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June 12, 1974
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25X1A -Ar3proved For Release 2064MtlItEN9AIRDP77-00432R000100330003=8 NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES INTERNAL USE ONLY This publication contains clippings from the domestic and foreign press for YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use of selected items would rarely be advisable. No. 10 12 JULY 1974 GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 1 GENERAL 24 EASTERN EUROPE 36 FAR EAST 38 Destroy after backgrounder has served its purpose or within 60 days. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 PRESS RELEASE OF 12 June 1974 In connection with the publication of a book entitled The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency makes the following statement: The Central Intelligence Agency received a manuscript entitled The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence from its co-authors, Victor Marchetti and John Marks, pursuant to the provisions of a permanent injunction ordered by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, enforcing the Secrecy Agreement made by Mr. Victor Marchetti in connection with his employment by CIA and con- sequent access to sensitive intelligence matters. In accordance with that injunctionl- the Central Intelligence Agency identified for deletion those portions of the manuscript which were classified, were learned during Mr. Marchetti's employment with the Central Intelligence Agency, and had not been placed in the public domain by the U.S. Government. The CIA made a sub- sequent decision not to contest the publication of certain of these portions, in order to place full emphasis on the sensitive items remaining. The CIA also indicated its willingness not to contest certain portions if they could be rephrased to omit certain names or other specific references to classified material, but this offer was not accepted. The Central Intelligence Agency did not correct or contest the publication of factual errors in the manuscript. The Agency's decision not to contest the major portions of the manuscript does not constitute an endorsement of the book or agreement with its conclusions. A,publisher's note at the beginning of the book states, "Bold face type is used to indicate passages first deleted and later reinstated." Certain passages in bold face type were not identified for deletion by the Central Intelligence Agency to the authors. The Central Intelligence Agency has reviewed manuscripts of books of a number of former employees who had signed secrecy agreements as a condition of employment at the Agency. In all cases, the Agency's role has been solely to identify classified information learned by the ex-employee-during his employment. In no case has the Agency attempted to suggest editorial changes of the author%s opinions or conclusions. The Agency has not attempted to suggest changes in material that was not true. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : C11A-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 Legislative Note During the first week of June the Senate debated several amendments to the Defense Procurement Authorization bill (S.3000) that are of concern to the Intelligence Community. An amendment offered by Senator Proxmire would have required the Director of Central Intelligence to submit an unclassified report each year to the Congress disclosing the total national intelligence program budget. The amendment was defeated by a vote of 55 to 33. --Opposing this amendment were a number of senators, including the Chairmen of the Community's Oversight Committees in the Senate. Their opposition was based on the belief that such a disclosure would only stimulate requests for additional detail on the foreign intelligence effort. They also argued that disclosing the total budget figure over the years would reveal trends in intelligence spending that would prove helpful to our adversaries. --The Senators emphasized that the ?four Congressional Committees responsible for oversight of the Intelligence Community are fully conversant with the details and programs of the foreign intelligence budget and that they inquire deeply into these matters. They assured the Senate that they would provide information on the total figures, on a classified basis, to any Senator who wished to know. Other amendments to the bill, affecting the CIA section cf the National Security Act of 1947, and Tupported by the Director of Central Intelligence, were passed by the Senate. The changes are as follows: --Emphasize that CIA is concerned only with foreign intelligence by inserting the word "foreign" as a modifier throughout the section of the law setting forth the Agency's , 1 responsibilities. 1 --Require that functions and duties related to foreign intelligence performed by CIA at the direction of the National Security Council shall be reported to the Congress. This provision establishes in statute a procedure followed for a number of years with the Agency's four oversight committees. --Clarify the current statutory prohibition concerning law enforcement, police, or internal security matters by providing that CIA shall not carry out on its own or assist other agencies of Government in carrying out law enforcement or police-type operations. The amendment specifically authorizes the Agency to protect its installations, conduct investigations of those granted access to sensitive Agency information, and provide information resulting from foreign intelligence activities to other appropriate departments and agencies. The Senate passed the Defense Procurement Authorization bill on June 11 by a vote of 84 to 6. The bill will now go to conference with the House and will require final passage by both houses before being sent to the President for signature. 2 ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 - EDITOR & PUBLISHER 29 June 1974 CIA seeks power to stop 'leaks' The Washington Post reported this week that legislation that would significantly broaden the government's power to bring criminal sanctions against employees. for disclose:re of intelligence secrets is being circulated with the Nixon administration. The Post said the measure, proposed by Central Intelligence Agency director William E. Colby, could also empower him to seek injunctions against news media to prevent them from publishing material he considers harmful to the protection of in- telligence sources and methods. Under Colby's proposed amendment to the National Security Act of 1947, the CIA, director would be empowered to de- termine the ground rules for classification under a general grant of responsibility for protec:ing "intelligence sources and meth- ods." The Colby proposal would exempt news media from the criminal provisions of the law. But the draft language could, ac- cording to informed officials, enable the CIA director to trigger injunctive action by the Attorney General against "any per- son"?presumably including journalists?. before or after an act of disclosure. Leaks of confidential. information and supposedly secret documents from "in- formed sources" have become the stock in trade of investigative reporters delving into the complexities of Watergate. Wide- NEWSWEEK 1 JULY 19711. Dangerous Deletions THE CIA AND THE CULT OF iNTELLI- CENCE. By Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks. 398 pages. Knopf. $8.95. The legal hassle began before the book was ever written. On the basis of an outline submitted to New York pub- lishers in the spring of 1972, the Central Intelligence Agency obtained a blanket injunction prohibiting Victor Marchetti from "disclosing in any manner ... any intelligence information" on the ground that his proposed book would "result in grave and irreparable injury to the in- terests of the United States. ? When Marchetti, a CIA officer for four- teen years before his resignation in.1969, and co-author John D. Marks, a former State . Department intelligence . analyst, presented their completed manuscript, the CIA. required 339 national-security uts, of which 171 Were restored before e case came to court. A Federal judge led in March that no more than 27 cuts vere necessary. But that decision is still eina appealed. The book now appears vith?168 blanks, varying in length from few words to whole paragraphs; the 71 restored passages are printed in oldface for ready identification. Two eeks before publication, the CIA went o the trouble of issuing a press release? ne of the few in its 27-year history?in last-ditch effort to discredit the book. spread use of leaks in news stories and by the electronic media has begun to irritate some legislative and administrative officials and especially the White House. . Target of the most outspoken criticism ? is the House Judiciary Committee which is . considering charges of impeachment of President Nixon. Gerald L. Warren, deputy White House press secretary, said Thursday at his news conference that Chairman Peter L. Bodino and other members of the House commit- tee, should take some action to stop leaks of "prejudicial and one-sided information" emanating from unidentified sources re- portedly familiar with all phases of the impeachment inquiry. "Selective leaking of prejudicial information from the commit- tee," Warren said, "is a violation of due process and creates a deplorable situa- tion." The situation could be corrected, War- ren thought, by throwing open committee meetings to the public. Warren's criticism followed earlier as- sertions by Ken W. Clawson, White House Communications Director, and Patrick J. Buchanan, a presidential assistant, that leaks from the Judiciary Committee and other congressional sources constituted a "sy:sternatic campaign to tear down the reputation of the President and his associ- ates: The sharpest attack on disclosure of confiriential information by the media was mad,_?. by Senator Barry Goldwater, Ari- zena Republican. In a Senate speech he sIggeste..d that. the Attorney General fmil grounds "to institute criminal prosecutions against the Washington Post." ? The Arizona Senator placed in the Rec- "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence" was worth the CIA's moves to suppress it. The "irreparable damage" it inflicts is to the agency's image of omnipotence and indispensability. Founded in 1947 as a cold-war extension of the wartime OSS, exempted from the normal Congression- al reviewing process, the CIA is here portrayed as having gown "old, fat, and bureaucratic"?a flop at its appointed task of penetrating the secrets of the U.S.S.R. and Communist China. Classi- cal espionage has been rendered obso- lete by satellite surveillance, and U.S. intelligence has been unable for fifteen years to break the high-grade cipher sys- tems and codes of its most powerful adversaries; boxcars and warehouses of incomprehensible Soviet and Chinese tapes await a hoped-for breakthrough. Fresh: Balked in its intelligence func- tion, the CIA began during the 1950s to deploy its Clandestine Services branch in paramilitary adventures in the Third World, where easier results could be achieved and the agency's existence jus- tified. Marchetti and Marks provide fresh details on such interventions as the spon- soring of the uprising against Indonesia's Sukarno, the floating of balloons full of propaganda leaflets over China during the cultural revolution, the building of a miniature Fort Bragg in the Peruvian Jungle in the mid-'60s. The CIA per- mitted publication (in boldface, mean- ing it was censored earlier) of a plan to ? ord a 38-page legal memo he said was prepared by J. Terry Emerson, his staff legal counsel. The memo listed these spe- cial provisions of the U.S. code as the basis for prosecution: "Communicating documents relating to the national defense; retaining national defense documents (presumably the Pen- tagon papers and others): conversion of property of the United States; conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States; conspiracy to impair, obstruct or defeat the lawful functions of the United States and the Secretary of State." "The possible criminality of the Post's activities lies not only in its disclosure and retention of top-secret documents," Sena- tor Goldwater said, "but also in the use to which these documents were put, which was to challenge the credibility of the Secretary of State at a time when the country is engaged in negotiations of a monumental nature." Last week, Senator Goldwater charged the Post with "treason" in printing secret FBI documents. He withdrew the charge after his legal advisors told him that the "act I am complaining about would not come under this (treason) term." Some syndicated columnists, among them Richard 'Wilson of the Des Moines Register Tribune, have commented that Watergate, and by inference the prosecu- tors and investigators, have gone too far and it is time now to close the books and either drop the impeachment proceedings or get them over with. Senator Mansfield said he was "disturbed and in a sense depressed by the delay" in the impeach- ment proceedings, and by the leaks. , create a one-man airplane that could theoretically have been carried into China in two large suitcases, assembled when the agent's mission was completed and to the nearest friendly border. This wondrous project died on the draw- ing boards, Marchetti and Marks report;1 , their description of it is followed by two i blank half-pages stamped DELETED, de-; priving us of who-knows-what scheme. too hot (or too foolish) to be revealed. Marchetti arid Marks suggest that se.: crecy for secrecy's sake has become the besetting sin of an agency that has so: bewitched legislators that the House has never even had a recorded vote on 150 bills introduced since 1947 to increase Congressional surveillance. "I'll just tell . them a few war stories," said Allen Dul- : les, setting off for an annual budget pres- entation in the 1950s. Covert action in countries that pose no threat to U.S. se- curity, the book argues, is a liability for this country on practical as well as moral grounds, and the $6 billion yearly cost of. American intelligence is largely wasted. ? Since Watergate, "national security" has become an odorous slogan. Marchet- ti and Marks, delayed nearly two years in publishing their book, may have suc- ceeded where earlier CIA exposes have failed?in voicing an idea whose time has come. Even in this mutilated form, their presentation is crisp, _finely detailed and devastating. ?WALTER CLEMONS: Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 3 I I RAMPARTS Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 I July 1974 - 1 ? - -- ---- -,... ? 1 Inside- the 4tt. Ten years ago, the CIA was an organization whose opera- dons seemed awesome in their secrecy and their scope, its agents all the more formidable for theiranonymity. When someone like the legendary Col. Edward G. Landsdale did become known, the fact that he slipped romantically be- tween the intrigue-ridden back alleys of Saigon and the . palace of the Diems? setting up programs for the South Vietnamese peasants and channeling millions of dollars of :CIA .money into clandestine operations against the PILE, only made his employer seem more potent and glamorous. By the late 1960s .the Agency's aura had begun to, fade. Beginning with RA.N1PARTS 1967 revelations that the National Student Association and other supposedly in- dependent domestic institutions were iii fact fronts for the , CIA, the Agency was. dragged more and more into the pub- ' lie view;.- Its-stature diminished with each new cause cel.bre ? until, far from being a collection of James Bonds, it seemed._ .more a haven for Keystone Kops, unable to pull off theiu.o, assignments without. stumbling over one iinothere.- ?. This is not to underestimate the CIA .'s.capacity for tere; ror and destruction.eYee_it is evident that -much of the. Agency's.impact has depended on the illusion of prowess it': has been able to create.:-This illusion, plus an obsession with secrecy; have been the.- pillars, on which its reputation was. - built.. And this is why it has gone all out to censor .Victor.. Marchetti, to stop the publication of The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence. by Victor Marchetti and John Marks I* ? * ? Marchetti joined the:. Agency- in 1955 after graduating- with a degree in Russian history and culture from Perm State. Like others of his generation, he believed the myths ? of the Cold War, and for 15 years was a Willing soldier in its. battles. He eventually became one of the leading CIA ana- lysts on Soviet military capacity and aid to the Third .World, and worked from 1966 until 1969 in the Office of the Director, Central Intelligence. ??-? Increasingly disillusioned with the CIA's practices and attitudes. Marchetti resigned in 1969. For the next couple of years he moved around Washington, finding others who had dropped out of the intelligence community, listening to their experiences and comparing them to his own. He de- cided then to write a book that would penetrate the myth- on which the op. eration of the CIA was based. - Yet before he had written the first sentence of the first. chapter, the Agency knew of it. One of its agents in New York had managed .to obtain a copy of the book outline Marchetti had submitted to several New York publishers. In April 1972 the CIA filed for an injunction to prohibit him. from publishing anything about the Agency; then-Director Richard Helms swore in an affidavit that such a book would "cause grave and irreparable harm to the national defense interest of the United States and will seriously disrupt the conduct Of the country's foreign relations." The heart of the Agency's position, however, was filed in an affidavit by the head of Clandestine Services, a document which was itself classified as "secret" and jbthidden even to Mar- chetti's A a U attorneys until four days before the trial. ? Marchetti 's legal team, including ACLU head 1:41f realized that this case had serious implications and ? assembled a series, of expert witnesses including Princeton . Professor Richard Falk and former Kissinger aide Morton . Halperin. They were prepared to contest government allega- dons that the book Marahetti had not yet written was a threat to security. Yet when they c2Pre o court on May 15, - 1972 they lbw& that the issue was to be fought on the narrow ground of contract enforcement-the feet that Marchetti, like all who /ciq the Agency, had signed a piece ' of paper agreeing never to talk about his work. The court ruled against Merchetti. Sir months Leer the Supreme Court-which had recently decided against censorship in the Pentagon Papers case-refused by a 6-3 rote to consider Marchetti's appeal. ' Yet Marchetti went ahead and wrote the book anyway, in collaboration with John Marks, a young foreign service officer who: had worked LI the State Department from 1966 until Ri vrote a pessimistic memo at the time of the 1970 Cambodia invasion. It took them nine months to complete the job, the difficulty of their labor compounded by the fact that they were enjoined from seeking editorial help fromtheir publisher; Alfred A. Knopf . ?. ? _ .In August 1973, "Ware/teed sent a-draft of the manuscript :to the CL4, which marked it TOP SECRET-SENSITI VE,.. : read it, and agreed that it could be published-after some 339 cuts- had. been made, or roughly 20 percent of the entire book. In the negotiations whicn'. followed between Marchetti and his attorneys and the CIA, the Agency was forced to admit that -many of the censored items were- either in. the public domain or so minor as to be ludicrous. ? . By February 1974 the CIA had reduced its demand to 168 cuts.' Meanwhile,. the matter had returned to court as ICnopf,. Marchetti and Marks vs. Colby and Kissinger, and .the CYA was finally hoisted on its own petard when it re- fused to bring in evidence to support the TO? SECRET classification, it had attached to the 163 deletions. So ob- sessed with secrecy was the Agency that it refiuse.d to give the evidence that would back up hs claims; and in the end the fudge ruled that only 28 of the 168 cuts might be considered classified. . . The trial is not over. Marchetti, et at have appealed the decision that the CIA has any right whatsoever to censor the manuscript. But While that lengthy process is taking place, the decision was made to go ahead and publish the work with its 28 deletions, which are every bit as telling, and in the same spirit, as the 183.-mirzu re-gap in a White- House tape. ? Even before its publication, The CIA and .the Cult of Intelligence has accomplished much of what it started to do, showing that the malevolence and imperiousness of the CIA is well tempered by bureaucratic ineptitude. Like-all bullies its success is dependent on an inflated reputation. The Agency that has toppled governments cannot stop the publication of a book. Doubtless some will see this as another sign of the vitality of the American system, a sign of the long-range medicinel powers of the Constitution. Actually the les con is shnpler and more fir:elemental: Organizations like the CIA flourish in the .dark and lose their powers when they .are forced to operate in ihe day- light, 1i:hen their true nariure-ced their banality-become overpoweringly clear. .We owe thanks to Victor Marchetti, not least of all because Jt? the lutes.' voice to protest that the emperor has no clothes. --The Editors Copyright 0 1974 by Victor L. Marchetti and John D. Marks. From The'CI.1 and the Cult of Intelligence to be publi;hed by Knopf. ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 few years ago Newsweek magazine described the CIA as the most secretive and tightly knit organi- zation (with the possible exception of the Mafia) in American society. The characterization is something of an overstatement, but it contains more than a kernel of truth. In its golden era, during the height of the Cold War, the agency did possess a rare elan; it had a staff of imaginative and daring officers at all levels and in all directorates. But over the years the CIA has grown old, fat, and bureaucratic. The esprit de corps and devotion to duty its staff once had, setting the agency apart from other gov- ernment departments, has faded, and to a great degree it has been replaced by an outmoded, doctrinaire approach to its missions andftinctions. The true purpose of secrecy?to ; keep the opposition in the dark about agency policies and operations?has been lost sight of. Today the CIA often practices secrecy for secrecy's sake?and to prevent- the American public from learning of its activities. And the true purpose of intelligence collection?to monitor efficiently the moves of international adversaries?has, been distorted by the need to nourish a collective clandestine ego. . , After the U.S. invasion of Cambodia in 1970, a few :hundred CIA employees (mostly younger officers from the Intelligence and Science and Technology directorates, not ,the Clandestine Services) signed a petition objecting to American policies in Indochina. Director Richard Helms , was so concerned about the prospect of widespread unrest :in the agency's ranks, and the chance that word of it might leak out to the public, that he summoned all the protestors to the main auditorium and lectured them on the need to separate their personal views from their professional duties. At the same time, similar demonstrations on the Cambo- dian issue were mounted at the State Department and other government agencies. Nearly every newspaper in the coun- try carried articles about the incipient rebellion brewing in the ranks of the federal bureaucracy. The happenings at the CIA, which were- potentially the most newsworthy of all, were, however, never discovered by the press. In keeping *with the agency's clandestine traditions, CIA employees had conducted a secret protest. To agency personnel who had had the need for secrecy drilled into them from their moment of recruitment, there , was nothing strange about keeping their demonstration hid- den from public view. Secrecy is an absolute way of life at the agency, and while outsiders might consider some of the resulting practices comical in the extreme, the subject is treated with great seriousness in the CIA. Training officers lecture new personnel for hours on end about "security consciousness," and these sessions are augmented during far employee's entire career by refresher courses, warning , posters, and even the semi-annual requirement for each em- ployee. to .review the agency's security rules and to sign a copy, as an indication it has been read. As a matter of course, outsiders should be told absolutely nothing about the CIA and fellow employees should be given only that information for which they have an actual "need io know." (The penchant for secrecy sometimes takes on an air of ludicrousness. Secret medals are awarded for outstanding performance, but they cannot be worn or shown outside the agency. Even athletic trophies?for intramural bowling, softball, and so on?cannot be displayed except within the guarded sanctuary of the headquarters building.) CIA personnel become so accustomed to the rigorous security precautions (some of which are indeed justified) that they easily accept them all, and seldom are caught in violations. Nothing could be More natural than to work with a telephone book marked SECRET, an intentionally incomplete telephone book which lists no one working in the Clandestine Services and which in each semi-annually revised edition leaves. oat the names of many of the people ?employed by the overt directorates, so if the book ever falls into unauthorized hands, no enterprising foreign agent or reporter will be able to figure out how many people work at CIA headquarterora even, Ilow raiAssegyji/ONRY8 roveo Tor me clandestine jobs. ThSsid. temporaruy ?nail-Rican ook tor- ward to having their names appear in the next edition of the directory, at which time others are selected for tele- phonic limbo. Added to this confusion is the fact that most agency phone numbers are regularly changed for sectFity reasons. Most employees manage. to keep track of com- monly called numbers by listing them in their own personal desk directories, although they have to be careful to lock these in their safes at. night?or else risk being charged with a security violation. For a first violation the employee is given a reprimand and usually assigned to several weeks of security- inspection in his or her office. Successive violations lead to forced vacation without pay for periods up to sev- eral weeks, or to outright dismissal. Along with the phone books, all other classified ma-terial (including typewriter ribbons and scrap paper) is placed in _office safes whenever the office is unoccupied. Security guards patrol every part of the agency at roughly half-hour intervals in the evening and on weekends to see that no secret documents have been left out, that no safes have been left unlocked, and that no spies are lurking in the halls: If a guard finds -any classified material unsecured, both the person who failed to put it away-and the person within the office who was assigned to double-check the premises have security violations entered in their personnel files. ? -? - - These- security precautions all take place inside a head- quarters building that is surrounded by a twelve-foot fence topped with barbed wire,. patrolled by armed guards and police dogs, and sealed off by a security check system that guarantees that no one can enter either the outer perimeter or the building itself without the proper identificatiori. Each CIA employee is issued a laminated plastic badge with his picture on it, and these must not only be presented to the guards on entry, but be kept constantly in view within the building. Around the edges of the badge are twenty or so little boxes which may or may not be filled with red letters. Each letter signifies a special security clearance held by the owner. Certain offices at the CIA are designated as restricted, and only persons holding the proper clearance, as marked on their badges, can gain entry. These areas are usually guarded by an agency policeman sitting inside a glass cage, from which he controls a turnstile that forbids passage to unauthorized personnel. Particularly sensitive of- are protected, in addition to the guarded turnstile, by a combination or cipher lock which must be opened by the individual after the badge is inspected. Even a charwoman at the 'CIA-must gain security clear- ance ? in order to qualify for .the badge that she, too, must v..ear at all times; then she must be accompanied by an armed guard while she cleans offices (where all classified material has presumably been locked up). Some rooms at the agency are considered so secret that the charwoman and her guard must also be watched by someone who works in the office.. The pervasive secrecy extends everywhere. Cards placed on agency bulletin boards offering items for sale conclude: "Call Bill, extension 6464." Neither clandestine nor overt CIA employees are permitted to have their last names ex- posed to the Scrutiny of their colleagues, and it was only in 1973 that employees were allowed. to answer their phones with any. words other than those signifying_ the four-digit extension number. _ Also until recent years all CIA personnel were required to identify themselves to non-agency people as employees of the State or Defense Department or some other outside organization.. Now the analysts and technicians are per- mitted to say they work for the agency, although the,' cannot reveal their particular office.. Clandestine Service employees. are easily spotted. around Washington because they almost always claim to be employed by Defense or State, butausually are extremely ? vague on the details and imaHe to furnish an office address. They do sometimes give. out a phone number which corresponds to the correct ex- : CIAARDP07-00482R0001011-a300443,-Sut these extensions, 5 Virginia. Approve ming, ring at CIA headquarters in .... ? [THE ACENCY:S EMPIRE] , ? he headquarters building, located on a partially wooded 125-acre tract eight miles from downtown Washington, is a modernistic fortress-like structure. Until the spring of 1973 one of the two roads lead- ing 'at? the secluded compound was totally unmarked, and the other featured a sign identifying the installation as the Bureau of Public Roads, which maintains the. Fairbanks Hihway Research Station adjacent to the agency.. ? - Until 1961 the CIA had been located in a score of build- ings scattered all over ?Washington. One of the princrpal justifications for the S46 million headquarters in the sub- urbs was that considerable expense would be saved by rnov- ina all employees under ona roof. But in keeping with the best-leid bureaucratic plans, the headquarters building, from the day it was completed, proved too smaU for all the CIA's Washington activities. The agency never vacated some -of its old headquarters buildings hidden behind a naval :medical facility on 23rd Street .Northwest in Washington, and its National Photo Inte.rpretation Center shares pert of the Nevrs facilities in Southeast Washington. Other large CIA offices located downtown include the Domestic Opera- tions D:eision, .on Pennsylvania Avenue near the White House. .In Washington's Virginia suburbs there are even more . CIA buildings outside the headquarters complex. An agency! . training facility is located in the Broyhill Building in Arling-I ton, and the CIA occupies considerable other office space; in that county's Rosslyn section. Also at least half a dozen CIA components.are located in the Tyson's Corner area of, :northern Virginia, which has become something of a mini- intelligence community for technical work due to the pres- ence there of numerous electronics and research companies : that do work for the agency and the Pentagon. (Of course the list of 'CIA facilities would be much longer if it included covert sites across the U.S.?a para-- Military base in North Carolina, secret air bases in Nevada. and Arizona, scores of "dummy" commercial organizations and airlines, operational offices in more than twenty major; cities, a huge antis warehouse in the Midwest, and "safe ouses" for rendezvous in Washington and other cities.) ?;._The rapid expansion of CIA office space in the last ten : ears did not happen as a result of any appreciable increase n personnel. Rather, the technological explosion, coupled vith inevitable bureaucratic lust for new frcintiers, has been e cause. As Director, Richard Helms paid little attention the diffusion of his agency until one day in 1968 when a IA official mentioned to him that yet one more technical mponent was moving to Tyson's Corner. For some reason is aroused Heirris',ire, and he ordered a study prepared to d out just how much of the agency was located outside headquarters. The completed report told him what most sington-area real-estatehgents already knew, that a sub- tle' percentage of CIA employees had vacated the build- originally justified. to Congress as necessary to put all sonnet under- one roof. Helms decreed that all future es would require his personal approval, but his action ed the exodus only temporarily. Vhert the CIA headquarters building was being con- cted during the late 1950s, the subcontractor respon- for putting in the heating and air-conditioning system d the agency how many 'people the structure was in- ed to accomodate. For security reasons, the agency ed to tell him, and he was forced to make his own ate based on the building's size. The resulting heating worked reasonably well, while the air-conditioning uite uneven. After initial complaints in 1961, the con- r installed an individual thermostat in each office, but any agency employees were continually readjusting. 6 ? 7-00432R000100330003-8 their thermostats that the system got worse. The M ? Directorate then decreed that the thermostats could n longer be used, and each one was sealed up. However, th M&S experts had not considered That the CIA was a clan :destine agency, and that many of its personnel had taken a ,"locks and picks" course while in training. Most of the thermostats were soon unlocked and back in operation. At this point the CIA took the subcontractor to court to force him to make improvements. His defense was that he . had installed the best system he could without a clear indi- cation of how many people. would occupy the building. The ? .CIA could not counter this reasoning and lost the decision.! Another unusual feature of the CIA headquarters is the a cafeteria. It is partitioned into a secret and an open section, I, .the larger part being only for agency employees, who must show their badges to the armed guards before entering, and the smaller being for visitors as well as people who work at the CIA. Although the only outsiders ever to enter the :small, dismal section .are moloyees of other U.S. govern- ment agencies, representatives of a few friendly govern- merits; and CIA families, the partition ensures that no visitor will see the face of any clandestine operator eating ? lunch. The CIA's "supergrades" (civilian equivalents of gen- erals) have -their own private dining room in the executive suite, however. There they are provided higher-quality food at lower prices than in the cafeteria, served on fine china with fresh linens by black waiters in immaculate white coats. These waiters and the executive cooks are regular CIA employees, in contrast to the cafeteria personnel, who work for a contcactor. On several occasions the Office of Management aid Budget has questioned the high cost of ? this private dining room, but the agency has always been able to fend off the attacks, as it fends off. virtually all ? attacks on its:, activities; . by: citing "national-security" _ - reasons as the major justification ? et-41;E... -1:-:AS'T':':13'AltS"-T uestions .of social class and Snobbery have: always been very important in the CIA. With its roots in the :wartime Office of Strategic Services (the let-. ?eee? ters- OSS were said, .only 'half-jokingly,- to stand for "Oh So Social"), the agency has long been known for its Concentration of Eastern Establishment, Ivy .League types. Allen Dulles, a former American diplomat and Wall Street lawyer- with impeccable connections and credentials, set the -tone- for an agency full of Roosevelts,- Bundys, Cleveland Amory's brother Robert, and other scions of ? America's leading families. There haae been exceptions, to be sure, but most of the CIA's top leaders have been white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, and graduates of the right Eastern schools. While changing times and ideas have diffused the influence -of the Eastern elite throughout the government as a whole, the CIA remains perhaps the last bastion in official Washington of WASP power, or at least the slowest to adopt the principle of equal opportunity. It was no accident that former Clandestine Services chief Richard Bissell (Groton, Yale, A.B., Ph.D., London School _of Economics, A.B.) was talking to a Council on Foreign Relations discussion group in 1968 when he made his "con- fidential" speech on covert action. For the influential but private Council, composed of several hundred of the coun- try's top political, military, business, and academic leaders, has long been the CIA's principal "constituency" in the American public. When the agency has needed prominent citizens to front for its proprietary companies or for other special assistance, it has often turned to Council members. : Bissell knew that night in 1968 that he could talk freely and openly about extremely sensitive subjects because he was among "friends." His words leaked out not because of the indiscretion of any of the'participants, but because of student upheavals at Harvard in 1971. It may well have been the' sons of CFR members or CIA Approved For Release 2001/08/08 ? II 0100330003-8 ' Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 officials who ransacked the office housing the minutes of ? Bissell's speech, and therein lies the changing nature of the CIA (and the Eastern Establishment, for that matter). Over the last decade the attitudes of the young people, who in ` earlier times would have followed their fathers or their ; ? fathers' college roommates into the CIA, have, changed dras- tically. With the Vietnam War as a catalyst, the agency has become, to a large extent, discredited in the traditional Eastern schools and bolleges. And consequently the CIA has ? been forced to alter its recruiting base. No longer do liar-. ; yard, Yale, Princeton, and a few other Eastern schools pro- vide the bulk of the agency's professional recruits, or even a , substantial number. For the most part, Ivy Leaguers do not want to join the ' agency, and the CIA now does its most fruitful recruiting at the universities of ,middle America and in the armed forces. While the shift unquestionably reflects increasing democ- ratization in American government, . the CIA made the change not so much voluntarily as because it had no other choice .if it. wished to fill its ranks. If the "old boy" net- work cannot be replenished, some officials believe, it will ,be much more. difficult to'enlist the aid of American cor- porations and generally to make use of influential "friends". in the private and public, sectors. - ? ;Despite: the Comparatively recent ,broadening of the CIA's 'recruiting base, the. agency is not now and has never I been an equal-opportunity employer...The:agency has one of the smallest percentages?if not the smallest?of blacks of any federal department.. The CIA's top. management had this forcefully called to their attention in, 1967 when a local !civil-rights .activist wrote to tlie agency- td complain about minority hiring practices. A study was ordered at that time, and the CIA's highest-ranking black was found to be a 1GS-13 (the rough equivalent of an Army major). Alto- gether, there were less than twenty blacks among the CIA's approximately 12,000* non-clerical employees, and even the proportion of black secretaries, clerks, and other non- professionals was considerably below that of most Washington-area government agencies. One might attribute this latter fact to the agency's suburban location, but blacks were notably well represented in the guard and char forces. ' Top officials seemed surprised by the results of the 1967 ? study because they did not consider themselves prejudiced men. They ordered increased efforts to hire more blacks, but these were not particularly successful. Young black col-- lege graduates in recent years have shied away from joining the agency, some on political grounds and others because of ' the more promising opportunities available in the private .sector. Furthermore, the CIA recruiting system could not easily be changed to bring in minorities. Most of the "spot- ting'!- of 'potential employees is done by individual college professors who are either friends or consultants of the agency, and they are located on predominantly white cam- - puses where each year they hand-pick a few carefully .selected students for the CIA. The paucity of minority groups in the CIA goes well beyond blacks, however. In 1964 the agency's Inspector General did a routine study of the Office of National Esti- - mates (ONE). The Inspector found no black, Jewish, or women professionals, and only a few Catholics. ONE im- mediately .took steps to bring in .minorities.o0ne _woman, professioni. was hired on?raPrObition- cry basis: and one black secretary V/13' brottc.,h(in.Nyhen the professional had finished her :probation, . was en- couraged to .find Work elsewhere,. and the, black secretary was given duties away 'from .the main ONE offices?out of sight. n the reproduction. center. ONE did bend:somewhat by' hiring a ? Tins figure is in boldface to indicate one of 339 items tlie CIA attempted to censor before Publicacr. Intelligence (see page 24p prove Ferf Rheiecaten/01:11708708 few Jews. and some additional.Catho- . lies. ? There are-,eXtremely.few,WoMen in high-ranking positions in the CIA; but,. of course;7' the.- agency does- 'employ wornen. as',secretaries ? and.' fbno..pther non-professional duties. As is true- with'- , all large- organilations, thereAs...a high: -*turnover in: these jobs, and the agency. : each 'year ? hires a thousand. of.. more new applicants_ In a search for suitable candidates,...CIA recruiters concentrate . on recent high-school graduates from the mostly- white small. towns. and cities of Virginia and the neighboring :states, Maryland, West Virginia, and' Pennsylvania.. Washington; . with. its 'overwhelming black majority, supplies comparatively few. of the CIA's secre- taries.: Over- the years ? the recruiters have. established good contacts with :high-school guidance counselors and. ;principals in the -nearby .states, and when.they make their annual tour in' search Of candidates, interested girls are: Steered their- way, with several from the same class often being hired - at the same time. When the new sect& 'taries...come to CIA headquarters out- side. of Washington, they are encour- agect;to? live 'in agency-selected apart- :merits.. in the Virginia suburbs, build- ings In.:which virtually all ? the tenants, F.are CIA employees...,-...- - ? ....: --*--?!Security consideration? play a large -part-iriT.the agency's lack of attention- :to:urban-areas in its secretarial recruit-. . . age.ncYernployees must receive' c'es.:1b,e..fore -.they start.; wOrk..- This -is a. very expensive process, and-women. from small town, areeasier;!.- and cheaper :to 4:l'ietigate..:_ Moieover;. the CIA:see:Ms. actu011yto prefer:?'.secretarieS.7.-_?tvi ths-.7.? the All American image whO:,:ioiless.likely hase been 'corrupted or ? `.?pplin--- .Cized". than their urbanized siSters..:-., [NEW RECIWTSI: .? ...? ?army se.cretaries, :Well as -"ail other, personnel, must pass-lie-. detector tests' as -a condition of einplaYment. Then they periodically?.? :usually at five-year- intervals or when. they.return from. overseas assignments- ..*:rntist submit themselves again to the- .1)1Ock. box." The CIA,- 'Unlike' most, employers, finds out nearly everything 'imaginable about the private lives of its personnel . through these polygraph tests.- Questions about. sex, drugs, and ? Personal honesty are routinely asked ?along' with security-related matters ,.such as possible contacts with foreign:- agents: .The plunger secretaries invari- 'ably .rester a negative reading on the 'machine when asked the standard:* -."Have- you ever stolen government 'property?" The polygraph . experts usually have to add the.. qualifying CI-R11)1277,4i0413itg000/11031341a0043, or Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 'minor clerical items." Once CIA recruits have passed their security investigations and lie-detector. tests, they are given tlaining by the agency.. Most of the secretaries receive instruction in the ? Washington area, such instruction focusing on the need for secrecy in all aspects of the work. Women going overseas to type and file for their CIA bosses are tven courses in espionage tradecrafr. A former secretary reported that the- most notable part of her field trailing , in the late -1960s WaS to trail an in- structor in and out of Washington department - stores. (This i.vornan's ? training Proved useful, however, when in he first post abroad, oste.nsibly as .an embassy secretary, she was tven. .. the mission of surveilling an apartment . building in -disguise as - an _Arab ? woman.) ., ? ..."- , ? The agency's professionals, most of '.thern (until the 1967 National Student ,,Association disclosures)- recruited - ..through. 'friendly"-lcollege professors,' ;..reteive? much More extensive- instruc--, tioa when they enter-the CIA as career. .1trainees (CTs). For two years they are:: On a'. probationary status, the first year in 'formal training prograrris and the ,second with on-the:job instruction..i The CTs take introdtictory courses at a CIA fadiity ("The Farm") in .Arling--: in -subjects such as secu-1 ,;rity,zahe..organization of the. agency: --and the-test of the intelligence corn--; munity, and the. 'nature of in ternatfon- .21..communism: -Allen Dulles,. in his days as DireCtor, liked to talk to'these; ...classes and tell-them how, as an Arne.ri-; . can . diplomat -in_ Switzerland duringr _World War.I,- he-received a telephone: -call froth a Russian late on a Saturday ; morning. -The Russian wanted .to talk ? to' government representative immediatelyi.- but ...Dulles had a .date.? with a young ladY? sci he declined thel offer. The Russian turned out to be.. Nikolai Lenin, and 'Dulles used the incident to urge Cae. young CTs always to -be alert to the possible. importance of people they meet in their work. The. Farm, disguised as a Pentagon iesearch-and-testing facility, indeed resembles. a large military reser/v.1?n- : Barracks, offices, 'classrooms, .and an , officers' club. are grouped around a ,.central point.. Scattered over its 480 *mostly wooded acres are weapons ranges, jump towers, :Ind a simulated ? closed border of a my:hi:al cornmu-. . nist country. . 'Away from these facili- ties are heavily guarded and off-limits sites, locations used for super-secret projects such as debriefing a recent defector, planning a special operation, or training an important .foreign ceent who will be , returning to his native country to spy for the CIA. All the CTs receive some light. weapons training, ..and those destined . for paramilitary duties receive a 'course which includes instructio explosives and demolition, parac jumps, air and sea operations, and finery training. This paramilitary tr ing is also .taken -by the contract diers (who greatly resent being cal "mercenaries") who have been- s .rately recruited for special operati They join- the CTs for some of other courses,-but generally-. tend avoid the younger and less experiezi recent college 'graduates who make . the bulk of.the. CT ranks; Many these mercenaries:and a few Of the. .'continue on form- advanced tours ? explosives and heavy weapons given ? a CIA training-facility in North. c. Postgraduate-.1,:;'trainingirr::.:'Pa military operatiOriS' . is 'conducted Fort Bragg Irk North CarOlina -arid at Fort. Gulick in the. ,Panama, Canal full merits:. -- .. -. .,72,,,,,,i-.... .--::-.: - ? n in -; '.! For banking ac tes;CIA emplo-Y- hute ,ees.are'enCouraged to use the-agency' Town-credit -union, which is located in am- . the. headquarters . buil ding..:,?.The union sol- . is expert, MT_ giving loans to Clandestine- led operators Under cover, who-Se Personal:- epa- - backgroUnd "statements. 'are by-defud-- ons. i tionfalse..In the rare-instance when an j_he . -employee forfeits- On a loan,' the .credit to - Union..seldorn_ prOseciites:.talget back ced .the':n1-0.tlirl. that conld'heebreach Of. . _ . .. - up- security.. There is .also ; a_special -"fund; , of supported _-..-hy' ;annual- .contributiOns-. CTs from agency _ . -officers,-. to.. heli_fellow- e in . . emPloyees :Who accidentlly.....get *into- . . at financial - , , trouble- - arb_. - ? --The cradit union also Makes .various. la; kinds of insurance =available. to.. CIA . . .'4t - ?employees. Since the ageacy_does not wish to give outsiders any- biographical -information on its personnel ,-..the CIA provides the insutor with hone Of that .dalta7that insurance coniPanies normal- ly demand, except _age -and size-of policy .;,:The - agency .certifies-Sthat all facts.-:are -_true?even -that .'a :Particular- -Zone. [FRINGE BENEFITSI1.? - tthoUgh agency personnel hold. llie the-- -same:ratings . and receive same: Salaries as :gave merit employees,: they do no t.faIL u ?der Civil ?Service jurisdiction4TI Director has the authority -to hire-. fire an employee -without any rega - to normal 'governmental fegulation and there is no legal appeal. to his de sions. In general, however, :it: is.. th CIA's practice. to' take extrerneligo care of the people who remain loyal the organization. There is a strong fe ing among !agenCy management; of that theymust concenthe. selves welfare 1:-rif personnel,: and this feeling goes. we . beyond the-: normal employe employee relationship in the: gOvern ment or in private industry. To:a Ce tam n extent;_security consideration dictate this attitude on the ptar. o management,..:since an unhappy;-a ? financially insecure employee can be come a potential target for- a forei espionage agent. But there- is more-it it than that. Nearly everyone seemst believe: We're all in this together an anyone who's on the team should b taken care of decently. The employee : probably feel a higher loyalty 'to the CIA than members of almost any other agency feel for their organiza- tion. Again., this is good for 'security, but that makes the sentiments no less real. . If a CIA employee dies, an agency security officer immediately goes to his or her house to see that everything is in order for the survivors (and, not incidentally, to make sure, no CIA documents have been taken home from the office). If the individual has been living under a cover identity, the security officer insures that the. cover does not fall.apart with: the death. Often the. security man will even help th th with. the funeral and. burial. arrange- in-. employee-has died:--without offering: n-any procif:: Blue Cross,.i.vhich originally: had the ;; agency's _health-insurance or ? palicy,Aemanded- too much- inforrna-, rd tion for the- agency's liking,..and in the 1950s -:the CIA Switched its ac--- ci- . count to:the. more tolerant Mutual, of e Omaha. ..Agency employees: are. even'. Od instruCtednot to use the airplane-crash, to insurance machines available at air-.. el- ports, but to purchase such insurance . from the credit union. . - m--... Attempts are made even to regulate all the extracurricular activities of agency 11: employees?to reinforce. their- attach-. meat -to the organization ? and, of: course, for security reasons.' An *em- ployee-activity association (incorpo-- s rated for legal purpOses) sponsors f: programs in everything from sports r ? and art to slimnastics and karate. The ? association also runs a recreational travel service; a sports and theater 0 ticket service, and a discount sales store. The CIA runs its own training programs for reserve military officers, too. And it has arranged with local s universities to have its own officers teach college-level and graduate courses for credit to its employees in the security of its headquarters build- \8'. The CIA calf be enga_tngly paternal in-other ways, too. On-the whole, it is :quite_ tolerant : of sexual dalliance .:among its employees, as long .as the relationships. are-heterosexual and.not with enemy_ spies: 'In fact, the CIA's :Medical "office In .Saigon , was known 'during the late 1960s for its no-ques- 'tions-asked ictires."-of -venereal disease, Lvvhile State :Deiartment officers." in -that.--CitY.'avoided the embassy clinic for z the'sam- e :malady . because they :feared the. consequences to their ca- -reersz-orhaving YD listed ron their Per-- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00.432R000100330003-8 ApOroved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 other" ways the CIA keeps Cloie watch over-its employees', health'.. If a CIA-officer gets sick, he. can go to doctor or a: "cleared" out- Sidee:physician.,If he. undergoes sur- gery,tlie frequently - is accompanied into '..the Operating room ? by a CIA , ? ? :security 'man who-makes sure that no fscrets - are revealed --_under. Sodium: pentOthol anesthesia: If .he 'mental breakdown, he is required ? to; ..bel:treated by -_arragency psychiatrist. cleared contact on the :otitside) an extreme case, to beadmitted , - ? 107,;.a CIA-sanctiOrted, sanitarium: 'Al- though no statistics _available; breakdowni seem more corn-- anon in the 'raaency's.i.teriSion-laden "atmosphere than in the population as-a :whole, and the ? CIA :tends to have- a -imore tolerant attitude than the general. ublic toward mental-health problems, .:apd psychiatric' therapy. In the _Clan-: 'destine Services,' breakdowns are' con- sidered virtually normal work 107ards, 'and employees,:, are- encouraged:to; NEW YORK DAILY NEWS 30 June 1974 .1The CIA rind The Culla of I1iPelliy6-ncer _return to work after..they have com- pleted treatment. Usually no stigma is. attached to illness of this type; in fact,! :Richard Helms suffered a breakdown when he was still with the Clandestine; Services during the 1950s and it clear- ly did not hurt his career. Ex-Clandes- tine Services chief Frank Wisner had a- similar illess, and he later returned to work as the CIA station chief. in- London. . i\iany agency, officials. are known for their heavy drinking?which also seems to be looked upon as an occupa- tional hazard. Again; the CIA is more sympathetic to drinking problems than outside organizations. Drag .use, how7 ever, remains absolutelY.taboO. While_ the. personnel:. policies and benefits: e_xtended: by: the CIA to its. employees -:can. be. Justified .? on_ the. gounds of 'national. security' and. the need to develop organizational loyalty, these tend to have something of a per- ion-al debilitating effect on the career 'officers. The agency is unconsciously 1.1 ? r-./ ? ? ? 4:0?1,, viewed as an omniscient, omnipotent institution?one that c an even be con- sidered infallible. Devotion to duty 'grows to fanaticism; questioning the decisions of the authorities is tanta- 'mount to-. relious blasphemy. Such .circumstances. encourage bureaucratic ,insulation and introversion. (especially ...Under strong pressures from the &h- :side), and they even' promote:a 'iceise,_* defensive % attitude which -? stricts the individual from keeping pace with sigiiticant social events oc- curring in. one's own nation?to say ' nothing of those evolving abroad. In- stead of continuing to develop vision and sensitivity with regard 'to their professional activities, the career of- ficers become unthinking bureaucrats concerned only with their own com- fort and security, which they achieve by catering to the demands_ of the existing political and institutional lead- erships?those groups which are able to prthide.- the me.arts :for such personal ends. Aithcygh the CIA is generally thought of in terms of fight-lipped \ cloak-and-dagg;.,r operatives conspiring in exotic, far.-away lands; the secrecy-shrouded agency is active in this' coUntry as vieil cis oVerseal. In '!The Ctfel and the Cult of Intelligence," authors Victor. Marchetti and John D. Marls disclose' some of the domestic operations that brought the CIA- unwanted publicity?and criticism. ? : '?. ? By ifICTOR. LIARCHETT1 and J6NN.D. MARKS . ? " ' ..fieerz, all told, from 'a total of about- . - Second of two pod; " :. , .a dozen city nndecounty police forcesii - ? THE DOMESTIC Operations Divi- have reeeiveibsome sort of?ageney b. rief-'1 gin!' (DOW of the CIA, with a lag within the past. two }ears." , . But the CIA police training, whiCh! staff of 'a few hundred .persons and an a Consisted of much more than a ?"brief- is, . annual budget of up to ' $10 . million, ing," had been going on for r. well-established part of the consider- --Glandes- tine Sen'ices.ably more than the two years cited ?byl : ? '-:' , DOD is surrounded by extreme the CIA ? at least since. 1937 Nvhen -The I Chicago police . received...instruction . at: secrecy, even by CIA standards, 'and its; the rigeiley's headquarters and at "Thel .itctual functions are shrouded in niy-, Farm," a training installation in south.: 4ry. Tile extent of the agency's unwili-i irginiii. v . ingness to discuss the Dom 0,,,...,t,i.,, Domestic Division; coutd.Le seen when 'the CIA officer CIA training of local police depart- pa ? pre-; rnents may seem like a relatively.harm-; ring' the agency's annual budget TC- less a_tivitv,? but it does raise ? several: to 'quest to Congress in 1968 was pointedly 'questions. Why did the 'agency at first told by the Executive Director not to. try to cover, and then mislead' Con;: include anything about the 1)01) in the secret briefing to be given to the Sen- Fress and the press and the public about: tte, V. by the sante train-: ate'. tied House appropriations commit- :tees. in, not have .been given by time FDI?, ? . ?. And su why have bseqe unt CIA directors Training or Cops., ? James Schlesinger and Williain,Cohby Li Dec.,,,ther I972.%'Tcw yell not specifically -ruled out' any future po? Times revealed that the CIA' had 'secret-) lice training, even after the press and ly provided training to PI New York l ,,,Cong:ress .have raised the questions. City policemen. After persistent queries ! luega"tY and impropriety? ? by Representative Edward Koch, th e': A few months after Watergate,: the ? CIA's legislative counsel, John Maury,' Press would discover that..Q.1.1e)pie ie admitted 'that "less thalApproVed Rdderalle120011/118fOgianOlhakil-tq ..043 R ? 9 do ? ? ? ative and helpful" (in rhe worCliof?Whie? House aide Toni If-Liston) in helping to organize top-secret White House plans; for domestic surveillance and.. intelli7 genee? collection; that the CIA. had pro,. Acted "technical" aSsistanee to the White. House. plumber in their 1971 burglary of the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psy- chiatrist; that -.the agency maintained. ."safe houses" in the heart of Washing- 'ton where E. Howard hunt was clandes- ?tinely 'provided with CIA-ratinufactured false documents, a disguise, a speech- altering device, and a camera fitted into a tobacco pouch; that five of the seven Watergate burglars were ex-CIA em- ?ployees, and one was stilt on the payroll and regularly repocting to an agency ease officer; and, perhaps most signifi- cantly, that top Ca. officials remained silent, even in secret testimony before Congressional committees, about the place.tcel. activities they -knew had taken ? t To the inistrustfel minds of the Clan:. destine Services, the prvbiems caused by dissidents, civil-riehts activists, and anti-war protesters conjured Up the specter of ?foreign influences. And as .Direetur Colby mentivned at his confir- mation hearinies: the nieeney can right- fully siee on Americans -involved' with foreign institutioi:s." ? Pentagon Blunders ? - - the late ?1960s and early 1970, the Johnson !White House gave the ma.- or 'responsibility ior penetrating the. anti-Near movement to the Pentagon. But Army intelligence blundered and its: domestic sm.veillance programs were ex- posed in January, 1970 by ex-agent , Christopher.Pylee-During the following, ar time o rliight"se,rvices were forced 0 CI' 1o Unlatisive attack against mestie dissidents; the field was once Approved Fo again )eft to the FBI and CIA. ? This. situation resulted in ''an ? o) break between ? the agency. and ? bureau. Sant- Papich, ? the Fill's offi in charge of, liaieon with the CIA, a a 'member of J. Edgar Hoover's int!) (Nato. steff, was dismissed by the reauechief. And only. weeks later, - head of the FBI's. Division of Inten Security, the FBPs'representative on' ? U.. S. Intelligence Board, Was locked o ;Of his office and fired by?Hoover. In the aftermath of the troubles the FBI, the press carried a series ? reports of Hoover's and the ? burea .incoMpetence. Some comments,' attr .uted. to ?ttautlioritative -.sources" -clea priginited ? svith; ? Or ..were ? inspired the : f'PUblie ;aware- of... the' time;. :was' ? that ? since' 1970 ?-;L-. lo before,the -.Open CIA-FBI Split t White House had been planning to e ?pand 'domestic intelligence . operatio :And :while the . CIA had encouraged t !secret?-:policy,;:the ? FBI 'had resisted 3vaS, hi fact,'.1100yerpersonal refu 'al'?to'.support the ne,w,:-policy r ;stilted in the collapse of the White Ilou plan- ? : ? .-? ? ? - r Release 2001108/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 ? The . CIA's best-known proprietaries )C71 ;were Radio'Free Europe and..Radio, Lib- the , ?erty. The corporate structures .of .these rev two stationa; served as prototypes. for ad . other agency. proprietaries.: Each func- tioned under the Over provided: by a bit- board of directots maclenp 'Of prominent the. .Americans. But CIA officers in key man- lot segment 'positions made all . the _ impor- . tant decisions: ? ?? ? ? ' : ???', ', ,? ...., l-;. :. the '-?. Direct CIA ownership of Radio. Free' ut ? Europe, 'Radio' Liberty andAnterarruco. (a private arms-sales company) is large- st' ly 'history. Nevertheless, the agency is of ' still very much involved in the proprie- u 5. Lary business, especially to support its paramilitary operations. rly, ; " ncter ible as It may seem, the C by, is the owner: of one of the' bigge fleets of ? "commercial" airplanes in, t at, world. Agency proPrietaries irieltide?.A ng? America, Air Asia, Civil Air Trinspo he: 'Intermountain Aviation, Southern A x..? Transport and several other air chart as companies? around the world. he: . . Air America was r:et up in the In it. 19503 b necemmoclate.the agency's re ? illynerowinge number - of operations e-n . Southeast % Asia. ? By i 971, . the ? Agen se for Itn:ernational Development -: (AID Dominican Republic?where the agency had been called on'hy the, White IfouSe to take action against existing politica/ trends.' ? ?- ? ? .d.a.m. . Up ?With ? ? t ? It proved to be itersuasive?netrategy. as the director peraonallyn approved Doole's request, and Southern re:en-zed its several million dollars for jets; ? So if the U.S. decidei interrene covertly in the internal affairs of a Latin American. coontry, Nolen planci will be 'available to support the operation. These CIA airlines eland ready to 'drop.' their leeeitintate charter basinesn. IA quietly and assume the role . they were St established for: the transport of .arms; he . and mercenaries for the agency's- special. tr.- operations. . ? , The guns will come from the CIA's ir own stockpiles and from the warehouses. Cr of Interarmco and other arms. dealers.. The -mercenaries will, be furnished by te the agency's Special Operations Division, P- and, like the air -proprietaries, their eon-, in ncetion with .the agency will be "p1aus-- ey ibly deniable" to the. American public ) and the world,' . ? ? - it i ? A few Years ri.go, .the CIA vias de- .. . . Student Subsidization ' .-? ? ? ? ? :-Another domestic area .in which t :CIA has 'been. involved. came . to lig Yin 196T after Ramparts .0,itga t ne revea ..ed?the- Clksulesidizationeof the.Nation 'Student Asiociatioii.::?'.'?:J.4::':-?;;;;::-;`,-: ? :2 Clandestine. Servieei at times h used ? umversities to provide cover and even assist in a covert Operation over- seas. From 1955 to 4959, for ineeeneen the CIA paid $25 million to Michigan' State 'University to run A covert pelice-n training program in South Vietnam.. The ? linkage: betWeen the CIA and: research? institutions on cninptr; :and ia th&peivete eeetee .)enatne 's:tancinee't ? ??? Lice,- just .as it 'did for the. Pe' ntagon. But whereas the 'Pentagon's procedures could to. some 'extent 'be monitored by the Congress and 'the public, CIA set up und subsidized its own !Think tanks" under a complete veil of s?erecy. ? The compika-s of a 1967 study on A. ties to-, the ucadenrie commenit found that the Clandestine Services ha their own research' links with ,universi ties for the purposes of developing Let ter espionage tools.. Butthe uniyereitie also represented fertile terrt:ory for en- rolling foreign students,. especially those front emerging countries, many of whom Were (and are) destined to hold high po- .sitions itt their homelands. . . Enlist ? Professors . . . . To evaluate these student, the Clan.: *destine ? Servicei Maintained a contrae- Anal relationship with key professors on numerous campuses. When a professor had picked out a likely candidate, h notified his contact .at the CIA and On oecasionn participated in. the .actua recruitment attempt. - When a.CIA study :An ?.the .agency's ties with American universities wee pre Sented to the: then. director,: Richert Heinle, only one cop- - was made, becaus o, its sensitivity. Helms reviewed it an agreed with its conclusion: that all Cl. campus activities were valuable to th agency and should be centinued. In th end, there was a selective pruning o these programs-but essentially the. CIA' activities with and ? at the universities continued as they had before the NSA scandal broke. ? , ? '??? ? They do so today. ? ? : "Proprietary corporations,", or, more simply, "proprietaries, are ? ? ostensibly private Institutions and businesses Which are in fact; financed and, controlled by The CIA. ?? ? ? ?,' : ; ..',..From behind ' th'eir commercial 'and sotnetinies non-profit covers, the agency is nWe to carry out a multitude of clan- destine' nctivilies?usually covert. aIo!e had pai, Air Atne'rtca more the ? ..::?:;' tnillion for charter services-In 1st: i -;_kir America:. was - able to.- generate' , . . he:much businesi:,ig Southeast :Apia-11 eventually other American airlines ht ? note of the profits to be made. ? e n -? 1.-: . at . ?? ' One private.: company, Continen ?- Airlines, made a successful move in mid-1960s to take Some of the Marl as away front Air America. Pierre Senn' ? . who became an officer of Continen after his years ? as. President Kenned ' press secretary, led Continental's fig to gain its share of the lucrative' Sout east Asian business.- : ? Rather than - face the possibility unwanted publicity, the CIA permitt Continental to move into Laos, whet since the late 1960s, it has flown chart flights worth millions of :dollars nun allY. And Continental's best custom . is the CIA itself. t, 1 scribed as the most secretive and tightly So knit organization (with the possible ex- mat ception of the Mafia) 'in American so- ok .ciety. In its golden era, during the height: of the. Cold War, the agency did pos-! tel sess a rare elan; it had _a staff- of imag=, the ?inative and daring officers at all levels. cet and all. directorates. ? ; But over . the years the . CIA. has, tot!: grown old and fat: and bureaucratic. The true: purpose of , secrecy?to keep the ht It- the dark about agency poli- .eica and. operations?has been lost sight. Today_ the. CIA' often' practices see- of ,reey for secreey's?sake-.-and to prevent ed ;the American 'public ;from learning of ?e, its activities.* .1 ? er ? ? . Purpose!Dzsforted' ? - The er- true purpose of intelligence col-. ? ? ? .lection-i--to monitor efficiently.the threat-' ening moves of international adversaries: Although the boards of directors o the air proprietaries arc studded wit the names of eminently respectable hue ness leaders and financiers, several o the companies' operations .were actuall d_ long in thehands of one ratheresimen "lar Man, George- Doole Jr. Doole.'s, offi cial titles, until: his retirement 1971 ? were president., of, the Pacific. COrpo ea tion and c executive Officer:ea...Ai America and.Air Asia. ? .; - enif n.te ?-?7-has been distorted by the need to nour- ish a collective clandestine ego.: . Secrets, is. an -absolute, way of life Y.: at .the:ageney, and while. outsiders might. consider ?.some - of the resulting practices: .comical.? in the .extreme, the subject is ? treated-...With great :seriousness in.-the . r l?i?- ? *.;-- 7Trajnin :7 officersleeture new person- nel' for hours on endabout "security ? ,consciousness," ? augmenting these 'ses- 3 eions ;with refreshen courses, warning posters and semi-annual .reviews of se- . ? curity rules. ? As a matter of course, outsiders should be told absolutely nothing about the CIA: and fellow eniployes should be ? given ? only -that information for, which r they .have. an 'actual "need to know." CIA Personnel become so necu:.ztotned Mon of .Talent Doole was knoWn, to his ...Colleague in the agency: as a superb. businessmaU He had d talent for ?expandingliii 'Air lines and for ;.Making: them intonProfit making concerns': In fact, his.proprietar ies proveel Soniething of 'an, embarrass went to the agency_ becaneen ts,f; 'thei ? 'profitability. - ? ? . .; ; In 1908, the_CIA's,Executive,Commit- e--. lee for ;Air ,iinet; ;ter,deat with.nsAequest from. Doole fon- several ?million::dollarS to. "modernize" Southern Air Transport, Doole's justitic'ation for the money ? was e that every major airline- iii 'the world was using jets, and that Southern needed. to follow suit if it were to continue ? toe"live its Cover." o ? At the meeting; Doole Wae-eiked ? if. he thought .expanding Southern's. cape- s Hates for future- interventions in: Latin Ameriee, conformed iyith e?..isqpg..- esti, -iaates. .????'? ? .c ? ? ? ?;,?? ?'' Doole. ieniained Silent but tine. Services ' officer working': in "nera- military affair's ?replicd that the estimate might well have been'a correetnippraiel of. the Latin. Ametscan situation,: !). that nen-intervention- not'- tieeeit- ; ;sadly become :Official An-it:rind Policr, The Clandestine Services man poS4ied nut that over the years there had been other developMents in T.,ritin itt countries midi as Guatemala and the ? n to the: rigorous Security precautions (sorno of which are indeed justified) that they easily accept them all. Nothing could. be more natural than to work . -with a telephone boo', marked SECRET, .an intentionally incomplete book which )jStflno ono in the Clandestine Services and 'which, in each semi-an:really reeiseel - of the people emploYed by the overt .di- editic,n, leaves out the rrcinIcs or mein- rnetorates. ? .?..? ? ? ? ?\ Thus, if the book ever falls into nneu- thorized hands, ho. one will be able to - figure out how many people work at CIA headquarters. Those temporarily omitted can look forward to haying their names appear in the next edition, at nwhich time others are selected. for. tele.- phonic lim- :Along with bo ? n. ?? 7. the .phone books, all other . . . classified material (including typewriter ribbons and Scrap paper) is placed in safes whenever an office is 'unoccupied. Security guards petrel every part of' A Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 ? -Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 the agency at roughly half-hour inter-, vela in . the evenings and on, Weekends.; Even a charwoman at CIA Must gain' security. clearance to qualify for the badge she must wear at all times; then she Must be 'accompanied by an armed guard -.While She 'cleans offices (where alt classified 'material has already been 'locked up).- Some rooms . at the agency are 'Considered So secret that- the char- woman and eller .:guard must also be watched by someone who works in the office.? ? ; ? . - ? The .penchant for secrecy Sometimes takes on an .air of. ludicrousness. Secret medals are.awarded fonoutstanding per- ?formance,ebut. they' cannot be worn or shoWri 'outside' the, sig,ency. Even athletic -trophiei?for intramural sports?cannot be displayed except within the guarded sanctuary of the headquarters building. ? Questions' of ? SOW ? class and snob- bery have ..alwaYS .been. very important in the , ? The ageneY1MS long been known for' its concentration. of Eastern Establish meat, Ivy League types.There have been exceptions, to be 'sure, but most of the CIA's top leaders . have been white, Anglo-Saxon,- Protestant and graduates of the "right". Eastern schools. While changing times and ideas have difiatesed the.: influende of . the Eastern elite . throughout the 'government as. a whole, ? . the CIA remains perhaps the last bastion :in Official Washington of WASP: power,: cni at least the .slowest to adopt the prin-: ciple of equal.opportunity. . .? The Home Is'Chonged - . The num who masterminded and oversaw the CIA's clandestine operations ? in Indochina .durine much of the 1960a was William-Colby, the current CIA di- rector. He . is. a ' trime,,wellesreemed .Princeton and Celeinbia Law Sehool ,graduate. Etarting during .1.7orld War II with the Office of Strategic Services,. he showed a remarkable talent for clane: destine work, and in 1962 he was named head. of the Par East Division of the - Clandestine Services. ?? In 1965, Colby oversaw the founding. in Vietnam of the agency's" Counter Ter-: ror (CT)-program. In 1966, the agency:: became wary of adverse publicity. sure ?rounding -the 'use of the word "terror? iand changed the name of the CT teams, to the Provincial Reconnaissance Units THE GUARDIAN, MANCHESTER 1 July 1974 ii!Ze- -.?: Wayne . Cooper, ? a former ? foreign service officer who 'spent almost 18 months as an advisor to South Vietna- mese internal security operations, de- seribed? the 'operation ? ?"a' unilateral: 'American program, never recognized- by . the South Vietnamese. government. CIA ,representatiyes recruited,'., organized, -supplied : and directly paid CT ?teams, whose function . was to. use ? Viet Cong technique of terror ? assassination, ,abuses, kidnapings and intimidation_ against the Viet Cong.leadership." Admits Some Abuses 1967; Colby's office devised 'a Pro- gram, Called Phoenix, to coordinate an ? attack against the Viet Cong infrastruc- ture., CIA., money was .the ?catalyst. Ac- ? cording to Colby's own testimony, 20,587. suspected Viet Cong were killed under Phoenix in its first two-and-a-half years. ? Even'. Colby ? admitted that serious abuses were Corimiitted -under Phoenix: :Former. intelligence off icera before. . Con- gressional- committees have' described re- . . Peated examples of torture: and. Other ?repugnarit. practices used by Phoenix op- eratives. ? . -s ? ? . Deeply embedded within the clandes- tine mentality is the belief that human ethics and social laws have no bearing on Covert operations. The intelligence profession, because of its lofty "national security" goals, is free from all moral restrictions. There i no need to wrestle .With technical legalisms or judgments as to whether something is right. or :wrong. The determining faders' in secret '.operations are purely pragmatic: Does the job need to be done? Can it be done? And can secrecy (or plausible denial) be maintained? - Thus a William Colby can devise and direct 'terror tactics, secret wets and the like, .all in the name of democracy. This is the clandestine mentality; a separation, of personal morality and-con- duct from netione, leattee how de- tv.ken nerre the government' and, morn-Specifically, the Central Intelligence Agency. - Although Harry Truman wrote In 190 that ."I never had any thought when I set up the CIA that it would be injected into peacetime cloak-and-deg-eel. operas From simoN WINCHESTER, Washington, June 30 find their way into print. Even- tually the agency agreed : they A remarkable book published here -this week is being billed as "The first book the US Government ever went to court. to censor before publication." Called 4The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," it is the work of Victor Marchetti and John Marks, respectively 'former CIA official and State :Department intelligence expert, who joined forces three years ago to expose what they ?believed to he the shortcomings of the CIA and the growing " theology of intelligence." The CIA took them to court, . saying that, no material gained while the pair were civil ser- vents could he published, So Ntarchetti and Marks wrote the manuscript under a .court order to hand it over to CIA censors , when it was finished. This they edid, and the CIA cut no fewer than 339 " offensive " passages. So the authors went back to reduced the number of dele- tions from 339 to 168: . T Ii e publishers, Alfred Knopf,- of New York, went ahead on this basis, and for $3.93 (about. ?3.75) one can now buy the resulting book. The 168 continuing CIA dele- tions appear as blanks, some of them two pages long. The 171 which the. Government allowed after the fight appear in. bold type : and a future edition will contain, probably, all but about 30 of the deleted passages in full, because the judge in Vir- ginia has recently declared (though he has permitted the CIA to appeal) that the public, at large should be allowed to read them. The reader's attention is naturally drawn to all the pas- sages in .the book that appeal- in bold print, some of which tions,'', he he ? and each President 'after ? him.. willingly employed the agency 'to .carry: out clandestine scspionage And covert intervention the 'internal af- fairs of other countries. r. ? ? ? ',. From its beginning, the CIA's actual functions ;were couched in deceptiOn and secrecy. - s ? ? . Charter. Revised es Former . Clandestine Services:: Chief 'Richard Dissell told. the Council on Per-- eign 'Relations in' 1968 that the "CIA's :fUll 'charter' has been frequently revised, "!butit has been, and must remain, secret. ?The absence of a public charter leads , people to search for the charter and ? to question -the ? agency's authority to . undertake various 'activities. The prob- lem .of a. secret 'charter' .. remains, as a , curse; ;but. the needefor secrecy.. would appear to preclude a sellition." ' One?-eXecutis'e Organization set up to 7cOntrol' the CIA is the 40 Committee. The committee is supposed. to meet Once -A week, .but its members have so many responsibilities in. their ? own departments that'itsSneetings are frequently Canceled. ..e,Nor? is the .40 Committee: an effec- tive. Watchdog when it does Meet. Ac- 'cording to 'one-veteran intelligence offi- l'elal;',queted -in: the :Washington Post, !the Committee ? "was like: a. bunch ".of ? schoolboys.. They would listen and their eyes would bug out." He continued: "I always used- to say nthat 'could get '$5 million out:.of the .40.. Committee , for, a. covert operation 'faster than. I could. get meney ? for a typewriter, out of the .ordinary bureauc- racy." : -? ? . Even as the 40 Committee to keep. a close Watch on secret reconnais- : same activities, is. ineffective- in. racini- toning ethe CIA's covert operationS and i-is totally in the dark on espionage-opera- .: tione, -President Nixon and especially 'Henry_ . are *unquestionably . aware .of its shortcomings and have done , little to change things. It is the President and Kissinger who :ultimately determine how the CIA oper- ates; and if they do net want to impose closer contra!, then the form of any control mechanism is meaningless. Actankci frcnt Ihn boo+ "ilut CIA r-ke. t!t.r., Cult .lctyt 0, f,t17s,,r,. Vicl,r (1. varls.s. ty s fol era can intelligence community. The CIA staff, we learn for example, is 16,500 strong. It has an annual -budget of about $730 millions. The otal intelligence. costs in the US every year are a staggering $6,300 millions (with the National Security Agency, which listens to all embassy radio traffic and tapes all transatlantic telephone and telex conversations, taking $1,200 millions). The, cost of the CIA's direct espionage and counter-espionage programme is $440-millions a year. The way this money is spent, might occasionally appear- a little ridiculous. There was once a plan, a bold face passage in the book says, to give all agents operating in hostile ter- ritories an aeroplane that could. quite literally be folded up into a suitcase. court in Virginia and tried to drawn at random from the .The idea was igaglig, ersuade the CIA to a11930-01PettfcrevRgieAseii2004./0614:18 :afliget-EtiDlant)0 feast some of the deletion de ai c po reit of the Amen- walk to the nearest - border, 11 11,R, in lanes unpack- his plane, and fly off to freedom. Little other than ini- tial funds were spent on this device, to the taxpayers' relief. The CIA also spends a lot.of. money looking after the security of all US embassy- com- munications rooms, taking ela- borate precautions to prevent the Russians frcem eavesdrop. ping. "The rooms themselves are encased in lead and rest on huge springs to reduce internal noises. Resembling large camp- ing trailers, the coda rooms are normally located deep in .the Concrete basements of embassy buildings." There are occasional revela- tions that do not' so *much embarrass the CIA as they do other wings of' the American Government, In 1970 for exam- ple, a State Department' official 34030.141 an Arab diplomat in tffetton about current peace negotiations ? in the Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 I Midi/le East. cabled a report on the conversa- tion ,to his own Government.' The CIA-NSA , network inter- cepted his cable and found to ' their Surprise that the State ?Departinent man .had not told The Arabs the proper facts, or, .else the Arab had grossly mis- .understood them. The dollar spent on uncovering slip-ups of diplomacy like that may well be NEW YORK TIMES 4 July 1974 .worthrirhite-In FOr?the first time since .its', creation' in 1947', the agency , that has sent shivers down the necks ? of. Governments as far. away as Chile and Ireland- has now lifted its %,itirts a tiny. amount to reveaa tantalising ? amount of clandestine- ankle. It is up to the courts in Washin fon to decide whether we shall ever, see tbe whele- body. ? C.I.A. Agent Said to Give Secrets to Russian in 1972 Report Drunken American Disclosed to Soviet Aide What Ile Knew Emerges as Result of Watergate Inquiry c? By JOHN M. CREWDSON Special to The WASHINGTON, July 3?A tale of a drunken and despond ent C.I.A. agent who apparently 'sat down with a Soviet K.G.B operative somewhere in Latin America and told him what he knew has emerged as a result of a Senate Watergate commit- tee. inquiry into the activities of ? the Central Intelligence Agency. ,, ? The K.G.B., the Soviet Com- mittee of State Security, com- bines internal security and for- eign intelligence functions: A 'report issued by the Water- gate committee yesterday eon- tains a cryptic mention of .a "W H? flap" that highly reliable sources said today resulted from the conversation and its ensuing effect on many of the agency's clandestine operations. The 'initials "W H" are 'C.I.A. parlance for the Western Hemi- sphere.'. The agent clearly provided information Of value to the Russians,. because the C.I.A.'s deputy director for plans later told the Watergate committee, according to its 'report, that the affair "threatened to com- promise Western Hemisphere operations." The C.I.A. man, believed to have been stationed somewhere in Latin America, 'was de- scribed by sources as "despond- ent," "disgruntled" with the agency ,and "in his cups" at the time of his brief, and per- haps unprecedented, contact with the Rusians a little more than .two years ago. It could not be learned what specific information the Ameri- can imparted, but the sources said today that the matter was still considered extremely sen- sitive. One of the lesser agency se- Icrets compromised in the con- krersation, 'however, .was the New York Times , fact that a Washington public - relations' concern, Robert R. , iMullen .& Co., had for years ? ibeen providing "cover" -for 'C.I.A. agents stationed abroad. According to the Senate re- 'port, prepared by the Water- gate committee's minority staff and released yesterday, the Mullen ' concern "has main- tained a relationship with. the Central Intelligence Agency since its incorporation in 1959." At the time of the Watergate break-in, on June 17, 1972, one C.I.A. agent in Singapore and another in Amsterdam were said to be representing them- selves as "overseas employes" of the Mullen company. , A number of other American multinational companies with intere?st in Western Europe or the Far East have traditionally furnished such "covee for C.I.A. operations, according to intelligence sources. '- - At the time of the Watergate break-in, the Mullen Company employed E. Howard Hunt Jr., a retired C.I.A. operative who later pleaded guilty to having conspired to tap telephones at the Democratic party's national headquarters here. Although the company's president, Robert F. Bennett, has said that the Mullen com- pany was not serving as . a cover organization for Mr. Hunt, the committee report, says that-"Hunt's covert securi- ty clearance was extended by the C.I.A." when he left the agency to join the company in 1970. - Mr. Bennett, the son of Sc ator Wallace F. Bennett, Re- publican of Utah, has headed the Mullen organization since 1971. The company handled publicity for President Nixon's 1968 campaign and reportedly helped -to set up and administer Republican campaign finance committees that received $232,- 500 from dairy industry repre- sentatives in 1971 and $100,000 from Howard R. Hughes in /972. ? A July 10, 1972, memo from 12 Martin Lukasky, Mr. Bennett's "case officer" at the C.I.A., re- 'fers to the "W H flap," accord- ing to the committee rport, and "States that if the Mullen [company] cover is terminated, the Watergate could not be used as an excuse." ? The agency's reluctance to tell Mr. Bennett outright that the company's cover had been brached, according to one source, stemmed from its desire to conceal . from .the Russians its knowledge of the clandes- tine contact between the Rus- sian agent and the C.I.A. man, who has since retired from the agency. ' This source said that he had been told that the C.I.A. had learned of the Matter from an- other individual within the "Soviet apparatus," who appar- ently been privy to the K.G.B. man's account of-the affair and whom the C.I.A. wished to pro- tect. Another source, however, said that that was "absolutely not" the manner in which the information about the talkative American agent had reached .C.I.A.- headquarters in Langley, I A spokesman for the C.I.A. said that -the "W H flap" was still a highly sensitive matter. He declined to comment fur- ther, except to say that addi- tional information had been provided to the Watergate panel and other Congressional com- mittees: ? ? The Watergate committee's minority staff received a num- ber of classified documents from the C.I.A. in connection with its inquiry, including :the July 10 memo from Mr. Lukasky land a follow-up report from him two weeks 'later. Although the first memo sug- gested, according to the corn-, mittee report, that "the agency might have to level with [Mr. Bennett] about the 'W H Flap,'" the C.I.A. apparently decided on a course of deception instead.j The second Lukasky memo, the report said, "shows that the C.I.A. -convinced Robert Mullen of the need to withdraw its Far East [Singapore] cover through an 'agree.d upon scena- rio' which included a falsified Watergate publicity crisis." ? The report also said that, while the C.I.A. had explained the."W H flap" in general terms to Senate investigators, it had not given "sufficient reason to withhold such information from Mullen nor explained the sig- nificance of some to Watergate developments." The connection to Water- gate, according to a well-placed source, was more imagined than real. Mr. Bennett was report- edly told that an individual in Singapore, an island city at the tip of the Malaysian peninsula, had previously accused the Mullen representative there of being associated with the C.I.A. The agent denied his af- filiation, the source said. ? Some time between June 17 an July 24, 1972, Mr. Bennett was allegedly told, this same Individual had approached the I.A. man bearing a copy of le International Herald Tri- which is published in Paris, that contained an article on Mr. Hunt's erstwhile em- ployment at the Mullen head- quarters in Washington. The accuser cited the article as proof that the Singapore agent's connection with Mullen indicated his affiliation with the C.I.A., Mr. Bennett was al- legedly told, and the cover would therefore have to be dis carded, which it was. ? But, the source said,' it was subsequently established that the entire incident in Singa- pore never took place, WASHINGTON POST 7 July 1974 ? Ex-Agent Identified In 'Flap' - By Laurence Stern Washington Post Staff Writer A veteran Central Intelli- gence Agency covert agent, who resigned in 1969 in protest to U.S. policies in Latin America, figured centrally in the closing of a Mexico City CIA "cover" operation run by the Wash- ington-based public r e I a- tions firm, Robert R. Mul- len & Co. The ex-agent, Philip B. F. Agee, was the unidentified subject of a cryptic reference to a "WH flap" in the recently released Watergate report of Sen. Howard Baker (R-Tenn.). Agee served in the Western Hemisphere (WH) Division of the CIA's clandestine services in Ecuador, Uruguay and Mexi- co from 1960 to 1969, when he resigned from the agency, ac- cording to informed nongov- ernmental sources. Since leaving the CIA, it was further learned, Agee, who now is living abroad, made several trips to Cuba where, according to one ac- quaintance, he was enga..eed in research." An earlier ptb- lished report that a former CIA official?now known to have been an allusion to Agee ?had passed information on to Soviet intelligence officials was termed?"nonsense" yester- day by informed sources. The CIA terminated the pre- viously undisclosed Mullen company cover operation in Mexico City after becoming fearful that Agee might pub- licly disclose its secret intelli- gence role. The Washington- Post previously reported that Mullen operated cover offices' for CIA operatives in Singa- pore and Amsterdam which , have since been closed. A ihnirth Mullen company cover Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 Operation Was con-ducted Stockholm, according to in-;. formed sources, but was tranS-: ferred to Amsterdam. Baker for months has beer; pursuing the possibility of a: CIA involvement in the. Watergate scandal. President, Nixon, too, justified the inter- vention of top White House- aides in the July, 1972, FBI in- vestigation of Nixon re-elec- tion funds being "laundered". through Mexico City banks on grounds that an FBI probe might expose covert CIA ac-.: tivities. ? CIA Director William E.: Colby, in a written response to Baker's report last week, said that "the 'Western Hemisphere flap' . . . had no relationship to Watergate." This was presumably a re- sponse to the observation in 'the Baker report that the CIA had failed to explain the "significance" of the flap "to Watergate developments." The CIA acknowledged to Baker's investigators that the "Western Hemisphere Flap" threatened to "compromise Western Hemisphere (CIA) op- erations." And without specifi- cally alluding to the Agee-Mul- len episode. the CIA further told Baker that its efforts to "terminate projects and move _ assets [cover operations] sub- 4,ject to compromise . . . were closely held even within the agency in order to protect these efforts." , The first reference to a "WIT flap" was made in a July 10, 1972, memorandum by CIA official Martin J. Lukasky, summarizing the agency's relationship with the Mullen public relations firm. It was cited in the Baker re- ?port as one of the aspects of the case that required further investigation. Lukasky was the De CIA "case officer? for Robert r. Bennett, president of Mullen, and son of Sen.1 Wallace Bennett (R-Utah). CIA officials refused to ? ,comment yesterday on any as- pect, of the Agee resignation or the circumstances of the closing of the Mullen office in Mexico City. Nor would any government spokesman comment on whether the episode was the 'basis for President Nixon's. publicly, stated concern early in the Watergate case over ex- posure of covert CIA opera- tions in Mexico. Within six days of the Watergate break-in on June ,17, 1972, the President di- rected his two 'chief aides then, H. R. (Bob) Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman, to "ensure that the investigation of the (Watergate) break-in not expose either an unrelated ,covert operation of the CIA or the activities of the White House investigations unit ...," ,as Mr. Nixon recalled it on May 22, 1973. ? ApprOV Then CIA Director Richire M. Helms and his deputy, Gen. Vernon Walters, repeatedly as- serted to White House offi- cials and to then acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray III that the FBI investigation of Watergate money laundered through Mexico would not ex- pose covert CIA activities. Colby's comments last week reaffirmed the Helms position of last year. But Baker per- sisted last week in keeping the question open and said that the agency's explanation of the Mullen-CIA incident "is clouded by conflicting evi- dence." ' Agee, the disaffected ex-CIA agent who has not previously been identified publicly in the complex Mexican connection scenario, is understood to be a continuing source of concern to government officials be- cause of his extensive knowl- edge of CIA activities in Latin America. It was understood that when Agee resigned in 1969 his CIA superiors had no idea of the extent of his disaffection with his own mission or the general pattern of covert U.S. activi- ties in the countries where he worked. ? An . acquaintance in the United States with whom Agee has been correspondieg said the former CIA officer acknowledged that he had functioned as an undercover agent in the American Insti- tute for Free Labor Develop- ment, an affiliate of ,the AFL- CIO. The institute, v;ihich was headed by veteran AFL-CIO organizer Jay Lovestone, has conducted extensive programs with Latin-American labor or- ganizations. Agee wrote his American correspondent recently that he now regards the CIA as a "police force" which in his view assists in imposing U.S. "economic exploitation" -on Latin American countries. I "He's obviously become quite radicalized," said Agee's correspondent, who has also been associated with intelli- gence activities. "But this guy was an operative for 14 years and he knows names and places. There are people in Washington who are scared s? of this guy." Agee is understood to have entered into negotiations with a foreign publisher for a manu- script, which totals some 250,000 words. ? He was described by his American acquaintance as a graduate of Notre Dame ? "a good Catholic boy who was fi- nally fed up to the teeth with hypocrisy and deception. Like some Catholic priests who have gone down there he be- came freaked out with poverty and repression an what our government was doing." eqi F?taTeRe I setae g2801148/63-: dren are in the United States. The couple is separated. CIA witnesses named Agee in secret testimony to four congressional subcommittees looking into the agency's rela- tionship with the Watergate case. These include the Senate and House intelligence over- sight subcommittees as well as the Senate Watergate com- mittee. It was understood that Bak- er was the only investigating senator who concluded that Agee's resignation from the agency and the feared expos- ure of the Mullen 'cover in Mexico City was of possible ? significance in linking the agency to the Watergate scan- dal. ? Bennett and the Mullen com- pany have figured in a series of relationships not only with the CIA but also the Nixon re- election campaign. During 1971 Bennett ,drew up the names of dummy commit- ,tees set up tO funnel secretly more than $300,000 in contri- butions from the milk pro- ducers into the Nixon re-elec- tion campaign. The Mullen company was also identified as the source of blank checks trans- mitted from Howard Hughes' interests to the Committee for the Reelection. of the President during the 1972 campaign. Bennett ' according to the Baker report, also served, as a "point of contact" between con- victed Watergate conspirator and ex-CIA operative E. Howard Hunt Jr. and G. Gordon Liddy, Hunt's co-conspirator, during the two weeks after the Water- gate break-in. , Hunt, too, went to work for the Mullen firm after retiring from the CIA in 1970 and con- tinued to work for the public relations firm for a period of 'time while working as a con- sultant-to the White House in the special investigative unit that became known as "the plumbers." A CIA official, Frank 0'. Malley, recommended Hunt for employment with Mullen, ac- cording to officials of the firm. It was understood that one of O'Malley's responsibilities at the agency was finding retire- ment employment for CIA em- iployees. The CIA has regular "cover- age" arrangements with private companies f o r operatives abroad, according to knowledge- able oficials. It was recently , acknowledged that some 200 operatives abroad function under such private', corporate 'covers. Mullen & Co. was one such corporate host., LOS ANGELES TIMES 1 July 1974 Officials See- CIA_Pait: in -Scandal .WASHINGTO.;:.( UPI) :Two -members-0, Congress -who-participated Tin, hear-: eingseintO-:-LeosSible crx -in-. ;Tthe:,?--Water.-:.1! kate-.,bariglary -Or.;'*COverup:.: ::_.'sahle--..5tindaye they had-'?7! -found no7?eYidence that the agencY's-Abia .. nothing. that ?hinie.-is NViong from the,._.standpoint.i of -what . 'they ..hive-,been doing" ? Sen. Stuart Symington -Mo.) ? s'aid-ipf-i-the Central Intelligence Agency direc.- ? of the bur-. . --glary-and ? Nedzi (D-Mich), chairman of a :House sub- 'committee ?it:intelligence, ; said: I. dortT believe- that you're going.-to .see any- thing substantive with re- "spect 'to CIA involvement in'the Watergate affair." Both men were ques- tioned: in.':.braadcast. inter-.. . CIA-FRP77-00432R000100330003-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 NEW YORK TIMES 6 July 1974 EiAployp--6fC 2rers .A' By SYDNEY H. SCHANBERG , Special to The Nipr York Times SINGAPORE, July iS?A man who gave his name as Arthur H. Hochberg left Singapore hurriedly about two years ago, and has not been heard from since. He left in such a rush that he did not even tell his office landlord that he was pull- ing out and closing down his small office. His two local employes were puzzled; as was the landlord, but they were not angry, for, he had been a congenial em- ployer who had paid his rent several months in advance. The landlord did have one small complaint, however?Mr. Hoch- berg had put a special lock-on this private,inner office and the landlord had to bring in lock- smiths to open it after, Mr. Hochberg vanished. All of this would not be very unusual in Singapore, which is, after all, an international com- mercial center where foreign businessmen come and go in large numbers, except that a couple of days ago, a report by the minority staff of the Senate Watergate committee revealed that the company Mr. Hochberg worked for has for many years been providing "cover". for Central Intelligence Agency loperatives stationed abroad. public relations concern. The Mullen & Co., a Washington The company is Robert R. NEW YORK TIMES Senate committee came up with the information about Mullen as a by-product of its inquiry into the role played by the C.I.A. in the Watergate scandal. An article in The New York Times about the Senate report was reprinted in this morning's Straits Times, Singapore's-main English-language daily. The apparent reason for Mr. Hochberg's sudden departure from Singapore, according to the tenon, was . that a short time earlier, a C.I.A. agent in Latin America, while drunk And despondent, had given away several agency secrets to a Rus- sian intelligence agent, includ- ing the C.I.A. function of the Mullen Company. Murky.Conneetion The Senate report said that the president of the Mullen Company, Robert F. Bennett, son of Senator Wallace F. Ben- nett, Republican of Utah, had not been told that The secret was out and that this was the real reason for having to close down the Singapore operation, but was instead given a cooked- up "scenario which inclutled a falsified Watergate publicity crisis." ? The connection ? between the Singapore episode and Water- gate is extremely murky. The only possibly connective facts that are publicly known are that E. Howard Hunt Jr., a former C.I.A. agent who plead- ed guilty and was convicted for his role in the Watergate break-in, was employed by the Mullen Company at the time of the break-in on June 17, 1972, while- at the same time retaining his C.I.A. "covert se- curity clearance." ?- Also, the Senate report said that at the time of the break-in, a CI A. agent in Singapore and another in Amsterdam were said to be representing them- eslves as 'overseas employes" of the Mullen Company. Mr. Hochberg was the only known Mullen representative in Singapore at the time. A very limited picture? of his activities here emerged to- day from conversationsorith his office landlord and one of his former employes. 'A Very Fair Employer' . The employe, a secretary, de- scribed Mr. Hochberg as an American in his mid-30's who wore horn-rimmed ,glasses and had tight, curly hair. She said he was "a very fair employer" and a "cheerful" man. She pre- sumed him to be a bachelor because he had no family with him in Singapore. She also had the impression that he did not lead an active social life here and kept fairly much to him- self. She said Mr. Hochberg re- signed from the company when 11 July 1974 Ex-C.I.A.Age7rii 'Denies He Gave Information . to the Russians ? Special to The New York Times LONDON, July 10?Philip give .a detailed picture of the B. F. Agee, a former employe of the Central Intelligence :Agency who has written a book about the agency's opera- tion in Latin America, denied today that he had ever disclosed information about the agency to the K.G.B., the Soviet intel- ligence agency. Last week, reliable sources in Washington were reported in an article in The New York Times as having :said that the C.I.A. had been obliged ,to re- organize its. Western Hemis- phere operations because one of its agents, when drunk, had revealed aspects of the organi- zation, to a K.G.B. agent. These sources did not name Mr. Agee, who resigned from the agency in 1969, subsequent- ly spent time in Mexico, France' and Cuba, and now is living in Britain. It was later reported, however, that the intelligence agency's reorganization was a result of its concern that Mr. Agee would reveal information about the agency's work in Latin America., . Mr. Agee said today that his book, which is to be published nett year by Penguin Book Publishers of London, would C.I.A.'s work in Ecuador, Uru- guay and Mexico during the years he was stationed in those countries. "It is only a small window on the C.I.A. as a whole," he said. "But I think that it can be taken as giving a clear idea; of how the agency operates." "I did not at any time give information about the C.I.A. to members of the k.B.G.," he said. "That is a complete fabri- cation and I can only think it is part of an effort to discredit the book in advance. What I have to say about the C.I.A., I am saying in my book." - Mr. Agee also denied a re- port in a New York Times dis- patch that the book contained allegations that C.I.A. agents had upon occasion assassinated ;temporary employes of the agency in Latin America. He said that although in training courses he had taken after join- ing the agency such action was not excluded, he knew of no instances in which assassina- tion had been resorted to. No Comment by C.I.A. ' Special to The New York Times ' WASHINGTON, July 10?The Central Intelligence Agency 40 comment today on the de- nial by Mr. Agee that he had compromised the ? agency's Latin-American operations: _ Official sources had said earlier that they could not deny, that the, former agent had met; with the Soviet intelligence service. , Subsequently, official sources said that although Mr.' Agee had traveled to Cuba on three occasions after resigning from the C.I.A., there was no indi- cation that he had spoken with Soviet agents there or any- where else. The New York Thies dis- patch last week said that a tale of a "drunken and despondent" C.I.A. agent who had sat down with a Soviet intelligence oper- ative "somewhere in Latin America" had emerged as a re- sult of a Senate Watergate C mittee inquiry into the activi- ties of the intelligence agency. "Information of value; to the Russians" clearly was provided, the dispatch said, because the Watergate Committee's report quoted a high C.I.A. official as having said that the affair "threatened to compromise Western Hemisphere opera- tions." ? An informed source, speak- ing of Mr. Agee today, said that the matter of "what con- tacts he had, with whom he had them, what he may have passed and what damage has been don is still a very serious counterintelligence problem." ' he left and was' not m being transferred to ano IMullen job. She had not read the s about the C.I.A. and the M company in 'this morni newspaper, .but when about it and asked if she ever noticed anything ou the ordinary during the year she worked far Mr. Hoch she answered in the nega She described her work as tine business corresponde about public relations matt She recalled letters 'to s banking houses and to a container company. A Modern Office She said Mr. Hochberg "his own small typewriter' his private office. The o was in Suite 306 of the Ca Building, which also house movie theater. It is a mod office, with wall-to-wall ca ing and Scandinavian-style fice furniture. A Swedish s ping company now has spate once occupied by Mul The former employe said t Mr. Hochberg opened the of and hired her in the summe 1971 and left Singapore a .1. later in August, 1972. Be taking, the office, she s Mr. Hochberg had appar worked alone out of his ho the address of which she co not remember. She expressed puzzlem not only over the haste of Hochberg's departure but over the circumstances of event ?she said the Mul Company wanted the office remain open, but that Mr. Ho berg's resignation forced shut-down. Closing Was Forced "His decision to res caused the company to clos she said. "It was not the c pany asking him to lea Which we found odd, beca the company did ,not want close' but it had to because resigned." A spokesman for the Uni States Embassy here, 'asked comment, said: "We never h any comment on alleged C.I activities." The landlord of the Cath Building, who earlier in the d had talked freely about Hochberg's advance rent p ments and about the sub quent trouble with his off locks, and who had invited newsman to phone him la for mpre information?beca silent when the newsm called back. It could not be detertnin if ? Singapore or 'American a thOrities had spoken to him. - Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 NEW YORK TIMES 9 July 1974 Ex-Agent Said to Assert C.I.A. Killed Some Aides By SEYMOUR M. HERSH Special to 'The New York Times and elsewhere, including an of- o5ce in Mexico City, and the Watergate investigations. ' President Nixon has publicly-, WASHINGTON, July 8 ? A: former undercover agent for the Central Intelligence Agency in Latin America has written what his associates describe as a major expose of the agency's Latin-American activities in the 1960's, including an assertion that the agency participated in the murder of some of its em- ployes. The new book, sources said, was recently completed in Lon- don by the former agent, Philip B. F. Agee, who served from 1956 until 1969 with the C.I.A. in, among other places, Ecua- dor, Mexico and Uruguay. The as yet unnamed book by Mr. Agee is expected to be pub- lished by Penguin Book Publish- ers of London this fall. Mr. Agee, now seeking an American publisher for the. 220,000-word manuscript, has retained Mel- vin L. Wulf, legal director of the American Civil Liberties Union, in anticipation of pro- tests by the C.I.A. Mr. Wulf, who represented Victor M'archetti, former C.I.A., official, in his recent dish ,pute , with the agency, con- firmed in a telephone interview that the A.C.L.U., "if' needed, will certainly come to Mr. Agee's defense." ' ? ? Mr. Agee's decision to pub- lish his book, said to be in diary form, and the fact that he made' three trips to Cuba since 1971 have been of in- tense concern to the C.I.A. That concern, in turn, sources said, was the cryptic "WH flap" mentioned in the Watergate- C.I.A. report released last week by Senaor Howard H. Baker Jr., Rep,..blican of Tennessee. Mr. Baker, vice chairman of the Senate Watergate commit- tee, has been known to be deep- ly suspicious of the agency's possible advance knowledge of both the 1971 "plumbers" bur- glary of the office of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg's former psychiatrist and the 1972 Watergate break- in at the offices of the Demo- cratic National Committee. Both operations involved E. Howard Hunt Jr., a former C.I.A. official who joined a ,Washington-based public rela- tions firm, Robert R. Mullen & Company, after his retirement in 1971. Mr. Baker's report officially disclosed that overseas offices of the Mullen Company had .been serving as "cover" offices for C.I.A. employes. The report also noted that a Mullen office in the Far East had been shut down by the C.I.A. in fear that Mr. Agee might have compro- mised that and other "cover" operations during his Cuba -visits. Agency officials have denied said he asked his top White House aides, John D. Ehrlich- man and H. R. Haldeman, to intervene in a - Federal Bureau of Investigation inquiry into, "money-laundering" operations in Mexico City after the Water- gate break-in because of his concern that the F.B.I. might inadvetently expose covert C.I.A. operations in Mexico. One well-informed legislator, who said he had received full briefings on the Agee affair, emphatically declared .today that there was no evidence linking Mr. Nixon's concern about the F.B.L inquiry in Mex- ico to Mr. Agee. ? The legislator also said that he believed the C.I.A. was overreacting to- the dangers posed by M. Agee's revela- tions. "The whole operation is so compartmentalized that ? I per- sonally don't think any single person can compromise it that badly," he said, adding: "He went sour and so ,they've shuffled things about." 1 An informed source ack- nowledged today that the C.I.A. had been unable to learn how much if anything?Mr. Agee 'told the Cuban Government during his visits, although there was an official "presumption" that he "was very forthcoming in Havana and Havana was very forthcorning with Moscow." Because of Mr. Agee's ack- nowledged threat to "cover" offices and methods of 'opera= tion throughout Latin America, the official added, sonic opera- tions were terminated and others modified. Throughout part of his clandestine Latin- American career, Mr. Agee's of- ficial cover was as an employe of the American Institute for Free Labor Development, an arm of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of dustrial Organizations. - A spokesman for the insti- tute, a nonprofit organization set up in 1962 to work with Latin-American labor organiza- tions, said records there showed no indication that Mr. Agee had ever been carried on its payroll. High agency officials, said they would have no comment on Mr. Agee's decision to pub- lish in, his book, although they did confirm that he had served in Latin America for the agency. The State Department's For- eign Service List for 1968 lists Mr. Agee as a staff aide in the executive section of the United States. Embassy in Mexico City. The official biographical reg- ister for the State Department shows that he was born in 1935 in Maryland, was a 1956 gradu- a that there was any connection ate of Notre Dame University, between the Mullen offices dosing Far East AppiS044, FNilkklOWOCtilitl8i08 a e epart- , in the rtnent 'Official for the neit 12 irears, one of his cover assign- ments, as listed in the register,. was, as a "laundry manager" for the Air Force in 1956-57. In an interview today with The Associate Press, Mr. Agee,. on vacation in Cornwall, Eng-, land, said his book would tell' "what we did in Latin Amer- ica, why we did it, why'I quit and why I decided to write about it.' ? He added, according to The Associated Press, that "what we did in Latin America and what we do in so many other countries of the third world is similar to what the United States did in Vietnam." The re- sult, he was quoted as saying, is the strengthening of minor- ity governments "which perpet- uate great wealth for a few and widespread poverty." 'Mr. Agee, whose wife and children are now living in Flor- ida, has told associates that he has firsthand knowledge of' WASHINGTON STAR 28 June 1974 Inany previously unrev'eale4 C.I.A. operations?some of. them against Cuba?and that he also was involved in the as-c sassination of locally employed: C.I.A. agents, known in the agency as contract employes. ' Highly reliable sources said that in discussions with friends, he has declared that the assas- sinations were not official pol- icy of the C.I.A., but instead were local options taken in the field. At.least one such killing, Mr: Agee is known to have related, involved the use of a truck to run over a recently utilized lo- cal C.I.A. operative whose mis- sion had been completed. . Such allegations about the C.I.A.'s operations in Latin America and elsewhere have been widely rumored for years, but?pending Mr. Agee's to-be- published -account, there has been no firsthand description of such incidents. I Is Acc Associated Press The Central Intelligence Agency requested last year that a public relations firm which had employed one of the original Watergate con- spirators not?disclose that it provided cover for CIA agents abroad, according to an informed official source. On Feb. 28;1973, then-CIA director James R. Schles- inger met with a represen- tative of Robert R. Mullen & Co., an international pub- lic relations firm, the source said last night. "Schlesinger told them to keep' their mouths shut about their relation with the ,CIA, because several peo- ple overseas as Mullen representatives were CIA people," the source said. THE MULLEN firm em- ployed E. Howard Hunt Jr., the convicted Watergate break-in conspirator, after he left the CIA and at least parttime while he was 'a member of the White House special investigations ? or plumbers ? unit. - ? Earlier this week, private investigator Richard L. Bast said that former White sed ir House special counsel Charles W. Colson had told him that the Mullen firm was a CIA front and that the Mullen firm was direct- ed to lie if necessary' in denying any, CIA associa- tion. Meanwhile, ABC News reported last night that documents in possession of the Senate Watergate com- mittee show that Schlesing- er ordered information in agency files turned over to the Mullen firm for use in planting cover stories. ABC said the Mullen firth planted an erroneous story in the March 5 edition of Newsweek magazine as- serting that Colson was in charge of political dirty tricks during the 1972 presi- dential campaign. It was learned that the CIA was prepared to deny having had any hand in the New- sweek story. THE CIA's purpose in. planting stories, ABC said, was to divert newsmen from discovery of its rela- tionship to the Mullen firm and to a law firm, which ABC also said was under contract to provide cover for CIA agents. , , A major concern was that newsmen would trace CIA connection to Paul L. O'Bri- en, a counsel to the Commit- tee for the Re-election of the President, ABC said. : CIA-R13/97-00432R0060u.siums-a Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 THE WASHINGTON POST ada% Jub; 1974 Ex-Spy to Give Detailed Account of ? By'Laurence Stern Washington Post Staff Writer LONDON, July_ 10?Philip B. F. Agee is an ex-spy who is coming out of the cold with what is likely to be the most detailed account of covert Cen- tral Intelligence Agency operations ever compiled by an American intelli- gence officer. The 39-year-old former CIA case offi- cer, who hopes to remain in seclusion in a remote stretch of English country- side until his book is published, has finished a 200,000-word manuscript at which he has labored since he resigned from the CIA in 1969. Agee's credentials as an officer in the clandestine ("dirty tricks") service of the CIA\ have been confirmed by au- thoritative sources in Washington. The CIA itself refuses to comment on any aspect of the case but officials are re- ported to be deeply concerned about Agee's prospective revelations. In the course of an afternoon-long Interview at his modest seaside hidea- way Agee spoke guardedly of his eight _ years of covert , operations against "unfriendly" governments and insur- gent political forces. It was a world of manipulation of agents, news media, public officials, and military establish- ments through the classic espionage techniques of bribery, blackmail and mass propaganda. In agreeing to talk to a reporter for The Washington Post, Agee withheld specific details that are in his manu- script which he felt might jeopardize his physical security before the book makes its appearance sometime within the next year. He did, however, make these points: ? During a brief assignment at CIA headquarters in Langley in 1966 he set up the Mexico City "cover" operation for the CIA, conducted under the front of the Robert Mullen company, a Washington-based public relations firm that has figured prominently in the Watergate case. It was his involvement In the Mullen cover, established for a CIA operative engaged in anti-Soviet operations, which led last week to the surfacing of Agee's identity. CIA fears that Agee would publicly disclose the Mullen arrangement in 1972 led to its closing by the CIA and the "Western Hemisphere flap" alluded to in the re- port last week of Sen. Howard Baker' (R-Tenn.). In Mexico, Agee's cover was as the Olympics staff assistant to then-Am- bassador, Holton Freeman. In his Olympics role, Agee's covert mission during 1967 and 1968 was to "meet all kinds of people" in order to extend the Mexican CIA station's network of ? agents. ? While serving in the CIA's Ecua- dor station in 1962 Agee participated in the launching of a pressure cam- paign against the Arosemena govern- ment to end diplomatic ties with Cuba. "President Arosemena didn't want to break relations but we forced him,", Agee related. "We promoted the Corn-1 munist issue and especially Commu- nist penetration of the government." Eventually Arosemena fell and was re- placed by a military junta. ? Agee personally served in 1964 as a conduit for funneling $200,000 in Chil- ean currency from a major New York City bank into covert election support activities for Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei. Frei won. Agee handled the cashing of the check in Montevi- deo, where he was then assigned to the CIA station, and conversion into Chil- ean currency which was then sent on by diplomatic pounch into Santiago, he related. There was In 1964 a major co- vert program on Frei's behalf. Agee said that the United States also poured an estimated $20 million into the 1962 Brazilian election in support of several hundred candidates for gubernatorial, congressional, state and municipal of- fices. ? The CIA operates in close coordi- nation with an international network of trade union confederations and na- tional labor groups which Agee said have proven to be effective instru- ments of political influence in Latin America. In Ecuador, Agee said, he served as a CIA case officer for a local branch of the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), which was founded in the early 1960s as an affiliate of the AFL-CIO. He cited AIFLD, the International Con- federation of Free Trade Unions, its Latin American subsidiary, ORIT, the Public Service International (comprised of government employee unions) and the various international trade secretariats as having given strong support to CIA-directed covert political programs. The trade union organizations as well as other mass groups coordinate with the CIA chiefly through the inter- national organizations division, which was in the center of the controversy over CIA funding of student, labor and cultural organizations seven years ago. - Agee last week was mentioned in press reports as having told his secrets to the KGB in a fit of drunken despon- dency. The Washington source respon- sible for the story later denied its au- thenticity. , Agee insists that he has never talked to the KGB, although he acknowledges that he intends to demonstrate in his book that the CIA has served as "the secret police force of American capi- talism." The former agent said he had made three trips to Cuba since 1971 to con- duct research for his book and, as he put it, to witness the results of a "successful socialist revolution." The Cuban trips were arranged by a Paris publisher who first contracted to publish Agee's book. One of the terms on which he went to Cuba, Agee said, was that he did not want to be de- briefed by the KGB. Agee's ideological break with the CIA and U.S. policy in Latin America started during his 1963-1966 assign- ment to Uruguay where his official, mission was to direct operations against the Cubans and build up local security forces. 16 It was in Uruguay, which was an ad- vanced welfare state by Latin Ameri- can standards, that Agee said he lost his faith in the possibility of solving the region's problems through piece- meal reform. Agee, who is under contract at pres- ent with British Penguin book publish- ers, said that his account, written in di- ary form, names numerous case offi- cers, agents arid particular episodes gathered from firsthand experience in the field. Such a narrative has never been published on the American clan- destine services and Agee is apprehen- sive about the possibility of injunction action against him such as was taken against Victor Marchetti on his book, co-authored with John Marks, "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence." , . - In 1971 when he had embarked on the book project and was living from hand-to-mouth at a secret location in Paris, Agee said he came under sur- veillance by a pair of Americans who befriended him and advanced him small amounts of money. Agee said he determined to his certainty that they were retained by the CIA to fipd out, the contents of his book. The CIA, he said, rirst became aware of his intentions to publish the critical book after he wrote a letter to a Uru- guayan political journal suggesting that the 1971 election there would be subject to CIA infiltration. In Decem- ber of that year he received a visit from a former CIA colleague who tracked him down in Paris through French police cOnnections. Within several months, Agee said, he was in regular contact with the two Americans who professed an interest in the book and a desire to see the manuscript. It was to his new-found "friends" that Agee confided, after the first burst of Watergate .publicity in the newspapers, that the Mullen organ- ization was providing cover for the CIA in Mexico. The Washington public relations company Was identified in. early stories as an employer of Water- gate conspirator E. Howard Hunt Jr... Agee's "friends" in turn sent word to the CIA, as he reconstructs the events, that he might disclose the Mullen Cover in his book. This was the origin of the "WH flap" alluded to in Baker's report. Agee found himself in the remarka- ble position of having created the Mul- len cover and having been responsible for "blowing" it five years later by di- vulging his awareness of it to agents? as he firmly believes today?of the CIA. The CIA admitted in writing to Baker that as a result of the "WH flap" (the initials stand for Western Hemisphere division of CIA) it had to shift assets and personnel in Mexico as well as other posts in which Agee served to minimize the damage of his possible revelations. ? It is Agee's opinion that the Mullen cover arrangement in Mexico is "completely, irrelevant" to Watergate. Nonetheless it was President Nixon's stated concern ,over exposing covert Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 CIA operations in Mexico .that? prompted him to issue instructions re- sulting in the FBI's delay for nearly three weeks in June and July 1972 of its investigation of the "laundering," of Nixon re-election money through a Mexico City bank account. ' The President said, however, on May 22, 1973, that he had learned there was no basis for having worried about ex- posing covert CIA activities in Mexico. Former CIA Director Richard M. Helms was providing repeated assurances of this. The tortuous path that has brought Agee to his current position of self-ex- ile?started in a conventionally middle- class home in Tampa, Fla. His father was a businessman and the atmos- phere was politically "reactionary?no, .say conventional." ' He attended a Jesuit high school and-Agees are divorced. . went to Notre Dame, where Agee was first aproached by CIA recruiters In 1956. He joined the following year and took three years of military training under the agency's auspices. "It didn't take long to develop en- thusiasm and decide to stay in. There was a combination of things, the aura of intrigue, the sense of patriotism and public service. It was intellectually stimulating and challenging work," as Agee saw it in the early period. Now he sees the clandestine service and the agency generally as an instru- ment of political repression. Agee manages to live on a series, of meager advances while the book .is be- ing prepared for publication. His two young sons recently joined him from Falls Church, Va., where they had been living with their mother. The WASHINGTON STAR 28 June 1974 .SmfitEn lienipstone: 111?163?11.211.00, On the face of it, former White House aide Charles W. Colson's charge that virtually the entire Watergate scandal was a Central Intelligence Ag- ency plot designed to black- mail President Nixon so that the cloak-and-dagger boys could get What they wanted out of the Oval Office is preposterous. , ? This is not to say that it cannot be true: We here in Gomorrah East have learned over the past two years that the unthinkable is, indeed, think- able. Nor does it mean that Broth- er Chuck, born anew in Christ prior to drawing one-to-three years in stir and a $5,000 fine after pleading guilty to ob- struction of justice last week, does not believe the fantastic tale he told former private inves1 i gator Richard L. Bast, a Washington man seldom de- scribed as one of nature's noblemen: Colson has a tend- ency to see life through a glass, darkly. IT COULD BE true; it may be true. But there emanates from the whole bizarre story an odor oddly reminiscent of that fish called a red herring. According to the public record to date, the CIA was in- deed involved in Watergate in a peripheral fashion. The agency, largely through the good offices of its then-deputy director, Gen. Robert Cush- man, a former aide to Presi- dent Nixon when he was vice . ? president and no comman- dant of the Marine Corps, did provide former CIA agent E. Howard Hunt Jr., one of the White House plumbers, with that famous ill-fitting red wig (indignant CIA staffers main- tain that the.wig was auburn and a perfect fit), a voice- modifier and a miniature C7/21- era. But the public testimony to date indicates that former CIA Director Richard M. klelms, now ambassador to Iran, terminated the arrangement with extreme prejudice (as the Green Berets used to say) as soon as he heard about it. Nor is there anything in the White House transcripts dumped on the House Judici- ary Committee to indicate, as Colson implies in the notes recorded by-Bast at two long conversations on May 13 and May 31, that Mr. Nixon re- garded himself as a pawn of the CIA. OF COURSE, one would be in a better position to make a judgment of the thinking of Mr. Nixon and Colson (al- -though not necessarily of the veracity of their allegations, if any) if the tape ? if there is one ? of the "two or three hours" of conversation that Colson said he had with the, President on a Sunday in January were available. But Mr. Nixon -to date has reso- lutely refused to release the tapes of any of his conversa-, tuck and the CIA tions with Brother Chuck, theological or otherwise. It is true that Sen. Howard H. Baker, the Tennessee Republican, ranking minority member on the Ervin Commit- tee and a sensible man, has long been of the view that the CIA has been, shall we say, something less than candid about its role in the Watergate mess. But if, as Colson alleges, Senator Sam is sitting on a 35-' page report detailing the spooks' chicanery, then surely this should be made public, de- spite the CIA's alleged objec- tions to its declassification. . Ultimately, in the absence of specific knowledge about the incident in question, one can only draw on one's own experi- ence. Having spent 13 years working abroad, where the CIA's writ does run, and hav- ing known perhaps 100 em- ployes of the agency, some intimately, some casually, this observer finds it hard to credit the Colson implication of a CIA plot against the Presi- dent. IN THE first place, most CIA employes are essentially bureaucrats, different only, in degree from the striped-pants boys at the State Department or, indeed, the paper-shufflers at Health, Education and Wel-- fare. There are, to be sure, cow- boys among them, deep-cover operatives whose deeds cannot stand close scrutiny. But the mass of them are analysts, statisticians, academics, lin- guists, computer experts and communications specialists who wouldn't know a cloak?let alone a dagger?from a port- manteau. They are men and women who serve their government ? in the main well ? and retire like other government em- ployes to sun and shuffle- board. They may occasionally assist in the overthrow of a troublesome foreign govern- ment. But ni:essing about in domestic politics simply has not been their bag, and there is no real reason to think it has become so. The point has been made that all of those directly in- volved in the Watergate and Ellsberg break-ins, with the exception of G._ Gordon Liddy (who had an FBI back- ground), had been associated, either directly or indirectly, with the CIA. But since they were hired by Hunt, this is perhaps not unnatural, and hardly in itself justifies Col- son's description of the CIA as a 'frightening" power "with tentacles everywhere." And ultimately one returns to a simple question: Who hired Hunt? Answer: Colson, who has himself now come in from the cold. CIA's role in Watergate, in short. deserves further scruti- ny. But at least at this writing, the Colson-Bast scenario lacks, as they say, credibility. Approved For Release 2001/08/0/7 CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 WASHINGTON ? ved For ReOttrtietyptqh: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 MP' 28 June 1974 29 June 1974 .Break-ins ;iFor CIA By Richard M. Cohen ? Washington Post Staff Writer the lawyer for Watergate Conspirators Bernard Barker and Eugenio Martinez re- vealed yesterday that the two had previously engaged in* a Series of 'illegal activities for The Central Intelligence Agency, including a ."penetration" of the Radio City Music Hall by Barker in the mid-1960s. The Radio City Music Hall entry, the lawyer said, was ap- parently a "CIA "training ses- sion" to see if Barker could ac- complish his mission satsfac- torily. Other missions, the law- yer said, included the burglary; of the Miami. home of a boat! crew member who was making trips for the CIA to Cuba and, a similar break-in of a Miami , business office. The lawyer", Daniel Schultz, revealed some of Br-Icer's and Martinez' past CIA escapades. during during opening arguments for their trial, along with former top presidential aide John DA Ehrlichman and Watergate conspirator G. Gordon Liddy, on charges stemming from the 1971 break-in of Daniel Ells- berg's psychiatrist's office. - A CIA spokesman said yes- terday the agency would not comment on Schultz's state- ment because the matter is now before the court. "Our le- gal guys are very concerned about the propriety of this," the spokesman said. ' By the 1947 act of Congress that created it, the CIA is forbidden to engage in do- mestic intelligence operations. However, the agency, is per- mitted to conduct domestic operations to protect its for:- eign activities ? a loophole that could cover the alleged Miami break-ins by Barker. Those break-ins and those at the Watergate and at the office of Ellsberg's psychia- trist are just a few to have gained public attention. Some, such as the illegal entry into Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office, involved the use of CIA equip- ment and facilities. Others, such as the break-ins at Chile- an government offices here and New York in 1971 and 1972 remain unexplained and .no agency role has ever been proven. In addition, antiwar groups have frequently complained of ' break-ins, somtimes alleg- ing government attempts to obtain information. None of, these claims has been sub- stantiated." 18 Carl T. Rowan: 'Hook the Spooks' Theory Once again, in banner headlines, we are slapped with the theory that the Watergate burglary and the Ellsberg ,break-in were part of a plot conceived and executed by the cloak-and-dagger boys of the Central Intelligence Agency. This time we get a really wild fourth- hand version, -where reporters are told by a former private eye, Richard L. - Bast, who allegedly was told by former White House aide Charles Colson, that President Nixon felt the CIA was even scheming to "get something" on the White House. This "hook the spooks" theorizing may be swallowed whole by some of those Americans who believe that the CIA is a government unto itself, with far-flung agents who Murder unfriendly politicians, organize coups, rig foreign elections and topple democratic re- gimes in favor of dictatorships ? all without the President, the secretary al State or other American officials either approving or knowing anything about it. The CIA has engaged in all the activi- ties mentioned above, but you can wager that the overall CIA actions had the sanction of whomever was Presi- dent ? or of top officials giving approv- al in the President's behalf. LOOKING AT ALL the Watergate evi- dence, I became convinced months ago that the CIA was more deeply involved than the public or the Congress knew. In my column of May 11, 1973, I told of a conversation in which formet CIA d ,Director Richard Helms casually men- tioned to me that minutes after the bur- glars were seized inside the Watergate someone at CIA awakened him to tell him of the arrests. I raised the question of why anyone at CIA would awaken the director in the wee hours just to inform of what at the the Watergate and Ellsberg burglaries had previously been involved in. numer- ous CIA ventures. We know-that the CIA was still providing disguises and other help to E. Howard Hunt, Jr., a leader of the Watergate burglary and accused of being a principal in the Ellsberg break- in. But we have testimony that CIA cooperation was requested by the White House, and this seems to shoot- holes in the theory that the CIA was out to sub- vert the President and make the White House bend to its will. COLSON HS denied telling Bast that President Nixon thought of firing cur- rent CIA Director William E. Colby be- cause of the President's suspicion that CIA was up to some dirt in the Water- gate and Ellsberg matters. It wouldn't have made sense anyhow. Helms, not Colby, was CIA boss at the time of, and long after, the Watergate burglary. During four and a half years in gov ernment I got to know Richard Helms pretty well. I found him to be a profes- sional whose integrity I never saw cause to question. I can conceive of Helms agreeing, under pressure from the White House, o cooperate with Hunt and his crew, or with the White House plumbers, out of a belief that they really might be uncover- ng information vital to national seeml- y. I can't believe that 'Helms would knowingly make CIA part of burglaries esigned simply to serve the partisan olitical interest of the party in power. I find it beyond either acceptance or peculation that Helms would use the IA, or let it be used, to undermine the resident and his White House staff. time seemed to be "a third-rate bur- glary" ? unless the caller knew of potential serious embarrassment to CIA. AS far, as I can determine, none of the f investigating units has bothered to ask a ,Helms who telephoned him. Or why any- ,n one would feel compelled to awaken the w CIA director because of that burglary. We now know that the men involved in Either Colson got suckered by the resident, or Bast got suckered by Col- on, or the press got taken in by all of hem. There is reason to ask a lot more uestions about the CIA's involvement, or it appears that the CIA was used and bused in a shocking way. But-there is o evidence of any substance that the hole dirty business was a CIA plot, ith Richard Nixon targeted as a major ictim. Schultz refused to expand upon his courtroom remarks other than to say that addi- tional details would 1)e made public as the trial pro- gressed. Nevertheless, it was the sec- ond time in a week that a re- port of a CIA role in the Watergate affair has come to public attention. ? Earlier this week, a Wash- ington-based former private oetective, Richard Bast,, said former presidential aide Charles Colson suspected that the CIA planned both the Watergate break-in, and the entry of Ellsberg's psychia- trist's office, and , that Presi- dent Nixon, to an extent, I shared Colson's suspicions of the agency. , Bast said .,he, IntervieWecl Colson on two occasions be- fore Colson was sentenced a week ago to a one-to-three-year jail term and a $5,000 fine for attempting to influence the outcome of the Ellsberg trial by leaking derogatory informa- tion about Ellsberg to the press. Colson, according to Bast, also said that Senate Water- gate committee investigators were informed of the times, and places of at least 300 other break-ins conducted by Martinez. Senate committee sources have denied they have such information. Neither Barker nor Marti- nez has made any secret of their past work for the CIA, which the two have said was limited to operations against the regime of Fidel Castro in 'Cuba. Barker and Martinez also were among five men ar- rested in the Watergate of- fices of the Democratic Na- tional Committee and were subsequently convicted of bur- glary. Barker, a bespectacled un- dercover operative, was born in Havana and grew up both in the United States and Cuba. He' was a captain in World War II in the Army Air Corps and was shot down over Ger; many where he was held pris- oner for 17 months. In the late 1950s, he joined the Castro' guerilla :moveme-nt but he be- came disillusioned andiled toi Miami in 1959. : Thereafter*, Barker worked- against Castro and is said to' have been one of the organiz- ers of the Bay of Pigs inva- sion. From that 'time, until 1966. ;Barker. worked for, the ApproVed FOr Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 " Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330001-8 CIA. Until Iis atrest 'at: 'the Watergate, he ran a real,: eS? tate agency in Miami. Like Barker, Martinez origi- nally ?worked ?for .Castro but. later turned against him. He, too, participated in the Bay, of Pigs invasion, later, worked for the CIA and joined Barker's real estate firm as a salesman. According to an informed source, Barker and Martinez met during the planning and execution of the Bay of Pigs. invasion and later worked for the CIA in operations directed against the Castro regime. Martinez, according to the source, was the cal-tam n of a WASHINGTON STAR 29 June 1974 boat used by the CIA to ferry supplies and personnel to Cuba and to take refugees back to Florida. Martinez, ac- eroding to this source, partici- pated in occasional raids against the Castro regime. In these capacities, the source said, Martinez engaged in the activities that Schultz mentioned in court yesterday ?destrucion of foreign prop- erty, possession, and distribu- tion of firearms, and falsifica- tion of income tax returns to hide the CIA as a source_ of in- come. As for Barker, his entry into the Radio City Music Hall, the ;source said, was a CIA-test to see if he could accomplish the mission successfully and re- tain details of what he had peen. The break-in site was the theater's "monitoring office", which contained closed-circuit ? television cameras. When Barker returned from his mis- sion, he was debriefed to see If he had actually- been in the -room. The source close to Barker ,said that-Barker presumed the Radio City Music Hall break- in was a training operation be- 'cause of the- nature of the 'questioning he underwent :upon his return. The source said the illegal :entry into the Miami home of. a crew member of a boat usicf in forays against Cuba was or- dered because the man was suspected of talking about the Cuban operations?"not keep- ing security.' The other Mi- ami break-in Schultz men- tioned yesterday was also con .nected to the CIA's Cuban op- erations, the source said. Barker, for one, has ac- knowledged his participation 'in anti-Castro activities, main- taining before the Senate Watergate Committee that he believed the Watergate break- in was ordered to determine if the Democrats were receiving money from the Castro re- gime. By Dan Thomasson Scripps-Howard News Service 'A secret Senate report states that the Central Intelligence Agency knew inside details of the Water- gate ,break-in less than a month after it occurred but never passed them on to , federal investigators. Sources familiar with the report say it also states that the CIA knew of plans to break into the presidential campaign headquarters of Sen. George S. McGovern, - D-S.D. The report ? written by minority staff members of the Senate Watergate com- mittee ? is undergoing CIA "declassification" in prepa- ration for its release to the public. The report was instigated by committee Vice Chair- man Howard H. Baker Jr., R-Tt.nn., who long has con- tended privately that CIA- involvement in the entire: Watergate affair was con- siderably more than the agency has admitted. BUT ALTHOUGH the re- port contains documented information supporting this ,theory, it does not, the sources said, add much sup- port to contentions the CIA? had advance knowledge of - the Watergate break-in or that it deliberately assisted in the break-in of the office of Dr. Lewis Fielding, a psychiatrist who had been treating Dr. Daniel Ells- berg, who leaked Pentagon documents to the press. And the sources said the report, which apparently reaches no conclusions, ap- pears to raise more ques- tions about the CIA involve- ment than it answers. The report was due for re- lease several days ago, but, the CIA now is negotiating with the committee staff to delete portions which would expose agency "cover" operations, the sources said. The report, in its present state, documents an exten-. sive relationship between the CIA and two Washing- ton firms involved in Water- gate ? Robert R. Mullen & Co., a public relations firm where Watergate conspira- tor E. Howard Hunt Jr. was employed, and the law firm of paul L. O'Brien, who was counsel to the Committee for the re-election of the President. THE REPORT states, ac- cording to the sources, that the Mullen Co. and its presi- dent, Robert Bennett, son of Sen. Wallace Bennett, R-- Utah, long have provided cover for CIA operations, a fact the CIA has admitted. But the report outlines Bennett's role as a CIA front man and details his ef- forts to mask the agency's involvement in the Water- gate, including leaking information to Washington reporters and withholding information from the FBI. The sources said the re- port states that on July 10, 1972, Bennett relayed to his CIA "case officer" some of the details of the June 17, 1972, Watergate burglary. He presumably had gotten the details from Hunt. Bennett's report was channeled to Richard Helms, former CIA director who is now ambassador to Iran. Helms never passed on the information to Watergate investigators, the committee staff docu-, nient states. According to the sources, the report also states that Bennett: ? Knew of efforts to get Sen. Sam J. Ervin Jr., D-N. C., chairman of the Senate Watergate committee, to keep the Mullen firm out of the Watergate investiga- tion. _11) Planted phony stories with the neweS media whicli- would lead investigators away from CIA involve- ment. The report also suggests a connection between the CIA and O'Brien, whose role an adviser to poten- Iial Watergate witnesses in the early days of the inves- tigation and his talk with Hunt about legal expenses 'has made him a possible witness in the House Judici- ary Committee's impeach- ment inquiry. O'Brien said in an inter- view that he was employed by the CIA for one year in 1952. But he said he has had nothing to do with the agen- cy since. ' O'Brien did say he has learned of a "connection" between his law firm and the CIA, but added that he has had nothing to do with it. O'Brien is a senior part- ner. He refused to detail the connection, but sources said the law firm has had a con- tract to provide cover for CIA agents. One source said publication of this is an important part of the ne- gotiations between the com- mittee staff and the CIA, which is concerned that some of its agents will be exposed. Approved For Release 2001/08/081tIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 WASHINGTON POST 1 JUL 1974 046 la Laments Lesson Loss By Lee Byrd Associated Press -The greatest peril of Water- gate, says prison-bound Charles Wendell Colson, is that, "We'll purge a few peo- ple and then we'll says, `Now all the rest of us are saved.'" "Well.., all the rest of the country isn't saved by just ex- - ilin.g a few Nixon men," he de- clared. . Once one of the closest of the Nixon men, Colson faces, by his terminology, the long- est exile yet decreed. He re- flected upon Watergate and other issues in an interview just a week before he is to surrender _himself for at least a year's imprisonment for ob- structing justice. "We've got to have several things happen out of Water- gate if the county is to be better for it," Colson said. One has to be getting rid of the an- ger and hatred and divisive- ness that Watergate has -cre- ated ... ? "The second thing is we need some serious structural reforms in the political proc- ess and in the governmental process . . . change that will result in the future in people ? being less tempted to abuse their public trust." Foremost in that area, he said, is "the need for public fi- nancing of polit.icalcam- paigns. I mean I think it's just ludicrous ... you know, so many abuses have been re- vealed that if we continue just to apply Band-Aids the Pa- tient's gonna the, the country's gona hemorrhage,r for this. We've got to get rid of the sys- tem: of private finance?'.. Along with public financing of campaigns, said Colson, an- other prime objective should be greater congressional and executive oversight of the Central Intelligence Agency. He confirmed that he had raised the issue of the CIA's involvement in the Watergate and Ellsberg break-ins with private detective; Richard L. Bast, But Colsen complained that several rather sensational as- sertions attributed to him by Bast were taken out of context from a discussion aimed merely at exploring "every possible theory." He said :le did not, for example, mean to create the impression?as Bast's version of his remarks suggested?that President WASHINGTON POST 2 July 1974 Bilker to Say CIA Helped Ilunt Get Job By Laurence Stern Washington Post Staff Writer ?' Testimony indicating that a Central: :Intelligence Agency official recom-, mended the employment of Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt ,Jr. by. a ? Washington 'public relations. :firm . -which has sbrved as a CIA "COver" he released today by Sen. Howard IL: Baker: Jr. (R-Tenn.). . The public relations firm'. is Robert, Mullen & Co., whose relationship with' flie' CIA form a central theme bf the' Baker report cleared by, the CIA for release last Weekend. - Hunt was recommended 'to the Mul. len.firm at the time of his retirement from the agency in 1970 by a CIA offi- cial identified as Frank O'Malley: There have been unsubstantiated alle- gations in the case that Hunt was re- commended to Mullen by former CIA Director Richard M. Helms. Both- the CIA and officials of the.. Mullen company have acknowledged their mutual ties, which included pro- viding a corporate cover for CIA oper- Nixon felt 'imprisoned or. threatened by CIA sympathi- . ers at the te House. "What I was saying," Colson explained, "is that I think a lot of people around the Presi- dent were people with ties into the military and the intel- ligence establishment." . Colson said the CIA was "much more deeply involved in a lot of things than the pub- lic thus-far knows. I'm gonna be doing a lot of testifying about this, I suspect, and I'd rather save it ler that." Mean- while, he said, a report on the subject being readied by. Sen. Howard H. Baker Jr.. (It- Tenn.) "is going to raise an awful lot of questions?' Colson, as yet, does not know where he will be con- fined. He likely will be kept near the capital for. some time, however, since he will be a witness at the"plumbers" trial of John- D. . Ehrlichman and others and almost surely will appear before the House im- peachment panel. Many have viewed him as potentially star witness No. 2 against ? the. President?the. first being John W. Dean III. That prospect was spurred by ? atives in Mullen & Co. offices in Singa- pore and Amsterdam. Sources who have examined the re-, port say it provides no conclusive links between the CIA and the original Watergate break-in such as have been hinted by former White House aide Charles Colson'and by Baker. However, *it includes documentation in the form of three CIA memoranda Which point to covert efforts by offi- cials of the agency to minimize its in- volvement in the Watergate investiga- tion. there is also some 'evidence that Robert F. Bennett, president of Mullen 'and on of Sen. Wallace F. Bennet (R- Utah), was tipped off prior to the Watergate burglary that a White 'House break-in team was targeting Mc- Govern campaign headquarters for a politiCal intelligence raid. Bennett has privately acknowledged that he was given advance knowledge of the operations of the burglary team. But it was unknown whether he passed this information on to the CIA. - The memos upon which Baker drew in the preparation of his report were drafted by Eric W. Eisenstadt, chief of the' central cover staff for the CIA's clandestine directorate; Martin J. Lu- kasky, Bennett's "case officer" within the agency, and subordinates of former CIA security director Howard Osborn, who recently took an early, retirement from the CIA. 20 his surprise courtroom state- ment that his felonious attempt to smear Daniel Ellsberg was urged repeatedly by Mr. Nixon. Some Some of Mr. Nixon's adver! saries see Colson as a far; more impressive witness than; Dean, partly because he, was closer to Mr. Nixon and also because he did not barter-his testimony for immunity. According to Colson, a law-i yet now disbarred, his plea was a first in legal annals ? and was made on his own initia4 tive. ? _ ? . "I have always told the- pro- secutors that I have been part of an effort to discredit Ellsi berg," he said.- "As I said tot the court . that was some-; thing I, could in -conscience plead to and that I felt was a; useful plea!? Colson said it was he who "came up with the idea of ap-! plying this particular set of facts to the obstruction of jus- tice statute and hopefullyl making a principle of it?thatl in the future anyone who tries' to interfere with the rights of; the defendants is going to vio-1 late a criminal law. There had never been a prosecution for this." ? The Eisenstadt and Lukasky memos recount the CIA's relationships with Mullen & Co. and recount claims by Bennett that he planted unfavorable stories in Newsweek and The Washing- ton Post dealing with White House aides, including Colson. The object of these stories, the Baker report will in- dicate, was to draw attention away from CIA involvement in the Water- gate case. The Osborn material, as presented by Baker, suggests that the former CIA security director provided Mis- leading information to the FBI on the identity of a former federal investiga- tor who helped Watergate burglar James W. McCord Jr.'s wife destroy. CIA records at their home immedi- ately after her husband's arrest in the Watergate break-in case. Osborn's retirement, according to one official familiar with the handling of the case, was an outgrowth of the Internal memorandum prepared in Osborn's office which resulted in the transmission of misleading informa- tion to the FBI. Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi (D-Mich.), who has reviewed a draft of the P aker re- port, said Sunday on the CBS pro- gram "Face the Nation" (WTOP) that it contained "no bombshells." Nedzi, chairman of the House 'Armed Service Intelligence Subcommittee, has taken testimony from CIA officials on a number of allegations made in the Approved, For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/68 : CIA-RDP77.-00432R000100330003-8 draft version of Baker' S report. ' The Michigan Democrat is said to be in contact with the CIA's con-. gressional liaison office on an almost day-to-day basis as new allegations have arisen suggesting new involve- ments by the agency in the Water-, gate scandal. Some of Baker's colleagues on the Senate Watergate committee, of which be served as co-chairman, have WASHINGTON POST 3 July 1974 eport Critical Of CIA Baker Hints Agency Knew . Of Break-in By Lawrence Meyer Washington Post St..:f Writer The Central Intelligence Agency may have known in ,advance of plans for break- ins at the offices of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist and 'the Democratic National Committee's Watergate headquarters, a report re- leased yesterday by Sen. Howard H. Baker Jr. (R- Tenn.) suggests. Baker's report, accompanied by CIA comments and denials, 'provides a rare, if incomplete,' glimpse into the activities of the CIA that are, by design, normally secret. Among other things, the re- port describes how the CIA used a Washington public rela- tions firm as a cover for agents operating abroad, as- serts that the CIA destroyed its own records in direct con- flict with a Senate request to keep them' intact, asserts that a CIA operative may have been a -"domestic agent" in vi- olation of the agency's charter and recounts how one CIA ern- ployee fought within the agency against withholding in- formation from the Senate committee .and other congres- sional committees. The report recites several instances in which it says CIA personnel whom the commit- tee staff sought to interview were not made available by the CIA. In addition, the re- port lists several other in- stances in which it says the CIA either ignored, resisted or refused requests for infor Charged that Baker has sought to hu-, plicate the CIA in the scandal to di- vert attention from the White House role in the break-in and ensuing cover- up. The report also questions why photo- graphs found in the CIA file taken by members of the White House "plumb- ers" team during the Ellsberg break-in were not turned ever to the FBI, even , tion and -documents by ale committee. Although the repor.t raises, ."questions" about the involve-' tment of the CIA in the Water- ? gate and Ellsberg break-ins,- Baker said in a letter to pres-; .ent CIA Director William E . Colby that was also released :yesterday, "Neither the select committee's decision to make this report a part of our pub- lic record nor the contents of 'the report should be viewed as Any indication that either the committee or I have reached conclusions in this area of in- vestigation." " ? The report by Baker, vice chairman of the Senate select Watergate committee, is the long-awaited product of sev- eral months of investigation }conducted primarily by the ;Republican minority staff of the Senate Watergate commit- ee. Although the report is im- plicitly critical of the CIA; it noes not radically alter what is already known about the general outlines of the plan- ning and implementation of the Ellsberg and Watergate break-ins. Remarks by the CIA 'accompanying the 43-page re- port reject the suggestion that the agency knew in advance about either of the two burg- laries. The CIA also disagrees with a number of allegations in the report that it has not made in- formation available to the committee. In addition, the re- port contains numerous dele- tions of names and descrip- tions, made at the request of the CIA on the grounds of na- tional security. One of the central figures , who is named in the report is' convicted Watergate conspira- tor E. Howard Hunt Jr., a for-, mer CIA agent who continued I to seek assistance from the CIA even after he left the agency in 1970. . ?.- In three of the ' six areas1 that the report. -discusses,: Hunt' emerges as a principal actor. These areas include the: activities of Robert R. Mullen and Co., a Washington public ' relations firm; the provid- ing of . technical services by the CIA that Hunt used for, 'the Ellsberg break-in; and the , activities of Watergate con-, Pgittd*oiiiieleasevi2ditE68/ though agency officials were aware of their evidentiary significance. By and large, the Baker report reaches no definite conclusions but it suggests continued investigation of the relationships between the CIA and Watergate and names prospective wit- nesses to be examined. The Senate Watergate committee has gone out of existence' but will issue its final report next week. wlio'was recruited by Hunt for' the - Ellsberg and Watergate break-ins. ., ? In introducing the section on Hunt and his "receipt .of technical support frem the CIA in connection with the Ellsberg break-in, the report states, "In light of the facts and circumstances developed through the documents and conflicting testimony of CIA personnel adduced by this committee ... the question ar- ises as to whether the CIA had advance knowledge of the Fielding (Ellsberg's psychiat- ?.rist) break-in. The report asserts that the committee gathered "a wealth of conflicting' testimony among CIA officials" when it investigated. the Ellsberg break-in. Much of what the report cites about the Ellsberg break- in and Hunt's approaches to the CIA in that connection are already known. ? At the request of the White House and with the permis- sion of CIA Director Richard M, Helms, Hunt was supplied with a wig, voice alteration de- vices, fake glasses, falsified identification, a miniature camera and other gear._ The report recalls that be- fore the Ellsberg break-in, the CIA developed photographs for Hunt that he had made outside the' Beverly Hills, Calif., offices of Dr. Lewis Fielding, Ellsberg's psychia- trist. "Not only was the film de- veloped, however, but it was reviewed by CIA supervisory officials before it was re- -turned to Hunt," the report states. "One CIA official who , reviewed the film admitted Ithat he found the photographs 'intriguing' and recognized !them to be of 'Southern Cali- fornia.' He then ordered one of the photographs blown up. The blowup revealed Dr. Fielding's name in the park- ing lot next to his office. An- other CIA official has testis lied that he speculated that they w ere 'casing' photo- graphs." - According to the report, 'recent testimony" showed that the CIA official who re- viewed the photographs 'immediately" reported their ootents to Deputy CIA Direc- Syr. OPPRBIRM74104a12RNII 1 23. assistant. The report says I Cushman and his assistant de- nied ever having been told ofl the photographs by anyone. The report asserts, and the CIA denies, that it was only when these photographs were developed that assistance to Hunt by the agency was termi- nated. According to the CIA, "The decision to cut off sup- port to Hunt was made in the _face of escalating demands and was not based upon the development of the photo- graphs." , The report also challenges "previous public CIA testi- mony" that claimed that the CIA had no contact with Hunt at all after Aug. 31, 1971. The Ellsberg break-in occurred Sept. 3, 1971. According to the report, "recent testimony and secret documents indicate that Hunt had extensive contact with the CIA after" Aug. 31, 1971, that Hunt played a "large role" in the preparation of a psycho- logical profile of Ellsberg that was completed in November, 1971, and that Hunt had other contacts with the CIA. According to the report, Hunt and his fellow Watergate conspirator, G. Gordon Liddy, who is now on trial on federal charges arising from the Ells- berg break-in, told a CIA psy- chiatrist that they wanted to " 'try Ellsberg in public, rend- er him `the object of pity as a bro'ken man' and be. able to refer to Ellsberg's 'Oedipal complex.' " The report says Hunt asked the CIA psychiatrist not to re- veal Hunt's discussion of the profile to anyone else at the CIA. But the psychiatrist, ac- cording to the report, was "extremely concerned about Hunt's presence and remarks" and reported' them to his CIA, superiors. The report says the committee has asked to see memorandums of the psychia- trist and his superiors, but the request was refused. In addition, the repoi t states, the psychiatrist "also was given the name of Dr. Fielding as Ellsberg's psychia- trist . . ." , "While Director Helms has I denied that he was ever told that Hunt was involved in the CIA's Ellsberg profile pro- omb rgport asserts, "it is ,not significance that Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 the?tribe- Period during which the CIA psychiatrist was brief- ing his superiors of his con- cerns regarding Hunt wes I circa Aug. 20, 1971 ? a week' prior to the developing of I Hunt's film of 'intriguing' photographs of medical offices : in Southern California which , impressed at least one CIA of. . ficial as 'casing' photographs." The CIA responded to the report that at the time it de- veloped the photographs for Hunt, Fielding's name had no meaning to the agency person- nel involved. In addition, the' CIA stated, "Ambassador e Helms (Helms is now ambassa- dor to Iran) has testified that he had no knowledge of E. Howard Hunt's role in the pro- s files. The former director of security for CIA has testified s Iii he was recruiting; Cubans to' , assist in the Watergate breake in," the report states. . In response, the CIA as- serts, "There is ,no evidence within CIA that the agency; possessed any .knowledge of Hunt's recruitment of individe uals to assist in the Watergate: or any other break-in." - The report also discusses the destruction of records by, the CIA about one week after the agency received 0 letter from Senate Majority Leader' Mike Masnlield (D-Mont.) in January, 1973, asking that `evidentiary materials" be re-; ained. ? . HelmS,- the report asserts, ordered that tapes of conver- ations held within offices at CIA headquarters be de- troyed, In addition, the re- ort states, "on,. Helms' in- trnction, nis secretary de;- troyecl .his transcriptions of oth telephone. and room eon; ersations" that may have in- luded conversations with" resident Nixon, White House hief of staff 'H.R. % (Bob) aldeman, ton Presidential omestic adviser John D. Ehrk. chman and other White ouse officials. Helms and his secretary have testified that the conver- sations did 'not pertain to Watergate, the report _states, adding, "Unfortunately, any means of corroboration is no longer available." Two facts about the destruc- tion are "clear," aEr.:Orrling to e report. "First; the only her destruction for which e CIA has any. record was n Jan: 21, 1972, when tapes Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 NEW YORK DAILY NEWS 3 JUL 1974 r7-77:1 Jtj, Lp-? 4iit -War! f?: t.t74 "1 ? a sj gi!.1 h .1) ? 1 I-70 b.& By JAMES WIEGIIART Washington, July 2 (News Bureou) -- Sen. Howard Baker's Wate: gate committee report de- tailinv the role of the CIA with the burglyry team financed by Presi- dent ',7ixon's campaign committee takes is full circle as we head into the th'rd summer of the nation's worst ?olitical scandal. In t e immediate aftermath of the . June 1-, . 1972, break-in and bugging of Denu cratic National Headquarters, there w re ? strong signals from the White 1-14 use that the Watergate black- bag job was the work of a bunch of right-wing Cubans, led by a pair of ex- CIA spooks, who were convinced that ? the 3IcGovernized Democratic ? Party would lead the. country straight into the embrace of 'Red . dictator Fidel Castro. Just a bunch of well-meaning, but misguided, patriots, that's all. ? ? The early stories emphasized E. How- ard Hunt Jr.'s CIA role in ? the B a y of Pigs disaster a decade before and the fact that the Cubans had also taken, par- in that abortive adventure.-- PreSi.-:7 dent Nixon.: has disclosed. .that, ewas. re nceMed abotit.. that within a week after Watergate he directed his two top aides. H.R. Halde- man and John D. Ehrlichman, to see that the FBI investigation into the break-in didn't uncover CIA operations.? But alas for the administration, the sensational nationally televised Water-. gate hearings last summer showed that: Watergate was not planned and ap- proved out in some .dark room at sp headquarters in Langley, Va., but in th office of then Attorney General Joh WASHINGTON STAR 2 JUL 1974 Vie GoEd: , k,1te Laiiest:CL4 tf r7;) a 17 zi t:? ArpnT i. F ? . Mitchell, Nixon's campaign chief. ' And the hundreds of thousands of dollars that financed the Watergate and Ellsberg, burglaries, along- with a good many other -illegal activities, .and the subsequent coverup did not come from the CIA's well-fiiled coffers but from cash-filled safes at the Committee for the Reelection of the President ' -The? CIA- theory gradually collapsed under the weight of last summer's evi- dence, as did other spurious, speculations, such .as..the. White :House7advanced.:no,, that.:Nixon;:had: to iturn, over .the,- his -own merry, - ::,panst, 7.14.14114.1.)ei*: _ I L. Di- rector J. Edgar Hoover was too chummy with Ellsberg's father-in-law. " - -? However, as summer - .1974 rolls around, the. CIA connection. pops up again, like crab grass.--Former Special White House Counsel Charles- W. Colson ; has spent the last several weeks hinting'I to reporters that the CIA_: not.? only! planned Watergate, but later used it cleverly in an aim to destroy the Nixon"! administration. Never _mind that Colson,1 who will begin serving one-to-three in the federal pen next week for obstruct- ing justice in the Ellsberg case, .was? a college classmate of Hunt and was the one responsible for getting -the re- tired spy ? his . White House plumber's - So now conies Baker, .the- Tennessee' senator who'. looks like Johnny Carson and who delighted TV audiences during last summer's Watergate. hearings by drawling that. what he wanted to know was "what the President knew and when he keew it," with his own. contribution- to the CIA myth- ? - ? - Former White House aide Charles W. Colson has developed a derailed theory ? which he says is generally shared by President Nixon ? that the Central Intelligence Agency is implicated in the Watergate. scandals to a far greater ex- tent than has ever been disclosed. ? News report Jim Garrison, Mark Lane, Norm Mailer: where are you now, when your . President needs you? ? .. ? -. ? All you true believers in the omni-ma- levolence of.the Central Intelligence Ag- ency ? are you ready for another Con- spiracy Theory? Good, because this one is wild. Almost as wild as the one Norm was?handing out last year about the mystery of Marilyn Monroe's death. . Yes, indee-c1;. there's a fresh-CIA plot just waiting' to be stirred. One that cries out for experienced hands. :You've all been the-route, from 'How-the-CIA; Killed-John-Kennedy' to How-the-CIA.: Caused-Hurricane-Agnes. So it figures that if Chuck Colson and Howard Baker are going anywhere with their theory of How-the-CIA-Is-Responsible-for-Water- gate, they could use your help. - . ?._ THAT'S SEN. How44el3f9A9iFFir In ? Pf ,."!,71) 71:1'111 1 to ui=1 t';11-:i-jk 17 r La:a) ts ? ; It's all there in Baker's report: Howl the CIA furnished Hunt with a false ID, a wig, a camera, a speech-altering device and -other spy stuff; how the-, CIA. worlted_up. a psychiatric -profile of-1 Pentagon:Papers?lea,ter?Daniel Ellsbergf how, most..of'.the--Watergate..teanrhad ties with the.; CIA;...ancl:!_isetr the -CIA ! was less than forthcerning with FBI in- vestigators after Watergate. Baker's report is, of course, all true as far as it goes. But left unsaid was how the CIA got conned into providing materials and the psychiatric profile on direct orders of the White House, trans- mitted by Nixon's top aides in the Presi- dent's name. . Damage to the Bureaucracy The central point here is that one of the great tragedies of Watergate is the damage that has been done to the federal bureaucracy, particularly the in- telligence and law-enforcement agencies. Not only the CIA, but the FBI, whose agents- were sent on wild-goose chases by the White House and whose former acting director actnally?was called on, to and did destroy Watergate evidence. --. " Ditto for the- Justice Department, with: its reputation_ blackened . by the conviction of former- Attorney General Kleindienst and the still-pending Water-" gate coverup indictment of Mitchell. The image of the Internal Revenue Service,, called on to punish the administration's -"Enemies" with audits and reward the administration's friends"- by going easy on their tax problems: has -suffered as !weIL :But why: gO'cine.? point :ikthat -crimeS? of --Watergate wei performed-'by'indivrdnnis, not' insti-tu-,_ 1,ioris like --th e CIA: FBI` Of I course, who was Sam Ervin's -sidekick last summer during the Senate Wat6r- gate hearings. Baker has been trying to sell his CIA's-the-One line around Wash- ington for the past six months, but with no success. He says it's because the CIA won't cooperate. If you ask me, though, Jim/Mark/Norm, it's because the Ten- nessee senator keeps talking in para- bles. Stuff about "animals crashing around in the forest," and the like. -- Now, Jim, you !mow, from your ex- perience gulling the voters of New Or- leans (until they finally tired of your act), that talking in parables isn't the way to get a good conspiracy theory going. No, to-sell a CIA scenario that people will listen to, a man's got to lay it -on .the line. The way Colson did last week.. And let me tell you, gentlemen, when Chuck Colson runs a CIA conspiracy theory up his greased flagpole, folks stop, look up and listen. Because Chuck was right there with the President him- self. And the way he tells it, the Old Man was fairly quaking over the possi- bility that the CIA might succeed in a RellitiigeP1200/013101111e:007.4A4ZOR7110.0043 . operations. ; 23 -- -NIXON, said Colson, is "convinced the CIA is in this up to their eyeballs." Sound familiar, Jim/Mark/Norm? Why, it's-practically a line taken straight from one of your left-wing texts about the John F. Kennedy assassination. Ex- cept,_Mark, whereas you titled your book on that subject "Rush to Judg- ment," I, think what we have here is more -like *".Rush Away from Judg- - 7 It's. as'i.f.-theY -sat 'around the White - House-one afternoon, -the Old Man and Chuck, and thought: The liberal media want a scapegoat -for Watergate. O.K., give 'em the CIA. But what could .the CIA have in mind, getting "up to their eyeballs" in this sort of mess? Well, says Colson, the President's theory is "they were coming in --to spy and they wanted to get enough on the White House so they could get what they wanted." And what do they want? That's where we're counting on you, Jim/Mark/ Norm. Because, you see, Chuck can only go so far elaborating on a CIA con- spiracy. Beyond a certain point, he lacks your experience filling in outland- ish details about such things. That is, in explaining to the American people that what the CIA really wants ? in league with its allies, the FBI, the Pentagon, those Texas oil millionaires, Burt Lan- caster, lurk Douglas and the rest of the 2rufieSgforplaYs in May" ? is at sof u er power. o- 'rig less, Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 WASHINGTON POST 8 July 1974 ), eace rrornises xemi telligence ? I3y Marilyn Berger Washington Post Staff Writer , In the aftermath of the Moscow summit, a leading analyst of Soviet affairs has " expressed concern that the ? preMise of ?"a generation of " peace" is being oversold to the American people as an - ? -accomplishinent rather than - a hope. ? / .The Soviet Union, mean- maintains its goals of expanding its economic and ? political power in the world, he.said. ' The Soviets, according 'to: Ray S. Cline, the former di- , rector of intelligence and re- search at the State Depart- nlent, - "use the circus and -theater of summitry in their own world strategy of peace- ful coexistence. Richard Nixon appears to be using it to make domestic political gains. I "The administration is " '? confusing the American peo- ?, pie because it is talking . about the prolonged reduc- tion of international tension ? and a generation, of peace. In thd American view this , means an absence of con- flict, but in the Soviet view it. means only no nuclear k'war while the 'class strng-, ? ? ' gle' continues econonlically 'and politically ,around the . world.", The Soviet Union, Cline , said, believes that the "correlation -of forces" in the world?especially the , weakening of the United States as a result, of its in- ternal economic and politi- cal problems?will inevi- tably lead to the victory of Soviet power. - Cline 'Was the chief of the analytical- staffs on the So- viet Union and China in the ? Central Intelligence Agency and later deputy director of the CIA before he went to the State Department. ? He is now director of stud- ies at the Georgetown Uni- versity Center for Strategic . Studies. ? ? Cline said the experts in , government are well aware of iwhat is happening, and are reporting fully on the Soviet policy and attitudes... Numerous outstanding So-,: vietologists have been mak- '. inglhe.sarne points in schol! Sayffici? 'I think the cautionary. aspects of this ex- pe'riment in the diplomatic approach to- ward the Soviet Union. . . may have been submerged in the need for domestic political triumph.' any journals, books and , . congressional testimony. - ."But," Cline said, "I think' the cautionary' ' aspects of this experiment in the diplo- matic approach toward the Soviet Union?and toward China?may have been sub-:, merged in the need for do- mestic political triumph."' These These were strong words . coming from Cline, who has refused to let himself he quoted on government pol- icy since he resigned from the State Department nine months ago. At that time it was clear that he was con- cerned that the problems of 'Watergate were interfering In the orderly process of conducting foreign policy. Cline admitted that there was some irony in the fact that Mr. Nixon was no'w us- ing cooperation with the So- viets when he had built his early'political career in the 1940s and 1950s on Cold War rhetoric and virulent' anti- cemmunism: ? Summit' conferences like. ,the= one just completed, ? , Cline said, 'tend to create an atmosphere of improved, re- lations, but they also create the illusion that the Soviet Union and the United States share the same goals in seeking detente. Actually, Cline said, what ? the Soviet Union, in an ef- fort to obtain Western tech- nology and consumer goods, is seeking, is peaceful coex- Istence--in Moscow's lexi- con the avoidance of war, the support of world revolu- tionary forces, the shrinking ef ,capitalist resources and the "class struggle." ? ."Detente," according to Cline, ."is defined by most Americans as peace, stabil- ity, . international coopera- tion; tolerance and conver- gence. ' "One of the " things that 'bothers me," he said, "is that we've got ourselves pretty well convinced that basic formulations of na- tional purpose don't mean anything. Obviously ideolog-? ical statements are not sim- ple blueprints for future ac- tion, but they- mean some- thing." ' He said, "This problem has been around ? a long, time. I believe we tend to ig- nore ideology completely, just as we refused to believe what Hitler said about Ger- many in the 1930s." ? Cline made his rather pes- simistic remarks during a lengthy interview in his of- fice in the quiet of a fourth of July weekend. The paradox, he Said, "is that if detente were really to succeed in our sense of the world , of opening mean- ingful contacts inside Soviet society, the Soviet internal control system would feel so threatened it would destroy those contacts. Therefore our concept of detente, Can continue only so long as it doesn't succeed.". President Nixon's descrip- tion of a web of relation- ships drawing the Soviet Union into a detente that is irreversible, in Cline's view, is thus probably not in the cards. t ? '"The kind of. peaceful Coexistence and detente which we do in fact have, a strong, mutual interest -in - avoiding nuclear war. was established not by Richard Nixon .and Henry 'Kissinger but .by Jack Kennedy as a result of the education in inv ternational affairs he gave Nikita Khruslichcy during the Cuban missile crisis in , 1962," Cline said. ..The basic outlines of pres- lent Soviet strategy. Cline said, was decided at that time. A very high Soviet ? leader came to the United States shortly after that ? cri- . sis and told an American of- . ficial that there would never again be a conflict on those unequal terms. The Soviet leaders decided then to have ? no more ,missile gaps, on It was then that -- Moscow started investing in '1t5 big, missile build-up. to- z ward a parity of forces with the United States. ''What we've had since, t but without the hoopla sur-1: !"rounding detente," Cline Said; "is the successful de- terrence of nuclear war. Ev- eryone has struggled since then on how to translate this into international coop-.. eration and understanding? our concept of detente as distinct from the Soviet vi- sion of continued, bitter 'struggle based on class and the need to support world revolutionary forces wher- ever they are." At this point Cline pulled out a recent article from the influential Soviet journal Problems of Peace and' .So- cialism to make his point. It said: "Peaceful coexistence is a specific international form of class confrontation, linked to the peoples' strug- gle not only for peace but also for the revolutionary transformation of society, to the strengthening of the so- ' cialist community and to mass actions against imperi- alism." It is Cline's view that the American people ? must be educated about tlie Soviet perception of what is hap- pening. Cline quoted from a" recent monograph by for- ? mer U.S. Ambassador to the' ; Soviet Union Foy Kohler . and others. He noted that after the -1972 Moscow summit meet-. ing Soviet spokesmen said. the Soviet Union 'does not view the U.S. policy of de- tente as reflecting a change of heart but as a policy forced upon it by what the Soviets call "the social, eco- nomic and ultimately, tary power of the Soviet Un- ion and the socialist coun- tries." ? The quote continue's': "The standard Soviet line been; and continues to be, that 'the real alignment of forces in the world arena' , has shifted against the , United States." Exaggerated hopes from summitry. Cline said, "create an illusion that' tends to divide and confuse and produce apathy, not only at home but among our Approved For 'Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 A0proved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 allies." In Europe, be said, there is "fear that a new Soviet- American relationship will lead to a diminution of the U.S. commitment to NATO, that there will be a with-, drawal of U.S., forces and a ,lessening Of economic coop- .,eratioti, and hence increas- ing pressure on them to en- ter into long-term under- standings with the Soviet Union which, in time, would ,neutralize them politically and strategically and, even sooner, provide opportuni- ties for united front 'govern- _merits, getting Communist oarties into power through the 'parliamentary road to socialism'." Cline noted that this 'al- most happened in France and 'could very 'likely occur in. Italywithin the year. ? Thus the Soviet Union, Cline said, is using the at- ?mosplieries of summitry for Its own ends; "Just as the Chinese saw the Peking summit of 1972 in the same terms as a thousand years ago they saw the .arrival of NEW YORK TIMES 11 July 1974 'delegations from tributary states to bear gifts to the emperor?first kowtowing nine times?the Russians, with a different psychology, out of their sense of insecu- rity, take pride that Nixon was coming to seek a modus vivendi with their now pow- erful state?and that .when problems build up in the Middle East they can sum- mon Kissinger to Moscow." Soviet Communist Party chief Leonid I. Brezhnev is using summitry for his own purposes. He has, Cline said, "identified himself with peaceful coexistence of a kind which will permit the gradual growth of what he calls the socialist world, without serious danger of war with the United States, the only adversary the Rus- sians fear." . . , , Cline's concern is, first of all, that the American peo- ple be made aware of what is going on. "There is a need for what these days we, call 'consciousness raising'," he said. ? ..?., , They should be urged, he said, "to focus on the eco- nomic and political conflict which continues, and not be misled by diplomatie spec- taculars." The Soviets he stressed, "have shown no interest in creating any web of rela- tionships because they fear the penetration of Soviet society by hostile 'Western ide- ology." Instead, he said, they point to this desire for a "web of relationships" as demonstrating 'American weakness. ? Cline's prescription for ? dealing with the Soviets en- tails first of all understand- ing what we are about. The United States, he said, should remain strong mili- tarily, preserving. its deter- rent "whatever it costs." _ It should trade with the Soviet Union, but on non- concessional terms. He has no objection to granting most-favored-nation status, which would only put the Soviets on a par with other nations. But he thinks cred- rms, After Moscow By Herbeit Scoville Jr. ? McLEAN, Va.?Although. no proof was probably needed, the agreements negotiated at the Moscow summit con- ference have demonstrated beyond a shadow of doubt that United States - arms control goals have become hos- tage to impeachment politics. No longer can President Nixon assert that his continuance in office is essen- tial to bringing the arms race under ' control and making the world less vul- nerable:to a nuclear conflagration. ? Quite the contrary. It is now clear that as long as Mr. Nixon remains in ' office we are doomed to, increase nuclear competition, with all the dan- gers and costs it entails. His political , survival rests on the appeasement of the conservative pro-military clique in Congress. The summit meeting not only failed to mark any significant progress to- ward reducing the threat of nuclear war, it actually took us several steps backward. The hopes that a broad permanent limitation on offensive weapons might 'be achieved have long been dim, but there remained a faint glimmer that some restraint might be placed on MIRV's?or multiple independently tar- getable re-entry, vehicles?those dan- gerous multiple-missile warheads that provide incentives for initiating a nu- clear strike. But now these hopes have been dashed, and the large programs to, procure new and more-threatening MIRV's will soon have progressed be- " . yond the point of no return in both i countries. Secretary of State Kissinger was un- willing to bite the MIRV bullet, as it were, in the first round of talks on limiting strategic arms,A0pritvtadulaor 1 ? Its should be limited only those deals that would be: economically beneficial to the United States. ' "We should take care not ? to export our most advanced technology but to trade the 7 products of that technology ; for Soviet raw materials," .1 Cline said. Finally, "we should Make no large, long-term invest- ments in capital unless there is no other opportu- nity for the development of ; those ? same resources," he ; said. This would mean that ! we should avoid investments in developing things such as Siberian oil and natural gas because of the uncertainties 1 of long-term access to the 'Products. "We , should nffer conces- sions in limited fields," ,?; Cline said, "if and when, 1 through quiet diplomacy, we ' an make progresS in open- ing Soviet society to foreign contacts, which is, after all, what we have advertised de- tente diplomacy is all about." have bee n relatively and technology in easy to stifle these search of 'superior- programs in their infancy, and now ity, which he indicated is meaningless when he was willing to face up to- since both sides already have thou- this issue his efforts were sabotaged sands of warheads. by Secretary of Defense James R. But the. most damaging agreement - Schlesinger, the military and the Con- ; negotiated at Moscow was that re:. gressional hawks led by Senator Henry lated to underground nuclear testing, M. Jackson and assisted by the re- and for this the President ,alone must ' cently resigned strategic-arms-negotia- take full responsibility. tor Paul Nitze. Soviet leaders had made it abun- A year from now the MIRV Pan- dandy clear that they were prepared dora's box will be wide open and to sign immediately a treaty stopping both countries will have MIRV's that all underground tests. In the United 'will have the technical capability of States, 37 Senators have cosponsored threatening,the other's land-based-mis- a resolution supporting the negotia- tion of such a ban; only 'the most con- firmed hard-liners were reluctant. sue deterrent. A major new rung in the arms race will have been climbed. A year ago at the much-touted Washington summit talks, Mr. Nixon and Leonid I. Brezhnev pledged to seek to achieve a comprehensive, perma- nent agreement on offensive 'weapons by the end of 1974. Now a year later the goal of a permanent treaty has ? disappeared, and they are instead seek- ing the prolongation of an interim agreement to run until 1985. This hardly seems like progress along the road to peace, of which President Nixon boasted on his return to the United States on 'July 3. This retrogression was mandated by the need to allow the military in both countries to proceed with their colos- sally expensive new weapons pro- grams, such as the Trident submarine and its Soviet counterpart, the new counterforce MIRV intercontinental ballistic missiles, and the supersonic bombers. These are all bargaining chips for negotiations that will now continue for - eleven years, and are hedges in case no permanent treaty is ever achieved. As Mr, Kissinger stated in his Mos- cow news conference, this will mean Yet the Administration opposed a threshold treaty that would halt explosions only above a certain power., To make matters worse at Moscow, this limit was set at greater than 150 kilotons of explosive power?ten times the power of the bomb used over Hiro- shima in 1945?so as to have almost no effect on any current weapons de- , velopment. Such a threshold ban at this time in i history would be worse than no ban at all. It would almost certainly pre- vent the achievement of a total ban for many years. However, the crowning' act of superpower cynicism was to put off for two years?until March 31, 1976?the date when even this incon- sequential restriction would take ef- fect. A primary objective of limiting nu- clear tests is to inhibit the further spread of nuclear weapons to new na- tions. Under the Nonproliferation . Treaty, effective in 1969, the United States and the Soviet 'Union 'under- took to negotiate seriously toward a complete ban on nuclear testing. RVIeNg4q0Eii#3810EkrePAYROPP7-0Q102600400 25 ? 1.1 I ? tileRrecent In- .1n1 the pro- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 posed transfer Of nuclear technology to the Middle East the problem of 'weapons proliferation should be given a high priority. Yet the Moscow treaty?which must be ratified by the Senate?can only be viewed by potential nonnuclear ',countries as proof that the superpow- ers have no intention of exercising re- straint or of fulfilling their obligations LOS ANGELES TIMES 30 June 1974 011 taken in exchange for the nonnuclear countries' giving up their option to acquire nuclear weapons. Those countries will now undoubt- edly feel free to confine the 'Nonpro- liferation Treaty to the scrap heap at next year's review conference and to? make their own way into the nuclear- weapons jungle. The risk that we will all be incinerated in 'a nuclear holo- caust has been immeasurably increased by the Moscow underground-test treaty. Herbert Scoville Jr, Secretary of the Arms Control Association, was former- ly assistant director of the Arms Con- trol and Disarmament Agency and deputy director of the Central Intelli- gence Agency. .. ? ,; BY ALBERT?PARRY' In certain high-level circles in Washington and Houston there is' talk going around that the joint US.- Soviet space flight planned for 1975 is little more than a "wheat-deal in the, sky? The reason is clear: The Russians need it far more than we do. - The Nixon Administration is pushing it for political reasons?as a ? prop for the faltering US.-Soviet de- . ? Albert Parry, professor emeritus of Russian civilization and language at Colgate University, is a Russian- born. U.S. citizen who is the author of "Russian Cavalcade: A Military Record,." "Russia's Rockets and Mis- siles, and "The Russian Scientist.": tente (which President Nixon is snaking additional efforts to pre- serve during his current visit to Moscow). The scientific-engineering wisdom Of the joint space flight is doubtful and is growing more so all the time. Indeed, we must ask: Is this trip nes cessary? For America, that is. Knowledgeable men ? in Washing.' fon and Houston talk about their doubts informally, but they refuse to be identified. After all, their careers must be safeguarded. These are some of the point's brought up in, quiet conversations: , i? ?Why go ahead with the Apollo: Son= flight? And why now? En- gineers had discussed the possibility of a joint U.S.-Soviet manned space mission ever since 1966, but it was not until it assumed political signifi? cance that it was approved in both Washington and Moscow. . ?If the flight is really to be a symbol of meaningful space coopera- tion, why so few other signs of cooperation? Those there have been were of paltry significance (ex- . ? change of weather satellite photos, of moon rock samples, of scientific papers the Russians would have got- ten their hands on anyway). Keeping close watch in London on scientific developments in the Soviet *Union is Leonid Vladimirov, former- ly a science writer-editor in the So- viet Union who defected during a trip to England in 1966. ? Not long ago, he told me, "Only the Soviet side will gain from.this (A p01- lo-Soyuz) project. True, your Ameri- can experts may gather some more -of an idea about the general level of Moscow's space achievements. But even without this project your spe- cialists have, in the last half-decade, learned much about the Soviet kos- faosavtika. There will be no other results for America?except, that is, for some questionable political di- vidends for the White House.' . 1--asked Ifladimirov: "Precisely. what will the Soviets gain, and what: might we lose, from' the Apollo-Soy- us project?" . ? -He replied, "They will learn more about ?the? latest :American technolos , gy while trying to conceal their own lag. In the process they hope to charm a few 'more American experts' and businessmen with' those vodka-' and-caviar parties.. And . whatever .new the Soviets find out from the Americans, they will use (it) for ,military purposes., . ? "Then there is the Soviet propa.- ganda aim. Here is what they .will _ stress 'in their domestic, and, later, foreign propaganda: ? ? "First: 'Without us Soviets,' the Americans could not develop their space technology any further, even if they did achieve their landings on the moon and, their Skylab success. To make their next giant steps they' simply had to have our Soviet tech- nology. and the help of. our cosmo- nauts.' ? ? ? "Second: 'An . the. disrupting cries - :by Andrei Sakharov and other sidents could not, will not, prevent the. American scientists and en- gineers?in.addition to businessmen r--from cooperating with us.' "Third: 'All the .world can see for itself that the US.S.R. is a peaceful nation and stands for naught but a most complete collaboration be- tween nations, 'Including disarm- ament'?with, I must add, no real control over the Soviet side." Some facts about the Apollo-Soyuz mission are publicly known, but. the Russians are giving the Americans as little information as possible, U.S. astronauts will be allowed to visit the Soviet launch center at: Tyuratam to check out some Ameri- can-made equipment. that will be in- stalled in the Soviet spaceship. But the Americans will be flown to the airport at the Soviet base, will be the assembly building in a blacked-out Soviet limousine, will check the equipment ? and will leave the same day, not being per- mitted to .stay until the Soyuz launch. :26 American astronauts confirm dimirov's opinion that. they already have learned enough about the Soy- uz to have misgivings about its pri- ? rnitive systems and the lack of real control by the pilot. One member of ' the U.S. link-up crew was heard to say about the Soyuz: "You'll never get me up in one of those." - The American side began Apollo- Soyuz flight planning with consider- able enthusiasm. This was fostered 'by the initial belief that the Rus- sians, with a dozen or more manned space flights to their credit since 1967, had compiled a record approxi-. mately equivalent to that of the U.S. Apollo program. , But as. the 1975 link-up began to be studied in depth, as the Americans dipped into the available Soviet documentation of the Soyuz and start- . ed practicing in Soyuz ground simulators, the consensus emerged that---in terms of onboard capabilities and design?the Soyuz does not compare even with the ? American Gemini capsule of 10 years ago.. Some disquieting specifics: Soviet ? cosmonauts have little flight-plan- ning flexibility, few malfunction in- dicators or controls, and minimal flight instruments. There is no on- board inertial platform or program- mable computer. ? Already, though, the Russians are trying to claim more than their pro- per share of credit for the project. The Apollo is larger than the Soy- uz (more than twice the weight and nearly twice the length of the Soy- uz), but the official drawing used in the Soviet press shows the two spaceships as being of equal size. , The docking module is American- made, and it is the Apollo attitude control system that will keep both vehicles stabilized during the link- up?but not a word of such impor- tant facts can be found in Soviet publications. Finally, the Soyuz systems will run out. first, and the cosmonauts will have to land after five days in space. The Apollo would be able to stay aloft for another week or mores but the sensitive Russians insist that both crews must land the same day. No wonder the Russians want this 'project! As an American astronaut mused, "While they were ahead, there was no chance of their joining with us. They played their space Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 " 'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 ? lead for all ifwas 'Worth. Now -that we've pulled way in front with Apol- lo and Skylab, they are very eager to cooperate in any manner we'll let them:' As for the US. side?leaving out the lure of detente?there is One via- ble reason for the project. Says an American expert: ? "Until this link-up tame up, we had no plans for manned space flights for the period between the end of the Skylab project in early .1974 and the start of flight-testing the Space Shuttle in 1978. Our exper- ienced astronauts and our trained, professional ground support person- NEW YORK TIMES 2 July 1974 nel?who are among this' nation'S greatest space assets?would have had to spend more than four years practicing without the real thing. That is why we need this link-up with Soyuz." Still, the political reason domin- ates. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration is under pres- sure' from the highest levels of government to carry out this mis- sion without trouble. Why is the project so important? Even President Nixon's severest critics admit that his foreign policy moves have been commendable. As the morass of Watergate infects the. national politiCal scene, and as rising': prices and possible renewed energy shortages threaten, foreign policy ? spectaculars remain the last ace-in-, the-We for Mr.Nixon. ? Detente is very popular now?as- long as one does not think too much about the concessions the United ? States was forced to make at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks?and what better symbol of detente could there be than a Rus- sian-American space mission? ? The symbol is all the more iinpor- tant as the reality becomes less pleasant to contemplate. . ower and Saintly Purity By ..? By Peregrine VVorsthorne ' LONDON?Any public man who has ever succeeded in doing anything must be aware of how vulnerable his con- duct is to moral judgment. Every biography of a great statesman bears ?this out. There are always skeletons in the cupboard; always incidents where even the most illustrious and heroic figure behaved with less than total honesty or truthfulness. Such a statement is certainly not 'intended to be provocative or con- troversial. It is, of course, the merest truism. The exercise of power cannot be combined with saintly purity, since ?nee a Man assumes responsibility for public affairs, the moral simplicities within which it is just possible, with luck, to be able to lead a private life are soon hideously complicated to an extent that precludes all clear? dis- tinctions between right and wrong. A healthy public opinion undet- stands this, and judges its public men accordingly, allowing them some lati- tude. It is always a question of apply- ing a sense of proportion of turning a judiciously blind eye, of having a feel for what is excusable and what is not. Mass opinion sometimes needs guidance in these matters, which is what a properly functioning "Estab- lishment," or governing order, should be able to supply. What is so disturging about the Kis- singer affair is that it demonstrates a total failure by the American liberal Establishment to do precisely that; worse, on an almost hysterical deter- mination to do precisely the opposite. . ? ? By any standards of common sense it is ridiculous that the Secretary of State should be . so unnecessarily in- . WASHINGTON STAR milt 8 July 1974 volved in a major row threatening his moral credibility. Yet the quality press, whose job it ought to be to get these matters right, to articulate the Estab- lishment voice of worldly wisdom, has taken the lead in getting them wrong and articulating the voice of unworldly stupidity. It maytwell he that Henry A. Kis- singer was rather less than frank in his Senate evidence about the part he played in the telephone tapping of his colleagues, -Ind of certain members of the? press. Possibly the documents will show that he did more than as- sent to it, and positively encouraged and even ordered it. More likely it will show nothing wholly conclusive either way. But this surely is not the point. The point is that the question is not terribly impor- tant; certainly not important enough to risk endangering the American na- tional interest by discrediting a highly successful Secretary of State. To some extent this can obviously be explained by Watergate, which has shown the dangers-of excessive cyni- cism. But an attitude to the exercise of power which contains too little cynicism is quite as dangerous as one which contains too much. And in the aftermath of Watergate, this second danger may be the one that needs , watching most. ? What is new today in all advanced societies is the extent to which in- tellectuals determine the climate of Establishment opinion because, with . the dependence of almost all forms of large organization on specialized , knowledge, academics have become so much more an integral and highly influential part of the power structure than ever they were- before. But they do not feel at home in it.- Theirs is En It/Borst: ?scow By diplomatic standards, Richard Nixon's trip to Moscow must be judged a disaster. Presidents of the United States aren't supposed to go to the sum- mit, exchange a few smiles, sign a vapid communique and return home Dr empty-handed. Approved For ReleaSei the world of theory, of concepts, of ideals, or talking rather than doing. For the first time, in short, the new power structures include an element of growing influence?based on brain power?which finds the moral ambiv- alence inherent in the exercise of power alien, not to say shocking, to its own values. That this development 'should cide with Watergate is distinctly un- fortunate for the United States, since everything about the Nixon Adminis- tration has seethed to justify and deepen this resistance to a proper understanding of the painful and ugly realities of power. But the absurd , Kissinger affair surely underlines how dangerous it is if public opinion comes to be dominated by influences con- stitutionally incapable of understand- ing these realities. ' ? Nothing would be gained if, in es- caping from the nightmare world of Richard Nixon and Watergate, the United States took refuge in the dream world of The New York Times and The Washington Post. Peregrine Worsthorne is a columnist for The Sunday Telegraph of London. This is adapted from that newspaper. But diplomatic standards, in these times, are secondary. These are im- peachment times, which I presume will not characterize the future indefinitely. Understandably, Nixon measures the trip in impeachment terms ? and he JON 32470fra-s94u0 a, SIP 27 assume greater blame for the failure to reach a disarmament agreement. Secre- tary Henry Kissinger's strange state- ment put the onus equally on Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, neither. able to control his military establish- ment. It was further evidence of an in- creasingly angry man. KfSSINGER SURELY recognized 1101,0083001)34thout impeachment, might have been willing to make con- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 cessions, to take risks in-the interests of disarmament. An impeachable Nixon, cannot afford to take such risks and alienate the pro-military right wing in the country, his last body of unflinching support. So the Moscow visit was pure cere- mony, which is not necessarily bad. In 1972, Nixon went to Moscow and, after the long years of confrontation over the Vietnam war, his presence there con- veyed the symbolism of a new relation- ship A decade or so ago, during the transi- tional era between Eisenhower and Kennedy, the very principles of summi- try (what purpose did it serve?) were a .regular topic of conversation in diplo- matic circles and the press. It was accepted then 'that summit meetings which have no positive results tend, by their nature, to have negative results. Such meetings tend to solidify disagreements, in having them sancti- fied by heads of state, and to signal these disagreements to the entire world. Nixon's visit, I suspect, achieved just that result. Although Nixon insists pub- licly that the momentum toward disar- mament has been accelerated, I suspect, it's been stopped dead in its tracks. NIXON AND BREZHNEV tell us that the low-keyed talks will resume, and we all might as well hope for the best ? but there is little doubt what the failure of this summit will mean in other countries.. It is foolish to imagine that middle- ? LOS ANGELES TIMES 4 July 1974 Rosy Theme-Startles tlesiltgtiators in Geneva Optimistic Tone of Moscow Communique Surprises Delegates Locked in Dispute I3Y: JOE ALEX MORRIS JR. Times staff Writer highest level." . GENEVA?Western and neutral delegates to', the .:European security confer- ence expressed surprise at the ?relatively 'optimistic tone of the U.S.-Soviet communique issued in Moscow Wednesday on the subject of .the conference , - Delegates from the 35- -- nation' at the conference -are 'still locked in a tough dispute. over whether to ?icall a break in flle Confer- ence 'for the rest of the ? summer. Both.. West Eu- ropean 'partners in the NATO alliance and.Europ- ? eati neutrals are dissatis- fied with the lack of Soviet ? concessions on key issues, such as greater freedom of :movement 'of - both ideas and peoples. ? . -. The Moscow commu- nique 'did not reflect this. ? 'Instead it referred to "sub-.' stantial ? progress" being .made here at Geneva, - 'called for a windup of the ? conference "at an early :date," and assumed that '.the results of current ne- gotiations would permit i thin to take place., "at the ? This is, delegates Point- :: ed out, pretty much what Soviet Communist Party leader Leonid I. Brezhnev ? wants from the Security ? conference. It is also what he signally ? failed- get from the late French Pres- ident Georges Pompidou during his Soviet visit: shortly before his death: Taken together, it raised suspicions in many minds, here that President Nixon.. . did' not take into account`' the serious reservations . the Europeans have about winding up the- security conference soon. These may come into clearer fo- cus Friday when.the plen- um meets here for the sec-. ond time to try to decide whether to call a summer ? recess. The Russians are vigor- ously opposing the idea, and want instead to try to break the deadlock by ele- vating the level of delega- tions here. In informal: conversations they have, suggested taising it to de- puty foreign minister lev- el. Several Western nation's . ,have countered that. ' sized powers around the world will no be influenced by the example which th big powers have set in Moscow. The reasoning of the middle-sized power goes like this: If you guys, who have this fantastic capacity for overkill, can't keep yourselves under control, then why should we? The latest count on countries with the unrealized potential for nuclear weap- onry has, according to American ex perts, soared to 24. Thanks to India, Pakistan will be next. Why not, one day. Costa Rica or Tanzania? Americans have largely convinced themselves, right or wrong, that the big powers have too much good sense to fire these weapons. But what about the other 24? That question, alas, is the heritage of the Moscow summit. 'present pioblems h a V e. nothing to do with the lev- el 'of leadership, but con- cern substantive issues. This was emphasized June 11 when the nine Common Market foreign -ministers issued an unu- sual statement after their Meeting in Bonn, in which . they expressed their "suf.- ,prise" at the lack of pro- gess at Geneva: This stands in contrast to the .Nixon-Brezhnev claim of "substantial progress" be- ing made on "many signi- ficant questions." Delegates here empha- sized that they could not see that any "substantial progress" had been made between the foreign minis- ters' statement and the Nixon-BrezhneV commu- nique. The soviets hate shown ? some indications they may be ready to make conces- sions on questions of acces information,, family reun- ions across the iron cur- tain, and on advance noti- fication and sending ob- servers to each other's mil- itary maneuvers. This' has been less specific than tan- talizing, sources here say,* but it will probably contri- bute towards extending the current session be- yond the original July 12th planned cutoff date: At .the same time, dele- gates expressed hopes that earlier signs of American anxiousness to speed up.' the whole process of nego-, 28 1-" -tiation disappear. '3 One also drew attention to an" apparent contradic; tion in American policy. ' Secretary of State Henry ' A. Kissinger, in a. press' -conference held in Bad; Reichenall last month, re-. luctantly agreed with the: Common Market state- ment on the lack of pr,o- ? gress at Geneva. . , It was noted at the time ; that the. endorsement ap- peared to be drawn out of ? Kissinger- more or less 'against his will. The Mos- Icow communique ap- peared likely to increase European fears that the, United States will not join In ,a tough stand on the , windup of the security conference ? a suspicion some Europeans had even before Mr. Nixon went to Moscow. :_ 'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 WASHINGTON POST 8 July 1974 Summits and Human Rights UNLESS MR. NIXON and Mr. Brezhnev, address "the problems of humanity and the basic rights of man," Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov said in a letter to the two leaders on the eve of the summit, their meeting will be "condemned to failure." But, one gathers, aside from game practical talk about emigration as it relates .to trade, there is no evidence?certainly not in the com- , untnique--that this appeal was heeded. Mr. Sakharov himself spent the summit week conducting a hunger ,Strike to dramatize the plight of Soviet political pris- oners. ? '''Three summits have only sharpened, not resolved, the broad issue he raised. It proceeds from the outrage Which all decent people must feel at the continuing Soviet record on human rights. Earlier, Western liberals had hoped that contact with the West and the onset of detente would liberalize or "mellow" Soviet society, blit Kremlin authorities responded instead by tighten- ing controls. Others felt that the very process of in- dustrialization would make Soviet ways- and values "converge" with Western ones, but this prospect has been blocked by Russian tradition and Kremlin ideology ? alike. Soviet propagandists and well-meaning Americans cultivate the view that underneath, as people,' we're all the same. In fact, underneath we're different in funda- mental values: we have one view of the relationship between the individual and the state and the Russians have another. This is nothing to get excited or defiant ,about, but it cannot be ignored. ? - 0? Two Political strategies have arisen for relating this (apt to detente. By the first, these differences in values " ore accepted, and diplomacy moves onto make the best govertunent-to-government agreements possible, with .the hope that a kind of political' suction will carry Some human rights causes along. This is the adminis- tration's strategy. Mr. Nixon and Dr. Kissinger have been extremely sensitive to Soviet threats to break off : Other diplomatic avenues if the United States expressed more than perfunctory concern for Soviet intellectuals, 'dissenters, Jews, constituent nationalities; and so on. Sen. Henry Jackson's (D-Wash.) contrary strategy holds that internal Soviet liberalization is not just a welcome byproduct but an essential precondition of any real and enduring detente. Until the Kremlin is tamed by the political need to consider the wishes of the 'Soviet people, he feels, 'it will be free to act in arbi- trary and hostile ways in foreign affairs. Mr. Jackson believes that the Soviet government, desperate for rade, is more vulnerable to American pressure on human rights than the administration has perceived. The terms of this debate do not allow any single' categorical resolution. But enough experience has been gathered under detente to support certain judgments. First, a detente policy will not win the strong popular NEW YORK TIMES, SUIVDAY, JUNE 30, 1974 ? support it needs to be effective ih other areas if it : does not evince a serious concern for. Soviet human rights. Not only do Soviet writers, dissenters, Jews, Ukrainians, and others have their American constitu- encies, but as a people Americans have shown that they. demand that American values be reflected in American foreign policy. This is all the more so now that it is becoming generally clear that detente in its other as---t pects, such as arms control, is. sticky and slow. '? Second,- different Soviet human rights issues cut ' , different ways. The Kremlin's principal thrust iS to maintain its control at home. Thus it is particularly , open to pressures whose aim or result is to get certain people?Jews, writers?out of the country. But pres- sures meant to soften the situation within Soviet society touch domestic politics directly more and encounter tougher going. This produces an unhappy paradox; for- - eign pressures, if they succeed, may leave the Soviet' Union a more illiberal place because they draw out of the country many individuals who might be pushing to liberalize it if theSr remained. ? Third, it is not possible, or necessary, to. avoid argu- ment over how to press Moscow on human rights. That Mr. Jackson -blew better than Dr. -Kissinger over the last three years that the Kremlin would "give" on emigration to get trade, does not prove there is no effective limit on how hard the West can push. Indeed, the emigration-trade link may dissolve if Congress de- ? cides that, on economic grounds alo trade with the Soviet Union should not keep reeeiving Ex-lin Bank subsidies. Pressures might then switch to political is- sues, such as relations in Europe. If the Russians want a full-dress European summit, for instance, -why should they not first accept Western proposals on the exchange - of information and people? Pressures should not be ap- plied, however, unless the, United States is prepared to have its bluff called. Each case must be thought out. Stalemates and reverses can't be excluded. They - will produce, in the Westf, feelings of anger and guilt. Finally, there is no justification to walk on tiptoe and to avoid speaking plainly and unprovocatively on appropriate occasions about human rights out of fear that Russian' sensitivities and politics will be upset. The Russians are tougher than that. There is no need to be abusive but no need to paint pictures either. Russians routinely spout ,false and vicious stuff about Americans.' The least Americans can do is offer the truth. Soviet officials often contend that they do not demand internal 'American changes as the 'condition of political, agree- - ments. But that is not out of delicacy; it is out of an ' absolute indifference to human rights on the part of the Soviet political establishment. Nothing illustrates more sharply and 'sadly this basic obstacle to an au- -; thentic Soviet-American detente. D?nte, ith Caution By Robert Taft Jr. WASHINGTON?President Nixon is In Moscow to further the cause of detente. There should be no one in Washington who does not wish him success. But at the same time that we work for the lessening of ten- sions between the United States and the Soviet Union, we must con- tinue to watch i r o not, just the sIrtor he ie14e2otiti018108eY etieostfiliwoo Approveu but also the realities of United States- Soviet relations. Foremost among these realities is the discrepancy between the Soviet public endorsement of detente and the quiet but constant build-up of Soviet military power. In strategic arms, the Russians are preparing to deploy four powerful new intercontinental ballistic missiles plus a new strategic bomber. ? ?. 29 nullify the United States acceptance of the first agreement on the limita- tion of strategic arms, by adopting their own system of MIRV's, or war- heads with multiple missiles. In conventional armaments, their naval expansion is proceeding rapidly and includes the buildinr, of aircraft carriers. They are embarked on a major program to strengthen their conventional land forces in Europe, advanced, VeMapons. ' Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 ? Nor do the private statements of Soviet leaders offer assurance. It is no secret that at the Prague confer- ence of Eastern European party chiefs, Le mid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet party , leader, described detente not as a goal but as a tactic with limited duration. 1 D?nte is justified within the party on the grounds that it is acceptable to bargain with the devil as long as you cheat him in the end. ? As long as these Soviet policies and attitudes persist we must base our . diplomacy not on pro forma d?nte, but on diplomatic and military reali- ties. The foremost of these realities " is our need for a strong and independ- ent China to act as a counterweight to the Soviet Union. ? In our ? recent concern with the , Middle East and with improving rela- tions with Moscow, we have diverted our attention from Peking, with unfor- ? tunate results. The Chinese leadership has been increasingly open about its ? disappointment with the United States - and its feeling that China has received WASHINGTON POST ?9 July 1974 ?Victor Zorza little American assistance in reducing the Soviet threat. ? It is clear that an important element in the current Chinese power struggle is the argument of the old Lin Piao faction that the understanding with the United States has failed and that the only way to reduce the Soviet threat is through a new alliance with the Soviet Union. If we are to maintain China's cur- rent position as a counterbalance to Soviet power, we must take forceful measures to strengthen the United States-Chinese relationship. Secretary of State Kissinger in la recent but unfortunately little noticed address did re-emphasize the United States interest in a strong and independent China. But the American effort must be in concrete terms. Specifically, we must make it clear that we would expect to give active diplomatic and material support to China in the event of a confrontation with the Soviet Union. We should carefully examine inclusion, of China under the 'Nixon Doctrine, ? Kissinger's Strategic Challenges At the end of last week's summit talks Dr. Kissinger issued an emo- tional challenge to his adversaries in both Washington and Moscow. The two .most quoted remarks to emerge from his Moscow press conference set the stage for the next phase of the politi- cal struggle in both capitals. He said: "One of the questions we have to ask - ourselves as a country is: what in the name of God is strategic superiority? - . What do you do with it?" What he had observed?in both capitals?led r him to believe that "both sides have to convince their military establishments of the benefits of restraint, and that is not a thought that comes naturally to military people on either side." The thought that came naturally to Secretary of Defense James Schles- inger was that this was an attack on him, and he retorted angrily that "we have firm civilian control in this coun- try," that "there is no problem with the military." How Soviet defense min- ister Marshal Andrei Grechko re- sponded is not on record, but an arti- cle he published just before the sum- mit led CIA analysts to conclude that he too had gone out of his way to stress his submissiveness to the pond- , cal leadership. Kissinger evidently does not accept this picture of the realities of power, in either capital. In urging the Ki-em- providing her with an -opportunity to acquire the material she needs to defend herself against aggression. Exchanges of ballet troupes and orchestras are all very well, but Peking Is aware, if some here are not, that antitank weapons are rather more effective in deterring potential Soviet aggression. This does not mean that we should fail to seek detente with Moscow. A real d?nte would, by definition, include a reduction of the Soviet inili- tary threat to all powers. But as long as the current discrep- ancy exists between Soviet public pro- nouncements and Soviet military prep- arations, we cannot afford to abandon the traditional practice of counting the divisions. In the currer: world balance of power, it is imperative that the divi- sions of China's Army continue to be stationed on the Soviet frontier. Robert Taft Jr. is Republican Senator froM Ohio. ?lin to "convince" its military establish- ' ment of the benefits of restraint, he is in effect -telling Brezhnev to bring to a conclusion the power struggle with ? Grechko over the making of strategic policy which has proceeded fitfully in , Moscow for the past few years. In re- ? turn, be has undertaken to engage in a similar policy struggle with Schles- inger?and even, if need be, with ; Nixon. This is evident from his remark, just ? before the summit, that if the Presi- dent were faced with differences be- tween his top officials, "then it is his duty to move ahead in the direction which he believes to be in the national interest, keeping In mind the views of ? all of his senior advisers, but, if neces- sary, choosing among them . ." It was the duty of the President, "which I do not doubt he will exercise," to re- solve disagreements. He was not pushing Mr. Nixon?not yet?but serving notice on him that the time might come when the Presi- dent would have to choose between the Schlesinger defense policy and the Kissinger foreign policy. Lest Mr. Nixon should feel inclined to shirk his duty, Kissinger pointed out that he must realize that "in the present cli- mate" a fundamental debate was inevi- table. The "present climate" includes not only the strategic debate, but Water- gate as well. The Kremlin's Washing- tonologists examine Kissinger's utter- . % ances word by word and comma by comma, in much the same way that Western Kremlinologists study Soviet statements. His remark may suggest to them that Kissinger's post-summit press conference began to pose for Mr. Nixon the choice which Kissinger had previously adumbrated. Kissinger's earlier resignation threat over allegations that he was involved in wiretapping would, if carried out, do more damage to Mr. Nixon than to anyone else. Without Kissinger, Nixon ?30 could not convincingly persist with the ? argument that he must stay in power' to complete the "structure of peace." Vice President Gerald Ford, on the other hand, has already said that if he became President he would retain Kis- singer?and that he would drop Schles- inger. Ford has made his choice, but Nixon has still to make it. A Soviet an- alyst trying to determine which way Mr. Nixon will turn might well con- clude that the President has no choice, that the resignation or dismissal of ei- ther Kissinger or Schlesinger would bring the administration down. .The Kremlin makes no secret of its belief that Schlesinger is responsible for the persistence of cold war tenden- cies in the administration. Schlesinger ?as the Soviet press says?insists on retaining the "superiority" which Kis- singer has denounced with such feel- ing. In the Kremlin's view, therefore, the retention of Schlesinger for the re- mainder of Mr. Nixon's tenure would mean that no progress could be made in strategic talks. - One conclusion the Kremlin may draw from this analysis is that, even if Mr. Nixon remains in power, he will be politically too weak to trade conces- sions with Moscow. Yet without' mu- tual concessions, without imposing on the military of both sides the "restraint" which Kissinger demands, a strategic arms agreement will be unattainable. But if Mr. Nixon is in no position to meet the Kremlin half-way, then Kis- singer's advice to Brezhnev to take on Grechko in a full-scale power struggle is unlikely to be heeded in the Krem- lin. Why should the Kremlin risk a ma jor leadership crisis if the Nixon ad' ministration is committed to strater.le "superiority" in any case? The admin- istration's spokesmen, of course, call it "parity," but that is not how Grechko sees it, as his statements make quite clear. 0 19/4. Vidor Zona Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 "TY Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 WASHINGTON POST Joseph Kraft 7 July 1974 A New Weakness in Our MOSCOW?The Moscow summit meetings last week provided a fore- taste of the rough going the United States is apt to encounter in the inter- national arena as long as President Nixon clings to office, The talks here showed plainly that Mr. Nixon has lost his clout in the most important of for- eign affairs. Moreover, the President's weakness is now beginning to rub off on his Sec- retary of State. Dr. Kissinger can no longer wield the club of a strong presi- dency to line up the American bu- reaucracy in the style required by his special kind of diplomacy, _ Unmistakable evidence of the Presi- denVs weakness abroad arose from his efforts to make the summit talks a per- sonal victory, He repeatedly and pub- licly declared that the talks and their success depended upon "personal di- plomacy" between himself and Secre- tary General Leonid Brezhnev. But the Russians did not rise to that bait, On one occasion, which referred to the future, Pravda struck the term "personal" from the text of a presiden- tial toast, At the final banquet, Mr. Brezhnev Made rejoinder to the President's stress on personal diplomacy by point- edly alluding to the American people , and the American Congress. The Rus- sians have come to understand that their future with the United States re- quires a thick diet of relations with all elements in American life. It says something of Moscow's changing view that a documentary film of Sen. Ed- ward Kennedy's recent visit to Russia WASHINGTON POST, Frida). July 5, 1974- opened here last week, Neither were the Russians prepared to oblige the President on the main matter of substance in the summit talks here. The big item on the agenda turned around proposals for a limita- tion on multi-headed missiles, or MIRVs., The Russians clearly sensed that they had Mr. Nixon on the defensive. , Secretary General Brezhnev presented proposals which would have allowed the Russians to catch up with the United States and perhaps achieve a decisive edge in 1980. The Politburo spurned more restrictive numbers put forward by Mr. Nixon. Not only did the Russians feel able to hang tough, but it seems clear that thelPresident could not have bought a slightly softer Russian position. Mr. Nixon depends on conservative votes In the Senate to overcome impeach- ment, The last thing he can afford is a nuclear agreement that would alienate such hawks as Barry Goldwater, ? Congressional opposition was the more certain because the administra- tion position on MIRV limitation has not been unanimous. Defense Secre- tary James Schlesinger actually wanted more restrictive limits on So- viet deployment than those set forth in the U.S. proposal which the Russians rejected. Had a deal been struck there would have been some murderous in- fighting within the administration. For, relations among the chief fig- ures inside Mr. Nixon's government. have been recently altered. Dr. Kis- - singer used ? by invoking the Presi- dent's authority and by playing a close, Global Relations Inside game ? to force his own posi- tions on the rest of Washington. But the presidency which he once brandished as a club has turned into a banana. Independent-minded men, - such as Dr. Schlesinger, can and do take positions which differ from those , of the Secretary of State. Dr. .Kis- singer now has to make treaties with the Washington opposition instead of overcoming it by main force. ? It says a good deal that during the Moscow visit various Russians ex- pressed a keen interest in a visit from the Defense Secretary, It also says - something that Dr, Kissinger hung back in the negotiations, and once, not entirely in jest, said, "Nobody tells me anything. I -just follow ten paces be- ? hind." _ ? _ _ What was achieved at the Moscow summit, in these conditions, is not\ to be disparaged. The condition called de- tente was maintained. Some accords which' provide for further cooperation - were signed, A. truly bad deal was avoided, I . No doubt it is unfortunate that more was not achieved. But no one should be in any doubt as to why the accom- plishment was so meager. ? The central fact is that the United States has a President crushed by the problems which have brought an lm peachment process down upon his. head. Even if he were a man of pure motive and unblemished conscience, he could not possibly separate out his own interest from the national inter- est. So long as he remains in office, the country will limp along in its most important international business. 1074, field EnterPrifics, Inc An Epitaph for Detente rytHE PREMIER diplomatic project of the Nixon pres1- 1- dency, to negotiate Meaningful checks on the stra- tegic arms race, is stalemated. The point of all previous arms control agreements was to build up political momentum to tackle the problem of strategic offensive nuclear arms. As recently as, the last summit, that was the goal for this one. In Moscow, however, Mr. Nixon and Mr. Brezhnev evidently could not come near finding a mutually acceptable basis to put permanent controls on offensive arms or temporary stopgap con- trols on the development and deployment of the multiple- warhead missiles cal/ed MIRVs, technologically and po- litically the hottest brand of strategic weaponry. They could only agree to send their negotiators back to Geneva to negotiate a "new agreement," to follow the interim offensive-arms limitation expiring in 1977, to cover the decade ending in 1985. Not everyone, of course, agrees that the summit re- flects such a great disappointment. Mr. Nixon, as his TV audience Wednesday night could plainly see, has .his own domestic political reasons to portray his diplomacy as fruitful and forward-looking ("the process of peace is going steadily forward"): this is his principal bulwark against impeachment. Mr. Schlesinger, the Secretary of Defense, having long worried of the possibility of ill- considered arms control agreements, at once offered the stoical view that the BclaVg1394 ibikekkattd21001108/ have Its dialogue with 1 meow sustained. Certainly those who professed to fear that Mr. Nixon would give away the nation's security to compensate for his Watergate Weakness have been proven wrong. $efore he left Moscow, however, Secretary of State Kissinger uttered what struck us as an apt remark. "Both sides have to convince their military establishments of the benefits of restraint," he said, "and that is not a thought that comes naturally to military people on either side." As a statement or allegation about the Soviet government, these words?spoken in Moscow, no less?are startling enough. As a statement or report about the American government, they are even more startling, 'suggesting as they do that President Nixon has not convinced the Pentagon and its political allies of those "benefits of restraint". Recall the uncontested fact that Mr. Nixon' went to Moscow without having resolved strong differences among his advisers on how to proceed on arms control. No one can say flatly what alterations in its position the Kremlin might have made but it is evident that President Nixon did not resolve the differences he brought to Moscow in a way making substantial progress possible. Certainly the American "military establish- ment" cannot be faulted for offering the President its best judgment of what the national security requires. The APripidgedgyili J,410 klyndlitammtp3As to make 66ffiligifig judgments. In 31 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 the circumstances, it is hard to avoid suspecting that 'Mr. Nixon negotiated as he did not merely because he may have been swayed by the Pentagon's strategic arguments but because he wished to protect his domestic political position against attack from the right. In other words, considerations of political survival influenced his determination of the requirements of national se- ?curity. Here is Watergate at work in the most dispirit- ing and Insidious way. This is not to dismiss the particular accomplishments of this summit. The agreement not to build a second ABM site is reassuring, and perhaps not entirely the foregone conclusion that many people had thought it to be. The threshhold test ban, which will limit underground tests of warheads larger than 150 kilotons starting in 1976, will strike many observers as late, weak and incomplete but it will evidently put a stop, two years from-now, to cer- tain arms work that both sides might otherwise have carried forward, and it sets some useful technical prece- dents?exchanging test-site geological data, for instance. Then, it is good neles, if not exactly worth house-top !broadcast, that Moscow and Washington will work on 'agreements to prevent the waging of war by modifying the weather, and to take a "first step" to control the ."most dangerous, lethal" kinds of chemical warfare. " The political results of the summit, furthermore, are : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 'not to be dierniesed. "Detente," we are all learning, can provide a framework for orderly discussion of difficult problems like the Mideast and Europe, even when solu- tions are remote. This fact is registered in the final com- munique. On trade, Mr. Nixon?wisely?seems to have Made no promises which will precipitate a battle with Congress. The word he brings back on Soviet emigration policies will be especially important in this regard. The apparently common Soviet-American desire to make new bilateral agreements symbolizing progress in detente is leading to some pretty rarified areas, such as?this time ?"artificial heart research." Mr. Brezhnev is to come to the United States next year. This is well and good. The more that summits become routine, the more they can perhaps be isolated?though of course there is a limit? from 'political tugs and pulls in both countries. For all of this, the bottom line is that the dangerous arms build-up has not yet been checked. Both countries are now moving ahead to what Dr. Kissinger calls "astro- nomical" numbers of warheads. "What in the name of God," he declared to newsmen in Moscow, "is strategic superiority at these levels?" Barring a measure of mu- tual restraint in the next few years in the absence of a formal agreement, this just might be?at least in respect , to the arms race?an epitaph for detente.,. THE 4 THE NEW YORK TIMES SATURDAY, JUNE 29, 1974 Power in the World Economic Arena By O. Edmund Clubb " -PALENVILLE, N. Y.--:-The World is experiencing *a :massive power shift. There 'is talk of military budgets, multiple-warhead missiles,' strategic. ' arms talks and ?counterforce strategy. But the real issues lie in the inter- national. economic arena. There, the United States and its, allies battle among themselves, while the Soviet -Union, a sometime 'enemy, is rapidly .gaining ground. - The Nixon Administration's strategic oiiCepts and tactical Maneuvers are seriously flawed. In' July, 1971, the President forecast that future world confrontations would 'be among the United States, the European Economic - Community, Japan, the Soviet Union, and China. Confrontations promptly ensued, but they were primarily among the United States, the Common Market and Japan, and not with the Commu- nist powers that the -so-called free world had been organized to combat'. Later, ? Henry A. Kissinger' hailed :1973 as "the Year of Europe" (with . a role provided for Japan) but disputea 'persisted within the projected partner- ? ;ship .and were aggravated by the ? Arab-Israeli war. Though-the full impact Of The energy crisis on the international trade -struc- ture ,and .monetary 'system is still to be felt, commercial patterns are being distorted, inflation . magnified, and Protectionism spurred in the capitalist world. Also, internal political weak- nessesiii the West will be aggravated by the growing economic nationalism of Third World countries, who threat- en to have' greater control over their valuable raw materials.. The United States; Japan and Western Europe must share the limited supplies, or compete for them. The' free enterprise system is not designed for sharing with competitors, ' and the United States Produces an agricultural surplus With which it can pay some of the increased costs of oil imports. - The North Atlantic Treaty *Organ= ization. referred in its June 19 declara- tion to' 'sources of conflict between' their economic policies'," reflecting the actuality. Mr. Nixon's Moscow visit is to be viewed In that light." ,The Soviet _Union also faces indus- trial and agricultural problems. But it has not been involved in the capitalist world's economic feuding and has thus been' spared major economic dif- ficulties: Its gross national product climbs, its foreign .trade is expanding, the ruble is stable. And the Soviet Union 'is More richly endowed with natural resources than even the United States. Possessing vast reserves of oil and natural gas, and over one-half of the world's coal, it is self-sufficient in energy, and in 1973 exported 118 million metric tons of petroleum and 4.9 billion cubic meters of natural gas. It also exports such goods as nickel, chromium and platinum-group metals ?which other industrialized countries have to import. The Soviet Union Is in a position to produce substantial . surpluses of. 32 ?energy mat&ials and metals for export ? at a time when .the E.E.C., Japan and the United States face major deficit's of thbse goods. ? Soviet trade with the West was up 40 per cent in 1973. Trade with the United States doubled over that of ?the year before, but West Germany iwas still the Soviet Union's chief capi- talist trading partner. The present urge of E.E.C. countries and Japan in partic- ular to exchange? industrial equipment ? and technology for needed raw ma- terials is only a fraction of what it promises to be in a short time. Just as the Europeans dealt directly with the Arab countries in 1973 despite American displeasure, so will they deal increasingly in the future with both. the Third World and the Soviet Union. The Nixon Doctrine disrupted our major alliances and was counterpro- ductive. The Administration's attempts -to assert American domination over ? the capitalist sector of the global econ- omy has failed. World influence is . now destined to flow not to those commanding the biggest nuclear war- heads but to those wielding economic ? power. A fundamental adjustment of American foreign policy, relating it more effectively to a radically altered ,global economic situation, should be the order of the day. 0. Edmund Ciubb was former director of the State Department's Office of: Chinese Affairs.. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010033000-8 ? LONDON T I ME5 5 July 1974 The poppy crop that could cost Turkey, dear A Bill to cut off all US aid to Turkey if poppy'cultivation were If resumed, is going ?rough Congress rapidly now The Turkish Government is risking a major crisis in its relations with the United States after its decision to up- hold an electoral pledge and lift the ban on the cultivation -of the opium poppy, the source of morphine and heroin. The American Government which regards Turkey as. the origin of ' as much as 80 per cent of all the heroin smuggled into the United States, had made it "vigorously clear" to Ankara that to rescind the poppy ban would, cause irre- parable damage in their rela- tions, if not a definite breach. Uniler the current law in Tur- key, the Government -had to produce a decree by July 1 list- ing the districts where the ban must continue. This is in- tended to give farmers timely warning to switch to other, less lucrative, crops. This year's decree names all but six or seven of the main districts in the poppy-growing plains of south-western Anatolia. The Americans accuse the Etevit Government of choosing this issue, so vital to their drive against hard-drug addiction in. the. United States merely in . order -to display " virility " in their external relations. They forecast that Congress - would ut off all United States eco- omic and military aid to Tur- key in retaliation. Turkish Government ieaders hrug off the threats as out ageons. . They insist that their THE ECONOMIST JUNE 29, 1974 Nuclear tests All in secret e' motive is the economic well being of about one million Turks who live off this crop. They give solemn pledges that the product will be controlled so effectively that? none of it will be diverted from the medi- cinal purposes ,for which it is intended. United States -? officials asserted that the popy ban in Turkey, imposed in 1971 under strong American pressure, has had spectacular results in their campaign .to check the spread of drug addiction in the United States. They said that a major heroin shortage in the United States in --the -past two years had forced many . addicts to seek medical treatment. They attributed this to the ban, as well, as the fact that the -price of heroin in the streets of New York had risen from 18p to 63p a milligram by mid-1973, while its purity at street leyel had decreased considerably. The United States Drug En. fprcement Administration noticed a sharp decline in the total haul of heroin-intercepted in the United States from 705 . kilograms in 1971 to 219 kilo. grams in 1973?only 63 - per cent of it white (therefore pre-. sumably kish) against 92 per cent in mid-1972. The grave implications that a lifting of the poppy ban would ? have on United States-Turkish relations were recently. con- veyed by the American Ambas- sador, Mr William Macomber, jar, personally .to the: Prime ; It is a measure of present British politics that the angriest public debate on defence policy in years should have been initiated by a speculative report in a daily news- paper. At the weekend Labour's left wing was up in arms because it thought Britain was about to test a nuclear weapon underground in Nevada; on Monday it discovered from Mr Wilson that the test. had._ already taken... place some weeks ago. The metire. riv&witiFIbr Mr Wilson tried to pers ae-the left 33 Minigter,- ? Mr. ?Billent ? Ecevit whose Republican ? People's Party is the senior partner in the ruling coalition. - The Turkish leader was told of resentment in Congress where poppy growing in Turkey .and the rate of drug-addiction in the United Sfates were dramatic- ally linked in a direct cause-and- effect relationship. Lester Wolff, Chairman of the House of Representatives Special Nar- cotics Subcommittee, stated recentiy : "If Turkey rescinds the ban . . . we may expect to lose an additional 250,000 young Americans to the ravishes of drug addiction." -A Bill to cut off all United States aid to Turkey if poppy cultivation were resumed, it ; "going through- Congress rapidly now. American officials said if the bill went through as it is, it would end United States mi-ti- tary and economic aid to Turkey worth some $200m annually. ? "If they go ahead with it ", one American diplomat set "relations between the two countries will never be the ,same again. To cut off aid will be felt here not so _much as a financial loss as an insult from the United States." The United States-Turkish opium controversy has gained nationalist overtones which reflect the Ecevit Government's eagerness to show?at home and abroad?that the days of unquesz tioning conformism in Turkey's relations with the West are over and gone. Beyond this there is the awareness that the United States might ill be able to afford, ail this Phase in East-West rela- tions, the removal of United" States bases in Turkey. To ensure effective control the authorities are expected to limit poppy-growing to areas totalling 50,000 acres in the six_ cultivation of other crops in these districts will be banned so. that aerial inspection would be, possible. - , The poppies would not be incised to drain the opium gum, but the plant will be sur- rendered as a whole to the state agents. The price is to be raised substantially to discourage illicit that it had nothing to complain about cast more light on Mr Wilson's habitual politicking than on anything else. But it is a measure of the international self- confidence of the present government that it saw fit to-keep secret as long as possible a smallish, non-polluting and wholly legal nuclear test conducted in strict accordance with Britain's inter- national undertakings. The real issue and one that merited serious public concern early last year but did not get much of it, was whether Britain should install new tubes in its Frelisithap 21311111013/0goic bek.FEHur Polaris submarines to take the lailarlyo independently-targetable re-entry vehicles sales, seeing that in any event -only a fraction of the price even- tually fetched by smuggled nar- cotics reaches the farmer. The Americans are accusing Turkey of violating an arrange- ment made in 1971 whereby the US budgeted a programme worth $35.7m for the payment- of compensation to farmers for three years, as well as to firi- ance crop substitution pro- grammes. The Turkish Govern- ment denies the arrangement was binding. They have serious' doubts that any form of control. could be effective, especially after the discovery of a heroin- laboratory in Turkey for the first time in 12 years last May-.i A leading Turkish parlia- mentarian whose opinions in-- fluence the Government poli cies; said : "We know that this is one of the dirtiest businesses in the 'world. It does not give us joy to deal with opium, nor is it a question of challenge or prestige. But we must ensure "the livelihood of about one mu- -lion peasants before we ban the- crop on which they made a hi-- , ing for centuries." -The US crop substitution pro. was quite inadequate and although he was aware that the Americans were willing to pay a much higher price to keen the ban, nothing could be done this year: Turkish officials and private- individuals react sharply when the poppy dispute is treated as a problem of morality or ethics : "Why should Turkey be ' the only poppy-growine country which is being pressed to ban it. Just because the drug is not consumed locally as jr other countries ? ", asked an influential Turkish journalist. Mr Semih Akbil, the Govern- ment spokesman, raised a dif- ferent objection : "The Ameri- cans manufture guns and sell them freely ", he said. "Each year about 100,000 guns are smuggled into Turkey. Do we ask the Americans to stop manufacturing guns? .No, no. We just tighten our controls against smugglers." Mario Modiano (lvflivs), or build new warheads for the American-produced missile bodies it already has. There are many factors involved: whether the United States will continue to supply spare parts for Polaris missiles that its own forces are now giving up; how much extra protection the submarines would get from Poseidon's longer range, which enables them to operate farther away from Russia; and whether it is really necessary to have a lot of Mirvs to get through Russia's anti- missile defences. ' But the time for debating these things 401%tritish test means cision as been made: to design new warheads for the present pprove or Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 missiles. The actual installation could begin within a year: This is very likely the correct decision, and no British government should have hesitated to explain it, or to let the Soviet Union know about it. After all, secret deterrents do not deter. ? ? It is the cheaper decision, by millions of pounds, compared with putting new ? tubes in the submarines to take Poseidon missiles. The money saved is money Britain badly needs to spend on its conventional forces. The extra range of the Poseidon, which is of immense value to the Americans, is not so valuable to Britain. Poseidon's Miry warheads- 1 0- 14 per missile, compared with 3 cluster-type in Polaris?are primarily of use in avoiding and confusing a wide anti-ballistic missile defence of a sort that does not yet exist in Russia, and probably will never be built. Even if it is, a smaller number of warheads would probably still deter an attack on Britain. -So Britain's missiles are to be modern- ised,. but-not replaced. The Nevada test does not add to the number of nucl powers, as India's did last month; ? unlike France's tests in the Pacifi produces no fall-out; The aim of th who-attack it is thatBritain should ce to be one- of the five accepted nucl countries. There was never any ques that Britain could pay the price or mus the. technological -shit to stay in business. There was; and still is, as great nuclear non-debate of 1974 sho a serious question whether British poll is up to coping with the nuclear age. - BALTIMORE SUN 11 July 1974 'To i ? I L inamed for not agreemg to complete Fay MICHAEL PARKS ' i China,- making it 'appear that' I trying to force an end to the n.ticlear ban. ' Moscow Bureau of The Sun the two superpowers were I Chinese nuclear weapons pro- gram. . Mr. Zamyatin did not go into the background of the negotia- tions on the new nuclear test }ban, which bars underground [nuclear weapons tests equiva- lent to more than 150,000 tons of TNT 'starting April 1, 1976, and his critical remarks sug- gested that Moscow wants to shift more of the blame for a lackluster, even disappointing summit onto Washington. Mr. Zamyr.tin also attacked pessimistic Western assess- ments of the summit, which Soviet commentators see as modestly successful, as deli- berate attempts to 'undermine public faith in detente itself. In particulai; he said that Western suggestions ? which in fact originated with the ana- lysis made by Dr. Kissinger ? that the two superpowers were , far apart on a new overall agreement to limit strategic arms is wrong. . "Skeptics who doubt that agreement are wrong," he said } of the decision to seek a 10- year pact lasting until '1985. ' There was "a big positive advance toward solving that problem" of limiting long- range missiles with their mul- tiple nuclear warheads during- . the summit, Mr. Zamyatin maintained. ' The failure to 'reach a per- Moscow?The chief Soviet }government spokesman blamed the United States last night for the failure during the ,Soviet-American summit meet- ing to agree to a full ban on underground nuclear tests. Lleonid N. Zamyatin, the director general of the govern- ment news agency ? 'a parti- cipant in the summit talks, said the Soviet Union had N nnted and still wants a flat prohibition against any under- ground testing of nuclear wea- pons. The reason that President Nixon and Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet Communist party's general secretary, failed to reach such an agreement, Zamyatin said, was "the posi- tion of the United States." "Our position is still," he continued, "that the Soviet Union stands for a complete end of underground tests of nuclear weapons." American officials' have openly said that they did in- deed reject a complete prohibi- tion at this time. Henry A. Kissinger, the United States Secretary of State, told a press conference here at the }end of the summit last week that Washington had op- posed a complete ban because Moscow's conditions would }make it impossible to verify , and enforce and because, he liraplied, it was directed at manent limitation and the Out- right declaration that both this type of agreement and even a short-term one are now impos- sible are the chief reasons for the pessimistic assessments made by Western commenta- tors. The discussion in which Mr. Zamyatin participated was ap-. parently directed at answering these questions for the nation- wide Soviet television audience and viewers in Eastern Eu- rope, where the 40-minute pro- gram was also broadcast' Mr. Zamyatin's carefully prepared comments were } meant not only to innoculate these listeners against the Western assessments but also to ansWer Dr. Kissinger's con- tinuing discussion of the sum- mit's secret negotiations, sources here said. The Kremlim has been parti- cularly annoyed, the sources said, by Dr. Kissinger's disclo- sures to newsmen traveling with him in Western Europe of summit negotiation details. Some of the information he has given, the sources said, amounted to a serious breach of confidence. The moderator of the televi- sion program, Valentin Zorin, a political commentator, took the occasion to attack Senator Henry M. Jackson, the Wash- 34 ington Democrat and, in the Soviet view, chief opponent of improved relations between Moscow and Washington. - "One must be very naive," Mr. Zorin said, "to believe that [Senator Jackson's trip to I Peking during the Moscow summit] was ' an aecidental coincidence." American sources here prov- ided additional background on the negotiations on the test- ban agreement, which supple- ments a 1963 treaty banning all nuclear tests in the atmos- There, outer space or in the sea. I The United States originally wanted a ban on anything above 150 kilotons, the agreed limit, but had wanted it to include peaceful nuclear explo- sions that in the end were excluded at Soviet insistence. The American position itself was a compromise reached by various American government agencies and took into account a military desire to test new missile warheads for which a 200 kiloton limit would be low and thecclesire of arms-control } experts to limit any under- ground explosions to less than } 30 kilotons, which they said } could be easily distinguished now from natural seismic dis- turbances. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 CFA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 ? LOS ANGELES TIMES 7 July 1.974 --- India's TECHNICAL KNOW-HOW SETS STAGE ? ? ? 1,"7:?? lit-VVILLIAM DRUMMOND *NE* DELHI?The Canadian govern- ment over the last 20 years gave India plentiful technical and financial assis- tance to develop nuclear energy for peace- ful purposes. Times staff writer William .Drummond is based in New Delhi. Ottawa recognized too late that this ? assistance had opened the way for New ljelhi to make an atomic bomb. ,..-Although Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau tried by negotiations and even- tually threats to head off India's steps to-. Ward. building an explosive device, he zooid not. ? . Of all the reactions to India's May .18 atomic test, Ottawa's has been the . bitterest, because the Canadians feel ?the"), were betrayed. The history of the Canada-India nuclear collaboration, pieced together from inter- views and docume:.ts, including previous- ly .unpublished correspondence between Trudeau and Prime Minister Indira Gand- hi; holds particular significance for the United States. ? Washington wants to sell Egypt a nu- clear reactor for the peaceful purpose of generating electrical power. Critics of the proposal say it will provide Egypt with the wherewithal to make a ,nuclear bomb and lead to proliferation in .the Middle East. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's. response to these fears were expressed in a June 19 press conference: ". ? We see no possibility that Egypt can develop nuclear weapons by means of the reactor that we have agreed to sell; it will take six to eight years to install or. build, and will be subject to safeguards which we consider substantially foolproof ? . . ? The Canadians look at Kissinger'S ? statements with skepticism. Their ex- perience with India taught them one major, unforgettable lesson: Safeguards and inspections, however "foolproof," can at best delay, prolifera- tion of nuclear weapons. They cannot stop it. This is not because evasion is inevitable, \ but because evasion may not be necessary for long. "Does- the American plan for Egypt in- volve a transfer of technology?" asked an Informed Canadian source. _"That should o b a Warning be the main consideration. PrOteeting the source of plutonium is predicated on safe guards, but the inevitable element of risk is the transfer of technology, not safe guarding the reactor." (Plutonium is the byproduct of the burning of uranium fuel in any nuclear reactor. The plutonium, after reprocess- ing, becomes the raw material for atomic explosive devices). -"Once a country acquires the technology to Operate a nuclear power plant," the Canadian said, "it can then move on to building its own unsafeguarded nuclear power plants. It can then have access to unsafeguarded plutonium. ? "As for acquiring explosion technology; the Indians got it on their own," the sources said. ? The debate on the Egyptian reactor sale according to these sources, should not fo- cus on safeguards on plutonium, but on whether America should give Egypt's technical elite a boost in a direction that would take many years for them to attain without external. aid. In this'respect, Canada's nuclear aid to India was of crucial importance.. By October, 1971, Canada had brought 263 Indians to Canada for training in nu- clear technology. In addition, Canada had put up $10.8 million, about half the total cost, to build the Canada-India nuclear reactor called CIRUS at the B.haba Atomic Research Center, Bombay. Another $89 million in credits was ex- .tended by Ottawa to buy equipment for the Rajasthan atomic power project near. .Kota. Against this background, Trudeau wrote to Mrs. Gandhi on Oct. 1,1.971: "You ? will remember in our talks (the _ previous January) I referred to the se- rious concern of the Canadian govern- ment regarding any further proliferation of nuclear explosive devices. The position of my government on nuclear explosions has been stated on a number of occasions and you will no doubt be well aware of it. "The use of Canadian supplied material, equipment and facilities in India, that is, at CIRUS, at Rajas- than, or fissile material from these reactors, for the development of a nuclear explosive device would ine- vitably call on our part for a reas- sessment of our nuclear operation arrangements with India . ." Mrs. Gandhi's response was cordial but noncommittal: "The obligations undertaken by for U.S. our t`Wo ? governments are mutual and they.cannot be unilaterally va- ried. In these circumstances, it should not be necessary, now in our view, to interpret these agreements in a particular way based on the development of a hypothetical con- tingency." The contingency was anything but hypothetical, as India's atomic blast. last May 18 proved. How had India gotten the plutoni- , urn?. ? ? - . - It carne from the CIRUS reactor, as New Delhi later informed Ottawa.. ' But the plutonium was not of - Canadian origin. India had put its own uranium in CIRUS, and made weapons-grade plutonium. India used know-how that was largely a spinoff from the many: years of Canadian and, to a lesser de- gree, American technical assistance. Under the CIRUS agreement, Can- ada had the right to inspect any Canadian uranium fuel in the reac- tor. However, CIRUS had not used: Canadian fuel for several years. India said the Canadian -fuel had ."corroded" in the reactor and as a 'result, Indian uranium fuel was sub-' stitu ted. As the Canadians- point out, the ,agreements for safeguarding CIR.VS were worked out in 1956, 14 Years before the nuclear nonproliferation treaty took effect. Canada signed the treaty, but India neser has. It 'was impossible for Ottawa to.; .impose inspection under the Inter- national Atomic Energy Agency. Thus what Canada had to settle for was a limited inspection access, that is, permission to inspect only Cana- - dian fuel. ? This inspection was ineffective when India substituted its own ura- nium fuel. While reactors can be sealed off and inspected, knowl- edge cannot. The CIRUS and Rajasthan reac- tors have made such a major contri- bution to India's know-how that New Delhi is .now building wholly indigenous reactors, which will in turn become sources of unsafeguard- ed plutonium. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 35 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 - EasterivEurop - BALTIMORE SUN 8 July 1974 Reasoner became delivery boy when Harry Reasoner became Even after an official ery boy last week. the world's highest paid deliv-o censorship an ogydTuesday a pledge that Russians pulled plu Soviet apol for 's The $250,000-a-year Al3C wou dn t happen again, ; 'Moscow privately feel that to us in China?' - ? News anchorman, angered Russian technicians Wednes- the White House didn't want by Soviet censorship of day night again refused to TV reports on Soviet Jews,' American TV news reports transmit an interview with intellectual dissidents or hun- from the Soviet Union, per- Sakharov by a CBS news- ger strikes any more than. sonally escorted a can of man, Murray Fromson. Russian leaders did. news film on a flight fronr "They pulled the plug on ' The newsmen believe the IMfinoas1cIoywwtoasLoanbldeonto, wfeheedrethhe spokesman said. e ' us again," a CBS News ',Nixon administration there- ': fore applied little or no diplo- film via satellite to the ' "The Russian engineers matic pressure on the Soviet United States in time for his told Murray they thought his hierarchy to give American network's Wednesday news- film was anti-Soviet and that TV reporters freedom to cast. .? they wouldn't transmit it. transmit their choice of news 'The report, an interview. And they didn't. They, just stories during the Nixon,- by Russell Jones with Andrei walked out and refused to Brezhnev meetings. Sakharov, the dissident Rus-' rack up the film." ; Sources at the networks sian physicist, was one of six 'The CBS White House cor-; said the Soviet technicians news - stories abruptly- respondent, Dan Rather, who cut off the satellite re- blacked out Tuesday evening? meantime, placed partial re- ports were supervisory per- when Soviet technicians sponsibility for the censor; sonnel and not rank-and-file "pulled the plug" on CBS, ship on the Nixon adminis- workers as the Soviet gov- NBC, and ABC. - tration. ? ' ernment claimed. The low- All three networks telecast ' "As far as can be deter- er-echelon workers were the abbrieviated and garbled mined," Rather, charged, deeply embarrassed by the reports?blackouts and all? "White House officials did situation, the sources said. and explained to American -nothing to prevent the Soviets Rather said there were no viewers exactly what had from making good on their shouting matches or taunts taken place. ?1 1 threat [to censor)." exhanged between American Pressing Reasoner into Rather and several other. newsmen and Soviet TV em- emergency duty as a flying U.S. network newsmen ,who ployees when the blackout messenger proved to 'be a accompanied President occurred. Instead, he ex- wise move by ABC- , , Nixon on his summit trip,to plained, there was quiet in the studio. ' Finally, one American !broadcaster called out to an- i ,other, "Did they ever do this 'THE WASHINGTON Pair- Friday, July 5,1974 , ? ? R . _ "No, they didn't," another answered from the opposite side of the room. The Soviet technicians said nothing, and the blackout continued. Bill Sheehan, senior vice president of ABC News, said both the Secretary of State,' Henry A. Kissinger, and the White House press secretary, Ronald L. Ziegler, "indicated. they Were very upset" by the. Soviet censorship, and that they would register a formal'. protest if the networks re- quested it. "It's really just an exten-: sion of the difficulty we a!- ways have in Russia with: filth cameras," said. "You have to hire: your: film cameras from the Rus-? sians and you have to tell; them what story you want to do- And if they don't like the story, then there's no film camera- available to you. "But it was surprising that It could happen during this: Nixon visit, in such a cordial atmosphere of diplomacy.") ? . Xnlight News Service Censorship' and Sthnn"titry- ? yt was only a week after the United States Supreme Court had affirmed the principle that a free society can only remain free if the government keeps it hands off the news. Tuesday night, the Russian technicians who operated the "satellite feed" that brought pictures from the Moscow, summit showed what happens when governments take into their own hands the right to censor public expression. Each time American broad- cast correspondents tried to get out the stork of what was happening to Soviet dissidents?with particular respect to the repressive precautions taken during Mr. Nixon's visit?the technicians cut them off in mid- sentence. It was a story the Russian authorities did not wish to have told while the summit was in progress, so they cut it off?just by pulling the plug. It has never been easy for Western correspondents to get stories out of the Soviet Union that the govern- ment didn't want told. And it is certainly, true that the 'Soviet Union is not the only government in the world that resorts to censoring what it dislikes to bear. Yet, the heavy fashion in which the Russians behaved on ? ? just this one occasion tells us all we need to know about , the value of a free press and the price that is paid when an overbearing government intervenes. The story the Americans were attempting to tell concerned the general problem of the lives of dissidents in the Soviet Union, and especially their treatment while President Nixon was in town. The story of the way that Mr. Nixon's presence resulted in the Russian authorities rounding up their local critics and jailing them was of more than passing interest to the American people. And yet Mr. Nixon's aides were conspicuously-silent on the subject, declining to lodge any forceful formal protest, saying merely to 'Whomever might be listening that the American broadcasters should have the right to cover and report whatever they pleased. It is some- what disappointing that no one in the President's party was willing to defend, if only for the record, the eleznen- i tary principles, so central to a free system of govern- ment, of a free press. Ironically, it was left to the Rus- sians, by their abrupt interruption of the American broadcasters, to drive the lesson home. 36 Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 -5 -* ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 WASHINGTON POST 9 July 1974 "George F. Will - ?r4 0171r, ?? Moscow: Censorship and Persecution - In Moscow, Mr. Nixon embarrassing.' ly 'and almost 'pathetically referred to detente as largely the product of his "personal relationship" with Leonid 'Brezhnev., ?? ? - It might seem odd that a President, even one fighting impeachment and trying to convince an understandably skeptical public that he is indispensa- ble to peace, should solicit public en- thusiasm for his "personal relation- ship" with the-commandant of the Gu- lag Archipelago. But these are odd times, as the summit demonstrated even before it started. As Mr. Nixon prepared to fly to Mos. cow there were numerous reports that Brezhnev was preparing for Mr. Nix- on's arrival by ordering wholesale ar- rests of the most conspicuously brave Jewish dissenters. Mr. Nixon gave no sign that he thought that anything un- toward was happening. -Here was' the leader of the free world placidly packing his toothbrush for a. trip that he knew already was producing as its first (and, as it turned out, its most important) result ,the .wholesale persecution of people whose only crime is 'adherence to principles of freedom. :. It would have been an act of simple , decency, and a useful political and dip-' lomatic stroke, for Mr. Nixon to have made' use of his "personal relation- ship" with Brezhnev by explaining to him that the arrests must stop or the, summit would stop. ? . . This would have demonstrated to an understandably skeptical American public that Mr. Nixon is not dead to all feelings of disgust about the bullying use of state power. And it would have demonstrated to an understandably skeptical Brezhnev that there is some Soviet behavior too gross for Mr. Nixon to tolerate in the name of de- But Mr. Nixon either did not dare or did not care to use his personal rela- tionship with Brezhnev to stop the ar- rests that his own trip was causing Aside from Mr. Nixon's nonresponse to the persecution of the Jews, the most interesting aspect of the summit was the brutal Soviet censorship of all U.S. television broadcasts from Moscow concerning the persecution. One reason Brezhnev arrested the Jews was to try to keep them away from American journalists. One reason Brezhnev censored the broadcasts to America is that he knew that he could do it without provoking a protest from Mr. Nixon, whose opinion of the press is no secret to Brezhnev. The U.S. television correspondents should have insisted that the Moscow authorities transmit the stories about the dissidents before transmitting all those stories about Mr. Nixon and Brezhnev drinking toasts to detente. The correspondents would have given the Soviet government a choice?ei- ther all the news from Moscow, or none of the news. Both Brezhnev and Mr. Nixon care very much about tele- vising those carefully staged events where they, sign the documents pro, DAILY TELEGRAPH, London 8 July 19714 ;U.S. FIRMS T -SHOW SPY GEAR' 0,.; ? 'IN MOSCOW ? ??;-:t ' By' Our' New York Staff Fears that some American !secret- intelligence systems may compromised "have been, :raised by the Chicago D'ibune, ivitich 'reported -yesterday- that- many and foreign, firms making police equipment are being urged to take part in :a 'Moscow exhibition on crime: ? detection next month. At" least two American com- panies making the latest elec- :trohic detection gear which can also be used to gather' political intelligence, have,. Agreed to' exhibit. A Middle West' firm gpecialisiiig in trade with linssiao Welt Internatiotial CorPoration, is, trying to drurit interest. ; ? ? A 'Chicago manufacturer ,who ...says rlo'Ps not: Plan to' ex! 4iibit, said: " It seems mighty; strange that a country which maintains its has little or nO' crime would want -our goods."' Department: of ' Commerce', Officials emphasised that there are! ,00 regulations banning the. n PlpfirdVitr FtAuPteltittstP200 eN alLISS . ? ? 1 4 ? ? ? 5 cV1-6 claiming detente. . ? ? -? We have no evidence or reason to .believe that Mr. Nixon uttered even a private protest to Brezhnev about ei- ther the arrests or the censorship. But if the arrests "and the censorship 'oc- ; cured in spite- of what Mr. Nixon, likes ; to call his quiet diplomacy, that is more evidence that the quiet diplo- ' macy is as unavailing as the personal relationship. It is interesting that Brezhnev's con-' ? trolled press, in translating Mr. Nix- on's remarks about the importance of. the "personal relationship," gave Mr. Nixon a taste of censorship. The Soviet . press dropped the word "personal" so. 'that Mr. Nixon's remark would be read as just a reference to the relationship -between two .nations. Marxism insists -that politics (and hence politicians) are ephiphenomena ?that history is a dialectic of vast im- personal forces moving ineluctably to ; a predictable climax. So a proper. 'Marxist like Brezhnev rejects the no- tion that any "personal relationship" is really important in history. ?? , . Unfortunately; the tattered doetrine of detente rests-on the blind hope that" the "Soviet leaders are not serious , about their Marxist ideology. But they obviously do ,take Marxism seriously., It conditions their approach to de-- tente., It assures them of the inevitable_ enfeeblement and eventual collapse of nations like ours., NEW NEW YORK TIMES 5 July 1974 'AMERICAN IN SOVIET 'SAYS U.S. BARS HIM MOSCOW, July 4?An Amer- ican Communist who settled in the Soviet Union 17 years ago said today that the Soviet au- thorities had given him permis- sion to go home but that the United States Government had blocked his return. Dean Hoxsley, who is 47 years old, reported that the consular office of the American Embassy here had notified him by letter that his request to be recognized as an American citi- zen had been rejected because he accepted a Soviet passport in 1957, thus surrendering his American citizenship. ? He said that his application to visit the United States as an alien had also been refused be- cause he had been a member of the American Communist party and because he did not in- end to return to the Soviet Union. But American consular offi- . ?cials have invited him to the embassy tomorrow for a further discussion of his case, Mr. Rox- 1/08/06's:ebrs4413.P.77-004.321300 s 00330003-8 37 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 Fiair4..EaSt WASHINGTON POST 30 June 1974 Food for Peace?Is It Really for Cambodia Seen Shifting Funds I By Philip ? Washington P PHNOM PENH ? Congres- sional efforts to prevent mili- tary use of funds generated , by the Food for Peace pro- gram apparently are being , frustrated by some ingenious bookkeeping in Cambodia and South Vietnam. Food for Peace is the American assistance program which for years has shipped massive amounts of foodstuffs to countries around the,world rincluding millions of dollars in goods yearly to Cambodia and, Vietnam. The proceeds from the sale of this food has consistently , been used to support the war ? effort in 'both countries and it is this practice which Con- gress set out to stop with legislation last year. r ? Despite the legislation, how- "ever, it appears the Cam- bodian government may be able to circumvent the intent ,.- , of Congress by simply allow- ing the funds to pile up un- used in a bank account and then printing an equal ; amount of new money to pay soldiers. A. McCombs ' , , ost Foreign Service . . " national Development (AID) a an administrative matter an required no specific Congres sional authorization. ? A' Senate Foreign Relation Committee report on the Sen ate version of the December legislation said, "It will keep Congress and the American , people better informed about this particular aspect of the 'foreign ad program." The legislation will, the re- port 'said, "enable Congress to I approve, disapprove, or amend agreements" for any future possible military use of funds ,,generated by .the Food for Peace, program. ' "In a larger context," the re- port said, "this (legislation) is simply another step forward, in the committee's efforts to help Congress redress the in balance between the executive and legislative branches in the field of foreign polcy." Aid officials here and in Sai- gon conceded that it was pos- .sible for them to appear be- fore Congress to request "specific authorization" to use Food for Peace-generated, funds for military purposes as contemplated in the December legislation. " ? - However, they said this was not likely to happen because such appearances would im- pose an unbearable adminis- trative burden on' them. "It's . scary?just the time that would be involved in bringing the U.S ' Congress into day-to-day dcisions." Thomas F. Olmsted, AID di-, rector here, also said it is un- likely that AID officials will go back to Congress with spe- cific requests. However, both Olmsted and Yaeger said they are planning trips to Washington in the near future to consult with higher AID officials who will make the final decisions on this and other problems raised by the December legislation. In addition, the officials will discuss other legislation now under consideration in Con- gress that would impose strict new limits on Foodf Peace pending in any one country 1 nd thus bring to an abrupt 1 mi the massive programs in s nclochina. . I In Saigon, it also appears ; possible that funds generated, by the program could be channeled into other non-mili- tary areas of the economy, freeing up equal amounts- of 1. money for military use and thus again frustrating Con- ' gress' efforts at control. - In the 1974 fiscal year end; ing today, $182 million in I ; Peace commodities were j i- shipped to Cambodia and $268 million to South Viet- nam. In each country, the food was sold for local cur- rency. Much of this currency was ? then given by . the United States to the government of t Cambodia and South Vietman m pay soidiers' salaries and .other military costs. It was this type of practice which many congresme.n con- sidered to be hidden and uncon- trolled war. spending by. the administration and which led to legislation this past Decem- J3er to bring it to a halt. The Congressional ban pro- a hibils any military use of funds e generated by the Food for Peacel I program "unless such [use] is 'specifically authorized by legis- lation." The ban goes into effect today. 1 'Previously grants were I made.1 Iby the U.S. Agency for Anter-1 !that now seems Possible. ! In the case of Cambodi where the Food for Peace pr ? gram plays a far more impo tent role in the tiny, staggc s ing wartime economy than i d does in Vietnam, the admini . tration presumably woul j have to launch an immediat s appeal to Congress for addi tional AID funds to keep Ca entire American effort her from collapsing. the Cambodian officials have a,I any idea how these debts?be- o-1 ginning with the healthy inter- r- est payment that comes due r- next year?can ever be repaid t to the United States. S - He also said the change in d status will place enormous e pressure on the government to " raise the price of rice because e under the previous grant sys- e tem, the government heavily subSidized rice. ? Although the Food for d Peace funds will now belong t to the Cambodian government, d Olmsted said, they still cannot o be used directly for military 0 Purposes under Public Law 480 and the administrative procedures of AID. _ AID procedures require that the funds be used for eco- nomic development projects approved by AID, he said.' However, he, added, Cambo- dia is in such a state of eco- nomic distress and general turmoil that there' are no con- ceivable, projects that could quOalilmfys.ted said the money will simply build up in the national bank and not be used. On the other h9nd, the gov- ernment can then turn around and print an equal amount of money that can be used to pay soldiers just as the Food for Peace funds have been used in the past, Olmsted said. ' , This can be done without generating the massive infla- tion that usually results when a government prints money, he said. Cambodia already suf- fers from tremendous infla- With respect to the Decem ber legislation, both. Olmste and Yaeger emphasized tha no Food for Peace-generate funds will be channeled t military uses after the June 3 mandatory cutoff. They both said that the ulti , mate use of the funds will be strictly legal and- in no _way designed to frustrate the ob- jectives of Congress. He said that Food-for Peace funds _can only be grauted to the government to the extent that there is a designated use for them under the provisions of Public Law 480. . The money can no longer go for military purposes, he said, and the other uses under the law, which include things like funds for painting the U.S. Embassy or acquiring books j for the Library of Congress are not sufficient to use the vast amounts of money in- Volved. Therefore, said Olmsted, un- der the law the funds revert to an entirely different status. Instead of belonging to the U.S. government, he said, they will now automatically belong to the Cambodian government, but in the form of a soft loan that must be repaid in dollars in 40 years. ' The payments must begin after 10 years, said Olmsted, with interest of 2 per cent dur- ing the next 10 years and 3 per cent after that. Olmsted said that Cambo- dian officials were "shocked" when they learned that the ef- fect of the December legisla- tion was to halt the free grants of funds that they had been receiving and to substi- tute for them obligations that must eventually be repaid in dollars. He said the officials were urther shocked when they I earned that roughly $110 mil-I ion that has built, up unusedi o far in their Food for Peace ccount will, instead of being ' ranted to them free, also be- ome a dollar obligation. here has not been such a uildup in Vietnam. Olmsted said neither he nor a Passage of such legislation resumably would end the c ossibility of bookkeeping flanges being used to circum- b ern) the December legislation at least on the large scale, 38 ? Olmsted said that, in real economic terms, when the United States sends large quantities of rice and other foodstuffs to a county like Cambodia hovering on the edge of bankruptcy and mili- tary disaster, this aid is, in fact,- military aid no matter what one calls Cambodia's domestically generated government reve- nues from taxes in fiscal 1974 amounted to $54 million?not nearly enough to cover its $109 million military and $60 million civilian budgets. The $115 million difference was made up roughly by $50 million in Food for Peace funds, $50 million in local funds generated by the Com- mercial Import Program, and $15 million in deficit financ- ing. The . Commercial Import Program, which works like the Food for Peace program ex- cept that it involves commodi- ties other than food, is author- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 ApOroved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 ? ized under the Foreign Assist- ance Act and has not been as strongly criticized as the Food for Peace program as a hiding place for military aid. The Cambodian military budget goes mostly for pay and benefits. U.S. military as- sistance to Cambodia is not in- cluded in this budget figure. Under the old Food for W./6%11MM POST 30 June 19714 I Peace system, Olmsted's office i maintained strict control over the military uses to which the granted funds were put For example, he said, AID was able to get the Cambodi- ans to institute a computer- ized pay system in the army that substantially reduced the number of -ghost" soldiers? troops that did not exist but whose officers received their pay. Under the ? new system, Olmsted said this control will be lessened. In Saigon, Yaeger said that the December legislation will also mean a change in status in the Food for Peace program that will probably impose a similar 40-year soft loan on the-government ? ' " However, he' said, 'govern- ment officials were very diss turbed when they learned of the change and it is not yet clear if they will continue to accept Food for, Peace under the condition that they 'must pay for it in dollars. iniiochin?ood Aid Program Under Ftre ? - By Dan Morgan ; Washington Post Staff Writer "These decisions are made Congressional battle lines ' ss are drawn between security-, y, -minded supporters of the de -Nixon doctrine of giving aid priority to U.S. military a- clients, and ? "doves" who, e- feel the many-faceted aid to Saigon is only delaying an ' - eventual political accommo- dation between the regime and the Cemmunists. However, officials who p. o .) have followed the evolution al? of the Food for Peace pro- - ic gram over the years say a_ broader principles are in- Or volved. Secretary of State-, Henry A. Kissinger has called for a t t world food conference to be n held,in Rome in November. . t e_ The plight of hungry na- ? tions, and the response of y n wealthy countries to it, is t i. high on the agenda. e - In the background are ri- d valries involving half a t ? dozen government agencies, t ? which have differed in the o 0 / Past two years over the allo- a o- cation of the United States' A limited food aid resources. These rivalries have some- a times pitted representatives t of Kissinger against those of Agriculture Secretary Earl L. Butz, with Butz often G emerging the loser. Sources said, that in the interagency board that allo- cates food resources, Kis- singer's aides on the Na- tional Security Council con- sistently pressed for massive shipments to Indochina?the downtown by a facele group, an interagency hod it is called, and it is ma up of representatives fro OMB, Treasury, AID, N tional Security, National D fense and Agriculture . . What it amounts to is ? $435-million slush fund." . With those words on ti House floor June 21, Re James P. Johnson (R-Col opened a congression . drive to force a drast shake-up of the administr tion's food aid program?f years the least questione .form of foreign assistance. A Johnson amendmen which the House passed o a 61-to-51 vote would pr vent the administratio from allocating more tha 10 per cent of the appropr ated funds to any singl country. The effect woul be to put a $42.5 milli? 1974 ceiling on farm corn modifies transferred t South Vietnam and Camb dia under concessiona loans. Advocates of a radic -reordering of food aid prio ities charge that the admin istration has systematicall used the 20-year-old Publi Law 480 to circumvent con gressional limits on milifer and economic aid to Ind china. In the fiscal year jus ending, nearly half of al food aid loans were allo cated to South Vietnam an Cambodia. Johnson's amendment, at tached to the admin istra tion's agricultural spending bill, is now before a Senat Appropriations subcommit tee which is reported fairly evenly divided on the issue Public Law 480, which es- tablished the food aid pro- grams of the 1950s and 1960s, was set up to make use of surplus U.S. food pro- duction, develop overseas markets, combat hunger and "promote in other ways the foreign policy of the United States." Some critics claim that the latter has increasingly become the central rationale for American food largesse, with less and less emphasis given to humanitarian con- siderations or feeding_ the world's hungry. The United States halted food aid loans to India after hat country's war with Pakistan in 1971, and plans o resume such loans to Chiletheg fiscal ear, in the aftermath of he ouster of the Marxist egime of the late Salvador Allende. The Agency for In- ernational Development es- imates that $35 million out , f the total $50 million food ssistance loans t South merica will be allocated to hile. Food aid loans are at n average 2.2 per cent in-, erest for a period averag- ng 33 years A report issued by the eneral Accounting Office this year stopped just short f calling a 1971 American ledge to increase by $275 illion food aid commit- ents to South Korea a po- itical quid pro quo for eoul's agreement to limit extile exports to the United tates. Subsequently, however, e United States sharply educed its 'food aid to Ko- ea. The United States re- ponded to Korean corn- taints by saying the corn odities were not available. ut some congressional offi- als assert that the reason as the heavy diversion of od products to South Viet- am. In the coming fiscal year, owever, food loan ship- ents to the Seoul regime ill be increased from $10 illion to an estimated $150 illion AID says. The adniinistration pre- , cts a slight v decline n the value of food aid ipments in the coming i ar: $891.7 million corn- . 4VIVIC)91-1I Senate sources said that Sen. George McGovern (D- S.D.), barked by a number / of Senate liberals and some Republicans, would make a floor fight for the food aid . restrictions if the amend- _ merit is deleted in the sub- committee. "The issue here is the prostitution of the American Food for Peace program," said a Senate source last "Something has got to be done about food aid," an ad- serted. ministration officialAppo 1 so-called "supporting assist- S ance." Butz argued for giving the , th priority to countries such as r Indonesia and South Korea r because of their potential as s future commercial markets. In this debate, pleas for a , m bigger share for some 90 B other poor countries that re- pi ceivcd little or no food aid w .have gone mainly unheeded. fn In the House floor discus- n sion last week, Rep. James D. Symington (D-Mo.), ? h asked: "Why should 1 per m cent of the world's popula- w tion, the peoples of Cambo- , mm dia and South Vietnam, re- ceive nearly half of the di scarce funds available under i Title I? It does not seem sh proper, yet it happened in ye 1974, to our surprise and dis- vetlaFOr Release 2001/A8/08 on Hill It wants Congress to. ap- propriate $425 million in new money for the program of concessional sales of farm commodities, called Title I, and $353.2 million for the - food giveaway ? program, called Title II. According to AID, South Vietnam and Cambodia re-' ceived just under half the - world total of food aid in the fiscal year .just ending. In defense of this prepon- derance, officials say: "All the rice was eaten." They , - also assert that last year, be- cause of quadrupled U.S. rice prices, only 600,000 tons, rather than the 1 mil- - lion tons sent in fiscal year 1973, was shipped to" Indo- china. -Congressional critics re- ? 7 tort that the aid was nothing but a thinly disguised budg- etary subsidy for Saigon's war economy. Administration officials have conceeded that much of the proceeds from the Saigon government's sale of Public Law 480 food on the local economy went to mili- tary or defense 'purposes, with U.S. approval. Rep. Joseph P. Addabbo (D-N.Y.) Charged on the. House floor: "These funds 'all were used, or could -be used, un der aid for common defense, so as we cut the military aid ' they came' in through the back door with Public Law 480 aid and reversed the fandate of Congress." Under the 1973 Foreign Assistance Act, proceeds ,from the sale of the PL-480 commodities cannot be used for military purposes after . July 1, unless specifically authorized by Congress. However, some ambiguity apparently remained as re- cently as Jan. 21, when South Vietnamese Foreign Minister Vuong Van Bac signed a $55.2 million agree- ment for the delivery of, rice, soybean, corn and pea- nut seeds under Public Law. 480. In that, it was stated that the government of Viet- nam understood that the foreign aid act restriction ? iyaBrgiplys,n8 the effect of pro I ding the use of for- 39 ; Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8 ? eign currencies for-common defense purposes. U.S. offi- cials said last week that am- biguities have been cleared ) up. AID Director Daniel Par- ker told a Senate Agricul- ture Committee panel in April: "Unequivocally . . . we are not going to continue to use these funds for de- fense budgets." . Rep. Johnson's amend- : ment providing country ceil- -. Ings on future food aid ship- merits was opposed by Rep. lamie L. Whitten (D-Miss.), ? c hairman of the Agriculture ? Subcommittee of the House : Appropriations Committee, and by Rep. Otto Passman , (DLa.). Both are from rice- growing states. Passman's home state is the country's leading rice producer. The domestic mar- WASHINc-TON POST Sunday, June 30,1974 ? Covert unit , Disdosed to Australians Manchester Guardian CANBERRA ? Liberal for- mer Prime Minister William McMahon has revealed the.cryp- tic title of a top-secret security organization, MO-9, previously unknown to Australians. - ;McMahon referred to the or- rganization three times during a television interview but refused to discuss its operations. The revelation seems certain to escalate the ruling Labor Party's growing demands for a full examination of security and intelligence operations. It was only 18 months ago that the ex- istence of ASIS, the Australian Secret- Intelligence Service, calm to light. ? ! The right-wing news maga- zine, the Bulletin, recently pub- lished a long report on a 1971 security assessment of Jim Cairns, the deputy prime minis- -ter, from the files of ASIO, the 'Australian Security Intelligence Organization. ? The fourth known member of .the security family is JI0; the -Joint Intelligence Organization within the defense department, deals in strategic assessments and information. ASIO is sup- posed to be limited to domestic intelligence connected with pos- sible subversive activity. The government refuses to talk about ASIS, but it ap-. itet uses only. 35: to 40 per', cent of the rice produced in the United States. The rest is exported, much of it to Asia. The. rice industry has I been a major beneficiary of the Public Law 480 program,'' which has accounted for about half of all U.S.. rice exports in recent years. Rice Is not consumed in many poor parts of the world. Therefore, the Asian 'food aid program, rice industry officials say, is important. "This (congressional amendment)- will definitely be .a blow, if it meant losing that export market," said J. P. Gaines, executive presi- dent of the Rice Millers As- sociation. Public Law 480 still en- joys , a broad following among farmers and their pears to be primarily 'and per- haps solely concerned with gathering intelligence overseas_ It's existence became known when the precipitate withdrawal of Australian troops from Singa- pore last year uncovered a se- cret signals unit whose job was to monitor military and diplo- matic radio traffic in the region for NO and ASIS assessment. There is a marked reluctance among officials even to confirm the existence of MO-9. But it, too, maintains a network of op- eratives outside Australia, as- cording to the little information available. . It is said to deal in "purely factual" information about any country in which Australia has an interest. MO-9 agents are briefed to gather industrial, po- litical and some military intel- ligence as the basis for long- term assessments, but not to attempt to influence events. Prime Minister Gough Whit- lam already has instituted an inquiry into ASIO to be eon- ductedt by a Supreme Court judge. This was started late last year. There are now suggestions that the inquiry be widened to cover the entire intelligence es- tablishment. The dossier on Deputy 'Prime Minister Cairns leaked to the press was prepared during McMahon's term, but he dis- claimed any knowledge of it. ' "If I had known that the ac- tivities of a member of Parlia- ment were under scrutiny by ASIO I would have immediately taken action to see that it stopped, and that what records there were, were destroyed," he. said. , - Liberal Party Sen. ? Ivor Greenwood, who was attorney general at the time was re- sponsible for ASIO, has also disclaimed knowledge of the file but defended it as a legiti- mate activity of the organiza- representatives; on Capitol Hill. Although world food demand outstripped supply last year, some farmers feel that bumper U.S. corn and wheat crops this year could reverse the trend. There- fore, Public Law 480 is seen as the best guarantee that the government will still be around to help move- sur- pluses abroad, if foreign de- mand slackens. The food aid debate marks a questioning of the allocation procedure, rather ? than the program itself. Critics point out that only $4.1 million in food givea- ways is currenly planned for the drought-stricken Sa- hel region in Africa?one, fortieth of the South Viet- nam estimate. 40 -...House and. Senate critics claim' that the food aid op' - propriations, as handled in the past, give the adminis- tration a blank check. ' The interagency board which decides how he funds are spent can shift the' allocations from one-coun- try to another without con- gressional approval. It also has at its disposal some $300 million in annual loan re- payments. , There are other loopholes as well, Johnson and others maintain. "If they're determined to 'keep-the aid to South Viet- nam at the present high level, they can do it one way or another," said one offi- cial. "The question is how long they -are prepared to hold the whole program hos- tage to Vietnam." THE GUARDIAN, MANCHESTER 26 June 1974 Cambodia's' rotteii ? fru Prince Sihanouk once boasted that he, had only to wait until Phnom Penh fell to him like an overripe fruit. By Most standards, the' govern- ment of Marshal Lon Nol and the area under his control have gone rotten on the branch. But even Without the support of *American bombing, it: steadfastly refuses to drop., The ,capacity of this lame government for hanging on has often been underestimated. With the dry: season coming to an end; it looks as if the weather will contribute to .extending..its life. Lon Nol is in trouble from many directions. His Prime Minister, Long Boret, who has proved no more competent than his predecessors, formed his most recent cabinet against a background of inter-party bickering. His previous government -had been brought down by student demonstrations ;which- culminated at the beginning of this month in, the murder of the Minister of Education. Their." -complaints ? against a cost of living rising at the rate of 300 per cent a year, against the draft, and against corruption in government ? are 7 shared by many: But although the population is ? demoralised and overcrowded in the capital and the republican spirit of 1970 has evaporated, .its patience is not at an end. The military situation ' is poor, with the main roads from the capital to the ports and agricultural areas cut .off. The anti-Lon Nol forces; the Khmer ,Rouge; have their problems. They have shown some indecision -in changing their tactics from an assault on Phnom Penh to an assault on provincial Capitals. - Prince Sihanouk appears to be lOsing ' political support from Peking and Hanoi to the.: Deputy Prime Minister, Khieu Samphan. A vital 'factor in the longevity of Lon Nol's regime is the' US economic support, running at ?240 millions a year. Both sides are in fact victims of Cambodia's . long-standing tragedy of being everyone's puppet. . North Vietnam's priority is success in South Viet- ;..nam. Both China and the-US appear to be keeping their clients- armed and equipped up to a certain ? level. This produces an indecisive situation 'in , which both sides grind on without either looking ? likely for some time either to gain victory or to , suffer defeat. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8