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Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9- CONFIDENTIAL NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES INTERNAL USE ONLY This publication contains clippings from the domestic and foreign press for YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use of selected items would rarely be advisable. No. 11 9 AUGUST 1974 GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 1 GENERAL 20 EASTERN EUROPE 22 WESTERN EUROPE 28 FAR EAST 30 WESTERN HEMISPHERE 40 25X1A Destroy after backgrounder has served its purpose or within 60 days. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 - Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010033000 THE NEW YORK TIME ti Li "RIDAY: AUGUST 9, 7974 0 A ?-ainst ichard Nixon: A ar s and?His Replies Ca la.1U) ? . ? , rl 0.-q< ae or By PAUL L. MONTGOMERY pa ted During the three summers and two winters of what clearly has been the biggest- political scandal in the history of the United States, Richard M. Nixon was investigated more heavily and charged with wrongdoing more frequently than any of his 36 predecessors. From the time of the arrest of the Watergate burglars early on the morning of June /7, 1972, the allegations against the President and his aides built to a tidal wave that ? 26 months later ? overwhelmed him. The burglary and its subsequent cover-up were always the center of the wilderness of investigations but as time. went on and evidence accumulated the inquiry seeped over Into at least 13 separate areas of .Presidential activity aside trom Watergate. Millions of words of testimony and thousands of dtscuments and transcripts were amassed by the Watergate grand fury and special prosecutor, the Senate Select.Com- mittee on Watergate and the plethora of subsidiary bodies. For Mr. Nixon, the ultimate forum was the House Com- mittee on the Judiciary, authorized on Feb. 6, 1974, by a vote of 410-4 to conduct an impeachment inquiry. In six months of examining the evidence Of the other investigations, and opening new lines itself, the staff of the committee made a massive synthesis of the charges against the President and the facts to support them. At the end, the committee voted to recommend impeachment of the Presi- dent for hil conduct in the Watergate matter and for. involvement in the three other unrelated activities. . The first article chargedthat Mr. Nixon, "using the powers of his high office, engaged personally and through his subordinates and agents in a course of conduct or plan -designated to delay, impede, and obstruct the Mil- estiga- tion" of the Watergate burglary and "to cover up, conceal and protect those responsible." The second article said the residerit "has repeatedly engaged in conduct violating the Constitutional rights of citizens" and "impairing the due and proper administration of justice." The third article charged him with having "willfully disobeyed" the com- mittee's subpoenas for tapes and documents. Two other articles, dealing with the secret bombing of Cambodia and Mr. Nixon's income taxes and persona/ finances, were not.- approved by the committee. What follows is an accounting of the charges against Mr. Nixon?based on the Judiciary Committee's documents and proceedings, supplemented by statements that post- dated he committee's deliberations?and of his responses to them?ba.sed on statements by Mr. Nixon, his lawyers and other defenders. Watergate On May 27, 1972, and again on June 17, agents of the Committee for the. Re-election of the President broke into the Democratic National Committee headquarters in the Watergate in Washington to install wiretaps and collect other political information. Basically, Mr. Nixon was charged with having used the office of the Presidency over at least the next two years to conceal the responsibility Of, the White House and the re-election committee for the burglaries. NO direct evidence has been introduced that Mr. Nixon knew in advance of the burglaries. But the committee cited evidence that the plan underlying the burglaries had been approved by John N. Mitchell, the tainpaign director, 'and H. R. Haldeman, the President's chief of Staff in the White House. The first article of impeachment approved by the House committee charges, however, that Mr. Nixon partici- 1 e y in t wafting investigations of the crime and covering up the responsibility of his aides in it. John M. Doer, the committee's special counsel, wrote that the evidence "strongly/suggests" that Mr. Nixon de- cided shortly after the arresf of the burglars on June 17 to, pursue a policy of concealment and containment. He further said that in late March, 1973, Mr. Nixon took over personal direction of the cover-up. The committeet?in its vote, made no direct correlation between the overt acts by the President and the general- ized charges in the first article of impeachment It was clear, however, that the majority accepted Mr. Doer's sum- mation of the specific charges. These broke down roughly into eight areas: GENERAL PLAN AND POLICY. After the committee hearings, Mr. Nixon admitted that on June 23, 1972, he had instructed Mr. Haldeman to stop the Federal Bureau of Investigation inquiry into the sources of funds for the Watergate burglars (the funds had come from campaign contributions). The President said his aides, to thwart the F.B.I., should use the excuse that the investigation would endanger operations of the Central Intelligence Agency. Despite C.I.A. assurances that this was not so, the aides pursued that course and succeeded on June 28 in "topping the F.B.I. effort to trace the money. The summation of evidence for the committee also cited- numerous instances in transcripts of Presidential conversations 'in which Mr. Nixon had indicated that he acquiesced in the cover-up. To Mr. Mitchell on June 30, 1972: "Well, I'd cut the loss fast. I'd cut it fast." To John W. Dean 3d, his counsel, on Sept. 15, 1972: "So you jUst try to button it up as well as you can . To Mr. Dean on March 21, 1973: "It's better just to fight it out, and not -let people testify, so forth and so on." To Mr. Michell on March 22, 1973: "I want you all to stonewall it, let them plead tile Fifth Amendment, cover-up or anything else, if it'll save it?save the plan." ? Critics also cited amoral insensitivity in Mr. Nixon's conversations that could indicate his approval of the cover- up. On March 21, 1973, for example, in recorded personal reminiscences, . Mr. Nixon gave contrasting assessment of two aides,----Jeb Stuart Magruder, who had decided to tell the truth to investigators, and Gordon Strachan, who the President described as "in a straight position of perjury." He called Mr. Magruder "a rather weak man who had all the appearance of character but who really lacks it when the, uh, chips are down," while he found Mr. Strachan "a real, uh, courageous fellow through all this." Mr. Nixon has never made an . attempt to rebut charges involving each overt act of which he was accused. The Judiciary Committee staff made a summation of 243 incidents or series of incidents, and the reply of the President's lawyer, James D. St. Clair, dealt only with 34 incidents with no correlation with the staff summation: Mr. St. Clair's final statement was, "The Preside;A had no knowledge of an attempt by the White House to cover up involvement in the Watergate affair." In his last account of Watergate, on Aug. 5, when he admitted that he had previously concealed bhis order on June 23, 1972, to stop the F.B.I. investigation, Mr. Nixon said it was a ."serious act of omission for which I take full responsibility and which I deeply regret." He said he had not told Mr. St. Clair of the incident when his lawyer was defending him. "I was aware of the advantages this course of action would have with respect to limiting possible public exposure of involvement by persons connected with the re-election committee," the President said. Mr. Nixon, however, reiterated that if the evidence was looked at in its entirety, rather than as isolated incriminating statements, it would show he had made mistakes but had committed no impeachable offense. This was a theme that ran through his defense as the tapes of his conversations were made public. In the Aug. 5 statement,- Mil Nixon said that "the basic truth remains that?when all the facts were brought to, mr, attention I insisted on a full investigation and prosecution of those guilty." He did not mention that, as a result of the investigation, he was named by the Water- --ApprovedEar Release .2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA gate grand jury as a co-conspirator in the cover-up, though no indictment was voted because of his office. INTERFERING WITH INVESTIGATIONS. Aside from the attempted use of the C.I.A. against the F.B.I., the House conimittee staff found a number of occasions when Mr. Nixon tried to thwart or divert duly authorized investiga- tions into Watergate. Among the instances cited were his repeated refusal to honor subpoenas of evidence, his attempts to influence members of Congressional committees, his efforts to get special treatment for aides before the Watergate prosecu- tors, and his dismissal of the special prosecutor, Archibald Cox, when Mr. Cox insisted on having, tapes of White House conversations. . Mr. Nixon's relations with Henry Petersen, the Justice Department official originally charged with prosecutint the Watergate burglars, also drew criticism. The President re- peatedly quizzed the Assistant Attorney General about the 'progress of the investigation, and then passed the informa- tion on to subordinates who were suspects. "I've got Peter- sen on a short leash," he told John D. Ehrlichman, his chief doniestic aide, at one point. In a telephone conversation with Mr. Petersen on the evening of April 16, 1973, Mr. Nixon elicited the informa- tion that Frederick C. LaRue, a campaign aide who helped pass money to the burglars, was talking to the prosecutors. "Anything you tell me, as I think I told you earlier, will not, be passed on," Mr. Nixon told Mr. Petersen. Yet, the next morning, the President instructed Mr. Haldeman to tell, Herbert W. Kalmbach, another suspect in the money- passing, that Mr. LaRue was talking. _ - ' In his defense, the President insisted he had pressed for a full investigation as soon as he was made aware of incriminating facts. In testimony before the Judiciary Com- mittee, Mr. Petersen said he saw nothing improper in Mr. Nixon's relations with him since the President is the na- tion's chief law-enforcefnent officer. ALTERING OR DESTROYING EVIDENCE. Mr. Doar cited the apparently deliberate erasure of an 181/2-minute portion of a tape recording conversation between Mr. Nixon and Mr. Haldeman on June 20, -1972 ? three days after the break-in. Mr. Haldeman's notes indicated the conversation was aboufWatergate, and that the President instructed him to be "on the attack for diversion." The ?tape was in the possession of Mr. Nixon's personal secretary, Rose Mary Woods, when the erasure occurred. The staff also cited many material discrepancies be; -tween transcripts of tapes prepared under Mr. Nixon's direction and transcripts of the same tapes made by the committee. In some cases, potentially compromising state- ments by the President were omitted entirely. For example, on Feb. 28, 1973, Mr. Nixon expressed worry about evidence pointing to Mr. Kalmbach because "It'll be hard for him, he ? 'cause it'll, it'll get out about Hunt." The statement did not appear' in the White House transcript of the conversation. The reference is apparently to Mr. Kalmbach's help in sending money to E. Howard Hunt Jr., one of the burglars; Mr. Nixon had Maintained steadfastly that he did not learn of payments to Mr. Hunt until March 21, 1973. In a March' 22, 1973, conversation, the White House transcripts had Mr. Nixon #aying he needed flexibility "in order to get off the cover-up line." The committee transcript made the phrase "in order to get on with the cover-up plan." The President and his defenders said they did not know how the 181/2-minute gap in the key tape had occurred, but left open the implication that it could have been a mechan- ical fault in Miss Woods's tape recorder- rather than a deliberate erasure. Miss Woods said she had accidentally erased a part of the tape when she answered the, telephone while transcribing it, but could not account for the entire erasure. Regarding the discrepancies between the White House and committee transcripts, Mr. St. Clair described them as honest differences in interpretation of tapes of poor quality that did not have material bearing on the matters stated. HUSH MONEY. Beginning on June 29, 1972?twelve days after the break-in?and continuing for nearly a year, a total of nearly $450,000 was paid by aides of Mr. Nixon to those accused in the butglary. The money came from contributions to his campaign, and much of it was routed through his personal attorney, Mr. Kalmbach. On March 21, 1973, the President talked with Mr. Dean about payments to Mr. Hunt. He, contended it was the first time he was ihformed of the payments, yet in the conversation he made no protest, showed no surprise and indicated familiarity with some details of the pay-off -RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 scheme, Mr. Dean said Mr. Hunt Might consume a million dollars in the next' two years. "What I meant is, you could, you get a million dollars," Mr. Nixon said. "And you could get it in cash. I, I know where it could be gotten." The same day Mr. Nixon told Mr. Haldeman that Mr. Hunt might "blow the whistle" and that "his price is ,pretty high, but at least, uh, we should, wes 'should buy the time on that, uh, as I, as I pointed out to John." That night, $75,000 in cash was delivered to Mr. Hunt's lawyer. ? Under persistent questioning before the Watergate grand jury, Mr. Hunt stated unequivocally that when he- was demanding money. from the White House he was threatening to reveal "seamy things" he had done for the Administration if the money was not paid. , Mr. Nixon's defenders at one point said the President was "joking" in his discussion of $1-million with Mr. Dean. At all points, the President said, the money paid to the burglars was for legal expenses and support of their fam- ilies, and not to buy their silence. ; Mr. Nixon denied repeatedly that the money for Mr. Hunt was "hush money." I:is lawyer quoted a passage from an unreleased tape in which Mr. Nixon said, "I don't mean to be blackmailed by Hunt?that goes too far." ? EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY. On at least three occasions recorded in the transcripts, Mr. Nixon discussed with aides the possibility and political wisdom of giving executive clemency to Watergate defendants after their presumed conviction. The first- discussion, with Mr. Ehrlichman on July 8, 1972, came two months before the burglars were indicted and six months before they were tried. On March 21, 1973, talking with Mr. Dean about when clemency could be granted, Mr. Nixon said, "You can't do it till after the '74 elections, that's for sure. But even then : . . Your point is that even then you couldn't do it" On April 14, 1973, Mr. Nixon spoke with Mr. Ehrlich- Man about how he could give signals to Mr. Magruder that leniency could be expected. The President suggested he ? mention "lovely wife and all the rest" and how painful it was to deliver the message. "Also, I would first put that in so that he knows I have personal affection," said Mr. Nixon. "That's the way the so-called clemency's got to be handled. Do you see, John?" Mr. Nixon's response to the charge was that, hr any discussion of clemency, he was acting out of motives of compassion rather than trying to win favor with the defendants. He pointed out, for example, that Mr. Hunt's wife- had been killed in an airplane crash shortly before his trial and that any consideration of clemency would be on that basis. The President cited a point in a conversation about clemency for Mr. 'Hunt in which he said "It would be wrong." However, in the context of the conversation, the statement appears to refer to the political feasibility rather than the morality of granting clemency. SUBORNING PERJURY. The staff cited a number of statements by the President in which he advised potential witnesses to lie or give incomplete answers, and .others in which he coached Witnesses to give answers that would match the testimony of those who had gone before. On March 21, 1973, he gave this advice to Mr. Dean. about talking with prosecutors: - "Just be damned sure you say I don't ... remember. I can't recall, I can't give any honest, an answer to that, that I can recall. But that's it." On April 14, 1973, Mr. Nixon directed Mt. Ehrlichman to coach Mr. Strachan on his forthcoming testimony so that he could cover the same points that :qr. Magruder made to the prosecutors. On April 17, Mr. Nixon discussed with Mr. Ehrlichman what he could say to investigators that would corroborate what Mr. Kalmbach had told them and impugn what Mr. Dean had said. Mr. Nixon's defenders, discussing these passages, said it should be remembered that the President ard his aides were discuseing the range of options on how to act, and not recommending a specific course of conduct. Mr. Ziegler said that, in the transcripts, Mr. Nixon eeuld often be found playing the "devil's advocate"?that is, eliciting statements by taking a position without really advocating it. His defenders also pointed out that on numerous other occasions Mr. Nixon had urged aides to tell the truth. FAILURE TO ACT. Some of the major charges that Mr. Nixon failed to see that the laws. were faithfully 2 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 eeA.Ole: ?-?e,,,?.etePeeeeee Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100336002-9' executed were based on his failure to report wrpngdoing tc the authorities when he learned of it. As early as July 6, 1972, L. Patrick Gray 3d, then head of the F.B.I., says he warned the President that his staff was giving him a "mortal wound" through inter- ference in the Watergate matter. Mr.' Gray said the President never questioned him about the statement. On March 21, 1973, by Mr. Nixon's admission, Mr. Dean told him of the extent of the cover-up. His counsel also charged that Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Mitchell were implicated in the obstruction of justice. Mr. Nixon did not inform any authority of the charges, though he spoke at least three times in the next ten days with Attorney General Richard q: K1 ie ndierist about the Watergate case. The President's response to the charge was that as soon' as he learned . of the cover-up he had immediately "personally ordered those conducting the investigation to get all the facts and to report them directly to me." (All major witnesses deny receiving such instructions.) Mr. Nixon said he "felt it was my responsibility to conduct my own investigation" and the White House asserted that the President himself was a "civil authority" em- powered to receive reports, of wrongdoing. . MISLEADING THE PUBLIC. The Judiciary Committee staff produced massive evidence, based on the tapes and Mr. Nixon's public statements, that the President had lied repeatedly in speeches and news conferences about the extent of his knowledge of the complicity of his aides. Immediately after the break-in, Mr. Mitchell and 'Ronald L. Ziegler, the President's press secretary; issued statements that fleither the re-election committee nor the White . House was involved. On June 22, Mr. Nixon affirmed those statements and repeated them for the next .10 months, though, the staff said, he had no basis. for believing, they were true, and probably knew they were false. Several times, Mr. Nixon cited `:reports" or "investi- gations" leY his aides that, he declared, cleared. the White House. there is no evidence that such reports were ever prepared. On March 21, '1973, when Mr. Dean was talking about making such a report, Mr. Nixon said "Understand (iaughs) .1 don't want to gdt all that goddamned specific." That' day, Mr. Dean had told him that at least three of his aides had committed perjury in questioning by the prosecutors. Mr. Nixon's contention in response to the charges was that his aides had misled him, or that he had told the truth as far as he was aware of it at the time. After the cover-up fell apart in 4pril, 1973, the President's statements denied much that he had said before. Each 'major speech involved retraction of previous assertions. Abuse of Power ?? In addition to the article of impeachment dealing with Watergate, and an article condemning the President for refusing committee subpenas in connection with it, the Judiciary Committee voted for impeachment on four other specific matters: INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE. The committee staff collected evidence that Mr. Haldeman and other aides had put pressure on the I.R.S. to punish Mr. Nixon's opponents by auditing their tax returns and to reward friends by not auditing. There was testimony from both of Mr. Nixon's first two Commissioners of Internal Reve- nue that they had offered their resignations in the face of pressures from the White House to take improper' actions. According to the evidence, a prineipal target for audit- ing was Lawrence F. O'Brien, the Democratic National Chairman in 1972. There was also a charge that Mr. Nixon's aides obtained tax information on Gov. George C. Wallace of Alabama and leaked it to the press. Regarding favors, it was alleged that the I.R.S. yielded to pressure not to audit the returns of the President's friend, C. G. Rebozo, in 1968 and 1969. Mr. Nixon made no direct response to the specific charges but stated generally that he had not misused the government agency. The White House acknowledged it kept ? a list of "enemies" but asserted the list was Co make sure that opponents received no favors, and not to subject them to persecution by arms of the Government. WIRETAPS. Between May, 1969, and February, 1971, the President authorized F.B.I. wiretap t on four newsmen and 13 Government officials in an effort to stop leaks ot confidential material to the press. The wiretaps were placed without a court order. Two of the subjects of the wiretaps went to work for Senator Edmund S. Muskie, a potential opponent of the President's in 1972, and three others were White tHouse staff members. The committee staff found evidence that information from the wiretaps went to the President, that it did not lead to the discovery of any leaks, that some. of the wiretaps were installed for political purposes, and that the White House tried later to have the F.B.I. destroy records of the taps. Mr. Nixon has said the wiretaps were installed to' prevent dissemination of national security information that would damage the nation if revealed. He said it was his right to take such action. Mr. St. Clair said that, at the time the action was taken, court approval was not required. PLUMEERS. In 1971, Mie Nixon authorized creation of a special investigation unit within the White House called the "Plumbers." The unit was assigned to plug leaks of classified information. Facilities of the Central ? Intelligence Agency, prohibited by law from domestic a0vities, were used for several of the unit's operations. In *several cases, members of tht.. unit acted to quell potentially embarrassing situations for Mr. Nixon. On Sept. 3, 1971, agents of the unit broke into the Beverly. Hills, Calif., office of Dr. Lewis J. Fielding in an effort to get psychiatric' information about Daniel Ellsberg. Mr. Nixon said the unit was created because of threats to national security. He said he had not approved the burglary of Dr. Fielding, and did not learn of it until March 17, 1973. He did not relay the ? information to judicial authorities until April 25. KLEINDIENST NOMINATION. In 1969, the Justice .Department brought three,antitrust suits against the In- ternational Telephone and Telegraph Corporation. On April 19, Mr. Nixon telephoned Deputy Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst and ordered him to drop an appeal in one of the suits with the words "The order is to' leave the goddamned thing alone." In March, 1972, Mr. Kleindienst was undergoing Senate approval of his appointment as Attorney General, and he testified under oath that he had never received ny White House direc, stives about the I.T.T. case. Mr. Nixon took no action in regard to the perjury. Mr. St. Clair, in his brief for Mr. Nixon, said there was 'no reason why the President should have .known of Mr. Kleindienst's statement under oath, and that there was no legal duty to respond to the testimony. 3 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 ? _ . Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 BALTIMORE SUN 9 August 1974 gate, but the spectacle- of an o- deal ma American president going. to N- jail really distresses me." The grand jury had wanted to indict President Nixon last prosecution . ,, , ormer aides, including John May on charges similar to o . fthose brought against his aa. ? - ? N. Mitchell, H. R. Haldeman awor' ski .s4s. this action on ground that an ? . , aalr. Jaworski re.portedly dis-, ' suaded the grand jury from . . - ;and -John D. Ehrlichman. ' . a . incumbent president could not BY STEPHEN E.. NORDLINGER. Washinytcrn Bureau of The Sun , Washington?Leon Jaworski, the Watergate spe- cial' prosecutor, said- last' there has. been "no- 'agree:mentor understandiug..,- of any sort" between his office and President Nixon.;., ? Mr.. Jaworski, as the.mah in charge of the Water- gate criminal prosecutions,presluriably. would, play a ,Aajor-role in deciding whether to press- criminal 'charges against Mr. ?Nixon, for' Richard M. Nixon. . his involvement in The Viatet-- "Resolved by the Senate (the 'gate scandal. ? ' .? . ,_? , , Despite the uncertainties overthis question, it. appeared likely to legal experts yester- day that as a private citizen Mr.'. Nixon will be summoned to appear as a witness at the trial of his former aides in the Watergate coverina 'se achede: uled to open -next-?montlia'',- " .. Senator Edward W. Brooke '(R., Mass.). said last?night he' will drop his move in Congress to get immunity for the Presi- ? dent-nriless?Mr:NECOlfmakes a, ?.1u11.? ? donfession" of :hiss' ine .volvement in. Watergate'-and- related scandals.: ' "I believe that the President Owes it to the AmericaraPeople- to melte full' disclosure of'his- 'personal involvement in,Watere ;Ate and related sincidents,'-"? said Mr., Brooke;' who -earlier yesterday had introdaced a re- solution, calling for .1 immatnityra . , "There has been- no agree- ment or understanding of any !sora between the President or representatives and the speciala prosecutor relating in 'any way to the President's iresignation.' Mr. Jaworski ,said in the statement- tele- Iphoned to the press following the Nixon resignation 'speech. s "The- special .. prosecutor's office ? was not asked for any such agreement or understand- ing and offered none. Although I was informed of the Presi- dent's decision this afternoon.. my office did not participate in , any way in the President's 'decision to resign." Mr. Jawoeski's statement ap- parently was aimed at killing one popular bit of speculation ?that Mr. Jaworski might agree not to prosecute the Pres- ident-in return for a presiden- tial promise to resign: The Brooke resolution staled: "Expressing the: -sense ..ofI Congress with respect to pro- ceedingg against President House of Representatives con- curring) that it is the sense of Congress that if President Rich- ard M. Nixon should resign, constitutionally be indicted. However, with Mr. Nixon out of office, the grand jury would be free to indict him for ob- struction of justice in the Wat- ergate coverup, a charge to ;which he virtually admitted Iguilt in his statement Monday. 1 Penalties severe According to knowledgeable !criminal lawyers, if Mr. Nixon !should be indicted, he would face criminal penalties that could reach a total of 30 to 60 years in prison and $57,500 in fines. T no officer or employee of the he experts based their esti- United States, including the at- mates on the specifications in looney general and the special' the articles of impeachment prosecutor, and no officer or approved by the House Judi- employee of any state,' tern-. dory Committee. The sections tory or local government of the criminal code that were should bring, conduct or con- said to apply forbid attempts tinue criminal or civil proceed- to influence or impede wit- nesses, obstruct criminal pro- ceedings or cause nusrepresen- tation of facts in criminal cases. Brooke announced his intention , On Watergate matters, Mr. Jaworski was given the sole to withdraw it. Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Mont.), the ma- discretion in terms of plea-bar- . gaining and prosecution. His jority leader, said it raised a; grave constitutional question jurisdiction ?cannot be limited " Of the separation of powers," without the approval of the and Senator Robert C. Byrd ( majority and minority leaders D., W. Va.), the assistant majority of the House and Senate and, leader, said it would "set a! the chairman and ranking mi- bad precedent." nority members of the House In any case; the resolution would lack binding power on either Mr. Jaworski or the Watergate grand jury and, as a matter of fact, on local and :for pursuing a criminal case state prosecutors. :against President Nixon. The The House Republican: . leader, Representative John J. congressmen probably would Rhodes (Ariz.),. said that al- though there were moral rea- sons for such a resolution, "it wasn't worth the paper it was written on. "I have never felt Congress had the constitutional authority cannot be dismissed "except to grant immunity to anybody ;for extraordinary improprie- for anything," Mr. Rhodes had said earlier at a news confer- Therefore, Mr. Jaworski and ence Tuesday. the Watergate grand jury ap- Such a resolution could.' how- pear free to indict Mr. Nixon ever, exert influence on the if they wish. ? Watergate grand jury and Mr. Most observers here believe, Jaworski against pursuing cri- however, that before acting he minal action against Mr. would consult with the leader- Nixon. In discussing the reso- ship of Congress. which has lution during a televised inter- the sole 6r:tit to remove a view, Senator Brooke said. "t president from office, as well think that the American public as with the new President and has the right to know exactly 'what has gone on in Water- ings against him." The likelihood that the reso- lution would be approved seem- ed doubtful ever before Senator and Senate Judiciary Commit- ees. It also appears doubtful that William B. Saxbe, the Attorney General, would discharge him not approve such an action. Mr. Jaworski's charter. that !developed after the first storm ; caused by the firing of his predecessor, Archibald Cox, !last October, states that he 4 Mr. Saxbe. In this sense, a congressional, resolution might influence Jaworski. As Mr. Saxbe said earlier this week about a con- , gressional move to immunize Mr. Nixon: "The only people' who can interpret what the . American people want is the 'Congress. I think they're aware of this and if it were handled in that manner, it. would not be a legal question." Power to pardon . Under his constitutional' power "to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against i the United States," Mr. Ford could pardon Mr. Nixon for his: alleged crimes. This decision; would be made largely on hu- manitarian and political I grounds, the anticipated public reaction. Asked last November?in his confirmation hearings at thel Senate Rules Committee on his nomination for vice president! ?whether he would pardon Mr. Nixon should he become president, Mr. Ford said: "I don't think the public' would stand for it." Sentiments change, however.1 and there is no public outcry; in Washington to deny Mr. Nixon immunity and a pardon.! if necessary. Senator Brooke seems to have expressed the; dominant mood here. z "It's pretty tough to picture a former President of the lin- ited States in jail," Represen- tative Charles E. Wiggins (R., Calif.), Mr. Nixon's most elo-1 quent' defender on the House; Judiciary Committee, told re- porters at breakfast yesterday.! Senator Robert P. Griffin i (R., Mich.). the assistant Re-' publican leader of the Senate, said earlier this week . that President Nixon's alleged of- fenses were not so serious that people wanted to see him in jail. ' However, the feeling in the 'nation might not run entirely that way. The California Poll, operated 'by Mervin D. Field in Presi- dent Nixon's home state, 'showed this week that 51 per cent of those asked felt that Mr. Nixon should not be granted immunity from prose- cution and 34 per cent said he ;should be granted immunity. i Even if Mr. Nixon is given !full immunity from federal ac- tion, he could still face other I 1legal problems as a private I citizen. There would be no bar to subpoenaing him to testify in court, an expected move in the coming Watergate coverup case. He could also be indicted by state and local prosecutors i land he could be sued in civil cases. 1 Mr. Nixon might also be dis-1 barred because of his alleged misconduct. A committee of the Newt Approved For ReEpp,?4,29041/q8/043 :,,CIAFRPP?77700432ROD01.003-30062=-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 -CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 7 August 1974 \n7-1 411 kz.4) ()a b\z5v 861 Before new disclosures, President assured U.S. that FBI was 'conducting a full field investigation'; pledged no cover-up By a staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor Many of President Nixon's state- ments on the fullness of White House-ordered investigations into Watergate from 1972 onward now contrast sharply with his latest statement ? that he ordered the FBI to limit its investigation into the Watergate break-in six days after the break-in occurred ? June 23, 1972. Excerpts from those statements follow: Press conference ? Aug. 29, 1972 ". . . The FBI is conducting a full field investigation. . . . The other point I should make is that these investigations ? the investigations by the GAO (General Accounting Office), the investigation by the FBI, by the Department of Justice ? have, at my direction, had the total cooperation of the ? not only the White House but also all agencies of government. ". . What really hurts is if you try to cover it up. . ." ' TV address ? April 30, 1913 "Last June 17 while I was ? in Florida . . . I first learned from news reports of the Watergate break-in. . . . I immediately or- dered an investigation by appro- priate government authorities. . . . "I again ordered that all persons In the government, or at the re- election committee, should cooper- ate fully with the FBI, the prose- cutors, and the grand jury. . . There can be no whitewash at the White House. Press statement ? May 22, 1973 "The burglary and bugging of the York city bar association re-i portedly has been investigating' Mr. Nixon in proceedings that, could lead to disbarment. The state bar of California is also conducting a disbarment inves- tigation. The California Poll asked if Mr. Nixon should be allowed to continue to practice law after being removed from the presi- dency. Fifty per cent said he , should not and 31 per cent said he should be allowed to prac- tice. There appeared to be little Democratic National Committee headquarters came as a complete surprise to me. . . . My immediate reaction was that those guilty should be brought to justice and, with the five burglars themselves already in custody, I assumed that they would be. "Within a few days, however, I was advised that there was a possi- bility of CIA involvement In some way. "It did seem to me possible that, because of the involvement of for- mer CIA personnel, and because of some of their apparent associations, the investigation could lead to the uncovering of covert CIA operations totally unrelated to the Watergate break-in. . . . It was certainly not my intent, nor my wish, that the investigation of the Watergate break-in or of related acts be im- peded in any way. . . ." Written statement ? Aug. 15, 1973 "In the summer of 1972, I had given orders for the Justice Depart- ment and the FBI to conduct a thorough and aggressive in- vestigation of the Watergate break- in . . . my only concern about the scope of the investigation was that it might lead into CIA or other national security operations of a sensitive nature. Mr. Gray, the acting direc- tor of the FBI, told me by telephone on July 6 that he had met with General Walters, that General Wal- ters had told him the CIA was not involved, and that CIA activities would not be compromised by the FBI investigation. As a result, any problems that Mr. Gray may have had in coordinating with the CIA support in Congress yesterday to continue the impeachment proceedings in light of the: Nixon resignation. but Senator Frank E. Moss fD.. Utah) said Mr. Nixon Should be impeached if he resigns without acknow- ledging guilt. "We all feel that whatever abuses of power were commit- ted ought somehow to he lnid out on the public record," said' Senator Byrd, who indicated that the final filing of the tfouse Judiciary Committee's impeachment report might serve that purposed. were moot. I concluded by instruct- ing him to press forward vigorously with his own investigation. . "Attorney General Kleindienst . . . informed us that it had been the most intensive investigation since the assassination of President Ken- nedy, and that it had been estab- lished that no one at the White House, and no higher-ups in the campaign committee, were in- volved. . . "Not only was I unaware of any cover-up, but at that time [Sept. 15] and until March 21, I was unaware that there was anything to cover up . . . "My consistent position from the beginning has been to get out the facts about Watergate, not to cover them up. . . . Nov. 20, 19'73 At a private appearance before, Republican governors in Memphis, President Nixon said that no "other bombs" of Watergate information Were about to explode. On Nov. 21, the 18%-minute tape gap was dis- closed to Judge Sirica and made public. TV speech ? April Z9, 1974 (Release of tape transcripts of presidential conversations) "will at last, once and for all, show that what I knew and what I did with regard to the Watergate break-in and cover-up were just as I have described them to you from the very beginning. . . . "As far as what the President personally knew and did with regard to Watergate and the cover-up is concerned, these materials ? to- gether with those already made available ? will tell it all." Approved For Release2001/08/0.8,:ZIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, AUGUST 6, 1974 White House Transcripts of 3 Nixon - Haldeman Conversations on Special to The New York Times WASHINGTON, Aug. 5?Following. are transcripts released by the White House today of three conversations between President Nixon and H. R. Haldeman on June 23, 1972. The White House said the transcripts were as complete as the quality of the tape recordings would permit. FIRST TRANSCRIPT. Meeting: The President and Haldeman, Oval Of- fice, June 23, 1972 (10:04-" -11:39 A.M.) (Unintelligible) P (Unintelligible) . . they've got a magnificent place. H No, they don't. See, that was all hand-held camera without lighting? lousy place. It's good in content,. it's terrible in film quality. P (Unintelligible) Rose, she ought to be in here. ? H No, well let her in if you want to;. Sure? P That's right. Got so goddamned much (scratching noises) .. H Goddamned. , . P I understand, I just thought (unin- telligible). If I do, I just buzz. H Yeah. Ah? P Good, that's a very ?good paper at least (unintelligible) The one?thing - they haven't got in there is the thing we mentioned with regard to the armed services. H I covered that with Ehrlichman who says that can be done and he's moving. Not only armed services, but the whole Government. P GSA? All government? H All government procurement, yeah and, I talked to John about that and he thought that was a good idea. So, Henry gets back at 3:45. P I told Haig today that I'd see Rogers at 4:30. H Oh, good, O.K. P Well, if he gets back at 3:45, he Won't be here until 4:00 or 4:30. H It'll be a little after 4:00 (untelligi- ble) 5:00. . Trip to Camp David P Well, I have to, I'm supposed to go to Camp David. Rogers doesn't need a lot of time, does he? H No sir. P Just a picture? H That's all. He called me about it yesterday afternoon and said I don't want to be in the meeting with Henry, I understand that but there may be a couple of points Henry wants me to be aware of. P Sure. P (Unintelligible) Call him and tell him we'll call him as soon as Henry gets. here, between 4:30 and 5:00 (unintelligi- ble) Good. H O.K., that's fine. H Now, on the investigation, you know the Democratic break-in thing, we're back in the problem area because the F.B.I. is not under control, because Gray doesn't exactly know how to con- trol it and they have?their investiga- tion is now leading into some produc- tive areas?because they've been able to trace the money?not through 'the money itself?but through the bank sources?the banker. 'And, and it goes in some directions we don't want it to go. Ah, also there have been some things?like an informant came in off the street to the F.B.I. in Miami who was a photographer or has a friend who is a photographer who developed some films through this Guy Barker and the films had pictures of Democratic Na- tional Committee letterhead documents and things. So it's things like that that are filtering in. Mitchell came up' with yesterday, and John Dean analyzed very carefully last night and concludes; con- curs now with Mitchell's recommenda- tion that the only way ta solve this, and we're set up beautifully to do it, ah, in that and that?the only network that paid any attention to it last night was NBC?they did a massive story story on the Cuban thing. P That's right. , H That the way to handle this now is for us to have Walters call Pat Gray and just say, "stay to hell out of this ?this is ah, business here we don't want you to go any further on it." That's not an unusual development, and ah, that would take care of it. P What about Pat Gray?you mean. Pat Gray doesn't want to? H Pat does want to. He doesn't know how to, and he doesn't have, he doesn't have any basis for doing it, Given this, he will then have the basis. He'll call Mark Felt in, and ?the two of them? and Mark Felt wants to cooperate be- cause he's ambitious? ? ? ,P Yeah. What Would Be Said H He'll call him in and say, "we've got the signal from across the river to put the hold on this." And that will fit. rather well because the FBI agents who are working the case, at this point, feel that's what it is. P This is CIA? They've traced the money? Who'd they trace it to? H Well they've traced it to a name, but they haven't gotten to the guy yet. P Would it be somebody here? H Ken Dahlberg, P Who the hell is Ken Dahlberg? H He gave $25,000 in Minnesota and, ah, the check went directly to this guy Barker. P It isn't from the committee though, from Stens? H Yeah'. It is. It's directly traceable and there's some more through some Texas people that went to the Mexican Bank which can also be traced to the Mexican Bank?They'll get their names today. H?and (pause) P Well, I mean, there's no way?I'm just thinking if they don't cooperate, what do they say? That they were approached by the Cubans. That's what Dahlberg has to say, the Texans too, that they? H Well, if they will, But then we're relying on more and more people all the time. That's the problem and they'll stop if we could take this other- route. P All right. II And you seem to think the thing to do is get them to stop? ?P Right, fine. -It They say. the only way to do that ise'from White House instructions. And it' S got to be to Helms and to ?ah, what's his name?? Walters. P Walters. / '6 June 23, 1972 H And the proposal would be that Ehrlichman and I call them in, and say, ah P All right, fine. How do you call him in--1 mean you just?well, we pro- Jected Helms from one hell of a lot of things. H That's what Ehrlichman says. P Of course, this Hunt, that will un- cover a lot of things. You open that scab there's a hell of a lot of things and we just feet that it would be very detrimental to have this thing go any; further. This involves these Cubans, Hunt and a lot of hanky-panky that we have nothing to do with ourselves. Well ? what the hell, did Mitchell know about, this? I: I think so. I don't think he knew the details, but I think he knew. P He didn't know how it was going to -he handled though?with Dahlberg and the Texans and so forth? Well who was the 'asshole that did? Is it Liddy? Is that the fellow? He must be a little? nuts. H He is. P I mean he just isn't well screwed on is he? Is that the problem? H No, but' he was under pressure, apparently, to get more information, and as he got more pressure, he pushed the people harder to move harder? P Pressure from Mitchell? H Apparently. P Oh, Mitchell. Mitchell' was, at the point (unintelligible). ? H Yea. P All right, fine, I understand it all. We won't second-guess Mitchell and the Test. Thank God it wasn't Colson. Colson Interviewed H The F.B.I. interviewed Colson yes- terday. They determined that would be a good thing to do. To have him take an interrogation, which he did, and that?the F.B.I. guys working the case concluded that there were one or two possibilities?one, that this is a White House?they don't think that there is anything at the election committee?. they think it was either a White House operation and they had some obscure reasons for it?nonpolitical, or it was a Cuban and the C.I.A. And after their interrogation of Colson yesterday, they concluded it was not the White House, but are now convinced it is a C.I.A. thing, so the C.I.A. turnoff would? P Well, not sure of their analysis, I'm not going to get that involved. I'm . H No, sir, we don't want you to. P You call them Ia. H Good deal. ? P Play it tough. That's the way they play it and that's the way we are going to play it. H O.K. P When I saw that news summary, I questioned whether it's a bunch of crap, I thought, er, well it's good to have them off us awhile, because when they start bugging us, which they have, our little boys will not know how to handle it. I hope they will though. H You never know. P Good H Mosbacher has resigned. P Oh yeah? H As we expected he would. P Yeah. H lie's going back to private life (un- intelligible). Do you want to sign this Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-Q042R000;100310002-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 or should I send it to Rose? P (scratching poise). H Do you want to release it? P O.K. Great. Good job, Bob. H Kissinger? P Huh? That's a joke. H Is it? P Whenever Mosbacher came for din- ners, you see he'd have to he out escort-. log the petson in and when they came' through the receiving line, Henry was always with Mrs. Mosbacher and she'd turn and they would say this is Mr. Kissinger. He made a little joke. H I see. Very good. O.K. A Meeting With Mills H (unintelligible) Congressional guid- ance to get into the Mills thing at all.. It was reported that somebody?Church . met with Mills. P Big deal (unintelligible). H Well, what happened there is? that's true?Church went uh? ? P Is it pay as you go or not? H Well, Church say S it is, our people don't believe it is. Church told Mills that he had Long's support on adding Social Security and Wilbur equivocated on the question when Johnny Burns talked to ?him about whether he would support the Long/Church amendment, but Long and Church telling him that it is fully funded?and our people are afraid Mills is going to go along if they put the heat on him as a partisan Democrat to say : that this would be damned helpful just before our convention to stick this to the White House. Ah, Johnny Burns, he talked to Wilbur about it afterwards and this has been changed, so don't be concerned about it?you should call Mansfield and you should tell Mansfield that Burns is going to fight this in con- ference and that 'he will demand that it go to Rules and he will demand a three-day lay-over, which means he will carry the conference over until July 7, which would be?and then before they even start the action, so it will mean ? they have to stay in?they can't? P All right. H (Unintelligible). ? P Go ahead. 'A Dangerous Game' H Clark made the point that he should handle this, not you, and is doing this through Scott .to Byrd, who is acting (unintelligible) still in the hospital. And ah, Clark's effort is going to be to kill the Church/Long amend- i lent. They got another tactic which is playing a dangerous game, but they are thinking about, which is, if they put social security on (unintelligible) that they will put revenue sharing and H. R. in it and really screw it up. P I would. Not dangerous at all. Buck up. H They're playing with it?they un- derstand. Clark is going off with the mission to kill it. P Revenue sharing won't kill it. But H. R. I would. H So that's what he is off to. ? P But, boy if the debt ceiling isn't passed start firing (expletive deleted) government workers. Really mean it cut them off. They can't do this?they've got to give us that debt ceiling. Mills has said that he didn't (unintelligible) of-the debt ceiling earlier. Well, it's o.k. It's o.k. H. Well. Burns says that he is justify- ing it on the basis that they have told him that it's finance. Ehrlichman met with them the Republicans on Senate Finance yesterday and explained the whole thing to them. They hadn't understood the first six-months financ- ing and they are with it now and all ready to go and hanging on that de- fense. He feels, and they very much want, a meeting with you before the recess, Finance Republicans. P. All right. Certainly. "British Floated the Pound!" H So, we'll do that next week. Did you get the report that the British floated the pound? P No, I don't think so, H They did. P That's devaluation? 1-1 Yeah. Vianigan's got a report on it here. P I don't care about it. Nothing we can do about it. H You want 'a run-down? P No, I don't. H He argues it shows the wisdom of our refusal to consider convertability until we get a new monetary system. P Good. I think he's right. It's too complicated for me to get into. (unintel- ligible) I understand. ? H Burns expects a 5-day percent de- valuation against the dollar. ? P Yeah. O.K. Fine. H Burns is Concerned about specula- tion about the lira. P Well, I don't give a (expletive de- leted) about the lira. (Unintelligible) H That's the substance of that. P How are the House guys (unintelli- gible) Boggs (unintelligible) H All our people are, they think it's a great?a great ah? P There ain't a vote in it. Only George Shultz and people like that that think it's great (unintelligible) There's no votes in it, Bob. P Or do you think there is? H No, (unintelligible) I think it's?it looks like a Nixon victory (shuffling) major piece of legislation (unintelligible) P (unntelligible) H Not til July. 1 mean, our guys anal- ysis is that it will?not going to get screwed up. The Senate will tack a little ? bit of amendment on it, but not enough to matter, and it can be easily resolved 'in Conference. P Well, what the hell, why not ac- .complish one thing while we're here. H Maybe we will. P?Yep. Not bad. H?In spite of ourselves. P-0.K. What else have you got that's amusing today? H?That's it. P?How's your (unintelligible) (Voices fade) coverage? 'Good Newspaper Play' H?Good newspaper play?lousy tele- vision?and they covered all the items, but didn't (unintelligible) you gotta (un- intelligible) but maximum few minutes (unintelligible). P?(unintelligible). H?Sure. One thing, if you decide to do more in-office ones?Remember, I, I --when I came in I asked Alex, but ap- parently we don't have people in charge. I said I understood, that you had told me that the scheme was to let them come in and take a picture?an 011ie picture?but (expletive deleted), what good does an 011ie picture do? H?Doesn't do any good. P?Don't know what it was but ap- parently he didn't get the word. H?Well, I think we ought to try that next time. If you want to see if it does us any good, and it might, let them. p?Well, why wasn't it done this time? H?I don't know. P?It wasn't raised? H I don't know. You said it--- P Because I know you said?and 011ie sat back there and (unintelligible) and I said (unintelligible) But, (expletive deleted) 011ie's pictures hang there and nobody sees them except us. H Now what you've got to?it's really not the stills that do us any good on that. We've got to let them come in with the lights. P Well in the future, will you ma!- - a note. Alex, Ron or whoever it is? Steve. 1 have no objection to them com- ing in, and taking a picture with stills, I mean with the camera, I couldn't agree more. I don't give a (expletive deleted) about the newspapers. 11 You're going to get newspaper coverage anyway. P What (unintelligible) good objective play? H Oh, yeah. . P ?In terms of the way it was? H Of in the news. P Needless ?to say, they sunk the bussing thing, but there was very, very little on that. (unintelligible) Detroit (unintelligible) H Two networks covered it. . P We'll see what Detroit does. ? We hope to Christ the question P (unintelligible) SOB. If necessary: Hit it again. Somebody (unintilligible) bussing thing back up again. H What's happened on the bussing thing? We going to get one or not? Well, no we're out of time. No. After. P I guess it is sort of impossible to gtt to the research people that when you say 100 words, you mean. 100 words. H Well, I'm surprised because this is Buchanan, and I didn't say time on this one, I said 100 words and Pat usually takes that seriously, but that one?I have a feeling 'maybe what happened is that he may. have started short and he may have gotten int6 the editing? you know the people?the clearance process?who say you have to say such and such, although I. know what's hap- pened. - P I don't know?maybe it isn't worth going out and (unintelligible) Maybe it is. Ehrliehman Mentioned H Well, it's a close call. Ah, Ehrlich- man thought you probably? P What? I-1 Well, he said you probably didn't need it. He didn't think you should, not at all. He said he felt fine doing it. H Well, it's a close call. Ehrlichman thought you probably? p What? . H Well he said you probably didn't need it. He didn't think you should ? not at all. He said he felt fine doing it. P He did? The question, the point, is does he think everybody is going to understand the bussing? . H That's right. P And, ah, well (unintelligible) says no. H Well, the fact is Somewhere in be- tween. I think, because I think that unintelligible) is missing some. P Well, if the fact is somewhere in between, we better do it. . H Yoah, I think Mitchell says, "Hell yes. Anything, we can hit on at any- time we get the chance ? and we've got a reason for doing it ? do it." P When you get in -- when you get in (unintelligible) people, say, "Look the problem is that this will open the whole, the whole Bay of Pigs thing, and the President just feels that ah, without going into the details ? don't, don't lie to them to the extent to say no involvement, but just say this is a comedy of errors, without getting into it, 'the President believes that it is go- ing to open the whole Bay of Pigs thing up again. And, ah, because these people are plugging for (unintelligible) and that they should call the F.B.I. in and Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R7000100330002-9 (unintelligible) don'tViViCirviWePrnBel this case period! P (Inaudible) our cause ? H Get more done for our cause by the opposition than by us. P Well, can you get it done? H I think so. P (unintelligible) moves (unintelligi- ble) election (unintelligible) H They're all?that's the whole thing. The Washington Post said it in its lead editorial today. Another "McGovern's got to change his position." That that would be a good thing, that's construc- tive. Ah, the white wash for change. P (unintelligible) urging him to do so ?say that is perfectly all right? `Maye He's Right' H Cause then they are saying?on the other hand?that he were not so smart. We have to admire the progress he's made on teh basis of the position he's taken and maybe he's right and we're . . wrong. P (Inaudible) I just, ha ha H Sitting in Miami (unintelligible) our hand a little bit. They eliminated their law prohibiting male (unintelligible) from wearing female clothes?now the boys can all put on their dresses?so the bgay . lib is going to turn out 6,000 (unintelli-' gible). P .(unintelligible) H I think P They sure test the effect of the writing press. I think, I think it was still good to have it in the papers, but,. but, let's ? perfectly ? from another standpoint, let's just say look, "Because (unintelligible) people trying and any other damned reason, I just don't want to go out there (unintelligible) what better way to s. end my time than to take off two afternoons or whatever it was to prepare for an in-office press conference." Don't you agree? H That's, that's? P (unintelligible) I spend an hour? whatever it was-45 Minutes or so with television executives (unintelligible) all in and outs (unintelligible). "Look, we . have no right to ask the President any- thing (unintelligible) biased." (unintelli- gible) says I'm going to raise hell with the networks. And look, you've just not got to let Klein ever set up a meeting again. He just doesn't have his head screwed on. You know what I mean.. He just opens it up and sits there with eggs on his face. He's just not our guy at all is he? H No. ? P Absolutely, totally, unorganized. H He's a very nice guy. ' P People love him, but damn is he unorganized. H?That's right, he's not. P?But don't you agree that (unintelli- ble) worth doing and that it's kind of satisfying. H?Sure. And as you point out there's soem fringe benefits with?going through the things is a good exercise for you? P?Tha t's right. H?In the sense of getting caught up on certain items? P?Right. H?It's a good exercise for the troops in having to figure out. what the prob- lems are and what the answers are to them. P?Three or four things. Ah?Pat raised the point last night that probably she and the gils ottghtto stay in a hotel on Miami Beach. First she says the moment they get the helicopter and get off and so forth, it destroys their hair and so forth. And of course, that is true ?even though you turn them off and turn them on so on. The second point Is? easei20.1e1,1 /MI6 PWRDP77-00432R000/1gpan992-9 P?Well, the point is, I want to check to be sure what the?driving driving time with traffic up to an hour? with Dean time is. If the is going to be H?Oh no. P With the traffic? H But they have an escort. P How long would it take? 'Girls on Television H Half an hour. Less than, half an hour. YOu can make it easy in a half hour without an escort, and they would ?they should, have an, escort. They ' should arrive with?and they may not like it?it may bother them a little, but that's what people expect ? and you know at the Conventions?every county ?she ha S :another point though which I think will please everybody concerned: She says,. "Now, look. You go there? she says as far as she was concerned she would be delighted?the girls would be delighted to very reception?every- thing that they have there." They want to ?be busy. They want to do things and they want to be useful. Of course, as you know, our primary aim is to see that' they are on -television (unintelligi- ble) coming into the ball (unintelligible) shooting the hall (unintelligible) plan on television. My point is, I think it would be really great if they did the delega- tions of the bit states. Just to stop in you know. Each girl and so forth can do? - ? . H Sure. 1- P The second thing is?just go by and say hello, and they'll P They'll do the handshakers (unin- telligible) you know (unintelligible). H Well, the big point is, there's, there's several major functions that they may want to tie that into. P Yeah. Yeah.. - H There's?a strong view on the part of some of our strategists that we should be danmed-careful not to over use them ,and cheapen them. That they should? there is a celebrity 'value you can lose. - I-1 By rubbing on them -too much? P I couldn't agree more. H And -so, we have to?their eager- ness to participate should not go? P California delegation (unintelligible) think I'm here. I mean we're going to have (unintelligible) P You understand?they're Have them do things?do the impor- tant things, and so forth, and so on. H There's the question. Like Sunday night they have the (unintelligible) whether they should go to that?now at least the girls should go. I think I ought to go too! - P Yep. Plan for Arrivals H You know, whether Pat ? one thought that was raised was that the- girls and their husbands go down on Sunday and Pat wait and come -down with you on Tuesday. I think Pat should go down and should be there cause they'll have the Salute? P (Inaudible) H She should arrive separately. ? I think she should arrive with the girls. Another thought was to have the girls arrive Sunday, Pat arrive Monday and you arrive Tuesday. I think you're over- doing your arrivals. P No, no, no. She arrives with the girls and they?they should go. I agree. H But, I don't think you have to be there until Tuesday. P I don't want to go near the damned place until Tuesday. I don't want to be near it. I've got the arrival planned (un- intelligible) my arrival of, ah? H Now we're going to do, unless you have some objection, we should do your arrival at Miami International not at, P Yes, I agree H Ah, we can crank up a hell of an arrival thing. P Allright P (unintelligible) is for you, ah, an perhaps Colson probably. (inaudible). ? H I was thumbing through the, ah .last chapters of (unintelligible) las night, and I also read the (unintdlligible chapters (unintelligible). Warm up to it and it makes, ah, fascinating reading? Also reminds you of a hell of a lot of ?? things that happened in the campaign press you know, election coverage, the (unintelligble) etc., etc. ? H Yeah P So on and so on. I want you to re-- read it, adn I want Colson to read it, and anybody, else. 11 O.K. - P And anybody else .in the campaign. Get copies of the book and give it to 'each of them. Say I want them to read it and have it in mind. Give it to Who- ever you can. O.K.? ? H Sure will.. P Actually, the book reads 'awfully well-T.-have to look at history. I want to talk to you more about that later in terms of what it tells us about how our campaign should be run,' O.K.? H O.K. In other words, (unintellig- ible) the media and so forth. ' P TAo a great extent, is responsible to what happened- to Humphrey back in '68. If that's true, it did not apply in 1960. The media was just as bad (unin- telligible) two weeks. In 1960 we ran? H It was a dead heat. 'How Much Television' / P All the way through the campaign and it never changed, clearly. It may be?it may be that our?as you read this on how (unintelligible) our cam-, paign was. . . how much television, you know. We didn't have (unintelligible) at, all. It may be that our '60 campaign- (unintelligible) was extremely much., more effective and it may be too, that. we misjudged the (uninteligible).. You-. read it through and (unintelligible) see what I mean. I mean, it's it's?even. realize that '68 Nlias much better organ- ized. It may be we did a better job in. '60. It just may be. It.may tell us some- thing.' Anyway would you 'check it over? H Yep. P (unintelligible) check another? thing?gets back? Convention? , H He was, I'm not sure if he still is, P Cbuld find out from him what chap- ters Of the book he worked on. Ah, I don't want coverage of the heart attack thing. I did most of the dictating on the last two but I've been curious (unintel- ligible). But could you find out which, chapters he worked on. Also find out where Moscow is?what's ,become of him?what's he's doing ten years. Say hello to him (unintelligible) might find it useful (unintelligible) future, despite the (unintelligible). You'll find this ex- tremely interesting. Read (unintelligi- ble). H Read that a number of times (un- intelligible) different context? P Ah, I would say another thing?. Bud Brown (unintelligible) did you read it? (Unintelligible) candidates. I don't know who all y,pu discussed that with. Maybe it's net 'been handled at a high enough level. Who did you discuss that 'with? (Unintelligible) H MacGregor and Mitchell. MacGreg- or and Mitchell, that's all. ? , Pictures With Democrats P Yep. (Unintelligible) I don't mind the time?the problem that I have with it is that I do not want to have picturc:. with candidates athat are running with Approved FOr Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330Q,Q2-9 , ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100S300029 Democrats?or against ? Democrats. that ma yeihtey be (unintelligible) or might be for us. On the other hand, all sophis- ticated Democratic candidates you un- derstand?the damned candidates (un- intelligible) they gotta get a nidturo with the President. The way to have the pictures with the candidates?this would be a very clever thing?is to call both Democrats?the good South- ern Democrats and those few like (unintelligible), who did have a picture with me, see, and then call them up and say look (unintelligible) came ors and they took a picture and maybe (unintelligible) president. Wants you to know that If you would like a picture, if you would like to come down to the office, you know, you can have a ptc- ture taken that you are welcome to .use. How does that sound to you as at (unintelligible)? Let me say this. I'm no rrot?I think* that getting to the - cardidates out there that are very busy and so forth may help us a bit. If the candidates' run too far behind you, it drags you too much. H Yeah. That's right: F On the, on the other side, I don't think it's, going to hurt you particularly if you always (unintelligible) there's some quality ? H 0 yeah, but they aren't going to (inaudible) ? (Unintelligible) quite candid with you ? I think when I ran in '46, re- member, I would have gotten on my hands and knees for a picture . with Harold Stassen and (unintelligible) whole story. We (unintelligible) to do what we can (unintelligible) in. the house and the Senate ? as well as we can. H (Unintelligible) have our loyalists feel that we're? . - P That's right. (Unintelligible) and I'll he .glad to do it next week, and I think on that basis we can handle the Democrats. Say, "Look they had a picture," and then call each one. I mean they'll have to check this list. Check each one (unintelligible) and say, look (unintelligible) if you'd like a picture with him?not on a bisis of support?one? P Yeah. P (Unintelligible) not going to make any statement?not going to make any s!ntement. (Unintelligible) have a nic- he?, he'd be glad to have a picture' ttuentelligible). II Picture of the? P That's right. Be glad to if you like, but it's up to you and so forth.. ' ? You did the Democrats in here. Would you do a, would you do the Republicans? Do a different picture (unintelligible) full shot. P Yeah. Another point I was going to mention to you. Bob, is the situation with regard to the girls. I was talking to Pat last night. Tricia and I were talking, and she mentioned?Tricia said that apparently when she was in Allen- town htere were 20 or 30 thugs?labor thugs out hoeing. H Hinmm. P And when she went to Boston to present some art?her Chinese things to the art e.aliery there?two the (unintelli- gible) from the press were pretty vicious. What I mean is they came throught the line and one refused to shake. One was not with the press. Refused to shake hands, so forth and so on. Tricia (unin- telligible) very' personal point, (unintelli- gible) good brain in that head. She said first she couldn't believe that the event that they do locally (unintelligible) understand. You know she does the Boys' Club, the Art Gallery. (unintelligi- ble). She says the important thing is to find this type of (unintelligible) to go into the damn town (unintelligible) do television, which of course, they do. (Unintelligible) she says why (intelligi- ble) control tehe place. She says in other words, go in do the Republican group. Now, sure isn't (unintelligible) to say you did the Republican group, as it is the Allentown Bullies Club? But, that's the paper story. The point is, I think Parker has to eet a little more thinking in depth, or is 1 Codus now who will do this? II They are both working on it. PWhat's your off-hand reaction on that, Bob. I do not want them, though, to go in and get the hell kicked (un- intelligible). He?There's no question, and we've really got to work at that. P?Yep. (unintelligible). H?Ya, but in think?I'm not sure? if you can't get the controlled non- political event, then I think it is better to do a political event (unintelligible). P?For example?now the worse thing (unintelligible) is to go to anything that has to do with the Arts. H?Ya, see that?it was (unintelligi- ble) Julie giving that time in the Mu- seum in Jacksonville. P?The Arts you know?they're Jews, they're left wing?in other words, stay away. P?Make a point. H?Sure. P?Middle America?put that word out? Middle America-type of people (unintelligible), auxiliary, (unintelligi- ble). Why the . hell doesn't Parker get that kind of think going? Most of his things are elite groups except, I mean, do the cancer thing?maybe nice for Tricia to go up?ride a bus for 2 hours ?do some of that park in Oklahoma?. but my view is, Bob, relate it to Middle -America and not the elitist (unintelli- gible). Dou you agree? P I'm not complaining. I think they are doing a hell of a job. The kids are willing? H They really are, but she can im- prove. P There again, Tricia had a very good thought on this, but let's do Middle- America. H Yep. P (Unintelligible). Secret Service Reception P I don't know whether Alex told you or not, hut I want a Secret Service re- ception some time next week. I just gotta know who these guys are. (Unin- telligible). Don't you think so? I really feel they're there?that ah, I see new guys around?and Jesus Christ they look so young. H Well, they change them?that's one (unintelligible) any reception now would be totally different (unintelligi- ble). P Get 100 then?so it's 200 and I shake their hands and thank them and you look (unintelligible) too?(unintel- ligible). They have a hell of a lot of fellas, let's face it, (unintelligible) friends (unintelligible), but I just think it's a nite? H They all?you have such?that's why it's a god thing t?o do, cause they are friends?and they have, such over-. riding respect for y6u and your family ?that a P I wouldn't want the whole group? something like unintelligible). Third point?I would like a good telephone call list for California, but not a huge ? book, and' the kind is?This would be a good time where (unintelligible) and just give thanks to people for their sup-, I, Colson' had me call port. For example, (unintelligible) the other day?(unintel- ligible) thing to do, but, here you could take the key guys that work?I wouldn't mind calling a very few con- tributors?maybe, but we're talking about magnitude of ten?very key ten. II Ten?you mean ten people? . P Ya. H Oh, I thought you meant $10,000. P No, ten. Ten. I was thinking of very key (unintelligible), people like?that worked their ass off collecting money,' just to say that?people that?the peo- ple that are doing the work?very key political (unintelligible) just to pat them on the back. I mean that means a helluva lot?very key political VIPs, you know, by political VIPs ?ah (unintelligible) just get the South get a, better (unintel- ligible). Our problem is that there are only two men in this place that really give us names?that's Rose?the other is Colson, and we just aren't getting them. But I mean ah, and then editors ?by editors and television people?like a (unintelligible) cal, but a few key edi- tors-who are just busting their ass for us where there's something to do. But give me a good telephone list, and Rose should give me a few personal things? likeb I do a lot of things, but I called (unintelligible) here today some (unin- telligible) and things of that sort. But I I never mind doing it you know when " I've got an hour to put my feet up and .make a few calls?don't you agree? H Yep. P I think of tthe campaign?that's going to be a hell of a (unintelligible). I think sometimes when we're here in Washington, you know, supposedly doing the business of the government, that I can call heople around the coun- try?people that will come out for us? and so forth?like (unintelligible) for example, Democrats come out for us. Theyr'e (unintelligible) right across the board?Democrat or labor union. (unin- ?telligible) H Ya. Care Is Urged P Religious leaders (unintelligible) say something. You gotta he careful some ass over in (unintelligible) checked on (unintelligible) that's why you can't have Klein (unintelligible). He just doesn't really have his head screwed on Bob. I could see it in that meeting yes- terday. He does not. H That's right. P He just doesn't know. He just sort 'of blubbers around. I don't know how he does TV so well. H Well, he's a sensation on that? .that goes to the (unintelligible) meaning of the thing, you know. What's his drawback. is really an asset. P Ya. If you would do this. Pat, and tell Codus, (unintelligible), but I will go to Camp David (unintelligible) haif hour. Key Biscayne?she might want to stay there if she can go in less than a half hour with an escort. Do you think you can? Frankly, Miami Beach (unintelligi- ble) but we can arrange it either way? Leave it to her choice. H It wouldn't take as long. P Leave it to her choice?she'd? it's.? H She'd?it's so misorable. If she's at Miami Beach she'll be a prisoner in that hotel. - P Yoa'n. Tell her?tell her that's fine. But it's up to her. H Fair enough! P I'll be anxious in (unintelligible) sign that stuff (unintelligible). I sup- pose most of our staff (unintelligible) but that Six Crises is a damned good book, and the (unintelligible) story reads like a novel?the Hiss case? Caracas was fascinating. The campaign Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432 000100330002-9 A p p rove or -e ease is 5: s : A-RDP -10432R000100330002-9 of ("purse for anybody in politics should be a must because it had a lot in there of how politicians are like (unintelligi- ble) elections, and how you do things, (unintelligible) as of that time. I think part of the problem as an example, for example, I'm just thinking?research people something they really missed (unintelligible) Burns. Pat and I, she said (unintelligible) no, she had re- membered .She remembered (unintelli- -gible) and Jimmy Burns said well (un- intelligible) hard for me to come, but I.just want you to know (unintelligible) but because (unintelligible) want you to know you are still my friend (unin- telligible). Wonderful item to put in. H Is that in the book? P It's in the book. Hell yes. It's in the book. P (Unintelligible) Why don't you re- read it? Z [Ronald L. Ziegler, the press secre- tary] We're delaying our briefing until noon for the higher education (unin- telligible) and so forth. But I thought, if you agree, that I would not press purposes, but just sit on the side for this economic thing. P Sure. How many of them are there? Z Well there's the entire cabinet of economic advisers. I mean Council of Economic Advisers, plus Shultz?fairly big group. P Shultz Z Well. H (Unintelligible) P See what I mean? H Sure. 'Should Be Must Reading' - P It's the kind of thing that I get in toasts and that sort of thing, but, but you see. I don't think our guys do that kind of?that should be must reading? that book is crammed full?crammed full?see. It would be helpful for those to get it. O.K. Oh, can we take another second? I mean, on that thing on the All Time Baseball greats?I would like to do that and, if you could ,if you could get it. Unidentified Voice. There's already a story at random? P I saw it. UV Indicating that you were going to P If you would get that?if you would get three of four. I don't want the?I'm only speaking of the All Times Greats. UV Right. P And then, and then get me a couple of other people (unintelligible) very badly (unintelligible) and I'll go down through the?quietly (unintelligible) ? UV So do you want names from me or just a list of others you have picked? H No, just the names that have been picked (unintelligible) various people. UV Right. P (Unintelligible) UV Right, I got it. P O.K. UV Yes Sir. (Unintelligible) H You did, huh, Z Yeah. Incidentally,' in the news summary (unintelligible) preferred tele- vision. Did you see that?( unintelligible) I talked to If We may (unintelligible) we may not. Z No, the point I'm making? P I know Ron, but let me say?but think?apparently, the TODAY Show this morning (unintelligible) two mM- utes of teelvision?. Z?I though he got good play. Par- ticularly in tight of the fact that ah, helluva a lot of other (unintelligible) would take place in the nation. P?Right. H?We have an overriding? P?What, weren't, how, about the guys that were there? They were pleased with the? Z?(unintelligible) and then (unintel- ligible), P?Huh? P?Cause I didn't think they would? Z?But they always are? P?Helluva a lot of news and? H?Well that snaps all our own ma- chinery, into motion too. Z?(unintelligible) damn. Feel it? P?(unintelligible) that's good, warm? Z?Right. They came tome and then said (unintelligible). ? P?(unintelligible) should have some more Z?And, they liked the color. , They made the point about?you know. How relaxed you were, and at the end, sitting down and talking about the baseball thing after the whole thing?after it was over. You know, you just chipped those things off with such ease and so forth.' It was so good. SECOND . TRANSCRIPT' Meeting: .The President and Haldeman, Oval Of- fice, June 23, 1972 (1:04- 1:13.P.M.) P-0.K., just postpone (scratching noises) (unintelligible) just say (unintel- ligible) very bad to have this fellow Hunt, ah, he knows too damned much, if he was involved?you happen to know that? If it gets out that this is all involved, the Cuba thing it would be a fiasco. It would make the CIA look bad, it's going to make Hunt look bad, and it is likely to blow the whole Bay of Pigs thing which we think would be very unfortunate?both for CIA, and for the country, at this time, and for Ameri- can foreign policy. Just tell him to lay off. Don't you? H?Yep. That's the basis to do it on. Just leave it at that. P?I don't know if he'll get any ideas for doing it because our concern po- litical (unintelligible). Helms is not one to (unintelligible)?I would just say, lookit, because of the Hunt involvement, whole cover basically this H?Yep. Good move. P?Well, they've got some pretty good ideas on this Meany thing. Shultz did a good paper. I read it all (voices fade). THIRD TRANSCRIPT Meeting: The President. and Haldeman, EOB Of- fice, June 23, 1972. (2:20- 2:45 P.M.) H?No problem P?(Unintelligible) H?Well, it was kind of interest. Wal- ters made the point and I didn't mention Hunt, I just said that the thing was lead- ing into directions that were going to create potential problems because they were exploring leads that led back into areas that would be harmful to the CIA and harmful to the government (unintel- ligible) didn't have anything to do (un- intelligible). (Telephone) P?Chuck? I wonder if you would give John Connally a call he's on his trip- 1 don't want him to read it in the paper before Monday about this quota thing and say?Look, we're going to do this, but that I checked I asked you about the situation (unintelligible) had an under-i 10 standing it was only temporary and ah , (unintelligible) O.K.? I just don't want/ him to read it in the papers. Cond. Rm.\ H--(Unintelligible) I think Helms did to (unintelligible) said, l've had no? P God (unintelligible) H Gray called and said, yesterday, and said that he thought? P Who did? Gray? H Gray called Helms and said I think we've run right into the middle of a CIA covert operation. .P Gray said that? H Yeah. And (unintelligible) said nothing we've done at this point and ah (unintelligible) says well it sure looks to me like it is (unintelligible) and ah,; that was the end of that conversaton (unintelligible) the problem is it tracks back to the Bay of Pigs and it tracks back to some other the leads run out to people who had no involvement in this, except by contacts and connection, but it gets to areas that are liable to be raised? The whole problem (unintelli- gible) hunt. So at that point he kind of got the picture. He said, he said we'll be very happy to be helpful (unintelligi- ble) handle anything you want. I would like to know the reason for being help- ful, and I made it clear to him he hasn't going to get explicit (unintelli- gible) generality, and he said fine. And Walters (unintelligible). Walters is go- ing to make a call to Gray. That's the way we put it and that's the way it was left. P How does that work though, how, they've got to (unintelligible) somebody from the Miami bank. Bureau's Inquiry H Unintelligible). The point John makes?the bureau is going on this be- cause they don't know what they are uncovering (unintelligible) continue to pursue it. They don't need to because they already have their case as far as the charges against these men (unintel- ligible) and ah, as they pursue it (un- intelligible) exactly, but we didn't in any way say we (unintelligible). One thing Helms did arise. He said, Gray? he asked Gray why they thought they had run into a C.I.A. thing and Gray said because of the characters involved and the amount of money involved, a lot of dough. (unintelligible) and ah,' (unintelligible). \ P (unintelligible) H Well, I think they will. P If it runs (unintelligible) what the hell who knows (unintelligible) con- tributed C.I.A. H Ya, it's money CIA gets money (un- 'intelligible) I mean their money moves in a lot of different ways, too. P Ya. How are (unintelligible)?a lot of good H (unintelligible) P Well you remember what the SOB did on my book? When I brought out the fact, you know H Ya. P That he knew all about Dulles? (ex- pletive deleted) Dulles knew. Dulles told me. I know, I mean (unintelligible) had the telephone call. Remember had a call put in?Dulles just blandly said and knew why. H Ya P Now, what the hell!-Who told him to do it? Thi President? (unintelligible) H Dulles was no more Kennedy's man than (unintelligible) was your, man (un- intelligible) ,P (Unintelligible) covert operation? do anything else (unintelligible) H The Democratic nominee, we're going to, have to brief him. The remainder of the transcripts was not available for this edition. The full text will appear in later editions. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 ? ;Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001.00330002-8 WASHINGTON POST 7 August 1974 CIA Gets WaterEate Vindication By Laurence Stern Washington Post Staff Writer The newest installment of White House .transcripts strongly 'indicates the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency in its long standing denials of. ?.any direct involvement in the Watergate break-in. The transcripts of the Jape recordings reveal ? in -the President's own utter- ances ? that the CIA was injected into the Watergate case by Mr. Nixon and his top aides. Their efforts de- . layed for nearly two weeks ? the FBI investigation of the first major evidentiary link . between the Watergate bur- glars and the 1972 Nixon campaign organization. But the strategy ulti-. mately failed when former CIA Director .Richard . M. Helms persistently refused to give a written declaration to former acting FBI Direc- tor L. Patrick Gray III that .the bureau's investigation threatened to expc?3e covert .CIA activities in Mexico. . The plan concocted in the, White House by the Presi- dent and his chief of. staff, H. R. (Bob) Haldeman. was to direct the CIA to tell the _FBI to "stay the hell out of" (Haldeman's words) the in- vestigation of Nixon funds which were laundered through a Mexico City bank account and ended up in the pockets of the Watergate burglars. The new evidence wholly undermines the President's repeated claims that he was ni.,aLed by national secu- rity considerations in impli- cat:eig the CIA. Mr. Nixon said on May 22, 1973, that his initial suspicions of CIA involvement were incorrect. But he did not concede, un- til the release of the latest bombshells of evidence, that the concern was to cover up Watergate-White House con- nections. True to its institutional ways, the CIA had no com- ment yesterday on the latest developments. But there is little doubt that the tape disclosures provided a cer- tain joy in Langley in the aftermath of the hammering the CIA has taken through- Out the unfolding Watergate scandal. There was one fleeting and cryptic presidential comment in the new tran- scripts relating to Helms on which no informed officials could shed light. It was the President's remark that "well, we protected Helms from one hell of a lot." . Previous testimony in the CIA-Watergate affair has re- vealed that the White HOuse acted through the CIA's deputy director, Gen. Ver- non Walters, a former mili- tary aide to Mr. Nixon in his . vice presidential days, to carry the message to the FBI. , Walters initally complied with the White House direc- tive that he tell Gray the FBI investigation in Mexico endangered covert CIA op- erations. But he reversed himself in the face of the in- sistence of his boss, Helms, that there was no basis for such a stand by the agency. Helms, who had a reputa- tion as an adroit maneu- verer in Washington's bu- reaucratic minefields, was pursuing a strategy of "distancing" the agency from the scandal. 'Despite the confirmatory, 'revelations of the new tapes,. the CIA does not emerge from the episode with its skirts in spotless condition. Item. The agency did, in 1971, agree to provide?at, high-level White House di- rection?spy paraphernalia to White house "plumbers" E. Howard Hunt and G. Gor- ? don Liddy which was used in the Daniel Ellsberg .break-in. The CIA's defense was that it did not know what the equipment would be used for. Items. In testimony to the the initial assistance . to Hunt in August, 1971, when it became suspicious of h,is activities, it once again re- sumed dealings with him in connection with the White House - requested psychiatric profile of Pentagon Papers .defendant Ellsberg. Item. After turning off Senate Foreign Relations ComMittee early in 1973 Helms testified that the CIA had no dealings with Hunt or any of the other Watergate break-in figures subsequent to their retire- ment from the agency. It was Helms' successor, James G. Schlesinger, who broke the story of the 1971 assist- ance to Hunt to investigat- ing congressional. commit- tees. . Item. Helms also denied in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Commit- tee that the CIA was in- volved in an interagency White House domestic intel- ligence program launched in 1970. Subsequent publica- tion of the so-called "Huston Plan" (drafted by former White House aide Tom Charles Huston) confirmed that Helms personally par- ticipated in the White House program. The CIA is prohib- ited by its congressional charter from becoming in- NEW YORK TIMES 7 August 1974 FREIE PANEL CLEARS KISSINGER ON WIRETAP ROLE By BERNARD GWERTZIVIAN speeiai to The Tieis York Times WASHINGTON, Aug. 6?The Senate Foreign Relations Com- mittee voted unanimously today ,to clear Secretary of State Kis- singer of allegations. that he had misled the committee about his role in the wiretapping of 17 officials and newsmen from 1969 to 1971. In a report approved, this morning, the committee "con- cludes that there are no con- tradictions between what Dr. Kissinger told the committees . last year and the totality of the new information available." The favorable report, first made known by Senator J. W. Fulbright, Democrat of Arkans- as, the committee chairman, to newsmen, removed the possi- bility of Mr. Kissinger's resign- ing because of doubts 'raised; in the press about his credibil- ity; ? Kissinger 'Gratified' The State Department, late this afternoon, said that Mr. Kissinger had been "gratified" by the report and "no longer sees any reason for resigna- tion." . "Therefore, he does not in- tend to resign," Robert Ander- son, department spokesman, said. . On June 11, in a news con- ference in Salzburg, Austria, Mr. Kissinker had threatened to quit unless his reputation was cleared of allegations that he had lied to the committee last fall. Mr. Kissinger had noted news reports at the time based on Federal Bureau of Investigation documents that raised doubts as to whether he had been com- pletely candid in discussing his wiretapping role before the committee last September when he was up for confirmation. Asserting that he could not? continue to conduct foreignI volved in internal security enforcement matters. But on the crucial ques- tion ,of CIA involvement in Watergate, the White House- instigated effort to suspend the FBI's investigation of the re-election committee cash, Helms stood firm against what must then have seemed awesome presiden- tial pressures. The new tapes gave some measure of how prowerful those pressures must have been. policy if his honesty was ques- tioned, Mr. Kissinger asked the committee to make a new in- quiry into his role in the wire- tapping that involved 13 Gov- ernment officials, several of them former and present Kis- singer aides, and four news- men. "The committee reaffirms its position of last ? year that his role in the wiretapping 'did not constitute grounds to bar his confirmation as Secretary of State.'" the report said. It added: ? "If the committee knew then what it knows now it 'would have nonetheless reported the nomination favorably to the 'Senate." ; Committee members were unanimous in their statements to newsmen about their sup- port for Mr. Kissinger. Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, Democrat of Minnesota, said ."the committee made a very exhaustive study." "We found nothing in those documents or hearings of any significance to cause us to change our minds," he said. "The decision made at Dr. Kis- singer's nomination hearings still stands." Mr. Humphrey added that he hoped Mr. Kissinger would re- main as Secretary, even if President Nixon was forced to leave office. "He is needed," Mr. Humph- rey said. "His role is good. He's a tremendout national asset." The committee held six closed-door hearings in the cur- rent inquiry, with Mr. Kissinger testifying as well as Attorney General William B. Saxbe, Clar- ence M. Kelley, F.B.I. director, and Gen. Alexander M. Haig Jr., the White House chief of staff, who at the time of the taps was Mr. Kissinger's deputy on the National Security Council staff. The report made clear that the committee's purpose "was not to investigate the wiretap operation per se." ? It said that the inquiry did not make definitive findings on each allegation about Mr. Kis- singer's role, "but we believe it should lay to rest the major questions raised about Secre- tary Kissinger's role." The committee said that it was not ruling on the legality of the wiretap program, initi- ated, according to President Nixon and Mr. Kissinger, to stem leaks of national security information to the press. Noting that "discrepancies" remained between the F.B.I. documents and the testimony of 'participants, the report said, "Probably it will never be pos- sible to determine exactly what took place." It said that since it was im- possible to resolve "every ques- tion about the wiretap program and Secretary Kissinger's role in it," the committee set "a more modest and realistic ob- jective." I It said that it had tried to Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77?00432R000100330002-9 , Approved For Release 2001/08/08 answer two questions: inconsistencies" between Mr. "1. Is there a basis in ascer- Kissinger's testimony last fall tamable fact to conclude that and the new evidence?pri-1 Dr. ,(issinger misrepresented marily the F.B.I. material'. his role in the wiretapping dur- ing his testimony.last year? "2. Would the committee, With all of the information it now has concerning the wire- tapping program, reach the same conclusion it did last Sep- tember that `Dr. Kissinger's role in the wiretapping of 17 Government officials and news- men did not constitute grounds to bar his confirmation as Sec- retary of State.'" Answer Is 'Yes' The report said that "after considering all of the testimony and relevant materials, the committee has concluded that the answer to the second is `Yes.'" In its inquiry, the committee failed to find 'any significant It noted that one "incon- sistency" was the fact that the President's decision to order wiretaps was made on April 25, 1969, and not May 9, 1969, as Mr: Kissinger had first testi- fied. But it concluded that "it' matters little" wehn the deci- sion was taken. "None of the discrepancies: that has emerged pierce the! heart of the issue here: Is there solid reason to doubt that Dr. Kissinger was truthful last year in describing his role?" the re- port said. .The major question raised in the press about Mr. Kissinger's role was- that in the F.B.I. documents, including memo- randums written by the NEW YORK TIMES 7 August 1974 Text of Report Special to The hteiv York Times WASHINGTON, Aug.. 6-- Following is the text of the observations and conclusions of the Senate Foreign Rela- tions Committee report on its most recent inquiry into Secretary of State Kissinger's role in the White House wire- tap program: ? The purpose of the com- mittee's inquiry was not to investigate the wiretap oper- ation per se. Nor does the committee consider it neces- sary to make definitive find- ings of fact on each of the allegations that have been made concerning Dr. Kis- singer's role in the wiretap- ping. In fact, this new record may raise additional ques- tions about certain aspects of the wiretap program. But, we believe it should lay to rest the major questions raised about Secretary Kis- singer's role. The committee had no illu- sions about the difficulty of establishing precisely what took place in the wiretap program. There are some dis- crepancies between the F.B.I. documents and the testimony of participants in the pro- gram. Probably it will never be possible to determine exactly what took place. More than five years have passed since the wiretaps. were iniated an dtime has taken its toll in life, memory, health, and records. IgSome questions can be answered only by President Nixon. SlOthers could be answered only by the late J. Edgar Hoover. cSome inconsistencies be- tween the testimony and the F.B.I. documents can be re- solved only by Mr. William C. Sullivan, who is physically unable to testify. cOther aspects will remain a mystery due to apparent gaps in the F.B.I. documents. Recollections of partici- pants have become hazy and uncertain with the lapse of time. 12 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 bureau's late director, J. Edgar Hoover, Mr. Kissinger was de- scribed as "initiating" same of the wiretaps.? Kissinger's Contention . Mr. Kissinger, in his prior testimony, and in public state- ments had insisted that he had only participated in the pro- gram by supplying names of those who had access to in- formation that had been leaked to the press, or whose files had derogatory information, - or' whose names arose in the course of the investigation. The committee said that "to be sure there are inconsistencies between the F.B.I. documents and the testimony." As. an example, it said that there was a letter from William C. Sullivan, .a former top F.B.I. official, to Mr. Hoover, dated May 20, 1969, asserting that Mr. Kissinger came to Mr. Sul- on Kissinger's Role Realizing the impossibility Of laying to rest every ques- tion about the wiretap pro- gram and Secretary Kissing- er's role in it, the committee set a more modest and re- .alistic objective. The commit- tee approached this inquiry with two questions in mind: [1] Is there a basis in .ascer- tainable fact to conclude that Dr. Kissinger misrepresented his role in the wiretapping during his testimony last year? [2] Would the committee, with all of the information it now has concerning the wiretap-. ' ping program, reach the same conclusion it did last Septem- ber that"...Dr. Kissinger's role in the Wiretapping of 17 Government officials and newsmen did not constitute grounds to bar his confirma- tion as Secretary of State?" After considering all of the testimony and relevant mate- rials, the committee has con- cluded that the answer to the first is "no," and the answer to the second is "yes." In making this inquiry the committee has not addressed itself to the legality of the wiretaps involved.' It is neither passing judgment on the constitutionality of war- rantless wiretaps for foreigu policy/national security pur- poses nor on whether these 'individual wiretaps . were properly justified if, in fact, warrantless wiretaps for such purposes were legal at the time:. These are matters for the courts to decide. But it should be noted that Dr. Kissinger's participation in the wiretapping came after assurances by the Attorney General that such wiretaps were lawful and by Mr. Hoover that similar wiretaps were carried out under pre- vious administrations. It is highly unlikely that anyone with Dr. Kissinger's back- ground, largely within the academic world, would ques- tion assurances of legality and precedents from the na- tion's chief law enforcement officers. In carrying out his orders from the President, Dr. Kissinger was acting on the assumption, backed by At- torney General Mitchell and F.B.I. director Hoover, that, the wiretaps were perfectly legal. The committee has not found any significant incon- sistencies between Dr. Kis,' singer's testimony of last .year as to his role in wire- tapping and the new evidence now available. It matters lit- tle whether the President's decision to use wiretaps in an effort to trace the source of leaks was made in April 25, 1969, as now appears to be the case, or May 9, 1969, as Dr. Kissinger had thought when he testified last year. None of the discrepancies that has emerged pierce the heart of the issue here: Is there solid reason to doubt that Dr. Kissinger was truth- ful last year in describing his role? Te be sure, there are in- consistencies between the F.8.1. documents and the testimony'. For example, in the documents, there is a let- ter from Mr. Sullivan to Mr. Hoover dated May 20, 1969, which states that Dr. Kis- singer came to Mr. Sullivan's 'office that morning and " read all the logs." Dr. Kis- singer cannot recall such a visit, and Mr. Sullivan as- sured the committee that he neither saw nor talked to Dr. Kissinger during the entire time the wiretap program was in operation. Much of the recent con- troversy over Dr. Kissinger's role seems to be a question of semantics, particularly over the meaning of the words "initiate" and "re- quest" in relation to his par- ticipation in the wiretapping. Words in F.B.I. documents or on Presidential tape cannot be considered as definitive statements either of what transpired or of Dr. Kissin- ger's part in the over-all pro- gram. They should be con- livan's office that morning and "read all the logs." Mr. Kissinger told the com- mittee that he "cannot recall such a visit," the report said, and Mr. Sullivan "assured the committee that he neither saw nor talked to Mr. Kissinger dur-I ing the entire time the wiretap was in operation." program report noted that Mr.( am !Nixon in a letter to the com-: mittee on July .12 reaffirmed. his own responsibility for the! wiretap program. 'It said that: Mr. Kissinger had told the corn-: mittee that "I did not initiate; the program, I did not recom- mend the program, and I had nothing to do with its estab- lishment." "I then participated in the; program, once it was estab- lished, according to criteria Pthc had been laid down in the resident's office," he said. I in Wiretaps sidered only in relation to the framework of the over- all policy ordered ' by the President and the total evi- dence now available. Did Dr. Kissinger initiate the wiretap program by urg- ing it on the President? Or, did he. merely participate in, the wiretapping, carrying out a program ordered by the President, as he testified last year? . Assertion by Nixon In a letter to the commit- tee dated July 12, 1974, in response to a committee re- quest for additional informa- tion, the President wrote: . "I ordered the use of the most effective investigative procedures possible, including wiretaps, to deal with cer- tain critically important na- tional security problems. Where _supporting evidence was available, I personally directed the surveillance, in- cluding wiretapping, of cer- tain specific individuals. I am familiar with the testimony given by Secretary Kissinger before your com- mittee to the effect that he performed the function, at my request, of furnishing information about individuals within investigative cate- gories that I established so that an appropriate and ef- fective investigation could be conducted in each case. This testimony is entirely correct: and I wish to affirm categori- cally that Secretary Kissinger and others involved in var- ious aspects of this investi- gation were operating under my specific authority and were carrying out my express order." the committee, "I did not initiate the program, I did not recommend the program, and I had nothing to do with its establishment. I then par- ticipated, according to cri- teria that had been laid down in the President's office." The President stated ? that he initiated the program. D. Kissinger's role, as he described it last year and again this year, was that of Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010033.0002-9. assisting in implementing a program ordered and direct- - ed by the president. The committee has received no new information which con- tradicts that description of his role. Semantic problems arise again in the question of ? whether or not Dr. Kissinger -"initiated" individual wire- taps. Secretary Kissinger testified last year that he supplied names to the F.B.I. of those fitting the criteria agreed upon in the meeting with the President but that "in supplying the names we did not specifically request a tap, although we knew, of - course, that thi. -could be, was a probable outcome." In testimony this year he ex- palmed that: "Insofar as the submission of a name trig- gered a series of events which resulted in a wiretap, it could be said that the submission 'initiated' the tap. ? Contradictions Noted There are unexplained con-, ?tradictions between the testi- mony arid the documents re- lative to the wording of in- dividual wiretap requests. Documents concerning "re- quests" for wiretaps were generally prepared without the benefit of personal con- tact between the drafter and ,the "requester," whose real identity is sometimes doubt- ful. Upbn ques'i.oning, Mr. Bernard Wells,' the F.B.I. agent who handled the prep- aration of most of the papers relative to the program stated that the wording on the in- dividual request forms could not be taken literally. The committee was unable to settle to its satisfaction some questions about the ini- tiation and termination of 'certain wiretaps. But it did establish to its satisfaction that Secretary Kissinger's role in the program was es- sentially as he described it in testimony last year. In summary, the commit- tce is of the opinion that it has appropriately inquired into Dr. Kissinger's role in the wiretapping, pursuant to his request following the re- cent controversy, and the committee now concludes that there are no contradic- tions between what Dr. Kiss- inger told the committee last year and the totality of the new information available. The committee reaffirms its "position of last year that Is role in the wiretapping . . . "Did not constitute grounds to bar his confirmation as Secretary of State." If the committee knew then what it knows now it would have nomination favorably to the Senate. BALI 4 I14 0 j-ft UELIIE;94.7S4AME R I CAII oaers. THE. CIA: and- the -.-Cult...6!; :and .eriteirp- rise: the,Their.-message 'to the .press ? leadei-s-,_of.;:ourgovemment:-. anc1.7the?people is that the. t,che and, , John has-lchanged. its ways in, :Alfred A Knopf,S93 j themselves. -,;,thilEin office* by -.1 keeping . ? -ith? - .the .changing -11"tevievied by tirnes.i'In,.an 'era of 'detente.... '..THOMAS B;.R.;SS the people.';S:fiuiness; ?:.the.CDA is said to be -cancer - ? c.????? trating,;-:-Ort:;?intelligence-gath- Upo- ? leay.2 .n.d no-. longer - rned- - -; ? ?. . .? . . ing in the,-affairs .:of. other ? i s -_pri bl -sell'i f govern rne?n - ? -is for cy.if to :saw. often; for; rth.e.'%_ti and. Marl's Marchettt is former ion s of dol lars in a:pasiagethat was origin- ranking CI k official -and. the -'1intml M a r c h e't t i--and ally censored,v. estimate -ithat first to devoting two-- :71thogi zed b.Ook7AbOut:...Otir. from' the money-- and man tibilli ondollattspy,-Organi.-1ZaFed.? On Marks' is..a;:former. State- ;H:e-rt'...-"..Evert ? noC-Sure.?:: The, authors:, b aroue.,'_that e V ..pepartmenoificial ',and *Seri.-.'7.fthat- th-eY'liafre spending'is almosttoaily :-waste1ul.?4E---.'they ...credit7the --case-to the So CIA ith having reciited -,gence..rn a t ? :-.- only ,ona,, -high leyel. to t'Ytnion..and degree the State Department -' sions indicated by - blantt?maintairt..th_a..(The :was-actilal-: censor -this book,:':-::.--?,.--Spices`.--.-1;They':::-are:,':rnar:ked- 1.,Over by B'itish , . . ..? ? ?..?..... arguing 'th'dt the pa rti cularly".::Marchetti,ti?hid tive '-.-involvecf'are';those Of ir- - The.-'bulk of intelligence in effect,.,waived ,their CIA officials..Conternpla theY,-ay;',...,i.s.'now collectedty i*Am-endineribriblits--,4hY variouS.-...,Secrecy?-?agre-e-'...:-SpaceS-:will be filled.-in 'after.;;the-skirSatelliteS-and the. Eke 'during-..their-.-'0overri-:-.:-the :;'Supreme ..agent is in en t'employ The- courts' at ? .F dOwn its ru I ng. . bold- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 Prepared Statement on H.R. 15845 by William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence 22 July 1974 NY. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity to testify today on H.R. 15845 introduced by you and NY. Bray. The amendments proposed in this bill would be the first changes in the charter of the Central Intelligence Agency, found in the National Security Act of 1947. In conformity with our American constitutional structure, the existence of the Central Intelligence Agency stems from an Act of Congress. This is a unique contrast to the tradition and practice of most intelligence services, but it is a necessary reflection of our free society. The result, I believe makes us a stronger nation, whose citizens live in a freedom envied by most of the world. The amendments would add the word "foreign" before the word "intelligence" whenever it refers to the activities authorized to be undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency. I fully support this change.. While I believe the word "intelligence" alone in the original Act was generally understood to refer only to foreign intelligence, I concur that this limitation of the Agency's role to foreign intelligence should be made crystal clear to its own employees and to the public. I hope this amendment will reassure any of our fellow citizens as to the Agency's true and only purpose. Section (3) of the bill reenforces the charge in the original Act that the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for "protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." The amendment states that pursuant to this responsibility, the Director shall develop appropriate plans, policies and regulations but such responsibility shall not be construed to authorize the Agency to engage in any police, subpoena, law enforcement or internal security activities, and that any information indicating a violation of the Director's plans, policies and regulations, should be reported to the Attorney General for appropriate action. This amendment conforms to my own understanding of the meaning of the original statutory language. As I said in my confirmation hearing, I believe that the original Act gives the Director a charge but does not give him commensurate authority. Under existing law, the Director is responsible for developing such internal administrative controls as are possible and appropriate to protect against unauthorized disclosure, but if such a disclosure is identified, his only recourse beyond internal disciplinary action, including termination of an employee, would be to report the matter to appropriate authorities for examination of possible legal action. As you are aware, NY. Chairman, the Government did take legal action with respect to one of our ex-employees who declined to abide by the agreement he made when he joined CIA to protect the confidential information to which he would be exposed. NY. Chairman, I fully agree with this clarification of the precise nature of the charge on the Director to protect intelligence sources and methods against unauthorized disclosure. As you know, I am of the personal opinion that additional legislation is required on this subject to improve our ability to protect intelligence sources and methods against unauthorized disclosure. The contract theory on which the previously mentioned litigation is based is indeed a very slender reed upon which to rely in all cases. My views on this subject became known publicly as a result of that case and the specifics of my recommendations on this subject are still under active consideration within the Executive Branch, so that an appropriate Executive Branch recommendation can be made to the Congress. 14 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000.100330002-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 The bill would also require that the Agency report to the Congress "in accordance with such procedures as the Congress may establish" on those "other functions and duties related to [foreign] intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct." The National Security Act authorized the National Security Council to direct the Agency to conduct a number of foreign intelligence activities which by their nature must remain secret. The Act made clear, however, that these functions and duties could only stem from a specific direction by the National Security Council rather than being determined by the Agency itself. The amendments do not change this situation but add the requirement of reporting to Congress. Mt. Chairman, at present the Agency reports to the Congress about its activities in a number of ways. On certain matters the Agency reports publicly, such as in this hearing and in my own confirmation hearings. The Agency further identifies for public release a number of matters affecting it or resulting from its efforts. A recent example was the publication of testimony on the economies of the Soviet Union and China provided to the Joint Economic Committee and published on July 19th with only a few deletions which related to intelligence sources and methods. The second area in which the Agency reports to Congress is in its assessments of foreign situations. The Agency briefs appropriate committees of the Congress in executive session, using the most sensitive material available, thus providing the Congress the fruits of the intelligence investment made by the United States. I believe this type of reporting is particularly important, as I hope to make our intelligence of maximum service to the nation as a whole, and this can only take place if it can assist those in the Congress who share in the American decision-making process under our Constitution. The Appropriations Committees, the Armed Services Committees, the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and others have been the recipients of this kind of material. Again, to the extent possible, information provided and discussed in these executive sessions is later screened for publication. In many cases the sensitivity of the sources and methods involved does not permit such publication, but the classified transcript of the briefing can be made available to the meMbers of Congress. The third area in which the Agency reports to Congress concerns its operations. Pursuant to long-established procedures of the Congress, reports on these matters, including the most sensitive details, are provided only to the Intelligence Subcommittees of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees of each House. MY. Chairman, there are literally no secrets withheld from these Subcommittees. In fact, I believe I have more than a duty to respond to them; I must undertake the positive obligation to volunteer to these Subcommittees all matters of possible interest to the Congress. As you know, these reports cover our annual budget, the details of our activities, and problems which may have arisen in some regard or other. The procedures established by the Congress for this reporting have worked well. Large numbers of highly sensitive matters have been revealed to these Subcommittees over the years, and their classification has been respected. I am also aware of the sense of responsibility of the members of the Congress as a whole with respect to matters which must remain highly classified because of their sensitivity. Thus, I. am confident that congressional procedures in the future will be as effective as those of the past and I welcome the codification of this relationship in the proposed amendment which requires the Agency to report to the Congress. 15 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 Mr. Chairman, the bill also reenforces the proscription in the original Act against police, subpoena, law enforcement powers or internal security functions. I wish I could say that this clarification was not necessary but as you know, MY. Chairman, I have frankly admitted that the Agency did make some mistakes in recent years in this area. Your own report of the investigations of this Subcommittee dealt with those incidents. The Congress has, in Public Law 93-83 of August 6, 1973, made clear that the CIA may not provide help to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in assisting local police and law enforcement agencies of the states and municipalities. The language of the bill would go further in this regard and prohibit the Agency from engaging directly or indirectly in the above type of activities within the United States either on its own or in cooperation or conjunction with any other department, agency, organization or individual. This would restrict our collaboration with the FBI to the field of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence. It may also limit the degree of assistance the Agency could provide to the Secret Service, under the Secret Service Act, which authorizes it to call upon the assistance of any other agency of the Government to assist it in its mission (Public Law 90-331). While this amendment might restrict certain of our activities of the past which were not in any way reprehensible, I believe that its enactment at this time would be an appropriate way of clarifying the purpose of the Agency as related only to foreign intelligence. I do note that the bill contains a proviso in this area which I believe is both appropriate and essential to the proper functioning of the Agency. This makes it clear that nothing in the Act shall be construed to prohibit the Agency from conducting certain necessary and appropriate activities in the United States directly related to its foreign intelligence responsibilities. I welcome this proviso not only for its content but aiso for its clarification of the propriety of some of the long-standing activities of the Agency which are essential to its foreign intelligence mission. These include: a. Recruiting, screening, training and investigating employees, applicants and others granted access to sensitive Agency information; b. Contracting for supplies; c. Interviewing U.S. citizens who voluntarily share with their Government their knowledge of foreign subjects; d. Collecting foreign intelligence from foreigners in the United States; e. Establishing and maintaining support structures essential to CIA's foreign intelligence operations; and f. Processing, evaluating and disseminating foreign intelligence information to appropriate recipients within the United States. These matters were publicly reported by me in my confirmation hearing last summer, and I believe that there is general understanding of their necessity and propriety. The proviso in the amendment, however, would make this explicit. The bill also adds a new subsection to the Act to prohibit transactions between the Agency and former employees except for purely official matters. I fully subscribe to the purpose of this provision, to assure that former employees not take advantage of their prior associations to utilize the Agency's assistance or resources or to have an undue influence on the Agency's activities. This is particularly directed at the possible use of the Agency's assets for "nonofficial" assistance outside the Agency's charter. I would like to 16 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010033000.2-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9. say that such a provision is not necessary, but again I must admit that errors have been made. While I do not believe there were any instances of major import, I accept the desirability of making the limitations on the Agency's unique authorities quite clear. The normal legal proscriptions against improper influence on Federal employees apply, of course, to the Agency. In addition, a regulation has been developed within the Agency, which is brought to the attention of each employee each year, that any CIA employee who believes that he has received instructions which in any way appear inconsistent with the CIA legislative charter will inform the Director immediately. I might point out that in those cases which presented questions concerning the Agency overstepping its bounds, the propriety and dedication to American traditions of our own employees caused them to object to possible Agency activities outside its charter. In my confirmation hearing I stated that I am quite prepared to leave my post if I should receive an order which appeared to be illegal and if my objections were not respected. Thus we in the Agency are fully in accord with the purpose of this amendment. At the same time, I confess concern over some possible interpretations of the language of this subsection. I assume that "purely official matters" would include our normal relationships with our retirees or others who left the Agency. I would assume it would also enable us to maintain normal official relationships with individuals who left the Agency to go on to other Governmental activities so long as the "official matters" fall within the scope of CIA's legitimate charter and there is no undue influence involved. I do wonder, however, whether certain activities might be included under this provision as official which neither the Congress nor the Agency would want to countenance, and on the other hand whether the phrase might interfere with a contact with an ex-employee volunteering important information to the Agency. Since the Agency has certain unique authorities under the National Security Act and the CIA Act of 1949 and since much of its work does involve highly classified activity, I would think it appropriate that the Congress add to the Agency's legislative charter some special recognition of the high degree of responsibility imposed on the Agency and its employees as a result of the grant of these unique authorities. This could require the Director to develop and promulgate a code of conduct for CIA employees at a higher standard than that expected of Federal employees generally. Thereby, the intelligence profession would become one of those with special standards such as the medical or legal professions. The Director's unique authority to terminate employees in his discretion when necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States, pursuant to the National Security-Act of 1947, would provide a sanction for the application of such high standards. Regular congressional review would provide an assurance that such a code of conduct was adequate and that it was being promulgated, applied, and adhered to. Mr. Chairman, it has been a pleasure to have had this opportunity to conunent on H.R. 15845. With the few reservations I have noted above, I fully support the bill. Most of all, I fully support the purpose of the legislation in clarifying the mission of the Central Intelligence Agency only to conduct foreign intelligence activities. At the same time, I am pleased that the modifications proposed to the CIA charter would not adversely affect its authority or capability to carry out the challenging task of collecting, processing and disseminating foreign intelligence in the world today. I believe these amendments would mark an important milestone in eliminating any apparent conflict between our ideal of an open American society and the minimum require- ments of secrecy in the intelligence apparatus necessary to protect this free nation. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : COR-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 fRprErred For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 LOS ANGETS 21l- July 1971I- VITE BOOK' ittPORT robing the CIA's ? BY ROBERT KIRSCH/ - Time Book critic . ? A dilatation from :Mal- colm Muggeridge provides the lieadnote for, the final, chapter of The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence' (Knopf: $8.95) by Victor Marchetti and John ? P.. Marks. it: is worth quating in full: 7 . ? "In the eyes' of. posterity . it will inevitably ? seem that, in safegtiardiiig our. freedom, we. destroyed it; ? . that the vast ClarideStine apparatus we built Up to probe our enemies re- - sources and intentions only served in the end to. 'confuse our own purposes; ? that'the practice of deceiv- ing others for the, good of the state led, infallibly .to: our deceiving 'ourselves:: ? and that the vast army of. intelligence, personnel ? built up to execute these ? purposes were soon caught up in the web of their.own ? sick fantiasies; disas-!,? trous consequences to them and us." ? ' ? prescient Words Muggericlge wrote these: words in -.1966. How pee-. 'Scient, they are remains in be seen, but, there is hint, - enough nowadays 'to ..sug- gest, their ominous rete-... ? vance. . ?The CIA and the Cult or. Intelligence" has already been much in the news; Marchetti, a -veteran of CIA service, resigned in 3969 after 14 years with ; the agency: He began the' writing of this book in col' Jaboration with. John `Cult of Secrecy ty, and . . Vital to.thei conduct of foreign -affairs." . They continue: "The, proven benefits of intel- lio-bence.are not in question: 'Rather, it is the illegal and unethical clandestine *operations Carried out tin; .der the guise of ? intel- ligence that are questiona-. ble .? both on moral.: igrounds and in 'terms of .,practical benefit to the na-, They Call for legislation' limiting. the' CIA's' role to its original ? functions o( coordinating and evaluat? ing intelligence .and ? that the minimal clandes tine functions be. assumed. by appropriate ? govern-. ment ? departments with counter espionage func- tions taken 'overby the FBI.i . Ironically, in one passage that remains ? intact, after: the CIA reading, they re-, port on "the most impor-1 tant of the' CIA's .private.: literary projects . . the 'massive secret history ? of? the agency that has been' in preparation since 1967.".. This ."encyclopedic sum- mary of -the CIA's 'past,",' which might answer some, of their claims. they, say,. will never be published ex-? .eept for the benefit of. those few . who ."have al .clear.need tb know." That: -is the dilemma of 'secrecy, .?for We, the public, alsO' have a need to. know. The deletions of matter in these pages are a.constant reminder of. that .depriva- tion. .1 Marks. in 3972. Shortly, thereafter he .was servedf with a ?court ? order ob- tained by, the governinents enjoining hirn from closing in any manner any information 'relating .to .intelligence . activities, (2) any information con- cerning sources and methods,: ? (3) any intelligence. ..infer-. rnation." lit art introduc7: tion to the book, Melvin : Wulf, legal director. Of the: American Civil Liberties' Union, which assisted in Marchetti's defense, scribes .the litigation.. in the -end, the doctrine:, .,against prior 'restraint ml publication was. over turned in the case because as a CIA employe Marchet4 ti had, ? the courts held,' signed several secrecy agreements with the agen- , cy, .and this made theCase ."a contract action" rather than.a ,First Amendment issue. ? ' In the course onegal lion, .and under protest, the authors delivered the manuscript . to the CIA. The agency designated 339. ?deletions ranging from one' word. to whole pages. By ? this year, when 'another action brought by the au- thors went to trial, the de- letions had - been reduced 'to 168. The trial , judge'. 'found that only 27 of these: deletions were The- CIA appealed and so did the authors. . ? For the authors this his- tone c'elisorshiP is. evidence of the basic point:i ithey:. seek to that LONDON TIMES 9 July 1974 Vatican denies 'CIA cash link' with the Pope From Our Correspondent Rome, July 8 The Vatican newspaper rOsservatore Ron iano today denied a magazine report that. the Pope received money from the United States Central telligence Agency (CIA) when he was Archbishop of Milan. An interview with a former CIA agent in Panorama last May said the Pope had received CIA funds for use in orphan- ages but may not have known where the money came front. Today rOsservatore Romano said in a brief statement: " His Holiness Pope Paul VI has never received financial 'con- tributions from the CIA or any other unknown source." ,the CIA ?'has gone beyond': ?,its- original pin-pose "as a .coordinating agency re- sPonsible for gathering; evaluating and preparing foreign. intelligence" to be.- come "an-operational arm, independent .and unac countable, the secret.- in- strument .of the; Presiden cy and a handfill of poi,ver-? ?flit men whose purpose iS interference ,in the domes- tie affairs of. other na-. . tiOns." ... ? ? ? This last, phrase'is posed in the-form of a rhetorical, Aluestion, but there is no', doubt .that the authors irie ,tend an affirmative, answer. That, indeed, is the' burden of the remaining text of the . book. ' ? The strongest point made by- the book is in its attack on the clandestine' 'mentality,- the "cult .of se- crecy'. which the authors say has pursued policies to make th,e ?service immune from public scrutiny. This Mythologizing of the clan, ,destine shields the failures Of the CIA, fosters. a reliance on covert ac- tivities,?minimizes.accomv: tability and injects inter foreign policy and, to some'. -degree, . domestic Policy 'operations which have the, possibility of. subverting! .the democratic process. . . " Marchetti and Marks do not deny, "that the gather.:: ? ing of intelligence is a ne- cessary . function , of- . modern government . Makes a significant contri-i ..b.gtion.. to,. riationar,.securi-:, WASHINGTON POST 2 August 1974 Colby Agamst Declassfying Speedup ' 'Associated Prete CIA chief William E. Colby yesterday said congressional efforts to speed the declassifi- cation of government docu- ments would endanger, the country's intelligence opera- tions. "I would find it very diffi- cult ... to urge a foreign Intel- ligence service or a gtrate gically placed individual in a foreign government or a for- eign country to cooperate with this agency and to provide in'. formation in confidence if the law of this country required that such information be made available to. the public two years later," Colby told a House Government Opera. tionssubcommittee. , The subcommittee is consid- ering amendments to the Free- . dom of Information Act that would require all documentS labeled secret and confidential to be declassified within two years. 18 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 JAPAN TIMES 6 July 1974 WASHINGTON (AP) ? A new book about the Central intelligeney Agency (CIA) says a series of American presidents encouraged and as- sisted the agency to shift from its original mission of gathering Intelligence to one primarily devoted to covert operations.. While conceding the agency a number of successes, the book says the agency has be- come "a secret instrument of BALTIMORE SUN 28 July 1974 Man Criticizes Agency in ook the presidency and a handful of powerful men, wholly inde- pendent of public account- ability." The CIA's chief purpose is interference in the domeelie affairs of other nations (and perhaps our own) by means of penetration agents, propa- ganda, covert paramilitary in- terventions and an array of other -dirty tricks," the book says. - The authors of "The CIA The caat e - of (ITC' ruirtid spies _The CIA and the. 'Cult of Intelligence. By Victor Mar-, chetli and John D. Marks.: ? 398 pages. $8.95. Knopf. ' To the great joy of its :.publisher ?and authors this thick volume, in the .brassy tradition ? of the old- style expose, has reaped a .rippling harvest of advance ?;_publicity. This .is because, -according to its dust jacket, :the book is "the first in American history to be sub- lected to prior government "censorship," on the ground that it reveals government ?secrets normally held within the confines of "classified" information. 'Nevertheles Ili e authors?Marchetti is a esignee from the Central In- telligence Agency, Marks from the Department of ! State?persisted clamo- :musty; and the upshot of the legal skirmishing is a tome. pockmarked With restored' deleetions, indicated by bold-face type, and with deletions per se in the form of blank areas approximat- ing the length of the. exci- sion. If nothing .else, the work is a bibliographical cu- riosity. Is it anything else? Seamlessly written To take its good points, the volume is, considering the dual authorship, seamlessly written. It has a good index. There are two charts, on the CIA's internal structure and on the components of the "intelligence community" in Washington. On the minus side the book has no bibliog- raphy, no illustrations and no annotation. The few sources cited in the text tend to steer toward such twin- kling examples of objective journalism as Boss and Wise's "The Invisible Gov- ernment" (1964) or Ram- parts magazine. ? -What of the alleged revela- tions that have caused such a clacking of media type- writers? These constitute a running diatribe against the "cult," or obsessive venera- tion, of intelligence gather- ing; detailed descriptions. of :the various branches of the CIA, viewed as the focus of that activity; and a conclud- ing section that seeks to.ana- lyze "the clandestine mental- ity" ? and show why it ought .to be eradicated_ Through- out certain theses recur. The covert (secret or hid- den) branch of CIA controls the agency, to the detri- ment of ,its less exception- able information-assembling branches. Anywhere in the world such secret services exist ptirnarily for the fun and games to be derived at public expense. The CIA "in- tervenes" in the affairs of other -nations, and this is criminal; it maintains some of its background machinery in this country, and that is almost as beastly. Despite its machinations the agency 'has not placed a spy in the Kremlin since Oleg Penkov- sky, and the British he,nded him to us to begin with. The problem ihumpingly presented by the appearance of this polemic is the nature of a government's right to protect its valid secrets. Should it have ony secrets? If so who is to determine and the Cult of Intelligence" are Victor Marchetti, a CIA man- for 14 years who rose to he executive assistant to the deputy director, and John D. Marks, a former State De- partment official. ' The book, just published, has been, a subject of litiga- tion for years. The CIA ob- tained an injunction barring Marchetti from publishing any secrets he learned while he was in CIA employ. ? When the Manuscript was submitted last fall, the CIA ordered 339 deletions, ranging from single words to entire pages, but it later yielded on all but 168. A federal judge ruled that only 27 of them were justified. Pending ap- peals, however, the book has been, published with blank spaces representing the 168 passages. ' The CIA has not com- mented on specific portions of the book, but says it does not endorse it nor agree with its conclusions. The ? authors note that Presi- den,t Harry Truman, during whose administration the CIA. was established, said in 1963 he was disturbed that it had NEW YORK TIMES 3 August 1974 Mexico to Probe Charges Officials Are C.U. Agents MEXICO CITY; Aug. I (Reu- ters) ? President Luis Eche- verria Alvarez today ordered the Attorney General's depart- ment to investigate whether there are agents of the United States Central Intelligence Agency in the Government, a spokesman said. The investigation follows a their just extent? Marchetti and Marks are of course entitled to their opinions. But then so are the "faceless, desk-bound bureaucrats", they sneer at?and even Presidents. To take another tack: the manner of both authors' departure from their jobs is not spelled out, but it is well known that Mr. Marchetti is violating the sworn oath of secrecy re- quired of any CIA employee. (Presumably a similar re- euirement obtained for Mr. Marks.) If a man so grandi- loquently abandons an honor- able contract, what does this 'say about his honor? More specifically, what does it say about his accuracy in repor- tage? . Make no mistake: There is been diverted from its origi- nal assignment and become "an operational and at times a policy-making arm of the Government." "In no instanc'e?has a presi- dent of the United States ever made a serious attempt to re- view or revamp the covert practices of the CIA," March- etti and Marks write. "And this is not. surprising: presi- dents like the CIA. It does their dirty work ? work that might' not otherwise be do- able. When the agency fails- or blunders, all the president need do is to deny, scold or threaten." In a passage that the agen- cy first ordered deleted, the authors say the CIA employs 16,500 persons ? not counting tens of thousands of agents mostly overseas who work under contract ? and has an annual budget of $750 million, p 1 u s hundreds of millions more from the Pentagon. Even so, Marchetti and Marks say, that is less than 15 per cent of the total of 150.000 persons and annual funds of over $6,000 million spent for intelligence by the Government. statement last month in Britain iby Philip Agee, an American who claimed to have worked for the C.I.A. in Mexico and other Latin-American countries, that there were at least 50 people paid by the agency in the Mexican Government. Since then there has been a rash of charges among political 1 parties here that the other 'Igroups are harboring C.I.A. agents. . much here .for concerned citizens to ponder. These au- . thors are too knowledgable to he put down as just an- other pair of Peck's Bad Boys., (Mr. Marchetti con- fesses that he was probably the country's "leading ex- ,pert.? on certain aspects of Soviet affairs.) But neither are they so wise as to quali- fy just yet .for Wunderkind status. In sum, it seems fair to afririn that a citizen woudl do well to weigh many an-. other piece of evidence on this topic rather than rely on the unconfirmed allegations leveled by these rather grimy Galahads. CURTIS CARROLL DAVIS Mr. Davis served with the CIA's Office of Specific (fpr- ations a long time ago. Approved For Release 2001/08ff : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 NEW YORK TIMES 26 July 1974 Assessing the Strategic-Arms By Paul?Nitze WASHINGTON ? For those who have seriously hoped for long-term, balanced and effective limits on offen- sive strategic nuclear arms, the Mos- cow. summit talks may turn out to have been a decisive, negative turning point. There are three considerations: what was agreed, what was not achieved, and what President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger have said about the strategic-arms part of the talks. The agreements covered three mat- ters: a treaty prohibiting underground weapons tests exceeding 150 kilotons; amendments to the antiballistic-mis- sile treaty under which both sides would be limited to one rather than two ABM sites; and an agreement that the delegations of the two sides will meet promptly to begin negotiation of an interim agreement on limiting offen- siye nuclear arms extending through 1985. The first two would appear to accomplish little of strategic impor- tance and the third would appear to acknowledge a serious setback to pre- vious hopes. What was,not achieved was a per- manent agreement to replace the first interim agreement on offensive arms, an objective that the two sides at the ltast summit meeting, in Washington in 1973, had set themselves to accom- plish this year. Nor was it possible to secure agreement on an equitable par- tial measure limiting deployment of the new family of Soviet offensive strategic-weapons systems. The President in his television ap- pearance on his return from Moscow said that new patterns were emerging between the United States and the So- viet Union "that hold out to the world the brightest hopes in a generation for a just and lasting peace that all can enjoy." The accomplishments at Mos- cow would appear to warrant a more modest appraisal. The proposed treaty to prohibit un- derground tests?it requires Senate ratification?undoubtedly has? positiye political aspects. There was, however, inadequate time in Moscow to work out agreed criteria to distinguish be- tween nuclear-weapons tests and peaceful nuclear explosions, and agreed measures to assure adequate means of verifying such a distinction. This task remains to be accomplished. , Furthermore,, the strategic value of an agreement not to test after March 15, 1976, weapons of a yield greater than 350 kilotons--the equivalent of 150,000 tons of TNT?is doubtful. The Russians have tested, or will have tested by the starting date of the ban, warheads they need for their new fam- ily of offensive weapons. What would be cut off would be subsequent weapons tests above that threshold. A principal purpose of such tests would ,appear to be further im- egotiations in Moscow Paul Nitze recently resigned from the United States strategic-arms delega- tion in Geneva. provefnents in the ratio of the explo- sive power of a warhead to its weight. The strategic significance of such improved ratios for a force having the large throw-weight potential of the So- viet missile force is not readily appar- ent, while such improved ratios could' be significant for a force with smaller throw-weight. (Throw-weight is the weight a missie can carry to a target.) As for the proposed amendments to the ABM treaty, there are again cer- tain positive'aspects: One ABM site on each side would appear to be better than two. However, the defense either, of a nation's capital or of an intercon- tinental ballistic missile silo field lim- ited to 100 ABM interceptors is not of major strategic significance. The risk in the ABM treaty is rather the diffi- culty of distinguishing between an ABM interceptor and a modern sur- face-to-air-missile (SAM) interceptor.' From that standpoint, the radar com- plexes around Moscow have a greater strategic potential than do those at Grand Forks, N. D. What gives greater grounds for con- cern, however, is the summit decision that the delegations of both sides will now direct their efforts not toward ne- gotiating a permanent agreement limit- ing offensive nuclear systems to re- place the interim agreement but toward" negotiating a limited agreement cover- ing the period to 1985. This decision would appear to un- dercut the positions taken by the United States delegation at Geneva under Presidential instruction and to favor the Soviet positions. , In essence, the United States sought in Geneva a permanent agreement based on the concept of equality, or essential equivalence, in basic yeti- fiable limitations on those offensive weapon systems whose principal role is strategic; with a provision not to circumvent the agreement through the deployment of other nuclear systems not specifically limited. To avoid the necessity of the United States building up to Soviet levels to achieve essential equivalence, the United States delega- tion proposed phased reductions to lower levels. I believe the Soviet strategy is to deal with i each segment of the problem piecemeal, nailing down one piece after another in a manner favorable 20 to Soviet interests and using all effec- tive measures--diplomatic, propagan- distic and through enhanced military capabilities?to bring pressure on the United States to settle for such piece- meal agreemers. Among the issues the Soviet side consider, already settled are the in- equalities in numbers of launchers and silo dimensions provided by the in- terim agreement and their right to put multiple warheads on a substantial proportion of their more numerous and larger missiles. Their current interest in a threshold nuclear-test ban (the treaty involving underground tests), agreement to fore- go a second ABM site, and a lim- ited agreement to cover the period to 1985 is consistent with such a piece- meal strategy and with inhibiting a United States response to the immi- nent deployment of the Soviet Union's new and much more effective family of offensive strategic systems. In the absence of any agreement by the Soviet side to substantially alter its past positions?and there have been no indications of such a change ?I ,see small prospect of the con- tinuing Geneva talks on limiting stra- tegic arms making progress toward a bal ced and substantially helpful out- come. In his news conference in Moscow, Mr. Kissinger implied that the respon- sibility for lack of greater progress rested equally on both sides, which "have to convince their military Es- tablishments of the benefits of re- straint." During the thirty years since I first became associated with the interface between foreign policy and defense policy, I recall no instance when a' Secretary of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff failed to respond to a valid Presidential order. Any implication that the specialized advice of those legally charged with giving it cannot be overridden by Pres- idential or Congressional decision based on their broader range of re- sponsibilities, that it should be molded to fit the views of higher authority or should be withheld from those en- titled to it, I would find novel and contrary to our theory of government. Furthermore, it is my judgment that the United States defense Establish- ment, because of its particular nation- al security responsibility, has been more deeply concerned that there be balanced and effective arms-control- measures than other parts of the Gov- ernment. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 ? NEW YORK TIMES 14 July 1974 of: to. lutoriu for Peace, Maybe . By Paul 14: Leventhal . . . . . WASHINGTON?Peaceful plutonium can be the death of us all?not will be necessarily-but. can he. The present course of the United States and France to step up the exporting of nuclear- power technology to nations willing to pa Y the cost is a form of insanity that may irSvertake the ? world before its awesome dimensions are realized. -Consider this: The nuclear power plants that the 'President wants to sell to Egypt are each. capable of produc- ing 150 kilograms (352 pounds) of plutonium as a by-product every year. After, reprocessing, this plutonium will amount to more than 700 pounds of . weapons-grade material? suitable for the fashioning rof dozens of bombs of ? the 'size of the:one:dropped on Naga- .saki. ? ? Consider this also: The Atomic En- ergyCommission plans to license over the next quarter-century 1,000 ,nu- clear-power plants in the United States, which will produce 60 per' cent of our electricity and also 660,000 pounds of plutonium a year by the year 2000. ? Worldwide projections for that date are for 2,000 reactors, including our ? own, generating 40 per cent of elec- trical needs and also more than two million pounds of plutonium a -year. These projections are based on the de- velopment of the so-called "breeder" reactor, which will generate more plu- tonium than it consumes. All this, of course, is to be done un- der adequate?the industry does not like the term "strict"?safeguards. . A recent study by a team 'of outside -consultants for the Atomie Energy Commission, which was released in May by Senator Abraham A. Ribicoff after he obtained it from the A.E.C., reported that current regulations are "entirely inadequate" to protect wean- 'ems-grade nuclear-materials in the pri- -trate sector from theft and subsequent fashioning into terrorist bomb's. Most commercial reactors today do hot use weapons-grade uranium or plutonium. ? If safeguards are so poor?and danger- ous?now, what will the ?situation be like after 1980, when the A.E.C. pre- dicts that commercial power reactors will be producing and using more plu- tonium than will the ? Government weapons program? And also consider this: The A.E.C. ' conducted a secret study to determine whether two physicists With doctor- ates, fresh out of graduate school, could design an atomic bomb from current, public literature, assuming. they could obtain the necessary .plu- tonium or highly enriched uranium. - ' ?It, has since been disclosed that the young physicists succeeded in design- ing a fission device that A.E.C. ex- perts determined would explode with a force within 10' per cent of the yield predicted by ? the.. would-be bomb-. makers:. And, finally, consider this: Pluto- nium is the most toxic Substance known to man.. One thirty-millionth of an ounce?less than a .pollen grain? if inhaled or ,swallowed ,will, cause cancer. Thus, even if a crudely fash- ioned bomb fails' to explode, partial detonation will conVert it into a ter- ribly poisonous dispersion device.Also,' the radioactive half-life of plutonium- is 23,640 years, which means it retains its. toxicity for at least ? 100,000 years.. These facts lead to three basic con- clusions. . I Ei First, the nuclear-power industry generates the world's most explosive and poisonous element. Second, this element can be fash- ioned by skilled, determined individ- uals into atomic bombs or deadly dis- persion devices. Third, present efforts to safeguard this element from outside -theft or in-- ternal diversion have been found to be entirely inadequate. in the world's most sophisticated nuclear nation, the United States. What, then, are we in for if we and our peaceful nuclear competitors like France continue to view the exporting of this technology as a solution to our balance-of-payments problems?' At best, we, are in for a period of uncertainty. It is an uncertainty built on the sure knowledge that even en- ergy-rich nations like Iran and Saudi Arabia are only too-ready to pay the price for the stuff that international dreams are made of: ultimate power. In that sense, plutonium-producing power plants are international dream machines. Plutonium has become the world's most valuable and coveted substance. India has recently. demon- strated what one country can do with. 21 plutonium from foreign-built reactors on its own soil?for "peaceful pur- poses," of course. Even if the industry proves to.oper- ate as safely as the A.E.C. and other advocates say it will, there is still the problem of safeguarding nuclear ma- terials from theft and nuclear facilities from sabotage. At present, international safeguards is administered by the International Atamie Energy Agency cover only in- ternal accounting systems (comparable , to a bank audit), not physical security (comparable to a bank guard). How- ever, while a bank audit involves ac- countability down to the penny, a nu- clear audit is considered tight if it-can account for 99 per cent of weapons- grade materials. TA -? Materials ? unaccounted for already amount to thousands of pounds of plu- tonium and highly enriched uranium that the A.E.C. assumes?and can only assume?have been lost in the indus- trial process, not stolen. Nevertheless, the A.E.C. does not require tests of the commercial-safe- guards system?so-called adversary testing?to determine whether sneak- thefts of small amuurits of weapons- grade nuclear materials are possible. , The nuclear power debate has been subjected to much sound and fury, mostly over, the safety issue. This has benefited the industry because it has diverted attention from the most basic issue of, all: safeguards. The bottom line of ? the nuclear- power -industry is the exporting and the common use of plutonium. Can the world whose commerce will soon have to accommodate more than two mil- lion pounds of plutonium a year sur- vive? Even if legitimate governments agree to safeguard the industry from threats, thefts and sabotage, what of nationalizations, revolutions and ter- i'orist attacks? The trend toward nuclear power may be inevitable. But we, and the rest of the world, ought to know now what we are letting ourselves in for. Paul L. Leventhal is special counsel to the Senate Subcommittee on Reorgan- ization. Research and International Or, ganizations, which reported to the Senate the origina/ version of a pend- ing bill to reorganize the Atomic En- ergy Commission. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 NEW YORK TIMES 7 August 1974 ealing Experts lit oscow. Fasp.West w- lue a.nd Risks Last month, following the summit meeting be- tween President. Nixon and Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet leader, Secietary of State Kissinger said that he expected a national debate on the meaning of security in the nuclear age and on the value and risks of closer ties with the Soviet Union. Tomorrow, that debate in effect begins when Mr. Kissinger testifies before the Senate Foreign Rela- tions Committee. In advance of that discussion, The New York Times invited four public figures with interests in East-West relations to its Wash- .ington Bureau last Friday to consider some of the issues. The discussion preceded President Nixon's, - latest Watergate disclosures Monday, but the par- ticiapnts 'already had assumed that the impeach- ment inquiry might result in Mr. Nixon's depar- Mr. DANIEL: It seems' to suppose they might say the me that when we begin talk- same thing of us. I believe it mg about security in the is important that the agree- nuclear age, to us Secretary . ments that we do have with Kissinger's phraseology, we the Soviets are mutually ben- eventually coma down to one ' eficial so that they can be question, and that question.. implemented and carried out is can we trust the Russians? to the satisfaction of both countries. MR. BRZEZINSKI: If you ask whether we can trust the Russians, it sort of begs the question. Trust them about what? I think we can trust the Russians to pro- mote their national interests as they best see fit, as I think we try to do also. What bothers me about the problem of American-Soviet relations is that I see in the Soviet attitude the curious combination of ideological residue and recently awaken- ed great-power nationalism, the combination of which may -make the Soviet Union an insufficiently constructive partner in dealing with the new global problems that are becoming central. SENATOR FULBRIGHT: I never like to put it as trust-. ing people. It is a matter of recognizing and adjusting. the interests of the two countries. Where their inter- ests are in variance with ours, I don't think you can trust them or other govern- ments. The only possibility of' making progress is to discov- er, if possible, areas of mu-. tual interest on which they can agree. To take a simple example, we have had treaties with .them in the Antarctic, for ex- ample, which it was in our mutual interest to make and they respected them. Lack of Mutual Interest Now if we take the other example, where we attempt to make them abide by our ideas of morality, or ideology and so on, there is no mutual interest there and you can't trust them to do. something in reformation of their own society that they don't want, to do. Problems are Gobal Indeed, in some respects, I consider the debate about detente a bit anachronistic because it focuses on a power relationship which is important and critical but which, in many ways, deals SENATOR JACKSON: I with the very traditional think it boils down to the aspects of international poll- simple fact that if you are tics. We are very rapidly be- to have an agreement with ing thrust into a world in the Soviets, it must be one which, for the first time, that is not based on faith as global problems are becom- such. I think agreements to Mg central. be meaningful must be init. What makes me uneasy tually self-enforcing. If one about the Soviet attitude is presupposes that we can en- that the Soviet Union, in ter into an agreement with many ways, much less than the Soviets in which we are the United S,tates, does not going to rely on their word have a global perspective. It or their interpretauon I has a rather narrow vision think this is an illusion. .I of its interests. There is lure from office. They also discussed what implica- United States policy. The participants were Zbigniew Brzezinski, di- rector of the Trilateral Commission, a nongovern- mental group focusing on coranon problems of the United States, Japan and Europe, and professor of government at Columbia University; McGeorge Bundy, president of the Ford Foundation and for- mer adviser on national security to Presidents Ken- nedy and Johnson; Senator J. W. Fulbright, Demo- crat of Arkansas, chairman of the Foreign Rela- tions Committee, and Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat of aWshington, a frequent critic of the Adimnistration. Clifton Daniel, Washington Bureau chief of The 'Time ,moderated, assisted by David Binder and Bernard Gwertzman? of the bureau. ? much less of a willingness to respond to the new global problemS that impose them- selves on 'Us. The longer-range threat is not Soviet domination, be- cause I don't think the 'So- viets are strong enough to impose it on anyone.,... but world chaos to which the Soviets would be able to' make a very major contri- bution. MR. DANIEL: Since you mentioned detente?it was bound to come up very early in the discussion because the d?nte revolves a great deal around the word?you have said, that there is no alterna- tive to d?nte. What do you mean by "d?nte?" MR. BRZEZINSICI: When I said there was nd alternative to detente, I mean as a mat- ter of deliberate policy there is no alternative but for both sides to try to stabilize the relationship, to try to upset . the competitive aspects of their relations with more co- operative aspects. But within that context, there are dif- ferent kinds of detents that we can have. Compartmentalized Concept My criticism of the Nixon. Kissinger detente is that it is a highly compartmentalized, highly limited, very conserva- tive concept of d?nte that happens to suit the Soviet leadership as well. It is not a detente which is compatible with these global problems that are surfacing and which. require a much broader so- cial, political, even cultural accommodation among the advanced countries. In that sense, it is an anachronistic and, in some respects, even a very dangerous detente. 22 ?MR..BUNDY: The idea, pur-- pose, in American for- eign po?cy goes back long .before the present Adminis- tration. The first efforts in that direction, I think, can be associated with the later years of the Eisenhower Ad-. ministration. They were an element, a strong element in the policy of both President Kennedy and President John- son. There were some results; as Senator Fulbrig'nt has sug- gested. I am inclined to be- lieve, however, that d?nte -is not a state of peace among friends, and cannot be, that there is this persistent ambi- guity between our common interests and our adversary relationship, and that we have to expect that to cone tinue. So when you ask the question, "Can we trust the Russians?" I agree that we can trust them to pursue their own interests. . In my judgment, the over- riding common interest is survival in the nuclear age. One of the great things that we have achieved over the last 15 years is some in- crease in common under.' standing of that reality. The disappointments we have had along the way are not trivial; the disappointment with Moscow this spring and summer. is serious. I would think, nonethe- less, that we have no altern- ative but to continue to try to have the most effective communication with this complex, secretive, self- serving, ideologically primi- tive state and, in that sense, I Would agree with Mr. /3rz- ezinsIti that we need more and not less effort at effec- tive communication and, if possible. agreement with Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003.30002-0 the Soviet Union. MR. DANIEL: Why do you think it was the Nixon Ad- ministration that was able to achieve this degree of de- tente, rather than. the earlier administrations, two of which you served? MR. BUNDY: These things build on each other. You can't have a SALT I except in the context of your ear-. her efforts over nuclear- - lest bans and nuclear nonpro- liferation. I don't blame the Nixon Administration par- ticularly for talking as if detente began in 1969. Most administrations have a hal). it of talking . as if foreign policy began on the inaugura- tion. A. National Objective It is the ? fact that any large-scale policy of this and not all of the arange- ments that have been made,' I would have to say, seem to me to have been well calcu- lated Or carefully connected in spite of the Administra- tion's belief in linkage. . I would not believe, to wind up quickly here, that d?nte is irreversible. I think it has been a national ? objective, not a single Ad- 'ministration's objective, and that it should continue to be so. ?? MR. BINDER: What makes' it- not rreversible? , MR. BUNDY: Czechoslo- ?vakia is a kind of example. Vietnam sometimes was an example of an action which, could impede or make diffi- cult communications. ? We could have that kind of breakdown or understanding in the Middle East. We could have it, I regret to say, on the next stage of the arms. balance, because there are very serious differences evi- dently now between the con- .cepts of Moscow and those, of Washington is . to what makes an acceptable agreed po,-ition for strategic weap- ons in the next five to ten' yea Ts. MR. DANIEL: Could you offer some reasons why d6-., tente is unstable or reversi- ble? ? ? MR. BRZEZ1NSKI: The. first is ? the potential for' leadership change in both systems. We may be getting a very significant leadership change in this country and it is conceivable that the new leadership in some respect is going to be more cautious in foreign affairs, more con- servative. We know that the Soviet. leadershhip is aged, quite? aged. It is one of the oldest leaderships in the world. We do know in the past at least that. leadership changes in the Soviet Union produce periods of instability and rather dramatic shifts in for- eign policy as well. The second reason is more basic and worth considering in the general context of what is meant by -national security. I think we are on the eve of a very major crisis of international- systems as'a whole. , ? \Ye may have national, bankruptcies of a number of, America's allies. The whole. international situation is be- coming unstuck. In that con- text, I think it is ? only rea? sonable to expect the Soviet? Government to 'reassess 'its' own stake in a detente rela- tionship which is predicated to some extent on stability. SENATOR JACKSON: I do? not think it is a question of- whether we should or should not have a d?nte. Everyone wants peace. The question is what kind of detente. You can have a good detente; you can have a ? had detente. It -seems to me that it boils down to the basic question of how should we conduct American foreign policy. I thing first that we should engage in bard bargaining ? with the Soviets, just as the' 'Soviets do on' every- trans-' action. If you only .put for- ward the proposal S that you -know in advance' are accept- able to the Soviets, you end up. negotiating on Soviet terms. ? Second, each agreement 'that we enter into. should 'reflect reciprocity, a two-way street. f ? The, grain deal is the clas- sic ekample ? of a one-way street. . The ' Administration announced it as being part Of detente. The official, po- sition now is that it was never a part of detente. That change came after the ine vestigatien of the grain deal was completed. , -,I would point out,' too, that in this area of reciproc- ity there is a lot to be done ? in improving the accessibility of the American press in Moscow to their citizens as ,the Russian press moves freely in this town. Somehow we are reluctant to insist on reciprocal terms.- I think the whole . world had a chance to see how reciprocity is handled when the Soviets cut off the inter- views in the middle of the summit conference, over the three great networks. Another key point here is the need for early progress in the critical area of mutual arms reduction. To the man in the street, I suspect, and it has been my own experience in talking with audiences that . if lie would see some ? movement toward a mutual reduction in arms leading to 'disarmament, this more than anything else would give credibility to a better relationship with the Soviet Union. The same applies in the area of progress in human rights. That is why I intro- duced my amendment on the right and opportunity to emi- grate that is being debated too in this context. There is also the need to. promote genuine trade not economic subsidies disguised' as trade. Let me just illustrate how Approved Aer 260176b/o8 a+me wandered in the handling -of trade, in the handling of ex- ports. We are sending a lot of phosphates to the Soviet, Union. The bulk of the phos- phates come from Florida. We are sending so much now that we are being required to open up an important en- vironmental area, one of the national forests in Florida, to mine phosphates because we are going to be short of phosphates for our own needs. ? I do believe that we should have the kind of trade -with the Soviet Union that is a two-way street. Now the facts are that the Soviets have very little to offer us in the way ? of goods and services, unless we are will- ing to spend billions of dol- lars in capital investment in the Soviet Union. I would be willing to make some special concessions in commerce and trade, recog- nizing that our trade with. the Soviet Union will not inure directly -to our com- -mercial benefit if we can work out satisfactory ? ar- rangements in other fields with them,. I -think another element in a genuine detent that is of critical importance is the re- straint on the part of .both countries ? it has not been exercised by the Russians of late -- in the delivery of sophisticated ? weapons to :areas- of tension. The Middle East is a classic example of this. ?? .Better relations 'with the 'Soviets requires less empha- 'sis. by the Soviets on the .ideological ,struggle. MR. DANIEL Do any of you feel that d?nte with the SovietTnion depends on -the personal relationship be- tween President Nixon and Mr. Brezhnev to the extent that Mr. Nixon indicates? Secondly, is d?nte a parti- san matter in your view, as between Republicans and Democrats? - SENATOR FULBRIGHT: I don't think it is partisan. I do think the personal rela- tions can have a great ef- 'feet. You asked a moment ago why Mr. Nixon could do this. I think one of the reasons is the fact that he has such- a reputation for be- ing anti-Communist. If the Democrats did the same, they would be accused by the Republicans of being subversive. I think much of it has to do with' our ancient feel- ing about the-Russians being atheistic Communists and bad people. MR. BUNDY: I would just Say that I don't think Presi- dent Johnson felt inhibited on the Soviet side. I do -think Senator Fulbright's remark about [Nixon's] spe- cial advantage is important in the -context of China. SENATOR JACKSON: I might make one observation. I think Communist states tend to speak in terms of top personalities of other governments. I have found this generally to be true, 23 that. However, that the de- parture of a top representa- tive of any of the states will in itself cause a change in relations. I think this points up the ned to institutionalize our relationships more effective- ly between the United States and the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. MR. BRZEZINSKI: It seems to me that the central ques- tion about d?nte is whether our policies are reinforcing the worst tendencies in the Soviet system or are they encouraging the hest. It seems to me that a meaning- ful detente, one which offers real prospects for the future, is obviously the one which engages the Soviet Union in more extensive, more col- laborative effort in regard to all, of the central issues the are now becoming im- portant. Tt is this kind of detente which I believe this Adminis- tration has not been-success- ful in mounting. . The fact of the matter is that the economic relation- ship today amounts to nothing less than a fairly sizable Americanized science-tech- nology transfer to the Soviet Union. This I think is, the kind of d?nte which does not encourage the best and which is some -respects re- inforces the worst because it d-lays internal reform in the Soviet Union. It makes' it impossible for the Soviet system to maintain a highly centralized economic system on the basis of a highly cen- tralized political system. It impedes the kind of pressures from within the economy which in time will spill over into the political realm. In? deed it even encourages a certain measure of domestic repression when external costs are not too high. MR. BUNDY: Are you sug- gesting that not to have eco- nomic relations would lead to an increased diversity in the Soviet economic system? MR. BRZEZINSKI: What I am suggesting is that the economic relationship ought to be calibrated very closely to the development of other relationships and should not outpace it on the basis of one-sided arrangements. - SENATOR JACKSON: I will break in here by saying :that this is where hard bar- gaining comes in. The So- viets have a serious need for our science, our technology, our . business - management technicians and a vast amount of our agriculture and agri- cultural know-how. All I am suggesting is that in light of this situation we should in our bargaining relate this to a reordering of priorities in both countries. I don't see why we should subsidize their military-indus-, trial complex. I would he willing to make some eco- liOrtliC and some technological concessions if I cou;c1 see a movement away from the tErk-koliblViektavo2koe01oofS61562- r?ls build-up to an arms reduction. MR. DANIEL: Senator Ful- bright, a short while ago, Senator Jackson outlined what might be described as a negotiating posture toward the Soviet Union. Do you agree with that attitude and posture? SENATOR FULBRIGHT: No. Just two incidents I want to remark on. When he says that the grain deal was part of detente, I never conceived that it was part of detente. It was part of the elections of 1972 to create an image of tremendous effectiveness on the part of President Nixon to get rid of a surplus. What was wrong with it was selling it at such a cheap priee. We had had a policy for 2 years of helping our farmers by getting rid of our surpluses to ? the extent of giving it away under P. L. [public law] na0. What was wrong with that is the price. If we had gotten $2.50 a bushel, it would have been a good grain deal. Giving it to them at $1.65 was stupidity, but it was our stupidity. We didn't have to give it at $1.65. Now, if you come down to attitude, I think the attitude is basic to it in the matter of arms. The overriding, single most important one is the control of strategic arms. I can't see where we have been very. forthcoming. The Secre- tary of State says we have three times as many nuclear warheads as the Russians to- day. We have the forward bases, we have the aircraft carriers, all with nuclear weapons. We our nuclear weapons on the borders of Russia, all the way from Turkey, Germany, and all around their periphery ex- cept, I guess, on the Arctic Circle. I think they have taken the position that we meant it, when we said "parity" and they have not achieved parity. I don't think they are going : to be satisfied in agreeing to a permanent inferiority which - they believe they have. Now, you get into all kinds of minute descriptions of "throw weight" and so on In this argument, but I just, sum it up by saying the Sec- retary believes that we have ?I think he said we have 36 warheads for each 218 cities in the Soviet Union. We could, if they were per- fect in their delivery system, that many on each city. We have, all along, een ahead of them, back to the missile gap of the Kennedy era, when President Kennedy alleged there was a missile gap. There was a missile gap but it was in reverse. We had about 1,000 weapons and they had about 80, whereas he made the coun- thy believe that we had 80 and they had 1,000. It just was not so. But the public believes that 'We are behind.- We have had Admiral Moorer and Admiral Zum- walt going about recently? of course, this always hap- pens: this is an annual ritual just before appropriations time?saying we are sudden- ly inferior, our fleets are in- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 ferior, everything is inferior, we are in terrible shape mili- tarily, and therefore we need more money. I think when it comes to the nitty-gritty of doing something, we are never quite willing to do it. We began MIRV. we have ad- vanced the Trident, which is twice as large as their big- gest submarine. We are going into the B-1, which they have nothing compa- rable to. SENATOR JACKSON: May I just make a brief comment to my colleagues. I think we should all agree that reduc- tion of arms to a new and lower lever of equality should be our main objec- tive. What is being said is that there is too much arma- ment on both sides.. My an- swer is very simple. Let us start reducing on both' sides. MR. DANIEL: Although you make that suggestion, it seems that the military on both sides are opposed .to this. Both Washington and Moscow, think they must approach detente from a strong military position. How are we going to deal with that problem? SENATOR JACKSON: This is not correct on the Amer- ican side. I have seen the official papers. The Secretary. of Defense supports?and I am advised the Joint Chiefs join in that? a mutual re- duction of strategic arms based upon the amendment adopted by the Senate and :the House two years ago for equality. Certainly we will always have the problem within the military services of one serv- ice wanting to keep bombers or missiles and aonther serv- ice wanting to keep ships. You will always have that. But the official position of :he Department of Derense is ar a mutual reduction in. sLrategic arms. SENATOR FULBRIGHT: I suggest there is a great difr ference between the official position and what they do. That is all I suggest. SENATOR JACKSON: That is their -negotiating position. I stand on that statement. MR. BRZEZINSKI: I think of the major factors of strategic instability in the American-Soviet relationship is the ambiguity and uncer- tainty surrounding Soviet planning, development, and deployment. However, one judges the scale of the American effort and however critical one may be of its scale, the fact is that our rival knows pretty :much what we intende to do in the strategic realm. We have absolutely no knowledge of long-term So- viet strategic planning. We have no idea whether it is geared to permanent relation- ship of party, whether it is geared to something which might he called political-mili- tary superiority. Our knowledge becomes reasonably extensive, though not foolproof, only on the level of deployment. : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 I should think that one Major contribution which could be made to strategic stability would be for the Soviets, in the context of% something which now ap- proximates parity, to begin to indicate more explicitly and overtly what their strate.- gic planning is, what their long-term development pro- posals and plans are. Senator Fulbright might feel that we exaggerate the Soviet threat, and we might well be doing so. We cer- tainly have done so in the past. He is absolutely right when he said theat we exag- gerated it in the early sixties. The reason we exaggerated the Soviet threat in the early sixties is not because every man in the United States was running around . howling about the missile gap. The fact is that the Soviets went out of their way in 1960 to claim that they had missile superiority, to operate as if they had it, and even to en- gage in a little bit of deliber- ate deception to pretend they had it. It was a miscalcula- tion for Which they paid in Cuba. MR. BUNDY: I agree with Senator Jackson that, if we can get balanced reduction, substantive reduction, in numbers of ,warheads, "throw weight," any measure yeti want, that would he excel- lent. I think that is a long way away. ? None of the agreements that we have made at any time with the Soviet Union in this area has involved their giving up something they al- ready had that they still really wanted. I think it will be quite a while before the Soviet military will agree to the dismantling of a "Grade A" force. The most we can expect them to do on the basis of past experience is not to deploy things that they have come to believe are not really valuable, like the ABM, or to agree to an eventual implied scrapping of obsoles- cent or obsolete forces. This is really our own posi- tion, too. I know of no readi- ness really in our military to give up the prospect of de- veloping and deploying forces which they regard as of first- class strategic importance. It is one reason for being patient about the progress of Salt' II and one reason for being skeptical about the speed which the Administra- tion has tried to put behind this phase of the bargaining. I really think it just takes longer. This is a harder thing than any defensive or ineffec- tive systems. I also think that it is go- ing to be a long time?I suspect Profesor Brzezinski will agree?before the Sovi- ets engage in the kind of rel- atively open discussion of their defense planning or de- fense development and re- search that we have been ac- customed to in some measure here. So it does seem to me that we need to be very patient about strategic-arms limita- tion and we need to look to 24 the question of the way in which our own behavior, which is within our control, and does and does not Con- tribute toward increased, un- derstanding and eventual lim- itation. And here I would have to say I am seriously disturbed by the intermixing of target- ing doctrine with SALT nego- tiations which has been a consequence of the Pentagon position and secretary Schle- singer's otherwise extremely intelligent and helpful contri- butions to the discussion. I think he is right that American strategic targeting 'needs to have something' other than a doomsday plot to it. I think that has, in fact, been a problem for 15 years anyway. I think it is also right that we should be very careful about assuming that there could never be a use a nuclear power to try to affect political results. - But I think it is very dan- gerous to connect those ques- tions to the potential devel- opment of a wholly new stra- tegic system which could be :perceived as a counterforce system, which, in that con- nection, in spite of the Sec- retary's disclaimers, does ex- ist. That perception, I believe, has been seized upon in Mos-* cow and has seriously im- pedec' the discussions of SALT II, and it is this kind of question, it seems to me, that needs clarification. I be- lieve that is not the cost of strategic weapons that is so serious. The danger of nu- clear war, if it ever came, is so massive that insurance policies should not be meas- ured by the kind of cost that is now associated with our strategic-weapons system, a cost which is lower than it was a decade ago. ilORE But I think the character and make-up of those courses, the doctrine which justifies them and the things we do and do not seem to be planning to do on our own are potentially very de- stabilizing, and I do not my- self believe that there is any urgent need for major change at any early time in the cur- rent strategic posture of the United States. MR. DANIEL: When you speak of patience and time, what sort of time frame do you have in mind? MR. BUNDY: I should be .inclined to agree with Jerry Smith, who was the principal negotiator under the Presi- dent and Kissinger in SALT I, and his last suggestion is that it may take at least as long to do SALT II as it did SALT I. That would go to another two or three years and perhaps longer because this is much harder. MR. DANIEL: Has interna- tional stability and security been enhanced by what we have agreed upon? MR. BUNDY: I think the agreement on ABM was a very stabilizing agreement. I think, as Senator Fulbright Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9' said, it did give treaty recog- nition to the proposition that there is no such thig as pro- tection between superpowers in the event of major nuclear war. SENATOR JACKSON: I think the significance of the ABM agreement lies in the fact that they have recog- nized equality, and that is: each side is to have one site. I think that is the di- rection we should be moving. . I would just like to make a point in response to Mr. Bundy's comment about the new targeting doctrine. First, let us remember that this is only a research-and-develop- ment effort. It is an option that we can examine later on. This move, I think, was made in a restrained and re- sponsible way. What we have said is that no American President should be allowed to have only the inhuniarie option of killing all human beings in the So- viet Union. The doctrine of assured destruction may have had some validity when we had overwhelming superiori- ty but I don't think it has validity in the context in which we now face the Sovi- et Union. Finally, I think the point needs to be made that the Administration has not pushed arms reduction. I want to emphasize that very strongly. The President has not gone to the country and -to the world and said our ob- jective is to reduce arms to new and lower levels of equivalence. I disagree with the Admin- istration in their whole nego- tiating approach. If you only put forward proposals that you know in advance the Soviets are go- ing to accept, you wind up negotiating on their terms. I disagree on this basic issue. I think it is a central issue in the whole negotiation proc- ess. MR. DANIEL: Are you sug- gesting that the President is &Mg this sort of thing in ol der to enhance his own image as a peacemaker, as a success in international re- lations? SENATOR JACKSON: I long ago have given up deter- mining the intent of the White House in many differ- ent areas. MR. BRZEZINSKI: One of the purposes of these ar- rangements is to not only reach specific agreement but also to set in motion a pro- longed process of mutual edi- fication. I think one of the great importances and even accomplishments of SALT was that it did result in bet- ter mutual understtanding of the relative strategic politi- cal positions of both sides. In, this connection I would like to make a very modest proposal. We have now had more than a decade at differ- ent stages of American-Soviet talks. Perhaps the time must come for both sides by joint agreement to begin to release to the public the protocols of at least some of the talks. The fact of the matter is that they have been conVt, pproved A Glossary ZUMWALT, Adm. Elmo R. ?Recently retired Chief of Naval Operations. MOORER, Adm. Thomas H.? Recently retired chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. GRECHKO, Marshal Andrei A. Soviet Defense Minister and alternate member of the Politburo of the Soviet. Communist party. THROW-WEIGHT, a term for the weight, usualy in kilo- tons or megatons, of war-. . heads caPable of being car- ried to targets by missiles. FORWARD BASES, military usage for submarines armed with nuclear mis- sies and intermediate range ballistc missiles lo- cated close to opponent frontiers, as in. West Ger- many. ? B-1, a new nuclear-bomb- carrying plane to be the main Air Force bomber, replacing the aging B-52 series. ABM, anti-ballistic missile, that is, mssiles designed to knock down other missiles. ed in great secrecy. I think this secrecy is first of all in the long run incompatible with the nature of our soci- ety. We are entitled to know more about the nature of some of these discussions. -In the longer run, I think public knowledge would con- tribute also to greater Soviet understanding of the issues involved. I am aware of the fact that you cannot conduct sensitive ongoing negotia- tions if you expect them to be published quickly. Renee I would- not recommend that anything that transpired re- cently be made part of the public record. MR. DANIEL: What about the possibility of that? SENATOR FULBRIGHT: I don't think there is much possibility on it on both sides. MR. BUNDY: I must say I would be strongly in favor of it. SENATOR FULBRIGHT: I would too. SENATOR JACKSON: A condition precedent to that, however, gentlemen, is the need to get the Administra- tion voluntarily to make pub- lic the understandings en- tered into in connection with SALT I which were kept secret from the chief of SALT negotiations for our Government from July 24, 1972, until June 20, 1973, kept secret from Secretary of State Rogers and the Secre- tary of Defense. I refer to two important documents that the Congress knew noth- ing about. I hope that the one that was agreed to in Moscow that -modified the July 24, 1972, agreement will volun- tarily be made public. .This 'business of entering into agreements with the Soviets and keeping them secret astounds me. I can't for the life of me understand what useful purpose the Admin- istration hopes to further by that kind of procedure. ? . For Release 2001/08/08: I would agree, I think al of us can agree, that a bilateral agreement to re lease the discussions in the areas that Professo Brezezinski has referred ?to would be useful. I think it is some way down the road yet MR. BUNDY: I really do think that this Administra- tion is not unique in this-- that administrations tend to underestimate the value of the precise expositions of what they themselves are thinking. When the Secretary of State called for a debate, it seemed to me one of his first addressees should have been the Secretary of State. I think it is very fortunate that he is going to be the lead-off witness in Senator Ful- bright's hearings because it is inescapable that the tem- per of argument is set by what the Executive Branch says, and at the moment based on what the Executive Brtnch has said and said most clearly by the Secre- tary of Defense, I would still have to sustain the position that that could be read as very threatening in Moscow. SENATOR JACKSON: I would add, that we don't really know the role of the military in the decision- making process in the So- viet Union. Marshal Grechko is now a member of the Politburo. We do know what the role of the military is in our own decision-making process. The President and the Secretary of State really make the final decisions. I think you can find that for the most part in connection with Salt I and Salt II decisions the mil- itary has played a relatively less important role than the civilians, contrary to a lot of statements that are being made. SENATOR FULBRIGHT: That is contrary to my state- ment. I don't agree with it at all. I think the military and its allies have muc:h in- fluence here. In our case, even if the President does not like it, the military can go to Congress and override the President. They do it on their appropriations time and time again, year a'fter year. It has been going on and there is no power that can restrict the military in our political system. The Russians don't have the organization behind them that you have here. You have Mr. Meany and 13 million of his people, ?all the labor or- ganizations. There is very little counterforce against the power of the military. Look at the votes in the Senate on any effort to re- duce in a substantial way anything the military wants. everybody knows what happens year after year. We have never won a ' single showdown with the military. MR. BUNDY: It does ap- pear to me that it really is true that the Soviet military arms are very strong and if you make available all ob- jective measures, percentages of gross national product, those soldiers seem to do CIA-RW77-00432R000 'better than our soldiers. At the same time I would have to say that I think it is simplistic to say that the President and Secretary or State are in charge and what they say goes. I think there has been a very pronounced weakening over the last several years, both inside the Executive Branch and in the country as a whole, of the capability to countermilitary arguments in knowledgable and sophisticated terms. Many of us think?al- though I am open to correc- tion on this?that as a con- sequence of the bargaining in the Senate, the arms con- trol agency was stripped of many of its most capable - staff officers. Since Henry Kissinger moved from the White House to the Depart- ment of State, there is evi- dence that the White House capability and influence at staff level in these matters has declined. It is very diffi- cult, although it is not im- possible, for members of the Legislative Branch and their staffs 'and for informed and interested members of the public to participate effec- tively in the kind of debate' that is being asked for, if the debate does not exist already in some measure inside the Executive Branch of the Gov- ernment. SENATOR JACKSON: I would disagree with that Contrary to some public statements, I think there has been a real debate between Dr. Kissinger and Dr. Schles- inger. There has been a com- ing together, allegedly In more recent weeks, on some of these points. I think it is fair to say There have been some strong differences of opinion. ? I can say very candidly I think the failure of the re- cent Moscow summit stems from the fact that neither Dr. Kissinger nor the Presi- dent of the United States could accept what was being proposed by the Russians at the summit. Those are the facts. It has nothing to do with the U.S. military or any evil spirit that I know of. MR. DANIELS: This new MR. DANIELS: This new American committee on U.S.- Soviet relations that was formed recently put out a list of seven positive accomplish- ments in interunational rela- tions that they thought cid- tente had so far achieved, including, incidentally, help dealing with the problems of peace in the Middle East. How do you feel about the contributions to date of dd. tente? SENATOR JACKSON: It is incredible to cite the Middle East as an example of help- ful progress. SENATOR FULBRIGHT: The Secretary did. SENATOR JACKSON: Let me give a bil of particulars. Was it helpful for the Sovi- ets to bring the two countries to the brink almost again, the first time since Cuba? Was it helpful during the course of that Yom Kippur war for the Soviets to urge 1 OOSISOOtil2t9Arab countries to Approved fOiCtiOge10408/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 join in the fight against Is- rael? Was it helpful to en- courage maintaining the oil embargo? Was it helpful to the economies of the Western world when the Russians day after day Urged the Arab countries to increase the price of oil? ? I would say that what Dr. Kissinger was able to do in Egypt to separate Egypt from the more militant Arab states was one of the singular ac- complishments of this Ad- ministration, that and open- ing travel to China. Finally, I would Say that what is going on right now in Syria on the part of the Soviet Union does not por- tend well for the months Ahead. The Soviets have moved more arms, mostly sophisticated arms, arms that are not even available in the Warsaw Pact countries, into Syria. SENATOR FULBRIGHT: I don't know wh it seems to be that we view these ques- tions in directly the opposite way. I have heard the Secre= tary several times. I don't see any evidence that the Rus- sians urged an increase in the price of oil. If you want to pick on one man, it is the Shah of Iran. To attribute everything that goes wrong, or wrong from our point of view, to the Russians I think is fn- realistic and not true. .Not that they don't enjoy it and take advantage of it. But. I think the Middle East grew out of a conflict which had its origins long ago and thet was not Russian-inspired. Ob- viously when something which discomforts us hap- pens, they, enjoy it. I think to treat it as we did at the time gave mueh more significance to the alert than was justified. I don't think there was any great threat. To put it bluntly, the Secretary has said that with- out their acquiescence and cooperation, nothing could have been achieved. It would have been very easy to pre- vent an agreement with Syria or to make it impossi- ble to have any agreement at- all. The Russians?I don't pro- tend they are out to help us, I regret that they are not more cooperative. The Sec- retary stated?and I have n`p reason not to agree with him ?that they are so interested in bringing about detente they have been very Fe- strained during this whole period in several areas where they could have been ex- tremely difficult. Now they are becoming impatient, par- ticularly as to holdup of the trade bill. Above all, they do have the capacity to reduce the tensions politically. That comes right back to Professor Brezezinski's central idea: '1 we don't move in this direce tion, we are really threatened with international chaose-- certainly, if not worldwid4 chaos, a worldwide depresv don. ? Ugly strains of RI 2,1-lonalism that lie below the Soviet surface tf nationalIsin were not the strongest acid attacking the So: viet regime's iron, speculation about its fresh strength would smack of White ?gr? cafe plans for returning upon the Bolshevik clique's fall. But in fact, national feeling?among Ukrainians. Estonians, Cossacks, Tadjiks and many other minorities? bubbles and hails in the Soviet "family of nations ". Just as the rouble's price in Moscow black-market currency transac- tions fluctuates in tight step with the quotations of Zurich banks, the aspirations and re- sentments . of the Soviet empire's non-Russian peoples have swelled in rough propor- tion to those of Third World Nations. ? The Curtain, that is to say, is porous to these calculations and emotions. Scorching winds of native patriotism blown up since the Second World War rage through it. But perhaps such metaphors are misleading, for on that side, love of country?not of the union of socialist republics forcibly formed in 1924 and enlarged by subsequent aggression, but of ancient homelands?needed ? no outside encouragement. All the conditions that have made old fashioned nationalism, among the most powerful of modern forces, operate in high gear there. The much more se- vere penalties fdr expressing such instincts only increases the commitment, bitterness and ?potential for explosion. But, as in other aspects of Soviet life, repression not only stimulates noble ideals and heroic deeds in its finest victims, it also provokes what can only be called the worst elements to think and mutter their unlovely thoughts. From New Printing House Square, minority nationalism is the most promising agent for the empire's disintegration. . But. in the Soviet Union itself, nationalism is often startlingly different: evil jokes. drunken obscenities of one race 0. .../V0.,0.? cursing another, raised rancour and fists. A Georgian entre- preneur reviling an Armenian engineer, a Latvian lorry driver scorning the Ukrainian khakhli, huddled Uzbeks pro- nouncing their superiority over lesser Central Asian tribes?and Tartars theirs over the Uzbeks. A reservoir of bigotry and mis- directed grievances. This is why. Mr Bei-bard Levin's description of nationa- list sentiment as "heartening " and "salutary", let alone his gratification that the problem may soon become more impor- tant than America's racial one. is perniciously misleading, for all his admirable intention. Months before the publica- tion pf Andrei Amalrik's Will The Soviet Union Survive, the most politically perceptive Muscovite I knew also spoke of the real danger of war with China. Defeat or difficulties might be the spark to ignite the magazines of non-Russian nationalism, he said?but in his prediction, this would lead to nothing beneficial, but to a grisly new time of troubles. Thirty major peoples will be at each others' throats, " and all will beat the Jews, meaning anyone not 'one of us '". Two- hundred-and-fifty million people lashing out after re- lease from their totalitarian swaddling will produce a "huge, ugly, vicious riot?a nightmare. . . . The prospect is horrible, terrible, unimagin- able". This is mere supposition of course, but it raises questions that deserve consideration be- fore tossing flowers at disrup- tive forces?even disruptive of Soviet rule. However odious the tyranny, potentially uglier strains of obscurantism and hatred lurk below its surface. However uncomfortable 'the notion, some of the progressive and civilizing influences in Soviet lite, as well as many of the savage, abominable ones, come from the centre. Not all the restraints are sinister. And this leaves out Great 26 Russian nationalism. Almost by definition, patriotic sentiment among the minorities incor- porates deep resentment, some- times loathing, of the Moscow colonizers. If free expression of this were encouraged, one Pictures not only whipped-up hooligans mistreating Russian residents in cities from Riga to Tbilisi, but also a violent back- lash in Mother -Russia against the foreigners ". Many decent Russians feel t'iat they bear disproportionate sacrifices for the sake of back- ward Soviet peoples. Many less decent ones simply hate foreigners and Jews, in the spirit of Black Hundred preju- dice and pogroms. ? No way out of a dictatorship is easy when its citizens can be as easily confused, swayed by demagoguery and goaded to violence as the Soviet peoples. But even to suggest a remedy of nationalism, here so com- ingled with virulent chau- vanism and jingoism, without warning of its possible side effects is an act of some irres- ponsibility. As the British press's most eloquent prosecutor of Soviet crimes, Mr Levin bears a spe- cial responsibility in any case. He who never tires of re- minding the West of its duty in helping bring down the dic- tatorship might spare some thought to his own obligation to picture Russia after the fall. Otherwise, his sense of outrage at Kremlin evil, however justi- fiedin itself, is too much like I the radicals' call for capita- I lism's downfall, which pretends that some shining substitute system will sprout by itself from the ruins. So many well-intended mis- takes in our prescriptions for Russia, so many exhortations to correct injustices with what turn out to be greater ones ! One would think Western com- mentators had developed some caution. But propagandists keep shouting. George Feifer Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003300024 WASHINGTON POST 2 August 1974 Stephen S. Rosenfeld live a .ons' And Detente "Captive Nations Week" came and went without much fuss last week. The particular kind of ethnic anti-Commu- nism which the "captive nations" concept represents?the "captives" being the nations and nationality groups incorporated within the Soviet Union plus the East European States dominated by Moscow?has been pretty much eclipsed by detente. Mr. Nixon has indicated firmly that it is not possible to try to improve re- lations with the Soviet government while at the same time trying openly to cultivate the nationalistic and even secessionist impulses of Moscow's constituent parts and allies. Typically, the Urtted States' annual ritual appeals for the "self determina- tion" of the Baltic States, incorporated by Moscow as World War II began,- ended as soon as President Nixon be- came a regular summiteer. At the last summit, Mr. Nixon, agreed to establish a U.S. consulate in Kiev?a step re- garded by the Kremlin and by Ukrain- ian Nationalists alike as a symbolic denial . of Ukrainian nationhood. The two American radio stations broadcasting specifically to the "captive nations," Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, constantly wonder if they will survive the next summit. Mr. Nixon's own "Captive Nation Proclamation" has become the faintest shatmw of the original growling anti- Russian, anti-communist resolution pa sed by Congress in 059. Yet the underlying issues do not eas- ily go away. The "nations" themselves ?some more, some less?remain Un- digested parts of the Soviet polity and the Soviet block. No sober analysis of the Soviet scene can ignore the tugs and pulls of, say, the Ukrainians and the Poles. Certainly the Kremlin takes these into the closest account in devel- oping its own basic policies, from where it invests its money to where it stations its troops. On the face of it, there is no appar- ent reason?except politics?why, say, Palestinians deeerve a state .of their own, as Moscow asserts, while a num.. her of Soviet nationality groups, larger and with equal national creden- tials, are denied even the lesser goal al a genuine nationality group exist- ence. The connection of "human rights" to detente has been widely accepted in recent years, mostly in respect to Jews, intellectuals and dissenters in- side the Soviet Union. And they pose no territorial challenge to the Kremlin. Their causes are certainly legitimate. But it is plain that at least part of the NEW YORK TIMES 20 July 1974 Se Curbs Export of Police Equipment By ,BERNARD GWERTZMAN . 'ssessea to The New York Times WASHINGTON, July 19 The? Nixcin Administration bowed to Congressional pressure and is- sued regulations todAy to dis- courage American companies from selling sophisticated law enforcement equipment at a Moscow trade fair next month. The effect of the new rules, industry and Government sourc- es said makes it extremely un- likely that any American com- pany would exhibit or try to sell its products to Sciviet au- thorities. Commerce Secretary Fred- erick B. Dent announced that specific licenses would be re- quired for the sale to the Soviet Union . and other Communist. countries of "any instruments and equipment particularly use- ful :in crime control and detection." . Mr, Dent said that the newi controls were being impo.sed as the result of consultation with-- the .State Department, which suggested to the Com- merce Department earlier in the week that steps be taken to close a loophole by which most, law enforcement equip- ment could be sold without licenses. In a statement, Mr. Dent saicr-.that the new rules were being imposed under the provi- sions of the Export Adminis- tration Act, which allows such moves for "foreign policy" con- sideration. He said the 'Government was concerned "with potential uses to such equipment could be put, and had a continuing interest in the welfare of per- sons who seek to exercise their, fundamental rights." Mr. Dent said .that the decision had the approval of Secretary of State Kiseinger. The controversy arose twol !weeks ago when representative Charles A. Vanik, Democrat of Ohio, disclosed on the House floor that a number of Ameri- can firms were planning to show and sell their wares- at a. Moscow fair in August, dedicated to modern means of law enforcement. He and several other mem- bers of Congress, including Senator Henry -M. Jackson, Democrat of Washington, ar- gued that equipment such as voice-identification devices and lie detectors would logically end up being purchased by the Soviet secret police for use against Jewish- and other dis- sidents. Although Mr. Vanik's office said on Wednesday that be- tween 15 and 30 firms had shown interest in exhibiting at the fair, a check by The New: reason why their plight has become. politicized is that each of these groups (they overlap) has a recognizable con- stituency within the United States. - In abstract terms, the cultural or na- tional aspirations of the "captive na- tions" are hardly less legitimate. Yet their American spokesmen do not have the same political leverage. The realities of American politics, then, have an effect on which people or peoples controlled by Moscow win active American concern. The realities of geopolitics also have an effect. Suc- cessive American Presidents have cul- tivated local nationalism in, first, Yu- goslavia and, then Romania?Commu- nist states whch for their own reasons have chosen to assert a measure of in- dependence from the Kremlin. The White House has done this for the pur- pose of strengthening the American hand in dealing with. the Russians. - Like Yugoslavia, however Romania, which sits off in the southwest corner of the Soviet Union, has by virtue of geography a degree of political maneu- verability which is simply unavailable to a country like Czechoslovakia which directly connects the Soviet Union with Germany. This in turn affects the degree of encouragement which any responsible American President can York Times produced no more' than six, most of which said today that they had already decided, because of the adverse Congressional reaction, not to exhibit. Mr. Dent, in speaking to newsmen before testifying in closed session before Senator Jackson's Permanent Investiga- tions Subcommittee, said that the new rules do not prohibit exhibiting at the Moscow fair, but do require licenses before sales can be made. He said such sales would be scrutinized very stringently before permission Would be granted. Mrs. - Johanna Welt, vice president of Welt International of Chicago, which had been commissioned by two . Ameri- can companies to represent them at Moscow, said by phone today that she did not think any company would now ex- hibit because it would probably be impossible to secure licenses in time for the fair. She said no company would go to the fair without expecting to make sales. ? Technology Sale Criticized - WASHINGTON, July 19 (AP) An American manufacturer urged today that the United States refrain from selling tech- nology to the Soviet Union and other Communist nations. .proffer. The fact remains that the United States has no comprehensive strategy to free "captive nations." On the con- trary, detente and the discipline neces- sarily imposed by the nuclear responsi- bility of a great power rule out much more than tentative efforts to remove certain symptoms of their plight. This is painful; some small part of the pain could perhaps be relieved if the rest of us looked with more sympathy at the -very human emotions which touch many Americans whose kinsmen lived hard lives under Communist rule, but it is unavoidable. Hero it is useful to recall the time when the 'U.S. did have such a compre- hensive strategy. According to a credi- ble, though officially denied account in "Operation Splinter Factor," a new book by British journalist Stewart Steven, Allen Dulles set out to lib- erate East 14;urope by destroying lib- eral nationalistic Communists in those countries, thus provoking a Stalinist repression that would ignite a success- ful popular revolt. This fantastic oper- ation called "Splinter Factor," may in- deed have contributed to Stalinist re- pression. It certainly did not free East Europe. A more cynical and disastrous policy is hard to imagine. Its lessons linger. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP2777-00432R000100330002-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 THE GUARDIAN, MANCHESTER 25 July 1974 Torus rivals 'pai by CIA' From 'BELLA PICK Washington, July 24 ? ? Both Nikos Sampson and Archbishop Makarios had been receiving CIA funds, "as part of the agency's standard policy of supporting both sides in a dispute," . according to the ! Washington columnist Jack ?I? . Anderson. Quoting CIA sources he said that Makarios was "simply blackmailing the CIA. If the . agency . wanted to ? keep its NEW YORK TIMES 2 August 1974 extensive facilities in Cyprus, Makarios allegedly told them, they had to pay for the privi- lege." According to Anderson, Sampson had been receiving CIA money for many years. It was channelled to him through Savas Konstantopoulos, pub- lisher - of the Athens Free World. Konstantopoulos, say Anderson sources, had long been on the CIA payroll. Anderson also claims that President Nixon and Dr Kis-? singer were the last to maintain free-world support for the Greek military junta. He believes that even the CIA had given them up, and was " secretly pulling out its facili- ties from Athens" and trans- ferring them to Tehran. ? The Administration today hastened to put itself on the side of the angels, and wel- comed the return of Greece to civilian rule. Dr Kissinger said this morning that we expect to have close and friendly rela- tions with the new Greek Government, which is composed' of old friends of ours," ? ? U.S. Said to er Tr Curtail Role in Grcece ? . By DAVID BINDER Special to "Me New York Times i WASHINGTON, Aug. 1?The 'coup, but also with his suc- Central Intelligence Agency hasIcessor, Brig. Gen. Demetrios reportedly been instructed by lIoannides. top officials of the Nixon Ad- Mr. Papadopoulos, who was ministration not to interfere in deposed last November, was the internal affairs of Greece among many Greek , political nor to play favorites among' and military figures who re- Greek politicians. Iceived personal subsidies over These orders, according to many years from the intelli- well-placed officials, reelect the gence agency, two United States current thinking of Secretary officials said. Another source of State Kissinger and of the said Mr. Papadopoulos had Director of Central Intelligence, received money from the William E. Colby?that Amer-t agency since 1952. leans should keep out of the The C.I.A. stopped its sub- 'politics of other countries as sidies for Greek political fig. much as possible. The. C.I.A. urea about two years ago, a is said to have been deeply in- high American official said. yolved in Greek politics for 25 years. Until the last few weeks of the Athens military junta, accord- ing to high American officials and to Greek sources, American operatives remained quite close to the men in power in Greece. A United States specialist on Greece said that the C.I.A. continued to maintain about 60 full-time operatives in Greece and that sonic had been there 15 years Or longer. The agency, the specialist said, had close contact not only r.pAtotspoi?ivca )ss. listed as a with George Papadopoulos, the political officer in the American Greek colonel who led the 1967 Embassy. He served earlier in; The operative. closest to Gen- eral Ioannides was said to have been Peter Koromilas, a Greek- American who also went by the name of Korom. An Amer- ican official said Mr. Koromi-i las had been sent to Athens to confer with General Ioannides shortly before the July 15 coup in Cyprus, which was headed by Greek officers. `Papadopoulos is My Boy' James M. Potts, the agency's station_ chief in Athens from 1968 to 1972, was described as having been on close terms throughout his stay there with' a The United States -ha long been severely criticised for sup. porting the Greek junta, but Dr Kissinger. said that he did not believe this would cause difficulties with the new Greek Prime Minister, Mr Karamanlis: - The Administration's fore- most concern in its relations with Greece has always been to safeguard its military bases there, as part of NATO's vital southern flank. In spite of warnings from NATO, the Secretary for Defence, Mr -James Schlesinger, told the Senate as recently as June 2n that " as far as the military side of the alliance is con- cerned, Greece remained an effective member." However, there have been Indications during the last .few days that even the Pentagons arid certainly the State Depart- ment, realised at the time of the coup against Cyprus that they must recognise the weak- ness of the Greek military junta. From that moment its fate was .sealed, probably even in the Administration's .eyes, ad it still remains to be seen pi-ed- gels what role US officials played in bringing civilian leaders back to power in Greece. However, Jack Anderson claims that NATO had given up the Greek ;military junta well before the Administration did, and that it had sent repeated warnings of the junta's unreliability to Washington. He quotes from one confidential paper which a-gues that "the European allies were eager to hasten the transfer of power from unso- phisticated and parochial min- tary men . . . to a political Government enjoying the confidence of the people," According to Anderson, the advice from NATO head- quarters was that "there are, growing doubts about the' extent to which the Greek armed forces as a whole, die- united as they are, and dissi- pated by police and supervisory functions, are capable of play- ing their part in NATO defence strategy." ? . . Athens from 1960 to 1964 as teen-sixties, a former Greek deputy station chief of the, official said. I "In the beginning, say abouti intelligence agency. A State Department official 1962 or '63, the C.I.A. used, said that when Mr. Potts left :Andreas as an agent, as a re- Athens in August, 1972, his 'source and supported him," farewell party was attended by the Greek said. "His buddy was virtually every member of the !Campbell," he added, referring! military junta. The American no Laughlin A. Campbell, thei Ambassador, Henry J. Tasca 'C.I.A. station chief from 1959i seeing who was present, turned ;to 1962. and walked out, the source said, !Agent Reassigned After Protest after which he sent a cablegram ; In his 1970 book, "Democ- to Washington protesting Mr.: , racy at Gunpoint," Andreas Pa- Potts's action. ''pandreou describes a scene in Mr. Tasca had adopted a 1961 in which he had an alter- chilly attitude toward the cation with Mr. Campbell. Athens junta and was appalled Now retired-' and living in that the C.I.A. station chief i would give a party that con- Washington, Mr, Campbell de- tradicted the position the j I dined to talk with a reporter: , about his Greek service. American Ambassador had; A knowledgeable Greek said -taken. that State Department officials! at Stavis Milton, an opera-, 1 tive who objected to the "cozy"1 who, have served in Greece, relationship between the agency, commented in background. in-! terviews on what they de- and the junta leaders over the 1,last seven years, was moved! 'scribed as a negative role played in the past by the Central Intel- out of Greece and sent to Iran' ligence Agency in Greek affairs. ;and later to the Far East. , One of them mentioned John; Mr. Milton was described as 'M. Maury, the agency's sta- !one of numerous Greek-Amer- tion chief in Athens from 1962 icans recruited by the agency' to 1968. in the early days of its opera- "Maury worked on behalf of tions in Greece. Another was. the palace in 1965," the offi- said to be Thomas H, Karames-1 cial said. sines, a 57-year-old Newt "He helped King Constantine! Yorker who served in Athens' buy Center Union Deputies so from 1947 to 1948, during thei that the George Papandreou! Greek struggle against Com-i Government was toppled." munist insurgents, then again; Mr. Maury, 61, left the agency as station chief from 1951 toi somewhat more than a year ago 1953. and is now Assistant Secre- Mr. Karamessines rose to be; nary of Defense for Corigres- head of the agency's clandese :sional Relations, Although generally leaning itiilneent,serrveciecnetslyb.efore his retire-1 to Greek conservative politi- ; The Central Intelligence !clans, the, agency flirted briefly ;Agency also used enterprises of with the Variant in Greek poli- ;Thomas A. Pappas, the 75-year- tics offered by George Papan- ?old Greek-Amencan industrial- dreou and his Harvard-educated ist, as a cover for its ope-a- son, Andreas, in the early nine. ! tions in Greece according to .Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 '28 - Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100a3000219 the Greek source. A spokesmen at the head- quarters of the agency, in Langley, Va., said he had no general comment on the allega- WASHINGTON POST 25 July 1974 tions. He did say, however, that C.I.A. agents follow orders ap- proved at the highest level in Washington, ^ t Rowland Evans and Robert Novak And: Sisco's Shuttle Full-scale war between Turkey and Greece was averted and the 7-year-old military dictatorship in Athens toppled when Washington belatedly abandoned permissiveness and laid down the law to the Greek junta. ? ? There is little doubt Greece would haVe responded to Turkey's invasion. of Cyprus wi.4k, its own invasion of Tur- key were it not for Undersecretary of State Joseph Sisco's backstage pres- sure in Athens. In most undiplomatic language, Sisco told the Greek gener- al S that the U.S. would abandon them tti'inevitable destruction if they at- tacked Turkey. Jolted by this unex- Pected threat, the military dictatorship backed down and thereby guaranteed itS own fall on Tuesday. . But there is no room for American.. self-congratulation here. The generals held tyrannical power so long because of Washington's coddling. The Cyprus crisis which has shaken the NATO alli- ance should have been averted by the United States. What's more, this men- acing question remains: will bitterness by 'Ordinary Greeks toward Washing- ton for wet-nursing the dictatorship eventually propel their nation out of the Western alliance? U.S. follies toward Athens date back to'the Johnson administration, which embraced the Greek military coup of April 1967. U.S. diplomats in Athens felt the obscure colonels mastermind- ing the coup would have collapsed at a single word from Washington, but that wOrd never came. This policy was per- petuated by the Nixon administration, freezing tyranny in Greece. - 'Despite a growing coolness toward Athens recently, the U.S. has rigidly refused to 'pressure the military dicta- torship. The current junta, dominated by Brig. Gen. Dimitrios Ioannides, seemed puzzled that Washington de- manded so little for friendship and military aid. Noting American permissiveness co- inciding with increased opposition from the Greek people, Ioannides ? de- cided on the ancient expedient of fal- tering regimes: a foreign adventure. Athen's plot to take over Cyprus should have been foreseen and pre- vented by Washington. Instead, as the junta expected, there was no U.S. in- terference. Moreover, working-level State De- partment officials who wanted to con- demn Athens for the Cyprus plot after it occurred were overruled by Secre- tary of State Henry Kissinger, heeding Pentagon fears of losing Greece as sNATO's anchor. Had Kissinger instead aligned himself with the British against the coup, congressional critics iplomacy believe, the Turks might have been dissuaded from invading Cyprus?a contention bitterly disputed by admin-. istration policymakers. By the time Sisco left Washington at 11 p.m. July 17 for his try at shuttle diplomacy, the administration was re- signed to a Greek-Turkish war which would shatter the West's strategic posi- tion against Moscow and threaten the NATO alliance. Thankfully, at that be- lated hour, Sisal:, talked tough to the _ Greeks. When Sisco arrived in Athens Friday morning, July 19, the generals in- formed him they Would respond to Turkish invasion of Cyprus by invad- ing Turkey. Sisco's hardboiled reply: except for the U.S., you have no friends in NATO?or the world. You . can expect nothing from the Commu- nist world. In the Third World, you are pariahs. And if you attack Turkey, you will lose the U.S. and be totally iso- lated. ' . _ Flying to -Ankara that night, Sisco told the Turks that the U.S.' would work with Turkey and Great Britain to undo Greek meddling in Cyprus. But the Turks seemed determined to teach Athens a lesson. At 5:43 a.m. Saturday, Sisco was informed of the Turkish in- vasion of Cyprus to begin 15 minutes later. He left Ankara for Athens at 6:30 a.m. - In Athens, the Greeks reiterated . their ? intention. to ? counterattack against Turkey. Again, Sisco recited his tough line. Stunned that Washing- ton finally meant business, the gener- als backed down. When Sisco left for - Washington last Monday night after negotiating the shaky cease-fire, it was clear the Ioannides regime could not survive. Luckily, it was replaced not by na- tionalistic young colonels vowing a re- demptive war against Turkey but by a civilian government headed by old con- servative Constantine Karamanlis. But the United States has not escaped the consequences of its follies. The har- vest from anti-American seed sown in Greece since 1967 by Washington's pro- junta policies has yet to be revealed. We reported from Athens in June 1969 that the U.S. embrace of the junta ?because 'of military requirements in the Eastern Mediterranean?posed "immense danger to long-range stabil- ity" in the region. That prediction was fully realized by the Cyprus crisis. Whether Sisco's belated badgering of the Greeks can forestall the predic- tion's full consequences will require undeserved but eagerly welcomed good fortune. et. 1974. Meld Enterprises, Inc. NEW YORK TIMES 3 August 1974 ARTICLE ON C.I.A. IN CREECE ATTACKED Andreas Papandreou, a for- mer Greek Cabinet Minister and an exiled leader of the Greek political left, released a statement yesterday charging The New York Times with an attempt to "damage [his] po- litical reputation" 'in an article published in yesterday's edi- tions. The article by David Binder of The Times Washington Bu- reau reported a move by top' officials of the Nixon Adminis- tration instructing the Central Intelligence Agency not to in- terfer in Greek internal affairs. The article quoted, a former Greek official as saying that the agency in 1962 or 1963 had supported Mr. Papandreou and used him "as an agent." "The American establish- ment, using newspaper corres- pondent David Binder and The New York Times, is attempting to damage the political reputa- tion of Andreas Papandreou, leader of the Panhellenic Lib- eration Movement and leading political figure in Greece, argu- ing among other things that he has had support from the C.I.A.," the statement from his political office said. "We charge David Binder and The New York Times with be- ing parties to attempted politi- cal sabotage in the internal affairs of our country, Greece," the statement said. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP71900432R000100330002-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 WASHINGTON POST 4 August 1974 Jack Anderson Vietnam ar: Th Ten years ago, the Gulf of Tonkin incident led to massive U.S. involvement in an unwanted war in Vietnam. Did the Central Intelligence Agency play a hidden role in that incident? We have now pieced together part of the story, together with other CIA exploits in Vietnam, from intelligence memos and old Vietnam hands, including an ex-CIA officer, John Kelly, who has agreed to break his long silence. It is a fascinating story, some- times hilarious, sometimes deadly grim. At the time of Tonkin, the CIA was already deeply inVolved in a vast undercover operation known mysteriously as Op-34-A. Memos show that the CIA, ' working secretly with the Saigon government and U.S. armed forces, kidnaped North Vietnamese fisher- men to recruit them as spies, landed rubber-boat crews on the North Vietnamese coast to blow up bridges, parachuted agents into the Communist back- country and engaged in other clandestine activities. Although U.S. forces weren't supposed to partici- pate An open combat, a favorite Op-34-A sport was to send dark-painted U.S. patrol boats to bombard Communist-held islands off the Vietnam coast. This? sometimes?led to shootouts between U.S. and North Vietnamese gunboats. The incidents, according to one Pentagon memo, were regarded as acceptable risks The public wasn't told about these naval engage- ments until the late President Lyndon Johnson chose to make an issue of the August 2, 1964, attack on U.S. destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin. There is some indication that the destroyers may have been pre- paring to draw North Vietnamese gunboats away from an Op34-A operation when the celebrated in- cident occurred. After the United States was drawn openly into the War, the? CIA brass settled into a handsome ? dwelling next to the Italian embassy in Saigon. In- stead of CIA, one of its units adopted the intials SOG?short for "Special Operations Group." In long interviews with my associate Les Whitten, the irreverent John Kelly, now an investigative reporter for CBS News in New York City, remem- bers the SOG as a sort of "Catch 22" outfit forever goofing up but occasionally achieving a triumph. The ?SOG, of course, was obsessed with secrecy. It operated fleets of black-paint-6d planes, jeeps, trucks and PT boats. Even the SOG's gates were sometimes painted black. It didn't take the Vietna- mese, South and North alike, long to identify black as the CIA-SOG color. The black gates, therefore, may as well have been emblazoned with the CIA seal. . On one occasion, the CIA's secret identification Was found scribbled on a latrine wall in a Saigon bar. Among the obscene inscriptions, a horrified CIA officer saw the equation, "CAS equals SOG equals CIA." CAS means "Controlled American Source," a euphemism for a CIA agent. In great alarm, the CIA officer dispatched two majors and a team of enlisted men to comb the men's rooms of Saigon in search of similar security violations hidden amid the graffiti. The CIA brass went to such lengths to maintain secrecy that they held their most important confer- ences in a huge transparent box, constructed of Role of the CIA inch-thick clear plastic walls resting on plastic beams, with a transparent plastic door, at the U.S. embassy. One day, a CIA officer, peeping at the Italian embassy across the way, discovered the Italians peeping back. He spotted a telescope lens aimed at secret maps on the CIA walls. With all the drama of a TV slapstick spy episode ?iis superior ordered the windows boarded up. This had scarcely been completed before another agent, missing the sun- light, tore down the boards. Meanwhile, a terse security directive was issued by Washington after CIA agents in Nigeria were almost killed during a rebellion because their auto- mobile was a "Rebel," a 1967 American Motors model. The CIA urgently ordered agents around the world to remove the "Rebel" insignia from their cars, Kelly was told. , When Kelly first arrived in Saigon under super- secret orders, he was greeted at Tansonhut airport by. a Eurasian, with a uniquely brawny build and, a mouthful of flashing gold teeth. He turned out to be the official CIA greeter, who would have been hard to miss by the Vietcong agents lurking around the airport. At. SOG headquarters. Kelly found the CIA brass in a tizzy. One of his superiors had just been identi- fied by French and West German intelligence as the naked American on vacation at the famous L'Ile du Levant nudist camp off the coast of France. The CIA officer's girl friend had divulged his identity ?the moment he left the nudist camp for Saigon. One of the CIA's great objectives was to get the North Vietnamese to listen to a CIA radio transmit- ter, which was disguised as a militant Vietnamese nationalist underground station. To increase its Hooper rating, the CIA dropped tens of thousands of, plastic transistor radios in styrofoam boxes on North Vietnam. The radios were locked upon a single frequency, so those who retrieved the radios could listen only to the CIA station. To reach the Vietcong, whose jungle hiding places were difficult to locate for parachute droppings, the CIA strategists planned to bait the styrofoam ? radio boxes with food and float them down the Mekong River network. The hungry guerillas, it was suggested, would fish the food-laden radios out of the river. The plan was finally abandoned, however, because the CIA could find no foolproof flow harts for the Mekong. At last report, there were still two warehouses full of the little black radios: ? The CIA, however, had its occasional successes. It was able to determine, for example, that 33,000 Saigon officials, from clerks to cabinet officers, were active Vietcong agents or Vietcong sympathiz- ers. More dramatically, the .SOG units equipped South Vietnamese troops with Vietcong-style black pajamas. The disguised troops were able to crash into a North Vietnamese encampment, firing machine guns and tossing grenades. But the notorious Phoenix program, an assassina- tion scheme run by present CIA director William Colby, was less effetive. A report to the U.S. em- bassy revealed that the program was only one per cent effective. 1974. United Feature Synd cote 30 --? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 Approved For Releae 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 ? NEW YORK TIMES 6 August 1974 SENATE ANS HIT EMBASSY1 un 11 'Selective' Reports Adhere! to South Vietnam's Line I Too Closely; Study Says By BERNARD GWERTZMAN 'Special to Tbe New Y,:rk Times WASHINGTON, Aug. 6?A staff report issued today by the Senate Foreign Relations Com- mittee criticizes the United States Embassy in Saigon for reports that were described as adhering too closely to the of- ficial line of the Saigon Gov- ernment. , "Over the years, the-Ameri-i ,can Embassy in Saigon has ac-i 'quired a reputation, among both official and unofficial observ- ers, for close identification with! the pc4icies of the South Viet- namese Government and for ;selective reporting," the study. said. "These same tendencies are apparent today." The 47-page report was pre- pared by Richard M. Moose and 1Charles F. Meissner, staff mem- bers, after a mission to Indo- !china from May 12 to June 4. The report on Vietnam said he did when he testified before that unless the big powers ap- the Foreign Relations Commit- ply strong pressure, the South tee two weeks ago?the allega- Vietnamese 'Government and tions that the Embassy had distorted its reporting to Wash- ington on the situation in South Vietnam. He said he had given the strongest orders that reports should be objective and fair, but he added that sometimes messages to the State Depart- ment did not convey what was already included in Pentagon or Central Intelligence Agency cables. . The report said that in com- paring reports submitted to Sai- gon by foreign service officers in the field with reports unti- mately sent by the Eaigon Em- bassy to Washington "one con- sistent pattern emerges." It said the Embassy had a ten- dency "to play down or to ig- nore obvious cease-fire viola- tions by the South iVetnamese armed forces." "The Embassy, both in brief- ings provided to us and in its reporting to Washington, close- ly folloWed the public line of the South Vietnamese Govern- ment in justifying the South Vietnamese measures which precipitated the temporary breakdown in May 1974 of the talks in Paris and Saigon," be- tween the South Vietnamese and the Viet Cong, the staff members reported. The report cited the case of the fall of Tong Le Chan as an example. That small outpost on the Cambodian border had been under siege for more than a year. On April. 12. the Saigon the Communists will fail to reach a political settlement. "The present military con- frontation seems likely to con- tinue," the report said, "with the South Vietnamese unable to expel the North Vietnamese from their country, and the Communists unable to acquire "the decisive edge required to defeat the south militarily." On specific points, the report doubted whether the Adminis- tration's economic aid request of S750-million for this fiscal year would accomplish what Ambassador Graham A. Martin has predicted?a "takeoff" by the South Vietnamese economy, and an eventual American ex- trication from Saigon. "It is difficult to reach any other conclusion that that the fiscal year 1975 program is, in reality: a continuation of the past aid strategy of supporting the Vietnamese economy with massive flows of outside re- sources in order to fill fiscal and trade deficits," it said. Mr. Martin, who has been in Washington urging support of the aid request, said again in an interview the other day th- t a large appropriation was needed to spur the South Vietnamese economy and thus accelerate an end to American involvement. Mr. Martin -has rejected ?as WASHINGTON POST NEW YORK TIMES 7 August 1974 4 August 1974 State tellies U.S. Eirav ' y in Camb dia , Distortions Said to Give Arms Advice From Sail;-on Associated Press The State Department reaf- firmed its confidence -yester- day in the reporting of U.S. Ambassador Graham Martin and the embassy in South Vi- etnam to the department. A Senate Foreign Relations Connnittee saff report re- leased this week said the em- bassy was distorting its dis- patches in favor of the Saigon government. Robert Anderson, depart- ment spokesman, said that some of the reporting from consuls in South Vietnam to Saigon was not included in in- formation that the embassy sent in to Washington. He added, "If significant re- ports are left out, it is because of an effort to avoid duplicat- ing information." Anderson said the 'totality of the reporting" from Saigon has had no significant omis- sions. This would include the Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency ! reports as well as those of the _ State Department. Approveld ? By BERNARD GWERTZMAN Special to The New York Times ' WASHINGTON, -Aug. 3 ? iforms," the report said. It was John G. Dean, the United Statesiprepared by John J. Brady and Ambassador in Cambodia, reg-hJohn H. Sullivan, who visited ularly gives military advice to;l!the area from April 15 to May President Lon Nol and other,110. Cambodian officials despite The report said that, con- Congressional injunctions, ac- trary to some press reports ,cording to a report issued today that American military person- by ' the House of Representa- nel were actively advising Cam- tives' Foreign Affairs Commit- ,bodian military units, "the staff tee. The report, _which covered all of Indochina, noted that five separate acts of Congress pro- hibit the United States "from acting, in a military advisory capacity in Cambodia." But- the study, prepared by two committee consultants, said that Mr. Dean, "by his own ad- mission does not hesitate to give strategic military advice to Lon Nol or tactical advice Ito subordinate military com- manders." "It is his interpretation of existing laws that Congress did not mean to preclude 'advising' "It is clear, however, that :survey team could find no evi- dence that Americans are act- ing as combat unit advisers." Members of the defense at- taches office regularly go into the field to gather information,! the report continued, and while there their actions "or even; their questions may have some impact on the actions of Cam-i bodian field commanders." "There is no indication, how- ever, that this practice has' been systematized or is being used by defense attach?ffice: personnel with the intent of, violating the law," it added. I at the level at which lie Ler- or Release 2001/08/U8 : ' Government- announced that a "massive" North Vietnamese at- tack using tanks had overrun the entire garrison. Within a few days, today's report noted, it was widely known in Saigon?and report- ed in the American press?that the government had withdrawn voluntarily without losing al man. The Communists also said no battle had been fought, ? According to the report, the Embassy in Saigon was re- porting to -Washington as late as April 24 on the "bombard- ment and fall" of Tong Le Chan. The report said that many diplomats in Saigon believed that the Tong Le Chan incident and others were "part of a deliberate effort by the Saigon Government, assisted by the United States Embassy, to im- press the United States Con- gress of the necessity to au- thorize additional military as- sistance for Sbuth Vietnam." The report said that in the months between October, 1972, and January, 1973, when the Paris accord on Vietnam was signed, the United States sup- plied Saigon with equipment worth $753.3-million. This was the first time this figure was .made known. jj It said most of the equip- ment has not been well util- ized, and one "knowledgeable t:official" was quoted as saying it was "sitting around rusting." heiitated to give the Cambodi-I ans advice on military matters! ranging from command struc- ture and training to manage- ment and logistics," it said. Broad Help by Americana In detail, the report said: - "In order to insure proper end use of equipment, the United States has found it necessary to help the Cambo- dians to develop ports to re- ceive the equipment, repair roads and bridges on which to move it, train personnel to operate it, build housing for trainees, establish supply sys-. tems for efficient distribution and reorder, create facilities for maintenance and repair, and educate them to run the logistics and other systems." "This has resulted in con- stant, wide-ranging communi- cation between Americans and Cambodians, with the Ameri- cans telling Cambodians what to do." The study said that American officials -hoped that the Com- munist forces in Cambodia would acknowledge a stalemate in and agree to a Laotian-style coalition Government through negotiations. But the insurgents' successes in the dry season just ended, may encourage them o continue the fight. Moreover, a possibility that the Lon Nol Government would be replaced at the United Na- tters General Assembly session this fall by a Communist dele- gation would probably also rule thaptifil5b3431Ft17061)6 Ca80002+fitotiations, thc study; said. LOS ANGELEsAilerard For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 1 August 1974 Laos War Still Real for Meo Tribal Leader " CIA Aid Gone, Mountain ,General in Lonely Fight for Threatened Homeland ? BY GEORGE Me11.11THUlt. , Times Staff Writer LONG CHENG, Laos?The most effective general produced by the government side in three decades of war- in Lao, Lt. GUI. Vang Pao, sits today in his once-secret mountain fortress, his maps still showing North. Vietnamese troops -looking down his throat, and shrugs "La guerre, c'est fini (the war is over)." Then, gesturing toward his big, wall map, the Men tribal leader who :began his personal war as a French army second lieutenant in the early '50s, .adds: "But we,wilI never have peace as 'long as the North ?Vietnamese are here." These are difficult times for the 46-year-old soldier, lifted from rela- tive obscurity by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 15 years ago. The reason then was simple: Unlike kis Laotian -counterparts Yang Pao tvaS energetic. The tribal mountain people, unlike the lowland Laotians, -were willing to fight and unafraid of The Vietnamese. With CIA money, -Yang Pao led the army that carried the brunt of the fighting. Now, a coalition' government in- cluding the Communists is installed 'in the capital of Vientiane and a de . facto partitioning of Laos has been. accepted?with most of the Meo homeland given up to control of e North Vietnam and the local Pathet Lao movement. As was the case., with the war itself, the Meo and oth- er tribal people have had little voice in the so-called peace. ? Still, even Yang Pao now thinks mainly of reconstruction. "We lost too Much," he. said. "Our homes, our women, our cattle?al- most everything." But demobilizing some of his sol- diers and sending them back to non- 'existent homes is proving difficult.. With CIA support gone, it is also dif- ficult to keep the remaining men up to past standards: And the attitude of the Americans is disturbing? c,pough yang Pao remains unaliec- ledly pro-American, a portrait, of tichard Nixon on his wall and his eldest son off to West Point as a ca- (let. It is a sign of the times that the - 'Americans are planting grass at Long Cheng, Vang Pao's mountain base which was virtually destroyed three times during the war. The kase was once so full of CIA secrets 'Its very existence was denied and extra labor in those days was used to dig holes and build bunkers. ? Nestled below a cloud-topped gra- litte peak called Skyline Ridge, its short airstrip shuttling' off bomb-la- den 'warplanes, often under shell' Jire, the base held much of the .world's attention in 1972. With terri- ble bloodshed and vast American air ' support it survived by a hair?at 1 one time North Vietnamese soldiers reached the ground floor of yang Pao's stone home but were shot down by tribal soldiers on the -sec- ? ond floor. In those days, Long Cheng was the virtual symbol of the war in Laos. e The price was almost total . destruction: But there ? are those Nvho say that bat- tle Was a necessary pre- lude to the ' peace talks ?that followed. : Now rebuilt, Long Cheng ?- ? bas muted the trappings :of war.., Around the air- :Strip is a hodg,e podge tri- :-bal community in wood. ,and t? sheet'- metal homes. ,-Streetside Stalls sell harm- nag, coconuts-and lowland luxuries, including canned 'American soft -drinks. IThere ? is a movie. house and .a brightly painted temple. In -the 'immediate 'area-there are 12,000 civil- = tans, mostly the families of ;Yang Pao's -prolific sol- diers. - On- the airstrip are' a dozen single-engined -the ancient propel- lor-driven trainers . which ? .avere..con,yeked into bomb- :ers' for the hastily trained .-Meo pilots. Their boinb 'racks are emty and nowa- days- -they seldom make - even, training flights. The -raffish Air America pilots - :and CIA men of the past -are gone (though who can say what a CIA man looks _like). Only four Americans ',:stay in Lona Cheng regu- ar I y, working in new Concrete block buildings, _labeled United States ',Agency for International :Development. ? Where newsmen were ence ? arrested on sight, :they now get an affable greeting: Yang Pao him- self is likely to put a silver -Ting on your finger and with the cheery politic- . ness- of mountain people,- , insist on your return. . Yet the sprouting radio aerials, the bomha stacked by the runway, the swag- - ger of tribal soldiers on .the streets attest that .Long Cheng retains some muscle and mystery. Even getting there is an ,ad yen- ture. From Vientiane' it is six hours of bumping and grinding on a pc'rilous dirt road cut through jungles and mountains. The ap- proach by air. through peaks often shrouded by ? clouds, resembles the end. of a roller-coaster ride. ? The surrounding jungle is sparsely dotted with the stilt-houses of the tribal . people and sometimes ele- ? phants are seen working . fields and pulling out trees -though they are rare. to- ? day. ? .In thW fortress valley, ml d w a y between Vien- tiane and the riain of Jars which t-1.-te Communist :forces have occupied for four years, Yang Pao holds .sway as Something of a .-warlord?though hardly in : the old tradition. Only a handful 'of guards. stand around the two-'"i story stone building which., is his headquarters and home (only part of his family is with him. He has . had 28 children by his six wives). He: strolls about casually, wearing a base- ' ball cap and a non-regula- tion bush jacket adorned ? with red shoulder tabs and.. .his three-star insignia. In the casual manner probab- ly. picked up from the. Americans, many of his " men Simply call him Vee- Pee. He is a husky man with. a. ready laugh. While he complains that he is get- ting old he also volunteers. that his latest child is just three months. Asked about his good health, he . grins:- -- "I don't smoke. But- I . drink a little 'oft." In title, Yang Pao is simply commander of Mil- a itary Region II. But in fact he is the leader of 200,000' people who make up the Meo tribes. There is little that Yang .Pao can now do to regain ? the Men homeland around the fabled Plain of jars. Negotiators in Vientiane are now attempting to draw some kind of line be- 1 tween Yang Pao's forces ; and the Communists on. facing hilltop s. Mean- while, he accuses them of attempting to nibble off , the dwindling land hold- ings he has left though he admits that actual shoot- ing incidents have been feW since the country's third coalition gover n- ment was formed April 5. He dismisses any idea that the North Vietnamese will ever pull Fait the Plain of Jars and turn over the 32 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 administration to Pathet Lao forces?who %\ mild be acceptable to the tribal people. Pointing to the map at.14n, Yang Pao pointed to a valley about GO miles to the north. From there, he said, a North Vietnam- ese brigadier general, with radios and supplies tucked in h u n he vs and caves, commands "the Plain of Jars operational front." It is One of three North Viet- namese military com- mands in Laos, all report- ing directly hack to Flanoi ?and bypassing the Pathet Lao political headquarters zit Sam iNeua ruled over by Red Prince Souphanou- vong who commutes to his eahinet post in Vientiane aboard an ancient Russian biplane. WASHINGTON STAR 6 August 1974 fITT (73\ 711? (f!) While Yang Pao admits ?' I he North Vietnamese show no present sign of at- tacking, he notes the pre- sence of four veteran re- giments in the plain prob- a b 1 y numbering 10,000 men. These are combat troops. The number of support troops and Pathet Lao forces could double that? , possibly more. ? Yang Pao claims. the North Vietnamese now have two good highways going , into the Plain of Jars. One cuts almost due east to the panhandle of North Vietnam and is sometimes not passable in -the rainy season. The oth-. or is an all-weather route leading northeast from the plain to the North _Viet, namese border. , 0 Ply Oald ..Valmsoza Star-News Staff Writer ? Despite calculated offi- cial optimism, South Viet- nam .18 months after the cease-fire is economically, politically and militarily in peril and could continue to be a burden to the United States for years to come. This gloomy assessment emerges from a Senate For- eign Relations Committee report which charges the Nixon administration with -a policy of aimless drift and specifically faults the U.S. embassy in Saigon for deliberately misrepresent- ing the gravity of the situa- tion. In addition, the report re- veals for the first time the staggering cost in military equipment transferred from U.S. stockpiles to South Vietnam between October 1972, (when peace was "at hand"), and January 1973, when the cease-fire was agreed. That arms bill was $753.3 million ? a figure which nevee appeared in any budget and was never approved by any congres- sional action. EXCEPT FOR the de- tails, the report, by commit- tee staff aides Richard M. Moose and Charles F. Meissner, could have been written 10 years ago, when the United States was first sliding into the Vietnam quagmire. In a particularly c A Embassy so committed to the Saigon regime that facts adverse to South Viet- namese policy are deleted from embassy reports to Washington. The report charged that embassy reports to Wash- ington either distorted or deleted information on deliberate cease-fire viola- tions by the South Viet- namese army, on deterio- rating security and poor performance by South Viet- namese troops; and on the actual course of some mili- tary actions. U.S. Ambassador Graham A. Martin answer- ed the :charges during a committee hearing by say- ing deletions were made be- cause he did not believe it necessary to report some actions more than once, and that military information was reaching Washington through Pentagon channels. A separate report on the House side written by John J. Brady and John H. Sulli- van, charged that the U.S. ambassador in Cambodia, Jelin G. Dean, has system- atically violated congres- sional restrictions on the size of his embassy staff and had given military ad- vice, to the Phnom Penh government in the face of a congressional ban. THE HOUSE report charged that Dean has been boosting the size of his mis- poignant echo fr levy e difterbReletMalle0f/?03Y98 II I t past, it describes t 22 military and civilians Defeetors and agents in the Plain of Jars report, Yang Pao said, that about 50 trucks a day go be- tween the plain and North Vietnam. They bring in food ?and ammunition and take out timber, hides, scrap metal and an aSsort- , ment of things that amazes Yang Pao. "They are taking out all kinds of things, broken bottles and animal bones for example. I don't know what they do with it." Just to keep yang Pao edgy, the North Vietnam- ese keep a handful of tanks just north of Long ? Cheng and also have the base within range of a bat- tery of Soviet-built 130mm guns. Where he once com- manded perhaps i-24,000 above the 200-man limit im- posed by Congress. To do so, it said, Dean has been flying personnel into Cambodia in the morning and out again at night so that no more than 200 are actually present when counts are taken. In addition, it said, Dean "by his own admission. . . does not hesitate to give... military advice" to the Cambodian government, but maintains that Congress did not intend to preclude advising "at the level at which he performs." In a lengthy exposition of South Vietnam's faltering post-war economy, the Sen- ate report argues that the country's top-heavy mili- tary establishment and excessive reliance on a U.S.-fostered artificial economy of expensive im- ports will make South Viet- nam incapable of self-suffi- ciency for at least another 10 years. LN THE FACE of this, the report notes, the Agency for International Development establishment in Saigon is aiming for an economic "takeoff" in five years at the latest. AID officials base that projection in part on a reduction in South Vietnamese military expen- ditures which, the report. notes, Martin and other embassy officials oppose. Martin is currently in Washington to sell the administration's aid plans to a reluctant and preoccu- pied Congress. He has been arguing for a two-year pro- gram of massive doses of economic aid ( 750 to 5800 million a year) in addition to the 51.45 billion in military aid the adminis- tration has requested. (The rt(DtAt-RBR71714:10401215t000 et and Chinese aid to North men, including son* 4,000 now departed Thai merce- naries,- Yanc, Pao is now down to 6,70 men. He will lose even more by the end of the year -when the over-? all Lao army will drop to 50,000 men from its, peak of 78,000. There is grumbling among the men who are being sent home ? some having became virtually professional soldiers with. up to 15 years service. ? and more grumbling over pay and, severance allow- ances. The pay of the tri-? hal soldiers?once about $60 monthly?was cut in half when they were in- corporated into the Royal Army and lost their CIA subsidies. - Vietnam in 1973 is estimat- ed by U.S. intelligence-ex- perts to be no more than $713 million ? of which $425 million was estimated as economic aid and only $290 million military aid. This was exactly the reverse of the prevailihg 2-to-1 military-to-economic ratio' of U.S. aid to South Viet- nam.) THE STATED theory of Martin's proposed massive aid jolt is that it would push the South Vietnamese economy over the takeoff point in two years, after which it would rapidly be- come self-sufficient. But Martin's own subordinates in AID see five years neces- sary before this could hap- pen and other economists cited in the report expect this process to take 10 to 15 years. Accordingly, Mar- tin's rationale is rejected as totally unfounded. In a carefully understated conclusion to the report, Moose and Meissner made this assessment of the poli- cy Martin is responsible for administering: "What we saw and heard . suggested to us that our present policy toward Viet- nam is directed toward the maintenace of the status quo at a time when Wash- ington's attention is direct- ed elsewhere." The Report said that "the present military confronta- tion seems likely to contin- ue," with the South Viet- namese unable to expel the North Vietnamese, and the Communists unable to ac- quire "the decisive edge re- quired to defeat the South A critic of administration policy with access to coin- rnittee materials pointed 100330002u9e two-year Peri- od would expire iu 1976. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330.002-9 NEW YORK TIMES 22 July 1974 Spreading Trials in Korea Devastate Political Activity Students, Press and Clergy Are Silent s as President Park Uses the Courts to Eradicate Rising Opposition By FOX BUTTERFIELD " Special to The New York Times SEOUL, South Korea, July 20 The wife of a man sen- tenced to be executed in one of' Korea's spreading political trials stared ateier hands and said, almost imperceptibly, "If I tell you he was innocent, they will send me to jail too." . It is a measure of the dev- astating effect of the trials, ordered by President Park Cbung Hee to exterminate growing opposition to his Gov- ernment, that even the families of the accused dare not talk about them. ? Students have stopped- dis- cussing politics, the clergy are giving circumspect sermons, the press prints only the official version of the trials, and busi- nessmen mutter that stability is lgood for the economy. The impact ' of the trials, which began last winter after ia series of small demonstra- itions against Mr. Park's auto- cratic 13-year rule, was sudden:, lly intensified in the last week with a new wave of arrests, indictments and convictions. In the last eight days, 55 per- sons have been convicted be- fore secret courts-martial. Four- teen were sentenced to death, 'including South Korea's best known young poet, Kim Chi Ha, end six students. Today, however, the death sentences of the poet and four other men convicted of an anti- Government plot were com- muted to life terms after De- fense Minister Suh Jong Chul reviewed their sentences. A respected 77-year-old for- mer President of the country, Yun Po Sun, was taken before another military tribunal this week, and a prominent Catholic bishop, the Most Rev. Daniel Chi, was ordered to stand trial next week, under emergency decrees proclaimed by Presi- dent Park. Both men face a: death sentence. Moreover, it appears that the THE ECONOMIST JULY 20, 1974 Korea trials will continue to spread. An American-educated lawyer who had defended several students and the poet, Mr. Kim, was arrested this week by.the Korean Central Intelligence Agency after he bitterly ob- jected in Court to the death sen- tences given his clients. Also, 150 Koreans, including clergymen, professors' and students, are being held in jail awaiting trial, well-informed diplomats say. Among the few Koreans still willing to talk, although in fur- tive whispers, there is a feel- ing that the austere, aloof Mrs., Park has gone too far. "He isl mad, mad, there is no other, explanation," said One opposi- tion politician. But some other ,officials with access to the PreSident ? and there are very few these days ?insist that he is still under control. "Cold, calculating and self-confident," one diplomat said. s - According to associates, Mr. Park, who first came to power in the military coup of 1961 as a general, is the product of three related and rigorous tra- ditions. One is Korea's bor- rowed heritage of Confucian- ism, with its stress on paternal government by stern- leaders.. Another is the bleak, often vio- lent w6rld Of the Korean peas- ant, and the third sterns from Mr. Park's highly disciplined training in the imperial Japa- nese Army, where subordinates Vere expected to follow orders. "Park is only doing what his instinct and training" have, taught him to do: use force and terror to enforce his leader- ship," said one Westerner with long experience here. "It would be easier if we just recognized this is a dictatorship." Among Korean officials Mr. Park's crackdown is explained as "an unfortunate necessity" Look-alikes Opposition is treason. This simple equation, which has served dictators from time immemorial, was formally proclaimed the law of the land in South Korea three months ago when the death penalty was introduced for pretty well any expression of dissent. Last week the first lot of prisoners was convicted under this emergency decree: 14 people, including the country's leading satirical poet and several student leaders, were 34 caused by the constant threat of North Korea, as Chung 11 Kwon, the Speaker of the Na- tional Assembly, said in an in- terview. ? Mr. :Chung, whd was com- mander of the Korean Army at the outbreak of the Korean war, a former Premier and close friend of President Park said, "Our American friends must understand our special situation and traditions. North' Korea may invade any day, se we cannot afford the luxury of democracy as you can." , 'Anyone who creates unrest is really helping the Commu- nists," Mr. Chung added. Tht interview was conducted in Mr. Chung's new hilltop house. in a wood-paneled "QOM deco- rated with a tiger's head, a carved elephant tusk and a lac- quered table from Vietnam. The last two were gifts froma President Nguyen Van Thin and former President Nguyen Cao Ky of South Vietnam. Since the current crackdown began last January with the first of Mr. Park's emergency decrees, the Seoal Government has repeatedly stressed the im- minence of an invasion from the north. ? Officials here point o sev- eral signs: two small neW air- fields the Communists have built close to the demilitarized zone, a new na val base on the 'have no real ties to the peas- west coast not far north ot Seoul, and several attacks this year by the north on southern fis'ling boats and patrol ships. Yesterday the Government said North Korean antiaircraft gunners had fired on a Korean Airlines civilian jetliner as it P approached Kimpo Interna- tional Airport at Seoul, though a no bullet holes were found. 5 However, the American in. a telligence community here takes issue with the Govern- o ment's analysis of the Commu- s nists' hostile actions and inten- tions at almost every point. 'I economists here forecast a 12 per cent growth rate this year, down from last year's phenom- enal 17 per cent but still excellent. ' Inflation has become a svri- ous concern, with wholesale prices up 30 per cent from last year and consumer prices 16 per cent by, official estimate. But to offset the effects of in- flation, the Government re- cently approved a 30 per cent raise for civil servants. Both the 600,000-man army and the large Korean intelli- gence agency, Mr. Park's main es)wer bases, remain loyal to ?him, as far_ as can be deter, mined, knowledgeable diplo- mats say. The President has made a practice of regulaAy transferring the top army coin- manders to. prevent any officer from accumulating power. . Thus ?Mr. Park's opponents who have been arrested and tried in recent weeks remain largely an isolated minority, like the liberals in China who were squeezed between Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists and the elusive third force in Vietnam caught between Presi- dent Thieu and the Vietcong. The dissidents are almost all, urban, middle class and well educated, and many are mem- bers of South Korea's 12 per cent Christian minority. They antry that still forms the back- bone of the population, and they have only strictly con- trolled links to the growing working class. But the 1960 coup that too- led President Syngman Rhee vas begun by students in Seoul, nd there is still a feeling that omeday the students can do it gain. And despite the current wave f repression, there are still ome surprising acts of cour- ge. Bishop Chi, the Catholic eader 'under indictment, came ack from a European trip even hough he knew what would appen to him. "We cannot allow ourselves o become just the same as orth Korea," said Mr. Yun, ie former President now on rial. "I admit I gave money to he students to demonstrate," vlr. Yun related in an inter- iew. "I would do it again if would help." There is a prevalent belief that Mr. Park has been using the threat more for his own domes- tic purposes. Mr. Park's control Over the Government and the population' has no doubt been helped byl the continued growth of the Korean economy. -Despite dis- locations caused by the oil ti crisis last winter ? South v Korea must import all its oil?i it condemned to death, 15 were given life terms and 26, among them-two Japanese, were sentenced to 15-20 years in jail. This week a former president of the country went on trial along with a pro- fessor of history, the dean of a theo- logical college and the minister of a Seoul church. Another 200 students, teachers and churchmen are said to be under arrest and awaiting their turn in the military courts. The prosecution claim is that all these defendants were involved in a student-led conspiracy to overthrow the Park regime. The main evidence of such a conspiracy seems to be the fact that large numbers of students throughout the country defied police orders and joined anti-government demonstrations in early April. The group which led the demonstrations, the National Federa- tion of Democratic Youth and Students, has since been declared a North Korean front and banned, along with the leading student Christian organisation. Any connection with these student federations is now defined as subversion: the former president, Yun Po Sun, is being tried for donating $1,000 to student funds. The red smear is familiar enough in South Korea, where it has lonct been used to discredit anyone who falls out of Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100S30002:9 favour with the Park regime. But a witch- hunt on the present scale is not standard, nor is the provocative tone of current anti-communist propaganda (President Park declared on Tuesday that relations with North Korea were approaching a state of war). The partial American withdrawal from the Asian mainland has made many Asian leaders take drastic action to protect their govern- ments from the communist challenge. But President Park seems to be approaching a state of mind very little different from that of his rival in Pyongyang. Thursday, August 8, 1974 THE WASHENGTON POST . . . a By Don Oberdorfer Washington Post Foreign Service SEOUL--"It has been most difficult to control my- self during this past year. I had to try hard to keep from bursting out, to keep seren- ity in my own mind. 1 think I know ? how Solzhenitsyn and some of the other Rus- sian dissenters felt. I'm not surprised that some of them were placed in mental hospi- tals:' Kim Dae Jung was sitting In the living room of his closely watched house, chat- ting with visitors over steaming cups of Korea's fa- mous ginseng (herb root) tea. A black secret-police se- dan was parked up the street near the "real estate office" 'where lights burn all night despite tly3 city's strict midnight curfew. Three years ago Kim was the opposition party's unsuc- cessful candidate for presi- dent against incumbent Park Chung Hee. A little over a year ago he was shut- tling between the United States and Japan as the most articultate outside critic of President Park's seizure of unlimited power under martial law. Then on Aug. 8, 1973, Kim was abducted in broad day- light from a Tokyo hotel, spirited out of Japan in a fast boat and taken, bound and gagged, to the doorstep of his Seoul home. There he has remained ever since, first under house arrest and then under heavy surveil- lance, while international controversy has continued about his case. One year after his kidnap- ing?Ia.panese newspapers and television are giving coverage to reviews of de- velopments in Japan-Korea relations since the sensa- tional. incident. The Japa- nese Foreign Ministry has reiterated its unhappiness ? that Kim is not free to travel abroad and instead is being tried by a Korean court on old charges stem- ming from his unsuccessful presidential campaign. The South Korean govern- ment has ignored repeated appeals from Prof. Edwin 0. Reischauer, former U.S. am- bassador to Japan, and oth- ers that Kim be released to accept a previously offered fellowship at Harvard Uni- versity. A House Foreign Affairs subcommittee has asked for Kim's appearance in Washington as a witness in a study of human rights in Korea?but there's no sign the request will be granted. Until a few days ago Kim was virtually a nonperson in Seoul, with little news of him and none of his opin- ions permitted in the con- trolled Korean press. Then an Associated Press corre- spondent reported Kim's opinion that U.S. military assistance to South Korea should not be reduced or terminated, and stories about this viewpoint blos- somed forth on the front pages here. It has been his long-held and consistent view that ces- sation of American support would spell the doom of South Korea. "I think Amer- ican military aid and the stationing of American troops here is still necessary in principle?but I think the U.S. should check any abuses . . . to make sure your military aid is used for defense, and not used against the Korean people," he said in an interview. He added, as in the past, his protest against reduction of political freedoms in the southern half of the divided peninsula. "We are the same race as the North Korean people, with the same lan- guage, the same blood. The same cultural heritage. There is no reason to fight against North Korea except for freedom. If we lose our freedoms, we nave no rea- son to resist," he main- tained. Whatever the condition of his countrymen, Kim him- self has very little freedom in a practical everyday sense; His suburban house is surrounded by agents, who follow him conspicuously anytime he leaves his, small walled compound. His telephone is tapped. Any Korean who comes to see him is likely to be pulled in .for police interro- gation. For security reasons and to avoid difficulty to his friends, he leaves home only to attend Catholic Mass on Sunday and to attend ses- sions of the district criminal court where he is being tried on the old election charges. Kim's kidnaping has been nearly universally attrib- uted to the Park regime's ubiquitous CIA, the secret police-intelligence-thought control agency. His sus- pected kidnapers are living better than their victim. Former KCIA Director Lee Hu-rak, who was drop- ped from his high office last December in a bow to Japa- nese and Korean indigna- tion about the case, slipped out of the country for a time but was persuaded to return. He is reported alter- nately living in a resort ho- tel in seaside Chung Mu and on the grounds of a Bud- dhist temple near Seoul. Kim Dong-woon, the em- bassy first secretary in Ja- pan whose fingerprints were found at the hotel abduction' site, fled home to Korea and disappeared from view. Ex- ile sources say he is living comfortably on the grounds of the Walker Hill resort in Seoul. Lee Sang-ho, the former KCIA chief in Washington who is reported to have been the task force director of the kidnap group, is back in Seoul. Korean exile sources say he has been pro- moted to a high-ranking po- sition in KCIA headquar- ters under his real name, which is Yang Doo-won. Other members of the KCIA team that allegedly abducted Kim Dae Jung are said .to have been scattered throughout the world-74o Canada, Mexico, Chile, Los Angeles and other posts. So - far nobody has come for- ward to tell the full story of the kidnaping last Aug. 8. Officially it is still an un- solved crime. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RPP77-00432R000100330002-9 WASHINGTON ruAntal:wed For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 sl: 5 August 1974 Seelig 77-7 By Don Oberdorfer Washington Post Foreign Service SEOUL, Aug. 4?Pres- sures are mounting for Pres- ident Park Chung Hee to roll back the wave of inter- i nal repression1. before irre- parable dareage is done to his leadeiship at home and ? his country's standing abroad: ? ' Despite resolute talk in . public, nearly all the second- echelon figures of the Ko- rean government are re- ported to be privately dis- mayed by the reaction to the recent series of arrests, closed military trials and harsh sentences, and to be ? pretty well convinced that Park has gone too far. The problem is that there's no sign yet that the president agrees. It would a bold aide indeed who -risked displea- sure by being the first to sug- gest a .change in direction. A former general in the government? camp recalls that he and several others successfully faced down the president in the 1950s when Park wanted to take a par- , ticular ruthless and unac- ceptable action. Today Park's one-time -military peers have died or been *downgraded; and nobody is in position to tell him "no" and make it-stick. "Until two or three years ago I was able to go in and ? discuss things with him," said a man known for his close connection with the, president and who is per- forming major jobs for -the regime: "I can't get to him ; anymore," Park's old friend said. The isolation of the man in power, which is a serious problem in many lands and political systems, seems to have ? grown apace since Park seized total control un- der martial law 22 months ago. For the past 10 days, the Korean chief of state has been vacationing at the offi-? cial summer resort at Chin Hae, near Pusan, and thus is more removed ? than usual .from the workaday worries .of the capital. U.S. Ambassa- dor Philipliabib, soon to deo , part for Washington to be- ? come assistant secretary of state for East Asian affairs, has been sending American press, reports and other mes- sages to the beachside re- treat-e-presumably to warn Park about the growing re- action in Congress and else- where against his crack- down on political opponents. Two. subcommittees of the U.S. House Foreign Affairs 'Committee held public hear- ings last Tuesday on human rights in Korea, and another day of hearings is scheduled for this week. The chairmen pfsboth subcomthittees, Rep. Donald Fraser (11)-Mine.) and Rep. Robert Nix (D-Pa.) urged cuts in U.S. military aid to Koree to show disap- - proval of what is taking place. , ? Another, sign of, Coiligres- ional opinion was the For- eign Affairs Committee's ac- tion?approved by the 'full, House last week ? denying funds to the U.S. Informa- tion Agency for relocating powerful Voice of America transmitters to Korea from Okinawa. At Japan's insist- ence, the United States has ? agreed to remove the trans- mitters from Japanese terri- tory by 1977, and Korea was considered the prime reloca- tion site. While such a relocation may be justified on techni- cal grounds, the committee is of the opinion that present conditions in that country (Korea) do not make it the most desirable alternative," said the congressional re- port denying the funds. For a state that owes its very existence to the United THE WASHINGTON POST Thursday, August 8,1974 rean Le - 0 By Edward Schumacher Special to The Washington Post SEOUL, Aug. 7?An opposi- tion lawmaker attacked the emergency measures of Presi- dent Park Chung Hee in the National Assembly today, the first public challenge from the opposition since criticism of the measures was forbidden eight months ago. Rep. Kim Won Man, 53, in statements harsher than those for which many dissenters are now in jail declared "You I can't secure political stability : with oppression and suppres- ercv States and continues to tie- pond heavily on U.S. military, economic and diplomatic support, such disaffection could be . extremely serious -in the long run. In an interview with foreign corespondents, Park's second-in-command, Premier Kim John Pil, suggested last week that international opinion has emboldened "a handful of disgruntled peo- ple" at home to act as if ine whole world were behind them. Whether for this rea- son or from sheer despera- tion, there is no doubt that opposition is beginning to surface again despite the de- crees that " make it . punieh- able .by long prison terms or death sentences. The thin line of resistance is ? centered in the churches,, ,both Catholic and Protes- tant. Despite concerted 'gov- ernment maneuvers to si- lence them, church leaders are increasingly engaged in defending dissidents against complete suppression. ? In the ' Catholic cliurch, the issue' was: joined by Bishop. Daniel Chi. 'whose court-martial on charges of aiding antigovernment ? stu- debt demonstrators . began Thursday. Chi had , many chances to avoid arrest and trial, but he rebuffed every one and headed into a con- frontation with the-state. The government's reac- tion has been to charge the bishop with urging "violent revolution" , and. to call. him "a liar" for denying the charge, and to work behind the scenes to cut off Chi's Catholic support. Secret-police agent's have visited Korea's Stephen Car- dinal Kim and senior bish- ops to ask them not to sup- port Chi. Delegations of sion." Premier Kim Jong PH told the assembly, in its first day of debate on any issue in seven months, that the govern- ment will not perpetuate the emergency measures taken to quell dissent and that trials of persons accused of plotting to overthrow the government would end soon. "I understand even Presi- dent Park himself considers these measures to be only temporary in nature," he said. Informed sources said the premier also told a group of 0 r; Catholic generals and Cath- olic assemblymen froni the government party were also sent to ask church leaders. to stay aloof. Despite the pressure, Catholic sentiment in Korea appears to be strongly behind the bishop. ' The Protestant hierarchy, whish had remained pub- 41y passive despite arrest and court-martial of many Christian ministers and lay leaders this'year, has begun to show signs of fighting back. Nine senior leaders affili- ated ? with -the Anglican Church, Evangelical Church. -Jesus Presbyterian Church, Methodist Church. Presbyte- rian Church of the Republic of Korea and the Salvation Army have asked to see Park or Premier Kim to ask for repeal of "emergency de- crees" and release of per- sons arrested or convicted under them. If no satisfae-. tion is forthcoming, they . plan a public rally Aug. II 'despite the strict ban on an- tigovernment expressions. Some of the previously cautious churchmen appear to have been affected by re- Cent trips !outside the count try, which exposed them td the international condemna- tion of the Park regime., Others were affected by the allegations of torture and other abuses -inflicted on recently convicted stuqents and intellectuals: In an effort to ? identify leaks from the closed courts- martial, 'police have called ? in , and, grilled relatives of the defendants. The wife of a prominent church leader was interrogated, placed un- der heavy surveillance and limited in her movements. Protestant leaders at a meet- ing two days ago that some of the measures might be re- laxed. Because of that and the !premier's meeting with Ameri- can Ambassador Philip Habib yesterday, the Protestants can- celed a demonstration planned for Sunday. It was unclear what the ambassador said or the arguments of the lawyer, Kan' g4 Shin Ok, constituted contempt of judges and a vio- lation of emergency decrees. Kim -Chi Ha is serving a life sentence for allegedly aiding a- dissident. student group. eereesi was secretly put back on trial today, and the announcement. by Justice Minister Lee Pong Sung that the lawyer who de- fended poet Kim Chi Ha at his recent court-martial has been arrested. Lee told the assembly that who requested the meeting. These events increased spec- ulation that Park might back off. Counterbalancing them. however, were a report from an informed source that Cath- ?tic Bishop Daniel Chi, who is , The Denfense 'Ministry said being tried by court-martial,i today that Bishop Chi has' Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 ? ? - c 'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 'pleaded guilty, hut it did not' specify to what offenses. The Catholic Church con- tinued to press its support of! the bishop, which could lead to a showdown with the gov- ernment. steering commit- tee of four bishops, ho ap- parently represent all 13 Ko- rean bishops plus Korea's Ste- phen Cardinal Kim, yesterday sent the country's 700 parishes a statement which in effect de- nied the government's claims against Bishop Chi. The harshness of the Na- tional Assembly speech by Rep. Kim startled meniherg CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 2 August 1974 r-1 rA-N of the ruling party. They tried to shout him down, but the lawmaker from Seoul, a city which voted ainst Park in the last election in 1972, per- sisted. "People are uneasy," he said. "Foreign investors are uneasy. The number of tour- Roman Catholic bishop tried under tightest secrecy; curbs to continue By Elizabeth Pond Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor Tokyo President Park's authoritarian re- gime has taken yet further steps against the Christian churches and democratic freedom in Korea. The latest move is against Roman Catholic Bishop Daniel Chi, who was put on trial Aug. 1 in an especially secret court martial in Seoul on charges of giving money to and Inciting anti-government students who were allegedly trying to over- throw the South Korean Government by violence. Ata luncheon the same day, Korean Prime Minister Kim Jong Pil told reporters that curbs on democratic freedom in South Korea would con- tinue until the achievement of eco- nomic affluence. This phase would probably extend until 1981, "by which time we hope to have achieved our objective of $1,000 per capita gross national product and $10 billion annual exports," he said. Neither freedom nor democracy can be ensured without money, Mr. Kim explained. "The same is true with national security. If we do not have money. . . we will be overrun by [Communist North Korean leader] Kim Il sung." The Prime Minister appealed for International understanding, espe- cially from the United States, which has recently charged South Korea with increasingly harsh repression. Some of the U.S. concern centers on a series of South Korean military court sessions that have recently sentenced 55 students and other dis- sidents to death, life imprisonment, or 15- to 20-year prison terms. All have been closed sessions. But some notice of the trial dates has usually been given to prisoners' familes and, at least in theory, one member of the Immediate family has been allowed to be present at each of these trials. Criticism outlawed In the case of Bishop Chi, however, no outsider other than his lawyer was Informed of the trial, and no witness friendly to Mr. Chi was present. Catholic sources in Tokyo were not even sure if Mr. Chi's lawyer was present at the trial. Military courts have been trying the cases of students who demonstrated against the government under presi- dential decrees of January and April outlawing criticism of South Korea's strongman constitution and support for anti-government student demon- strators. Among other prominent Christians on trial or in jail for supporting the students are the former president of South Korea, a well-known Presby- terian minister, the dean of the Yonsei University School of Theology, and almost the entire leadership of the Korean Student Christian Feder- ation. 1 Nonclerical clothes The only news about Bishop Chi's trial and present detention has come from a Japanese reporter who saw Mr. Chi being taken out of a hospital behind Korean CIA (secret police) THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, AUGUST 8, .1974 60 More Al re Put on Trial Secretly By FOX BUTITAFIELD Speciai to The New York Times SEOUL, South Korea, Aug. 7?In a major intensification of the recent series of politi- cal' trials here, 60 more per- sons have been taken secretly before military courts in the last week. Many are believed to be students, including several under 20 years of age at - one group of 8 students from Sogang, they were not noti- fied that the trials had begun and discovered it only after visiting Westgate Prison in Seoul to bring the prisoners fresh clothing. The disclosure that 60 addi- tional defendants were on trial was .made by Lee Yang Woo, the chief legal adviser to the Ministry of National Sogang University, a Catholic Defense, which is conducting, olersin scho Seoul. Accgriiiiiii0Uhcep"rc.5161kAiikihgrOgr memb of the falfiffir.s - 31" Yi ists has dropped by half. Peo- ple with means are emigrat- ing." Referring to the Japanese occupation that ended in 1945, he added, "Even imperialistic, colonialistic Japanese had not so much abused emergency measures." headquarters at 8 o'clock Thursday morning. The journalist reported that four guards put Mr. Chi, who was wearing ordinary nonclerial clothes, Into a car and took him away. Late in the day a Defense Ministry spokesman said that in the trial Mr. Chi admitted giving financial support to a student movement to overthrow the Park Chung Hee government. In a public statement on July 23 Mr. Chi announced that he would never go to a court martial trial voluntarily. He also warned the public not to believe any words attributed to him in the censored Korean media. In the statement Mr. Chi acknowl- edged that he gave funds in support of "oppressed Christian-minded stu- dents," but added that he was being "falsely accused by forged documen- tation of instigating a revolt." The extra secrecy in Mr. Chi's case Is apparently occa-ioned by his der- ing in making public calls for restora- tion of democracy in South Korea ? and by South Korean Government concern over the possible reaction to Mr. Chi's stand among South Korea's 800,000 Catholics. The South Korean Catholic Church Is basically conservative, ready to support any restrictive measures the government says are necessary to fight against communism. Since Mr. Chi, an outspoken social activist and critic of government repression, was arrested a month ago, however, the Catholic Church has rallied behind him, holding nationwide masses for him. Mr. Chi was originally scheduled to go on trial July 23, but the trial was postponed, apparently because of the wave of international protests to his arrest. More recently, the South Korean dragnet was extended to include two Irish priests who are associates of Bishop Chi resident in South Korea. They, too, were interrogated over- night by secret police and were reported exhausted after the ordeal. as Seoul Intensifies Political Crackdown! that the new trials had beem)ganization outlawed by Presi-____ going on for 10 days and some !dent Park Chung Ree's emer- gency degree. Ninety-one persons, including two Japanese, have been con- victed so far in the spreading series of political trials. Five more, including Yun Po Sun, the 77-year-old former Presi- . dent of South Korea, are cur- were over. In that 10-day peri- od, his office denied repeatedly that such trials were going on. Outlawed League Cited Mr. Lee, who is a former naval officer, said that the CO were "suspecter of partici- patation in treason led by the I 745' iibti 003 4.0I. a P t0002 leglit es, a243.1?nt or-li The sudden step-up, at a time 37 ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 iwhen President Park is Involved In a controversy with South Korea's Protestants and Boman Catholics over detention of Christian clergymen, apparent- ly took many Government of- ficials by surprise. Premier Hints of Letup Some diplomats here, citing the Government's sensitivity to trials and their international implications, believe that policy' related to the crackdown is being made by a tiny group in, the national leadership and is not too well coordinated. There were also these devel- opments today: 41Premier Kim Jong Pil, In an address to the National As- sembly, hinted that the Govern- ment might lift the emergency decrees, ?which Mr. Park pro- claimed last winter and spring and which provide the legal basis for the courts-martial. Mr. Kim said, "I understand President Park himself consid- ers these measures to be only temporary in nature." IllAlso in a speech to the legis- lature, a member of the oppo- sition, Kim Won Man of the New. Democratic party, de- nounced the decrees, saying, "You can't secure political sta- bility with oppression and sup- pression." Under Decree No. 4, such criticism is punishable by death, but Mr. Kim was not) prevented from speaking. (Mishap Daniel Chi Bak; Soun, an outspoken Catholic prelate who is charged with subversion, was taken before a military court today for the second time. According to Mr. Lee of the Ministry of National Defense, Bishop Chi testified that his trial was being con- ducted "fairly" and that if the court showed leniency, "in the future I will devote myself only to religious activities." Another spokesman said today's pro- cedures concluded the taking of testimony and that the pros- ecution would make known its demands for punishment at the next session. gThe steering committee of the Council of Catholic Bishops in Korea issued a statement suggesting that in view of the Government's account of the Bishop's arrest and trial as made public in the press here, "the faithful will not accept the face value of the news- paper articles." No Catholic leader, not even Stephen Car- dinal Kim, has been permitted ;to attend the Bishop's trial. ? WASHINGTON STAR 6 August 1974 There were fresh accounts of police abuse of political op- ponents of the Park Govern- ment. The mothers of two defend- ants already convicted were said to have been knocked un- conscious by policemen seeking to find out who had provided foreign newsmen with, stories of torture of the prisoners. - The 26-year-old wife of an- other defendant, An Chae Ung, has reportdly told friends that she was interrogated for three straight days without sleep by a team of 10 policemen from a Seoul district police station. As a result, she is said to have related, she suffered from nervous ? exhaustion and her arms and hands became immo- bilized. Asked today to comment u?n the charges, Mr. Lee suggested that the women "should appeal to the authorities concerned, or even report them to me." None Sentenced, He Says The ministry's legal offices said of the 60 new defendants, that they had been divided into five groups, "according to school or profession." Mr. Lee asserted that some of the 60 were not students, but when Koveart Ergsan4 The wholesale attack on political dissent in South Korea has reached such ridiculous proportions as to raise doubts about the Seoul leadership's grasp of international realities. Presi- dent Chung Hee Park and his associ- ates in tyranny have shown no under- standing of how their indiscriminate crackdown on domestic critics has devastated the image of their regime, hurting rather than helping South Korea's prospects for national surviv- al and economic development. Park's obsession, about maintaining his absolute power has led him to ap- palling excesses, in decreeing the death penalty for virtually any dissent and in using the police and military power with the grossest lack of judg- ment. A recent count indicated that 55 students and other dissidents, includ- ing the country's leading poet, have been sentenced to death, life imprison- ment or 15-to-20-year terms. Hundreds more await secret military trials. Defendants include Catholic Bishop Daniel Chi, on trial for his life for giv- ing money for student protests, and former President Yun Po Sun, 76, ar- rested on a similar charge. The Chris- tian churches have provided many targets besides the bishop: five priests and a nun, a Presbyterian minister, a theology-school dean and the leaders of the Korean Student Christian Federation. The National Council of Churches, representing more than 2 tasked to describe what, jobsi they held, he remarked, "I can't remember." He also stated that "a part of the trials may have con- cluded," but said no prisoners had been sentenced. Asked what sentences the prosecution had demanded, Mr. Lee said that It had not asked the death penalty. As for why his office had repeatedly denied during the past 10 days that trials were being held Mr. Lee insisted that there had been "no effort at deception" and that it was not a regular practice for the Government to announce every court-martial session. In the, ? earlier 91 cases, most sessions were announced. Catholics contacted today said they doubted seriously whether Bishop Chi would re- pent in any form or promise to cease his activities against President Park. The Govern- ment has often cited a prison- er's reported repentence as a ground for a pardon or for re- ducing a sentence. It was speculated in some circles that the Government ,might do that in the bishop's case. million South Korean Protestants, threatens a mass protest _Sunday if Park's repressive emergency decrees are not withdrawn. The very letter an- nouncing the rally is illegal. The cur- rent uproar is rife with charges of tor- ture and other abuses attributed to Park's police forces. Nothing is more illustrative of Seoul's lack of insight than the laugh- able defense voiced by Premier Kim Jong Pil. Applying a sort of reverse means test, he said Koreans are too poor to be allowed more democracy. When per capita annual income has doubled to $1,000, in 1981, it will be possible to ease up. There is nothing funny about the loss of freedom that many Koreans would endure in the meantime, or about the larger tragedy that could re- sult from Seoul's alienation from the democratic world. South Korea is heavily dependant on American sup- port for security from the aggressive Communist regime of North Korea. Now there are congressional calls to cut or suspend South Korea's $241.5- million military-aid allocation this fis- cal year, and there will be new pres- sure to withdraw the 38,000 American troops remaining on the truce line since the 1950-53 war. The administra- tion wants to stand pat despite the beating democracy is taking from our ally, but Park seems bent on eroding even that amoral position. 38 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 " Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-6 CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 24 July 1974 Korea and U.S. policy It is time for the American Government to declare publicly and forcefully its concern about the wave of political arrests and trials which is still sweeping , through South Korea. The attention of South Korean President Park Chung Hee should be drawn specifically to Section 32 of the current U.S. Foreign Aid Act: "It is the sense of Congress that ? the President should deny any economic or military assistance to the government of any foreign country which practices the in- ternment or imprisonment of that country's citizens for political purposes." Nearly 100 South Korean citi- zens so far have been jailed for long terms, or sentenced to death, on charges that amount to little more than being publicly critical of the Park government's increas- ingly authoritarian rulership. More recent arrests and trials have incluc: -(1 South Korea's only living former president, Yun Po Sun, and a prominent bishop. Although some of the death sen- tences have been commuted to life imprisonment, this was expected, and is no indication that the gov- ernment is reconsidering its poli- cies. What must be brought home to the Park regime is the danger it is bringing to itself, to South Korea and the delicate international bal- ance of the whole region by its attempt to repress all political dissent. Lesser provocation has already produced one popular uprising in CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 15 July 1974 plea for reason in Korea The Government of South Korea has pushed to its ultimate the policy of labeling political dis- sidents as "enemies" who endan- ger "national security." A three-man military tribunal set up under emergency decrees has sentenced 14 South Korean citizens to death, and 39 others to long prison terms, some for life. Another 200 are under court mar- tial and face similar treatment. Among the 14 receiving death sentences are five students from Seoul National University and the poet Kim Chi Ha who has been called the Solzhenitsyn of Korea. The severity of the sentences seems obviously intended to frighten away any further politi- cal opposition to the rule of Park Chung Hee. That opposition, suppressed un- der martial law since 1972, finally boiled to the surface in the spring of last ,year with student protest demonstrations involving thou- -sands of students in almost every major university. President Park yielded momen- tarily, pulling back somewhat the Korean CIA's domestic surveil- lance operations and replacing its unpopular chief. But that tempo- rary tactic was soon followed by the extraordinary decrees that recent South Korean history, bringing down the government of Syngman Rhee. Today the possi- bilities for chaos are even greater. But the American troops in Korea did not attempt to bail out Mr. Rhee then, and they cannot be expected to intervene for Mr. Park now, should another rebel- lion take place in the South. Such a disturbance could even Invite intervention by the North, confronting the U.S. with more warfare. It should be made clear to Presi- dent Park that Congress and the American people would not toler- ate further involvement in Asia under such circumstances. And that if he does not reverse his course, Washington may be forced to reassess its policy of military and economic support. made virtually any whisper of dissent punishable in the extreme. Mr. Park's excuse is the need for vigilance against the North. But South Korea has never been stronger economically and mili- tarily. There is less reason now for authoritarianism than ever and, indeed, every condition exists for the country tO adopt more demo- ' cratic practices. Kim Chi Ha's "crime" was that he gave some money (about $450) to one group of student protesters. Previously, the well-known poet had been jailed a number of times and once committed to a sanato- rium ? in a move similar to the Soviet Union's treatment of prominent dissidents ? because of poetry satirical of government policies. Inevitably, one compares the Soviets' final disposition of Mr. Solzhenitsyn with the Park re- gime's "solution" to Kim Chi Ha. To the extent that world protest helped to obtain the release of Solzhenitsyn to exile, might it now obtain more lenient and reason- able treatment for Kim Chi Ha and his fellow South Korean dis- senters? - It is possible, and there is time. Here is one such protest. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-INP77-00432R000100330002-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 Friday, 4 agust 2,1974 THE V.A.S111NOTON POST k1 0 67 By Joseph 2siovitski , Speolal to Tho Washington Post SANTIAGO The Chi- lean military junta, after governing f or 10 Months with improvised policies and structures, has settled down for a long stay in power. The junta, which replaced President Salvador Allende after the coup in which he died last September, began its tenth month by reorder- ing the country's govern- ment, burning the national voter registry and breaking off relations with Chile's largest political party, the Christian Democrats. It all added up to a declaration that the military plans ? to gpern for an indefinite , snan, without elections or organized civilian political support. ClOvernment spokesmen, when asked how long mili- tary rule may last, answer, . ?We have 'plans, not dead- lies." '-The plans are for the long tc*rrt and on a large scale. we don't do big, last- ing things, we might as well go home now," an adviser to the junta said recently. 'Thus far, in what it calls "the second stage," the jtinta has made known its intention to rebuild the economy, to make it grow with the help of foreign in- vestment, to reduce and re- organize the government bu- reaucracy and to enforce a total ban on civilian politi- cal activity by continuing the detentions and military- court. trials that have been the rule since last Septem- ber. The first step of govern- ment reorganization came late in June, when the armed forces agreed to shift _ from a four-man junta to a .one-man presidency. Since the military overthrew Al- lende and uprooted his Marxist-oriented goveimment, the commanders of the army, the navy, the air force and the carabineros, Chile's national police force, had exercised the powers of the presidency. They also took over the law-making power Of the Congress, which was 'closed last year. Now, Gen. Augusto Pino- chet, commander-in-chief of the army and leader of the junta, has been named presi- dent for an indefinite term with the formal title of "su- preme chief of the nation." The point of the change, government sources said, was efficiency. The four- man junta had been slower in reaching decisions than one man would be, they said. The commanders of the. army, navy, air force and police have retained the role of drawing up laws for prom- ulgation by decree. Pinochet's rise also repre- sents the ascendency of the Chilean army ?over the navy, air force and ponce. Some civilian observers, believing that the army officers in -government had - shown more moderation than air force and navy officers, thought this might mean an easing of repression. This has not yet been the case. Chilean families report that men and women are still disappearing for days and sometimes -weeks. A businessman told friends re- cently he had been arrested, held for four days alone in a tiny cell and then released without charges. While Gen. Pinochet was Christian Science Monitor 29 July 197/4 mocro imns forming a neW Cabinet of 14 military men and 3 civilians, two ot' them technocrats with international reputa- tions, the government .burned the national voter registration records. A gov- ernment spokesman ex- plained that the lists of 4 million voters . were "notoriously fraudulent." No plans were announced for making new lists or reregis- tering voters. The remote expectation that the junta might call eleetions to carry out its an- nounced aim of restoring Chilean -democracy disap- peared , with the electoral records. There remained an- other possibility, suggested to the junta by leaders of the Christian Democratic Party. The party leadership, who opposed Allende and publicly accepted the coup ' as a necessary evil, had hoped for a return tb civil- ian government within three to five years. That hope, according to Christian Democrats famil- iar with party affairs, disap- peared when the junta pub- - hely broke off .its semipublic relations with the party in July. Formally, there has been no political party activ- ity in Chile since the -junta outlawed the country's Marxist parties and declared the others, including the Christian Democrats, in re- cess. During the recess, Chris- tian Democratic leaders con- tinued to meet privately. Last January they presented a memorandum to the gov- ernment that criticized the military's treatment of pris- oners and its disregard for. legal ? and human rights. ? litciarts regret . rt of mlll tary junta By James Nelson Goodsell Latin America correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor Chile's Christian Democratic Party has come to lament its early support , of the military government now run- ning the South American nation. The extent of the party's dis- enchantment became apparent re- cently with the release of a sharply worded exchange of letters between Also in January, former Sen. Patricia Aylwin, recog- nizci by ?the junta as the president, suggested privately to a military minis- ter that Christian Demo- crats saw no need for more than five years of military dictatorship in Chile. It was not Christian Dem- ocratic political opinions,, but censorship imposed on a Santiago radio station owned by the party that caused the party's complete break with the junta. After an exchange of let- ters. the gevernment called ? the party an "instrument of international Marxism" and - told Aylwin bluntly to keep a respec ful tongue in his head when he spoke to the military government. Christian Democrats said the government's, move looked like a signal from the army that its contacts with Christian Democrats were at an end. Some party leaders said the break helped the party overcome the reputation of having helped in the couri.. Even former President Eduardo Frei, the grand old man of Chilean Christian Democracy who had gone, with other former presi- dents, to - a thanksgiving Mass with the junta last year, was reliably reported_ to be critical of the military 'government now. ? "In the end it's probably better this way," said a Christian Democratic law- yer. "They tell us to shut up and- we stop arguing. It shows everyone that this is ' a dictatorship and that's that." the party's president and one of the nation's top military commanders. The two men involved, Party chief- tain Patricia Aylwin Azocar and De- fense Minister Oscar Bonilla Bra- danovic, once enjoyed a friendly relationship, but the tone of the letters suggests that this is no longer the case. Mr. Aylwin wrote: "History shows that no stable or just order can be built on a foundation of unilateral Imposition of the will of those who govern." 40 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 Approved For Release 2001I-0148: CIA-RDP77-00432R00010033'0002-9- The Ay'win letter, which was under- stood to reflect the views of top Christian Democratic leaders in- cluding former President Eduardo Frei Montalva, was in response to a harsh letter by General Bonilla. Exchange began in June The exchange originally got under way in June when the military junta Imposed stiff censorship on Radio Baimaceda in Santiago, the flagship station of the Christian Democratic Party. Mr. Aylwin wrote to General Bonilla, then Interior Minister, pro- testing the action. In response, General Bonilla wrote Mr. Aylwin in a tone that implied the political leader had no business criti- cizing the military. "Please. do not write to me in any terms that are not those of an admin- istrative authority of a recessed party respectfully addressing the govern- ment of the nation," General 13bnilla wrote. The Christian Democratic Party was declared "in recess" soon after CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 16 July 1974 ? the Military takeover last September, as were other political parties. Marx- ist-oriented parties that supported the deposed government of Salvador Al- lende Gossens were "outlawed for- ever" by the military. ' , ? Repetition charged Mr. Aylwin's latest letter accused the government of trying to impose its ' will unilaterally, thus "repeating the error" of the Allende government. He also protested the junta's treat- ment of the Christian Democrats, which he said amounted to "system- atic distrust," "Our patriotic efforts to tell the government what we believe to' be true and good for Chile," he wrote, "have received no other response than repeated signs of hostility." The Aylwin letter was the sharpest public criticism yet of the military leaders ruling Chile since the take- over last September 11. Christian ' Democrats had been smarting under the restrictions overtures to Cuba?. renewe les in,t e win ?:'-'",!!"'?????.; By Aiwa Adams SehMid.i ? : ? Staff correspondent of IlikChristian Science Monitor LWa..shington grOiring nuMber 'of." signs point. towardrevision",of re the , 10-year-old- diplomatic quarantine of Cuba. EVen.7. -the- U.S. State Departnient,' where .th& Official -signals read-t'stop,""i: there are suggestionaof :approaching.: Ehange. The', latest ?--o- f: these, is .the..visit to :Ctiba'ot Pat'M". Holt; " staftdireetor the Senate ? Foreign -Relations- Com- mittee.- Mr. Holt interviewed Fidel - Castro, First Deputy Premier-Carlos: ? Rafael Rodriguez, and leading mem- .ber of the Communist Party-secretar-, iat;ineluding Blas Molt - has just froin his trip, ;which. began -213,.--and has yet: to :--rnake any'. --public reporton his findings?-?:1-' -'? .9The; visit Is being hailed) ,however,: :among 'analysts -of- LatinLAmericair '.:0.ffairs as an oblique American over- ;lure to the Castro regime with which the U.S. Government broke relations ? in January, 1961. -Although Secretary of State Henry-A. Kissinger approved. onlyreluctantly the visa for Mr. Holt, for which_ he had been waiting since 1966, the fact that he. did. so was significant. Mr. Molt's trip to Cuba coincided with evidence that the reason for which the United States in 1 2 led the . Organization of American States to exclude Cuba from inter-American affairs, and in 1964 to cut diplomatic and trade ties, no longer applies and that Latin American states are begin- ning to move toward a resumption of ties with Cuba. ? ? ? ? , The reason was that Cuba was Identified as the center of a Commu- nist revolutionary movement that sought to export revolution to the rest of the hemisphere. Most analysts think that Dr. Castro has almost entirely halted this kind of activity, but State Department officials are not yet ready to concede the point. According to a department spokes- man there has admittedly been a decline in such activity, but the department holds that it continues. Official position The department's official position is that the meeting of Latin American foreign ministers in April decided to leave it up to Argentina to report to the next meeting, at Buenos Aires in March of next year, as to whether there are grounds for making con- cessions to Cuba, and the U.S. is willing to wait for that report. But the rest of the continent does not appear willing to wait. Peru, Argentina, and four Caribbean coun- tries have joined Mexico, which never did break off relations, in restoring diplomatic ties with Cuba. Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Vene- zuela are expected soon to follow suit, to be followed by Panama, Colombia, Guatemala, and Honduras. Anxious Castro The President of Mexico, Luis Ech- everria Alvarez, furthermore, is tour- ing seven Latin American countries with the avowed purpose of seeking a lifting of the restrictions on trade and diplomatic relations with Cuba. Although the State Department off 1- placed on them by the military long before the censorship of 'Radio Bal- maceda. They argue that they have been played false by the military whom they originally supported. Support anticipated They also felt that they had a friend In General Bonilla, who as a colonel was a military aide to Mr. Frei during his presidency from 1964 to 1970. Indeed, in initial reaction to the members of the military government last September, General Bonilla was regarded as one of those supporting the concept of civilian, constitutional government. "We may be wrong about that," a christiarl Democratic official said last :larch when commenting on earlier actions taken by General Bonilla. But some Christian Demo- crats, at the time, still held out the view that General Bonilla would favor them. The exchange of letters appears to dash that hope. cially scoffs at the idea, many an- alysts see the U.S. becoming increas- ingly isolated in its Cuban policy. From Cuba there are reports, meanwhile, that Dr. Castro is anxious to encourage the trend because he is weary of Cuba's dependence on the Soviet Union from which he receives a subsidy of about $1 million a day, much of which is spent under the direction of about 7,000 Soviet tech- nicians and advisers.. 41 NEW YORK TIMES 6 August 1974 World Council of Churches Says Chile Violates Rights GENEVA, Aug. 5 (Reuters) ? The World Council of Churches alleged today that citizens' rights were being sys- tematically violated in Chile and appealed to churches throughout the world to do everything to help restore the rule of law there. i A statement by the council's commission on international af- fairs said that at least 6,000 people were in prison or con- centration camps in Chile and that: there had been an alarm- ing new wave of arrests. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9