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? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA,RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 CONFIDENTIAL 25X1A NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES INTERNAL USE ONLY This publication contains clippings from the domestic and foreign press for YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use of selected items would rarely be advisable. No. 17 4 November 1974 GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 1 GENERAL 28 WESTERN EUROPE 29 NEAR EAST 31 FAR EAST 33 WESTERN HEMISPHERE 41 Destroy after backgrounder has served its purpose or within 60 days. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 NEW YORK TIMES 1 NOVEMBER 1974 The Value Of the ? C? I? A? By Ray S. Cline ? WASHINGTON?The surge of senti- mental piety and outrage over the public disclosure that the Central In- telligence Agency had attempted to ? influence the Course of political events in Chile in the nineteen-seventies has? 'shed' more heat than light. All great countries attempt to influ- ence events in other countries when: these events affect . their interests: ' Other nations try to influence our domestic politics; the Soviet Union and China have a well-defined and widely-known philosophy of attempt- ing to promote violent social and po- litical revolution in all non-Communist countries. The C.I.A. did not invent covert political-action programs?that is, ac- tion to influence political events abroad without the Government's official hand showing. It was Soviet efforts to intervene through local Communist parties and large-scale infusion of money into Western Europe that first led to a C.I.A. counter-effort. President Truman took this step on the advice of very competent and pa- triotic men, particularly Gen. George C. Marshall and Defense Secretary James V. Forrestal. This happened in 1948, a crucial year, especially for the future of Eu-- rope. The Soviet occupation of Czecho- slovakia and the Berlin blockade frightened most Americans then. Fear of Soviet domination of most of Europe led to the Marshall Plan and creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The same fear led to the decision In favor of secret efforts to assist moderate, center and center-left po- litical leaders re-establish a multiparty parliamentary system in Italy and in other nations threatened by strong local Communist movements supported by Moscow. NEW YORK TIMES 20 October 1974 PRESS GROUP ASSAILS' C.I.A. ROLE IN CHILE CARACAS, Venezuela, Oct. 19 (UPI)?The Inter-American Press Association yesterday con- demned the United States Cen- tral Intelligence Agency's fin- ancing of Chilean newspapers opposed to the leftist govern- ment of the late Salvador Al- lende Goseens and urged Presi- dent Ford to identify the re- Thus, American funds were made available to democratic political parties and the democratic press. Because the Europeans were determined to avoid one-party dictatorship and Soviet domination, they accepted this covert aid; using it to their advantage, and ours. ? - The C.I.A. did not act on its own. It has never initiated such covert programs without approval of appro-- priate authorities acting on the Presi- dent's behalf or on direct instructions from the Presidant himself. The authority for such decision-mak- ing is the National Security Council, set up in 1947 to deal with military and political considerations in Ameri- can strategic and foreign policies. The C.I.A. is purely an instrument of pol- icy. To belabor it for carrying out covert-action programs is pointless. The tendency to blame the CIA.. for failed programs when they are pub- licized is dangerous because the effect on the public and on Congressmen who vote for C.I.A. funds is to discredit the country's whole intelligence organiza- tion. The best term for this organization is "intelligence community" because it is a coordinated group of agencies in the State, Defense and other depart- ments as well as in the C.I.A. Most of the agencies' work involves collec- tion, evaluation, analysis and report- ing of intelligence. The entire intel- ligeece community's total effort devoted to covert political actions of any kind in recent years has been between one and 2 per cent of the total program. This level is falling. There are no political-action programs under way .now. It would be a shame if a furor- over the Chilean operation caused the C.I.A. to be so damaged in public and Congressional esteem that it can- not carry on its absolutely indispensa- ble work on behalf of our safety. The Chilean program, whether well- advised or not, was focused on furnishing money needed to keep the opposition news media alive so that groups whose activities are consid- ered compatible with United States interests would continue to be heard despite efforts to silence them. It also provieied campaign funds to center parties, mainly the Christian Demo- crats. The money spent in Chile, and other places, was spent to keep op cipients of the moneY. 1 The action on the final day of the association's 30th annual general assembly marked the first time it has criticized the United States in a report of its freedom of the press committee. The five-day convention, at- tended by some 400 United States and Latin American pub- lishers, also condemned the take-over by the Peruvian Gov- ernment of six newspapers- and what it called a lack of press freedom in Brazil and Argen- R000100340004-6- tions before the voters. The principal supporters of Presi- dent Salvador Allende Gossens' ad- ministration intended to establish a dictatorship of the revolutionary left, abolish Congress and neutralize or destroy the entire managerial and middle class. The administration re- ceived aid and credit from Communist countries, Much, of which it did not have time to use, totaling about $600 million. The United States gave about $8 million to the parties fighting to keep Congress and constitutional democratic guarantees alive unti the .1976 election._ . . , I hope the center groups still sur- viving will be able to restore parlia- mentary government. If so, it probably will be done without American help, in view of United States Congressional, and public criticism. . ? Clearly, American covert aid should. 'be given rarely, specifically 'when it will help stabilize a friendly nation's politics by keeping constitutional government alive. . Perhaps the effort in Chile was a mistake. It certainly did not succeed. Everyone is entitled to his own view 'of whether Americans will ever again want, or be able, to conduct covert political action to support like-minded people abroad when our help would make a crucial difference in their survival. I suspect that in the troubled world situation ahead the responsible consensus will again favor it just as in 1948. ? ' . I think we should not be obsessed , with piety but instead should think earnestly of every way possible short of total war to insure that our society and political structures and alliances with like-minded peoples will continue to flourish in the face of a threatening international economic and political - environment. Ray S. Cline, executive (Erector of studies at The Center for Strategic and International Studies. Georgetown University, was from 196.9 to 1973 director of the State Department's bureau of intelligence and research. Re participated in department delib- erations on issues involving Chile be- fore the 40 Committee, the high-level intelligence board that reviews the Government's covert activities. tine. The C.I.A. payments made during the administration of Dr. Allende, who died during a right-wing military coup 13 months ago,. became known last month. ? The press organization elect- ed Julio de Mesquite Neto, pub- usher of 0 Estado de Sao Paulo of Brazil, as its president, suce" ceeding Robert U. Brown of Editor and Publisher, a New :York-based trade magazine. 1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 NEW YORK TIMES 16 October 1974 Foreign Companies Aided Anti-Allende By JONATHAN KANDELL Special to The New York Times SANTIAGO, Chile ? The widespread strikes that set the stage for the military coup that overthrew the late President Salvador Allende Gossens were partly financed by funds pro- vided by companies based in Mexico, Venezuela and Peru, according to leading Chilean businessmen. . The businessmen, ranking members of the SOFOFA, the most important industrial asso- ciation in 'Chile, said that they had personally channeled these funds?amounting to $200,000 ?to striking truck owners, shopkeepers and professional groups in the weeks preceding the fall of the Allende Govern- menton Sept: 11, 1973. They said that a company called Protexa, based in Mon- terrey, Mexico, contributed $100,000 to the anti-Allende campaign and Grupo Mendoza of Caracas, Venezuela, $50,000. Money From the C.I.A. The businessmen said that a Peruvian concern, which they declined to identify, gave close to $50,000 to help finance the Chilean strikes. It was disclosed in September that the United States Central Intelligence Agency had secret- ly financed unions and trade groups for more than 18 months befOre? President. Al- lende was overthrown. More than half of the $8-million au- thorized for clandestine C.I.A. activities in Chile was used to provide benefits for anti-Al- lende strikers in 1972 and 1973, according to United States In- telligence sources. How the funds were chan- neled to Allende opponents was not disclosed. The Chilean busi- ness sources did not link the money they received to the C.I.A. "I would have no way of knowing whether. those funds were indirectly from the C.I.A. or whether those companies were merely sympathetic to our cause as they claimed they were," said one businessman. "We did not 'ask any ques- tions," he added. "We had a very tough time collecting funds both here and abroad be- cause people were giving up hope that things could change in Chile." "All these stories that money was pouring into Chile to fight Allende," said another busi- nessman. "They were just not true. It was not that easy." The sources described a half- dozen fruitless fund - raising trips through Latin America, Europe and the United States. "Most of the time, we were promised money and it never came" said a former SOFOFA member. "The Europeans espe- cially madelools of us." The sonrces said that the mo- ney from the Mexican, Vene- zuelan and Peruvian companies ,suddenly started to arrive dur- ing the first half of 1973 in time ,to help finance the anti-Allende , strikes that began in July of Strikers, Chileans Sa that year. Protexa, the Mexico-based concern, was founded in 19451 as a small manufacturer of waterproofing material for roofing. It has grown rapidly and now owns at least eight Mexican companies, and has: eight affiliates abroad, includ- ing Asfaltos Chilenbs Protexa, with offices in Santiago. According to business sour- ces, Protexa was not expro- priated or seized by workers during the Allende years when hundreds of foreign and Chilean companies came under government control. The Grupo Mendoza, one of the largest Venezuelan business groups, is involved in machine- ry imports, cement and paper production and other activities. Chilean sources said they did not know of any affiliate here of the concern. ? ' SOFOFA officials said the money was distributed to strik- ers weekly in July, August and September of 1973. The dollars were converted on the black market at up to 500 per cent the official exchange rate. "We were giving the truckers about $2,000 a week," said one 'businessman, adding that he believed the truck owners also received support from other fi- nancial sources. Le6n Vilarin, the -president of the Truck Owners Association, has been traveling in Europe. Previously he has asserted that the truck- ers depended on their own fi- nancial resources dur?ng the strik. Other ranking Members of the Truck Owners. Association could not be reached or com- ment. Firm Foes of Allende The truck owners ? about 40,000 controlling some 70,001), vehicles?were the stanchest opponents of . the Allende Government during its waning months. Their 50-day strike crippled this country's econo- my, which depends far more heavily on trucks than on the state-owned railways for the movement of goods. The truck owners' hostility was due to the Marxist coali- tion Government's efforts to create a parallel, state-owned trucking group. Mr. Vilarin, a former Socialist party member, liked to surprise critics by pointing out that he was once an Allende supporter. Even af- ter the coup, he kept a large photograph in his office show- ing the late President embrac- ing him. The opposition to Dr. Allende was broadly divided into those who sought a military coup with an end to civilian politics and those who wanted to tem- per the President's socialist pol- icies and defeat his coalition through elections in 1976. The C.I.A. helped finance both groups even when they. were in bitter disagreement with each other. Although de- fenders of C.I.A. intervention in Chile, including President Ford, have asserted that the goat of the agency was to maintain de- mocratic -political parties and! other institutions, its rule of thumb apparently was to throw ;its weight behind the strongest 'source of opposition to the Al- ,lende Government. At times, this meant' support- ing strikers intent on overthrow- ing the Government and at oth- er dines it meant heavy finan- cial contributions to anti-Al- lende candidates when legisla- tive elections were considered the best method of overturning: Dr. Allende. Some Were Annoyed -In interviews, left-wing mem- bers of the Christian Democra- tic party, which received heavy financial support from the C.I.A., recalled with annoyance the agency's support of a 26 day work stoppage by truck owners,- profeesionals and busi- nessmen that failed to over- throw Dr. Allende in October, 1972. At that time, a left-wing, member, Ren?uentealba, was the party's secretary general.! He called a party meeting with Mr. Valarin to tr yto get the truckers and other strikers to moderate their demands. ? "We asked Vilarfn who was funding the strike" said a rank- ing Christian Democrat who 'participated in the meeting. "All he said was that he wanted to bring down Allende. We told him that we were willing to back the strikers' legitimate economic ? grievances, but that we would not go along with a coup." The October, 1972, strike ended when Dr. Allende, -backed by moderate Christian Democrats, persuaded military leaders to join his Cabinet. Al- lende opponents thought the military officers would put a brake on the Government's so- cialist program while both sides geared up for the March, 1973, legislative elections. The C.I.A. contributed $1.5- million to opposition candi- dates who banked heavily on gaining a two-thirds 'legislative majority that would have en- abled them to remove Dr. Al- lende by impeachment: Although the opposition par- ties maintained solid majorities in Congress,. the Marxist coali- tion received a surprising 43.4 per cent of the. popular vote, ,compared with 36 per cent re- ceived when Dr. Allende was voted into office in 1970, and picked up two Senate seats and six seats in the Chamber of De- puties. According to informed sour- ces, the C.I.A., which had cor- rectly predicted an Allende vic- tory in 1970, underestimated Allende support in the 1973 le-. gislative elections, predicting less than a 40 per cent vote for the Marxist coalition. The disclosure of C.I.A. aid to anti-Allende groups has caused relatively little impact in Chile. Few Chileans, even leftists, be- lieve that the C.I.A. itself could have provoked the coup or ac- counted for the widespread 'dis- content with the Allende Government. Most Chileans assumed all along that the agency was in- volved in the country's politics along with intelligence groups from Communist countries. As long as we could main- tain our political independence, we would have taken money from the C.I.A., the Russians or anybody,", said Gabriel Caceres, a leading fund raiser for the PIR, a small party .that broke away from the Allende. coali- tion. "We didn't because it was not offered." ? El Mercurio, theleadinA anti- Allende newspaper, which is reported to have receivd finan- cial backing from th?C.I.A., has published news of the disclo- sure in detail. 'Such Incredible Cheapness' In editorials, the newspaper. has asserted that the disclosure "undoubtedly has Communist inspiration, , which blows through the minds of liberals in the Country to the north." The newspaper added that,, if anything, the C.I.A. was f"miserly." "Spending $10-mil- lion for the fall of ,Allende," stated a recent Mercurio editor- ial. "have you ever seen such .incredible cheapness?" Among Christain Democrats, the main concern over the dis- closures appears to be the ef- fect they might have in reduc- ing financial contributions to the party from Christian Demo- cratic sources in West Germa- ny. Spokesmen for the military junta have responded to the charges of C.I.A. interference by suggesting that the issue is basically an internal United States matter. The junta,-which has strongly rejected a return to civilian politics, has also sought to dismiss the charges as evidence of the corruptness of the 'political party system be- fore the coup. ? "Nobody has suggested that C.I.A. bought off military offi- cers," said Federico Willough- by, a ranking Government offi- cial. "AS far as we are con- cerned, this was all a symptom of the political decomposition in the country before the mili- tary junta took power." ? Mexicans Deny Involvement S.pec:a1 tf, The Ntmv Yrq-k Times i MEXICO CITY, Oct. I5?Al- Fredo Molina, executive vicei I president of Protexa, said yes- terday that it. was "absolutely' false" that the company helped finance the anti-Allende strikes., "At no moment did we have any contact with the strike; movement," he said in a tele- phone interview from his of- fice in Monterrey. "Nor were we ever asked. We had a policy cf not interfering in Chilean politics in any way." Mr. Molina sail that Pro. texas Chilean affiliaie was "symbolically" taken ovee by Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010034000476 WASHINGTON POST 12 October 1974 Tom Braden Decision-Making and 'Covert Operations' This town is disturbed about what the CIA did in Chile and is asking itself where to place the blame and how to prevent something similar from happening again. ? Some people?Sen. James Abourezk. (D-S.D.), for example?are saying that so long as you- haVe covert operators ready to operate somebody is going to approve a plan to use them, and that the best way to avoid future mis- adventures is to abolish the jobs of th operators and forbid the hiring of-any more. ? On the other hand, Sens. Howard Baker (R-Tenn.) and Lowell Weicker (R-Conn.) think they can envision occasions when covert operations might be essential to the survival of the nation. What went wrong in the Chilean affair, they say, is that Secre- tary of State Henry Kissinger approved a plan which was not only not essential to the survival of the nation but not even conducive to the nation's good. They have introduced a bill to give Congress an official oversight function on covert operations. But they are not very clear as to whether Congress should approve the operations in advance or merely be told -about them after they are under way. 'P-'. The ambiguity points up the weak- WASHINGTON POST-PARADE 27 October 1974 ?mess of their, arguments. If Congress knows officially about operations in -advance, Congress is responsible for a lot of dirty business, and no repre- sentative or senator wants to be so responsible. On the other hand.- if Congress were merely told about. covert operations after the fact,' what good would that do? There's a third aspect to the argu- ment, and it is put forward by Sen. Frank Church (D-Ida.). Church spent a lot qf time last year investigating an earlier CIA effort in Chile ? the campaign to defeat Salvador Allende at the polls. Obviously, he didn't probe deeply enoitgh. At the same time he was getting testimony 'about a 1970 operation, the CIA was off on another one. What irritates Church even more is that Henry Kissinger, whom he regarded as a friend, was 'a great deal less than candid with him when Church asked him questions about the downfall of Allende. Kissinger kept repeating he knew nothing of the coup?without saying he knew a good .4.ea1 about what brought about the coup. He also told Church that the CIA intervention Was limited to paying newspapers and ra- Q. Recently I attended a conference on the CIA in Washington, D.C., where I heard a professor from Vanderbilt University?I believe his name was Ran- som?cite an exchange of letters between Adm. Sidney Souers, first temporary director of the CIA, . and President Truman, who founded the CIA. Both were disillusioned with the agency. Can you fill me in on the details??David Marks, Washington, D.C. A. On Dec. 27, 1963, Admiral Souers, then chairman of the board of the General American Life Insurance Co. in St. Louis, wrote Truman a letter in which he :!ted: "...Allen Dulles caused the CIA to wander far from the original goal established by you, and it is certainly a different animal than I tried to set up for you. "It would seem that its principal effort was to cause revolutions in smaller countries around the the "Marxist union" about six imonths before the coup but Ithat "in practice we continued ,to administer the factory and after the coup everything-con- tinued quite normally.' sneciai to The New York Times CARACAS, Venevuela, Oct. 15? A spokesman for Grupo Mendoza today denied "em- phatically" making any con- tribution to the campaign to overthrow President Allende. Approved For Release. dio stations which Allende was trying to put out of business. Church took him at his word and then discovered that the CIA had also paid for the truck strike which para- lyzed the Chilean government and led ' directly to the death of Allende. . What disturbs Church is the lack of trust as well as the lack-of judgment.. He's even willing to finesse the judg-` ment. Perhaps, he says, Kissinger had reasons for the operation which are not now clear. But if so, why not ex-' plain plain them to key members of the Foreign Relations Committee? Why dissemble to the very people who are trying to help him with detente and- - in the Mideast? ? . Right after World War II, this coun-* try was asking itself whether a demo- cracy could engage in covert opera- tions. Experience since then seems to demonstrate that it can but only at the tremendous risk of judgment and gov- ernment by the few. Chile is another example of that risk. ':The question people are asking now is whether the decision-making group can be enlarged, the judgment made more responsible and the risks mini- mized. CII1974. Los Angeles Times globe. "As bad as that was, it was worse to try to conduct a 'war' invading Cuba with a handful of men and without air cover. The campaign had been designed and carried out by Mr. [Richard M.) Bissell who was on my staff in the N.S.C. (National Security Council). He had been a professor at Harvard and wrote good staff papers, but he had little or no experience in practical warfare. As a matter of fact, it is my under- standing that he has never worn a uniform. "With so much emphasis on operations, it would, not surprise me to find that-the matter of collecting and processing intelligence has suffered some." In reply, Truman on Jan. 17, 1964, wrote Souers: "Thanks for yours of December 27. I more than appreciated it, and I am as happy as I can be that my article on the Central Intelligence Agency rang a bell with you because you know exactly why the organi- zation was set up?it was set up so the President would know what was going on...." CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 31 October 1974 Argentine Senate blasts interference by U.S. CIA By the Associated Press Buenos Aires The -Argentine Senate has con- demned interference in the affairs of other nations by the United States Central Intelligence Agency and sim- WifigattiMA-RDP77-00432R0001003400,94-6 Approved For Release 2001/08/08.: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 NEW YORK TIMES 20 October 1974 C LA.Said to Have AskedFunds forChile By SEYMOUR M. HERSH Special to The New York Times ? than S50,000 was actually spent because of the coup d'etat in Chile the next month. Mr. Eagleburger's intention in ? briefing Mr. Schorr, the sources said, was to rebuff off-the- record statements made to the ,newsman earlier by Ray, S. ;Cline, the former director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence. Mr. Cline par- ticipated in 40 Committee de- .liberations on Chile from 1970 to 1973 and has recently criti- cized Mr. Kissinger's role at ? those Meetings. The disclosure of the docu- ments took place less than a week after Mr. Kissinger, through his spokesman, had publicly called such leaks "a disgrace to the Foreign Serv- ice" and dangerous to national security. One of -the 1970 documents shown to Mr. Schorr included the name of a Chilean Govern- . . ment official who served as a' conduit for C.I.A. views and also apparently helped relay funds to anti-Allende forces. Such information traditionally has been among the most close- ly guarded government secrets. A number of persons familiar with State Department opera.' tions expressed doubt that Mr. Eagleburger would have shown Mr. Schorr such documents without the direct ;or indirect concurrence of the Secretary of State. Mr. Eagleburger has- denied showing Mr. Schorr any docu- ments and insisted that he had personally made the decision to brief Mr. Schorr. "I did not, show any documents, cables, letters or memoranda to any- body," he said. "I did not describe any of the particular events that were being argued about. All I . provided was a general broad statement {deal- ing with Mr. Cline's- role]." "Henry's role was only to ask me to do a check of the files," Mr. Eagleburger. said. "It was me, on my own, who told some people what the files said." Mr: Schorr has made no public use of the materials; reportedly supplied by Mr. i Eagleburger and in a telephone' interview refused to discuss; the issue, adding: "I don't: know what you are talkingi about." I The first word of Mr. Eagle- burger's action came indirectly1 from State Department officials' who learned that. a search had: been made of the department's! I special vault containging its 40 Committee documents. In a telephone interview yes- terday, Mr. Eagleburger ac- knowledged that Mr. Kissinger had authorized file searches both of the National Security Council minutes in the White House and of the 40 Committee documents stored in the State ;Department in an effort "to see whether we &mid come up with something that would indicate whet her those l M r. Cline's] statements were correct." As Mr. Eagleburger described it, the file searches began short- WASHINGTON, Oct. 20?The Central Intelligence Agency . sought to finance an extreme right-wing opposition group in !Chile six weeks before the over- !throw of. President Salvadore 'Allende Gossens in September,. _1973, highly reliable sources: 'said today. .The sources said that the first Word of the C.I.A.'s. at- tempt to become involved with; the, extremist group became! known two weeks ago when al ,-close aide to Secretary of State' Kissinger leaked. documents in: an effort to discredit a former high .Nixon Administration in- telligence official who was, known to be privately critical of Mr. Kissinger's role in Chile., .The documents, although in? tended to show that there was a. consensus inside the Admin-. ? istratiOn over the clandestine C.I.A. operations in, Chile, have instead .raised new questions 'about the _extent of the secret United 'States involvement ;in the overthrow of Dr. Allende. The sources said that Law- rence S. Eagleburger, Mr. Kiss- inger's executive assistant,, leaked three summaries of :pro-' posals for clandestine C.I.A. operations in Chile during a briefing for the CBS television newsman Daniel Schorr. The documents had been prepared for 'meetings in 1970 and -1973i of the 40 Committee. the high? level intelligence board that re- views covert activities for the United States Government. A Reactionary Group The 1973 document, sources; said, ;showed- that as late as July 5. 1973. the C.I.A. recom- mended to the 40 Committee; that -$200,000 be -provided clan.: destinely to the National party in Chile, a conservative group that had urged Chileans to re- ject?with violence if neces- sary?the Allende Administra- tion as "illegitimate" and "un- constitutional." The Nationa lparty was con- sidered to represent the views of the propertied class in Chile and, in the year before the overthrew of Dr. Allende, was known to have close ties to Patria y Libertad, a reactionary group that openly boasted of its involvement in military ef- forts to overthrow the Allende Government. Since the first published dis- closures last month of the C.LA. operations in Chile, knowledge- able Ford Administration . offi 'cials have mainted that the ;main goal was to enable mod- I erate political factors to sur- vive the Allende period: . Whether the 40 Commit- tee specifically .approved the proposed funds for the National! party could not be learned, but William E. Colby, the C.I.A. director, told a House intelli-1 gence subcommit tee Periled ;Mk year that $1-million was authorized in August, 1973, for use in Chile. Mr. Colby further testified, however, that less Rightists in '73 ly after Mr. Kissinger learned! that Mr. Cline, who retired last! year, "had made some state- ments about his opposition to a number of activities in Chile and Henry and Nixon had over- ruled him and the State Depart- ment." "It is true," Mr. Eagleburger added, "that I have told some people who asked about it that the documents made available demonstrated the opposite of what Cline said." ? "I guess that I have ,.t) say that a chec kof the fil:s showed nothing to support the conten- tion that Mr. Cline registered any opposition to proposals that had gone to the 40 Com- mittee on Chile," he added. "In ? fact, those files demonstrated the opposite." In an interview with The New York Times published Thursday, Mr. Cline said that the impetus for the Chile pro- grams had come from either Mr. Kissinger or President Nixon, or both. Mr. Cline also confirmed that the C.I.A.'s ac- tivities in Chile included the financial support of strikes by shopkeepers and truckers. President Ford and Mr. Kis- singer have said that the C.I.A. !funding in Chile was limited to lopposition- newspapers and pol- iticians. Told of Mr. Eagleburger's efforts to contradict his views, Mr. Cline said that he was "un- willing to comment on the staff papers prepared for 40 Committee meetings." "No one should discuss in- ternal papers of such impor- tance," he added. Mr. Cline, who served with the C.I.A. for more than 20 years before becoming the head of State Department in- telligence, is now executive di- rector of the Georgetown University School of Strategic Studies, The Three Documents 1 The three documents des- cribed by Mr. Eagleburger dealt' with the State Department's comments on C.I.A. proposals! to be discussed at 40 commit- tee meetings. According to reliable sources, i Mr. Cline, as director of in- telligence, could make addition-' al recommendations or com- ments on the documents, which were to be forwarded to the Undersecretary for Political Af- fairs, the official who tradi-, be tionally represented State on the 40 Committee. The first document, the sources said, was dated Aug. 31, 1970, and dealt with the C.I.A. recommendations in. case the pending Chilean presiden- tial elections resulted in a run- off involving Dr. Allende. Three proposals, or options, for investing money in amounts ranging from $350,000 to $900,- 000 were reported discussed, with the State Department urg- ing limited funds or no funds at all for covert activities. Mr. Cline, in a handwritten com- ment, called for major financial - support for anti-Allende forces if it could "make a differente" between victory or defeat- for. Dr. Allende, the source said: A second document, dated Sept. 4, 1970, the day Dr. Allende barely won the Chilean election, reportedly discussed a C.I.A. proposal for bribing members of the Chilean Con- gress, which, under that coun- try's Constitution, would have to ratify the election and thus ultimately choose the President. Wymberly Coerr, then thd State Department's coordinator for 40 Committee staff recom- mendations, urged that Trio ,program involving what he termed "subornation" be initi- ated, according to the sources. Mr. Cline, in another -hand- Written comment, reportedly depicted Mr. Coerr? as being "hung up" ? on the emotional overtones of the word suborna- tion. "In the world of realpoli- tik," Mr. Cline is said to have written such activities do take _place. . Spending Authorized ' The 40 Committee eventually recommended that $350,000 be spent in an attempt to bribe the Congress, which voted nonetheless in October to ratify Dr. Allende as President. The third document, dated July 25, 1973, was said to have been forwarded to William Porter, then the Under Secre- tary for Political Affairs,"by Jack B. Kubisch, then the As- sistant Secretary for State for Inter - American Affairs. The document reportedly discussed C.I.A. proposals for clandes- tine financing of the anti-Al- lende political parties, includ- ing a specific recommendation that $350,000 be given to the Christian Democrats and an- . other suggestion that $200,000 be given to the National party. Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 Approved For Release 2001/98/08 : CIA:RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 NEW YORK TIMES 17 October 1974 '-DOUBT ON U.S. ROLE IN CHILE RECALLED. ; Ex-Intelligence Aide Asserts, C.I.A. and State Dept. 'Went, Along' With Nixon Plan ' By SEYMOUR M. HERSH special to The New York Times WASHINGTON, Oct. 16?Ray S. Cline, a former high-level intelligence official in the Nixon Administration, said to- day that he was dubious about the ultimate wisdom of the Ad- ministration's covert interven- tion against President Salvador Allende Gossens of Chile but that he supported it because he feared more serious inter- vention by the Soviet Union. Mr. Cline, who was inter- viewed by telephone, is the first high official to permit his name to be used in confirming published reports that the role of the Central Intelligence Agency in the effort to oust the Marxist Government included the direct financing of a num- ber of anti-Allende trade groups and labor unions, including truckers. Despite warnings about the Allende Government's inten- tions relayed in the intelligence reports, he said, many high of- ficials did not believe that clan- destine operations would ac- complish the "goal in mind"? to keep a center coalition alive until 1976. "State and the, C.I.A. were dubious - but naturally went along," Mr. Cline said, because the White House?either Nixon and Dr. Kissinger, or both? decided the push the program." "They key role in this whole thing was in the White House," he added, "but it's impossible to tell whether only one or both were enthusiastic about it because the orders came through Kissinger and the 40 Committee. It was a National Security Council decision and not a decision made by the C.I.A. or the State Depart- ment." 'Resistance Strikes' "Some of the money was in- tended for financial support of the small businessmen and the truckers in their resistance strikes against the Allende Government," Mr. Cline said. "I think it was very logical to en- 'able those groups to keep alive economically so that we could maintain a core of private entrepreneurs until the .1976 elections." Disclosed by C.I.A. Chief The extensive C.I.A. role in Chile became known Sept. 8 When it was reported that the Agency's directar, William E. :Colby, had told a Congressional Committee that $8-million in .clandestine funds, was author- -ized for operations against the . Allende Government between -1970 and 1973. Dr. Allende died a military coup that over threw his Government in Sep- , tember, 1973. ? Mr. Cline served as director' ;of. the State Department's Bu- reau of Intelligence and Was. directly involved in much of the planning and discussions: .that went on in the 40 Com-I -mittee, the top-level intelligence board that oversees all covert ,operations of the intelligence agency. Before joining the State Department, from which he re- -tired last year, Mr. Cline served :more than 20 years with the -agency, eventually becoming :its- deputy director for intelli- -gence. His account of the assistance .? ,ito labor groups flatly contra- dicts both the public and pri- >Nate descriptions of the C.I.A. iale presented by President Ford and Secretary of State -.Kissinger. At a televised news confer- ence on Sept. 16, Mr. Ford said :that Dr. Allende had been at- tempting to suppress opposi- , tion newspapers and politicians. He added that the "effort that was made in this case was to help and assist the preservation of opposition newspapers and electronic media and to pre- Serve opposition political_ par- .:ties." " Program Termed Broader In the interview, however, Mr. Cline said the program? as approved by the 40 Commit- tee, he noted?was far broader. "What the C.I.A. was trying to do," he said, "was to see that .at least 50 per cent and proba- bly 60 per cent of the electorate ,would be disillusioned by the time. of the presidential elec lions in 1976" ? when, under the Constitution, Dr. Allende could not run again - "Well," the former State De- partment official added, "by .1973 they were totally disil- lusioned with him." Mr. Cline was alluding to the protests and strikes in the last months of the Allende Government. "I decided to speak out be- cause I feel that there's such a superficial understanding as to why the United States has tried to assist democratic po- litical organizations abroad," Mr. Cline asserted. "I'm not happy about the', way I can defend them because! think our strategy was not unreasonable or immoral. It was our duty to preserve insti- tutions which we call free" He explained that the ulti- mate goal of the clandestine: activities was to enable the I center coalition factions of the Christian Democratic party to survive the Allende period., 4`And," he said, "I think 'the I renter groups did survive, as they might not have under a prolonged Allende Commonist ? BALTIMORE SUN 15 October 1974 CI A rivals Cuba on , By RICHARD O'MARA Rio de Janeiro Bureau of The Sun Rio de Janeiro?Central In- telligence Agency skulduggery in' Latin America is expected to preoccupy, the foreign minis- ters 'at next month's meeting Latin America: The overthrow of the Organization of Amen- of President Jacob Arbenz of can States at least as much as the Cuba question, the issue for which the meeting is being convened. . In fact, the potential for em- barrassment to tile United States at the frthcoming meeting in Quito, Ecuador, is so great that some observers here-suggest that as the real reason Henry A. Kissinger, the Secretary of State, is not likely to attend.. Both Both Cuba and the CIA are sensitive subjects with Ameri- can diplomats and policy-mak- ers in Latin America. The . OAS meeting will be held November 8. The member states will have to vote on whether to end the 10-year economic boycott of Cuba. A majority of the members are expected to approve ending the embargo. According to a report out of Washington published hers yes- terday, Mr. Kissinger, will not attend the Quito conference. A State ? Department spokesman said the secretary's schedule was filled through November. The CIA has become some- thing of an obsession with many Latin American leaders since its subversive, activities against the government of Dr. Salvador Allende of Chile be- came known in early Septem- ber. Sunday, a former foreign minister of Colombia, Alfredo Vasquez CarrIzosa, published an article in a Bogota newSpa- 1 per that blamed the weakness fired the Imaginations of many of the OAS on the CIA. Latin Americans, who before ! Writing in El Espectador, that were not so disposed to 'Mr. Vasquez described the CIA find U.S. spies behind every as "the mysterious arm of the plot and economic bad break. United States." Its interven- These imaginations are ex- tions in the affairs of other pected to be fully alight in countries, he argued, has be- Quito next month, especially if come "an inter-American prob-.Mr. Kissinger is not there. lem." The former Colombian politi- cian recalled the CIA's three most spectacular operations in Guatemala in 1954, the unsuc- cessful invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in 1961, and the Chile operation. Because of these, and other less visible operations. he wrote, the OAS has been con- verted into a "debating aca- demy, a forum for discussion," an organization "without arty real power in hemispheric af- fairs." ? ? The reason, he maintains, is because the Latin American members have tacitly given the United States the right to intervene in their domestic af-- fairs, even though this is in violation of the Charter of. the OAS. The Vasquez article is only the mt,st recent attack against the CIA, and indirectly, against the U.S. government. In late September two Argen- tine- politicians, Rodolfo Uig- gros- and Hector Sandler, attri- buteduch of the terrorism and violence in their country to t`a,,, CIA. Mr. Sandie, a left-wing con- gressman, suet, -isted that the CIA was behind t`ie new right- wing assassinatie.i squad ac- tive in Argentina, the Argen- tine anti-Comrnunist Alliance. Most observe.r,- agree that the revelations. mad:, Wash- ington September 7, ?the Nixon administration had thorized $8 million to subvert', Dr. Allende's government, which was ousted in 1973. has NEW YORK TIMES . 22 October 1974 CORRECTIONS In an article published Thursday, Ray S. Cline, was quoted as saying that trade groups and labor unions in Chile, including truckers, had received direct financing from the Central Intelligence Agency. He actually said they bad benefited indirecily from Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP.77-00402R00a1902491104,76po. 5 Attica! parties. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 Nrw REPUBLIC 28 Sept. 1974 Getting to the Bottom. Of the CIA Cover-up Tad Szulc, in his article that follows, writes about Cen- tral Intelligence Agency subversion in Chile and the hiding of it from congressional scrutiny. The judg- ments that led to secret intervention in Chilean politics deserve to be criticized, but at least the CIA was with- in its legal authority.under its charter. That is not the case with CIA's complicity in Watergate "extra-agency activities." The law barring the agency from under- i taking domestic operations was dearly violated. More- over, when former CIA Director Richard Helms gave i misleading and inaccurate answers to questions posed by senators about past CIA assistance to Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt, who worked for the, Nixon White House, he was covering up .possible criminal activity; On May 21, 1973 Helms was recalled from his post as ambassador to Iran and questioned under oath by members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The break-in at the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychi- atrist, Dr. Lewis Fielding, by then had been uncovered, along with information that CIA had given equipment and aid to Hunt who had directed the illegal entry. Helms said he had never heard of Dr. Fielding until the psychiatrist's name appeared in the newspapers. When asked about photographs that had been taken by Hunt with a CIA camera and developed by-the agency, Helms swore, "I do not know what the con- tents of the film were in the latter part of August [1971]." One senator asked if anyone at the agency who . reviewed the film thought Hunt might be contemplat- ing a break-in. "I never heard anybody at the agency mention such a theory," Helms replied and later ad- ded, "nobody had given us the slightest indication that anything underhanded was afoot." Helms was asked why CIA had cut off its assistance to Hunt on August 27, 1971. Twice the former director said it was solely because Hunt's requests had. be- come "too extensive." To support that, he recollected that Hunt asked to have a secretary brought back from Paris and a covert New York telephone and address established for him. Helms never mentioned the photographs and what they appeared to show as the reason for the agency's stopping its aid to Hunt. A review of the House Judiciary Committee material on the Ellsberg break-in and CIA's role indicate Helms', Senate testimony was not the true agency -story. On: July 7, 1971 White House aide John Ehrlichrnan called then CIA Deputy Director Robert Cushman, and ac- cording to Cushman's secretary's notes, said: "I want to alert you that an old acquaintance [of Cushman's], Howard Hunt, has been asked by the President to do some special consultant work on security problems. He may be contacting you sometime in the future for some assistance. Lwanted you to know that he was in fact doing somethings for the President. He is a long- time acquaintance with the people here. He may want some help on computer rims and other things. You should consider he has pretty much carte blanche." Cushman did not know that Ehrlichman's call had ? been prompted by Hunt's then-White House boss Charles Colson. And at the time Cushman could not know that the reason for the call was to pave the way for Hunt to get alisguises, false identity cards, a clan- destine camera and tape recording equipment from the CIA which were to be used for domestic political purpoises. In making this July 1971 request to the agency for "carte blanche" aid to Hunt and wrapping it in vague- ness about "security problem4" Ehrlichman and Colson seemed to- be sure they-iCFolild encounter no CIA demand for proof that Hunt was not violating the agency's charter? and the law?prohibiting domestic operations. Would Cushman have cared? Why were these White House aides either. unaware of the law or not fearful such an illegal request, if identified, would be turned down, or worse, exposed to the public? - gain, another flashback ,-- this time to 1969. Ac- cording to the-House Judiciary Committee's final re- port on the impeachment articles against Richard Nixon: "In 1969, Haldeman and Ehrlichman asked the Central Intelligence Agency to conduct physical sur- veillance of Donald Nixon, the PieSident's brother, who was moving to Las Vegas. Haldeman WaS re- ported-to have feared that Donald Nixon would come into contact with- criminal elements." Thereafter is cited a report by the CIA inspector general and Deputy Director Cushman dated June 29, .1973. Thefl House report goes on to. say that the CIA refused to under- take that mission because it had "no jurisdiction to engage in domestic law enforcement or internal a 0 se- curity activities.. ." So some line was drawn. Sometime after the July 7 Ehrlichrnan call to Cush- man, which was dutifully reported to the CIA staff meeting the next morning, and before July 27, 1971, CIA was asked to prepare a psychological profile of Daniel Ellsberg. The request came from White House aide David Young, who along with Hunt and others were investigating Ellsberg. Young reportedly said that both Henry Kissinger, then running the National Security Council, and Ehrlichrnan wanted CIA to help. Helms' director of security, Howard Osborne, to whom the request was first, made, has stated he initially told Young it would hare to be cleared by Helms, since Ellsbeig was "a United States citizen who was pre- sently involved in a legal sense with the United States government." He.lms approved the project after talk- ing to Young. He told Osborne that nothing was to be sent to the White House "without his personal prior approval." It is interesting that Helms, in later testimony on the matter, said he complained to Young that for the agency to write a profile on an American citize.n was "an imposition," since CIA knew nothing about Ellsberg. Nowhere did Helms complain that the task involved CIA in a domestic matter. Later Helms was to weasel out some language in the law that per- mitted the agency to study problems associated with the security of CIA classified documents. Vi th the profile project approved, FBI documents on Ellsberg and published materials were sent to the CIA employee who handled the job, Dr. Bernard Malloy. Meanwhile Hunt followed up on the July 7 Ehrlich- man call and visited CIA Deputy Director Cushman 6 ApTirOVed For Release 2001708/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 1 - a Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001.00340004-6 y . ape o at meeting relates that Hunt said the equipment was needed because of "a highly sensitive mission by the hite House to visit and elicit Information from an individual whose ideology we aren't entirely sure of.. That "individual" was ? Clifton DeMotte, a man who supposedly had informa- ?tion on the Kennedys. Hunt also said it would be a ? "one time opteration] . . in and out." Cushman did ? not ask if this was a domestic activity, instead he said: 'I don't see why we can't" provide the equip- ment. The next day Hunt .got what he wanted. One week later Hunt called the CIA technician who sup- o plied the first material and asked for a tape recorder and additional, help, including credit cards, a second speech alteration device and a New York address and p telephone number. On August 11 the CIA's first profile on Elisberg was .6 delivered -to the White House, after having been re- s viewed by Helms. Attached to it was a note from CIA Security Director Osborne stipulating: "I know that H you appreciate that however thrs is used, the agency should not become involved." The report disappointed Young and his colleagues at the White House. That same day, Young and Emil Krogh proposed "a covert operation be undertaken to examine" the files of Ellsbera's former s ct-Cati t the technicians began to question the use to which Hunt was putting the equipment. The camera had been used by Hunt and Liddy to clandestinely photo- graph Dr. Fielding's office, inside and outside, in order to prepare for the burclary, Th- photographs were reviewed by CIA technical supervisory person- nel before they were delivered to Hunt. They revealed a shot of a parking space with the name "Dr. Fielding" dearly visible. They also disclosed shots of the office and one .CIA official speculated at the time they were "casing" photographs. Deputy Director Ctishman's ffice was informed. A decision was made to tell Hunt that no more requests for assistance would be honored. According to Gen. Cushman's aide, the CIA technical eople thought the assistance given Hunt "appeared o involve the agency in domestic clandestine opera- ons," a finding confirmed by the CIA general court- el's office. That same day, August 27, Cushman called Ehrlichman at the White House and told him aid to tint was being halted because of those concerns. On September 3, 1971 the break-in-at Dr. Fieldirtg's ffice took place. On October 14 or 15, 1971 the CIA echniciart who had developed the pictures for Hunt was told Gen. Cushman was lunching with Hunt the briefingext day and wanted a complete briefing on what assistance Hunt had been given. The technician in- cluded in the briefing material z:erox copies of the Hunt photographs. What happened at that meeting (if it took place) between. Hunt and Cushman, and why did the CIA deputy-director at that time want to be brought .up to date ox + Hunt's requests? Did the agency figure out that there was a relationship between e Ellsberg profile and the Hunt casing job of Field- ng s office? Was any additional material supplied y CIA on Ellsberg after the Fielding break-in? I've sked that question several places and have no answer. is known that the final CIA profile wept to the White ouse on November 9, 1971 and carried with it a note om Helms stating: "I do wish to underline the point at our involvement in this matter should not be vea/ed any context, formal or informal." Though elms was later to testify he meant the work might flect adversely on the capabilities of the agency, the en who put the study together have said that their ncern was that the "agency's involvement become own and particularly that it might come to light uring any proceeding." Dr. Lewis Fielding. Thus plans were launched for the subsequent break-in, and on the following day Mr. Malloy of CIA met with Young, Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy to discuss the agency .report on Ellsberg. Malloy has recalled that when he was told that Ellsberg had been under the care of a psychiatrist, Dr. Field- ing's name was also given to him. Though Huntaske Malloy to keep his name out of any report on the meet- ing, Malloy responded he could not. The White House aides asked Malloy what additional material he needed.. to expand what had already been done. Malloy, sug- gested data from Elisberg's early life, "from nurses or close relatives...." ? Conversations continued to take place over the nex ? weeks between Malloy and Hunt with the latter pre?s su:ing for a new profile. On August 25, 1971, Hun and Cordon Liddy requested and received additiona disguise material from CIA, along with a. camera con- ce..zied in a tobacco pouch. A day later the CIA tech- ncian who delivered the material was called ? long distance by Hunt and asked to meet him at six am at Dulles Airport to receive the, camera and film ard de- th 1 a It fr th re re CO kn velop them. The film was taken for development but Walter Pincus EDITOR Sc. PUBLISHER 12 October 1974 )11y ? CT;iit Et ..11ereurio of 'Santiago, Chile, has ,1.?;:iod it was the recipient. of CIA funds (1-2&P, Septonlber '28, Page 14)..In a cable to .1.:&13, I:ono Silva, director of El Mer- curio, said: "A pa rlinmentary ? group from the Pemoeratic Party, in its campai;m Cie prose.nt achninistration, not Ile:lit:At-ain using Et MOI.curio fee their pur- ? xvithout any proor, hal Leen one of the nowsl,r,ilers that had i ?F.V.0(1 ?I'?.'sCi?-'t lid CO!!`, th CIA. An c.litor of, cven thattli I have no par- ticipatitot Iii the fit:at:clot af:a!es of the ni:wspaper, I laa-Av that its inc...ine has a normal ?and legal o?rigin, Lizov:a hY an in- ? . volvc,1 and carefully controlle;I!)y I and tax authorities of the country. Not even in our worse ta,.inents of political per::::cat!on, thero any slistrlov of doubt al-at seeP!aatters.." Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : GIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 NEW REPUBLIC * 28 Sept. 1974 Candid but Mistaken about Chile.. IAThere Presidnt by 'Fad. Szulc Gerald Ford's first public pronouncement on a con tro ?versial foreign policy question?secret intervention in Chilean politics prior to last year's bloody coup d'etat ?was as startling in its sweep as it was erroneous on virtually every point of fact. Probably the first .American President to do so publicly, Mr. Ford last week delivered an extraordinary defense of covert intelligence operations abroad, claiming that in this particular case it was "in the best interest of the people of Chile, and certainly in our best interest," and that "our government, like other governments, does take certain actions in the intelligence field to help imple- ment foreign policy and protect national security." By thus advertising the subversion engineered on a continuing basis by the super-secret "40 Committee" of the National Security Council, the President handed the worldwide Communist propaganda mill some of ? the best grist it has had in years. Now for the facts. Mr. Ford stated that the US government "had no involvement in any way whatsoever in the coup it- self." In the strictest sense, this is probably true: the Chilean army needed no further physical help from us to launch the September 11, 1973 revolution and the subsequent terror. Chile's armed forces are equipped mainly with- US materiel, and Our military. advisers worked with the Chileans throughout the Allende period. Likewise between 1970 and 1974, when the US deprived Chile of commercial credit, including credit for vitally needed food imports, it supplied the Chilean armed forces with at least $30 million worth of arms, primarily aircraft,. on credit. A squadron of S-5 jet fighters: was delivered a few. Weeks before the coup ,and more planes were in the pipeline. The regime fell :after jet fighters bombed the presidential palace.-For what it was worth psychologiCally, a US naval task force was. off the shores of Chile the week of the coup in preparation for joint exercises with Chilean war- ships: Most loans to Allende's Chile were refused by the US on the grounds that Chile lacked credit worthi- ness, although this was no bar to military credit sales. What of US assistance. to anti-Allende forces before the coup and before Allende took office? Here is where the President was misinformed, perhaps by Secretary of State Kissingerwho himself is caught in a credibility squeeze on - Until the surfacir. ig of secret Clonessional testimony last April by CIA: -Director William E. Colby, the ad-p. ministatiort had. insisted, as did Kissinger a month after...the coup, that. the US did virtually nothing to damage Allende. C_Olby testified, however, that the CIA spent eight million dollars in Chile between 1970 and 1973 to prevent Allende, in effect, from governing Ford and Frankfurter Q. Mr. President, under what international law do we _ have a right to attempt to destabilize the constitu- tionally elected government of another country? And does the Soviet Union have a similar right to try to destabilize the government-of Canada, for eXample, or the United States? A. I'm not going to pass judgment on whether it's permitted or authorized under international law. It's a recognized fact that historically as well as presently such actions are taken in the best interests of the countries involved. Presidential press conference, Sept. 16, 1974 I remember shocking him [the Judge Advocate General] . . when he came into my room and said, "Frank- furter, I want you to help me. I've just been over to the White House"?this was just after we had seized. the customs house at Vera Cruz (April 19141 "and I'm asked to write a memorandum whether that seizure should be treated as an act of war and what its status is in international law. Will you work with me on that?" I said, "General, I'm going to ask to be excused. I don't have to work on that. I know the answer to that." "You do?" "Yes, I do." "What is the answer?" "It would be an act of war against a great nation; it isn't against a small nation." "I can't give him that." ? "I know you can't, but.that's the answer." from Felix Frankfurter Reminiscences Reynal & Company, C) 1960 by Harlan B. Phillips efficiently. He also said that three million dollars had been expended in 1964 to keep Allende from winning in that election. This is how Mr. Ford explained these -pre-coup activities: "In a period of time, three or four years agp, there was an effort being made by the Allende government to destroy opposition news me- dia, both the writing press as well as the electronic press. And 'to destroy opposition political parties. And the effort that was made in this case was to help and. assist the preservation. of opposition newspapers and electronic media and to preserve opposition political parties. I think this is in the best interest of the people in Chile, and certainly- in our best interest." The President's statement is inconsistent with reality in these respects: 1) The US, through authorizations issued by the 40 Corrunittee, embarked on undercover support of the anti-Allende press and opposition parties nearly four Months before Allende took office. Former CIA Direc- tor Richard Helms te_stified last year that $400,000 was approved for media support in Chile on June. 27, 1970. After Allende won a plurality, but not a majority in Approved Fol. Releate 2001/08/08 : CIA4RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 ApprovedFor Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340.004-6 the elections on September 4, 1970, the US, according to Colby's testimony, invested $350,000 to bribe Chil- ean congressmen to vote against Allende in the run- ? off in the Congress on October 24. So there was no . question of saving opposition parties and press at that time from persecution by Allende.- 2) After Allende became 'President, minority Marxist re-gime, the Unidad Popular, did Precious little to "destroy opposition news media." El Mercurio, the principal anti-Allende newspaper in Santiago, was closed down only once for several days, after publish- ing an. editorial calling, in effect, for insurrection. When its owner, Augustin Edwards, fled Chile im- mediately after Allende took office (Edwards came to the US and became a member of the board of di- rectors of the Pepsi-Cola company, which is headed by Richard Nixon's close friend, Donald Kimball) the new governnient began tax and antitrust litigation against the Edwards empire. While El Mercurio remained the voice of the opposition (it could be read in the waiting room of the Chilean embassy in Washington, along with pro-regime leftist publications), the Edwards family was divested of its bank and other nonpress holdings:A right-wing newspaper, La Tribuna., ran into some trouble after charging in print that Allende had been expelled from medical school for raping a 14- year-old girl. - The Allende regime did refuse to authorize the Catholic university in Concepcion to go on the air with a new radio station. The university thereupon set up a relay from the Catholic .university's station in Santiago. After the regime began jamming these broadcasts, persons believed to be linked to rightist. militant groups blew up the jamming facility. 3) There is no evidence. that Allende was out to ? "destroy opposition political parties," 'unless we are . willing to say that the Nixon administration was out to destroy the Democrats here. The Chilean Senate .and the Chamber of Deputies, both with anti-Allende :.'majorities, functioned until the day of. the coup. Allende resisted pressure from the extreme left of his coalition to call a plebiscite to abolish the existing Congress and replace it with a hand-picked unicam- eral parliament. There were few political prisoners in Chile under Allende_ Today there are over 20,000. If the opposition was not in that much' trouble (Allende failed to win.a majority in the Congress in the 1972 parliamentary elections), the question arises why the CIA. needed eight million dollars to._ preserve- the "best interest- of the Chilean people. Colby, who WASHINGTON POST-PARADE 20 October 19714 Q. Of the men who have been directors of the CM? Adm. Roscoe Hillenkoetter, Gen. Bedell Smith, Allen Dulles, John McCone, Adm. William Raborn, Richard Helms and William Colby?which one in your opin- ion has been the best??GT., Langley,Va. A. William Colby. He is a modest, strong, efficient director whose experience in the intelligence com- munity goes back to 1944. Colby has had visited upon him the sins of his predecessors; many of them almost unforgivable, and under the circumstances, he is more precise in his statements,. told a conference on the CIA. and Covert Actions in Washington, DC earlier this month that all That money.went to Chile to help "our.democratic friends" to survive until 1976, so that they couldthen vote the Marxists:out of office. Addressing..., specialists, Colby knew: better than. .to argue that the. CIA was saving the opposition from destructiOn by-Allende. : ;,- 4) Mr. Ford; asserted that ..the 40 Committee keeps the appropriate congressional committees informed of its plans for covert intrigue. This is not so. The 40 Committee as such has never briefed the ,Congress and, as far as it is known, Kissinger, . who runs the secret group, never confided in congressmen on its be half. There is an oversight authority in four subcom- mittees over the CIA's activities, but these bodies meet seldom and their members rarely ask searching ques- tions. Colby has acknowledged that the congressional subcommittees are told of CIA activities post facto rather than before the fact as Mr. Ford claimed. ? The day after the President spoke, the Senate For- eign Relations Committee voted unanimously to reopen its investigation of the US role in the Chilean events. Its staff. recommended that perjury or con- tempt. citations be considered against formir CIA Director Richard Helms and former senior. CIA and State Department officials for misleading the Senate in earlier testimony. And the senators want to hear again from Kissinger, who heads the 40 Committee. The question I find so puzzling is why Mr. Ford is so misinformed about the history of our involvement in Chile?and about the Chilean situation in 1970- 1973.-- and why the 40 Committee. approved the eight. million dollars: for covert operations, a rather large ? sum to keep ,Chileans newspapers going and "our democratic friends" in pocket money. lf, in the name of democracy, the US was aiding the opposition in Chile against art elected government; was it also aid-? . ing,the press and the opposition under dictatorships ins Brazil, Greece. and Spain or the Soviet Union? It would be interesting to know. Is it helping the new opposition in Chile, where a police state has been constructed by,. the military junta? Kissinger claims that the US must not interfere in the internal affairs of others?even to encourage Soviet dissidents. If the issue was the nationalization by Chile of US foreign investments with inadequate.inderanification or none, why not admit it insiead of sermonizing about the opposition press and parties? WhY doesn't this "open administration" come clean? has carried the burden well. Moreover he has been sensitive to the rising opposition in this country to "a secret government" and has opened the hereto- fore closed CIA window enough to provide the agency with a new image. If he can resist the tempta- tion of introducing new legislation calling for 10- year jail terms and $10,000 fines for anyone writing a book about the CIA, he will retain the admiration and high standing he so richly deserves. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 :9CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 NEW YORK TIMES 23 October 1974 Issues and Debates C.I.A.'s Covert Role.. Should the_ By Dmnp, BINDER er the United. States should saniat to The New York Times have at this phase in ita, his- tory a 16,000-member WASHINGTON, Oct. 22?. intelli- Prompted by new disclosures gence agency, with an esti- of covert operations of the, mated ?annual budget of $750- - United States Central Intelli- Million, functioning. on a ? gence Agency in Chile, a worldwide scale. growing number of Congress-, Adm. inistration men are demanding that such ? ? .agency actions be curtailed or. Point of View stop.ped altogether. ? The. involvement of the Reduced to its most simple , form, as.expounded by Presi- C.I.A. in subverting' foreign dent Ford on Sept. 16, the governments deemed hostile United States is big in the to American interests has be- intelligence field because the come fairly well known over other side?the Communists the years?the buying of vota ?is big in italt is-a logic also ers, the, arming of plotters,? . the .infiltration of labor un-, w applied to the strategic- eapons race. - ions and all the other"black" It wai held justifiable in. arts of ?intelligence. the late nineteen-fifties to ? The catalogue inclUdes; monitor. Soviet Missile deael- C.I.A. activities in Iran, Gua-1 opment with U-2 spy planes, ternala, the Dominican Re-! public, Cuba, Bolivia, Berlin, a practice Nikita S. Khru- Albania, Greece, Italy, the shehey damned in 1960 when Congo, Indonesia and 'Indo-1 a U-2 was shot down over china. ` the Soviet Union. Now both. Covert operations of the sides maintain sirhilar sur- Chile type have a long his- veillance with apy satellites, tory, dating, from the very inception of the "central in- and the United States holds telligence group" on Jan. 22,a its efforts doubly justified. 1946, under President Harry In the Chile-. situation, a S. Truman. Within a short justification by United States time American agents were intelligence officials was that buying up Italian parliarnen- the . Communist powers, tary deputies by the dozen notably the Soviet Union and and using secret funds to Cuba, invested a great deal in help Italian ? conservative men and material in Chile on. forces stop the Communist behalf of theAllende Govern= influence in trade unions. The justification then, and ment. The President said: "Our almost always thereafter was Government, like other gov- to halt the spread of Com- ermnents, does take certain ? munism and support free in- -stitutions. , actions in the intelligence What made the case of field to help implement for- Chile different? eign policy and protect na- tional security. . .Background ? The clincher followed: "T am reliably informed that When the highest Adminis- Communist Mations spend tration officials, includingSec- vastly -more money than we retary of State-Kissinger, de- do for the same kind of pura clared flatly last .year that poses." the United States was not Mr. Colby, with wide ex-` involved in the Military coup perience in intelligence, ap- that overthrew President plies a sophisticated line of Salvador Allende Gossens argument. In the year since of Chile, Senators and Rep- he became director of intelli- resentativeS took them at gence, he has told newsmen. their word. on and off the record ? Now. in light of new dis- and public audiences that closures from secret testi- properly conceived intelli- molly by William E. Colby, gence operations constitute the Director of Central Intel- an indispensable defensive ligence, and other revelations weapon. in the press, it seems obvious He is careful to distin- to at least a score of legis- gulch between the .three lators on Capitol Hill that branches of intelligence: the they were at best Misled and gathering of raw intelligence at worst lied to. material by secaet means, The furor over ilie Chile the analysis and estimating operations of the C.I.A. may of raw intelligence gathered also be related to the mood both clandestinely and opeh- of the times?marked by the ly, and the deliberate actions aftermath of the Watergate taken to. disrupt adversaries, 'scandal and. the strengthen- whether they be constituted Mg of East-West d?nte. geveriiments or other intela Both post-Watergate attitudes ligence agencies. and the feeling that interna- Few domestic critics of the firmal tensions have eased an- C.I.A. dispute the necessity pear to he conducive to the for the secret gathering of questioning of the reasoning intelligence?by human, elec- hehind covert intelligence op- tronic or photographic means. orations. None dispute the need for At the heart of the cmrent analysis and estimation of debate is the question whet- adversary capabilities, ? It is the nature and .pur- ? pose ,of covert operations that have drawn the. sharpest fire, especially from Con- gress. Mr. Colby's response? ; made ',in- public- early hi Sep--; tember and previously in pri- vate? is, that the covert cap; bility i's a "useful dagger .ita. the sheath" ranged an-long-the Multitude' of other. military and economic weapons avail- able to the Administration.. The Critics'., View ? "1 'don't think the C.I.A.' should be engaged in covert' operation at *ill," Senator` J. W. Fulbright, the Arkansas-2 Democrat who heads the San- ? ? ate Foreign :Relations Corii;, mittee, said last Month:. 1: think it should be an intel- ligence-gathering - operation.. Their- covert operations get' involved in elections ',in for, eign countries and we usuallY end up, electing. the wrong. - ? Mr. Fulbrig,ht has joined a- . ? group of 12 Senators spon- soring a new bill that would create a 14-member joint C6ngressional committee t6 oversee the United States in-' telligence community. The, legislation was pro- poSed by Senators Lowell P. ? Weicker Jr? the Connecticut Republican, and Howard H. Baker, the Tennessee Repub- lican, who asserted last month that Congress had' been re- ? miss in exercising control of the C.I.A. They were following up the protest by Representa- tive Michael J. Harrington, the Massachusetts Democrat, that the Administration was telling one thing about the Chile operations in public hearings and a different, darker tale .in private ses- sions with the House intelli- gence subcommittee. 10 - - --Approved For-Release 2001108/08 : aA-RDP77-00432R0Q01003004-6 ,aa NEW YORK TIMES 23 October 1974 Ex-Envoy to Chile Denounces Leaks Discrediting Aides ? to Ta s NEW York "notes WASHINGTON, Oct. 22?The ? director general of, the foreign service has expressed concern .in the State Department's newsletter about "malicious or calculated" leaks aimed at dis- crediting high officials. ? ? .. Nathaniel Davis, former Ain- bassador to Chile, wrote in his regular column in ?the monthly newsletter that there were three kinds of leaks. . The first, "the classic secu- rity breach," is not :a major gents Come Home, Mr. Colby had gone into considerable ' detail about' ? C.I.A. operations in Chile at an informal session last April of the seven-member ? subcommittee headed . .by ? Representative Lucien N. Nedzi, the Michigan Dem- ocrat. The subcommittee was exercising its authority to eaersee C.I.A. operations. In legislative practice, however, the intelligence subcommittee does not ap- preve or veto the details of covert operations. There is one .more argu- ment against covert - operaa. .tions of the Chile variety. a "They are stupid," said a retired CIA. official . who participated in some. "The case of Allende is a ?classic example. He would have gone down the drain all by , himself as any intelligent person 'could see. It didn't help him. along." I ' Finally, there-is a question of ethics, whether the ethics ' of .individual C.I.A. opera- tives whose zeal 'might have carried theta beyond their ,authority in places like Chile or Greece, .or the ethics of :the United States as a naal , At the beginning of the anonth, Senator James Abou- rezk, Democrat of South. Da- kota, submitted an amend: rnent to the foreign aid bill that Would e havhalted all covert -operations by the a, Before ?it ? was ':'defeated.,: i..6g to 17, Senator Abouretic ,said: "There is no justific< .ttion in our legal, moral.,pit religious prineiples (Or operac tions ot agency.whiCli? ..'restilt. in aassaasinations; -salt ,ota-ge. political , diaruptionsa or other meddling in anothe"r country's internal affairs, ajt _ . .? -in the name of-the Arneric(h. ? people, problem now; he said. The seC- ond kind, be said, involves in- formation by responsible of- ficers "to clarify policy or fact, to promote understanding, and reduce mischief." "The greatest damage, to constructive interchange be- tween foreign service officers and the press results from the third kind of leak,- he said. "This is the leak designed to cut down a superior or col- league, or to gain advantage in an internal policy question in ? dispute." ? Mr. Davis's article did not. specify which leaks had caused concern, but he has made clear in private his, own unhappiness' with articles printed recently' on the 'Central Inteili;encel Agency's -involvement in Chile I while be was ambaszador there.I ? Approved For Release 2001/08/00 CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 . RADIO:TV MONITORING SERVICE, INC:. 3408 WISCONSIN AVENUE. N. w, -:- WASHINGTON. D, C. 20018 -:- 244-8682 ? PROGRAM: . '.- ' EYEWITNESS NEWS DATE: TUES., OCTOBER 1, 1974 STATION OR NETWORK: ' ..WTOP TELEVISION TIME: 600 PM, EDT EX-CIA OFFICER REPLIES. TO WTOP CRITICISM OF CIA ANNOUNCER: A recent WTOP editorial criticized the role of the Central Intelligence Agency in Chile during the 'regime of President Salvador Allende. With an opposing view, here is Thomas Ernst. THOMAS ERNST: As a former CIA and U. S. Air Force dntelligence officer, I take issue with WTOP's recent editorial regarding the covert operations of the Agency. In my judgment WTOP erred in its criticism of the'Agency and in the covert nature of some of its activities. I believe the American people and most liberal critics of the CIA would support many of the follbwing'tovert operations, and I ask; would.WTOP object to a covert operation' designed to free black political prisoners in racist South Africa? Would WTOP object to secret activities directed against the. racist government of Rhodesia? If such covert -actioh would result in a bi-racial and black majority govern- .ment in that country, I think not. Would most Americans, liberal or conservative, object .to CIA-directed operations in Southeast Asia to free ,POWs and. MIAs? Again, I think not. Would WTOP and most Ameri- cans object to covert operations designed to free Soviet 'Jews from that still oppressive country? I think not Who could object to Secret CIA. moves to capture or kidnap-Arab terrorists or PLO leaders who planned and'.ordered the Mahlot massacre? Hopefully, not WTOP. For these reasons I believe the majority of the Ameri- can people should and do-support such CIA operations. In cl\%s- ing, I ask WTOP to criticize the policy makers like Mr. Kissi,:ger, and I ask that it refrain from criticizing the CIA in its necessary secret operations- Thank you. Approved For Release 2001/08/N : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 .:LOS ANGELES TIMES 6 October 1974 e Intrigues Before Allende Fe dr, B RD' FAGEN. ?? ? . :Nly wife and I gained firSt-hand er; perience of ;American involvement. in Chilean affairs a few months after we .arrived in Santiago in February, 1972. That was when a...U.S. Foreign Service officer?an acquaintance of mine?got in touch with-me and said that the U.S. Embassy in Santiago had succeeded in infiltrating all- parties of the Popular Unity coalition; but that it had not Yet managed to. infiltrate the Movement Of the Revolutionary Left,. a. group outside the governnient and critical of it. ? This US.'officialtho? light my uni- versity connectiOns?:which he knew. about at first handrnight ? provide. links for infiltrating that group. He. offered to change money for me on the black market. Because of our old association and strictly for toy own in- formation, he also sketched the number and. distribution of CIA agents masked as regular diplomats in the U.S. Embassy in Chile?about. one-third of the total. -- I doubt that I was the only Ameri- can citizen approached in this man- ner. I hope I was not the. only one to. refuse. The incident is a measure of how blatantly ? the U.S. Embassy operated 4.4ng that period. There was Tic) question by the mid- die of 1972 that the Allende Govern- ment was in serious trouble. The in- flationary. spiral was twisting, up-' ward, shortages- of foodstuffs had - developed ? although much was available on the black market?and the centrist Christian Democrats', led' by ex-?resident Eduardo Frei, (.vhorri the United States had once actively supported) were in open alliance with the right-wing National Party. Many members of this center-right coalition has. passed in word and deed far . beyond the point of "loyal opposition.", The political and economical situa- tion was ripe for'what later came to be known as "destabilization:' In October. 3972, the massive waIk-? ? out or truckers, shopowners, .and busine-ssm en in opposition began. Those. ef ns living in Santiago Were . .arnazed at the seeming .ease with which thousands 'of, persons withoet yen:ale income?and ..vit'nout savings because of. the inflationary spiral?were able to support .thernseees: The dollar rate on the black ,--earket dropped, indicating that _fresh sc..Irces ot currency were flow- ing into :he country. It was everyday specula:ion in-Santiago, both on the ?Right and Left, that the United States was funding the walkouts, specula- Wan later confirmed in the recent dis- closures about CIA. actiVities. H Despite political and economic dif- ficulties, however, the government was actually gaining support at the polls. Much to the dismay of hi a op- ponents, in the congressional elec- lions of March, 1973, the Allende: .coalition gained electoral s.trength, receiving 44% of the total vote. electron' was the first step toward the military coupe . Convinced-that Allende could not be .removed constitutionally?his con- Richard Fagen; professor of politi- cal science at Stanford, was in Chile for 18 months 177.1972-73 as a consul- tant to the- Ford Foundation, and visit- ing professor at the Latin American. 'Faculty of .the Social Sciences-. He-is coauthor of !..Latin. America- and the. United States: the Changing Polflical Realities."., ;gressionar sUpport would have-had to drop below. 33%. for him to be im- peached?the- Ilight, began to plot in earnest:Violence, sabotage...and a fi- ? nal series, of crippling strikes "wracked Chile" during July and. Au- gust of 1973. The full role.of the CIA- in these events is yet to be told. Throughout this period, the. Chilean politica/ situation was fra- gile, the economy Was in trouble, and class, and political tensions ran,- high. We now 'know that .S3 to-S.II ? ? ? - Million were tied"covertly tcie Sup- port opposition newspaper's, parties and strikers.The United States in- filtrated political parties, and, as now .conceded, attempted to buy votes in order to prevent the election of Allen- de. ? ? Fui-thermore, 'because the CLA. and its friends certainly had the Means to change their dollars into Chilean cur- rency, somewhere other. than at the .Central Bank; the moneypuMped .into Chili may.actually have bought 540 to 550 million worth of subversive activities and services. With a raging black market, opposition par- ties, newspapers, and- operatives could be purchased in dollars at a very substantial discount. All of this makes ?a mockery. of official claims that the United States did nothing?in. Mr. Ford's words?but ensure 'that' democratic institutions and parties. survived." :What Washington did do was Put.a very substantial thumb on- ._ . 'the Scalesetipping theni: against the . . .freely elected government of Chile. 'AgainS.E.the background of what: we .now know.of'VOlvereent in. . Chile, the statemenii'hy.. high ? US. olficials that.'we'djd not participate iri?the overthrow ,.of. the Allende GoVernment.'F- .areeSerionsly misleading. Perhaps- the ? United. StateS did not participate in the plan- ning' Or help -in .thee.attatk on. the! 'Presidential palace...--eBut as recognized. iegalt Sxsterrie -accesseries,hefore-the-fact niiist..4hare ,fesponsibility-with' those4 ? who actually corernit the criminal act,, 'eterzliiiciugh the forra en-MAY-not be; present at the scene of the crime. : -..ktragic as .the4vent.s in Chile are; 0-perhaps even: more. signWleanCe .tol ? 'Wolericaris i.s theincre. coverup?'fa1sa.-jdtjfjcatiQn$ ,and ? outright ?told to . the American peoI?y the highest' of.: ? ? ? ficials of the Ford Adminis tra tion. For - -1 ' example, in justifying covert CIA ac tivities, the President has claimed! that "there was aneffortbeinba made! - :by: the government of Salvador Al-i Iende to:: destroy' oppositiono.newmediaV _ and. to _destroy oppo.sitiOn:. This . . does,eriotLkefIect.- the true :predoup situation .in Chile. Actually,. _ -thenp.po.sitiOn .parties.. and. " newspapers :kept functioning froriaI ? l'?1970,to?.19;73??--,andTfidot. only-.becaUseei oikr:goiiernmenii,ivaS .pouringinianeY7 rink) them:el:1 faCf,iOne of the most'sict- eChilean constitutionalism had Occiirai Tedin 1970 vehentheCL9..tried tobuY1 ? ..oPpcisition-votes in-Congress prevent Allende from assuming thel presidency To a11 Of. this sorry recent history theekey actor: and prime villain"has.4 been. Secretary.: of State Henry A.' .Ki:ssinger.:As head of the Forty Corn-, inittee,e. Kissinger' Was the Clii6fi 'architect.of covert, operations against'. the.''Allende government. It..was he.! .who',, first articulated the "domino theory" of the "threat" that Chile (with' a population '5%,. and Wealth less tharele,"'aethat of the-Unit- ed States) posed to this country. "I . don't think we should delude ourselves that an Allende takeover in Chile would not present massive 'pro- blems for us ....".Kissinger said. in . 1970- ? This is the Same man- who just a. ? few weeks ago told the U.S. ambas- sadOr in Chile to-cut out the politi- cal- sCience lectures" because the am- . bassador brought up the. question of human rights with members of the junta when he "should have been". discussing military "aid. . All of " this betrays. -a scenario in' .which. the-- U.S.' goverriment?:once again?has, set itself implacably against p.Diitical and economic ex- perimentation in.the Third World. 1 It's the sPirit of 'Vietnam and. Watergate at work in hemispheric: . politics. This scenario; in Chile as in Vietnam, involved disregard for the sovereignty and rights of others, the violation of national and international law, dirty tricks by-the CIA and other agencies, cozying up to :repressive governments, and withholding vital- information from Congress. and the American electorate: . . - The people of Chile and Latin America .deserVe better from ? the government of the United States? arid so do the American people. 12 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6-'4 Approved-For Release 2091/08/Q8 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010.0340004-6 ? LOS ANGELES TIMES 6 October 1974 taS. Ought to Suspend Co-vert Actrvmes Abroad ? ? 1 - BY DAVID WISE..:-.. ?-? When Soviet Party chief Leonid Council. The .purpose of the CIA, as. nneethnev Neae in Washington in 1973 tset forth in the law, was to. pull.: together the intelligence in:orma- ? - ? ? ? fora summit .rneeting, Richard Nixe tion that-the ...President needs to'., ? on- introduced him to a short, th-----7'n' inakn decisions in the .field of foreign ' with graying' btack hair,. Sharp ne_,,licv. features: and very cold blue eyes bee There is nothing* in the law about - overthrowing goyernments-: hind glasses rimmed in flesh-colored ..n. -mere- is language, however, permit- . ? . . , ? plastic frames. -ting the CIA to perform such "other BrezhneY-Stared Tor a moment at. .functions :as the NSC may direct. Williana?:. -:Colby, director of the n Under :this umbrella clause, ..the . . . _ . . ?CIA has engaged in its global dirty . David the coauthor -tricks,. manipulated the- ? politics .of' Invisiae Government," a critical study ..'other countries, directed a secret . of the CIA, and of "The Espionage war in Laos, funneled millions of Establishment." His .1atest ,book is dollars -through foundation-conduits 'The Politics_of Lying.1 into student, academic. _and. laboe groups, dropped agents by para- . ? Central ? Intelligence Agency; and ? chute in various 'countries and asked:!'IS.he a dangerous man'?" ? served as the clandestine arm of the Colby yeplied soothingly: "The US. foreign policy. more we ? know of each other,. the A partial list of such covert opera- safer we-both will be. bons includes the .following:.? The answer was disarming, but it ? Btirmat In the 1950'se4he CIA fi- -alsci? was. consistent with?the CIA's nanced approximately 12,000 Chi- current strategy of emphasizing its nese Nationalist troops who fled to information, intelligence-gathering, Burma as the Comminnists took over -:.and analytic functions, andedown- mainland 'China in .1949. The CIA's :playing covert operations . or. troops, discovering poppies to be irty;-Axicks more profitable than politics, soon ? The- CIA does indeed collect: became'heavily involved in the opin ? ibreign intelligence. But its Direntor! um trade. ate of Operations?which Colby for- ? China: In the 'early 1950's, the. in- nerly headed?also conducts secret telligence agency air-dropped agents ? political operations. around the into the People's Republic of China. .globe. These have ranged from pay- To CIA men, John T. Downey and ? Inents to foreign Political leaders Richard Fecteau, were captured and and attempts -to rig elections, tO-? spent 20 years in Chinese orisons be- overthrowing governments and pa- fore they were released. ramilitary invasions. CIA-backed Philippines: Also in the early coups .have sometimes resulted. in 1950's, the CIA backed Rainol'a 'Men- the assassination of the political saysaans campaign against the Com- :leaders who are overthrown. At munist Huk- zuerrillas. times, the CIA has even operated its Lean: In 1953, the CIA overthrew own air force, army and. navy. the government of Premier Mo- Increasingly, these. secret. opera ?- 'lions have .coMe- under criticism, in hammed Mossaciegh, who had na- tionalized the Iranian oil industry. and out .of Congress. Covert activi- ties have focused nublic attention on The coup was led by CIA agent Ker- the question of whether the United mit "Kim" Roosevelt. grandson of President Theodore Roosevelt. The States 'nas the right to intervene se- ? operation kept the?shah in -power, cretly in the internal affairs of other and in its wake, American oil compa- . nations. And secret operations have raised basic questions about the role ?? ries were permitted into Iran_ ' of an intelligence agency M. a demo- Guatemala: In 1954, the CIA top- chacy. ?pled the Communist-dominated . Recent disclosures that the CIA government of President Jacobo ,Ar- apparently with the approval of high ben, - Guzman of Guatemala with the help of a. CIA air force of old World officials nof the Nixon Admhtistra? - War II .fighter . planes. President ? lion, spent $8 million in Chile to Eisenhower later confirmed that he 'de.stabilize" the Marxist novernn ' ment of Salvador Allende hc'ave in- i had. approved theCIA operation.- creased demandn for either an end to 'Indonesia: In 1958," with a secret 'such secret .political operations, or air force of B-26 bombers :the CIA tighter control by Congress over hacked Indonesian rebels againsi. the. aA, or both. government- OfnPresident . Sukarno.; One of the -CIA: pilots; Allen ?Law-: The CIA was created in 1947 ais .rence Pope, was shot down and cann The successor to the Office of Strate-: -.tined; he wan freed in 1267. through, eric Services (0S3). The same legisln- -the intervention of Robert F. Kenn- ton created tlie National Security rnn, ? Approved For Rele'ae 2.001/08108 olA-RCP-737- Tibete In the late 1950s, the CIA . . established a secret base at Camp' Hale, Colo, nearly. 10,000 feet high in the Rockies; and there trained ..Tibetan guerrillas to return to their: ? homeland to fight against the Chi- nese Communists. CIA covert opei?alei :tars later Claimed that some of the: :rinbe. tans trained: in Colorado helped' :"...the Dalai Lamano escape to India i? 1959. nen'. -?n'? - ? ? nee ba: -In-1961;a brigade of Cuban- . .? exiles trained by the CIA on Plantation- tie-Guatemala.' invaded Cnba at the .Bay of Pigs in art unsuc, ? cessfut attempt to overthrow ?? the: government of Fidel Castro:: More. than .250. of.the invaders died on the; ..beacheS.and almost 1,200 were cap- tured in-President Kennedy's. worst. foreign-lponcy disaster; - In 1963, the ?CIA worked' ? ;closely-with the. South Vietnamese . -generals Who. carried out the coup,- against President Ngo Dinh. Diem, ? Who was. killed. In Vietnam; the CIA, also s-eated the Phoenix program.' .which kilted 20,587 Vietcong during the period_Williern Colby headed it, . ,.b...etweeti..1968 and 1971n.. ? rt. tinlinna:-.-In- 1967, antearni of CU' operatives; was ? sent n to:? Bolivia, 'where_theyhelned to tack down Er- nestiaq-Chenr Guevara..former .aide - Caste&....J.Guenara was tapturen and : The rationale for all such covert CIA operations is that.they are justi- fied and necessary to protect Amen- can national security. A secret five- ? man government committee,. known -over the years by various names and. currently. as the Forty Committee, has the responsibility of approving covert -operations in advance. At ore- ? sent, the chairman of the committee is Secretary of State. Henry A. Kis- singer. Its other members are Un-' der.secre tate/ of State for Political Afn . fairs Joseph J. Sisco; Wiiiiam P. Clen merits, Jr.., the deputy ',secretary of: ? ?defense; Air .Force Gen_ George S. Brown,. chairman of the Joint Chiefs: of Sniff, and Conoy... . _ The? extent to -which- .thc Forty ri .Committee controls secret CIA. oper- ations remains uncertnin -for the i very reason.th7+ the conirnittee, like" ? the CIA itself,. oper-ates in great se-I -crecy. -In any . event; nwhaV cantron ? -does exist.. iswithin the executive .branch: the :Forty Committee does. not _in clud e : anyemembers of 'Con- gress in-its- ranks. Nor, as far as can be determined, does.theCIA'discuss?- its- covert onerntions to- any signifi- cant extent with the four. shadowy House -and --Senate subcommittees that. supposedly monitor CLn.acitivi: ? ties. In the case of Chile.,--Various Ex- ecutive -branch. witnesses assured congressional committees, that thel .? 'United -States had*--not!Internen-edi against Allende. ne. ni . In an-era of cold War, secret inter-! nvention _in_ other: countries might have seemed justified .to manyi. 00432040061tTEP33b084g6r4t appealtiustin, 13 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 fled today. There is no moi-al or legali .basis for covert operations.-_the-l7i act does' not specifically. authorize then-I?anti such. tatervention..vio-1, Yates the charter of the United Na-i tions,-which the United -States is; pledged to respect. ? , :? ? i - Moreover, the. Constitution gives1 Congress the war power; secret oper.- ations involving paramilitary actioril and the overthrow of goVernmerits are clearly the equivalent of unde- clared war and, on their face, unconH ? stitutional. 1 The price of secret operations is; too high in a democracy that rests on LOS ANGELES TIMES 6 October 19714 the consent of the governed. Often, 'the government has lied to protect: .covert CIA activities: Such ? official lying has eroded confidence in our national leaders and the American system of government. ..1 It is 'high time that the CIA Put. away its cloak and. dagger -and! packed up its bag of deadly tricks.! The CIA should be conned to gath- ering intelligence overseas. Pres- idea: Ford, Secretary Kissinger and their successors- should ccr7duct. a foreign policy that is visible and ac- countable to the -American peop:e. President Must Balance Interests, Share Planning 33 Y HAARY ROSITZXE 'Chantrnent with secrecy deepened .. From the Bay of Pigs to the cur- rent Chilean case, there have. been sporadic denunciations of the CIA's 'action operations abroad?in the press, in books from inside and out- side Washington's intelligence. establishment, and occasionally. in :Congress. ?' The issue is 'heightened rather than resolved by President Ford's statement. that. "our government, like other . governments, does- take. certain actions in the intelligence field to help implement foreign pol- icies and protect n.atipnal security.'i The central question:- Should the. United States employ secret means. to interfere in the affairs of other' countries?..The debate is waged on two levels?moral and pragmatic. For pure. men of principle, covert- action is imperrnissable as A means. whatever the end. Covert actions are Harry Rositzke, retired after many years in operations with the OSS and the (IA, is' the author of "U.S.S.R. To- day!, immoral not only because they are. secret and therefore violate the can- ons of an open society, but also be- cause by interfering in the domestic! affairs of another country they vi- ]ate the U.N. Charter and the mora/ and .legal principles of American., society. At a more realistic level,?the cri-1 4.1que of secret operations addresses' itself, to profit and loss: Are secret ;operations worth carrying out? ? On the loss side are not only the "moral objections. but the conspic- ? arous failures of the past (the Bay of Pigs), the sinister image of the CIA ;abroad (the .bogie of "-American jai- oerialism"), the compuision of the ex- ecutive to lie in public and to Con- gress in order to keep secret its spon- sorship of ."unofficial" actions. (Chile), and the domestic disen- oy "Vi a tergate. - What are the'entries on the profit side?. The list of' pass :successes on the public record is 'short. President Truman authorized large-scale offi- cial and unofficial support for the -democratic parties in the 1`..24.S an elections to prevent a Communist victory=and the Communists lost. President Eisenhower triggered a coup in Tehran in 1953 to keep Irs-rt- Put of tile Soviet sphere-?--and it stta is.. The following year he authorized. a coup in G u atemal to- pre verit'thc.:. export of Soviet arms into the West- ern hemisphere?and the coup sue-. ceeded without bloodshed. What are the secret successes? No one knows outside the small elite in the executive. -Political action operations ? played a ?ma rginaCrole in American . 'foreign policy since 1948, but the full record is. not available either to Con- gress or the public. For a decade al- ? ter World War II they -played-a tan- gible but minor role in the A.mericart *effort to restore a stabilized, demo- cratic .Europe. Through its contacts ? with non-Communist politicians and- government.?:i- officials, with.,,labor .leaders, and media figures, the CIA added its influence .to that of the State and .Defense Departments in containing .the expansion of ,Soviet poWer-.west of the Elbe. ? In the late 1950s and 1960s, the fo- cus of political operations the Third World, the terrain chosen by Moscow to weaken the "ironer- lists." In the .Near East,. in Africa. briefly, and in Southeast Asia, covert operations played the part in furthering overall American ob- jectives, however, ill-conceived some of these objectiVes.raay appear in re- :trospect. In Latin-America the political si- tuation became even more challeng- ing after Castro's:victory, and coun- terinsurgency, became the order of the day.; for.-- half.. a s dozen federal :14 agencies:-The.CIA's political. action 'operations were aimed mainly' at the :legal and .illegal?Coinniunist. parties supported.. by Moscow with money, -? training and:advice:at he insurgent, ..groups working-out-of Havana, and. at the' minor rash of "Chinese par- ties" that broke_ out in the mid-6Cs ? The evolution of purely domestic ? surgenties- and ? of. urban terrorist; groups further broadened the chal- lenge .to.*, local .?,?security agencies working in concert pith the CIA_ . .;.It is niistake.tolhir24 that all CIA operations ..irr..Latin America' were ? aimed at supportMg.right-wirig tarists. Arnerica's.jultimate goal in* Chile's 1964 election. of course, was. to thwart the election of Salvador Allende. but Washington-put its money on., a.. refonn-minded...Chris-: tian Democrat. Eduardo -Frei, 'and' - actively sought the achievement oC his goals. ?.-breaking up the domiri-, ant financial oligarchy, for instance.: - :art action ,.arm government,: the.. CIA ., historically: has .Ottracted; Many liberals to its ranks, for they saw in it a chance to ,bring democratic 'reforms to. parts of :the world that:most needed it. One :reason that the-CIA now is widely, 'perceived as far-right is that its fail- ures have been more publicized thani k3-successes, and these usually have involved: strictly anti-Communist ac- tivities, as in Annde's Cone. - . In the new 'world of. detente, often argued, secret 'action opera- tions are no longer needed..Detente, however broadly defined, has not of-, fected Soviet competition on the: ideological and -political front_ :Mos-71 covr :continues to . exploit the re-;; sources of its.built-irt political action, instruments?the' Crtrty4ilinist par.: ties:-..abrOad.:. 4 continues tri-export . . . propaganda an - its awn radios and news services, and - by'. the distribution al--.anti-:capitalist !literature... and , general subsidies to 'local 'editors 'and .colii-nristsr The; KGB continues-to recruit 'agents influence"... ?-? - Secret political action is not th4 only .antidote' for:secret Soviet 2C?? but it is One-ir-sfrument. Situa- tions are bound to arise, especially in .Latin. -America or the. Near East, in - which the 'President Will find a _get' American action is tlie_only ef- fective ., response_ Such -.occasions may be rare; but it. would be foolish to deprive-him of the sea-et option- ...Who will measure the profit' and loss of such operations? ? It is a fundamental-and frustiting fact that the pragmatic equation can . be 'written only -within the execu- .tive. The broad. .moral-pragmatic issue' is inevitably reduced to the question of controllinc, the action of . the executive?and here frustration.. ? persists. for there are no adequate ? answers. A-? Hoover-type commission on in-,. _ _ Approved For Release 2001/08/08-: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 Approved For Release 2001108108 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 . ke.11igence and secret operations can, at., best, make broad bureaucratic. ?ant""policy. recommendations. Con- gressional oversight. can do no more than rubber stamp executive deci- sions or hold,drama tic post mortems. Legislation, a -"foreign intervention control act*, for example, is impossi- ble. to write on such a rarified 'sub- ject,.nor can Congress or a.commit- tee vote on individual strategic oper- ations that are to be carded out se-- .cretly. ? . ? ? ..- . The burctea is clearlyon.the Pres- .ident to re:solve. at least some of the public suspicion and distrust about' secret political actions abroad: He can change the 'machinery of secret committees to bring in. a broaderad-- versaryv of view in the initial -stages of secret action proposals. He-.. can make:, 'the National Security 'Ccuncil as a.whoTe.responsible for .ral recommendations to him-He can- exercise his., sharpest judgment or the possible profit and.cost of each. operation..And he is the-Only man. who can bring to bear a moral judg- renL that reflects the values,of the,, 'electorate..-as. ? . . . ". The President can take 'one furthei-I ,step to brfne".iri the people.: He can., as-range for the participation of se- lect congressmen a the National curity Council's deliberations on se-? cret action propcisAls ' " Who monitors the PresidentZ.1n1 any government, secret ? aetivitiesi are peculiarly the province of the ex- ecutive-: secret negotiations, -back-i, door diplomacy, foreign intelligence and domestic security operations,-i covert action operations. In a repu'ol lic.without an official secrets, act there is only one check on what he; does in secret?the pres.'.... ? .! ? The, adversary relationship" be- tween the media and the executive on official secrets may in individual cases entail some damage to national . interests, but without private inves- tizators, we cannot know;- who doing what to us or for us.. Expcse of the government's secret .opera- tons. whether an Cambodia. or Chile, can throw light on: the acts of the past. and provide a cautionary signal, for the decisions of tomorrow: CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 18 October 1974 Uncovering the CIA: is congressional oversight needed? ? ? By Editorial Research Reports The past two years have not been kind to the American intelligence community in general, and especially not to the Central Intelligence Agency. Tainted by Watergate, the CIA is taking it on the chin for having spent $8 million to "destalailize'! the Marx- ist regime of Chile's late president, Salvador Allende, The Senate Foreign Relations Committee immediately launched an fnvestigation into the matter. ? In addition, Sens. Howard H. Baker (R) of Tennessee and Lowell P. Weicker (R) of Connecticut have introduced legislation to establish a 14-member congressional oversight committee for all federal agencies with intelligence functions. These in- clude not only the CIA but also the FBI, Secret Service, Defense In- telligence Agency, and National Secu- rity Agency. The idea of an intelligence over- sight committee is hardly a new one. In s an extensive survey of the in- telligence community in 1966, a team of New York Times reporters found that the "overwhelming consensus" of those interviewed was that Con- gress should not attempt to "control" the' CIA through a special committee. It was felt such a panel "might -become anew intelligence empire on Capitol Hill that could exert a direct policy influence on the CIA separate ?from and challenging the President's policy decisions." Covert activities If the CIA ?did nothing but gather and evaluate intelligence, It would have few critics. But the agency also engages hi covert political operations LONDON TIMES 8 October 1974 Mr McMahon's denial on CIA connexion From Our Correspondent Melbourne, Oct 7 Mr William McMahon, the former Liberal Pritne Minister of Australia, denied today that his Government had authorized I the Australian Securityintelli- gence Organization to cooperate with the American Central In- telligence Agency in any activity' designed ? to overthrow the Allende Government in Chile. Mr McMahon said that there, was no 'truth in the, allegation (reported to have been made by an unnamed official in the - United States State Department) that the Australianintelligence organization had acted as a watchdog for the CIA in Chile. ? The Liberal Government It, ? ? abroad, and these occasionally have brought it into disrepute. The disas- trous invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in 1961 is perhaps the classic example of a bungled CIA adventure, From time to time the agency's intelligence-gathering activities also cause embarrassment, as when the U- 2 spy plane was shot down over the Soviet Union in 1960. President Ford and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger both de- fended the CIA's covert activities in Chile as in the best interests of that country as well as of the United - States. Others are not so certain. "Special operations pose dangers not only to the nations against which they are directed, but to ourselves,". wrote David Wise and Thomas B. Ross in "The Invisible Government," a book about the U.S. intelligence Community. "Thei,aise the question of how far a free socit. in attempt- ing to preserve itself, emulate a closed society without bet. -..ning in- distinguishable from it." Apprehension justified ? The CIA's involvement in NS ver- gate, limited and reluctant thoug it was, has raised questions about -i.e nature of the agency's activ!`it.3 within the United States. Vic... r Marchetti and John D. Marks, a thors of a recent book about the CIA say that Americans are justified in feeling apprehensive. ? "Nurtured in the adversary scling of the ? cold war," they. w:lte, "shielded by secrecy, and spurrec by patriotism that views dissent as threat to the national security, the clandestine operatives of the CIA have the capability, the resources, the experience - and the inclination - to ply their skills increasingly on the domestic scene." . ? The CIA's capacity to defend itself against such attacks is limited by its overriding need to operate in secret. To provide a detailed rebuttal might expose sensitive matters of national security. Still, the mover for greater congressional oversight of the CIA is gathering force and may become law. affairs of other nations. It would certainly have never countenanced activities whose object was to overthrow . the legally elected Government of Chile. . Mr McMahon also repudiated any ? suggestion that the CIA might have contributed funds to the Liberal Party genera) election campaign earlier this year.. This suggestion has been made in a book entitled Looking at the Liberals just, issued in Melbourne and edited by Mr Ray Aitchison, a former I -Can bers-a journalist. " I can assure you we would never accept funds from the nor ae said, had made it a suit ii ? 15 Approved For Reitaatseidt00410810814 :0 hve 77-0-#3t1=1061310 thv ever been 04400044fir? 1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 NEW YORK TIMES 31 October 1974 Kissinger Assures India That A.Won't interfere! By BERNARD WEINRAUB Special to The New York Times NEW DELHI, Oct. 30 ? Sec retary of State Kissinger bluntl assured India today that th Central Intelligence Agenc would not interfere in the po litical situation here. . Mr. Kissinger, ending a three day visit to New Delhi, said at a news conference: "I rejec the implication that the United States is engaged on a sys- tematic basis in undermining any government, and, particu- larly, constitutional govern- ments. Exactly the opposite is true." In making the comments be- fore departing for Bangladesh, Mr. Kissinger sought to ease the persistent and expressed fears of Indian politicians, in- cluding Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, that the C.I.A. was bent on subverting India. Amer- ican officials-here have termed the fears obsessive and Mr. Kis- singer was questioned several 'times about the agency as well as United States involvement in the coup. ? A year later, American news- papers reported that the di- rector of the intelligence agen- cy, William E. Colby, had told Congress that the Nixon Ad- ministration had authorized more than $8-million for covert activities ?by the agency in Chile between 1970 and 1973 in an effort to prevent the elec- tion of Salvador Allende Gos- sens as President after he was elected anyway, to make it impossible for him to govern. Dr. Allende died in the 1973 0 coupe. Asked by several Communist newsmen about United States - involvement in the coups in y Chile, and last summer In e Cyprus, Mr. Kissinger replied: y ? "The United States did not - foment the overthrow of a ccin stitutional government in Chile - That has been made suffi ciently Plain by the President "Secondly, the United States had nothing whatever to do with the coup in Cyprus. This is simply repeating totally un- founded propaganda. "Thirdly, the United States is not engaged, directly ,or in- directly in any attempt to influ- ence the domestic situation in India." Mr. Kissinger added: "It has not authorized such a program, it is not engaged in such a pro- gram and it has repeatedly pointed out that if any of its officials should ever be caught ? in unauthorized action, we _would take strong measures." 'New Page' Turned Mr. Kissinger's visit to India has been widely applauded by Indian and American officials. The Secretary relaxed ?and seemingly cheerful at a crowd- ed government auditorium, said that "a new page". had been turned in Indian-American re- lations.i "In terms of the purpose that we set ourselves, which was to establish a basis for a new and mature relationship, I consider the trip completely successful," Mr. Kissinger said. He flew from here to Dacca, Bangdalesh, on a trip that will also take him to Pakistan, Af- EDITOR & PUBLISHER -28 SE'P 67.1 ? CIA infhl.ertee. 111 CiiI- coidepd by TAPA .The Inter American Press Association issued a statement September 2ri condemn- ing attempts' by governments to influence :newspapers thr'ough financial support. . The statement, signed by IAPA presi- dent Pohert U. Prown, publisher and edi- tor of Eurron & Pc-nmstiEn, was iss,ted after the. New York Times disclosed that *the Central Intelligence Agency had se- cretly financed Chile's .striking labor unions and news media threatened by Sal- vador Allende's minority. government. In testimony, September 19, before the Serate Foreign Relations. Committee, See- ' rt.t.try of State henry Kissinger asserted tloit the intelligence ,agency's involvement- in Chile had .been authorized 'solely to. keep alive political parties and threzttened by Salvador Allende.'s mi- nority Government. ? -Ford favors CIA 'President Gerald It. Ford, revealed at his September 11; conference, that he supp-qded the CIA involvement in Chile and said that it had been auth:lriz:2..1 be- cause "Ilicre was an effort being made 1,y the Allen -le Government to destroy 0 i an stan, Iran, Europe and the Middle East. Mr. Kissinger's visit, at the behest of the Indian Govern- ment and his first time here in three years, was largely de- signed to lift relations between India and the United States. Resentments linger here over Washington's support for Pak- istan before and during the 1971 war that resulted in the Creation of Bangdalesh. 'Also, many Indians view the $10-billion in United States eco- nomic assistance to India in the nineteen-sixties as a sym- bol of dependence and a soiree of American political leverage there. Americans See Hostility Americans often contend that the Indian Government has been hostile to the United States in recent years and has spent too- much time lecturing and criti- cizing successive United States Administrations whileignoring repressive tactics of the So- viet Union, such as crackdowns on dissidents. t? Moreover, Indian comments that the United States seeks to exploit India's poverty political- ly and economically have soured the relationship and annoyed Americans. Mr. Kissinger said today, 'while discussing food aid to India, "I think one of the as- pects of the relationship that is Ideveloping now between India iand the United States is that ;we can talk to each other free of complexes. I r One of the complexes that ;has affected our relationship in; sit ion news media both the writing press as well as, the electronic press, and to destroy opposition parties.' Times' S91.11'CPS deClarCd that "less than half of the money made available fcr clandestine_ activities in Chile was pro- vided for the' .direct support of the al- legedly threateled new-spapers and raWo-television stations, referred to Mr.? Fora." ? An official disclosed to Seymour Hersh Nc"..v York Times reporter that "i-oine finneinl support for newspaper and radio stations was needed in Chile, ben use wouldn't have been good to have strikes if nolx-,ely k WM'S it." 11(.rsh s111-Xested that most of the funds invested for propaganda purposes, acc'erd-. ing to his sot:rees, "went to El .1ferci(r,, the main oppse-;!tion newspaper in Chile. It was the only. ser:ous political force t'ne new-spapers and tele\ isic41 s::- ? lions there," tin soarer' Mited. JA PA pfesident. I;rown explained in a statement: ?'.11.c: Inter Amerik?an Press .Association deplori-s reports that the CIA has spent funds in Chile to supinIrt the opine.dtic;n press under Preside..t. Allende. The lAPA condemns any attempt by Cre,Trnments to eithcr !,.fl.r.seut or nm!ncially s6ppo:'t 11PWspa per :?11,11) S'App,,rt 111(1.r.".:Iden,:',.." 16 the past has been who wasl :asking whom, for what. And' secondly, whether the United ',States was doing anybody ? a ifavor by extending aid. --I i "Let me say first of all that ;when the United States under- 'takes a certain measure,' with !respect to India or any other Country, it does so in its own linterest as well as the interest lof the other Country." - - , Decision on Food Awaited 1 Mr. Kissinger said that' a "final judgment' on food aid ,for India would-be made when he returned to Washington-next month. Current estimates are that India will receive about 500,000 tons of food at-prefer- antial prices within the next .few months. Indian sources said 'that by next summer the total lof new American food aid, might reach one million tons.. , On ? other issues, Mr.?Kis-1 singer, who spoke with news- . . men more than 30 minutes, con- ceded that there was "an ab- sence of identity .of views" on the establishment of a -United States naval base on the Indian Ocean island. of Diego Garcia, , about _1,000 miles south of India. . . He declined to discuss the possibility of lifting or relaxing the United States embargo on the supply of weapons to Pakis- tan. "I .do not think it is appro- priate for-me to -make state- ments that affect other cowl-, -tries on the while', I'm in New Delhi," Mr. Kis- i singer said.' JAPAN TIMES 5 OCTOBER 1974 CIA's Agents Listed . -LONDON (Kyodo-Reuter) ? A former United States spy turned Marxist, Philip Agee, Thursday moved to embarrass the Central Intelligence Agen- cy (CIA) by making public a list said ? to be the agency's . operatives in Mexico. A book by Agee, to be pub- lished here in January, tells of 'his work ,with the CIA in Lat- in America up to the time he resigned, disillusioned, in 1969. Thursday he told a press conference held above a Fleet Street pub that he want- ed to expose CIA officers and drive thdm out of the coun- tries where they operated. He said his list of agency personnel in Mexico, under Station Chief Richard Samp- son; was drawn up recently ."by comrades who I trained to follow the comings and go- ings of the CIA." ? The 39-year-old writer, who now lives in southwest Eng- land, attacked the agency as the "sectet political policy of American capitalism and the enforcer of economic ex- ploitation." Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA4RDP77-00432R000100340004L6 _Approved For. Release 2001/08/08 : CJAADP77-00432R000100340004-6' LOS ANGELES TIMES 29 October 1974 DESPITE COLBY CLAIM, IT WASN'T AGENCY'S FINEST HOUR The CIA in Laos: 'An Equivocal Success' ! B.Y CHARLES A. STEVENSON The Central Intelligence Agency doesn't brag very much, nor does it get many com- pliments. With its reputation. tarnished by such misadventures as the Bay of Pigs and .secret support to opposition groups in Chile, the CIA is seldom credited for its po- litical analyses and its intelligence on So- viet weaponry. So it was somewhat unusual when CIA Director William E. Colby emerged from ,the shadows in September to defend covert operations. And it was ironic that he decid- ed to praise the "effective but modest man- ner" in which the CIA operated in Laos. Over the past dozen years, he said, "a small commitment of CIA Americans and a small expenditure? had defended Laos so well. that the battle lines remain "essentially un- changed." To a student of American policy in Laos, this was hardly a "small" effort. , The CIA spent about $100 million per year in Laos in the early 1970s ? an amount equal to about half of that small country's total gross national product in those years. Together with even larger. sums openly given in military and econom- ic aid, U.S. assistance dwarfed the local economy, giving the United States a dom- inating influence. CIA-financed Americans?probably num- bering fewer than 1,000?supported, sup- plied, advised, and in effect commanded a 45,000-man army (at its peak) in a bloody, decade-long war. This struggle produced an estimated mil- lion refugees and left uncounted civilian casualties. The Meo and other hill tribes, for whose benefit. and protection the CIA aided the conflict, saw their villages devas- tated and their populations decimated. . Even U.S. air support, which dropped 21 million tons of bombs during 1964-73, could not alter the outcome of the war?a stalemate. Whatever one's judgment on the magni- tude of these efforts in Laos, the most ba- sic question is what we want the CIA to do?and to be. When established by law in 1947, the CIA's chief purposes were "to correlate and evaluate intelligence" and to coordinate -the ,various intelligence activities of the government. Authority for covert actions was derived from a catch-all clause allow- Based in Washington, D. C., Charles A. Stevenson is the author of "The End of No- where," a study of American policy toward Laos. the CIA "to perform such other func- tions and duties related to intelligence af- fecting the national security as the Nation- al Security Council may from time to time direct." Although Director Colby favors no re- strictions on the CIA's ability to conduct covert operations, he did tell the Senate Armed Services Committee .last year that the agency "undoubtedly" went beyond .what Congress had intended by running the war in Laos: ? This admission suggests that we should look more closely at the record before ac- cepting the CIA's 'effective but modest" ac- tions in Laos as a good example to follow. The CIA got a key role in Indochina on Aug. 20, 1954, when the National Security Council adopted a policy of "covert opera- tions on a large and effective scale." Acting sometimes without the knowl- edge or approval of the U.S. ambassador, CIA agents in Laos proceeded to bolster their own chosen factions as cabinets were 'made and broken. According to U.S. personnel in Laos at the time, the CIA supported groups which brought down Prince Souvanna Phouma's .neiltralist coalition government in 1958 and almost succeeded in bringing down its suc- .cessor in 1959. (This later attempt was foiled when the U.S. ambassador, unable to harness the CIA. obtained diplomatic sup.: port for his stand from other nations.) - In 1960, the CIA helped rig elections to . keep its clients in power. When an indigen- ous, grass-roots military coup returned Souvanna Phourna to 'power later that year, the CIA continued monetary and material aid to its military friends, who sent rebel forces to oust the government. All the while, President Eisenhower and the U.S. ambassador proclaimed their sup- port for Souvanna Phouma. ' CIA assistance to the hill tribes, which had been organized into a 9,000-man army, also contributed to the breakdown of the 1962 Geneva agreements on Laos, which had put Souvanna Phouma once again in charge of a coalition government. -As the conflict in-Vietnam intensified., the United States expanded its efforts in Laos and secretly aided the fighting there as a rear-guard action against the North Vietnamese. Said former Secretary of State. .Dean Rusk: "After 1963 Laos was only the wart on the hog Of Vietnam." The U.S. Air FOrce concentrated on the so-called Ho Chi Minh trails leading through Laos into South Vietnam, but it also bombed heavily in support of Laotian .units, the most aggressive and effective of .which were the CIA's clandestine army. - As the Meo were forced to rely more and more on preteen-age boys for soldiers, the CIA expanded its secret army with Thai ."volunteers" Eventually these forces: num- bered over 40,000 ? and could mot really be kept secret.. _ Some 'members of Congress and theiress had piecemeal knowledge of these activi- ties, but they generally accepted the opera- tions as a useful adjunct to the Vietnam war. Now, according to news reports, the CIA's presence in Laos has been greatly reduced. A new, shaky coalition govern- ment has brought peace. A new mood is taking over in the United States as well ? a rejection of the-cold War mentality of the 1950s, of unrestrained presidential power and of secret wars. Many people are beginning to question whether the President should have, in ef- fect, a private army to use to intervene in other nations (often in their domestic polit- ical affairs), with little it any accountability to Congress and the public. - Colby has justified covert CIA operations as the only choice "between a diplomatic protest and sending the marines." In Laos. however. other Options were available and used with some beneficial effect: suspend- ing aid, soliciting international diplomacy or refusing to deal with certain self-pro- claimed local governments. .These steps were at least open to. public scrutiny, while the CIA's clandestine mani- pulations and intervention were not. Secrecy tends to produce a moral blind- ness toward the means, ends and conse- quences of U.S. actions. In Laos. the CIA's 'record of political interference' and of bloody, stalemated war can be judged, at. best, only an equivocal success. Approved For Release 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 WASHINGTON POST 27 October 1974 .S. Said to Fear Lisbon Shift to Left By Miguel Acoca Special to The Washington-Post LISBON?Secretary s of , State Henry Kissinger, appar- enUy skeptical of U.S. Ent- bassy reports from here mini- mizing the peril of a Commu- nist takeover in Portugal, sent high-level intelligence and. dip- lomatic experts to this Iberian :country recently to make inde- pendent evaluations. Informed sources said that ,Xissinger dispatched Lt. Gen. - k Vernon Walters, deputy direc- tor of the Central Intelligence :Agency, to Lisbon in August 'for a "personal appraisal." :The general, who speaks excel- :lent Portuguese and is consid- .ered a specialist on Portugal, ;was in Lisbon from August 9 to 12 for meetings with high government officials and se- nior U.S. embassy staffers. The CIA would not com- ment on the persistent reports sof Walters' visit, refusing even rto confirm that it took place. LA CIA spokesman said that ,:the agency never comments ;)on the travels of its top per- ;sonnet. 1,, Two weeks ago, Kissinger sent a four-man State Depart- ; anent mission to Lisbon for still another independent re- :view of Portugal's future :course, the sources said. The !group, headed by Alan Luk- :ens, director of the depart- ment's Iberian section, in- 'eluded Robert Ryan, a depart- ;ment monetary expert, and :Michael Samuels, an authority ?on Portugal's African colonies. :The identity of the fourth mis- sion member was not dis- closed. The pro-Soviet Portuguese Communist Party has become ;an important factor in Portu- gal since the right-wing, pro- :U.S. dictatorship which ruled Portugal for 48 years was de- :posed in April. The young mil - :Rau officers who have been running the country since Then have given the Commu- nists a Cabinet post and full 'participation in the country's new military-controlled gov- ernment. Much of the strength and popularity of the Commu- nists derives from their long .!underground fight against the +dictatorship, which had out- lawed the party, ? : While . nothing could be !learned of the thrust of Wal- .ters' report to Kissinger, sources said that the Lukens :group diverged from the em- bassy's appraisal. The extent :of the differences was not dis- closed, but sources said that the embassy's reporting had 'grown more cautious as a re- sult. ; The sources said that Kise singer and others in Washing- ton were obsessed with the lear that Portugal will be the :first country to go Communist ,in what was called "a southern ?Europe domino theory" also involving Spain, Italy and ''Greece. This fear apparently has been fed by pessimistic in- telligence assessments, press reports stressing the power of the left in Portugal, and the Anxieties of multinational 'companies with interests in Portugal and its African colo- nies. ? Washington apparently fears that the emergence of the .Portuguese Communists following the fall of the dicta- torship will be duplicated in !neighboring Spain, the last re- maining pro-American rightist 1 government in Western Eu- rope. . ? _. Since his visit to Portugal, Walters has also been in Spain 'for secret talks with high Spanish officials, the sources said. The CIA deputy direc- tor's latest visit reportedly took place two weeks ago when he had a briefing on Portugal with senior Spanish-, military and civilian authori- ties. Spanish and U.S. officials are known to be concerned by the potential for Communist - infiltration from Portugal,, which has a long and hard-to-1 guard border with Spain. The' Communist Party has been1 banned in Spain since the end of the civil war in 1939. but it 1 has remained a major clandes- tine political forge in indus- -trial urban centers and the backbone of opposition to Generalissimo Francisco Franco. Another recent visitor to Spain was William 'Colby, the , CIA's director, but sources said that he had merely stop- ped in Madrid on his way east. One source, however, pointed out that visits to Iberia by high 'U.S. intelligence official I could become more frequent because the Mediterranean has risen in U.S. priority. Many Portuguese rightists who fled following the popu- list military coup in April are now living in exile in Madrid. Some have been heating a path to the U.S. embassy in Madrid to lobby for their views and to plead for help in presenting a Communist take- over. Conservatives and moder- ates still living in?Portugal are 'also said to be seeking to in- fluence the United States. Informed sources here said that during Walters' visit in August, he met with Gen. An- torilo de Spinola, then provi- sional president. At the time, Spinola, a conservative, was locked in a struggle for power 18 1 with populist Prerper Vasco Goncalves and the coordinat- ing committee of the Armed Forces Movement. Spinola resigned Sept. 20 af- ter failing to win a bid for one-man rule and martial-law powers. He sought to curb Communist activities and the leftist-controlled press and to increase his control over the decolonization of Portugal's African colonies. . Both U.S. and Portuguese government sources have pri- vately confirmed Walters' meeting with Spinola, and a subsequent conference with Gen. Francisco da Costa Go- mes, the armed forces chief who succeeded Spinola. ? High-ranking revolutionary military officers have claimed repeatedly that there are at least 100 CIA agents operating in Portugal, striving to create "another Chile." The news that Walters had been in Portugal, reported ,in Atigust and September in the _Portuguese press, aggravated WASHINGTON POST 9 October -1974 C Rol..e. Is Alleged Portugal- ..:: By Jonathan C. Randal NW-shin:ton Post POreigu Service . :PARIS, Oct. 8?the- U. S.1 Central Intelligence Agency was instrumental in. persuad- ing executives of unnamed; multinational companies .ini ? Lisbon to -subsidize a conserv-1 ative newspaper and right-i wing. political ? parties?last! summer, the satirical weekly; Le Canard Enchaine says ini its current issue. ? I In an' article by investiga- tive reporter . Claude. Angeli,t the French weekly stopped; short of. Suggesting that. the; CIA actually financed the litical parties ? -or the newspa-1 per, called 0 Tempo. The CIA also tried to get( the now ousted chief of state, - Gen. Antonio de- Spinola, to approve a new radio and tele- vision station to be ?financed by Bulhosa. a Portuguese com- pany, two unnamed Lisbon ra- dio stations and two unnamed Brazilian stations, the weekly, added. The inclusion of the Brazil; ian interests was to "allow the Americans to be present in, the deal," the paper said, with- out making clear whether Spi- nola had agreed or if the:new, station was ever set up., Gen. Vernon Walters, dep- uty director of the CIA, spent' a week's vacation ? appar-, potty in August in southern the fears of leftists of a rightd ist countercoup during the' crisis which culminated in Spi-,/ nola's resignatipn. Rightists took the visit to I, mean that United States was casting its lot with Spinola and his ideas. Leaflets and posters linking the CIA with Portuguese right began \, to appear throughout, Lisbon as the crisis devel- oped, and walls were sprayed, with anti-CIA Slogans. 'The special. Revolutionary. Security Command, led by ? Brig. Gen. Otelo de. Carvalho began to track foreigners com- ing into Portugal; particularly anti-Castro Cuban exiles,. Chi..! leans, Spaniards and Amen- cans. This led to a 'series . of raids on luxury hotels here. Also placed under surveil-I lance was the Brazilian em- bassy, which security officials; suspect of being a conduit for counter revolutionary activ- ities. Portugal "as an innocent tour-? ist" after visitin .Mediterra- nean countries, the-- weekly sad sarcastically. . ? [In Washington, the CL',re- fused to confirm or deny whether Walters had visited PortugaLl The- newspaper also said Secretary of State Henry Kis- singer let the revolutionary Portuguese leadership know? In May that the "United States was not opposed to independ-1 ence for Guinea Bissau, butt would not stand for the Portti- guese giving up the Canei Verde Island; to the Guine- ans." Kissinger's warning was: based on fears that "one day"' the Soviets would set un a na- val air base on the strate-! g,ically located islands off the coast of West Africa if they! ceased to be' Portuguese. The newspaper credited U.' S. ambassador Stuart N. Scott and the CIA with sizing up Spinola early on as a ?"bad bet." Spinola was judged un- able to reach political compro- mises and over-optimistic about his real influence in the Army and the willingness of the public to back him. By May, Washington had de- cided to step Ira contacts with ? the Portuguese general staff, but that effort apparently was not a success, the weekly sug- gested, noting ?that a purge of officer ranks was-already un- der way. The conflict between the! Portuguese Communist and Socialist parties is Oeing closely followed by the CIA,: the weekly said. It quoted an. nnamed American diplomat, 'as saying 'nogically we should play the Socialist card but I don't know if my, government will make up its mind to do Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-er Approved For Release 2001/08/08...: CIA-RDP77-00432R00010034.0004-6' WASHINGTON STAR 20 Oct. 1974 Betty Beale "MY COUNPAY HAS BEEN lating for a . ? month now," said Manuel Trucco, Chilean ambassa- dor to the OAS, at a diplo- matic dinner. "The CIA could not have destabilized the Allende government for $8 million. It's ridicu- BALTIMORE NEWS AMERICAN .6 October 1974 ? JOHN P. .110CIIE ? at About the only thing the Central Intelligence ?Agency (CIA) has not been Warned far in recent months is the Honduran flood. (And some, KGB operative has probably suggested that mystery planes were seen seeding the rain clouds so the! agency may yet end up with the flood on its door. bus." step.) When the Greek junta withered away, for .Manuel Trucco is no fly- example, Americans were suddenly in bad odor in by-night observer. He has Athens as the old charge resurfaced that the CIA served his country in such had sponsored the 1967 coup, which put the mili- capacities as undersecre- tary of foreign affairs, ambassador to Bolivia, to the OAS in the 60's, presi- tary junta in power.' In addition, the United States generally came under attack for sustaining the. junta. ? ow as ar as CIA Involvementn the events dent of the OAS commis- of 1967 is concerned, let us set the 'record straight. skin on economic affairs, By accident, I was sitting with President Johnson I and now again as his coun- and national security adviser Walt Roston When try's envoy at the Pan ?we heard of the coup. (We were in the president's American Union. So in compartment of Air Force One, en rotate back to view of the horrified reac- the United States from Konrad Andenatter's fu- tion of certain senators neral.) Johnson and Rostow did not look knowing. and columnists over the ly at each other and wink ? the president blew . CIA supposedly causing his very substantial cork. Poor Walt spent the the downfall of President rest of the ride desperately trying to find.out what Allende, his comments are had happened in Athens. If the President of the ? United States has, as advertised, the. most sophis- worth hearing. ? fleeted communications equipment in the world,?I First he had something would hate AO, see how unSophisticated stuff to say about the $350,000 works. When 'we got off the plane at Andrews the CIA allegedly spent to AFB some hours later, we still didn't knOW who bribe Chilean congress- had gone what to whom in Greece. men not to vote for Al- ? It turned out that American intelligence had Al- lende. "It's ridiculous be- been worried about -a Military coupe but .by an cause everybody, had entirely-different cast of Greek characters! -The decided to vote for Allende bunch that pulled it off had gone- undetected. - anyway. He had an agree- When it began, 'the American ambassador pre- nient before the election with the Christian Demo- pared to Implement "Operation Prometheus" (a crats. The vote was 0 to contingency plan against a Communist coup) and 16 ? offered the king a helicopter to go to Salonika and 30 for him." Second, Allende had rally his allegedly loyal troops. The king refused. nearly $2 billion in govern- That was the extent of American involvement. ment funds at his corn- Note that our effort was to maintain the constitu- tional monarchy. mand compared to the $3 ??: ;ere ? million. "Allende during ? 'Once the colonels were in power, what should his three years in .govern-..we have done? Send the Sixth Fleet and land ment had $450 million in Marines? Or treat the junta as the government of reserves; he got a credit of over $850 million from the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia and even Spain. He didn't pay any of the $800 million debts to foreign countries ? during those three years; and he negotiated another $140 million credit from abroad. On top of that the money in circulation in Chile increased fiftyfold in three years. It broke the economy . and paralyzed everything." And third, as for the truck strike which the CIA is now said to have paid for, thereby paralyzing the Allende government, Trucco says: "The truck- ers did not have any spare parts, and Allende would- n't give them the currency or the permission to im- port spare parts, so their 50,000 trucks were being paralyzed. They struck in 1972 and again in 1973. The only difference in '73 was they concentrated tAear pprovedcfmoReidase 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77- trucks in the mud on the outskirts of Santiago. "I have no idea if the $8 million was earmarked (by the CIA to overthrow Allende) or not, but-if so," Trucco said, "it wasn't enough to even get one Greece and Continue on a business as usual basis? ; Or privately put the heat on the dictatorship to restore civil rights, a free press, and other consti- tutional guarantees? When I was young, I thought a question like this could be simply answered, but :in watching the internal debate In the U.S. gov- ernment over Greek policy I learned an awful lot. Let me put It in question and answer forme - Roche: Why can'tfwe cut off military supplies? until thy release'political prisoners and restore civil rights? Are the Bulgarians or the Albanians planning to invade if Greek tanks aren't up to. ? e ? . Answer: bo you want the Sixth Fleet to oper- ate in the Eastern Mediterranean? . - ? 'Roche: Of course; it's essential If the Arabs lump. Israel and the Soviets threaten to get into the act. (As indeed happened about six weeks aft- er the Greek coup.) Answer: Then you must want to maintain our base at Suda Bay on Crete. Without it the fleet has to go all the way to Italy for supplies. Roche: What you are saying is that, in overall strategic terms, the colonels in Athens have us over a barrel? The question answered itself. In fact, as cur- rent developments in Athens ? the semi-exodu ' from NATO in particular ? indicate, whoever rules Greece has us in a strategic bind. Reluctantly I concluded we could not put the arm on the Greek junta, though in fairness we did persistently urge it in private to modify its re- pressive tactics. However, we now have in the case of Chile a ? Situation where direct pressure in defense of hu- man rights creates no strategic problem. In Sec- retary Kissinger's phrase, "Chile is a dagger pointed at the heart of Antarctica." Yet the SET- retar,y of State recently reprimanded the Ameri- ? can ambassador, David II. 'Popper, for linking possible American military assistance to an eas- ing of the military dictatorship. Having been to the other side of the moon, I am incapable of a pious shriek, but the burden of . proof Is clearly on Kissinger to demonstrate the rationale for "gigging" Ambassador Popper. 00432R000100340004-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 1.04 Znett rand :?Wed., Oct. 16, 1974 BOOK BLOWS COVER CIA and Mexico: Close Association Leaves Red Faces BY STANLEY ME1SLER Timaa Staff Writer . MEXICO CITY?Both the. United' States and Mexican governments have been embarrassed recently by an accelerating serie,z of revelations about the work of the U.S. Central. Intelligence Agency in -Mexico. The revelations are far different from those 'about the CIA efforts in Chile to weaken the government of the late Salvador Allende. There has- been no hint that the CIA is doing' anything to hurt the government of, President Luis Echeverria of ?Mexi-. Co and his ruling Party of the Insti- tutional Revolution (PRI). In fact, the stories stress that there has been close cooperation between the Mexi- can government and .the CIA.. That is what makes the revelations so em- barrassing to Mexico, Though it won't be listed on any public agenda, a disens.s 10 n . of. changes in CIA personnel and per- haps operation stemming from the 'revelations will probably take up ' some of the time of President Eche- verria and. President Ford when they meet at the border towns-of No- tales, Ariz., and Nagales? Sonora, - next Monday. . The revelations- have come from -a former CU agent in Mexico, Philip B. F. Agee, who is now 'living in London. Publishers in London and Paris plan to publish his book, "In- side the Company: A CIA Diary." in January. In advance of publication. Agee- has been talking with news- men about the work of the CIA in Mexico and the rest; of Latin Ameri- ca. These interviews have made the front pages of most Mexi- can newspapers. In some ways, the reve- lations have been less startling than the Mexican reaction to them. They have provoked confusion in government statements, recriminations among pol- iticians, accusations and counteraccusations, and a campaign by some Mexi- can journalists and polti- cians to blame a good deal of Mexico's troubles on the CIA. .In an interview in Lon- on in early October, Agee amed 35 agents within' he U.S. Embassy in Mexi- o City and two others outside-. He said that Rich- ard Sampson was the CIA station chief. in Mexico and that Jonathan Henke was his assistant. Both are classified officially as po- litical officers of the em- bassy. There were obvious er- rors on Agee's list. One man listed had left the emb as sy a few months a go. Another, Winston' Scott, whom Agee identi- fied as a former station chief now living in feigned retirement in Mexico, died a few years ago. Despite this, most inde- pendent observers believe that the list is, in general, very accurate and up to date. The identity of most of the CIA agents within an embassy is usually an open secret, known both by other employes of the embassy and by outsiders, like American newsmen, who spend much time talking with embassy- offi- cials. The-publication of. the list has .Put. the Mexican government in :a kind .of quandary. It is doubtful that .many of the Lames ? surprise Mexican officials. Most of the CIA employes. listed were probably what are known in. the .diplo- matic world as "revealed agents." . That term de- scribes CIA agents, usual- ly working in an embassy, whom the. I.T.S. govern- ment identifies to afriend- ly and cooperative govern- ment. But the 'Mexican government does not want to be known as friendly, and cooperative to the CIA.' A few days after the list was published, a Mexi- can delegation asked the Interparliamentary Union. meeting In Tokyo to con- demn the interference by intelligence ? agencies in .the internal affairs Of oth- er countries. The Mexi- cans, however, cited .the CIA in Chile, not Mexico, as an example. ? So ' 'far, the Mexican government has not ex- pelted' any of those on the list. Asked about this at a news conference. P r e s- Went Echeverria. in a mild and somewhat con- fusing comment. said, "In regard to two or three of the people, we can never expel them from the coun- try because they died some time ago. The others are officials' of the Ameri- can Embassy who worked there publicly in different offices. ? "This man (Agee) Was here. in 1968," ? Echeverra went on.. "and he had in- terests, who knows why, tci make, these declare-, tions, and, curiously, he is very,. insistent about the 'subiect. But there are cdead people on the pub- lished list. I believe that it :will. soon be made more precise for me who is dead .and who works in. the American Embassy, ? This is the present si- tuation. We are going to invite this man to Mexico to help us find them." The reaction of the U.S. Embassy has been about what might be expected. When Agee's first revela- tions came, U.S. Ambasa.7 dor Joseph John Jova told . Mexican, newsmen, -"You' have to realize that ,Agee is a bitter, fired ex-em- ploye. That's why you should take these things with a grain of ?salt." But once the list was published, ? the embassy switched to, silence. With- out denying the accuracy of the list, the embassy has refused to comment on ? ? it. . ..4surring the list iS gen- -erally accurate, it is ob- vious that the work of some CIA agents has been handicapped by the loss of ?Cover. F'''ew Mexicans. will 'want to 'keep up friend- ships with those On- the list. The CIA obviously needs to send at least a Sew new agents to Mexico now.. ? Watergate burst, a prominence to the :CIA 'operations in Mexico. Ac- ? the House Judi- ciary Committee, the aides of fOrmer President Rich- ard M. Nixon tried in vain in 1972 to persuade the Federal Bureau of Investi- gation that its investiga- tion of campaign' money laundered in ?Mexico would hurt the CIA's oper- ations there. The CIA, however.. refused' to sup- port the White House on. the contention. In the Sen- ate. Watergate. COmrnit- te's in-.-es-tU:.-mti?:2., ? Sen. Howard Baker Ft-Tenn.) - learned by accident that 'the CIA had disbanded a Washirton pubic rela- tions firm in 1972 because it feared that a former agent was going to. re- veal that the firm .was act- ing as its cover in Mexico City. Watergate conspira- tor and former CIA agent E. Howard Hunt Jr, .had once been identi;:ied as an employe of the firm, the Robert Mullen Co. The former agent who worried the CIA was Agee. Agee, now 39, re- signed from the . CIA in. 1969 after working for the' agency for 12 ?year t in ,Washington; Mexico, Ecuador and Uruguay, Af- ter resignation, Agee .visited Cuba three times. In early July, a U.S. government source told newsmen 'in Washington that Agee had revealed - CIA secrets to a Soviet se- cret agent in Havana. Agee denied this and said he had visited ebbe only to gather more material for his book.. The U.S. source later withdrew the accusation' but said "the. presumption is that he (Agee) was very forthcom- ing in . Havana, and that Havana was very forth- coming with Moscow." In any case, the source said the CIA. arranged some of its Latin American opera- tions after Agee's visits to Cuba: - in his many press inter- views and leaks of his manuscript, Agee has de- scribed -Mexico as an ex- tremely important base of Coperations for the CIA., "Because of the strategic importance of Mexico to the United States, its size and proximity, and the abundance of enemy (i.e., Communist) activities, the Mexico City (CIA) station is the largest in the hemis- phere," Agee has said. Agee has also character- ized the 'relations between the CIA and the Mexican government as "exception- al," claiming that Mexican security forces collaborate ' closely with CIA agents In fact, according to Agee, former President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz preferred meeting with station chief Winston Scott rather than - U.S. Ambassador Fulton Freeman in the late 1960s, causing conflict between' the. station chief and the ambassador. This conflict man, who is now president has been denied by Free- of the Monterey Institute of Foreign Studies in Mon-. terey, Calif. The close relationship between Scott and Pres- ident Diaz Ordaz began, according to Agee, in the previous Mexican admin- istration when Diaz Ordaz was secretary of the interi- or. the official in charge of Mexican security. Agee. has alse giiti that .1")rcside-iit Echeverria, when he was . 'Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 Approved For. Release 2001/08/08 : CIA7RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 . secretary of the interior in Diaz Ordaz' administra- tion, worked with the CIA station chief. But acrbfd- ing to Agee this personal relationship with the CIA was broken when Eche-1 verria took over the office of president in 1970. This disclosure has so upset the Mexican govern- ment, Agee has said, that the Mexicans have tried to pressure his publishers to delete all references to Echeverria in the book. Besides naming the American agents within the U.S. Embassy, Agee has said that at least 50 iMexican agents, working for the Americans, have infiltrated the Mexican government, t h e ruling party and other Mexican oianizations. The Ministry of the In- terior issued a statement, saying, "The government of Mexico does not permit and will not permit activi- ties in our territory by any foreign agency, no matter what its origin, that tries to interfere in our internal affairs:" The ministry promised an investigation of Agee's charges. ? Although the govern... meat has not expelled any American on Agee's list of CIA agents, some Mexi- cans have peen using the publicity over Agee's dis- closures to blame many of Mexico's troubles on the CIA. JAPAN TIMES 5 OCTOBER 19711 CIA Airline BANGKOK (UPI)?A civi- lian airline with links to the U.S. Central Intelligence' Agency (CIA) has begun flights that include parachut- ing military supplies to? belea- guered Khmer garrisons, offi- cials said Friday. A U.S. spokesman said C130 transports operated by Bird Air, headquartered in Wash- ington State, started some sup- ply flights from U Tapao Air Base in Thailand ' this week and was expected to take over the airlift from the U.S. Air Force by Oct. 14. The Pentagon announced last week that Bird Air would fly the four-engine transports belonging to the Air Force with civilian crews under a $1,760,000 contract. A spokes- man said the move was aimed at reducing U.S. military pre- sence in Khmer. ? WASHINGTON STAR 17 October 1974 '? By Harry Rositzke 'Special to the Star-News According to its author, "Without Cloak or Dagger" will set the record straight on CIA's remarkable success in its operations overseas, a "balanced and accurate" inside account to place against the dismal record of publicized failures and hostile exposes. It pro- fesses to offer "the truth about the new espionage," though author Miles Cope- land has stated that he left the CIA more than 17 years ago. It is a naive and unpersuasive per- formance. , What emerges is the writer's main bent, as a schoolmaster. Apparently an ,intelligence instructor in his early days, he refers frequently to training courses, curricula, and lectures. Like any good ? teacher, he likes tidy rules and number- edtoxes. THE MOST ludicrous example of the author's schematic approach is his model for "the ideal espionage opera- tion." An agent is handled, through a Cutout,. by a principal agent who, through a cutout, trarrmits both in- structions from and intelligence reports to a resident who in turn contacts his? "case-officer" ? five points of contact and possible exposure. Ideally, the case-officer handles only one agent, though elsewhere the author notes that the best case-officer is the busiest case- officer. The author also has a flair for making flat statements that are wrong: About half the agents in the world have been recruited through their wives, and many agents are wives (this is a notion, IChrushchey tells us, shared by Stalin). ? Blackmail now plays a greater role in recruiting agents than it ever did be- fore. O Most spies do no know what espio- nage service they are working for. O Espionage services use "intelligent, emotionally stable women for a wide variety of purposes including the f the CIA 17.3UBLISIZTRS WEEla.,Y 30 Sep 19711. UNDERCOVER: Menioirs of an ? American Secret Agent. E. Howard Hunt. Putnam, $N.95 ? As few do, Hunt's absorbingly written memoir authentic view of the .hangover, in our time, Of the romantic good guys VS; had 'guys notion .that had unquestionable validity during World War IF when I hint went on NVOIAN jde "ops"' for the OSS?Mexico, China; Ja- pan, etc. Hunt was a derring-doer in a murderous business chose "enemies list". Caine ready-made...It seems inevitable that the . patriotic justifications would carry over from hot war to cold war-- and ultimately to the Oval Office. H tint's fast-paced narrative, read with .sophis- ? Books WITHOUT CLOAK OR DAGGER. By Miles Copeland. Simon & Schuster. 351 pages. $8.95. seduction of prospective agents" (it is reassuring to hear that "the CIA is now out of the brothel business"). 0 Until the CIA developed modern methods (whatever they are), its spies were "universally unreliable." 0 The British and Americans normally run operations into a country from an outside capital. Copeland is a romantic at heart. He. dresses up CIA officials with droll, non-- existent nicknames in the best spy-fie- tion tradition: Mother, Kingfish, Jojo, Fisherman. He casually tosses around such hip phrases as "termination with extreme prejudice (i.e., liquidation)." - A FAVORITE phrase of Copeland's is "creative intelligence." What stands out in his account of CIA operations is ? his own creative imagination. After as- serting in his preface that the CIA can- not be as ineffective as it appears to be. ?otherwise, there would be no CIA ? he proceeds to garnish his tale with en- tirely mythical examples of its great prowess, especially in operating inside the Soviet Union: The CIA sends agents into a remote Siberian village to get data on its electric supply; It runs full- time Communist Party workers as. principal agents with contacts through- out the Soviet Union; it covers vast areas of the USSR and China with - agents sent in by air and across the bor- der, etc. etc. It is all very heady. The author's cheerfully laudatory comments on CIA performance have led some observers to see his book as a CIA bult-up job. With friends like Copeland, the CIA has no need for the surfeit of enemies it now possesses. Harry Positzke is a former employe of the CIA. ticaied hindsight (and an eye on some seemingly disingenuous passages), fasci- nates as it carries through his postwar CIA career (Mexico and the Guatemalan coup: the Bay of Pigs) right into Hunt's step-by-step story of Watergate and its aftermath. Et hardly seems in hint's na- ture to re-examine the undcrk nu as- sumptions of his lifetime of undoubted patriotic. service. But few readers can es- cape the weight of his personal tragedy? wife dead, his life shattered. For that rea- son, its pungent readability and its "reve- lations" aside, his book seems the most .moving, account. by tiny Watergate figure thus far. National ad-promo canif)aign. ?I l's?' oven, her II 1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-004HR000100340004-6 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 THE MURDER OF .CHE GUEVARA ACCORDING TO MARCHETTI AND MARKS Athena EPIKAIRA in Greek 5 Sep 74 PP 32734, 41 ifext7 EPIKAIRA starts today the exclusive publication of 1-he most revealing document that has ever come to light on the activities of the American CIA. It concerns the book "CIA and the Cult of Intelligence" by Victor Marchetti and John Marks, two former CIA senior officials. The things revealed in the 1.400 pages of the Marchetti and Marks book are truly shocking; so much so that the CIA tried through every legitimate and illegitimate means to prevent its publication. When the CIA found out that it could not stop publication, it resorted-to the courts and asked for? the deletion of 368 "hot" paragraphs which referred to specific persons and events. Publication was delayed for over a year. Finally, the courts "cut" 168 paragraphs and allowed the other 200 to go through. From the very first week of publication the book became an instant best-seller in the United States, the first book in American history to. have been censored before publication. In the two chapters published today by EPIKAIRA, the, authors reveal how the CIA developed into such a powerful agency that operates beyond the law, and CIA's involvement in the capture and execution of Che Guevara in 1967 in Bolivia. CIA: Above and Beyond the Law A powerful and dangerous cult is currently prevalent throughout the United States--a cult which holds spying as its god. The saints of this cult are the professional agents of the CIA. Its patrons and protectors are the highest officials in the federal government. Its membership which extends beyond government circles includes leading personalities in industry, commerce, finance and labor. Its friends are many in all those sectors which exert significant influence on public opinion, the academic world and the media. The cult constitutes a secret fraternity of the American political elite. The CIA is both the center and the main instrument of this cult. Its task is intelligence and counter-intelligence, propaganda and nprovocatsia"-- the deliberate distribution of false information--psychological warfare and paramilitary actions and activities. It infiltrates and manipulates private institutions, it even establishes its own organizations?known as "companies"--when this becomes necessary. It recruits agents and mercenaries. It bribes and blackmails foreign leaders to carry out the most malodorous objectives. It uses any means to accomplish those goals, without any reservations as to the methods used or as to the moral consequences of its activities. The CIA's most potent weapon is its covert intervention in the internal affairs of countries the American government wishes to control or influence. The Presidents Lie The cult insists on directing the US governmental affairs without informing the people and without public participation. It does not accept any checks on its activities from the legislative bodies or the press. Its followers believe that they alone have the right and the obligation to decide what is needed to serve the national interest. The "mentality, of secrecy" is cultivated in a climate of illegality and fraud. It encourages professional amoralism--the belief, that right objectives may be achieved by unholy and normally unacceptable means. In this way, the leaders of the cult keep their official activities out of 22 Appioyed For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100346004-6 a* Approved For Release, 2001/08/08 J,CIA7RDF'77700432R000100340004-6 public view with constant vigilance. Whenever necessary, the members of the cult--including the presidents of the United States who always know, generally approve and often inspire the more significant CIA operations--have lied without shame to protect the secret service and to conceal their own responsibility for its actions. The Eisenhower administration lied to the American people on the CIA involvement in the Guatemala coup in 1954, on its support to the unsuccess- ful uprising in Indonesia in 1958 and on the mission of Gary Powers with the U-2 spy plane over Russia in 1960. The Kennedy administration lied on the CIA role in the unsuccessful invasion in Cuba in 1961 and confessed its involvement only after the catastrophic failure of that operation. The Johnson administration lied on the extent of the American commitments to Laos and Vietnam and totally concealed the role of the CIA. The Nixon administration, too, lied on the CIA attempt to "manipulate" Chile's election in 1970. For the cult followers, 4ynocricy and deceit as well as secrecy are the ,sacred methods used to prevent the public from learning about the CIA's secret operations and to avoid any accounting on those operations by the American government. Blunders and Luck The absolute secrecy surrounding the CIA's activities has resulted--and continues to do so--in keeping the public from even imagining how many times the agency has failed. In the sector of classic syping, the CIA's secret services have failed dismally in their efforts to infiltrate their major targets. The Penkofsky affair, in the early 1960s--the only intelli- gence operation against the Soviets for which the CIA can be proud--was just a "lucky break" due entirely to the British Intelligence Service. The widely-advertised operation of the Berlin tunnel in the middle 1950s-- in reality it was a giant wiretapping network?resulted in meager gains in terms of significant information that could be of use to the CIA brain- trust. The true value of that operation lay in the embarrassment it caused to the KGB and the favorable publicity it brought to the CIA. Not .a single intelligence success was scored against China. The CIA secret services were more successful in counter-intelligence than in the sector of classic spying. But even in this case, the successes are mostly due to luck. Most successes were not due to CIA spies but to the good offices of escapees who divulged all they knew in exchange for gaining safety for themselves. In the CIA's favorite sector of covert activities, the Operatives scored their greatest successes but it is also true that their blunders and failures often very seriously embarrassed the United States. Specifically, the CIA played a basic the Iron Curtain following the first dismally in its efforts to push back Bamboo Curtain in the late 1940s and by questionable means, in its effort other parts of the world. Even Against the USA role in keeping Western Europe outside Cold War period, although it failed the Iron Curtain as well as the . in the 1950s. It also succeeded, to prevent communist expansion in Some of its "successes," however, boomeranged and hit the American govern- ment itself. It is hard to understand how the CIA braintrust failed to realize that it would have been more prudent for the agency not to get involved in Guatemala, Cuba or Chile, to avoid its secret role in Iran or in other parts of the Middle East and to avoid getting so deeply involved in the internal affairs of Soutbeaet A. 084-tarlioffratilkoboigels04444. But Approved For Release . - 23 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 the CIA became involved and the American nation has to live with the consequences of those activities. More recently, the Watergate investigation revealed some of the CIA secret operations within the U3 itself and presented a terrifying picture of the methods used by the CIA for so many years in other countries. Its assis- tance to the White House "plumbers" and the attempt to put all the blame for the cover-up on the CIA revealed to the American public the dangers' involved for a democracy in an inadequately controlled secret intelligence agency. The issue is simple: Should the CIA operate in keeping with its original objectives--as a coordinating agency responsible for gathering, evaluating and processing information for the perusal of the appropriate officials as they formulate government policies--or should it be allowed to operate in this fashion for so many years as a secret instrument of the White House and of a clique of powerful individuals who are not subject to accounting for their actions and whose main objective is interfere in the internal affairs of other countries--and possibly of the United States as well--through agents, propaganda, covert paramilitary interventions and all kinds of dirty tricks? Hunting Che in Bolivia When Ernesto "Che" Guevara disappeared from the political stage in Cuba in the spring of 1965 nobody could give a specific explanation. Some reports said that the Argentine revolutionary, a physician and a comrade-in-arms of Fidel Castro, had challenged the authority of the Cuban leader and that he had been imprisoned or executed as a result. Other reports claimed that Guevara had lost his mind and with no hope of recovery he had been confined to a country villa in one of Cuba's provinces. Some other reports said that Che had formed a band of devoted followers and had left Cuba to start another revolution somewhere else. At first the people in the CIA did not know what to believe. But gradually some information on Guevara's whereabouts began to filter in from the CIA field stations. The clues were loose and imprecise but they all seemed to point to Africa. In the Republic of the Congo (today's Zaire) another uprising had broken out and the reports from the CIA agents there indicated the presence of foreign revolutionaries. Some of their methods and tactics revealed Guevara's unique style. But the uprising fizzled out suddenly before one could verify those reports. By the fall of 1965 that area was calm again. But the CIA mercenaries--some of them "Bay of Pigs" veterans-- who assisted the Congolese government in putting down the uprising were convinced, and so were their superiors in Washington, that Che was indeed in that area. It was later.that the CIA learned that Che Guevara and a band of over. 100 -revolutionaries had slipped into the Congo from neighboring Tanzania in the spring of 1965. Their objective, was to spark a general uprising in Africa but their revolutionary zeal found no worthy imitators among the native guerrillas and the local population. "Disillusioned, Che returned ? secretly 6 months. later to Cuba to make plans for his next adventure At that time, however, all that the CIA knew wasthat he had disappeared again. Once again conflicting reports regarding his role, his health, etc, began to reach the CIA. In early 1967, reports reaching the agency pointed to the heart of South America--to Bolivia. Mary of the: CIA officials in charge of secret operations were convinced that Guevara was the brain behind the guerrilla movement in Bolivia's southern mountains but some of the CIA top leaders were reluctant to agree. In spite of this climate of doubt, come CIA special operations agents were sent to Bolivia to assist the local forces in their' fight against the guerrillas. Ironically, not even the then president of Bolivia,. Rene BarrientosIbelieved that-Guevara was involved in the guerrilla move- ment. Two months later, in April 1967, two events dramatically reaffirmed the belief of the CIA agents in Bolivia as well as in the CIA headquarters 24 Approved-ForRetease 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6. - - ` Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-0.0432R000100340004-6 that Guevara was the leader of the guerrillas. At the beginning of the month, a unit of the Bolivian army caputred the guerrilla base in Nanda- chausu fEransliteration7 where they found a wealth of documents, pictures and diaries left by the guerrillas as they fled. Included in the material seized by the army were pictures of a slightly balding gray-haired man with glasses who bore a striking resemblance to Guevara, as an exhaustive study of the pictures revealed. Moreover, two fingerprints seemed to resemble those of Guevara. The documents further revealed that some of the guerrillas operating in Bolivia were Cubans, possibly the same individuals that had gone to the Congo with Guevara. Ten days later, the French leftist journalist Regie Debre was arrested near Muupamba /transliteration7 together with two other foreigners who were suspected ofhaving contacts with the guerrillas. Debre had disappeared a few months after he had cone to Bolivia to collect material for a geo- political study. As he stated several months later, Debre escaped execution thanks to the intervention of the CIA operatives who accompanied the Bolivian forces which arrested him. Those CIA agents later showed him certain confidential data which convinced him that the CIA knew much more about his activities abroad and especially in Bolivia than he could ever imagine. Debre initially refused to admit that he knew anything at all about Guevara's involvement in the guerrilla movement. But soon he gave in and started talking in an effort to save himself from being tried and executed. The clues were coming in fast. But the CIA director, Richard Helms, continued to refuse to believe that the legendary revolutionary had indeed appeared again and that he was leading another revolt. Helms derided the reports of the field agents who claimed to have in their hands prel)f of Guevara's presence in Bolivia. Helms was of the opinion that Guevara was probably dead. But Thomas Karamesinis, chief of secret operations in the CIA at that time, who had presented the case to.Helms, did not give up his conviction that his agents were on Guevara's trail. Other CIA "advisors," some of them Bay of Pigs veterans, were soon dispatched to Bolivia to help in tracking down Guevara. A group of specialists from the American Army Special Forces came to La Paz from the Canal Zone to train Bolivian commandos in anti-guerrilla warfare. The-secret services were obsessed with Guevara, and in a way they were afraid of him. He was a constant, irritating reminder of their Day of Pigs failure. Unable to vent their anger on the American officials who had undertaken that desperate operation, and without any possibility of getting even by destroying Castro himself or his Soviet or Chinese allies-, the CIA Secret Services continued to deplore their failure--until the reappear- ance of Guevara offered a provocative target to the CIA. His arrest or death would give the CIA an opportunity to take revenge for past failures. .A$14,200 Reward In the summer of 1967, while the men of the CIA Special Operations division were helping the Bolivian army in its pursuit of Guevara, reports came in regarding the way he had entered Bolivia. It was made known that he had arrived in La Paz in Noverber 1966 from Havana by way of Prague, Frankfurt and Sao Paolo, traveling with a false Paraguayan passport and disguised as a bald, gray-haired bespectacled merchant?totally different from his familiar appearance on posters, Fifteen other Cubans had preceded him to help him with the Bolivian operation, There was no longer any doubt that Che Guevara was in Bolivia, leading the guerrilla movement in the country's southern region. The Bolivian govern- ment offered a reward of $41200 for Che Guevara--dead or alive. Now his extermination was only a matter of time. In the following months the guerrillas met one defeat after another at the hands of the Bolivian commandos who had been trained by the Americans and Approved For Release 2001/08/45 CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 were assisted by CIA advisors. One encounter on the last day of August ended with the death of the mysterious Tania, the only woman in Guevara's guerrilla band. Although she appeared as a Cuban secret agent, a liaison between the guerrillas and Havana, it was at last revealed that this East German woman was in reality a double agent. Her main employer was the Soviet KGB which--like the CIA--wanted to keep an eye? on the Cuba-financed revolutionary activities of Guevara in Latin America. Less than 6 weeks later, on 8 October, Guevara himself was wounded and captured near the small mountain village of La Biguera. ,As with Debre earlier, the CIA advisors who were with the Bolivian aliv tried to bring Guevara alive back to La Paz for an in depth investigation. .But the commander of the Bolivian units had orders to execute him. The only proof he had to bring back was the head and the hands--irrefutable proof that Guevara was dead. While the CIA advisors were trying. to delay the Bolivian colonel, the chief of the CIA field station in La Paz was trying to persuade President Barrientos of the long-term advantages to be gained by having Guevara moved ? .from the mountains to the capital as the government's prisoner. But .Barrientos was adamant. He claimed that Dare's case had caused him enough headaches and Guevara's arrival at the capital alive night possibly set off - demonstrations by university students and leftists--demonstrations that the 'government might find impossible to contain. - Desperate, the field station chief turned for help that same evening to the CIA headquarters at Langley but to no avail. Convinced that neither the field station nor the Washington headquarters could convince Barrientos, ,the CIA chief agent at La effort to interrogate Che. But the revolutionary did not appear willing to 000perate. He was willing to talk about political philosophies and the revolutionary movements in _general but he refused to give any information on the details of his Bolivian operation or on his previous activities in other areas. The CIA had to be content With his personal diary which he carried at the time of his arrest. Che 16 Executed The final decision came from the capital early the next morning. The prisoner was to be executed on the Spot and his body, tied to the landing gear of a helicopter, was to be transferred to Villagrande for identifica- tion by a small group of journalists and government representatives. Then the body was to be buried in a nameless grave outside the city. As soon as the CIA agent learned of this order...rushed to the school building where Guevara was being held and made a last attempt to interrogate the prisoner. There was not much time left. The execution would.take place in a couple of hours. Guevara' s last moments are described in a rare, moving report sent by the agent to the CIA headquarters. The Cuban, a veteran CIA liaison officer, remarked that Guevara was certain at the beginning that somehow he was going to come out alive from this ordeal. But when he finally realized that he was about to die, his pipe slipped from his mouth. But soon he regained his composure and asked for some tobacco. His painful leg wound seemed no longer to bother him. He accepted his fate with a stoic sigh, without asking for any last favor. The 5gent7...apparent1y felt admiration and compassion for the man whose capture and aecution he had aided. A few minutes later Che Guevara was dead. The following summer Che's diary appeared suddenly and quickly reached the hands of his comrades in Havana and some of his American admirers--the magazine RAMPARTS--which immediately verified its authenticity and began its publication, to the great discomfort of the CIA and of the Bolivian government which had made public only those parts which supported their charges against Guevara and his guerrillas. In the confusion of conflicting accusations, Antonio Arguentas, the Bolivian minister of interior, disappeared in July while an orgy of rumors identified him as the in who had given the diary for publication. As minister of interior, Arguentas 26 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 ?: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 was the chief of the Bolivian Secret Service, which had close ties with the CIA. Arguentas himself was a CIA agent. It soon became known that Arguentas had escaped to Chile where he intended to seek political asylum. But the Chilean authorities delivered Arguentas to the CIA field station and the agent who was initially his superior was immediately dispatched from the Washington CIA headquarters to bring him back to his senses. But in spite of the CIA admonitions, Arguentas continued to speak in public against the CIA and its activities in Bolivia. He denounced the Barrientos reglme as an instrument of American imperialism, criticized the government for its handling of the Guevara case and then he disappeared again, causing a serious political crisis in Bolivia. During 1968, Arguentas appeared from time to time in London, New York and Peru. Sometimes deriding and sometimes threatening the CIA agents in every field station who were trying to keep him from talking, the former minister confessed that he was the one who made Che's diary public. He claimed that he didso because he agreed with the motives of the revolutionary and with his effort to impose popular social, political and economic changes in Bolivia and in the other countries of Latin America. In the end, to the consternation of the CIA and the Barrientos government, he revealed that he had been a CIA agent since 1965 and that some other Bolivian politicians were also included in the CIA's payroll. He described the circumstances of his recruitment and he revealed that the CIA had threatened to disclose his radical past as a university student and thus destroy his political career if he did not agree to become an agent. Finally the CIA came to some agreement with Arguentas who returned voluntarily to Bolivia-- apparently to stand trial. During the flight from Lima to La Paz, Arguentas told a NEW YORK TIMES reporter that in the event "something happened" to him, a tape recording with all his charges against the CI 1 and the Barrientos government would be delivered to certain persons in the United States and in Cuba. The tape, he said, was in the custody of Lieutenant Mario Teran. Strangely, Teran had been previously identified as the man who executed Guevara. In his interview, Arguentas hinted at the extent of his potential revela- tions by disclosing the names of several CIA officials with whom he had worked together in the past: Hugo Murrey, field station chief, John Hilton, former field station chief, Larry Sternfield and Nick Lendiris. He also revealed the identity of some CIA liaison officers who had assisted in the capture of Guevara: Joli Gabriel Garcia, a Cuban, and Edie and Mario Gonzales, Bolivians. Arguentas also stated that the Gonzales brothers had saved Debre's life. He claimed, however, that Barrientos and even the American ambassador did not know the full extent of the CIA's infiltration into the Bolivian government. The last act of the story was written the following summer, almost 2 years after the death of Che Guevara. President Barrientos was killed when his helicopter crashed on his return from a tour. Six weeks later, Antonio Arguentas, by his own admission a CIA agent who was to be tried for treason and for the publication of the Guevara diary, was murdered in one of La Paz' narrow back streets. A month later, Herbert? Rojas, the guide of the Bolivian commandos and of their CIA advisors in the search for Guevara and one of the very few people who probably knew where the revolutionary leader was buried, was murdered in Santa Cruz. The tapes with the incriminating evidence, which Arguentas claimed to have entrusted to Mario Texan, disappeared. 27 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 LONDON OBSERVER 13 October 19714 piu fil 'as hln ? by our Foreign Staff ? 'COPIES of the television film ..The " Opium'- War- 'Lords,' shot in Burma by two yoUnnb Briton's' 'Lind Screened by ATV last week, are being flown to the United States in an attempt to rouse official and public interest in the startling offer it contains. 'In interviews in the. film, officers of the rebellious Shan State Army (SSA) undertake to destroy the region's poppy Crop, believed a major sOurce Of the heroin sold illegally to addicts on the streets of ;America. ? In return, the SSA wants $12 million (about ?4.500,000) and American help towards 14 permanent solution' of jts prolonged rebellion against the Burmese central Government. ? ??With the co-operation of SA, the two British film- makers, Mt- Chris Menges and Mr Adrian Cowell, spent more than' a year in Shan State filming the conflict be- een rival war-lords cen- tred on the opium convoys heading* towards America's illegal drugs market. The two also brought out a written tatement of the SSA's offer. But the American Nar- tics Bureau, Mr Cowell says, at first ? showed no nterest in the plan. When ressure was applied by Mr ester Wolff, a New York emocrat and chairman of he House of Representatives arcotics sub-committee, the mean considered the SSA lan?and rejected it. At this point, Neither Mr tolff nor the bureau had en the British film, which any viewers believe adds a rear deal to the credibility f the Shan State's Army's Ian. -The hope now is that the 28 KACHI kSTATE CORM 1.? 7-R7KtIaboN ? 0 100 2001 Miles 0111NA ES LAOS THAILAND' i n-n---BAY?BANGKOK, :=E3ENA 1:=7? ? film will be shown on America's national networks, enabling Mr 'Wolff?if he is returned to the House at the coming elections?to ? revive the 'issue. ? Mr Cowell says Mr Wolff . . is meet some Of the Shan leaders at the ?Thailand ? border: It might be possible to persuade them to Send representatives to the US and talk about their offer. At least a? third of the world's illegal narcotics sup- plies are produced in this area of Burma and the quan- tity passing through the, Shan area each year amounts to about 400 tons, in the form of opium. The total production of . To rkey?n?ow the primary concern of Mr Wolff's sub- committee?is only about 100 tons. The 400 tons of Opium the SSA and its allies are now offering to burn, under inter- national supervision, is the equivalt,-,nt of 40 tons of heroin, which would be worth about ?400 million sold on the streets of America. In addition, American efforts to impede the illegal drugs traffic cost vast sums of money every year. Our Washington corres- pondent tells us that Ameri- can opposition to the plan is based on the belief that an operation aimed at acquiring and destroying the whole of the tribesmen's poppy crop could not be Made to work. It is also, feared that much of the ?money would be used to buy arms for use in the Shan rebellion-7.m which the Burmese Government would obviously raise the strongest objections. NEW YORK TIMES 27 October 1974 Ford, Moscow and Pekin WASHINGTON By Jarnes Reston -WASHINGTON, Oct. 26?The 'rela- tions between the United States and ,both the Soviet Union and China have .changed in subtle ways since Presi- ;dent Ford moved into the White Hotise. Washington's 'policy toward the two major Communist states remains the 'Same, but Moscow - and Peking are 'rbeing very cautious about Mr. Ford, :who is a new figure on the world 'stage, and they are wondering what :he's like, how long he will last and vwho will succeed .him. , All the civilities and diplomatic courtesies of the last couple of years were extended "to Secretary of State Kissinger in his latest mission to Mos- cow, but progress toward the control -of nuclear arms was slight_at best, and for obvious reasons. Any really serious agreement to end the nuclear arms race could not begin to be effective for two or three years, and it would limit freedom of action, for the major nuclear powers there- after, but who would be President of the United States in three years? Mr. Ford, whom the Soviets don't know, or maybe even "Scoop? Jackson, the :Democratic Senator from Washington, ,who is regarded in Moscow with al- most as much suspicion as Mao Tse- 'lung and Chou- En-lai. So there is a pause now in talks among representatives of the big con- tinental and nuclear nations. Nobody knows what is going to happen after the departure of Gerald Ford in Wash- ington or the aged leaders in Peking. .They are all willing to meet but not 'to decide, and particularly not to lock themselves into long-range policies for a future nobody can foresee. There is another change in the re- cent propaganda of both Moscow and Peking. They seldom agree these days in their relations with one another, but -lately they have been agreeing about the economic crisis 'in the capitalist" world. Both have been dramatizing the problems of inflation in Europe, the Unitecb.States and Japan; the crises Of colonialism in Portugal; the transi- tion from fascism to monarchy in Spain. Both have also been supporting the Arab oil states against the industrial capitalist states and seeing in the "en- ergy crisis" a new economic oppor- tunity to weaken the free world, and '-a new strategic opportunity to block- ade Europe, Japan, and even the United States at the, source of their oil and :industrial power in the Middle East. Leonid I3rezhnev, by all reports, was very tough on Mr. Kissinger in Mos- cow. He was bitter about Senator Jackson's insistence on the immigra- tion of 60,000 Jews a year from the Soviet Union to Israel and astonished that Mr. Jackson would be allowed to Rome out on the White House steps And define, inaccurately, the compro- mise. Mr, Kissinger was furious about this and President Ford ignored it at ? first and finally had to correct it, bu Mr. Kissinger had to deal with thi confusion when he got to Moscow. - President Ford, out campaigning fo Republicans in Congress, is not reall putting his Mind to this world prob lem. He is looking for Republican seat in the House and Senate, and arguin that somehow this will help deal wit these larger world questions. n The truth is that even his own Cab inet, which is also trying to deal wit .iflation, the balance of payments, th Russians and the Chinese, thinks tha ? he is not only wasting his time bu _ is raising doubts about his judgment. In the next two or three years, the ? leadership of the United States. Chin _ and probably the Soviet Union, i going to pass from the old generatio to the new. In the United States, i may .pass fromnGerald Ford to Nelson Rockefeller, to Henry Jackson, or even ? to a third-party conservative coalition of Ronald Reagan and George Wallace. In China, it may even pass from the anti-Soviet leadership of Mao Tse-tung and- Chou En-lai to a new military junta that will revive the Soviet- Chinese Communist alliance agains ? the West, Nobody knows, so everybody ; is waiting. Mr. Kissinger hoped when' he came to Washington that he was going to define. and organize arrangements ? for the coming world, but it is not working out exactly as he had hoped. There is no political, economic or financial stability in the world today. Last year, it seemed that the major powers were coming together on the control of arms and the avoidance of ? war, and they are still trying to do so. But on the problems of food, energy and population, and on the organiza- tion of a new order of the world, they are still deeply divided. In fact, the political trend now is toward division and confrontation. The Communists are seeking economic dis- array of the capitalist world as con- firmation of their Marxist prophecies. The Jacksons and Reagens in America are swinging American politics toward nationalism and anti-Communism, and the Russians and Chinese are watching all this with their usual skepticism. The result is that no big deals abotit disarmament or anything else are like- ly to be made in the next few years with either the Russians or the Chi- nese or even the Europeans: They know that American power in the world is probably decisive, both economically and militarily, but they don't know how President Ford is going to use that power or who is going to succeed him. So the Russians have been polite with Mr. Kissinger in Moscow, and the Indians will probably also be polite in the next few days, and so will the Chinese when he goes to Peking later on. But nobody is in a mood now to make any long-range commitments: We are now in a holding operation for the next few years. waiting to find out who is going to come after the tem- porary leaders who now preside over the major capitals of the world. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 Approved Fqr Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340J304-6 NEW YORK TIMES 27 October 1974 uro es Communists djust, for Power's Sake By? ANDRE FONTAINE PARIS?Lenin in his day- denounced the treason of the Social Democrats and broke with them be- cause they rejected what he saw as inescapable re- course to violence and instead 'accepted "class col- laboration." What would he say today? seeing the Communist parties of the Latin part of Europe set out, one after the other, on the very road? he condemned? The French Communist party has just held In a' Paris suburb an extraordinary congress, the first in its history. Its objective was to turn into durable strategy, not to say doctrine, the political line that has led to its alliance with the Socialist party and aims to gain power legally, even if it is shared. The French Communist chief, Georges Marchais, does nth hesitate to reduce to mere "nuances" the past dis- agreements of his party with Charles de Gaulle to be able to invite "the authentic Gaullists" to join, the union of the left. The Italian Communist party is going even further. While in France it is a case of having the right beaten by the left, the Communists of the Itailan peninsula are campaigning for an "historical corn- promise" with the Christian Democrats in order to. avert a threat to existing freedoms posed from the extreme right. The same game is played by the Spanish Com- ? munist party, now reconciled with the Kremlin after a long quarrel. The party's boss, Santiago Carillo,' has taken up contacts in almost all quarters, includ- ing the army.-And, together with Rafael Calvo Serer, .the Catholic and monarchist who was one of the founders of the famous Opus Dei and one of the pillars of the Franco regime, he has constituted a' "junta of national union" which aspires to govern the country after the Caudillo has left the scene. Finally in Portugal, the Communist party is al- ready partaking in power through its Secretary General, Alvaro Cunha!, back from a long exile in Prague immediately after the fall of the Caetano' regime. In a short time he has become the principal political force in the country and has officially rejected all references to "the dictatorship of the proletariat," a notion going back to Marx and as fundamental to Leninist thought as that of class struggle. The Rise of the 'Maoists' As always when an extreme left movement modifies its political line, a more eXtremist move- ment arises on its left. That is the case in all four countries. In France, the radicalism that had its high point in May, 1968, appears to have lost ground since and the "Maoists" are now only a handful. But "gauchiste" influence has much increased inside of the rejuvenated Socialist party. In Italy and in Portu 94)3tOgetitgiiik8i6Wg 2001/a/08 : is surfacing. Particularly in Lisbon, there is not a day when the radical press does not denounce "revisionist" compromises. In Spain, the clandestine nature of politics does not permit a clear idea of the balance of forces,, but a Marxist-Leninist party favorable to the Peking's ideas does exist, especially among the Basque separatists responsible for the !assassination of Premier Carrero Blanco. These groups do not hesitate to resort to armed action. It is significant that the 'softening of the Com- munists' doctrinal positions comes when everywhere in Mediterranean Europe they are closer to power and in Portugal share it already. Violen8e does not seem necessary when the inability of capitalist states to face world economic crises and social imbalances is leading a growing number of voters to put faith in those who promise them a society, at once more? equitable and more rational. , Elementary tactical intelligence should thus suf- fice to lead the Communist parties to adopt a moderate line that respects existing institutions. But doubtless there is more: The party workers and Communist leaders?it is enough to watch them in the flesh to be convinced of this?have not escaped the sociological changes of the Western countries. The time of the robots remote-controlled from Mos-. tow, if it ever existed, died with the myth of Stalin- ?ist infallibility. It is, incidentally, manifest that in the East there is too much need for Western tech- nology and capital for there to be much encourage- ment for violent adventures: The Chilean tragedy is still too much in the minds of all the Communist leaders, and who knows how the United States would react? The Americans, it would seem, find themselvess- embarrassed by ? the erosion of their positions. in Mediterranean Europe. For having recklessly bet on - regimes cut off from all popular root., they lost, two vital bridgeheads. Admittedly Portugal has ? stated its intention to remain in NATO, in spite of the presence in its governmeet of a Com- munist Deputy Premier. As to Greeceeif it has left :NATO, like France it remains a member of the At- lantic alliance, and the vigor with which the Com- munists are denouncing as premature the Greek elections scheduled for November confirms the im- pression that they have little chance -of winning ,more than 15 per cent of the seats. However, in -both cases, the Soviet Union has applauded the downfall of dictatorships while the United States ? cannot wield as much influence on the new teams- as it did over the old. If, added to this, the precarious situation on Cy- prus is taken into account, where the local Commun- ist party can take advantage of the idea prevalent on the island that it was the Central Intelligence Agency that encouraged the coup against Archbishop Makarios, the balance sheet appears negative for the United States. The United States would be wrong, though, to view those events. through the spectacles of the Cold War. Much as the Eastern Communist regimes are keeping their distance vis-a-vis the Soviet model, the West European parties are dif- ferentiating themselves as they approach power and ally themselves with other political groupings. It is significant that in France, where the current in favor of the left has been so powerful over the last 18 months, the Communist party has regressed rather than progressed in elections, whereas the So- cialist party?supposed to he its "hostage" according to government spokesmen?has registered a specta- cular advance. This means that the memories of the Stalin .era and of the .invasion of Czechoslovakia still weigh on the image of the French Communist party. Perhaps it cannot enlarge its area of influence without establishing more clearly the distance be- tween itself and the superpower of which it used to proclaim itself the unconditional ally. If that day came, many things would change, not only in France but in all of Europe, perhaps inclusive of the Europe east of the Iron Curtain, Andre Fontaine is managing editor of Le Monde. This article was translated by the Paris bureau of 11X-iii3PWAM3V2SIR000100340004-6 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 NEW YORK TIMES 27 October 1974 yORX TIMES 27 OCT 1974 The U.S. Is Scouting Iberian Regimes' ? , . The extent of existing and potential Communist influence in Portugal's new regime is known to worry Secretary of State Kissinger, so much so that he has sent a four-man mission to Lisbon to scout the situation; there is anxiety-as well 'in Washington over the political in I uncertainty in Spa. ? . S.4_ The instability on the Iberian Penin- sual could create doubt about the con-- -timed existence of a number of United 1 States and North Atlandc Treaty Orga-,1 nization military bases. During The Cyprus fighting, Greece withdrew from NATO, and American ships have since been prevented from using anchorages-; there. . ? In Spain, the United States has:four i Installations, among them one at Rota, home for Polaris submarines, and an air base at Torejon near Madrid. Under present age agreements, which are to be renegotiated starting,-Nov. 4, the United States has given the ?Franco Government about $1-bililon in mili- tary and economic aid since 1970. Spain, not a member of NATO, would like to extend the present arrange!. !trent :in the form of a mutual defense treaty, something the United States has so far avoided. ? ? - In Portugal's Azores Islands, the United States leases the Lajes Air Base. In return for a five-year renewal of the lease, Portugal wants increased aid in an amount not yet made public.... Both Spain and Portugal say that, despite their desire for change,: they want to keep their military ties to the United States. President Francisco da Costa Gomes of Portugal, on his return from the United Nations and Washing, ton last week, took care to stress the importance he placed on his country's NATO link. But other influential members of the new military regime are not so enthu- siastic about the American presence, either military or diplomatic. They have expressed fear that Washington might start to treat Portugal like Cuba or Chile. ? Brig. Gen. Otelo de Carvalho, head of the Lisbon garrison, said: "The Ameri- cans have a morbid terror of Commu- . nism, and have a series of organs to fight against it. The C.I.A., which uses the niost incredible methods--and you only have to look at the example of Chile?is probably the most dange- rous, but it is not the only one." en in an Aegean Boat FOREIGN AFFAIRS' By C. L. Sulzberger PARIS?The most urgent task Henry Kissinger has set himself on his cur- ? rent diplomatic foray is moving the -Cyprus crisis along the path to .peaceful settlement, thereby healing a .aerious breach in NATO. The under- taking's magnitude may not compare with the ultimate goals -sought in sontinued talks with Russia; but the immediate dangers of failure are great. Mr. Kissinger's efforts to get some Motion on Cyprushave been delayed by two things. First, the United Statas Congress sought to impose a handicap on Presidential policy-making by 'abrupt termination of aid to Turkey. This would have removed a principal :trump from the Secretary of State's hand as he began negotiations. Even now he has very limited leeway but ? -at least he is not in a position of appearing to be an outright bully to the Turks, something he must avoid. The second obstacle has been Turkey's failure to replace the Ecevit Government after it resigned. Mr. - Ecevit's widespread popularity, stem- ming from the landings in Cyprus, ?'nevertheless hasn't yet enabled him -to make a deal with other party leaders and his parliamentary backing -remains a minority pending next :spring's elections. Thus, curiously, the politic 's of Turkey where a strongman seemed ato be emerging, have proved to be a ,greater hurdle than the politics of Greece, where an entire system of 'government has been replaced. Mr. Kissinger desperately hopes to see a new Turkish Cabinet formed under .Mr. Ecevit within the next few days _so he can include Ankara--and perhaps -Athens?on his forthcoming schedule -and pull Cyprus away from the brink. , No contemporary Greek leader save :Constantine Caramanlis, the provi- sional Premier running for formal ;leadership in the Nov. 17 elections, _Ithe first in many years, has the ? eastrength and prestige to get a sensible _deal with Turkey accepted by the :,Greeks. Therefore Mr. Kissinger hopes .to obtain some yield from the Turks by early November, in order to im- prove Mr. Caramanlis's vote-getting -position and set the stage for Greco. Turkish talks. Before Mr. Ecevit's resignation, he had already promised Mr. Kissinger This waa a plan to split the island into -mixed provinces with the largest of the five dominated by Turkish. speakers situated in the north. But when Mr. Kissinger passed the formula On to James Callaghan, chairman of the first Cyprus peace talks in Geneva, the British Foreign Secretary failed to ;present the paper. Mr. Kissinger's Margin of maneuver is very slender. Congress has put a time limit on future Turkish aid ? un- , less Ankara budges considerably on Cyprus. This has irked many Turks who a..alt of quitting NATO completely. The Greeks themselves have already withdrawn from the alliance's military commands but are moving very slowly - to implement their decision. The Secretary of State's chances of. cutting the Cyprian knot depend al- most wholly on two. men: Mr. Ecevit as Premier in Turkey and Mr. Cara- mantis as head of the first parliamen- tary government Greece has had since 1967. Curiously enuogh, although both may seem to symbolize vigorous na- tionalistic and somewhat anti-Amer- ican feelings in their own countries, they are also acknowledged to be real- istic, strong-willed?and Possessing. broad vision. And Mr. Kissinger's rep- utation as a dii.lomatic miracle-maker rides along with. them. . Mr. Kissinger, aware of the political intricacies inside Greece and Turkey and of the ancient passions involve was quietly proceeding along lines de- sired by an emotional Congress re- sponsible to well-organized American lobbies. But Congress did not sufficiently appreciate either the present complex- ities or the past historical background. Professor Arnold Toynbee wrote in 1923 ("The Western Question, in Greece and Turkey") words that could apply today in Cyprus: The Greeks have shown the same unfitness as the Turks for governing a - mixed population. .. The herd instinct can be relied on, as it cannot be in the West, to override the interest and judgment of the individual . . . Each nation fears that its own hostages in. the other's territory may be:ill-treated and that the other's hostages in its own territory may undermine its sov- ereignty, and such expectations have a fatal ? tendency to realize them- selves . . ." The United States Congress is per- less acquainted with this back- nd than it ought to be. But then, oynbee also wrote: "Western sen- nt about ? the Greeks and the s is for the most part ill-informed, ntly expressed and dangerously ential." . _ _ _ initialhaps concessions. It wasn't entirely grou simple for him because of his politidal as T situation and also because he had time initially offered a cantonal solution Turk after the first Turkish landing in viole Cyprus, influ 30 _ Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003400046 Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 . NEW YORK TIMES ? 27 October 1974 Subcontinent's ? Leaders Face The Enemies Within ' E The Smartest Around . Zulfikar All Bhutto By BERNARD WEINRAUB RAWALPINDI ? Prime Minister Zulfikar All Blintto .of Pakistan rarely goes to bed before 2 or 3 in the morning, and sometimes he hardly sleeps at all. He prowls his official residence, reading documents, leafing through American news magazines, writing statements, abruptly phoning for- eign diplomats about food imports or arms supplies or aid. Within the past few weeks, Mr. Bhutto has been partic- ularly busy. He has stepped up his pleas to the United States to relax the ban on arms sales to coincide with the visit this week of Secretary of State Kissinger to India and Pakistan. Mr. Bhutto visited Baluchistan, the most troubled province in Pakistan, and announced that "organized" re- sistence by anti-Government rebels had ended. He has ex- pressed readiness to hold talks with India over the peren- nial Kashmir issue. At the same time he has been exultant over a quiet but significant breakthrough in Indo-Pakistani relations: the resumption of telephone and postal links be- tween the two nations after a break of nearly three years. Mr. Bhutto's activity ? he makes pronouncements and calls news conferences with the abandon of a New York city mayoral candidate is a measure of the style and pace of Pakistani politics. After three years in power, and after tak- ing over a divided and undisciplined nation, Mr. Bhutto has thrust Pakistan forward and sought to shape a new identity for the country of 70 million. The results are mixed. Pakistan's internal problems are glaring. The nation, with an annual per capita income of about $110 and illiteracy that totals nearly 80 per cent, is impoverished and riven with despair. One out of every four babies dies before the age of five. Nevertheless, Pakistan's economic position seems sur- prisingly bright, compared with that of her neighbors. In- flation is running at 25 per cent annually, but the Govern- ment subsidizes such essentials as wheat, flour, vegetable oil and sugar. ? Pakistan says she needs to import about a million tons of wheat, but this is because the current record crop of about 8 million tons was below expectations. Pakistan does not suffer from the large-scale food problems of India or Bangladesh. Even the oil price increase has been less damaging to Pakistan than to her iahhor ApprOValuF d'&g4t200 ilk38/0?1: imports will reach $385-million 'next year, but loans from two fellow Islamic nations, Iran and Saudi Arabia, will help. Although the economy has proved surprisingly buoyant, Pakistan is weighted down by internal troubles. Rebellious tribesmen in Baluchistan resent Mr. Bhutto's efftors to gain firm central control in the state, which could be a potential source of oil. There are troubles along the Afghan border, persistent Pakistani fears of being Swallowed up by India, and a con- sistent need by Pakistan to feed her own military machine. Without\ American arms, Mr. Bhutto relies on China for weapons as well as support. The relationship is based on the mutual fear of Soviet involvement on the subcontinent and the anxiety, on Mr. Bhutto's part, that Moscow is step- ping up its role in the area. As an independent magazine, Outlook, commented last spring in a discussion that dealt with the enduring angers on the subcontinent that trap India, Pakistan and Bangla- desh: "It is a bizarre setting in which cupboards full of poverty-stricken skeletons are rattling with the din of sophisticated and outdated armaments. Countries which cannot afford to provide two square meals a day to their teeming millions are wrapped up in visions of hegemony, spheres of 'peace' and their 'manifest destiny.'" The mag- azine, like several opposition newspapers, has since been banned. ' -- Bhutto supporters assert that the 1971 Bangladesh war, ' when Pakistan lost her eastern wing, still affects the nation, 13hutto critics point out that several assassination attempts have been made on his key opponent, Khan Abdul Wali Khan, leader of the?National Awami party, whose- strongholds areBaluchistan'`and, the Northwest Frontier province. Lesser Opposition figures 'eave been "bullied" and, tough security, police generally forbi?ct ,are public gather- ings. Defenders of Mr. BhUtto, however,, and even some of his critics, maintain that the Prime Minister is adept and, pragmatic, and his singular achievement remaia,s impres- sive: He has restored some self-respect to a nation that was an object of scorn three years ago. The Pivotal Figure Indira Gandhi NEW DELHI?She has been called the Empress of India and the most powerful woman in the world. In New Delhi, she is known as "Mrs. G." or "Mataji," Big Mother. Whatever the title, Indira Gandhi remains the pivotal figure in the nation of 580 million, a woman who has plainly decided to move in .new directions at home and abroad. To Prime Minister Gandhi, the changes are neces- sary because India's economy is in a shambles, food scarci- ties are growing, the mood in the cities where inflation is limbing annually at 30 per cent, seems bleak and uneasy. India is hardly. on the verge of revolution, but the nation does face a deepening crisis. To avert it, Mrs. Gandhi has reshuffled her Cabinet, cracked down on smugglers, sought to fragment her political opposition and in foreign affairs, seems bent on easing relations with the United States. Beyond these shifts, and intertwined with them, is a persistent and melancholy criticism that the idealism and adventure in democracy of the 1950's has turned cynical,. that too many people are going hungry, that there are too many allegations of corruption and manipulation and police activities. Government allocations to maintain law and order have doubled in the past five years, and climbed by 52 times in the last 24 years, a figure termed "alarming" by a parliamentary committee. "The nation is adrift," said one columnist. Jayaprakash Narayan, an ailing figure whose prominence dates to the time of Mahatma Gandhi, has abruptly emerged politically to frighten the Congress party. He said the other night that Jawaharlal Nehru "was one hundred times more democratic" than his daughter, Mrs. Gandhi, who has served as India's CiRtMrs. Gandhi prot 11e'mA34a0 0a t10100m004- are immense. The Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 nation needs anywhere from 5 to 10 million tons of food imports to avid widespread starvation. The population is growing by 13 million each year, and per capita food con- sumption is steadily declining. Industrial growth is negligi- ble, despite sizable assistance. Land reforms have failed. Shortages of water, seeds and fertilizer have throttled the "green revolution." ? Mrs. Gandhi's critics place much of the blame for the nation's faltering policies on radic'al?and unkept?promises such as "Garibi Hatao," or "Abolish Poverty." "The appeal of the Garibi Hatao promise was based on the fact that it articulated the vast needs of society," Rajni Kothari, a prominent political scientist said. "The violence that is engulfing the country is the result of the Government's failure to even make a start in fulfilling that promise."- ? Perhaps the key criticism of Mrs. Gandhi is that the Government has twisted its priorities and has concentrated on the development of heavy industry despite the fact that India is an agrarian nation: 80 per cent of the populace lives on farms: To critics, the symbol of India's distorted priorities was the nuclear blast on May 18. Indians insist that the blast was "for peaceful purposes" but the'Government obviously weighed the propoganda and military impact of the surprise move. As the Economic and Political Weekly said recently: "Deaths from starvation are taking place. No famine is go- ing to be declared. But officially the country will continue its 'progress.' "This year it was the first nuclear implosion followed by [the takeover of] Sikkim, Next year, perhaps, it will be an Indian version of the sputnik, and we will have arrived in space. Once you hate Attained such heights, people and their need for food must indeed seem remote and trivial." The annual outlay for agriculture has dwindled. Last year, for example, it was about $1.03-billion. This year it amounts to $850-million. ? In fairness to Mrs. Gandhi, who remains an aloof and chilly figure, the task of dealing with India's poverty is extraordinarily difficult. "I think that the only reason I'm able to survive this with equanamity is that I'm just myself, regardless of the situation in the country," she has said. "I know the condition of the people. There's nothing I can see that I don't know about already. It's not that you don't feel it but?it's like a nurse and illness. You see it in perspective." To Mrs. Gandhi's numerous critics, however, the recent steps taken by the Prime Minister are cynical gestures to cope with India's emergency. Yes, critics say, Mrs. Gandhi has finally reshuffled her Cabinet and placed Jagjivan Ram, a tough and powerful figure, in the key post of Food Minis- ter, a position that has too often been held by inept figures. But the Cabinet, the critics add, consists of merely the same old faces in new jobs. ? Even critics have welcomed the crackdown on smugglers, whose illicit trade threatened to damage the economy. But there is resentment that the pay-offs by the smugglers, and the alleged involvement of government officials, is ignored. Moreover, the seizure of the smugglers under emergency measures coupled with the increased use of such laws to arbitrarily arrest strikers, students and terrorist suspects as well as the dismissal of an anti-Government newspaper editor, B. G. Verghese, have spurred debate about the quality of India's democracy. The nation remains an open, free-wheeling society, with a lively press, but recent events have left Indian intellectuals uneasy. In recent months, Mrs. Gandhi has managed her foreign policy with some success. Relations with Pakistan, always fragile, are still so but India's friendship with Iran has deepened, with the recent visit here of Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi. Now Secretary of State Kissinger's visit is expected to lift relations between Washington and New Delhi whose friendship soured during the 1971 Bangladesh war when the United States sided with Pakistan over India. 32 "It's a question of Kissinger and Mrs. Gandhi meeting again and, hopefully, hitting it off after three years," said one American source here. "If they do, that's fine, and if they don't, well. ..." The American merely shrugged. ?BERNARD WEINRAUB The Father Figure? Sheik Mujibur Rahman r.Jy KASTURI RANGAN NEW DELHI ? After winning Bangladesh's admission to the United Nations, when China withdrew its opposition, Prime Minister Sheik Mujibur Rahman returned home this month asserting that his country's "dark days" were over. famine {threatening and industry almost entirely idle, there w_ere sthne to whom his optimism seemed premature. The diplomatic breakthrough at the United Nations was accompanied by a shipment of 5,000 tons of urgently needed rice' from China. The Dacca Government has also received an offer from the United States of 150,000 tons of wheat and rice. and the promise of a large development loan. But the grain from the United States has not arrived and officials in Dacca complain that Washington has ignored a ? plea to speed deliveries by diverting some grain going to nearby countries. Only last weekend, because of prodding by the United Nations, an American shipment of 10,000 tons of rice to Indonesia was diverted, but even this consignment will not reach Bangladesh before the end of this month. Officials here are hurt by the belated sympathy for the millions of people starving following floods earlier this year. Further, more than a half-mililon workers have been rendered jobless by the closure of hundreds of factories be- cause of a shortage of fuel and raw material. Nearly 200 big textile, jute, sugar and paper mills, perform on the average 40 per cent below normal capacity. At least 10 of the 70 jute mills, which contribute the bulk of foreign exchange earn- ings, were closed for, many months by labor troubles. According to the Government, the floods destroyed nearly a third of the expected grain crop; the loss in crops, homes destroyed and factory production could exceed $300-mililon. Foreign observers say that, even with foreign aid, 100,000 people could starve. The Government has concluded that these compulsions re- quire Bangladesh to adjust its foreign policy to maintain good relations with all the parties seeking influence on the subcontinent, not just with- India and the Soviet Union, but also with China and the United States. But relations with the Soviet Union and India, the two countries that wholeheartedly backed Bangladesh in win- ning her independence from Pakistan four years ago, have cooled. Despite a recent pledge of $21-mililon dollars from the Soviet Union, people remain suspicious about Moscow's gestures. Smuggling over the 1,300-mile border the two countries share is the principal irritant in relations with India. Despite these troubles, Sheik Mujib's popularity remains intact. Even though his administration is saddled by inexpe- rienced, inefficient and corrupt officials, there is hardly any political opposition to his rule. He is still venerated by most ? people as the father of the nation. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 ' ? - Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 . WASHINGTON STAR 21 October 1974 ? By Henry S. Brads her Star-News Staff Writer SAIGON ? Throughout Indochina today; the gloom is deepening. The old threat that has loomed larger ever since the United States -began withdrawing from South Viet- nam has now acquired a greater, sense of immediacy. Government officials, politically aware citizens and diplomats are wondering with growing concern whether this blood-soaked peninsula is moving with accelerating speed toward eventual control by North Vietnam, or by local Communists under strong influence from Hanoi. This concern still falls consider- ably short of desperation, despair or a sense of inevitability. A col- lapse of anti-Communist morale is not in sight. But there is a distinct ebbing of confidence in long term prospects. It results from a strong apprehension that resistance to con- tinuing Communist pressure cannot be sustained at an adequate level. THE WAR GOES ON in South Vietnam, little affected by the American unilateral declaration of peace almost two years ago. Cam- bodia, too, suffers unending war, stalemated at the present level of outside aid to the two sides. The fragile cease-fire in Laos has shift- ed the nature of that struggle with. out ending it. And in Thailand, Communist insurgency continues with North Vietnamese aid. The basic problems remain the same as they were when the Ameri- cans were here with their half-mil- lion soldiers and their willingness to pour in whatever money and material was needed to meet the threats to friendly governments. If the Americans had never been here, those governments would not exist in their present form, but they were and they do and hence the gloom. The problems are the same; the old solutions are either no longer available or no longer work very -well. With American support dwin- dling, the governments of South Vietnam and Cambodia, and non- Communists in Laos who are now in uneasy coalition with the? Communists, are caught between continuing Communist pressure and their own inability to generate greater internal strength. No one knows just where the threshold lies at which U.S. military keep viable the Saigon and Phnom Penh governments, and the non- Communist element in Vientiane. Computing a dollar figure for each country is complicated by unstable. local factors, varying degrees of corruption and wastage, and deliberate exaggeration of need in order to provide a margin for cuts. There is also the psychological factor of maintaining confidence in each country. The wide- spread in Indochina that the United States public in general and Con- gress in particular misjudge the threshold, or simply do not care. Congress has cut military aid to South Vietnam in the year which began July 1 to about one half in. real terms what it had been the previous year, and chopped econo- mic aid to Saigon, and. refused to give special military aid to Cam- bodia like that which kept the Cambodian army going in the last fiscal year. Just how- real and direct is the tie between aid cuts and the ability of these gov- ernments to survive is, how- ever, open to debate. A SENIOR AMERICAN official in one of the Indo- chinese countries said can- didly the other day that "I don't know how we can spend all the money" that was left after Congress had made cuts in the now-post- poned version of the foreign aid bill. A deputy premier in another of the countries said, "American aid is more than sufficient if we can use it properly" ? adding that it is not used properly now. Some military officers in the third country feel that their army could and would fight better if it had less American equipment and ammunition to perpetuate the addiction to inappropri- ate U.S. Army tactics. These are, though, dis- puted opinions. The more general attitude, as well as the official posture, among both government ministers and diplomats is that while inflation is pushing up the threshold Congress is going the opposite direction. The psychological result is perhaps as significant as any measurement in 105mm artillery shells. M79 gren- and economic aid will be too low to ade launchers and gallons of aviation fuel. If the feeling spreads in these countries that they cannot keep going on the old basis, not only for lack of ammunition but also because inflation makes it impossible for a soldier to feed his family, then that alone can cause a crumb-. ling. . Some of the same top offi- cials who talk one moment of the desirability of negoti- ations with the Communists ? whether directly with Hanoi or with local ele- ments whom they view as Hanoi's agents ? speak the next moment of the im- placability of the adver- sary. They remain equivo- cal whether their hope of a negotiated settlement is sufficient to overcome their assumption, based on long and bitter experience, that North Vietnam will never settle for less at the negoti- ating table than it hopes to win from protracted war. HERE IN SOUTH Viet- nam "our war will not be solved by military means, it must be negotiated," Hoang Duc Nha said in an inter- view the other day. Nha, the minister of information, has been President Nguyen Van Thieu's key adviser and was the only South Vietnamese official to sit with Thieu in all the tortu- ous negotiations two years ago that finally produced the Paris agreement, which was supposed to halt this war but did not. . ? The Cambodian regime of President Lon Nol has been seeking futilely for years to establish contact with its enemies in order to negoti- ate a truce but the other side appears to be divided and rejects every negotiat- ing offer, even when the re- gime retreated last July to offering talks without any preconditions. In his office at the educa- tion ministry in Phnom Penh, from which his prede- cessor was dragged to a mysterious death last June, acting Premier Pan Sothi said recently that "low- intensity war is the pros- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-R131577-/6-64:3211q000MACkfa-46 Approved For Release 2001/08/08.: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 Norodom Sihanouk's exile regime to take away the Cambodian seat in the United Nations is causing grave concern. "A doubt exists that we could go on and fight the war" if the seat is lost, Pan Sothi said, because the cli- mate of confidence would- be destroyed. Laos has negotiated, and the result has been the re- , establishment of coalition government, which has broken down twice before in the last two decades. Now members of the old Vienti- ane government that had been fighting the Pathet Lao are-worried that the Pathet Lao are deminating the coalition. One of them, Major General Oudone Sa- nanikone, said in his De- fense Ministry office recent- ly that "the war goes on, a political war now." He com- plained that the Communists had all the advantages in the coalition, getting a share of power in Vientiane without giving up any control of their own territory and supported by the neutralist premier, Prince Souvanna Phouma, in arguments with the rightists. . The deputy foreign minis- ter of Thailand, Major General Chatichai Choonha- van, in his ministry building overlooking the fabulously spired and tinted roofs of the royal palace at Bang- kok, said that if North Viet- , nam "wanted to bring back peace in one region it could in a few days." But Hanoi goes on supporting wars and the Communist insur- gency in Thailand, he said. The opening up of demo- cratic debate in Thailand which began a year ago with the overthrow of mili- tary rulers who committed the country to American policy in Indochina has created uncertainty over fu- ture attitudes of this situa- tion. For now, however, American warplanes re- main on standby alert in Thailand for possible re- sumption of bombing in Indochina. IT IS ONLY in Thailand that basic policy toward the Communist problem seems to be under active consider- ation. Officials and opposition political leaders in South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos talk gloomily of short- term prospects. There is a marked reluctance to dwell upon the ultimate result of the current gloomy trends in the economic and mili- tary situations, should they continue unchecked by some presently unforesee- able change of circum- stances. Some kind of men- tal block seems to make it impossible to face the possi- bility of losing these long wars and falling under the control of the enemies, or a single enemy for those who see the local threat as only a front for Hanoi. This block exists on conversation with outsiders, anyway. It is generally assumed among foreign observers and even among lower offi- cials that many of the top people in these countries are looking ahead to the possibility of collapse. Al- though no proof is offered, many say that Swiss bank accounts and other fallback arrangements are being made with funds which originate through U.S. aid. Diplomats are also more open in their speculation about the future than local people, being less personal- ly involved. Many of them wonder aloud whether the three Indochinese countries are already on an inevitable slide into Communist con- trol, and how long it will take. A few years? A dec- ade? It is an impossible ques- tion to answer, as everyone realizes, even though the essential importance is the pessimism of the asking. The ability of nations to sur- vive apparently hopeless situations is often surpris- ing; and conditions that look desperate can sometimes drag on indefinitely. THE MILITARY situa- tions in South Vietnam and- Cambodia are the primary reason for the regional gloom. Economic problems are generally seen as a re- sult of the continued fight- ing, although the difficulties of paying former soldiers in Laos suggests that a cease- fire alone fails to remove economic problems. Since the Paris agreement sup- posedly went into effect in South Vietnam almost 21 months ago, fighting has continued at approximately the same level as it did in between major offensives of the war. Each side has been guilty of violating the cease-fire when it felt it could gain territorial or population advantages. The Saigon government's internal propaganda has wavered between proclaim- ing a major Communist offensive to be underway or te be imminent, as if the Thieu regime cannot itself decide. This has been paral- leled by U.S. embassy wavering that has appar- ently been keyed to efforts to obtain larger aid alloca- tions from Congress. The current intensive 'fighting around Hue and Da Nang along South Viet- nam's northern coat, and in almost uninhabited parts of the central highlands, is more jockeying for future positions of value in any big Communist offensive than a major drive in itself. There is no doubt that the North Vietnamese army, at a currently estimated strength of just below 200,- 000 soldiers in the South, is stronger than it has ever been. It has more artillery, some big enough to shell government positions from outside the range of return gunfire, more armored vehicles, more anti-aircraft cover and better mobility than when it launched the last big offensive at Easter 1972. The development of roads and pipelines into Communist controlled areas of South Vietnam has sig- nificantly changed the pros- pects for any future up- surge. Hanoi can now rush reinforcements south in a few weeks instead of taking months on the old bomb- harassed Ho Chi Minh trail. The trail itself remains in use, contrary to North Viet- nam's obligation to remove its troops from Laos after the cease-fire there. In Cambodia some 50,000 sol- diers, labeled by the Ameri- cans "Khmer Communists" 34 for lack of any more dis-, criminating identification of probably still disparate opponents of Lon No!, con-. trol most of the country. Neither side presently has the manpower or arma- ments to make a decisive breakthrough. The Phnom Penh government just stag- gers on from one dry season to the next wet season, reacting to what the enemy does. "As long as U.S. aid stays at last year's level, this war could go on for another 10 years," one informed ob- server commented as Con- gress was cutting the aid. Unlike the Viet Cong, how- ever, enemy propaganda in Cambodia does not talk of a long war. It emphasizes that the withdrawal of U.S. aid would bring a quick end with the collapse of Lon Nol's regime. Pathet Lao _ troops in Laos, who have mostly replaced in forward positions North Vietnamese units that did the actual wartime fighting for them, have been jockeying for ter- ritorial advantage, particu- larly around the royal cap- ital, Luang Prabang. But a: Pathet Lao spokesman in Vientiane, the government seat, serves .cold drinks and talks of his side observing the cease-fire. He also still insists U.S. and Thai mili- tary forces must leave Laos, although independent ob- servers agree that they al- ready have. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 30 October 1974 Cambodia UN mission occupied by protestors United Nations, N.Y. - Four women and six men occupied the Cambodian Mission to the United Nations on Third Avenue early Tuesday morning, pushing two young Cambodian staff members out of the . building, writes David Anable, Monitor - staff correspondent. The 10, apparently all Americans identifying themselves as members of an "anti-imperialist group in New ? York," were removed within an hour or so by the police, and, according to Cambodian Government sources, :charged with criminal trespass. ? The aim of the occupation seems to have been to dramatize calls for the Lon Nol government's replacement by Prince Norodom Sihanouk's government-in-exile ? both at the UN and in Phnom Penh itself. The UN is scheduled to debate. Cambodian representation here next . month. It remains touch and go as to whether the present government will be able to retain its UN credentials. . Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 Approved For Release,;001/08/08 : clkRDP77-004921000100340004-6- IN-77;14en %Anus Tuesday, October 22, 1974 Ecc INDOCHINA IA/CONY ic Woes intensify By Henry S. Bradsher Star-News Staff Writer SAIGON ? Duch Stile sat on a wooden bed in the gar- den outside his weather- beaten house near Phnom Penh, talking with the quiet air of an educated man, but , worried. "I tried to get a job as a taxi-bus driver, but I could- n't. Some of the other teach- ers have part-time jobs, but even then it's hard." Before war came to CaMbodia, Duch Side earn- ed 78,000 riels a month at his school. It cost about 8 percent of that to buy the basic staple, rice, for his family. Now he earns 30,000 ries and rice takes up half of it. Other 'food expenses take the remainder. His wife is , able to earn only 400 riels a day in the marketplace ? not enough for all the other things the family reds. ?On the outskirts of Sai- gon, Nguyen Van Than, who was called away from teaching to fight in the army, is now back teaching SS pupils all subjects in five elementary grades after losing his right eye in com- bat. When he started teaching in 1960, Than paid one-sev- enth of his salary of 5,500 piasters to feed his family. I Now it costs two-thirds of his current salary, 34,000 piasters. He and his wife sew mosquito nets at home to try to make ends meet. While hundreds of thousands, per- haps 2 million, persons are unem- ployed and unable to pay for enough rice, even people on fixed govern- ment salaries in .Indochina like teachers are hard-pressed theses days to survive. Both South Viet- namese and Cambodian soldiers, whose monthly pay has been ,whit- tied, down by inflation to only enough to feed their families for about 10 days, are resorting to loot- ing and petty extortion from the people they are supposed to be pro- tecting from Communism. IT WAS just such military abuse of the civilian population in Viet- nam more than a decade ago that alienated popular support and ena-. bled the Viet Cong to built up its strength. The massive American in- volvement in Vietnam reduced this problem for some years. But now the combination of reduced U.S. aid and roaring inflation has brought it back to South Vietnam, posed addi- Approved tional problems for Cambodia and led to rioting by soldiers in Laos. These three Indochinese countries have for years existed on American- money. The United States provides ap-,' . proximately two-thirds of the com- bined civilian and military financial needs of South Vietnam. As the Cambodian government's territorial control and tax base have contract- ed, the U.S. contribution to the n,a- -tional budget has risen from about a nuarter two years ago to two-thirds now ? and if military supplies are added, the American share comes ,close to 90 percent of total expenses: Laos would scarcely 'have' monetized 'monetized, economy without U. S, 'aid.. , , ? All three countries are worried how they might survive in the fu- ture. Their economies have been adapted to the modernization that War has brought, and it is no easier to send an unemployed Saigon dock- worker or former U. S. army camp laborer back to the rice paddy than it is to get a laid-off Detroit factory hand to return to a Kentucky farm ?harder, even, when the farm is now occupied by the enemy. Officials in Vietnam and Cambo- dia are even more urgently con- cerned with the possibility that reductions of military aid will leave - their soldiers without adequate aril- munition to withstand Communist attacks. Some outposts have been abandohed as no longer feasible to maintain with less firepower avail- able, enabling the enemy to- expand his control. Despite the arguments being made for continuing American aid at more or less same levels, there is widespread skepticism among ob- servers in Indochina that even the full amounts would do much more than keep the governments grinding into seemingly endless wars, rather than solving basic problems. It is even uncertain that the same levels would remain adequate as inflation, both the imported worldwide vari- ety and that spurred by deficit fi- nancing in these countries, eats into resources. NOR IS THERE any-certainty that aid cuts will have the theoreti- cally ideal effect of forcing clearer thinking about priorities and sensi- ble economies in spending. The Indochinese governments look even less capable of that than most. In none of these countries is there any serious long-term consideration of economic problems. They all have planning ministries but plan- ning is impossible under the strain- ed circumstances. In fact, Vietnam and areconcerneW t FproReleitaes ;. le; little better in Laos. ? '- This makes the Nixon and Ford administrations' requests to 'Con- gress, for "postwar reconstruction assistance" a sad joke. There is nothing post about the wars in Viet- nam and Cambodia, nothing is being reconstructed while the de- struction goes on and fighting deters any meaningful productive investment, and rather than assist- ance the U. S. aid is primarY suste- - nance. . ' Nonetheless, the administration has contended that a five-year pro- :gram of declining aid for South Vietnam would enable this country -to take off into economic self reli--. ance. This was an early salespoint on this year's foreign aid program. It was not thought up by U. S. eco- nomic experts in Saigon. When bressed on the idea that South Viet- -nam can become selfsufficient with- in- any foreseeable future, 'they agree with the foreign observer who commented that the idea depended upon half a dozen or more favorable assumptions all coming true, but none of them looked very likely. ' , Only the 'glimmer of offshore oil holds much encouragement, and the Communists are trying their best to discourage foreign exploration for it off. South Vietnam. Cambodia is in- volved in disputes over delineation of its offshore waters with Vietnam: and Thailand, -which between them want to reduce Phnom Penh's share to almost nothing, while Laos is left out in oil like almost everything else of economic value. For years this correspondent has been hearing in these countries moan ? from U. S. officials about congressional cuts in aid appropria- tions. Each year there would be explanations how goods in the pipe- line or some fortituous circum- stance had allowed the client gov- ernment to survive the previous year's cats, but this year the full amount was really needed if eco- .nomic stability and the war effort was to be maintained. The repetition of the year after. year suggested considerable water- .ing of aid requests to insure that the reduced appropriation would still be enough. But if there was water, offi- - cials contend, it has evaporated and! Congress is now cutting into essen- tials that help these countries stay led and armed. The contention is hard to evaluate, but the visible problems of declining living stand- ards tend to support it. "AN ECONOMY with less resili- ency than ours would have collaps- ed by now," the minister of trade and industry, Nguyen Duc Cuong, said in a recent interview. Cuong said the country faces a dilemma whether to put primary emphasis on fighting inflation, "only 50 percent this year if we are lucky," or on trying to spend out of the recession caused by U. S. froop Withdrawals, imported inflation, the war and other problems. "We can- not expect the economy to do any Cambodia better" if U. S. aid i3 eta, CtIntlg miiii0PaltsrDP77-0%4p2Rdotfli On40010211/6' hone to manage t4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 so the situation won't be too explo- sive:: President Nguyen Van Thieu vows that South Vietnam "will cer- tainly be ready to fight until the last drop of blood, the last bullet and the. last grain of rice," if the United States fails to provide enough aid._ In a rather gloomy speech recently, one in which he only vaguely de- fended himself against corruption charges, Thieu said the U. S. gov- ernment had promised him ade- quate aid at the time of the so-called ? cease-fire. Americans are now "en- countering economic and? financial difficulties," Thieu said. "Neverthe- less, they cannot swallow their promises and shirk their obligation to one of their allies." When the Paris agreement was :signed 21 months ago to let the' Americans out of the war, the U. S. _government also promised, Thieu ? said, that it "would react vigorously to 'Communist violations of the cease-fire, their continued infiltra- 'tion into the South and their lack of respect for the Paris agreement. ?- ? "What have we seen so far?'' Thieu asked. "There has been no U. S. reaction to the Communist infil- .tration into the South and their grave violations of the cease-fire., This is. because of the U. S. internal situation." In an interview, Tram Van Lam, ' who as foreign minister signed the Paris agreement for South Vietnam, said that Henry A. Kissinger had given him assurances during the ne- gotiations which have failed to work out. Now it does not make sense for the United States to cut its aid, Lam protested. ? ? ? " While such protests are heard from the government, old political opponents of Thiel/ have beenreiri- vigorated by the signs of fading American backing for his regime. THIEU HAS COME to represent American interests in Vietnam in the eyes of many people here, fairly or unfairly. He has been able to deliver aid. Now if he can no longer deliver, his usefulness is more like- ? ly to be questioned.. Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the? ousted leader of Cambodia who now from Peking fronts for Communist effort to take over his country, said the other day that the territory con- trolled by the Lon Nol regime is "nothing but an economic corpse ? a 'non-state' which has no economy of its own and is surviving with great difficulty on the constant and massive aid injections from its U. S. masters." Early this year the U. S. embassy in Phnom Peah was saying that it had a virtual blank check from the Nixon administration to provide whatever military and economic aid was needed to sustain "the finest example of the Nixon Doctrine in action," as the former president once called it. Now the mood has changed. Congress has been closing loop- holes which made it possible to find extra money for Cambodia. At the, same time the Communists have shut off the flow of rubber from their zone, bartered against U. S. aid goods, which provided the Phnom Penh regime with its only significant foreign exchange earn- ings. CORRUPTION is a problem in all three Indochinese countries but in none is it more of a drain on the war effort and homefront economic stability than in Cambodia. ? "We copy the French in so many 'things" in this former French colonial area, one official in Phnom Penh commented, "its a shame we don't use their system of taxing vis- ible wealth instead of official in- come." The visible wealth-of gener- als and some civilian officials since U. S. aid began flowing into Cambo- dia has increased enormously while salaries have remained low. But Marshal Lou Nol ignores the obvious corruption of top military and civilian officials, making .it :impossible to clean up a malignant situation. When the U. S. embassy insisted last spring that repaYment be made for some stolen aviation gasoline provided by American aid, it was paid ? but the payment origi- nated ultimately from other U. S. 'funds. ? The economic situation in Cambo- dia, where inflation is now running some 250 percent a year in the Phnom Penh enclave, is a major factor in political unrest. Subsidiza- tion of rice at such a low level that much was smuggled abroad while ,the United States shipped more in NEW YORK TIMES 25 October 1974 SEOUL" REPORTERS DENOUNCE REGIME Strike Wins Page 1 Display of Attack on Press Curbs Special to The Neer York Times SEOUL, South Korea, Friday, Oct. 25?Reporters for South Korea's largest newspaper call- ed off an unusual 11-hour strike last night when their publisher acceded to a demand for publi- cation of their statement de- nouncing Government press restrictions. Dong-A-Ilbo, one of the most influential national newspapers,1 is being published this mornin,,, with an anti-Government resolu- tion adopted by its news staff on its front page. The agreement by Kim Sang 'has now been reduced. But that overdue measure of raising rice prices touched off demonstrations ? against the government. ' In Laos U. S. aid is now support- ing a government in which the Communist Pathet Lao holds half the places and has more than half the influence. A Pathet Lao spokes- man explained that his side did not mind the continued aid so long as American intentions were good, meaning money but no influence. " In fact, the Communists apparent- ly hope the United States will con- tinue to help foot. the bill for that primitive country with some expen- sive modern tastes which Ameri- cans helped develop. Aid promises have recently been collected from North Vietnam, North Korea, China and other Communist countries, but some Western nations have been put off by rather pre-emptory de- ? mands for free plane tickets and hotels for a Cambodian aid mission to go beg from them. Thailand has an independent economy, troubled- lae most others in today's world but standing without massive American backing. But while the U. S. Air Force continues to use Thai bases, American aid has been slash- ed and troop spending is off, raising questions in Bangkok of whether there should be some direct tie be- tween bases and aid: Man, the publisher to run the three-point resolution was inter- preted as a major victory for the Korean press, which has been fighting off and on against restrictions by the Government. About 180 reporters of Dong- A Ilbo and its affiliated radio 200 students, clergymen, and in- tellectuals have been court- martialed and the press has been under tight control. In the ?Dong-A Ilbo matter, the publisher withdrew a pro- posal that the resolution be station protested the arrests and Printed on the back page when questioning of the managing he realized that there would be editor and his three deputies no paper today if he did not give way. The half-century-old paper hal a circulation in ex- cess of 600,000. ? Two weeks ago President Park told the owners of news- papers, news agencies and broadcasting companies that he would not tolerate challenges to the Constitution. he spe- Newspapers have paid exten- cifically asked for control of sive attention to developments younger journalists who, he as- n South Vietnam, apparently serted, are fostering campus as an oblique criticism of their unrest. Government. Dong-A Ilbo has a long his- President Park declared an tory of political suppression. emergency two years ago tolIt was closed numerous times crack down on his political op-under Japanese colonial rule ponents. Since then more than, and President Syngman Rhee by intelligence agents. The edi- tors have been under intermit- tent interrogation for allegedly having prominently reported recent student demonstrations here and stirrings in South Vietnam. Oblique Criticism 36 suspended it for a month in 1955 when it became too crit- ical to his policies. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 Appre;iNied For Release 2001108/08:t- CIA-RPP77-00432R0001 0034Q004-6 WASHINGTON STAR - 21 October 1974 U.S. SAYS HANOI EXPLOITS DISSENT CIA Role 19 ffl 4:151.0 By George Esper Associated Press SAIGON ? The United States Embassy today denied that the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency is involved in demonstrations against South Vietnam's President Nguyen Van Thieu and accused North Vietnam of a "crudely obvious attempt to ex- ploit the dissent" The U.S. Embassy statement was issued after anti-Thieu demonstra- .tors in Saigon yesterday burned a police jeep and stoned the National Assembly building. Quieter anti- government rallies were held in Hue, Can Tho and other towns. THE EMBASSY cited Viet Cong statements in the past two weeks .charging that the CIA is giving sup- port to dissident political groups in South Vietnam. "The United States does not en- courage, nor does? it support in any way, any political faction in Viet- nam," the American statements said. "These accusations are utter- ly groundless and totally false." ' The statement also said that by Viet Cong and North Vietnamese destruction of roeds, bridges and other important installations in military attacks, Hanoi is "seeking to increase the economic suffering of the South Vietnamese people in the hope that it can exploit po itical- ly the resulting misery." , THE WET CONG claimed Oct. 12 that the United States was trying to infiltrate agents into the dissident South Vietnamese political groups' to "manipulate and turn" the dis- sent to its own benefit. The Communists charge that the United States is conducting a "double-faced" policy: Pushing Thieu to make reforms to strength- en his position and the same time trying to develop a position of influ- ence with the opposition in case Thieu is overthrown. officials contend that the Viet Cong is conducting the "double-faced" policy: Assailing the United States for its support ol Thieu and at the same time accus- ? ing the United States of preparing a fallback position should he be oust- ed. SOME ANALYSTS say they be- lieve the Viet Cong is laying the groundwork, should Thieu be forced out, to refuse to cooperate with his successor by claiining that the United States was behind . the change. So far, however, there is no suggestion that the anti-Thieu BALTIMORE SUN 22 October 1974 Unrest in South movement is strong enough to top-? ? ple him. The demonstration in Saigon yes- terday began with a march by about 100 politicians, Buddhist monks and nuns and Roman Catholic priests ? through downtown Saigon. They were joined by several hundres students and children who broke away from the older people; burned a police jeep smashed the ornate glass doors and porcelain flower pots at the National Assem- bly building, and burned portraits of Thieu. At least two of the demonstrators were injured, and a govertunent spokesman claimed 36 policeman were hurt. In Inchon, South Korea, mean- while, an American bishop, the Reg. William McNaughton of Boston, ledi SOO Roman Catholic priests, nuns and laymen yesterday in a demon- stration that police tried to break up withitear gas. The marchers shouted "Dictatori- al regime go away" in the second antigovernment protest since Au- gust, when President Chung Hee Park lifted two goventunent decrees banning political dissent. 'South Vietnam seems to be heading into another of its convoluted political crises. As the war rumbles on and economic hardships increase, opponents of the Thieu regime are showing a surprising capacity to stage im i two months ago, President Nguyen Van Thieu seemed still at the height of his police-state powers. The legislature was utterly under his thumb and political foes either were in jail, in hiding or ostentatiously inactive. While his regime was as unpopular as ever, no real protest wds in evidence. Why the change? Why the spectacle of crowds marching on the National Assembly building in Saigon with many a Thieu poster cross-hitched by .a large black X? One reason is that Thieu has been duly warned by the American Embassy that any display. of harsh strongarm methods would so outrage the U.S. Congress that economic and military aid would be slashed even more deeply. Another reason?a more pervasive one?is the ? growing intolerance of the Vietnamese people for the corruption that riddles their government from cop to general. When American money and arms were giving the Vietnamese economy a phony flush of prosperity, graft was tolerable to the masses?to those who were doing better than ever provided they were not being killed or maimed or uprooted. But now that inflation and joblessness are rampant in the wake of the U.S. troop withdrawals, the average citizen can ill-afford to feel the extra squeeze of the petty shakedown. pr ess ve pretest demonstrations. Only Perhaps the most striking thing about the current wave of protests is the part being played by con- servative Catholic anti-corruption groups. As stanchly anti-Communist as ever, these Catholic dissidents feel Hanoi and the Viet Cong can b overcome only if the South Vietnamese population more content with its government. The emergenc of the Catholic opposition to Thieu has been a companied by more resistance on the part of Bu dhists who reflect the terrible war-weariness of th country and seek a vaguely defined "nation reconciliation." The real potency of current protests- I questionable because no creditable civilian alter ative to Thieu's military regime has emerged. Th Catholics and the Buddhists are by no mean mlfied, among themselves or with each other, an he oldline political figures are keeping their head o low as to remain invisible. If Thieu should b verthrown, the current betting is that the coup ould be engineered by another military clique hen the old game of Saigon musical chairs could egin again. As unrest crescendoes in South Vietnam, the nited States as usual is lacking any definable, ngrange policy. We are still playing it by ear, still egretting our involvement; still uncertain how best withdraw. Once again, the folly of our en- nglement in a conflict wehave never understood is oming home to plague us?and the people we ought we were helping. Jo to ta th Approved For Release 2001/008 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 t "51 Approved WASHINGTON POST 13 October 1974 For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 THE TIMES (LONDON) 12 Oct 1974 Bugged pen set By Philip A. McCombs Wa,hi lig ton Post Foreign Service SAIGON, Oct. 12?Low army morale is threatening President Thieu's traditional military power base at a time when . he is under mounting political pressure to enact democratic reforms, make peace, and end cOrrup, tion. Desertions duriqg a re- cent period reached the staggering rate of between 4,000 and 5,000 a week, ac- cording to reliable Sources. At that rate, more than 20 per cent of the 1.1 million. man armed forces would de- sert during the year, al- though many of these might be repeaters. The rate is in- creasing. Also, government soldiers are dying at a rate of 300 per week this year, a 50 per cent increase over last year. Army pay continues to be low, and field commanders are reporting that lack of rice for soldiers and their families is becoming- an even bigger morale problem than the aggressiveness of the Communist forces. The Communists are tak- ing advantage of Saigon's in- creasing morale problems by massing overwhelming forces to' score dramatic psy- chological victories against small isolated outposts; iso- lated towns and even battal- ion-sized government units. Government soldiers are still firing five times as many shells as the Commu- nists, hut this is less than half the firepower that was available to the government a year ago before severe congressional military aid cuts began. The army is riddled with corruption, and reports from the field indicate that: the common soldiers are in- creasingly unhappy with this as reports of anticorrup- tion rallies in major cities spread thrbugh the ranks. "There's no talk of a mili- tary, coup right now, but there's more direct criticism of Thieu in the army than there ever has been below." said a well-placed Western observer. A military librarian at the armed forees headquarters made the front pages here the other clay in a public protest when he declared, "high-level army corruption has eroded the eonfidence and fighting spirit of the soldiers." The soldier, Sgt. Dao Vu Dat, cited widespread -stealing of food, uniforms, ow Army erile orale in Canberra was 'a disaster '- and military equipment in- tended for the Lighting men." He said there is wide- spread embezzlement of pension funds intended for the', fatuities. of. dead sol- diers, President Thieu promised in his Oct. 1 speech to the nation to try to eliminate corruption in the armed forces by the. end of the month, and as commander- in-chief he has issued orders - to accomplish that. But Thieu's problem, ac- cording to, observers here, is that he cannot get rid of the numerous high-ranking eor-- rupt generals under -his command without destroy- ing his power base and thus, bringing about his own dem- ise. Thieu has retired or fired more than a dozen generals since the beginning of the /year, but the changes were of little significance since many of the generals had long before already been placed in insignificant jobs because of old age, physical disabilities or alleged cor- ruption. Western diplomats and other sources picture Thieu as enmeshed in an intricate web of corruption and favor- itism with many of his top commanders that makes it Impossible for him to fire them. His positicin is - becoming increasingly delicate as the result of Mounting pressure . from his political opponents that he clean house. Thieu, a lieutenant gen- eral at the time of his elec- tion in 1967 and a partici- pant in the 1963 coup that overthrew President Ngo Dinh Diem, has skillfully played off the loyalties, aspi- rations and greed of his gen- erals to keep himself firmly entrenched and immune" from coup attempts. Most of the generals who are considered non-corrupt and apolitical are serving ? far from Saigon in the northern part of South Viet- nam where there is no possi- bility of their suddenly mov- ing against Thieu in a coup. These include the com- mander of the first military Region (the Hue-Danang area), Lt. Gen, Ngo Quang vTruong; 1st Division corn.: mander Brig. Gen. Nguyen Van Diem; '3rd Division commander Brig. Gen, Nguyen Duy Ilinh; Maj. Gen. Le Quang Luong, com- mander of the Airborne Di- vision, and Brig. Gen. -Bui The Lan, commander of the Marine Division. _ Gen. Cao Van Vien, com- mander of the joint general staff, is considered an apoli- tical general, but Thieu' makes all the important mil- itary decisions himself .and uses Vien only to implement them. In the important southern -areas of the country around Saigon, Thiel.' has installed mostly corrupt, politically loyal commanders, sources. say. ? Lt. Gen. Pham Quoc Thuan, commander of the. Third Military Region ,around Saigon, has lost large numbers of soldiers in the crucial fighting in the Iron Triangle 20 miles north of Saigon. " He has failed to retake key positions lost to the Communists, and has gained a reputation among most Western observers here, in- cluding the U.S. Embassy, as a corrupt general 'com- pletely beholden to Thieu. The commander of the Mekong Delta south of Sai- gon, Gen. Nguyen Vinh Nghi, has developed a simi- lar reputation, as have the commanders of the several divisions stationed near Sai- gon. All of these men have come under attack by the growing Catholic anticor- ruption movement. r..t. Gen. Dang Van Ouang,. Thieu's right-hand military assistant in the presidential palace and an old colleague, is considered by many sources to be one of the worst examples of a corrupt officer in the country. -"Suffice it to say that he is a very nasty piece of work," summed up one ob- server. Observers here think that if a military coup is to be prepared, it must originate among the regimental com- manders?Colonels and lieu- tenant colonels?who have been profesisonal soldiers for a decade or more, and who are in close touch with their men and concerned with their welfare. So far there is no sign that this is happen- ing. Saigon Veterans Aid Anti-Thien Forces From Nev.'s Dispatches SAIGON, Oct. 12 ? The leader of 200,000 South Viet- namese war veterans today threw his support behind growing anticorruption pro- tests aimed at President Nguyen Van Thiett's govern. From Our Correspondent Melbourne,?Oct.13 ? Mr. Anthony Eggleston the, former press secretary and confidant of Sir Robert Men- 2ies, Mr Harold Holt and Mr John Gorton when* they were Prime Minister, said today that he was reSponsible for putting a " hugging " device in the Prime Minister's office in Par- liament House in Canberra. He said : "I suggested a tape be installed to record peess conferences and Harold liolt agreed. The commercial firm we called in .during the middle.icii 1966 suggested the buggink device so that Harold would not have his desk clut- tered up with a microphone. The device installed was a pen set with a " bug " inside it and two tape recorders on a 'shelf in the private secretary's office next door, "But the bug proved a. disaster. Harold never could get used to it. It was so realis- tic he kept ripping it out of its socket thinking it was a real pen. it was so much trouble having it fixed up all the time that eventually we had a plug- in microphone installed in its place." Mr Eggleston had never been in-.0Ived in using the device for anything but provid- ing a transcript ? of press con.... ferences. As far as he was con- cerned no one had been taped ? unless he was aware of it. Mr Eggleston is now a senior adviser to Mr Snedden, the Liberal Party :coder. Mr William McMahon today confirmed the existence of the bugging device but said that it had never been used while he was Prime Minister. -ment. ? ' The chairman of the staunchly anti-Communist War Veterans' Association, Nguyen Dinh, told reporters President Thieu had failed to give direct answers to corruption charges, "The government has to review its leadership before it is too late," he said. In Phnom Penh, military sources said today that Com- munist rebel gunners shot _down a Cambodian air force cargo plane near the provin- cial capital of Svay Rieng, killing two of 18 persons aboard. The Pathet Lao today re- leased its third batch of prisoners to the Vientiane government in Laris. In the ceremony, 24 Laotian sol- diers were handed over un- der the supervision of the International Control Com- misSion. The government side has already released all its Pathet -Lao prisoners. In Saigon, a Communist spokesman said the Viet- cong will refuse to negotiate on peace or. missing .?meri- cans until South Vietnamese President Thieu is over- thrown. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 hP.079.vedf:Fpr.1.3elpApe 2001/08/08: CIA7RDP77-00432R00010,034004-6&,;, NEW YORK TIMES 31 October 1974 Americans. - Feel Ill Will In Laos City ?i By DAVID K. SHIPLER svet:ai to Tbe kew Yoric T1mot. LUANG PRABANG, Laos Oct_ 29?In this tiny royal capital, where the Commu- nist-led Pathet Lao has made its most pronounced impact since the coalition Govern- ment was formed last April, !there is a slight air of ,anti- Americanism. The Pathet Lao members who have entered into Luang Prahang's life more confi- dently and more fully than that in Vientiane, the admin- istrative capital?have re- 1 cently been showing propa- ganda films of the intensive ! American bombing that was directed against their terri- tory during the Indochina war. The ,films were shown first to schoolchildren, later to the general public. Some of the few Americans who live here are not con- vinced that the Pathet Lao is? trying deliberately to gener- ate anti-American feeling, but that seems to -be the effect. "Kids make funny eoises at you when you walk by," one long-time American resident complained. "That never used to happen." Another, who speaks Laotian, says that children on the street now chant, "Foreigner! Foreigner!" when he passes. Suspicion of C.I.A. Links One civilian, not employed by the Government, is con- tinually accused of being in the Central Intelligence Agen- cy. 'Maybe they had these feelings all along and now just feel free to express them," He speculated. "Or ? maybe I'm just paranoid." ? Associating with Ameri- cans seems to carry a cer- tain stigma for Laotians in !Luang Prabang A Laotian who drives a big American car for the United States aid mission here has asked for a more proletarian vehicle, one official reports. "Friends hesitate to come to our house," another Amer- ! lean said. "One came one night by making a feint to- ward Souphanouvong's !house." He was referring to ;Prince Souphanouvong, who is the titualr head of the .Pathet Lao. ? He said that another old friend, a rightist Government ?official, "hardly talks to us !anymore." 1, The American went on to tdescribe several instances in !which Laotian acquaintances ihad deinurced from keeping company with him in public. iIn one wase, he recalled, when the suggested having a drink :in a crowded hotel bar, his Different Mood in Vientiane Pathet Lao has not yet de- 'Laotian guest nervously The atmosphere is coni- cided what to do about Kilo- ;chose a remote ? and vir- pletely different in , itually deserted ? placeApprovedfattlRelea Vientiane se 21104/04/08 :IletKADP77-00432R000100340004-0 ? NEW YORK TIMES 22 October 1974 Japanese Leftists Attack Ford's Visit By RICHARD HALLORAN !years. Leftist organizations, !during the Vietnam war, desig- nated Oct. 21 an annual "inter- national antiwar day" for protest meetings and demon- strations. The new issue is reports of the presence of American nu- clear weapons here. - The conservatives, who have ruled Japan steadily for a quar- ter century, have followed a policy of not making and not acquiring nuclear weapons and pee.a t The NesYork Times TOKYO, Oct. 21?Japanese leftists began a drive to stop President Ford's scheduled visit here next month with huge ral- lies all over Japan today. The organizers, led by the Communist party, the Socialist party and the major labor unions, said that 2.2 million people had taken part in 456 demonstrations, including one that drew an estimated 70,000 not. allowing such weapons to flag-carrying and banner-way- come into this country. ing people here in Tokyo. But recent testimony in Kakuo Honjo, chairman of the Washington before ?a Congres- rally held in Meiji Park in cen_ sional committee by a retired tral Tokyo tonight, said in e ,United States Rear- ADmiral, brief interview that "we're try. Gene R. LaRocque, has made it appear that the Japanese Government has misled its people. Admiral LaRocque tes- tified that American warships regularly called at Japanese ing to create an atmosphere or mood among the Japanese people to stop Mr. Ford from coming here." He said he did not think there would be physi- cal violence if the President' Ports with nuclear weapons came but that the leftist groups aboard. were trying to generate so Premier Kakuei Tanaka's much vocal opposition that Mr. Ford would cancel the trip, Government has vigorously denied that nuclear weapons, himself. . if they were brought in, were The critical question is whe. allowed in the Japanese per- ther the leftists can build up a mission. There is evidence, sustained outflow of anti-Amer- however, of the existence of ican sentiment strong enough to prevent the President's four- day visit, scheduled to begin Nov. 18. With the rather light- hearted, carnival atmosphere that prevailed tonight, it seemed doubtful that they had made much headway toward their obIective. The liftists, however, have the first real issue they have had since the end of the Viet- nam war, which undoubtedly accounted for the largest turn- out they have had at this an- nual "antiwar day" rite in a secret "transit agreement" that permits the United States to bring nuclear weapons into Japan temporarily. The Government's denial seems not to have been very effective. Yomiuri Shimbun, Japan's second largest cir- culating newspaper, said in an editorial: "Many people now believe that nuclear weapons are being secretly brought into Japan despite the three nonnuclear principles and that the Government has always been aware of this." ;the bank of the Mekong" f River, ' One of the clearest indices of the state of Laotian-Amer- 'jean amity is the Laotian- American Association, an or- ganization funded by the United States Information Service and devoted to joint cultural and linguistic en- deavors. Attendance Delining Peter Coombs the director of the organization's Luang Prabang branch, says that since the Pathet Lao moved into town, the number of Lao- tians attending association functions had dropped. The enrollment in English language courses, for exam- ple, has fallen to 300 from 400. And although Mr. Coombs recalls having been able to invite about 20 Lao- tion friends to his house for movies at an earlier time, "I'm lucky now if four show "People keep asking when the L.A.A. is going to close," he said. At the rally here tonight, peaker after speaker rose to denounce the United States and the Tanaka Government, then to demand the abrogation of Japan's security treaty with the United States and the closing fof American military bases here. The nuclear issue was also stressed. Moreover, the leftists point- edly. recalled events in 1960, when swirling riots in the streets forced the Japanese Government to cancel Presi- dent Dwight D. Eisenhower's scheduled visit at the last mo- ment because the Government could not guarantee his safety. Tonight, a Communist speak- er said: "We must read this historical lesson and resort to a new action to stop Ford's visit. Let us have an even larger-scale movement to stop ford." The response from the audience, munching on hot dogs, noodles and rice lunches and drinking Pepsi-Cola bought from portable stands that ringed the rally, was tepid. After the rally, the leftists streamed out of the park for demonstrations through the city. One procession wound past the Parliament building and near the American Embas- sy. It was boisterous ? but peaceful, more full of sound than of fury: , Ultraleftist radical factions demonstrated in other parts of the capital but they seemed far more concerned about their rivalries with one another than with the nuclear issue or Mr. Ford's visit. In any case they were controlled by special riot policemen, who made 11 ar- rests. whose population is generally regarded as less enthusiastic about the Pathet Lao. There the Pathet Lao contingent has not made its presence felt so acutely as in Luang Prabang. There have been some de- mands from workers for the - expulsion of foreigners from _certain skilled jobs in Vienti- ane, but on balance Ameri- can affluence and exclusivity are tolerated there. American officials who have water tanks by their spacious houses in Vientiane get water delivered by United States Embassy trucks when city water pressure is low. When an American official moves into a house, the residence is wired to an embassy genera- tor so he will not have to de- pend on the erratic Vientiane power system. Even the ultimate in Amer- icana still exists?Kilometer 6, an American-style suburb at the edge of Vientiane, com- plete with huge American automobiles in the driveways of ranch-type houses. Accord- ing to intelligence reports the Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 BALTIMORE SUN 31 October 1974 Forced isolation takes toll on By MATTHEW J. SEMEN Suu Staff Correspondent Seoul?A year and? three months of forced _seclusion has begun to take its physical and emotional toll on Kim Dae ;Jung, the once-controversial South --Korean opposition leader. The former presidential can- didate has been denied permis- sion to leave Korea and kept under constant surveillance since his abduction from a Tokyo hotel room in August, .1973. Harassed by threatening phone calls, disturbed by mys- terious gunshots at night; con- stantly trailed, bugged and phone-tapped, the 49-year-old f6rmer politician is a virtual prisoner in his own house. ' "With so many, many things to make me nervous, the most NEW YORK TIMES 19 October 1974 difficult thing has been to con- trol myself," Mr. Kim said. "I can well understand how politi- cal prisoners in Russia end up suffering from mental prob- lems." Mr. Kim is suffering from sciatica, and said his condition has deteriorated considerably during his confinement, with particularly strong pain in his legs. He walks stiffly, has trou- ble bending over, and said he cannot sleep well at night. He said he frequently. takes sleeping pills and sleeps during the day instead of at night. His face appears puffy and aged, and his mind wanders occa- sionally during a conversation,. While he was still anxious to talk about politics last spring, in a recent interview Mr. Kim appeared preoccupied with his own problems. My house is surrounded. They have surveillance sta- tions in buildings on three sides of me. Wherever I go, two cars follow me. If I see friends, they are taken in for interrogation," he said. , "Basically, I am a politician. I know my people are out there, and still remember me, and support me," he said. "But I am completely cut off. My name can't be mentioned in the news media, and I go anywhere or see anyone, except foreign visito"s." Mr. Kim, who won 46 per cent of the vote in the nation's last free presidential election three 'yearsago, now is also in the midst of an extended legal case bared on. alleged cam- paign-law violations stemming from that election. Although the South Korean Anti-Red Priest Leads Foes of 'Thieu By JAMES M. MARKHAM Spedat to The New York Times SAIGON, South Vietnam, Oct. 18?The Roman Catholic priest at the of the thinly dis- guised movement to oust Pres- ident Nguyen van Thieu reck- ons that 3,000 South Vietna- mese colonels and lieutenant colonels passed through his courses on anti-Communist Psychological warfare. "Among my students, I can count six generals," said the Rev. Tran Huu Thanh, chuckl- ing. "It is because of this that 'Thieu is afraid of me." Father Thanh no longer gives those courses, because he is busy trying to get President Thieu to resign. He sees no con- tradiction between the lifetime he has spent combating Vietna- mese Communists and his cur- rent efforts to overturn their No. I enemy. ? "It is a labor that I have pre- pared for over the past 30 years," the priest said, speaking French. Father Thanh, a calm man on the surface, chain- smokes even at demonstrations, flecking ashes over his black soutane. About two months ago, the 59-year-old priest, a member of the Redemptorlst orcer, entered a tentative opposition scene that was dominated by over-fa- miliar names and faces, veter- ans of unsuccessful causes. He had begun his pastorate at Hue at the end of World War H, training young Catholics to counter the mounting influence of the Vietminh. And it was there that he began his cam- paign against Mr. Thieu. In Hue last Sept. 8 Father Thanh and several thousand de- monstrators were tear-gassed by South Vietnamese police- men. He had launched a de- Tear-Gassed at Hue i monstration, ?and his political career, with an audacious, six- point accusation that charged President Thieu and his family with gross acts of corruption. Since then "Accusation No. i 1," as t was called, promising others to come, has become the catalyst of a revived opposi- tion Mr. Thieu has been put on the defensive, at least for the moment, and Father Thanh is the Opposition's hottest politi- cal property. 'Tacit Approal' of Rome The priest says that he has the "tacit approal" of the Vati- can for his activities. That be- came apparent on the morning of Oct. 1, a day when P?res-, ident Thieu was to go on the airl to defend himself, and when the cautious Archbishop of Sai- gon, the Most Rev. Nguy- en Van Binh, endorsed the anti- corruption front. "We are only demanding, at first changes in the Govern- ment, not a change of the Government," Father Thanh said, ticking off a familiar list of generals frequently accused of corruption. But he said that he "certainly" hoped that Pres- ident Thieu would ultimately resign. "But softly, not by force," he was quick to add. , Mr. Thieu's resignation, he speculated, could be followed by elections for a constitutent assembly in which the commu- nists would be invited to parti- cipate "in a political party, like in France," as he put it "We accept the Communists in the bosom of Vietnamese politics," he said. Though he has spent his adult years trying to undo the politi- cal handiwork of-the Vietminh and .the Vietcong, he obviously retains an admiration for their skills at indoctrination: "They use logic," he said. While he is generally pigeon- holed as a "rightist Catholic," he says he endorses "the' Com- munists' Promises of social re- form" while rejecting their au- thoritarian methods. "That is why, even todaytoday, my anti- Communisin is different from that of this Government," he said. The early work in Hue honed his anti-Communism. ."Of 80 cadres I had, 40 were arrested and shot by the Vietminh," he said deferring to workers. In 1954, he was sent by Rome to northeastern Thailand to work among pro-Communist Vietna- mese refugees and afterward to Hanoi,, where he aided people seeking to flee the north in the wake of the Geneva agreements that created the two Vinams. "I left Hanoi by the last air-' plane," he said, and the next day Ho Chi Minh came into Hanoi. Father Thanh returned to Saigon and presented to them Premier Ngo Dinh Diem a plan for a network of anti-Com- munit agents along what was to become known as the Ho Chi Minh trail, in Laos and 'Cambo- dia. The plan was rejected but Father Thanh was offered the job of forming Republican Youth cadres under the direc- tion of Ngo Dinh Nhu, the Pre- mier:s brother and the power fi- gure of the regime. Subsequently, the young priest was appointed head of the School of Personalism and set about writing textbooks on the foggy, eclectic doctrine to which the new government tried to anchor itself as an in- tellectual counterweight to Communism. This was a mix- ture of the Christian existentia- lism of Gabriel Marcel, Domini- can ideas about the distribution of wealth and Mr. Nhrs -perso- nal philosophical insights. ark foe Supreme Court recently asked the Appeals Court to review the Kim case, the favorable Supreme Court action has served to further drag out the already, lengthy, proceedings. Meanwhile, the government says Mr! Kim cannot leave the country as long as the court case is unresolved. Mr. Kim said he wants to accept a teaching position at Harvard University. In addi- tion, he said he wants to un- dergo medical treatment in the United States. He said that, although he has been told he should be hospi- I talized, he is afraid to enter a South Korean hospital for fear of being drugged, poisoned or killed in the hospital. Mr. Kim's situation has also made life difficult for other members of the Kim family. His second son, for example. has been unable to get a job, and Mr. Kim's wife and chil- dren must "be very careful" about whom they see. Mr. Kim said he would like to see President Ford when he visits !.?.re at the end of Nov- ember. However, he said be realizes, "it's almost impossi- ble, for protocol reasons. "I sincerely hope that Presi- dent Ford will And his aides wi seek to hear more voices than just the government side here" Mr. Kim said. "I hope he will have a chance to learn of the strong democratic will of the Korean people,, and to see that we can't. have security and stabil- ity in South Korea until we ;have democracy. 40 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 kpproved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA7RDP77-00432R000100340D0476 NEW YORK TIMES 24 October 1974 CHILE IS ACCUSED BY JURISTS GROUP kternation'al-BodY beClareS I 'Repression Is Widespread * and More Systematic Special to The New York Times GENEVA, Oct. 23?The Inter- national Commission of Jurists charged today that political re- pression in Chile was now "more ubiquitous and more systematic" than at any time since President Salvadore Al- lende Gossens was overthrown by the military 13 months ago. "For every detainee who has been released in recnt months at last two new arrests have been made," the commission said. The 40-member commission Is a private organiziion based in Geneva that draws support from lawyers groups in na- tional chapters in 50 countries. It describes itself as "strictly nonpolitical" and is recog- nized by the United Nations. The commission gathers in- formation for its reports from lawyers on the spot, observers sent to follow trials and spe- cial teams such as the three- man group that went to Chile last May to study the situation there. Lawyers Supplied Data Most of the information'in today's report was obtained from Chilean defense lawyers, the commission' secretary gen- eral, Niall MacDermott, a Brit- ish lawyer, said. "I cannot be more precise than that," he declared. ? The commission said that from May to August there were 700 known arrests of political suspects in Chile. Most of the ? arrests, it said, were carried out without warrants by un- identified persons in plain clothes armed with machine guns. Since Miguel Enriquez, lead- er of the Movement of the Rev- olutionary Left, was killed on Oct. 5 in a shotout with secu- rity forces there have been 600 further arrests, according to the report. .The commission said that the announcement last month by Gen. Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, the head of Chile's military jun- ta, that the "state of war" was being ended and that all prison- ers who were prepared to go abroad would be released was 'designed for external con- sumption." The legal system, it declared, "continues to contravene basic principles of justice accepted by civilized nations." Besides individual arrests, there are mass arrests in the shantytowns, with the inten- tion apparently being to intimi- date the population, the com- mission said. Some 10,000 to 15,000 people have been arrest- ed in this way in recent months, it reported, with most being released after seven to 10 days. The effect of such measures, including the extension of mili- tary control over the schools, has been t "heighten the fear and tension ainong the working population," the commission said. 'The Great Injury' ? Before the military coup d'etat Chile was a "participa- tory democracy," the commis- sion said, in which all sections of the population through trade unions, professional associa- tions and other groups took an active part in the national life. "All this has now been sys- tematically supressed," the 'commission said. "This is per- haps the greatest injury of all to have been inflicted on the people of Chile." The present members of the commission include Edgar :Faure, the former French Pre- mier; Masatoshi Yokota, the !former Chief Justice of Japan's Supreme Court; Sir Adetokunbo !Ademola, the former Chief Jus- tice of Nigeria, and Eli Whitney Debevoise, a New York lawyer, ' who is chairman of the five- man executive committee. Another member is Sean ;MacBride, winner of hte Nobel Peace Prize and former Irish ;Foreign Minister. Mr. MacBride :served ,for seven years as sec- retary general of the commis- sion. NEW YORK TIMES 31 October 1974 Puerto Rican at U.N. Sees 'Genocide' by Imperialists . ! By PER KIHSS 'Special to The New York Times UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., Puerto Rico's political develop- Oct: 30?The United Nations Ments for omitting what he heard charges today. that, said was abstention by more "North American imperialists"; than 320,000 voters in the 1952 were embarked on a "plan of constitutional referendum boy- genocide" in Puerto Rico that cotted by the former Nationa- has led to sterilization of 200,- list party. 000 women, or 35 per cent of While his own party, which those of child-bearing age. proclaims Marxism -Leninism, Juan Mari Bras, Secretary- abstained in the last election in General of the Puerto Rican So- 1972; Mr. Mari Bres asserted it cialist party, asserted in the 24- had gathered 72,000 signatures nation special committee on co;- of former voters to make it eli- lonialism that the alleged plan gible for inscription in the 1976 also involved migration of one ballot. He said Senator Berrios' million more Puerto. Ricans to own election by 94,570 votes in :the mainland in 10 years. He 1972 represented almost 10 per said. two million had already cent of that year's vote. come north "expelled from the _On what by coincidence was territory by deplorable condi- the 24th -anniversary of the tions of the colonial system." bloody 1950 Nationalist revolt, Mr. Mari bras called on the Mr, Mari Bras contended Puerto committee in a fortheeming Rico ix./as subjected to United! 1975 session to condemn the al- leged plans and "replacement of our country by foreigners." Another pro-indenpendence ad- vocate, Senator Ruben Berrios, president of the Puerto Rican Independence party, ' whose hearing was put over until Fri- day, endorsed this and other re- commendations as jointly deve- loped. Both island leaders said the sterilization figures had come from the Commonwealth's fa- mily planning department. Last month, the Office of Puerto Rico in Washington estimated the island's population had in- creased 223,000 in three years, to 2,912,000 in mid-1973. The 24- nation committee, headed by Ambassador Salim Ahmed Salim of Tanzania, vot- ed with General Assemblyy ap- proval last year to collect poli- tical; economic, social and oth- er data on Puerto Ricans' rights and "to keep the question un- der continuous review." . Right to Self-Determination The United States contends the committee lacks compe- tence to consider Puerto Rico on the ground that the General Assembly in 1953 voted that Puerto Ricans had exercised their right *to self-determination in setting up the common- wealth status and should no longer be listed as non-self- governing. Mr. Mari Bras had also been heard by the special committee with Senator Berrios last Au- gust. Today he criticized a com- mittee reapporteur's report on States control of trade, compul- sory military service, superior. Congressional Federal judicial - power. - He declared the Common- wealth Government .'without I shame" advertised that such in- dustries as t extiles achieved 6 ! per cent profits on the island ! compared with 2.5 per xcent on the mainland; metals, 18.9 per- cent as against 3.9; electrical machinery, 31.6 per cent as against 3.9?much of which he attributed to low wages. The Socialist party- leader urged the committee at a 1975 session to call upon the United States for transfer of power to Puerto Rico without conditions and to send a visiting mission to the island to "sound out the people." Senator Berrios had planned to describe worsening economic conditions in which he said Puerto Rico had a "negative growth" of 2 pr cent in its eco- nomy last year for the first tim in 20 years. Consumer prices, he said, soared 23.7 per cent in the year nded last June, compared with 53 per cnt the year before. Public debt, he went on, has ri- sen to 83.9-billion, an total bt, including private, to 12.6-billion?which he reck- oned at $4,345 per capita. In the year ended June 30, he asserted United States interests had taken $895-million in direct earnings and interestf from Puerto Rico, up from $762-mil- lion, the year before. 1 - la Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 NEW YORK TIMES 22 October 1974 U. S. Policy and Soviet Subs By Barry M. Blechman and Stephanie E. Levinson. WASHINGTON ? Today marks the twelfth anniversary of the Cuban mis- sile crisis. At its conclusion, in 1962, the Soviet Union conceded that it would no longer deploy strategic of- fensive weapons in Cuba. Eight years later, in September, 1970, after renewed tensions, this commitment was broadened to disal- low the servicing of submarines from Cuban ports. Let, last April, a Soviet Golf-class ?this is an Atlantic alliance designa- tion?diesel-powered strategic missile submarine visited Havana. No confron- tation ensued this time. What hap- pened to bring about this change? And what implications can be drawn from this incident for United States policy? There is no question that in 1970 the Soviet Union built a facility for servicing submarines at the Cuban 'port of Cienfuegos. The construction work included barracks, recreational facilities, a water tower, rehabilitation .of an existing pier, and the sinking of moorings for visiting submarines. Also, two barges, associated exclu- sively with the disposal of effluents from nuclear-power plants, were brought to the port. All these facilities Still remain. All that is necessary to make use of the base is the arrival of a' submarineand a tender. . As a result of United States pro- i tests, Soviet plans to operate from the port were shelved, at least temporari- ly. An understanding was reached in 1970 defining what the Soviet Union s would and would not do with respect to the basing of naval vessels in Cuba. But this agreement remains secret to s all but a handful of officials. Further- e more, the official United States inter- pretation of the agreement seems to have narrowed. Initially, United States concern over a the Cienfuegos facilities was directed at preventing the Soviet Union from N basing strategic missile submarines in a the Western Hemisphere. In this sense, c the understanding was viewed as an extension of the 1962 Kennedy- Khruslichev agreement on nondeploy- ment of strategic weapons in Cuba. In the face of recent visits by the Golf-class submarine, the understand- ing is now interpreted to apply only to nuclear-powered vessels. The Defense Department's current position is summarized in a statement by former President Nixon in January, 1971, that "in the event that nuclear subs were serviced in Cuba, or from Cuba, that would be a violation of the understanding." If, in fact, this, was an accurate de- scription of the agreement, it was vio- lated in February, 1971. That month, a nuclear-powered November-class submarine with a tender visited Cien- fuegos. Whether the submarine actu- ally was serviced in the port remains a moot point, but there were no Unit- ed States protests. Nor did the United States protest subsequent visits by- Echo-class submarines ?nuclear-pow- ered vessels carrying tactical missiles. It seems evident that the So- viet Union has been probing the margins of the 1970 understanding. It has done the following, in this order: put a nuclear-powered attack subma- rine into Cienfuegos with a tender, put a nuclear-powered tactical missile submarine into Cienfuegos with a tender, diesel-poweredstrategic missile submarine into a different Cu- ban port quietly, and put a diesel- powered strategic missile submarine nto a different Cuban port publicly. This is just what may be learned from the public record. The ramifications of this activity hould not be overstated. The Soviet Union has not, as yet, challenged the understanding directly, by for example ending a Yankee-class nuclear-pow- red strategiv submarine into Cien- uegos. Nonetheless, it seems clear that the oviet Union is gradually but deliber- tely encroaching upon the agreement. ? Since the military advantages that vould result from the establishment of submarine base in Cuba are not ommensurate with the risk of pro.. NEW YORK TIMES 15 October 1974 A TIMES REPORTER IS BARRED BY CHILE SANTIAGO, Chile, Oct. l4 (UPI) ? The military Govern- ment annOunced today that a New York Times correspondent, Jonathan Kandell, had been permanently banned from the country. Mr. Kandell was turned back when he arrived at the airport. Comdr. Enrique Montero, Un- der Secretary of the Interior, yoking a strong political response by the United States, Soviet motives must be more complex. ? In effect, the submarine visits pro- vide a test of United States willing- ? ness to take risks in its broad relations with the Soviet Union in order to prevent a shift in the two sides' rela- tive military capabilitie - If this indeed is the Russians' pur- pose, then the United States response to the visits?essentially an endorse- ment of the Russions' conduct?can only encourare similar future actions. Thus, thij series of submarine visits to Cuba poses a political challenge for- United States foreign policy. More important, if this Soviet tactic is successful over the long-term United States reluctance to insist on compli- ance with the accord could help bring into question its credibility in world ? affairs. Ahe implication of this assess- ment is that the United States should adopt a firm attitude toward Soviet submarine activity in the Caribbean. This does not mean that all opera- tions should become a cause celebre. It would be difficult to balk at those types of visits for which the Soviet Union has established precedents. New ?steps, however, such as the servicing of a Golf-class sub in Cien- fuegos, should stir a strong reaction. Only by demonstrating a willingness to make issues of single events that in isolation appear relatively insig- nificant can the United States cause the Soviet Union to understand that normalizing our relations requires mutual concessions. Barry M. Blechman and Stephanie E. Levinson are staff members of the foreign policy studies program at the Brookings Institution. said that Mr. Kandell, normally based in Buenos Aires, "would never be permitted to return" to Chile. Although he gave no details on the ban. Governn-rent sources said it was because of ob.i.ieCr tions to articles by Mr. Kandell. Friends of the correspondent. said that Mr. Kandell barred from entering the coun- try after he arrived at Padahueli International Airport outside! Colum- bian airliner. Santiago on an Aviaries Colum-I Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003400Ci4-.6 4