senate Special Committee on national emergencies and delegated emergency powers. 4 dude that technological collection such as satellite reconnaissance, while most expensive, seems necessary and worthwhile. But, most money goes to the service intelligence agencies and to the National Security Agency. They concentrate on the clan- destine activities of the C.I.A., re- peatedly pointing out that the agency's problems are the result of disproportionate emphasis on clandes- tine activities, to the detriment of the analytic sections, Beyond counter- espionage, "the dirty struggle in the back alleys of the world" Dean Rusk said, _Marchetti and Marks find mini- mal benefits from the agency's dirty trick operations, with the least yield coming from behind the Iron Curtain, where the need for information is greatest. The recital of clandestine activities, despite the deletions, is an 'interesting historical record of the range of American efforts to influence affairs of other nations. The list of operations in Cuba, in Chile, Iran, Vietnam and Bolivia (the -last the melo- -dramatic hunt for Che Guevara), won't surprise regular newspaper readers, though the details could have come from spy novels. -The best parts of the book are the analysis of intelligence activities by purpose, organization and cost. The critique of the oversight committees in Congress will not reassure those who believed there were adequate safeguards and institutional checks on the intelligence community. The com- mittees met rarely and were regularly diverted from systematic budget - and program reviews by the gimmicks and showmanship of the agency di- rectors. Despite the 168 deletions there is enough information to give thoughtful citizens and Congressmen enough facts and reasons to press for new statutory guidelines to control American intelli- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 The New York Times Book Review/August 18, 1974 Without Cloak , Or \Dagger The Truth About the New Espionage. By Miles Cope/and. 351 pp. New York.: _ Simon & Schuster. $8.95. ,By MICHAEL BURKE The C.I.A. seems to have concluded that stone- walling it simply won't wash any longer?not after Watergate. They must now drop a veil a little to quell mounting public apprehension. To that end "Without Cloak or Dagger" is a virtual manual of in- telligence technique. It tells all you always wanted to know about spying but didn't know whom to ask. Secret writing is effective. Clandestine radio is safer - than commonly supposed. Clandestine penetration of Russia and China is now accomplished with ease. C.I.A. officers engage in a considerable amount of adultery but never pad expense accounts. C.I.A. is now out of the brothel business. . Less definitively but clearly there emerges from ? Copeland's book the shadow group of elitists who control the C.I.A.?"the old boy net," powerful enough to chew up and spit- out_an unwanted Director of Central Intelligence, as they did James Schlesinger_ ? C.I.A. is the devil we don't-know. Copeland's aim is to convey a "fundamental understanding" of the central Intelligence Agency and to correct popular misconceptions. In the proCess he surfaces the Agency's deepest dilemma, reveals the ominous reach of an operation called Octopus and discloses the C.I.A.'s ambition to become a body as untouchable as the Supreme Court. - The author's credentials are well established. He has been a senior C.I.A. officer and remains an old boy in good standing. His book, then, -ten "the truth about intelligence" as a member of the old-boy net sees it. Espionage is but a small part of intelligence, the clandestine dirty tricks part, but apparently it is as ineradicable as the, world's oldest profession. The .C.LA.'s relationships with the F.B.I. are uneasy; civility at the top drops off sharply to hostility. They are combative with Defense, cool with State. But the pure professional camaraderie shared by the C.I.A. the Russian K.G.B. and the British S.I.S. is- warm, even cozy. A diplomatic gathering in Beirut, Vienna or La Paz will find senior intelligence officers gravi- tating toward one another, drawn by some mutual chemistry, chatting easily and ignored by regular diplomats. These are the management types?senior enough to "come out," to operate without the pre- tense of cover. -- If it isn't already, the C.I.A. may soon become the -world's most powerful Government agency. Opera- tion Octopus,' designed to deal with terrorist groups, is the world's largest repository of personality data. To the C.I.A.'s information, foreign intelligence serv- ices have added their own; they fear that, in their own countries, public outcry against this massive invasicn of privacy might force destruction of such informa- tion. "As the Agency's power increases, so does the public's fear of us," one Agency official said. This is the C.I.A.'s dilemma: How to remain pow- erful, anonymous, secret and at the same time win public confidence. Through Miles Copeland, the old- boy net is saying: We know the enemy; we know how to deal with him; we are incorruptible. Though you don't know us, you can trust us implicitly. The Agency maintains it .demonstrated its incor- ruptibility by rejecting White House efforts to mis- use it in connection with Watergate. It has also demonstrated its fierce sense of autonomy by quickly disposing of Schlesinger. Although Faith and Trust are usually, placed in people, Copeland tells us nothing of the men and wo- men who populate the C.I.A. They are, in truth, just like you and me---except that they live in a strange, private -world -sealed off from the rest of us by the covert nature of their work. They play by their own rules, hence develop a perspective that tends to dis- tort their view .of the overt world. They are at un- ending war, enemy?Communism. Copeland gingerly mentions idealism. in fact there is little room at the* C.I.A. for idealism, only prag- matism. And technique. - The old-boy net, the C.I.A.'s first generation, has lived its whole life in a clandestine world. Its defense is impregnable; its instinct for self-preservation tenaa tious. For its members to tell anyone anything is an unnatural act. -To reveal something of themselves and their activities, as the public. temper seems to demand, will be a wrenching experience. Intelligence is. a serious piece of the nation's busi- ness--too important to be left exclusively to 'the spooks. 11; Michael Burke, now, president of Madison Square Garden, lived the life in wartime O.S.S., filmed as "Cloak and Dagger." gence operations, to ? assure that whether overt or concealed such opera- tions serve the nation's real security needs within constitutional processes. As the Bicentennial celebrations approach we can only hope the cere- monies will celebrate the continued existence of a strong, open, constitu- tional government rather than the continuation of growing practices of rule by secret cabal, so much a part of the Watergate eta, and so well docu- mented in "The C.I.A. and the Cult of Intelligence." Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP$7-00432R000100330001-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 WASHINGTON POST 17 August 1974 'Disinformation' on CIA, or the Unintentional Indictment [ Book World WITHOUT CLOAK OR DAGGER: The Truth About the New Espionage. By Miles Copeland (Simon Ss Schuster. 351 pa. $8.95) ? Reviewed by Thomas. B. Ross ? The reviewer is Washington bureau chief of The Chicago Sun-Times and the co-author of "The U-2 Affair," "The In- visible Government" and "The 'Espionage Establishment." . Miles. Copeland, an old CIA hand, has E. Howard Hunt's penchant for adven- ture, intrigue, conservative geopolitics and the games grown boys play. But Hunt, when not living out his fan- tasies at the Watergate or Dr. Fielding's office, was turning them into fiction, so labeled. Copeland, on the other hand, has subtitled his second book "The Truth About the New Espionage." The problem is that Cope- land concedes he has changed names and situa- tions to protect the agency and his comrades in arms. The reader is thus left with the problem of guessing when the author is present- ing fact and when he is presenting fiction or, on a more subtle level, when the old CIA operative is practic- ing the fine, professional art of "disinformation" to de- ceive the "opposition" and, incidentally, the reader. The problem is com- pounded by the fact that Copeland assertedly did not submit his manuscript to the CIA for clearance, yet the agency has not chal- lenged its publication. By contrast, the agency took an- other important CIA man, Victor Marchetti, on a long ride through the courts to stop or censor his recent book, "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence." Why such permissiveness toward Copeland when he purports to be dealing with the innermost secrets of the CIA? Perhaps it is because he is loyal and uncritical and Marchetti is not. Cope- land takes the orthodox line that those who Tun the CIA are "incorruptible," that much of what they do should be taken on faith, and that there is more than enough control of the agency by Congress and the White House. But there is an inner con- tradiction in the argument. Copeland contends, on the one hand, that the House and Senate subcommittees on the CIA are kept fully in- formed of the agency's activ- ities. On the other hand, he concedes that no. one in the CIA hierarchy will "tell even those Congressmen on the 'watchdog' committee more than they 'need to know.' " It's like President Nixon judging what evidence the House Judiciary Committee needed to pass judgment on him. ? Copeland takes an insid- er's pleasure in the _ cute practices of John M. Maury, until recently the CIA offi- cer in charge of congres- sional relations. "Maury, a Southern gentleman of great charm, has a simple, formula," Copeland writes. "When appearing before committees; he provides a carefully worked-out, story that contains no untruths, yet reveals no information that would damage the Agency should it leak out to, the public. With dema- gogues, he takes them aside and tells them.'nothing, and lots of it, and with an air .of great secrecy.' Finally, with the most respected Con- gressmen, he tells them the whole truth, thefeby passing on to them the responsibil- Ity for deciding whether or not what he confides should. go any further." But even when "the most respected Congressmen"?I assume he means respected by the CIA for their unwav- ering support?take excep- tion, Copeland concedes they do not necessarily pre- vail. He complains bitterly, at one point, about some smart-ass kid in 'Support" . who complied with a con-. gressional demand that the CIA obey official policy on chemical warfare by de- stroying the agency's supply of chemical agents. The proper procedure, Copeland explains, is to "lose the pa- pers" or "concoct an excuse plausible enough" for not carrying out a "stupid or- der" from ?Congress or the White House. Copeland suggests that in a similar way the "old boy net" dealt with a new boy, James H. Schlesinger, dur- ing his brief tenure as direc- tor of the CIA. Schlesinger sought to make the CIA "re- sponsive to the needs of .the White House," Copeland ex- plains, but "The only result of his firings and attempts at reorganization was to force most of the espionage branch to go underground where he "couldn't find it, thus crippling his ability to govern." Copeland speculates that the CIA took even more drastic action against the form e r President's men when they repeatedly so'fight to use the CIA for political purposes. He theor- izes that James McCord was 6 a double agent for the' CIA and that he purposely botched the Watergate job to expose the illegal activities of the White House plum- bers. It does not appear to have crossed Copeland's mind? or Richard Helms' for that matter?that it might have been simpler and more effi- cient, not to mention more democratic, for the agency to have gone to one of its "respected Congressmen" and exposed the dirty tricks. ? Copeland's blind spot on Watergate is reflective of a general myopia about the problem of running a secret intelligence organization in a free society. He tried to _write an apologia but pro- duced an indictment. PLAYBOY AUGUST 1974 BOOKS If the CIA could kill men and move-: ments as well as it can kill books?such. as TIv.! CIA and ihe Cult of lntellivence (Knopf), by Victor Marchetti and John Marks?: the Cold War long ago would have turriod into a rout and we would havei 1),!.:11 able to dismantle our conventional military organizations and go back to families. crops. hell and other 1 natural things. Trouble is, we Ameri-1 t?ever really had much aptitude for ! the kind of dirty work that comes pretty much as second nature to the Russians. Instead of steely-eyed K.G.B. operatives do their work without remorse or romance. we hired buffoons like E. How- d Hunt. with his feverish imagination I is taste for good living. So we got 1.:1V of Pigs.. Operation Phoenix and other disasters as part of the deal. Iii short, we got an organization (insiders call it The Agency or The Firm or even Vtither, and they usually whisper the wards in tones of grave awe) that can kill a lot of people without improving any- thing. A very bad bargain. But when word of this book reached CilA headquarters in Langley. Virginia, sleuths went right ,to work. (inciden- tally. the lavish CIA- li-eadquarters was :it one time "secret- and the highway &-\:ts leading to it either were not .1::?Iked at all or were maiked by signs' ?NC:Te. intended to mislead. This, in of the fact that everbosly in Wash- tm.ton scho was ;those school age how what that building and what scent on there. But the :igerlcr has never been deterred by ridicule over its obsession with secrecy. When the building was: under construction, the contractor who was installing the air conditioning needed to know how many people his machinery would have to cool. Sorry.; Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 buddy, he was told, but that's classified. tie did the best he could. but the system never worked properly. The agency took hint to court and lost?as usual.) Any- way, nobody in the CIA was -nappy about it when it was learned that Mar- chetti, a CIA veteran, had a book in mind. Since lie'd signed some Oaths about not revealing classified intelli- gence material, they slapped an injunc- tion on him. Marchetti, his publisher and the A.C.L.U. argued that this was prior restraint and in violation of the First Amendment. Not so, said the DAILY WORLD New York Communist daily 3 August 1974 vee, judge. It's a contractual matter, just like bank loans and alimony. After several complicated appeals, Marchetti won?sort of. You wouldn't know it to read this book. It looks as if it was put together by a printer stumbling down the road to dipsomania: The pages are a blinding mixture of plain type, boldface and large areas of white space with DELETED stamped over them. Those are the parts that are still under litigation. The bold- faced portions represent deletions orig- inally insisted upon by the CIA that the courts have allowed to be published. If the stuff that belongs on the white parts is as "damaging" as the stuff that ap- pears in boldface, then these ruthless minions of sabotage and espionage are more chary of their virtue and reputa- tion than the average spinster from Mo- bile. Which is to say that though this is a good book?what there is of it (perhaps ten percent of the original was deleted and will be restored in later edi- tions)? it's not one that con- siderable way to our fund of knowledge about the CIA. TThe deletions themselves are probably the most dramatic message in this book. By George Morris ....1??????10?1110.... ? major developments in which the AIFLD . played a role during his years with the CIA. In 1964, trainees of AIFLD. as its director ; boasted, had an important hand in the m . (r : tary overthrow of the liberal Jao Boulart /el u regime in Brazil. The dictatorship that took control then is still in power and is the major base for fascism in Latin America today. Simultaneously,? in 1964, the CIA-led operation in Chile successfully prevented Salvadore Allende from winning the presi- dency then. The Washington Post, in a story that also appeared in the April 7, 1973, Los Angeles Times, noted that that 198-1 oper- ation was under the direction of Cord Mey- er, who directed the CIA policy of setting up labor, student and cultural fronts since the early CIA years. ' In the 066-67 CIA scandal, Cord Meyer figured prominently. And last February. during the long coal miners' strike and the general labor upsurge in Great Britain. Cord Meyer was headlined when he was , found, as the Guardian noled, in a "plush pan in swank Eaton Place directing the operations of CIA men "studying" the sit- uation there. The entire British press raised a cry against the CIA invasion. The London Times observed, "From Washing- ton, Britain must now be beginning to took like a Central American banana republic." .a Who's Vo in Multinationals. ? requires sending in troops as we. did in And also in the mid 60.s. it no one for.-;et. Re- The AIFLD receives at least 33 million Vietnam and the Dominican Republic.' the U.S. troops entered the Dominican annually, almost-all, of it from the U.S.. The U.S. policy, he added, "has the effect public to protect a fascist military clique. government, piped through the Agency for of strengthening minority governments A spokesman for Agee in the United International Development (AID). (In 1965, which perpetuate great wealth for the few States ig to arrange for a U.S. publish- a similar agency for operations in Africa and widespread poverty for the rest. It has er) also hinted that Agee will tell of CIA was. set up ? the Afro-American Labor the result of strengthening injustice." assassinations of agents, referring to a Council ? and in 1963 the Asian-American Thomas Braden, a top CIA official in the specific case "involving the use of a truck Institute for Free Labor Development was early 50s, revealed how, soon after it was to run over a recently utilized local CIA h corn: established: George .1',Ieany is chairman of established M 1947 operative whose mission ad been, the CIA had need of a each.) "labor cover" and how that problem was pleted." In its July 3, 1974 issue, The New ? Concerning the AIFLD, J. Peter Grace, solved by the quartet then running the, York Times said "such allegations were head man of the huge Grace & Co. con- AFL's affairs ? Meany. Matthew Woll. widely rumored for .years." E.g.. its own glomerate, is chairman of the board and David Dubinsky and director Jay Love- correspondent, Terence Smith, wrote from Joseph Beirne, until recently the president stone. Of course Braden approved that role Saigon in August 1969 that "according to of the Communications Workers of Amer- of the labor bureaucracy and defended also reliable sources, more than 150 double r-e ica, is secretary-treasurer. Business ex- the CIA and its disruptive role of splitting agents have been caught and execeti" ecutives and top union heads are on the European unions; the CIA phony "founda- by the CIA's Green Berets. Other observers board of directors. - tions" through which it piped millions to have written like reports. Much evidence has been uncovered and the labor, student, cultural and other coy- Agee should be able to tell about the has been published in the mass media show- ?ers for CIA operations: and the eventual abortive CIA-led Bay of Pigs invasion in and . ing that, in effect, all three of the outfits CIA-induced split in the World Federation nvhich E. Howard Hunt (of Watergate Ellsherg break-in fame) had a leading part are CIA covers and that their hundreds of of Trade Unions which resulted in CLA-spon- - she has made three trips to Cuba since labor operatives were 'directed by Jay sorecl and financed splinter "anti-Commun- 19n9 in connection with research for his Loy-stone, until July 1 the director of the . ist" unions in France. Italy, Greece and book. And undoubtedly lie will also be abi, AFL-CIO's Internationl 4=88 p6p=t-. other_civv4 iNj131?" lease . rykiRrau+GG43,2.Rocle aitT115030 Vb. on the CIA's role in Chile merit. eee trch ro? ast eptem er when Allende was tner- tai ',nay Meany's appearance as a witness be- for Senator J.W. Fulbright's Foreign Af- fairs Committee in August 1969 led to the introduction of Some of these data, and some two dozen published documents were gathered by a Senate Sub-committee even earlier. But with the backing of President Richard Nixon and the continuing flow of AID funds, the Meany-Loyestone-Beirne clique ignored the exposures and charges, claiming that they were functioning in ac- cordance with the government's anti-com- munism policy. Agee, however, is the first important CIA insider to talk and, as he told 'news services in his telephone interview, he is in a position to reveal "what we did in Latin America-, why we did it, why I quit and why I decided to write about it." Also, indicat- ing ?the course his exposure will follow, Agee added, "What we did in Latin Amer- ica, and and what we do in so many other countries in the third world, is similar to what the United States did in Vietnam .. The agency's job is to keep the level of insurgent activity below the point which J;\1 ? ill the Central Intelligence Agency' succeed in blocking publication in the Uni- ted States of a book exposing its worldwide network of operations?. Philip B.F..Agee. who wrote the book Penguin Publishers is putting out in England where he now lives, was with the CIA for 14 years; holding re- sponsible positions in Latin America until 1969. Recent investigations into the role of the CIA in the Watergate affair have "blown" that agency's "cover" in much of Latin America as a result of disclosures that have necessitated a change in the en- tire structure of its operations. ? ! The Agee defection is especially ,sig,ni-i cant for the labor movement because, ac cording to reports of a telephone press in- terview with him, he used as his cover the American Institute for Free Labor De- velopment (AIFLD). This organization, ? set up in 1962 for the professed purpose of combatting "Communism" in Latin Amer- ica, is supported jointly by the AFL-CIO bureaucracy and top executives' of scores t, corporations whose names read like 7 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 dered and his Poputar Unity government overthrown by the fascist junta.? The CIA will surely try every trick in its hook to stop publication of Agee's book in the United States. It tried to prevent the. issuance of a book by Victor ailacchetti. a 'former agent, and succeeded in holdinsup publication for a long time by legal actions. Finally it forced many deletions and wa- tering down before it was printed. And Marchetti's aim was only some liberal re- forms in the CIA!' It is an interesting coincidence that, the very week the -U.S. public heard about the Agee defection and his forthcoming book, the AMID was the subject of a meet- ing in San Jose, California, of the Santa Clara ? County Central Labor Council (SCCCI.C). Last December an Emergency ? Committee to Defend Democracy in Chile was set up at a conference in San Jose, and material subsequently compiled by the committee's chairman. Fred Hirsch (member of the Steamfi tiers and Plumbers Local 393), was widely distributed. This report was titled "An analysis of Our AFL- CIO Role in Latin America. or Under the Covers with the CIA." At its July 1 meeting. on the basis of the Hirsch pamphlet the SCCCLC adopted a resolution declaring AIFLD "against the best interests of the labor movement in Latin America and the United States," and called on Meany, chairman of AIFLD, "to reaffirm the integrity and high purpose of the AFL-CIO." Meany, disturbed by the publicity for the Hirsch pamphlet and the resoiution, sent William C. Doherty,- Jr., director of AIFLD, and his assistant Jesse Friedman to Santa Clara to "straighten out" the Council members. Doherty and Friedman, armed with an 11-page answer to the kirsch p mabiat, eveded the real charge-3 "AIM) is a front for the U.S. Stale De- partment," Doherty argued. He.fmned and blustered, an observer told me, but "lie was 20 years late in his rhetoric." He stiii used the old red herring ? labor's "obligation to fight Communism" and "Cuba is just SO miles from our shores." He also used in- vectives against the Daily World and George Morris, apparently still disturbed by my Kiii7 book "CIA and American Labor" (International Publishers). He asked the Council to reconsider the resolution, bat the idelegates refused and instead, according to my informant, they "tore the pants off Doherty," asking questions which he ducked and evaded. Delegates were particularly interested in the fact that some 95 multinationals sup- port AIFLD and its indicated CIA connec- lions. "We'll take money from the devil ; himself if it :vitt help us organize unions for' the workers of Latin America," Doherty said. To which a delegate from -Service Ern-i! ployes Local 715 responded, "The one thing. I have learned in the labor movement is. never to take money from the bosses. This: really blows my mind." And asked why; AIFLD-supported unions were permitted: to operate in Chile since the outlawing Of. ? Chile's main trade union Movement (CUT), Doherty admitted the AIFLD ;vitt stay: there aS long as there is a chance to "help. our trade union brothers." To which Coun- cil delegates ebserved that the AFL-CIO is much involved in military dictatorships in Latin America "but does little organizing: work in the United States," pointing out: that the AFL-CIO's domestic organizing staff has dwindled from 4:10 to about CO. Vika tharzazigge Wfferry.exo.noniad d its Elgin By Jack Anderson The Central Intelligence Agency has admitted in an ex- traordinary private letter to Sen. J.W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) tht the agency has penetrated the police forces of friendly foreign countries. The remarkable confession by CIA Director William Colby came in the course of a discreet but intensive lobbying effort to keep alive U.S. support for for- eign police programs. Colby-told Fulbright that the "relationships" built up with Volicemen through these pro- grams had been highly useful In "obtaining foreign Intelli- gence" from foreign constabu- laries. The friendly foreign cops, like national police evezywhere, are privy to their nation's darkest secrets. And while Colby does not say so, our government sources tell us the foreigners are not above trading a national secret or two for a little CIA cash. Colby, in his message to Ful- bright, delicately skins the mat- ter of corrupting foreign police, conceding only that the liaisons bring the CIA vital information on "illicit narcotics traffic, In- ternational terrorism and hi- jacking." ! Colby's "covert lobbying was directed against a bill by Sen. James Abourezk (D-S.D.) th0 would kill U.S. aid to foreign po- lice and prison operations. The measure was drafted after shocking abuses were disclosed in South Vietnamese prisons constructed with the U.S. tax-i payers' funds. The CIA director, who. as atop U.S. hand in Vietnam saw the abuses first hand, said, never- theless, that the Abourezk measure would "appear to re-i strict activities.,, by the CIA."' The main cutback would be in "obtaining foreign intelligence information" from friendly espis onago services and agents "within national police forces.. .," Colby went on. Sonao of the agents in foreign police forces, Colby indicated, had been developed during "specialized training and oth support" given by the CIA. Colby's lobbying proved Wee- g?-?-st.t she conclusion of the conference, an embarrassed Do'hcrty disclosed, in answer to a Inent question, that his sentry is ailas- Cii0 a year plus expenses ? which he didn't estlina le. The signifiaance of the Santa Clara con- frontation is that it was labor's first chal- lcnge to the use of a !al..eir cover for the C. In a Lasie sc:r..e, it is a challenge to those, like hie:.?rei and oSsocintes in the AFL-CIO baireatioracy, who oppose the pal.. icy of detente. How sable can detente be if there is en "invisible government" fi- nanced by billions ? net just millions; with a network of secret operation centers circling the globe; with manpower, air- lines, space techniques sufficient to over- threw and set up governments; with the ability to create incidents and undermine and blast treaties for peaceful relation- ships? There are even accusations of as- sassinations at the instigation of secret plotters, and widespread belief persists that Peesideat John Kennetiy at,:-.1 in retaliatian for his tn.:Tea:neat ae Cuba foil-J.:jag the Bay of Pitts inzinent. President Lyrition to an article in the Atlamie oath!y (Jon. 1073), based en an interview with Lea ..lanet said, "I never believed Ostvaid acted ahene. though I can accept that he pulled the tr,a ger." Johnson said that when he took et Hee, he found "We had been eneratize damned l',Ierder, Inc. in the Catiiiteeen; Johnson. observed Janos. apparently refee red to the fact that a year earlier "a CL-S hacked assassination team had been up in Havana." Agee may throw some light on that, :she THE WASHINGTON POST Armisy Aagast IFIW I five. In secret session, the com- mittee permitted the CIA to go /on supporting foreign pollee op- erations. Insiders suspect that Colby's effort to defeat the Abourezk 'provision was actually aimed at !preserving the International Police Academy, an institution dear to the hearts of the spooks. . According to Victor Marchetti and John Marks, authors of "The CIA and the Cult of Intelli- gence," the agency has funded training of foreign police at the academy and recruited spies there. Colby himself wrote to Abour- ezk last January that the acad- emy, ostensibly run by the State -Department had "called on us in the past for some support for their program. But," he added, "all such support has been ter- minated." We also reported last Septem- ber that the CIA was involved in a Texas bomb school where the academy trained foreign police- men ? on explosive devices. A State Department official 1ater admitted the CIA provided "guest lecturers" for the course, which has now been moved to Ed gewood Arsenal, Md. Footnote: Both the CIA and the 'academy say no CIA funds are now going into the school. Colby has also personally said 'support by the CIA for the school has been terminated. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 A.SHEICIT011 STAR 3 AUG 1974 3 Li ? ? ? ? e ? or -e ease 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 e Author (That By Tam Dowling Star-News Staff Writer 17-ZWICK ISLAND, Del. ? The bathers wander in from the beach to buy a morn- iag paper, to grab some suntan lotion, to ourchase a rubber swan for junior. They come to the Fenwick Beach Shop in flip- flops, the brown cleavage fading into white inside women's bathing tops, the men's -.dies as red as lobsters inside their snbuttoned beach shirts. A red rubber ball rolls down the Fen- s-sick Beach Shop's middle aisle, apparent- ly chucked by the brown-as-a-berry 5-year- on:l in the rear of the store. A reporter, who has more important matters at hand, flicks, the ball back, soccer style. "I've followed the Watergate case as close as anyone but Nixon," says James McCord, standing in front of the folding bridge table that displays 40 copies of his book, "A Piece of Tape. The Watergate Story: Fact and Fiction." A FISTHE7:', and his son approach in cu- riosity. At first the man's face says: Hey, aren't you . . .? Then it registers recogni- tion. His five-year-old son stares up dumb- ly, wearing a denim beach hat on which is printed: "State Prison 04U2." "What will happen?" a woman asks McCord breathlessly. "He'll be impeached and removed." "What about Gerald Ford?" "'S. don't know him," McCord allows. so it goes. Jeb Stuart Magruder had we eelrftrecedented distinction, through, of being the first behind-bars jailbird to appear on the Cavett and Today sitrees. Whatever happens to Nixon, a $1 million advance on his book is assured, alcag with an hour-long book-plugging shot en the Today, Tonight, Tomorrow, Yester- day and the Happy Days to Come shows. And so here is McCord, the Watergate bugger himself, standing in the near empty aisle of a beach shop, flogging his book o oanaided by Budweiser and Straw- berry Hill towels, b.: ach balls, plastic hair curl ,er coolers, comic book racks and a sunglasses steed. Ne. that there's ay anomaly here. The IittlL-y always has it toughest. That is ane,.7.:'atergatehs apt lessons. The rub a ,F are sent to eet in the can by Sirica. ce.o gerts a',.onger sentence and a lousi- ? r been deal than Magruder. Kleindienst eets a lecture. Nixon is being urged to re- , ign so he can still keep his six-figure- tour asks McCord in a voice that shudders with promise, as if bearing an invitation to dinner chez Agnew in some by-gone Ocean City era. "Nothing," says James McCord. "Do you think you could do Welch's from 7 to 9 to- night?" breathes the news agent. "They're dying for you." Welch's is a drug store in Ocean City, where McCord admits to having sold SO books a few weeks ago. A handful of tourists drifts up tentatively. "How did you get involv- ed?" asks a bald man in a bathing suit. "Through Liddy," says McCord. "He talked me into it." "Were you actually in the Watergate itself?" the man continues, the quaver at meeting a celebrity blending in his voice with an indefinite recollection of the events of June 17, 1972. - "Yes." s -year-government pension and benefits. t yen a constitutional republic has its hei- archical prerogatives. McCORD, WHO is currently out of the stir on appeal, seems sanguine about his iudicial fate, positively bullish about his ?ook. Perhaps men accept their lot accord- 'rig to their station ? as in a monarchy. cCord says he is the author-publisher- istributor-publicist of "A Piece of Tape.". e has been to 15 cities so far in his "auto: raph party" tour, appearing largely, it .eerns, in drug stores and out-of-the-way ick-knack shops. He says the first edi- ion of 15,000 paperbacks at $3.95 is sold, ecessitating a second printing of 25,000 opies. James McCord stand's cretary adc,ee "What are you doing tonight?" the local there, amid the suntan lo- Hoese pre-e5 .-e, ti, pre ;.clit 1.ord con,ici. Democratic party's "Ji-aterpte, Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-110P7T-00432R00010033000111- ()ices. He said 1:e lead co idea ews agent in charge of the book-signing tios and styrofoam beer ;red alfair 'deplorable." "HOW DO YOU feel about impeachment? I'm highly confused," says an older woman in a one- piece. "I'm for it," says McCord. "What do you think of the Mitchell-Stars trial?" says a man, holding an in- fant who stares bug-eyed at a box of Chiclets he's rattling. "As far as the Mitchell- Stens case goes," James McCord says, "I don't know the details well enough to know what the evidence was." "One final question," says the man, hungry for insider's knowledge. "Will the Senate convict?" "I think the Senate will be affected by the House," says James McCord, just as smoothly as Joseph Alsop. "Can I listen to what you're saying?" says a fat man with a moustache, si- dling over. "Is there a question on any subject I can an- swer?" asks McCord affa- bly. Lo coasters. The assured, sto- lid author. In two hours of conversation with a re- porter, he is unfailingly prudent, meticulously po- lite, fundamentally remote in the style of a man ob- sessed by caution and a fine regard for detail. ,LIDDY, THE pathologi- cally loyal soldier, makes sense. Hunt, the ineptly romantic CIA second-story man, is a plausible Water- gate burglar. But McCord the finicky dotter Of bu- reaucratic I's and crosser of T's, the shrewd legalis- tic master of options and self interest ? is an enig- ma. Even his book ? a singularly impenetrable 327-page volume of mas- sive details and passion- less grudges ? sheds no eRde Lo eiy) light. His prose is so stiff and correct that H. R. (Bob) Haldeman is refer- red to throughout as Rob- ert Haldeman. Just the same, McCord has books to sell. "Here, take a look at it," he urges a man, who will, if all goes well, become the 10th cus- tomer in two hours of work. A buxom, freckled woman bustled into the beach shop. "Oh, Mr.. McCloud," she sighs. "Mr. McCloud, my daughter said you were here and I had to come and meet you." James McCord smiles and hands her over a book. It's not the Today Show, but even the little guys in Watergate have to get by, somehow. n'7V YORK T.IIM 19 AUG 12.74 Hunt Says Seven Cartons Had No Rockefei 'or Data By JOIN M. CREWDSON seo-e..1 to Ter :seer I.:or..., Teat ei MIAMI, Aug. 18?E. Howaedi In an interview, Mr. Hunt. Hunt Jr. said today that, as far! who is free pending an appeal as he knew, the seven myste-, of his coeviction in the Water- ri01.13 cartons stored in his gate :natter, recalled that in White House office after the; the fall of 1971 he was ap- Watergate break-in in ?Juneel eroacteed by a woman assist- 1972, contained hundreds of, ant to Charles W. Colson, then copies of a hook-length criti-i a special counsel to forme: clsm of television news report-I President Richard M. Nixon. Lag but no information concern-1 He said the woman had ing former -Gov. Nelson A.' asked Mr. Hunt, then a mem - Rockefeller of New Yc-rk. I ? ber of the White House's Mr. Hunt, one of the seven ? cial investigations unit known men who pleaded guilty or were, as the "pluntbers," whether she convicted in the original Water- mint store seven bulky car- gate break-in case and who is toes in his quarters in .the now a Miami resident, termed Executive Office Building, next a "total absurdity' recent ree door to the White House. ports that the boxes had con- ?-tr. Hunt said that he had e-orese evidence that Mr. Rocke- agreed, and that the cartons feller, who is under considera-, were moved into his office, Lion for the Vice-Presidential' contained only a desk nomination, had financed dem- and a small, two-drawer safe. c;nstrations at the Democratic Five of the se'..en cartons, 1972. - house, were sealed. :It 1-searing the name of a took- National Convention here in The White House charged Ir Hunt said, but the two.. yesterday that the "tip con- cerning theapparently non ex- istent clocuments, which re- . others contained copies of a book by Edith Elton. a televi-: sion critic. entitled "The Nev...s: pettedly came to as at.ent.en Twisters." a week a;;o, was.. a hoax de- Mr. Hunt said that he had signed "t discredit Mr- Rocks- left the cartons unteeched, and ft='11..r and. th=rhY attempt t? that they were in place 1.*ctrr-ove 1-1-0111 corsidera- when he made his last tion" for the Vice-Pres:dency- to the office on Jur...e 19. 1972, two days after the =success- 3. F. terhorsc, the tkillite f I ' ? k-in att?not at the Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 'whatever became of them. ? Th s former Cenral Intelli- gence Agency operative con- ceded that the flve closed -cartons, which he said appear :to have been sealed. by the 'publisher of Miss Efron's book, .,`Inight have; unbelmomest to him, contained some other ma- Sterials of which "I was. an in- .'nocent holder." ? But he dismissed the possi- :bility as "ridiculous," in view of .his close association with Mr. "Colson, a fellow Brown. Uni- versity alumnus. and a:so the sensitive nature Of Els tasks as 'a member of the White House plumbers. , Information made 'available -last summer to the Senate 'Watergate corrirnie'nee about campaign "dirty oricks" in- -eluded 'testimony that Mr. Col- son had appropriated S.000 in -funds belonging to the Corn-' mittee for the Re--e;ection of the President to purchase quan-i titres of the Efron book. The; book contended tha: teielelsiorn news reporting was sometimes distorted, a public reeeition then :favored by _the. White House,. with the intention of putting the yob/me onto the best-seller lists, The Colson effort was unsuccessful. Roy Sheppard. a al.eo,'ner of Mr. Nixon's 1972 campaign; staff, reportedly told the Water-I gate committee earlier this! year. that, a few days after; the June 17 break-:n, h ehadi been directed by Mr. Hunt's! wife, Dorothy, to go to the Ex- ecutive Office Building and takei away. several cartons of docu-1 merits. Conflicting Versions Committee sources recalled: tcday, however. that they had. been told at least two conflict- ing versions about what oce curred thereafter. frensr. that Mr.: materials, and then that he had ?shipped them out of Washing- ton by way of the Railway Ex-, press Agency. One Senate invesaiaator said that Mn Shepparel's account' had never been cerna-:;orated by, the committee staff, which, among other things, determined that the sign-in book from the Executive Office Building for the period in question did not bear any indication that Mr. Sheppard had ever been a visi- tor there. !The source said that Mr. ;Hunt, when queried about the !matter, gave the committee. staff the account about the Efron book that he repeated in the. interview today. The source added that the Watergate com- mittee, which conducted an ex-' tensive inquiry into campaign sabotage and plans for demon- strations at the Democratic, convention, had never come. across Mr. Rockefel:er'S name in any context. Mr. Hunt said that the only materials in his office when he left it for the last time on June 19, 1972, had been the seven cartons, some old newspapers, and a small safe. He added that, he had never heard of Mr. Shep- pard, who could not be reached for comment today. The safe did contain sensitive documents. Mr. Hunt said, but nothing relating even indirectly to Mr. Rockefeller. Those items, which included reports on ani investigation of Senator Edward M. Kennedy and the Interna- tional Telephone and Telegraph. Corporation, falsified "diplo- matic cables" and two personal. telephone registers, were re- moved later in the week after :the Watergate break-in by johm W. Dean '3d, then the White! House counsel. Some of the documents were. given to L. Patrick Gray 3d,: at the time the acting director of the Federal Bureau of Inves- tigation, who later destroyed. them. Mr. Dean reportedly dis- posed of two notebooks. The apparently erroneous: tip regarding the "Rockefeller papers" was provided last Sun-. day to Philip W. Buchen, the', new White House counsel, by' Hamilton A. Long, a retired' Wall Street la-yer who for- merly headed a conservative, .Philadelphia publis'e corn-, pany, the American fieritagej Education Corporation. Mr. Long, who was describedi by Mr. Buchen today as about: 70 years of age, has written a number of conservative tracts,. including one, published in the. nineteen-fifties; entitled, "Per- mit Communist-Conspirators to! ? be Teachers?" Mr. Buchen sal dthat Mr. Long Cold him that he had also, been in touch with the staffs! of two Senators about the in- formation purported to have! been in Mr. Hunt's office, Rob- ert P. Griffin of Michigan, the! Republican.whip, and Cowell P. Weicter Jr. of Connecticut, a member .,of 'the Watergate commottee. Mr. Long was described by; several sources close to the. Hunt affair today as an ac- quaintance of H. J. O'Brien, thei o,,vner of a Washington, D.C.4 photo copy company and also' a close friend of Mr. Sheppard.; 10 THE ECONOMIST AUGUST 10,1914 Watergate in Russia umnimgmewr The Russians have started to be told about Watergate at last: Mr Nixon's confession on Monday that he knew about the cover-up all along got five paragraphs in Pravda on Wednesday. But the men who run the Soviet press are not going to find it easy to explain the fall of Mr Nixon. So far they have dribbled out the story in tiny fragments, spattered with strange ? foreign terms, and there has been no attempt to ex- plain the origins of the business or how the American :..:onstitution works. The ordinary reader would have to be a genius to guess what it was all about. On Monday, for instance, the reader of Pravda could learn in a snippet on the third page of his paper that Vice- President Ford, while believing in the innocence of President Nixon, expressed his preference for a procedure of censure (the word translated into Russian) rather than that of "impeachment" (the English word simply transliterated, as in the title of this article, into Cyrillic characters). It is true that, for some time now, Soviet propaganda has dropped its origi- nal line, which suggested that any attack against Nixon was an attack against the policy of detente. The Soviet govern- ment realised that the matter was serious, and that such an identification of relations between the two countries with relations between their respec- tive leaders, was getting dangerous. A series of ...Aides this week in Pravda and Izvestia about detente did not mention Mr Nixon's name once. But conditioned reflexes die hard, and other reports appearing elsewhere have con- tinued to show a strong bias against the critics of Richard Nixon. On July 29th Moscow radio, broadcasting in English, gave the impressions of a Russian who had just visited the United States. He was puzzled by the fuss about Water- gate, since "according to the recent Gallup poll 53 per cent of the American people . . . find the Watergate coverage excessive, unfair and misleading". But then, he explained, he saw the offices of the Washington Post, and in one of them was a poster saying: "Watergate, the gift that keeps on giving." "Keeps on giving what and to whom?" he asked, and meant it to sting. No doubt, even with the best of coverages, it would not have been easy to explain to the Soviet people the opera- tion of the American constitution, or the role performed by a hard-hitting press. But Soviet commentators will now want to show that Watergate was not merely a wicked plot against coexistence. After their contorted and mysterious ref- erences to it so far, they will find that difficult. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 LOS ANGELES TIMES 17 July 1974. t-liaid Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 -111 CIA- _Ayala BY HARRY ROSITZKE Many recent events highlight the C.ilemma that confronts the government in dealing with secret and sensitive infor- mation. Among these events is the publi- cation of a new book about the Central In- felligence Agency which contains 168 blank spaces marked "Deleted." Written. by Victor Marchetti and John 'alarks, "The CIA and the Cult of Intel-. agence" is at expose of the CIA's covert: operations abroad and, as such, has been,. the subject of prior restraint in the courts: In effect, it has been censored by the very agency whose activities it portrays. ?The government action was based on Marchetti's violation of his CIA contract to keep secret what he learned during his career with the agency. But, of course, the broader issue is the right of free speech and free press?and the related concept of "openness" in government. There are two and, So far as I can see, only two categories where absolute limits ate essential on what can be .openly di- villged about American intelligence oper- ations. These involve certain activities that cannot be Carried out if they are not kept secret. In such cases, therefore, the issue is not secrecy but whether these ac- fia hies should be pursued at all, ? One category is the code-breaking work of the National Security 'Agency, a sepa- rate organization in the Defense Depart- Mena The restriction against even a faint hint that a particular code has been bro- ken must be absolute. if the NSA breaks a foreign government's code, we can read its most secret military or diplomatic communications, as we were able to do af- ter breaking the Japanese code before Pearl Harbor. But if it leaks out that a cert code has been broken, that code wib;)e discarded and a source of vital info; mat ion closed off. Tho second category involves our actual espionaee work abroad. The CIA's foreign intelligenee agents have, been recruited. over the years to provide the government with essential information that cannot be procured by legitimate means. These agents are operating in foreign countries under conditions requiring utmost securi- ty, and knowledge of their identities is narrowly restrieted even within the CIA. Such safeguard: are mandatory if there is to be an Arne! lean espionage service. - Even the fairest implication that the American intell:zence service cannot be 1 Stamped 'Top Secret, depended on to keep its agents' names se- cret would cause the CTA to lose the ser- vices of many of its present agents and make the recruitment of new ones next to impossible. Only fools and frauds would venture their well-being for an intel- ligence service that cannot protect them. The alternatives are simply these: a se- cret foreign intelligence service, or no in- telligence service at all. Both in breaking codes and recruiting agents, secrecy is a .practical i m p er-a t i v e, not something vaguely desirable-in the dame of "national security." , However, after the information has been gathered, I see no reason, as a ground rule, not to encourage openness. Most classified material, once screened for accuracy, could be made public without imperiling the nation's security. It is often argued, of course, that even the most general. revelations concerning our intelligence-gathering capabilities are ? Harr'y Rositzke worked for the Office of Strategic. Services and the Central Intel- ligence Agency for 26 years, before retir- ing in 1970. He is the author of two books,. "The U.S.S.R. Today" and "Left ,On!" not in the public interest. In fact, Many contend it is actually desirable to culti- vate uncertainty .about how complete or precise our intelligence is. But within the world intelligence com- munity,? all the -major countries have a pretty good idea of other nations' capabili- ties. 'What is missing are the specific or unique facts that tell' who, how .and where. ? The amount of detail that might go into -public reports remains to be deter- mined; indeed, it could only be made on an individual case' basis. The real point is that no information is being disseminat- ed at present, and that is not in the public interest. ? Here are three types of now-secret in- formation gathered by intelligence orga- nizations that could be publicly revealed with some degree of usefulness: ? ?Satellite photographs. Our orbiting satellites are making superb photographs of the earth's surface: I see little reason why they should not be published. Yet, oddly, these pictures are treated like top- level secrets, apparently to keep the Rus- sians from knowing how good they are. However, it is precisely in the field of science and technology, from photogra- phy to guidance systems, that more and more American scientists are urging com- plete openness. Perhaps it is time for America to take the lead in global free- dom for all scientific knowledge. ? ?National intelligence estimates. The major task of the CIA is to make objective estimates of strategic trends or situations in the world -to assist policymakers in reaching decisions. These estimates are' the top of the intelligence iceberg?the fi- nal distillation of weighted facts from the vast amount of raw data flowing into Washington. A few estimates have- been leaked over the years, most recently in the Pentagon Papers, and their official release would be a sensible and desirable step toward open- ness in government. Whether the topic is the number of Soviet missiles, or trade prospects with China, or trends in world oil, objective estimates would be of dis- tinct value to Congress, the media and the public in broadening their knowledgeable participation in discussions of 'foreign affairs. ? There is one danger ? that the White_ House would release only estimates that support its policies and would suppress those that do not. The politicization of in- telligence is a running hazard that cannot be totally avoided. ?Current intelligence reports. Another useful device for keeping Congress and the public better informed would be the publication of occasional "situation re- ports" on significant events abroad, These would be balanced, factual statements on what Is going on: the developments that led th White Nouse to declare a global military alert, for example. or the facts behind a looming crisis in the Near East, or the meaning of China's new Cultural Revolution. In regard to this kind of now-secret -data, .there are no built-in limits on open- ness. All we really need to do is to make sure that published material does not lead to identifying a broken code or unmask- ing an agent abroad. Any limits beyond 'these are likely to be motivated by the de- sire to avoid "embarrassment,' to cover up the clash of bureaucratic opinion, or to preserve; an aura of omniscience for the executive. Since any such limits are man- made, they can he unmade by pressare from Congress and from the people?and the sooner the better. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 11 PARADE ? JULY 21, 1974 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 by Lloyd Shearer WASHINGTON, D.C., he Central Intelligence Agency is iuffering from a badly tarnished image, and its new director, William Egan Colby, 54, is charged with bur-- fishing it. ? This is no easy job, since over the years the CIA has generated on the domestic front- a closed, mysterious, excessively secretive and sinister image. It has also violated the legislation of its origin. Created in 1947 specifically to gather "Foreign Intelligence," it has inter- vened in American student organiza- tions. It has trained about 50 police of- ficers from a dozen American cities in intelligence theory and technique. ? And worse yet,-from a public rela- tions viewpoint, it has stupidly involved itself in the domestic scandals of the .Nixon Administration by furnishing equipment to E. Howard Hunt Jr. to help break into and burglarize the Bev- erly Hills office of Dr. Lewis Fielding, psychiatrist of Daniel Ellsberg of Pen- tagon Papers notoriety. The CIA also provided Hunt with false identity equipment so that he could fly to Denver and.try to talk Dita Beard into denying that she ever wrote the infamous ITT memo, coupling a favorable anti-trust Justice Department ruling with the promise of a $400,000 contribution to the Republican cam- paign fund of 1972. Moreover, it al- lowed its personnel to prepare a psy- chological profile on Ellsberg for the White House. Leading participants And two of its former employees, E. Howard Hunt and James McCord, were leading characters in- the Watergate fiasco, to say nothing of the four Cu- ban-Americans who were hired to do the actual dirty work. Overseas, of course, where most of its clandestine as well as overt activities take place, the CIA has hired merce, naries in Southeast Asia, overflown the Soviet Union, dropped agents into Red China, structured its own airline out of Taiwan, conspired to overthrow various regimes in various parts of the world from Iran to Cambodia to Cuba, and in general, has consistently intervened in the domestic affairs of -foreign nations. With that agency background of con- troversial hits and misses, Director Colby has his image-changing work cut out for him. He is approaching it with care and vigor. He is inviting newsmen to lunch with him, to ask questions, to visit CIA headquarters in Langley, Va., where the access road now bears a sign, plainly lettered CIA. It used to say Bu- reau of Public Roads. He even allowed PARADE to interview his wife, the for- mer Barbara Heinzen, a delightful woman with printer's ink in her blood who helped put him through Columbia University Law School by working as a 'department store copywriter and editor of a New York State labor publication. Soft-speaking and low-key, Colby, a 24-year unpretentious veteran of the spy business, believes in opening up the CIA without disclosing its secrets. He is allowing the TV networks to take a guided tour of the agency. He is permitting his men to identify them- selves over the telephone instead of switching the caller to an extension number. He is preparing succinct in- telligence summaries instead of pon- derous, bulky reports and forwarding them to interested parties with a phone number to call in case they need more detailed information. Conscious of public opinion He is aware of the mounting public criticism which holds that his 16,000- man agency is spending approximately $750 million of the taxpayers' money each year without enough public ac- countability through the various Con? - gressional subcommittees charged with tracking the CIA. And he is mindful of inadequacies in the agency's recruiting program, especially of minorities. "What we're looking for,", he ex- plains, "are young men and women who are interested in intellectual and technical pursuits. Intelligence is tech- nical these days. We're in the market for something like 130 specialist disci- plines, running all the way from nuclear physicists to financial economists. We need every kind of specialty to help in our total 'intelligence process. 12 "We especially need women- and blacks. We don't have enough of them as professional intelligence officers. A few months ago I -gathered together ill the middle managers in the agency and gave them a very direct talk. I told them I, wanted to see the number of blacks and the number of women in -responsible jobs rise sharply..? Opportunity and challenge "We also need," Colby concedes, "some fellows who will run some clan- destine operations for us. They have to be fellows with a little bit of adventure in their spirit and frequently quite a lot of courage. But I'm not going around saying, 'Join the CIA instead of the Fish and Wildlife Service.'And I'm not go- ing around saying, 'Join the CIA and save, the world.' People who want an interesting, fascinating challenging ca-- reer can find it in the CIA, and that in- 'cludes those who are more student than activist, those who are more ac- tivist than student, those who are mOre ?the engineer than liberal art buff. We're wide open for the person who believes we have an essential function to perform." _ According to Colby, the primary function of the CIA is apple-pie simple: "We gather information from all over the world in order to learn as much as we can about foreign problems so that we can decide what to do about them. "We have various ways of gathering information?reading newspapers, tak- ing photographs, listening to electronic noises in the atmosphere,-and employ- ing clandestine activity where it's essen- tial. We gather the information, analyze it, think about it, come to some judg- ment or estimate the situation and relay it to the national leadership, executive, legislative, and indirectly, even to the public so that the' U.S. can make in- formed judgments and decisions." Colby, who will finish his first year as director of the CIA on Sept. 4 this year, believes the agency is indispensable, "because I do not think the U.S. today can afford the luxury of being blind in the world or of hoping to learn enough of what's going on through the public _Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 press and other media." He knows, he says, that the U.S. has no intention of invading the Soviet Union and is sure the Soviet Union has no intention of invading us. "But I think the Soviet Union has a philosophy which holds that America is run by an imperialist conspiracy, a class society and that there must be, according to their doctrine, a revolution, a change in our- society. "It's a religious belief, ai id from time .to time the Soviets have engaged in the process, of trying to encourage it along. "America has gotten into several wars in this century, started by people who thought we either would not or could not-stand up to them. Kaiser Wil- helm thought we would not join World. War I. Adolf Hitler was quite certain that we would stay out of World War II. Josef Stalin thought we would not fight in Korea and Ho Chi Minh cer- tainly felt we could not stop his effort to take over South Vietnam. Where people realized we not only could but would fight?for example, in the Berlin Crisis, the Cuban Missile Crisis?we have had no war. Having a CIA is like having insurance. You pay for it, but hopefully it's worth it." - Head of 'black operations' Bill Colby, 5 feet 11, thin, trim, with pale- blue myopic eyes helped by glasses, is a lawyer by training. He looks like a -lawyer, also like a teacher, a minister, a banker, a doctor, anything- except what he is?the nation's .chief: ?spooksman who for years was deputy director of the CIA's clandestine or, "black operations" directorate. He was born in St. Paul, Minn., in 1920, the only child of Elbridge Colby, an Army officer. He was reared at var- ..: inus Army posts, spent three years of his youth (1929-32) in Tientsin,. China, tntered Princeton in 1936 and was graduated four years later. He entered Columbia University Law School but left after his first year to join the para- chute corps. "He had to memorize the eye chart in order to get in," his wife reveals. "But he memorized one line back- wards. When he took the eye test, he cited the letters incorrectly. He wanted so badly to get in, however, that they looked the other way and the examin- ing officer said, 'So long as you can see the ground we'll take you." Colby served as a staff lieutenant in the 4-62nd Parachute Artillery Battalion (he had attended the ROTC at Prince- ton} and was fired when a new com- mander joined the 462nd and replaced the old staff with a new one. Lieutenant Colby found himself in a replacement pool, which he didn't like. When an officer came through, looking for vol- unteers for an overseas operation, code- named JEDBURGH, j43191.16cjik1kieRei 13 ieered, thus becomini a member of Gen. William Donovan's intelligence service, the Office of Strategic Services. As a member of the JED's, Colby para- chuted in uniform to help resistance. groups in France during the weeks fol- lowing the Allied landing. .. ? - He was so cool and outstanding in action that he was chosen despite his young age, 24,, to command a group of Norwegian-American paratroopers charged with sabotaging German rail- way operations in Norway. According to Harris Smith, an historian of the OSS: "The drop was finally made from Amer- ican aircraft staffed by inexperienced crews in late March, 1945. Two of the planes crashed and ten OSS men were killed. Colby and those OSS men who did reach their destination were forced , to operate with a minimum of supplies; the American planes had dropped their equipment a bit off target?in Sweden.' _ College s.weetheart -? ? Discharged from the Army as a ma-' jor, young Colby married Barbara Heinzen whom he'd dated in .1941 when she was a junior at Barnard Col- lege and he a first-year. law student at Columbia. - They' were married. in St. Patrick's Cathedral on Fifth Avenue, and then Colby reentered Columbia Law. Before* he was graduated he went to work for 'Maj. Gen. Bill Donovan's prestigious New York law firm, Donovan, Leisure, Newton, Lombard and-Irvine, many of whose members had served with him in the OSS. In 1949 after a two-year stint with the Donovan firm, Colby joined the Na- tional Labor Relations 'Board in Wash- ington. He wasn't particularly happy or fulfilled asa lawyer, and one evening he remarked to his wife, "I don't know. 1- just don't want to go through life sav- ing $100,000 a year for American Can some other corporation." Call of the CIA When the Korean War broke out, Bill Colby; an adventurer by heart, joined the Central Intelligence-Agency. Under one guise or another he has been with the agency ever since, generally fighting communism. In Stockholm from 1951 to 1953 he was listed as a foreign serviee attach? In Rome from 1953 to 1958, where he was unofficially known as "one of Clare Boothe Luce's boys," he was officially carried as "first secretary and special assistant to the ambassador." In Rome where his wife reCalls, "we lived five of our loveliest years," Colby worked underground to prevent the Italian Communist Party from winning a ma- jority in Parliament. Came next his first three-year stint in Vietnam, ostensibly as first secretary of the AritsgrocaRc4mtasyi Anit vt?'-ud432R RAnsfiY,Hri-NWYri) Asra.Pro y was, ot course, much more than that. He was probably the shining light of the intelli- gence community, performing so well in his situational assignments and vari- ous cloak-and-dagger assignments that he was brought back to CIA headquar- ters in Washington and appointed chief of its Far Eastern Division. The most controversial segment of William Colby's intelligence career concerns his involvement in the Viet- namese pacification program known as "CORDS," an acronym for "Civil Oper- ations and Revolutionary Development Support." One part of this program was the operation code-named Phoenix. Just as .he was about to become chief of the CIA's Soviet operations in 1968, Colby was sent back to Vietnam on the request of Robert Kamer, a former CIA man, and given ambassadorial rank. He was placed in charge of_South Vietnarn's overall pacifica,ion program, sup- posedly designed -to ?vin the hearts and minds of the people." Abuses during Phnix The Phoenix portion of the p:-. ram, which aimed to neutralize the Vie'-ng infrastructure, involved the captie:>. imprisonment; defection, and murder of the Vietcong. There were abuses in its execution, and as Colby conceded in February, 19'0, to the Senate- Fc:eign Relations Committee, "..?: l_wocid not want to testify that nobody was killed wrongly or executed in this kine of a program. I think it has probably hap- pened, unfortunately." But there are excesses in all wars; and it seems rn,:oi- festly- unfair to brand Colby a "nit .5 murderer and war criminal" which ;eat - done by those in the intelligence co,- - munity who last year opposed his al., pointment as CIA director. No one ever', called.him such names in World War II when he was killing Germans. And few people realize how chaotic "Phoenix" was until he took it over. Colby does not look or act like an exquisitely sensitive man, but during the period of his Senatorial confirma- tion, when posters bearing his photo with the legend, "mass Murderer and war criminal," were tacked to posts and - walls in Washington, D.C., he was deeply hurt. One night he drove home to the unpretentious house he owns in Springfield, Va., a capital suburb, plain- tively asked his wife, "How does it feel being married to a war criminal?".. "My heart went out to him," Barbara Colby recalls, "because if ever there was a good, decent man who has served his country and his family?Bill has served every President from Franklin D Roosevelt to Nixon?well, it's Bill." Although Colby is a Nixon appointee, he, unlike so many others, is not about to follow orders blindly or to traffic Vvith White House types like Ehrlichman s' OT361815-tught to compromise t e t in the Watergate coverup, "I will do the proper and legitimate Approved For ReleaseA01/8grrialtRDP77-00432R000100330001-0 20 August 1974 things under the statute that CIA has been charged to do," he says. "And if I'm asked to do something beyond that legal authority, then I won't do it. I'll resign." In line with that, Colby recently sup- ported an amendment to the National Security Act of 1947 which originally authorized the founding of the CIA. The amendment was introduced by Sen. William Proxmire (D., Wis.) to protect the CIA from abuses emanating from the political system. It limits the CIA to its basic mission of collecting foreign intelligence and closes a loop- hole in the 1947 act which permitted the agency to get itself so disastrously involved in domestic intelligence. Under 'Colby's regime the CIA is not only projecting a more open and can- did image, it is undergoing a structural transformation. Colby has abolished the 10-man Board of National Estimates founded in 1950 and replaced it with a group of national intelligence officers, each charged with preparing a series of short-term intelligence assessments of. their special areas. He has reduced the number of covert, so-called "black operations" largely because satellite equipment is so sophisticated today that it can photograph and relay far more reliable information than that provided by an agent dropped by plane or landed by submarine on foreign land:- : A practicing Roman Catholic, a pillar in community affairs, a hard-working (Saturdays until 3 p.m.) civil servant who earns $42,000 a year, a good and.. understanding father to his four sur- viving children?a fifth died early this year of epilepsy?a loving and dutiful. husband, William Colby has been a professional intelligence-officer for half his adult years. No flag lapel pin ? The United States is indeed fortunate in having him. As a lawyer he could be earning three times in civilian life what he earns in government service. "But it wouldn't give me the satisfaction," he says, "that I find in this job." Colby wears no flag pins in his lapel to dem- onstrate his patriotism. It goes much deeper than that. Foreign-Policy Advice By Ronald Steel SARATOGA' SPRINGS, N.Y.?Presi- dent Ford tells us that he will remain true to the foreign policy of Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger. The media applauds and Congress sighs with relief. This is one area, perhaps the only one, where. continuity is hailed as a good thing.' So it would seem, at any rate. The Nixon-Kissinger team restored the broken dialogue with Peking, ham- mered out a military disengagement in the Middle East, negotiated- an ac- cord for waging the Vietnam war with local proxies instead of G.I.'s, and established a new coziness with Moscow. For this it has won, and de- served, high points. Mr. Kissinger, having emerged slightly tarnished, but intact, from the Watergate debacle, is the superstar of the new Administration. It is not sur- prising that President Ford has af- firmed his confidence in his predeces- sor's Secretary of State. Having never shown any particular interest in for- eign affairs, and eager to assuage as many anxieties as possible, Mr. Ford will be. almost irresistibly tempted to leave that side of the ledger to Henry. It is an understandable temptation, but it should be zoided. The problem is not Mr. Kissinger's abilities but the message he has used and the val- ues that underlie them. Like the Presi- dent he so lately served, Mr. Kissinger is indifferent to ideology, obsessed with secrecy, and mesmerized by the game of power politics. This has led him into a number of curious adventures in realpolitik, most lately revealed in the Cyprus war. Un- willing to antagonize the military junta in Athens, and detesting President Ma: karios, he refused to condemn the gangster regime under Nikos Giorgia- des Sampson. When democracy was restored in Greece, he winked at the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, preferring part of the island "safely" under Anka- ra's control to an undependable neu- tralist Government. Defended as "real- ism" this policy of expediency has in- volved terrible suffering in Cyprus and has weakened Greece's fragile democratic Government. Support for the brutal Pakistani re- pression of the Bengalis; financial and military aid to the dictatorships in South Korea, South Vietnam and, until recently, Greece; indifference to the repression of minorities and dissidents 14 in the Soviet Union?all of this has been carried an in the name of a higher realism, as though a nation's values could be detached from the foreign policy it pursues. The notion that the end justifies the means was, after all,, the essence of Watergate. Mr. Ford is President today because the stench of that mentality became too great: In trying to leave behind, Watergate' S corruption, we will have learned little if we dismiss from for- eign affairs the moral values, that have been receiving such heady reaf- firmation these last days. Foreign pol- icy is not merely a. method of manipu- lation. Nor is it the waging of war by othee means. It is the expression of a nation's values. Domestic problems are urgent, but foreign affairs cannot be pt on the back burner. Nor can they be left to Henry to orchestrate as he sees fit. His successes, while impressive, are nonetheless tenuous. The link with China depends on. Peking's quarrel with Moscow. The d?nte with the Kremlin, while desir- able, so far involves mostly American money for Russian promises. And in Vietnam, of course, the war goes on. President Ford has an opportunity to take a fresh look at a foreign policy apparatus that has been shrouded in secrecy, to seek other views on issues raised or left unreloved. Relations with Japan, compounded by neglect and even contempt, are at a critical point. The time for a less domineering role toward Western Eu- rope, and for the withdrawal of Amer- ican troops, is long overdue. The specter of famine and the intensifying misery of much of the Third World are pressing closer to home. Overhanging all is the persistent commitment to a policy of global intervention that has never been seriously re-examined since the onset of the cold war. Perhaps Mr. Kissinger, who has shown little interest in these matters, has a secret bundle of answers. But his skill has always been as a negotiator ?not as an innovator. With Mr. Nixon gone, his game of realpolitik, with its emphasis on expediency and flashy deals, may prove to be neither very _realistic nor long-lived. Mr. Ford. would be mistaken if he assumed that. the present foreign policy consensus will hold up and that everything will be all right if he just leaves it to Henry. Ronald Steel is author of several books on foreign policy. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 BALTIMORE NEWS AMERICAN 9 August 1974 (-1 7i '1:71 By JOHN P. WALLACH News American'Bureau WASHINGTON ? Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who once asked Gerald R. Ford to participate in his Harvard . seminar, is Ii1:ely to emerge in the , new administration with even more power and autono- my to shape the nation's for- eign ? policy. This assessment is based on several factors ? President Nixon's unwavering confi- dence in Kissinger, the only member of his original inner' circle to survive unscathed by Watergate, and the demon- strated successes of Kissin- ger's policies in Indochina, the. Soviet Union and China. But above all is Ford's can- did recognition of his own for- eign affairs shortcomings and of Kissinger's expertise. Kis- ? singer was said to have been the first administration offi- cial asked to stay on by the new chief executive. Kissinger was tentatively approached almost two months ago, sources here re- vealed, and readily accepted.. One example of Kissinger's new power is his current per- sonal campaign to salvage U. S.-Gra:: relations from years of Nixon administration sup- of the military regime 4 rs 4 4L! e ./ 2 ? :: ? ? .? ? lYE y IIItctbu ciA ri fat 312s..4:1?Ul. Lib there, now that a civilian de- mocracy has been restored. Kissinger also is expected to ' launch new initiatives towards Cuba, which were impossible aslong as Nixon needed con- servative congressional. Sup- port In his impeachment fight. Ford's foreign policy rec- ord ,as a House member, was one of consistent support for Israel, for the United Nations and for administration initia- tives to defuse tension with the Soviet Union and Com- munist China. In fact, Kissinger made the arrangements for Ford to be- come one of the first members of Congress to visit Peking after Nixon went there in Feb- ruary, 1972. But Ford was also very i much his own man in foreign affairs. He vigorously/ support- ed the Cooper-Church Amend- ment in 1970 that would have cut off all funds to continue the war in Cambodia and sub- sequently voted to prevent the I '? ' - ? e-e-i?f:. ? s a n 'Kissingerreportedly' tried ' to persuade Ford that fornier New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller, who was Kissinger's boss before he joined the Nixon achninistra-. tion, . would be an excellent vice presidential choice. Pentagon from transferring lends from other military pro- grams to continue the bomb- ing of Cambodia. Apart. from his appearance in 1E.59 as a lecturer at one of Kissinger's 'Harvard semi- nars, Ford has had little di- rect contact with the secre- tary. State Departemnt officials disclosed that prior to the current crisis, Kissinger had only been asked to brief Ford once ? about two weeks ago?on foreign policy mat- ters. The former vice president, of course, participated in White House breakfast meet- ings with congressional lead- ers that Kissinger regularly addressed and received daily briefings as vice president from the Central Intelligence A aency. But in private conversations Ford frequently has been the first to concede his foreign peiicy inadequacy. ; In fact, for just those rea- Rockefeller is well-known by U. S. allies and Communist adversaries, Kissinger is said to have argued, and could provide valuable conthuityin the foreign affairs field. ? Nixon's strong reliance on Kissinger appeared confirmed. by the disclosure that in the final days of his presidency the outgoing chief executive spent more time with his sec- retary of state than with any other official, including Vice President Ford. State Department sources' revealed that Kissinger had spent more than four hours with Nixon Thursday and that Nixon had asked Kissinger t9 thoroughly brief Ford on cur- rent foreign policy- 'develop- ments only a few hours before he announced his resignation. Kissinger reportedly had ? urged Nixon after Monday's cabinet meeting to make a, quick decision about resigna- tion because any delay might contribute to the uneasiness among U. .S. allies or. might. I : spark ? a crisis- in one of the's many trouble spots. Kissinger was said to have stressed at the Cabinet session that unity among administra- tion officials was essential to present a picture. of stability during the turbulent transition of power. Without such a dis- play of unity, foreign powers might be tempted to exploit America's passing weakness, - Kissinger said: . To this end, Kissinger recommended that for the in- Lenin changeover period the cabinet be kept intact and all appointed officials overseas, including ambassadors, be al- lowed to remain at their pests despite the formality of resig- .nation letters. Approved For Release 2001/08/4 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 BALTIMORE SUN 9 August 1974 Allied Dispute over European Security Conference Brussels. After apparently patching up their differences over the Otta- wa declaration on Atlantic prin- ciples, the United States and its European allies may be headed for a new dispute over .the pace and progress of ? detente ? with Communist countries. The problem revolves around soporific negotiations now under way in Geneva over European security and such diverse issues as the inviolability of frontiers, magazine subscriptions to Com- munist countries and people like Alexander Solzhenitsyn. ? 0 ? For the most part these topics have not fired public opinion on either side of the Atlantic. But they did threaten to ignite a new controversy when Henry Kissin- ger passed through Brussels on his return from the Moscow. sum- mit. Only some fast talking by the 'American Secretary of State defused a potential eeplosion by some of America's stanchest al- lies. But the underlying differ- ences of opinion still exist and will have to be resolved in the coming months if another At- lantic shouting match is to be avoided. The Europeans were extremely agitated over what they saw as a betrayal at the recent, Nixon- Brezhnev summit over the dead- locked European Security Confer- ence. In the summit communi- que they read in black and white what they had feared: that the American and Soviet desire for showcase achievements had con- verged to seek a quick wrapup BALTIMORE SUN 21 August 1974 By DAVID FOUQUET to the security conference. The United States and the Soviet Union "expressed themselves in favor of the final stage of the conference taking place at an early date." The statement also declared that "substantial prog- ress" had already been made and that "documents of great in- ternational significance" would be produced at the talks. This summit enthusiasm did not square with the "disappoint- ment at the small progress" ex- pressed by the European Commu- nity foreign ministers a few weeks earlier. Nor did it mirror the statement accepted in Ottawa just a few days earlier by all the NATO allies including the United States. That communique spoke of the "uneven" progress at the Geneva East-West talks and the "patience" needed to achieve re- sults. , ? a 0 Secretary Kissinger was able to convince his European col- leagues in Brussels and in his subsequent tour of capitals that he and President Nixon had not committed themselves to any date or setting for the windup of the European Security Conference. Nevertheless reports issuing from the private meeting indicate a major divergence of views be- tween Kissinger and some Euro- peans. Putting it diplomatically Bel- gian Foreign Minister Renaat Van Elslande commented that the Moscow declaration indicat- ed that "bilateral views may have progressed beyond the al- liance views" on the Geneva con- ference. Having been dragged reluctant- ly and skeptically after years of refusal into the Soviet-proposed gathering, the Europeans want some tangible results. The War- saw Pact first proposed such a - Pan-European conference in 1966 in order to, in Western eyes, seek confirmation of the status quo in Europe and split the United States from its European allies. Hesitant, the Western Europeans ? set a number of preconditions to be fulfilled before they would sit down to discuss European secur- ity. Largely through the West German Ostpotitik and U.S.- Soviet rapprochement, the pre- conditions were met and the talks started in Helsinki in 1972. ? ? 0 The subsequent negotiations have dealt with three major "baskets" or areas political- military measures, economic and technical co-operation between East and West and "the free ex- change of peoples and ideas." Every one of the 35 states in- volved has its pet issues. For instance West Germany, hoping to preserve the possibility of a German reunification, hopes to gain recognition for the doctrine of the peaceful change of fron- tiers. Romania, seeking to main- tain its economic independence in the face of Soviet domination, is resisting East-West economic co- operation solely between the Com- mon Market and Comecon. But the Western European countries have been remarkably unified and tenacious on obtain- ing a 'relaxation of the Commu- nist controls on information and travel. They feel there will never be a real detente until there is a freer flow through the Iron Cur- tain. They want to open up the closed societies and hopefully avoid the type of repression typi- fied by the Solzhenitsyn case. ? ? ? This is anathema to the Soviet Union and some of its allies who believe the state has a right to control travel and information and who view the Western de- mands as opening the floodgates to a tide of pornography and sub- version. In fact some observers in both camps have speculated that the West European intransi- gence is an attempt to sabotage the talks and detente in order to maintain U.S. troops in Europe. The few concessions on this issue made by the Communist coun- tries have been meager ones like allowing Western magazine sub- scriptions into Eastern Europe. This will not satisfy some Euro- pean governments which find themselves in the unusual role of being hard-liners while the United States and the Soviet- Union are urging a faster pace. While all countries are commit- ted to producing some concrete results in this conference which has been called the most irnpor- tent since the Congress of Vienna, it is this difference in aims which the United States and its NATO partners say they will try to re- solve in the coming months. Mr. Fouquet is a freelance jour- nalist, resident in, Brussels. (ennan warns about pressur'st on Soviet trade, affiance Washington let ? George F. Kerman, one of the nation's long-time leading experts on the Soviet Union, said yeRela day he sees little sense in using a trade bill to compel the U.S.S.R. to .ease immigra- tion restrictions on its Jewish citizens. Mr. Kennan also told the i Senate Foreign Relations Corn- mittee that it is an illusion to ' believe that China can become! "a suitable ally or associate of, this country in world affairs." I On the problems of Soviet Jewry, Mr. Kennan said he has no sympathy for denying- most-favored-nation status to the Soviet Union "as a means of bringing pressure upon the Soviet government for an al- teration of its policies with, respect to the emigration from Russia of its Jewish citizens." He said he considers such tactics unsound because they call for the United States to interfere in the domestic activ- ities of another nation to an extent which the U.S. would be unwilling to accept if the situa- tion were reversed. He said he is "bewildered" at the timing of the move, which is sponsored in the Sen- ate principally by Senator Henry M.?Jackson 0a., Wash.). Actually, he sa'io, the Soviet Union has become more liberal in its immigration policy in the recent past than at any time in the last 40 years. "I am also troubled by the fact that the pressures we are, urged to exert appear to relate specifically to People of one, ? single ethnic religious back- China ,ground," Mr. Kennan said. "Such pressures should be a exerted on behalf of all those aseen to suffer from the policies a hi question aria not just those of given ethnic or religious identity," he said. ' As for China, Mr. Kennan noted that in other eras of ' history; U.S. foreign policy in the Far East has been "ser-I iouely disbalanced" by what he called "our traditional predi- lection for the Chinese. "Whatever else may be said , of Communist China, she is not a a suitable ally or associate of this country in .world affairs," ahe said. Mr. Kennan said the reasons I for this incongruity lie in the a differences between the Chi-: nese and American characters, the ideological commitment of ; the Chinese leaders, the nature, of the Chinese military estab- lishment and the differing ; characters of the two nations' interests and commitments. On another subject Mr. Ken-? i nen said the enormous size of the American defense budget and the large role that defense plays in the national economy has distorted national policy. ' "Our whole governmental system is militarily top-. heavy," he said. "And this sets ? up forces in the midst of which it is hard to get a true picture of the national interests." Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 NEW YORK TIMES 4 August 1974 orture fficial Way of Life By JEAN-PIERRE CLA'VEL i 30ountries - Torture has now become a state institution in more than 30 countries, a rule of pain carried out by technicians, scientists, paramilitary officials, judges and cabinet minis- ters. Documentation comes from the respected human rights agency Amnesty International, a private London-based group that seeks freedom for political prisoners and has offices in 32 nations. As the 25th anniversary of the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights approaches, Amnesty's London headquarters described in a 224-page report allegations and evidence of torture in 64 countries, in the last 10 years. Most of what the agency calls a "cancerous" growth of torture has occurred in Latin America, spreading to 22 nations there in the 10-year period. Portugal and Northern Ireland are among the 10 European countries named, as are 14 nations in Africa, 7 in Asia and 8 in the Middle East. The vast number of victims in urban areas are members of legitimate political organizations, trade unions and youth movements, professors, women's leaders, religious figures, lawyers and journalists. In rural situations, it is unarmed peasants, villagers and even children who are caught in the torture net. ? Contends Amnesty International, "it is ? apparent today that much of state torture is carried out by the military forces, usually elite or special units, who displace the civil police in matters of political security. Their. military training and. their exposure to post-World ?War II theories about 'unconventional war' make them particularly apt for the practice and enable them to apply the concept of 'war' to any situation of civil conflict no matter how mild." ? In Latin America, It is possible to pinpoint the arrival of torture in nations such as Uruguay, Bolivia and Chile and to demonstrate the pattern in which torture has spread across the continent. Niall MacDerrnot, Secretary-General of the International Commission of Jurists, reported at the United Nations this June after a fact-finding mission that between 3,500 and 4,000 persons had been interrogated in Uruguay alone since July 1972, in an effort to stamp out the Tupamaros. Of these, at .least 50 per cent are believed to have been tortured. Secret steps were taken in Brazil in the early nineteen- sixties by a group of senior military and police officialst to create a coordinated, autonomous torture and "death squad" network to crush political opposition. To train per- sonnel, illustrated lectures and live demonstrations of tor- ture wen:: conducted, using political' prisoners as guinea pigs, by Operacao Bandeirantes, once described as "a type of advanced school of torture." Subsequently, trained Brazilian torturers traveled to military academies in neigh- boring nations to conduct courses in what is euphemisti- THE ECONOMIST JULY 20, 1974 Kidnapping Three-card trick FROM OUR HONGKONG CORRESPONDENT The latest details of the quiet release of two Soviet medical advisers kidnapped by Burmese opium-running terrorists in April last year reveal remarkable and unprecedented co-operation between the CIA and the Russians?with tacit Chinese endorsement. According to reliable sources in Rangoon and Bangkok, the American government discreetly approached the Soviet Union to ask if there would be any objection cally called "interrogation." "Refinements" have resulted from technical and medical research designed to develop techniques of intensifying pain without causing death or irreversible damage. In Northern Ireland in 1971, security forces put "sensory deprivation" into action against Irish Republican Army suspects, using 'white noise, tactile obliteration, fatigue and starvation to force nervous systems to "torture themselves." Dr. Timothy Shallice of London's National Hospital has traced these methods to a clear line of private and government-sponsored research that began in the nineteen-fifties and intensified after the Korean War. "Torture which was once a craft," - says Dr. Shallice, "has become a technology." Further evidence of this trend was unearthed after the "liberation" of the DGS (political police) headquarters in Lisbon following the May coup in Portugal. Inside were found anatomy charts and films used to instruct novices in torture and detailed medical reports indicating that tor- ture had become a medical science conducted under the supervision of doctors. In the Soviet Union the abuse of psychiatry has led to the long-term incarceration of dissidents such as Grigorenko , and Plyusch in execrable conditions inside special psychi- atric hospitals on the ground that they had committed political offenses "while of unsound mind" Amnesty has produced a unique portrait of a world which, like a Bosch phantasm, is palloramic, almost aloof, ? chronicling the ordeals and wasted lives of men and women trapped in the breakdown of the rule f law. It speaks, for the countless victims sent to labor cami:-s in the barren regions of the Soviet Union, for the fate of the 55,000 . political detainees still held without charge or trial in the -camps of Indonesia, for defendants sent to the torture cells beneath the courtrooms in central Lisbon, for the crippled Vietnamese inmates of the Tiger Cages of Con Son ? and their dead countrymen thrown from United States helicopters during the years of overt American military involvement in Indochina, for the unknown individuals who faced certain of the Red Guard factions in the violent street trials of the Cultural Revolution and for the personal victims of South Africa's Brigailier Swanepoel, Brazil's Sergio Fleury and Greece's Colonel Theophyloyannakos. What distinguishes the present wave of torture from others is that where formerly it presented itself as a series -of national crises (such as the unleashing of torture during .the Algerian War beginning on Algerian patriots and even- tually spreading to metropolitan France), today we confront an international network of Torture States exchanging ex- pertise and equipment. Jean-Pierre Clavel is a contributor to the recently pub- - lished "Amnesty International Report on Torture." Burma had already rejected the kid- nappers' demands for a $2m ransom and the release of a former opium war- lord of Chinese blood imprisoned since 1969. The Soviet ambassador in Rangoon had openly supported Burma's stand and so, indirectly, had the Chinese and American ambassadors. The Russians gladly accepted America's offer. The kidnappers, led by a Manchurian named Chang Shu-chen. then suggested a compromise-1,000 M-16 rifles worth $180 each for the release of the two Russians. The Ameri- if the United SWAP rittiVeid&ff glicRE41,0asdIrOBScOgiggiVellkirriDPV71-6043gRO flappers, who had slipped across the brought Thai agents into the negotia- border into Thailand. flans. The Thais, in an apparent con- 17 cession, said they would- Provide the rifles in two instalments. The first 500 were handed over and one Soviet hostage was released in March. The Thais then demanded payment for the next instal- ment and the kidnappers. perhaps feel- ing that it was all becoming too much for them, surrendered the second Russian without the second delivery. It is being suggested that the 500 delivered rifles may be less reliable than the kidnappers expected. The opium chief remains in prison in redoubled security. So, at the end of it all, the tough south-east Asian front against allntatklia#mail still endures--with the backmg of that unlikely triumvirate, Russia, China and the United States. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 WASHINGTON POST 11 August 1974 Million Soviets Repatriated, Jailed 130 k Details '45 Pact ostivar Return By David Berliner Special to The WaShingt011 Pa? ? settlement hit its victims. At the heart of the action lay two bilateral agreements signed at Yalta on Feb. 11, 1945?one by Eden and Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molo- tov, another by Maj. Gen. John,. D. Deane, military atta- che at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, and a Soviet lie- teuant general named Gryz- lov. ? "The Soviet government could not forgive any Soviet citizen who had in any way NEW YORK?A pact signed at the Yalta Conference and described recently by Alexan- der Solzhenitsyn as "the last secret of World War II" led to the forced repatriation of more than one million Soviet citizens held by the western Allies, a new book detail's for the first time. Appropriately titled "The; Last Secret"?a phrase used by Solzhenitsyn in a footnote; to "The Gulag Archipelago"? the book by Nicholas Bothell. traces step by step the events which resulted in the impris- onment and deaths of Rus- sians liberated by American land British troops or captured while serving with the collaps- ing German army. , Lord Bethell's book is sub- titled, "The Delivery to Stalin. of Over Two Million Russians by Britain and the U.S.A.," but the figure includes those who returned voluntarily. Citing many newly declas- sified papers and numerous personal interviews, the study offers a grim view of . Soviet leaders out for 'Wbolesale re- venge and of Western officials so concerned with the return of their own soldiers and with the appeasement of Stalin that normal humanitarian consider- ations were discarded. ? "It was a long and tragic mistake" said Bethell, a 36- year-old English journalist and expert on Russian affairs, in a transatlantic telephone in- terview from London last week. "The man- I hold most re- sponsible is Anthony Eden who was foreign secretary at the time, because the original decision was a British one and the American government later went along with it. "We made the decision on. the advice of Eden who pushed it through the Cabinet in spite of Winston Churchill's initial reluctance and in spite of the very strong proteste from .several ministers. Tie said it was essential for us to send these people back? by force if necessary, irrespective of ?their individual wishes." collaborated with the Nazi Ger- mans, let alone actively fought, for them," Lord Bethell writes.' "That so many ordinary citi- zens should spend a number of years in a foreig i was itself a mind-racking worry to .the binkered, secu- rity-obsessed men who ran the country. "To such 'policeman minds' they were all dangerous, every one of them, even those whO had resisted the Nazi blandish- ments or threats and re- mained in prisoner of war camps on starvation rations. Stalin was resolved to isolate every one of them from the community, the innocent as well as the guilty, the loyal as well as the traitors ... "It would also take- dozens of years to `clear' every for- mer prisoner of war. Also, the mere fact that a man has fallen into captivity was taken aS evidence of a lukewarm at- titude to Soviet Russia. "Why he had not fought to the death? Perhaps because he wanted to be taken prisoner. The security men could, of course, examine every case in detail, take evidence,. conduct interrogations, hold trials. "By skilled painstaking work, they would be able to 'sort the sheep from the goats. Mit then, what if they made a mistake and allowed a foreign agent to slip through their fingers? Stalin and his men concluded that there was a simpler and more secure way of dealing with the problem to imprison the lot." Consequently, few differen- The book (to be published in tiations were made, Bethell the United States by Basic says, and Russian citizens who Books Nov. 15) recounts in of- had been forced into some ten-harrowing detail, the force sort of service by the Germans that was used and the chaos or who had even actively re- and mass suicide that ensued I sisted them, were lumped with when the full impact of the their countrymen who had willingly fought with the Ger- man army through loyalty to Nazism or hatred of Stalin- ism. Political refugees seek- ing 'asylum were treated as traitors to their homeland, regardless' of the circum- stances, he writes. Even non-Soviet citiZei4s, in- cluding many of the 50,000 Cos- sack men, women and children who surrendered to the Brit- ish in southern Austria, were forced to return to Russia where half met their deaths in labor ? camps, according .to Bethel]. While the gist of the pact and some details of surround- ing events were released in the mid 1950s (author Julius iEpstein subsequently docu- mented sqme episodes of forced repatriation), the full dimensions of the complicity and initial lack of vision on the !part of British officials and American leaders including President Roosevelt and Gen- eral Eisenhower have re- mained concealed. In a footnote to "The Gulag Archipelago," dissident writer Solzhenitsyn remarks: "It is surprising that in the West, where political secrets Cannot be kept long, since they inevit- ably come out or are dis- closed, the secret of this par- ticular act of betrayal has been very, well and carefully kept by the British and Ameri- can governments. "This is truly the last secret, or one of the last, of the Sec- ond World War. Having often encountered these ,people in camps, I was unable to believe for "a whole quarter-century that the public in the West knew nothing of this action of the Western governments, this massive handling over of ordinary Russian people to re- tribution and death." The comments drew an un- derstanding but firm response last week from Lord Bethell, who noted that Solzhenitsyn had little if any access to ar- chives and books on the sub- ject at the time he wrote "Gulag." ' "It was a terrible thing to send these people back to be slaughtered, but there were; 18 certainly strong military and .political reasons for doing so," said the British -author who tranSlited Solzhenitsyn's book, "Cancer Ward," and play, "The Love Girl and the Innocent," into English. "The main reason was that we feared that if we didn't send ithem back, Stalin would retali- ate by keeping British and American prisoners of war in his own hands as hostages," Pethell said. "There was also a general desire at Yalta to appease Sta- lin, or at the least to accommo- date him in any way. possible: He was, after all, bearing the brunt of the war at that time . and, in February, 1945, we be- lieved we would require his assistance to defeat Japan." The firm adherence to the secret agreement loosened considerably by late 1945 but the repatriation procedure re- mained in effect until 1947, said Bethell. By then, as he notes in his book, relations with the Soviet Union had de- teriorated into the cold war. ,"I doubt if this same thingi c'ould happen again," he said by telephone. "The same ques-I tion did arise some 10 years later at the end of the Korean, War regarding the repatria-I tion by force of Chinese pris- oners of war who had been in United Nations camps and didn't want to return. The cease-fire was held up for nearly a year because the Chi- nese insisted on having these peoPle and the United Nations refused. Eventually, they weren't handed over. "I anticipate people in Eng- land being very shocked by the degree of ,violence that was used (at the end of World , War II) and by the fate of so many people," he predicted. ". . . most of the British ? soldiers; including those who took part in it, feel very badly now." In what may prove an ironic ? footnote, there may be a re? verse scenario to the smuggfIng to the West of "Gulag" and other Solzhenitsyn works. Lord Bethell said his expose ; will be printed in Russian and, , he said, "these books do find their way into the Soviet (Union." Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001:0. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 13 August 1974 . P yr--" 11'%:59 Kissinger accused of sdeiiberately seeking partition of Cyprus y John K. Cooley Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor Athens Some vocal Greek politicians are blaming the United States and Secre- tary of State Henry A. Kissinger for what they see as their position of extreme weakness against Turkey on the Cyprus question. Former Greek minister John Zig- hdis, who belongs to the political center, charges that Dr. Kissinger has deliberately sought the partition of Cyprus, and used for this purpose two strong-arm men who now are discredited in Greece ? Brig. Gen. Dimitri Ioannides, the man behind the junta which was removed from power . in Athens last month, and Nicholas Sampson, the junta's choice to re- place Archbishop Maltarlos as Presi- dent of Cyprus. Mr. Zighdis, who was imprisoned under the military dictatorship and has recently been living in Washing- ton, says American foreign policy suffered a disaster in the Cyprus coup. CIA accused of participation isTlie.former. minister also charges that the Central Intelligence Agency n(CIAphelped keep the-junta in power and in effect governed Greece, a feeling shared by many Greek oppo- nents of the fallen junta. Newspapers here have asserted repeatedly that the CIA was either behind the abor- tive Cyprus coup, or was at least informed of It days in advance by Monciay, August 72,1974 ? " General Ioannides with the knowl- edge of U.S. Ambassador Henry J. Tasca. It appears reasonably certain, though embassy sources are un- communicative on this point, that Ambassador Tasca in fact rejected contact with General Ioannides. Mr. Zighdis further charges that the real American ambassador in Athens is not Mr. Tasca but Tom Pappas, a Greek-American magnate from Bos- ton who heads the Esso Corporation here and represents many other U.S. business interests in Greece. The Greek armed forces, in Mr. Zighdis's view, are allied to the American Military Mission (US- MAAG, the U.S. Military Assistance Group in Greece). USMAAG does not perform a mission within the (NATO) alliance, but a mission of keeping the Greek forces tied to the strategic interests of the United States, he says. No public protest Mr. Pappas has never publicly contested the CIA role attributed to him. His Pappas foundation was iden- tified in 1969 as one of the conduits of CIA funds channeled into Latin Amer- ica. Since then, Mr. Pappas, President Nixon's brother, Donald, former com- merce secretary Maurice H. Stans, and former Vice-President Spiro T. Agnew, whose most ' recent business trip here happened to be at the height of the Cyprus 'crisis, were alwaYs viewed by Greeks as links between the U.S. administration and the for- THE WASPFINGTON POST By Jonathan Cllandal ienniefees Pest Foreign Servteo ATHENS, Aug. 11 U.S. Ambassador Henry J. Tasca is- sued a statement' today deny- ing American press reports that he had failed to carry out .State Department orders to deliver a message early, in July to Brig, Gen. Dimitrios Ioannides, leader(AA rjs'erA. pier ruling militarr liYrtY ess mer junta. Beside bad publicity for its role in Greece, the CIA has suffered another setback in losing one of its key monitoring stations at Karavas, in Cyprus. Nearly 50 CIA personnel and em- ployees manning the Karavas station on the Northern Cyprus Coast were ' evacuated after the Turkish invasion. The Turkish armed forces now con- trout. ? The Cyprus fighting forced a second ? monitoring and radio-relay site near Nicosia te reduce operations. A third one was being phased down for clo- sure before the crisis began. Operated by service Karavas was operated by the CIA's foreign broadcast information service (FBIS) which operates similar sta- tions in Hong Kong, Panama, and Nigeria, among other places. It lis- tens and watches worldwide radio and television broadcasts. It feeds the digested material, in unclassified but limited-distribution booklets, to U.S. government and some other users. The United States paid the Ma- karios Government undisclosed rent- als for the sites. In their recent book, the CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, which the agency succeeded in censoring under - a court order, Victor Marchetti and John Marks allude to what they call ? Archbishop Makarios's blackmail of U.S. intelligence, but do not explain in . the undeleted portions of the book what this blackmail was. Their use of this word, however, has helped to. convince many persons that the CIA was on bad terms with the arch- bishop. then@ Denies ,_,,rociers on t ment in Greece, expressing Washington's strong opposi- tion to any attempted coup in Cyprus. The coup was carried out July 15 by the Greek-led Cyp- riot National Guard. It re- sulted in the overthrow of Cypriot President Makaries, the invasion of Cyprus by Tur- key, and the replacement of the military government of ORMeti111291 y 'Matis reportsiliC suggested 19 Oral that Tasca had balked at see-j Jag Icannides. then chief of the military police, because he was not officially part of the all instructions received from the State Department, and that all of my actions and ac- tivities have been based on de- cisions made by my superiors in-Washington." The ambassador also sought to refute the often-repeated charge that he and the U.S. government had been the jun- ta's main prop and that Wash- ington had prior knowledge of the July 15 coup, but had done ! nothing to warn Archbishop Greek government he demi- Makarios because the Central nated.The ambassador's state- !! intelligence agency wanted a merit left that point moot more tractable leader in Cy- "Without addressing myself prus. to the accuracy of these re- eThe restoration of democ- ports," the statement said, "I racy in Greece, toward whieh wish to state categorically that I have directed my endeavors and my embassy have 43. keengilia r?e with established! : ICIA-RIVW40432R00010 ili/gYVVIgtause for rejoicing! ? once with established practice. and I and the, American pee- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 pie loin our Greek friends in celebrating this historic event In which I shall always be proud to have taken part," the statement said. The tone of the statement sttggesteci to Greek observers that Tasca, who has served here since January 1970, may be replaced soon. The leading candidate to ancceed him as ambassador is believed to. be Monteagle' Stearns, the 50-year-old deputy chief of mission who returned to Athens last week after an absence of more than a dec- ade. . The changed mood of ! Greece was exhibited in Ath- ens today when dozens of ar- mored cars and tanks, so long the unloved synpol of the mil- itary dictatclrship, were cheered and applauded as they moved through down- town streets. Their destination was not disclosed. The movement of the armor NEW YORK TIMES 14 August 1974 was decided on at a 90-minute seven years had become syn. meeting called by Prime Min- onymous with unpopular as- ister Constantine Karamanlis to review Greece's weak de- fense posture. If nothing else, the troop movements seemed to be aimed at persuading .the US, IS REPLACING , ENVOY TO ATMS Tun's Controversial Role Spurs Recall?lost G,oes to a Kissinger Aide Greek public that the newel. gested it might unless the vilian government is deter-. Turks relented and adopted a mined to put on a show' of more compromising attittide in Geneva. For the first time since tak- cided or to "strengthen other1 ing office July 24, Karamanlis units" stationed elsewhere. Friday recognized the poten- No details of the 'troop ' tial danger of such talk?en- movements were provided, but couraged by the extreme observers noted that the ar- right-wing Athenian press? mor was seen heading for the and pointedly blamed the iun-TheY assumed pects of the dictatorship. ? Their departure from Atli- ens was . seen as reducing chances that the disgraced military junta would try to re- move the civilian government, as street rumors have sug- force no 'matter how powerless the armed forces really are, as the result of the dictatorship's meddling in Cyprus, In addition, they onstituted a message to the Turks, whose uncompromising behavior in, Cyprus and at the Geneva con- Minister Evaaelos Averoff Gen. Gregory Bonanos, the chief of the general staff, and the leaders of the three armed services. The discussion of Greek mil- itary preparedness will con- thiue Monday, according to an official communique that said the shift of units stationed around Athens had been de- ; ference ? has dampened hopes ta's "reckless policy" in re- 13 " or ? that the most likely final des- here of achieving a face-saving moving Archbishop Makarios solution for the civilian goy- as president of Cyprus for ere- tination was the Third Amy, e stationed oppoSite Greece's. ernment. ating "frightful difficulties" land border with Turkey in Perhaps the most positke for his government. Thrace,4 or perhaps even a note was the public's display -The morning Ineeting pre- Greek island Which eventually of affection for the armored sided over by Karamanlis was units, whose periodic appear- attended by figurehead Presi- could serve as a staging area ances in Athens over the past dent Phaedon Gizikis, Defense for troop tmivements to Cy-1 pr Us- , career Foreign Service officerl contributed heavily to the Pres- who previously was Ambassa-i ident's political campaigns. Some Greek politicians have described Mr. Pappas as the "real" American ambasador. ' According to a highly reliable 'weekend, "that all of my ac-1 , seurce, Mr. Tasca would see 'tions and activities have been 1%1r. Pappas "three or four based on decisions made 1-e; times a week" when the in-1 superiors in Washington." dustrialist, the man' who Attacks on those decisions i brought Coca-Cola to Greece, i ray was in Athens. ? have snowballed in recent dor to Morocco, In reply to the criticisms of his performance, ,he has always niaintained, as he did in a statement last By STEVEN V. ROBERTS .Spectil to Tile New York Times ATHENS, Aug. 13?The White House announced today that Henry J. Tasca would be replaced as Washington's Am- bassador to Athens. Subject to Senate confirma- tion, the new ambassador will be Jack B. Kubisch, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- American Affairs. Mr. Kubisch has never been an ambassador and has never dealt with this part of the world. The news that Mr. Tasca would be replaced was widely expected. Many Greeks believe that the United States gave too much .support to the mili- weeks... A typical comment "During a party or some-I came from the conservative Ithing at the Ambasador's resi- h Idence. Pappas would rush in newspaper Vra yn wrote after President Nixon's resignation: "Nixon and his accomplice trou e did everything possible after coming straight from the airport," the source said. "Oft- en he would say something like 'Where's Henry?' I was at the White House last night.' Some- . . _ Gradually, Mr. Tasca told associates, he became disillu- sioned. He never liked the mili- tary strongmen who unseated - Mr. Papadopoulas last Novem-,' .ber, and at least in private,' called them "Fascists". and "Tyrants." He began develop- ing closer ties with the opposi-1 tion movement here,. and had dinner with George Mavros, now the Foreign Minister, only hours before Mr. Mavros was arrested last April for criticiz- ing the dictatorship. i The Ambassador told thel Embassy to maintain a "low in Congress and the voices of times the two of them would profile" here, and the flow of; visitors decreased. But his to neutralize the honest voices the men of letters in America go into a small room and start 1 image as a supporter of the who saw his dangerous flirt- making telephone calls." ing with the junta of Athens as Mr. Tasca, whose resignation junta Was already fixed in the a blot on America." has been announcer in Wash- public mind, bothe here and in Washington. Moreover, Mr. The paper said it would shed ington, arrived here in 1970, aTsca always insisted that no "tears of sorrow" for Mr. the first American ambassador Nixon and added: "Now that after a military coup overthrew Secretary of State Kissinger Nixon has fallen, let his most the parliamentary Government forbade ambassadors to corn- other countries. him. Mr. Tasca should go to -maintained good relations with' - Mr. Tasca often pointed to Mr. Nixon's property so that he : Ikey military figures, and he tre- I his Fourth of July messages as may keep him company there ? quently told visitors that Co!. evidence of his support for Even diplomatic colleagues. George Papadopoulos, the junta democracy. This year he took in his loneliness." who are usually discreet in leader, sincedely wanted to great pride in having written it such matters, have openly fa- hold elections and return the himself. Mr. Kubisch, 53 years Old,' voted Mr. Tasca's removal. As country to democracy. ment on the internal affairs of faithful Ambassador follow in 1967. In the early veers he, tary dictatorship that ruled this! one put it a few days ago,, Greece was visited by a started his career as a busi- - "Henry Tasca has done a great steady procession of American nessman and entered Govern-, country for seven years, and ! deal of damage to American in-' offiCials, including Vice Presi- ment service in 1961. His first they place part of the blame on terests here." ' dent Agnew and Commerce post was as Deputy Director of Mr. Tasca, who has been Am-I Last February, a Congres-e Secretary Maurice- Stans, who the Agency For International bassador here for more than' sional committee headed by paid public tribute to the junta. ,Development's mission in Cey- four years. Since the dictatorship ceded power to a. civilian Government three Weeks ago, and censor- ship has been lifted, many 1 Greek newspapers and politi- cians have been calling for Mr.! Tasca's Mr. Tasca, who will be 62: years old ? next week is al He rose tonka i l ow sra . Representative Donald M. Fra-, 1 According to his critics, Mr. Ion, n and then ser of Minnesota urged the re- moval of Mr. Tasca as a sign Tasca paid little attention dur-. :director of the agency ing those years to important l served as State Department that Washington was no longer 'opposition leaders, including! desk officer for Brazil. Before supporting the military dicta- Constantine Caramanlis, now! begin named Assistant Secre- torship here. ' '; the Premier, who was then liv- tary last year, he was deputy But the Ambassador report-. ing in Paris. In 1971 Mr. Cara-! chief of Mission in Mexico City edly enjoyed the strong sup-1 matins was quoted as saying' ;and Paris. ' port of President Nixon. One of 1 that Mr. Tasca was "a small . The Embassy here indicated Mr. Tasca's closest friends here I man" who met dissidents infre; that the changeover would is Thomas A. Pappas. a Greek- ` quently, and then mainly to probably take place in mid-Sep- American industrialist who I curry favor with Congress. '.tetriber. 20 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 NEW YORK TIMES 18 August 1974 A F 1-4 ily Fig By IAN SMART LONDON ? Not for the first time, Cyprus has opened a rift in the NATO lute. What can be said of an alliance whose individual members step to the brink of war with each each other and go on to pull their force S out of the alliance or divert them to fight a national battle? What collective de- fense is possible when particular countries, in pursuit of national goals, turn their military backs on a common ad- versary? Recent Greek and Turkish actions have, of course, struck at the Atlantic Alliance, but reports of its imminent death on that account are exaggerated. They are, in fact, about as much exaggerated as persistent allegations -of NATO's military impotence in the face of "the threat from the East." Strictly speaking, NATO has no military forces of its own: What it has are members that "assign" or "earmark" some or all of their national forces to be used by NATO com- manders in time of war. Especially since 1966; When France set a precedent for Greece by withdrawing her forces from NATO's integrated military structure, a finely graduated set of peacetime relationships has grown up between national units-"assigned," "earmarked" and the rest -- and the al- liance's joint commanders. Apart from administrative com- plexity, one effect is to make it much harder to measure sensibly either NATO's military strength or the "balance" between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. - To take only one example, the Supreme Allied Command- er Atlantic, responsible for the whole Atlantic from the North Pole to the Tropic of Cancer, is currently assigned a total naval force of four destroyers ? which gives no irdi- cation of the enormously powerful allied fleet he would certainly command in war. By the, same token, any measure- ment of NATO's European strength that completely excludes French ? and now Greek ? forces, ignoring the stand they would clearly take against any Warsaw Pact attack,. is of little practical interest. All this is background to saying that, apocalyptic warn- ings about NATO's over-all military weakness or about the particular damage caused by: Greece or Turkey need to be looked at critically: NATO has' its-military problems in the European theater, and many are serious. Perennial man- power shortages, uneven and sometimes low standards of training, morale and efficiency. are some, as well as mili- tarily inappropriate deployment?especially of Italian ground forces or the United States 7th Army?and inflexible logistic CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 16 August 1974 NATO's southern n? liDnv collapses By Richard Burt Special to The Christian Science Monitor London . While military strateg!cts are still attempting to assess the full implicat;ans of the Greek decision to withdraw its armed forces from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), one con- elusion appears inescapable: For the time being at least, NATO's southern flank has collapsed. Officials compare the move by the Athens government to former French President Charles de Gaulle's decision in 19R3 to re- move French forces from the alliance's military organization. The French deciolon was un- doubtedly a more traumatic t and NATO systems. Above all, perhaps, there is a deplorable 'lack of equipment standardization. But it is an illogical leap from such deficiencies to the simplistic conclusion ,that the al- liance's 'conventional military capability is trivial. When all is said and done, NATO members have more men, more ships and more combat aircraft in their worldwide armed forces than the whole of the Warsaw Pact., That is not to deny the extent to which Greco-Turkish conflict has disrupted NATO's local military situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. But it does help to put the dis- ruption into a wider perspective. Nor should the focusing process end there. Turkey, for example, has used less than 10 per cent of her forces to invade Cyprus. Even when troops moved to the Greek frontier are taken into account, most Turkish units remain relatively unaffected. Even if Greek forces are permanently withdrawn from the NATO command structure, Greece would hardly want, or be able, to stand aside from an East-West military confrontation. (In any case, the utility of Greek units has been rated rather low by NATO experts over the last five years.) As to the effect on United States forces in the Mediterranean of their potential expulsion from Greek bases, the effect will be more on cost and convenience than on combat effective- ness. The Sixth Fleet did without a Greek base until a few years ago, and it can do without it again. The military effects of the Cyprus crisis on NATO are not, of course, totally insignificant. But they do pale into insignificance beside the political damage done. While the serviceability of any military alliance depends on the -strength of its political foundations, the North Atlantic, Treaty is much more than a purely military alliance. It also expresses a sense of general community within the Western world. Moreover, it contains an undertaking to settle in- ternational disputes peacefully. It is these aspects of the alliance, rather than its narrower military capacities, which are now being trampled under- foot. The current strength of anti-American feeling in Greece, linking left and right in the .political spectrum, is a greater threat to Western security than any decision about Greece's military relationship to NATO. Bitterness in Turkey over the ' political attitudes of her allies to, the Cyprus problem since 1960 is more serious than any' military redeployment. The gaps that need to be plugged in NATO's defenses in the wake of this crisis will have to be filled by diplomats more than by soldiers. Ian Smart is deputy director and director of studies at ? . the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London. event, but NATO's loss of 160,000 troops, according to one official, "tears a gaping hole in the de- fense of southern Europe and the eastern Mediterranean." The reason given by the Greek Government for the pullout ? that "crack units needed to be brought under direct control" ? is not taken seriously by diplomats here, because troops assigned to NATO are always ultimately under national control. Instead, the maneuver is thought to represent Greek displeasure over the Inability or unwillingness of Greece's NATO allies, particularly the United States, to exert more pressure on Turkey to reach a diplomatic settle- ment over Cyprus at the Geneva peace talks earlier this week. "The NATO pullout came out of sheer frustration," said one official, who speculated that the Athens govern- ment wanted to punish Washington for "tilting toward Turkey." It is also believed that the decision had been taken partly for military reasons to prevent Turkey from learning too much about Greek troop and air movements. (At NATO com- mand centers, all military move- ments are monitored and the informa- tion is made available to other NATO countries.) Defending northern frontier Greece joined NATO in 1952, and membership in the alliance has been a strong factor in the foreign policy of successive governments. Strate- gically positioned between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, during the 1950's Greece concentrated on defending its northern frontier against the tradi- tional threat of attack from Mace- donia and Thrace. Greece's frontier with the Soviet bloc is one of the few areas in Europe where NATO manpower outnumbers that of the Warsaw pact. The Greek departure means the loss of an Army of 120.000, a 22,000-man Air Force, and Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIXRDP77-00432R000100330001-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 an 18,000-man Navy. The proportion of Greece's gross national product devoted to defense and the percentage of its manpower committed to mili- tary service are among the highest in the alliance. During the 1980's, however, Greece took on additional strategic impor- tance as a base for NATO naval activities engaged in countering the growing presence of the Soviet Navy In the Mediterranean. A large portion of the U.S. Navy's Sixth Fleet is "home-ported" at Piraeus, the port of Athens, and naval analysts say that if the Navy is asked to leave its Athens and Suda Bay (Crete) bases, it will be Impossible to continue to man two carrier task forces in the region. NEW YORK TIMES 19 August 1974 Access to Mediterranean Ironically, one of the chief ar- guments that was earlier used for retaining Greece's membership in the alliance was that otherwise Turkey would be left isolated and exposed. In fact, Turkey's strategic position is viewed by most analysts to be of greater importance than Greece's. Possessing a common border with the Soviet Union and straddling the Dardanelles, Turkey controls the So- viet Black Sea Fleet's only access to the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. The importance of Western control of the Dardanelles was expressed in the 19th century by the British: "While we're Britons true, the Russians shall not have Constantinople." Some officials, though shocked by the Greek pullout, also indicate that Greece might soon want to reexamine its decision. Analysts point out that the Athens government has clearly said it wishes to maintain political membership in the alliance, and it is thought unlikely that Greece for too long will want Turkey to enjoy all the benefits of NATO membership ? Intelligence reports and military aid and training ? while Greece goes it alone. "In the long run," said one analyst, "Greece has nowhere else to turn but NATO." Kissinger's Role in Cyprus Crisis Criticized By ALVIN SHUSTER Special to The New York Times 1 'LONDON, 'Aug. 18 ? ,The month-old Cyprus crisis has left the Turks satisfied, the Greeks dismayed and angry and European experts in be- wilderment over whether Secre- tary of State Kissinger has lost his diplomatic touch. ' ? The rhetoric in Athens and Ankara is predictably emo- tional. But more detached dip- lomats and independent -ana- lysts agree that American Mis- judgments and early indiffer-i once deprived Washington of credibility or leverage in both capitals. ? This critical view of the American role was tempered by comments that there was nrobably little Washington could have done anyway - to prevent the hostilities. But the question remains among many in Europe of why the United States did not appear to try harder and why' it allowed it- self to end up with an image of ineffectiveness? U. S: Called Too Calm ? "One of Washington's crucial mistakes came very early in the game, right after the Jnly 15 coup," said one analyst here. "Kissinger's mind must 'have been elsewhere, perhaps, on the Nixon crisis. But the United States was much too, calm about it all, about the, ouster of Makarios, and showed Ino sign of recognizing the po- tential trouble." ? His assessment, shared by others, was that Washington at first took a line that sup- !port ed the then Greek govern- ment, the junta ousted eight Idays after the coup as a' direct ;result of the crisis. Indeed, 1Washington did give every im- pression of serenity over the !ouster of President Makarios and even seemed willing to ,accept his ,anti-Turkish replace- ment Nikos Giorgiades Samp- son, if only Cyprus would' re- main quiet. "Despite that, Washington' felt confident it could persuade; the Turks from invading," an-' other independent ekpert said.! "Washington probably felt bet- ter without Makarios anyway.' And then stories emerged from; Washington suggesting that! Kissinger viewed the Archbish- op as the Fidel Castro of the eastern Mediterranean. The Americans just didn't seem too worried." How Turkey Reacted. ;the impressions of that Amer- ican approach, despite the post- coup shuttling between Ankara and Athens by Joseph J. Sisco, the Under Secretary of State, varied. But in Turkey it was seen as a pro-junta stance and officials there decided- to go !ahead with,the invasion on July 20 after concluding that neither London nor Washington was interested in backing the search for a diplomatic solution. Turkish 'officials, the experts agreed, also felt that Washing- ton would not be too upset if: they resorted to military rather than ,diplomatic means to in- sure the safety of the island's 'Turkish minority and attempt ' to settle the Cyprus problem once and for all. ' "In the second phase of the crisis ? after the invasion ? Washington and Kissinger seemed to wake up and begin concentrating on Cyprus," a diplomat said. "The United States improved its position, asking the Greeks to accept what the Turks were offering, and asking the Turks to accept a cease-fire. But it became clear that Washington felt that Tun- key was much more important to the Western alliance than Greece and adopted a line much more pro-Turkey. No wonder the Greeks got angry." 7 By now, the experts suggest- ed, the United States was with- out leverage with both sides, even if it wanted to use any. The Turks, though applauding what they call Washington's "objectivity" and "correct ap- proach," experienced little American pressure and proceed- ed to enlarge their hold on the island and to resume fighting last week after the breakdown of the Geneva peace conference mediated by Britain.. ? At it was, Turkey was in no ;mood to listen to Washington ;or anyone else. Ankara had al- ready stood up to Washington on the resumption of the growth of opium poppies? a decision that led the .United States to recall its ambassador: ? Moreover, Turkish officials remain angry to this day over the 1964 letter from President Johnson, who headed off a Turkish invasion' of 'Cyprus then by threatening to with- draw America's nuclear protec- tion if the crisis led the Soviet' Union to act. ? Such threats were not forth- coming this time, presumably as a result of Mr. Kissinger's conclusion that they would have little effect and work only to anger a partner whose border? with the Soviet Union and whose value to the alliance' made continued friendship im- perative. "It is our information that Washington pulled its punches in Ankara," said one well-in- formed, non-Greek diplomat in Athens. "It was a hardheaded decision, taken by hardheaded people. America had to lose one friend or the father and they chose to lose Greece." . This is a view confirmed by Americans in Ankara and Athens. While the American naval bases in Greece are re- garded as important to the United States, the installations in Turkey are regarded as even more vital to strategic interests of the alliance. Ankara's Firnmness Noted Moreover, American diplo- mats in Ankara said there was no point in overdoing the pres- sure on Turkey. They stressed that nothing short of using the American Sixth Fleet between Turkey arecl Cyprus would have stopped Ankara from invading. 7 Thus, there is general under- ttanding in European capitals for the bitterness stirred in the new Greek Government over the American role. Greek leaders insisted in meetings with American officials; that Washington should "do more" to hold back the Turks and then -pulled their troops out of 'the North Atlantic alliance out of frustration over what they saw as Mr. Kissinger's "aloof- ness" to the crisis and his "lae-: ?trayal" of Greece. For his part, Mr. Kissinger kept in constant touch .with, Ankara and Athens and ? with James Callaghan, the British Foreign Secretary, who tried to bring the two sides together in Geneva. The American Sec- retary clearly decided to leave much of the detail work to Britain, one of the guarantors of the island's independence under a 1960 treaty. "Kissinger is a man who understands power," said ? a diplomat at the North Atlantic 'Treaty Organization headquar- ters in Brussels. "And in this case Turkey had all the power." '-Mr. Kissinger's decision last week to take a more active role in the negotiations and even to go to Cyprus, if asked, is widely regarded in Europe as acknowl- edgement by Washington that the United States erred in han- dling the crisis. The comments today by Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger that Turkish forces may have pushed too fail on the island was also seen as another ,effort by Washington to com- 'pensate for past errors. In any event, the mood of many in Europe was summed up today in The Sunday Tele- graph, which said: "It is really ironic that a Secretary of State shciuld spend weeks in a personal-jet-shuttl between Middle East capitals to damp down the Arab-Israel conflict and only now grudg- ingly offer to stir from Wash ington ?to mend a gaping hol in America's own global de :lenses." 22 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 NEW YORK TIMES 20 August 1974 The Gree Turnaround on the U.S. By STEVEN V. ROBERTS Speelal to The New York Times ATHENS, Aug. 19 ? On a square in downtown Athens stands a statue of Harry Tru- man. It expresses Greece's gratitude to the United States for the Truman Doctrine, and the outpouring aid in the nineteen- forties and fifties that helped Greece recover from the devastation . of World War II and resist Corn- News Analysis munist subversion during the civil war that followed. In another square, a few blocks away, young people have been gathering every night for a week. They call Secretary of State Kissinger a murderer, and they chant,* "Americans, go home." Today, in Cyprus, ethnic Greeks went beyond words, to violence, killing the American ambassador in a spasm of fury against Washington's policies. How did the United States go from hero to villain? How did the country that Washington brought into the North Atlantic alliance 22 years ago turn its back on its allies last week, as virtually every Greek, in- cluding the military, cheered? There are many reasons, but after conversations with ana- lysts from both countries, three explanations stand out. The first is that America is N a victim of its own mythology. Many Greeks still believe that the United States is so rich and powerful that it can do t virtually anything. The legend was ended in Vietnam, but was b renewed by the successes of Mr. Kissinger. There is a per- h vasive belief that if the wonder- a worker of the Middle East had wanted to stop the Turkish in- vasion of Cyprus, he could have. The second reason given is that Athens does not need Washington or. the Atlantic al- liance so much anymore. Thi is a problem plaguing all mem bers of the alliance. It wa based on the ? threat of a corn mon enemy, and as that threa appears to recede, the ties bind jog the allies together begin t weaken, more parochial inter ests assert themselves. More over, the economic aid of pas years has worked; Greece' economy is basically sound. This feeling is enhanced by another factor?the passage of time. The Youths chanting in the streets and the soldiers mobilized in Thrace do not re- member World War II, or the Greek civil war of 1946-49, or American aid. They are not grateful to America, and they are not afraid of civil strife? if only because they have never ived through it. The third major factor is na- tionalism, the desire to show independence of the great pow- ers, to stand on one's own feet. When Greece withdrew her forces from the Atlantic alli- ance and Premier Constantine Caramanlis rejected an invita- tion to see President Ford in Washington, the headlines here were revealing. . Headlines Are Quoted Vranthyni, : a conservative paper, wrote: "Not one step in retreat?Subjection 'out of Lite question." Athinailti, a left- ving daily, said: "No more de- pendence." As an American diplomat put it: "There's a feeling in Greece hat at 'least we'll be masters n our own house, we haven't eon men before, and now we're men. There's a lot of appy nationalist feeling round." This feeling flows- out of a long history. Greece has always been a client state, influenced 1 NEW YORK TIMES 18 August 1974 GR El EXPECTED TO CUB U.S. BASES Aides Assume That Athens Will Act Amid Increasing Anti-American Feeling By STEVEN V. ROBERTS Special to The New York 74 III Ca ATHENS, Aug. 17?Ameri- can and Greek officials are now assuming that the United States will eventually be asked to vacate or reorganize at least some of the seven major military installations it main- tains in Greece. No decisions are believed to have been made yet, but one informed source said of the Greek position: "They mean business, no question about it. Their Intent is very serious." Approved by one power or another. As a of the Athens junta, many result, one diplomat said. Greeks again blamed-Washing- "Greeks like to try to 'find ton. other people to blame."- ? . Often they advanced little After the military coup top- proof. But they tend to assume pled democracy in Greece in that since Cyprus would make 1967, that blame Jell largely a good American base, and on the United States. The, basic since Archbishop Makarios was American policy was to main- an independent-minded poli- tain good relations with the tician who refused to align junta to preserve American with the Atlantic alliance, military bases and keep Greece Washington must have been in- as a loyal and well-equipped volved. As one Greek news- ally. paper editor put it, "The junta American *generals and cab- would not have dared stage met offiCers visited Athens, the coup without a green light meeting cordially with the from Washington." junta and seeing their pictures This .feeling was reinforced published on the front pages of by another article in The New the controlled press. The con- York Times, also circulated viction grew, as one paper put here, reporting that the C.I.A. it last week, that the United had received advance warning - States "had become an instru- of the coup. ment of our repression." The Again readers tended to ex- aggerate the article and often people of Greece, the charge went, were being sacrificed to ignored its main point?that the interests of Washington the State Department had tried and the Atlantic Alliance, to warn the junta that it dis- approved of the Cyprus coup. Here, too, in the view of most The most recent blow to observers, the myth of Amen. America's reputation here was can power played a central role. the Turkish invasion. of Cyprus. The clich?n Athens Was that Again, the desire to' find other Washington couuld topple the people to blame was powerful. junta "with a snap of its fing- When Washington announced ers." Therefore, Greeks rea- that it favored more autonomy. for the Turkish Cypriotes, Greeks interpreted the state- soned, Washington was respon- sible for the dictatorship. The belief was considerably ment as confirmation of Nash- strengthened recently when The ington's support for Turkey. New York Times published an The suspicion that Mr. Kissin- article?widely reprinted here? ger had condoned, if not detailing the close relationship planned, the Turkish invasion between the Central Intelligence became gospel. Agency and Greek political During the years of dicta- leaders. ? torship, critics of American The facts in the article were policy warned that support of interpreted by some readers as the Junta would disillusion conclusive proof that the C.I.A. Greek democrats with the completely dominated Greece. United States, This has now Every new fact is fitted into happened. Greece has with- the basic conviction. When drawn a military role in the Archbishop Makarios was over-Atlantic alliance and American thrown in Cyprus with the help bases are threatened. The status of the American bases has been threatened by Greece's decision last week to' withdraw her troops from the North Atlantic Treaty Organi- zation in protest against Tur- key's military action in Cyprus. The bases were established by agreements between Athens and Washington, but they are authorized by the NATO treaty and linked to NATO strategy. Turkey is also a mem- ber of the. alliance. Greece prohibited all Amen-! can military aircraft from land- ing or taking off anywhere in the country. Today the order was modified to allow opera- tions only in Athens, and then only with six-hour notice. Anti-Americanism Grows Anti-Americanism is sweep- ing Greece. For seven years, many Greeks criticized Wash- ington for supporting the mili- tary dictatorship, which fell last month. Now they are seek- ing a reason?some Americans would say a scapegoat?for the humiliating situation in Cyp- rus, and Washington is the tar- get.. For Release 2001/08/08: A typical comment was made by Christianiki, a reli- gious weekly, which published an editorial titled "Americans, Pack Up." The editorial said: "The American establishment of Watergates and murderers infects the holy soils of Greece, and they must take their mis- siles and their boats and leave." Americans here seemed nerv- ous today after anti-Americana demonstrations last night and; the huge welcome accorded; Andreas Papandreou, a leading! entice of the United States, who returned from six years in exile. At the American air base near Athens a special "rumor- control center received more than 100 calls today from wor- ried American servicemen and their families, and servicemen were advised not to wear their uniforms in public. In attacking Washington,: Greeks seemed to asserting their national pride and inde- pendence after weeks of frus-i aating inaction on the Cyprus' issue. The newspaper Ta Nerv puublished a huge one-word CIA2RDP77-00432R00010 headline today that. sai dsimply, "Oxi," or "No." That is a famous word in Greek .history, the reply that Gen. John Metaxas gave to Mussolini in 18940 when Italy asked fo rpermission to send troops into Greece. 1 Today Greece was saying no to four things, Ta Nea said: President Ford's invitation to I Premier Constantine Caraman- lis to come to Washington for talks, Secrcetary of State Kis- Minister George Mavros, Tur- key's suggestion that the Gen- eva talks resume, and NATO's retquest to send a representa- tive here, In the wake of her with- drawal from NATO military ac- tivities, Greece moved to im- prove relations with Yugoslavia and France. Milos Minic, Yugo- slavia's Deputy Premier, flew here with a message from Presi- dent Tito. Greek officials have been implying that they might conclude defense treaties with such communist neighbors as Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. France, the only ?other na- tion to have withdrawn militar-1 0330001-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 By from NATO, announced that she would speed up delivery of 50 Mirage figthter-bombers pre- viously purchased by Greece. As war tension over Cyprus subside, Greece issued a long statement of economic policy from the-Minister of Coordina- tion and Planning, Xenophon Zolotas. The statement had been delayed twice by the Cyprus crisis as the new civi- WASHINGTON POST 19 AUG 1974 Cyprus War Protested by 20,000 Here Ly Charles A. Krause Vfltuu POSC Staff Writer Thousands of highly emo- tional b u t orderly Greek- Americans converged . on the White House yesterday to pro- test the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. The demonstrators esti- k Police. at mated by U.S. Par between 20,000 and 22,000 'marched !down Pennsylvania Avenue chanting "Turks out of Cyprus" and "Killer Kissinger!" Despite the large crowd and, charged atmosphere, only two arrests were reported' by The' protesters, most oi them foreign-born, naturalized. U.S. citizens, demanded that: President 'Ford and tecretary.: of State Henry Kissinger act decisively to rid Cyprus of the! Turkish troops that have cap.; tttred the northern third of the Mediterranean . The vast outpouring of dem- onstrators surprised even some ot their leaders, who' said !that the piotest was only organized in he last several. days. The demonstration was originally sehedukx1 thr fayette Par;?:, across from the. White liousE., but was moveds to the Ellipse behind the man-: sion yesterday afternoon when thousanc;.s more protesters ar- rived then had been expected. Dr. A. J. Tousimis, Rockville physician and one at the group's leaders. said !lei had eypected about 2,000 dem-, onstratore when he obtained a parade pedant Saturday. ? Tousinda celled the demon- stration "snoniarteous" and said that 3:-..0,t1C0 Greek-Aimiri- caes would have come tir Waehinston. had there been inure time foe organization. , As it was, hundreds of buses came from :,;ew York, New dersee, Boston and Philadel- phia. Three chartered planes brou:eln. protesters from San. Franc' co. . The demonstration began; .abdut 2 p.m.. ?viiien thousands! PrntestorS nathered on the, Eineee They brought with . _ ^ lian Government was unable to get on with the reforms it planned after seven years of military rule. Mr. Zolotas expressed optimism about the economy and said that with the return of civilian rule "confidence and coopera- tion have been restored, both at home as well as abroad." Specifically, he said that Greece would now move toward fuull ? them signs and banners that,: An the main, stressed two, themes: that the United StateI should remember its strong .s; ties with Greece and that Kis- singer is personally to blame; for the present situatinn- in ' Cyprus. . ) . Other signs acaLZ.F.::,1 'Surkish soldiers of brutality' (aTurkish , Pigs Leave Crepeure Women I Alone") and the Turkish gov- ernment of refusing to stop its I farmers .from growing poppies IUsed to produce heroin: , -Lakes ti:hristodoulou, presi; ! ; Clent of the Cyprus Federation of America, said many Greek- Americans feel betrayed by ,lictr own government's policy of official neutrality on the 'Cyprus question. "The United States could have stopped this long before. it started because the (Greek). junta government was under the CIA," Christodoulou said. : : The ? latest crisis in Cyprus began last month when Arch-. bishop Makarios, the elected president of Cyprus. was over-. thrown in a coup allegedly en- gineered by the Greek junta, that had ruled Greece for: seven years ? Many of the demonstrators; attici they agreed with Christo-! doulou that ? the CIA mush have Ineostre?and approved of --the coop end, titus, could; ha\ e prevented it. "Wt want the U.S. to take' the invaders out of.. Cyprus," Christodaulou said. Alex Diatsintos, 29, a stad dent at the University of, Maryland said that the Greek- ; American community feels; that "the U.S. has betrayed: the principles of democracy" he not acting to stop the Turk- lab army over the past two: yreeks as it seized more and; more of the island. ? As the demonstrators' formed their parade lines on , the Ellipse, Eleni VenetoulisS whose husband, Ted, is run- , ring in the Democratic pri- mary for county executive of ; Baltimore County, said she ; was amazed by the number of' ; demonstrators. Greek-Americans, Mrs. yen-; etoulis said, are "basically cOnl' Their social lives re- volve around the church. This;' is the rivet time they have, ' ever demonstrated in this country"." - Asked why so many Greeltd? association with the European Economic Community. Greece has been an associate member, but relations between Athens and thee Common Market were frozen after the military coup of 1967. The Minister promised an end to the "unsteady and spas- modic" economic policies fol- lowed by the military rulers and and announced the lifting Americans had turned out ford ;he protest and why their emod 'dans were so strong, Mrs.! Vcialtoulis Laid: "Because un-! :Ser.:math, we're ? all Greeks.! You know. there has always] been this thing between Tur- . hey and the Greek people." About 4 p.m.. as thousands ed the protesters marched 10 abreast clown Pennsylvania Avenue, several young men climbed a statue in Lafayette However, police did make !arrests later in the afternoon. when several hundred of the: 'protesters attempted. to march around the White House again. Police officers warned the 'demonstrators that their pa- rade permit was about to run out and ordered the demon- strators to remain on the' Park and burned an effigy of !Kissinger. The crowds cheered- ' but police made no effort to I stop the burning or arrest. I those responsible. Ellipse.? When the demonstrators at-I itempted to surge through the! ?police line at 15th and E Streets. NW, D.C. police ar- rested two men and charged them with disorderly conduct. Police later identified the two :as John Orfanas, 27, 11.1ont- igornery, N.J., and John Psa-i ras, 29, New York City. Each; man posted S10 collateral and. was released, police said. U.S. Park Police said they had between 230 and 300 men: on duty for the demonstration' while metropolitan police said. they had 135 patrolmen near. the White House. ? As the demonstrators wound, their way around the White! House, four of their leaders. met with J.W. Roberts, an as- sistant White House press aide. According to Tousimis, one ef :hose who met with Robe ems, the assistant press secre- tary assured the Greek-Ameri- cans that their concerns about policy on Cyprus would he eoramunicated to President Ford, who was playing golf yesterday and did not witness. the demorestration. Tousirais said the group em- phasized to Roberts that the sooner the Turks are out of: Ceprus the better for world. peace. Tousimis said Roberts; did not say what American, policy toward the Cyprus cri-. sis was or would be but "he , of regulations that had severfyl restricted credit for Greek ind dustry. "The seven-year period has accomplished just one thing,"; said Mr. Zolotas, an economist' and professor, "to confirm in a most dramatic way that with- out democracy, neither econ- omic stability nor substantial progress can be achieved." ;cod say he was very impressed ;with the demonstration." Virtually all of the demon- strators had departed the El-. ;nose area by 6 pare. leavingi Irately their signs and litter asi 'reminders that they had been there. ' Earlier in the day. Ni.kos Dimitriou. the Cypriot am- bassador- to the United States, charged that Turkey had "taken advantage" of the coup against Malsarios "to launch a barbaric invasion of an es-. sentially defenseless island." Speaking from the altar of St. George Greek Orthcdox church in Bethesda, Dimitriou said that Greek Cypriots "shall never surrender. There shall never be peace as long as one Tukish soldier remains on Cy- prus." Contributing to this story. were Washington Past staff. writers Alice Bonner and Barbara Bright-Sagnier. ? 24 jir oWeiliie-2001/08/08-: CIA-RDP77-00432R0D0100330001-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010033.0001-0. NEW YORK TIMES 3 August 1974 CJOA Chid oubts Soviet Navy Plans I dian ace n :uild-up By BERNARD GWERTZMAN Special to The New York Tittles WASHINGTON, Aug. 2 William E. Colby, director of 'Central Intelligence said in Congressional testimony made public today that, contrary to Pentagon concern, the Soviet Union was unlikely to build up its Indian Ocean fleet signifi- cantly unless the United States built up it fleet there first. In a closed-door hearing of the Senate Armed Services on July 11, Mr. Colby also scoffed at the view often heard in in Washington that the reopen- ing of the Suez Canal would lead to a major transfer of Soviet warships from the Medi- terranean to the Red Sea and then to the Indian Ocean. Mr. Colby said that the open- ing of the canal, expected by the end of this year or early 'next year, "will increase the over-all flexibility ?>f the Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean, but not in itself cause a signifi- cant increase in the Soviet presence." Canal Vulnerable to Closing Because the canal could be easily closed in time of crisis, he said, the Russians were un- likely "to be caught with a sub- stantial portion of available units on the wrong end of a blocked canal." Mr. Colby said that Soviet priority would be to maintain the Mediterranean Fleet at top efficiency rather than risk hav- ing warships cut off in the Indi-, an Ocean. The Soviet presence in the Tnclian Ocean was described by Colby as "relatively small and inactive." "By mid-1973, the typical So- viet Indian Ocean force includ- ed fiva surface warships?one gun-armed cruiser or missile- equipped ship, two destroyers or destroyer escorts, a mine- sweeper and an amphibious ship," he said. "There was also usually a diesel submarine and six auxiliary support ships, one of which was a merchant tanker." The number now is about the same, he said, except that the total of minesweepers has been increased to nine to aid in clearing the Suez Canal of war debris. The Soviet forces in the In- dian Ocean, he said, have usually been drawn from the Pacific Fleet, except in the case of vessels from the western fleet en route to the Pacific. Mr. Colby said that Soviet growth in the Indian Ocean would be steady over the long term, in keeping with the growing Soviet presence in the area. A Balance With U.S. Fleet He said that the ultimate size of the Soviet force would depend on "the size of the in- vestment and the forces that we arrange to be there." "If we put in a permanent establishment of some size, why they would correspond- ingly increase to some substan- tial degree," he said. "If we had only sort of tentative connections there and some improvements, they might just continue their gradual in- crease." He said that during the Mid- dle East war last October, the United States moved a carrier task force into the Indian Ocean, provoking the Russians to increase their force, par- ticularly in submarines. Mr. Colby was testifying be- fore the committee in relation to the Pentagon's request for $29-million to expand port and air facilities on the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. Defense Department witnesses have asked for the funds to counter Soviet pres- ence in the area. "Viewed from a. global per- spective, the Indian Ocean area ?as distinct from the Middle East?has a lower priority than the United States, China or Eu- rope in the U.S.S.R.'s diplo- matic, economic and military initiatives," Mr. Colby said. "Moscow's probable long- range strategic objectives in this area are to win influence at the expense of the West, and to limit the future role of China," he said. "Toward these goals, the Soviets use their naval presence as one element in a combined approach that utilizes political, economic, sub- versive and military-aid activ- ity." "We believe that the roles of military, and particularly naval forces, have been secondary to diplomatic efforts and aid pro- grams in promoting Soviet in- terests in the Indian Ocean area," Mr. Colby said. BALTIMORE SUN 3 August 1974 Arms race feared ver liego Garcia 1] By CHARLES W. CORDDRY Washington Bureau of The Sun Washington ? William E. Colby, the director of Central Intelligence, has given Con- gress an implicit warning that expansion of United States naval facilities on Diego Gar- cia Island could spark a naval arms race with the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean. In testimony given secretly July 11 and published yester- day in the Congressional Rec- ord, Mr. Colby extensively described Soviet naval deploy- ments in the Indian Ocean since they began in 1968 and said temporary surges in strength customarily have taken place in response to U.S. naval activities. ? The Defense Department and Navy leaders nave described the situation the other way around in their efforts to win congressional approval for ex- pansion of facilities ? on the mid-Indian Ocean island. They want, in addition to the present cnonmarnbulenic,taatiosieirsvinfeacsilhitiipess, antdo Describing Russia's naval: units in the Indian Ocean as a' sort of minimum force that can be enlarged "from time to' time for political purposes, Mr. Colby said that that ? part of the world ranks far behind the' United States, Western Europe and China on the Russian scale' of interests. He implied tbe Soviet ? Union would expand' only.' reluctantly at a faster_ rate than the current increase:: of one or two combatant ships a year in the Indian Ocean. The Russians would match; any American expansion he-, said, but to move faster than they do now would involve "reordering their priorities and shifting naval forces from , other areas." He described the "typical" Soviet naval force in the Indian Ocean as five surface warships, a diesel-powered submarine and six supporting ships. The American* Navy has crated three ships in the Per- sian Gulf area for many years and has recently been sending aircraft carrier task groups into he Indian Ocean on sor- ties from the Pacific. Diego Garcia is supposed to make the latter easier by cutting logistic ties to the Philippines 5,000, miles from the Indian Ocean island. James R. Schlesinger, the Secretary of Defense who headed the CIA before Mr. Colby, and Navy leaders con- tend the Navy must be able to operate routinely in the Indian Ocean because of Russia's "growing" air and naval pres- ence, reopening of the Suez Canal which will ease Soviet . entry into ---the ocean, and the, concentration of oil routes over the ocean to Eu:cde, Japan and the United States. Mr. Colby said Russia's long-range aims in the area probably are to win influence at Western expense and to limit China's role, with the naval miss!on secondary to di- plomatic efforts and aid pro;'. grams. While the Russians see the importance of Persian Gulf oil and the sea lanes to the West. and Japan, he said, the normal makeup of the Soviet naval force "suggests that interdic- tion of Western commerce, particularly oil shipments from the Persian Gulf, has not been a major objective." operate tankers and to accom- mcdate anti-submarine and other aircraft from a leng- thened runway. .Mr. Colby testified that the assesSment of the Central In- telligence Agency is, "The So- viets would match any in- crease in our presence in that , area." Senator Stuart Symington 1 (D., Mo.), chairman of a mili- tary construction panel of the ,Senate Armed Services Corn- ' , mittee, inserted Mr. Colby's testimony in the record, with 'deletions of secret data, so that members of Congress could have the .evaluation of the agency "assigned the 'prime responsibility of gather- ing intelligence data on the Soviet Union." _ . Skeptical of proposals Mr. Symington, skeptical of proposals to spend $29 million on Britain's Diego Garcia Is- land this year and possibly $75 million eventually, plainly wanted a different perspective from the Navy to be aired. "You expect the Soviet pres- ence in the Indian Ocean to continue to grow," he inquired of, Mr. Colby, "regardless of what we do, but that it will grow faster if we start devel- oping Diego Garcia. Is that a fair interpretation?" Mr. Colby replied: "I think that is true, yes, sir." Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA5RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 SCIENCE For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 CMISTIAN *MVO 13 August 1974 or? 9 s I India a By Razia Ismail Special to The Christian Science Monitor pact ?n P kistan New Delhi The exit of Richard Nixon and the entrance of Gerald Ford is not ex- pected to result in any dramatic foreign-policy changes concerning the Indo-Pakistani subcontinent. Specifically, Mr. Ford's assumption of office is not seen as a deterrent to the current gradual return of Indo- American relations to cordial under- standing. But two Washington reports in Delhi papers reflect the -dichotomy that persists in these ties. One report speaks of deepening Indo-American friendship and peace; the other re- vives the Diego Garcia controversy. The first item reports Mr. Ford's desire to strengthen friendly ties with India and cites Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's reiteration of United States commitment to policy of peaceful relations abroad. Mr. Ford's messages to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi anc, to Pakistani Pre- mier Zulfikar Ali Bhutto have both made front-page news, with his reaf- firmation of close ties with both countries. The other item reports congres- sional approval of funds for the expansion of American Navy in- stallations in the Indian Ocean. Amer- ican interest in the tiny island of Diego Garcia remains an irritant to nations like India, which oppose any form of armed one-upmanship in the ocean they want to retain as a "zone of peace." The approval of $32.3 million for expanding facilities on Diego Garcia was the only controversial feature of the United States annual military- construction bill. Its passage by the House of Representatives has coin- cided rather unhappily with Mr. Ford's initial expression of cordiality toward India, although no link is seen or imputed between the two. India's anxiety to keep the Indian Ocean free of any big-power Navy games was recently restressed by Foreign Minister Swaran Singh in Jakarta. "India would never provide the Soviet Union or any country a naval base on the Nicobar Islands," he told newsmen there. India and Indonesia have just signed a seabed boundary agreement covering about 90 miles between the northern tip of Sumatra and the Nicobar group in the Indian Ocean. Indonesia has similar pacts with Australia, Malaysia, and Thailand. India has a similar agreement with Sri Lanka. India and Indonesia urged the big powers on Aug. 9 to act with restraint and cooperate to preserve the ocean as a peaceful zone. Passage of funds for Diego Garcia will revive India's'fears, even though the general feeling here so far is that President Ford might show greater zeal than Mr. Nixon in improving ties with India. However, on the strength of his meeting with Dr. Kissinger Aug. 10, Pakistani Ambassador Yaqub Khan has already declared that the severeignty, integrity, and independence of Pakistan "will continue to be the cornerstone of American policy in south Asia." Pakistan radio has also broadcast the gist of Mr. Ford's message to Mr. Bhutto. The contents -of his message to Prime Minister Gandhi have not yet been disclosed here. While it is expected that the Ford administration's main pre- occupation over the coming weeks will be to provide a stable transition, Indians are hopeful that the thoughts of President Ford on south Asia will also take clearer shape before Dr. Kissinger embarks on his expecteg subcontinental journey in October. Pakistanis uneasy Qutubuddin Aziz reports from Ka- rachi: Pakistanis, who will celebrate the WASHINGTON STAR ii An 1974 P?ed 27th anniversary of independence on Aug. 14, are harried by apprehensions over India's nuclear-weapons capa- bility, and the change of presidents in the United States had made them a little uneasy. They now, feel consid- erably regdshrea-by Pretitlent Ford's affirmation, ? ina-message to Pre- mier Zulfiltar'Alt .BhUtto ? of MS intention to honor American com- mitments to Pakistan. In Washington last September Pres- ident Nixon had told visiting Premier Bhutto that the United States consid- ered the independence and territorial integrity of Pakistah as a cornerstone of American foreign policy. After the Indians' May 18 nuclear blast, Pakistan's solicitations for an American nuclear umbrella produced a reassuring response from the Nixon administration. Commenting on President Ford's askirance to Pakistan, Karachi's semiofficial daily Morning News wrote in an editorial Aug. 12 that it had "encouraged hope that there is not going to be any let-up in the United States' stand in support of Pakistan's national independence and territorial integrity. , ? , lAdiuxth Parsuhl-u It is reassuring to have the director- of central intelligence give an unwor- Tied assessment of Soviet activity in a sensitive part of the world. This is what William Colby did last month in testimony, since parEally declassified, before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Undercutting expressions of concern by the Pentagon, he envi- sioned no significant buildup of Soviet naval activity in the_Indian Ocean un- less it is inspired by an expansion of the American presence there. The Colby comments could be read as casting doubt on the wisdom or need of our improving the berthing and naval-supply facilities and airfield available to us at Diego Garcia, a re- mote British-held island. Colby tcok no specific stand on the project, for which the Pentagon has requested 529 It would be a mistake to drop the project, in the light of the present 26 power vacuum in the Indian Ocea, area and its strategic importance t . the West. The ocean is traversed the supertanker routes from the Per sian Gulf to Europe and Japan, and in creasingly to North America as oui oi imports grow. Beneath the water Polaris submarines are an station witi missiles trained on the Soviet Unioi and China. While the Soviet Nay_ presence typically amounts to abou. five surface warships, these require a least a minimal American counter presence. Since at least a few Ameni can ships unquestionably will be open ating in the Indian Ocean for the fore seeable future, it is sensible to inn prove their support facilities. The Pentagon may have oversol' the .Soviet threat in the Indian Ocea, for the purpose of squeeeing rnonei out of Congress. But the Die.g,o Garci: project seems in any event to be ju.sti fiabie. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 fipproved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-R0P77-00432R000100330001-0 LOS ANGELES TIMES It August 197)-1- aS a Army Aid Ruffles Some. India Feathers BY WILLIAM DRUMMOND Times Staff Writer- NEW DELHI?The U.S. Army's grant of $11,000 to India's leading ornitholo- gist to study migratory birds on the subcontinent has caused a big flap in Parliament. Several members last week' called for a high lev- el investigation into the collaboration between the Bombay Natural History Society and the U.S. Ar- my's Migratory Animal Pathological Survey, which was the source of the money. Anti--American sen- timents, dormant in recent weeks, reawakened during one of Parliament's more emotional debates. S. M. Bannerjee, a Corn-- munist membvr, accused some Indian agencies of helping Americans "sabo- tage" the country. The excitement was touched off by a report in the press recently that lumped the Army-funded bird survey together with experiments in mosquito control carried on here by the World Health Organi- zation. India, the headlines warned, was to be the guinea pig for foreign ex- periments in biological varfare. However, the U.S. Army contends that the bird stu- dy had nothing to do with warfare, and on the con- trary, might have some humanitarian benefits. Walter Reed Army Hos- pital has long been seeking to advance knowledge about how migratory ani- mals transmit diseases that affect man, an official American source said. "The Army contributed the money here because we had an opportunity to work through Indian scientists to broaden an area that we had been working on already. We sent in no people. We gave no advice. We just gave the money," the source said. The recipient was Salim All, author of the authori- tative volume "The Birds of India." He has been stu- NEW YORK TIMES 19 August 1974 ? India's Presidency: Pomp or Power? By BERNARD I,VEINRAUB Speotat to The New Yurk Times NEW DELHI, Aug. 18 ? The two - decade debate over whether the President of India is an ornamental figure .or a political 'power was renewed this weekend as Indian legisla- tors voted for a new president. President V. V. Gin, an ami- able 80-year-old former labor leader who spent much of his time at ceremonial functionsl in Rashtrapati Bhavan, the red) sandstone presidential palace, is stepping down after fivel years in office. - , Although the results of the vote will not be announced un- til Tuesday, the new President of India will, by all accounts, be Prime Minister Indira Gan- dhi's candidate, Fakhruddin All Ahmed. His only opponent is a little-known opposition candidate, Tridib Kumar?Chau- dhury. 'Mr. Ahmed is a frail, 70-year- old former Food Minister Whose recent performance, even ac- cording to associates, was dis- mal. He was chosen b& Mrs. Gandhi to run for President be- cause he is a Moslem?and the Government is struggling to calm this huge, restive minori- ty?as well as a loyal follow- er of the Prime Minister. Per- haps the key reason for his selection is that he will prob- ably heed the wishes of Mrs. Gandhi without question. .., ?A Fuzzy Role The role of the Indian Presi- dent is one of the fuzziest ele- ments of this democracy. By tradition, 'the Prime Minister is the dominant figure, while the President's functions are poorly defined and largeiy dependent T\loitnhiseteprersoannadlitifete personalities ofPresident. Prime Mrs. Gandhi, and to a lesser degree her father, Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister, sought out presidential candi- dates who were pliable. Other- wise. an independent or power- ful . President could jolt the powers of the Prime Minister. Yesterday members of the dying migratory birds since 1928. In 1967, Salim Ali was in need of funds to carry on his work. One place to which he turned was the Smithsonian Institution, which responded with money. Another was the Walter Reed group, called the Migratory Animal Pathological Survey. Because Walter Reed is an Army institution, Salim Al's grant request had to be submitted to the U.S. Army's chief of research and development. This "bookkeeping" procedure made the project sound more military than it ac- Parliament and state assem- blies secret ballots for Presi- dent in an election that will probably favor Mr. Ahmed be- cause the governing Congress party commands more than 67 per cent of the votes. The new president will take office next Saturday for a five-year term. ' What makes the role of the Indian President interesting is that its powers have never really been tested. The nation's four presidents since independ- ence in 1947 have labored un- der a ceremonial role?a role that clearly displeased the na- tion's first President, Dr. Rajen- dra Prasad, as well as some legal authorities here. Mr. Ahmed himself said re- cently that would not be a "rubber-stamp" president but added: I don't think, there should be any scope for a con- frontation ? between the Presi- dent and the Prime Minister. The relationship should be based on cooperation and understand- ing of each other's functions. The point is, can you oppose a, Prime Minister who is an elect- ed representative? Then you would be a dictator." 1 The Potential Powers The Indian Constitution gives, the President potentially vast powers. As head of state, he can theoretically dissolve Par- liament and the state assem- blies, issue ordinances during parliamentary recesses and serve as commander of' the armed forces. Public-sector en- temrises are under the presi- dent's control. Perhaps the pivotal sentence of the Indian Constitution is: "there shall be a Council of Ministers (senior Cabinet offi- cials) with the Prime Minister at the head to aid and advise the President in the exercise of his function." The question that has been asked here is, what happens if the president should reject this aid and advice." - Moreover, the Constitution says that "the Prime Minister shal be appointed by the Presi- dent." So far this has proved; source said. The Army agreed to supply the money in 1969 with the knowledge and 'concurrence of the Indian government. What Salim Ali proposed to do was to catch and at- tach identification bands to migratory .birds. His work was to be centered at the Keoladeo Ghana bird sanctuary in Rajasthan a formlity because the Con- Icress party has won each of the national elections and the parliamentary leader became Prime Minister. "Penn Bhatia, a journalist and former government official, wrote recently: "But the Presi- dent would have to exercise some discretion if the choice lies between rival claimants from different parties none of' which commands a majority." "What would happen if the President refuses to be aided and advised?" he asked. "Would it lead to the resignation of the Prime Minister or the impeach- ment of the head of state." A Chilly Relationship Shifted India's first President, Dr: Prasad, had a chilly reltionship with Prime. Minister Nehru, who let it be known that India could nat have two heads of government Mr. Nehru yearned to have a figurehead President, an idea decried by Dr. Prasad, a Hindu nationalist. The second President, Serve- palli Radhakrishnan, a scholar and philosopher, played a muted role, although he was sometimes privately critical of Mr. Nehru. The third President, Zakir Husain, a Moslem, was' appointed by Mrs. Gandhi and held office two years until his death in 1969. A fierce fight was fought within the Congress party over his successor. The old-guard leaders overruled Mrs. Gandhi's objections and nominated the speaker of the lower house, Sanjiva Reddy. Mrs. Gandhi called for a "free conscience vote" within the party and naminated Mr. Girl, who be- came President in August, This was the backdrop for the split in the Congress party. Mrs. Gandhi was initially "ex- pelled" by the old guard but then gained the support of the majority of the party as well as the leftist opposition parties. In 1971 she won the parliamen- tary elections with an over- whelming majority. but he also proposed to set up another station in northeastern India. In five years, he caught 820,000 birds of 1,060 dif- ferent species, took blood samples and collected pa- rasites. "The results are in no way classified," the official said. "This was medical re- search,. pure and simple, and everybody benefits:' Approve411. : CIA-FDP77-00432R000100330001-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 15 August 1974 India's 'brain drain' to U.S. By Henry S. Hayward ? , New Delhi Not long ago a five-year-old young- ster here in New Delhi formally applied for a U.S. student visa. "I've seen everything now," said a veteran consular officer. The youngster's overzealous parents even supplied a supporting letter from a U.S. kinder- garten saying they were ready to accept the lad. At the other extreme among appli- cants was a retired Indian colonel with a pension of 120 rupees, about $15 a month. Unable to live on this without using his meager savings, he had decided to join his son in the States. He can gain entry as part of a family. In all, 134,000 Indians, including first and second generations, were in the U.S. last year, and visa appli- cations are running high again this year. An average of 20 Indian nurses LOS ANGELES TIMES 14 August 1974 lUme vales in India ound 'Ready to Rebel BY WILLIAM DRUMMOND 7irttes Staff Writer : NEW DELHI?The first nationwide public opinion poll among India's lowly' untouchables shows a growing will to rebel "that carries explosive possibili-. ties." The landmark survey was carried .out by the In-: than Institute of Public' Opinion here, an affiliate . of the international Gallup group. ? The poll described the treatment of untouchables prevailing today as "India. an apartheid." 'The high-handedness of, dominant castes is creat+ ing what might be de- scribed as a psychological, backlash among the Hari-, jans (untouchables) said institute Director Eric P. W. Da, Costa. .Harijans, apply each day at the American Embassy here. The reason: most of them can hope to earn between $8,000 and $10,000 a year in America. Here they get about 200 rupees a month, less than $30. Or take medical doctors. One hun- dred and twenty five students gradu- ated from a medical college in Guja- rat, north of Bombay, recently. Eighty-five of them promptly char- tered a bus and arrived several days later at the U.S. consulate in Bombay to apply for visas. Again, vastly higher financial re- wards for doctors in the United States are the basic reason for the rush. Indeed some critics claim India is losing many of its best state-educated men and women to the U.S. in a new "brain drain." Not so, say others. The doctors and nurses may depart, but they send back far more funds to their home folks in India than the Indian Govern- ment ever invested in their education. So there is a rupee gain, not a loss, involved. Moreover, experts here question whether India actually is prepared to absorb all its own professional gradu- ates. It already has a surplus of trained people in the cities. Where India needs arid wants them is in its 500,000 small villages. Yet the villages offer an educated profes- sional man almost nothing In facilities or financial return. 'literally "children 'Of God,"! is the name given to' the' -.untouchables by Mahatma Gandhi. ? "Forty percent of those ..surveyed throughout the country would opt for or- ganizing their community tg fight against injustice committed by other . castes," said De Costa, add- ing: ? "A sizable segment of the Harijan community is thus in a ferment that carries . explosive possibilities. A. majority of those willing to organize themselves* would not hesitate to re- sort to violence in self-de- fense. "This militant sectiod. constitutes only One-fifth. of the Harijan community.; .But this small but deter- mined segment may even- tually convert the ? silent and resentful majority to. opt for violence when they chips are down." The number of Harijans in India is estimated at S0. million, about 15% of the total population.. ? , They are eligible for special government quotas in gaining employment or 28 The U.S. Government, meanwhile, feels it needs more doctors, nurses, dieticians, veterinarians, and public health experts than it now has. So it smiles at qualified applicants, here and elsewhere. How many are coming? In India in 1973, Uncle Sam issued 8,000 immi- gration visas, plus 4,000 to visitors who adjusted their status after ar- rival. Total, 12,000. Under present American regu- lations, the permitted ceiling is 20,000 a year from any one country in the Eastern Hemisphere, or 170,000 over- all from the area, whichever figure is reached first. In 1.97.S India sent 17,000 to the U.S. This year officials expect 17,000 again. But in 1073, U.S. officials tightened the requirements because of economic conditions in the states. One result was 5,000 fewer Indian doctors and nurses. Britain and Canada are other favor- ite Indian destinations. They are regarded as easy places to make a living. But Canada now is difficult for Indian applicants. And Britain has closed its door. Both were being inundated by Indians as Common- wealth members. Meanwhile, don't forget Indian stu- dents. In 1973 there were 11,000 in the United States, more than any other foreign, nationality. eaucation. - Apart from Constitution- al guarantees for a number. of individual rights, discri- mination on grounds of !, untouchability is a crime* punishable by law. ? ? 'A special act provides penalties for preventing a Harijan from using public! 'facilities or subjecting him.' ?to social, or occupational 'discrimination. ?? However. De Costa ,found that the legal ?liar- santees had been ineffec- tive.The survey of 1,500 re- .spondents found that 13% Harijan youngsters 'were placed in'segregated :seating arrangements in schools, more than 50% of Harijans were made either to stand or to sit on the ground during visits to the home of caste Hindus and. 410% of Harijans said they were forbidden to enter a caste Hindu temple to Worship. Economically, the Hari- ?:ians are still downtrodden. De Costa said. "A vast maiority, not-. withstanding the evidence of some improvement in economic condition, ' still hive to wage a losing. struggle for Making ends meet,? he said. ' "This is reflected in the :feeling shared by a sizable :segment (43%) that. their' lot is worse than their. parents.? f- De Costa drew attention Aci the recent formation of a group in Maharashtra state calling itself the Dal-:, it. Panthers (Black Pan- thers), a militant organza-' 'tion of untouchables that :has borrowed a page from Eldridge Cleaver. Earlier this year, the' Dalit Panthers engaged in :violent clashes in the- streets of Bombay with .caste Hindus and police in :Which dozens of persons were injured. The possibility that the Dalit Panthers might be- come the leaders of Hari- jans seeking change 'must surely call for some furious thinking on the part of India's privileged classes?' `The pace at which con- frontation is proceeding 'and, even more. the pace at which confrontation leads to violence is a warn- ing of graver problems to come;' De Costa said. r ? ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 ETLMBA, Brazzaville (Central Organ of the Congolese Workers Party) 9-16 March 19714 744--) ffa !I? riln, C 170 Notts reprettons pour nos lecteurs..un article (traduit) Jourttal ;< Ghanaian Times ? consacre- aux ? actit,!its, de la C.I.A. Anjonid'hui, dans. le monde ender, la, settle. mention de la C.LA. ? Central Intelligence Agency ? preoccupe et alar- me les coeurs de tons ceux qui comprennent ou qui- sont ca- pables: de ? comprendre les grands ,enjeux de la politique internationale. La C.I.A. est consideree comme (Amu omnipresente. Car elle est generalement connue corn. me le bras long et fort du gon- yernewelit des Etats-Unis . a'. l'aide duquel elle manipule.les situations dans le's sydetnes ? politique.s ?et &ono- miques d'autres pays. .Mais.quels son.t les objectifs et les Methodes .de. la .C.I.A. ? -? Nombre de journaux et de livres se sont.consacres aux ac- tivites de la C.LA. D7une Ma- niere plus ou moins compre- hensible us ont expose la na- ture. et le mode de travail de cc service de renseignements des Etats-Unis ? operant dans le monde entier: ? Deux anteurs americains, D. Waist! et T.. Ross, ont- publie int livre interessant sur ces tivites revelatrices sous le titre ?. Le gonvernement invisible ? (The invisible Government ). D'apres des informations ?offi- cielles, la C.I.A. se trouve sous contrede.du Conseil de Securi- te Nationale (National Securi- ty Council). Ce dernier &an t subordonne directement au President des Etats-Unis. La loi sur la Securite Natio- flak (National Security Act) du 18 septembre 1947 stipule ses functions comme suit : Approved e la CIA en frk1ue 1- 2? tt C.I.A. en act inn ? 9 La C.I.A., le serpent a sept fetes, deploie ses rentacules. donner des conseils au Conseil de Securite Na- tionale et an President par rapport aux ques- limn; de renseignement concernant la securite na ti, onale ; coo rdonner les activites de renseignement du gottvernement A Pe- tra tiger 3 ? composer et distribuer des informations an sein du gouvernement 4 ? m.ener des activites de renseignement d u ii e itnportance generale, c'est-it-dire des activites 1.011Challt JOU? les 0.67 ments des services de renseignement ; 5'? remplir d'autres devoirs concernant la securi-- te nationale qui lui soul confies de temps en temps. C'est le chiquieme point, qui ne pent guere etre' depasse ?- dans l'innocence ? qui merite l'attention particuliere de pays africains luttant?pour une inde- pendance authentique. Ce point donne A la C.I.A. le privilege de realiser des actions et ope- rations secretes dirigees eontre n'importe gild Etat du monde. Les objectifs et les methodes de la C.I.A. out ete tenement destomorants que d? en ete 1948 le Conseil de Securite Na- tionale devait dinner l'in.-Arue- tion secrete NSC 10/2 permet- For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0G0400330001-0 'Ca Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 taut des operations speciales pourvu que le gotivernetnent les estitne suffisamment secre- tes et ? restreintes ? pour putt- voir flier chaque liaison &Mille avec ce dernier a l'aide d'argu- ments plausibles. Actuellement c'est POffice d'Operations Spe- eiales (Office of Special Ope- rations) qui realise de telles actions secretes. Le devoir principal de la C. LA. est le support pour le gon-, vernement des Etats-Unis dans la sauvegarde de ses interets ? nationaux ?. Les objectifs a- mericains en direction de frique sont determines par les- interets economiques, 'poi iii- ques et strategiques des Etats- Vnis en Afrique, et Us jouent un . role important dans la politi- : que globale de cette puissance ao-ressive. Du point de vue .economi- que, les Etats-Unis aspirent 4 l'etablissement des conditions les plus avantageuses pour Pin- vestissement de leurs capitaux, A la realisation de grands pro- fits, a nn approvisiotmement durable de..l'industrie - ameri-: eaine eu matieres premieres d'importance strategique et a l'expansion des marches pour tine vente profitable de. leurs marchandises. ? POLITIQUE En plus de cela. les Etats-U- nis s'efforcent de her les pays ETIMA BrazzaviLle 16-23 March 19714 72) F v7r1ti 7-1,74 41, imzegl africai as en qualite de parte- naires subordonnes sans droits egaux a la panic du marche mondial capitaliste qui est do- minee par les americains. Du point de vue politique les Eta t-Unis visent a tine influ- ence dans les Etats africains, leur assurant sur la scene in- ternationale le soutien de l'A- frique pour leur politique ?e- - trangere. Ei eXercatit lent` iii- influence . dans les Etats afri- cains, les Etats-Unis entrent souvent en conflit avec leg in- terets d'autres Etats occiden- taux. Cest -pourquol, les Etats-U- nis se presentent, selon les oki- gences de la situation concrete respective, comme .un ennenii du colonialisme .(s'ils peuvent par ce moyen diminuer l'influ- ence de l'ancienne loniale) ou hien comme fenseur. . ? . A cote de la livraison tiere.s, pren.ieres_pour leur in- dustrie, les Etats-Unis out des fitted-As militaires et strategi- ques en Afrique leur assurant le controle de l'Oce-mn Atlan- tique, l'Ocean Indien et la Mer Rouge. Voila la raison pour l'acqui- sition de bases aeriennes et na- vales ainsi que d'autres. types d'installations militaires dans les Etats Africains.. Dans l'ensemble, l'objectif Voici le deuxieme article de la serie publiee par ? Times ?au sujet du role de la C.I.A. (Cen- tral Intelligence Agency) dans le monde en general et en Afrique en particulier. ? La C.I,A. qiii ouvertement on secretement emploie les- me- thodes les plus differentes y com- pris l'ecoute telephonique et le traquage electoral ainsi que la destruction .de pouts et les inter- ventions armees, devient l'instru- InCllt le pins important de la mi- se en pratique de la politique americaine et un des organes les plus importants du gouvernement americain ?, (New York Times, 26 avril 1966). La transformation des pays africains en appendices economi- Ties, politiques et strategiques des Etats-Unis est une tache tres compliquee que meme une super- Puissance gigantesque comme les Etats-Unis ne peut pas accomplir par des moyens legaux exclusive- ment. En plus de cela, cet objectif est tres impopulaire aux yeux des po- pulations africaines et de ropi- Mon mondiale, et il se trouve en 30 strategique de Washington con- siste .en l'incorporation:.gra- duelle des pays africains dans l'appareil militaire des Etats.- Unis et de l'OTAN., ? ?.. En resultat ,du developpe- ment croissant de la techno1O- gie militaire, le nombre .des pays etant d'un intere.t Strate!- gigue pour les Etats-UniS ? va augmenter de maniere eviden.7. te. Si l'on considere:;ces,.JevoirS dans leur .unite, est; evideril qu'ils sont une partie des ef- forts faits par. les' ?Etats-Unis ?pour..achever-la-dotnination-du Monde... Deja 'T en- ,1940; -,IfarrY Truman,. he President des Etats Unis, souligne cet objec- tif en declarant : ?Les Etats-Unis sont Un pays puissant.. ll n'y a pas de. pays plus puissant rine leS, Etats-,(1- nis. 'En possession d'une telle puissance, .nous devons obte- nir l'heg(itnonie dans le 111071r de ?. ? L'ancien .Secretaire d'Etat a'?:?? mericain ? Dean Acheson---a ex- prime d'une maniere encore plus franche que les. Etats-Unis ne poursuivent pas des objec.- tifs philatitrophiques, mais bienleurs propres interets dans leur programme d'aide aux- pays sous-developpes.. (A suivre) contradiction flagrante avec les declarations officielles des Etats- Unis au sujet de leur support pour les idees de la liberte, de la justice et du-respect des droits de rhomme, de sorte que les Etats- Unis sont forces de le realiser moyennant la guerre secrete. Cela explique la transformation de la C.I.A. en un instrument de la politique etrangere des Etats- Unis et rimportance speciale du role qui lui est assigne. A la base des objectifs gene- raux internationaux des Etats- Unis en Afrique, On peut carac- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 AiSprOved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010-03300-01-0. .tenser .1a tIche concrete de la C.I.A. sur le continent africain comme suit : 10 foumir des renseignements etendus sur la situation dans les pays africains, leurs objectifs po- litiques et autres, sur l'opposition, les sentiments des populations en general, sur des personnes etant d'un inter& pour les Services de Renseignements et stir les activi- tes des Representations Officiel- les et des Services de Renseigne- ments d'autres Etats dans ces pays ; .2'..e.wblir des reseaux d'agents necessaires e realiser d'autres ? operations secretes ? en vue d'exercer une pression sur l? Gouvernements des pays africains ainsi que, s:il est necessaire, pre- parer un coup d'Etat pOitr" la li- quidation de .Gouvernements afri- cains desagreables. Le la C.I.A. a grandi avec la proclamation de la. poli-?. tique de la ? nouvelle approche des Etats-Unis vis-a-vis de l'Afri-, que. Ce fait est confirme par les .; instructions du Secretaite. d'Etat. americain W. ROGERS qui a sou-., ligne les devoirs speciaux nom- mes ci-apres de la diplomatie et ?des Services de Renseignements americains an cours dune reunion des Chefs des RepresenLtions Diplomatiques Americaines et des postes de la C.I.A. dans les. pays de l'Afrique Orientale? qui 'a eu ? lieu en fevrier 1970 a Addis.- Abeba : 10 sauvegarde des lnter ets? strategiques des Etats-Unis et de l'O.T.A.N. 2" obstruction de la politique.; des pays communistes et de; pansion de l'ideologie socialiste 3" lutte contre le Mouvement de Liberation Nationale ; 4" penetration dims les Repre-? sentations des pays socialistes 5" substitution ,prudente, mais continue de l'influence anglaise par l'influence americaine ; 6" garantie ? d'approVisionne- ments pour l'industrie dc guerre des Etats-Unis. On pent supposer que la di-. plomatie et le Service de kensei- gnements americains ont les me- tries devoirs dans d'autres Etats africains, avec la seule difference. que dans les pays sous domination francaise le point 5 pent envisa-? aer la sul..Ytitution de l'influence francaise. Le travail de la C.I.A. en vue de sauvegarder les interets inter- nationaux des Etats-Unis est- ac:-. compli par les cadres et les agents' faisant part-ie d'un grand depar- tement de cette organisation. Ce departement a. ete cree con- formement a la loi sur Ia Securite Nationale de 1947. -.. II est difficile de donner le chiffre exact de ces ? 'Chevaliers du poignard et du poison ?. D'apres des estimations d'un an-. cien dirigeant de la C.I.A., L. KIRKPATRIC JVA, qui ..etait ?egaletnent l'Inspecteur General de la C.I.A. sous ALLAN DULLES, cc departement comprend environ- 100.000 membres. et .agents,., LITS OFFICES I? D. WEISE et T. ROSS l'esti- !Tient .4 200.000. A peu pres '20.000.d'entre eux travaillent aux Etats-Unis dans le quartier gene- al de la C.I.A. et dans ses suc- cursales se troilvaiit dans 20 vil- es americaines. . . Le quartier general est sii:ue ft dix mines de Washing- ion a la rive du Potomac. C'est un hatiment de huit Cages nomme le ?.I\Iausolee d'Allan Dulles D'anres des chiffres donnes par STUART ALSOPS dans son nvie ? Le Centre ? (The Center), ie budget annuel de la C.I.A. pour 1968 &air de 500 millions dollars. I Tine section du departement de recherches at d'infortnation de la sont -representees ton- tes les regions geographiques, s'occupe directement des affaires Ofricaines. Mais ii y a encore d'au- tres departements de la C.I.A. i'occupant de l'Afrique : Le ? departement d'operations , peciales ? oil, comme les cadres pe la C.I.A. disent, le ? departe- ment des sales trucs ? qui realise des enlevements. des assassinats t-d:atitres actions .? delicates ? ; le ? .departement de propagan- tie ?-s'Occupe de la propagande et de fausses informations ainsi clue du: soutien et de 1.a formation Ie partis'et organisations d'oppo- Sition ft Fetranger ; le ?.departe- rnent. de science. et de :technolo-. gie ? qui -est pouivu d'equipe- merits .d'espionnage les plus re- cents allant des.. appareils d'ecou- en ?miniature - jusqu'aux instal- lations de radar et aux avions U2 pour la reconnaissance aerienne: 1. A l'etranger, les agents de la concentres dans des postes et dans des 'centres regiortaux diriges.. par les_ groupes.. re-. gionaux. Ils menent toutes sortes d'actiVites de renSeignement. 'Les CentreS'iegionaux ' sont diriges par - des . Directeurs regionaux. Leurs agents. se ,deplacent dans les pays de. leur rayon d'action... Dans les gra.nds pays princi- paux de l'Afrique, les postes de la .C.I.A. ont. jusqu'a 30 agents dirigeant les reseaux locaux. En dehors de cela us sont ap- puyes.,par. des Americains recru- tes a cette. fin .qui travaillent dans les, pays Jespectifs. . Dans' des pays &amine le Ma- la Tunisie, l'Ethiopie, le Zai- re et le Senegal oil ii y a d'im- portants postes de la C.I.A., its ont a leur disposition des specia- list-es d'interception et d'autres techniques d'espionnage ainsi que des agents pour la reconnais- sance a fetranger. A Mombasa (Kenya) et ft la base militaire des Etats-Unis ft Kenitra (Maroc), il y a aussi des ecoles speciales pour Pentraine- ment d'agents recrutes parmi la population indigene et parmi les etrangers. Les Chefs des Institutions des Etats-Unis ft let-ranger sont obli- ges de dormer le soutien requis aux agents de la C.I.A. est necessaire, ces derniers utilisent pour la realisation de leurs ob- jectifs largernent les offices des Ambassades, Missions et autres Representations ainsi que les vol- tures des Diplomates americains Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-WP77-00432R000100330001-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 et d'autres personnalites officiel- les. Les Chefs des Institutions itine- ricaines organisent largement des receptions, des demonstrations de films, des meetings, des visites, des evenements culturels et d'au- tres reunions convenables aux agents de la C.I.A. pour leurs ac- tivites en vue de nouer des con- tacts aux fins du renseignement et .11 d'autres fins de la C.I.A. Souvent les agents de la C.I.A. emploient leurs femmes ou d'au- tres Americains pour etablir des relations, organiser des rendez-: vous et mener des enquetes, par- ce qu'ils veulent egarer le Service de Securite local, etc. COUVERT A cette fin, les femmes des agents de la C.I.A. se soumettent un entrainement special avant de partir pour l'etranger. La fern- -me du Chef du poste de la C.I.A. au Maroc, Mme WELLES, par exemple, dirige l'Association des Femmes Americaines servant de couvert au Service de Renseigne- rnents americain. L'agent de la C.I.A. ALLAN LOGGAN qui en 1967 etait deu- xierne Secretaire de l'Ainbassade des Etats=Unis a Conakry, entre- tenait la liaison avec les agents a ,l'aide de sa femme. Formellement les Chefs des postes de la C.I.A. sont subordon- nes aux Ambassadeurs et a d'au- tres, diplomates d'un rang eleve representant les Etats-Unis dans un pays donne. Mais en pratique, ce principe est souvent viole par- ce qu'ils travaillent de maniere independante. Frequemment les Chefs des Representations Diplo- CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 9 August 1974 Pas!ting Artvdca The leader of one of Angola's three liberation movements now is looking more to China and less to the U.S. for aid when the breakaway from Portugal comes. Holden Roberto, operating from neighboring Kinshasa, Zaire, with the support of Zaire President Mobutu Sese Seko, is president of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA). He also heads the Government of the Republic of Angola in Exile (GRAE). Born a Bakongo tribesman in the Dembos area of northern Angola, the son of a mission worker, Mr. Roberto was taken to Kinshasa as a young child and educated in mission schools there. Although FNLA is not regarded as the first movement for the liberation of the Portuguese territory in south- western Africa, it was the first to estab- lish a government in exile, in 1962. In 1959, Mr. Roberto visited the United States to present the case for ilvt4cipenderize matiques des Etats-Unis sont eux- memes les Chefs des postes de la C.I.A. En 1966 par exemple, l'Am- bassadeur Docteur WILLIAM LEONNART etait le Chef du poste de la C.I.A. a Zanzibar. Plus tard il est devenu Conseiller du President des Etats-Unis. Francis A. RUSSEL qui de 1942 a 1944 etait le Chef du de- partement de renseignements eco- nomicives au departement d'Etat americain, a ete Ambasadeur et Chef du poste de la C.I.A. en Tu- nisie. A present l'Ambasadeur des Etats-Unis au Mali, Robert BLA- KE, detient la meme double fonction. (Traduction d'un article paru dans ? Ghanian Times ? du 6 no- vembre 1973). Angolan independence to the United Nations. During his stay, he made many American acquaintances and at- tracted unofficial U.S. sympathy. Since that time he has been consid- ered pro-Western in outlook, and alle- gations often are made that the FNLA received covert American financial and arms support from.the Central In- telligence Agency. Recently, however, he has begun to look to China for aid and military in- structors. Like other African liberation leaders, he realizes that China and the Soviet Union, in selected cases, are willing to give open support to guerrilla move- ments, whereas the United States is not. With supply routes to the Mideast a consideration, Washington has pre- ferred maintaining good relations with Portugal to backing freedom groups in the Portuguese territories of Angola, Mozambique, or Portuguese Guinea (Guinea Bissau). 32 After his U.S visit, he returned to Zaire (then the Congo) and started weekly broadcasts for Angolan inde- pendence and a party political maga- zine. Since he has spent most of his life outside Angola, it sometimes is claimed that he has little support in his native land, except among Bakongos in the northern part of the country. The severe 1961 riots in Angola, which resulted in the slaying of hun- dreds of whites and the subsequent massacre of thousands of blacks, are attributed to his followers, which sug- gests he and the FNLA were not un- known in Angola. Efforts to unify FNLA and the other major group, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), have been under way since 1972. " Henry S. Hayward Luanda, Angola Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 NEW YORK TIMES 18 August 1974 Saigon Police Fight ubversion ut Also Curb Pu Ica! Dissent By DAVID K. SHIPLER Spedal to The New York Times SAIGON, South Vietnam, Aug. 17?On the floor of a Saigon hospital ward a young seam- stress named Dang Thi Hien lay handcuffed to . an olive-drab stretcher. Her legs, covered with a blanket, were paralyzed : ?a result, she said of beatings and torture during police inter- rogation. In a small office a student activist, Nguyen Xuan Ham, drew deeply on a cigarette', !while he ,described being forcedi to watch three friends tortured' as policemen tried vainly tol 'make him admit that he was a Communist. A high-school philosophy, teacher, Tran Tuan Nham, who' ;was jailed after his unsuccess- ful run as an anti-Government !candidate for the National As- sembly, hunched over his draW-. *Mg of the layout of cells in the Saigon municipal police headquarters to show where he saw the head of the Private Bank Workers Union, Phan Van Hi, meet death?not by suicide, as the Government re- ported, but after days of beatings. Beyond the well-known war of tanks and planes and in- fantry there is another war in South Vietnam?a silent, hid- den war that runs its course out of the public view. 'It is waged in interrogation rooms,, in prisons, in courtro6ms. It is fought in tiny print shops and large universities, in churches r na pagodas, in the cramped .offices of opposition politicians and the shabby headquarters of dissident union leaders. Far Friern Public View Some portray the struggle as a monumental clash between free ideas and governmental suppression; others see it as the Saigon Government's right- ful battle for survival against a potent campaign of Com- munist subversion. In fact it is both, for its major roots are in the civil war that has consumed South Viet- nam for two decades, taking some two million Vietnamese lives, touching virtually every family, seeping into every 'crevice of society. The Government, to defend itself against Communist at- tempts to seduce anilaviya ? the civilian population, and to [ combat infiltration, sabotage and assassination by the Viet- cong, has assembled ? with American financial and advisory help?an extensive police ap- paratus' and a military judicial system that are waging this sec- ond, simultaneous war. But those caught in the web of arrest, torture and imprison.: ment include not only Commu- nists' who pose as dissidents but non-Communist dissidents as well; not only sophisticated Vietcong officials but apolitical peasants suspected of Commu- nist sympathies; not just Com- munist lahor organizers but tough, aggressive union leaders; not only Vietcong propagandists but poets and writers who have simply opposed United States policy and called for peace. In recent months a picture of the Government's police and judicial systems has emerged through interviews with former prisoners and their farnilies, student activists, labor officials, teachers, journalists, authors, opposition politicians, Roman Catholic priests.. Buddhist monks, lawyers and police of- ficials. Such inquiries by foreign cor- respondents are possible in Gov- ernment-held areas, where out- siders have . relative freedom. The Vietcong, in contrast, have permitted only strictly guided tours hy newsmen, so little is known of the actual workings of their security and judicial, systems. The sketchy outlines! provided in captured documents! and the interrogation of defec- tors indicate that recalcitrant civilians in Vietcong areas are, subjected to arrest, trial, "re- education" and even execution,! As a result of the police ac- tivity on both sides, no nen-1 tralist sentiment has been al-1 lowed to gain momentum. The? Government machinery de- signed to fight the Communists has actually eaten away the middle ground between the two warnng camps. No Place to Turn Those politically active South Vietnamese who dislike both sides find themselves with no , place to go. Some who were anti- Government dissidents have ' turned reluctantly to the Com- munists. Others hate and fear the Communists so much that they have grudgingly accepted President Nguyen Van Thieu al- though they do not like him either. Yet the Government's system is not a massive, ever-present police operation comparable to that of the Soviet Union, nor does it suppress dissent so thor- oughly that the country can as does NortrVietnam. It creates, instead, a mosaic of free expression and fear, of political opposition and political conformity, of gentle interfer- ince and harsh punishment. Within this mosaic the heavily censored South Vietnamese Dress often displays a streak of irreverence. And a few vitriolic politicians can berate Presiclen I Thieu and have their views re ' ported? not domestically, in deed, but by the foreign press. On the other hand, dissidents who are free to speak out often contend that they are mere ornaments, that whenever they begin to accrue political power the police arrest the lesser figures around them, break up their meetings and leave them isolated. By the same token the police rarely make mass arrests of student dissidents, some stu- dents report, but prefer to in- filtrate quietly and then choose carefully those leaders whose imprisonment will sap an op- position movement of its vigor. Distinctions Often Ignored The distinctions between Communists and non-Commu- nists are not always apparent to the police, some of whose principal officers insist that all dissidents are really Commu- nists. In any given case the military judicial system?whose judgments rely chiefly on police dossiers?does little to estab- lish the truth, which may be known only to the accused. Those expressing antiwar sentiments have long been targets of police scrutiny, both because such views are re- garded as Communist views and for fear that they will spread among a war-weary population. Consequently, many people put themselves in con- ,siderable danger by opposing United States involvement in. the war. Mr. Nham, the teacher, was arrested shortly after his un- successful 1971 campaign for a National Assembly seat, run on the theme "Fight the Amer- icans and save the country,"? a slogan also used by North 'Vietnam. He was released in March after nearly two years in prison. "At the beginning of the campaign, my election pam- phlets were confiscated right at the print shop," he said in an interview four days after his release. "And on the first day of the campaign, in the morning, I began putting up my posters. By six o'clock that night the police were tearing them down." Every day, he recalled, five or six of his campaign worker,: were arrested, held for a few that after the election?he finished eighth in a field of 87 candidates running for six seats?about 20 of his workers were put in jail, where some remain. Anti-U.S. Articles Cited A journalist who asked not to be identified related that he had been arrested, beaten and I tortured with electrical shock by policemen who cited several of his anti-American articles as evidence that he was a. Communist. He had translated American antiwar writing and had written a newspaper series about the My Lai, massacre, the effects of defoliants and the use of antipersonnel bombs against North Vietnam, all based on books and articles published in the United States. He was' released several months ago, after about a year and a half.1 A well-known author, Ngu- yen Buc Dung, who uses the pen name Vu Hanh, was ar- rested in 1967 and held for three years after he had written [newspaper and magazine ar !tides arguing that Vietnan4 national culture must be pre- served against Americanization. He advocated the establish- ment of ?a political movement with that aim. During interrogation, he said, policemen beat him, forced soapy water into his mouth and tortured him by applying electrodes to his body. In 1969, when his 18-year- old son, Nguyen Anh Tuan, protested the imprisonment, he was arrested and is still in prison. In January 1973, Mr. Dung's 15-year-old daughter, Nguyen Thi Phuong Thao, was arrested and held for six months for allegedly possessing antiwar music. The police said' she was a Communist. Now Mr. Dung's small house, tucked away in a compact gar- den off a back alley in Saigon, is stripped of his books and writings, all seized by the po- lice. He has written two novels since his release, both so heavily censored that he does not think it worth trying again., On Jan. 1, 1974, the policei surrounded a Saigon cafe and,1 it is reported, arrested 'three, young people connected with! the clandestine publication of, a small book of short stories! entitled "Pink Hearts." The stories are intensely antiwar, portraying the Gov- ernment as the prime cause of a conflict that separates lovers and shatters families. One of those said to have been arrest- ed, Tran The Hung, a student! at Van Hanh University in Sai- gon, wrote of a peasant named Sao Do, who fought the French and was now opposed to both sides in this war. Sao Do reflects happily on the forthcoming marriage of his daughter, but worries that his two sons might. kill each other. tIA-Kt Suddenly Government rises cirrOrrttOiluebahscein/obif/ ii0vg Pltif#43R130011003^300Glii0 "thousan s of Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 fragments of bombs and bullets surrounding and swooping down on Sao Do's hieing place, where his 'neighbors also try to save some fragment of life amid the net of death." . "After the careless terroriza- tion," the story goes on, "the planes flew away, leaving be- hind a scene of destruction, torn houses, rows of bamboo with their heads bowed low to the ground, smoke rising up from burning houses. The smoke rose and disappeared like the incomplete dream of Sao Do." 'I Don't Like This Flag' Another author reportedly arrested was Hoang Thoai Chau, who wrote a bitter story about a Saigon taxi driver's happiness upon hearing of the cease-fire. He expected his three sons to return from the army, but when he entered:his house he found that only one son had come home, in a coffin draped with the South Vietna-? mese flag. "Why don't you bring home something different from this flag?" the man asks his dead son. "I don't like this flag.". Many former prisoners, al- though by no means all, de- scribe being subjected to tor- ture, usually for one of two purposes: to force them to pro- yide intelligence information or' to "force confessions, to which the military judicial system at- taches great va:ue. A number who have been imprisoned in the Saigon mu- nicipal headquarters, in- cluding a student leader, Ha Dink Nguyen, report seeing, a slogan on the walls and on signs on desks: "If he is not guilty, beat him until he re- nounces. If he does not re- nounce, beat him to death." Mr. Nham, the teacher and opposition candidate, said he was never tortured, but in the first week in March, when he was, in a cell at the Saigon Municipal police headquarters, he recalled, he saw many peo- ple from the countryside, mostly. women, who had been beaten so badly that they could noi longer walk and had to be car- ried from cell to interrogation room. Links to the Other Sides "I had a chance to talk with some of them," he reported, "and it seems they were people 'who had husbands or relatives on the other side, and so they had been brought here. Other ipeople were suspected of trad- ing with the other side." . He recognized among the prisoners a former. student, Thuy Dung, a frail woman in her early twenties who leaned weakly against the wall of the corridor as she walked to and from interrogation. Through a student who was serving as a lsweeper in the cellblock, she conveyed to Mr. Nham her con- cern that she was suffering from an injury caused when an eel was put in her under- pants. When Mr. Nham was first arrested, he went on, students in his cell had painfully swol- len fingers because policemen had inserted pins under their fingernails, then run rulers back and forth across the ends' of the pins during questioning. One of those in the cell, a. law student named Trinh Dinh Ban, had been beaten so badly that he- could not sit upright, Mr. Nham related, adding, "He screamed all the. time because he was in pain all over his body." Other people have described similar situations. An American physician who works in a pro- vincial hospital reported that prisoners were often brought into the wards with bruises that they attributed to police beatings. The doctor, who asked not to be.identified, told of a woman who was near death, having been severely beaten on the stomach: "She had internal injuries, bleeding, she couldn't eat. I thought she :was going to _ die, but she survived. Just Routine Questioning Dr. Torn Hoskins, an Ameri- can who works in Quang Ngai, on the central coast, reported .that one of his clinic's regular lpatients, a 45-year-old woman, came in suffering from bruises. "She had been picked up for routine questioning," he said, "and was severely, beaten around the arms, ,chest, legs. . The patterns of arrest en- velop certain aggressive labor, unions as well:.?those that threaten to translate serious' economic concerns into sharp political issues. In April, 1973, a number ofi prdminent union officers werel arrested and accused of being Communist agents, among them Mr. Hi, head of the bank union; ,Dang Tam Si, secretary general of the bank union; Nguyen! Thua Nghiep, president of the Petroleum and Chemical Fac- tory Workers Union, and Ho- ang Xuan Dong, secretary general of the Railway Work- ers Union. ? Mr. Dong was among 27 un- ion members arrested in April 1973, after an illegal two-hour atrike by clerical and repair workers seeking a wage in- crease. During interrogation,, according to a source close to the case, he was blindfolded and his wrists were handcuffed behind his back and water was forced into his nose and mouth until he could not breathe. The police asked: "Who gave the order for this strike? Do you have contacts With Mr. Nghiep or Mr. Hi?" He Died in Prison Mr. Hi, arrested at about the isame time, was accused of be- ing a Communist agent for 25 years. Five days after his arrest he died in prison; the Govern- ment said he had hanged him- self. Mr. Nham, the teacher, whose cell was across the corridor, has a different version. "I could see him carried out for interrogation and carried back," Mr. Nham recalled. "The person who brought rice to the cells .said he was being beaten really severely and he didn't know whether he would be able to bear it much longer." On the night of April 22, Mr: Nham continued? he heard a noise from Mr. Hi%e cell. "A guard came over and Opened his door and pulled him out head first so his legs were still in the cell and his body outside," Mr. Nham said. "He had no clothes on. One arm was across his chest. His arm was swollen and it was black like a piece of putrid meat. On his chest was a little bit of ,blood, his side along his ribs, was just beaten into ham- burger." Mr. Hi was dead. Last March, Mr. Nham said, he shared a cell with a union man named Trang. Torture of Students Described "He had been there seven or eight months," Mr. Nham con- tinued. "He was being strung up by. his arms daily and beaten on his legs; his back, his chest. When I left there he was unable, to walk because of the beatiegs on his legs, and his knees were so swollen. "He was arrested for having known a Liberation Front offi- cial who had responsibility for having lent him his pickup truck to go around in." .according to Mr. Nguyen, the student leader and a former student chairman at the Saigon university, torture was a com- mon aspect of the wave of ar- rests in which he and about 250 student leaders were caught early in 1972. They had assem- bled a "peace movement" to op- pose the American presence in South Vietnam and President Thieu's one-man election in 1971. One activity was burning American vehicles. Mr. Nguyen described him- 'self as one of three students tortured in front of Mr. Ham, the activist leader, who, was chairman of an association of Catholic students at the 'Uni- versity. Mr. Ham said the others were Huynh Tan Mam, head of the South Vietnam Student Union, who is still imprisoned and Phan Nguvet Quon, who has which he insists he is not. The police been by torturing him alone. "Sometimes they tied me to the chair," Mr. Ham recalled. "Sometimes they blindfolded me. During the first week I was beaten every day." He also; re- ported being shocked by means - of an old hand-cranked tele-, phone generator connected to his nipples with clips. This failing to elicit a confes- sion, the police brought in his friends one at a time, he said, adding: ? "It terrorized me. I was very angry that they beat a girl in front of me. They tied her an- kles to a chair, tied a rope around her stomach and blind- folded her. They had a long rubber baton and they beat her knee caps. Then they thrust their hands in under her ribs and pulled them out. They had her lie clown and forced soapy water into her mouth. "They attached one wire to, an earlobe and one to her breast or to her genital area and then they would crank.; When the Crank was turned!, ? and produced a burst of elec- tricity, she would strain at the chair and slump back." The policemen ,.took turns, Mr. Ham recalled. Some were in uniform, and he could see that they were high-ranking _ bfficers?majora,and lieutenant colonels?while others were in civilian clothes or bacc-chested. 'Ordinary Job, No Emotion' "It was like an ordinary job 'with no emotion," Mr. Ham commented. "They had many Coca-Cola bottles and ciga- rettes. They would beat a little, drink a little Coca-Cala, smoke a cigarette, speak to each other in quiet voices?no emotion, very professional. Most were not angry- or hateful but were just doing it very coolly." , t There were times, he said, when he considered "saying anything to relieve the suffer- ing," but he thought that they would have asked him for de- tails he could not provide, "so it just would have prolonged the torture." Miss Quon never begged him to confess, he said, "but she did shout at them, asking them why they were so savage." 34 'Scars Are Often Buried ' It is hard to see the scars of torture. Sometimes they are in the eyes, but not always. Often they are hidden far be- neath the steady gaze and self- control learned, perhaps, in the interrogation rooms. For some curiously, it is not the thought of the torture itself but the recollection of that dreadful time of waiting to be sum- moned that stirs the old taste of fear. Nguyen Viet Tuan can still taste it, and he was never tor- 1tured. The president of a group 'called the Young Catholic Workers, he was arrested for helping workers striking at a 'Saigon factory. He was treated gently, he said, but his cell was full of those tortured. The tension is still real?the extreme fear of the long, silent , "After 10 P.M.," he said, "we would wait for a sound, a bell. Then the guard gets up, climbs upstairs?then the sound of the key. The interrogators in the daytime were' not severe, but the interrogators at night were hard." Approved For Release 20.01/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 AAproved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010033.0001-0' NEW YORK TIMES 20 August 1974 To Saigon, All Dissenters Are roes, All Foes Reds By DAVID K. SHIPLER 'sfusin to The New York Tunes SAIGON, South Vietnam ? After two decades of fratricidal audience: "The so-called third force is only a bunch of trat- warfare the Government of South Vietnam has been left with a legacy of corrosive sus-, picions directed in large mea- sure against its own citizens. The Chief instrument and re- pository of these suspicions. is the police apparatus. In a war in which the enemy cannot al- ways be seen, the police struc- ture tends to see him every- where, attributing to him im- tore to the motherli,;ra znd henchmen of the Communists and colonialists." A group of 301 Roman Cath- olic priests replied to this in a statement planned for a June news conference that the po- lice sealed.. off and prevented from taking place. "The anti- Communist cause has become a padlock to shut the mouth of the people," the pests de- clared, "because every helpless citizen may be accused of con- for the intelligence information they are belie'. ed to have about Vietcong activities. . A middle-aged woman from Hue, the mother of seven, de- scribed being arrested three times, beaten, interrogated and held for three or four months each time in the years after her husband, a professor of literature at Hue University, left in 1968 to go with the Vietcong. The last time, in April. 1972, she said, she was forced to sign a promise to gather intel- ligence. "I signed," she said. 'I was afraid of being beaten, v,Tts very fearful. They said, 'If you do not report with in- tellfgence you can be arrested again.' ".This haunted her, she explained because she had no intelligence to provide. She is required to report to the police ' "It was very dirty," Nguyen. Viet Tuan, president of a stu- dent group called the Young Catholic Workers. said. "There were urine and excrement on the floor: you couldn't breathe., It was full of mosquitoes." Most prisoners had one leg; shackle& to an iron bar that, ran the length of the cell a few inches above ? the floor. Sometimes, former prisoners. said, the Movie Room contained a dozen or more people, some-. times only three or four. "If we were shackled by the , legs and we protested." said I Nguyen Xuan Ham, another !:student leader "then they 1;would shackle our hands as well, or cross the legs and then shackle them or shackle you face down ? that was the worst." The shackled prisoners , passed around a wooden box. dised as a toilet. "If vou were lucky it would be fairly clean," Mr. Ham said, "but if it was old, urine would leak out all over where you were lying." , For many the refusal to 'salute was a matter not of ide- ology but of principle that their ,captors could not comprehend. The journalist who was ar- rested for his anti-American' ,articles recalled his converse- tion with a prison official sever- al days after the signing of the Paris cease-fire agreement in 1973. "You do not agree to salute the flag," the official de- clared. "You must be a Com- munist.". "No, I am not a Communist," iwas the reply. "I was a jour- nalist and I engaged in no il- legal activities. This Govern- ment arrested me, and that Nag is a symbol of the Govern- ment that illegally arrested me, so how can I salute that flag?, If they want me to salute the flag they must release me? then I will salute it." Has he saluted it since hisI release last October? "From the time I was small," he an- swered slowly, "I lived in Sai- gon, and all that time I saluted the flag. All that time I was not a Communist. Now I do not know. Now no *one asks me." ? Some South Vietnamese see a self-fulfilling prophecy in the Government's compulsion to, label opponents as Communists,1 A prominent civilian judge, for instance, declared in a recenti ? interview that no matter what; the national emergency, martialt law "can reach too mans, inno-e cents and transform these inno-i cents into Communists because i they are angry against the un- lust measures taken against; them." Some student dissidents have gone over to. the Com-. munist side, friends say, usual- ly out of fear of arrest or re- arrest. It is not an easy deci- sion. It means leaving a family pting a political vith which few seem comfort- ble. Many stay behind, living n a kind of underground ?corld,. sleeping each night in the home; of a different friend, hop:m; to. keep one step ahead of the police. "Yes, I may go to the otheri side," said a young man re- from prison who, mense, almost superhuman nivance with or assistance to monthly.. . I ' Unable to Get a Job ? "The whole thing is such a preoccupation with me that I can't do anything," she said. "I can't work. Even private agencies are afraid to give me work?afraid they might be im- plicated, afraid they might be arrested." - For another family the trou- ble began when the father, Prof. Ton That Duong Ky, who had been . arrested by the French colonial rulers and then again under the Government of Ngo Dinh Diem, signed an anti- war petition in 1965. He 'was Imprisoned 'and then, with several either intellectuals who had signed the petition; was forced across the demilitarized zone into exile in the North. He ,isciw. heads a Communist organ- 1)-? Since his exile, his wife said, . :five of his nine children?most 'are in their twenties, and one is a 14-year-old girl ? have been arrested, some more than once. A son, Nguyen Phuoc Quynh Tien 18 was beaten to death in prison, his mother said.- And, she added,' Nguyen Thi Que Lang, 25, a daughter- in-law, was arrested, beaten, suspended by her arms- from the ceiling and tortured with electric shock, then left in l : prison for five years. In the prisons themselves thel . obsession of defining- SouthI Vietnamese citizens as pro- Government or pro-Vietcong. focuses on one symbol: thel i three thin red stripes on the! yellow field that form the flagj ? of the Republic of South Viet-I i nam. . "Will you s.alute the flag?" The question is asked when the prisoner arrives in Chi Hoa Prison in Saigon. The answer is of great importance. To the prison officials it represents loyalty or disloyalty, patriotism or treason, although students say their refusal, to salute is a protest against the injustice of their arrest and imprisonment. powers of deviousness and pee_ Communists. tmasion. To many former prisoners This attitude; which has who have undergone police , fueled the system of arrest, torture and imprisonment in South Vietnam, was defined recently by a high-ranking of- ficer of the Special Branch of !the National Police, which is responsible for coping with Vietcong infiltrators, in the ci- vilian population. The -Communists, he ex- plained during a conversation, scheme to get one family mem- ber after another on their side. They woo them one by one, using those who have come over to send first a letter, then perhaps a ljttle money to lure the rest of the family across the, ideological line. Students are very vulner- able, he- observed, gesturing with his cigarette. We have caught students having secret Meetings. They organize sports clubs and they hold weekend retreats "where they sing for- bidden songs ? North Vietna- mese songs!" He portrayed the Commu- mists as masters of infiltration. who penetrate the. ranks of dissidents and even of the, -A. young officer who works in a provincial reconnaissance police. Officers, he said, have unit ? part of the Special to watch their own men very Branch?said that he was con- carefully. , ? . vinced that most dissidents Asked if he thought there sought Communist support not were any opponents of Presi.o necessarily out of ideology but dent Nguyen Van Thieu who: ! out of opportunism: "They, 'want to elevate themselves in notwere Communists, he re- case some day there is a coali-, plied with an emphatic no. tion government," he said. i They are all Communists,. he ? He went on to talk fearfully! said, and as for their assero of a recent North Viemarnesei tions that they are merely neu_ program to send civilians into tralists opposed to this Govern- the South to farm abandoned' ment, "it's just a cover." land in Vietcong-controlled So there is not much room areas. The danger, he explained, for other voices in South Viet- is intermarriage. The Commu- nam now. President?Thieu said nists would try to intermarry , ' h -C ? , d with non- interrogation, Mr. Thieu's view of dissent seems genuine, not manufactured to excuse arrest. The interrogators, they say ap- pear to believe quite sincerely that the student or the writer in question wrote as he did or spoke as he did only to help the Communists. For example, a journalist who was arrested after he wrote newspaper articles about the My Lai massacre, the use of defoliants and the antiper- sonnel bombs dropped by the -United States in North Viet- nam gave this account' of his interrogation by the police: "They asked me, `What Com- munist organization are you working under?' I said that l'm not in any Communist organ- ization, that T'm not acquainted with Communists, I only write these articles that oppose the war. They said that they did not believe me and started ap- plying electrodes to the lobes of my ears. - ? "Certainly I. must be in a Communist organization, they said, 'Why would you have written such articles if you were not in a Communist or- ganization?'" Opportunists, an Officer Says as much April 14 when he de- Nit pro ommunists an the clared in a speech that "the pro-communists 19.5 million south Vietnamese!Communists, so Communism people should be welded itol would spread relentlessly, he a monolithic bloc, motivated by said, speaking as if it was a a single anti-Communist ideal."1 hereditary disease or a dreaded racial defect. . 'Only a Bunch of Traitors' ? . Families of Communists thus Contending that the sup-i become targets of suspicion. posedly neutralist "Mid force"! They are arrested -frequently, wag a creation of the National not just for their supposed pro- Liberation Front, he told his! Communist sympathiu but also Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : In the 'Movie Room' 's a Every person interviewed who had served time in Chi Hoa told the same story: Upon refusing to salute the flag, he was placed for periods of a day ? or two to a week or two in the I Movie Room, a cell about 18 by 24 feet, lit dimly by a single b61A-RIE77-00432R00010 Approved For Is living under Release go? nd. A Vietcong side friend, arrested at the same, jections. time, has gone. If I lose my Isolation morale, perhaps J will go. But Those who I'm not a Communist. There ? are certain parts of Communist policy that I don't accept. We ,are pacifists. We are against the fighting." A Confluence of Views He is a militant Buddhist! and a former student leader! who helped organize campaigns! in the late nineteen-sixties ? in which American vehicles were; burned in Saigon as a protest! against the American military' presence: New he wants to see President Thieu out of office.; Only then, he says, can the i Paris agreement's guarantee of democratic liberties and generali elections be realized. . On these two issues ? thel Americans and the Paris agree- ment?he and many other op- ponents of Mr. Thieu share a coincidence of views with the Communists. But it was with some disgust that' he recalled being locked in the same cell with a dozen Vietcong political cadremen at Tan Hiep. prison. "They were inferior cadres," he said with cliedain. "I didn't discuss serious things with them. The Buddhists do not like foreigners. The Buddhists do not accept foreign ideas Marx- ist or capitalist." Thus he. like many of 11.: colleagues, is left suspended between two sided, practicing his politics clandes- tinely and With little success. The Government does not seem- perturbed to have such opponents going 'physically to .the Communists. During the :prisoner exchanges that ended lin March the Government re- leased to the Vietcong a num- ber of prisoners who denied that they were Communists. Some refused to go. These in- cluded two prominent oppo- nents Chau, s tha e Government?Tran former Ngoc parlia- mentary deputy and a friend of many American advisers, and Huynh Tan Main, former presi- dent of the South Vietnam Stu- dent Union, 'They were offered freedom on the Saigon side if they would.agree to go through the Open Arms program, which xas designed for Communists defectors. But they refused on the ground that this would be tantamount to making the con- fessions that they had resisted for. so lone. Mr. Main remains in jail; Mr. Chau was released on June 5 on the condition that he engage in no political' activities. Another, Nguyen, Long, an aging antiwar law-1 yer who has defended many; dissidents, was forced to the: BALTIMORE SUN 20 August 1974 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 despite his ob- doeunients criticizing the served that the ,Goieernmene course of the Government. The had also been ,conciliatory on as a Tactic general is an opponent of. Pres- occasion, especially when a stu- remain in Gov- ident Thieu." dent demand enjoys broad pub- f. d their'h 1 ff five litical activities sharply cur- tailed and undermined by what they call skillful police action. Where a movement depends on a few leaders, they say, the leaders will be taken. But where the arrest of the leaders is like- business, did find a willing ly to provoke deeper protest, publisher, one of the few who have hired him in the four years Mr. Ninh has been oue of prison. "He asked me to help him organize the editorial staff" That is the situation of Ho. Mr. Ninh said. "I warned him Ngoc Nhuan. a Roman Catholic that the Government doesn't opposition deputy in the Na- want me to direct any editorial staff, but the publisher insisted tionaleAssembly. He is free to on hiring me. worked 13 days: denounce the Government, but On 10 of those 13 days the he says' he has great trouble paper was confiscated by the holding meetings with political Government." allies or constitutents. Now, to earn money, his wife sells kerosene and fish sauce With regularity the police Itosurround his office and refuse in the market place..and as for to let anyone in for -a scheduled jmeeting, he complained; on I other occasions, the police have used the intimidating tactic of i photographing those who visit led 1 lie support. Such was the case t h t fa rest po ice ac ics s or o r . For example, writers in dis- some months ago when a new- favor rarely find publishers nationwide organization of pt-i-- willing to take risks. Ky Ninh, vete university students made once the managing editor of a an appeal for a change in the 'Saigon newspaper now out of law covering student draft de- 'ferments. This came shortly after student uprisings had taken place in Thailand and South Korea. Mr. Nhuan said, and the Government agreed to the change within a week. The Unending War Many opponents of the Gov- ernment who have been ar- rested like to think thaewith- at the police President Thieu would fall from power. But teere are factors beside the po- lice that stabilize the present Government. One is the war it- self, which still polarizes the Mr. Ninh?"I'm asheeed to say population, feeding the tension this but it's true?I-carry pas- in the country and giving senors on my bike." those who hate and fear the Police Techniques Described Communists only one place to Students also deecribe sophisdi go Some politicians who count ticated police methods by themselves among the opposi- which antiwar and anti-Thieu ! an attempt is made to isolate them by threatening or arrest- ing lesser figures around them. s 1 ? movements have been drtven! . e--: strongly anti-Communist say "Every Tee" Mr. Nhuan said, underground, fragmented, in-' . referring to the Lunar New timidaqed and?the most - .a.ri-1 cism of Mr. Thieu because they ; they have tempered their criti- Year, "I make a calendar. I did concede?rendered virtual-; . do not want to weaken the non- Communist :side further at a I visit them they invite me into time when the American with- drawal . has made it more their bedrooms to show me dents, and who can .tell the Ida- -. vulnerable to the Vietcong and North Vietnamese. In addition, the dissidents do not have access to the electoral process. The control of the press; the absence of any strong public figure to pose a neutralist alternative; the dif- ficulty of assembling .a political party with enough members, times, e says, "making i i - chapters and votes to meet the ficult for them to carry on their councils and university-wide 'daily lives." executive councils, bodies that Government's strict require- The police also have the can take positions- on national ments -- all of these frustrate , power to keep any candidate issues and command wide au- the dissidents' desire for change,i as surely as-the threat of arrest, off the ballot by filing a nega. diences. Before the election this I torture and imprisonment does. .spring at the University of Can i Many of those Who oppose. - Tho, the police jailed some of I President Thieu lapse into em- barrassed silence when asked ' the candidates and the rest, 1 about 25, went into hiding, ac- . to name an alternative. Then cording to Nguyen Duc .Dung, they insist that another man student chairman of the univer- would emerge if the country ?sity's Committee of Represent-had a truly free political life. etives. 'Perhaps, but there is no Gallup . One apparent reason for the !Poll in South Vietnam, no way police interest. Mr. Dung said, of scientifically testing the as- was that the students had be- .sumption of the dissidents. that .gun discussing two dangerous ,Mr. Thieu is unpopular. topics ? the country's severe to have "contacted the An economic difficulties and the Quang Buddhist, bloc to partici-. amendment to the Constitution pate in a secret meeting." Also. that allows President Thieu to from the police report: I run for a third term. "They both contacted the office of former Lieut. Gen. However, Mr. Nhuan, the Duong Van Minh and received: Catholic opposition Deputy ob- send .them to my constitutents in Saigon, and when I go to ly impotent. "The police take off their uniforms and register as stu? that they do hang my calendar ference?" said Nguyen Van on the wall, but in the. bed- Ngoc, a lanky young student room." leader on the run, from the After his visits, he .said, his police. . constituents are in turn visited Ile and others said that the ?ho ask about police routinely influenced stu- dent elections by arresting anti- Government candidates and making sure tbat pro-Govern- ment students filled faculty y tue potice. their tax payments, their jobs and the like. "They invite them to the police station several ? IP five report on him with the Election Commission. According to documents ob- tained by The New York Times, two incumbents on the Bac Lieu Province Council were denied permission to run for re- election in July on the basis of a police report that accused them of belonging "to a group opposed to the administration." ? The two one is named Ta Van Bo, the other requested anonymity?were also reported i? pullout, rishIcir co besieffe Viet economy ? el By ARNOLD B. ISAACS Sun Staff Corre.lponden! Saigon ? Along with the half. There are almost one continuing misery of war, million unemployed, about. pne-third of them workers who South Vietnam is suffering a grave economic crisis, formerly earned their livings, Living costs have nearly directly or indirectly, from the doubled in the last year and a, American presence. 36 ? Living standards Furthermore, there is no 'guarantee that a change in government would bring politi- cal freedom. The Communists :_and even the dissidents who !clamor for a fully open society !?would not surprise - many ;South Vietnamese if, after gain. ling power, they merely put dil- 1 ferent people in jail. are hoping against hope for a I substantial increase in Ameni-i With wage increases lagging can economic aid, but they are far behind the inflation rate, aware their cause is not popu-1 living standards are falling. A Ian in the United States Con- recent survey showed the aver- gress. age soldier or government Trying to ease American re-1 worker with a family in Saigon sistance to a never-ending corn- no longer earns enough even mitment, Saigon officials argue ! for the bare necessities of that if aid is increased now, it .food, fuel, clothes arid housing. can be ended sooner. To survive he must moonlight,' "Our goal is to reach self-, steal or have another wage sufficiency by the end of the: earner in his family. ? I decade," said Nguyen Tien, South Vietnamese officials Hung, commissioner of state i Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 for planning. "If American aid is at a high level in the next two or three years, it can be substantially reduced later." Advancing the same argu- ment, another Cabinet officer said: "If we don't have suh-. stantial aid, we can never get out of the morass. NVe will be bogged down, with no re- sources to pull ourselves out." Before President Nixon left !office, his administration had i proposed $750 million economic !aid program for this fiscal I year ? nearly doubling the $399 million level of last year. The proposal faces strong op- position in Congress, however. The South Vietnamese are- not at all ignorant of the cal difficulties they face in ? Washington, Lut they hope to I stave off aid cuts for a while !longer. 1 "America has helped Many countries reconstruct . after war," .Mr. Hung said in an interview, "and we believe we are a good candidate for such aid. I think Americans would ;like to help us recover. Not endlessly, not forever, but for a few more years." his emphasis on postwar re- construction evokes a some- what unreal itnage, since full- scale war still is raging des- pite the Paris peace agree- ment. However, South Viet- namese officials concerned with economic aid prefer to speak in such terms, which might sound more palatable to American legislators than sup- port for a continuing war. Officials like Mr. Hung are also anxious to discuss the economy in terms that will not frighten potential investors from abroad. The result is that govern- Ment spokesmen on the civil- ian economy sometimes sound ;as if they are from a different ? country from that described by milita.ry officers. who are BALTIMORE SUN 18 August 1974 ? -p rfr ' C.) By ARNOLD R. ISAACS Sun Stall Cwrespondcnt Saigon?The impact of dim- inishing American military aid is already being felt on South Vietnam's battlefields. Field commanders, who are shocked and dismayed at the prospect of still deeper aid !cuts, say their casualties al- ready have risen as the result ' of restrictions on military sup- plies.. The item causing the most immediate concern is artillery ammunition. The South Viet- namese Army, which had !grown accustomed over the !years to the American style of :spending firepower rather than lives, is under strichit50546d more concerned about cuts in military aid and tend to stress the continuing warfare. There is a similar air of unreality about the projected timetable for South Vietnam's self-sufficiency. Econmists in the still-large American aid mission ih Sai- gon have prepared ,brightly colored flip-charts showing projections for a phases,out of American economic aid alter 1980,, (The charts do not -men-? tion military aid.). One American acknowl- edged, however, that the projections. "are more an ex-i pression of!'? than anything else. "Security situation" Prepared to answer congres- sional queries on how long American aid must go on, the projections are based on, some highly ?optimistic assumptions. They show, for example, a sixfold-increase in South. Viet- nam's 'export earnings by 1930. They also project a ninefold increase in aid from non- American sources. And they are based on. American aid at the requesfed ? $750 million level for this 'year and next. Such goals would be difficult enough to meet even if the ?war truly were ended or greatly reduced?and there is no sign of that. With the. .,i/ar going on, the chances for such dramatic increases in exports or "third- country aid" are even slim- mer. ? ? "The main probleM?1S-- 'the security situation," one aid ex- pert said. "Nothing is more important than that." Vietnam's economic crisis IsI I particularly ? grave because itj is really two .crises?one inter- national and one domestic. Like every other developing nation dependent on imports,: ! Vietnam has been. hard hit by soaring world food and fuel} IIJr is-177 (7.1 easua save stocks by using as little ammunition as possible. "Our fire support is much more limited now," said one division commander. "If we get into a big battle we can ask for artillery and we get it, but normally we don't have the authority to use it as we did before. . . . This is the main reason for our casualties." Maj. Gen. Iran Ba Di, de- puty commander of the vital !Mekong Delta region, said that lbecause of restrictions on the , use of artillery,. "our ground 1 forces are not supported as I well, and the number of cas- ualties is higher." I prices. Its import bill this year is expected to hit $850 million ?more than. eight times its I export earnings and about $150 I million higher than it was two !years ago. But the actual volume ,of !imports will be less than two- . ' thirds of the 1972 level. The government has let the price rise, hoping to lower consump- tion?although it reluctantly has begun to subsidize petro- leum-based fertilizer?and the resulting inflation has sharply eroded real incomes. ._ Shrinking revenue This "imported inflation" battered an economy that al- ready was suffering the effects of the American withdrawal. ! Three years ago, South Viet- nam earned about $400 million: a year frorn the American" presence. This represented wages paid to Vietnamese em- ployees, purchases for Ameri- can installations and spending by individual American sol- diers and civilians. This income?"our touri?t re- venue," one economist wryly called it?has shrunk to $100 million a year. ? In addition, the Vietnamese, estimate. and American offi- cials acknowledge, that the U.S. withdrawal wiped out about 350,000 jobs. This combination of circum- stances has produced both sig- I nificant slowdown in economic I activity and a raging inflation. Living costs rose about 40 per cent in 1972. and 65 per cent last year. They already have' gone up 27 per cent this year, I and government officials at their most optimistic predict' that the rate for the year as a whole will not be under 50 per cent. , ? Growth questions I Meanwhile, with fewer jobs, civilians are less and less able! 'to make ends meet. Soldiers and civil , servants, who in! South Vietnam's war-mobilized .economy make up a very large' proportion of the labor force, have received pay increases' , offsetting less than one-quarter of the rise in their cost of living. The government, has made some progress in the export field?scoring huge percentage 'gains, although the dollar amounts are still low. Promo- tion of seafood, lumber, rubber and scrap metal have pushed 'exports up from $12 million ? three years ago to $60 million last year, and this year's earn- ings are expected. to reach close to $100 million. However, there are question marks over future export growth. Timber and seafood prices might be softening, and high fuel prices are slowing down the fishing industry, ac- cording to experts' in Saigon. Lumbering, always. affected by the military situation, might have reached its limits of ex- pansion because the war con- tinues to ;affect the forested regions of the country. This year, South Vietnam earned a windfall of $55 mil- lion from American oil compa- nies for rights to explore off. the Vietnamese coast, The first ; test holes are already being 'drilled. Even if oil in commer- cial quantities is discovered, however, it will produce no more revenues for at least another four years. Because of the failure of the .Paris agreement, neither third-country aid nor foreign investment has reached levels Vietnamese officials once' hoped for. Businessmen have remained cautious: Potential aid donors seem reluctant to commit large sums if there is no genuine reconstruction tak- ing place. to U S Cul ? ?,.71 ? ci i the) c.,-; ,I and other supplies has been; to the Americans in the 900- '1 imposed partly because ship- man defense attache's office, rilents from the United States which administers the military already have been reduced,, . aid program. "It was a total, devastating shock," one Amer. and partly because South Viet-' jean official admitted. nam, worried about future aid levels, is carefully husbanding! the supplies it receives. The cutback on artillery! ?ftedts,MbilgW12001 mewl 37 Concern about supplies was! suddenly heightened with the! U.S. House of Representatives vote to slash military aid to Vietnam to $700 million?half The alarm in the ranks of ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) over military aid is in some ways reminiscent of the fears that have accompan- ied every stage of the Ameri- can disengagement. the amount originally re. The South Vietnamese under- quested by the Nixon adminis- !went similar spasms of ner- tration and $300 million under vousness when the American the level approved by Congress withdrawals began in 1969, in the defense authorization.! when the last American bill only a few weeks earlier, ground combat units left the The House vote came as an field a couple of years later unpleasant surprise not. only to and when American air sup-, : E4AERDPZ7r40432R001061 WNW 101: off by ?-? the Paris Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 !agreement last year, : Some Americans predict the South Vietnamese eventually will adjust. without too much .difficulty, to the loss of expen- sive firepower and supplies. Others, however, regard the .aid level as having fallen below a critical minimum. "They can't live with $700 mil- lion," said one high-ranking American officer in the de- fense attache's office. "They'll die with it." Asked if he agreed that more South Vietnamese soldiers are already' 'dying because of the supply cutback, the' American said 'flatly: "Of. course they are. :There is ,.absolutely no doubt about it."' Th:e South Vietnamese react with :angry impatience to the argument advanced by some American congressmen who saw the aid cuts as a means to force: President Nguyen Van Thieti to make political conces- sions in order to revive the -Paris peace agreement. "That is irrelevant and un- realistic," says one Viet- namese Cabinet... minister. "They're putting pressure .in the :wrong place. They should put pressure on the -North: Vietnamese." Dead letter After a .year and a half of full-scale war,' most Viet- namese Officials regard the Pull agreement as a dead period. In the last two months the South., Vietnamese :have been,' losing as many as-500 men ?killed in some weeks, a rate 'Comparable to all but the worst weeks of the big 1972 offensive. AltOgether, according to South Vietnamese figures, bat- tle deaths on both sides have reached nearly 100,000 .since the cease-fire.. : Note of the political ar- rangements outlined in the agreement has even begun to take, shape. Among officials, diplomats and journalists in Saigon, even those few who still -believe there might be a chance for :an ultimate com- promise peace think it cannot come until after one more all- out military test. ? In dozens of conversations, a reporter found no one who be- lieved that -cuts -in American aid would in fact prod Mr. 1Thieu into offering concessions. Despite the falling aid levels, ! ! the South Vietnamese still 'have more arms and firepov,er than the Communists. In large main-force battles, such as those being fought in the current wave of heavy' fighting near the northern' coast, South Vietnamese sources say the government still has plenty of ammunition.' The effects of the aid declina are being felt in the less publi- cized but equally bloody day- to-day war of smaller battles. On the whole, Vietnamese commanders insist, the govern- ment's battlefield positions I have not been seriously weak- 1 BALTIMORE SUN 16 August 1974 The Attempt The death of Mrs. Park Chung Hee, wife for 24 .'years of the man who has ruled South Korea for 13, is a bitter tragedy for him and their three chil- dren. She died from the bullet of a lone assassin who was trying to kill her husband while the die- itator was making an Independence Day address.? There are no grounds here for a pew crackdown and Weeding out of dissidents. Park himself is to ...blame for the assassination. He has made the :mildest forms of political dissidence, tolerable .not only in all democracies but in many authorita- rian states, punishable by death. His Central In- telligence Agency has been scooping up and im- prisoning those who would speak against him or demonstrate for freedoms. The Park repressions :have not insured his life but imperiled it, by deny- .ing his people more moderate forms of expression. One of Park's officials told The Sun's Matthew J. !Seiden last May that there is a Korean saying :to the effect that "sometimes a benevolent dicta- 'tor is necessary." A student dissident told the re- porter that "We are not Communists or Socialists, ' ened with the eve:-tighter sup- ply restrictions?but they say that a higher price is being paid in soldiers killed or wounded. But Vietnamese and Ameri- can sources say the Commu nists have improved their wea- ponry since the cease-fire, j bringing in 150 additional heavy artillery pieces, more than 1,000 lighter field guns and antiaircraft weapons, and enough munitions, according to one high-level American source, to sustain heavy com- bat for more than a year. Citing infiltration statistics, General Di, the deputy corn- mander in the Mekong Delta, said; -"In certain places, the use of arms and ammunition is , now inferior on cur side We can't say they are stronger than We are, but when they concentrate their forces they, can achieve local superiority! in arms and firepower." A source in the Delta, speak-1 ng specifically of artillery, iaidetht Delta command, known as IV corps, iS. allotted 40,000 rouncia a. month for its 105-mm. howitzers?the basic fire-sup- port weapon of the South Viet- namese Army?compares to 140,000 rounds a month in. the period shortly after the Paris agreement was signed in Janu- ary, 1973. ? No comparable figures could be obtained for the other three corps commands, or military regions, into which Vietnam is divided, the reduction has 1 clearly been' very sharp, how- ever. In areas where outgoing artillery used to bt heard day and night, a traveler now hears only an occasional round. A district chief in a tradition- ally contested region where the !howitzers used to fire almost hourly says he is now rationed to three rounds a day. All supplies affected Though it is artillery muni- tions that Commanders speak of first and with the most emotions, the aid cutbacks have affected all categories of supplies. Along Highway 1 on the cen- tral coast, and on the innumer-; able byways of the Delta, it is! not unusual to see outposts with fresh-cut bamboo stakts instead of barbed' wire de- fenses. Soldiers have begun stringing hand grenales in place of the more expensive claymore mines outside their positions. ? Because of the high price of gasoline and strict limits on its use, military sources say mo- bility has been affected "We have some difficulties in shift- ing troops now," one high- ranking officer acknowledged. The volume of military_ sup- plies have been' affectedeven more sharply than the dollar amounts, because like every- thing else, weapons, munitions and other supplies have be- come more expensive .in the ast year. ri Park's Life most of us are not even interested in politics. All we want is the basic freedoms. All we want is' the liberty to speak what we think." At times in his 'dictatorship and presidency, Park has seemed indeed to be benevolent, and at other times to be heading toward the introduction of democracy, at least until he saw that it threatened his continued rule. All claims to benevolence have V.anished since last winter. Park is ruling now with a paranoid tyranny. There is nothing re- motely anti-Communist about it. The arguably un- Korean doctrines that the onetime lieutenant in the Japanese Imperial Army, onetime court-rnar- tialed Communist sympathizer, is stamping out are American style civil liberties, Christianity, and Western learning, It was not for this that 34,000 Americans died in Korea two decades ago, that 44,000 trews and Pentagon civilians serve there now, that American military aid pours in. The first thing President Park can do-, both to counteract attempts on his person and to redeem the immense American investment in his rule is to let the Korean people speak their minds. 38 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100,83000t-0 NEW YORK TIMES 16 August 1974 Korean Tragedy United States support for an unpopular and repres- sive regime in South Korea is in danger of undermining the collective security interests which such support is, intended to insure. Yesterday's assassination attempt against President Park Chung Hee and the subsequent death of his wife are tragedies which only underline the plight of the Korean dictator. President Park's problem it not just one of an ugly international "image"; it is the problem of survival which any dictator faces when the only viable means , of rule left to him are repression and decree. As suc- cessive United States Administrations have had painful occasion to observe around the world, American inter- ests are not well served by endless efforts to prop up regimes devoid of popular support. There is continuing validity to the close ties. and CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 16 August 1974 Interests which the United States his maintained in Korea since the war there a quarter-century ago; political stability and economic development in South Korea are important features of the over-all Asian security system. But these valid interests are ill-protected by the refusal of United States policymakers to confront the question , of whether the Park regime is any longer capable of pro- viding either stability or development. As the months of repression go .on, it is increasingly evident that the South Korean Government's policies are promoting exactly the kind of internal unrest which makes the country vulnerable to exploitation by the Communist North. Just as the United States cannot dictate the internal policies of another country, so President Park must realize that the United States is entitled to determine for itself whEither it is worth continuing military aid that no longer serves its intended purpose. The tragedy of Korea By Elizabeth Pond Tokyo The Koreans are a warm, emo- tional, and quietly proud people. They have an inborn sense of justice ? and an inborn political instinct. They are direct and frank. They have a per- sistent innocence. But because they are individualistic in a way neither the Japanese nor the Chinese are, some of the best of the Koreans are now in jail. They be- lieved in the self-evident truths of the American Declaration of Indepen- dence. They dared to voice these truths, and they were silenced by a government that believes only in the self-evident "truth" of force. Maybe the tragedy isn't as obvious to Westerns as was iron military rule in Greece, the birthplace of democ- racy. But it is just as real. South Korea is the one country among the developing nations of Asia that could best maintain and benefit from parti- cipatory government. It's an odd phenomenon for a once rigidly Confucian country. Yet a cen- tury of Christian teaching of the worth of the individual ? even a peasant, even the poor, even a woman ? has taken strong root in Korea. And 20 years of American-style education has indoctrinated young Koreans with the assumption that men should be free and equal. It is true that some of the most cruel atrocities in World War II were perpetrated by Koreans in the Japa- nese military forces. It is true that Korean troops in Vietnam had a reputation for killing Vietnamese vil- lagers without making any fine dis- tinction between 'guerrillas and civil- ians. It is true that maltreatment of political prisoners in the decade since the Korean CIA (secret police) was created has included bestial torture methods. But the men who performed such brutalities are not the people a foreign reporter comes to know and admire over years of close contact with Koreans. The Koreans one gets to know have done volunteer work for Vietnamese orphans in Saigon. They have lived in Seoul slums for years on end to help poor rural Immigrants get a fair shake in a harsh city. They have impetuously donated money out of their own pockets ? with no reference to their ability to pay ? to set up exchange programs between small American and Korean colleges. They have sold clothes off their backs to support legal aid for poor women. The Koreans I know are proud of the close-to-100-percent literacy of their people. They are proud of their compatriots' matter-of-fact collection of Harvard and Princeton PhDs in economics and political science. They are proud of their Hangul script, devised with phonetic exactitude five centuries ago, proud of their invention of movable type at a date prior to the Gutenberg press. For these people authoritarianism is no longer the natural pattern for Korea. Indeed, President Park Chung Hoe's current dictatorship is looked upon as archaic, unintelligible, "Mon- golian." This is the tragedy of South Korea today: that such innate believers in democracy and the right of free speech should be so deprived of participation in their government ? and subjected to death penalties for protesting this loss. The further tragedy of South Korea is that the government repression and resulting public hostility toward the government are so unnecessary. President Park provided strong lead- ership for South Korea after his coup in 1961. He defended the country against North Korea. He stopped factionalism in the South. He?along with the nation's very competent bureaucracy, imaginative entrepre- neurs, and hard-working skilled and unskilled labor ? led South Korea into a remarkable "economic miracle" of fast, sound growth. He reopened civil contact. with North Korea after the two enemies had been hermetically sealed off from each other for a quarter century. By the summer of 1972, when the first North Korean delegates visited Seoul, South Koreans were demon- strably united behind their govern- ment. They were proud of the relative freedom that they had and the North didn't. They were proud of their reponsibility and restraint in ex- ercising this freedom. Within months, however, President Park squandered this voluntary sup- port ? or "90 percent control," as one foreign diplomat termed it ? by trying to grasp a 100 percent mono- poly of power ? regardless of the cost. His repressive acts, far from stifling what little opposition there was, fanned it into real opposition. In particular, by making martyrs of prominent Christians who declared their conscience about human rights, President Park alienated even Korea's conservative Christians ? an Important 13 percent of the popu- lation. . The result, diplomatically, is a serious strain in South Korea's rela- tions with its closest ally, Japan. The result domestically is a widespread revulsion of South Korean citizens toward their government. All this is a travesty of South Koreans' sensibilities and capabil- ities. President Park and the Korean people both deserve better. Miss Pond is the Monitor's Tokyo correspondent. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RD97-00432R000100330001-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0 WASHINGTON POST 3 August 1974 'Justice' in Chile ripHE "JUSTICE" of the victors is being releVessly administered in Chile by the officers who over- ?threw the Allende government last fall. Given the chaos ..of his last days, it is conceivable that some of Allende's 'supporters sensed that a coup was coining and hoped to ' forestall it by creating a power center of their own within the Chilean armed forces. At any rate, the coup came, destroying any such hopes, and the would-be ? hunters became the prey. The officers who had seized 'power looked about them for a dramatic way to legiti- mize their authority, to convince others inside and out- side Chile that they had indeed saved' the country by 'their own intervention. For Chileans are, despite their recent trauma, a law-minded people, and even the new leaders appreciate the benefits of winning their coun- trymen's respect. To fulfill this vital legitimizing pur- pose, they decided on a mass trial 'of Allende supporters, .:who were accused of trying to take over a substantial .part of the Chilean air force. Sentences were handed ,down in that trial the other day. Now, only in a country as politically riven as Salva- dor Allende's Chile could a group of 54 air force men (arid 1G civilians) have _contemplated a kind of coup within one branch of the armed forces in order to assure 'military support to keep the elected government , in power That is a fair measure of how things were in Santiago at that time. But only in a country as politi- ,:eally restric,ive -as General 'Augusto Pinochet's Chile 'Would these defendants have been tried with so little a sense on the governrrient's part of its own basic illogic. Note that, despite goverment promises of a prompt public trial, a considerable number of Allende's civilian sofficials have remained in prison or otherwise under detention for almost a year, untried and uncharged. But apparently the military was offended by the BALTIMORE SUN 14 August 1974 thought that some of Its own?air force men?sup- ported Allende. The military perhaps also wanted to intimidate would-be dissenters still within itk ranks. These seem to be the particular reasons why the 60- odd defendants were brought to trial before an air force court martial. That court sentenced four of them ?a former Socialist Party leader, and a colonel, captain and sergeant?to be shot, while 56 others received prison terms. Carrying out those sentences is a virtually certain way to build more hate and bitterness into Chilean society, which is despaately in need of a turn toward domestic peace. .In a trial where the crime charged is essentially loyalty te the previous government, there can be no question whether the trial is political: It is. Nonetheless, the Pinochet leadership permitted foreign observers to attend the sessions that were open?presumably to bear witness to the correctness of the proceedings or, at the least, to attest to the good faith of the Santiago junta. Whether the observers, simply by going, sanctioned the purpose of the trial would seem to be a fair ques- tion. Anyway, the reports of the several American ob- servers, made to the Kennedy and Fraser congressional subcommittees, hardly gave the junta the clean bill of health it desired. The torture of political prisoners still goes on, the observers reported. Due process is an occasional thing The exodus of political refugees runs high. Official American interest in how the Chilean gov- ernment lives up to international standards of human rights is hard to perceive. American military aid is high and getting higher. And in respect to Chile there is not even the excuse, offered most recently, for instance, in respect to police excesses in South Korea, that the United States has strategic interests requiring it to look the other way. Fall of Nixon said to he good omen for extending live branch to Cu a By RICHARD O'MARA .Rio de Janeiro Bureau of The Sun Rio de Janeiro ? Observers here and elsewhere in Latin; America agree that the resig- nation of Richard M. Nixon, has removed the final obstacle to Cuba's re-entry into the nor- mal flow of hemispheric affairs. Mr. Nixon's departure from. the White House also is ex- pected to hasten the reopening of diplomatic relations between Washington and Havana. These expectations were en- couraged by President Ford's address Monday night, in which he promised to continue the dialogue established among the nations of the hemisphere by the Secretary of State, Henry A. Kissinger. To many political observers ,in Latin America, Dr. Kissin- ger's initiative in attempting to improve relations between the United States and its neighbors' in the hemisphere ran counter to Mr. Nixon's continued hard line against Cuba. Time and again diplomats in the Latin capitals have com- mented on the discrepancy be- tween President Nixon's friend- liness toward the large Com- munist countries,. the Soviet Union and China, and his en- during hostility toward Cuba. No adequate explanation for that hostility has yet been of- fered. One of the most com- monly suggested was that Mr. Nixon had a personal dis- like for Fidel.Castro and his government. Another was that IMr. Nixon just did not care or consider Cuba important en- ough to American interests to warrant a change in policy. Not indifferent The latter explanation has lost much credibility in recent ? months. Pres?sure had begun tol mount against the President's' policy, both at borne and abroad. Had he been indiffer- ent to Cuba, there would have been no justification for main- taining the hard line against the Communist island. ? By doing so, he saddled his secretary of state with a con- tradiction and alienated need- lessly those Latin American countries willing to let bygones be bygones as far as Cuba is concerned. The pressure against the ex- president's Cuba policy had manifested itself in a number of ways. Most recently the Senate Foreign. Relations Com- mittee received and published a report from one of its top staff members urging an end to the economic blockade. The report was made by Pat Holt, after an investigatory visit to Cuba. The Holt vis'ti received wide newspaper cov-; 'erage in Latin America, attest- ing, many' believe, to the con- tinuing interest in the Cuba issue there. Earlier this year the ban on trade between the U.S. and Cuba was violated, :n spirit at least, by the subsidiaries of !three American automobile companies?Ford. General Mo- tors and Chrysler?based in :Argentina. Vehicles made by these, companies are entering the Cuban market. More important, .perhaps, has been the attitude develop- ing among other Latin coun- tries toward Cuba. The trend now is toward detente. Even Venezuela, the most offended by Cuba during the earlier and more feisty years of its revolution, is re-examining its policy. Currently, Argentina, Mex- ico, Peru, Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago maintain formal diplomatic relations with Cuba. If Venezuela change's, Colombia, Ecuador, Costa Rica and Panama are expected to follow suit. . The United States along with Brazil and Chile has been the most leiv-wIOU defen-, tiers of ,the status quo. 40 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-0