ADDRESS TO THE LOS ANGELES WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA BY WILLIAM E. COLBY FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE FOR AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330005-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 21, 2001
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: May 3, 1974
• Content Type: SPEECH

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330005-6
_. .._ _ 1
INTERNAL USE ONLY
This publication contains clippings from the
domestic and foreign press for YOUR
BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use
of selected items would rarely be advisable.
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
GENERAL
EASTERN EUROPE
WESTERN EUROPE
Destroy after backgrounder
has served,,, its purpose or
within 60 days.
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330005-6
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010033Q095-6...
ADDRESS TO THE
LOS ANGELES WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA
WILLIAM I. COLBY
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AY 3, ti 974
REIGN HINTELLICENCE
FOR AMERICA
Foreign intelligence has a long tradition in America. One of our earliest
national heroes, Nathan Hale, was an intelligence agent. Our first President,
General Washington, was an assiduous director and user of intelligence.
Intelligence has changed in recent years, however, and today its reality
is different from its traditional meaning. In the ' common understanding,
intelligence is still linked with secrecy and spying. But what I would like
to talk about tonight is thivay we in America have changed the scope of
the word "intelligence," so that it has come to mean something different
from that old-fashioned perception. These changes have stemmed from
characteristics peculiar to America ,and from the nature of our society.
The first and most dramatic change in today's meaning of the word "in-
telligence" stems from the technological genius of Americans. We have
applied to intelligence the talents of our inventors, of our engineers, and
of our scientists. In the short space of eighteen years since the U-2 began
its missions, we have revolutionized intelligence. In 1960 this country en-
gaged in a great debate as to whether there was a missile gap between the
Soviet Union and ourselves. Today the facts are so well established that
such a debate is impossible. Then we had to try to deduce from bits of
circumstantial evidence how many missiles the Soviets had; today we see
and count them. We wondered then what new missiles the Soviets might
be developing; today we follow their tests and determine from them the
range, the size, and the effectiveness of such missiles.
This tecluiical contribution to intelligence not only provides a better basis
for decisions about the national security of the United States, it also enables
us to negotiate agreements such as the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. Over the years such limitation treaties
were always stopped by one essential feature: the United States needed
some assurance that the other party would abide by a treaty's restraints.
Thus we came up with the "open skies" proposal and tried to negotiate
on-site inspection procedures. The Soviet leaders rejected these because
they believed such measures would permit foreigners an undue degree of
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330005-6
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330005-6
access to their sovereign territory.
It was only after American intelligence developed the ability to monitor
such agreements from afar, through technical means, that we on our side
became sufficiently confident to begin the process of mutual arms limitation.
In the text of the first SALT agreement, intelligence in fact was even ad-
mitted to polite diplomatic society under the name of "national technical
means of verification."
Technology has revolutionized the intelligence business in many other
ways beyond those I just described. They provide a precision to our knowl-
edge of the world around us, which- was inconceivable fifteen years ago.
I might add that I give full credit to the many talents here in California
which have contributed immensely to this effort.
The second major contribution America has made to intelligence stemmed
in part from a bad American habit. This was our habit of disbanding our
intelligence machinery at the end of every war, requiring us to reassemble
one hastily at the beginning of a new war. Thus we abandoned intelligence
in the period after World War I, when Secretary of State Stimson is alleged
to have commented that "gentlemen do not read each other's mail." We
disbanded the Office of Strategic Services in October 1945, only to estab-
lish a new central intelligence apparatus to help meet the Cold War in 1947.
This habitual exercise provided something new in 1942. We were faced
then with the urgent need to provide intelligence support to our govern-
mental and military leadership about such disparate areas of the world
as the North African littoral, the "hump" between China and India, and
distant Pacific islands. General William Donovan, our first director of central
intelligence, mobilized the talents of academia and industry to assemble
every possible American source of information on these subjects..
This central pool of intellectual talent proved its worth and provided the
base for the second major American contribution to the intelligence profes-
sion. While certainly the collection of information is vital to intelligence,
an equally vital contribution comes from the analysis, assessment, and esti-
mating process. The analytic staff within the Central Intelligence Agency
has access to all the raw information on foreign areas available to our Gov-
ernment, ranging from that which is completely public to the most secret
products of our worldwide collection apparatus. It subjects this information
to the intellectual talents and experience of its membership, which in scope
and scholarship can rival those of our large universities. It then produces
objective and reasoned assessments of developments around the world and
projections of likely future trends.
Some of the work of this corps of experts has come to" light through the
revelation of the Pentagon Papers, in which the various national estimates
on Vietnam were shown to have been independent, objective assessments
of the likely future course of events there. This. is not the time or place to
debate American involvement in Vietnaan and the many factors which
influenced it; I. mention these reports only to demonstrate what this assess-
ment process can contribute: an independent and objective assessment
of a foreign situation, unaffected by political commitments or departmental
parochialism.
As has been reported in the press, I have made certain changes in the
bureaucratic structure through which these assessments are produced, but
the estimating process in its essentials remains as it was. I hope I have
even reinforced it by my own insistence that honest differences among the
experts must be fully reflected in our final output rather than concealed
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330005-6~~
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RD P77-004328000106330005-6
under useless generalizations.
America's success in this assessment process perhaps influenced the forma-
tion by the Soviets a few years ago of the Institute for the Study of the
U.S.A. The Soviets apparently have recognized, as we did long ago, that it
is as important to study and try to understand American society as it would
be to spy on it. While some other nations also consider assessment a part
of their intelligence process, I know of none which can match the invest-
ment we in America have made in research and analysis as an integral
element of our intelligence mechanism. The product delivered to our policy-
makers has often demonstrated the value of this investment, and opened
new perspectives for the concept of intelligence.
American intelligence presents another unique feature. It must operate
within the tradition of an open society in America. But, as General Wash-
ington once noted, "upon secrecy, success depends in most enterprises"
of intelligence. These principles are not easily reconcilable, and we are
breaking new ground in intelligence doctrine as we try to resolve the
dilemma between them.
Part of our solution to this problem appears in the National Security Act
of'1947, providing that CIA have no police, subpoena, or law enforcement
powers, or internal security functions, i.e., that it is restricted to foreign
intelligence. This limitation is clearly recognized among our employees,
although my predecessors and I have candidly admitted that CIA made
mistakes with respect to the wig and other equipment and the psychological
profile provided to the Watergate "plumbers." I am confident and have
assured the Congress publicly that it will be respected in the future.
The 1947 Act recognized the other horn of our dilemma when it charged
the Director of Central Intelligence with responsibility for the protection
of intelligence sources and methods. It is this charge that led my prede-
cessors and me to take such Constitutional steps as are possible to retain
the essential secrets of intelligence. In this respect we have at least one
common interest with the'profession of journalism: we are both interested
.in -the protection of our sources.
We are currently engaged in the courts in an effort to enforce the secrecy
agreement that one of our ex-employees signed when he came to work
with us. In it he acknowledged that he would be receiving sensitive in-
formation and agreed to hold it secret unless we released it. We are not
objecting to most of a book he proposed to write, even including about
half of the items that we initially identified as technically classified. We
are struggling, however, to prevent the publication of the names of a
number of foreigners, publicity which could do substantial' injury to in-
dividuals who once put their confidence in us. Similarly, we hope to with-
hold the details of specific operations where exposure could prevent our
receipt of further information of great value. In some cases, the publication
of the fact of our knowledge of a situation can be of major assistance to
another nation in deducing how we must have learned of it and shutting
us off from it. I might add that we do not censor our ex-employees' opinions.
We have cleared several such books full of criticism, in which the authors
have been careful not to reveal our sources or operations. The most serious
aspect of this struggle is that if we cannot protect our sources and methods,
friendly foreign officials and individuals will be less forthcoming with
us in the future, when it could be of critical importance to our country.
No serious intelligence professional has ever believed that General Wash-
ington's maxim could be replaced by a variation Doff the Wilsonian approach 11 Approved For RlEase1200V69768o?8Yk_F V77-O~t432R000100330005-6
Another unique aspect of American intelligence is our relationship to
 Approve Fin %%rgPQ0J/9N% -e 6A ON 77 0 432Rll0a01003 30rdspay
considerable shock when they learn that I appeared in an open hearing
before the television cameras as a part of my Senate confirmation. Many
of them would never be subjected to detailed scrutiny by their Parliament,
and their identities are frequently totally unknown. Some months ago, for
example, two journalists were prosecuted in Sweden-hardly a closed so- .
ciety-for revealing the startling fact that their country had an intelligence
service. In our country our intelligence authority stems from an act of
Congress, it is subject to oversight by the Congress, and it depends upon
funds appropriated annually by the Congress.
The Congress has provided for. itself a way of resolving the dilemma
between the need for secrecy in intelligence and the demands of our open
society. Those Senators and Congressmen designated to exercise oversight
of CIA or review its budgets are fully informed of our activities, inspect
us at will, and are given detailed and specific answers to any questions they
raise. Other individual Senators and Congressmen and other committees
frequently receive the same intelligence assessments of the world situation
as are provided to the Executive Branch, on a classified basis, but they
are not provided the operational details of our intelligence activities. This
arrangement was established by the Congress and is, of course, subject
to change. My own position is that the method by which Congress exer-
cises its oversight of intelligence activity is a matter for the Congress to
decide.
As a related aspect of American intelligence in this open society, I might
say something about our relations with the public and the press. We do
not conduct a public relations program; we are not in the public inforn a-
tion business. But we do make as much information as possible available
to the news media and to the public. Groups of our citizens, including high
school students, have. visited our facilities, where we try to respond to
their questions about the nature of American intelligence.
Thus we in the intelligence profession are aware that ours must be * an
a
intelligence effort conducted on American principles and that it must be
more open and responsive to our public than the intelligence activities
of other nations. At the same time, we must respect the essential professional
requirement embodied in the National Security Act to protect our intelli-
gence sources and methods. We will consequently continue to arouse wonder-
ment from some of our foreign associates as to our openness, and concern
among some American citizens that we still must keep some information
secret if we are to conduct an intelligence effort at all.
Technical intelligence, the intellectual process of assessment, and our
exposure to our Constitutional authorities and the public are three major
contributions America has made to the intelligence profession. I do not
want to be accused, however, of concealing the fact that intelligence still
requires clandestine activity. Our technical intelligence and our study and
assessment of material openly available throughout the world have cer-
tainly revolutionized the intelligence profession in the past twenty years.
But they have not removed the needs of our national policy-makers for
information on the intentions of other powers. They have not removed
the need to identify at an early stage research abroad into some new
weapon which might threaten the safety of our nation, so that we do not
become aware of a new and overpowering threat, especially from a nation
not as open as ours, too late to negotiate about it or to protect ourselves.
The need for clandestine collection can perhaps be illustrated by com-
paring the task facing me with that facing Mr. Andropov, the head of the
KGB in the Soviet Union. Mr. Andropov faces a veritable cornucopia of
easily acquired information about America from published and public
Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330005-6
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330005-6
sources. Out of this, he must pick those facts -which are significant and
assemble them into an accurate assessment of America. My task is to
search for individual facts kept in the utmost secrecy in closed societies,
and with these few facts try to construct whole assessments, in somewhat
the way one extrapolates a reproduction of the skeleton of 'a Brontosaurus
from a thigh bone. Without the contributions of clandestinely acquired in-
formation, our Brontosaurus could in some situations be very deformed.
indeed.
Simple prudence, of course, causes us to use clandestine collection only
when the information is available in no other way and is of real value to
our country. My point is that such situations do exist. Thus we will con-
tinue to need Americans and friendly foreigners willing to undertake clan-
destine intelligence missions. I might add only that we must do a better job
of training future generations of American intelligence officers and agents
than Nathan Hale received in a one-day briefing and the advice to place
his reports in his shoes.
From this description we see that intelligence in today's complicated
world is a complex affair. It must warn our Government of new generations
of intercontinental missiles being developed, it must be attentive to foreign
economic threats to America's strength and well-being, and it must identify
political problems around the world which can adversely affect our interests.
The very complexity of the challenge has led to the active collaboration
of all the different elements of the American Government which, can con-
tribute to the process of information collection and national assessment.
President Nixon has charged my predecessors and me with the leadership
of this Intelligence Community anc has provided certain interdepartmental
mechanisms through which to implement this charge. This charge of leader-
ship for the entire American intelligence process applies to the substance
of our intelligence needs and to the resources devoted to intelligence. It
puts on me the responsibility of preventing separate bureaucratic interests
from impinging on the effectiveness or raising the cost- of our national
intelligence effort.
This then is foreign intelligence in and for America today. It reflects the
technical and intellectual talents of America, it reflects our open society,
it reflects the courage and integrity of our professional intelligence officers.
Most important of all, it provides American policy-makers with critical in-
formation and reasoned assessments about the complex foreign political,
economic, and military challenges to our national security and welfare. It
is designed to help us to achieve and to live in peace, rather than only to
protect us in time of war. It has become an important and permanent ele-
ment of our national foreign policy structure. We Americans who are a part
of it are proud of it, and of the improvements we Americans have brought
to a profession which can be traced at least to Moses, who sent a man from
each tribe to "spy out" the land of Canaan.
Thank you very much.
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330005-6
5
 NEW YORKed For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330005-6
7 June 1974
CIA., .Bruised by etnam and Watergate,
Undergoes Quiet Changes tinder Colby`
By DAVID BINDER ployment of opponent forces nator." Mr. Colby is on the tele='
Sped-al to The New York Tunes
WASHINGTON, June 6 -
Bruised by the domestic poll-
. tics of the Vietnam conflict
and the Watergate affair, its
influence in the White House
broken by the practitioners
of detente, the Central Intel-
ligence Agency is undergo-
ing a major, perhaps funda-
mental, transformation.
Its claws-the covert oper-
ations that once marshaled
large mercenary armies in
Laos and Latin America and
toppled undesired govern-
ments in Iran and Guatemala
-are now largely retracted.
Its weightiest organ in the
bureaucracy, the Board of
National Estimates, a-federal
court of intelligence, has
been abolished.
Under its new director,
William E. Colby, some of the
agency's functions and. prior-
ities have been shifted, with
seemingly paradoxical re-
sults.. -
Although President Nixon
has given Mr. Colby more
power and responsibility
than most of his predeces-
sors, the director has mark-
edly less access to the White
House.
Based on Nine Interviews
While he may not face as
much rivalry from the mili-
tary Intelligence establish-
ibent as some critics feared,
Mr. Colby's agency is being
challenged by the State De-
partment's intelligence and
research bureau, newly re-
vitalized at Secretary of State
A' singer's behest.
These changes, which by
the nature of the intelligence
profession have taken place
quietly, became known
through interviews in the in-
telligence community.
The rules of the game re-
quires that there be no at-
tribution of information ac-
quired from high intelligence
officials. When Mr. Colby
sees newsmen - he has done
so more frequently than any
of his predecessors since he
took over last summer - he
requests that not even the
terms "officials" or "sourc-
es" be used.
The mandate given Mr. Col-
by by the President provides
him not only the power to.
preside over all intelligence
operations, but also the pow-
er to ailocale the entire
tel' react budget of
$6-billion.
Even tactical intelligence,
previously an activity jeal-
ously maintained by the mili-
tary services, comes under
his purview.
Impelled by apparent fail-
ures of Israeli tactical intel-
ligence during the October
war, American intelligence
officials have decided to
place greater stress on re-
laying information on the de-
Germany and South Korea.
But the most 'striking
changes in the Central Intelli-,
gence Agency have come at
the top, having been initiated
by Mr. Colby himself.
He replaced the 10-man.
Board of National Estimates
and its staff of 20 last
October with a system
manned by what he calls na-
tional intelligence officers.
Founded in 1950 by Wal-
ter Bedell Smith, and run or-
iginally by the Harvard his-
torian Willam Langer, the
board in its heyday had been
an "independent corporate
entity," in the description of
a. former member. It pro-
duced long-range estimates of
the intentions and capabili-
ties of antagonists.
"I felt the board was es-.
sential to doing honest in-
telligence," this retired mem-
ber continued. "It was impos-
sible for the White House to
order up something that fit
their views. It was impossi-
'ble then, but it's possible
now." .
The new I i national in-
telligence officers are expect-
ed to range through the
entire government and be-
yond to put together their
evaluations.
Each has a geographic re-'
gion or a topical area, among
them the Middle East, South-
east Asia, Japan and the
Pacific, Latin America,. Eu-
rope, strategic forces, dentral
purpose forces, economics
and energy.
More Short-Term Studies
The new officers are pre-.
paring more short-term as-
sessments and fewer long-
range estimates. This is partly
-in response to the demands
.of their chief consumer, Sec-
retary of State Kissinger.. -
"It's ad hoc-ism," said an
agency official. "The old,
board could respond to a re
quest for an estimate in five
days or 24 hours. But it
didn't like to. We used to
schedule the work three to
six months in advance."
Explaining why he be-
lieve the change was neces-
sary, even though regret-
table, the official went on:
"The board couldn't have
gone on. It was in a helluva
rut. It thought in big stra
teeic terms and didn't get
in,
c _r r as. it was
s sophical. Also its profound.
'skepticism on Vietnam didn't
help the board in this town.
"Besides, Henry Kissinger
is hopelessly antibureaucra-
cy. He wants his intelligence
handed to him scribbled on
the back of an envelope."
An aide of Mr. Kissinger
remembers the old blue-cov-
ered national estimates as
"blah-they ended up with
the least common denomi-
The new estimates carry phore almost daily with the
dissenting views from with- President's aides and he'
in the intelligence commu-,
nity as an, integral part of
their texts. In the old system'
dissents were registered as
footnotes.
Key Military Man Hired
A concern voiced by Mr.
Colby's critics is that the
military intelligence estab-
lishment, which makes up-
more than four-fifths of the
intelligence community, may,
simply overpower the agency
and -its independent, civilian'
views.
The preponderance of the
military, even after the Con-'
gress,slashed 9,000 people
from the Defense Intelligence
Agency last year, does not
worry Mr. Colby.
He hired Maj. Gen. Daniel
Graham, a defense intel-
ligence specialist who had
greater military control over
military intelligence. General
Graham is now Mr. Colby's
liaison man within the intel-
ligence community.
"You've got the fox in the
chicken coop," said a critic.
But a former C.I.A. official
who now works for State De
partment intelligence com
merited: t
"I always thought the.
threat of the military was'
terribly exaggerated. It as-`
sumes that civilians are a
bunch of dummies. I never+
found that the civilians were-
willing to roll over and play
dead. They were always will-'
ing to challenge."
In addition to General Gra-
ham, Mr. Colby has appointed
an admiral as his national
'intelligence officer on con
ventional forces. The Board
of National Estimates usually
had two or three former ad-
mirals and generals.
Mr. Colby is satisfied with
'his system because he feels
it has ruled out institution-
al differences with the mili-
tary and made remaining
differences a matter of factu-
al appraisals rather than
opinions.
Rarely Sees President
Although he appears to
have established his authori-
ty firmly under Mr. Nixon, he
hardly ever sees the Presi-
dent. Under John F. Kennedy
and Lyndon Johnson, the Di
rector of Central Intelligence
called at the .x. it e 1,ouse
almost every week.
seems to feel comfortable
with A his arrangement, be-:
lieving that his counterparts,'
Mr. Kissinger and Defense
Secretary James R. Schles-
inger, have not much more
time with Mr. Nixon than he
does. .
In the year since he has-
taken charge, Mr. Colby has
let it be known that he wants
the agency to concentrate on
what he believes are new.
priorities-international trade,
cultural relations and the
monitoring of international
agreements to reduce arms
and armies.
. To this end the agency
continues to maintain agents.
in American companies en-
gaged in foreign trade and
in journalism, with perhaps-
500 of 6,000 agents using the.
-cover of businessman or re-
porter.-
Mr. Colby, who spent most.
of his career with the agency
in covert operations, is in-
tent on keeping that capabili-
ty. Even if it is being applied'
.only sparingly.
"It is ':ke keeping an air
craft carrier," said a man
who believes in the value of
covert operations. "You have.
it.,, .%
But there are lunchtime'
debates among the agency's
senior officials about the val--
ue of maintaining the planes,
the weapons and the train-..
ers that were associated with
the secret armies.
"It doesn't seem to go with
Nixon's idea of constructing
world peace," said oni
official.
State Department's Roler
"It needs to be diminished
very considerably," said an-
other. "We are not in a po-
sition nor is it worthwhile
to try influencing the course
of action in every othe
country. There are also the
budgetary realities."
Mr. Kissinger apparently
has also given some thought
to reducing the size of tile-
covert operations establishc-
ment, according to one .'of
his aides in the Bureau of
Intelligence and Research.
The bureau, under Willia)i
G. Hyland, has become mores
active and does much anal:
sis work for Mr. Kissinger
with results that are said to'
please him. A
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330005-6
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330005-6
NEW YORK TIMES
7 June 1974
arts the
Book Cerisor~d bthe
Following are excerpts from a forthcoming
book, "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," by Victor
Marchetti and John D. Marks. Mr, Marchetti worked.
for the Central Intelligence Agency for fourteen
years as a Soviet-military specialist and executive
assistant to the deputy director. Mr. Marks was an
analyst and staff assistant to the intelligence. director
in the State Department.
The book has been at the center of a legal dispute
between the authors; the publisher, Alfred A. Knopf,.
and the C.I.A. A Federal court order permitted
the agency to inspect the manuscript of the book.
The C.I.A. deleted 339 passages, btrt later reinstated
.171 after the publisher and the authors started
litigation against the agency.
A Federal judge cleared for use 140 passages, plus
'parts of. two others, but continuing legal appeals made
them unavailable for inclusion in the book. Both
sides submitted written briefs to the United States Court
.of Appeals for the Fourth District. Oral arguments
were heard June 3 and a ruling is pending.
In these excerpts-and it the rest of the book-
boldface type represents original C.I.A. deletions that
the agency later reinstated. The word DELETED repre-
sents deletions 'the agency refused to reinstate.
In' all, there were 168 deletions.
lie CIA is big, very big. Officially, it has authorized man-
power of 16,500, and an authorized -budget of $750 million-
?and even those figures are jealously guarded, generally made avail
able only to Congress. Yet, regardless of its official size and cost,
the agency is far larger and more affluent than these figures indicate.
The CIA itself does' not even know how many people work for
it. The 16,500. figure- does -not reflect the tens of thousands who'
serve under contract (mercenaries, agents, consultants,-, etc.) or
,who work for the agency's proprietary companies.* Past efforts to
total up the number of foreign agents have never resulted in-precise
figures because of the inordinate secrecy'and compartmentalization
practiced by the Clandestine Services. Sloppy record-keeping-.-
often deliberate on the part of the operators "for security pur-
poses"-is also a factor. There are one-time agents hired for
specific missions, contract agents who serve for extended periods of
time, and career agents who spend their entire working lives secretly
employed by the CIA. In some. instances, contract agents are
. ret:s..e d long aster their a s?;:i~.. ,.:_s ,:gas I.= ,.r..; L' t gist ally are
known only to the case oiuceis'wire whom ey deal. One of the
Watergate burglars, Eugenia Martinez,. was in this 'category. When
he was caught inside the Watergate on.that day in June 1972, he
still was receiving a $ 100-a-month ? stipend from the agency for
work apparently unrelated to his covert assignment for the Com-
mittee to Re-Elect the President. The CIA claims to have since
dropped him from the payroll.
L A
Appro\ I F 1}rPt T 6 'Pl Bi(It W~0404 *OOP100390005-6
 ApprovedftCReVamwpOdtfidiVff,chOAf 7j7aQ0} W9Q@:f?@P,0005-6
that were used in Vietnam with limited success but great del.'ght.
DELETED
) - In actual practice,-,bow-
.CM whatever damage was caused by the chemical was quickly
repaired by the Vietcong and North Vietnamese.
The agency's other discovery was a weapons-detection system.
It worked by spraying a .special chemical on the hands of a sus-
pected Vietcong and then, after a few minutes, shining an ultra.
violet light on his hands. If the chemical glowed in a certain man-
ner, that meant that the suspect had held a metal object-ia theory,
?'a weapon-during the preceding twenty-four hours. The system's
main drawback.was that it was just as sensitive to steel farm im-
plements as to -guns and it could implicate a person who had been
merely working with a hammer. The CIA considered the system
such a success, however, that it passed it on through a domestic
training program to the police forces of several American cities,
Latin America in 1954 was the acme of one of the QA's greatest
paramilitary trinmphs-~-the successful invasion. of Guatemala by
an agency-organized rebel force. And it was in Latin America that
the CIA seven years later suffered its most notable failure-the
abortive invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs' But the agency was
slow to accept defeat in the Cuban operation. The only reason for
the failure, the CIA's operators believed, was that President Ken-
nedy had lost his nerve at the last minute, ref using more air support
? for the invasion and withholding or reducing other possible assist-
ance by U.S. forces. Consequently, the agency continued its rela-
tionships with its "penetrations" of Cuban exile groups--in a way
reminiscent of its lingering ties- with Eastern European 'emigre
organizations from the early Cold War period. And the CIA kept
many of the Bay -of Pig's veterans under contract, paying them
regular aIaries for more than a decade afterward.
DELETED
Time after time, the Cuban government would parade CIA-span.
eared rebels before television eras to display ibern and their
equipment to, the Cuban public .and the world. Often the captives
made full confessions of the agency's role in their activities.
;)r n:.s 5i3 it .r alp au ~Lwr cd to pat. the e 1o9' W House
' 11!'t,tj
Christmas decorations in place on a December day in 1969 when
the. President met in the Cabinet room with the National Security
Council. The (
DELETED
) out to the interested parts of the feral.
government the previous April, bureaucrats had been, writing posi-
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330005-6
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330B05-6
tion papers to prepare their chiefs for this meeting. There was
sharp disagreement within the government on how hard a line the.
United States should take with the
DELETED
Now the time for decision-making was at hand,
and those present included the Vice President, the Secretaries of
State and Defense, the Under Secretaries of State and Commerce,
the Director of Central Intelligence, a representative of the Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA), the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs, and the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.*
* Admiral Thomas Moorer, the newly named Chairman of the JCS, was
attending his first NSC meeting in this capacity. The President noted the
occasion by introducing him to all assembled as "Admiral Moimon."
The President opened The session by stating that the NSC had
before it some very complex problems--complex not only in the
usual foreign-policy sense but also in a moral context which, the
President noted, concerned a large portion of the American'popula-
'tion. Nixon then turned to his DCI, Richard Helms, and said, "Go
,ahead, Dick."
The NSC meeting had officially begun, and, as was customary,
Helms set the scene by giving a detailed 'briefing on the political
and economic background of the countries under discussion. Using
charts and-maps carried in by an aide, he described recent devel-
opments in southern Africa. (His otherwise flawless performance
was marred only by his mispronunciation of "Malagasy" [formerly
Madagascar], when referring to the young republic.)
Next, Henry Kissinger talked about-the kind of general posture
the United'States could maintain toward the ( DELETED )
and outlined- the ?spcc(fic policy options open to the President. In
the case of
NEW 'YORK TIMES
9 June 1974 '
C.I'A. CHIEF SEEKS
SECRECY POWERS
Wants Law for Enforcing
Intelligence Protection.
The case is now before the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit, in Rich-
mond, and Mr. Colby evidently
intends to fight it to the end
because he feels the C.I.A.
would be naked without the
power to enforce its secrecy
oath upon employes and former
By DAVID BINDER -~
Spedal to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, June 8
William E. Colby, the director
of Central Intelligence, is seek-
ing legislation that would give
him powers to enforce the pro-
tection of intelligence secrets
and provide a penalty of 10
years in prison or a' fine of
$10,000 for violations.
The request; accompanied
with a three-page draft of a bill
amending the National Security
Act of 1947, was sent out to
Nixon Administration officials
and Congressional leaders on
Jan. 14.
But it became public knowl-
edge only when it was issued
last Monday by the United
States Court of Appeals in
Richmond, appended to a brief
submitted by the Central Intel-
ligence Agency in a still run-
nine battle over secrecy powers.
The genesis of Mr. Colby's
request is in his court struggle
with Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., pub-
lishers of the soon to' be dis-
tributed book, "The C.I.A. and
the Cult of Intelligence," by
Victor L. Marchetti and John
D. Marks.
Mr. Marchetti was a C.I.A.
employe from 1955 to 1969 and
the book draws heavily on his
experience and knowledge of
agency operations.
Last September Mr. Colby,
who had just taken over as
director of Central Intelligence,
and head of the agency, sought';
court assistance-to require 339
deletions of what he and his
associates considered to be
classified and highly sensitive
information. The proposed de-'
letions total almost 100 pages
of the 530-page manuscript.
Set Limit of 27
After a series of court en-
counters between the C.I.A. and:
Knopf and the authors-much
of the time being spent in
closed sessions-Judge Albert
V. Bryan Jr. ruled in the United
States District Court in Alex-
andria, Va., that only 27 pas-
sages could and should be prop-
erly deleted.
Some of the statements were quite revealing. Early in the meeting See'
retary of State William Rogers jokingly pointed '0114 to &eneral laughter
in the room, that it might be inappropriate for the group to discuss the sub-
ject ii hand; since some of Those present had iepresented southenis African
clients in earlier Jaw practices. Vice President Spiro Agnew gave mf im-
passioned' speech on how the South Africans, now that they had iecently
declared their independence, were not about to be pushed around,/and he
went on to compare South Africa to the United States In its Infant days.
Finally, the President leaned over to Agnew and said gently, "You mean
Rhodesia, don't you, Wed?"
DELETED
C.I.A., new employes are now
required to sign a paper com-
mitting themselves to refrain
from passing on intelligence
secrets, even after leaving the
agency. But the Marchetti case
has shown that at least some'
courts are unwilling to uphold
the validity of these oaths by
applyirig penalties or restrain-
ing orders or injunctions
against publishing.
Mr. Colby has explained that
he decided to seek the new
legislation to give him the
muscle to enforce the C.I.A.'s
secrecy and intelligence classi-
fication regulations.
Authority Defined
The draft bill for amendment
of the National Security Act,
prepared by C.I.A. legal experts,
proposes that the Director of
Central Intelligence be "respon-
sible for protecting intelligence.
sources and methods from un-'
authorized disclosure." It would
give the director authority over
employes of the Government,
members of the armed forces
and contractors of the Govern-
ment as well as their employes
insofar as they come into con-
tace with secrets.
It would further give the
C.I.A. chief the power to define
the "intelligence" in question
and defines those subject to
prosecution as only those
"authorized" to receive such
information. Others would be
immune from prosecution.
In addition, it provides for
gourt procedures "in camera"
-that is, closed to the public
-to' review intelligence cases
brought up by the director.
Finally, it provides for injunc-
tions to prevent. acts such as
publication of the Marchetti
book. -
A C.I.A. spokesman empha-
sized in a telephone interview
that' the draft bill was by no
means the last word on the sub-
ject, and, indeed, the request
has been shuffled between the
Office of Management and Bud-
get and the Justice Department'
ever since. it was first submit-
) the United States to do sm To what extent
elms' arguments played a part in the presidential decision caA
be answered 'only by Richard Nixon himself. But, the following*
.t ,.u 1 ?e.-
year, a t16 at (.Vrl:t~ 1 ,il!s) Wr? Ql; t"' J a6..1~, gW!4 j,.. t., Stiblvi to(: r"--
bAL JiLa ...
was' such' an estab-
fished factor that it was not even under review at the NSC meet-
ing.
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330005-6
9
 WASHING-MNAB'pARved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RD ru-ll04 OO 5-6 ~~
5 June 1974 I ~'~?
CIA Cost
Disdosure
Bid Killed
Associated Press
The Senate has refused to
require the Cental Intelli-
gence ,Agency to disclose
publicly each year the total
amount of money America
spends on spying.
Sen. William Proxmire..
D-Wis., was voted down, SS-
33, yesterday on his public
.disclosure amendment to
the $21.8 billion weapons
procurement authorization
bill.
ALSO REJECTED, 55-27,
was an amendment by Sen.
George McGovern, D-S.D.,
to authorize a $100 million
grant and loan fund to help
defense contractors to con-
vert their plants and em-,
ployes to civilian work as
defense contracts expire.
He has offered similar
proposals every year since
1966, when the Vietnam war
was in full swing, and all
have been defeated.
The Senate approved, 76-
12, an amendment by Sen.
Hubert Humphrey,. D-
Minn., to. forbid the armed
forces from testing poison-
ous gases, germ and chemi-.
cal warfare agents and
radioactive materials on
dogs.
HUMPHREY SAID the
Army's Edgewood Arsenal
in Maryland recently
advertised for 450 beagle
puppies to continue evalua-
tion of toxic substances de-
spite widespread public
protests.
"I suggest that the De-
partment of Defense take a
greater interest in rats, and
.let the dogs alone," he as-
serted.
Proxmire's CIA budget
disclosure amendment was
opposed by members of a
22-man Senate-House spe-
cial CIA Oversight Commit-
tee made up of senior mem-
bers of the House and Sen-
ate appropriations and
armed services com,a'ttecs.
Chairman Jo 11 C.
Stennis, D-Miss., of the
Armed Services Committee
said disclosure could give
U.S. adversaries, present
and future, "the working
tools to blueprint to a de-
gree United States intelli-
gence activity."
"WE MIGHT AS WELL
abolish the agency," he
said.
JULY 1974
The only blatantly sexist
66 recruiting practices I y9
found were in the CIA i
Currently I am a candidate for a
Ph.D. in Economics. During the past
few months I have been in contact
with private, academic, and govern-
ment organizations concerning open-
ings for economists. Since the federal
government has been forcing affirma-
tive action programs on various or-
ganiz4tions, I found it ironic that the
only blatantly sexist recruiting prac-
tices 1 found were in a government
organization, the Central Intelligence
Agency.
During an interview with a repre-
sentative of the CIA's personnel of-
fice, I was informed by the inter-
viewer that "they" were worried
about me, since they assumed that
my career was secondary to my hus'-
band's and they did not want to spend
money processing my application if
all of my current and future employ-
ment decisions would be dependent
on my husband's job. When I tried
to explain that my husband and I
both felt that my profession was the
more specialized and that I would
find a job,f .rst, and he would look for
a job in that geographic area, the
interviewer made the snide remark,
"famous last words."
Since the job of research econo-
mist consisted partly in becoming an
expert on various economic problems
all over the world, I thought it only
reasonable that travel to those parts
of the world would be included in,
the job. When I asked about the pos-
sibilities of travel, I was given a&.
extensive lecture on how dangerous;
rt.,. v.-,,.-ld war and how they cout
Chairman John L. McCel-
Ian, D-Ark., of the Appro-
priations Committee, said
disclosure of the intelli-
gence budget total would
lead to demands for, expla-
nations and details.
"If you end all the igno-
rance, you end national se-
.curity," he asserted.
The Senate adopted by
not allow a young woman with famih. '
responsibilities (a son and a hus-?
band) to travel away from home_
When I asked if a young man witit-
a wife and son would be allowed to
travel, the interviewer answered,
"We don't send young mothers to
Uganda." Thus the interview ended.
The next step in the CIA's recruit=
ing process consists of a three-and-a-
half-hour battery of tests. The first
two and a half hours consisted of
sta ndardired: verbal and mathemati-
call aha'ade 'c-us. The last hour was:
devoted to a ve:ational a,,titude and,
preference test which was supposedly'
designed to determine the fitness of
the candidate for a long-term careen
with the CIA. When the test was;
handed out, I was shocked to see that `
men and women were receiving dif
ferent tests-those for men had a
blue cover; for women, a pink-cove'!
I was asked : -Do you prefer hcusse-
hold magazines or fashion maga-
zines " "Would you rather he the
wife of a research scientist or the wife
of a rancher %" . "Would you rather
spend a lot of time putting on makeup
or go out without, makeup :" "Would
you rather cook or sew a, dress I
failed to see how these questions were
relevant or useful in determining my
suitability as a research ecotiotnist.
Needless to say, I do nit intend to
pursue my employment opt) rtunities.
with the CIA. I only hope hat in the .
future all government-