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. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7 25X1A CONFIDENTIAL NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES INTERNAL USE ONLY This publication contains clippings from the domestic and foreign press for YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use of selected items would rarely be advisable. No, 9 1 JULY 1974 GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 1 GENERAL 20 EASTERN EUROPE 29 WESTERN EUROPE 31 NEAR EAST 32 AFRICA 35 FAR EAST 37 Destroy after backgrounder has served its purpose or within 60 days. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7 -?Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7. Foreign Policy Number 15, Summer 1974 Opinion ? ON BEING CENSORED by John Marks In places like Santo Domingo and Saigon, the local authorities on Occasion object to the publicationof certain news stories and, as a result, papers roll off the presses With gaping blank spaces. Americans abroad seem to react to this phenomenon in two I ways: They smile knowingly at the foolishness of trying to suppress the truth, I and they say that such heavy-handed I censorship could never occur back home. I 'Yet in June, a critical book which Victor Marchetti and I have written about the ICentfal Intelligence Agency will be published I With blank spaces scattered throughout its .400-odd pages. While the United States still maintains higher standards of press freedom than a banana or domino republic, it was ? the U.S. government?acting on behalf: of the CIA?that demanded that these deletions be made, and so far at least two Federal courts have upheld the government's right to censor, although one . judge?ruling essentially on technical grounds?refused to allow 85 percent of the government-requested deletions. There seems to be a tendency in the foreign affairs community to discount our case as being of little import to others. But if the government succeeds in muzzling ? us, then a legal precedent will be established that the government has the right to rule on the acceptability of writing done by virtually all former officials. The public, as a result, may well be deprived of one of its principal sources of information about American foreign policy. Also, aspiring bureaucrats may become reluctant even to enter government service when they realize that their prospective employer can assert lifetime control over their work. The same legal action taken against Marchetti, as a former CIA official, and taken against me, as an ex-State Department officer, could be used to force a future George Kennan to submit his Memoirs to State for prior approval. Jr could even require Leslie Gelb, a former Defense official now with the New York Times Washington Bureau, to send all his copy to the Pentagon before giving it to his editors. Those prospects should be disturbing even for people who Approved For Release 2001/08/08 ' disagree with our premise? that if there is ever to be meaningful reform of the CIA and the rest of the intelligence community, then the public and the Congress must have a better idea of what these clandestine agencies are?and are not?doing. Carefully Nurtured Myths Marchetti and I strongly believe that our First Amendment rights have been violated and that the only possible justification for ? government-mandated cuts in our book would be strict adherence to the standard set- forth by Justice Stewart in the Pentagon Papers case, namely that disclosure would "surely result in direct, immediate and irreparable damage to the Nation or its people." However, we believe that there is no daMuging material of that sort in the book, although we do acknowledge that publication might puncture a few carefully ? nurtured myths about the CIA; might embarrass some Agency officials; might cut down the frequency of cer- tain ongoing "reconnaissance" activities every bit as provocative aid as dangeroui ? as the ill-fated U-2 Rights over the Soviet Union; and might even put some pressure on Congress to exercise a degree of control over American intelligence. The CIA has a different view of the case. What is at stake, according to the government lawyers, is the sanctity of contracts entered into by all officials authorized to handle classified information and, beyond that, the ability of the . - government to keep secrets. High officials of the CIA have attached extraordinary importance to the book, devoting, by their own admission. thousands of Agency man-hours to deciding what should be censored. Their absolute control over their .employees?both past and present?seems threatened, and they claim that if this control is weakened, the "national security" will be also. But this argument confuses national interests ? with bureaucratic interests. Marchetti and I are both ex-bureaucrats, and when we joined, respectively, CIA and State, we signed so-called secrecy agreements in which we pledged not to "reveal" any "classified information" without the permission of our chiefs. The government maintains that these agreements bind us to silence for the rest of our lives. Yet, until our case arose, most government lawyers. ?and indeed the CIA's own Office of the General Counsel?did not believe that the agreements were enforceable in the : 9A-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7 ?-?./ Approved For Release 2001/08/08,: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7 eOurts.1 In fact, no legal action was taken to hold Daniel Ellsberg to his agreement even after the government received advance ? intelligence that he was trying to release the Pentagon Papers; nor, of course, was. any action ever taken against Lyndon Johnson,' George Ball, John Kenneth Galbraith, Roger Hilsman, or any other of the many former officials who have made unauthorized use of classified material in their post-government employment writing. But after the Supreme Court ruled in : June 1971, in the Pentagon Papers case, ithat newspapers could not be blocked from printing documents on the Vietnam j war that the government claimed were . classified, the Nixon Administration sought I new ways to prevent unauthorized j disclosure. In its effort to tighten the lid, :the White House created the infamous Plumbers. Other government depart- ments devised their own strategies. ! It was the CIA, in April 1972, , that came up with the most original "legal" approach: the idea of applying judicial prior restraint against a potential ' discloser of information, Victor Marchetti. The CIA knew Marchetti was planning to write a book, according to a sworn affidavit from a CIA man named Robert R. B. Lohmann "assigned to the Agency's offices in New York City," because it had received a copy of Marchetti's outline, along with a draft magazine article by him, !"from a confidential source, who has !provided reliable information in the past." (Unless the CIA was lying and actually stole the outline and the article, that "confidential source" had to be connected with one of the six New York publishers to which Marchetti submitted the material, since no other copies existed ,outside his possession. That the CIA, which is legally forbidden from domestic ;operations, apparently has spies inside 1New York publishing houses is one of the most disquieting but least noticed ;aspects of the case.) Carefully avoiding the civil libertarian- inclined bench in Washington, D.C., the ? CIA went into an Alexandria, Virginia Federal District Court, seeking a permanent injunction against Marchetti, which would require him to submit all his future writing In a classified document, CIA's Assistant General Counsel John D. Morrison, Jr. wrote in 1966: ?The problem of protecting official government secrets and related material, in our free society deadloched Cs it is on the Constitution with its attendant Bill of Rights, has long plagued the intelligence com- munity. Title 18 of the U.S. Code provides ample legal sanction following acts of espionage, sabotage and unlawful disclosure of classified information; however, with the exception of the injunctive powers granted the Atomic Energy Commission under Title 42 USC 2280, there is currently no truly effective legal weapon, in use, whereby CIA or the intelligence com- munity can protect classified or related information - from disclosure front withan. even given informa- tion to the effect that s_ __.crch a cfsclowhis tont elated by an. en#43KOMQ% ,,wdRa.se no 1/08/08 ? ?"factual, fiction, or otherwise"?about ,the CIA or intelligence in general to that Agency for advance approval. Former Director Richard Helms swore that Marchetti's unabridged work "will cause igrave and irreparable harm to the national defense interest of the United States . .." The heart of the CIA's position, however, was contained in another affidavit, stamped "Secret" and submitted by Thomas H. Karamessines, the head of the Agency's Clandestine Services. , The effeet of this classified filing? which while part of the r:krrt's records still cannot be revealel?was initially to prevent even Marchetti's lawyers, from the American Civil Liberties Union, from viewing the most important document the CIA was using against their client?a seemingly clear infringement of his right- to counsel. The government waited until four days before the case was scheduled for trial?a week after the original papers :Were served?before giving security clearance to the ACLU lawyers. Furthermore, ' it insisted that any expert witnesses for Marchetti wo'uld have to be cleared before :they could become involved in disputing the "Secret" aspects of the case. When a list of experts, was submitted, the . government refused to approve two: 'Richard Barnet of the Institute for Policy Studies and Princeton University Professor Richard Falk. Barnet chose not to dispute the matter, but Falk ? demanded that the presiding judge, Albert V. Bryan, Jr., order him to be cleared. The government resisted, on the grounds that Falk had recently visited North Vietnam and also because he had told an FBI agent that he agreed with Ellsberg's release of the Pentagon Papers. The government was, in effect, trying ,to disqualify Falk as a witness for the defense because he actively opposed Administration policies: Even Judge Bryan found this unreasonable," and he ruled that Falk should receive a clearance. Finding and clearing expert witnesses ' was a lengthy process for- Marchetti's law yers?aprocess not made any easier by the reluctance of most of the best and the brightest of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, several of whom had used classified documents in writing their own memoirs, to take the stand in support of Marchetti. Some, after being apprised of what was wanted, did not return phone calls to Melvin Wulf, the Legal Director of the national ACLU. Others said that they were reluctant to become involved, and still others reported that they believed the government did have the right to censor Marchetti's work. Those willing to challenge the government on the issue_ismidition l? C A-RDP77-00432R00010033 2 elease 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003300.04-7 ere Ab niChages, who had been usk.'s S te Department Legal- dXsor; Mc;#iton Halperin, ex-Deputy Assistant S,LEretary of Defense; and Paul/13lackstock, a professor and ; former/intelligence official. ? Just' A Contract O? t May 15, 1972, a one-day trial was held in Judge Bryan's court to determine whether Marchetti 'should be put under ? permanent injunction. Despite the efforts of the ACLU lawyers and their expert witnesses to introduce First Amendment arguments, Judge Bryan, in essence, accepted the government's premise that the only issue to be discussed was the enforcement of a contract. He ruled out testimony on matters such as the public's right to know what its government is doing, the constant leaking of classified ,information by government officials, the legality and the misuses of the whole classification system, and the selective Iprosecution ,of Marchetti. ' Furthermore, since the bulk of the :government's case was classified, the public ?including Marchetti's family and friends?was barred from most of the proceedings. .1.s -a result of these closed sessions and the "Secret" affidavits, media coverage was very limited. At the preliminary hearings and the trial itself, reporters were reluctant to wait outside in the corridors to try to learn what was happening, especially since all participants were forbidden from discussing the key elements of the case. White every American does not have the inherent right to have news reporting of his or her legal difficulties, the decision to cover a trial should belong to the press, not the government. Ideally, the glare of the media should have no effect on judicial proceedings, but in our less-than-perfect world?in case after case involving civil liberties?public attention can make a significant difference in both the government's tactics and the judge's reactions. In any event, the government carried the day with Judge Bryan, who put ? Marchetti under permanent injunction. At the appellate level later that spring, - Judge Clement Haynsworth affirmed the CIA's right to censor Marchetti. but added the following qualifications: only "classified" ? information could be excluded; information already in the public domain-could not be excluded; nor could facts learned by Marchetti after he left the CIA be excluded.. In December 1972. the Supreme Court. by a 6-to-3 vote, refused to consider the case ?possibly because the majority agreed with the lower courts' decisions or because 1ST the case was not "ripe," since Marchetti had not yet written his book. It was shortly before the Supreme Court announced that it would not review the. case that I became involved in the.book. Faced with the government's legal : pressure and other problems, Marchetti asked me to co-author the work. We spent the next nine months writing. With his injunction hanging over our heads, we were barred from discussing our progress with ,Daniel Okrent, the editor assigned to us by, our publisher, Alfred A. Knopf. In July 1973, about a month before we Inished the first draft, I received a letter "from Charles N. Brower, the State Department's Acting Legal Advisor, which indicated that State had "received information" about my involvement and was thereby issuing a "formal request" !that I provide my work to State for prior !clearance. On the advice of counsel at the IACLU, 1 ignored Brotver's letter, knowing ifull well that Marchetti would have Ito sub-mit the same manuscript to the CIA, from which State could get a copy. The CIA received our draft on August 27, 1973, and, within the terms of the !injunction, had 30 days to review it. At the end of that period, Acting CIA General Counsel John S. Warner wrote, "The iUnited States government has determined ? that proper classification of the manuscript ; is TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE," and said 'that the book could only be published if We deleted 339 items,. 15 to 20 percent ;of the book. Shocked and somewhat dejected by the CIA's wholesale hatchet job, Marchetti ,and I spent four hours late on a September afternbon sitting in an ACLU conference 'room along with our chief lawyer, Melvin Wulf, cutting up our own manuscript with x-acto knives. Some of the CIA-cleared pages wound up looking like pieces of :Swiss cheese; others had huge holes in them through which one could peer out. The easiest pages to eliminate ;were the 17 on which the CIA claimed that every last ? word endangered "national security." As painful as the task was, we had little choice but to do the CIA's actual scissors work for it, since the only way we could legally show the work to the publisher was to first make the deletions ourselves. Then, as on numerous other occasions, we were forced to follow the extremely restrictive rules laid down by the government and largely enforced by. Judge Bryan. Secretaries had to receive security clearances before they could type our legal briefs. At times, our lawyers could not retain ? possession of various "Secret" legal documents related to the case but had to read 3 them while the papers were still in the it! ifilakildetfeVldeillellite)cictelatli ?., Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : 61A-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7 physical possession of the CIA. Depositions on the most routine matters were - classified and thus required special handling. We had to ignore the great number of loutside experts who might have been :consulted informally because such people still had tb be approved by the government. We did have one small glimmer of hope when the CIA made its demand for the 339 ? deletions, as a result of an accompanying offer to talk the case over. In early October, Marchetti and Wulf sat down with CIA and Justice Department lawyers to see . what the government had in mind: , (I did not attend because we did not want to acknowledge that the CIA ? had any jurisdiction over my work.) At that :meeting, the government lawyers largely ;remained quiet while Marchetti and Wulf listed reasons why certain deletions were particularly outrageous?in some cases pointing to books or newspaper articles in Which the alleged classified material was ; printed; in others, explaining how Marchetti could not possibly have learned the informtition while he was in the CIA, 'since the events occurred after his 1969 resignation. Shortly after this session, the CIA granted ,us permission to print 114 of the original 319 deletions, and in the following months, the Agency twice authorized publication of ! large chunks from other offending passages. By the end of February 1974, the CIA had i"voluntarily" cut back its list of deletions i to 1687?less than 50 percent of the number with which it started. Once-Forbidden Passages While the CIA's reduced demands might be thought, in some quarters, to show reasonableness, a look at the restored material , indicates that much of what was originally censored was so un-secret as to be ludicrous. A few examples of the once-forbidden but now acceptable passages illustrate the point: > A statement that former Director Helms had mispronounced the name "Malagasy" at a National Security Council meeting. (Ironically, the CIA did not choose to censor the fact that at .the same session President Nixon called the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff "Admiral Mormon.") .> All reference to CIA ownership ; of Air America, even though this connection has been widely written about for years. >A chart showing the size and budget of the CIA and the rest of the intelligence community?data which Senator , William Proxmire had read into the Congressional Record in similar form.. . > Two references to the Tom Charles Huston domestic surveillance plan, approved and then Supposedly rescinded by President in 1970. This document was printed 14 in its entirety in the New York Times and it was from that newspaper that we learned of these particular domestic spying efforts. While admittedly there is other censored information in the book which is Of greater substance than the passages cited above, these examples would seem to indicate that .at a minimum the CIA overreacted to our -work. In our case, at least, the? Agency's sensors have proved to be arbitrary and .capricious Savonarolas, whose constantly _changing definition of what will damage the ; "national security" would be laughable if it did not do violence to the First Amendment. In any event, despite the CIA's alleged charity, we decided, in October 1973, to go back into court to challenge the remaining deletions, both on a practical item-by-item basis and on broader constitutional grounds. Significantly, Knopf joined us in this new legal action, thets making a final (and very expensive) commitment to publication 6f the book. In the view of the ACLU, the inclusion of the publisher in the suit (called Knopf. Marchetti, and Marks v. Colby and Kissinger) strengthened our claim that the, government was not so much enforcing a contract as interfering with the publication of a book. The Oovernment's initial reaction to the suit was to file a countersuit asking Judge Bryan to-put me under a permanent injunction identical to Marchetti's. Thus the club of prior _restraint was to be extended beyond the CIA to yet another government agency, the State Department. As the new suit progressed, again in Judge Bryan's court, the government, if anything, was more unreasonable than in the.first case. It refused to clear any expert witnesses for our side, claiming they were not needed by us, since the injunction against Marchetti left to the CIA, not to the courts, the power to say what was classified and hence must be deleted. Similarly, the government refused to submit any evidence showing that the 168 deletions were indeed classified because, in its view, the simple say-so of the four CIA Deputy Directors?men all authorized under the executive order governing classification to be "classifying officers"?was suffcient proof, even though the government admitted that the decisions on what was actually classified were questions of "judgment." Judge Bryan did not agree with the government on either issue and ordered it to clear witnesses and show documentary evidence. The prospect of again bringing a few experts into the case so alarmed the ' The State Department's suit against me was satted in March by a torment agreement th..:t joined me to Marchetti's Injunction for the purpo.us of this book but which does not bind me in the future. d For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010033,0004-7 ? ; Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7 CIA that Director Colby offered to make a personal appearance before the judge?in camera, of course?to explain why giving "Secret" details to these additional people would endanger the national security. Bryan rebuffed Co/by's personal plea and let stand his order that the experts be cleared. In February, the government appealed ? this decision, thus threatening to put off the trial, which was scheduled for the end of the month, and further postponing our publication date, which had already been stalled for over six months. Obviously, at that point, time was not on our-side, so we finally accepted a compromise under which the government agreed to clear one?and only one?witness, Morton Halperin, and we dropped our insistence on having others. Even more effectively than in the first case, the government , had succeeded in limiting the scope of our i position in court by controlling the number of witnesses we could use. During this same pretrial period, the government moved to have Marchetti and me puein contempt of court, alleging that certain information censored from :the manuscript had later appeared in the ,media. , Five examples were cited in a "Top-Secret" letter addressed to Judge Bryan, , including interviews the two of us had taped with Canadian TV, news stories from the Washington Post. and the New . York Times, and an article in Harper's. Judge Bryan decided, after looking at the material sent to him by the government, that he did not believe that the injunction ,had been violated and that he was "not inclined" to take action. The Key Questions The trial opened on February 28,-1974., and lasted for three days. Judge Bryan would not accept testimony on the 'constitutionality of the so-called secrecy , agreements, nor would he listen to First Amendment arguments, although we managed to preserve both these issues for futare appeal. Thus, the three questions we were allowed to dispute were: (I) 'Whether we had learned of any of the deleted material after we had left government service. Although perhaps 25 percent of the deletions fell into this category, we had great difficulty proving it without naming our sources, which we refused to do and which Judge Bryan insisted we do to back up our claim. Consequently, in most cases the Judge lumped together the fruits of our post-governnient employment independent research with the material we had learned at our respective agencies. (2) Whether any of the deletions were already in the public domain. On this ? question, the JAilifreffeeiftiotifteWner201:6Y08104 : contention that even if information has already been revealed in the media, it may remain classified until it has officially been put on the record by the government. In an interesting commentary on the limited civil rights of former official,s,. Bryan admitted that his ruling puts - "Marchetti and Marks in a position of being unable to write about matters that everyone else has written about. But they are different from 'everyone else' because Of their former employment and employment agreements." Bryan went on to say that with our "former employment status as an added credential." our discussing classified information is "quite ,different" from a news reporter's or a congressman's doing so.3 (3) Whether any of the 162 deletions were in fact classified (not whether they had been legally and properly classified in the 'first place). Throughout the trial, the government contended that the simple say-so of the four CIA.Deputy Directors was sufficient proof that material was classified. .Judge Bryan disagreed, ruling "the ipse dixit of the Deputy Directors.. . is not sufficient, and cannot suffice if the First Amendment rights of these plaintiffs or others like them are to survive. If the reasonableness of classification is not to be subjected to judicial review, then adoption of such a standard would leave plaintiffs' First Amendment rights unprotected and ,subject to the whim of the reviewing official." While Bryan's pretrial ruling that the government must show our lawyers documentary proof of classification indicated how he felt on this issue, in his words, "It was only after the plaintiffs' expert Halperin I testified that his examination of the 'govont-nent's documents revealed only ,12-13 instances where the documents supported the classification determination, that the documents were offered in evidence." ? On the whole, Bryan found that the document's proved nothing. The CIA?as ever, obsessed with secrecy?pruned and ? mashed these papers to such a degree that Bryan found Most of them lacked . "specificity" and some were "so thoroughly excised as to be meaningless as evidence." ? Apparently, the CIA was so concerned that additional secrets would be introduced into the closed proceedings that it held back proof even when additional information would have supported its case. Thus, the Judge ruled that we could publish 140 of the 168 deletions on the grounds that no evidence of classification had been provided. ? Judge Bryan was not the only person to speak about our credibility. Under cross-examination, William Nelson, the head of the CIA's Clc:n,lestine Services. ? conceded that only the truth can be cici.sified; falsehoods cannot be and thus could not be deleted from the book. While Nelson surely had no such intention, we were gratified to be his testimony in support of our accuracy. CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7 Naturally, we were pleased that Bryan was allowing us tq print so much of the deleted material. Yet, we were still disturbed that the government's right to censor its former employees remained intact. While we won on an essentially technical question of. ,evidence, the next time the government tries to block a former employee's book, if should be smart enough to bring in sufficient documentation. Moreover, we anticipate that the government will now institute new procedures for handling documents to provide the "specificity" on what is or is ' not classified that Judge Bryan found lacking. For example, bureaucrats will probably be required to classify material ;.on a paragraph-by-paragraph .or even a tine- by-line basis so that every fact deemed sensitive will be individually noted. ! " There is such a thing as an authentic ? "secret." Marchetti and I do not dispute this point. We completely reject, however, the notion advanced by government lawyers that anything the executive branch decrees is classified?and now, with Judge Bryan's modification, that can be shown to be so marked?can be excluded, without any appeal to Justice Stewart's standard, from our book or any similar one. Giving such editorial control to an agency like the CIA allows it to cut not only material which is already on the public record but also information that might publicly embarrass and hence politically weaken it. To give a specific instance, one of the passages in our book that the CIA insisted on dereting concerns some dubious financial practices in the sale of an ostensibly private research THE GUARDIAN, MANCHESTER 11 June 1974 THE APARTMENT building is ordinary and, inside, all :the:cloors look alike. Behind t.rotie lives a lawyer; behind ? :another, a secretary; behind the another is a secret school for- from spey Washington think-tank owned by the Agency. If this kind of possible conflict of interests is worthy of censorship, then it is not too , difficult to accept the fact that 'burglarizing a political party's headquarters can be justifiied to. protect the "national .security-" We are appealing the case on First Amendment grounds, and the government is appealing the specifics of Judge Bryan's ruling. .Considering the length of time that will be involved, however, Marchetti and I decided?and Knopf agreed?to bring the book out in June with actual blank spaces to indicate where the deletions are. There will be only 27 blanks rem...ming if higher 'courts can clear the material restored by - Judge Bryan in time, and we are optimistic that this can be done, since his decision hinged on a question of fact (insufficient evidence) rather than on a vastly more complicated question of law. Hopefully, later editions will include all of the deleted material, but waiting any longer would only hurt the book's timeliness and further serve one of the CIA's original purposes: blocking publication. Readers should see , more than enough, even in the censored version, to accePt or reject what we have to say. And white authors might be reluctant to admit it, blank spaces can often read more eloquently than actual words. After all, one of the book's main themes , is that the CIA as an institution is both repressive and inept. We believe that the censored book will give living proof to our argument. With no apologies to McLuhan, the book has become the message, and the message is the book. MARTIN SCHRAM, visitor. It is not neces- sary. The trainer is blessed .* with a rich, clear voice. It can ispies. ? ? . ? .. be heard while lounging casu- ? On a sunny spring day, three men in business suits .enter the building, take the .lift to the fourth floor sand :.step into the apartment. They are. carrying attach?ases. .The routine is regular. They .come during daylight, stay a efew hours-and leave. Always* the same apartment. The apartment is rented in the- ,name of a husband and wife ?but nobody seems ever to have seen the wife and the husband doesn't spend his ,nights there. ? A visitor takes note of this, and one day, while walking along the fourth floor corn-- 'dor. he hears a man's voice coming from inside the apart- :went. ? . . microdot . .1' ". . . KGB . ..7 , The voice, It becomes apparent, belongs to the trainer. No electronic* eaves- dropping equipment or any , .other device is ever used 1)), 6 ally in the hallway against the. wall opposite the apart- ment door. If can be heard even better in the laundry room, across ,the way, where the cement-block walls create an echo-chamber effect. . Usually background music plays in the apartment, per- haps as, a precaution against being overheard. The trainer's voice carries above the music. hut the voices of the students do not. .They speak more soitly?their comments come in a decided foreign accent. One day' the trainer is lecturing on how a spy can avoid being followed. "Go to three or four locations in a city?like a wide-open square. Go to the first one and look around. See who's there. Then go to -a second place far removed. Look around. If you see any of the same faces, you're being fol- lowed." Then class is overfor the day. When the spies-in- training 1'eye ? they walk several blocks and enter another apartment" building where they seem to feel very much at home. They emerge? a short time later on a corner balcony several storeys above the street and proceed to take in the afternoon' sun., It is easy to follow the trainer. He takes the lift down to the basement garage and drives out .in a blue sedan. The car has Virginia licence tags and an Arling- ton. Virginia inspection sticker. A check of the sticker registration reveals the trainer's true identity. On occasion, the school for spies has another visitor who drives a Volkswagen. On a rainy day, he gives a couple of the other students a ride. His car has Maryland licence tags. A registration check .reveals his identify as well. ? A Newsday reporter tele- phones the Rockville., Mary- land, home of the man with the Volkswagen. A relative answers. "He's not here." the relative says. "He's at work." In response to questions, the ? I r - . relative adds: "I don't know his phone number at work ... he works for the Govern- ment . I don't know which agency or which branch of the Government . . . He. doesn't tell me anything. _....That's the way they are and I don't ask." It seems a good time to call the CIA. A Newsday reporter tele- phones an official at the CIA, headquarters. The reporter identifies himself and says he wants to try, to verify the employMent of three men. He gives the names of the man, in the blue sedan, the man. with the Volkswagen. The official, explains that such requests cannot usually , be fulfilled. Maybe this time, the reporter says, adding that 'he is concerned because: " If they are not ours, then they are probably theirs.' The CIA official checks and. cane back with the answer. "Thee are our guys," be says. "You've come across something that is quite useful and legitimate. It's a training exercise. There is training going on at various times and -various places. "This is all rather ember- ?rassing."--Newsday. ?,?\PProvetivoriqe:rea-re-M1-1113/0 / CIA-RDP77-0043R000100330b0477 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7 WASHINGTON POST 23 June 1974 THE CM AND THE CULT OF INTEL- LIGENCE. By Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks. Knopf. 398 pg. $8.95 By LAURENCE STERN through blackmail, terrorism, murder, sabotage and "psywar." We are talking about programs of disinformation (a term of the art for counter-propaganda) di- rected against United States audiences, as well as manipulation of the news the- dia. The Watergate scandal has shown us that the CIA, for all its vaunted acumen at THERE WAS A PERIOD last year when the intelligence game, was played for a the timing seemed right, when Congress patsy (and that is the charitable view) by. finally had political grounds to conduct the White House to help stage a disinfor- that long-overdue examination of the op- illation and espionage operation against erations of the Central Intelligence Daniel Ellsberg at a time when he was Agency. campaigning against the resumption .of. High-ranking CIA officials were troop- bombing of North Vietnam. Ing up to Capitol Hill in frequency and The presumption of innocence on the numbers approaching the level of high part of the CiA. shrinks considering the' school seniors at Easter recess. Agency behavior of CIA Director William E. men who not long ago would have rather Colby in the fall of 1972 upon being ques- swallowed the pill than be caught within tioned by former Watergate Prosecutor sight of still cameras were suddenly pi- Earl J. Silbert about the identity of the rouetting before four separate congres_ White House official who first requeited sional committees. ? . CIA assistance for E.,Howard Hunt. Col- The men from tile agency came with by's response, at first, was evasive. He their impassive faces and sharply circum- "danced around- the room for ten min- scribed testimony designed mainly to utes," by his own admission, before Sia; ."distance" their place of employment bert finally pinned him to the wall with a from the political crimes of Watergate. direct question. The answer was John D. But as soon as senatorial questioning be- Ehrlichman. Colby explained afterwards ganhlundering into the CIA's own busi- that he was reluctant to inject a name so controversial as Elnlichman's into the ness the answers trailed- off into calcu- lated obscurity, as a visiting homicide case. squad detective might be rebuffed for In doing so, he camp within a hairline asking the price of the house. of obstruction of justice. Had it not been What was the extent of the CIA's role in for Silbert's persistence?and perhaps the Chilean coup? Was it involved in the the feet that Silbert knew the answer to junta's take-over in Greece? Is there any his own question?Colby might have sue- prospect of more large-scale CIA opera- eeeded in willfully concealing informa- tions such as the war in Laos? What is the tion from a government prosecutor in a extent of the agency's domestic Pending criminal case. . operations? Watergate must indeed have brought a The answers came back, engraved with special anguish to the CIA. For the White politeness, but ungiving: "To the best of House, in trying to put the Watergate my knowledge, Senator, no." "I, would be monkey on the agency's back, used some happy, Senator, to go into that a little of the same techniques that have been more in closed session." "We have no evi- employed by the CIA in its own opera- deuce of that, sir." ' ' tions. There 'was the diffuse charter of And yet these questions were all symp- "national security" through. which the tomatic of the need for a serious and com- White House operatives sought to stall prehensive oversight job on what the CIA the FBI investigation of Nixon campaign is up to, what iort of checkreins there are funds through Mexico, to arrange for co- to its covert operations targeted within vert payoffs of the .Watergate suspects, to the United States as well as abroad. The disseminate a cover story that the Water- need has existed. The political opportu- gate burglary was a CIA operation, and so nities are rare. ' . forth. . This is not to question the legitimacy of The agency was, in effect, being tar- intelligence gathering or the need for. geted as a decoy by the president's office forms of state security in the American which was dipping into the classic black government, cOnsistent with what we con- bag of dirty tricks. aider to be the base price that must be Hunt and his Cuban proteges, then in p :3 id f1:0: m - -1-1illg pn c,.n ser;,,. Ti:e the pay of the Committee for the Re-Elec- -0-11:i r , ' , ? 7 - : ),- ro 7 ? ,, ,.: . 1-, _ ' : ,,,.? - .1 ti on of Ihe President (CREEP) were so in- gently to the operational programs of the grained in the ways of their alma mater' CIA's clandestine services which are con- at Langley, the Clandestine Services, ducted beyond the that they seemed to be genuinely incapa- pale of public assent to serve often ques. ble of drawing the distinction between tionable interests in achieving dubious serving the United States government goals by illicit means. . and carrying out the sleazy schemes of What we are talking about is United the White House-CREEP Politburo. States financial manipulation of foreign As an example of what they call the elections and domestic political proc- "clandestine mentality" John Mark; and esses, the mounting of coups, toppling of Victor Marchetti cite this exchange be- governments, bribery of nubile officials, fore a federal grand jury between Hunt clandestine programs of 19Pf64IPl REgindstagnalliagiSaAtebilaiRI3RUPOCSIB. bert has asked whether Hunt was .a that he had participated in "what migh 'commonly be referred to as illegal activi ties." HUNT: I have no recollection of any, no, sir." SILBERT: What about clandestine activities? HUNT: Yes, sir. SILBERT: All right. What about that? HUNT: I'm not quibbling, but there's quite a difference between some- thing that's illegal and something that's clandestine. SILBERT: Well, in your terminology, would the entry into Dr. Fielding's (Daniel Ells berg's psychiatrist) office have been clandestine, illegal, nei- ' ther or both? HUNT: I would simply call it an entry operation conducted under the aus- pices of competent authority. These are the values Of the appar- atchik, which had become pervasive among the sad young men of the Nixon White House. It is the moral code of the black side of most espionage services as well as, we must reluctantly conclude, the top side of the CIA. Congress has had the chance to bite at the apple and run the risk of corrupting its own innocence. But no one was willing to take on a confrontation with executive authority. No one even was able to formu- late the right questions other than those bearing on the extrication of the CIA , from Watergate. 1 And so the function of oversight contin- ues to be abdicated to daily journalists and writers of books. It is not an alto- gether fruitful alternative. Books rarely generate legislation. Daily journalists are not equipped to penetrate the- rein- forced armor of secrecy by which CIA is shielded from public scrutiny. Leaks from within are self-serving. What passes for candor by top CIA offi- cials in the congressional hearing room is the frankness of the schoolboy standing before the brained canary and denying .all, with his sling shot in his back pocket. The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence is a welcome addition to the body of litera- ture which constitutes the only form of genuine oversight being currently prac- ticed. Both Marchetti and Marks are for- mer practitioners 'of the intelligence trade and were privy to some of its se- crets. There is the inevitable bias of the analyst against the dirty tricks boys. John Kennedy learned the dismal las- son in the Bay of Pigs 13 years ago that Clandestine Services tends to operate within its own narrow world of assump- tions and political theology. The atmos- phere of the clandestine shop is conspira- torial, paranoic and action-prone. It reeks with suspicion of social and politi- cal change on the left. Marks and Marchetti take us through the sometimes familiar, sometimes new; sometimes deleted catalogue of covert in- terventions and patterns of secret propri- etorships and domestic activities which have flourished in a vacuum of resound- ing public indifference since the agency 2 Fietrome 30004171strumen.t.of executive 7 ( Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7 THE ITN REPUBLIC 22 JUNE 1974 py. Story power in the early 1950s. The book represents a triumph of de- termination by its authors, the publishing house of Knopf and the American Civil Liberties Union, which defended the manuscript against a partially successful effort to censor it. Melvin L. Wulf, legal director of the ACLU, notes in the intro- duction that co-author Marchetti was the first American writer to be served with an official censorship order issued by a United States court. His case, along with that of Marks, raises two interesting constitutional issues: (1) the power of the government to abridge by a contractual oath of secrecy, the First Amendment rights of govern- ment employes; and (2) the authority of an executive agency to classify information by mere post facto declarations that it is classified. In the battle of the book .?the CIA was able to produce no proof that much of the material it wanted to excise was in fact classified. At this point in the still-pending appel- late court fight the government has pre- vailed on the first question and the au- thors prevailed on the second issue. One of the consequences of the Mar- chetti-Marks case is that William Colby has asked for new authority to bring crim-. inal charges against any government em- ? ployee authorized to receive classified 'information. The proposed legislation .also would empower the CIA director to .define what is classified?thereby cir- cumventing the district court's ruling in the matter of Marchetti and Marks. An indicator of the quality of that judg- ment is that when the CIA's original 339 *deletions in the manuscript were submit- ted to a test of classification they were reduced to 168 by negotiation and then to 27 by judicial review. Unfortunately the book went to press before the judge's fi- nal decision and so The Cult of Intelli- gence is adorned throughout with that tal- ismanic word of our time?(deleted)--to tantalize the curious and bolster the sales. - If tile Colby proposal were in effect at the time Marchetti and Marks had under- taken publication of their manuscript this review would never have been writ- ten. Both would probably be ipjaiL O 8 - Approved The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence by Victor Marchetti ,and John D. Marks (Knopf; $8.95) . Diplomacy at its best is chess rather than poker, a game played with visible pieces rather than hidden cards. Thus the function of a peacetime espionage service is to provide the information with which diplomats can bargain with their adversaries. The Central Intelli- gence Agency lias performed that job admirably over the years. In 1962, using data obtained from electronic devices, its experts were able to detect the build- up of Soviet missiles in Cuba, and that knowledge served President Kennedy's successful effort to compel the Kremlin to retreat. Nor would the interim agree- ment with the Russians on the limita- tion of strategic arms have been possi- sble unless the US negotiators had, possessed dettils on Soviet weapons deployments. ? _ But such valuable services represent the smaller portion of the CIA's activi- ties. Its predominant role has been to pursue an assortment of unsavory clan- destine political and paramilitary oper- ations, and these suggest that our lead- ers have subsidized and 'encouraged an organization that is not only dedicated to illicit actions abroad, but also, as the Watergate scandals have revealed4 has cooperated in criminal conduct at home. Victor Marchetti, a former CIA em- ployee, and John D. Marks, who once worked for the State Department, have written a study of the agency's doings that has .obviously'touched raw nerves. In an attempt to suppress their work, the *CIA has dragged them through the courts, and the case is not yet over. The unfinished legal hassle prompted the authors to go into print with a volume in which more than 140 passages have been deleted. Yet its Swiss cheese qual- ity curiously reinforces rather than di- minishes the book's credibility, which is further strengthened by its sober, al- most dull literary style. One is tempted to speculate that it might have eluded public notice had not the CIA chosen to fight its publication, and so the agency 'merits a nod of gratitude for having un- wittingly launched it in the direction of the best-seller list. The book deserves wide readership because it illustrates the extent to which, despite our rhetori- .cal devotion to self-determination of nations, we have been violating the sovereignty of foreign states. Marchetti and Marks correctly empha- For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7 'size that the CIA is not an autonomous monster, but a White House tool acting under orders. This is doubly alarming in my opinion, since it underlines the fact that the agency's egregious covert. operations have not been aberrations,: but were carried out in the pursuit c;,f high policy shaped by our most distin- guished officials. The authors recall such familiar clandestine maneuvers as the CIA's successful putsch against -Iranian Premier Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953 and its abortive attempt five years later to overthrow 'Indonesian President Sukarno by Supporting insur- gent for....:s on the islan,d of Sumatra, 'They describe the agency's programs for training Tibetan rebels to fight against the takeover of Tibet by the Communist Chinese, and they hint althe possibility that the CIA raids against North Viet- nam in 1964 may have provoked a. North Vietnathese..- reaction against US de- stroyers in the . Tonkin Gulf, thereby handing Lyndon Johnson the pretext to ;win congressional. authorization: for large-scale American involvement , Indochina. - - Highlighting the degree to which we. permit ends to justify. means, the auth- ors relate-a 1969 episode in which :CIA:. Operatives acting with top Washington approval permitted.a group of Brazilian: radicals to. hijack-an airplane aricLert- danger the lives_ of,its.49 passengers so that Brazil's security forces could break-. Op -that country's principal ,revolution.'-. ary .faction_. pitting:the. _CulturaLReyor rution in Chirii4O-?:616. mici,-1900.;;;;:the,- book discloses,,CIA: operativecio;.-tai- . . wan transmittedphOny broadcastSCot rtrived- to reseinble.i.Official CO*41t1Ili.SE c.ratements. The broadcasts contribtited,-. the chaos roiling7.China:at-:the;tirne--? _77...Out they a1sd.misled . thei..agerky's,. -[1:iwn analysts.- at ..ttOme?. who.-Werernt:x? ciutd into the.. so-called .!'disinforma;, - _lion"' effort, 4- .t.The most interesting section, of' the -.hook deals with the CIA's proprietorr ? mpanies. The agency owns one of the- _ _ . World's - biggest - fleets Of _aircraft that 'Variously operate-Under 'the. names of America, Rocky' Mountain .Air and .Southern Air Transport. Such finis are .:Indispensable to, outfit engaged .in ,covert activities like moving irregular iroops and transporting supplies; espe-. ;day in Southeast, Asia. But these coy- -Vorations have not been held accounts- Ale. Although theY are theotetically ? ' ? ? _ responsible to the ptiblic, their records :are classified -and 'even their financial sbalance _sheets are a:, Secret,--and. that :raises the question of whether they may have contributed to the private fortunes ..;of occult business interests:- .For that matter, though,. to whom is the CIA itself accountable? The agency is technically supposed to be supervised by four different, congressional over- sight committees, but these groups ' Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7 rarely meet, and, when they do, it is mainly as rubber stamps. Legislative attempts to reform the oversight system chronically go nowhere, and they are likely to remain blocked as long as men like John Stennis, who runs one of the Senate committees, believes that "you have to. . . shut your eyes" to the agen- CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 26 June 1974 cy's activities. The principal casualty in all this, then, is truth, a rare commodity these days made even rarer by Presi- dent Nixon's assertion of a couple of weeks ago that "we cannot gear our for- eign policy to the transformation of other societies." He was, quite clearly, not referring to Guatemala, Cuba, Chile, Peru, Brazil, Iran, Vietnam, Laos, Cam- The uncloakin The CIA and the Cult of In- telligence, by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. $8.95. By David K. Willis The value of this controversial book about the Central In- telligence Agency is not so much the James Bond-style secrets it reveals ? though there are some of those. It is the questions it forces Americans to ask about the role of a secret agency in an open society that make it significant. Along with so many other in- stitutions, the CIA has come un- der searching scrutiny in recent years, intensified by Watergate and the agency's role in helping the White House "plumbers" in their work against Daniel Ells- berg. - This book is perhaps the most detailed yet to appear on how the CIA works, but its publication is also ' a symptom of the post- Vietnamese disillusion at home with America's attempt to make the world over into its own anti- Communist image. The authors ? a 14-year CIA veteran and a former foreign service officer who has seen in- telligence operations from the State Department end ? have produced a sustained, 400-page attack on CIA covert activities abroad ? and at home. Victor Marchetti and John Marks believe the secret agency should be more open, more ac- countable to Congress, less con- cerned with overthrowing foreign governments and more with col- lecting intelligence about the So- viet Union, mainland China, and other nations abroad. But it is virtually impossible for the average reader to judge the veracity of much of the book. The CIA steadfastly refused to con- firm (or deny) its contents. Its two-year fight to block publica- tion has been waged in a closed courtroom, amid warnings that the national interest will be en- dangered if the proceedings ? or the book ? reaches the public. Now the book is well and truly out ? but does not, to this non-007 eye at least ? appear to rock the boat of national securikip WSW d Fataekeattp,20 bodia, Indonesia, China or the Congo, to mention a few places in which the CIA, under instructions from him or his predecessors, has intervened in do- mestic affairs that were none of our business. .;, Stanley Karnow of the CIA paper readers and close followers of various other reports already know that during the cultural revolution the CIA had sent bal- loons carrying propaganda sheets floating from Taiwan across to mainland China. They already know that the CIA had trained the Dalai Lama's troops after the Chinese had driven him from Tibet ? though they may not be aware that frustrated CIA operatives, des- pairing that the troops would ever be unleashed against the Chinese and retake Tibet, turned to Tibe- tan prayer wheels for solace. They already know that CIA B- 26 bombers flew against Sukarno troops in the late 1950's. But they did not know that the CIA set up a "miniature Fort Bragg" training school deep in the Peruvian jungles to help Pres- ident Fernando Belaunde Terry defeat local rebels. Nor may they have heard ru- mors of one particularly exotic plan in which a CIA agent would penetrate mainland China's strategic missile complex carry- ing two oversized suitcases. The suitcases would contain an entire, If small, aeroplane. Mission ac- complished, the operative would open the cases, assemble his aircraft, and fly to safety. The plan was vetoed by senior CIA hands.... Again, we meet the Nungs pos- sibly for the first time. They are a minority group of Chinese hill people in South Vietnam, whom the CIA used to spy on North Vietnamese troop movements down the Ho Chi Minh trail. Since the Nungs were illiterate, the CIA equipped their radio transmitters with buttons adorned with pic- tures of tanks, anti-aircraft guns, and other weapons. When a Nung saw such a' weapon, he would press the ap- propriate button and if he 'saw another, he would press it again. The signals were received at a base station or by spotter planes circling above and directing air strikes accordingly. If we can assume the authors know whereof they speak, then we learn now that an agent can authorize a covert field operation Monitor's to the tune of $10,000. Anything anything over $100,000 must have the stamp of the director himself. - We are told that the CIA has an official strength of 16,500 and an official budget of $750,000 ? but that both figures are much higher when all operatives, merce- naries, and hangers-on are counted. ? The authors plead for tighter congressional scrutiny. Their main object, however, is to strip the agency of some of its secrecy, and to urge that it stick to collecting and evaluating in-i telligence. The CIA has tried to stop publi-- cation of their book ? first by arguing that Mr. Marchetti is violating the contract he signed when he Joined the agency ? promising not to reveal its meth- " ods or secrets ? and then by - invoking national security and the sanctity of classified material. At first the agency won an injunction against Marchetti, and deleted 339 passages out of the 400 pages, or about 20 percent of the text. Mr. Marchetti, Mr. Marks, publisher Knopf, and the Amer- ican Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) fought back and the agency restored all but 168 pas- ? sages. Then the judge upheld the au- thors' right to restore all but 27. A CIA appeal on this ruling has yet to be decided. Until it is, and all appeals have been exhausted,' only the first set of restorations ? appear in this edition (they are printed in bold type). Blanks - appear where deletions have been made. The reader is left to ask: Can the U.S. really dispense with all "dirty tricks" in a world where opponents of 'the U.S. and what it stands for do not hesitate to use ? such tricks against it? Should the ' CIA concentrate more on eval- uating and on leading the overall U.S. intelligence community? Answers to these questions, in- i volving a redefinition of the CIA's role, and ways to prevent it from embarking on another Watergate adventure, are worth searching for. This book's value lies in how much it helps the discovery of such answers. David Willis is the American news editor. more expensive re 11.1/ uires a nod 1418-: Calk-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7 9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7 VIRGINIA GAztalE 21 JUN 1974 "New book _Uocurn.eilts\ ai'FeaiV uverations - A-NWLY PUBLISHED book examining le Central Intelligence Agency and its ?orldi.vide operations- contains detailed escriptions of the CIA's activities at Camp eary. The book, "The CIA and the Cult of in- elligence," (Alfred A. Knopf) was written by ictor L. Marchetti, former executive ssistant to the CIA's deputy director, and ohn L. Marks, a former intelligence analyst ith the State Department. 1 Marchetti and Marks recount in detail! arious paramilitary and "intelligence! tradecraft" courses offered to CIA recruits at! amp Peary, as well as the !training and; afeguarding. of foreign nationals who have! igned on with the agency. 'Camp Peary is used by the authors as an xample of "the agency's orientation: march covert action" as early as the mid-! 1950s when the base was acquried by the CIA.: he 10,000-acre facility, known to CIA em-: loyees as "the farm," is "the agency's West! oint . operated under the cover of a! ilitary base...." ? [ "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence"j orroborates previous accounts of the CIA's' nvolvement at Camp Peary given by other! fanner agency employees. The book also, xpancis upon allegations made to The Virginia Gaz6t.te last year by Marchetti: imself regarding the training of local police! epartments at the base during 1967-71. i Training facilities, at. the base ineludei weapons' ranges, a simulated "closed brder of a mythical communist country,"1 parachute training towers,- and other! facilities used for planning special' operations, the authors wrote. CIA recruits graduate from the basic paramilitary courses at Camp Peary and are sent to a North Carolina CIA base to learn courses in heavy weapons and explosives. They also undergo jung!e v.-at-fare instrnetion at a CIA base in the Canal Zone. Marchetti and Marks included in their degcription of CIA-clandestine operations the account of a former CIA clandestine operator's training in weap,onry first published in Ramparts magazine: "The array of outlawed weaponry with which we were familiarized included bullets that ex-I, plode on impact, silencer-equipped machine l guns, home-made explosives and self-mad napalm. We were shown a quick method o saturating a confined area with flour o fertilizer, causing an explosion like in a dustbin or granary. "The CIA professional ... is involved in the creative challenge of plotting and or- chestrating a clandestine campaign without resorting to violence," the authors wrote. "The SOD (Special Operations Division, the agency's 'armed forces') man wages war, albeit on a small and secret level." LEVEL." Marchetti and Marks said in the book that their intention is to "demysticize" the workings of the CIA and th,e American in telligence coriiiiiimity, especially the:- agency's fixation with covert operations. "There can be no doubt that the gathering of intelligence is a necessary function of modern government," the authors stated. But then they asked of the CIA, "should it be permitted to function . . . as an operational arm, a secret instrument of the presidency?" When Marchetti began work on the book in 1972, he was served with a federal court injunction prohibiting him from publishing anything about the CIA without first sub- mitting the manuscript to the agency for review. The injunction was based on a secrecy agreement signed by all CIA em- ployees upon hiring; The CIA originally deleted 339 passages from the book, but relented on 171 of them. The reinstated passages, which include most of the Camp Peary allegations, were printed in boldface type. A statement issued by the CIA last Wednesday said the agency "identified for deletion those portions of the manuscript which were classified, were learned during Mr. Marchetti's employment with the CIA, and had not been placed in the public domain by the U.S. Government." Marchetti said in a telephone interview Monday that the censored manuscript por- tions relating to Camp Peary were reinstated by the CIA as a !result of prior newspaper accounts or the base. 10 roved-Ear-Release.2111111.0,81 WASHINGTON IOST 26 June 1974 CIA Seeks r New' Power to Halt Leaks By "Laurence Stern Washington Post Staff Writer Legislation that would sig- nificantly broaden the govern- ment's power to bring crimi- nal sanctions against employ- ees or government contrac- tirs for disclosure of intelli- gence secrets is being circu- lated within the Nixon admin- . istration. ? The measure, proposed by Central Intelligence Agency Director William E. Colby, could also empower him to seek injunctions against news media to prevent them from publishing material he consid- ers harmful to the protection of intelligence sources and methods. Colby's draft would give the CIA director more statutory muscle to define national se- curity secrets and punish transgressors than ever be- fore. Its appearance comes against a background of court battles on national security secrecy is- sues ranging from the Ells- berg case to the book, "CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," written by former government intelligence officers Victor Marchetti and John Marks. The book, the first to be pub- lished in the United States af- ter pre-publication censorship by the federal government, went on sale yesterday. Had Colby's proposal been law a year -earlier the book might well have never seen the light of day and the two authors would have been sub- ject to 10-year prison sen- tences and $10,000 fines. Under existing law, how- ever, the best the CIA was able to do was invoke the se- crecy oaths signed by both men as grounds for a civil ac- tion requiring them to submit their manuscripts in advance for government clearance. The government won the first round in the courts when the binding nature of the se- crecy oaths was upheld. But Marks and Marchetti chal- lenged the CIA's demand, on grounds of classification, for some 350 deletions in the man- uscript. After adjudication of their countersuit before U.S. District Court Judge Albert V. Bryan Jr., in Alexandria, the number of deletions was re- &iced to 27. Bryan required the agency to go beyond the more asser- tion by Colby and tour CIA deputy directors that material In the book was classified. He asked the CIA to demonstrate P77-00432R000100330004-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7 In each instance the basis for classification. Much of the trial was held in a closed courtroom. Under Colby's proposed amendment to the National Security Act of 1947, the CIA. director 'would be empowered to determine the ground rules for classification under a gen- eral grant of responsibility for protecting "intelligence sources and methods." The Colby proposal would exempt news media from the criminal provisions of the law. But the draft language could,- according to informed offi- cials, enable the CIA director to trigger injunctive action by the Attorney General against "any person" ? presumably including journalists ? before or after an act of disclosure. In the Pentagon Papers case, several Supreme Court justices, particularly Thur- good Marshall, cited the ab- sence of any statutes to sup- port the government's effort to prevent publication of the Vietnam documents. Colby's proposal would strengthen the government's hand in this re- spect. 'Colby submitted the draft measure to the Office of Man- agement and Budget to circu- late through the bureaucracy for comment before it is intro- duced in Congress. In a trans- mittal letter to OMB Director. Roy L. Ash. Colby observed that in "recent times, seri- ouf damage to our foreign intelligence effort has re- sulted from unauthorized dis- closure of information related to intelligence sources ,and methods." ? He did not specify what that 'damage was. LOS ANGELES TIMES 19 June 1974 $6 Billion a Year Spent on Spying, Authors Say. Much of Funds Wasted by Supersecret 'Intelligence Cult,' Book on CIA Contends WASHINGTON RI?The authors of a contested book about the CIA con- tend the federal govern- ment is spending about $6 billion a year on intel- ligence and covert activi- ties, and that much of it is ,wasted. The Central Intelligence Agency itself, they say, has an authorized strength of 16,500 but employs tens of thousands more as mercenaries, agents, con- sultants and so on. And they say its authorized budget of $750 Million yearly does not include hundreds of millions more provided by the Pentagon. Their book, "CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," argues that a cult, which it calls a secret fraternity of t h e American political aristocracy, seeks to furth- er foreign policies by covert and usually illegal means. The book was written, after litigation going back more than two years, by Victor Marchetti, a former executive assistant to the CIA's deputy director, and John D. Marks, a former State Department official. Marchetti has been or- dered by -the federal courts to publish nothing.. -of a 'Classified nature that.: I. he learned as a CIA em-' ? ; ploye. - ? When he Submitted his manuscript to the agency . for approval last October, it ordered that 339 pas- sages, ranging from single words to entire pages, be 'deleted.. .2 After extended discus- sions with the authors and their attorneys, the CIA agreed to reinstatement of all but 168 of the deletions. An additional 140 passages 'were cleared for publica- 'tion hy a federal judge, but appeals to higher 'courts have held up their publication. . Alfred A. Knopf is pub- lishing the book with blank spaces. indicating ,the deletions and with the reinstated passages set in bold face type. Among the latter are the references to the CIA's !manpower and budget. ? The CIA last week ? contest major parts of the. manuscript "does not con- stitute an endorsement of the book book or agreement- -with its conclusions." , A major conclusion of the book is that the intel- ligence Community is, dominated by a clandes- tine mentality that thrives on secrecy and deception, preventing Congress and the public from knowing what is being done in their names. ? "It encourages profes- sional amorality?the be- lief, that righteous goals can be achieved through ? the use of unprincipled and normally unaccepta-- ble means," Marchetti and Marks write. "Thus, the cult's leaders must tenaciously guard their official actions from public view. . . With the cooperation of an acquies- cent, ill-informed Con- ' gress, and the encourage? ment and assistance of a, series of Presidents, the, cult.' has built a wall of laws and executive orders_ around the CIA and itself, a wall that has blocked ef- fective public scrutiny." They say that the desire for secrecy has led.high of-. rficials? to lie about CIA volvement in such things 'as- the Bay .of Pigs inva- sion and-. the U-2 spy,. - flights over the Soviet Union. They say lies were told also about the CIA role in an abortive attempt to overthrow President Sukarno of Indonesia in, 1958 and about its role in the Congo in the early-, 1960s. ? "Contrary to denials by President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the CIA ? gave direct assistance to rebel groups located on the island of Sumatra," the authors say of the Su- ' karno incident. "Agency B-26s even car- red out bombing missions-, in support of the insur- gents . . . ? "The agency-also became deeply involved ? in the chaotic- struggle whic h, broke out in the Congo in the early 1960s. Clandes- tine service operators re- gularly 'bought and sold. ? ? IP,46t4Tik? Approvedtig6leR44128871irio that its aecision not o Pile a 'eY' and arMS 'to the suppor- ters of Cyril Adoula and' Joseph Mobutu," the book says. - The agency was created in 1950 to gather intel-- ligence and-to coordinate :the intelligence activities of other -federal depart- ments, but, the book says, it now devotes about two-. thirds of ' its funds and manpower for covert oper- ations and their support? a ratio relatively constant for the last 10 years. "The CIA's primary: task is not to coordinate the ef- forts of U.S. intelligence or, 'even to produce finished national intelligence for -- -the policy- makers," thW., authors say. "Its job is, for.i better or worse, to conduct' the government's covert. foreign policy." The CIA has refused to comment on specific parts, of the book other than toi say it "did not correct or 1 contest the publication of factual errors in the "man= uscript." 4 It said it had reviewed,a% number of book manu- scripts by former em-- ployes a.:,d that "in no case has the agency attempted to- suggest editorial .Changes of the authors'. opinions or conclusions," 000100330004-7 11 Approved For Release 2001/0,8/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7 ( WASHINGTON POST 24 June 1974 Colson: Nixon Suspected C - ? By Rudy Maxa , Washington Post Staff Writer In the days before he walked into a federal court- 'room to enter a guilty plea 4. ,early this month, Charles W. Colson made a startling series of allegations about President Nixon's fears of a Central In- telligence .Agency involvement In the Watergate scandal. - Colson, once among the President's most trusted White House aides, gave his account during two . bizarre evening confessionals with Washington private investiga- tor Richard L. East at Bast's home in McLean, Va. In the course of the conver- sation Colson told Bast that President Nixon confided to him in January that he was on the verge of dismissing Cen- tral Intelligence Agency Di- rector William E. Colby be- cause of suspicions that the agency was deeply implicated in Watergate. . He also told Bast that. the President was finally dis- suaded from launching a full- scale investigation of the intel- ligence community by Secre- tary of State Henry A. Kis- singer and White House chief of staff Alexander M. Haig Jr. - Colson portrayed the Presi- dent as a virtual captive in the Oval Office of suspected high- ranking conspirators in the in- telligence circles against Whom he dared not act for fear of international and do- mestic political repercussions. 1 -- The former White House aide told Bast of a January , phone-- call from President 1 Nixon after which Colson I characterized Mr. Nixon as' be- ing "out of his mind over the CIA and Pentagon? roles" in. Watergate. Colson's underlying suspi- don, as expressed to Bast, was that the CIA planned the break-ins at Watergate and the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist. The motive: to discredit the President's inner circle of advisers. Colson indicated that the CIA was concerned that it was being bypassed on policy mat- ters and channels of informa- tion-bearing on national secu- rity. This could well be the main I [line of Colson's forthcoming testimony to the House Judici- ary Committee and the Water-* gate special prosecutor al- though he has yet to substanti- ate it with specific evidence. Colson first went to Bast on May 13. on' the recommenda- tion of mutual acquaintances to discuss the possibility of a' private private investigation of the CIA's role in Watergate. He returned for another sessinn , . beside Bast's lushly landscaped swimming pool on May 31? three days before he went be- fore U.S. District Court Judge Gerhard.A. Gesell to 'deliver his guilty ?lea to a charge of obstructing justice.' Bast, who has largely re- tired from private investiga,. Lions to conduct.a highly spec- ulative commodity futures, 'fund, and other business inter-' ests, disclosed the substance of the'conversations on the ba- sis of his records and an un- derstanding 'with Colson that Bast would be free to speak, about it after Colsgn was sen- tenced. Colson 'was sentenced last' -Friday to a one-.to three-year jail term and $5,000 fine. 1 Watergate investigators said that Colson had told them about some of the same allega- tions he made to Bast. Some of those charges, they said, are being looked into. . Haig and Kissinger declined through. spokesmen to com- ment on the Colson account. 'One of the most detailed as- sertions Colson made to Bast concerned a March 1, 1973, memorandum by a high-rank- ing CIA official dealing with the agency's relationship to the. Washington 'public rela- tions firm of Robert R. Mullen & Co. Mullen is the firm which employed Watergate conspira- tor E. Howard Hunt Jr. after he left the CIA and before he was hired as a member of the White House "plumbers" unit. Colson said he was allowed to read the 25-page memoran- dum drafted by Eric W. Eisen- stadt, chief of the central cover staff of CIA's clandes- tine directorate, last ,Decem- ber at the home .of Sen. IIow- ard Baker (R-Tenn.); vice chairman pf the Senate Water- gate committee.. , The existence of the classi- fied memorandum -has been confirmed by Watergate inves- tigators. Colson summarized the contents of the Eisenstadt memo for Bast as follows: ? Robert Mullen, founder of the public relations firm, com- plained that former CIA Di- rector Richard M. Helms "twisted my arm hard" to hire Hunt. ? Former CT 1 Director James R. Schlesinger, who succeeded Helms, now De- fense Secretary, endorsed a suggestion by Eisenstadt that Mullen and Robert Bennett, an associate in Mullen's firm,1 be permitted to read FBI and i CIA memoranda on witnesses! who should not be interviewed in the Watergate case. The Mullen firm was directed to "lie if necessary" in denying any association with the CIA, Bast said he was told. ? The Senate Watergate committee was informed of the times and places of at, 'least 300 break-ins conducted' convicted Watergate bur- .glar Eugenio Martinez. ? Bennett, the son of - Sen. Wallace Bennett (R-Utah), bragged to the CIA of favora- ble news treatment in the na- tional media, including News- week and The Washington Post, for stories he plan,ted to discredit the President's top White House advisers. _ A prominent Charlotte, N.C., lawyer with CIA connec- tions reported after a, plane ride NVith Sen. Sam J. Ervin Jr. (D-N. C.), chairman of the Senate Watergate -committee, that Ervin would steer clear of CIA involvement in Water- gate. (The lawyer named by Col- son told The Washington Post he was indeed a friend of Er- vin but denied either suggest- ing or receiving assurances de- scribed by Colson.) ? Bennett reported to the CIA that "through his father, Senator Wallace Bennett, he could handle the Ervin com- mittee if the CIA could handle E. Howard Hunt? (Robert Bennett denies having told that to the CIA.) Colson told Bast that he made the unusual approach to the private investigator in or- der to get proof of the extent of CIA's Watergate role on be- half of himself and H. R. (Bob) Haldeman, John D. Ehrlich- man, John N. Mitchell, Robert C. Mardian, Gordon Strachan and Kenneth Parkinson, de- fendants in the Watergate cover-up conspiracy case. He also told the detective he .wanted information on who was "financing" John W. Dean III and also a closer look at the circumstances or the plane crasli which took the life of Hunt's wife, Dorothy, in De; cember, 1972. In explaining his motives in seeking the investigation, Bast related, Colson said: "I'm in- terested in getting out of my problems but I'm more inter- ested in straightening out what's going on in the country right now." The former White House aide who has recently pro- claimed himself a witness for Christ spoke with high emo- tion of his concern over the CIA. "If this happens with us, it could happen to any Presi- dent," he told Bast. But Colson acknowledged that "what is exculpatory for me is if I am able to expose the fact that there was a ma- jor plot by the CIA and they were responsible for the ,eover-ups throughout the' in-' yestigation."! In the early days of the 'Watergate scandal President ,Nixon,. through Haldeman and Ehrlichman, sought to delay the FBI's investigation of _Nixon campaign donations -funds funnelled through Mex- ico' on grounds that it might -expose covert CIA activity and ? itiperil national security. The President later acknowledged that his fears were groundless as far as the Mexican funds were concerned. Bast said he would, under certain conditions, consider unaertaking an investigation of alleged illegal CIA influ- ence directed at the White House. r Those conditions, he said, Included the authorization of grand jury subpoena power, full presidential backing and the appointment of an addi- tional special prosecutor. But !Colson found no takers at the ; White House, as far as could be determined, though Colson told Bast the President was "enthusiastic" about the idea. i During his two conversa- tions, Bast said Colson por- trayed the CIA as a "frigh- ?tening" power operating with' no congressional or execu- tive branch control. He disparaged the chairmen-1 of the House and Senate CIA oversight subcommittees and told Bast that "almost every- where you turn" the CIA has its "tentacles." Colson indi- cated his belief in the perva- siveness of the CIA- encour- aged him to ask acquaintances to recommend an incorrupti- ble investigator. Bast, 41, a child of Washing- ton's Southeast blue-collar dis- trict, developed a reputation for flamboyance, toughness and blunt talk during his climb into diversified business activity from the ranks of pri- vate investigators. ("My fees start at $100 an hour, I accept one case a year only if I find it interesting," he told Colson). Bast told Colson . at the start' of 'their conversa- tions that the Nixon adminis- tration "tore the Costitution to shreds." . "I'm not saying that's not true," he quoted Colson as re- plying. "But I'm not sure that the guys who are going after us now aren't doing more dis- service to the country," Colson was quoted. Bast said he told Colson that "perhaps your whole crew maybe belongs in jail" but not if "they (the special prosecu- tor's staff) violated your con- stitutional rights." "They've been violated sev- eral times," Colson replied glumly. He offered no speci- fics but commented on the overwhelming strength of Watergate Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski's prosecutorial staff against an individual de- 12 .-APP4P-14.194/9,8.1?C,WRQP77,-00432R000100330004-7 Approved For Releate 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7 fendant. "You know how strongly I feel, about all this?" - Colson asked Bast three days before pleading guilty. "You're ,going to think I belong in an asylum when I tell you this: I've thought about walking into that courtroom Monday [June 3] before Gesell and saying 'I want to plead guilty? " # "I told him in that case? ' he'd have to go to jail," past said. WASHINGTON POST 25 June 197j,_. Allegation. Is Denied By Colson Former White House aide Charles W. ?Colson denied yes- 'terday' any knowledge of an ' allegation attributed to him that President Nixon was con- sidering firing Central Intelli- gence Agency Director Hain E. Colby. ? Colson was responding to published assertions by Wash- ington: private investigator Richard L. Bast growing out of two lengthy conversations between the two men at Bast's home last month. In the course of those dis? cussions, according to ?Bast, Colson claimed the President had told him he was consider- ing firing Colby .because of a suspected CIA involvement in the Watergate break-in and cover-up. The former White House aide acknowledged that he 'had met with Bast "in confi- dence in an effort to explore a passible professional relation- ship." He said that "none of the statements I made to Mr. Bast were intended for public 'consumption." . Bast, in response to Colson's statement last night,- said, "Mr. Colson was either lying when he talked to me last month or he was lying in his press release" on the subject of the President's alleged statement about Colby. "I will swear under penalty of law to my veracity," Bast said. "After. hearing his state- ment this evening, I doubt that.. Mr. Colson will do the same." The investigator said the former Nixon ' adviser agreed to release him from "any 'bond of confidentiality" after Colson's sentencing in -U.S. District Court. Colson said he talked to Bast "in a very offhand fash- ion, largely exploring theckiviti, LOS ANGELES TIMES 26 June 1974 High Court Rejects Suirto Force Public Disclosure of CIA Budget BY RUDY A.BRAIIISON ',class' to .liti e. these numerous teder al Time4 Staff Writer WASHINGTON? Thel' Supreme Court l'uesdayl rejected a Pennsylvania., 'man's ? 'suit to force .;the; Centraf Intelligence Agen- cy-. to Make public- its'I ,budget, Which is now hid-1 t-den in appropriations for] other federalogencies4; ? The 5-4 decision, reveiV; ing art opinion by the'rdi Circuit" Court of Appealst .in Philadelphia; held that.' William B, Richardson-. had .no 'standineto Sfileiin ;federal courts for clisao-?' sure of the secret bildget:',. Chief Justice Warrerr,E. k, Burger, Spea" ling for ?Majority, said ?a taxpayer, could not -Use the'courts to air. a` '-gene.ral grievance.' about' the e On duct Of' govertunent: . , "In a VerY:real sense," he: " said," the absence of any particular individual or for many of which I had been unable to obtain factual sup- port." ? : ? - Rep. Lucien Nedzi (D-Mich.), chairman of the House Armed Services Intelligence Subcom- mittee, said his panel has had for many months a 25-page CIA document which Colson -described in 'his conversations .with Bast. Nedzi said the memo, written by Eric W. Ei- senstadt, chief of the CIA's central cover staff, produced no conclusive evidence of an ? undisclosed implication of the agency in the Watergate scan- dal. ? The document, said Nedzi, summarizes relationships be- tween the CfA and the Was%- ington public relations firm .of Robert R. Mullen & Co. The Mullen company em- ployed convicted Watergate conspirator, E. Howard Hunt Jr. after he retired from the CIA. It also provided a pH- :vote cover for CIA operative5 at two of its overse-is offices, according ? to intoned aft. cials. .?? Senate Watergate commit- tee sources also denied an allegation attributed by Bast to Colson that the commitee had been told of 300 break-ins by Watergate conspirator Eugenio Martinez. ? .In his statement. Colson said yesterday that he would "explain my views and what- 0 tgiVAMV2VPIre ell claims gives support to the , argurnent that the subject matter is committed to the 5 surveillance of Congress,i E and ultimately to the po- litical process. "Any other conclusion; w ou I Cmean th a t the; founding, fathers intended to set. UP Something in the; nature of.-"; an .-?Atheniam ; democracy or "aNew Eng: ?land town nye e t in g to oversee the condttct of the; national government by. means of lawsuits in feder- al courts." ? It is generally estimated that the CIA ;has: an? an-, nual budget of $7PO lion, part of an Overall fed- eral outlay of $6 billion a: year for intelligence. The, actual CIA figure, as welii as the total budget, is di-; vulged only to key mem- bers of Congress.. - Officials have defended secreay .of the total budg,, ets, not to Mention de-?. tailed breakdoWns; on the g r . that--disclosure wouldhe of great valtie to potential enemie'S Of the United States. . The Richardson s u I seeking public disclosure of CIA expenditures,: had' been dismissed in a- fed eral district court irt Penrv..i ,sylvania. But in July 1972?: the appeals court 'ordered; the case tried. The Justice Department: argued that a decision re- quiring disclosure would., set off a flood of' -citizen challenges in the courts to cgrams, ; , f. Binger waS joined in tli& majority by justices Byron R.- White, .I-Iarry Black-. amn4 Lewis; F. Powell and William H.F? Rehnquist., In concluding that a tax-: payer has no standing to air in ;het courts:a general.:. 1,z grievancq, against govern.: t ment conduct or allocation ' of power; Burger noted:. .that this "does not impair; ;the right to assert his views in the political for- _ . r'uni or at the polls." -"Slow, cumbersome and: responsive though the tra. rditional electoral process rnay be 'thought at times," )he Said, "our system pro- ides" for changing mem-'? 'ihers of the political ,branches when dissatis- 'lied citizens convince a 'sufficient number of their ,fellow- electors that elected representatives: are cletin, quent in Performing du- ties committed to them." . ' In dissent, Justice Wil- liam 0. Douglas argued that Richardson was not *making "generalized com- plaints." . : ? - :- "They do hot even chal= lenge the constitutionality of the Central Intelligence -Agency acts," he said: -"They only want to know the amount, of 'tax. money exacted from them that goes into CIA activities.' 'Secrecy of government ac- quires new sanctity when their claim is denied."., ? 8 : CIA-RDP77-004321W0100330004-7 THE WASHINGTON POST ? " 'Sunday, funs 23,1974. estions Abound Forgery of,ThiiIL Death Cable By Lawrence Meyer Washington Post Staff Writer Sometime during the Christmas week of 1972, then-acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray III took a sheaf of classified docu- ments from his Stonington, Conn., house and burned them with assorted paper, ribbons and -bows collected during the seasonal gift-giy- ing. ? ? According to later -testi- mony by Gray, he glanced at one of the documents before burning it and was shaken by what he read. "I do not recall 'the - exact language, Gray testified later, "but the text of the cable implicated officials of the Kennedy ad- ministration in the assassi- .nation of President Diem of South Vietnam." ? The cable was a forgery, latbr, admitted to by Water- gate conspirator and some- time .White House,. "plumb- er" E. Howard Hunt and the full sotry ? of its'. ? fabrication and purpose has been slow in unfolding. ? Now, information in pa- pers, bled in U.S. District -Court here last week by at- Aorneys for former. ;White House aide John D. ?Ehrlichman has created i-a, juxtaposition of events that. ? leaves unclear what, if any,. ?relationships 'may exist ttveen presidential actions and the Hunt forgery. ? The story goes back to a 'remark made by President Nixon during a press confer- ence he held on Sept. 16, 1971, when South Vietnam was preparing to hold an? 'election with incumbent President Nguyen Van Thief' running unopposed. Mr. Nixon was asked what he thought ,about using "leverage" to "redeem the situation." In response, Mr.' Nixon'll said, among other things, that if the suggestion was that "the United - States should use its leverage now to overthrow Thieu, I would remind all concerned that,: the way we got into Viet- nam was through overthrow- ing (President Ngo 'Dinh) Diem and the complicity in the murder of Diem...." ? President Nixon's state- ment about United States "complicity" in the assassi- nation of Diem did not bring any follow-up ques- tions from reporters or cre- ate any stir among them af- ter the press conference. Ac- cording to one participant in, the press conference, the charge of American complic- ity in Diem's death was com- mon enough in Washington circles that it might easily go unremarked by reporters. President Nixon may still have been interested two days later, however,. in the. coup that overthrew Diem and took his life. ccording to a brief filed in ti.s. Dis- trict Court here last Thurs- day by lawyers for Ehrlich- man, "discussions on Sept.. ,18, 1971, reflect the Presi- ,dent requesting that Ehrl- ichman have Room 16 em- ployees obtain documents on the Diem coup to pre- pare for-an upcoming press conference." Room 16, located in the Executive Office Building. was the headquarters of the special White House investi- sgative unit know as "the plumbers." Two days later, orL_Sept, 20, 1971, according to the; U.S. State Department, White House aide David Young, later revealed to be one of the plumbers, phoned the State Department and asked that -Howard Hunt be :given access to cable traffic'. to and from Saigon for p? m-idd of April 1 through Nov.,. 30, 1963?a period that in- eluded the coup. ? According to State De-, partment spokesman Char..t les?..?.W. Bray, Hunt ob- tained copies of 240 cables from the State Department. It is -not clear Whether: Hunt has - access ,to doeu- ments in the State Depart- ment piior to the Sept. 20 call from Young. According to Hunt, whose sworn testi- mony before a federal grand jury in April 1973 was made public, he discoveped while examining State Depart-fl cables that "a number of cables were missing." Among the cables missing, ,Hunt testified, were some immediately before and af- ter the Diem coup and assas- sination. Hunt said he checked with the Central In- telligence Agency, which re- ceived the same cables, to see it that agency could fill in the gaps. Hunt said he was told that 'the CIA did not keep cables back to 1963. He said he was told much the same thing at the Pentagon. "And there came a time when T mentioned this to Mr. Colson, who I had been' directing my researches into the?at the particular period ?the Vietnamese war, and told him that, in MY opinion, a lot if stuff that should have been there had been extracted," Hunt testified. "He (Colson) said, 'How do you account for that?' And I said, 'Well, some of the cables that they still have on hand at the Depart- ment of State have been-? roved For Release 2601/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R06M8N1004-7 sent, with date stamps, say- ing photographed or dupli- cated for the John F. Ken- nedy Memorial Library'. "So I said, Well obvi- ously, anybody Who had been given access to the De- partment of State file for the purposes of incorporat- ing them into material held by the J.F.K. Library would also have had opportunity to remove any cables that could have been embarrass- ing to the Kennedy legatees. ? "And he (Colson) said, 'Well, what kind-of material have you dug up on the-files that would indicate! Ken- nedy complicity?' , And, I showed him three ?Or four cables that indicated that they had pretty close to pulled the trigger against Premier (sic) Diem's head, but it didn't say so in so many words. Inferentially,. one could say there was a. high degree of -administra- tion complicity in the actual assassination of: Diem and his brother. "And, he said, 'Well, this isn't good enough. Do you think that: you could im- prove on them?'" Hunt testified that he re.-. plied he.could, but not with- out "technical assistance." But, Hunt testified, Colson _ replied, "'Well, we won't be able to give you any techni- cal help. This is too hot. See what you ,can do on your own.' " . ? Colson initially denied giving Hunt any such order when the story of the forged cable was first made public. Colson later altered his posi- tion to ) say that Hunt may have acted on the basis of A misunderstanding. Hunt produced two cables that did . not satisfy. him, but he showed them to Col-: son anyway, Hunt told the grand jury. Colson "seemed to like" the cables, Hunt tes- tified, so he told Colson. ." 'These will never stand Any kind of scrutiny. Let's :be very sure about that.' " In any event, sometinie during this same period, William Lambert, a reporter for Life Magazine asked Colson about President Nix- on's comment about "com- plicity" in tile murder of: Diem. According to Lambert, his conversation with Colson oc- curred in early October. Lambert said Colson told Aim that materials showing additional complicity in the Diem murder on the part of contatt Lambert and Lam- bert recalled that he talked - to Hunt on the phone shortly after. Lambert said he and Hunt spoke first at Lambert's ho- tel and then again at Hunt's office at the, Robert R. Mul- 'len Cd., the public relations :firm where Hunt worked at, ter leaving the CIA_ Hunt took some photocb- pies of cables from a manila envelope on his desk and. showed them to him, Lam- bert said. "I started going, through them and 'they didn't mean anything to me," Lambert recalled. "I told Hunt, 'I don't know, what you're driving at here. Hunt fished through 'them" and pulled out one_ and said, 'Here's your story.' And that turned out to be the docu- --ment that was faked. I was' shocked.' What he saw, Lam- bert said, amounted to a, "death warrant" for Diem. , Follow;ng these meetings with Hunt, Lambert said,?he Went through several, months after protracted ne- gotiations with Hunt- in an effort to get .a photocopy of the cable. At the same time, Lambert said, he was trying to contact Colson. but couldn't get to him." . Ultimately, nothing came' 'of Lambert's efforts and the, matter lapsed until late April, 1973, when Hunt's at- tempt to forge the cable was 'revealed publicly. ? ,4 . ? Among a number of qtzes- -tons that remain unan-: swered are: Why did Presi- dent Nixon bring up the, : Diem assassination in his Sept. 16, 1971, press conference? Why' may ,he. ;have asked Ehrlichman, as. Ehrlichman's lawyers now Allege, to obtain documents -on the Diem coup "for an upcoming press confer- ence"? For exec:fly what purpose was Hunt directed to prepare the forged cables Implicating President Ken- nedy in the Diem assassina- tion? Mystery also still sur- ,rounds the Diem assassina- tion itself. No definitive offi- cial. ,history of what toole place has yet been made public, although President Johnson. according to Wash- ington Post White House comspondent Carroll Kil- patrick told reporters dui.-- mg a discussion or ,riam in August, 1967, "On in-' structions of ours- we assas, sinated Diem and then, by the Kennedy White House God, I walked into it. It was had been- located. Colson too late and we went. through one government at. said he would have someone 14. c' Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : GIA-RDP77-00432R0001003300044 WASHINGTON POST 21 June 1974 Behi Assess By Laurence Stern "tia.Ainaton Post Staff Writer At firsi glance :the intet" nor of the reorn! on the fourth floor of the Van' Ness, Shopping Center office building looks like the many 'dozens of private consulting ,firms scattered in their smartly appointed quarters . throughout Washington. r The neat lettering on the door says:: "Psychological ,Assessments Associates ,Inc." Admission is gained by pushing a buzzer and wait- ing for someone to unlock'. the door from the inside. But Walter. P..P,asternak,, the operating head of psy-, chological Assessments,' not anxious to see unsche-1 duled visitors. "We Jhave thing to say," he told a visit-,1 ing reporter in terse and an- gry tones, moving immedi-; ? ately toward, the door. The reason for Pester,. nak's reticence is that Psy- chological Assessments, is, unlike -mut.-- other busi-, nesses. From tile time of its incorporation in 1965, its ' principal source of funding has been the Central Intelli- gence Agency, which is what Pasternak does not want to talk about. `11.Ve could never have ex; iited without this support," acknowledges the firm's re- 'tiring president, John W. Gittinger, who . founded it With two other former CIA 'psycholOgists after they left full-time employment with .the agency. Winger is less reluctant* ' to' talk because he is disasso- elating ? himself from Psy- thological Assessments on -.Tilly 1 and is'proud of the work it,.has done as well as his long years of service to the CIA, to which he is still personally under contract as a consultant. The company won an ob- 7.6 et: syc ologteal ? ents' Door, A scure and perhaps unjusti- fied mention in the case of former White House special counsel Charles Colson, who pleaded guilty on June 6 to an obstruction of juct_7:...ta charge growing out of his role in the Daniel Ellsbeig break-in case. Colson had asked the of- fice of the. Watergate special prosecutor to provide "docu- ments or records concerning the psychological profile of Dr: Ellsberg compiled by Psychological Assessments, Inc., for the CIA.", Gittinger heatedly, flenies any association with the Ellsberg profile or, indeed, any involvement with -the' White House on Watergate or national security matters. "It's an absolute, positive lie," said the 57-year-old psy- chologist of Colson's impli- cation of the company's in- volvement - in the 1971 "plumbers' break-in of Dr. ; Lewis Fielding's office Inc Los Angeles. Fielding was Ellsberg's psychiatrist. A CIA spokesman said yesterday the agency will not comment on whether if,: has financial or operational' relationships with Psycho- logical Assessments. The CIA has a policy 'of saying nothing about, its links with U.S. domestic concerns. Gittinger acknowledges- that the company oehind the undbtrusive door at 4301 Connenticut Ave. NW has conducted training pro- grams for CIA operatives abroad and performed psy-: chologioal evaluations for overseas employees or American firms with for- eign-based offices or subsidi- aries. ? The :ruble of "psychological assessments " covers a variety of services which both the firm and Gittinger, in his private coosoling role, have provided the CIA. It covers the study of bra- inwashing technioues by for: eigrt: intelligence organize:: lions that was carried out by a New York-hased prede-; cesSor organization to PAA: called the Human Ecology Fund. It also provides training to CIA employees for asess- ing the credibility of foreign intelligence informants. "It's a question of trying to unr: derStand whether someone is lying or telling the truth when he comes through the ,door and says be' wants to" give you information," Git-; tinger explained:, ? The beginning of the psy-' cholog,ical assessmekt :pro- gram, Gittinger related;', goes back to the early 1950s when former CIA Director: Allen*W. Dulles sought neu- rosurgical treatment for his son, Allen M., who was seri- ously injured in Korea, from; a New York .neurologist,D.'j Harold G. Wolfe. . Dulles became interested in Wolfe's research- into Chi- nese indoctrination Of':cap- tured-American pilots dur- , ing the Korean war. CIA be- gan. financing ? the .research work through first the Soci- ety for the Investigation of Human Ecology, with which Wolfe was associated, and then the Human' Ecology Fund, according 'to Git- -tinger. ? Both 'operated a 'private research Organization with headquarters in New York and with branches overseas. ."This whole project was ' Allen ?Dulles' baby," Git- tinger explained. "It grew ? out of his son's injury in Ko- rea." ? . _ Be6use. of the growing controversy 'over CIA fi- nancing of private organiza- tions in the mid-1960s, the Human Ecology Fund was abandoned. The controversy ;was touched off .by .disclo- . . 0 n /' ercth on 'sure that the agency was fiwciing. activities.. of. baled: Olden jaw:. nalistic and cultural organ- izatiOns.- - 4-- The Hyman Ecology! Blind was Spared public- mention during "thern furor 'over' ": destine CIA financing. - It. ;folded- quietly. after Git- tinger moved to Washington, 1 to start Psychological_ As- ;sessmenti Associates Inc:. Current ,t programe"'by- PAA, said Gittinger,-' are strong& pointed toward SE- .vietChinese and ?Arab-cul- tural training:: He declined to discuss ; the. , specific :na, ?.ture of,. ,the - programs -or whether; PAA.,carried, out ;such programs ..for '-foreign infelli gene& secuzity or ganizations.: ?-; ' . :The commercial side of PAA's activities?screemng 'foreign employees of Ameri- can firms?has shrunk in.re- cent years making making the ccniz, pany almost wholly depeind- eat on its CIA contracts:i- emphasized that he company has never taken; a. :government or, private-ion; tract.', which .:involved*.he ;"asSeisinentof- in Allier. i? cah- citizeii.-i-/We do- abso- , lutely no domestic' advis-- t ing,"; ,no said: ."..We have never been asked tch"; Evaluate an American."' Gittinger ?and-,,the-k.:-twis4 other ? ex-CLk, : founders PAA, Robert E. Goodnow-7 -and Samuel -It Lyerly, haver' 'Ended their ? active associa? :Hon - with .the;?company:-.,Iti was, understood that fthelt new operating group is seek- :ing.,to divest. itself of thet.; CIA financial sponsorship. r ."I am. very proud of what:: I have done for the agency-, Oyer along period of time ink, the assessments field," said; Gittinger. "There is nothing. I am ashamed of; nothing .17 have to hide.".:. ? , 15 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7 THE NEW REPUBLIC 29 JUN 19714 An Odd Bit o Hidden History: De Gaulle's CIA Aide Charles de Gaulle is reputed to haye been an ultrana- tionalist who was almost paranoically suspicious of any foreign intrusion into France's internal affairs. Yet for several years prior to his return to power in 1958 he knowingly maintained regular contact with a covert- ' US Central Intelligence Agency operative; partly be- cause he wanted to preserve a link with America and, partly because lie was personally attached to the Amer- ican assigned to keep tabs on. him _ But although the CIA was able with his own cooperation to Watch de: , ? Gaulle closely, it failed to perceive that he W?tild. re- gain authoritr *and at One stagf.-.ev-en tried_to'bloCk': "?;: him by financing his opponents; la fact that'Certainly: did not elude him and may have contributes:1"-th"his later wariness .of Washington:.: I encountered this historical footnote the: other day in the perscinbf John F. HaSey, :the forrner. CIA agent - attached to de Gaulle. A-slight; easygoing man in his, -mid-50s, Hasey .compensates for the prosaic pace of his.- , I needed you." - Dedicated as they were to a united Europe under.US auspices, CIA policymakers during this period feared that de Gaulle would, if he carne back to power, wreck ? the Atlantic alliance then in its embryonic phase. Hasey was under instructions to report any moves that de Gaulle might mi.-ke in. that direction. De Gaulle re- assured him that heli-ad no intention of toppling the ieeble-fourth Republic...- Nevertheless Hasey sensed__ that the general would eventually reemerge, and he so?gHt _to convince the 'CIA of the Wisdom. of cultiVat- ? ingt.:46:aulle;..thui!building u15 ."goodwill" future He proposed, ; for example,;-:_that the-agency- .. quietly bring the general to the US for aii.operation:to . . rremOyecatara'etS from his eyes..ThZide.awas spurried..;- Hasey:,Was,perMitted'td provide' with un- classified for memoirs he was then writing,-. buti-reC6rrimendation: that the be authPriied - to receive confidential US analyses Of World affairs Was rejected According- .t6"Hasey, the US ambassador in. : Paris at the time, Douglas Dillon, was reluctant to visit- de Gaulle and only agreed to do so after it was learned:- . . that the Soviet envoy was seeing the general regularlY. ; ? At meetings between de Gaulle and Hasey, which took place about once a month,' the two men remit nisced or speculated on global inatters:One theme that- de Gaulle often emphasized, Hasey--reeplls, was,that ? . the US and the Soviet -Union were countries too large to govern and would ultimately fragment. That notion suggested to Hasey that de Gaulle WaS thinking that- the residual French empire would also break up and that ":independence. for. Algeria,' a burning issue r in France -at that time,-was inevitable.' Hasey stresses, however, .that nobody really knew what Was going .6n in .de Gaulle's mind Even after he was propelled into power by the uprising in Algiers in 1953 Hasey re- present retireinent by recalling past experiences,- and ' 'he told me of his' years with de,Gaulle as we. chatted in ? the living roorn:Pf his home outside Washington He ? ? - had gone to France as a student in the 1930s, but in- stead of studying he landed a job in Paris with Car-- , ? ? ? . tier's, the jeweler. After Prance fell to the Germans,..he? met de Gaulle in England at a friend's dinner table and was so impressed by the Free French cause that 1e en-. listed in the?foreign legion.. Some months later, fight- " ? ing against the Vichy forces in Syria, a burst of machine gun fire shattered his face. His exploits earneci him . .'.:nerribership in the Ordre de la Liberation, an exclusive fraternity created by de Gaulle. to honor his supporters. Only three other Americans were similarly hondreci, ? among them Dwight Eisenhower. ? " ? Hasey went to work for Cartier's in New York after *World War II but hankered for something more: excit ing, and when Eisenhower WaS :appointed commander. Of the Allied armies in EuroPe in late 1950, .Hasey asked to join him. Ike forwarded the request to the CIA, ? . , CIA, and not-long afterward" Hasey was in Paris- per- . forming various agency duties.. He organized a clan- destine surveillance team composed of former foreign legionnaires. He persuaded .a young Laotian captain " by the name of Phoumi Nosavan, then at the Ecole de Guerre, to become a paid CIA protege. His chief task, .however, was to stick close to de Gaulle, Who was then in the political wilderness_ As Hasey tells it, he went to see de Gaulle at the general's shabby office in-the Rue de Solferino and announced that he represented CIA Director Allen Dulles. De Gaulle remembered Hasey from wartime days and said: "My door is open any time you need me because you rallied to my side when ? calls, 'a member_ of the Gaullist inner circle; Gen. Pierre Koenig, told hirri- know that de Gaulle will never let . Algeria go, and you report that to Washington." If the CIA did little to court de Gaulle's goodwill during the late 1950s; its efforts to mobilize his adver- saries against" him failed. When theAlgeriart eruption opened the way for de_Gaulle's return to power, for in- stance, a CIA agent in Paris delivered a black bag con-:. ' taming $75,000 to former Premier Guy Mollet in a last-ditch effort to help the Socialist party leader stop the general. Mollet riot only did nothing to halt de Gaulle; but in a.curious turnabout, joined the Gaullist government and lent it legitimacy. _The CIA, inciden- tally, never again saw the $75,000. . Stanley Karnow 16 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7 o'n^r*OrPgAir.1".-non..?. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010033000417 PHILADELPHIA INQUIRFR 16 JUN 107h COlb utba(c 1 _?? ? , . ? WASHINGTOI?f .) f THERE'S A NEW, more open style at the hush-hush ' Central Intelligence Agency. . . Director Willianf E. Colby, often tagged the na- tion's "chief spook," doesn't hide in the woodwork. . His_ home telephone is listed, he goes sailing with neighbors, is a pillar of the Little Flower Catholic Church and sometimes dines with journalists. ? . His 1ife, Barbara, has been known to invite an unex- pected visitor in for coffee and a chat ebout family mat- ters. . ' And a Colby aide at CIA headquarters even introduced himself wryly recently as the agency's "spooksman." For years CIA has been trying to scrub up its image as : an insidious "invisible government" abroad and, more re-. cently, an alleged ally of Watergate burglars at home. Congress has tried to get a "handle" on CIA's contro- versial covert operations ? or "dirty tricks" ? which re- portedly have overthrown governments and funded foreign' guerillas, U. S. foundations and even assassinations. ; Now reliable Capitol Hill sources sair the "cloak-and- dagger" doings have dwindled to? less than 10 percent of the agency's activity. '.? ? ? The trend began before Colby was named to the job about a year ago, but he has encouraged it. For a long time the super-secret agency was identified on an access road off a major highway with a deceptive sign. Now it's plainly marked "CIA." . . . ', ?, 1 , ' .- Colby's crucial, delicate role Makes him President Nix- on's principal intelligence adviser , and participant. in Na-' tional Security Council meetings..?..where confidentiality is.. a "must." ? ? , - 1 , . But Colby claims he "comesclean!' with subCommit-'. tees of Congress. , "I'll tell them anything. There are no secrets. It's good for bureaucras, to be under surveillance," he said at a rare interview at the fortress-like CIA Building in Langley, Va.' where all ground-floor windows are screened in chain- link, ' VERA GLASER Washington Wfbeat ?1 - 0 'REACH HIS SANCTUM, one rides to the seventh floor in a privaterelevator, waits briefly in an iso- lated reception cubicle, then is ushered' into a spec- teenier glass-walled office with a stunning view of the lush , spring landscape.' ? The soft-spoken, 54-year-old CIA boss, in his horn- rimmed glasses, muted plaid suit and dark tie, looks more like an accountant than a spy.' . '? ? The graying hair is neatly slicked down, the blue eyes are cool and seemingly indifferent. He uses the same cas- ual tone to speak of the Soviet Union and China as he does to chat about the crabgrass on his lawn.. Colby's job is managerial now, but he knows every- "dirty trick" in the book after a lifetime .in Intelligence and the "operations" end of CIA. During World War II, he parachuted behind enemy lines, worked with the French resistance, and was dropped into Norway to blow up a Ger- man rail line. Now he rides herd on 'an agency whose size and budget are top secret. Outside authorities have estimated that CIA employs upwards of 20,000 people around the world and spends about $750 million a year. It is actually a small part of the U. S. international Intelligence network. ? format Ian_ 911 hard 10 'PP what's going on A barrage of critiNapnovediffwaRelknalinigfteeclie8/08rplA-RDP7. _ 0 2 0 - - ge l's cutback in covert action. In recent weeks, for example, the last of a, CIA-trained "secret army" was withdrawn from ,Laos: At one time it was said to have reached 30,000 men; at a Cost of more thanS300 million eyear. ? , ? "We're kind: of a bid word in a lot of places in the: world, unforttnately," -Colby conceded. "Some of this is - sensationalilm and not .well-founded. Some we deserve." RS. COLBY, a lively, knowledgeable helpmate, who. stays up until 2 A. M. reading newspapers so as "not to miss anything," claims her husband has done much -"to wipe out the cult ,of secrecy-for-secrecy's- sake at the CIA." " - "t . ? SOurces on Capitol Hill agree: ' ' ' Last July Colby became the first CIA Director to tes-, , ,tify in open Senate confirmation. hearings. ' He conceded CIA may have overstepped by engaging' .in domestic actions and that the Laos war probably ex-.. ceeded the agency's legal authority. ?? He admits frankly it was a mistake for the CIA to.equip r. White House. operatives with disguises for their illegal break-in in California?and in the next breath chitekleethat CIA's .experts were insulted by persistent press. reports that 'a red wig furnished to Watergate burglar. Howard. Hunt was "ill-fitting." . Colby has made a good impression on Sen. 'John Sten- nis. and Rep. Lucien Nedzi, the Democrats who. head Armed Services sub-committees which tide herd on. the '"1 don't think we've tripped him hi any way," Nedzi said. "He has never flinched in responding to us." But Sea. William Proxmire worries that,"a real liossi- bility exists of using this enormous apparatus to unscrupu- lous orille.gal ends here at home." ? 'He 'wants covert operations entirely wiped out, and his amendment fo a pending military procurement bill would more- tightly limit CIA to international activity and extend Congress' powers of scrutiny, . . _ :? ? ? Later this summer a Stennis subcommittee will review :ih.depth the"1947 National Security Act which created CIA. ' Nevertheless Nedzi believes- the agency is "moving in the right direction, with less Meddling in other people's business." He calls it "the finest Intelligence apparatus in . the world.", ?:- - ? ?: ? ? ? ? ? OLBY CONSTANTLY' emphasizes 4at "the real na- ture of intelligence today is the intellectual process of _ /gathering bits and pieces of information and making over-all assessments from them.' ' ? Covert operations, he says, ."contribute a small and sometimes critical part to 0 total picture. I would not favor abandoning 'them. We have .had foreign envoys who have lied to our President about something critichl. It can be very important to ,the country to know .when they're lying and when they're telling the truth." I In a recent speech Colby said the CIA would "continue to need Americans and friendly foreigners willing to under- take' Clandestine Intelligence missions." - ? . The toughest parts of his S42,500 job, he says, are "the longer-term projections or what's going to happen to the world, and what the major threats to the U.S. are going to be. Some important countries are fairly close with their in- there." Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7 :Colby was born in St. Paul6Len., the ion of an Army officer. He spent three boyhood years in Tientsin, China.. ? He. was "pacification chief" in Vietnam, with the per- sonal rank of ambassador, in 1969 and' 1970; wa4 'named deputy director ot CIA in March 1973, and shortly after- ward appointed to the to job. ' Colby describes himself as "patiimonious about time." He works a 12-hour day, often on Saturdays, and has a safe at home for secret papers. He is in touch by "beeper" even NEWS, Buffalo, N.Y. 25 May 1971t 71 ' 3 1 1 1 ,,..-: 1 ;`.?, t . ' 1.-- ii,U,.1,'- when sailing?a' pastime so cherished that Colby hopes to spend a year on a boat when he retires at some indefinite future time: ? Colby keeps a good luck charm on the window sill of his modernistic office, a large green cerarnic dragon. He explains it's a Vietnamese temple:artifact designed to ward off evil spirits. ? . ,"Dees it work?" he was asked.' "We haven't done too badly," Colby smiled, an assess- ment whicti even'his critics would confirm. By LUCIAN WAIMEN News Wczhington Bureau. ? WASHINGTON ? It's an ill wind that doesn't blow somebody some good, and that's the cliche that fits exactly what Watergate did to the ; CIA.. ? ? . The Central Intelligence Agency did have to squirm for awhile the revelations showed how the CIA became ensnared in the Howard', Hunt machinations. -In a way, though, the CIA has been a help in ferret- ,ting out the truth about Watergate. ? , The CIA was able to supply to the! appropriate authorities t h e datel intelligencegathering operations:, - (July 7 ,1971) an substance of a call alarm bells would almost literally from John Ehrlichman to Lt. Gen. ring all over the pace. Robert E. Cushman, Jr., then. CIA I Th..e- CIA has changed in other director, in which the CIA was askedj ays, too, not as a :result of Water- to help Hunt, former CIA emPloye,1 :?in an -intelligence operation. nate problems, but a result of the changes climate -of East-West rela- ? It has provided the transcript of at tions. The old covert operation, the subsequent conversation between!! paramilitary adventures that railed Cushman and Hunt on July 27, 1971,1 in Cuba but largely succeeded in when the nature .oiethe help needed; Laos, is now a small part of the was outlined. At that time Multi CIA's activity. asked modestly only for a wig and The machinery is, of C011;f3-3, still I - tape recording equipment for a pea- I there, waiting to be used if the Na- time only operation he didn't explain. I tional Security Council orders. The CIA has no idea what he i But even when used, it is not used the equipment for ? possibly 1 something the CIA suddenly decides , the famous Dita Beard interview on on its own wouldrbe in the national ! - the ITT matter. , Interest to launch. It has to have 0.11 ?sr 7. okay from the National 'Security it does Itnow that Hunt came I Council and the Preside.nt: ; beck to the CIA for more and more 1 . . . material until finally the agency The National Security Council, an realized it was being used for a organization of top officials from a domestic political intelligence opera- number of government agencies tion for which it had neither moral which used to be run by Henry Kiss- ' nor legal authority. It then blew the inger, has some 44 committees which whistle on Hunt. . review the nation's needs in defense Hunt, by the way, apparently per- and intelligence operations. The CIA ! formed his duties satisfactorily when performs from directives from _the' ha was a ? CIA employe, but it's NSC. rumored that his old associate.s were Pretty shocked when they ? found. Hunt was used for an illegal entry operation (Watergate) as this was .! 'not his field of expertise in CIA. A3 A RIE,SULT of getting its Zin- gers burned by the Hunt operations, the CIA under Director William Colby has been subjected to a overhaul. Colby apparently has done a thorough housecleaning job and , nailed down the operating procedure for the CIA in a set of unroistalmn; directiv:?.3 to the organization. If some new Hunt tried anything similar on the C.T.1,, which by law must confine itself to foreign ---APPrAugg * ? *- TFIERE IS ANOTHER check on the CIA, performed even more zeal- ously in the post-Watergate period. Director Colby or one of his top offi- cials meet once in every two or three e.,eeks with Rep. Lucien' N. Nedzi (D., Mich.), chairman of the gence subcommittee of t1;ee House Armed Services CornratiteZe Nedzi bores in herd.l.vith ques- tions about what thd CIA is doing and by whose uuthccity: "fhe?re. is a similar CIA contact with e, Senate subcommittee. There's apparently very little these trusted members of Congress don't. know aboet CIA operations. 2 o?? . . ?, 4 . $1 CZ?.7:3;4 ; ? b;a) A 7 . ? And so the CIA has quietly, it would seem, reformed itself and set about the main business for which it was intended ? find out what friends and enemies are planning to do that might affect t b e - security of the United States.. Even with reform, it doesn't? always bat 1.000. .No iateingerice- gathering organization ever does. It most conspicious recent failure was in not predicting the October war between Israel and the Arabs. The CIA candidly acknowledges that it placed ,.00 much emphasis on ? mdi- cator; there wouldn't he a war, and not enough on those sagasting there would. ' But the CIA apparently is supply_ hg sitalie pretty good material days to our government on such. guz? jects a t h e uphea?..al. in Chin.t. .Russ:an-Chinese hotiLti:,-.,s and tee future of the sophisLicaied missiies in the Soviet Union. in China, there is some turb,i- leeee over a Mao-directed campaiz_a to shiike up-the bureaucrats in lin:: with his philosoplty of a ?-perpetual revolution. En-:al. even noegh bowing out foreign can:menial ftinc- Lims, believed Lo be in charge ? ofeee??ene -.11:e country. .? The ?:_A appeat*3 to ...ave ?any direct 'outbreak or hnstiitios between C1,:nn and 7.'?le: Scviet Leien along t-..ie_er -noeciers, al- theteeh Caren still have large rces facing each other. * . 'RUSSIA NOW has the eap.ability of deploying Muftiple incieeend.ent!y Targeted Vericie. ts'7,1?IleV) . hut there is no evidence it is ensacei in a massive deployment. effort and apparently i'rer.ds to phese them in e.!'edually over t e peers. IF !:, ceenees ire; mind en the policy woeld sec n become 14..ne?en here. It is in the tearennttel of such facts as tiese.,, anir; they are accurate, the the CI.e. tItitifies its existence. No majc?r can af- ford to be without an azenr:-_, if - it is k.,11 run andthe acr.cy knov.s cnoti.,eh p,ofit. by 70 1 -13D.P777994,0_00199.i30,99.4;L 'a Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7 NATION 22 JUNE 1974 The State 02:the Department *1 :'-??? Flying .at close to the speed of sound and setting new endurance records ha:: the annals - of diplomacy, Henry! Kissinger has achieved Egyptian and Syrian cease-fire :agreements and raised the possibility?no more than that ?of a future stabilization of relations between Israel andl its Arab neighbors. ? ? ? ? ? But; giving all credit to the Secretary of State, what ? Of the State Department? Some commentators argue that , .rnodern communications have made jet diplomacy fea- sible, with negligible, drawbacks. Writing on "How .Kis- singer Runs State by Remote Control" in The Christiani Science Monitor, Benjamin Welles suggests that elec- tronics has made location immaterial. :From whatever runl;vay Dr. Kissinger's plane lifts off, he is linked to) :Washington via the White House global communications system. When he is on the ground he works through .Embassies: and diplomatic mission code rooms. En- coded, a priority message from Damascus to Washington May travel by overland circuits, submarine cable and microwave in less than four minutes. From the State Department's communications center in the White House, it goes to the Pentagon and the CIA at speeds of thou- sands of words a minute. Welles reports that by tele- printer, which accounts for most of Dr. Kissinger's traf- fic,- during his ,thirty-four-day absence he sent seventy ?flash" "messages and received forty-five; he sent 633 immediate priority messages and received 1,075; etc. That sort of thing makes ? good journalism in the! popular science, "gee-whiz" genre, but politically it makes no sense. Diplomacy by jet and electronics comes at a high- cost. It is the stuff of which drama is made and the press naturally loves it, but many people in the State Department and the White House, including some who have worked with Kissinger, complain. Back at the! State. Department, Richard Dudman of the St. Louis; Post-Dispatch writes that praise for Kissinger's tour de! force in the Middle East is mixed with "concern ap- proaching desperation over the state of the department." It is in something of a mess. . Kissinger did .not create the mess; it goes far back. Since the Presidency of Herbert Hoover, there have been perhaps half a sdozen task force reports on the need to reorganize and reform -the State;?Department. Secretary Rogers set up the Macomber group;)'which in 1970 issued a 600-page program of reform for. thedepartment. About 500 changes were proposed. The department continued as before; if anything, it became more chaotic. ? -7 ? Kissinger knew the department's' failings and 'promised to cure them.. That commitment,:iii, effect, was a condi- tion of his confirmation as Secretary* of State,:but while setting himself up as a 1970s"John Foster Dulles--- more intelligent- but, also niore;:peripatetic--ICissinger seems to have: forgotten the pledge he made to "institu- tionalize" foreign policy,. - ? :;"The consequences "could .be-disastrous in some: future emergency; which -the StateDePartinent may :create by its own disorganization-. and::Managerial disarray.:7-?Con- sider-only . the-. foreigt servicei:-;dtisp one of ? the- divisions that; with more than 12,000 emPlOYees in all, makeup the department; Our June- 15th issue' we-ran 'a, piece by Barry Rubin-.itemizing some of the odd -characters who represent: US-: various '.part.St' of the 'world. Aside from the time-hbnored spoils :,-syStem, - under. -which' a Walter Annenberg?by no -.:means: the worst' :example?. can buy himselL the ambassadorship Greaf:Britain: with a campaign.-...contribution ibf.--:.$250,000,::mote than; 1,500 CIA personnel are currently:"-carried on the". State Department tolls:: Some Of these peOple are highly nant?ex-coup-makers and the like. One reason' that that Washington seems to have suchload relations :t -the "outs" in Greece; for example, or:in Portugal before- the de Spinola-switchover, is that weSend obsessed rightists to, such trouble spots. Surely, even'with a crippled Admin- istration, we can come up with- more reasonable foreiv21, service officers than irrational :"freedom fighters.". But basic reforms of this .1cindall for more. concen- trated attention._ than "Kissinger. :cart: give his department ' when most of his colleagues see-l_him only on :TV. 'And' an even more* disquieting possibility arises.- Kissinger's skills as a foreign negotiator -are:Universally recognized, but Is' he the- prima donna type?:,,-;11e- has -just lost, his deputy secretary,: Kenneth Rush; Who has gone:Over: to, the White House:- as the President's chief economic ad- viser.- Three of-the five 'top post.?in State areTreported to be vacant.; Itis a reasonable.fsuspicion that Kissinger wants to do it:all himself, that. betemperameritally lacks the basic managerial attribute of delegating responsibility.' He should allay :this suspicion before it is too_latej THE CIVIL LIBERTIES REVIEW WINTER/SPRING 19/4 esources For Civil Libertarians= COUNTER-SPY A new quarterly, 75 to 100 pages long, slated for publication May 15 by the Organizing Committee for a Fifth Estate, which was formed by the recent merger of the Committee for Action/Research on the Intelligence Community (CARIC) and The Fifth Estate, founded and funded largely by Norman Mailer and friends. The Organizing Committee's purpose is "to investigate United States intelligence and secret government operations and to resist techno- fascism." Counter-Spy supersedes a publication of the same name put out quarterly by CARIC. Some recent articles discussed lawsuits to force the CIA to release budget information, secret U.S. operations in Cambodia, the use of government infiltrators in the Gainesville Eight trial of 1973, and the exposure of anti-war activist "Crazy Annie" as an intelligence officer of the Washington, D.C., police department. ? Subscription: S6 (institutions S10). Write: Organizing Committee for a Fifth Estate, P.O. Box 647-, Ben Franklin Station, Washington, D.C. 20044. Approved For Release 2001/08/0a.9CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7 GENERAL THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, , Tuesday,' June 18, 1974 Maritime Muddle, Tide of Pessimism Is High as Talks on Law Of Sea Near Opening Formidable Agenda Awaits ? UN Meeting in Caracas: Fishing, Mining, Pollution A Plethora of Positions By BARRY NEWMAN . ; Staff Reporter of TELE WALL STREET JOURNAL Over the protests of the State Depart- ment and a threatened presidential veto, Congress recellitly passed a law declaring once and for all that a lobster isn't a fish. ? State Department emissaries argued at hearings that lobsters jump up and down when they get mad and swim a few feet, showing that they are more like fish than, say, clams are. But that didn't hold up in the face of scientific testimony that lobsters make whoopie on the sea floor, demonstrat- _ing that they don't swim much at all. ? With the law on the books lobsters now are considered "creatures of the sea floor" and, unlike fish, are off limits to foreign -fishermen. The whole lobster question still gives State Department diplomats heart- burn. .They might not actually care very much if a lobster is classified with fish or not. What really upsets them is that the new lobster law is another in a long list of pushy unilateral actions by the U.S. and other countries rustling rights to the oceans be. e the United Nations has a chance to de- cide peaceably on an international law of the sea......... That chance will come this week. On Thursday, in Caracas Venezuela, the IJN will convene a big Law of the Sea Confer- ence for 70 days of dickering. Debate over the lobster's swimming ability will be just one niggling point of friction among thou- sands at what promises to be the biggest in- ternational gathering in history?and quite possibly the most confusing. Hangers-On and Calligraphers There will lie about 150 countries attend- ing; that's about 70 more than even existed at a previous Law of the Sea Conference In 1958. Delegates, advisory committees, in- terest groups and assorted hangers-on will number close to 5,000. And the UN is send- ing 89 translators, 38 revisers and another 89 typists and calligraphers?plus a contin- gent of executives to r th To house this mob, the Venezuelan gov- ernment has reserved every inch of first- class hotel space in Caracas and has taken over a just-finished luxury housing jzoject, turning a 43-story tower into delegates' quarters and converting a movie theater into,a plenary meeting hall equipped for si- multaneous translating into five languages. The cost to the host government was $16.5 million. What all these people are going to try doing in Caracas is to boil down six fat vol- times of turgidly composed proposals into one neat document that would: ?Put a uniform world-wide limit on how far out to sea a coastal state can claim soy- lereign authority. ?Create an intermediate zone where a ' coastal state retains power but where other states have ?rights to navigate and exploit resources. ?Impose international law over the deep sea beyond national jurisdiction, especially over the mineral wealth at the bottom. ?Establish authority transcending na- tional end international bounds to control pollution and encourage scientific research. The complications are phenomenal. "It is fair to say," one expert asserts in all seriousness, "that mankind hasP probably never before attempted such a difficult task." ( The Conflicting Interests All the traditional alliances have come unstuck in a negotiation awash in conflicting interests dictated simultaneously by mili- tary, economic and geographical distinc- tions. Delegations are themselves divided into interest groups, and factions are war- ring within factions. ? ;, Coastal states want as much power as far out to sea as possible; landlocked states want to share that power. Advanced states want to exploit the sea; developing states fear exploitation. Maritime states want free- dom of navigation for their vessels; straits states want to control shipping. States with concave shorelines worry about- being squeezed by states with convex shorelines. States without islands are nervous about being pushed back by states with islands, There are combinations and permuta- tions: coastal states that are maritime pow- ers vs. coastal states that aren't; developing states with rich, seabed mineral resources vs. developing states without them. Oil in- terests within any one delegation may be pushing for freedom to drill while fishing in- terests want to prevent pollution. The oil in- terests may themselves be split between shippers wanting freedom to navigate and operators who don't want foreigners com- peting in coastal waters. And the fishing in- terests can be split just as often between those who want to chase the tuna anywhere on' earth and others who. want to protect coastal banks, against poachers. No wonder pessimism is riding high. "Most people just don't think we're going to get out of this thing with a treaty the United States Senate will ratify," a congressional observer says. "Our only hope is that every- body else will turn out to be more screwed up than we are." There is, however, one strong incentive for diplomats to find a workable treaty, and that is the thought of what might happen if they don't. There is too much of value in the oceans for the traditional "freedom" of the seas to persist. Without a treaty, the world is likely to see a wave of unilateral claims to vast ocean area s,--putting map makers to work drawing boundary lines over the blue. Louis B. Sohn, a Harvard professor, sees such a free-for-all leading "to a division of the oceans among a few major powers along the lines of the division of Africa in the 19th Century; and such neocolonialist competi- tion might easily degenerate into a new er of imperialist wars." Some nations, impatient with the lack of legal framework for exploitation, are taking ? the law into their own hands. Years ago sev- eral Latin American nations extended their territorial claims 200 miles out to sea, and Peru has harassed scores of U.S. fishing boats that venture too near. More recently, Canada declared a 100- mile "pollution zone," and Iceland extended Its territorial sea to 50 miles, touching off a "cod war" with Great Britain, its ally in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; that conflict rearlled the shooting stage last year. (Britain and Iceland signed an agree- ment on the issue last November, but it will only be in force for two years?presumably enough time for the UN to act.) In recent weeks, two more NATO mem- bers, Greece and Turkey, have been edging toward a military confrontation over Tur- key's exploration for oil in the eastern wa- ters of the Aegean Sea. The area is only a few, miles from Turkey's coast, but it is dot-f ted with small islands owned by Greece. Turkey claims the floor of the sea, Greek is- lands or no Greek islands. Greece dis- agrees, and the international law applying to such questions is very muddy. ? There are , four international treaties, :adopted at the 1958 Law of the Sea Confer- ence, but they have some deficiencies that are getting worse as technology for exploit- tug the oceans improves and the number of countries in the world increases. The treaties, for one thing, never clearly defined "territorial sea." For another, an average of only 40 nations ever bothered to ratify them. By 1970 it was obvious that something more was needed, so the United Nations de- cided to throw another conference. A 91-na- tion committee was set up to decide What to talk about, and without a single dissent, the General Assembly declared that the guiding principle of the meeting would be the pres- ervation of the sea as "the common heri- tage of mankind." This inspirational declaration lost some , of its high tones when the countries sat down to hash out the issues. "The seabed is the heritage of 'mankind,'" says Louis Hen- kin, a Columbia University professor, "but there has been no agreement as to who is or represents mankind or how mankind should enjoy that heritage." A Mountain of Conflicts The 91 countries that were supposed to spend four years arriving at a basic treaty text for 150 countries to ponder have instead dumped in Caracas a mountain of conflict- ing proposals. The six volumes don't include a single set of draft articles. The report of one of the three subcommittees has no fewer than 50 separate proposals, and ap- pended to them are hundreds of anonymous "variants." Another massive section is writ- ten with alternatives that aren't accepted by one or more delegations enclosed in brack- ets?and there are even brackets within the brackets. The "press kit" for the conference consists of sheets of paper several square feet in area, on which the plethora of posi- tions are separated into little boxes. If the issues sound complicated, consider that the conference still has to decide on a system for voting on the issues, In another grand gesture, the General Assembly reached a "gentleman's agreement" that decisions would be made by "consensus." But nobody knows what consensus means, except that it definitely means more than a two-thirds vote. The assembly has ordered the conference to clarify the rules in the ---Approved Fctr7,Rslaask-20,044041/08-,:r-GIA-RDP-77--004,32,R090-1,00330.00,44.,? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7 ( first week of the meeting. The conference could vote to rescind that order. But it would naturally first have to decide how many votes would be needed to decide whether to reconsider the decision that ev- erything should be decided by consensus. An International Authority Absurd as this seems, parliamentary procedure becomes deadly serious to states trying to line up alliances and predict how the conference will vote on a number of cru- cial points of conflict. "The business of the conference involves such concrete issues and interests that nobody wants to wind up in the minority," one UN official says. One key confrontation will involve the creation of an unprecedented international authority to govern the exploitation of the deep seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. This would have been an eso- teric topic a few years ago, but now several major mining companies, mostly from the U.S., are ready to take huge tonnages of minerals from the ocean floor at depths as great as 20,000 feet. Some developing countries, landlocked countries and countries not enamored of free enterprise want to share the wealth through an international authority that will operate the mines or at least form joint ven- tures. Advanced countries, namely the U.S., want an international body that will mainly grant mining licenses. Developed countries are worried about minerals shortages and expropriation threats; developing countries with rich resources don't want markets de- stroyed for minerals they mine on land. There isn't much room for compromise. Just as contentious is the question of what to do about the sea under national jurisdic- tion. There is general agreement that coastal states will get absolute sovereignty 12 miles from their shores. But beyond that, about 200 miles to the edge of the continen- tal shelves, there is a problem: how to re- tain national jurisdiction while giving the in- ternational community some rights in the area. This issue, says John Stevenson, the U.S. ambassador to the talks, "involves more interests of more states than any WASHINGTON POST 17 June 1974 Fish 9 d ee olities 1 By George' C. Wilson , ? Washington Post Staff Writer ABOARD THE SHARON-AND-NO- ? BEEN?The fishermen in the fo'c'sle of this dragger bucking through the At- lantic swells had a message for the United Nations delegates who will open the biggest international meeting in history on Thurcd:Iy. Neither the fishermen nor the fish, the men said angrily, can wait much longer for the U.N. or anybody else to bring some law and order to the ex- ploitation of the seas. Otherwise, it will be every country for itself. The 5,000 delegates from 151 na- tions who will gather at Caracas, Venezuela, for the U.N.'s third Law (if the Sea Conference know the fish- ermen are right. But it is improbable, despite the acknowledged urgency, that the delegates will succeed in writing an acceptablAppftittattbfaivR other problem in the law-of-the-sea negotia- tions." Some Latin American coastal states will argue for complete control of everything 200 miles out. A few of their neighbors will sup- port a 200-mile "patrimonial sea" where other states can navigate but can't mine or drill without permission. On the other hand, the U.S.?as well as some states with re- sources but without the wherewithal to get them?wants coastal states to relinquish some jurisdiction and in return to share in the revenue of investments Made off their shores. Fish and Pollution , Living resources are another kettle of fish. There are countries that hook most of their catch off their coasts; they want to keep foreigners out. Other countries have fishermen who travel long distances after their quarry; they want access to foreign waters. And still other countries, the U.S. included, have both kinds of fishermen, and they want the law to apply differently to dif- ferent kinds of fish. Even further from resolution is the pollu- tion problem. Ideally, ocean pollution could be controlled by an international body with power in national and international waters. Because a lot of ocean pollution starts, out on land, this authority might even have some influence on the kind of garbage al- lowed in the oceans to begin with. But that sort of rule would infringe on coastal-state sovereignty. As a result, the language of all the pollution proposals is high-minded but purposefully vague. Inter- national standards for land-based pollution are undoubtedly out the window. Some states want pollution standards that can be relaxed if their economic situation is bad. Others want the right to Impose stricter standards if they choose. Any such ideas are anathema to maritime countries worried about their ships having to meet one stan- dard in one port and another standard in an- other port. There is one area on which the U.S. and ? other big powers aren't likely to compro- mise. These nations want freedom to pass ; through narrow straits, regardless of how &fling two-thirds of the -earth's sur- face ? the seas. The realities of ocean p o Li ties threaten to polarize the conference, with the biggest "have" countries ? the United States and the Soviet Un- ion ? lined up against the "have not" countries backed by China. For the law of the sea no longer means merely agreeing on who can sail where. Today ? in a world run- ning short of food, fuel and minerals ? it Means agreeing on who can tap what part of the ocean for resources that are running out on land. "We may see a national race for the control of open oceans and seabeds com- parable to the race for the control of land areas of the past three centuries," former Secretary of State Dean Rusk has warned in urging world leaders to update the law of the sea before man- kind goes through the "sheer insanity" of another race for riches. The. New England fishermen aboard the Sharon-and-Noreen out of New Bed- ford, Mass., do not know much about the Law of the Sea Conference; nor the ';have vs. have-not" problem, n or Dean Risk. But they do know a lot about Ash and fishing and the ocean politics offshore. And, in making their case during a three-day sail from Washington to New B ei eitab (Oat 141 much the conference extends a nation's ter- ritorial limits. The major powers want their ;nuclear submarines to pass through the straits unimpeded and underwater. Some U.S. groups .are concerned that under Pentagon pressure to win on this Issue, the U.S. delegation might bargain away all other points. One congressional aide says that the Pentagon "would trade every damn thing there is lying around? fish, oil and everything else?to be able to go through the straits of the world with their atomic subs under water." The Question of Time Various groups are also worried about how long it might take to put into effect any international law that might come out of the conference. Another conference session seems almost certain next year, but any final agreement it might produce could lan- guish as long as a decade before wide ratifi- cation. Congress is already considering a hill that would permit ocean miners to go ahead and mine if the conference doesn't come up with a pact by next year. Another bill, which has a good chance of being passed this summer although it would probably be vetoed by President Nixon, would extend U.S. control over foreign fishermen to 200 miles from the current 12 miles. Rep. Gary Studds of Massachusetts, a principal spon- sor of the bill, says, "If we wait, the ques- -tion will be academic. There won't be any fish." Mr. Studds was also instrumental in get- ting the law passed that declared the lobster not a fish. He says he did it because he didn't think the lobster could wait for an in- ternational law of ne. sea either. . The State Department didn't agree with Mr. Studds on that, but there is in all this at least one point of almost universal agree- ment?clams. The State Department, Mr. Studds and almost everybody else seem to concur that a clam isn't a fish and is there- fore under national jurisdiction. "Clams are sedentary," U.S. Ambassador Stevenson says. "There lino problem with clams.". the U.N. delegates and their govirn- ments all during the Law of the Sea Conference from June 20 to Aug. 29. "If our oil guys have the right to -drill up to 200 miles off our shores, why shouldn't we fishermen have the same right?" asked Edward E. Longo, skipper of the Sharon-and-Noreen. He sailed the dragger from New Bedford to Washington to lobby for a 200-mile- wide American-controlled fishing zone around the United States. "If the Russians drilled oil right of four shores like they trawl for fish right now, you'd see something done," Longo said in the Sharon-and-Noreen fo'c'sle. He felt no better when told that Secretary of Inter!- nor Rogers C. B. Morton said recently that it was "a hell of a good question" what the United States would do if the Soviet Union suddenly' decided to drill for oil in the International waters off Maryland. ?A farmer?he can plant more nest year if he did not raise enough stuff this year," said John C. Botelho, SI, skipper-owner of two 2R00 MOlit 4taggers--also 21 Approved For Release 2011818: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7 ( salted trawlers. "But you can't do that with fishing once you take too many fish. They can't repllenish them- selves, then." ? Haddock have been virtu- ally wiped out by overfish- ing by foreign fleets off New England, Botelho said. The yellowtail flounder will be gone within three years unless the United States im- poses controls for every- body, he added. Why, Botelho asked in a voice heavy with frustration and pain, is the U.S. govern- ment standing by while for- eign fleets ruin fishing for all time for everybody off the American coast. The government should appoint Itself game warden and post rules for every country to obey when fishing within 200 miles of the U.S. shore- line, he argued. "You've seen these fine mesh nets these foreign fish- ing boats use," complained Edward W. DeCosta, 34, en- gineer on the Sharon-and Noreen. "How is it fair for our government to tell us to 'use only a certain size net and then other governments go ahead and use stuff so small it SCOOPS up every- thing." "We're getting desperate," ? Longo said "In two years I don't think there will be any of the good fish left the way things are going." Botelho?who has fished the waters off New Bedford for 31 years and reveres the sea to the point that "every trip is a lifetime"?agreed that fishermen are fed ,up with waiting. "We used to ? act like babies with pacifiers , when people promised us things," he said. "But no more." New England fishermen allied with a federation of interests. called Save the American Fisheries already are lobbying for passage of a bill sponsored by Sen. Warren G. Magnuson (D.- Wash.) and Rep. Gerry E. Studds (D-Mass.) to give the United States control of fishing up to 200 miles off Its coast until an interna- tional agreement is reached. The bill faces an uncertain CHRIST IAN SCIENCE 17 June 1974 Mideast A-pacts: hazards debated future because 'the Nixon administration contends that going? it alone at this point would undermine the ' Law of the Sea Conference. Beyond lobbying ,one plats up rumors that -some fishermen go to sea armed In case. the competition be-. tween American and foreign fleets should escalate to.gun fire. At the moment, the U.S. clai ins a- three-mile-wide band of territorial waters plus nine miles beyond it as an AmeriCan fishing zone? or a total limit of 12 miles.. The U.S. delegation at Cara- cas will agree to extending the territorial limit from three to 12 miles but oppose ? designating 188 miles more as an American-controlled economic zone. iThe fishermen would seem to be correct in assuming the Soviet Union could drill for oil as well as fish any- where beyond that 12-mile limit. But there are some other ? American claims to the riches of the sea?claims that the Law of the Sea Conference will argue about in Caracas. ? - On Sept. 28, 1945, Presi- dent Truman proclaimed that the .U.S. continental shelf from the beach to a depth of 600 feet was Ameri- can territory. He said the same day that the United States also reserved the right to establish American- controlled "conservation zones" for fishing, but did not define them. ? , In 1958, the U.N. General Assembly ;went further than the Truman proclamation by defining the shelf as "the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to ? the coast but outside the area of territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters or, be- yond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploi- tation of the natural re: sources of the said areas. ? ? ? In other words, the Gen.- eral Assembly said, any- thing a nation can reach, it MONITOR By Da;vid F. Sallsburyjf;-,: - ,- ? Staff writeisof ? ? ?-? ? ? The Christian Science Monitor.- . . ? The effectiveness of _ inter- national nuclear safeguards is under new scrutiny following .President Nixon's agreement to provide Egypt with nuclear energy. In particular, there is a danger that fissionable material used in a can take.- That is one sense of the "admits of the explor- ation of the natural re- sources" language. In faulting that loose lan- guage, George A. Doumani, in his book, "Ocean Wealth: Policy and Potential," said, "It is evident that the de- pendence of the delineation of the continental shelf on the technological feasibility of exploiting it can be used as license for encroachment. It has already led to confu- sion and may well lead to grievances among the na- tions of the world. Contin- ued encroachment would weaken the effectiveness of international law." Small wonder, then, that underdeveloped nations meet- ing at Caracas will try to put a fence around their coastal- waters so they can keep the oil and fish for themselves. Chile, Ecuador, and Peru, for example, want to pre- serve the riches along their Pacific coasts to 200 miles out, with the proviso that foreign ships, submarines and airplanes could still navigate within 12 miles of- their shores. The 33 nations with little or no coastline want vast riches of the "common herit- age" oceans divided up among all the nations of the world. They would like to ? see national claims limited to no more than 40 miles and apply- share-the-wealth philosophy to rest of the seas. One proposal to imple- ment that objective is to es- tablish an international li- censing body to control sea mining beyond national ju- rfsdictions. That is, out in deep sea. Here again competing eco- nomic interests and interna- tional ocean politics make it, difficult for the world to agree on a set of rules. American sea mining com- panies, for example, do not want to have to compete for licenses before an interna- tional body connected with the U.N. They fear they would come off second-best power plant in Egypt might be stolen by terrorist groups and used for blackmail. In the last few months, two Independent studies have found even United States nuclear safeguards, the tightest in the world, to be inadequate to prevent the theft of nuclear materials by armed terrorist groups. . U.S. officials insist that the nuclear power program for Egypt will be under strict examination from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. This involves regular on- _22 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7 because the "have-not" na- tions outnumber and out- ? vote the "have". nations In- the General Assembly. Instead; the mining com- panies are seeking congres- sional authority to stake, claims to big portions of the seabed. - Because of the complexi- ties and billions of dollars at stake, law of the sea special- ists predict the conference. will fail to agree on a final treaty at Caracas but will instead settle -for refining an agenda for voting next - winter in Geneva. - However ? and this is fin-- portant to New England fishermen ? the same spe- cialists predict ? the confer- ence majority will express itself in favor of a 200-mile "economic zone" where indi- vidual countries .would Con- trol the fishing, drilling for oil and seabed mining. The State Department is resigned to such an eco- nomic zone and realizes the Senate is unlikely to ap- prove a Law of the Sea. Treaty which does not pro- vide for one. Even the State, 'Department will continue to press at Caracas for appor- tioning jurisdiction over fishing in the basis of : where fish live and travel? the "species approach" which critics contend would be too complicated and diffi- ? cult to enforce. The Defense Department Is uneasy about 200-mile eco- ? nomic zones, even if territo- rial waters remain at 12 miles at the outset. Under the "creeping jurisdiction" argument, defense officials fear countries would at- tempt to extend territorial waters seaward toward the ? limits of the economic zone ?perhaps posing problems? for U.S. reconnaissance sub- marines and aircraft as well as warships. At the minimum, the De- / fense Department is insist..." ing as the right of transit ? through international straits even if overlapping territo4' rial jurisdictions theoreti-: oily closed them off. site inspection. The U.S. now has cooperative agreements under similar condi- tions with 2.5 nations. The Indian plant from which basic fissionable material was generated for India's first atomic blast recently was not under IAEA supervision. It was set up with the help of Canada, which has since ended its assistance in protest against the Indian detona- tion. , U.S. `atoinib energy officials Must" also consider the possibility that the Egyptians could use the plutonium Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7 ???? generated by the U.S.-provided nu- clear power plant to produce a nu- clear weapon themselves. Presently, the fuel rods that go into commercial nuclear reactors cannot be made easily into a nuclear bomb. However, in the core of the reactor some of the uranium transmuted into plutonium can be separated chem- ically and made into an explosive. Separation difficult Because the spent fuel is highly radioactive, this separation must be done remotely, behind heavy lead shielding. The process is very ex- pensive. But by the 1980's, when Egypt's first commercial reactor is to be com- pleted, present plans of the nuclear Industry call for enriching fuel with plutonium. This will make it easier for any country with a stockpile of fuel rods to divert materials and fabricate a bomb within days or weeks after they decide to do so, arms control experts concede. According to information supplied to the congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Egypt has agreed that it will not use any of the fissionable materials for even ? "peaceful" nuclear explosives, as the Indians have moved to do. However, Republican Sen. Jacob Javits of New York, among others in Congress, is not so sure about relying on such promises. In a recent press conference, he recalled Egypt's viola- tions of agreements made after 1956 and said, "We must be extremely wary about the possibility of in- troducing nuclear weapons into the Middle East tinderbox." Congress has veto Agreements providing nuclear as- ? sistance are subject to congressional veto. They take affect unless dis- approved by both houses within 60 days after being submitted to them. Some members of the congressional Joint Committee say they would watch closely any proposed safeguards. A member of the committee, Sen. Henry Jackson (D) of Washington, said he is considering introducing a resolution to make the Middle East a nuclear-free zone. He said this would have an effect of prohibiting the supply of nuclear equipment and fuel Into the region. The Washington Senator called the ' plan absurd to send reactors and atomic fuel into a region which has a huge pool of the world's oil and natural gas resources and also is prone to terrorism. Sen. Frank Church (D) of Idaho, a senior member: on.the,Foreign Rela- tions Committee, says he will in- troduce legislation prohibiting all American-foreign aid to Egypt until the Cairo government signs the inter- national treaty on the nonprolifeea- tion of nuclear weapons. At the same time, it is the concern ; of some that Palestinian or other terrorists might be able to steal ? generated plutonium and use it for ; international blackmail. Mr. Nixon is expected to sign a similar nuclear agreement with Is- ? rael. The Israelis have operated a French research reactor since the 1950's. Experts feel the Israelis have enough plutonium stockpiled to make at least 10 atomic bombs. This is in contrast with Egypt, which has oper- ated two small Soviet reactors but not: long enough to generate much pluto- nium. . Dangers described .THE WASECINGTON POST siidiy,Jnvai7,1974 ? EtWaorAzaVs21Z 4TIola,Coutaell. 4pon:W. Meg Frairried By Jack Anderson On his way to Moscow, Presi- dent Nixon stopped off in Brus- sels to sign a NATO charter and to smile for the cameras. But be- hind the show of cordiality, our NATO friends are 'secretly wor- ried that the President will give more than he will gain .at the Moscow summit meeting. This nagging concern appears in confidential ? draft repott3 prepar:d for Atlantic assembly, which gathered in Washington earlier this month. The reports reveal that some NATO leaders believe the Pres- ident has already signed away the Western military advantage. The result "could give the So- viet Union tremendous superi- ority in numbers of warheads and total 'throw-weight," warns one report. NATOleaderi are frankly sus- picious of detente. "Detente in Soviet eyes," states another re- port, "is clearly to achieve rec- ognition by the West of the polit- ical situation in Eastern Europe and to secure for the East as much economic and technologi- cal benefit as can be gained." Unfortunately, adds- the re- port, the political softening has been accompanied by a military eektening throughout the Su-j it Lloc. `11:ice the price of detente in the political sphere," the report warns, "is increased readiness and vigilance in the military sphere." A report on "Atlantic Political Problems" takes blunt notice of the "domestic problems" beset- ting President Nixon, These, ac- cording to the report, "threaten, to severely handicap his ... au- thority." , - ? at A long-time crusader for increased- nuclear safeguards and co-author of, one of the studies which found U.S. safeguards inadequate, Dr. Theodore 13. Taylor has told how.easy it would! be for terrorists. to steal nuclear. materials and fabricate them into an explosive. Both IAEA and U.S. Atomic Energy: Commission (AEC) safeguards rely heavily on accounting methods, elaborate methods of weighing and measuring that are designed to detect theft of nuclear materials after the; fact. "A terrorist group would not care If- their theft is detected," reasons Drat Taylor. "In many eases they even want the publicity. So such a system does not serve as an effective deter-.f rent." s - Effectiveness doubted In addition, Dr. Taylor's study andy another panel commissioned by the0 AEC, both conclude that such at system is inadequate to keep track of the large amounts of nuclear mate- rials that will be flowing throughout the U.S. and the world in the fore- seeable future. Instead, Dr. Taylor has been push- ing for a system stressing armed guards and electronic surveillance to protect against theft. In the U.S. he is I optimistic that such a system can be implemented fol. a few percent of the total cost of nuclear energy. Inter- nationally, he is less optimistic. "There has been an increasing amount of talk within the IAEA of strengthening safeguards, but not much action," he says. In addition to the present IAEA!' safeguards, the U.S. is reportedly Insisting that Egypt use special procekei dures to protect against theft and sabotage. scow Summit Declares the confidentiall ?document: "Most people would now acknowledge that above all, the President needs a major foreign policy initiative to counter the domestic issues that threaten to engulf him. "This in turn increases the' suspicion of his critics that he will seek a major agreement with the Soviet Union that will have more todo with domestic prestige than the long-terra for- eign policy interests of the country." In one report, the latest U.S. doctrine that "nuclear attack would be met by whatever scale of launch the circumstances de- manded" is described as a "dan- gerous development." This permits "a theoretical approach to nuclear weapons which is out of touch with politi- cal reality," the document charges. "It implies the possi- bility of waging limited nuclear war and the expression of such a possibility is a regressive' . step." Not only do NATO leaders look with apprehension on the edge which President Nixon has already given the Soviet Union lin missile numbers and pay- load, but the NATO partners are. also concerned about the bal- ance of troops and equipment in Europe. The Soviet satellites, accord- ing to one report, could unleash a force of 925,000 men, 15,500 tanks and 2,800 aircraft "with very little warning." As a de- fense, the NATO nations have only '770,000 men, 8,000 tanks and 2,700 aircraft, Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7 23 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7 CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 24 June 1974 U.S. arms talks critics suspect hastiness Soviet advantage .seen in accord By Richard Burt Special to The Christian Science Monitor Washington The resignation last week of the Pentagon's top strategic arms-control adviser, Paul H. Nitze, has fueled a growing controversy within United States Government circles which is likely to influence the outcome of President Nixon's talks with Soviet leaders in Moscow later this month. Mr. Nitze's departure has brought to light a major split within the arms- -control community over the advis- ability of signing an underground nuclear test-ban agreement with the Soviets. And experts here argue that regardless of the form it would take a testing accord will be subjected to substantial criticism from either lib- erals or hard-liners. ? The circumstmces behind Mr. Nitze's resignation, meanwhile, pro- vide a rare glimpse into the bureau- cratic maneuvering that consistently has characterized the formulation of U.S. policy concerning the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks ( SALT) . Mr. Nitze long has been a promi- nent member of the U.S. defense establishment, who has served in a variety of high-lev_el jobs including_ Secretary of the Navy in the Kennedy .era. Potential superiority During the first round of the SALT talks in 1969, he acted as a top-level negotiator with the U.S. delegation and is said to have been responsible for working out many of the under- standings that resulted in the U.S.- Soviet decision to restrict the deploy- ment of antiballistic missiles. , Mr. Nitze reportedly was unhappy, however, with the other major accord reached at the first round of SALT, the interim agreement, which gave the Soviet Union a potential 50 percent superiority in numbers of land-based and submarine-launched offensive strategic missiles. According to former associates, Mr. Nitze believed the agreement was too hastily arrived at and was, in part, designed to provide Mr. Nixon with what appeared to be a substantial foreign-policy success during his trip to the Soviet Union in May, 1972. Mr. Nitze's dissatisfaction with the outcome of the SALT I was aggra- vated, officials report, by the publica- tion of books and articles following the conclusion of the talks which gave Mr. Nixon and Secretary of State ' Henry A. Kissinger the major credit for negotiating the first-round ac- cords. Owing to the secrecy that sur- rounded the negotiations, many of the LONDON TIMES 18 June 1974. America's policy of detente: Realpolitik or ? 4 President Nixon's rpeech last week at Annapolis, in prepare- tion for his forthcoming visit to Moscow, was a classic statement of the Nixon-Kissinger position on detente. It argued with amenity and ability the case againit critics of that position. All the same it largely misrepre- sented or misunderstood what it ; is that is widely felt to be wrong with the current American approach. One would not wish to deni- grate the skill with which the President and his Secretary of State have handled many issues: but, however serious in their own way, these issues are minor ifl comparison with the great central problem of world poli- tics, the relationship with the Soviet Union. And no minor suc- cesses can conceivably compen- sate if a disastrous error is made' over that. 9 ? The burden of the Annapolis speech was that relations be- tween states should not be con- ducted on a purely idealistic basis, and that they should in- volve no interference with the domestic affairs of other coun- tries. In a general sense, such a view will not be disputed. But in the context of relations with the Soviet Union as they are at present, it contains major falla- cies. First is the implication that Senator Jackson (with his cele- brated amendment, overwhelm- ingly supported in the Congress, which snakes the granting of Most Favoured Nation treat- ment dependent upon freedom of emigration), and those Euro- pean statesmen who have stood tor the free movement of ideas and people as essential to any detente, are motivated merely by an impractical idealism. The contrary is true. The attempt to represent Senator Jackson as a sort of hick Woodrow Wilson is anyhow absurd. He is cer- tainly the American statesman contributions made by. Mr. Nitze and other negotiators, particularly for- mer delegation chief Gerard Smith, have yet to be publicly reported. Soviet momentum During SALT II, which began late in 1972, a number of former and present SALT participants privately voiced the fear that the inequalities ex- pressed in the first-round interim agreement would not be adequately addressed. These fears have been reinforced, in the minds of some observers, by the continued momen? tum in Soviet missile and warhead' development and the Nixon adminis- tration's need, in the wake of Water- gate, to score another foreign-policy victory in Moscow. Last summer, when Soviet party chief Leonid Brezhnev and Mr. Nixon announced in Washington their intention to limit the deployment of multiple warheads on U.S. and Soviet missiles, some analysts expressed concern that if such an agreement. were tied to number of missile launch- ers and not payload, the Soviets, possessing larger rockets, would be given the ability to deliver a large number of warheads. This fear vanished, however, when it became apparent during Dr. Kis- singer's visit to Moscow in the spring that the two sides were still far apart on the means of controlling multiple- warhead deployment, But concern now is directed toward the possibility that an accord limiting underground testing will be signed during Mr. Nixon's Moscow visit. with the profoundest knowledge and grasp of international and defence affairs?as was indeed shown when he was approached in turn to serve as Secretary of State and of Defence. He and the European leaders, who - have included Herr Brandt and ; such moderates as the Danish and Dutch representatives in recent negotiations, are moved precisely by a more pragmatic and more profound understand- ing of the Soviet Union than the American administration has ?and ot world ? There is, of course, a sense in which the demand for free emi- gration and for the free move- ment of people and ideas can be represented as interference in domestic Soviet affairs. Not that the Russians themselves have any right to complain. Suslov or Ponomarev appear at the con- gresses of Western Communist Parties. Soviet political works, printed in English in Moscow, are sold freely in our countries. And, on a different tack, Soviet arms (shipped via Prague) turn up in the Bogside. But in any case, such " internal " changes as are ne- cessary in the USSR if d?nte is to mean anything are not con- cerned with the political or social system as such. They are concerned with the fact?un- avoidably affecting international relations?that the Soviet Union is a siege polity and a siege \ economy. The right to emigra- tion is by common consent an in- ternational one, since it is guaranteed by the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights. And it might, incident- ally, be held relevant to Russia's reliability in honouring its sig- nature on international docu- ments that it has subscribed to but not observed these provi- sions. But the issue goes deeper I even than that. Soviet-United I States d?nte on present terms involves inside the Soviet Union not merely the thorough repres- sion of all Western-style ideas, but a powerful campaign of indoctrination with hatred for all that the West stands for. It is another major element of Kissingerite doctrine that trade will ease international relations. There is no historical warrant for this. The highest levels of Russian-German trade, for example, were reached in 1913 and 1940 respectively. And in fact, the whole Russian tradi- tion, since Peter the Great and through Stalin, has been to import the technology of the West with the aim of strengthen- ing the military, despotic and 'Approved Fer-ftelease. - .2004.1081084-CIA.,RDR7,7043213000100-3-9904-7 ' ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7 general anti-Western system of rule. In present circumstances, moreover, an even greater absurdity arises. The Russian economy needs Western grain and other products precisely because it is enormously dis- torted in favour of the war industries?supporting a bigger defence effort than that of the United States with about half the gross national product. With a, reasonable allocation of re- sources, Russia could master her own economic problems. As it Is, Western imports are merely a form of subsidizing the weaponry massed against us. And this is to say nothing of the sale on the cheap of, for example, recent computer ad- vances?that is, of making the results of Western research and development available to the Soviet Ministry of Defence. At Helsinki, the Russians were granted a fair margin of arms superiority over the United States. It was then held that American superiority in technique would compensate. More recent Soviet (Western- assisted) arms development has, for the time being at least, made nonsense of this. Nor can the huge lead in conventional weapons deployed in Europe be taken as particularly sweet fruit of the detente. And then, of course, there is the Chinese issue. To put it mildly, there has been no detente on that long Asian - CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 25 June 1974 frontier. Yet detente is (as we were told peace was) indivisible. If the Soviet Union were really able to negotiate a disengage- ment, however temporary, in the West, and gain a free hand for ' dealing with China, one can only say that any such easing of the pressures on our flank would be about as much of a contribution to peace as the Nazi-Soviet pact.. Meanwhile, it is worth noting' that almost all serious students of the Soviet Union, together with most observers of and par- ticipants in the international scene, are in general agreement with Senator Jackson's position. A detente in the sense of a truce may be achieved with a state which refuses to enter into the Lovestone retiring from key position End of an era for U.S. labor normal comity of nations, maintains an armed might far in excess of its true economic capa- city, and continuues to inflame its population against all non- Soviet systems and ideas. But such a truce cannot in any way be thought of as reliable?par- ticularly if the Russians are en- couraged to use it to modernize and re-equip themselves, while making no concessions in ex- change. A true detente must in- volve at least a lesser degree of intolerance towards the move- ment of people and ideas. Only in that direction are there any serious prospects of a really last- ing peace. Robert Conquest Times Newspapers Ltd, 1974 ? s- ? By Ed Townsend Labor correspondent of ? ? Po?-?.., The Christian Science Monitor New York An important and controversial era -in American Labor is ending. . ? ``r. Jay Lovestone, director of the 'AFL- 'CIO's International Department and the "gray eminence" of the feder- ation's strong anti-Communist for- aign policy, is retiring June 30..-a - ' There Is general agreement among :Observers that not many in American labor havebeen as broadly influential at home and abroad in shaping not ' only union philosophies, but also war- time and postwar social and political structures. . ? . ? t?-?- Mr. Love-stone has been one of a -small group of AFL-C10 "cloak and "dagger" operatives -4. more out in the 'open now --who were highly effective In plots and counterplots throughout ..the world to oppose Communist global ..aspirations to infiltrate labor move- ments. ? .r.,??? ? ' . f . ?Meany still boss , .But despite Mr. Lovestone's retire- -ment, the AFL-CIO's international position will remain the same for some time to come, observers say. For no matter who holds the labor body's top international affairs .'st, It is George Meany, president of the AFL-CIO, who is the final arbiter of policies ? and there is not a More hard-line, implacable anti-Commu- nist in U.S. labor. - "Labor and the free world owe him [Mr. Lovestone] a deep debt of grat- itude," said Mr. Meany recently of his friend and long-time adviser. Then recognizing Mr. Lovestone's con- troversial position, he noted that his foreign policy aide also has long been "the target of all who would pervert -democracy and -destroy democratic- institutions.' " ? ? t ? Many in AFL-CIO share in varying degrees Mr. Meany's regard for Mr. Lovestone, onetime U.S. Communist leader who renounced communism to become a dedicated and highly effec- tive foe of its ideology and tactics not only in the U.S. but throughout the free world. ' ? _ Mr. Lovestone is still denounced regularly in the U.S. Communist press and by extreme leftists as a traitor and a "fascist." Those in labor who favor more flexibility in relations with unions abroad, often_ criticize him as too rigid in his beliefs and too responsive to old ideological posi- tions. ? ' . , Party f tander in 1916 Mr. Lovestone helped organize the American Communist Party in 1918 and became its general secretary in the late 1920's, until he broke with Russian communism and was purged , from the party by Joseph- Stalin. A pragmatist, he had protested orders from Moscow to implement a worker and -farmer action program during the depression as impractical. He then reorganized the Communist Party, U.S.A., along lines he and other American leaders considered best suited for the country and its workers. At the same time, in the 1930's, he futilely sought to develop . a strong backing for communism within ra- pidly expanding American unions ? at one time with a particular empha- sis on the struggling, young United Auto Workers. But in a dramatic philosophical reversal in the late 1930's, Mr. Lovestone renounced com- munism and became an effective antagonist. He first began working with the International Ladies' Gar- ment Workers' Union in 1943, then later became active wit the old AFL and later the AFL-CIO. - - Significantly, Mr. Lovestone was decorated fortis activities in Europe by former West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. The AFL-CIO staff official helped form the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and to maintain it for years as a counter to Communisi. unionism. Although known particularly for foreign affairs, he also was a trusted aide to Mr. Meany in domestic and union matters. He was an inter- mediary ? unsuccessful ? between Mr. Meany, then secretary-treasurer Of the old AFL, and John L. Lewis of the United Mine Workers during ef- forts in the mid-1930's to avoid the Industrial unions breakaway that led to formation of the CIO. ' ? After World War U, he worked- strenuously to shore up Europe's democratic unions and governments ? with AFL-CIO's funds reportedly supplemented b a still-unconfirmed $2 million a year from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. A former top aide of Allen Dulles, then Director of the CIA, is a source for reports that Mr. Lovestone's vastly informed la- bor intelligence operation was used to -funnel CIA funds to groups fighting to strengthen democracy in Europe. Mr. Lovestone is to be succeeded by Ernest S. Lee, his assistant since 1964 and Mr. Meany's son-in-law. A gradu- ate of Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service and one- time Marine Corps major. Mr. Lee's views usually are parallel to those Of Mr. Lovestone ? and of Mr. Meany ? but they are less scarred by decades of ideological infighting. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-SDP77-00432R000100330004-7 ove or VirS}111,16TON POST 21 JUN 1974 Food Su hitelligen Lie ease 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7 -'1.- By Nancy L. Ross .? Washintt.na Post St-$:1 Writer . Two former presidential candidates and a former :presi- dential economic adviser yes- terday urged creation of an agicultural "intelligence" sys- tem , to help . alleviate the world food ? On the seconddai 'of hear- ings before the Senate Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs, Sens. Hubert H. Humphrey ,.(D-Minn.j.: and George. McGovern AD-S.D.) and Arthur Okun, who headed President Johnson's COuncil of Economic Advisers', said ad- vance.knowledge .of. countries' BALTIMORE SUN 25 June 1974 Ernest B. Furourson ed political attitudes,- ? on food- stuffs can help prevent prob- lamS such as those Caused by the 1972 Soviet . grain . deal. : "We have to know if it's a :one- or a two-alarm fire," said Okun. ..? i Agricultural ? intelligence woulthgo beyond harvest esti- '. mateS 'and 'food _demands pro- Jected4from 'expected Popular tion increases. It would seek, 'for example, to anticipate i whether :a .7coUntry would i tighten. its belt during a:time of shortage .or import large quantities .. of. food, and WALL STREET JOURNAL 26 Jun, 1974 i?;-:?AM proposal to blacklist the Soviet Union as a violator of the convention abolishing slave labor was rejected by delegates,to-an International Labor Organization -confer- ence in Geneva. A conference committee voted last week to cite the Soviets, the first time in the ILO's 55-year history that a major power, has been proposed for the "spectial list." _ ...-ence'in Rome next November. port surpluses. whether it would store or, :et- i"Rightnow.we have 60 differ- Humphrey deplored the, fact' ? ent food 'prices and policies:: e ? are extemporaneous that there despite an agreement - I changes in production and wi!..11 Moscow signed . a year consuniption., -We. can't -read ago; the U.S. is still not receiv, z sag information on Soviet ag- Goldberg-was chairman of a ricultural priorities.' He said panel on nutrition and food , he. had asked President Nixon availability. - ? The committee 'also sug- gested establishment of inter- national futures markets, es- pecially in developing ? coun- . trieS, so that.' producers would be able to make,-their plans par: of our crop; it - should ; ; free: of the burden -Of having keep the internaqpnal commu- ? e tn ir creditors determining nity advise of its grain priori- ? the market prices of their ties. And we should keep them advised of the availability of crops.. Lead here." - ? -? :Other. proposals were for..de-, ? velopment - of new food tech- Ray A. Goldberg, professor nologies, new sources- i)f pro- tein, aquaciature (`farming"; the waters and seas), and cen- tralized kitchens-to cut down labor costs - in school lune Aural intelligence be U.S. pol- icy at the, world food, confer- program the-minds of the leaders." to do something about it dur- ing /his Moscow visit next week. McGovern said: "If the -So- viet Union is going to. come and ask us for a substantial 'agriculture, at -':IHarvard Scho.ol oti Business Adminis- tration, ..irged that agricul- How Much is a Gooa Multitude Worth? . Washington. The word among our tradition- al allies in Western Europe is that Mr. Nixon's scouts have been asking about the reception he might get if he visited there, too, during the weeks when his case is before Congress and the courts. But in Moscow he never needed to put out feelers to our traditional adversaries; Brezh- nev sent him an eager message way back, making him welcome again. All of which brings up the question of whether foreign excursions whose domestic po- litical uses are so blatant can possibly produce anything bene- ficial to the rest of us Americans. ? ? That judgment cannot be based on the size and telegenic enthu- siasm of the hordes trucked in to line the boulevards of Mos- cow. Minsk and wherever else the President travels, any more than .an accurate assessment of his Middle Eastern trip can be taken from the White House's crowd estimates between Cairo and Alexandria. . Some may suspect I go too far, In saying the cheering throngs will be trucked in. Unless the increased output of motor ve- hicles in the Soviet Union allows them now to be bused in instead, that is exactly what happens. Many times while awaiting the arrival of one or another great man at the Moscow or Sofia or East Berlin airport or train sta- tion, I have come early enough to watch the spontaneous crowds being organized. This is not a procedure peculiar to Communist countries, as any Nixon advance man can tell you, but those coun- tries are more skilled at it. ? ? ? They already have each apart- ment house, block, assembly line and factory organized, with lead- ers assigned right down to squad level. So on a special occasion, when the order is issued that the workers of Red Banner Synthetic Fiber Factory No. 12 in the name of Vladimir Ilyich will have a holiday from work, and that they will show up at their assembly point at 8 A.M. sharp, dressed in their proletarian best, they show up. ; Their group leaders check them off like a marine sergeant preparing his troops for Satur- day morning inspection. They board their trucks and when they arrive at the airport or their designated spot along the motor- cade route they are issued tiny flags of the visiting dignitary's country, .to wave for him and the cameras as he passes by. And then they wait several hours, do their jobs, and the press re- ports that the visitor got an over- whelming reception that bodes well 'for the important economic and military negotiations that are to follow. ? ? ? In 1972, the scale of the pre- cisely controlled Moscow recep- tion for Mr. Nixon surprised many students of East-West at- mospherics. The agreements reached and communiques issued as the President departed were not of earth-shaking moment. But things have become clearer in retrospect, since for example the giant grain deal of that fall, after which the prices of gro- ceries .for American consumers have never been the same. Even as he departs on the cur- rent trip. Dr. Kissinger is having to deny that he made a special side agreement on the previous 'one, allowing the Russians more 'nuclear missiles aboard submar- ines than was stated in the for- mal SALT communiques signed two years ago. Should this smack of cynicism from one exposed too long to what is happening in Washing- ton, consider the view of a west- :26 ern European specialist in these affairs, Pierre Hassner of the Centre d'Etudes des Relations Internationales in Paris, writing in Potomac Associates' new book: "A Nation Observed": "If one judges the grain deal or other economic agreements with the Soviet Union as political bargains, one may wonder wheth- er the value of Soviet conces- sions was not limited to face-sav- ing for the Nixon administration in circumstances that it had un- necessarily, brought upon itself, and whether the administration's heralded diplomatic successes have not led primarily to a dis- creet but steady increase in the power of the Soviet Union. As an' Albanian newspaper put it, Moscow might be able to have its civilian economy financed by the West and thus be in a posi- tion to concentrate more heavily on military development." ? ? ? Which is not n'ecessarily to dis- count in adtance any agreements formalized in Moscow this week. It is, however, to remind that all the quid pro quo will not be typed out in the communiques. The most substantive thing Mr. Nixon gets may well be the crowds turned out for the Ameri- can cameras accompanying him. -Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-T Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7 WASHINGTON POST 25 June 1974 George- F Will The Reoliferation of Plutonium More than by a scarcity of food or energy or clean air or living space, civ- ilization is threatened by an exotic sur- plus. It is threatened by the prolifera- tion of plutonium. , Bear this in mind as the govern- Ment, floundering along miles behind events, debates the wisdom of giving .Egypt a nuclear reactor. The problem Is a lot bigger than that reactor. Plutonium is the crucial?the explo- sive?component in nuclear weapons. It is a man-made element. Slightly ? more than three decades ago all the world's plutonium was in a cigar box in a U.S. laboratory. . But the rapid growth of the nuclear power industry, which is just begin- ning, will produce a terrifying amount ? of plutonium. Plutonium is a by-prod- uct? of the fissioning of the fuel (enriched uranium) in the nuclear re- actors that are used increasingly to ? generate electricity. The process of 'enrichinguranium is , still very complex, secret, and expen- sive. But most nations can build (and, if necessary, conceal) a reprocessing plant for extracting plutonium from used reactor fuel. And a determined group or nation can get plutonium even if it has nei- ther a reactor nor a reprocessing plant. It can steal it. Once one has weapons-grade pluto- nium, construction of a bomb is a man- ageable task for a few competent phys- icists. If they need some tips they can send $4 to the U.S. Commerce Depart- ment for a book (declassiDed in 1961) that , describes the technic,s1 problems involved in building the -first atomic bombs. ? The cover of the book says the gov- ernment does not assume "any- liabili- ties with respect to the use of, or for damages resulting from the use of, any information, apparatus, method, or process disclosed in this report." (Cultural note: People were out- raged in the mid-1960s when the cover of the New York Review of Books con- . tamed a sketch showing how to con- struct a Molotov cocktail.) Looking ahead to the proliferation of electricity-generating reactors in the U.S., an expert says: Private companies will soon own more plutonium than exists in all the bombs of NATO. With the predict- able growth and expansion of the- , nuclear industry, power companies 0 will make a cumulative total of 10 million kilograms of plutonium with- in the last quarter of the twentieth century . . . Enough plutonium to make 'a weapon could be carried in a paper bag. A small group of determined per- sons could steal that much from pri- vate industry here or from public or private installations abroad. Indeed, that already may have happened. We ? can not know for sure. We protect plutonium no more rigo- rously than we protect currency. And keeping track of plutonium as it is processed and used involves a signifi- cant margin of inaccuracy. This is called MUF?material unac- counted for. Today, skillful pilfering of THE GUARDIAN, MANCHESTER 15 June 1974 weapons-building amounts of pinto- - nium MUF could go undetected here and around the world. Nations or groups that do not have the patience for embezzling plutonium - might try instead a bolder form of stealing, such as hijacking. By the end of this century a million kilograms of plutonium will be shipped annually by planes, trains, ships, and trucks be- tween thousands of nuclear plants in more than 50 countries. Brazil and Libya, perhaps with the help of India or France, soon may join the nuclear weapons club, which soon may be the least exclusive club in the world. According to some sober physi- cists, most nations could join. It is possible that, say, Uganda could - . "go nuclear" in a fee, years. Getting the necessary physicists would be . harder (but not all that much harder) ' than getting the necessary plutonium. Imagine how stimulating life will be when a blithe spirit like Uganda's Gen- ? eral Amin adds the tang of nuclear blackmail to his already frolicsome politics. But that thought, gruesome t though it is,? is not the grimmest , thought one must consider. The other day a terrorist bomb made a mess of Westminster Hall in London. It may not be long before the more so- phisticated terrorist organizations will have bombs that can make a crater out of central London?or any other city. Imagine the Irish Republic Army or El Fatah as a nuclear power. Someone once described the Nazi s aS "Neanderthals in airplanes." Neander- thals with nuclear weapons may be the ultimate 20th-century terror. Fr nch bona is Germany-bound? ; THE French nuclear strike , force is directed against Ger- many and not Russia, accord- ing to . a version of a lunch- , time conversation between the late President Pompidou and the recently dismissed 'Reform Minister, Jean- _ Jacques Servan-Schreiber. ? In an interview with the German magazine Die Welt, M. Servan-Sehrei her d isciosed that in loe8 President Pom- pidou, then Prime Minister under General de Gaulle, told him the true target of the French Force de Frappe. , Seeing his guest's astonish- ment. at -the suggestion, M. Pompidou went on "But From JAMES MacMANUS, Paris, June 14 what do you expect? In ten years the Germans will he so strong economically that they will demand the bomb. ? What Would France do if she was deprived of it? ". M. Servan - Schreiber did not record his answer to the question which, however, did little to dampen his campaign against the French nuclear ea ponry. There Is naturally enough no information about the scheduled destination of the missiles in the 18 silos near Marseilles or the atomic bombs carried by the 36 Mirage fighters which are split into four squadrons- around France. . ? The French President, who share's the secret with a hand- ful of senior Ministers and military officials, reviews the targets every year. The mis- siles have to be given definite targets, and, once given, the targets cannot easily be changed since the missile's computer system has to be fed with fresh information to gear it to a new target. It Would be ironic if the missiles on the bleak Plateau d'Alhion, in the South of France, do carry the names' of German cities. For in the early 'sixties General de Gaulle expended considerable diplomatic effort .urging Chancellor Adenauer to par- take in a jointly manned Franco-German nuclear bomber. The idea was to lure the Germans from under the American nuclear umbrella and strike, so the General thought. a deadly blow at the Americans' domination of Europe. ? The Chancellor clearly did not trust the French and their fledgling bomb and Germany remained firmly under American shelter. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-R29P77-00432R000100330004-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7 BALTIMORE SUN 23 June 1974 A an its ognia: e Brazil Connection', By HARRY SYLVESTER Washington. ,., Virtually all significant revolutionary movements have their rubric. What is 'known ? about the young people who gathered to form the Symbionese Liber- ation Army indicates that they were ;drawn to the writings of Ernesto (Che) Guevara, Regis Debray and Carlos Marighela. Almost everyone knows something about Guevara and Debray, both of ? them distinguished for their romanti- --:-. cismi, their impracticality and their long histories of failure?while Marighela is - known mainly to professionals on both sides of the ;aw, and was respected and feared by them. Marighela, who knew more about the political use of violence than Guevara and Debray together, died In a police stakeout on a November night in 1969 in Brazil's giant industrial city of Sao Paulo. He was 58 years old 'and had been an effective terrorist for about 40 years. , That the SLA has lasted as long as It has, and had at least some success according to its standards, may be a tribute to Marighela. Unlike Guevara or Debray, Marighela was orderly, rea- soned in his dictums, psychologically sound in judgments and, paradoxically 'enough, prudent. In his "Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla," he gives detailed Instructions for effective terrorism, sup- ports these with surprising insights, and delineates which social categories are most effective for such activity. ("Stu- dents are noted for being politically crude, and coarse and thus they break ? all the taboos . . . Churchmen . . . repre- sent a sector that has special ability to communicate with the people, particu- larly with workers, peasants, and the Brazilian women." His strictures on stu- dents appear to apply to some SLA ' mistakes. Long before the kidnaping of Patricia ? Hearst, Marighela wrote: "The kidnap- Mr. Sylvester is a Washington-based journalist and former specialist on Latin ' America with the State Department and the United States Information Agency. . . Ing Of personalities who are known ? artists,- or are outstanding in some other field, but who have evidenced no politi- cal interest, can be a useful form of propaganda ... provided it occurs under special circumstances, and the kidnaping is handled so that the public sympathizes with it and accepts it." With the same sophistication Marighela lists the seven deadly sins of the urban guerrilla, including in them vanity, boastfulness and impatience. Marighela appears to have written his An.structions over a 20-year period, but did not bring them together into the Minimanual, written in his native Portu- guese, until June, 1969. Five months later he was dead. Not surprisingly his death gave impetus to the spread of the manual. ,As a memorial of sorts, the , Havana-based Organization of Solidarity of The peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America reprinted the manual in a 1970 issue of its magazine Tricontinental. Typed copies of the English-language version found their way to the United States and became required reading among_ the Weatherman and similar groups. It is known that some members of the SLA read it before that group was organized. Some of these might be called intellec- tuals and Marighela lists the special virtues of intellectuals for terrorism just as he does those of the clergy and the military. But he knew most terrorists are not of great intellectual capacity and accordingly reduced some of his formulas for violence to acronyms that could be easily recalled. (Whether SLA represents this is anyone's guess.) .. There .appears to be a lack of an ideology among urban guerrillas, includ- ing the SLA. Political anarchism is not incompatible with their activity and it appears both they and the SLA slipped into this much as did Marighela himself ?out of internal and personal reasons rather than for external political ones. For years Marighela was a leader in the orthodox Brazilian Communist party (PCB). When the Moscow line changed in 1962 to one of "peaceful coexistence," the Brazilian party split, With leaders such as Mauricio Crabois and Joao Amazonas forming the dissident Com- munist Party of grazil (using the same initials as the orthodox party). Four years later a wave of terrorist activity, , 28 . ' ? , J,?,-.1-! !????v..: uncharacteristic for Brazilians, began. It. appears to ha.. e been directed by the splinter group although Marighela did not leave the orthodox party openly until - 1967. The time was a confused one following the overthrow of the left-wing Goulart government in 1964, and rightist groups and student ones were also en- gaged in terrorism. The rigid political stance of the Bra- zilian splinter party had not attracted many followers. Its ideological differ- ences with the orthodox one could be reduced to whether violence should be stopped, as Moscow directed, or contin- ued within the Brazilian context. The latter course suited the temperament uf some of the dissident leaders. The opeR- ational document of the group becante Marighela's manual or rather its conipo- nents before these were compiled into book form. Kidnapings were far less common then than now, but killings by gunfire?some political, some apparently at random?bank holdups to fund terror- ist activity, sabotage and abortive at- tempts to subvert the military all could be traced in time to Marighela's system- atic direction. ? ? - Yet within the historic context, the violence of that time appears mindless at best. That violence has been a major.. factor in the acceptance of most Brazil:' l. ?ans of a succession of military govern-'? ments as something to be feared les' than the terrorists. It also widened the., split with Moscow, so that the dissidents' found they had to turn to China and Cuba in hope of logistical and moral support. Both Mao and Castro, by what seems more than coincidence, had mani- fested an anarchic bent at some time in,. their careers. (Castro proclaimed 14' allegiance to anarchy early, in my he-:: lief, when he chose the traditional redo and-black anarchist colors as those-6t his 26th of July Movement.) -v It is this anarchic violence, rational- - ized as a form of protest, that the SIX' appears to have inherited from Marir hela, however, unconsciously on their part and unintentionally on his. He dis liked what he called "the penetration aiidv, domination of United States imperialism in our country," but it is most unlikelS," that he thought of his manual as figur? ing in an assault on the social fabric .of the United States. DP,724104,32RODD.1 ( Approved For Release 2001/08/68 : CTA=ROP77:06432R000106330004-7,? NEW YORK TIMES 17 June 1974 Nor Iron By Grace Paley While in Moscow as members of a delegation to the World Peace Con- gress, the Rev. Paul Mayer and I were -fortunate to be able to speak to a few Russian dissidents and were surprised by their ignorance of American polit- ical and economic life. They simply ?didn't know. Some wanted never to know. (Perhaps they thought if heaven doesn't exist, how are they to get out of hell?) Others like the Galiches and ? Sakharovs kindly listened to our , views and extended their courage with ? new sadness. .Certainly in his last couple of ad- dresses to, or interviews with, West- ern reporters, the views of Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn seem opinionated and , uninformed. A couple of other state- ments by Andrei D. Sakharov are more responsive to the painful concerns of ?Western radicals, and are humane and attentive?though both men and their families have suffered similar 'persecutions. The Soviet Government, which tries to keep news of American ease, afflu- ence and electoral politics from all Russian citizens, has prevented Rus- sian dissidents at least from believing the information about American in- .ternal fear and American methods of exporting terror with cash. The Russian dissidents' families know from personal experience that the Soviet Union maintains prison camps, but they have not wanted to know, as Americans do not want to know, that the United States apart from its large penal system forces ?thousands of young Americans to live in exile in Canada and Sweden, keeps most of its prisoners in other parts of the world and has trained an 6lite police for South America in techniques sometimes called counterinsurgent but basically antidissident. Every morning's paper brings news about that worldwide community of wardens and silencers. For instance, several weeks ago, I read the following three stories: On Page 1, that fearful knock on the ..idoor was described?the one that pre- ceded the forcible removal of Tor. Solzhenitsyn from his home and fam- ily. On Page 18, there was an article about the reinvestigation of a case in ,which two Americans were murdered ars a Cage in their beds by Chicago policemen. who didn't knock but shot 82 to '99 rounds of bullets into the room, there- by removing them forcibly from life itself. Then on Page 11, a two-inch story: 130 political prisoners of the South Vietnamese had been freed. The Russian, as we all know, is a world-famous writer, a brave man,' now in exile from his country and his language. This can be terrible for a writer, worse sometimes than prison among one's own people. He will live in free exile; he can't help but remem- ber the thousands of political prisoners in Soviet prison camps. , The dead Americans were Fred Hampton and Mark Clark, two Black' Panthers. They were fingered by their own security chief, a Federal Bureau of Investigation informer who had stocked and maintained the Panther: arsenal. The grand jury thought the dead men were in the wrong. The police were acquitted. Family action and citizen concern have reopened the ? case. The 130 Vietnamese were the first part of a group of 256 whose release, and exchange had been planned; 100,- 000 to 200,000 others, nearly forgotten, remain in cages and prison camps paid, for by the United States, guarded by police whose money comes from the United States. They are in effect pris-- oners of the United States. Although these Vietnamese, the black Americans and. the Russians have had an ideological and exemplary importance throughout the world, they've all been powerless to live free lives in their own countries. Some of us have asked: How can there not be' understanding among all these people whose door the state has knocked on in rage, or broken open without knock- ing, shooting bullets? As they emigrate toward our West, writing articles and giving interviews, the Russian dissidents must begin to include the pain of these other dis- sents, imprisonments, oppressions with their own. If they are unable to do this, they will have exchanged the condition of prisoner for the status of warden; they will have escaped the persecutions of one huge armored state for protection and employment in another. Grace Paley, short-story writer, is author of "Enormous Changes at the Last Minute." NEW YORK TIMES 17 June 1974 rt Politics s, By Anthony Lewis r733 3 LONDON, June I6?Lenin liked Beethoven piano music, especially the ' Appassionata Sonata. He told Maxim: Gorky that it made him think "what , marvelous things human beings can, , do." But then he added: "I can't listen to music too often. It affects your' nerves, makes you want to say stupid nice things and stroke the heads of: , people who .could create such beauty ?while living in this vile hell. And now, -you mustn't stroke anyone's head? you might get your hand bitten off. You have to hit them on the head without any mercy...." , Those words are brought to life in a' .remarkable play by Torn Stoppard, "Travesties," that has just opened in London. It is a play about, among many other things, attitudes toward , art. In the character of \Lenin, using .his actual words, Stoppard traces how the idea of artistic and intellectual" freedom becomes corrupted in the totalitarian mind to that of art as the servant ea the state?and of artists as , expendable "snivelers" and "whiners." Soviet attitudes toward art and free- dom are a subject much on the mind- of London just now. The Bolshoi Bal. let, here on a visit, opened with a lifeless production of "Swan Lake:" .vulgar. mechanical down to the obli- 'gatery Zovlet happy ending, with an Odette wno was on:Y an imitation. swan, not a bewitched girl suffering human emotions. It was a reminder of what fifty years of Leninism have done to Russian a'rtistic creativity. The Bolshoi visit is the occasion for debate here about what we in the West can do to help the victims of 'Soviet repression. Outside the theater, demonstrators protest the treatment of Soviet Jews. Many in official and artistic circles sympathize with the protesters. Others think it is wrong to annoy the Bolshoi troupe and argue. that private representations work better than public .protest. In this instance there is convincing evidence for the first view, for public pressure on behalf of the oppressed. For it would have been very difficult LONDON to Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDPF00432RIW _ 4127 were made me- 'Galina Panov and let those two dan- . 'ce.rs go to Israel. just before the opening, relented all if the Soviet authorities had not,: in their two-year torment of Valery anC what moved the U.S.S.R. off some course. In the case of the Panovs, It is always hard to know exactly' go ,oinwwssisthotwIthe Bolshoi season at. . Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7 'Henry Kissinger took thicase'up with . . the Soviets last year. But there is reason to think that the intensity of the public campaign on their behalf had become a real embarrassment ? - especially in this country, threatening disruption of the Bolshoi, a Soviet prestige symbol,. Some of the great names in British theater and music and dance wrote to The Times of London about the Panovs just before the Bolshoi opening: Lord Olivier, Sir Frederick Ashton, Raymond Leppard, Dame Marie Rambert, Dame Peggy ? Ashcroft, Sir John Gielgud, Harold Pinter among others. Lord Harewood, head of the National Opera and a cousin of the Queen, spoke with the Soviet Ambassador and Prime Minister Wilson wrote to Soviet- Premier Kosygin, a private letter at first, then made public. ? Is it an absurdly anachronistic idea, that the expression of freedom's ideals can help the victims of tyranny? For individuals, that seems to me an easy CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 20 June 1974 question. The relatively few of us who live in freedom, and it is few, have no choice but to try to help?each in his own way, however feeble it may appear. Opinion just could matter: A letter, a raised voice, a political gesture. For governments the question is harder: They simply must treat with regimes- of which they disapprove. President Nixon was plainly right, at Annapolis the other week, when he said that d?nte will have its value. if it lessens the chance of war between nations without affecting ideologies. ? The danger is that in seeking po- litical arrangements with authoritari- an powers, democratic governments will seem to condone their cruelties. That is no abstraction when it--comes to the Soviet Union. Those in the U.S.S.R. who suffer for their beliefs or their religion deeply fear that the , Nixon-Brezhnev variety of d?nte will add legitimacy to the tyranny. The fact is, for example, that Moscow ? has been cutting Jewish emigration? from an average of 3,000 a month last year t6 about I;225 now--end. has been intensifying the harassment of .those who dare to apply. If that trend continues after the Nixon visit, the United States will have made it that :much more' politically respectable.- '" Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski, of _Columbia University has said that we ' used to think of d?nte as bringing -."an increasing sense of shared ideals, with many in the Communist coun-. tries looking to us for inspiration. De- .tente today, instead, is a conservativo balance-of-power arrangement, devoid -of any moral content." Ideals: Yes, but we can only press them on others if we live them our- selves. We can hardly expect Mr. Brezhnev to listen very seriously to 1 talk about the rule' of law from an American Government that commits burglaries and wiretaps its own offi- cials. The answer to Lenin is that, in art and life, we are for the human spirit, not the state. .0 4 Boeing and Soviet Union may conclude world's largest contract for aircraft By Paul Wohl Written for The Christian Science Monitor Tass announced recently in seven lines what may turn out to be the biggest commercial deal in the his- tory of air transport. According to Tass, a "cooperation agreement" has been signed with Boeing covering the design and devel- opment of a new passenger aircraft and possible construction of a Boeing plant in the Soviet Union. The agreement also covers helicop- ? ter development, and may therefore Involve at least dne of the major 'United' States "chopper" manufac- turers. ? - - The outcome of the agreement may be production of the first wide-bodied aircraft in the U.S.S.R. based on Boeing design, ."which will probably prove to be a Soviet version of the American 747 Jumbo Jet," writes English economist Richard Rocking- ham Gill, retired from Radio Free Europe, in his latest news letter. Whether or not a Boeing factory will be built in Russia, this would be a transaction as spectacular as the big oil and gas projects sponsored last year. Moscow's cooperation agree- ment with Boeing is certain to come up in President Nixon's talks next week with the Soviet leaders. Nothing similar to 747 The Soviets lack anything similar to the American 747. Their only plane of a comparable class is the Antonov-22 air bus and freighter which was in series production before the Boeing 747, but the latter is more modern in design,. Series production of the ANT-2 cannot have been very satisfactory ? because last year the Soviet Air Force had only 15 of the mammoth aircraft. The Soviets hr.ve another very large supersonic plane, the Tupolev-144, but of these only four carry out route- proving mail flights inside the coun- try. One TU-144 crashed disastrously at the Paris air show last year. The plane's structural flaws are said to have been corrected, but its econom- ics are still open to doubt. The target date for passenger service by the TU- 144 now is 1975. Another. Soviet-built and designed wide-bodied aircraft, the Ilyushin-86 is not yet in service; it has only half the maximum payload and less than half the maximum range of the Boeing 747, of which more than 200 are flying all over the world. , Tests set for -1975 The IL-86 is scheduled to be ready for test flying next year. Another Ilyushin plane, the IL-62 was kept on test flights for more than four years and reached the air routes only in 1967. Judging by this precedent, the IL-86 may be ready for work in 1979. This shows how important it would be for the U.S.S.R. to secure a plane of the type of the Boeing-747 which could be delivered at much the same time, if built under license. Aeroflot, the Soviet air line, would be the gainer in view of the Boeing's superior perfor- mance and proven design. In the short term, the sale of Boeing's 747 to Aeroflot would be an economic advantage for the United States. The advantage in the long range is not certain.. If Aeroflot starts to operate planes of this type on its extensive international routes, which are believed to be the lopgest in the world, this would cut into United States earings from international air transportation, an important factor in the U.S. balance of payments. 'There also are political doubts about the wisdom of supplying big turbofan technology to the U.S.S.R. Engine question arises Should the cooperation agreement announced by Tass lead to a deal, the question of the engine contracts comes up because Soviet engine de- signers have been notoriously poor on fuel consumption. The engine con- tracts also may go to the West, says Mr. Gill. The most likely prospects would seem to be Rolls-Royce and Pratt & Whitney. The latter firm, reports Mr. Gill, "already has sewn up part of the Chinese market by making the en- gines for the Boeing 707 which were sold to Peking, and so have Rolls- Royce by building the Spey engines for Chinese Tridents." "If the Russians select either Pratt & Whitney or Rolls-Royce engines, the company concerned will have pulled off the once improbable feat of selling to the U.S.S.R., to China, and the United States, truly a multinatto7 nal performance." These are conjectures, of course, but the wording and timing of the Tass communique about Aeroflot's cooperation agreement with Boeing, covering the design and development of a new passenger aircraft and the possible construction of a Boeing plant in the U.S.S.R., undoubtedly were carefully planned. The Soviets may hope that by announcing the deal shortly before President Nixon's visit, it may come off in the wave of bonhomie and trade enthusiasm which is likely to result. 30 7.. 7-1"A5prOWVIrdrrelease''720-01f081fka-7,EIA'sRDP,7.7-00432R000-1-00:330004,77?- . Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7 IVA YORK nus 14 JUN 1974 The Land of the Free By Tom Wicker LISBON?While planning the coup that overthrew Portugal's 48-year-old dictatorship on April 25, the young army officers primarily responsible had no intention of letting the United States have the faintest inkling of what was afoot. They were convinced that if the Central Intelligence Agency knew a coup was even being talked of, the agency would promptly inform the D.G.S., Portugal's secret police, with which the C.I.A. had close and cordial ties. ? Yet, in Spain, which now eyes free Portugal both uneasily and hopefully ?according to one's political outlook ?across their common border, a long- experienced former diplomat recently delivered himself of the opinion that the United States must have given its approval in advance for the Portu- guese coup. Otherwise, he said con- fidently, the United States never ? would have permitted the dictatorial ..Caetano regime to be overthrown. There was a lesson in that for Spain, he continued. If there was to be genuine change toward a demo- cratic regime after the death of Fran- cisco Franco, or movement toward such a regime. before Franco's death, the United States would have to be convinced that such a development in Spain was in the best American inter- est. Washington simply would not permit democracy in .Spain unless that point was made in advance. A younger Spaniard, deeply in- volved in clandestine activities for a more democratic regime, took a dark- er view. Citing what "everybody knows," that the C.I.A. had over- BALTIMORE SUN 26 June 1974 thrown the Allende Government in Chile, he remarked gloomily, that the_ ? United States probably would never, allow Spain to have democracy. . This kind of thing is deeply disturb- ing, even shocking, to an American who would like to think of his court? try as the champion of -democracy and freedom everywhere. - The point is not whether the C.I.A.? really did overthrow Allende, or whether the agency would in . fact have betrayed the Portuguese coup to the D.G.S.; and explanations that the United States ought logically to wel-. come more democratic regimes in both Spain and Portugal, since that ? would ease the domestic political burl:, den of alliances with, these countries: do not alter the case. The fact is that.. manypeople abroad believe the United States is the enemy of freedom, and that it uses the C.I.A. relentlessly' and efficiently to oppose democratic- - movements everywhere. ' It is a sort of instant or ready-made paranoia. When the American Ambas- sador to Portugal, Stuart N. Scott, paid the first diplomatic call on Gen. Antemio de Spinola after the coup in Lisbon, and again paid the first call on the general after he was named Provisional President, the United States did not get all the expected credit for welcoming the advent of -- democracy in Portugal. Instead, Com- munists and others spread the word to? willing listeners that the calls had- been to protest the coup; and this was widely believed. ? - To a great extent, the United States- has no one to blame but itself for this state of affairs. The wheel has come full circle from the kind of. American lea er5 with internal ur thinking that, in the, fifties and six- ties,. suspected a Communist plot be- hind every political development in the world. From the Iran of Mossa- degh twenty years ago to the Chile of Allende in 1973, there have been ample facts and plausible reports of C.I.A. involvement in the overthrow of governments and the propping up of dictators?all 'augmented by the implacable set of American policy in Southeast Asia. for- the last fifteen . years ---to account for the world's paranoia. ? ? : ? ???? - - Just recently, Mario Soares, Portu- gal's animated -new. Foreign Minister, was telling funny stories about his fruitless,- efforts,:as leader of the out?-%. lawed Socialist party during the Sala- : zar' and Caetano -regimes, to make 'some kind of contact with the Amer- ican -TState Department. "Never got higher ,than a third secretary," he re- called. When one young American Foreign Service officer made an en- gagement for dinner with Mr. Soares's family in Lisbon:a few years ago, the American had to call and report with embarrassment that the American Am- bassador of the da?,..had forbidden him- to keep the date.. ? ???? ' So when Mr. SoarE.bs,. became _For- eign Minister a few ? weeks ago, he did not even try to approach the State, Department directly; he. asked his friends, Harold Wilson of Britain and Willy Brandt of West Germany, to put him in touch. They did, and no doubt. Mr. Soares will soon be getting red- carpet treatment in Washington; but . he has not forgotten?and probably won't?the years when no one but third secretaries paid attention to him. cciipied ) ems ruler of One of the world's ? By GILBERT A. LEWTHWAITE the next 25 years of NATO on major.. energy. exporting na- . Sun Staff Correspondent 'their minds. ' tions, to make the 40-minute Brussels ? The smiles and _Harold Wilson, the British congratulations to be exchang- Labor party leader, has suf- ed between President Nixon and' fered a series of parliamentary other NATO govcriunent lead- , defeats p over his vernment..s , Chirac, his premier, who left a and political problems will be ers during the si-zUng .a i' Pl'nz? a lel" nation shocked by ,the news at the kernel of the series of new Atlantic declaration here 'private discussions the NATO today mask the real worries of leaders are to hold. . the alliance members. But so complex are they, President Nixon; escaping that it seems likely that the ? briefly' from the woes of Wat- most that such brief encoun- -ergate, is not alone in having ters can do is foster the spirit ? serious preoccupations. of international cooperation ? Most of the major leaders he will meet today at the official that will be needed to enable ceremony and in a series of -flight here from Paris for the ceremony._ ?? Instead he sent " Jacques His difficultji is to ritalti-- tain the performance despite the difficulties of his neigh- bors. He has offered to help' those ". who help themselves, and is now waiting to See on which deserving cases to act. All this means that while the signing of the anniversary dec- laration will be the ceremonial highlight of President Nixon's stopover here en route to Mos- cow, the immediate economic' wing revolt within his own party over the latest British nuclear test, and the dilemma tat' the energy crisis has forced its two largest private Car manufacturers-to merge to 1. of when to call the next gen-. combat cost increases and fall- eral election in an effort to ing sales. 'increase his razor-edge plural- Helmut Schmidt, the -West lay in Parliament., German chancellor, faces the ' Courting the shah problem of controlling the only ' major western European econ- President Valery Giscard d' ,orny which has avoided a loss ' the Atlantic alliance to solve ;bilateral get-togethers have Estaing of France was too in its trade balance, and Which its economic problems so that ?'more than the last 25 years or busy courting the .shah of Iran, iseThaps even showing a sur- it 'can finance its defense Approved For Release 2001/08/0?1 CIA-RDP77-00432R00010 t3(88604tra Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7 East THE NEW YORK TIMES,.TUESDAY,,.JUNE 25, 1974 A Case Study in Disillusion: U.S. Aid Effort ? ..By JOSEPH LELYVELD Special to The New York 'limes 14,1EW DELHI?If there is such it thing as a historic anti- climax, then one occurred here early, this year when Ambas- sador Daniel P. Moynihan con- ferred his blessing and that ofe the United States on an Indian national piety . and 'aspiration known as "zero net aid." . BY definition net aid is what Is left over after repayments on aid debts. Zetn net aid, therefore, is not Zero aid ,buf;. whatever it takes to,:keen Atli? with the debt. In the- Indian', hovVever, it has come to" !j Stand; badly for self-reliance ? This is the third in a series of articies on the United States in Southern. Asia. - ?the end of demeaning de-' pendence on foreigr 'assistance that the donors persist in re- garding as handouts. " That, Ambassador Moynihan said' in: a lecture, "seems to the very.much in line with national interests.and offers the base ,for a'strong and viable relation With Other countries such as the United States."' He 3 added: "We" are pleased that India has reached a. stage, of development at which such. a decision is possible and proud 1.to have been of some help." ' Period of Disengagement , The valedictory tone was not inappropriate, for -if there was any country from which the United States had clearly engaged at the end of a trau- matic decade' in Asia, it was India,: and if there was any field, it was foreign aid. Of all Western nations, only Italy. Spends a emaller fraction of gross national product on foreign aid -than the. United States. American aid accounted for nearly two-thirds of the as- sistance funneled to the poor nations before the major troop build-up in Vietnam: now it is barely one-third. On the fact of it, foreign aid seems a war. casualty. Thai moo' i nvolvosi a Vietnam hang() er i ueillon-, strated by. .the long-standingl disillusion among Indians, thei major recipients of American' development assistance. The standard indictment ofi aid in Washington used to he. that it failed to buy influencet and gratitude. The Indians com- plained that aid was an attempt to buy influence and gratitude and, besides, that it saddled them .with a monumental debt without appreciably relieving} their huge, .burden of poverty.i Those very complaints be-1 ' came part a the American arguments against aid in gen- eral and aid to India in par-, 'titular. Last year, after having failed to enact any aid appro- priations., for two consecutive sessions, Congress passed a bill that virtually wrote the Indian critique into American law. It said development as; sistance should be spent only on programs that "affect the lives of the majority of the people in the developing coun- tries," especially those "that directly improve the lives of -the poorest of their people." 1, The language 'was conspicu- ously more far-reaching than !the appropriation. About 60 f per cent of the economic as- tsistance designated for Asia was reserved for what was ,euphemistically called "Indo- china postwar reconstruction." .In the main it was for neither lreconstructien nor develop- ment but for outright support lof the Thieu Government in South Vietnam and the Lon Nol Government in Cambodia, plus that portion of Laos not under Pathet Lao control; only in Laos was it possible to imagine any immediate appli- cation for the term "postwar." That left' less than $350-mil- lion in development assistance for the rest of Asia. .India, whose millions of "poorest" outnumber those of any other country, had been known tO get that much in a single year. Now, with an annual obliga- tion to the United. States of ;$60-million on a hard-currency 'debt of $3.4-billion, India stood an outside chance 'for $75-million. In fact, the fiscal year is ending without any new aid agreement. As far as the Unit-. ed States is concerned, zero, net aid has virtually been: achieved and minus zero is looming as a distinct possibili- ty. "They are becoming self- reliant in spite of themselves," a Western development expert said. . 1 The numbers tell only a bit of the story, but they are striking. In 1968 the lid Mission in India was bulging with 260 Americans and 98 Indians. An established part of the Delhi cenrs. the Americans were rr;gis- trit.:S, Wilere?apprciaLed or not. ?their advice carried weight. carried weight. By the start of this year there were eight Americans and 75 Indians left to super- vise the dwindling disburse- ments on loans made before American aid was suspended at the time of the war over Bangladesh in 1971. Only rare- ly did the Americans see the inside of an Indian office. American aid was now half what hard-pressed Britain was ; giving and even lege than Can-, ? ada's If there had not been a debt rescheduling of $30-mil- 1 lion, it would have been pos- sible to tally the numbers in such a way as to .show that 'Aid tolndia fin millions miitions of dollars, yaars,which begin 8 ? V Military , QeicMopmetfl The HOW York Times/June 25, 1974 U.S. also provided $848- million in aid through the World Bank in 1964-73.' the dollar'swere.4ctually flow-! 'ing from India to the United' States. ? Aid figures are notoriously deceptive and', in fact, India had been receiving a Substan- .tial dollar inflow in a disguised form-through the International Development Association, the easy-money side of the World Bank. The association, which has depended on the United 'for ,40 per cent of its funds, more than doubled its loans to lIndia to make up for the slump in American help. t, In January, however,' the 'House of Representatives voted 'down the latest "replenish- ment" of the Development As- sociation. Whether it will be revived is still much in doubt: If it is not, there is a real possi- bility, even though a bilateral aid program is being resumed, that debt repayments in the r or two will surpass Years ago, in speeches neith- er side would care to remem- ber now, American aid to In- dia was portrayed as a aoble effort to justify democracy in Asia. The climax would come when "the world's largest de- mocracy" ? words that seem to be repeated only in mockery now-was self-sustaining, eco- nomically and politically. Few onlookers would say that of the India of 1974. For all. the talk of self-reli- 32 AnTrii la; u ;ittice;. a 'combination -of natural; and man-made disasters ?--; :drought and economic misman-: ,agement-7--, has put India 14 oiverse circumstances than, any! ahe' has experienced Since. the -famine of '1966-67, when,Ainer- "iCan development and food -aid .reached its highest level, $877-i .million in, dne year., There were 490 million In- dians then; 90 million fewer than. now.' India, having fallen .short of goals for fertilizer pro- duction in the last five-yeari ,plan- by more than 60 per cent, was staggered when the oil crisis produced ,an inter- national shortage. of fertilizer. Now, inevitably, cutbakcs in fertilizer and crude-oil imports darken the outlook, for in- creased food output.-- A failure , of domestic ptte curement as much as' lagging production will force India to spend precious hard currency this year not only on oil and "fertilizer but, it is estimated, on three million tons of Amer- ican wheat. That is self-reli- ance with a vengeance,' bid not what Indian planners had in mind when they defined the goal. In fact, according to-esti- mates prepared by the 'World , Bank, aid needs . this year 'amount to a .record $1.4-billion. '- The ,prospects for assistance at that level may have been blasted by another Indian ges- ture toward self-reliance?the .explosion of a nuclear device -beneath the Rajasthan Desert in May. Reins Put in Other Hands. - On the level of economic planning, the basic Indian crit- icism of foreign aid was that It allowed donors to define development priorities. Their priorities, it -.was said, were not India's, for the, efforts that had relied on aid had left the mass poverty virtually un- touched; it was even possible to argue that it had worsened. And so?not just in India, but among development ex- perts generally?the old as- sumption that a high econom- ic growth rate was synonymous with development came under critical review. What was de- velopment, anyway? How was it to be measured? In tons of steel and kilowatt-hours of electric power? Or was there another index, involving in- come .distribution, the spread of eniployment, literacy, pro- tein in the diet? "We should not speak of development as having .taken place," a British economist, Paul P. Streeten, writes, "in circumstances,where poverty has not, eithe directly Or in- 'directly, been relieved.' ''The theme has been taken up by Robert .S. McNamara in Approved For Release2001/08/68 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100300044 _ . Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7? Ills Capacity as president e the World Bank. Sounding less like a banker and more like an evangelist with every speech Mr. McNamara keeps return- ing to a single statistic?that 40 per cent of the two billion :people in the so-called devel- oping countries live in condi- tions of "absolute poverty." As it happens, that figure was first used by an Indian economist to describe condi- tions in his own country, where more than 230 million people live on less than $60 a year On the basis of that calculation, India promised to make an attack on rural pov- -erty the "main thrust" of her fifth plan and thereby fulfill a.. campaign pledge by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to abol- ish poverty. 'When similar themes were .Written into American aid leg- :Iglation, there was no hint that the proponents of the new look in aid were thinking of India. "For all the talk," an experi- enced Westerner in the aid -latisiness here commented, ;"concern about poor people is ,pretty far down the list of, what determines ail policies." , "There is no way an ? aid program here can reach the bottom' 40 per cent," a hard- boiled American declared. "That's just McNamara and his 'Vietnam guilt complex." An official at the Tndian Fi- nance Ministry seems to agree.? "We can always take a bun- dle of money and say, 'Let's paint the stars and stripes on it,'" he " said, "but it's really' . very hard to identify a spe- cific bundle with a specific project." The point was that India needed dollars to buy *fertilizer and oil, not advice. Even in making the case for India's continued need, the of- ficial felt constrained to point out that word "aid" is a mis- nomer. It is an old Indian argu-' ment: that the terms of aid are so disadvantageous to the recipient country as to make any suggestion of philanthropy unseemly. "External capital in- flow" would be a better name for it, the official said. .The splitting of hairs pro- .vides the key to the basic In- dian attitude. Having declared ,that foreign assistance was an evil, India had now compro- I mised her position to the extent ,of conceding that it might be a necessary evil. This wariness, .American officials say, is hard- ly calculated to make aid , to India a popular cause. More Modest U.S. Stance ?. In any case, it is apparent that there is little disposition on the American We to offer unwanted a I% ice or re, major ; Irony of all is that the Ameri- cans have accepted the Indian criticisms of the old relation- ship. "The United States was nev- er in a position to run India," an American said. "We have become very much more mod- est." For an American returning to New Delhi after an absence of four years, the real proof of an American disengagement there is not in the low aid level ler the shrunken 'mission but in the changed attitudes and perceptions. ? In some . ways the mission Ambassador Moynihan heads is a negative image of the one over which Chester Bowles presided throughout the John- son Administration. In those days every Congressional vote on an aid bill was felt to have a crucial bearing on the future of Indian democracy and American Interests in Asia. It was a basic premise that the United States had sound prac: tical and moral reasons to be .intimately involved in India's economic planning. . . -.. ? Indians tend to remembeel those days with mixed emo-,! tions ? resentment over the pressures to which they were, ,subjected tinged with nostal-, gia for the concern. Most. American officials speak of thel period with unalloyed horror., ? Who Cares.? ! "We were masochists then," one said. A moment later, he asked abruptly: "Say India goes i'fascist. Who cares?' i It was an atypically harsh 'expression of a view held even by those who said they would feel a deep sense of loss if, India's ramshackle democracy, collapsed: that whatever thei 'United States can do for India! will be only of incidental val- ue at best; that whatever sen- timents and values the two na- tions share, the United States has few vital interests here. Again, this is acceptance of an argument Indians have made: that India's future rests on her ability to marshal her own resources, clear up' the cancerous mismanagement that afflicts her government and in- dustry, and grapple with the problems of rural landlessness. "The real government' here Is the large landlords," said an American who works for an international agency. "To say the Government lacks the Will for a program of agrarian reform misses the point. It's the same as saying they lack the will for self-denial. The truth is they've got the will to do just the opposite." In this view, the arguments for aid to India reduce them- selves to the one that is most offensive to Indian pride?that the country is so desperately needy. , No Santa Claus Role The countries that are Most successful now in attracting American assistance have al- ways assumed what the Indi- ans have always said but never 'quite' managed to believe ? ,that the United States coolly calculates its interests. The Indonesian Minister of alieraa Molirr---u:'d Sadli, said "v ? ,r) -!'t- --?;11 idea Luat, you come in nere as Santa Clauses." The American aid Program in Indonesia has risen to $100-million a year during a period in which, coinciden- tally or not, American mining and oil companies have been making major investments. The program is the largest ad- ministered by the Agency for International Development outside Indochina, a gtriking reversal. ; Ten years ago, when Sukar- !rip was President, he called Approved by Reteasco120%11.08 'Aid to Indonesia (In millIons of dollars in tlsal years which beg,n July ) : ?I I I V f I 1.2 1964 6S 68 70 72 73 The New York Times/June 2$, 1974 States Embassy in. Jakarta and shouted, "To hell with your raid!" Indonesia got $8-million ,that year, while India was get- ting $337-million, not counting ;food. ? , ? . i? Despite 'the Change now, the effort to focus development as- 'sistance on problems of rural poverty and social inequality has received strikingly mixed reviews in Indonesia, where poverty and inequality are smoldering political issues. Until recently aid officials seeking programs to support what could conceivably be said to involve "the poorest of their people" found that the Gov- ernment had not really been thinking along those lines at all. The aid agency scrapped plans to .back a program for new power stations in west and central Java on the ground ? that only 5 per cent of Indo- nesians have access to elec- tric power. Since electricity is for the privileged, it was rea- soned,.a power program should sustain itself by making them pay higher rates. ^ Paving Rural Roads I, The agency 'also shelved plans to finance part of a four- lane trans-Java highway at a 'cost of almost $1-million a !mile:-'for the same money, it :was calculated, Z000 miles of deteriorating rural roads coule be upgraded. Despite obvious risks of graft, labor-intensive rural public works were, seen as another likely field for sup- port. "Equity is now a major con- sideration," an American offi- cial declared. The United States was also planning to get back into ma- laria-eradication programs in Indonesia. To older officials this suggested the cyclical na- ture both of Asian problems and oi fashions in aid:, An American-backed antimalaria program in Indonesia nearly two decades ago reduced tha number of malaria cases on Java and Bali to 40,000. The latest count was two million. a, Some Indonesian leaders tfound the emphasis on social itisPetf. Mr: Saillf it) ed President Suharto : as rel marking: "This may be the' new form of imperialism. :If the West contributes onlytri small-scale grassroots projecti,', our plight' may . be. somewhat. alleviated but we will never ? grow. . For major capital 'projects, the. Minister went' on, the poor countries would be forced to turn to the cbmmercial banks: of the aid-giving countries and pay' high interest rates. The Indian left is' alreadf voicing the same suspicion. A political' weekly called Fron- tier, which is influential among' Calcutta's intellectuals, conf-i eluded: "Mr. McNamara is try." ing to prescribe a course which:, -while keeping up neo-colonial. exploitation, will bring down the danger of revolution in the', starved countryside of the ? third world." . , Art Advantage Discerned .An economist named?Houdhi, ayan Chattopadhyay who shared ? this view said he saw one major advantage in the? slump in aid. "In the past we' could always excuse ourselves by blaming the foreigners for; their bad advice," he explained, in a conversation. "Now we, know that only we are to blame for what is happening: to this country." ? The conversation was less abstract than the usual discus. Sion of Asian poverty in an office, study or cocktail lounge, for Mr. Chattopadhyay's mid-: die-class dwelling stands at the, very edge of one of Calcutta's. worst ? slums. Twenty yard away Moslem women .,were burning a fuel made Of coal- dust and cow dung to cools their. one daily -meal; the ac-' rid 'smoke, wafted into the:, economist's sitting room. and settled. ? . Was he saying,, he was asked, that the rich nation'.. should stand aside in the hope that the ensuing upheaval: would prove benign? The ques-:', tion seemed to deepen his,. gloom. Almost wistfully he, spoke of the idealism he often': found in young Americans lid; met?how rarely it shows up', amortg young Indians he rel.; marked?but he noted that: So few of those Americans seemed_ to count India among their' concerns. He had long, been convinced that American am wouin nevet. ,he a pOsitive tactor in inata, but now he was beginning to get a' feeling that India no longer figured in the Ameri- can world view, and it made' him uncomfortable. . It is a feeling, a number Of Indians and Americans here mention. In Mr. Chattopadh-,7, yay's acase, it came- when he-. read a collection of essays "bY.:: radical American scholars. called i'America's Asia," ,which.., mentioned India only in pass-. ing. "Asia without India,' he mused. "It's a funny kind of,i Asia." : CIA-VpP77-00432R000100330004-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7 CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 25 June 1974 tic's vate f critic's w 0.U.S.-Arab By a Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor Cairo The man who until a few months o was the most influential journal- ist is. tic Arab world and the confidant of Egyptian presidents takes a criti- cal view of President Nixon's recent Visit to the Middle East and of U.S.- Arab rapprochement. He is Mohammed Hassanein Hey. al, until last February editor of the Important Cairo newspaper, Al-Ah- ram. He was always close to the late President Nasser. (Some said he could explain Mr. Nasser's thoughts better than Mr. Nasser himself.) And Initially he continued in a role close to the seat of power under Mr. Nasser's successor, President Sadat. But he fell out with Mr. Sadat early this year because he insisted on the right to differ with the government in the columns of his newspaper. Mr. Sadat then dismissed hith from his editorial post, which he was able to do since all Egyptian newspapers are govern-. ment-run. Another round? But he has not become in any sense and "unperson." He is not under any constraint. He continues to express admiration for Mr. Sadat and agree- ment with 'much of what he is doing for Egypt. But he speaks freely. Rocking back and forth on a white_ garden chair in the middle of a spacious lawn on his farm deep in the Nile delta, he said: "I fear the worst. I wonder whether the Israelis can really learn the lessons of October 6 before there is another round. I think another round will be inevitable." His argument was that the Israelis had learned to respect the Arab soldier and that the disengagement agreement became possible as a result. But he doubted that the Is- raelis had learned to respect the Palestinian guerrilla fighters, ? the young men who are willing to sacri- fice their lives in attacks on Israeli settlements. Concessions impossible? "While the Israelis might be ready to deal with Egypt," he said, "I doubt they can appreciate and are ready to deal with the new Palestinians." Mr. Heykal did not think the Rabin Government in Israel would last long. "If a worse one ? namely a more hard-line one came into office ? I don't see where we can go in Gen- eva." He meant that he did not see how Israel could then make the concessions necessary for a settle- ment. He observed that in his opinion the ,Palestinians have come a long way toward adopting a tine that would make settlement possible, no longer insisting on a secular state in the entire area of the old Palestine, ,including Israel. They agreed at their, national council meeting in Cairo earlier this mOnth to accept formation of a Palestinian national authority .on nerated part a Palestine, the West Bank of the Jordan River._ Freedom of movement Personally Mr. Heykal did not think this would work. In the end, he thought, there would have to be either a secular state or a return to the 1947 partition border. , The reasoning behind this view is that some arrangement is required by the Arab world to avoid a land barrier between Egypt and the rest of the eastern Arab world, or more gener- ally between the Arabs in Asia and the Arabs in Africa. Contact could be established either according to the 1947 partition plan ? which would bring a Palestinian Arab state to the banks of the Gulf of Aqaba ? or a secular state through which there THE GUARDIAN, MANCHESTER 21 June 1974 Suez on the red horizon By DAVID FAIRHALL Speculation that the Soviet Navy has been invited to join the Americans and British in clearing the Suez Canal has 'grown after reports that a ? flotilla -Of five 'Soviet mine- sweepers passed through the Malacca Strait into the Indian Ocean yesterday. The ships then ? headed . west with 'supporting vessels. Their destination is unknown, hut it could be the .Tubal Strait in the Red Sea. The strait is believed mined?probably with Russian mines that the Soviet Navy would best know how to sweep?and will have to be declared safe before shipping can begin using the Suez route again. It is also possible that another move by the Soviet Navy concerns a minesweeping operation. This move. _under relations would be freedom of movement. Unless there is progress on one of these schemes, Mr. Heykal predicted, "We'll be dragged into a system of closed borders at best, or no-war, no- peace at worst. On President Nixon, Mr. Heykal said: "I think he made a mistake corning here and talking so much about economic factors, promising us $250 million. So what? A week ago Abu Dhabi, one of the smaller gulf oil producers, gave us $1.2 billion, not as a loan but as a gift. The Sauaiz a Illue ;!7r:t::. save us another $200 million. We got $150 million from Kuwait and $80 million from Algeria. Money is not the problem in the Arab world. The Saudis this year will get $19 billion of which they can absorb only a portion, even if they take all the American gadgets, including Phantom and de- fense systems." Mr. Heykal thought it striking that whereas President Nixon in his speeches kept talking about econom- ics, President Sadat kept responding In terms of the Palestinian political problem. "That was President Nixon's mistake," he said. Great crowds He thought Mr. Nixon did not understand that the great crowds that welcomed him meant not that the Arab world was asking him for eco- nomic aid but was receiving him on a political note ? the demand for American support in solving the Pal- estinian problem. "So here comes the tragedy of the thing," the former editor concluded, "the question whether Nixon can respond positively, given his prob- lems at home. The Soviet Union may welcome a weak American president ? but we would have preferred an Eisenhower." scrutiny by Western Intelli- gence services, is the passage of the helicopter cruiser Lenin- grad through the Bosphorus and into the Mediterranean. The Leningrad carries two big helicopters. She. too, may be heading for the Red Sea to act as a kind of mother ship. Egypt's invitation to the US Navy and the Royal Navy to clear mines and other explo- sives from the Canal was a major political coup for the West. The Soviet vessels may be positioning themselves to be on hand if their help is requested?or they may have received an undisclosed invita- tion. 34 20041W08-tC4A-RDIa7.7-00432RCIOMMOI104.77 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7 F R ICA TALKS '.:5:TYIVI 1 ED ? 67,73 NATIONAL GUARDIAN \ 26 JUN 1974 : t?- ? By.-WILFREP BURCHE11 !Guardian -staff correspondent i-..Recent speeches by.Gen.:.SPinola have poured icy. waters -on hopes for an early end to the African wars.:andEtingently. :needed-sOcial, reforms in POrtukal. itself - ;:????;- The atmosphere in Lisbon by mid-June -WaS that of a. . - . :race for time between those who.wanted to consolidate the ..gains made' since. the .Aptil 2.5..antifascist .and those who wanted to turn the clock: back-, ? Activists among the-leftist'-parties in ? theprOVisional government are working daY :and night to;preseiverithe alliance between the, peopleand4he young offiCers,Of-the.i ,r?Armed :Forces :Movernent:Ifind- -to demolish -the:fascist .; ;institutions:; before. :the right wing backlash sets -in -Top-ranking-U.S. CIA officials,-on the other hand,:rhaVel been. Working-to head off.a.-4-decolonization? moves ;that .1 -Would *affect U.S. .bases and interests in Africa .or,.._--theA interests. of the. roast regime. of Rhodesia and ..South Africa and to bring about the sort of economic chaos which preceded the end of the .Allende regime in As an extra measure of "insurance," the multinational.. 'monopolies. in 'Lisbon have had U.S. systems. analysts prepare computer scenarioi.fot-all options necessary to head off workers' .demands for structural reforms bf. the economy. Some -of the young officers, meanwhile; are-! already muttering doubts as to their-choice of Spinola as a I leader and wondering whether they might not have to do it -1 ? Spinola's speech of June 11. in which he set forth his ! impossible neocolonialist plans for the African territories, - only - confirms that Foreign Minister Mario Soares'! handshaltes and embraces with the heads of The PAIGC: and ?Frelimo .delegations in .London -.and lusaka! respectively had nothing to do with his negotiating; position. . The terms for settlement were the cold! neocolonialist pattern chosen by Spinola. As revealed in! the latter's June 11 speech. they are almost a replica of the' absurd terms Washington offered at the beginning of the! Paris.. talks on Vietnam. It took four and a half years of negotiations and sonic of the bloodiest fighting of the wan to bring them to reason. : This is what Spinola is "offering" the liberation: movements of Guinea-Bissau. Angola and Mozarnbique.? ?A ceasefire, equivalent to asking the resistance fighters to lay down their arms and disclose their; whereabouts. ?Accelerated economic reconstruction. The same wasi offered by the .U.S. government for Vietnam. But where is; it? 1 - ? ?Political settlement after ? the ceasefire." What happened:in?Vietnam?. Exactly-as with the French -in 1954.: the U.S. in 1973 fulfilled that part of the military terms ? which suited it. The U.S. got its POWs back ? and its demoralized army safely home?and then repudiated the political clauses. Is anyone foolish enough to think that ' African freedom vac"41:45t (wed tilab raRelea4e 1400M8/08 all over again. Imperialists and colonialists honor their pledges? ; ?Broad democratic organizations, political freedoms, etc.- Where. have- we heard this ?song before?- The; Vietnamese people have been -waiting 18 years for those! freedoms and elections promised them both in the 1954 agreements with .the French and the 1973 agreements' with the-U.S. :1 ROLE OF THE CIA ? :-Did the CIA agents bring this revamped draft of the! Paris Agreement with them to Lisbon when they arrived in! force a month after the' coup? ? -The-landing.Of mercenaries in -Guinea-Bissau while! negotiations were in progress is an .exact parallel to the; landing of CIA-armed and financed mercenaries?headed; by CIA officers?in North Vietnam while the 1954 Geneva! conference was going .on. It is described 'in detail in thei Pentagon Papers. Of course this maneuver has sabotaged! the talks' between Guinea-Bissau and ?Lisbon. After! resuming briefly in Algiers June 13-14, they broke up in an angry mob(' without a. resumption date. - r , - - -. It was not for -this type of trickery that the -captains: carried out the April 25 coup. To understand how they felt about all this; I spent-the better part of two eveningsi discussing with one of them how the men who made the! coup saw their role. For reasons best known to themselves,! the members of the Armed Forces Movement seem to I have agreed to remain as anonymous as possibled especially with the press. The captain with whom I spoke consented to the discussion only on condition I not ask his! name. He said only that he commanded an artillery unit and played an active role in the preparation and execution of the coup. "You must understand," he said. "that there were several attempts in the past at military coups. But these were always headed by some officer who had his own ideas and hoped for mass support afterwards-. Now, for the first time, a group which was formed, developed a program and later chose a leader. It is a much more solid affair to have a movement based on the ideas of many instead of one - ,...ANTI-FASCIST OFFICERS .? , As .to-_the background of the ,coupc.: . ? We the---younger, --officers, ? did :not- agree with the . . ? . ? - . ? - ? government"s-African1policy or the fascist regime at home. ,Wecould see that the Afric-aapolicy-would lead to another Goa,, thedisgrice of ihe.armAespecially to'the officer corps. There Were .3000 troops. in Goa when thelndians launched-the-invasion in :December 1961 -by air, -sea and land with 30,000 troops. (Farmer dictator) Salazar ordered our troops to defend 'to the last man.' They had not even a single anti-aircraft dun. The-officers on: the spot refused to obey . Salazar After initial resistance-,- they surrendered. Apart from one-or two they were all kicked out of the army. Ever since, the armed force S has been the scapegoat for all that is wronfin Portugal, including the impossible military; situation in _Africa and the, lowered living standards at home because -of the failures- in :Africa. ? "The class composition of the officer corps had also . changed.--The Military Academy -was -no longer -stuffed ? with the sons of the rich upper class; but by the sons of the lower Middle class and even the, working class. Soldiering had become a dangerous :and low prestige profession. What . ". with battlefield losses, desertions ? - and -draft-dodging. the army had-to-take into the junior officer corps Whoever it could get. *i there developed a big class - difference between officer-up -'to captains, and even , majors: and .the colonels and-generals? . " - ?. ? The artillery captain dealt in some detail with various sources of dissatisfaction in the army which was capped. in September, 1973, when Prime-Minister Caetano offered anyone who had graduated :from university a. six months :39A44.6pfMbiatiFf68risqobtAiadoillif which they would Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7 have commissions above the.,,heads ot jUniorsofficers with; at least four ?years' active service.--- ? ? ? ? .? .The first meeting of whaelater. becarnezthe. Armedi i; Forces -Movement was that cif :about-150 officers--except ? for three majors. all of them Captains?on Sept. 12.1973 to! 'discuss the situation. Those taking part sVere mostly those -affected by the new law on rapid promotions of youngsters! with .no: military experience -It was the captains, asi company commanders, who Suffered the greatest combat; josses in Africa apart from the ordinary soldiers?and nowl they were to be humiliated as-well! The Sept: 12 meeting! elected a commission with offieers from.the -Army, Navy' and Air Force: to look into .the- whole situation. . AGAINST MILITARY DICTATORSHIP 7 - ? "The commission was to work secretly and recommend : a course .of action." the . artillery captain...continued. "There was no question of' a vino at that time. There was .. no unified political Viewpoint.-.We were very conscious of tlie danger of a Spanish-type civil war and. Wioted to do everything possible to avoid thii. We did not want a Chile - or any other.Latin American-type putsch. At all costs we wanted. to avoid anything that-could lead to'a military dictatorship. The strategy that;the commission worked out ? was to bring pressure to bear on the government to change -its policy-to- repeal the offensive law on ranid promotions to safeguard the prestige of the career officers?and to Clarify the situation.' In December 1973 there were changes at the Ministry of Defense, a civilian was put in charge and some increases ' in .pay to the ranks -and junior officers were allowed. "The government changed personnel but not policies." the account continued. "It was at this -point, in January .1974. that we realized that the only possibility of change -was by a coup el'etat. Our aim was still to avoid civil ?var ., and any division within the armed forces. A new, much smaller comrnisSion was ?elected.-By this time everyone knew everybody else and the new -committee had the absolute confidence of everyone in what had now become ? the Armed Forces Movement. Planning for the coup started." ?-? . . . - "Why did you. decide later to invite Genera! Spinola io 'take-Ott :top. post after the coup?"- I ?asked. t'Because w considered" him honest, courageous. patriotic.. 'a; good :officer, just ,and impartial: who maintained close personal relations with his officers and. men. He was an officer of great prestige.?Tr.e book which .he wrote, demanding a political instead of military solution in Africa, was as 2 result of his contacts with officers of thel Armed Forces Movement. One of his merits was that hel dared to oppose -the official line." ? . "Is there not still a danger Of a Chile-type coup?a fascist comeback?" was one of the last questions I posed. is a Chile fascist-type regime that we have over- thrown after nearly 50 years," he replied. "And it is we.i the Armed Forces Movement. that 'did this. We are still around. The battalions move when we tell them to move. Our movement remains as united as ever. We still oppose any deviations in the application of our program?even if we have to stage another coup." "What if the people vote in a communist-socialist popular front type government in next year's elections?" I asked. - . ? ? "Our role is to give erre Portuguese people a free choice -under democratic conditions," the captain replied. ."If they choose Such a government--and that is up to them-7-there will be no interference from our side." SPINOLA'S LINE-- - But this is not necesSarily the perspective of Gen. Spinola, his recent speeches have made- plain. While aiming his attacks ostensibly at "cotinter-revolution" and vanarchy"-an4. foreseeing the day when the armed forces might "obliged to .-?reply....to violence by force"?Spinola's rhetoric has been understood by many as a do.ible-edged sword. One can easily read between its lines Spi tola's -.growing nervousness' at the strength of. popular feeling for an immediate end to the African wars, at the spread of the-movement to oust fascists from trade union and peasant -associations -and at the growing influence of the leftist parties in the provisional cabinet. Spinola's important June 11 statement on the -colonial! question seems-- to bring Portugal to a hazardous! crossroads. Either the left consolidates its position in the- provisional cabinet and dictates policy for speedy decolonization or the liberation struggles in Africa will be stepped up. with those inevitable consequences that the captain's coup was intended to avoid. One of the most , crucial of these consequences was the possibility of civil', war. in Portugal. ? With Spinola's speeches so clearly revealing the reason: -why- the . peace talks with the African independence movements are bogged down, people in Lisbon were; beginning to ask whether springtime had moved straight! into winter without-the summer season for which people been ? so ardently waiting. r.r.-77. ' I 36 Approve For Relea-CZOITIMM8TCrAIROP-7-7.604.3.2R909400,33041044 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004.7 NATI 011At GUARDIAN 26 JUN '1974 cf.a0 tr;zazicts EDI?). lJy VILFRED BURCHEM Guardian stall correi?or-denf Paris In the two months since the formation of the Laotian coalitiorrl government, the Pathet Lao has become the real leadership of the; . , ? country. .? ? .. ? - ? ? . .This is a testimonial to the remarkable struggle waged these past 20 years by the Lao patriots against seemingly impossible odds.: Under the leadership of Prince Souphanouvong, the Pathet Lao: have overcome numerous U.S.-directed plots, coups and attempted coups, assassinations, invasions and aggressions by -South Vietnamese, Thai and Meo tribal, mercenaries financed and led by! the CIA, capped by a merciless air war waged by the U.S. which exceeded the barbarous records established elsewhere in Indochina! for tons of .bombs dropped per head of population. ....The story of what happened in the?Very .early stages of intervention sets the pattern for all that has happened since. ..t At .the time of the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina,- the Pathet Lao forces under Prince Souphanouvong, which had wrested', power from the Japanese in August 1945 . and waged armed resistance against French attempts .to restore its colonial rule, controlled about half the territory of Laos., .? with bases in all that. country's 12 provinces. _ . -.. ? - , As was the ease with Vietnam, it was agre,ed.at Geneva that, in return for nationwide elections and to facilitate the separation of combatants, there would be a regroupment of each side's military forces. The French expeditionary force withdrew in full-security.. The Pathet Lao, troops likewise regrouped, as was stipulated,in the. two northern provinces of Sam Neua and Phong Saly. This meant abandoning old resistance bases in the South, especially those: in the strategic Bolovens Plateau and .other bases in Attnpeu and Saravane provinces. But as in Vietnam, it was felt that a temporary withdrawal was an acceptable price to pay for the independence guaranteed by the Geneva agreements and that free elections would result in an overwhelming.victory for supporters of the resistance forces. John Foster Dulles, then the U.S. Secretary of State,: had ? . other ideas, however. . . - DEFENSE MINISTER MURDERED ? Less than two months after the Geneva agreements were signed, the prime minister who had inherited the French-appointed government in Vientiane, Prince Souvanna Phouma, met, him half-brother, Prince Souphanouvong in the Plain of Jars.. They; agreed on the date, site and agenda for political talks to arrange the, nationwide elections. Nine days later, ' however,,Souvanna Phounia's Minister of Defense. Lou Voravong, who had arranged the Plain of Jars meeting, was assassinated. A bullet was fired into, his back through a window, at which the minister had been. ?onveniently 'placed by his host.. .. . I A few days previous to the assassination, Kou Voravong had told, he National Assembly that his co-delegate at the Geneva conference. Phoui Sananikone, had accepted a U.S. bribe of Si 'million not to sign the Geneva agreement on Laos. U.S. interventioi. ? in Laotian affairs can be 'dated from .the time of that bribe. Kou Voravon,,,'however, signed for Laos and prevented a breakdown of the conference. Kou Voravong had also publicly denounced a scheme to attaCk. and wipe out the, Pathet Lao troops as soon as the withdraWal was. completed. The 'person .who placed Kou Voravong in the window seat to receive the -assassin's bullet was none other. than Phoui Sananikone himself, who had invited his victim to dinner ,.'to talk things over." In the-scandal which erupted after the assassination. Souvanna Phouma resigned as prime minister, to be replaced by Katay Don Smith, a reactionary who had attracted the attention of Dulles with his book: ."Laos?The Meal Cornerstone in the Anti-Communist Struggle in Southeast Asia." Until he died somewhat' my. steriously just five years later. Katay remained one of the mOst faithful instruments of U.S. interventionist policies in Laos. ? . ? On Dec. 30. 1954. the Pathet Lao delegates turned up on time at the site for th6.' political negotiations agreed on over three nionths previously. They were put under house arrest by Katay's forces and told the conference site had "been changed." In the meantime commando troops had been.dropped from U.S. planes behind the Pathet Lao lines, with orders to set up bases for further incursions. The Pathet Lao delegates agreed to change the conference site and insisted on the political talks proceeding.? In late March 1955. Dulles dropped in at Vientiane for a brief conference with Katay. In a sequence strongly reminiscent of what happened after he inspected South Korean troops along the 38th parallel in June .1950,. _within .a few days of the Dulles visit to :? Vientiane, the first full-scale attack i were launched against Pathet, Lao bases in the two northern provinces. - What has happened ever since has been a replay, on an ever-increasing scale, of American:backed attempts to wipe out the Pathet Lao. Negotiations were used exclusively to play for time to build up the right-wing forces for ever bigger efforts.? During that first year of negotiation, Katay's side interrupted thel talks, once tlicy finally got started, seven times, by simply walking' out and not fixing a date for a resumption. His delegates returned only after serious battlefield setbacks. The Pathet Lao delegates! remained at the conference site under house arrest,: waiting' patiently for the next round until Katay completely broke off the: talks in November 1955. By that time?despite an agreement signed: directly between Souphanouvong and Katay in Rangoon the: previous month?Katay had moved over half the right-wing army into the Pathet Lao territory, launching an all out offensive in', November-December 1955. But despite the presence of U.S.; military "advisors," the offensive ended in disaster. Katay had to resign, and Souvanna Phouma again became prime minister.. i VOTE FAVORS PATHET LAO ? In July 1956,- the twohalf brothers met again?this time. ini Vientiane?and real negotiations got under way. During the months that followed, there was no fighting and on Dec. 28, 1956, it was announced that full agreement had been reached on setting "up a government of National Union, with Pathet Lao participation. It was; the first of a series of coalition governments preceding the one'l established in April of this year. None of the earlier ones worked 1, due to U.S. tenacity in opposing anything that smacked of "national! union." The U.S. embassy launched a tremendous campaign: against the 1956 agreements. Embassy personnel visited every! member of the National Assembly in an attempt to buy up enough votes to prevent ratification of the agreement. I was there at the : time, personally witnessed the bribery campaign, and was expelledi from Vientiane, all within 24 hours of my arrival. The threat was used that all U.S. "aid" would be halted if "Communists" entered the government, and supplies coming in via Thailand were halted as a warning. By such means formation of the government was held up until August 1957. Partial elections were held, in which the Pathet Lao presented 10 candidates?nine of whom were elected. The ally of the Pathet Lao, the Peace and Neutrality party, won three of four seats contested. Only four of Katay's 26 candidates were .elected and none at all of Sananikone's, the leader of the other right-wing ' ardrpateitnitletasiaRtoxfoli#031,300134LITS . State Department Approved For Release 200Q8/0! Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7 who knew they would be duplicated in any nationwide electoral ; contest. Then a new American "strong man," General Phoumi Nosavan, appeared on the scene as head of a fascist-type "Committee for the ! ; Defense of National Interests." With bribes of $100,000 a vote to ; National Assembly deputies, the Souvanna Phouma government was finally brought down on July 22, 1958, and a new one was ; formed under Sananikone, with eight of the 12 cabinet posts in the i hands of Nosavan's men?who had not a single seat in the; Assembly. Katay was made Minister of Defense and Interior. He: immediately launched an extermination campaign against all Patheti Lao personnel. Pathet Lao bureaus had been opened in every, province as a result of the 1956 agreements. Those staffing them! were wiped out to a man in many provinces. Their decapitated heads were stuck up on posts to "prove" that the Pathet ? Lao not longer existed. The killings went on throughout the last. months of! 1958 and the beginning of 1959. This was a prelude to the final blow! being prepared by the rightists. - According, to the December 1956 agreements.- the Pathet Lao reduced its armed forces to two:battalions and these were to be integrated into the royal (Vientiane) army, under the command of the High Military Council. They obeyed Vientiane orders to be. tranferred to positions in the Plain of Jars and near the royal, capital of Luang Prabang, respectively, and prepare for "integration," which was to take place on May 11, 1959. On that date, each Pathet Lao battalion was surrounded by three Vientiane. battalions, with tanks and artillery pieces pointed at their barracks. k week later an ultimatum was issued to both battalions: "Surrender within 24 hours or be wiped out!" That night they broke out of their encirelsment. The first battalion near Luang Prabang lost almost half its personnel in a fighting retreat back to the old I base area. The second managed to escape virtually intact. SOUPHANOUVONG JAILED, ESCAPES '; ? Souphanouvong :end 15 other Pathet Lao leaders, under, house _ ; WASHINGTON POST 17 June 1974 ? ? Leftist Leader Says CIA Plots Sabotage in Laos By John Burgess Washington Post ? VIENTIANE ; June 16 entiane peace agreement "Rumors" circulating in and help the two Laotian parties "dress the Wounds of war and build up independ- ence and true peace [in Leos]."' He also Said that "these repeated promises have , made Lao patriots, very happy." Phoumi made repeated references to "rumors" that the C.I.A. had "exhorted cer- tain people of the extreme right-wing cif - Vientiane to. demonstrate dissatisfaction with the agreements." AS plenipotentiary repre- Sentative of Pathet Lao leader Prince ,Souphanou- vong, Phoiiini negotiated much of the settlement that led to the formation on April 5 of Labs' third coali- tion government. He is the. ranking Pathet Lao member of the government. Soupha- houvong. heads the Political ? Laos pay that -the U.S. Cen: . tral Intelligence Agency. is , conspiring with 'Laotian , rightists to sabotage the ? new coalition government, according to Phoumi Vongvichit, vice premier of . the new government and senior Central Committee member of the leftist Pathet Lao. . ? In written answers to 10 questions submitted on May 27, Phoumi said that ? "meetings have taken place 'in southern and northern Laos to prepare subversion against the Provisional Gov- ernment of National Union:' The 65-year-old vice pre- mier, who is also foreign ? minister of the new govern._ ment, said that U.S. officials of all ranks had, repeatedly pledged that the :United States would respect the Vi- 38 ? arrest In Vientiane, were flung into prison, and in the months that followed Sannanikone tried to find a judge who would sentence them to death, but without success. ? "Fr guards," Souphanouvong told me later, "we had the most reactionary -.military police unit?trained, equipped and paid directly -by, the Americans. ,They had been hand-picked and especially indoctrinated: . .They were forbidden to exchange a single word with us. . ." But at least they were Laotians. The Pathet Lao leaders were in solitary confinement. Souphanouvong took Upon himself the infinitely slaw and patient work of winning the guards over by appealing to their patriotism. "In May 1960," he told me, "we were tipped off that there would be no trial. The authorities knew we would use the courtroom as a forum - to denounce their rotten policies. We were to be 'shot attempting to escape' while being transferred to another prison. We challenged the prison authorities with this and told them to shoot us on the spot?they could spare themselves the farce of an esape. attempt. This stopped them for a while, but soon after we learned that a date had definitely been set for the trial, the result of which; would be we would all die 'legally.' We decided the time had -come to flee." ?? By .that time Souphanouvong's persuasion had worked so well that an hour after midnight on May 23, 1960. the 16 Pathet Lao leaders and all 10 guards on duty that night, marched out of the Vientiane prison, all armed and in MP uniforms, past the quarters of 90 more MP's and their U.S. advisors, on their way to a "Long March" back to,the old Sam Neua bases. The greatest manhunt in; . the history of Laos was mobilized. to catch them but the prey,1 desperately weak as they were after 10 months in prison, were always a step or two ahead of the hunters. From this leadership and the one and a half battalions that had , . escaped the extermination attempt was built up the fighting force which today controls a good 80 percent of the territory of Laos and over half the population, and which again shares power in Vi (in r, . - NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, JUNE.24, 1974 Secret Study -on Laos Aid Says Almost All Goes to One Factio 'Consultative Council, an ad- visory body independent of the government. . ? Asked whether he thought the coalition was in danger, and if so from what sector, the vice premier said, the . government "is only in clan- ger so far as the C.I.A. sup, ,ports the supreme right- . wing clique to plot trouble against the nation. Without that, the government is free ofall further danger." ' Phoumi said that the- neW government would behave amicably toward all, coun, ? tries and would accept "unconditional assistance from'all countries that want to help Laos, regardless of -their political systems:: Laos would seek to tle. velop a new orientation to,. ward international politics, he said. ' By JOHN W. FINNEY Special to The New York Times. " WASHINGTON, June 23-1 Senator Edward M. Kennedy expressed concern today that the United States, through eco- nomic and military aid to one ; Laotian faction, might be per- petuating political divisions in Vaos despite the formation of a new coalition Government. In support of his concern, the Massachusetts Democrat, as ilhairman of the Senate Judici- ary subcommittee on refugees, made public a summary of a secret Geheral Accounting Of-' lice report on the economic aid program in Laos. The report, classified secret at the insist-, ence of the Administration,: shows that the economic aid was going almost entirely for. refugees and villages in areas controlled by the former Royal Lao Government. State and Defense Depart- ment officials said the same held true for United States military aid, which they said 'went exclusively to Royal Lao- tian military units. No Fundamental Changes As an outgrowth of the 1973 cease-fire agreement, the Royal Lao Government, which was Supported by the United States, formed this spring a provision- 1 government of national 'anion with the Pathet Lao fac- ion, which was supported by North Vietnam. Despite the formation of a coalition Gov- ernment, officials acknowl- Nged that there had been no iundamental changes yet in the Direction of, United States aid proveThrmerease-2otritoftiee- :-CIA-RDP77-00432R0404,043,31:10g44_,_ ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001(103300,04-7 ruograms, which continue to pport military forces and geographical areas still con- rolled by the Royal Lao fac- ion. . '-' For the coming fiscal year, which begins July 1. the Ad- inistration has asked Con- gress for $55.2-million in eco- omic aid and $86.1-million in ilitary aid for Laos. While Ad- ministration testimony has proadly discussed aid to main- tain a neutral Lao, officials !acknowledge that according to ,:esent plans most of this aid ould go to the Royal Laotian !side. 1! The explanation offered by state Department officials was ithat economic aid was going into Royal Laotian areas be- 'cause the United States was Continuing existing programs. ' At the same time, officials said the United States was not's fixed in this. policy and had informed the new Government that it was willing to give aid to the provisional government that might be channeled into Pathet Lao areas. "We are quite willing to shift it, if they ask us," one State Department official said. But thus far, he said, there had been no direct request from the Pathet Lao faction for economic aid for its zones: There are indications, how- ever, that such a shift in policy would be resisted in certain State Department circles that are opposed to any United States aid going into Commu-' inist-controlled areas of Indo- china, including humanitarian aid provided through United 'Nations agencies or -the Inter- national Committee of the Red Earlier this month, according to officials, Graham A. Martin, the United States Ambassador to South Vietnam, sent a cable- gram to the State Department NEW, YORK TIMES, MONDAY, JUNE 24, 1974 rof iteers in Cambodia? Find Food Is Now Gold , . By DAVID K. SHIPLER ,? ? Special to The New YorIc Titnes PHNOM PENH, Cambodia '?With ? her major cities be- : sieged by Communist-led in- , Cambodia has be- ? . - .come a,paradise for a new :kind of profiteering?not in ? gold or opium, but in food. It ,takes half an hour for a ? load of fresh fish to triple in value as it is flown the 50 miles from the. city of Kom- Peng Chhnang to the belea- guered capital of Phnom Penh. Over that distance, beef prices 'nearly double, and sugar rises 50 percent. Merchants who are brand -hew to the food business are reported making profits' of $10,000 a. day simply by fly- ; ing the scarce staples from , the country's agricultural . areas, over insurgent - held territory and into Phnom Penh, where many families, spend their entire .incomes just to feed themselves. , In an economy stagnated by war, this is one of the only booming segments. Six- teen private airlines are operating their 30-year-old DC - 3's lamming Phnom Penh's Pochentoir.. Airport, turning the tarmac into a 'busy truck terminal and mar- ketplace. American and Taiwanese pilots have flocked to Cam- bodia. A man selling planes arrived last week. Two huge new aircraft engines stood on a flatbed trailer outside an airline office in the center of town. The frenzied commerce has run like a fever through were an old western mining town whose plentiful gold might run out at any mo- ment. The prospect of fast money is so intoxicating, and the poverty of most working Cambodians so acute, that suffering and greed have been blended into a cor- rosive mixture that produces ingenious systems of cheat- id and corruption. Pilots and airline officials report that merchants try to overload planes by tamper- ing with scales or by paying off pilots to carry an extra few hundred pounds. Sugar Hidden on Planes Laborers, soldiers and offi- dals who work at outlying airports try to cash in on the trade by hiding 22-pound bags of sugar on planes to be Picked up by their col- laborators later at the air- port in Phnom Penh, pilots say. "A couple of weeks ago they hid 200 kilos [440 pounds] of sugar in the tail section of a DC-3," one air- craft owner declared. "The pilot couldn't move the con- trols, so they opened up the tail section and found the sugar." In another instance, he said, workers and military men took advantage of a moment when a plane, ready to take off for Phnom Penh, had lowered its flaps, re- vealing long hollow spaces , in the wings. "They were stuffing 10- kilo bags of sugar into the holes in the wings," the owner exclaimed. "Fortu- nately, one of our ground people saw it and warned the pilot." Otherwise, he Phnom Penh, as if the city said titer the plane was air- ' urging that no money be put into Red Cross operations in Indochina so long as the infer- national Red Cross committee "kicks USG around," "USG" standing for United States Gov- ernment. He suggested the com- mittee was courting the Com- munist side. On military aid, officials said continued support of the Royal Laotian forces was necessary to "maintain a balance" with the Pathet Lao forces, which they said were still being sup- lied by North Vietnam. Statement by Senator Vice Adm. Ray Peet, the Pen- tagon director of the military assistance program, told the House Foreign Affairs Commit- tee last week that the United States "security objectives" in Laos were "to support a bal- anced force which is of suffi- cient size and strength to main- tain the survival of the polit- ically neutral Royal Laotian borne the pilot would have raised the flaps and jammed them. One recent morning, on the dirt airstrip that serves Kompong Chhnang, a Cam- bodian Air Force pilot took off in an American-made T-28 propeller-driven plane. No bombs were slung be- . neath the wings, however, and no co-pilot was in the back seat. Instead, the seat was piled high with bags of sugar. The sugar comes from Thailand, shipped by road to Battarnbang or Kompong Chhnang, where women crowd along the airstrip selling 22-pound bags for 2,500 riels, about $6 at the official exchange rate. Beyond Kompong Chhnang the road is controlled by in- surgents, arid so, in Phnom Penh, other women clamor to buy the bags for $9 each from the crewmen, soldiers and military policemen who take _them off the planes. ? Big Profit to Be Made By selling just three bags a day, a laborer at the air-- port can make six times his daily wage of about $1.50 and a plane's crewman can double his day's pay by simply carrying one bag on a 30-minute flight from Kom- pong Chhnang to Phnom Penh. But the big money is in tons, not pounds. The food merchants are almost all ethnic Chinese, and their use of the shortages to drive up prices has stirred the latent anti-Chinese bigotry that pervades Indochina. The merchants buy fresh fish for about 34 cents a pound in Kompong Chhnang and sell it for about $1 in Phnom Penh. The cost of airlifting It to the capital runs only 10 cents a pound, so that even with that expense, the bribery and W-613`fft-P0a0d4 thikd 01041 Approved or elease 2001/08/0! ? 9 Government and the independ- ence of the people and to en- courage pursuit by Laos of .ob- jectives compatible with United States interests." The admiral did not spell out in his statement that "a bal- anced force" meant giving mili- tary aid exclusively' to Royal Laotian forces. in expressing concern over the course of United States policy in Laos, Senator Ken- nedy said in a statement: , ' "Despite our country's gen- eral public support for the cease-fire agreement and the new Government, several indi- cators suggest that the intent 'of some of our remaining pres- ence in Laos can only help to [perpetrate old relationships and i the divisions of that country. And this poses a threat of re- newed conflict in several areas." and truck drivers, business- , men estimate that merchants make at least 55 cents -profit, I a pound. * ? A DC-3 carries 7,000 pounds and generally flies two to, three trips a day. That adds , up to a daily profit of $7,700 to $11,550. The airlift has been, made' possible by the United States, which buys all the aviation . fuel with dollars, sells it to private distributors for riels. and turns the riels over to the Government. One official said ? that' Washington had agreed to in-, crease fuel shipments on the condition that they would not be sold on the black market and that the airlines would fly only within Cam- bodia transporting only food. "We do not want them flying drugs in from Laos," one American remarked. A Planeload of Hennessy There is no evidence that-, they fly drugs, but pilots say they sometimes fly smuggled luxury goods. "I've come out of Kompong Som with a corn-I plete planeload of Hennessy," one pilot declared. The fuel comes up the " Mekong River by convoy, , along with American rice, which is then flown from Phnom ? Penh to other en- circled cities. These flights are often forced on private airlines by the Government, which never pays, airline executives com- plain. Pilots say they are also required to use private planes to ferry troops and ammu- nition around the country. , free of charge. "We pay the [control] tow-I er a few thousand riels so we don't have to fly these every day," one pilot as- serted, and they say, 'O.K.? ? tomorrow'." One airline executive pul- led out a notebook listing 12 00330004-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7 different agencies and 6ffi- ciais who had to be bribed ' in a provincial airport, In- chiding the military chief who allegedly receives 5,000 riels, or about $12.50 each time a plane lands. ' In Phnom Penh, a pilot - said, "We pay the security police 100,000 riels a month for not stealing fuel." 1,500 Gallons Stolen "They hit me one night for over 1,500 gallons," one air- ? .Monday, June 17,1974 craft owner complained. "I figure it would have taken three trucks, ten people, five siphons and at least eight hours worth of work to siphon off that much fuel. The plane was sitting right on the apron in front ? of the control tower, but no- body knew anything." Pilots have also found security policemen trying to sell them spare parts ?that were stolen the night before. "They steal your fuel, they THE WASHINGTON POST 0 eric n steal your oil; they steal your hydraulic fluid ? anything they can sell," one pilot said. "You pay the guy who pumps ' gasoline into your plane, you pay the tower op- erators, the customs police ?even truck drivers get paid off. You know why? Because . otherwise when he backs his truck up to your plane he'll bump it." If the corruption were only better organized, the pilot mused. The trouble is that every man is out for him-1 self. "You could live with it i if it were controlled," he ex- plained. "If' you knew that 10 per dent of what you ' made went to corruption, then you could plan." But Cambodia cannot plan these days. It is a country scrambling to live from day to day amid a war and its profiteers. "Khmers used .to be soft, very soft," a young Cambodian observed sadly. "But not now." Is Protest Say Cambodian Military Commandeers Planes duties once performed by fleets of trucks. - Bryant and Shipman said they both demand cash be- lore they fly. "The Americans need us to run this country," said Bryant, "but they won't give , us protection from the mili- tary." Shipman arrived in Cam- bodia last April and Bryant has lived here for more than three years. Both say they cooperate with the military when they fly out to the provinces, but the military rarely returns these favors. "We carry whatever they like when we have the extra room," said Shipman. 'Wounded soldiers, wives with their sugar to sell in Phnom Penh?we have to do it in these situations. But they don't give us reliable information on enemy Posi- tions and then they com- mandeer the airplanes." The pilots plan to make renewed complaints to the embassy until they receive assurance that they will not be coerced into flying mili- tary missions. "We are an embittered lot; we've worked in an around the government and know what the Americans can do. We aren't on high salaries like Air America. We're paid less than U.S. mercenaries in China in 1948," said Shipman. "I think flying military mis- sions is illegal and I don't want to be shot up for_noth- By Elizabeth Becker Special to The Washington Post PHNOM PENH?Americap, commercial pilots have .asked the U.S. embassy in Phnom Penh to forbid the Cambodian military from commandering their private American-registered planes ?dor military missions, but the embassy refused the re- quest ? "I went to the embassy a few days ago to ask about this because I thought the embassy had to protect its citizens," . said earl Ship- man, a 50-year-old Ameri- can-licensed pilot for Heng Meas commercial airlines, "but the air attache told us the ambassador could not in- terfere in Cambodian gov- ernment affairs." Shipman had refused to transport Khmer Republic troops to Kompong Chem and the military subse- quently threatened to cut off all aviation gasoline to , his company if he did not comply. Since aviation gaso- line is provided by Ameri- can aid and its distribution controlled by the American embassy, Shipman felt the embassy could forbid the Cambodians from comman- deering his plane. "The attache said he would write a letter to the air force asking them not to take American registered planes to Kompong Cham, ? but we need more protec- tion than that," said Ship- man. Shipman is worried about the risk involved in flying military missions to endan- gered areas and the illegal- ity of his participation in a foreign war. Other Ameri- can pilots have been threat- ened and sometimes forced to fly military missions and two have complained, along with Shipman. "Active participation in this war effort jeopardizes our American citizenship," Skip Bryant, another pilot, said. "I was forced to fly troops to Kampot and I know that on the back of my passport it says I can lose my citizen- ship by serving in the armed forces of another country," Bryant said. The pilots feel the em- bassy is not guarding their rights as American citizens and they don't believe the embassy is powerless. "The Americans change the rules of their poker game daily," said Shipman. One recent change is a mandatory utilization report for aviation gasoline issued by the U.S. embassy to all private airline companies. Each day these companies must make a report to the embassy stating the amount of aviation gas used, the type and tonnage of cargo shipped, the destination of the cargo, and the names of passengers aboard. Well-informed diplomatic sources say the embassy hopes to control in-country airshipment of essential sup- plies between Phhom Penh and the provinces. The United States appar- ently hopes to cut down in- flation by supervising do- mestic cargo, flights and thereby limiting the role of middlethen. Shipman knows about these new measures, but he says things nave not changed. "The Cambodian govern- ment still commandeers any airline to do what they say," he said. The Cambodian air force has planes to get in and out of tight places but the mili- tary often uses its cargo lanes for paying passen- gers, Shipman said, adding, !'then they put the squeeze on us to bring the troops "I know none of Us was dragged 'here in the first place, but I have flown for AID in Africa and the agency (CIA) in Laos, and I have never had trouble like this before. His private company owns only one plane, like many of the more than 30 airline companies suddenly startec. operating this year when all inland roads were rut by the Khmer Rouge. Most compa- nies run on a very small budget, transporting essen- tial goods in and out of Phnom Penh, taking up the 40 ine 7PcpproveciforRelegese-2001408198?CIA-RDP7-7-0043,2R000-1903,3000.?7,-