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25X1A ?Ap-pt-oved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007,3 CONFIDENTIAL NEWS., VIEWS and ISSUES INTERNAL USE ONLY This publication contains clippings from the domestic and foreign press for YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use of selected items would rarely be advisable. No. 14 20 SEPTEMBER 1974 GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 1 GENERAL 37 WESTERN EUROPE 39 FAR EAST 44 WESTERN HEMISPHERE 48 Destroy after backgrounder has served its purpose or within 60 days. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3 App-roved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3 ? NEW YORK TIMES 8 September 1974 COLA. Chief Tells House Of $8-Million Campaign Against Allende in '70-73 By SEYMOUR M. HERSH Special to The New York Times WASHINGTON, Sept. 7?The ldirector of the Central ,Intelli- gence Agency has told Congress that the Nixon Administration ; authorized more than $8-million for covert activities , by the agency in Chile between 1970 and 1973 to make it impossible for President Salvador Allende Gossens to govern. The goal of the clandestine C.I.A. activities, the director, William E. Colby, testified at a top-secret hearing last April, was to "destabilize" the Marx- ist Government of .President Allende, who was elected in 1970. The Allende Government was overthrown in a Violent coup d'etat last Sept. 11 in which the President died. The military 'junta that seized per.-"er say he cortmitted suicide but his sup- porters maintain that he was slain by the soldiers who at- tacked the presidential' palace in Santiago. Intervention in '64 ? In his House testimony, Mr. Colby 'also disclosed that the Central Intelligence Agency first intervened against Dr. Allende in 1964, when he was a presi- dential candidate running against Eduardo Frei Montalva of the Christian Democratic party, which had the support of the United States. ? The agency's operations, Mr. Colby testified, were considered a test of the technique of using heavy cash payments to bring down a governMent viewed as antagonistic toward the United States. However, there have been many allegations that the C.I.A. was, involved in similar activities in other countries be- fore the election Of Dr. Allende. Mr. Colby also maintained that all of the agency's opera- tions against the Allende Gov- ernment were approved in ad- vance ,by the 40 Committee in Washington, a secret high-level intelligence panel headed by Secretary of State Kissinger. The 40 Committee was set up by President Kennedy in an at- 'tempt to provide Administra- tion control over C.I.A. activi- fties after Cuban exiles trained and' equipped by the agency failed in their invasion of Cuba In 1961. Appro ' Details of the agency's in- volvement in Chile were firsts provided by Mr. Colby to the House Armed Services Subcom- mittee of Intelligence, headed by Representative Lucien N. Nedzi, Democrat of Michigan, at a special one-day hearing last April 22. The testimony was .later made available to, Representative Michael J. Har- rington, a liberal Massachusetts Democrat who has long been a critic of the C.I.A. Harrington wrote other members of Con- gress six weeks ago to protest both the agency's clandestine activities and the failure of the Nixon Administration to ack- nowledge them despite repeated. inquiries from Congress. A cop. of a confidential seven-page letter sent by Mr. Harrington to Representative Thomas E. Morgan, chairman of the House, Foreign Affairs Committee, was made available to. The New York Times. The testimony of Mr. Colby indicates 'that high officials in the State Department and White House repeatedly and deliberately misled the public and the Congress about the extent of United States involve- ment in the internal affairs of Chile during the 6-me-year government of Dr. Allende. Shortly after Dr. Allende won a plurality in the presiden- tial elections in September, 1970, high Chilean officials told newsmen, as,a dispatch in The New York Times reported then, that the "United States lacks political, economic or mil- itary leverage to change the course of events in Chile, even if the Administration wished to do so." However, Mr. Colby testified that $500,000 was secretly au- thorized by the 40 Committee in 1970 to help the anti-Allende forces. Another $500,000 had been provided to the same forces in 1969, Mr. Colby said. Mr. Allende's victory was ra- tified by the Chilean Congress' in October, 1970, and the State's Department later declared 'thati the Administration had 'firmly rejected" any attempt to blockl his inauguration. J But Mr. Colby testified that $350,000 had been authorized by the 40 Committee in an un- successful effort to bribe mem- bers of the Chilean Congress. The bribe was part of a much more complicated scheme in- tended to overturn the results, of the election,' Mr. Colby tes- tified; but the over-all plan, al- TOCOOrkilOPMil rejected as unworkable. " Whilethe Central Intelligence Agency was conducting these 'clandestine operations, there were reductions- in United States foreign-aid grants to Chile .in development bank loans and in lines of credit from American commercial banks. Commodity credits for vitally needed grain purchases also were restricted. United States officials have declared that there was no Over-all Administration 'pro- gram designed to limit eco- nomic did to Ithe Allende Government, but critics have noted that large-scale loans'' and aid are now going to Chile. President Allende repeatedly complained about what he told the United Nations in Decem- e.xternal pressure to cut us off our economy and paralyzetra from the world, to strangle our economy and paralyze trade and to deprive us of access to sources of international ft- - nancing." Colby Declines Conunent Mr. Colby acknowledged in a brief telephone conversation this week ,that he had testified before the Nedzi' intelligence subcommittee about the C.I.A.'s involvement in Chile, but, he refused to' comment on the Har- rington letter. Mr. Nedzi, contacted in Mu- nich, West Germany, where he is on an inspection trip with other members of the House Armed Services Committee, also declined to comment. Mr. Harlington noted in his letter that he had been permit- ted to read the 48-page tran- script of Mr. Colby's testimony two times, apparently without taking notes. "My memory must serve here as ? the only source for the substance of, the testimony," he wrote. A number of high-ranking Government officials subse- quently confirmed the details of the C.I.A.'s involvement as summarized by the Massachu- setts Representative, a liberal - who has long been a critic of ' the agency's policies. In 1964, Mr. Colby 'testified,: some American corporations in Chile volunteered to serve as conduits for anti-Allende funds, but the proposal was rejected. A similar' proposal in 1970 led to a widely publicized Senate hearing las tyear. ? The C.I.A. director also said that after Dr. Allende's 'election, $5-million was authorized by the 40 Committee for more "de- stabilization" efforts in 1971, 1972 and 1973. An additional $1.5-million was provided to aid anti-Allende candidates in mu- nicipal elections last year. rington wrote. He added, how- Some of these funds, Mr. ever that Mr. Colby had testi- Colby testified were provided fied that $34,000 of the funds to an unidentified influential had been spent?including a anti-Allende newspaper in San- payment of $25,000 to one per- tiago. s summary of the Colby son to buy a radio station. In hi A specific request earlier in Ithese operktions was 'direct, though nOt to the point of iden- tifying 'actual. contacts and conduits," Mr.,' Harrington added. One fully informed _official, told of The New York Times's intention to publish an account of the clandestin4 C.I.A. ac- tivities in Chile, declared, "This thing calls for balanced reporting to put the blaine where it should be laid." "The agency didn't do any- thing without the knowledge and consent of the 40 commit- tee," he said. pointedly adding that the committee was headed by Mr. Kissinger, who was then serving as President Richard M. Nixon's National Security Ad- viser. _ Secrecy Called Necessary Another Government official similarly defended the C.I.A.'s role in funneling fund into Chile and the agency's subse- quent denials of any such 'ac- tivities. "You have a straight out policy that the United States conducts covert action on an officially authorized ba- is," he said. "If you do such things, obviously you're not go- ing to say anything about it." "On this kind of covert ac- 'tion," the official added; "it's up to those asked to do it to do it secretly." . Mr. Kissinger; although fully informed of The Times's ac- count through an aide, did not respond.', . A number of officials whose information about such activi- ties has been accurate in the past declared in interviews this week ,that there was a sharp split between some State De- partment officials and Mr. Kis- Singer over the 40 Committee's Chile policy. Kissinger,'s Comment In his only public comment on the Allende coup, Mr. Kis-' singer told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last year: "The C.I.A. had 'nothing to do With the coup, to the best of my knowledge and belief, and I only put in that qualification in case some madman appears ' down :there who without in- -structions talkild to soniebody. I.have abSolutely no reason to 'suppose it." , 'In his July" 18, 1974, letter to Representative , i Morgan, Mr. Harrington quoted Mr. Colby as:testifying that the 40 Com- mittee authorized an expendi- ture 14 $1-million for "further political destabilization" activi- ties in August, 1973, one month before the military junta seized control in Santiago. "The full plan authorized in August was called off when the military coup occurred less than one month later," Mr. Har- testimony, Mr. Harrington noted that "funding was provided to individuals, political -parties; and media outlets in Chile, through channels in other coun- tries in both Latin America and 08 a DP77-00432R0001 "Mr.. Colby's description. of 1 the summer of 1973 for $50,000 to support a nationwide truck- ers' strike that was crippling the Chilean Government was turned down by the 40 Com- mittee, Mr. Harrington further 0 0 ?VethlYS. Colby as testifying. n the period before the icoup," one official said. "there Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3 WASHINGTON POST 09 September 1974 lwas a pretty" firmview on the part of the 40 Committee which is Kissinger and nobody else?that the Allende Govern- ment was bound to come to de- struction and had to be thor- oughly discrdited.". "The State Department sup- ported this, but in a different way," the official recalled. "It wanted to stretch out any clan- destine activities to permit the regime to come to a political end. "The argument was between those who wanted to use force and end it quickly rather than to play, it out. Henry was on the side of the former?he was for considerabl obstruction." All of the officials inter- viewed, emphasized that the Central Intelligence Agency was not authorized to play any direct' role in the coup that overthrew Dr. Allende. It was also noted that- most of the subsequent denials of agency involvement in the internal af- fairs of Chile were made in the context, of a direct, United States role in the overthrow. , "On most of those you have ito look at the language very !carefully," one official said of ithe denials. ' 'Shortly after President Allen- de's overthrow there were.am- confirmed reports that the truckers' strike, which was a key element in the social chaos that preceded the coup, had been financed, at lease in part, by the C.I.A. ? At a closed hearing on Chile 'before 'a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee last October, Mr. Colby refused to rule out the possibility that some anti- Allende demonstrations in Chile .may have been assisted through subsidiaries of United States corporations in Brazil or other Latin-American countries. He was sharply questioned about ,that ,, possibility bye Mr. Harrington who emerged dur- ing Congressional debate' as a leading critic of the Adminis- tration's Chilean policies. Representative Harrington, reached yesterday at his Mas- iachusetts office, refused to discuss his letter to Mr. Mor- gan, which he termed confi- dential. Nor would he discuss !other aspects of-' the possible 'American involvement in the .fall of President Allende. In his letter, Mr. Harrington complained about the "inherent limitations facing members of Congress in uncOvering the facts of covert activities such as those in Chile." He also expressed dismay that the Administration had authorized the Covert expendi- ture of $1-million in August, 1973, "without any apparent deterrent being posed by the re- cently completed hearings into I.T.T. [International Telephone & Telegraph] involvement in Chile and the Senate Water- gate committee's disclosur of C.I.A. activities related to Watergate." , A Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee concluded hear- ings last April into what I.T.T. officials acknowledged was an attempt to contribute $1-million to the United States Govern- ment for use by the Central .In- telligence: Agency to create eco- nomic. chaos in Chile. Testimony showed, that the offer was re- jected after discussions that ap- parently involved Mr. Kissinger and Richard M. Helms,'then di- rector of the agency. , A number of high State De-: pertinent officials testified un-- der oath at those hearings that the United States was not mak- ing any attempts to interfere with Chile's internal politics. Edward M. Korry, former Ambassador to Chile, declared: "The United States did not seek to pressure, subvert, influence a single member of the Chilean Congress at any time in the en- tire four years of my stay. No hard line toward Chile was car- ried out at any time." Charles A. Meyer, former As- sistant Secretary of State for Latin-American Affairs, simila?- ly testified that the United States scrupulously adhered' tb a policy of nonintervention. "We bought no votes, we fund- ed no candidates, we promoted no coups," he said. Senator Frank Church, Deart arra of Idaho, who is chair- man of the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations,. could not be reached for com- ment. The subcommittee's chief. counsel, Jerome I. Levinson, ex- pressed anger today on hear- ing of Mr. Colby's- testimony. "For me," he said, -"the funda- mental issue now is who makes foreign policy in a democracy and by what standards and by what criteria?" ? Mr. Levinson said that the subcommittee had been "de- liberately deceived" during its public hearings last year. In ? his letter, to Mr. Morgan, Mr. Harrington said that he hid turned to the Foreign Af- fairs Committee chairman "as a last resort, having despaired ,cif the likelihood of anything productive occurring as a,. re- sult of the avenues I have al- ready pursued." Mr. Harrington noted that the subcommittee on Inter- American Affairs had held five hearings 'on human rights in Chile since the junta came to power, with testimony from only one State Departmerft wit- ness with full knowledge of the clandestine C.I.A. activity. And that witness, Harry W.' Shlaildernan, a Deputy Assist- ant Secretary of State for Inter- American Affairs, refused to testify about agency activities, Mr. Harrington wrote. He' urged Mr. Morgan to call for a full-scale public investi- gation of the Nixon Adminis- tration's involvement in Chile: Mr. Morgan could not be reached for comment, nor could it be learhed whether he had responded to Mr. Harring? .ton's letter. The Foreign Affairs Commit-' 'tee will begin sessions next week on the Administration's foreign military-aid requests, committee aides said. Amend- ments have been offered calling IA News Causes o tir in Chile . - By Joseph Novitski Snecial to The Washington Post , SANTIAGO, Sept. 8--The fer.ed $1 million to the CIA for report from Washington that use against Allende. The Chi- lean government printed a pa- perback translatibn of all the ITT documents released by the Central Intelligence Agency had alloc'ated $11 mil- lion between 1964 and 1973 to support anti-leftist political ac- tion in Chile caused no excite- ment here today. Reports of CIA financial in- volvement in Chilean politics have been so persistent in the past 10 years that they- were accepted as fact by many Po- litically aware Chileans Jong before a military coup de- posed leftist President Salva- dor Allende last year. , ? On this warm, sunny Sun- day, no government official could be located to comment on the report. Radio stations did not men- tion the report in their news broadcasts, although interna- tional news agencies sent the news to their Chilean subscri- bers. . There was no certainty that Santiago's government-con- trolled newspapers would pub- lish news of the report, , printed today in the United States on the basis of ? secret testimony before a congres- sional committee by William Colby, the director of the CIA. As long ago as 1970, just af;; ter Allende was elected presi- dent as the candidate of a left- ist coalition, Chileans in the' upper levels of several politi- cal parties believed - that for= eign funds had come into their, country at campaign time from several sources. Christian Democrate, then at the , end of six years in power under .. President, Eduardo Frei, admitted that: their party had been Sup- ported by, Christian Demo:; -cratic parties in Germany and. Italy. The conservative Na-- tional, Party claimed that the left had received funds from Communist and Socialist par-, ties abroad. An executive of an Amen- can tipper company in Santi- egg. said ,privately that his company had contributed cam- paign funds to non-leftist can- didates in the campaign just ended. There was little evidence to connect the CIA with , Al- lende's political opposition un- til the disclosure in 1972 that the ITT conglomerate had of- for the' halving and for the complete elimination of the Administration's request for more than $20-million in mill-, tary aid and training for Chile. [Washington columnist Jack , Anderson and later brought out a comic book version of the ITT conspiracy. - According to the transcript, of Colby's testimony cited bY' Thep. Michael Harrington (D-, Mass.) in his request for a con- gressional investigation of CIA involvement in Chile; $5 million for "politiqal destabili- zation efforts" and $500,000 for opposition politicians had ',been authorzed between Al-, lende's election and 1972. In , Chile, rumors that CIA funds were being channeled to, the opposition grew that year. ? ? , ! After .the nationalization' of American copper companies, large Chilean companies and, banks, Allende's economic poi- ides began affecting the mid-,1 die class in 1972. First shop- keepers and truck owners, then bureaucrats and profes- sional men reacted with the first of two waves of ? strikes that were to spread civil un- rest and economic disorder' through the country. The strike leaders denied, then, and -again during the strikes that preceded Al- lende's downfall last year, act cusations from the left that they were being financed, by the CIA. However, ,this year, one of the men involved in or- ganizing both series of strikes indicated . that. CIA funds, had been availqble.. , ? -4Ve never used. them,' we never got any," seid Vicente Kovaceide, an officer or, ,the Chilean small pusinessmeri's federation, in an interview in Kevaicevic,, an anti- Communist Yugoslav emigre to Chile, had helped to guide the shopkeepers' group through ttite 1972 and -,.1973 strikes. "Friends I had from other organizations came back from abroad and asked us if we had got our share," he added. "They said the money had been allocated by the CIA for all the unions in the strike, and some of it should have gone to us." 2 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 :-61A-14DP77-00432R00016640067=a- Appfoved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007.3 ithishingin %rams Monday, September 9, 1974 nit) 0 v?, \L I3y Jeremiah O'Leary St ar?News Staff Writer Secretary of State Henry ' A. 1Cissinger presided over every meeting of the "40 Committee" when the con- ? overt arm of the National Se- curity Council authorized expenditure of millions of . dollars from 1970 to 1973 against the election and rule of Chile's late Marxist . president Salvador Allende, U.S. officials said today. , ;Kissinger was President Nikon's national security adviser in the period from ? 1969 until late summer 1973 when the "40" Committee"- anthorized funds for indi- miduals, anti-Allende politi- cal; parties and news media inChile, these officials said. ram 1964 until 1973, the kn?tal authorization for clandestine operations 4gainst the Marxist leader and his coalition of parties Was more than $8 Million. _,? :""He chaired every meet- s ing:of the committee from the moment he came to town," an official said, add- ing that the Central Intelli- gence Agency did nothing ino Chile that the "40 Commit- i tee'.' had not authorized. :Spokesmen for Kissinger, ' who became secretary of skate last September'26 just 15:days after the Chilean thilitary overthrew Allende, said the secretary . was aWare of the new disci?. shres but no comment was einected until today.. ;THE INFORMED sources available to the . Star-News said not all of the mbney authorized for eimenditurc was used. The funds used to support anti- Allende politicians, press and radio during the presi- dential election of 1970, the congressional bi-election of 1972 and to "destabilize" the Allende regime were cut off when it appeared in mid- 1973 that a military coup d'etat was imminent. These sources claimed that the CIN and the money made available to it played no role in supporting the armed forces uprising on Sept. 11, 1973, in which Al- lende allegedly committed suicide when his La Moneda palace was attacked by the military rebels. Kissinger was testifying at his confir- mation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations ,Committee at the height of the Sept. 11 fighting before collapse of the Allende gov- ernment. . The anti-Allende deci- sions Of the "40 Committee" and the CIA's role in carry- ing them out were disclosed by CIA Director William E. Colby in secret testimony before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Intelligence last April 22. The tenor of Colby's 'testi- mony, made public over the weekend by the New York Times and Washington Post, was that the "40 Corn- orriittee" targeted the funds .to prevent Allende's elec- tion in 1964 and 1970 and to 'destabilize" his govern- ment after 1970. It is believed that the bulk of the money went to subsidize Christian Demo- cratic President Eduardo TM ECONOMIST 31 AUG 1974 Crying ?wolf FROM OUR SPAIN CORRESPONDENT If it's a really diiTerent holiday you. are looking for this summer, try the north- -west corner of Spain. But bring a Shotgun: 'For the big news there. inGeneral Franco's native Galicia. is of wolves. Since the beginning of July, Galleito villagers have shot about 40 of them. Every day brings fresh accounts of sheep, calves and dogs being devoured and farmers chased up trees. The papers tell of panic and even "psychosis" in some areas. Zoologists are baffled. It's against all the rules, they say, for wolves to approach human settlements in summer. Perhaps, say local farmers, a new wolf generation is emerging that doesn't respect rules. Some people suspect a publicity stunt for one of those English horror-films. Strangely, no one has yet blamed the . ? Frei in 1964, the campaign of conservative National Party leader Arturo Ales- sandri in 1970 and subse- quent "destabilization" ef- forts. Frei won the 1964 ? campaign but Allende led a three-man race in 1970 with less than two percentage points, or 36 percent of the vote, over Allessandri. Subsequently, Allende was. named president by the Chi- lean Congress in a runoff vote in which the CIA funds ? were liberally employed among Chilean politicians and press and radio outlets. MANY DETAILS of Colby's testimony appear in a letter written by Rep. Michael J. Harrington, D- Mass., to House Foreign Af- fairs Committee chairman Thomas E. Morgan, D-Pa. Harrington'S letter appears for further hearings on the CIA role against Allende. CIA spokesmen' said the agency had nothing to do with the revolution. But Colby's candid testi- mony to the House commit- tee was taking place last April while the Senate For- eign Relations subcommit- tee on multinational corpo- rations was hearing sworn declarations from U.S. offi- cials that Washington's 1970 election policy in Chile was one of non-intervention. Both former Ambassador Edwin M. Korry and Assist- ant Secretary of State Charles A. Meyer swore that the United States did nothing to pressure politi- cians or buy anti-Allende votes. The Senate hearing brought testimony that the CIA .with a mysterious sea-wolf?the 3,000-ton yacht Apollo. which potters around the 'coasts of Spain, Portugal and' Morocco heavily laden with cpmmunica- tions.gadgetry. It flies a Panamanian flag and belongs to something called ? the OperatioaTransport Corporation. The Apollo was anchored off Lisbon during Portugal's coup in April, and sub- sequently the liberal Portuguese weekly Expresso alleged that the yacht was in the service of the CIA. The Spanish monarch- ist daily ABC then revealed -that the Spaniards have been watching the boat closely since 1969, when it allegedly strayed into Spanish "naval waters". souler Spanish paper repo:led that the Apollo called at a part in A id.ulusL the day after Admiral Carrero Blanco was assassinated. It coupled this with the coincidental and unconfirmed information that Spanish security men had discovered lien ei oyes 'International Telephone & Telegraph Co. and the CIA discussed plans for expendi- ture of $I million in the 1970 election but denials that the plan was ever carried out. ' The general posture of the State Department in the ? 1969-1973 period was that it 'would be better for the United States to adopt a hands-off attitude toward Chile on the theory that Al- lende and his Marxist coali- tion would be so destructive of the national economy as to preclude any chance of another electoral victory there. Kissinger was quoted in this period as observing ironically that, "Chile is a dagger pointed at the heart of Antarctica." - KISSINGER testified at his confirmation hearing 'that the CIA had nothing to do with the coup last Sep- tember. Other sources inde- pendent of Kissinger have supported the claim that the Coup was launched by the Chilean military without cooperation or prior knowl- edge of the U.S. govern- ment or the CIA. But before the coup, offi- cials say there was a strong ,division between Kissinger ' in the White House and the ? , State Department on what ought to be done about Chile. ?,Kissinger was pbrtrayea. by sources close to the af- fair as haVing consistently taken a.harder line against .Chire than the State Depart-, 'inentia deliberations of the- ' ?"40 Committee'''. ? Lisbon during the coup but depies the allegation about Andalusia. In Tenerife last week he allowed two Spanish journal- ists to look 'over the -Sfacht. Crestfallen, they admitted ? to haying encountered nothing. abnormal?no false beards, no James Bond deVices, not even a bugged' cabaret girl. The well-heeled passengers spotted on board were following a floating management course, according to a friendly neighbourhood CIA man. It is unlikely, however, that we have heard the last of the Apollo. Although one paper has reported that the yacht ? spent a fortnight off Galicia at the begin- ning of the summer, nobody has remarked on the intriguing coincidence of this visit and the beginning of the wolf upsurge. But suspicions are bound to be aroused by anothdr sinister news item from Galicia: a. truckdriver who reported run- ning into two strange animals. He killed one? it was nearly six fectIong and weighed d For R suglxstioc._ %tulle ar.ii.n.ccs: the Guardia Civil Central Intellig,ence Agen,mv-^-prove or 911PACNNIIN N/Artifaiariti.W" b?432ftr-01-004060743 . 111 onferrada, where it was identified, ptain admits being in provisionally, as an American jackal. Some silly-season newspaper articles o The Apollo's ca here, however, have been trying to link the Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3 VE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 1974 Hearings Urged on C.1 .A.' s Role in Chile! By SEYMOUR M. HERSH ' speeiaito The New York Times 'BEVERLY, Mass., Sept. Representative Michael J. Har- rington called ioday for full- scale public 'hearings into the central intelligence agency's clandestine operations against the Government of President Salvador Allende Gossens of Chile. In an interview at his home here, Mr. Harrington said he would formally request the House Foreign Affairs Commit- tee, of which he is a member, to surnmon Secretary of State Kissinger and William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, to testify about the Chilean policy of the United States. The New York Times reported today that Mr. Colby told a House.committee in April that the C.I.A. was Authorized to spend more than $8-million clandestinely from 1970 to 1973 in an effort to make it impos- sible for President Allende to govern. The Allende Govern- ment was overthrown in a vio- lent military coup on Sept. 11, .1973, in which the Chilean leader died. . ? ' Kissinger's Kole In calling ?for hearings, Mr.. Harrington declared that one I reason senior officials in Con- gress were reluctant to investi-I gate Chilean policy was what i he termed a "disinclination" to: turn up facts that might reflect, adversely on Mr. Kissinger. "Without knowing anything at all about Mr. Kissinger's role in all of this," Mr. Harrington said, "Congress is hesitating because of fear that they'll run into Kissinger." "It's 'obvious to me," he added, "that the role played by Kissinger is going to be of significance in the evaluation of how the policy toward Chile evolved. But there's a disin- clination in Congress to even get into some areas that might peripherally damage or embar- rass Kissinger." In his testimony before a House subcommittee on intelli- gence last April 22, Mr. Colby noted that all of the C.I.A.'s efforts against President Al- lende were directly *approved by the 40 committee, a? high- level intelligence review com- mittee that has been headed by Mr.. Kissinger since the begin- ?;ning of the Nixon Administra- tion in early 1969. "We're not going to undo what happened in Chile," Mr. Harrington said today, "but we must examine the role of -the intelligence community in for- eign policy.. "When you look at the Colby testimony, you'll see that the notion of Congressional over- sight of the C.I.A. is passive, bystandish, totally ineffective." Mr. Harrington's public call today for hearings was his lat- est in a series of attempts, 'most of them in private, to force senior Members of, the Senate and House to begin a review of the Central Intelli- gence Agency's Chilian policy. ? The C.I.A. report published today was based in part on a 'confidential seven-page letter Mr. _Harrington wrote in mid- July to Representative Thomas E. Morgan, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Commit- tee, in which Mr. Colby's testi- mony was summarized. The Times received a copy of the letter from an outside source. Mr. Harrington said today that he had sent a similar let- ter to Senator 3. W. ,Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In his letter to Mr. Morgan, Mr. Harrington complained that he had discussed Mr. Colby's testimony with other members of the committee and con- cluded that there would be no ,"further investigations or hear- ings into the broader policy questions that such activities !pose," So far, Mr. Harrington said ;today, Mr. Morgan has refused to permit such hearings, argu- ing that the Foreign Affairs Committee does not have the authority to pursue questions of C.I.A. activities. . "Kissinger and colhy should testify," Mr. Haaington main- tained. "It's just inane to sug- gest that a foreign affairs com- mittee has no authority to ;conduct such hearings." Mr. Harrington refused to characterize Mr. Fulbright's re- sponse to his letter, but a Sen- ate source said later tbday that the Arkansas Democrat had told the Congressman that he could see "no useful purpose" in reopening the Foreign Rela- tions Committee hearings into Chile. "What this really means," the Senate source said, "is that he doesn't want to take Kis- singer on head on because it could mean exposing the fact that Kissinger himself was the man who controlled and direct- ed the policy of using covert action to make it impossible for Allende to govern." . Mr. Harrington, a liberal Democrat who was first elected to Congrks in 1969, praised Mr. Colby's testimony as "The most direct, unambiguous and to the point I've ever seen." He was permitted to review the still classified 48-page Chil- ean transcript in June by Rep- resentative Lucien M. Nedzi, chairman of the House Armed Services subcomthittee on in- telligence. Mr. Harrington recalled to- day that his initial reaction after reaclIng the account was one of ."profound shock." "I did not expect to see the docunientation of theories I hadn't held mystelf," he said. "I'd never subscribed to the conspiracy theories' about the United States' involvement in the disintegration of the Al- lende Government." "Colby's testimony may have been matter-of-fact," Mr. Har- rington added, "but it also was almost clinical?as if you had a well-trained surgeon called in to describe procedures. You didn't get the feeling that then, was any element of right or wrong that .went into the deci- sions about what to do." --i2q5prrr.vetrrorRe10-a-se 2001/08/08-f -CIA-ROP77 01:)43. 2ROOCr1003417007=3? WASHINGTON STAR 10 September 1974 HIT to Inv stig te 1Atis in Chill A ainst kflh1enie rty Jeremiah O'Leary Star-News Staff Writer Sen. Frank Church, chair- man of the Foreign Rela- tions subcommittee on mul- tinational corporations, is expected to reopen hearings on U.S. clandestine opera- tions in Chile following dis- closure that the so-called "40 Committee" of the Na- tional Security Council authorized expenditure of millions of dollars against the late Marxist Salvador Allende between 1964 and 1973. Church is expected by Capitol Hill sources to-con- fer with other subcommit- tee members and staff to decide what to do about dis- crepancies in the testimony given before several com- mittees on Chile by officials of the State Department and the CIA. One Senate source said, "Someone obviously has been lying about the U.S. role in Chile." Several offi- cials indicated Church is virtually certain to order an immediate investigation by the subcommittee staff and follow that up by reopening the hearings. Church could not be reached for com- ment. CIA DIRECTOR William E. Colby testified last April that The "40 Committee," chaired by Henry A. Kiss- inger, who is now secretary of state; authorized expen- diture of nearly .$11 million by the CIA to subsidize *news media and politicians against Allende in 1964 and again in the 1970 election period to bar his ascenden- cy to the presidency. Colby also testified in se- cret session before a House Armed Services Committee that funds were authorized as late as the summer of 1973 to "destabilize" the re- gime of Allende. But at the same time last April, then-Asst. Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Charles A. Meyer , told the Church subcommit- tee under oath that the: 4 United States- pursued a policy of nonintervention in Chilean affairs during the -Allende period. His succes- sor, Jack B. Kubisch, now ambassador to Greece, and Deputy Asst. Secretary Harry Shlaudeman gave similar testimony to House committees. (An official familiar with Meyer's testimony told 'the Star-News the former assistant secretary attend- - ed some meetings of the "40 Committee!' but that the State Department's repre- sentative was U. Alexis Johnson. This official said, Meyer gave "scrupulously honest" answers at the Church subcormnittee hear- ings but was not asked questipns that would have required replies acknowl- edging what the United States was doing- in Chile in the 1970 electoral period. Neither did he volunteer information which would have brought the matter to light. (The U.S. funds were used to support anti-Allende political ,parties and the. -anti-Mlende newspaper, El Mercurio; But Myer was ,not asked specifically aboixf- 'these, enterprises, the offi- cial , said. Meyer's state- ment that the United States "bought no votes, ftuided no candidates and promoted no coups" was literally accu- .rate.) KISSINGER'S only known testimony on inter- vention in Chile was given before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last September during his con- firmation hearings. He denied that the United States played any role in the coup d'etat of last Sept. 11 but apparently was not asked about previous covert activities against Allende. However, U.S. sources said 'yesterday Kissinger pre- sided over every meeting of the "40 Committee" from the moment he became President Nixon's national. Security adviser in 1969. State Department spokes- ' Appreved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3 man Robert Anderson did not directly answer a ques- tion yesterday as to wheth- er Kissinger saw any inconsistency in his role as chairman of the "40 Com- mittee" and as secretary of state in charge of 'overt for- eign policy. Anderson gave reporters a list of the mem- I bership of the "40 Commit- tee" and said that all deci- ' sions of the committee-are unanimous. Further, he said,. all "40 Committee" decisions are approved by the President and there is "a regular procedure to ?convey these decisions" on ,intelligence activities to the appropriate congressional committees. WASHINGTON POST? 11 . September 1.974 W. C. e. -.-Settior CIA fileer9 52 William Charles Regan, .52, a senior officer with the Cen.: tral,Intelligence Agency, died. Saturday of a heart attack while visiting in New Market, Va. Born in New York City, Mr. Regan graduated from Regis Preparatory School there and from Fordham University. He served as a captain in the U.S. Army in World War II and was attached to the Of- fice of Strategic Services on duty in the China-Burma-India theater. He received the Bronze Star for participation in two hazardous missions. Mr. Regan attended the Command . and General Staff School at Ft. Leavenworth and was a colonel in the Army Re- serves at the- time of his death. He had been with the CIA and its predecessors since 1946. ' He is survived bY his wife, Lorraine, and five daughters, Kathleen, Susan, Anne, Ellen and Mary Elizabeth, all of the home, 6707. Dean Dr.. McLean; his mother, Florence C: Re- gan, of Merrick, Long Island; a brother, Thomas, and a sis- ter, Gertrude, of Massachu- setts, and another sister, Ei- leen, of New York. WASHINGTON POST 10 September 1974 By Laurence Stern., Washington Post Staff Writer The State Department found itself in the center of a growing congressional, furor yesterday over the disclosure that some $11 million in U.S. funds had been authorized for covert political action against the late Chilean president, Salvador Allende. ? In the face of new 'charges ;that it misled Congress on the Issue of U.S: intervention in Chile, a State Department spokesman yesterday stood by sworn testimony of officials on Capitol Hill that . the United States pursued a policy of non-intervention during the Allende period. . The new round of contro- versy over U.S. policy on Chile was triggered by the dis- closure Sunday that CIA Di"- rector William E. Colby se- knowledged to a-House Armed Services subcommittee last April 22 that $3 million in co- vert funds was targeted against Allende's Cardidacy in 1964 and more than $8 million . was authorized to block _ his 1970 election and. "destabilize.!'1 his government between 19701 and September, 1973, when he I was overthrown. . Sen. Edward M. Kennedy .(I)-Mass.), chairman of a Sen-1 ate Refugee sttbcommittee which is investigating human rights violations in Chile, said yesterday that the disclosure. of CIA funding of Allende's. opposition "represents. not only a flagrant violation -Of our alleged policy of non-inter- vention in Chilean affairs but also an appalling lack of forth- rightneSs-with the Congress." He noted that covert politi; eal funding, such as was ac-, knowledge d by Colby,' "has been denied time and time again by high officials of the Nixon and now Ford adminis-. ? tration." Kennedy called for full con,' gressional investigation of the Aiscrepancies in the official' versions of what the United' States did in Chile during the Allende period. Jerome Levinson, counsel for the Senate Foreign Rela- tions Committee's multina-i tional corporations suhcorn--. mittee, said "there is no doubt. that we were misled" by State Department witnesses who testified last year that the United States had not Under-' taken covert activities against Allende. Levinson said he will raise the issue of whether the sub-1 committee's hearings on Chile' Approv@ilarreram should he .goe #18 :.ChkeRLIPt77E094r3ZEICIP0ii in enies IIrn,e turns from campaigning in Id-1 aho. It will be up to the sub- committee to decide whether it wants to extend the inquiry tO investigate sharp public dis:. crepancies in the testimony. The former Assistant Secre- tary of State for Inter-Ameri- can Affairs, Charles A. Meyer, gave sworn testimony to the subcommittee March 29, 1973, that "the policy of the govern- ment ... was that there would be no intervention in the polit- ical affairs of Chile .... We; financed no candidates, no po- litical parties...." ? ? ? j Last June 12 Acting Assist- ant Secretary of State Harry Shlaudeman told a House For- eign Affairs subcommittee-1 "Despite pressures to the con- trary the ,U.S. , government' adhered to a policy of non-in- tervention in Chile's affairs, during the Allende period.1 That policy remains in force today. . . ." When pressed by Rep. Don- ald M. Fraser (D-Minn.) On whether "you are prepared to, day to deny an assertion that ! the U.S. funneled money co-! vertly to opposition parties following the 1970 election in Chile," Shlaudeman respond- ed: "I am .not . . ." ' Fraser, chairman of a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on international organizations, charged yesterday that "the executive branch had deceived the Congress as well as the public with respect to its in- volvement in the overthrow of the Allende regime." Yesterday State Department spokesman Robert Anderson said that "we stand by the statements that have .been made in the past." He declined. to confirm or deny the report ; of Colby's testimony published Sunday', in The Washington Post. Secretary of State Henry A.' Kissinger similarly declined yesterday through a spokes- man to respond to Colby's tes- timony, which was recounted in a confidential letter from Rep. Michael Harrington (D- Mass.) to House Foreign Af- fairs Committee ? Chairman Thomas E. Morgan (D-Pa.) ap- pealing for further congres- sional inquiry into covert op- erations in Chile. Kissinger was chairman of a, meeting of the "Forty Com- mittee" on June 27, 1970 when the question of covert political action against Allende was taken up. Kissinger, according to records of. the proceeding, favored a limited and thor- oughly concealed program of intervention. 5 cording to sources with access ; to inter-departmental records of the deliberations, opposed CIA intervention in the Al- lende election but abandoned its opposition when President Nixon ratified a limited- 'pro-' gram oh, intervention for. which some $350,000 to $400,- 000 was authorized by the Forty.,Committee. Kissinger was suoted in Minutes of the June 27 top-se- cret meeting at the White House as having said: "I don't see. why we need to Stand by and watch a country go Com- munist due to the irresponsi- bility of its own people." A spokesman for the Secre, tary said yesterday that Mr. Kissinger had no.. recollection of having made Such an obser- vation and would not corn-, ment on his role in the delib-I erations. Colby's closed testimony to' the-House Armed- Service sub-, committee, as recounted in: the "Harrington letter, was that the CIA's role in the1970 Chi- lean election- was that of al "spoiler" engaged in ."generali attempts to politically destabi- lize the country_and discredit Allende to improve the likeli- hood that an opposition candi- date would win." The Forty Coininittee, which' is an inter-departmental White ,House panel supervising all :U.S. covert operations, author- ized a steady, outpouring of funds into Chile:through indi- viduals, political parties and ' news media through --Latin ; American: and European chan- nels during the anti-Allende effort, .according2,to the. Sum- ! marY of Colby's testimoriYv.:- Kissinger' had, on various 1 occisions,- expressed personal ;reservations about-the emer- gence of the Allende govern ment, which was committed to I a program of nationalization and incorbe redistribution. After Allende's popular election in September, 1970, but before the congressional run-off, Kissinger told a group of editors at the White House that "it is fairly easy 'for one to predict that if Allende wins, there is a good chance that he will establish over a period of years some sort of Communist government ... "So I don't think we should delude ourselves that an Al- lende takeover in Chile would not present massive problems for us, and for democratic forces and pro-U.S. forces in Latin America ... " But Kissinger added that the situation was not one "in ow- capacity for than- ?' ery great at this par- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3 NEW YORK TIMES 10 September 1974 State Department Backs Reports of a Hands-Off Policy - ? By SEYMOUR M. HERSH Special to The New York Times ? WASHINGTON, Sept. 9?In a dispute that could lead to further hearings, the State Det partment declared ,today that it was stahding by the testi- mony of senior officials who previously had asserted at Congressional hearings that the United States had not in- tervened in the internal affairs of Chile after the election of President Salvador Allende Gossens. The challenged testimony was officially endorsed by the State Department spokesman, Robert Anderson, at ?a news briefing. His statement came two days after it was reported that the Central Intelligence Agency had been authorized to I spend more than $8-million from 1970 to 1973 in an effort to make it impossible for Presi- dent Allende to' govern. The Allende Government was over- thrown last September in a military coup d'etat.. In In the last two days, a Massachusetts Representative and a Senate aide have attacked the, credibility of' testimony given under oath by Charles A. Meyer, former Assistant Secretary of State; EdWard M. Kerry, former Ambassador to Chile, and Harry W. Shlaude- man, Deputy Assistant Secre- tary of State. Mr. Meyer and Mr. Korry both maintained at a Senate Foreign Relations subcommit- tee hearing last year into the International Telephone S: Tele- graph Company's involvement in Chile that the Nixon Ad- ministration had scrupulously adhered to a policy of noninter- vention. Mr. Shlaudeman simi- larly told a House Foreign ticular moment now that mat- ters have reached this particu- lar point." It was during this period :that the CIA and 'Interna- tional- Telephone and Tele- graph Co. sought actively to Undermine Alleficle's prospects for election, according to testi- mony that emerged last year before the Senate Foreign Rel- ations multinational subcom- mittee and most recently cor- roborated in far greater detail by CIA Director Colby. ? Harrington, whose letter re- vived the controversy over U.S. policy in Chile, said he would renew his requests to Morgan and other 'congres- sional chairmen for a full in- -quiry into the extent of CIA intervention against Allende's elected government. "I strongly support the broad initiatives of the Nixon and Kissinger foreign policy," he said. "But I do not think we should tolerate the stand- ard of international conduct we displayed in Chile whether It was approved by Henry Kis- singer or anyone else." ?? Affairs subcommittee in June ;that the United States "had Inothing to do with the political 'destabilization in Chile." ? I Jerome .L. Levinson, chief counsel of the Senate Subcom- mittee an Multinational Cor- porations, which conducted the I.T.T. hearings, last' week ac- cused Mr. Meyer and Mr. Korry of having deliberately deceived the Senate. Representative Mi- chael J. Harrington, a Democra- tic member of the House Fo- reign Affairs Committee, charged that Mr. Shlaudeman was evading questions and, in effect, dissembling by refusing to testify about C.I.A. activities against the Allende. Govern- ment. Asked about those criticisms today, Mr. Anderson said, ."With regard to the testimony that was given on the Hill by Mr. Shlaudeman and Mr. Meyer and Others, we stand by that." "I realize there have been al- legations to the contrary," Mr. Anderson added, "and if any such allegations are pre- sented, obviously we wil be very pleased to review the testimony. But we are unaware ?of any mistatements by the of- ficers that you referred to." Mr. Levinson, reached later tqclay in his Senate office, as- serted that he would "stand on what I said." New Hearings Possible , "A reading of the record by any fair-minded person has to lead one to the conclusion that they were not candid with the subcommittee," he said. "The words used by Mr. Meyer and Mr. Korry were! artful in terms of dodging, butl NEW YORK TIMES 11 September 1974 in substance and spirit 'the in- tent was to deceive." . The subcommittee counsel said he was planning to confer tomorrow with Senator Frank ;Church, chairman .of the 'subcommittee, to determine whether further hearings would ,be necessary. Mr. Church, who is up. for re-election this fall, was said to be campaigning in Idaho today and could not be reached for comment. In testimony before the Churclh subcommittee last year; Mr. Meyer and Mr. Korry re- peatedly asserted that the 'United States policy was one of nonintervention, although both. men claimed executive privilege in refusing to discuss confidential State Department and White House communica- tions. Mr. Korry, who was Ambas- sador at the time 'Dr. 'Allende won the presidency in 1970, testifiecl, as follows in response to a question from Mr. Levin- son about his instructions; "It was Obvious from the his- torical record that we-did not act in any manner that 2 re- flected a hard line;' that the United States had maintained the most total hands-off the military policy from 1969 to i1971 conceivable; that - the lUnited States did not seek to pressure, subvert, influence a single member of the Chilean Congress at any time in the entire four years of my stay." However, according to still- secret testimony supplied for Congress, earlier this year by William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, the United States authorized $1.-million in clandestine funds in 1969 and oil Chile 1970 in an attempt to keep Dr. Allende from winning the gen- eral elections, and then spent an additional $350,000 in the fall of 1970 in an attempt to bribe members of the Chilean iCongress not to ratify his-elec- tion. 1_ Mr. Meyer, who was in 'charge of Latin-American laffairs in the State Department 'at the time of the coup d'etat, testifiedsimilarly a few days ilater that "we were ieligiously 'and scrupulously adhering to the, policy of. the Government of ,the United States ... . of non- intervention. We bought ho votes, we funded no candidates, we promoted no coups." Mr. Korry and Mr. Meyefl 'could not be reached for com- ment today. Mr. Shlaudeman, while re- 'fusing to discuss C.I.A. activi- ties in public testimony, also emphasized. the United States's "policy of nonintervention" during his appearance June 12 'before the House Foreign Af- fairs Subcommittee on Inter- American Affairs. , In that testimony, Mr. Shlau- deman 'quoted Secretary of State Kissinger as having de- clared That "we prefer demo- cratic-governments land attempt to exercise our influence to ithat end; 'but we also know we Icannot impose our political and legal structures on others." Mr. Shlaudeman, who spent four years in Chile before being reassigned to Washington last year, said "I certainly do" late this . afternoon when asked whether he..stood by his HouiZ Jestimony, 1Censored Matter in ook About Said to I lave Related Chile Activities, By SEYMOUR M. HERSH Special to The New York,Thpes WASHINGTON, Sept. 10 ? The Central Intelligence 'Agency, citing national secur- ity, censored the first prioved account of some of the agency's clandestine activities against President Salvadore Allende Gossens of Chile from a re- cently published expose of- the intelligence establishment, well-informed sources said to- day. The sources said that the book, "The C.I.A. and the Cult of Intelligence," written by two former Government intelligence officials, initially included a detailed description of the in- ternal debates in 1970. before the Nixon Administration re- portedly tried covertly to pre- vent Mr. Allende's victory in the Chilean national elections of September, 1970. After a ? lengthy battle in Federal Courts, over prior cen- sorship, the 434-page book was ?? ? ? published in June by Alfred A. Knopf with blank space where 168 passages were deleted. Much of ,the chapter dealing with Chile, titled "the Clandes- tine theory", was heavily cen- sored in that manner. . The C.I.A. had argued that those delitions and 177 other passages it unsuccessfully sought to censor would "cause grave and irreparable damage to the U.S." if published. As initially written, the sources said, the book's chap- ter on Chile began With the following quote from Henry Kissinger, who was then serv- ing as adviser on national se- curity to President Richard M. Nixon: "I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a coun- try go -Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own peo- ple." According to the book Mr. Kissinger made the coniment while chairman of a meeting of the secret "40 Committee," the high-level review panel that oversees and ? authorizes clan- destine C.I.A. a7ctivities. The- meeting took plate on June 27, 1970, according to the sciurces, a few months before the Marx- ist leader won the Presidential ? election ? Thus far Secretary of State Kissinger has refused to com- ment publicly on the reports published Sunday that the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency, acting at the specific direction of the Nixon Administration, was au- thorized to spend more than SS-million between 1970 and 1973 in an effort to make it impossible for President Al- lende to govern. The Allende Government was overthrown last September in a military coup d'etat in which the Chile- an leader died. Shortly after the coup, Mr. Kissinger told the Senate For- eign Relations Committee that "the C.I.A. had nothing to do with the coup to the best of my knowledge and belief." Oth- er Government officials, in their 6 ---Api:w-oveci-Fer-Release -2001/08/0F:- CIA=RDP77-00432R000 f00340007-3? ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3 appearances before Congres- sional committees, have gone further, insisting that the Ad- ministration followed a policy of nonintervention toward the Allende regime. Mr. Kissinger has been de- scribed by a number of officials t with first-hand knowledge as; having been among those most. alarmed in the Nixon Adminis- tration about Mr. Allende's rise :to power. - At a background meeting with newsmen in Chicago on Sept. 16, 1970, shortly after the elec- tion of Mr. Allende, Mr. Kis- singer declared that "an Allende take-over in Chile would present massive problems for us, and indeed ?to the whole Western Hemisphere. If the Chilean Congress were to ratify the election, Mr. Kis- singer added, "in a major Latin American ?country you would have a Communist government, joining, for example, Argentina, ikhich is already deeply divided along a long frontier, joining Peru, which has already been heading in directions that have been difficult to deal with, and ? joining Bolivia, which has also gone in a more left, anti-U. S. direction." 'A Close Look' He told the newsmen then: "We are taking a close look at the situation. It is not one in which our capacity for influ- ence is very great.'; ? According to still-classified House testimony last April by the Director of Central Intelli- gence William E. Colby, the in- telligence agency was author- ized by the 40 Committee to spend $500,000 in 1970 to head ? off Mr. Allende's popular elec- ? tion, and was later provided ' with $350,000 to bribe members of the Chilean Congress who nonetheless voted in October to ratify the election. A number of officials cau- tioned in interviews today that the C.I.A.'s efforts against Mr. Allende were?as one source put it ?"much more passive than you'd think" ? from the published newspaper accounts. "We were just trying to bail out people who were under the gun from Allende and his sup- porters," one., well-informed source said. Most Backed Frei Most of those who were aided, the source added, had been supporters of the former President, Eduardo Frei Mon- talva, who had received heavy C.I.A. subsidies while running for office in 1964 against Mr. Allende. "Don't forget," the source added, "the whole idea in the nineteen sixties was what we called 'nation building' and it worked. Frei would have won re-election easily," "It's a shame their Constitu- tion prevented his re-election," the source added. Under Chil- ean law, Mr. Frei could not be a candidate for re-election in 1970. According to another well- informed source who received "The C.I.A. and the Cult of In- telligence" before it ApprOnt sored, a somewhat similar NEW YORK TIMES 12 September 1974 ? Senator Church to Press C.I.A. Issue ? By SEYMOUR M. HERSH Special Ito The New York Time., WASHINGTON, Sept. 11? Declaring that deception of Congress has become , a habit," Senator' Frank Church said to- day he would turn over any misleading testimony in the hearingsd'CI '1 to the Justice Department for investigation into possible per- jury. , "I'm not going to let this matter slide by,. " Mr. Church said in a telephone interview today. "I'm very anuch incensed by this." ? - ?, 2 High Aides Testified It was the Idaho Democrat's first public comment on the subject since it was reported Sunday that the Central Intelli- gence Agency had been secret- ly authorized to spend more than $8-million between 1970 and 1973 in a covert attempt to make it impossible for Presi- dent Salvtdor. Allende Gossens to govern in Chile. Mr. Church is chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, which held highly publicizzed hearing last year into the International Tele- phone & Telegraph Company's attempts .to urge United States intervention against the Allende regime. Mr. -i..;,11ende was over- thrown by a, military junta in a bloody coup d'etat one year ago today. 91 During those- hearings, the State Department officials, Charles A. Meyer, former As- sistant Secretary of State for Latin-American Affairs, and Edward M. Korry, a former Ambassador to Chile, testified that the United States had maintained a policy of nonin- tervention toward Chile. The two officials also refused on a number of occasions during their testimony to answer spe- i ic.ques ions about whatey said were privileged communi- cations on United States policy toward Dr. Allende. ?Mr. Church, who returned late yesterday from a lengthy campaign trip to Idaho, said he had authorized the subcommit- tee staff to review testimony of Government witnesses who knew of the intelligence agency's cundestine activities. Ifothe staff review determines that there were contradictions in their testimony, the Senator said, ."in my judgment the ac- tion that would be called for would be to refer the testimony to the ,Justice Departthent for investigation of possible prejury. That's the reason we swear in witnesses," he said. ? Details Given by Colby- To aid in the staff review, Mr. Church said, he will formally (request a copy of the testimony on the agency's Chilean involve- ment given to a House of Rep- resentatives Armed Seryices Intelligence Subcommittee in April by William E. Colby, Di- rector of Central Intelligence. Government ,officiais have con- firmed that the still-secret testi- mony ? includes a detailed dis- cussion of the C.I.A.'s, goals and strategy in alloting the mil- lion cash payments. "Art from the question Of whether perjury was commit- ted in a legal sense," Mr. Church added, "there's no question but what the com- mittee was given to believe that our policy was one of nonintervention.' "This is clearly what they [the witnesses] wantsd us to believe, everi?though the truth was a very different matter," he said. 'Vietnam Syndrome' Seen Ivir. Church, a liberal .whO was lane of the early critics of the Vietnam w,ar, characterized the misleading testimony as "part of the Vietnam syn- drome." "There's become a pattern of deceiving the Congress that I think began cropping .up dur- ing the Vietnaiwavar," he. said," It became a habit with' testi- mony on all sensitive matters. If so' it's a habit the Congress is going to have to break." Along with the study of pos- sible perjury, Mr. Church said he would formally, request the full Senate Foreign Relations Committee, headed by Senator i J. W. Fulbright, now n China, to review "the propriety" of clandestine activities against constitutionally elected leaders such as Mr. Allende. . account of the decision to in- tervene in Chile was presented the two authors, Victor Mar- chetti, a former C.I.A. official and John D. Marks, a former State Department intelligence analyst. The C.I.A. later censored a part of the book in which, a source said, the C.I.A. was de- picted as having been divided about the proposals to invest funds secretly, against Mr. Al- lende. Officials at C.I.A. head- quartets. were said by Mr. Mar- chetti and Mr. Marks to, be con- cerned because of the possibili- ty' -that a sudden spurt -in spending againft Mr. Allende 'would be traceable to. Wash- ington. In addition, the source said, the original Marchetti-Marks manuscript described what was depicted as a serious dispute over the Chilean policy be- tween Edward M. Korry; who served as Ambassador to Chile from 1967 until 1971, and Charles A. Meyer, a former As- sistant Secretary of State for Latin America Affairs. The book depicted Mr. Korry as having been concerned that he would be considered after Mr. Allende's election as the am- bassador who permitted Chile to be taken over by a Castro- type figure, the source added. " Mr. Meyer, an official with Sears, Roebuck & Co., in Chi- cago, could not be reached to- day for comment, Mr. Korry, contacted today at his home in Briarcliff Manor, N. Y., declared that he was standing by his testimony last year to a Senate subcommittee in which he stated that the United States maintained a poi; icy, of nonintervention toward the Allende Government. "I'm not ducking anybody on this," Mr. Korry said. "I stand on all the statements I have given." He added that he had, I sent a lengthy letter to The New York Times explaining his position and said he would pre- fer not to comment further pending receipt of the letter. Although Mr. Kissinger has not spoken publicly on the Chilean issue, he did authorize to newsmen yesterday the fact that the 40 Committee only act- ed upon the unanimous approv- al of its five members. They include Mr. Kissinger, the Central Intelligence Direc- tor, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Deputy Sec- retary of State for Political Af- fairs, Mr. Anderson said. All 40 Committee decisions must be approved by the Presi-. dent before being put into ef- fect, Mr. Anderson said. ? ? ? ? r. , d For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDe77-00432R000100340007-3 7 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3 CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR) 1 SEP 1974 Chilean enera s unfazed by report of CIA .aict hi Allende ouster But disclosure causes furore in Washington ? By James Nelson Goodsell Latin America correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor One year after seizing Power, Chile's military leaders have settled In for a long stay. But they celebrate their first an- niversary in office Sept. 11 amid a sudden mushrooming of evidence that the United States Central Intelligence Agency, contrary to previous denials, spent millions of dollars from 1970 to 1973 to "destabilize" the government they ousted. ? One of the reasons they cited for the overthrow of President Salvador Al- lende Gossens was the escalating political and economic chaos in Chile that Dr. Allende seemed unable to cope with. Now, it appears that at least part of that chaos was sponsored by the CIA. AuthoritatiOn reported CIA director William Colby, in testimony to a House subcommittee, 'reportedly confirmed that his agency had been authorized to spend as much as $8 million in an effort to make it impossible for Dr. Allende to govern. The Colby testimony went counter .to sworn testimony of senior State Department officials, and spokesman Robert Anderson reiterated Tuesday denials that the department was in- volved in attempts to subvert the Allende regime. But there have been no denials of CIA involvement Suspicions of such involvement have made the rounds over the years. Although the Colby testimony made hardly a ripple in Chile after its disclosure Sunday, it is causing. a furor in Washington. There is a feeling that the testimony may only be the tip of the iceberg ? that more disclosures will be forth- coming and that they may well impli- cate a variety of Nixon adminis- tration officials. Already, there is question over Secretary of State Henry A. Kis- singer's role in the CIA activities. As a key member of the National Secu- rity Council and the head of its "Forty Committee," he apparently played a role in approving the use of funds for the "destabilization" program in Chile. ? Yet, in various statements, Dr. Kissinger has over the years been quoted as saying, in connection with Chile, that "we prefer democratic governments and attempt to exercise our influence to that end; but we also know we cannot impose our political and legal structures on others." It is precisely this point that is put in doubt by the disclosures of CIA Involvement in Chile. ? Until the Colby testimony was dis- closed over the weekend, the only confirmed anti-Allende activity by Washington was a United States- sponsored credit squeeze on the part of both Washington and international and hemisphere lending agencies. That squeeze made it hard for Dr. Allende's Marxist-leaning govern- ment to obtain credit. But in a way, Washington could argue effectively that credits to Chile had dropped significantly in the last two years of the government. of Eduardo Frei Montalva, which immediately. pre- ceded that of Dr. Allende, due to a feelinenri the part of President Frei and the international lenders that: Chile needed to expend already granted credits and begin repay- ments before a large new influx of credit was granted. . The Colby disclosures came in a confidential seven-page letter from Rep. ,Michael J. Harrington (D) of Massachusetts asking further con- gressional hearings on the CIA's role In the Sept. 11, 1973, military coup that toppled Dr. Allende's government. . That coup ended Dr. Allende's ef- forts to nudge Chile along the road to socialism and also ended Chile's long tradition of democratic government. Moreover, it was accompanied by a massive roundup of Allende suppor- ters, escalating reports of the murder of thousands of Chileans, and imposi- tion of a broad military dictatorship. On the eve of the first anniversary. of the military take-over, for ex- ample, Amnesty International, the London-based human rights organiza- tion, alleged that widespread torture and executions were continuing in ? Chile. "The death roll of victims is un- precedented in recent Latin Amer- ican history,'! the . organization- 8 charged. Moreover,it said, "there is little .indication that the situation is ; Improving or that a return to normal- I- ity is intended." Amnesty ? International estimated that between 8,000 and 10,000 political ? prisoners were still being detained without trial in Chile. It added that tthey represented every sector of Society .from former Allende '-min?e isters to ,,doctors, lawyers, trade unionists, and actors, ? Worldwide reaction to events in. Chile, as mirrored in the Amnesty - International report, has been largely . negative, prompting the military leaders headed by President Augusto Pinochet Ugarte to claim that a leftist public opinion campaign_ has been mounted against Chile. ' ? But General Pinochet and his fellow military officers have indicated that i they are worried about their image.. And it is reported that the .Chilean. Government has hired .the J. Walter. Thompson agency In New York to start a public relations campaign designed to Improve Chile's image. ? That image may be hard to im- prove, however, until the military relax some of the curbs placed on? Chile and Chileans in thepast year ? dissolution of Congress, ban on Marx- ist parties and the shutting down of all 'other political activity, the censorship of the press, and the abrogation of many civil rights. I : ? AliproveTrerflelease 20017t18108-: C A-R1DP77-00432R000100340007-3- ? ?4._ ' Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3 TEM WASHINGTON POST :Thursday, Sept. 72, 1474 .r0 74 it- nix g if; k - *41N, 7-17-14 (ay 4,1?, By Laurence Stern ' Washipelon Post Staff Writer Central Intelligence gency Director William E. Colby, the nation's pre-emi- nent spy, will come out of the cold into the heat of al- most certain confrontation Friday over the issue of co- ert U.S. political operations n Chile. . . . . Colby has ageeed to ap- pear at an unusual .two-day conference of former' agents, government officials and journalists on the sub- ject of "The Central 'Intelli- gence Agency and Covert Actions." The CIA director's op'. ? pearance was scheduled be- fore the disclosure Sunday? of.his executive session tes! timony on Congress last April that some $11 million in covert action funds were authorized by the' "Forty Committee" of the National Security Council and tar- geted. against the late Chi- lean ,President Salvador Al- lende. ? Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) cranked up, the Chile controversy another ,ger- turn yesterday with a letter ? to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger asking on what -authorization the programs were carried out without no- tification to Congress. Ken- - nedy also called State De-! ?partment testimony denying 'U.S. intervention against the Allende government "mis- leading' and "deceptive" in. the letter to Kissinger. Colby, who rose through the ranks of the CIA's' co-- vert operations service to command of the agency, un- dertakes a daring public re- lations gamble in facing the audience of specialists on in- telligence practices?most of them ? critical .of. the co- vert programs with which ? Colby- has been associated .through his professional lifetime. During his year-and-a-half tenure as director, Colby has sought to improve con- tacts with Congress and the: press in the aftermath of the battering the agency took during the unfolding of the Watergate scandal. But the two day . confer- ence, sponsored by the Cen- ter for National Security LONDON TIMES 10 September 1974 THE CIA LIVES UP TO ITS. BAD NAME Studies, will subject Colby to one of the most informed and critical audiences to which he has been so jar ex- posed. ? Covert operations are car- ried out under general p01- -icy guidadines approved by the Forty Committee, a sen- ior inter-departmental comp mittee Over which the Presi- dent's national securiyt ad- viser, Kissinger,. ? presides. Colby is a member of the, powerful but informal' com- mittee which meets under the auspices of the White House. In recent statements the. CIA director has empha- sized the agency's subordi- nate role to the White House and the senior policy, group whose name, until last year, was never in print and unknown to members of. the 'agency's oversight com- mittees on Capitol Hill: , The existence of the Forty Committee surfaced in con-' nee :on with the Senate For- eign Relations Committee's Multinational Subcommittee in connection with the role of the CIA and the Interna- tional Telephone and Tel graph .Corp. in Chile. Aside from the Chile case, The revelations about the CIA's .activities in Chile under the Allende regime will come as no surprise to the. many leftists and nationalists all over the world for whom -the role of " imperialism " in Allende's downfall was always a foregone conclusion. But they are a bitter draught for those ?of us who cling to the notion of the "free world", and who still re- gard the United States as an irreplaceable ally ? sometimes clumsy, often misunderstood, but fundamentally honourable in its conduct of international affairs. Must it be believed? Union, tunately? it seems that there is little alternative. The story ap- pears in both the New York Timess and the Washington Post, ? and has already been confirmed by Representative Michael Har- .rington who has read the 'Secret testimony of the CIA director Mr Colby, and on whose letter to the chairman of the House foreign affairs committee the original story was based. The question posed is not that of the merits of the Allende regime, which were on the whole outweighed by its demerits. Nor is it the much more debatable question whether those demerits not 'even whether the CIA's activities' were a determining factor in bringing about Allende's downfall.. Very prob- ably: they were not. The govern- ment's exaltation of the class struggle, its repeated circumven- tion or defiance of parliament and. the courts, its connivance at the arms procurement and train- ing activities of its supporters, its attempt to politicize the high command of the armed fortes? these things against a 'back- ground of three-figure inflation produced by its economic policies were probably bound to provoke a military response of some kind. If United States policy did contribute to Allende's downfall, it did so more effectively by blocking loans from the Inter- American Development Bank, the World Bank and the Export- Import Bank in reprisal for Chile's failure to compensate the Anaconda and Kennecott copper companies for the nationalization of their major mines. This certainly . accentuated Allende's economic problems, though it was by no means their sole cause. But one is not obliged to lend money to a regime that one dis- likes, and if shortage of foreign ? eratio, s ? the CIA faces the Prospects of new revelations on the scope of covert U.S. opera- tions under the management of the Forty Committee. Foriner New York Times correspondent Tad Szulc, writing in the new issue of Esquire, gives an account of the CIA's'role in support of South Africa's white supre- macist regime. The New Yorker Magazine is coming out with an account of the CIA role in supporting the ousting of Cheddi Jagan, leader' of Guyana's inde- pendence movement. .- , In England. forrner CIA' ,operations 'officer Philip B.F. Agee has completed a, manuscript detiling his .,day-to-day operations as a Clandestine operative -in three Latin-American coun- tries?Ecuador, Uruguay and Mexico. Agee's book is-- under contract \kith British , Penguin and is expected to be published early next, year. friends must share the blame, for they did little to help him. But if the - CIA's ." destab-. ilizing " activities were not even necessary, they, merit ? Talley- . , rand's double co,ndemnation: pire crime tine ftiute. Possibly 'the'-'' CIA foresaw that ? Allende': ?expetiment would encl. ? in a military takeover, and was trying,/ _to, strengthen the democratic opposi- tion to him. If so, it failed. But whatever it thought, 4 was inter- ferring in a matter which was none of its business : the internal politics of an independent state. It may be a proper function of American foreign policy to de-- fend the interests of. the Kenne- cott copper company, or to encourage foreign countries' attachment to democracy. But covert activity to " destabilize " the government of a foreign country in time of peace is not a proper method for achiev- ing either of those ends. Its use can only detract from 'the credi- bility of American policy through- out the World and strengthen suspicions that would otherwise seem fantastic?such as that of American 'involvement in the coup against Archbishop Mak- were such as toeAustify the inter- credit is to be blamed for forces a year ago. The question is Chinese and East European answer. 9 vention byto 11 IlittIThied SIteiRelillalSaccahli08/0ettialk 7e770 kliktabgaOtitiions v ,as-some Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3 WASHINGTON STAR 12 September 1974 By Jeremiah O'Leary Star-News Staff Writer Rep. Michael J. Harring- ton, D-Mass., has charged that CIA activities in Chile against the government of President Salvadore Al- lende were viewed by the ' 'agency as a "prototype or laboratory experim-ent" to test techniques .of heavy financial investment to dis- credit and bring down a government. The charge is contained in a letter to Chairman J. William Fulbright of the? Senate Foreign Relations committee two months ago. and which was released today by Harrington. In a press conference ? Harrington made public ex- changes or correspondence between himself, Fulbright and other members of Con- gress about his concern over activities of CIA and the U.S. Treasur/Depart- meat in Chile and the "quite limited" congressional re- view of CIA activities. Har- rington charged these reviews are perfunctory and come after the fact. ? IN HIS LETTER to Ful- bright, Harrington de- scribed how the "40 Com- mittee" headed by Henry A. Kissinger authorized expen- diture of $11 million from 1962 to 1973 to help prevent the election of Allende. He said CIA Director William WASHINGTON POST . 16 September 1974 Colby's words in testimony before a House Armed Serv- ices subcommittee on the CIA disclose ?the CIA's intention was to "destabilize" the Allende government so as to pre- cipitate its downfall. ? Harrington wrote that, "funding was provided to individuals, political parties and media outlets in Chile through channels in other countries and in both Latin America a- nd Europe. Mr. Colby's description of these operations was direct, though not to the point of identifying actual contacts and conduits." ? Harrington charged the Colby testimony indicated the agency role in 1970 Was viewed as that of the "spoil- er involving- general at-- tempts to politically. destabilize the country and discredit Allende to im- prove the likelihood that an opposition candidate would win. Following the election of Allende, $5 million was authorized by the 40 com- mittee for more destabiliza- tion efforts from 1971 to 1973. An additional $1.5 mil- lion was spent for the 1973 (Chilean) municipal elec- tions. Some of these funds ? were used to support an un- named but influential anti- Allende newspaper." (The Star-News has learned that this newspaper was El Mercurio, largest daily in Chile and the property of wealthy businessman CIA's laily Reports weedy to Fore. Now By Michael Getler Washington Post Staff Writer !CIA was never sure precisely .how much the President. saw I or read and what, if any. ques.' tions or comments he raised. ? In a move that pleases U.S. intelligence officials, Presi- dent F.ord has reversed a pol- icy of his predecessor and is now receiving his daily writ- ten report on global inteili- !genee matters directly from ;t he Central Intelligence Agency. During the Nixon years, ac- cording to White. House Augustin Edwards.) IN A SEPARATE letter to Chairman Lucien Nedzi of, the House Armed Serv- ices subcommittee on intel- ligence, Harrington chaged that Colby indicated in testimony last April that the CIA "counselled the White House to rebuff attempts of President Allende to settle his differences with the United States. These and other related activities sug- gest that the agency depart- ed from its proper role of intelligence gathering and; instead, participated in for- mulation of policies and events both in the United States and Chile which it was supposed to objectively, analyze and report." Fulbright responded on July 26, with a letter to Har- rington in which the Arkan- sas Democrat said he shared Harrington's frus- tration. "This has been going on- in places other than Chile for many years," Fulbright _mote. "The Senate at least has been unwilling to exer- cise serious control of the CIA and apparently ap- proves of the activities to which you refer in Chile and which I belive to be a proce- dure which the CIA has fol- lowed in other countreis." ? FULBR1GHT wrote that he believed creation of a Joint Committee with full authority to examine the Though the switch under Mr. Ford may not bring any more infOrmation to the Presi- deht's attention than in the past: many officials view the ? change as important in terms; sources, the daily CIA current of assuring full access to the , intelligence report for the presidency for various impor, . ' President was generally re-'? tant elethents within the fed. eral bureaucracy. - eeived in the Oval Office ei-; ther via Secretary of State Mr. Ford began receiving 'Henry Kissinger, who also hi s reports directly from the serves as the President's na- CIA during the period when tional security adviser, or ,sen- was Vice President, and lor White House aides. One result of this proce- dure, sources say, was that the CIA and control it is the only practical answer. "The Foreign Relations Committee," Fulbright wrote," in a Showdown never has sufficient votes to overcome the opposition of the forces led by the Armed Services Committee in the Sneate but a "jai t Commit- tee I think would have suffi- cient prestige to exertise control." Fulbright said he would be glad to join Harrington in sponsoring a renewed ef- fort to create a Joint Com- mittee on the Intellignece Community. Harrington said it is indicative of his frustra- tions that in five meetings of the House subcOmmittee. on inter-American affairs this year on human rights in Chile, only one government witness with knowledge of U.S. activities in Chile ppeared. That witness, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Harry Shlaudeman indicat- ed, Harrington said "some knowledge on his part of CIA activities that he was unwilling to discuss before a duly-constituted commit- tee of the House." Harrington added there' are inherent limitations for members of Congress in trying to uncover covert ac- tivities such as those in Chile and he said the exist- ing oversight machinery is illusory. asked that the practice be con- tinued after he assumed the (presidency. I The intelligence report is said to be delivered by a mid- dle-level CIA official. Sources ;say Kissinger's White House deputy on the National Sect'? rity Council st'aff, Gen. Brent Scoweroft, is frequently pres- ent in the President' t office when the CIA report is pres- ented. ? The CIA prepares a secret current intelligence report daily which gets fairly wide dist eibut;m1 throughout t h e, government. . 10 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00-01003400C17:S- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3 BALTIMORE SUN 13 September 1974 Study looks for lies tout Allende 1 By DEAN MILLS Washington Bureau of The Sun Washington ? Senator Frank sChurch, the most influential administration critic on the Senate Foreign Relations Com- mittee, initiated a study yes- terday to, determine whether State Department officials lied to various congressional com- mittees about American in- volvement in the overthrow of the Chilean regime of Salvador Allende. Aides to the Idaho Democrat said yesterday the senator in- structed his staff to make the study. They said it will be com- pleted within a day or two, and the senator will then de- cide whether, to call for new testimony on the question. Meanwhile, at a press con- ference yesterday, Representa- live Michael J. Harrington (D.,, Mass.), proposed that the Sen.! ? ate Foreign Relations Commit- tee hold open hearings on the I role of the United States 'in; Chile during the Allende per-i He said that Henry A. Kis- singer, the Secretary of State, should be called before the panel to give a public explana- tion of the role of the so-called "Forty Committee" in the ov- erthrow of the Allende regime. In his capacity as director of the National Security Council, Dr. Kissinger .chaired the com- mittee, which has responsibility for covert activities of the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency. I Mr. Harrington, citing secret testimony by William E. Colby, the CIA director, before !a House Armed Services sub- committee in July, . has charged that the CIA poured $11 million into Chile from 1962 to 1973 to support Allende op- ponents and to "destabilize" the Allende. government after it came to power. _ WASHINGTON POST 11 September 1974 In public testimony, State Department officials repeat- edly have denied any Ameri- can involvement in the over- throw of Dr. Allende. ? In a letter to Senator J .W. Fulbrighti (D., Ark.), chair- man of the Foreign Relations Committee, released at the press conference, Mr. Harring- ton said that the Senate panel ! should study the Possibility of 'lodging perjury charges !against the officials. I "It is no longer acceptable,"1 Ihe said, "for the Congress to :acquiesce in State Department officials' coming before con- gressional committees and making statements, which, if not outright lies, are at least evasions of the truth." Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D., Mass.) said at least three times in the last year State De- partment officials made "mis- leading and 'deceptive" state- ments to Congress about the American role in Chile, it was Chile and Cuba T' UNITED STATES has consistently denied using the CIA to fight leftist Salvador Allende in Chile: Yet, it now turns out, CIA director William E. Colby told a House committee last April that: The CIA gave $3 mil- lion to the Allende political opposition in 19M and $500,- 000 more to "anti-Allende forces" in 1969. It authorized $350,000 to bribe the Chilean congress against him in IWO, *the year he won. It contributed $5 million for "more destabilization efforts" in 1971-73 and $1.5 million in by-elections in 1973. In August of that year, it author- ized $1 million for "further political. destabilization ac- tivities."' A coup ousted him, and he 'was killed, a year ago today. The Colby revelations do not answer once and for all the question Of whether, as-the Latin left already..be, Heves, the United States destroyed Allende; some part of his difficulties were of his own making. Nor do the 'revelations demonstrate that the CIA had a direct hand in the coup. They prove beyond dispute,-however, that the United States acted in a' way to aggravate Mr. Al- lende's problems, and played into the hands of those who made the coup. We did so, ?moreover, deliberately: According to Mr. Colby, the anti-Allende acts were not the work of a mindless uncontrolled agency but of a CIA operating at the instructions of the appropriate White House review panel, the "FortyCommittee," headed by Henry Kissinger. Dr. Kissinger and' President Nixon, one gathers, had decided there were to be "no more Cubas": no more Marxist states in the western hemisphere. Any means, apparently, would do. Would it not be better, Dr. Kissin- Approved For Rejease 2001/08/ I disclosed. , ? In a letter to Dr. Kissinger, Senator Kennedy described the statements as "contrary to my understanding of the dual re- sponsibility of Congress and the !President in the conduct of U.S. foreign relations." The Colby disclosures were the highlight of the opening of a conference on covert activitiesi and the CIA,_ sponsored by the. Center for National Security, Studies. 1 Senator Phillip A. Hait (D.,,! Mich.) opened the conferencel yesterday by urging Congress to explore the CIA role in Chile. ' "We haven't done a damn thing . . . to prevent the Presi- dent from waging secret wars," Senator Hart said. He said the Colby testimony "has more pro- found implications for our for- .eign policy than many .interna tional issues in which Congress has shown interest." ger was asked at his confirmation hearing as Secretary of State a year ago, to take the CIA out of such - clandestine efforts as overturning Latin governments?. "There are certain types of these activities, 'difficult to describe here," the Meretary-designate replied, "that it would be dangerous to abolish." ' This information comes to light now through the sur- - ' facing of a confidential letter from Rep. Michael Har- rington (D-Mass.) to House Foreign Affairs Committee/ Chairman Thomas E. Morgan (D-Pa.), in. which 1?117. Har-, ?/ rington asks for a deeper investigation. Dr. Morgan, like his Senate counterpart, J. William Tulbright (D-Ark.), has been reluctant to press such' a probe. But it is laugh- able for Cengress to assert a larger foreign-policy role if it is to shy away from this outrageous instance of hemispheric realpolitik. Last year, for instance, the Sen- ate Foreign Relations Committee's subcommittee on mul- tinational corporations investigated charges that in 1970 ITT had sought to induce the CIA to block Allende. The subcommittee found that the CIA had not followed ITrs bidding.- But now it turns out that?before, during and after the ITT episode?the CIA was intervening in Chile- an politics. Since the 1960s, the United States lias- used its influ- ence to keep Cuba a hemispheric pariah. And why? A principal stated reason has been Cuba's ostensible support of subversion in Latin America: putting guer- rillas ashore here and there, sounding the revolutionary trumpet, and the like. But whatever Cuba has allegedly done in the past is peanuts next to what the .United States has admittedly done in Chile. To bar Cuba from hemispheric society on the basis of a test we fail our- ? selves is absurd. . , ? , 08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3 11 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3 LONDON TIMES 11 September 1974 Gung-ho Victor Marchetti was an officer' of the Central Intelligence Agency for 14 years, and a book; of which he is co-author, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, is a cause celebre in the Ameri- can courts. Because the courts ruled that Marchetti was still ' bound by the oath of secrecy - he made when he joined the CIA in 1955, the book has been pub- lished with about 5 per cent of its contents missing because of 168 deletions which the CIA still insist upon. Marchetti was on a 24-hour visit to London yesterday. It is his first travel abroad since he left the Agency. "I knew the CIA would do anything they could to discredit me when I surfaced so I had to be purer than the driven snow. I have been followed, my telephone has I been tapped, my mail has been tampered with, and there have ,been certain efforts toward en- trapment. Foreigners have been put in my path, whom I have ?had to take care not to get in- volved with." ' Marchetti does not believe the CIA masterminded the deaths of John Kennedy or Martin Luther King, and says he has no first-hand knowledge of any assassination attempts, though, he has heard rumours. "During training we were told that any- thing like that we-ild have to be approved at the highest level, and it would be a black mark against you. You would have to be a pretty lousy case officer if you could not find any way of terminating your agent with- out !tilling him." Marchetti says he never liked ? his job much. I always thought it Was basically sort of silly. I could never quite get with the gung-ho aspects of it. When I did training they were very strong on paramilitary stuff as well? as standard trade craft like how to ? open letters indetectably and how to plant bugs. I did not like a lot of the people I met." Honesty is not a CIA charac- teristic. "They denied being in- volved in Chile, but it is now revealed that they did pour ' millions of dollars in to prevent Allende coming to power and ? then to destabilize his govern- ment. They consistently denied being involved in Greece, but Greece is a major station for many area programmes and they clearly backed' the junta. Now they are moving assets out of Athens and on to Teheran where they have a safer station. The ambassador is the former director of the CIA, and the Shah owes his throne to the CIA." PHS ChTISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR ? 11 SEP 1974 ? CIA and Chile Now the facts are coming to light. The Central Intelligence Agency was not the innocent by- stander in Chile that the United States Government tried to imply it was at the time of the overthrow of Salvador Allende. The CIA, it turns out, engaged for years in clandestine activities against the late Chilean Presi- dent. CIA director William Colby acknowledged in secret testimony to the Congress that some $8 million had been authorized by a high-level intelligence -committee headed by Henry Kissinger to "destabilize" Allende's Marxist government and bring about its downfall after1970. The disclosures are shotking and dictate the urgent need for a public scrutiny of national secu- rity policies, a reform of CIA functions, and a system of strict accountability for CIA actions. They also point again to the decep- tion practiced by previous admin- istrations. The State Denartment sticks by its guns. It stated this week it backs the testimony of high offi- cials who previously told Congress that the U.S. had not intervened in the domestic affairs of Chile after Allende's election. ' Clearly the full story has yet to be told. In light of the developing dispute we favor full-scale public hearings into the CIA's role in Chile, as called for by Congress- man Michael Harrington. ? This is not the first time the CIA has been involved in questionable covert operations against foreign states. Its record includes the aborted Bay of Pigs invasion, the secret war in Laos, and efforts to overthrow governments in Iran and Guatemala. More recently, on the domestic front, it furnished the White House "plumbers"-with technical aid and a psychiatric profile of Daniel Ellsberg ? acts that violated its mandate. The record is disturbing. However distasteful, clandes-, tine operations sometimes are necessary. If a foreign power, for instance, is engaged in activities : in a country that could impair American interests, it stands to1 reason the U.S. must know what it is up to. But gathering informa- tion and exposing Co? ?unist sub- ? versipn, say, are one thing. At- i ? tempts to undermine or overthrow legitimate gos;ernments are quite ? another. A distressing aspect of all this is! the double standard which the U.S. has set for its international conduct. It apparently is per- , missible for the CIA to maneuver against local governments which' Washington does not like ? this is deemed in the national interest. But when the U.S. declines to use its influence to dissuade repres- sive regimes from antidemocratic excesses ? as in South Korea or Greece ? this is justified as "non- interference" in another country's internal affairs. If the CIA is permitted to abet the disintegration of constitu- tionally elected governments ? however unpalatable their ideo- logy ? does not the U.S. lose its moral authority to condemn sim- ilar subversive action by a Com- munist power?, The Allende regime was hardly a model for Latin America. But the late President aid carry on his Marxist experiment within the,. constitutional framework. if '- Washington chcise not tiS render help ? except to the Chilean military ? that at least was an overt, if debatable, position. But by colluding in the effort to undermine the Chilean Govern- ment by covert means, Washing- ton has only helped destroy the credibility of the argument that Communists should participate in the democratic process rather than seek power through violent means. 12 Ai:rprovect-PorRetease 200t/08/08 : GIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007---3- - - - - - Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3 NEW YORK TIMES ? 13 September 1974 NEM Secret War on Chile 'IN THE NATION - By Tom Wicker On the very day that President Ford extended preventive pardon to Richard Nixon, another high crime of the Nixon, ?Administration was being disclosed in The New York Times. Public outrage because of the pardon must not be allowed to obscure this sordid story of indefensible American ,intervention. in the internal affairs of Chile, in the years just before the violent over- throw of the Allende Government anti the death of President Salvador Al- lende Gossens. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger appears to have been a principal force in this covert intervention, and is be- .ing charged once again with not hav- ing told the whole truth to a. Senate committee. Demands are being heard for a reopening of the hearings which recommended his confirmation as Sec- zeta ry. . ? The Times story, by Seymour Hersh, was based on a letter from Repre- sentative Michael Harrington of Mas- sachusetts to Chairman Thomas E. Morgan of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The Harrington letter gave an? account, from memory, of testi- mony to a House Armed Services sub- comrhittee by William E. Colby, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Mr. Harrington said he had twice read a transcript of the Colby testi- mony. As he described it to Mr: Morgan, Mr. Colby said that the Nixon Administration had authorized about $8 million to be spent Overtly to make it impossible for President Al- lende to, govern. Specifically, $500,000 was authorized in both 1969 and 1970 to help Mr. Allende's election oppo- nents, and $350,000 was later au- thorized for bribing members of the Chilean Congress to vote against rati,7 fying Mr. Alleride's election. " Later $5 million was authorized for clandestine "destabilization" efforts in Chile; and in 1973, $1.5 million was provided to help anti-Allende candi- dates in municipal elections. The' au- thorizing body for a.11 this C.I:A. ac- tivity was the so-balled "40 Committee" of the Nixon Administrationa- com- mittee chaired by Henry Kissinger. But Mr. Kissinger told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during his confirmation hearings that "the C.I.A. had nothing to do with the coup, to the best of my knowledge and belief." While that may have been true in the narrowest sense, it was at best one .of those torturous non-lies in which gov- ernments specialize and at worst a concealment of the true nature of U.S. policy toward the Allende Government .and the scope of American activities to undermine that Government. . ? Similarly, Edward M. Korry, ambas- .sador to Chile during most of the,period in question, denied under oath to ?a ? Senate subcommittee that there had been American attempts to "pressure, subvert, influence a single member of the Chilean Congress.' Charles A. Meyer, a former Assistant Secretary of State for Latin-American affairs, also swore that the United States had scrupulously followed a policy of non-. intervention in Chile. No wonder, then, that Senator Frank Church, to whose, subcommittee this sworn testimony was offered, was re- ported to be outraged upon learning of the Colby testimony. He has prop- erly raised not only the possibility of perjury charges but the question. of comprehensive hearings by the full Foreign Relations Committee on the ? intervention in Chile. If such hearings are held, or if Mr. ? Kissinger's confirmation hearings? should be reopened?as they already have been oxide, to inquire into charges that he did not tell the whole truth" , abotit wiretaps on reporters and some of his associates?the inquiry should Rress much further than, the candor of official testimony, important as that question is. . But as One Government :official ? pointed out to Mr. Hersh, if .covert ac- tivities against another country are au- thorized, Gosiernment officials?some- times 'including Secretaries of State and Presidents?have to lie about them. Lies 'are part of the business. The real questions are whether this supposedly peace-roving and demo. cratic nation has any legal or moral right to conduct covert operations abroad, and whether any Administra- tion of either party has the constitu- tional authority to order taxpayers' money spent for clandestine warfare. against the legitimate government of a sovereign country. , These questions are long overdue for full and ppen debate; the Colby testi- mony, for example, said the first -in- tervention against Mr. Allende was Ordered by Lyndon Johnson in 1964? Congress, the press, Presidential .can- didates ? all have consistently shied away from this subject. Supposed , liberals have pled the supposed need , to be "hard-nosed.' The real need is, to face the fact that gangster schemes of bribery, violence and even assasSin? ation are being carried out, in the name of the great American people. The C.I.A. may be only an instru- ? ment, but it seems to have its own sinister vitality. The Chilean efforts, in fact, were authorized by the lineal descendent of a ?body set up by the Kennedy Administration to "control" the C.I.A. Isn't it clear at last that such "control" can be. achieved only by a Government with the political wilt, to cut the C.I.A. in half, or kill it al- together? NEW YORK TIMES 13 September 1974: ? CONCERN BY INDIA ON C.I.A. RELATED t By SEYMOUR M. HERSH , Special to The New York Times WASHINGTON, Sept. 12? Daniel P. Moynihan, ambassa- dor to India, has priyately ? warned Secretary of State Kis- singer that recent reports of Central Intelligence Agency ? activities in Chile have con- firmed Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's "worst suspicions and genuine fears" about American policy toward India. In a stinging rebuke of such s? clandestine activities, Mr. Moynihan noted in a confiden- that his embassy formally de- nied last year to the Indian Government that the United States had intervened against the Marxist President of Chile, ? Salvador Allende Gossens. Mr. Allende died in a bloody coup d'etat last September.' Writing of Mrs. Gandhi, Mr. Moynihan said: ''Her concern is whether the -United States accepts the In- dian. regime. She is not. sure but that we would be content to sea _others like her over- thrown. She knows full well that we have done our share and more of. bloody and dis- honorable deeds." Not Worried About Ouster The ambassador said Mrs. Gandhi was not worried about being overthrown, and added: "It is precisely because she Is not innocent, not squeamish and not a moralizer that .her concern about American inten- tions is real and immediate. "And of course the news from the United States, as printed in the Indian press, re- - peatedly confirms her .worst suspicions and genuine fears. "Nothing will change her un- less she is satisfied that the United States. acceptS her In- dia. She does noto. now think we do. She thinks, we are profoundly* selfish and cynical counter-revolutionary power." Because of. that belief, Mr. Moynihan noted, "she will aci cordingly proceed to develop nuclear weapons and a missile delivery system preaching non- violence all the way" State Department officials said that the cablegram had been personally re.A.;iewed by Mr. Kissinger, but, his reaction could not be learned. . There was no official com- ment from the State Depart- ment about the ambassador's Cable. One well-informed offi- cial acknowledged that Mr. dignant about the C.I.A.'s ac- tivities in Chile. - "Pat's always indignant," the official added. "He write beau- tifully and his cables are a de- light to read, but he's always indignant.", Other officials said that, as far as they knew, Mr. Moyni- han was still in good standing with the Ford Administration. IlRepresentative Michael J. _00412ftowinooksiitfoospusetts Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77 13 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3 WASHINGTON POST 13 Sept ember 19714 Stephen S. Rosenfeld the: CIA and Kissinger To go barking after the CIA because of its secret operations in Chile is be- side the point. The agency, in subvert- ing the late Socialist President. Salva- dor Allende, was carrying out estab- lished national policy ? White House policy. The CIA's director, William Colby, who was in the position of re- porting to Congress about actions taken under earlier (Erectors, deserves praise for his candor. The real need is to fathom why Henry Kissinger, then (1970-73) Mr. Nixon's national security adviser, felt it was essential to get rid of one partic- ular leader of a country which, by its region, size and general importance, plays almost no part in the global bal- ance of power, on which Kissinger's strategy supposedly is based. Interestingly, Allende and Chile are not mentioned once in the absorbing new book, "Kissinger," by Bernard and .Marvin Kalb. The only public clue to his thinking is pretty insubstantial. An Allende "takeover," Kissinger said in 1970 of Allende's electoral victory, could produce over time'sorne sort of, _ Communist government" which could pose "massive problems for is, and for democratic forces and pro-U.S. forces An Latin America." . What were those "massive prob- lems" which the United States set out to help diter by covert means? ?No doubt Kissinger and Nixon want- ed, if posible, to limit leftist move- ments throughout Latin America: "No more Cubes." But in view of Washing- ton's moves then toward Moscow, and its tentative move now toward Ha- vana, this hardly seems' an adequate rationale. ? e Nor can a very persuasive case be . Made that the defense of the United States' then-embattled corporate inter- ests in Chile ? and by extension, else- Democrat whose concern over Chile policy led to the C.I.A. disclosures, urged at a news conference that Mr. Kissinger publicly be called upon by Congress to aceount or that ,policy. He said that if the agency ?did not cease its clan- destine activtties, it might jeopardize all of its overt in- telligence-gathering work. cSenator Edward M. Ken- nedy, Democrat of Massachu- setts, made public a letter to Mr. iKssinger in which he sought an explanation for the ? legal basis of the agency's in- volvement in Chile as well as an explanation of why State Department ' officials misled Congress during sworn testi- mony about the United States policy toward Cuba. William E. Colby, director of the C.I.A., testified in secret about the Chile operations be- fore the Senate Armed Serv- ices subcommittee on intelli- gence. The hearing was led by Senator John C. Stennis, Dem- ocrat of Mississippi and chair- where in the third world ? required measures so extreme. You have to be a Marxist, or to think Kissinger and Nixon were pretty stupid, to believe that was a dominant factor. For what it's worth, I suspect Kis- singer feared that the example of a successful popular front government in Chile?Communists and Socialists working together ? might have a con- tagious effect in France and Italy and other places where, in the 1970s. popu- lar fronts have a real chance of com- ing to power. Kissinger voiced this fear in discussing his Chile policy pri- vately at the time. The election of a Socialist-Communist coalition in Chile . had, after all, aroused global attention. .Communist parties were widely being made re- spectable, in part by the example of Richard Nixon in dealing with Moscow and Peking. Their "natural" political partners were and are the democratic socialist parties of the left. It was not far-fetched ? not then, not now ? to imagine popular fronts taking power and, degree by degree, removing their countries from the "West," as the area of postwar American dominance is commonly known. It is suggestive that CIA Director Colbyapparently ranked the Chile op- eration in importance with postwar Greece and Guatemala and described it as a "prototype" for bringing for- eign governments down with money. In postwar Greece, the United States helped Athens defeat a Communist in- surgency launched across a national' frontier. In Guatemala in 1954, the CIA sponsored a military coup against a Communist government. In Chile it provided financial support to help local elements thwart an elected Marx- ist who was expected to take Chile to- ward communism by a parliamentary route. man of the full committee. alA two-day conference on "the C.I.A. and covert actions" opened in a Senate hearing room, with Senator Philip A. ?Hart, Democrat of Michigan, declaring that if Congress did not fully investigate the agency's role in Chile, "it will be sending the executive branch a clear signal that it is not really serious about reas- serting all its powers and its right to participate in the foreign policy area." Adverse Effect Is Seen Mrs. Ghandi's anger and, fears, as reported by Mr. May-' nihan, could have an adverse effect on the continuing United States attempt to improve rela- tions with India in the after- math of Mr. Kissinger's tilt to-, Kissinger, using wit as a cloak, has quipped that Chile is "a dagger pointed at the heart. of Antarctica." His implication: How_can anyone think he was uptight about Chile? But pera haps he was uptight about Chile. ? Temperamentally, what Kissinger seems to fear most in the current in- ternational scene is the flux, the un-" tertainty, the difficulty of convincing the American public to deal with fhter-' national challenges less evident ? but in his mind, hardly less ominous ? than military attack. Kissinger is a child of Weimal Germany: He has seen democracy de stroyed. He has some of the European Intellectual's characteristic ambiva. lence about popular democracy, 631 whose putative weaknesses he at tempts to compensate by diplomatic manipulation, elitism, secrecy, per sonal virtuosity. This is of a piece with his scarcely concealed contempt fo, Europe's cravenness ? an attitude al which the public saw traces after flu Mideast war last year. It is the conventional wisdom thai Vietnam taught the United States that it could no longer play th. "policeman" of the world. But perhapi it taught Kissinger, whose view of his tory is long and dark and extendy much beyond Vietnam, that the UniW States must play the policeman in particular way ? a way that fends ofi feared foreign dangers but does Dui bring down the domestie wrath on the government's or one'l own head. ? There is something undeniably val iant about Kissinger's purposes, but there can be something undeniably el cious about his means. Is there m other way for the values and the into, ,ests of the- United States to thrive?, _ . ? ward Pakistan. in the 1971 India-Pakistan war. ? The Secretary of State was known to be planning a visit to' India next, month and was expected to set up a number of joint United States-Indian com- missions to work out economic and technical aid agreements. Mr. Moynihan reported that! Indian newspapers had giveni wide circulation to dispatches! about C.I.A. activities against! Mr. Allende thatw ere author- ized by Mr. Kissinger as direc-; tor of the 40 Committee, a high- ?level intelligence review group that meets in the White House.; Mr. Moynihan also noted that the Indian newspapers had 7e- printed Mr. Kissinger's denials last year about United States ievolvement in Chile. 14 7A-143roiNaTOTRelease-20.01/08108 : CIAIRDP77-00432R000100340007-3 Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3 BALTIMORE SUN 14 September 1974 OA head defends ? . covert. plans ? C qhf;147t.071 137:T.CU 0! The Sun Washington--:-Tbe director - of central intelligence Said .yester- day cancellation of secret op-1 er;-:!tirsos ?bro?r_i ?wriel"? not ; gravely endanger the nation in ; the present -world situation.; But ? he. warned that imperative eeds could :arise in the future.1 ? William -E.- Colby, ? the ciirec-1 tor, aLso :deniethany CIA "con-i nedtion"-sto-the 1973 overthrowi of Salvador Allende in-Chile. 1 With a ;measured defense of ; the ? ?,? Celtrat. _ Intelligence: Azency,-?;Mr. Colby drew a care- ful distinction between-what -is desirable and. -what is imperat-i lye.- In the end he cable down: against :en ding covert- opera-, which :May range fromi Support of assassination to ero-i -ding governments'.? in the in7; terest of national security. He :acknowledged that the.; tnr-ndate ?'of the . CIA: -in-- this aree' was not ,a..ryrj-tal >under 'the . Asiational-'1Stiatritic! Act of 1947, which created the ;agency... Instead,- he -said;rthe tmandate had been developed , under the act by the executive! and Congress. If they 'changed ; it,..he-semphasized, the-ragency:1 (would act.accordingly. . .1 Mr. Colby appeared before a , largely hostile audience. It was: a conference on the CIA andi its covert activity, conducted by the Center for National Se- curity Studies under the spon- sorship of-Senator ? Philip ;A. ! Hart- (D.,- Mich.) and Senator!, Edward W. Brooke (D., Mass.). ! .It was?ari audience that gen-. erally applauded critics of the, agency and.. hisSed its defen- ders,-'-including Mr. Colby.- . It also was an audience that! Came to the hearing- room in ! the Senate Office Building armed with fresh evidence against the CIA. The material was leaked secret testimony by Mr. Colby that United States had spent?about $3 mil- lion to undermine the govern- ment of the late President Allende in ! Chile. ? Opposi- tion to Mr. Allende, a Marxist who was elected, finally culmi- nated last year in a coup dur- ing which he was shot to death. Mr. Colby said all covert operations of the CIA were approved by the so-called "40 Committee" of the National Security Council. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State, is chairman of the council. Dr. Kissinger and other State De- 711E-WASHINGTON:POST rrqaYS6PV3. 1974 is.dosure, of CIA Chile Rote ur verseers on ill. By Laurence 'Stern- -, Washington Post Staff Writer - One of the Senate's most senior congressional over- seers of the Central Intel- ligence Agency's operations said yesterday that he was not informed of the extent of U.S. covert political op- erations in Chile. Sen. Stuart Symington (D- Mo.) made this admission in a telephone interview after CIA Director William E. Colby was called into a two- hour executive session of the Senate Armed Services. intelligence subcommittee in the aftermath of disclosures Sunday that $11 million in covert action funds had been targeted against the late Chilean president, Salvador Allende. "You can say that I was surprised," said Symington, a loyal supporter_ of the agency in the past. Symington's surprise, it was understood, was shared by Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman oJhn C. Stennis (D-Miss.\. who also presides over the CIA oversightisubcommittee. Symington's statement se- riouslY clouds the credibility of the oft-repeated assertion by Colby and other top CIA officials that the agency's congressional oversight com- mittees have been fully briefed on all major covert programs carried out by the agency tinder the authority of the National Security Council. - The disclosure . of secret funding_ for anti-Allende ac- tivities, made by 'Colby in executive testimony to a House Armed Services intel- ligence subcommittee last :April 22, was also in direct &inflict with sworn testi- mony by high-ranking State ? Department officials that the United States pursued a policy of non-intervention during the Alleride period. So serious were these con- flicts that Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho). said he Would refer to the Justice Department for perjury in- The intelligence director took the same position yesterday. The agency, he said, "had no corfnection with the military coup ? in 1973," nor with its leaders. It was aware, he ack- nowledged. of sentiment for a coup, and as far as he knew no One had informed Mr. Allende. Mr. Colby refused to say, 'however, what actions the CIA, might have taken to encourage that sentiment. He also refused: to discuss specifics of any partment officials have told other covert CIA operation ex- Congress. the U.S. had Alffillovedfor Reignite 124361/08113 In the coup, 'congressional committees iiestigation previous sworn testimony before his Multi-, national Corporations Sub- Committee that appears to be misleading. Rep. Dante Fascell (D- na.), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Latin Amer- ica subcommittee, was also reported by ?aides yesterday: to be "deeply concerned" by, discrepancies in official tes-_ timony over covert U.S. ac- tion in Chile. .The issue was given fur- ther impetus yesterday with the release by Rep. Michael Harrington (D-Mass.) before television cameras of his summary of the top-secret Colby testimony on Chile as well as his until now futile efforts by letter to generate further congressional in- quiry into the subject. Harrington's dossier dis- Closed that last June 12?the day he examined Colby's testimony detailing the $11 million in covert authoriza- tions for a second time?a State Department 'witness testified under oath that there was no CIA funding of efforts to upset the Allende government. The witness was Harry Shlaudeman, then acting as- sistant secretary of state for inter-american affairs and second in command of the U.S. embassy in Chile dur- ing the Allende administra- tion. / Shlaudeman, former Am-, hassador to Chile Edward Korry and former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- American Affairs Charles- Meyer Jr., all testified un-., der oath before various con- gressional committees that no money was spent and no covert programs were ca,r:. ried out to subvert the Al-. lende government. - - Harrington said any con- gressional inquiries growing, out of the Chile disclosures should include testimony by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. As chairman of charged with watching over the agency. Responsible members of: Congress knew generally of the CIA's role in Chile. he said, but he could not say they knew ! precisely where every dollar was being spent. "We did look forward to a change in government," he continued, to skeptical laugh- ter, "but through the demo- I cratic processes in 1976." Mr. Colby suggested it was! ironic that the United States the National Security Coun- ell's senior panel on secret operations, the go-called Forty Committee, Kissinger' was a principal decision- maker on the funds and pro- grams targeted against Al- lende. The CIA Was the subject of a three-ring whirl of de- velopments on Capitol Hill. yesterday: the Armed Serv- ice Committee meeting, the Harrington press conference and an unusual conference on the agency's covert oper- ations attended by former government officials, ex- agents and specialists on in- telligence. The conference produced a mountain of special re- ports on covert programs and a consensus that the agency's covert operating programs ..-were, ' on . the whole, contrary to national interest. ? . CIA Director Colby will appear before the confer- ence at 3 p.m. today to speak on "The View from Langley," the suburban Vir- ginia headquarters of the CIA. -Sen. Philip A. Hart (D.- Mich.), in opening the con- ference, urged that Con- gress further explore the CIA role in Chile and pro- tested that "we haVen't done a damn thing ... to prevent the President from waging secret Wars." , One of the principal points of criticism in the conference and in Harring- ton's press conference was the ineffectiveness of con- gressional oversight of the CIA' operations ?)princi- pally those targeted, against government* or foreign po- litical leaders Considered "unfriendl&" to U.S. inter- ests. Symington's admission of surprise upon learning from press reports Sunday and from Colby yesterday of the scope of the Chile programs was an example of what the critics were talking about. countries vital information that ! was made public as a matter of course here. ? Did the agency use methods that were illegal in those coun- tries and would be illegal in the United States? He was: asked. "Of course," he said. I It was important, he said' ; that the president of the,' :United States have available to: him measures that provided options between "a diplomatic !protest and sending in the !Marines." i Ile could envision situations, ; he went on, in which the 8 3101A0REOPY74004821k0001003404107-8tates might need to ?methods to obtain from other; conduct covert action in the 15 - Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3 WASHINGTON POST 1.1-i September 19714 By Laurence Stern .-Washington Post &elf Writer . Central ? Intelligence' ,Agency Director William E. Colby stepped coolly into a public confrontation yester- day over his agency's covert. activities in Chile, took the boos and hisses 4ith equan- imity, and gave little in re- turn. n - ? Appearing, in a- crowded Capitol Hill hearing which was heavy in political thea- ter but short in substance, Colby declined to discuss publicly details of the re- ported $11 -million in secret U.S. activities targeted against the late Chilean President Salvador Allende before and .after he came to power. ? He did not deny the re- ports, which stemmed from secret testimony he gave a I House subcommittee last April 22. There'was only the most oblique hint of confir- mation when he deplored.. the leak of his testimony as raising the "dilemma of how we can provide Congress del-. icate information without . adverse effects." Colby reiterated his long- , standing position that "the CIA had no connection with; the military coup [in Chile] ' in 1973."- He acknowledged, ? however, that "we did look forward to a change in. government" in the .1976 ? elections. . Colby weathered with im- .perturbabilitY the cross-ex- ,amination of -congressional* questioners,. ? the needling and oratory of Pentagon Pa-. pers martyr Daniel Ellsberg and heckling inquiries from the floor. , "How many people have you killed?" someone shouted from the audience. Colby launched into a calm and numbing eXposition of the Phoenix program in Vi- etnam, which he directed and which has become a fo- tus of public criticism of his tenure as head of the U.S.. *pacification team there be- tween 1968 and 1971. . Colby's chief interrogator on the Chile question was Rep. Michael Harrington (D.Mass.). who inadvertently touched off the controversy in a confiden- tial letter td House Foreign Affairs Committee chairman face of "a new threat that developed in the world." - lie also defended his role as director of the so-called Phoe- nix program in Vietnam, a pacification campaign that ranged from economic develop- ment to assassination.. Rep." Thomas Morgan (D-Pa.) detailing Colby's April 22 testimony on secret CIA ac- tivities there. Colby told Harrington that the CIA had briefed its, congressional oversight .sub-' committees on all major co-; vert activities undertaken: abroad. He said also that he would discuss details only "before the appropriate sub- committees." Making the case for re- spectability of covert opera- tions, Colby cited participa- tion of feminist Gloria helm' in CIA subsidized youth festival activities dur-: ing the late 1960s. He re- cited a published testimon- ial by Ms. Steinheim that. she and -fellow participants were free to say, what they pleased during their travels. ? The forum before which, Colby spoke was a confer-, ence on "the, Central Intelli- gence Agency and Covert Action" sponsored by the Center.for National Security, Studies. Participants in- cluded former national secu- rity officials, ex-CIA agents, intelligence scholars ? and. journalists. In his prepared statdment; Colby took note of proposals that the CIA abandon its covert action programs car- 'red out by the directorate for clandestine services, col- loquially known as the "De- partment of Dirty Tricks." "This is a legitimate ques- tion," Colby said. " In light of current American . policy, as I have indicated, it would not have a major im- pact on our current activi- ties or the current security of the United States." This -was a strong hint that coy- -ert operatilins abroad have been reduced to a neglible level. But, the CIA director added, "a sovereign nation must look ahead to changing circumstances. I can envis- age situations in which the United States might well need to conduct covert ac-. bon in the face of some new threat that developed in the world." But it was the consensus of most of the panelists, as stated yesterday by Herbert Scoville ? Jr., former CIA deputy director for science and technology,-that covert operations consistently "interfere with legitimate intelligence collection" by the agency. He urged that the function, if it were nec- essary at all, should be spun off to a separate agency. Other ' participants, Ells- berg and former National, roverrPorRerease--2ooi/08/08-TCIA--RDP77-00432R0001130340007-3- n r nts Chile, Security' Council staffer Morton Halperin, objected on grounds that the covert prograins abroad institution- alize illegal. actions against foreign governments or po-' litical -movements. Author David, Wise also. objected that rtlie secret- activities also required *a policy of "plausible deniability" on the part of U,Sf. L officials when, pnblicly questioned. about thein. 2 Colby told Sen: Janne. Abourezk (D-S.D.), chairman: of yeSterday's session, that he :has proscribed the' phrase "plausible denial" .from use at CIA headquar- ters. "I do not- feel that I can tell the American people an untruth," said the CIA di- rector, his face composed behind neutral-shaded shell eyeglasses as guffaws ech- oed through the hearing chamber. When Abourezk asked. Colby about an article ap- pearing in last Sunday edi- tion of The Washington Post alluding to a $350,000 Na- tional Security Council au- thorization for -bribery of the Chilean Congress in 1970, Colby responded: "Those are details I'm dot going to talk about." Asked whether his agency undertakes action abroad which would be deemed criminal in the United 'States,-; Colby said quietly, "Of course. Espionage is a, crime in the Unites States." 16 Colby was 'also pressed on - - whether he could provide assurances that corporations - controlled by Viice Presiden- tial nominee Nelson A. Rockfeller , and his family , would not be used as CIA "covers" in the future. "This would not be a useful sub- . 'ject for Me. to discuss," he' answered. - ? - The major piece of thea- .ter was provided by Ells- , berg, who ;announced to ColbyC that he had. just. learned from testimony gathered by Sen.. Howard H. Baker Jr. (R-Tenn.) that CIA . officials had evidence?long before they admitted it?of the burglary of his psychia- trist's office. "You have much to an-, swer for," Ellsbeig said in' Ihis peroration. "Not very , much to mc very little." Colby answered with the only touch of heat he brought to the room. He challenged Ellsberg to sup- port his accusation that "I. do not support the constitu- tion and, do not understand "I understand ? it," said Colby to Ellsberg, "as well ,,as you-do." - As yesterday's, session , wound to its cloke a young woman in a red dress leaped to her feet and shouted; "You are not only a liar, you. are a Nazi; teo." Colby peer- ed back expressionlessly and replied, "I deny that," Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3 NEW YORK TIMES 14 September 1974 C.I.A. Ch.i.f Says Covert ? By SEYMOUR M. HERSH_ Special to The New York Times WASHINGTON, ? Sept. 13? William E. Colby,' Director of Central Intelligence, said today that there Would be no "major impact" on-the nation's security if the United States ceased' all cloak - and - dagger operations against ? foreign countries. "The .current status of the world is such that we do not appear to be threatened at this time," Mr. Colby told a con- ference on the Central Intelli- gence . Agency and covert activity. "The Capitol will still ;stand whether ?any particular !action does or ? does not take place." ' .'The C.I.A. director ? spent more than three hours making a speech and answering often; hostile questonS from the panel- ists and audience at the two- day conference, sponsored byl the newly formed Center for National Security Studies. ?, Against Curtailment . He made it clear, both in his prepared address and during' the question-and-answer ses- sion, that he did npt wish to see the agency's clandestine op- erations curtailed. Those op- erations, officially known as covert actions, have been the, focus of dispute this week in Congress because of the dis- elosude that the C.I.A. was au- thorized to spend more than $8-million..from 1970 to 1973 in an effort to make it difficult for President Salvador Allende Gossens of Chile to govern. More than $7-million of the authorized funds was spent. "I think it would be mistaken to deprive our nation ?of the possibility of some moderate overt action response to a foreign problem and leave us with nothing between a diplo- matic protest and sending in the Marines," Mr. Colby said in his prepared address. Activities Aren't Vitali Later, in response to a ques- tion Mr. Colby declared that "these days, "in view of the world situation and our poli- cies, we're not spending much effOrt" on cladestine activities. "We're keeping our powder and musket dry," he said. I Mr. Colby's statements ac- knowledging that clandestine 'operations were not vital, to the nation's ? security did not iseem to indicate, any impending !change in the Ford Administra- tion's approach to such activi- ties. The C.I.A. director was ap- parently giving a candid assess- ment of the value of such ac- tivities?as viewed by him to- day. ' When a panelist, Richard J. 'Barnet, author and former Ken- nedy Administration aide, asked whether he could envision any national security threats that would justify covert activity in Latin America', Asia or Africa, Mr. Colby said,. "There are some, yes." , ? ? ' "By security - of the United States," he repeated, "I do not' mean that the Capitol will fall by night. There are certain things that today are not an immediate danger to the United States but could become so." Discussing Chile, Mr. Colby again denied that the C.I.A. played any direct role in the overthrow of the latE,President Allende. "We :did. look forward to a change in government," he said to caustic laughter from the 'crowded Senate hearing room, "but by elections in 1976." Although he had announced that he would not discuss any specific details concerning the C.I.A.'s clandestine involvement in Chile, Mr. 'Colby all but spe- cifically confirmed that the agency had been heavily in- volved. Insisting that Congress had been kept informed about the clandestine activities there, Mr. Colby declared, "I can't sasS1 that every doliar the C.I.A.] ? ?NEW YORK POST 9 Sept. 1974 ?I. ? - Dirty Tricks In Chile I spent in Chile was individually approved [by intelligence com- mittees], but there was a series of discussions." He took note of a letter, pub- lished last week, describing the agency's activities in Chile be- tween 1964 and 1.973 that had been written earlier this year by Rerpresentative Michael S. Harrington. Democrat of Massa- chusetts. "At various times dur- ing that period." Mr. Colby said, "the maior steps were brought to the attention of the chair- man or various. members of : Ithose committees." 1 His account of the congres- sional overview was challenged by Mr. Harrington and another member of Congress attending! the conference, Senator James, Abourezk, Democrat of South! Dakota. Mr. Abourezk ques-1 tioned whether the C.I.A. 'wasl providing up-to-date briefings about current clandestine op- erations to the Congress; Mr. Harrington urged a broader, and more critical, Congressional overview of CiI.A. activities. In an obvious rebuke to those who advocated more C.I.A. disclosure to Congressional. committees, Mr. Colby com- plained that what he termed "the leak" about the 'Chilean, involvement "raises the dilem- ma of how we're going to supply the Congress with such delicate information without its disclosure." - "This is a matter, of course,: for, the Congress to decide,!'; he added. Throughout his long appear-, ance today, Mr. Colby expressed: little emotion and remained calm, even .when confronted with personal denunciations and accusations that he had .lied. The sharpest response from the audience came during a series of question's about his participa- tion in the Vietnam pacification program and his direct role with Operation Phoenix, a C.I.A.- involved program designed ."to , ? According to apparently well-founded reports, Central Intelligence Agency Director Williiiii?Colbr-has-'-privately ,told a Congressional committee that the Nixon Administration authorized more than $8 million for clandestine disrup- tion of the Allende regime in Chile be- tween 1970 and 1973. These operations, designed to "destabilize" that country and make it ipipossible for Allende to roof out the Vietcong infra-' structure" that has been widely Criticized. It has been charged that the program resulted in the deaths of more than 20,000: Vietnamese. "How many did you one youth shouted from the au- dience. ? . ' "I didn't kill arisc," Mr. Colby 'responded. ? At one point, panelist Daniel Ellsberg, who 'has said he was responsible for turning over the Pentagon Papers to the press . ? in 1971, delivered a lengthy summary of the G.I.A.'s involve- ment in Watergate, provoking :an exchange with Mr. Colby that 'provided no new informa- tion about the known involve- ment of the agency in the !break-in at the office of Dr. 'Ellsberg's Psychiatrist. ' Earlier, in response to a ques- tion from Dr. Ellsberg, Mr. Col- by had .acknowledged that .the .C.I.A. may have' had advance linformation about the impend- ling, coup d'etat in Chile that was not forwarded .to the Al. Government. Mr. Colby,. who had agreed to attend the, two-day confer- ence before the press .dis- closures of the covert activities in Chile, pointedly noted in his prepared remarks that such ac- tivities were conducted "only when specitically authorized by the National Security Council.'" "Thus," he 'added, vert actions reflect national policy." A number of high officials have told The New York Times t this week that much of the impetus for the 'clandestine policy against the Allende Gov- ernment was ? supplied by Sec- retary of State Kissinger, who was serving as former Presi- dent Nivon's national security adviser in 1970. , Arguing today in favor of covert actions, Mr. Colby said that' "a sovereign nation must lot* a-head to :changing circuny. Stances." ? ?; govern, are said to-have been approved by a panel headed by Henry _Kissinger. These reports indicate that the busi- ness of "dirty tricks" was conducted throughout a period when U.S. officials were solemnly denying to Congress arid, the- country charges of hostile oper-a.--.i tions against the Chilean government. A full-scale Congressional reexami- nation of the story is urgently needed. : Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3 17 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3 NEW YORK TIMES 15 September 1974 Allende's Fall, By Laurence R. Birns The disclosure that the United States had directly participated in the economic and political undermining of the Government of President Salvador Allende GossenS of Chile between 1970 and -1973 is only part of the dismal tale of what took place between Wash- ington and Santiago during the three years he held office. Viewed in its entirety, this tale re- veals the poverty of this nation's Latin- American policy, the staggering im- morality of the policy's architects and the ineffectuality and irrelevance of most scholars, journalists and Congres- sional leaders, whose professional obli- &lion it was to oversee executive policies toward Chile during this period. ' Now we know that William E. Colby, the Director of Central Intelligence, in secret testimony last April, told Con- gress that the Nixon Administration had authorized more than $8- million 'for covert Central Intelligence Agency activities between 1970 and 1973 in - an effort to make it impossible for Dr. Allende to govern. - ? Those of us w'ho had watched United States policy at the time felt in' our bones that this country was intent on establishing the climate for the 'overthrow of the democratically elected President?Dr. Allende died in a violent coup d'etat Sept. 11, 1973? but we lacked the proof. Our dilemma was plain in that we did not have the data to support our instincts, when such evidence would have been of most use in attempting, if futilely, to influence Washington's policy. But we knew that the workings of what we considered Washington's invisible gov- ernment would -be revealed only long after the events had become the raw material for footnotes in history books and the people involved had minced off to some new assignment. ? Still, in spite of our incredulity, of our.skepticism, we were reluctant to believe that the former Ambassador to Chile, Edward M. Kerry; the former Assistant Secretary of State for Latin- -American Affairs,. Charles A. Meyer; and our respected Secretary of State, Henry A. Kissinger, would practice such professional duplicity and such public deception. After all, they Were as one in re- peatedly saying that the United States bad played no role in the violent endhi ing of Chile's constitutional regime or had not carried out any other previous form of intervention, and when they did hint at the truth in Congressional inquiries after the coup they were always heard in the secrecy of execu- tive session, as if the public was too immature to know, or the officials too embarrassed to tell. Even before this, it was known that this nation had maintained a calcu- lated campaign to strangle Chile economically. Richard M. Nixon as President, and his Treasury Secretary at the time, John B. Connally, had in 1971 initiated a policy of economic a shil:igton's Push denial in United States lending agen- cies, as well as in the regional and international aid organizations, and Chile became a fiscally besieged island. This was done though international law (that historic handmaiden of the Western trading nations) had not been fully served in that Chilean adminis- trative procedures had not been ex- hausted when the United States policy of retribution for the legal nationali- zation of Kennecott Copper Corpora- ? tion's mines had begun. . Leading United States apologists of the fall of the Allende Government previously have tended to give, an economic justification for it. The sce- nario was a rather plain one. The eco- nomic policies of the President, a Marxist, polarized the population. The opposition political parties. that sup- ported the coup did so when Dr. Allende closed the political road. In any event, Dr. Allende was a minority President and did not have the neces- sary consensus to undertake such radi- cal changes. Thus, it was not United States policy that cut Dr. Allende off, from the possibilities of surviving, but rather the result of his own haphazard Jdomestic policies. The apologists neglected to men- tion that only once in this century has Chile had a majority President? from 1964 to 1970?and that some two-thirds of the population had voted in 1970 for candidates espousing policies .of nationalization and reform. The apologists' view was upheld by. ? Prof. P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan, director of the Center for Latin American De- velopment Studies of Boston Univer- sity, in a lengthy contribution to this newspaper recently in which he as- serted that "Allende died not because he was a socialist, but because he was an incompetent." But apparently now, in his view, things have improved. Dr. Rosenstein- Roden stated in a report to an agency for the Alliance for Progress, Chile has a "strong and intelligent" eco- nomic policy and a "Jean Monnet" ,directing it. This, as the people starve., 'Professor Rosenstein-Rodan has had little to say about the civic decencies that Dr. Allende had strived to main- tain,.. which the military now has cruelly destroyed. or the contribution, that the Opposition Christian Demo- cratic party had made to the "polari- zation" and !'chaos" of Chile's national life. He thinks of himself as dispas- sionate, but by his choice of themes, elimination of untidy evidence and priorities, he is ideological to the marrow. For a host of other academics, edi- torial writers and some leading United States intellectuals, such as Arthur Schlesinger Jr., the thin reed of their case that Dr. Allende had brought "it" upon himself has all but vanished in the disclosure of the C.I.A.'s role. It would be more accurate to have said that it was the intent of our nation's policy to bring "it" upon him because our goal was to "de- ,stabilize" Chile by pouring millions of dollars into' vulnerable corners of that nation's national life, not to heal but, to. kill. , , 111 Americans who earlier in the year witnessed the effects of the United States national truckers' strike and the breakdown of petroleum supplies in our own nation could well imagine the frailties of the infinitely weaker economy of the intended victim. It would seem that Dr. Allende's sole crime was that he felt that for- eign control of Chilean copper re- ,sources was intolerable, just as Mr. Nixon felt that the United States could not allow a continuing. depend- ence on feign oil supplies. ' ? For Chile, the United States Govern- ment had two possible roads to travel: cne of correct diplomatic relations (perhaps even favoredlreatment, since Chile's was one of the few remaining representative governments- in the re- gion) er political chicanery. Regret- ,tably,./Vir. Kissinger, a recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, systematically chose the latter?a course that helped to bring on a brutal military take- over that cost thousands of lives, with Chile now being dragged into the Stone Age: Present conditions in Chile have been carefully noted by a number of impartial investigative teams that have traveled to that nation, as well as by repeated utterances of church groups inside, and outside Chile. The jails are crammed with political prisoners, mili- tary law operates and the civil courts are defunct, total press censorship exists, the political parties of all per- suasions are banished, and trade un- ion activity has been terminated. The nation is now a barrack, and freedom of expression has been sent to the wall. During his administration, Dr. Al- lende was scrupulously correct in .maintaining unimpaired, under un- relieved internal and external pres- sure, all the nation's institutions. Not a single political prisoner !could be found in jail, not a single newspaper was censored by the civilian authori- ties and opposition'-political parties could rage at will against the Govbrn- ment. Why does Mr. 'Kissinger prefer tile_ present over the past? Chile now over Chile then? Why was this clever and capable man so simplistic ip conceiv- ing of Chile as an allegedly "Commu- nist" nation that must be suborned and so sophisticated in treating with such self-identified- Communist na- tions as China, the Soviet Union and, most recently, East Germany? In retrospect, his sins are more than the lies and deceptions; he has tra- duced the meager remains of our in- ternational reputation and the honor of this nation by espousing a plan of action that was not only vulgarly cruel, but amateurishly and patently ineffective given the current state of Chile's economy. If, in the recent chaotic past, he felt nfoved to offer the nation his resignation on an issue of personal honor in the Watergate wiretap affair, surely our nation has the obligation to solicit and, if refused, to demand his resignation 'over this far more 18 7243pfNeffrof Release 7001708/178?. CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007L3- V. ApprOved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3 NEW YORK TIMES 16 September. -1974 . The' Disclbsure that the Central Intelligence: Ageney ,au- thorized more than $8 million for Covert activities aimed? first at preventing Salvador,Allende's election as-Presi dent of Chile and then at "destabilizing". his Marxist Government Would be appalling enough by itself. It is doubly.so when stacked against flat denials of any such' United States intervention or policy to intervene, some of it in sworn testimony before committees of Congress, bY former 'and present Government officials. ? ?, In secret testimony before a House subcommittee last'. April, C.I.A. Director William E. Colby said his ageney :authorized $500,000 to aid Dr. Allende's opponents in the' .1970 election; $350,000 to bribe. Chilean legislators to .vote against him when the election was thrown into the ? Congress, and $6.5 million -:for subsequent "destabilize-. tion" activities and for helping anti-Allende candidates' 'in the 1971 municipal elections. : . This conflicts directly with testimony before a ?Senate' [ Foreign Relations subcommittee by former AmbassadOr, Edward- M. Korry that i.`the' United States .did not -Seek ?to- pressure, subvert, influence a single member of -thec ? Chilean Congress" during his four years.in Chile, and:by, . former Assistant Secretary of State Charles "A.' Meyer -that "we bought no votes; we funded ifei candidates, We promoted no COdps." . , . ..During .part of the period when . yr: Colby sAys. the ...C.I.A. was financing "destabilizing" activities; Ambassa7 ? dor Korry says-the was carrying on secret negotiations ? with President Allende; looking toward uninterrupted . American cOoperation and financial aid, provided Chile did not act with undue hostility toward the United States. 'These efforts, he says, were undermined by extremists in Dr. Allende's popular Unity coalition. . Are we to-believe that Ambassador Korry and the State ?Departtnent were endeavoring to stabilize Dr: Allende's Government while the C.I.A. was frying to "destabilize"- it?-Could the American Ainbassador. in.Santiago and the sobering matter of not only attempting to bribe Chile's democratically elected Congress tO withhold ratification of ? Dr. Allende's taking office, and foment- ing civic disorder, but denying it in sworn testimony as well. If a resigna- tion is not forthcoming, an honorable United States Congress must move to impeach. America and certain Americans bear a heavy hand in the unjustified tor- ment that has been visited upon Chile. That lovely little land and its good people deserved a more benign fate, and, for that matter, so did we. ? Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs' have been ignorant of what the C.I.A. was -doing---or was the C.I.A. in truth a law unto itself? And What of the role of Henry A. Kissinger in this sordid affair? Throughout the period he 'headed the so-called Forty Committee which supervises C.I.A. oper- ations ?and, according to Mr. Colby, approved in advance 'the 'coVert ?activities in-Chile: Yet, Mr. -Korry says that-ow -a trip to Washington in 1971 he got approval from both Mr. Kissinger at the National Security Council and Sec- retary of State William P. Rogers for his proposal of cooperation with Chile in a compensated take-over of American copper interests. Mr.- Kissinger told the Senate Foreign Relations Commiteee that "to the best of my knowledge, and belief," the C.I.A. "had nothing to do" with the military coup that overthrew Dr,Allende. , ? * ? ? * ? It is riowup to President Ford to find out who is actually in charge of United States foreign. policy in sensitive areas of the world, and, whether anyone in fact controls the operations of the C.I.A. ''Of far greater importance than the bizarre spectacle .of. two United States agencies trying simultaneously to stabilize and .destabilize" an elected Government is that fact that in inadequately controlled C.I.A. badly , served the American national interest by its dirty work in Chile. It matters not that the Soviet Union does far worse, that Fidel. Castro intervened' far more out-'. ?rageously in Chile than did the United States, or that extremists in Dr. Allende's camp would ,in any even4 . have destroyed the Chilean democracy on their own. Clearly, the so-called C.I.A. "oversight" committees in Senate and House are failing to do their job. Representa- tive Harrington of MaSsachusettS has. esited...the House Foreign Affairs Committee for hearings on .role in Chile. Senator Church of. Idaho will ask similar action from the Senate, Foreign Relations Committee. If this enormously powerful agency is ever to be "brought under effectiVe. oversight, Congress must rise to this distasteful but imperative responsibility. NErs1 YORK TIMES 18 Sept. ? 1974 Chile and the C.I.A. To the Editor: Your Sept. 16 editorial "The C.I.A. in chile" places major-lempl;asis on,an 'alleged quotation of my use of -the 'word "destabilization." This word ap- pears in Representative Harrington's letter which discussed my testimony before" the House Armed Services Com- mittee., . When this story first appeared, I 'reexamined the transcript Of the testi- mony land .determined that: the word "destabilize," in whatever grammatical form, does not appear. I so informed your representative at that time, and ? I so stated publicly Oil Sept. 13 at a public meeting, at- tended by Representative Harrington, which was ftilly, covered by your rep- resentative. .To .insure that no meres? . difference in seritantics is involved. I; added that' "this: term especially is - not a? fair ?description of our national policy from 1.971 on of encourastyig the continued existence of democratic forc- es looking toward future elecriOns." Your editorial. views on this matter are, of course, a matte f for you alone to determine; I ?do protest, however, your assertion that, I said something which I had taken pains to deny say- ing without 'giving any indication of such denial. W. E. CCL3Y Director, Central Intelligence. Agency Washington, Sept. 16, 1974 Laurence R. Birns, who teaches Latin- American studies at the New School ? for Social Research, has been a senior economic affairs officer with the Unit- ed Nations Economic Commission for Lotion America, in Santmvp'"--roved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3 ? 19 -Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3 WASPINGTON POST 17 September 1974 Perjury Inquiry Urged on Chile Dafa. Panel Gets Report , By Laurence Stern ? . Washington Post Staff Writer ? A Senate staff report recommends that a ,perjury investigation be initi- ated against former Central Intelli- gence Agency Director Richard M. Helms and accuses Secretary of State' Henry A. Kissinger of having "de- .ceived" the Senate Foreign Relations ? Committee in sworn testimony. The report, which centers on testi- mony given by high-ranking officials on U.S covert intervention in Chile's internal political affairs, also recom- mends perjury and contempt investi- gations of three other government wit- nesses in the Chile inquiry. Prepared by Jerome Levinson, chief counsel to the Senate Foreign Rela- tions Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, the confidential report will be taken up for possible action to- day at an executive session of the Foreign Relations Committee. ? ? The committee has the option of e'hdorsing or rejecting the report in whole or in part. . The targets- of the proposed investi- gations are former Assistant Secretary, t-of State for Inter-American Affairs , Charles E. Meyer, former U.S. Am- bassador to Chile' Edward Korry, and, William Brae, former chief of the CIA's Latin American Division. The report, submitted to subcom- mittee chairman Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho) and Sen. Clifford P. Case .(R-N.J.), also asks that the record of Kissinger's confirmation hearing be reopened in public .session to question the secretary on the "rationale" for U.S. covert political actions in Chile after 1969. It further recommended that Kis- 'singer be asked to testify generally on U.S. policy toward "duly elected gov- ernments which may be anticipated not to follow policies to the liking of the United States." The staff recommendations reflected rising concern in Congress over major discrepan- cies in the sivorn testimony of high State Department wit- nesses and the disclosure af 'secret 'testimony last A pri1,22 by CIA Director' William E. ColbY that the agency'spent $3 million in Chile to foil the late Salvadore Allende's candidacy in 1964 and SII million attempt- ing to block his election and undermine, his government af- ter 1969. ? The report cites previously secret testimony by Kissinger, 'delivered at an executive ses- sion of his confirmation hear- ing on Sept. 17, 1973, minimiz- ing the rele of the CIA in the 1970 Allende election, It quotes Kissinger as saying: ? "The CIA was heavily in- volved in 1964 in the election, was in a very minor way in- volved in the 1970 election and since then we have absolutely stayed wt13', from any coups. Our efforts in Chile were to' strengthen the democratic po- litical parties and give them a ?A0pfove4-F basis for winning the ,election in 1976, which we expressed our hope , was .that Allende could be defeated In a free democratic election." At the time Kissinger gave his testimony, the report noted, "the Forty Committee [the National Securitye Coun- cil's senior covert \ action panel]. had already authorized the expenditure of . . . lion for' the purpose of desta- bilizing the Allende govern- ment.so as to precipitate its downfall." . Only a month before, Kis- singer testified, the report fur- -ther noted, the Forty Commit- tee--which he' chaired?au7 thoriZed the expenditure of $r million of this amount for "further political destabiliza- tion." The basis for these assers'. tions was the Colby testimony as recounted by Rep. Michael Harrington (D-Mass.), 'a mem- ber of the House Foreign Af- fairs Committee. The CIA's only comment on the Harring- ton disclosure was to question whether Colby has used the, word "destabilization" in his April 22 testimony to a Ilbuse*. CIA oversight committee chaired, by Rep. Lucien Nedzi- (D-Mich.). Colby's only 'personal com- ment on the Harrington report was that he would neither con- firm nor deny its authenticity since it was given in executive session. Last Friday Colby' commented that the disclosure of his testimony through a confidential letter by Harring- ton to his chairman, ? Rep. Thomas Morgan (D-Pa.) raised questions about the ability of government witnesses to Jes- tify on "delicate" matters. The report described as "disingenuous" Kissinger's tes- timony that since 1970 "we have absolutely stayed away ' from any coups" in Chile. Kis- singer, wrbte Levinson, "must have known that expending, funds for the express purpose of creating political destabili- zation had to enhance the pos- sibility, indeed the probability, of the. coup which, in fact, took place." In the case of Helins, the re. port cited an exchange be.' tween the former CIA direstor and one of his leading senato- lila]. defenders, Stuart Symingr, ton (D-Mo.). during an execu- tive hearing on the Helms ? nomination as ambassador to Iran, on Feb. 7, 1973. . Symington: Did you have any money passed to the oppo- nents of Allende? Helms: No, sir. . Symington: So_ that the sto- ries that you were involved in that are wrong entirely? , ? Helms: Yes sir But Colby's testimony, as re- ported in the Harrington let- ter, ? was that the CIA ex- pended $500,000 in 1969 . to have not." fund anti-Allende forces' and 20 elease 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3------- during the 1970 election $500,- '- 000 was given to opposition party personnel. After .the Sept. 4 popular .election in which Allende won a plurality, the account continued, $350,- 000 was authorized "to bribe the Chilean Congress" in an effort to "overturn" the re- sults of the popular election in an' ensuing congressional run- off. - The staff report alluded, for 'the first time, to the existence of a National Security Council Decision Memorandum prior to Allende's el,ction which served as the 'umbrella" under 'which the Forty Committee au- thorized clandestine activities designed to ' destabilize the Allende government. Such a policy document would-have- been drafted tin- der the direction of Kissinger who also chaired the Forty Committee meetings at which the anti-Allende aCtion pro- grams were authorized. - The report was also critical of Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Af- fairs John .111. Hennessy, who assisted in coordinating U.S. economic :policy toward the Allende government that leaned heavily toward with- drawal of lines= of credit by such international lending bodies as the World Bank,'In- ter-Americatis = ? Development Bank and Export-Import Bank_ Hennessy, said the Levinson report, "either perjured him- self or seriously misled the subcommittee in stating that the primary consideration in U.S. economic policy toward the Allende government was Chile's credit-worthiness." ? Broe, the CIA's highest- ranking operative for Latin America. was quoted in the re- port as having testified that t : there Was no U.S. policy Win- tervene in the 1970 Chilean election. Broe's answers, ever, are "technically shy Oi perjury," 'the.report,, cbn- eluded, though they were "intended to convey the im- pression of a policy..of non?in- terverithan." ? The testimony of Nathaniel Davis, U.S. ambassador , to Chile during last year's anti- Allende coup, conformed? to ?the "overall pattern of State Department witnesses dissem-, bling and deceiving the com- mittee and subcommittee with respect to the true scope .of U.S. government activities de- signed to undermine the Al- lende regime," the Levinson report added; No action, how- ever, was recommended against Davis. Kissinger, and Meyer were not available for comment. Korry, reached in New York, said he was "gratified that Mr. Levinson, after deliberately spreading the word that, I have committed perjury, now reached the concluSion that I Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3 NEW YORK 'COVERT C.1,AirROLE? AGAII\ ST UDR DEFENDED BY FORD Asserts Activities in Chile . Were 'in Best Interests' of Chileans and U.S. " By SEYMOUR M. HERSH Special to The New York Times - WASHINGTON, Sept. 16? President Ford strongly defend- ted tonight the clandestine use of the Central Intelligence Agency to assist anti-Allende forces in Chile, but he denied that the United States Govern- !rnent had any involvement in ithe bloody coup there last year. The President, in his news 'Conference, contended that the C.J.A. activities were authorized because "there was an effort being made by the Government of Salvador Allende to destroy? opposition news media and to destroy opposition political parties." He said this was some- thing all governments did and he defended it in principle. Earlier, The New York Times learned that the staff of a Sen- ate Foreign Relations subcom- mittee -had recommended that charges' of contempt of Con- gress be placed against Richard Helms, former Director of Cen- tral. Intelligence, and three 'retired Nixon Administration officials on the ground of mis- leading -testimony oh the .clan- destine attivities in Chile. 'Certain Actions' Cited Mr. Ford's statements on Chile were the firSt by a high Administration, official since newspaper reports a week ago that the C.I.A. was authorized to spend more than $8-million from 1970 to 1973 to make it impossible for President Salva- dor Allende Gossens of Chile to govern. - 1. Asked .about those reports, the President made what 'amounted to a broad defense of such clandestine operations. "Our Government, like other governments, does take certain actions in the intelligence field to help implement foreign pol,, iicy and protect national secu- rity," Mr. Ford said. [Ques- tion 7, Page 22.] He added that he had been "reliably" informed that "Com- munist nations spend vastly .more money than we do for the 'same kind of purpose." The C.I.A. etfort in Chile, the President said, "was made in this case to help and assist the preservation of opposition newspapers and electronic me- dia and to preserve opOPP601V political Parties."' ' ? ?'' "I think this Is in the best interests of the people in Chile and certainly in our best in- terest," he added. . .Mr. Ford's account of the type and purpose of the inter- vention in- Chile differed in part, at least, with that ? pro- vided to Congress last April by William E. Colby, the present head of the C.I.A. . ? Mr. Colby testified that $350,000 was authorized by, the 40 Committe ,the secret' high-level intelligence review panel headed by Secretary of State Kissinger, to bribe mem- bers of the Chilean Parliament , in late 1970, shortly before the Mr. Al- Parliament ratified . . lende's election. ? - The report by the staff of a Senate subcommitte' report in- volved a different aspect of the . dispute over Chile?allegations that high-ranking officials of the Nixon Administration de- liberately misled- the Senate. , The sources said that, be- sides Mr. Helms, the report cited Charles A. Meyer, former. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Edward M. Korry, Ambassador to Chile from 1957 to 1971, and William V. Broe, former director of clandestine activities for the Central Intelligence Agency in Latin America. Mr. Helms, Mr. Meyer and John M. Hennessy, former As- sistant Secretary of the Treas- ury for International Affairs, the report said, might have committed perjury in testimony before the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations in the spring of 1973. None of the men named in the. subcommittee report couldi be reached immediately for comment. In his news conference to- night, President Ford defended the Nixon Administration's de- cision to intervene clandestine- ly in 1970 in Chile, declaring that the newly elected MarXist Government there made an "ef- fort to destroy ethe opposition media and to destroy opposition political parties." Such intervention was needed, Mr. Ford said, because the Corn- munist nations spend vast amdunts of money" in similar activities. The staff report, written' by -Jerome I. Levinson, chief coun- sel of the subcommittee, was prepared last week at the re- quest of Senator Frank Chtirch, Democrat of Idaho; who is chairman of the subcommittee. Details of Mr. Levinson's re- port, which was distributed to subcommittee members over the weekend, were provided to The New York Times .by a Senator's office. At issue is the discrepancy between the testimony pre- sented to the subcommittee' last year about the clandestine role of the C.I.A. in Chile and recent news reports indicating that the intelligence agency had been authorized to spend more than $8-million from 1970 to 1973 in a covert at- tempt to make it impossible for the Chilean President, Sal- vador Allende Gossens, to ecioFori.Release 2001/08/08 ? ' ' In' additioh, sourees said, the' subcommittee staff report' cited Mr. Hennessey's sworn testimony that the Nixon Ad- ministration's economic sanc- tions against Chile were based exclusively on lower credit rating after Dr. Allende's elec- tion. It was reported yester- day that Secretary of State Kissinger, then President Nix- on's adviser for national se- curity affairs, had personally headed an interagency panel that decided shortly after Dr: Allende's election in 1970 to attempt to cut off all economic aid and international credits. The allegations against the five Nixon Administration of fi-, ? cials stem from their testimony at highly " publicized hearings into a reported attempt by offi- cials of the International Tele- ? phone & Telegraph"Company to seek to interfer in Chile's do- mestic politics. Mr. Korry and Mr. Meyer both .testified that the United States had continued its policy of nonintervention toward Chile 'after Dr. Allende's elections. It was that testimony, sources' said, that led to the staff rec- ommendation that contempt and' ?in the case of Mr. Meyer? possible perjury charges be considered. The testimony that led to the recommendation that Mr. Helms be charged with contempt and possibly perjury and Mr. Broe with contempt was apparently provided to the subcommittee at classified briefings, sources said. ? Mr. Church, in an interview last week, said he had author- ized a staff review to determine if the. testimony should. be turned over to the Justice De- partment for possible prose- cution. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has scheduled a closed executive session tomor- row to discuss, among other matters, what to do about ap- parently misleading testimony provided to the Church sub- committee. In an interview, Senator Clifford P. Case, Republican of New Jersey and a ranking mi- nority member of the commit- tee; declared, "There'll be a serious question as to what the committee. ought to do." Mr. Case refused to discuss specifically his personal reac- tion to the staff report. "I certainly will press for ap- propriate action," he said. "No . matter what, if a guy is caught lying to a Congressional heak, ing, there has to be some kind of action." Other Foreign Relations Com- mittee sources said, however, that it was unlikely that the full committee would immedi- ately agree to press for con-i tenipt of Congress or perjury citations against the witnesses., Far more important, the sourceg said, will be an attempt to de.t< termine who in the Nixon Ad-, ministration influenced the yeti.: ous officials, including yire Helms, to he less than candid. before the Church subcom- mittee. NEW YORK TIMES 18 September 1974 ? SEA1tJJS ORDER ? IM)11111Y ON C111111 By SEYMOUR M. HERSH Special to 'rat Sine York Times WASHINGTON, Sept. P7-- The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, amid Congressional protests, over President Ford's defense of clandestine intelli- gence operations, today author- ized its staff to study available evidence that official testimony had been Misleading about the Central Intelligence Agency's involvement in Chile. Committee sources later eau- ' tioned that the Senators' deci- sion, announced by Chairman J. W. Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas, called only for a nee- iiminary "pulling together'; of :testimony and not yet a full- , fledged investigation into the t foreign policy of the Nixon :Administration. . "This is a very old problem," ',Senator Fulbright told reporters after the long closed-door corn- - mittee Meeting this morning. "The involvement of the C.LA. in other countries has been well- , known for years. There's not much news in that" "In my view," he added, "it's :very q :estionable practice to go ;beyond the collection of intelli- gence. I personally have always thought they should be confined !". to intelligence gathering." 'Outrage' Over Reports Some Senators later sug- gested that the committee's reluctance to, proceed more 'directly stemmed from 'what was depicted as' "outrage" over the publication ,today in ,The New York Times and The :Washington Post of the gist of private subcommittee staff report recommending possible perjury and contempt-of-Con- gress charges against five,gov- ernment officials as failing to testify. .fully about the C.I.A. role in Chile. e. ? The staff report, prepared by Jeftime I. Levinson, chief -cotinsel. of the Subcommittee on Multinational! Corporations, was rejected today:. "The commotion over the leaks almost wiped the whole thing off .but they are going eahead," one source who at- , tended the committee ? meeting said later. The disagreement inside the .committee over how to proceed with the inquiry was made clear, by Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho and chairman of the Subcom- mittee on the Multinational Corporations, which heard the apparently misleading testi- mony during hearings into the International Telephone & Tele- graph/ Corporation's involve- ment in Chile in early 1973. "Our policy in Chile was un- savory and unprincipled," Mr. Church told reporters today. "It can't possibly be justified unless 'we take the view that our methods and objectives are the same CIA-RDP77-00432R00010034 as those in ihe Soviet : 001071t3 "The Chilean affair warrants 21 Approved For Reteffit,,9ilife/Kietrig7sfR4032R000100340007-3 17 September 1974 R State of the nations The CIA problem a full investigation by the Senate," Senator Church added. Fulbright Noncommittal ? Mr. Fulbright was noncom- mittal, however, when asked whether he expected the staff investigation to lead to a re- view of the Nixon Administra- tion's foreign policies as well as the involvement of Secre- tary of State Kissinger in the ? Chilean decision-making, In his staff report, Mr. Levin- son ? recommended that the Senate co.mm4ttee reopen Vst confirmation -hearings on Mr.; Kissinger, saying he "deceived" the committee about Chile. "We'll have to wait for the -report," Mr. Fulbright said. "I don't know. whether we should have further hearings or not." Mr. Fulbright, who reported- ly has -been offered the am- bassadorship to Britain after he leaves the Senate, depicted the publication of the Levinson report as "regrettable" and added that "the staff has no business tputtink out tem- randa of that sort." A similar view was expressed by Senator Claiborne Pell, Democrat of Rhode Island, as he left the , closed hearing. Asked whether there was corn. itnittee concern over the C.I.A. involvement in Chile, Mr. Pell said that "the concern was more that statements . should, be made by Senators, and not by, staff." ? Committee sources said that the staff of the Foreign Reis-, tions Committee, directed byt Pat. M. Holt, was requested tot complete it preliminary review1 of the veidence by next week. These persons said that the new study would incorporate sorne, of the findings of the Levinson report. ? . " Mr. Levinson, in his memo- randum, called for possible per- jury and contempt of Congress proceedings against Richard . Helms, former director of Cen- tral Intelligence, William V. Broe, a former C.I.A. official, Charles A. Korry, who was Am- bassador to Chile from 1967 to 1971. By Joseph C. Harsch Three recent events in the news suggest fairly strongly that the role of the Central Intelligence Agency needs some pretty serious rethinking. First was the discovery that Presi- dent Nixon attempted N#ith some preliminary and partial success to use the CIA for domestic partisan political ends. We trust this will not 'happen again soon, but it is un- thinkable that the CIA should become an instrument of domestic faction- alism. More,.eafeguards? are,, desir- able. Second is the strong 'suspicion that the CIA gave too much comfort for far too long to the now thoroughly dis: credited former regime of the colo- nels in Athens. That regime caused a lot of trouble. The worst thing it did was to unleash the coup d'etat on Cyprus against Archbishop Makarios which brought down his regime, un- leashed a wave of terror, brought in a. massive Turkish Army to Cyprus, and undid a generation of patient effort to produce peaceful coexistence be- tween Greeks and Turks on Cyprus. The national interests of the United ? Slates in the eastern Mediterranean are best served by good relations between Greeks and Turks. Anything that embitters rather than improves Greek-Turkish relations deserves the United States. Insofar as the CIA supported and encouraged the colo- nels it injured the best interests of its own country. The evidence seems pretty clear that the colonels did get some CIA aid. The whole matter ought to be brought into the open as a first step toward changes which can prevent a repetition el such counter- productive activity. Third, the evidence is now impres- sive that the CIA sought deliberately to prevent Salvador Allende from becoming President of Chile and when he did, in 1970, spent more money in an attempt to "destabilize" that regime. The official policy of the Govern- ment of the United States toward the Allende regime was one of tolerance and noninterference. The State De- partment insists 'that it refrained from any interference in Chile's inter- nal affairs which, so far as the State Department itself is concerned, may well be true. The State Department isn't supposed to know what the covert side of CIA is up to. Sometimes It actually doesn't, although Henry .Kissinger, then at the White House, sat on a special subcommittee of the National Security Council which ap- proved the project of "destabilizing" . the Allende experiment in Chile. The point here is that the bringing down of the Allende regime was, an act of clandestine war against a theoretically friendly government. It was authorized covertly by a covert branch of the executive establish- ment. This infringed upon the eon- stitutional right of the Congress to declare war. It was the waging . of covert and undeclared war by a branch of the government which has no constitutional right to do such things. ? Granted the Soviets do precisely such things. And it often boomerangs against them. The lesson surely is that bringing down a supposedly friendly govern- ment is much too serious a business to be entrusted to clandestine operatois. If the Congress chooses to declare war on a foreign country, it then becomes the duty of the executive establishment to implement that pol- icy. But it's time to get the initiative in such matters back into the public domain. Perhaps it did seem desirable back In 1964 to try to keep Senor Allende out of office in Chile. And undoubtedly it seemed desirable to a- lot of people in high places in Washington to keep him out of office in 1970. And after 1970 many wanted to see his experiment ended as quickly as possible. But he was installed as President by con- stitutional means. He was forced out of office in a bloody revolution which ? has put a military dictatorship into the most democratic and formerly most prosperous country in South America. . The results of clandestine inter* ference in the internal-affairs of Chile - would certainly seem to suggest that this is a poor way of doing the national business. The'IA has had an excellent record in gathering and weighing intelligence about other countries in the world. Its record of clandestine activities has been marked by less success, the Bay of Pigs being the classic example. Covert subversion is a highly dubious activity. If it must be done, surely it must be more subject to congressional supervision and con- trol than in the past. 22 --74313TO-TieWri:FRe lea se 2-00T708/08-i:CIA=RDP77-00432R000100340007-3?: Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3 BALTIMORE SUN 17 September 1974 Secret 40 Committee' steers CI ?4,.. By JOHN J. FAIMEM . ;Fhts Philadelphia Bulletin , ? Washington?On a ? warm Saturday morning, June 27, 1970, Henry A. Kissinger, ad- dressing the. Most *sem.: committee Of the United States ;.": gOvernment,,e, down ' iv. highly; personal terms what was ? to become official 'U.S.: policy toward Chile. ? ?. ? ? . ? ?"I don't see why we should have to stand by and let a :country go **Communist 'due to: the irresponsibility of its own people, ?... he reportedly deelared.'!. , That statempt, according to,, government Intelligence sources, was made to the .40 committee, : a five-member , group 'so secret that its exist- , wee :Was;tihknewri at the time to the.,Vait. Mejority of' Congress, the press, and even the White House staff. ? Dr..' Kissinger,' sthr:. ugh a Stpte ? Peparttnent spokes- said he could not recall inaltintithetaterrient buti'in any:case, COnlditot-comineat on 40 Committee activities. 'The 40: '''Committee is ? elected by no one and res- ? ponsible to .po one except the . . . President; who'...appoints its , member's. ? , ? ? Serious 'saldents ? of for- eign-policy making have questicined whether, in a de- moarady, such a five-person? directorate should have this , pf unbridled power,, ? whether the five are. really In ?? touch with 'American public opinion, and 'whether Congress should., not have tighter reins on their covert programs. As a consequence of the 40 committee's action, however, large sums of Central Intelli- ?geece . Agency money were petered vainly into Chile to? 'avert the election of leftist Salvador Allende. That money was followed In later-years by even larger sums to "destab- ilize" the Chilean economy and topple The Allende re- gime. With the Chilean military uprising in 1973 and Dr. Allen- de's violent death, the policy ultimately succeeded. But it has produced in re- cent days several develop- ments certain to provoke a new national debate on the Dr., Kissinger himself. It has: 0, Focused attention, at last, on the 40 Committee, 'domin- ated by military and intelli- gence professionals of the World War II-cold war vint- age, as the real overseer, even operator, of the CIA's covert activities and responsi- ble only to the President. 0, Made clear the emer- gence of Dr. Kissinger as the -most powerful nonelected offi- cial in the nation's history, standing astride the intelli- ?gence, covert operations and foreign policy ?apparatus as secretary of state; chairman of the National Security Coun- eil,,national security adviser to the President and chair- map of the 40 Committee. . .; 0' Destroyed what Was left of the belief that at least a few members of ? Congress, have knowledge of and a veto ?over the Cloak-and-dagger as-. pects of the CIA. "The CIA is the tool of the President and it works today for Kissinger," according to one government source. The history of the U.S. gov- ernment's Chilean adventure dates to 1964 when Dr. Allen-' de, a proclaimed Marxist, first sought the presidency. CIA funds helped his Chris- tian Democratic opponent, Eduardo Frei, capture the presidency that year. But Mr. Frei could not suc- ceed himself and the Allende threat was seen by Washing- ton as greater than ever. This time even more money was funneled by CIA into anti-Al- lende effort.? . . In all, according to secret testimony April 22 by the CIA director, William E. Colby, as revealed by Repre- sentative Michael J. Harring: ton (D., Mass.) the agency pumped $11 million into anti-Allende efforts in Chile between 1964 and 1973. It was spent as follows: ? About $500,000 was ad- vanced in 1963 to help Chilean individuals and organizations gear up to oppose Dr. Al- lende the next year. ? Another $500,000 went to opposition party personnel during the 1970 campaign. ? Following Dr. Allende's election, $5 Million was authorized to disrupt the Chilean economy from 1971 Schlaudeman told a closed to 1973; and $1.5 million _ 1973. Some of 'these funds helped finance an influential Chilean newspaper. e Finally, in August, 1973, just one month before Presi- dent Allende's downfall, an- other $1 million was author- ized to press home the effort to wreck the Chilean econ- omy, already in trouble be- cause of Dr. Allende's own misguided policies. In each case, the effort and the expenditure were ape proved by the 40 Committee, or by the same committee operating under an alias. "No more mysterious group exists within the gov- ernment than the 40 Commit- ' tee," David Wise, a journal- ist who has long been a student of the .U.S. intellig- ence community, said. "Its operations are so se- cret that in an appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee, CIA_ Director Colby was even re- . luctant to identify the chair- - man." ? ? The Bay of Pigs invasion attempt, the U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union the ov- erthrow of the Arbenz gov- ernment in Guatemala?each of these was a CIA covert operation approved by the 40 Committee,' or its predeces- sors; In most cases, it appears, Congress was kept in the dark, at least until after the operations were completed, and sometimes beyond that. The Chilean intervention is an example of how this blindfolding of Congress works. On March 29 this year, Charles A. Meyers, the former assistant. secretary of state for Latin American af- fairs, told a Senate subcom- mittee that "the policy of the government .. . was that there would be no interven- tion in the political affairs of Chile ... We financed no candidates, no political par- ties ..." As late as June 12?two months after Mr. Colby's se- er e t admission?Harry Schlaudeman, No. 2 person in the American Embassy in Chile from 1969 to 1973, den- ied that any such U.S. effort was made. "There was no funding, of, that I am quite sure," Mr. more was spent to influence hearing of the House Foreign ezae. ? in.., :0 " Mr. Colby emphasizes when questioned that . the agency makes full secret re- ports to the "appropriate" congressional committees, the so-called CIA "over-. sight" subcommittees of the House and Senate. -But what they are told, according to a? former top; official of the CIA,. depends on what questions they ask ?and frequently they do not ask the right questions. "The CIA deals with Con- gress in the way that Con- gress requests it to," the ? official, who requested anon- ymity, said "Often they don't , know enough to ask the right ? guestions. But it's their fault." Among the subjects- that have esaped close congres- :sional questioning has been the operations of the 40 Corn- ; mittee. ? ? Despite its anonymity, the committee appears to have existed since before 1954, I-under several different names.. . The names have been deli- ' brately designed to provide no clue as to its function. Its , members communicate mostly by word of ',mouth, with little paperwork 'and a staff of one man, believed to be a CIA employee. "You can look all you want but you won't find any docu-. ; ment with the title '40 Com- mittee' on it," a former in- ? telligence officer said. "It's like,' officially. 'at least, it didn't exist." ? 4 ? Froireits pre-1954 origins as a loose group of top State and Defen'se department offi- cials': the group has evolved. a fixed membership based on title and formalized in a directive of the National Se- curity Council. The name 40 Committee is believed to refer to a National Security Council directive No. 40. , Dr. Kissinger, as national security adviser, took charge' of the 40 Committee under President Nixon and retains the chairmanship today. The other members are Gen. George S. Brown, USAF, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff; William P. Clements, Jr., deputy secre- tary of defense; Joseph J. Sisco, under secretary of state for political affairs and Mr. Colby, the CIA. director. in their 50's, ' role of the CIA and everi4peocAdaFeitu134Wietlettr11108/64P arlib077-00432R000ialtadyen 23 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3 veterans, of the World War II and cold war periods. . Mr. Colby's membership, according to critics, is the classic story of the "fox in the chicken coop"?the CIA director, in effect sitting in judgment on plans and pro- posals of .his own agency. ? At times, other officials have sat in; John N. Mitch- ell, as Mr. Nixon's attorney general, was a 40 Committee member, and there is some dispute over whether the late Robert F. Kennedy, in his.. turn as attorney general, also was a member. It is believed that Mr. Nix- on's controversial assistants, H. R. Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman, also attended meetings, but evidently not as members. ? Each 40 Committee, ac- cording to past and present intelligence officers, has tended to become an exten- v sion of the chairman chiefly .because he alone has access directly to the President. V Dr. Kissinger has come to .dominate the 40 Committee and to an extent some intel- ligence specialists here be- lieve is dangerous. In the past, for -example, the 40 Committee met weekly, but as Dr. Kissin- ger's own responsibilities have expanded, he has con- vened the committee less frequently,, intelligence spe- cialists here say. Much of the time, accord- ing' to several sources, Dr. Kissinger merely confers with the other members by telephone, dealing with them individually rather than as a group, and passing on to the President the consensus that he alone has had a, real?and in fashioning. ' The result, according to specialists who have served in both the CIA and State Department, has been to concentrate decision-making in fewer hands, mostly Dr. Kissinger's hands. 'A lot of the consultation and argument that went on is missing now," one official said. The controversy over Dr. Kissinger's role extends ? to the Chilean adventure and who really initiated it. The CIA clearly has taken most of the heat to date, but at least one official highly placed in the State Depart- ment from 1970 to 1973, the years of the most ambitious WASHINGTON STAR 17 September 1974 ? William F. neklier. Two questions have been 'raised on the CIA-in-Chile front. The first is whether I State Department officials de-' ceived congressional,commit- tees by reporting that the United States government had 'taken no action to frustrate the inauguratibn or success of Salvador Allende as president of Chile.-The second is wheth- er the United States govern- ment should have done so. , Needless to say the second ' question, which is more impor- tant than the first, is receiving practically no attention. The first absorbs the front page. FRANKLY, I DO NOT know what is the correct prescrip- tion for State Department offi- cials appearing before con- gressional committees that ask deeply sensitive questions. The routine answer is to demur, on the grounds of executive privilege. But that privilege, as we all know, is in high disrepute -these days, so that-congressional interroga- tors tend to press on, where yesterday, they'd have let things lie. How, for instance, would anti-Allende effort, believes the "CIA may be getting a bum rap." The idea for intervention, he- said, appears to have come from' the White House ?"from Nixon to Kissinger." It was then farmed out to the CIA to develop a plan and provide funds and routed routinely back to the 40 Com- mittee, where Dr. Kissinger, as chairman, approved what may have been his own plan, this source said. The agenda of the 40 Com- mittee includes some of the most delicate foreign policy decisions of the government. Besides the CIA's covert pro- jects, it also reviews and approves monthly a joint re- connaissance schedule that involves, among other things, the use of spy satellites ar- ound the world. Outside the intelligence community there is criticism of the secrecy that shrouds the CIA and hands over its operation to a non-elected elite such as ,the 40 Commit- tee. But within the intelligence community here?people sympathetic to the need for e CIA you, if you served 'as an ambassador, say, to Hitler's Germany, and you were collu- sively intriguing with the resistance moverpent, answer such a ? question as: "Mr. Ambassador, is the State De- partment engaged in any con- tacts whatever with the oppo- sition to the official government of the Third Reich?" You could "No" ?.which would be a lie. You could .say: "Yes",? which would be the truth, and would blow the operation. Or you could say: "I can't discuss that." In which case the press --- yes, the press, because as we have just seen with the sup- posedly secret testimony of CIA chief William Colby be- fore a congressional commit- tet, in due course we all end up reading what he said ? is invited to draw inferences, namely that in fact you are in touch with the resistance. To this dilemma there is no easy solution. BUT RETURNING now to Chile. It is alleged that the CIA was authorized by the clandestine policy alterna- tives in a divided world?the concern is that there is not enough control of the CIA by institutions such as the 40 Committee. For example, Victor Mar- chetti and John D. Marks, ,former U.S. intelligence offi- cers and authors of "The CIA and the Cult of Intellig- ence," maintain thet covert operations account for only $440 million of ,CIA's esti- mated budget of more than $750 million a year. The ac- tual figures are a closely held secret. By far the larger, more important operation?world- wide espionage?is subject to no review by the 40 Conunit- tee. This is true even if the espionage involves an opera- tion as sensitive as hiring a key official of a foreign vov- ernment?as has been done in Latin America, at the risk of a serious diplomatic inci- dent. Even covert operation ap- proved by the 40 Committee have some history of gener- ating capers never envi,- sioned by the 40 Committee. The Soviet sugar case is an example. d Allende Nixon administration to spend ? up to $8 million over a three- year period to prevent if possi-' ,ble, and if not possible then to frustrate, the government of Salvador Allende. This is ac- cepted prima facie as appall- ing. One wonders: what in the world is the Central Intelli- gence Agency supposed-to do? - We have been formally com- mitted since the days of Presi- dent Monroe to the doctrine' that no foreign country would be permitted to colonize a country in the Western Hemi- sphere. Granted, we backed away from that doctrine pari passu with our retreat from the Bay of Pigs. But the alto- gether official rhetoric of the United States in?its dealings with Latin America has been to incline towards freedom and sovereignty. The assertion that Allende was "democratically" elected, and that therefore we had no business opposing him, begs questions procedural and sub- stantive. For one thing, Allende's per- centage of the vote was less than Sen. Goldwater's in 1964. But more important. Allende 24 was the outspoken friend of socialist tyranny, and the no- tion that we should deny to his opponents such help as we gave them suggests that the United States should be totally indifferent to the growth with- in Latin America of a govern- ment dominated by a man whose idol was Fidel Castro. . ? IT MAY BE that interfer- ence of any.kipd in the affairs/ ,of another country s'ilduld be discouraged. But is it reallir a' . purely Chilean "affair" if it is contemplated that hundreds of millions of dollars of American investments are to be confis- cated?,. Is it purely a Chilean affairif the country becomes a base for revolutionary activi- ties against its neighbors?. . Are we in fact prepared to retreat so completely from the inaugural ideal of John F. Kennedy ("We shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty . . .") as to stop any clandes- tine effort to help our friends in other countries to help themselves? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010034600-713 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3 LONDON SUNDAY TIMES 15 Sep 1974 _ . By Henry Brandon hey. grilled the ?.IA Washington THE Director Of the Central Intelligence Agency, William Celby, proved yesterday that in ! his days as an undercover agent he had learnt how to survive alone in hostile territory. He spoke at a conference on the CIA and covert activities, hosted on Capitol Hill by Senators Edward Brooke (Republican, Massachu- setts) and Phillip Hart (Demo- crat, Michigan): it was as if General' Sir Walter Walker had come to address a TUC meeting. Mr Colby faced a hostile panel of well-known critics of the CIA, Including seven former members of the agency like Daniel Ellsberg, and also an obviously hostile, audience that consisted mostly of 300 yoring "new Left" CIA-haters. Ile not only defended the CIA's role, after two days of speeches by critics, but also sought to promote a legislative proposal for. the equivalent of an ; official secrets act to protect; "good secrets." Questions about the CIA's activities in the overthrow of the! Allende regime in Chile, which surfaced as the result of a con- gressional "leak," 'Mr Colby fended off by saying that he would answer them only in execu- 've session of the appropriate ?-zressional committees. How. 'he claimed that the CIA's aments in covert action are ken only as directed by -onal Security Council and Colby: survival lesson that "they are frankly and. regu- larly reported to the appropriate committees, and they require only a small proportion of our effort and time." When Mr Colby said the CIA had no connection with the mili- tary coup that overthrew Allende, but that agency "looked forward to a change in the government there by democratic means," the generally good-natured audience broke into laughter. He added that he had reread his secret testimony of last April which leaked out here earlier in the ' week, and found that he had not , used the phrase "destabilise-the Allende government' which he was quoted as having used in describing the application of clandestine funds that had been authorised by the Forty Com- mittee " of the Natfonal Security Council. ;. . When asked how miz,ch specific NEW YORK POST 10 Sept. 1974 z information Congress is given about covert actions, Mr Colby said it was " made aware at appropriate times of various major actions," and when asked whether the American ambas- sadors in Chile were kept informed of covert activities, there, he replied that such in- formation is primarly given to ) the Under Secretary of State and that ambassadors are informed on a "need-to-know basis." ? He refused to say whether those ambassadors to Chile who had testified before Congress that the US to their knowledge, main- tained a -" hands-of" policy had lied. He , insisted, however, that all major efforts and money spent in Chile were known, to several committees of Congress and that therefore the CIA, in the end, re- mains accountable to the voters. Asked whether there would now be a conflict of interest between Vice-President Nelson Rockefeller and his enterprises in Latin America?which the questioner claimed had been used as cover for intelligence opera- tions?Mr. Colby, who always maintained a truly stiff upper lip however insulting or indis- creet the question, replied that this was. " No useful subject for discussion." To a question about whether the CIA intended to intervene to prevent Greece from leaving NATO Mr Colby replied that I Greece's action had no immediate ! adverse effect on the security of the US and furthermore that IDOikble-Stanciard Diplomacy 'A few weeks back, members of the Senate Foreign Relations -Committee conCluded a special inquiry by warmly reaffirming their approval of the nomi- nation of Henry A. Kissinger as Secre- tary of State. Last- spring, it has now begn revealed,.there was another kind of confirmation hearing, It confirmed sus- picions that the Central Intelligence Agency,had-clone its best?or worst?to bring down the Allende government in The proceedings, as we noted yester- 'day, featured closed-door, testimony by CIA Director Colby that the CIA was given authority to invest iri61 e thaft t? 43' million between 1970 and 1973 to over- throw Allende?who died a year ago, assertedly by his own hand, 'after a ruthless military coup. Colby, a special- ist in covert CIA operations, explained that they had been approved by an in- telligence board headed by Kissinger. To Rep. Harrington (D-Mass), that information immediately suggested Con- gressional probing. While Kissinger has often objected that there should be no U. S. interference in ,Soviet "internal affairs"?such as' policy on emigration apparently holds different views pproved For Release 2001/08/08 : ? !covert actions have no irnpact i on current activities. I Daniel ..Ellsberg congratulated i Mr Colby on the CIA's participa- ! tion in getting the famous secret , speech of Mr Kbruschev in 1956, and then seemed to place his own IfeOt of, leaking the Pentagon i Papers in the same category. Mr tColby recalled that when Presi- ident Nixon introduced him to Mr Brezhnev on his visit to , Washington ? and the Russian leader. asked the ? CIA director whether he was a dangerous man., he replied that he was not, and that "the more the US and ; Russia know about .each other the safer we will be." When asked how many people he-had killed in connection with Operation Phoenix in Vietnam. Mr Colby eagerly replied. "none," and added that the ? majority were killed in rralitary ! comVat or police action. His ]-.interest was to capture the Viet i Cong, he said, because a dead ! man could not impart informa- tion- In his speech,,-Mr Colby. sought : to shift the emphasis from covert , operations because, he said. the CIA's predominant role now is ? concerned with information and analytical responsibilities. Though he had to endure some strong language?such as being called an " assassin "?he was also given credit by some, like the Director . of the Centre for National Security Studies, who said: "W ha: 1 a wonderful thing that you came to face your critics.'! about American intervention in Chile. But Harrington, a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, has been un- able, so far,to secure any commitment to investigate from either his,grdup or?its Senate counterpart. That, is hard to understand, 'even though the Secretary has been' treated by?Congress as a sacrosanct 'personage for some time. Allende frequently charged, 'that he was a CIA target? and he was evidently correct. Many. of the most, prominent members of his government still suffocate in the junta's jails. And anxious speculation 'is in- * evitable about how many other govern- ments are deemed by the CIA and the intelligence board headed by Kissinger to be appropriate subjects for U. S.- financed subversion. The issue is not whether the Allende regime was beyond reproach; it is, among other things, whether we have a double standard under which freely- elected governments are subject to our covert sabotage while despotisms are considered beyond even moral remon- strance. Are these topics taboo for the Fulbright and Morgan committees? Who CIA-INIMOVIRt?01331vegiatIbP2Sm2- 25 een/ecRelease 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3 Los sggs 16 September 197117 Meddling in. Chile by the CIA . William E. Colby, director of the Central Intel- ligence Agency, has denied all over again that the CIA had any connection with the military coup that toppled Chile's Marxist government a year ? ago. As far as we know, there is no evidence to the 'contrary. It now seems clear; however, that thp agency did, intervene repeatedly in Chilean politics. ? Congress has the right and the responsibility to pin down once and for all what did happen, and to :initiate appropriate action against any Administra- tion Officials who are found 'to have deliberately misled Congress as to the nature and. extent of -U.S. involvement. ? . . . In secret testimony before a House subcOrnmittee last, April, according to Rep. Michael J. Harrington (D-Mass.), Colby described a number of clandestine' .operations in Chile_ over the past decade. Some .were public knowledge already; some were not. Harrington, who has read the still-secret trans- cript, says Colby confirmed that the CIA spent $3 ,million in 1964 to support the candidacy of Chris- :flan Democrat Eduardo Frei against that of Dr. ? Salvador Allende, the Marxist candidate. Frei won. 1970, when the' next, presidential race was ? thrown into the Chilean Congress because none of the three candidates won a majority, the CIA was ;authorized to spend $350,000 in bribes to prevent Allende from being chosen president. Colby is said to have 'indicated, however, that the plan was ulti-, . mately dropped as "unworkable." In any, event, Al- .lende became president. NEW YORK TIMES 15 September 1974 KISSINGER CALLED CHILE STRATEGIST By SEYMOUR M. HERSH Special to The New York Times, WASHINGTON, Sept. 14? Secretary of State Kissinger personally. 'directed a tar-reach- ing Nixon \Administration pro- gram designed to curtail ecot 'nomic aid and .credits to Chile after:the election of .Pretideht Salvador Allende 'Cesspits ,in 1970, well-informed , Govern- ment sources said today. , These sources said that after the election of Dr. Allende, Mr. !Kissinger, who was then serv- ing as 'President Nixon's ad- viser on national security, took charge of a series of weekly- interagency 'meetings at which Administration officials worked out a policy of economic sane- tins?or "retaliation," as one source put it?against Chile. Covert C.I.A. Activities , The Nixon, Administration re- peatedly denied that there was any overt program of economic ,sanctions against Chile, public- ly stating that the Chilean Gov- ernment's inability to gct loans and 'credits after Dr. Allende'S election was a reflection 'of its poor credit risk: , There was no immediate:, comment from Mr. Kissinger.: The Secretary of State -has been under increasing criticism from Congress since it was revealed last ,week that the United States' had authorized more than $8-million for clan- destine activities by the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency against the Allende Government, from 1970 to 1973. The 'funds . were approved bY,the 40 Committee, - a high-level panel headed by Mr. Kissinger that is in charge of overseeing the C.I.A.'s'cov- ert activities*. Although he is Secretary of State, Mr. Kissinger remains as President Ford's ? national security adviser and thus still heads the 40 Commitee. The sources emphasized that Mr. Kissinger's economic ac- tivities against the Allende Government were distinct from his inVolvement in clandestine C.I.A. operations, although both programs were controlled by him with great secrecy. Mr. Kissing,er's decision to become personally involved in the economic reprisals against the Chilean Government; an- .gered a number of high-level State Department officials, who considered his action to be a sign of mistrust toward the department, the sources said. "The whole purpose of the ? Colby is described 'as testifying that, after 'Al- lende took office, the 'CIA Was authorized to spend $5'milliim for "destabilizatiOn:efforts7and support, for anti-Allende forces. . "! .; Allende's Communist-SOcialist government com- mitted so many blunders on its own that the mili- tary coup in' September, 1973, was probably inevi-. table, even if the CIA's clandestine anti-Allende. campaign had never taken place. ? It seems 'self-evident, however, that the United " States has no right to interfere in the 'politics of a democratic country, .even if there is reason to fear that the election of, a given leader will be injurious, to U.S., interests. Even more worrisome is the possibility that.re- sponsible officials deliberately misled Congress in earlier public hearings on the matter. Sen. Frank Church (D-Ida.), chairman of a Senate subcommittee that held hearings on possible CIA. invOlvement in Chile, has properly announced that if a review of .the testimony indicates that.-Con- ? gress..was lied to. he will refer the matter to the Justice Department for possible perjury prosecu- tions. As the Idaho senator said, the habit of deceiving Congress on sensitive foreign policy issues cropped' up during the Vietnam war. And if it's still going on, "It's a habit the Congress is going ,to have to break." meetings hi the first couple of months after the election was to insure that the various aid agencies and lending agen- cies were rejiggered to make sure that [Allende] wasn't to get a penny," said one well- informed source. Over the next two years, the Chilean Government was de- nied dozens of loans by the World Bank, a multinational loan agency over whose activ- ity the United States has vir- tual veto power, and by the Export-Import Bank, a United States Government agency. In addition, Chile's short-term line of credit with private banks fell from $220-million in 1971 to less than S40-million a year .later. In a speech on Dec. 4, 1972, to the United Nations, Dr. Al- lende complained of "large- scale external pressure to cut us off from the world, to strangle our economy and par- alyze our trade in our principal export, copper, and to deprive us of access to sources of in- ternational ? financing." The Allende Government was over- thrown in a bloody coup d'etat 10 months later in which the Chilean leader died. The most explicit Adminis- tration denial of such economic pressure came *during hearings last year on Chile before a Sen- ate Foreign Relations subcom- mittee, in which John M. Hen- nessy, then an Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, had the 'following exchange with Sen- ator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, the subcommittee chairman: Senator Church: "So the po- sition of our Government on the state of the economy in Chile was such that Chile was not credit-worthy, and that no further loans should be made owing to,the general condition of the economy. Is that . cor- xect?" ifermesy: "That is correct?' '? A number of sources charac- terized the Nixon 'Administra- ' tion's curtailment of credit and ? aid to Chile as a." political deci- ,aion that was initiated shortly after Dr. Allende fdrntally took office in November, 1970. "There was a range of alter- natives being considered,". one ? source reealled. "The options ranged from a marine-type. in- vastion to massive infusions of money. When Allende became President, everybody breathed a sigh of relief because we hadn't done anything." 'Once he was President, then there was set in motion a care- fully planned program led by Kissinger," the source added. "He personally chaired?for maybe as long as 10 or 12 weeks?a working staff group dealing with economic sanc- tions. It was our understanding that the President was extreme- ly concerned about Allende and Henry was showing him that he was on top of it." The- New York Times's sources include former Nixon Administration officials who :were involved in the decision- naking on Chile after the elec- 26 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007:3? * Appi-oved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007.-3 tion of Dr. Allende. Other in- formation was supplied by Con- gressiontl officials who have had access to all of the sworn testimony on Chile. The sources said that the working group included officials at the assistant-secretary level from the State Department, the ?Pentagon and the Treasury De- partment as well as Mr. Kissin- ger and other National Security Council aides. During that pe- riod, Sources said, a formai Na- tional Security Council Deci- sion Memorandum ruling out economic ? aid to Chile was issued. Normally, the interagency Unit would have been under the chairmanship of the Assistant BALTIMORE SUN 19 September 1974 - foseph Kraft Wider Abuses than Chile Justify Fuss over CIA - Secretary of State for Inter- American Affairs. But, the sources said, the Assistant Sec- retary at that time, Charles A. MeYer, had fallen into disfavor with ?the White House because of his resistance at meetings of the 40 Committee to some o the clandestine C.I.A. activities authorized against the Allende Government: "It was a big blow to the State Department," another source said. "It was a Kissin, ger group. "It stuck in my mind because Kissinger, in affect, became a Chilean desk officer," the, source added. "He made sure that policy. was made in the way he and the President wanted. it." The fuss over the role of the ?Central Intelligence Agency in Chile is not really about that agency or that country. It emerges chiefly from a deep general suspieion of the instruments of national secur- ity. If he truly wants to heal the country, President Ford will have to go out of his way to assuage this suspicion. Two major questions ought to be asked at all times about the CIA. The first engages the role of the agency in mak- ing and unmaking foreign governments by the black arts of sabotage and subversion. That issue seems to be cen- tral to the present stir? over Chile. The case grew out of a letter written by Representa- tive Michael J. Harrington (D., Mass.) and leaked to the press. The letter purported to summarize testimony to a House subcommittee by Wil- liam E. Colby, director of the t7A. According to the letter, Mr. Colby testified that the agen- cy spent $8 million between 1970 and 1973 to help the op- position to the Popular Front government of President Sal- vador Allende. ?The letter said the funds were used in order to achieve the "de- -stabilization" of the regime. The implication was that the ? CIA arranged the coun that overthrew Dr. Allende last year. In fact the word "destabili- zation" was not used by Mr. Colby in his testimony. It is hardly thinkable that so small a sum?for $8 million is vir- tually nothing in the modern intelligence game?could have caused the fall of the Chilean government. President Ford said at his the mgration of the CIA and tral Intelligence; John M. Hen- news conference what AfftrotimitYtarrffialtaaste alk01.108/005:sCIA-RDKIT00432 in-ormed sources also say? security policy. partment official, two former that the money was used only to sustain democratic news- papers and political leaders. It is as clear as it can ever NEW YORK TIMES be in this sort of murky 19 September 1974 business that the CIA did not play a significant role in the FORD TO BRIEF FIVE Chilean coup. The second big question turns on the: responsiveness of the CIA to the elected lead- 0 \I C.I.A. ACTIVITIES ership in the White House and Congress. Everybody agrees that in Chile the CIA was obedient to the wishes of the Nixon administration. What is in doubt is the question of keeping Congress informed. Several high offi- cials?including the Secretary of State, Henry A. Kissinger, and former CIA director, Richard Helms ? denied in testimony be!ore various ele- ments of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the United States had fomented the Chilean. coup. Technically, those state- ments appear to have been accurate. Moreover, it is tra- ditional that black-bag opera- tions of the agency are not revealed to the regular legis- lative committees of Con- gress but to a special watch- dog committee. Even if they did not tell the strict truth about such operations to the Foreign Relations Committee, in other words, Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Helms and the others were operating within established guidelines. However, if the particulars of the Chilean case do not justify the fuss, the general atmosphere of the oast few years does. Throughout the Vietnam war. Congress and much of the country were systematically deceived- about Over and over again in the Watergate case, President Nixon and those around him invoked the term "national security" as the justification for covering up common crimes. Many intelligent and well- meaning people have come to believe that the whole appa- ratus of national security is bogus?a cover for something illegitimate and improper. That is why the apparent im- proprieties of the CIA in Chile have excited such attention. ? If President Ford is to end what he has called the long national nightmare, he will have to sof.en tnese feelings. Unfortunately, he seems not to understand the depths of the doubts about national security. Thus when ques- tioned about Chile at his news conference Monday night, he gave a national security re- sponse straight out of the 1950's: "Our government, like other governments, does take certain actions in the intelli- By SEYMOUR M. HERSH WASHINGTON, Sept. 18? Secretary of State Kissinger an- nounced today that he and President Ford would person- ally brief five House and Sen- ate leaders tomorrow on the scope of the Central Intelligence Agency's covert operations. , "We will put it before them in detail and ask them, 'What do you want" Mr. Kissinger said aboard Air Force One as it returned here from New ? York, where President Ford ad- dressed the United Nations. Administration officials said that the President had decided to brief the Congressional lead- ers after his strong defense of all C.I.A. covert activities in his news ? conference Monday night. The President publicly confirmed then that the agency had been involved in clandestine efforts in Chile, but he de- picted them as having been aimed only at aiding newspaper and politicians opposing Presi- dent Salvador Allende Gossens, who, Mr. Ford said, was at- tempting to suppress criticism. The White House's anounce- '2/lent followed the Senate For- eign Relations Committee's an- nouncement yesterday that it 'had authorized a full-scale study into what has been called misleading testimony in the Senate about the C.I.A.'s role in Chile. Targets of that inquiry are known to include, Richard Helms, former Director of Cen- gence field to implement foreign policy and to protect national security." The same lack of under- standing entered into the blunder committed in the par- doning of President Nixon. The administration theory was that the curse would be taken off the pardon by the ,amnesty for Vietnam war Ke- sisters. Mr. Ford evidently did not. realize that the opposition to Vietnam rested on deep gen- eral doubts about national security actions?not on the relatively trivial issue of the draft dodgers. ? The point of all this is that the country is seriously and deeply divided on fundament- al issues of national security. President Ford is going to have to take account of those divisions. He will have to try tl understand the other side. Otherwise, he will end up, as his two predecessors did, limping out of the White House. high-level State Department of- ficials, and Mr. Kissinger him- self, who testified about United States involvement in Chile during his Senate confirmation hearings last fall. Those invited to the briefing tomorrow, Mr. Kissinger said were the Senate Democratic leader, Mike Mansfield of Mon- tana;-. the Senate ? Republican leader, Hugh Scott of Pennsyl- vania; Speaker of the House Carl Albert of Oklahoma; the House Dergocratic leader, Thomas P. O'Neill 3r. of Massa- chusetts, and the House Re- publican leader John J. Rhodes of Arizona. Administration officials said that Mr. Kissinger and Presi- dent Ford were confident that covert operations ? such as those in Chile ? could be de- ? fended on.. national securitY grounds.. If these operations were dropped, these officialsin- ?Sisted, an 'overwhelming cas"e" could be made that peril to the security of the United States would be increased,.; One high-level official, asked whether such beliefs on the part of Mr. Kissinger and President Ford -amounted to an endorse- ment of United States interven- tion is foreign countries, replied that the question was a philo- sophical one worth debating. ? Concern over lack of effec- tive Congressional oversight has been repeatedly expressed by ranking Senate and House members since newspaper dis- closures last week. that the C.I.A.. despite prior disclaimers, had been authorized by Mr. Kissinger and President Nixon to spend more than $8-million between 1970 and 1973 in an effort to make it more difficult for Mr. Allende, a Marxist, to govern. The Chilean President was overthrown last year in a mili- tary coup d'etat in which he died. 01012ANnefat Dante B. Fas-I of Florida, re- tgtive 27 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3 WASHINGTON POST .2.9 September 1974 :Rowland Evans 'and Robert Novak issinger or Schlesin a. ? In affirming on Tuesday that Henry ':"Kissinger would still wear two hats as 'both Secretary of State and director of the National Security Council (NSC), :President Ford was postponing the ul- timate choice between Kissinger and Secretary of Defense James Schle- :,singer. -Although Mr. Ford denied published ?reports that his transition team recom- mended that Mr. Kissinger 'be stripped ,of his NSC hat, the President did not .divulge 'confidential recommendations from intimate advisers. They had been urging the appointment el a new NSC .director, ending Kissinger 'e unprece- dented control over global policy and perhaps even reducing him to roughly ,the same level as Schlesinger. Accord- ingly, these same adviser's believed .(perhaps hoped) that cutting Kissinger down to human size would result in his jibrupt resignation. This showdown has been postponed, but there seems little chance that Kis- singer and Schlesinger can coexist In .the Ford administration into next sum- mer. Furthermore, 'despite Tuesday's ?zaisurance from the President, Ford in- lidert believe it is SchleSibger rather than Kissinger who may ultimately ? survive. ? - Even if they agreed on policy, con- lrontation between Kissinger and $chlesinger would have been inevita- ble. Never before have two such bril- liant intellectuals simultaneously held the Cabinet portfolios for state and de- iense. "Here are two egomaniacs," con- tends one high official who knows them both well. Two smart egomani rete, which *makes it worse.', t 7 But the fact is that they most cer- tainly do not agree. Schlesinger be- ? lieves Kissinger's detente diplomacy concedes too much to Moscow on all fronts?SALT, mutual force reduc- tions, 'the 'European Security Treaty. Contending that detente is not so frag- ile a flower, he would take a much . harder' bargaining line. ' It was therefore predictable that Schlesinger would grow restive with total domination of national security policy by Kissinger, wearing both his NSC and State Department hats. But President Nixon, obsessed by Water- gate, never even approached the prob- lem. Kissinger reigned supreme. : Mr. Ford's access:ion seemed to: con- firm that supremacy, As Vice presi- newed his call today for more effective control over the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency after a series of hearings that ended to- da" before his inter-American affairs subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Commit- tee. Mr. Fascell said he was "deeply distressed" that he and his colleagues had not been fully informed of the agency's activities in testimony given earlier this year by William E. -Colby. the Director of Central Intelligence. dent, -Mr. Ford sought a personal rela- -tionship with Kissinger while privately expressing doubts that the pipe-smok- ing, donnish Schlesinger could sell de- fense budgets on Capitol Hill. Gen. Al- exairder Haig, Kissinger's old deputy temporarily kept on as chief of staff by President Ford, felt that diplomatic strategy in negotiating with Moscow was no business of the Secretary of. Defense.. . The impression of Schlesinger's im- pending doom was confirmed ?by Mr. Ford's first weeks in office. Intimates reported him displeased by Schlesing- er's professorial style of exposition. White House staff papers gave the President the totally erroneous impres- sion that the Pentagon -brass distrusted Schlesinger because he had never wbrn the uniform. The President Was not happy about Schlesinger's publicly revealing his precautions against a mil- itary takeover during the Nixon-Ford transition. But within the ,past week or so, the climate has changed. Key Ford aides now defend Schlesinger and urge his retention. His position is certainly not hurt at the White House by Halg's im- minent departure. Moreover, Schle- 'singer's friends have this long-range view: Mr. Eord is essentially a congres- sional barghiner without Nixon's Wil- sonian ?world vision; as such, he in time will be attracted by Schlesinger's insistence on tit-for-tat bargains with THE ECONOMIST SEPTEMBER 14, 1974 Out into the open THE CBA AHD THE CULT OF INTELLIGENCE By Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks. Alfred A. Knopf; London: JOnathan Cape. 419 pages. ?3.95. The recent revelations that the CIA spent large sums of money between 1970 and 1973 in efforts to overthrow the Allende government in Chile will not have come as a surprise to those few people who followed the events there with care and patience. In addi- tion to these specialists, there is a huge number of casual readers who might have been surprised if. they had not read, or heard about, this recent popular account of some of the cIA's activities, written by a veteran of 14 years' service in the agency in association with a former member of the American foreign service. Published in July in the United States this book has already had consider- able influence. It has provoked a major court decision on the right of American government agencies to withhold information, and it has been largely responsible for. the Administration's asking for new legislation to tighten up and clarify laws covering not only the security of information but also means of enforcing them in cases where individuals such as Daniel Ellsberg and ?it must be added?Messrs Marks the Kremlin. " Finally, Kissinger's perceived indis- pensability has been sharply eroded by the Cyprus crisis and the Chilean reve- lations. Newsmen last Tuesday morn- ing were stunned when told by Rep. Albert Quie of Minnesota, a close con- gressional ally of Mr. Ford's, that Kis- singer should go. But Quie's view is in- creasingly prevalent in congressional \ cloakrooms.- Accusations that he mas- terminded Central Intelligence Agency Intervention in Chile has energized bit- ter, simultaneous campaigns against him from both left and right. Preoccupied by the Nixon pardon and Vietnam amnesty, Mr. Ford has not addressed the important disagree- ments over detente policy between Kissinger and Schlesinger. Nor does he have to decide between them imme- diately. But following the Chilean revela- tions, Ford insiders began urging that Kissinger's authority be diluted by the appointment of a new NSC director. The threat to Kissinger's supremacy posed by this recommendation was un- settling, obviously to President Ford and less obviously even to some offi- cials who disagree with Kissinger on policy. Contending that there is no al- ternative to Kissinger as possible Mid- eastern peacekeeper in the coming months, they want the status quo re- tained. Even some of these officials, how- ever, believe the long-term coexistence of Kissinger and Schlesinger is impos- sible. Within no more than six months, they believe, the President must choose between them. While it would not have been credible just a month ago, ,it is by no means certain today that the choice will be Henry Kis- singer. 1974. Field Enterprises. Us. and Marchetti themselves ' see fit to make public information that they have agreed to keep secret. But the book was not written so much about the system of classifying informa- tion as about an issue that is funda- mental to the intelligence establishment of the United .States: that the CIA,. originally established 'to co-ordinate the intelligence ' activities of the. various branches Of govefnment?the State Department, military services, FBI, National Sectirity. Agency (NSA) and the rest?his been forced ont- of this role, and has concentrated on its mission of clandestine operations, and that such operations- have included unethical meddling in the affairs of foreign governments. This charge is true. The so-called intelligence community is huge and com- partmented and not well managed. In fact, according to the authors, it is hardly managed at all. They also make the fair point that the NSA's com- munications interceptors and code- breakers and the mammoth Defense Intelligence Agency have most of the money and power and- that neither wishes to be co-ordinated by the CIA, whose political machinations abroad are well known and well documented. Having made this point early on, the authors suggest in the last chapter that the cure can be found in separating the co-ordinating functions of the CIA 28 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3 from operations. This makes good senie. Between, however, the initial exposi- tion of the problem and the proposed cure, the book is a rambling and dis- jointed account of some of the CIA's clandestine adventures and a lot of boring material about internal organisa- tion, policies and procedures. It is not a history of the CIA. The authors would be the first to confirm this, as they con- sistently make the point that the CIA and the whole American intelligence community are so compartmented that no one knows what is going on, and that, in effect, a lot of time is spent rediscovering the wheel. Although the individual accounts of clandestine operations are sometimes interesting, there is not much here which is really new: the Bay of Pigs (the war which was the undoing of Allen Dulles, arguably the best director the CIA ever had), Air America and the secret war in Laos, Che Guevara in Bolivia and the attempt to overthrow Sukarno are all rehashed at length. The most intriguing parts?and the main feature of the book?are the deletions ordered by a federal court judge (identified by the word "delete" -and a gap in the page the size of the deleted material) and the words that the CIA asked to have deleted but which the authors refused to delete and which are ndw printed in bold-face type. Although it initially gives the reader a sense of being in on something novel to read these bold-type sentences, not much is given away here, either. In fact, one is left with a sense of incred- ulity that there could have been any dispute at all over many of them. Surely, one hopes, there is more substance to the passages that the judge deleted. Or could the whole thing be a gigantic CIA hoax designed to get Congress to tighten up the security laws? Unlikely as this may seem, if one believes even a fraction of the escapades and hare- brained ideas the book attributes to the CIA's clandestine branch, such an operation is not entirely incredible. This is not the best book written about the CIA; but, because of its legal and legislative ramifications, it could turn out to be the most important one. ? CHRISTIAN ENCE MONT TOR 19 September 1974 . The CIA: Chile and elsewhere By Charles W. Yost New York Is it not high time that the United States Government, Congress, and people drew some operative con- clusions from the repeated and ern- - be -...rassing public predicamente in Wach the CIA has involved them over the past 15 years? ? The most recent debate on the subject arises from the avowal by the director of the agency that it did expend considerable sums in Chile to prevent Allende's accession to power and, after, he had nevertheless ac- ceded, to weaken or undermine him. I have not had an opportunity to examine the record sufficiently to judge whether, as claimed, other witnesses misled congressional com- mittees on this point, though there certainly is prima facie evidence that they were not wholly candid. I should myself, however, support the U.S. Government's contention that, what- ever the CIA may or may not have -done in Chile, it did not "overthrow" Allende. Allende was overthrown by Chil- eans. He never at any time had the support of the majority of the people. EL: was overthrown because he and his more radical adherents alienated, frightened, and ultimately radi- calized in the opposite sense the uneonverted majority, particularly its Most powerful element, the mill- tary. It is necessary to make this point in order to clarify the broad issue ? whether admitted CIA activities in Chile, even if they played no substan- tial part in the overthrow of Allende, were in the national interest of the U.S. I would argue that they were not. American and other Western spokesmen have for the past half century been pointing out that, while the Marxist revolutions in the Soviet Union and elsewhere were no doubt directed to noble ends, the atrocious means so often employed grossly distorted and even vitiated those ends. Yet since the onset of the cold wal the U.S. has takena leaf out of the Communist book .and, too often re- . ? sorted to means so shabby 'we dare not avow them. In the long run this does not pay. Ignoble means debase and demoral- ize the actors, corrupt and brutalize those acted upon and, in so doing, transform and disintegrate the end itself. This is as true for democrats as for Communists. The consequence of a quarter cen- , tury of "dirty tricks" by the CIA, that ? is, the U.S. Government, has been to make .the agency throughout the world a symbol for unscrupulous Intervention in other people's internal affairs and hence often to undermine, rather than to serve, the objectives of U.S. foreign policy. We see how it is almost universally believed in Greece that the CIA inspired the July 15 oaup in Cyprus which set in train the -subsequent Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3 disasters. I believe this is a mistaken judgment, because , upsetting the status quo was so obviously counter to U.S. interest. But? the fact it is plausible to suppose that the CIA might have inspired the coup if it had been in the U.S. interest lends color to the accusation. A New York Times story last week quotes a telegram from the U.S. ? Ambassador inDelhi to the effect that the recent revelations about CIA activities in Chile have confirmed the worst suspicions of the Indians about that agency and caused Indira Gandhi to wonder whether the Indian Govern- ? ment may not be the next target for" elimination. This is hardly the image of its foreign policy and practice the U.S. Government should wish to see widely held around the world. ? ? Supporters of "CIA activities of this kind think of themselves as "hard- nosed" realists. The Bay of Pigs is one instructive example and Gordon' Liddy's little operation at Watergate is another. ? The fact is the "dirty tricks" con- . ducted by agents of the U.S. Govern- ment very rarely serve the national interest of the United States, even if one interprets these interests in strictly "cold-war" terms. Ex- perience has shown that they cannot be adequately "controlled" within the executive branch, because it is so often the controllers, as in the case of the Bay of Pigs and perhaps of Chile, whose perceptions and judgments are . at fault. Vietnam has tragically demonstra- ted the limitation on the "capacity of the U.S. to determine the structure of an alien society even by a massive injection* of armed force. How much less likely that America could hope to do so by clandestine operations. The U.S. can, no doubt, occasionally con- tribute to the rise or fall of a particu- lar government orpolitician, but over the longer 'run.' indigenous forces, which it canriot 'control, will deter- mine whether this superficial change has any lasting effect. In referring at a public ?rneeting in Washington last week to proposals 'that CIA abandon its covert action programs, director William Colby said: "In light of current American policy, it would not have a major impact on our current activities or the current security of the United States." ? While the triple use of the word "current" is ominous, this statement is mildly reassuring. It is to be hoped that the President and Secretary of State will be persuaded that, in the, broader perspective, these "dirty tricks" do more harm than good to the national security and should be phased out. The author of this article writes from a background of 40 years as a United States diplomat. ? 1974 Charles W. Yost 29 ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3 Christian Science Monitor 12 Sept. 19714 Lib "1.ttrig: on-UJb9 LIrjijcI From red wigs at the Elisberg psy- chiatrist break-in to bumbling ar les in La s, the CIA has been getting a bad press lately. Here a longti e capital newsman and seasoned observer of! Els Intelligence and 'dirty tricks agency comments on how the spy agency c uld be overhauled. enjamin Welles Special to The Christian Science Monitor Washington The spies may not all be in from the cold ? but the canaries are' starting to sing. The trickle of critical "exposes" about the Central Intelligence Agency by ex-employees or? associates is becoming a flood. Each book seems to generate another, as America's spies go public for the good of their souls, their pocketbooks, or both. ? In recent years ? apart from Wise and Ross's "The Invisible Empire," an excellent journalistic work ? there have appeared Patrick MacGarvey's "CIA: The Myth and the Madness," J. Fletcher Prouty's "The Secret Team," and Alfred McCoy's ?,''The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia." Just out is "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence" 'by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, the most ? authoritative to date. Now looming over the horizon is still another expose; this one planned by Philip ,B. F. Agee,, who spent many years under-cover in Latin America until in 1969 he quit the CIA, apparently much disillusioned, to retire to En- gland. His British?publishers, Penguin, are said to have been asked to cut several passages by British ? intelligence ? working, presumably; at the behest of their American counterparts. "This publicity is unprecedented," said an intelligence specialist here. "The CIA seems unable to hold cover on anything these days. It must really be bothering them." So it appears. Six months ago the new CIA director William F. Colby, a trim ex-Princetonian ? with a quarter-century experience in clandestine operations, sent up for White House approval draft amendments to the 1947 National Security Act ,(which created the CIA). If passed by Congress ? which now seems increasingly unlikely in today's reaction to Watergate ? the legislation would impose 10-year jail terms and.. $10,000 fines on anyone violating what the CIA calls "secrecy." Exposes preferred to denials Under Mr. Colby's proposals all book, magazine, newspaper, radio, and television exposure of the CIA or its sister intelligence agencies could be 'blocked or litigated to death. That is, all but what the CIA wants put out, such as pictures of Director and Mrs. Colby on the recent cover, of a nationally syndicated Sunday supplement. In an article inside, Mr. Colby explained how he was refurbishing the CIA's 'image, especially by gutting back on "dirty tricks" overseas. Indepen- dent and authoritative reports suggest that if dirty tricks abroad are diminishing; the CIA itself is not. At this moment it is expanding its overseas operations, especially in politically wobbly Portu- gal and Spain, and currently pressing the State Department for more "cover slots" (embassy jobs that provide a legitimate diplomatic cover for CIA agents). t The Agency's bid for censorship power came to *light in June, when the agency unsuccessfully sought court orders that would. virtually have gutted the Marchetti-Marks book prior to publica- tion. The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Rich- mond, Va., threw out all but a handful of CIA- demanded deletions and let the book be published by Alfred A. Knopf, lee. But the CIA's struggle to control everything written about it continues. The struggle points up increasing skepticism in Washington over official declarAtions of what is legitimate "national security" ? as distinct from what is merely convenient secrecy to cover up government blundering or illegality. In this climate of skepticism, especially among young Americans, the nation seems avid for exposes of the CIA and of other government intelligence agencies: Defense Department in- telligence, the code-cracking National Security Agency, the spy satellite National Reconnaissance Office. Wary of what their leaders tell them, many' Americans seem to be finding the confessions of the spy masters credible and far more interesting than official denials. What has gone wrong? Two of the many potential criticisms of the CIA come principally to mind. First, the agency has undoubtedly been damaged ,by revelations in the Watergate hearings of its pliant obedience to White House orders of question- able legality and morality. Second, there is mount- ing concern about the CIA's ' size, cost, and :contribution to the nation's higher interest. ? It is not without significance that the ,ultra- suspicious Nixon administration placed under former CIA director Richard M. Helms two successive deputies ? Gen. Robert Cushman, ,U.S.M.C., and Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters, U.S. Army , ? each of whom had been personally attached to Mr. Nixon when he Was Vice-President. Their political loyalty to Mr. Nixon was unquestioned. It was General Cushman 1,,vho;, on John Ehrlich-, man's telephoned instruction in 1971, made avail- able to E. Howard Hunt the false'wigsand other spy claptrap used for the burglary of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office. It was Mr. 14elms, himself, who ordered CIA taiieS 'and memoranda destroyed one week after receiving a request from Senate majority leader Mike Mansfield (D) of Montana in January, 1973, that all "evidentiary materials" of possible usefulness to th6 Watergate, Investigation be preserved. "The nation must to a degree take it on faith,", Mr. Helms told the American Society of Newspaper Editors in 1971 "that we,' too, are honorable men devoted to her service." Sen. Howard H. Baker (R) of Tennessee, deputy chairman of the Senate Watergate Committee, raised, in' a 43-page report recently issued, many disturbing questions indicating CIA involvement in ?a wide range of domestic skullduggery ? in flat violation of Congress's intent in 1947 when it created the CIA for overseas spying and strong- arm activities and specifically barred it from such actions inside the U.S. Over the years successive presidents seem to have flouted Congress's ban and have begun using .the CIA for domestic political purposes through' a series of top-secret (even from Congress) National ' Security Council Intelligence directives. Only the President and a handful of top aides, including the -Approved -For-Re1ease-2001/08/08 CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-1 Appi-oved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003400073 ? Director of Central Intelligence, ever see these. Defense lawyers for Bernard Barker and Eu- genio Martinez, two of the CIA-subsidized "bur- glars" caught and sentenced in the Watergate affair and subsequently charged also with having participated in the Ensberg 'break-in, have de- manded CIA files. They claim that these will show "compelling parallels" between the Watergate, Ellsberg, and "previous" operations. This reference to "previous" actions suggest to CIA-watchers here the curious break-ins, still officially "unresolved" by the FBI or any other U.S. law enforcement agency, at Chilean diplo- matic premises in Washington and New York in 1971 and 1972. At that time the Nixon administration was at serious odds with the then leftist Chilean government headed by Salvador Allende Gossens. More important than the CIA's unquestioning 'obedience to questionable White House directives on Watergate, however, is the larger question: How well is the CIA serving the true national interest? The U.S. unquestionably needs swift intelligence. Does it get it from the CIA? Marchetti and Marks, in their book, make a strong case for reorganizing the agency. With its $750 million annual budget and its 16,000 employees' it is supposed to, but cannot possibly ride herd on all the other intelligence agencies in the federal government. The CIA director, with sub-cabinet rank and that $750 million budget, cannot and does not control the intelligence operations of the Defense Department, .whose Secretary has full cabinet rank and an annual budget exceeding $80 billion. As one recent 'Defense Secretary told this writer, "If Helms had ever come to my office and told me how to spend my intelligence funds I'd have told him to get. out . out of here!' ? Presidential directives and Mr. Colby's: asser- tions notwithstanding, the CIA spends about 12 cents of the .annual U.S. intelligence dollar ($750 million out of $6 billion). So .long as the Pentagon ?controls the spending of 80 percent ($4 billion out of the total $6 billion) it will rule the roost. Power in Washington means control of "resources" ? and ? compared with the Pentagon's the CIA's are limited. . The CIA at the start had a real function. In 1948, at the beginning of the Cold War, President Truman needed a "strong arm" group to spy on and counter Soviet machinations in war-shattered Western Europe, Greece, Iran, Korea, and elsewhere. He selected a former OSS man, Frank G. Wisner, and told him to create such a group and to report directly and solely to Secretary of State Marshall and Defense Secretary Forrestal. ? ', Mr. Wisner's team, code-named the OPC (Office iof Policy Coordination), unquestionably helped the 'visible 'NATO forces block Soviet ambitions in Western Europe through a combination of brains, ? brawn, and enormous secret slush funds. During the Korean war, however, Mr. Wiener's clandestine operators were merged with the fast- ? expanding CIA, and, ever. since Allen Dulles became CIA chief in 1952,. the mystique of "covert" action has dominated the agency. Successive directors ? Dulles, McCone, Helms, now Colby ?? have tended to favor the agency's clandestine action role rather than that eriginally foreseen by Congress, namely that of objective intelligence evaluation. . Even today two-thirds of its employees (about 10,000) and half its budget (about $375 million) belong to the clandestine side of the house. And what are the "operators" doing? In the 1960s they ran secret air forces in the Congo, a secret' army of 30,000 anti.Communist guerrillas in Laos, otherwise took the field with questionable efficacy in Cambodia and Vietnam. But now, with the U.S. leaving Indo-China, what is their function? "Buy- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 ing" Third World politicians? Subsidizing news- papers and trade unions in Latin America, Africa and Asia? If so, under what rules and what watchdog? The U.S. needs intelligence on troop deployments and missile developments in the U.S.S.R. and 'China, its only potential military rivals. But spy ,satellites and electronic interception already pro- ;vide 98 percent of such information. Human agents are supposed to discern an enemy's intentions as ! distinct from his capabilities. But since the ,Russians detected Col. Oleg ' Penkovsky spying for the British and the Amer- , icans and shot him in 1962, intelligence experts concede that the CIA has derived virtually nothing of national importance from spies in the Commu- nist world. What it gets principally is information passed on by Communist-bloc politicians, much of , which is gossip and hearsay. ? Bureaucratic momentum carries the CIA along, senior senators and congressmen who have the ., power to impose reforms have neither the time to probe nor the inclination. There are no votes or campaign contributions here; it is ea?ier to look the other way. "Control" over the CIA, which the agency touts endlessly in self-justification, is a fiction. The CIA is the President's secret arm, and no President inheriting such awesome power is likely to give it Watchdog panel recommended Only he and his intimate aides can find out what it is doing, and so long as the CIA follows their orders ? rightly or wrongly ? the nation and Congress will remain essentially in the dark. The PFIAB (President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board), a watchdog panel of 12 or more distinguished citizens, spends two days a month in ? Washington purportedly examining CIA and other intelligence agency functions; far too little to know: the facts. The OMB (Office of Manageinent and, Budget) reviews the CIA's secret yearly budget, ? but OMB is the President's instrument. True "control" over the CIA cculd nonetheless be assured by creating an independent panel of, say, 6 to 12 retired judges plus academics, industrialists, scientists, and such consumers of intelligence material as ambassadors, generals and admirals, preferably. recently retired, too. The key word here would be "independent." Such men, free from. bureaucratic loyalties and 'from all ambition but service to their country, 'could hew through agency propaganila to the .sinew of - national usefulness. It could be done, if any current or future president wanted it done.. , - In six Months to a year such a group would know what to recommend: scrapping or keeping various functions. Certainly the CIA's intelligence eval- .. uation function is vital. So is counterespionage, a- highly subtle technique ? which the FBI performs at home ? but which CIA experts perform abroad in close liaison with friendly intelligence services. A case might be made for continuing and expanding. CIA research and development ? especially to help monitor SALT or other dis- armament agreements on which world peace may largely depend if the "balance of terror" is slowly dismantled. But what seems long overdue is a ruthless pruning of the clandestine services now in their 26th year: overstaffed, overfunded, and increasingly out of tune with America's mood. Only the President of the U.S., in the last resort, s can remold the CIA. He can abuse it, as Mr. Nixon did in the Watergate and Ellsberg cases, or he can use it as Congress intended and as the national interest demands: a supreme tribunal sifting through the oceans of intelligence that lap the shores of the U.S. daily and then passing the conclusions to the decisionmakers. : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3 31 Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3 NEW YORK TIMES 20 September 1974 C.I.A. Is Linked to Strikes InChileThat Beset Allende Intelligence Sources Report That Money ? Was Distributed to Help Truck and Taxi Drivers to Prolong Crises By SEYMOUR M. HERSH gpeclei to The New York Times . WASHINGTON, Sept. 19 ? dency of Mr. Allende. ? 'The Central Intelligence Agency, ! The sources noted that a re- secretly financed striking labor! rest from the truckers union unions and trade groups in! In August, Amuorguest,C 1973, moanneciamlonag Chile for 'more than 18 months before the coup, was rejected before President Salvador Al- by the 40 Committee, the in- Hende Gossens was overthrown, aelligence review board chaired intelligence sources revealed by Secretary of State Kissin- ger. today., Nonetheless, the souces also They said that the majority conceded that some agency of more than $7-million author- funds inevitably?as one high ized for clandestine C.I.A. ac- official put it ?"could have tivities ,in Chile was used in filtered" to the truckers union 1972 and 1973 to provide strike thereafter. "If we give it to A, and then benefits and other means of Support for anti-Allende strik- ers and workers. William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, had no comment when told of The Thnes's information. :T. In testimony today before the Senate 'Foreign :Relations Committee, Secretary of State Kissinger asserted that the in- telligence agency's involvement, In Chile had beeen authorized! solely to keep alive politica1! parties and news media threat- ? ened by Mr. Allende's one-party minority Government. The clandestine activities, Mr. Xis-I singer said, were not aimed at subverting that Government. Among those heavily sub- sidized, the sources said, were the organizers of a na- tionwide truck? strike that lasted 26 days in the fall of 1972, ?seriously disrupting Chile's economy and provoking the first of a series of labor crisis for President Allende. ?Direct subsidies, the souces said, also were provided for a strike of middle-class shop- keeprs and a taxi strike, A gives it to B and C and D," the official said, "in a sense it's true that D got it but the question is?did we give it to A knowing that D woald get it?" The official added htat it was "awfully hard" to maintain con-' trol over local field operatives, particularly when large sums of cash were involved.; A number of sources also ex- plained that the Central Intelli- gence Agency, by using the Chilean black market, was able to increase the basic buying power of the $7-million esti- mated to have spent on clandes- tine efforts between 1970 and 1973; The unofficial exchange rate, sources said, was as much as 800 per cent higher than the official rate, indicating that the C.I.A.'s cash could have had a local impact of more than $40- million. , Informers Inside Parties The sources depicted the gen- eral involvement of the intel- ligence agency with the labor unions and trade groups as part of a broad effort to infiltrate all areas of Chile's govern- mental and political life. The sources said that by the end of the Allende period, the agen- cy had agents and informers in among others, that disrupted every major, party making up the capital city of Santiago in Mr. Allende s Popular Unity !the summer of 1973, shortly. coalition. One troubling failure during [before Mr. Allende was over- the latter part of Mr. Allende's !thrown by a military coup. power, the sources said, was I At its peak, the 1973 strikes the agency's inability to infil- 'involved more than 250,000 trate the Movement of the Rev- . truck drivers, shopkeepers and olutionary Left., or the M.I.R., professionals, who banded to- gether in a middle-class move- ment that, many analysts have concluded, made a violent overthrow inevitable. The Times's sources, while readily acknowledging the in- be- ing made by the Allende Gel,- the major revolutionary group outside the Allende coalition. ; At his news conference Mon- day night, President Ford de- clared his support for the C.I.A. involvement in Chile and said that it had been authorized be- cause "there was an effort telligence agency's secret sup- ernment to destroy opposition !Port for the middle classes, news media, both the writing linsisted that the Nixon Admin- press as well as the electronic listration's goal had not been press, and to destroy opposi- te force and end to the Presi- ;lion political parties." ! In fact, The Times's sources 32 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDF'77-00432R000100340007-3 agreed, less than half the money made available for clan- destine activities in Chile was provided for the direct support of the allegedly threatened politicians, newspapers apd radio-television stations 're- ferrerd to by Mr. Ford.' Official Defends Activities One official, .with first-hand knowledge of the decision-mak- ing on Chile, strongly defended, the intelligence agency's in-.volvement with trade unions and organized strikes. . "Of course, the agency tries to support the people who be- lieve in its aim," he said. "In- the taxicab driver strike, our goal is to make sure that he [the driver on strike] is not go- ing to fold. The strike money was used to supply subsistence for people who believed in what you do." "You've got to understand what was going on," the offi- cial added. "The intelligence reports coming to us were frightening. Allende would send Popular Unity representatives into a business and 'claim that the worker were complaining about high profits." , "Then they'd take over the books and raise the taxes 50 per cent," be said. "It was a very brutal policy." ? "So our idea was to prevent this from working and money was the way to go," the offie .cial said. "What we really were doing was supporting a civilian resistance movement against an arbitrary Government. Our target was the middle-class groups who were working against Allende." ? "The whole point of this is that covert action provides a 1 per cent impetus for some- thing that the people want any- way," he said. "In a civilized country, the C.I.A. can only make a marginal input. It takes a lot of money and?this is most important?you don't do it unless you're told to [by high- er authority in Washington]." Aid to Publicize Unrest Some financial support for newpaper and radio stations was needed in Chile, the official explained, because "it wouldn't have been goo dto have strikes if nobody knows about it." Most of the funds invested for propaganda purposes, the official said, went to El Mer- curio, the main opposition news- paper in Chile. "It was the only serious political force among the newspapers and television stations there," he said. "As long as you don't make it sound like we were trying to start a coup, it'll be all right," the official added. ."You've got to understand that he [Allende] was taxing them (the middle-class] to death." The official noted that the policy toward Chile, author- ized by the 40 Committee, had been the subject of intense de- bate in the Nixon Administra- tion. One concern, he said, was that intervention Would serve to polarize further the classes in Chile. "And if Allende de- cided to bear down and de- stroy the middle class," thei ['afield added, "some of us thought it might restilt in a dictatorship of ? the left or the right?and that wasn't' such a good idea." .? Military Coup Unexpected The -official described the Administration's policy in Chile as a failure. "We were ? not looking for a military take- over," he declared.. A different opinion about the ultimate goals of the Admini- stration's policy was provided in an interview by a source who served a number of years in Chile. "The people within the Em- bassy, "felt that they were engaged in. a kind of warfare," "people either were with you or against you when it came to Allende." "There were a lot of people in Santiago on the far right who were essentially dedicating their lives to the overthrow of Al- lende-Lit was like a holy war," the source said. "These people were increasingly seen at the mbassy in 1972 and 1973." At the time, he added, "just putting some resources at their disposal alone would be enough." In testimony Monday before a House subcommittee investi- gating the activities in Chile, Richard R. Fagen, a professor ,who did reseach in Chile in . 1972 and 1973, said he had been approached by an American Embassy official in Santiago and utged to aid in covert gath- ering of information on left- ? wing groups. ? Mr. Fagen, who teaches po- litical science at Stanford Uni- versity, testified that the re- quest had been coupled with an offer to help him exchange per- sonal money "through the black market channeli used by the ? embassy." ' All of the sources interviewed by The Times insisted that the policies regarding the clandes- tine financing of trade groups and unions had been established ? and approved by the 40 Com- mittee. -Edward M. Korry and. Na- thaniel? M. Davis, successive ambassadors to Chile during the Allende regime, freqUefitly reported to Mr. Kissinger, then former President Nixon's na- tional security adviser, through confidential channels, the sources said. Reports with less sensitive information were for- warded through the normal State Department channels to Washington, the sources said. They added that most, if not all, of the C.I.A.'s direct strike subsidies' for unions and trade groups weer initiated in 1972, afte Mr. Davis, a specialist on Eastern Europe, was assigned as Ambassador. A number of sources further told The Times that Mr. Colby, contrary to many published ac- counts, had fully briefed two Congressional subcommittees about the intelligence agency's financing of union and trade ? groups during the Allende re- gime. During those briefings, which were before the Senate Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on West- ern Hemisphere Affairs and the !House Armed Services Subcom- lmittee on Intelligence, Mr. Col- ApProved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3 iby sought to emphasize, the 'sources said, that the C.I.A. 'began to pull back on its clan- destine commitments in Chile !late in the spring of 1973, when there were almost weekly re- ports of an impending coup. Link to Military Severed At one point in the spring, the sources said, the agency did formally break its direct re- lations with the Chilean milltary, which was known to be plotting against President Al- lende. Although direct contact was eliminated,, the sources said, the agency continued to maintain a liaison role for .in- telligencey purposes. There was concern in the C.I.A. a reliable source said, :about "getting involved with 'people who were shorter-term 'people than we were." i "Our goals were longer term," Ihe said, in an allusion to the ,official Ford Administration po- sition now that the agency's 'objective had been to prevent the possible establishenent of a , - ;one-party Government by Mr. lAllende. Questions about the United States' clandestine role in pro- moting the 1973 truck strike have repeatedly been raised by supporters of President Allende, who lose his life in the eoup:' e In an interview in Mexico ,City last year, Mr. Allende's widow, Hortensia Bussi de Al- lende, charged that the United 'States "had a great responsi- bility in what happened." She asserted that the truck strike, which involved about 50,000 workers, had, been fi- nanced by American money. "What were they living on if they were not working?" she asked. "They had to be fi- nanced from outside." In August, 1973, & news- paper in Santiago, Ultima Rota, accused the United States of NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1974 having financed both the truck strike in the fall of 1972 and a strike then in progress. Mr. Davis, then the Ambassador, refused to comment. After the coup, the State De- partment formally denied any financial involvement in the 1973 truck strike or the other work stoppages and protests in Chile, declaring that "such suggestions are absurd." Jack B. Kubisch, then As.. sistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, refused Ito answer in public when queried about such financing, during 3 House hearing after the Allende coup. C.I.A.'s Covert Role: Ford's Defense Runs Against Current Trend By CLIFTON DANIEL Special to The New York Times WASHINGTON, Sept. 17 ?I President Ford helped revive al dying issue last night. That is- sue was whether it was proper for a democracy, using its in- telligence agencies to intervene in the internal af- fairs of other coun- News tries. Analysis Mr. Ford, at a news conference, seemed to answer the question affirmatively. He acknowledged that the United States had made an effort to preserve an .opposition press and opposition political parties in Chile during the rule of a Marxist President, Salvador Al- lende Gossens, ?who died in a military coup in September, 1973. President Ford justified the effort, which was made during the Nixon Administration, by saying that it was "in the best interest of the people of Chile, and certainly in our best interest." "I am reliably informed," Mr. Ford said, "that Commu- nist nations spend vastly more money than we do for the same kind of purpose." His response was presumably considered in advance- He had every reason to expect a ques- tion on the subject because of the recent disclosure that the Nixon Administration author- ized the Central Intelligence Agency to spend $8-million on covert activities in Chile be- tween 1970 and 1973. Indeed, Mr. Ford may have had the help of those who au- thorized those expenditures in framing his reply. In any event, he chose to defend the behavi- or of the old Administration rather than chart a new policy for his own. His response was presumably considered in advance. He had every reason to expect a ques- tion on the subject. Last week it was disclosed that the Nixon Administration lied authorized the Central Intelligence Agency to spend $8-million on covert activities in Chile between 1970 and 1973. Those activities were approved by the so-called 40 Committe, whose chairman was and is Secretary of Steee Kis- singer. Appro Mr. Ford possibly may have had the help of those who authorized those expenditures in framing his reply. In any event, the President chose to defend the behavior of the old Administration rather than chart a new policy for his own. Cold-War Rhetoric Seen Another kind of reply was possible. The President might have said that he was not re- sponsible for past activities of the C.I.A., but would be re- sponsible for its future behav- ior, and would accordingly re- view its policies and plans: He did promise to meet with the Congressional committees that review the covert, actions of the agency td see whether they might want to change the review process. Those commit- tees, however, are not noted in ? Washington for vigor and skep- ticism. Mr. Ford himself was a mem- ber of one of them for nitre years when he was a Repre- sentative from Michigan. ? His reversion last night to the reason and rhetoric of the cold war, however mildly ex- pressed, led to speculation that his mind was still set in that mold. "If it was good enough for Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy,. Johnson and Nixon, then it's good enough for Ford," one of the President's friends re- marked today. "That's the way he thinks." Even in an Administration that has been dedicated to openness and candor, President Ford was judged in Washington to have spoken with remark- able frankness. "It is the first time in my memory that a President has come out flatly and said, 'We do it, the other side does it, and we do it," said Prof. Rich- ard N. Gardner, a specialist in international law at Columbia University, speaking from New York. Secret C.I.A. operations such as the overthrow of Premier Mohammed Mossadegh of Iran in 1953 and President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman of Guatemala in 1954, the Bay of Pigs inva- sion of Cuba in 1961 and later operations in Laos have been identified when they became e tuo_bia kncli notorious to be Lone e.~ e ease 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3 33 However, none has ever been acknowledged as readily and fully as the Chile operation, al- though the acknowledgment was low-keyed. It came, oddly, when such ac- tivities seemed to be going out of style. Eighteen months ago the Nixon Administration let it be known that the clandestine operations of the CIA; were being curtailed. -M1 Just last week, William E. Colby, Director of Central Intel- ligence, said it was "clear that American policy today is differ- ent from when it was confront- ing worldwide Communist sub- version in the nineteen fifties or Communist insurgency in the ninetee sixties." "As a result," Mr. Colby told the Fud for 'Peace conference ill Washington, "C.I.A.'s in- volvement in covert action is very small indeed." Abandoning covert action en- tirely "would not have a major impact on our current activities or the current security of the United States," Mr. Colby ack- nowledged. However, the capacity for Such action may be needed in case of some new threat, he ad- ded, and it would be a mistake to "leave us with nothing be- tween a diplomatic protest and sending the Marines." - There was a conspicuous dif- ference in tone between Mr. Colby and President Ford, his new boss, but both seemed to take it for granted that the United States had the right to intervene in the affairs of 'other countries in its own interest. When Mr. Ford was asked what international law gave the United States the right to "des- tabilize the constitutionally elected government of another country,' the President de- clined to talk about law, but said, "it's a recognized fact that historically, as well as pre- sently, such actions are taken 'in the best interests of the countries involved." I Commenting on that, Senator' Frank Church, Democrat of Ida- ho, who is a high-ranking mem- ber of the Senate Foreign Rela- tions Committee, said today: "It seems he declared that the !United States-respects no law lother than the lawof the jungle in its dealings . with foreign countries. He equates us with the Russians. I thought there wes a difference, and the differ- ence is What it's all about." F. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3 in our final excerpts from ' The CIA-.- and ? the- Cult?of-----Intelli- gence ' (Cape 0.95), VICTOR ,MARCHETTI and JOHN D. MARKS unveil the commercial' secrets of the Central Intelli- gence Agency?which tried first to veto their book, and then to censor it. After a battle in the American courts, 171 CIA cuts were restored and published in black type (including those below). Blank spaces in the book indicate the remaining 168 deletions (including those identi- fied below as 0 0 ?). 4:A.r.:*- ? .AMONG the most secret weapons of the Central Intelligence Agency, have been, for years, the 'pro- prietaries corporations' or, simply,: proprietaries '?ostensibly private institutions and businesses which are in fact financed and controlled by the CIA. From behind their commercial and sometimes non- profit covers, the Agency is able to carry out a multitude of clandes- tine activities. ; The best-known were Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, both established in the early 1950s, and their corporate structures served as something of a prototype for. other Agency proprietaries. Each functioned under a .cover provided by a board of directors made pp of prominent Americans, but CIA officers in the key management ? positions made all the important decisions. ? ? Often the weapons and other military equipment for an opera- tion--like the covert intervention in the Congo in 1964?are provided by a ' private ' arms dealer. The: largest such dealer in the United States is the International -Arma- ment ? Corporation, or Interarmco, which has its main .office and some warehouses on the waterfront in Alexandria, Virginia. Advertising :that it specialises in arms for law- enforcement agencies, the corpor- ation hasmutlets in Manchester in England, Monte Carlo; Singapore, Pretoria, and several Latin Ameri- can cities. Interarmco was founded in 1953 by Samuel Cummings, a CIA officer during the Korean War. Although it is now a truly private corporation; it still maintains close ties with the CIA. Direct CIA ownership of Radio .Free Europe and Radio Liberty, and direct involvement in Inter- armco, are largely past history now.. Nevertheless, the Agency is . still very much involved in the pro- , prietary business. Incredible as it may seem, the., 1CIA. is the owner of one of the biggest?if not the biggest?fleets ? of ' commercial ' airplanes in the. world. Agency proprietaries in- dude Air America, Air Asia, Civil ? Air Transport, Rocky Mountain ?Air, Southern Air Transport, ? ? ? and several-other air charter corn-. panies around the world. Air America was set up in thel late 1950s to 'accommodate the. Agency's rapidly growing opera- tions in South-east Asia. As US involvement deepened in that part. of the world, other Government agencies also turned to Air: America to transport their people and supplies. In fact, Air America was able to generate so muth busi- ness in South-east Asia that eventu- ally other American airlines took. note of the profits to be made. One private company, Conti- nental Airlines, made a successful moye in the mid-1960s to take some of the market away from ? Air America. Pierre Salinger, who be- came an officer of Continental after his years as President Kennedy's press secretary, led Continental's . fight to gain its share of the lucra- tive Southeast Asian ousiness. Rather than face the possibility of unwanted publicity the CIA permitted Continental to move into Laos, where since the late 1960s it has flown charter flights worth millions of dollars annually. And Continental's best customer is the CIA itself. , But even with Continental flying in Laos, the Agency was able to keep most of the flights for its own Air America which, before the flying ceasefire in Vietnam, was 125 planes of its own, with roughly one of anking 40 more on lease. It was America's largest airlines, r just behind National in the total hat the number of planes. Now t US military forces have withdrawn; from the Vietnamese theatre, the role of maintaining a significant American influence has reverted d ? Air. largely to the CIA?an America is finding its services 'en the Con- e mem- Polandontract to sup- even more in demand. E International Supervisory an trol Commission, despite th bership of Communist and Hungary, has signed a c with the CIA proprietary port its supervision of the Vietnam ceasefire. . ? ? and eventually halted during the 1960s, this airline was reduced in size to a few planes, helicopters, and a supply; of spare parts. Still, up to the late 1960s, it flew charters for the Nepalese Govern- ment and private organisations in ,the area. 34 Perhaps the CIA's most out-of- the-way proprietary was located in Katmandu, Nepal. It was estab- lished to provide air support for Agency-financed and directed tribesmen who were operating in. Chinese-controlled Tibet. As the Tibetan operations were cut back The CIA's Planning- Program- ming, :ind Budgeting Stafj back in, Largiey, Virginia, believed that the ahline's usefulness as an Agency asset had passed, and the decision. was made to sell' it off. But for the CIA to sell a pro- prietary is a very difficult process. The Agency feels- that it must maintain the secrecy of its covert ,involvement, no matter how moot or insignificant the secrecy, and it does not want to be identified in any way, either before or after the actual transaction. - Although the boards of directors of the air proprietaries are studded with the names of eminently respectable business leaders and financiers, the companies' opera- tions were actually for i long time in the hands of one rather singular man, George Doole, Until . his retirement in 1971; Doole's official titles were presi- dent of the Pacific Corporation and chief executive of Air America and Air Asia; it was under his leader- ship that the CIA air proprietaries blossomed. ? Doole was known to his col.' leagues in the, Agency as a superb businessman. He had a talent for expanding ? his airlines and for. making them, functionally if not formally, into profit-making con- cerns.. In fact, his proprietaries pr3ved something of an embar- Tassment to the Agency because of their profitability:. Doole's empire- Was fornially placed under the CIA's Directorate of 'Support on the ? Agency's organisation chart, although many of its operations were superVised.- by the Clandestine Services. But . so little was known inside CIA headquarters about the air pro- ? prietaries, which employed almost as many people as the Agency itself (18,000), that in 1965 a CIA, 'officer with extensive Clandestine Services experience was assigned to make a study of their operations Or the Agency's top officials. This officer spent the better part of a year trying to assemble the relevant data, and became increas- ingly frustrated as he proceeded., He found that the various pro- prietaries were constantly trading, leasing, and selling aircraft to each other; that the tail numbers of many planes were regularly changed; and that the mixture of ? profit-making and covert flight made accounting almost impos- sible. lie finally put up a huge map of the world in a secure Agency conference. room and used flags and pproved-F or Re tea str2170//08/087CIA=RDP77-'00-432R000100340007-3- , ApOroved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R00010034000?-3 pins .to try to designate what pro; ?prietaries were operating with - what equipment in what countries. Finally, Richard Helms, then Deputy Director, was invited to see the snap and he briefed on the complexity of the airlines. A wit-, ness described Helms as being 'aghast.' ? - In 1968, the ? CIA's Executive. Committee for Air met to deal with a request from George Doole for several million dollars to:: ' modernise ' Southern Air Trans-' port. Doole's justification for he't money was that every major air- line in the world was using jets, ow: ye' aid and that Southern needed to foil suit if it were to continue to Ii its cover.' Additionally Doole s that Southern should have equip- he ment as effective as possible in t , event the Agency had to call on tin he: ;ti- ge tin it for future contingencies in La . America. ? Previous to Doole's request, t Agency's Board of National Fan mates had prepared a long-ra assessment of events in La America. This estimate bad been approved by the Director and sent to the President at the White House el- ateedhe. as the official analysis of the int ligence community. The esti m :strongly implied . that co u ntin open US intervention in t internal affairs of Latin American nations would only make matters , worse and further damage the ArperiCan image. in that region. ? . At 1 he meeting, Doole Was asked if he thought expai- ding Southern's ? capabilities for future interven- tions in Latin America conformed with the conclusions of the esti- mate.' Doole remained silent, but a Clandestine Services officer Working in paramilitary affairs replied that the estimate might well have been a- correct appraisal of the. Latin American situation, but that non-intervention, would not necessarily become official American policy. The Clandestine Services man pointed out that over the years there had been other developments in Latin America-L- in countries such as Guatemala and' ,the Dominican Republic?where the Agency had been called on by the White House to take action - against existing political trends;:: and that the Director (and the Clandestine Services and Doole)' also had a responsibility to be -ready for the worst contingencies. In working to strengthen South- ern Air Transport and his other proprietaries, Doole and the Clan- destine Services were following one of the basic maxims of covert "action: Build assets now for future contingencies. It proved to be persuasive strategy, as the Director personally ? approved Doole's ? .request and Southern received its several million dollars for jets. So if the US government decides .to intervene covertly in the internal affairs of a Latin Ameri- can country, Doole's planes will be. available to support the operation. These CIA airlines stand ready to drop their legitimate charter busi- ness quietly and assume the role, they. were .established for: the transport of arms and mercenaries for the Agency's 'special opera- tions.' ? The guns will come from the CIA's own stockpAlisonatiefercbr the warehouses of Interarmco and other international arms dealers. The mercenaries will be furnished by the Agency's Special Operations. Division, and, like the air pro- prietaries, their connection with the Agency will be plausibly deni- able ' to the American public and the rest of the world. ? ? .?00000000 000, OOOOOO THE sarise technological explosion which has affected nearly every other aspect of modern life has also ,drastically changed the intelligence trade. A report on-clandestine activities in Latin America during the 1960s by the CIA Inspector General, for example, revealed that a good part of the intelligence collected by the Agency in that region ? came from audio devices. In quite a few of the Latin nations., the report noted, the CIA was regularly intercepting the telephone conversations of import- ant officials and had managed to place bugs in the homes of many. key personnel, up to and including, ' cabinet ministers. In some coun- tries allied to the US, the Agency shares in the informa- tion acquired from audio surveil- lance conducted by the host intel- ligence service, which often -receives technical assistance from' the CIA. for this very purpose? and may be penetrated by the CIA ,in the process. ? The .Agency's successes with' ? -bugs and taps have usually been 'limited to the non-Communist ? countries, where relatively lax in-. ternal security systems do not deny: CIA op-orations the freedom of, movement necessary to installing eavesdropping devices. . In technical espionage, America's first experience came in' the form of radio intercepts and code-breaking. In 1952 the Presi- dent, by secret executive order, established the National Security, ? Agency (NSA) to interceptand de- cipher the communications of both the nation's enemies and its friends and to ensure that US codes were ? secure from similar eavesdropping.' The NSA, though placed under the control of the Defence Department, soon established an independent bureaucratic identity of its oWn? and at present has a huge budget ? ,of well over a billion dollars 'per annum and a work-force of some 25,000. Although the NSA engineered. ? _ . some success against the Eastern -European countries and Commun- ist China in its early days, for at least the last 15 years it has been completely unable to break into the high-grade cipher system and codes . of these nations. Against such major targets, the NSA has been reduced to reading comparatively unimportant communications be- tween low-level military compon- ents and the equally inconsequent- ial routine exchanges between low- grade bureaucrats and economic planners. This is far short of learn- ing, the Soviet Union's or China's' ,most vital secrets. . 0-000 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? o As with so many other parts of- the American intelligence appara- tus, the NSA has had considerably more success operating against the Third World countries and even Rektaties200008,i081traniiRDFMLIO 35 what is reportedly the largest hank' of computers in the world and thou- sands of cryptanalysts, the NSA has had little trouble with the codes and ciphers of these nations. ' ? ? ? ? ? ? - , Sometimes the Agency may' con ,cluct a physical attack on another country's communications systeni a clandestine operation to steal a? tcode book or cipher system, the, suborning of a communications clerk, or the planting of an audio. device in an embassy radio room. Within the CIA's Clandestine Ser-, vices, a special, unit of Foreign Intelligence (espionage) Staff specialises in these attacks. Numerous foreign embassies in Washington are already wiretap- ped, but by the FBI. This wiretap programme, like some of the NSA' intercept operations, also provides; information about Americans. in' co-operation w,ith the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company: (a Bell subsidiary), FBI agents re- gularly monitor the phones in the offices of all Communist Govern- ments represented in Washington; on occasion, the embassies of vari- ous non-Communist countries have their phones tapped, especially When their nations are engaged in. negotiations with the US Govern-. ment or when important develop- ment? are taking place in these ? Countries. ? And it is not only foreign em-': bassies which are .kept under' surveillance. The State Depart- ment long ago recognised that its most secret cables are not secure from CIA inspection by setting up special communications channels which supposedly cannot be deci- phered by the CIA. When, in 1968, the Ambassador' to Iran, Armin Meyer, ran into trouble with the CIA station chief in Teheran, Meyer switched his'' communications with the State Department in Washington to one of these secure 'channels. But the CIA had none the less figured out 'a way to intercept his cables and! the replies he received from Wash.'. ington; and the CIA Director received a' copy of. each intercep- tion. Written on top of every cable was a warning that the contents.. should be-kept especially confiden--- tial, because the State Department: :was unaware that the CIA had a copy. American embassies abroad have suffered, of course, from bugging. But today the likelihood of the KGB eavesdropping' on the activi- ties in an embassy code room is ex- .tremely remote. Most State Depart- ment communications overseas are handled by the CIA. The machines and other equipment are cushioned and covered to mute the sounds emanating from them. The rooms themselves are encased in lead and rest on huge springs that further ,reduce the internal noise. Re- : sembling large camping-trailers, the code rooms now are normally located deep in the concrete base- ments of embassy buildings. Access ? to them by sound-sensitive devices is, for all practical purposes, un- 'possible. - The official justification for all the technology--the wiretaps and audio devices, and satellite flights 0432R0 ?is 00100340 to ffsither intel007-3 ligence to help Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIAIRDP77-00432R000100340007-3 -protect the national security of the U.S. Sometimes, the machinery is justified. One of the finest hours for the CIA and the intelligence. Community was produced ? by. the. :Cuban .missile crisis; although the' last National Intelligence Estimate, prepared by the CIA a little over a month before President Kennedy , Went on nationwide television to ,announce the Cuban 'quarantine,' ..declared that it was unlikely that :the Soviets would install nuclear-, _tipped missiles on the island. The ,fact, remains: that the CIA and the ?other intelligence agencies did dis, ;cover?from 02 spy planes; and: -communications intercepts ? the missiles in time for the President to take action, and they presented the facts to Kennedy with no policy .recommendations or slanting which Icould have limited his options. ,This was- how. the intelligence pro- ? cess was supposed to work. The basic 'reason that the *CIA , analysts were able to monitor the Soviet arms build-up more closely than the other intelligence agen- cies, which had essentially the same information available, was the more refined technique that the , CIA had developed, including a special analytical tool known as crate-ology '?a unique method Of ,determining the contents of the. large crates carried on the decks of the Soviet ships delivering arms. With a high degree of accuracy, the specialists' could look at aerial photographs of tese boxes, add. 'information about the ship's em- barkation point and Soviet military .production schedules and deduce what the crates contained. More often, though, besides' 'supplying information, the CIA has profound effect on the actual' planning and carrying out of American foreign policy. Even the' . White House has not 'imposed close controrof the Agency. One eXecu'?;? tive organisation set up to control ,it is the 40 Committee. The ubiqui- tous Dr Kissinger chairs this com- mittee, just as he heads the three' other principal ',White .Ilous, . panels which supervise the intelli-4 "gence community. The committee' is supposed to meet once a week, but its non-CIA members from the State Department and the Penta- gon have so many responsibilities in, . their own departments that meetings are frequently cancelled. ? - Nor is the 40 Committee an effective watchdog when it does lineet. According to one veteran .intelligence official, it 'was like a bunch of schoolboys. They would _listen and their eyes would bug out. I always used to say that I could get $5 million out of the 4Q Committee for a covert operation ?faster than I could get 'money for .a typewriter out of the ordinary 'bureaucracy.' The 40 Committee fails to keep close watch on secret reconnais- sance -activities, is ineffective in monitoring the CIA's covert activi, ties, and is totally in the dark On ? classical espionage -operations. ,President Nixon and especially Henry Kissinger Were unquestion- ably.:aware of its shortcomings and did little to change things. Ear' 'six six years it was Nixon and Kissinger who ultimately deter- mined_ how the CIA operated, and if -they did not want to imposn closer control, then the form of any control mechanism was mean- ? ingless. The fact remains that both men believed in the need for the VS to use clandestine methods and dirty tricks ' in dealing with other ;countries,' 'and the level and types of' such operations obviously co- incided With their views of bow America's 'Secret foreign -policy should be carried out. ? . . ? As lortg as-the CIA remairi; the' President's loyal and personal tool to be used around the world at his , and his top adviser's discretion, no President is likely, barring strong, unforeseen pressure, to insist that' :the Agency's operations be brought iiinder- closer, outSide ClifigieSsional oversight has'b'eeri generally, limited to voting the CIA more than enough money for its needs, without seriously questioning how the funds would be spent. - To be sure, four separate sub- committees of the House and Sen- ate Armed Services committees were responsible for monitoring the CIA, but their supervision was minimal or non-existent. ' . ? SO the time has come, in our ,view, to demysticise the .intelli- gence profession, to disabuse people of the idea that clandestine , agents somehow make the world a safer place to live in, that exces- sive secrecy is necessary to protect the national security. These notions simply are not true. The CIA and other intelli- gence agencies have merely used them to build their own covert' empire. ? The US intelligence community performs a vital service in keeping track of and analysing the military capability and strengths of the Soviet Union and China, but its other functions?the CIA's dirty tricks and classical espionage?are a liability for the country, on both practical and moral grounds. The best solution would 'be not simply to separate the Clandestine Services from the rest of the CIA, but to abolish them completely. This would deprive the Govern- ment of-its arsenal of dirty tricks, but the republic could easily sus- tain ttl-le loss?and be better for it, rI 36 -----Aiaproved.for Release-2001/08/08-: GIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3: Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010034000T-3 BALTIMORE SUN 15 September 1974 ? 1 -1r. stopping until it had reached .. .1/11passe at strategic arms- taws ,...., The best Mr. Nixon and Dr. 1 superiority in M1RV's as well. ? 7 ? 7, ? , Kissinger could get in Moscow .. GintS to need for refit-Haan Cr 'was agreement to back up, leap- C - 5 , - Washin?to,n DttreaU?of 'The Sur. - long after Henry A.. Kissinger, . Washington ? When the the Secretary of State, visits strategic arms limitation talks Moscow at the end of October. resume f;..Viethies-day.. there Nor is there much reason to be doubtless will be the 6ustom- optimistic about the results then. The U.S. is limited by ary moment of excitement anti optimism in Geneva. But if internal debate in what it can ofter. Nothing the Soviet Union appearance is Milt reality, the; openingilouriShes ouickly: wilt! has done lately suggests it ade:into staleinate might make the kind of corn ? promises the U.S. could at- Wouldrbe irtaiscouraging--KoS-'. cePt. Given? the more urgent crises pect.lrideedcitis;in the broad sense that equitable agreement. of Watergate and the economy, isnot in sight. The the bleak situation at the arms ;- ?apportuni. talks has escaped wide public ties- on - the'' face of -it we ? enormous;:because.in their p attention. ri- mary .purpose, that...of limiting Another for ' the -.lack of public interest is that ear- the -power-.2-of-..nuclear -power Her accords have been over- ??1 to destroy eadh other, the' So- s tat tviet-American negotiations. are sons, partly because some of old, partly for cosmetic rea- a new beginning. . the negative dynamics of lini- : Still,. in the views of a -ells- . am control control only now are paiat,e_grtiup of theoretician ited s The ballyhoo stalemateinay be a good th becoming clear.ing that accompanied, the modest in the eircumstm,es. They 1411 arms.;control record of the Mos- controlagree on the merits of arms cow summit talks in July pro- judgments,of what ought tOile in the abstract. Their vides a case history of oversell. n'onelowever,-vary Former President .Nixon re- j` turned' On July 3 and stopped! ' breathlessly at Loring Air Force Base in Maine to inform Ameri- cans of the results. ? , . ? pillethinking in order :. -What.. they. -tio agree on is that yany. arrangement that "In the field of arms limita- . might grow out of current cote tion," he. said,' "three .of the ceptions. on both sidesmos. _t.. agreements we reached are of likely _would be iII-advisecind. special note." that.rethinking .is in, order. He cited the restrictions on - The .reasons for Doubt range., underground testing of nuclear widely ,. across. Arms control ideology. One school holds tha? - the trjted Sties is pre- pared to compromise enough: another that Washington has ,been too soft-with the Russians warheads, the confinement of 'each country to one defensive Missile: complex instead of the two agreed on earlier and, plans to seek ."a new agree-. ment to cover the period until an must reLo'4;her 1935" on- restriction of offen- frustrated by awareness that', sive weapons. - none of the arms control mea-; . In fact the two sides, from sures now in effect has limited experience with cost and likely the overall destructive power effectiveness, V adopted the -.1uclear arsenals suh&-tan- further limitation on defensive tially,- if at all. rockets with mutual relief. -;Jhere is frustration; tut The agreement to limit un.; more necessary optimism, in, derground tests indeed was pi- the official position of the ad- oneering in the sense that it ministration. U. Aleris John- was the first time such restric- son, the chief U.S. negotiator,' tions have been imposed. But will not be carrying an empty' it would not take effect until briefcase in Geneva.- With 1976?and rapid testing can be some agony the administration expected in the meantime. has scraped together a credi7 It would forbid Only tests of tile holding position for Mr. warheads more powerful than Johnson, though' it does 'not 150,600 tons of TNT. And it has have a larger design for the faded into a sort of limbo since talks. .. the return from Moscow. ,If there is to be substantial The .reaions- for, its disap- progress in this second round pearance reach back to a corn- of what has become FitittRigielivon2004108108 37 SALT II it will not co until Moscow only ii wincinlo. For the agreed resections' applied only to military tests. Nuclear testing for peaceful purposes would be permitted?a course the Soviet Union plans to fol- low and the U.S. does not?with terms to be negotiated later. Several things about this dimmed the glamour of the underground test limitation. 'For one thing, the 150-ki1oton ceiling on the size of tests exceeded anything either gov- ernment might be expected to test in the near future. Dr. Kissinger conceded that the ceiling? was directed at "the' next generation of weapons." For another, it became quite clear that Congress and the public might not take kindly to Moscow's popping off so-called peaceful nuclear explosions while the U.S. sat and watched. A nuclear explosion is a nu- clear explosion, with potential 'military application no matter what it is called, by all ac- counts. Although Moscow indi- cated it would permit outsiders to observe the tests, Soviet willingness to allow any real monitoring was regarded as at best doubtful. The result has been that the underground test agreement has been shelved without going to Congress pending agreement on so-called peaceful explo- sions. That agreement, in most observers' 'views, will be a long time coming. Mr. Nixon left his greatest gap in his explanation of the state of negotiations on offen- sive rockets and warheads. In- stead of bringing a new agree- ment to' succeed the five-year accord of 1972 "significantly closer," as he said, the discus- sions in effect left deadlock. The underlying reason is ob- vious. Offensive weapons are now more than ever the ulti- mate determinant of the stra- tegic balance. The interim agreement of 1972 left Moscow with the prospect of superior- ity in numbers of rockets and power of warheads. It left the U.S. with a lead in technology and above all in numbers of warheads?the multiple inde- pendently targeted re-entry ve- hicles, or MIRV's?to be placed on each rocket. What had. become clear be- fore the summit, and was rein- : ferlAdRDP7.7,400402R0604 viet Union had no intention of frog the current impasse, and try to head off the arms race at some greater order of mag- nitude. At his briefings in Moscow Dr. Kissinger agonized over the consequences of failure. Given the prospects of Soviet MIRV deployment, he said, the two nations had only 18 months to two 'years to impose controls before the arms race degener- ated into an unmanageable in- terplay of increasing numbers. "And one of the questions which we have to ask our- selves as a country is what in the name of God is strategic superiority? What is the sit.' nificance of it, politically, mili- tarily, operationally, at these levels of numbers? What do you do with it?" The answers at home vary enormously. Finding something approaching a consensus is an essential first step toward dealing with Soviet intransig- ence. At the moment a consen- sus, seems especially remote. Former Senator Eugene J. McCarthy, who says he may run for President Again, sug- gests the U.S. could initiate safely some "limited acts of. unilateral restraint" to tempt the Russians. Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, the former .chief of naval -operations, warns that the Soviet Union is nearing a significant margin of strategic. superiority and that detente is merely "a central element of. the Soviet political offensive.-- The admiral wants to expand weapons programs, not cut them back. Senator Henry M Jackson (D., Wash.), a yotential presi- dential candidate, who is hr, creasingly powerful in stra- tegic affairs, is one who be- lieves Dr. Kissinger is danger- ously resolved to reach agree- ment for its own sake. The senator would link American trade concessions and the ex- port of technology to the Rus- sians to rigidly specified stra- tegic compromose on their part. "With any future SALT agreement I think we should take a very firm stand," he says. "We should not subsidize their military-industrial com- plex into the 1980's with a highly destabilizing effect on world peace." ? In Senator' Jackson's view 0004i0atO Is yet to be ap- plied."In fact, he soya, "you Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3 'can have a good detente or a bad one, and my judgment up ' to now is obvious; it's a bad one." Even within the executive branch . there are substantial though still vaguely defined differences. Dr. Kissinger clearly favors linkage in the general sense of weaving a skein of economic, political, and military agreements. But he also appears to believe that agreements feed upon each other and grow, and thus he will settle for less than the ? hard, fixed terms demanded by Senator Jackson. Precise balance The Secretary of State's counterpart in the Defense De- partment. James R. Schlesin- ger, appears to come down more closely to the Jackson view, at least on the arms limitation talks alone. From what is known of his I differences with Dr. Kissinger, the Secretary of Defense de- mands precision in the balance of forces. Lacing it, he is Inc- lined. toward achange in nu- clear targeting strategy, a po- sition with possibly more polit- ical than military - conse- quences. For almost a decade, the avowed strategic policy of the United States has been "mu- tual assured destruction." It recognized that neither nuclear power would be allowed by the other to achieve decisive nu- clear scperiority. Therefore, by this concept, each need maintain ? only that power ne- 'cessary to discourage a nu- clear attack, and each would do so by holding cities and populations hostage. to a retal- iatory strike. If the prevalent interpreta- tion of Mr. Schlesinger's views is correct, The U.S. is moving to target, more of the Soviet weapons system directly, mi- te grounds that Moscow, by 'insisting on strategic superior- ity, is seeking the power of , nuclear blackmail. Targeting never has been totally selec- tive, of course, and the politi- cal perception of change?both at home and in Moscow?may be as important as the reality. arying judgmentsa azthese varying judgments all contribute to uncertainty about how the U.S. will proceed whn SALT II gets down to subst- ance. They all are held by one constituency or another. Senator Jackson's view is especially important, repre- senting not only his own con- siderable power, but also the dominant view of Congress, which historically favors majpr weapons programs. ? In the' wake of .the first round of the arms talks against any, treaty that leaves the U.S. in a Position of strategic "inferior- ity." To the extent that the administration challenges that congressional sentiment, the eventual results of the second round will face rough going on Capitol Hill. Outside the government] there are grave doubts about the arms limitation talks from a quite different perspective. Their most measured presenta- tion comes from many of the so-called defense intellectuals, teachers and former officials whose dedication to arms con- tool is passionate. In ' their judgment, limited agreements in one area of arms control unhappily have tended to speed up competition in others. "Exacerbating factor" "It can be plausibly argued," says George Ra- thjens, professor of political science at Massachusetts Insti- tute of Technology, "that con- tinuing negotiation ... may be an exacerbating factor in, the Soviet-American arms' competition ... Under the cir- cumstances, a question must be raised as to whether con- tinuing With SALT is .desira- ble." . , He 'in ade his Point in the publication Arms Control Today before Mr. Nixon left office. But he says he sees no reason to change it now. "I don't see any chance of the Soviets coming around un- less we take a very tough line on linkage," he says. "We would have to be very tough inl factoring in trade and technol- ogy and I don't think this fits the mood of Congress, the White House or the Depart- ment of Defense." The judgment of Ray S. Cline, former deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, comes closer to that of Senator Jackson. "My con- cern," he says, "is that in our eagerness to make progress in detent we have allowed our central strategic interests to erode. mainly in Western Eu- rope and japan." Mr. Cline, now director of studies at the Georgetown Cen- ter for Strategic and Interna- tional Studies, believes Dr. Kissinger erred in the judg- ment that Moscow's need for technology and trade could be exploited to American benefit. .I.Attle practical effect , "I'm sure they feel in the light of the world economic situation that time is on their side and they might not have to make any concessions at all," he says. "I've not seen The senator was the author d any agreement where acrea- Of the congressional injunction tive action our part reused the Russians to-fOrgo any 'major American- negotiators felt- , protected by the thousands' of ;extra warheads already being 1installed' on rockets, a figure ,that could reach 10;000 or more: by 1980. But now, given Soviet: technological progreas, Mos-: cow might also deploy at least that many?with greater explo- sive power?by the same time, !with the capacity to field thou- sand more. ? Reappraisals of record Figures like these also have caused some reappraisals of the past 'record. In A recent study Mr. Rathjens, Abram Chayes of Harvard University, and J.P. Ruina, professor AT' M.I.T. and formerly a govern.' ment adviser on nuclear wea- pons, worred that some agree- ments merery had forced de- velopment into other areas. But politically, they concluded, the exercises had been useful. "Even the least important of the efforts has served to bring the superpowers together at ? times when communications were difficult ..." they wrote. "Moreover," the several arms' control efforts may actually' have operated to some degree as vehicles for bringing about' change." Time has shown that nations can ? tolerate a high degree of raw inferiority in simple Mili- tary terms, as long as they can convince an opponent that attack would bring unaccepta- ble retaliation. Will to act ? development (if doing so) would limit them and benefit us." - Moscow, Mr. Cline says, is "feeling us out. And perhaps we ought to feel ourselves out for a while. A year ago I favored some rather strong self-limiting offer on deploy- ment of MIR, but now ran more inclined to think we would just hurt ourselves."-. Underscores the estent to which the current state of the strategic arms talks grows out of previous agreements. It also demonstrates once again how closely linked the arms nego- tiations are to the overall pat- tern of political and economic relations. , It has become more and more apparent that the pattern of agreements, while creating an atmosphere of controls, has had little practical effect in reducing the arms race. The limited tedst ban treaty of 1963 had the eminently desirable effect of ending nuclear pollu- tion in, the air by the great powers. Credible balance It -also was thought that lim- iting tests would prevent the deployment of bigger warheads becuase nations would not commit untested devices. But , now there is some uneasy re- trospective thought that the restriction may have contrib- uted to the U.S. and Soviet decisions to develop MIRV's? using smaller, already tested warheads. . And MIRV, of course, is now, the main prob- lem. Other weaknesses in pre- vious* agreements are appar- ent: The nations that might have been expected to go nu- clear simply refused to sign_ the nonproliferation and test ban agreements. Thus China and France?and now ,India? continue to test in the open air. The interim limitations on offensive rockets imposed by the 1972 agreements were tai- lored to what the U.S. and U.S.R. already had planned for the five-year period. They left a credible balance of U.S. so- phistication in MIRV's and submarine missiles against numbers of Soviet rockets and mightier warheads. But Mos- cow moved faster than the Americans had estimatedgl they could, and now the first Soviet MIRV's will be fixed to rockets in the field within a Moscow is inferior at the': moment, but clearly could re- taliate against a theoretical U.S. attack. Yet no noe has yet figured out a workable balance of these elements of weapons and 'political will. It is equally,' certain certain that the U.S. never will permit Moscow to reach simia? lar superiority. - The will *to act, and the other side's perception ofit, are cot- ?Hades of force, and that throws the strategic debate' open to a whole range of Politi- cal considerations, domestie- and external. year. Under the temporary agree- ment the U.S. was restricts(' to .1,000 land-based launchers and up to 710 rockets aboard nu- !clear submarines. The Rus- sians would be permitted 1,410 land-based missiles and ? 950 38 ' aboard submarines. Approved 'ForL keleae-iii-01/68/06-614-11RDP77-00432-R6601-60-340607-3 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3 WASHINGTON POST 16 Sept ember 19714 nvoy rec n rs aliens St ff By Jim Hoagland Washington Post Foreign Service ; ATHENS, Sept. 15?The departure of Ambassador ;Henry Tasca in diplomatic disgrace this week has embit? tered members of the U.S. embassy and intelligence communities here. Embassy staff and Central Intelligence Agency mem- bers who felt close to the controversial Tasca see his re- moval by the State Department as part of an effort to shift the blame for the sharp deteri- oriation of Greek-American relations from Washington to the field. ?Diplomats who previously seemed to idolize Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger are privately expressing to friends a strong new bitterness toward their chief and his top lieuta- nants over their handling of the aftermath of the Cyprus crisis. Tasca's unceremonious re- call to Washington and leaks to the Washington press corps detailing the alleged unre- sponsiveness of. Tasca and the CIA here to directives from Washington. have 'given rise to the scapegoat theory. The ? behind-the-scenes dis- pute centers on American ac- tions just prior to and after' the Greek-backed coup that deposed Cyprus' president; i?rehbishop Makarios, on July 15, triggering? the .Turkish in- vasion of the island five days later. Some U.S. officials in Greece are especially incensed by newspaper accounts ?from i Washington that portray Kiss- inger and his chief deputy. Jo- . WASHINGTON POST 14 September 1974 - Tito Sees CIA Role In litakorios, Ouster Reuter BELGRADE. Sept. 13?Yu- goslav President Tito accused the U.S. Centrall Intelligence' Agency of organizing the Cy- prus coup and of intending to, .kill President Makarios. "This coup d'etat was organ- ized by the CIA, Greek mili- taey junti and NATO," Tito said in a speech Apliji..1M here -today. apparently prepared to accept the responsibility for a major intelligence failure, but not for playing any role in the coup or for failing to respond adequately to warnings from Washington. The agency reportedly.was aware that the junta had had a plan for deposing Makarios in readiness since it seized power in 1967. . . New warnings were raised in June after Makarios de- manded that the junta with- draw 650 Greek, army officers stationed on the island, and on seph J. Sisco, in a favorable! June 19, according to this ac- light, while suggesting t h at ' Count, Ioannides -personally hi- Tasca and the local CIA, which formed a CIA liaison officer acted as the embassy's liaison that he was considering mov- with the now-toppled Grec '; ing against the archbishop. junta, did not act on orders . But he reportedly stressed to head off the -txottp. that he had not come to a The CIA's. version of what! decision. Ioannides is said to happened in July is ? still' have, discounted the chances shrouded by the secrecy that of strong Turkish reaction to ..overs the agency's work. But Makario's projetted downfall, Americans and. Greeks ? int- and added that he was sound- imately involved in those ing out the Turkish military crucial days have confided to command on this. ' friends, and it is possible tO 'On July 4, at Tasca's embas- put together hom authorita- sy Independence Day celebra- tive sources an intelligence tion, the agency was reported- community version of the pre- ly informed by a Greek liaison coup activity, officer speaking for Ioannides This version establishes the that the general had "almost coup as having been planned decided a gal n s t" any move and carried out almost entire- against Makarios. On July 11,; IY by Brig. Gen. Dimitrious loannides is said to have per-I loannides. the dominant fig- sonally informed an agency i ure of the junta, and Greek member that he had decided, army officers on?Cyprus. loan- "to cut the bastard loose," i.e.. I aides' mishandling of the coup to withdraw the officers and!- rap. for our closeness to the and his failure to tell other let Makarios sink or swim on junta. He does feel that he has dismayed when they learned that the coup was in progress on the morning of July 15. ? In the aftermath of the coup and the junta's decision to turn over power to a civilian government, Tasca and the em- bassy were repeatedly ignored by Washington. Kissinger secretly issued an invitation to new Premier Con- stantine Karamanlis to visit the United States_ to -discuss the crisis without tonsulting Or informing the enibassy, accord- ing to American diplomatic sources. . The Greeks disclosed the in- vitation and their pointed re- jection of it at the same time. American diplomats now say this was a predictable response that could and should have been avoided, since relations were already declining rapidly. "Many of us here can .see the reasons behind Kissinger's policy toward Greece during this period and don't really disagree with it, one intel- ligence analyst here told a friend. Tut there were certain- ly palliatives that could have been used. Sometimes we seemed to be deliberately an- tagonizing the Greeks." "Kissinger seemed much more.comfortable with-the mil- itarY 'government than Tasca ever-, did," said a member. of Tasca's staff, "although the ambassador always took the his own. officers on the junta about it o been shafted." destroyed his authority The agency is Said -to have!' The Greeks do not seem to and accepted these assurances and], have been pacified by the ap-, led to the junta's collapse after the Turkish invasion, ac- was reportedly caught by sur- ? pointment Cif Jack Kubisch as is account. prise when the coup occurred. Ta se a 's replacement. The cording Also surprised, according to It also maintains that loan- this account, was the Greek nides artfully deceived thc CIA general staff. Other junta Greek press has said that Kub- bisch comes 'from the same barrel of smelly sardines" as about the coup. The agency is members were shocked and Tasca. NEW YORK TIMES 18 September 1974 ":Makarios was to be killed because Cyprus was a nona- ligned country and Makarios was one of the founders of the nonaligned policy. He was to be. removed and Cyprus turned into a NATO base," Tito told a north Sovenian town meeting. He .also said that while Yu- goslovia backed Turkey's first invasion of Cyprus, it disap- proved of the second Turkish agr on the isvtgama, ;:i,ERNARD GWERTZMAN SEYATORS SEEM G TO BAR TURKEY AID Say Use of U.S. Equipment in Cyprus Compels Halt rtEttetkaaPfk f 39 By S eeai to The New More than 20 Senator s plan to seek Senate approval tomor- row of an amendment urging President Ford to cut off mili- tary aid to Turkey because of what they describe as the il- legal use of United States equipment during Cyprus crisis. In advance of the effort to attach a sense-of-the-Congress resolution to the pending Ex- port-Import Bank Act, Mr. Ford hasbeen urged by Secretary of 3160GOffiainger to continue the Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3 aid program on policy grounds, even if the law could be inter- preted to mean that aid should be suspended, State Department officials said. Mr. Kissinger's position, ar- rived. at after a long legal and policy review at the State De- partment, is that a cut in aid to Turkey might ruin chances for persuading -the Turks to make compromises in the Cy- prus dispute, and would raise long-term questions for other countries about the value of accepting United States aid. Amendment Not Binding The sponsors of the amend- ment, led by Senators Thomas F. Eagleton, Democrat of Mis- souri, and Adlai E. Stevenson 3d, Democrat of Illinois, believe they will receive overwhelming support for their measure, which would not be binding on President Ford. -Moreover, the Senators said that the amendment would probably be dropped in confer- ence with the House because the House version of the Ex- port-Import Act does not con- tain such an amendment and would probably be ruled by the House as not germane to the legislation. But the Senators, who repre- sent a broad spectrum of politi- cal views, have been angered by what they regard as stalling tactics by the State Department in refusing . to acknowledge publicly legal questions in- volved in the continuing aid to Turkey. They are seeking the vote as an expression of their concern, a Senate aide said. The dispute stems from the military action by the Turkish forces last mrenth to increase the territory they occupy in Cyprus, reported now to be about 40 per cent of the island. Mr. Eagleton, in a statement earlier this month, called on . Mr. Ford to suspend aid to Turkey because sections of foreign assistance and military sales acts ruled out military aid if a country used United States-supplied equipment for purposes other than those specified. He said that Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus could not be justified. U. S. Security Is Key Issue State Department lawyers, according to department offi- cials, reported after long analy- sis of the laws, that the mili- tary aid could be continued if the President ?used a waiver authority, and asserted that such aid was in the national security interests of the United States. But Mr. Kissinger, after read- ing the opinions, decided that the broad policy intention of foreign aid was to strengthen United States security and that any decision now on the aid issue would be a setback to efforts for Cyprus peace talks. If the United States an- nounced that such aid was in the national interest, this would only further infuriate the Greeks, Mr. Kissinger believes. if it cut the aid, the Turks would be angered. A policy of saying nothing was decided upon. -40 -7,Apiaroved-For-R-elease-200410.8a8 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001-00340007-3 NEW YORK TIMES 9 September 1974 ifts and Soviet Pressure Worry NATO By DREW MIDDLETON The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which celebrat- ed its 25th anniversary in April, in a confident mood, now is beset .by serious political and military problems. ' According to authoritative sources in Europe and Wash- ington, there are these major problems: (iThe Soviet Government- is ,pressing Norway for the estab- lishfrient of joint Norwegian- Soviet rule of the Spitsbergen island group north of Norway in the Arctic Oean?an action that would further weaken NATO's position in ?a stra- tegically important area. cCuts by the Netherlands in her defense budget and a re- view of defense spending in -Britain have raised fears that alliance forces in Central Eu- rope will be weakened. qThe . opposition by the Netherlands to the proposed appointment of Gen. Alexander M. Haig/ Jr. to replace Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster as Su- preme Allied Commander in Europe has created a command problem. - gThe withdrawal of Greece from the military 'sector of the alliance .has opened a gap in the alliance's radar network that military sources believe could have serious conse- quences in any future Middle East crisis. The Most Serious Problem The situation in northern .Norway has deteriorated to the point where, senior officers re?- gird Soviet pressure in the fu- ture for a demilitarization of the North Cape area, now held by a small Norwegian force, as "probable rather than possible." ? I Western officers believe that !of the alliance" and that other the methodical extension of !allies would ,have to increase ;Soviet sea and air power into!military and financial contribu- !the Norwegian and Baltic Seas Itions to compensate for the has already seriously weakened cuts: the alliance's -position on thel The British Defense Ministry !northern flank, regarded as the is now near the end of a de- !key to strategic contrcl of the tailed examination of military North Atlantic and the main spending intended to reduce the sea lanes between North Amer- outlay for arms and men. lica and Europe. British officials say that re- All Soviet nuclear-missile ductions will 'not affect the submarines are based' Mur-;contribution to NATO. But alli- mans]: and must pass be- ance officers believe that siz- tween Spitsbergen and Nor-'able cuts will inevitably reduce way's North Cape into the ;the forces in West Germany Atlantic. Under present an- sincea reduction of British gar- eangements their passage can Irisons outside Europe alone wil be detected by the alliance. ,not constitute major savings for Although Norwegian Govern-the weakened economy. ment officials believe there Haig, Called Inexperienced a possibiiity that . oil will be! found on the -sea- bed around i Opposition to General Haig's Spitsbergen, it is generally be- appointment, according to al- lieved that the Russians want liancP sources, has more to do joint rule of the islands as with his inexperience in deal- much for- strategic as for eco- ing with the allies and in corn- nomic reasons. manding large units than his The consequence of joint having been President Nixon's chief of staff. rule, NATO officials say, would be to bar adcess to the island American and other NATO by the United States and other officers concede that inexperi- signers of the 1920 treaty that ence may be a valid criticism established Norwegian sover- of General Haig. But they point eignty there. . out that he is a thoroughly , Dutch Cuts Criticized trained soldier and that , in , World War II many American The Dutch defense cuts an- officers who had never corn- nounced July 9, will be fully manded a unit in action larger effected by 1977. At that time than a battalion had success- the Netherlands will. have 16 fully commanded armies. mobilized battalions instead of The gap in the alliance's the present 22. Reductions also radar network caused by the are planned in the number of Greek withdrawal would be ex- fighter aircraft in the air force tremely serious in the event of and in the Nike missile force a crisis in the eastern Mediter- now In West Germany. ranean. The ,Greek section of The alliance's Defense Plan- the network covers the Bul- ning Committee has told the garian frontier and the most Dutch Government that these direct air routes from Soviet changes will have "adverse ef- bases in central Europe to the fects on the defense capabilityMiddle East DAILY TELEGRAPH!, London 29 August 19711 ? Intelligence (Yap `let in Bonn_ spy By'. .JOHN ENGLAND ? in Bonn ?? ? A? FAILURE of communi- cation within West German counter-espionage favoured Giinter Guillaume,- ? whose alleged spying for 'East Germany caused the ? scandal which forced Herr Brandt to resign as Fed- eral Chancellor. The .failure allowed Guillaume to penetrate the Bonn Chan- cellery, an investigating Parlia- mentary committee was told in Bonn yesterday. Herr Johann Gottlieb Her- menau, a former department chief with the Office for the Defence of the Constitution, who was responsible for giving Guillaume security clearance in 1970, , testified that documents that could have exposed Guillaume were not filed cen- trally. He did not have grounds to reject Guillaume for Chan- cellery service, he added. Nor did checks with state security services in West Berlin and Hessen reveal anything against Guillaume. Before hisarre st last April Guillaumeh ad been a personal aide of Herr Bnandt for 10 months. He is now tinder legal investigation on suspicio.n of espionage. Herr Herrnenau told the com- mittee that the department with- in his service responsible for watching Left-wing radicals had four documents about the East Berlin publishing house for which Guillaume worked before " fleeing" to West Germany in 1956. These documents were not in a central file, however, and he knew nothing: of their existence. He assured the committee he was not influenced in his decision to elearGuillaume by approaches from any political party. The all-party investigating committee is seeking to discover how Guillaume, slipped p West German security to obt a postton Herr Brandt's staff. As the committee began second day of public hear] yesterday, it was reported t the conservative weekly ma zine, Quick, in its issue today, would link Herr Herb Wehner, the Social Democr faction leader, with the G laume affair. ? The Quick report was said claim that Herr Wehner was - pected of baying told H Honecker, the East Gem leader, more than Is year that Guillaume's spying activit had been uncovered by Na German intelligence. The magazine based its cl on " research, documentat and combined statements Fr former 'agents of -the West man counter-espionage servi Social Democratic p spokesman later dismissed report as "sensational rubbi and "amear journalism." Apkoved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007L3 NATIONAL REVIEW 13 SEPT 1974 IFN ROUTE to the airport, to / cover the arrival of left wing firebrand Andreas Papandreou, son of the former prime minister George Pap- andreou, I watched a mob of young men burn an American-built car despite the protests of its owner, a Greek. This was just one of many such anti-Ameri- can acts in the fortnight following the Cyprus fighting. A sampling: Item. The beating of three Sudanese, who had been taken for American Negroes. The left wing paper Athinaiki, reporting the incident, said the people were right to beat up "anyone resembling an Ameri- can." Item. Dave Tonge, the BBC's man in Greece, thrusting a mike into a crowd of rampaging Papandreou youths and urging them to yell "Kis- singer murderer" for the audience back in Britain. Item. Stories in the leftist press urging taxi drivers not to pick up Americans, instructing the state-con- trolled radio no't to play American music, inciting mobs to destroy Ameri- can property, attack American depend- ents. Item. Avgi, the Communist daily, saying flat otit that former strongmen George Papadopoulos and Demetrios Ioannidis were paid agents of the CIA and that Kissinger personally ordered Ioannidis to kill Makarios. Item. On the day after the murder of U.S. Am- bassador Rodger Davies in Nicosia, Apogevmatini, the largest afternoon paper in Athens, reporting that a U.S. Marine guard had caused the riot and subsequent death of the Ambassador by 'provoking the crowd with taunts and finally by shooting at it." Now the case of Apogevmatini is particularly interesting, and illustrative of the Greek press. Until very recently it was very pro-American; until July 23 it was an ardent supporter of the military regime. The flipflop came over- night. One day it was extolling the Americans, the next it was explaining in great detail how Henry Kissinger had plotted to start a war between the two communities on Cyprus in order to effect a partition of the island that would net the U.S. ? two bases on Cyprus, one on the Turkish and one on the Greek side. The wave of anti-Americanism fanned by the domestic press was made easier by something we Greeks. call filotitno. The closest English word to fi/otimo is pride, but the word means more. It can be used in Greek to mean pride in a job well done, but also when one is lying in order to save face. mamonigrawainnsmomem LETTER FROM ATHENS ? The Anti-American Campaign TAKI THEODORACOPULOS. On the surface there was little for the Greeks to be ashamed of in the conduct of the Greek Cypriots, who defended themselves courageously against overwhelming odds: they were fighting off Phantom jets and tanks with World War II?vintage rifles. Rather than swallow this defeat and explain the failure of the government to aid the Cypriots, all sorts of alter- native explanations were advanced: the U.S. Sixth Fleet prevented Greek troop- ships from leaving for Cyprus; Greece was told she would have to hilt both Turkey and the United States if she moved to help the Cypriots; Henry Kissinger is a murderer; etc. And to make the story even more persuasive and the U.S. even more villainous, it turned out suddenly that it was. the Americans, not the junta that had kept the brave people of Greece captive for seven long years when, in fact?except for certain ele- ments among the bourgeoisie and the intellectuals?there had been little or no overt resistance to the Colonels. The government of Constantine Karamanlis calls itself a government of national salvation and encompasses all political factions except the Com- munists and, at least at this writing, Andreas Papandreou himself, although five members of his party are in the cabinet. Papandreou, who rushed back to Greece from Canada where he had been teaching in a university for some years, has failed to give his followers direction. He has concentrated his vitriol in attacks on the Karamanlis government as a puppet of the United States,. CIA, NATO, imperialism, Kiss- inger, whatever. But he has offered the country no alternative. Despite his vac- illation, Papandreou is believed to have the support of about 10 per cent of the population, mainly because of his father's name. The late George Pap- andreou, head of the Center Union Party, was a great orator, a consum- mate politician, a demagogue. Caught in the virulent anti-Ameri- canism that Papandreou and everyone else is exploiting, has been U.S. Am bassador to Athens Henry Tasca, wh was recalled a week ago: Tasca denies published stories that he had worked to bolster the regimes first of the colonels and then of the generals, and. says he has the, cables to prove it. "When history is written," he told me, "I will be exonerated from the charges against me." If he was such a supporter of the military, he asks, how come that on the day that General Ioannidis stepped down five dissideat- politicians, including Evangelos Averoff, the de- fense minister, called on him to con- gratulate him for his efforts in behalf of Greek freedom? Averoff, incidental- ly, says there is no truth in the reports that the ouster of Archbishop Makarios was engineered by the United States. Ioannidis decided on that step alone, he says, and when the Americans found , out what he was up to, they did their best to dissuade him. THE DANGER now is that the Com- munists and the leftists may try to move out the street mobs against the Karamanlis government. Karamanlis himself, as wise as he is Courageous, is trying not to be stampeded. He has stood up against pressures to go to war with Turkey... He has promised elec- tions within two to six months. He. has managed to dismantle most of the in- frastructure of. the military government, quietly and efficiently. He seems ready to negotiate with Turkey not only over Cyprus but also over the disputed Aegean oil rights. Biut in order to take the steam out of the mounting cam- paign against America and NATO he took Greece out of the NATO alliance. The American bases ?in Greece re- main in danger as Karamanlis?the only leader capable of neutralizing the Communists?is jockeyed by popular outcry into anti-American positions. 0 Mr. Theodoracoptdos is NR's corre- spondent in Athens. Approved For Release 2001/08/084rIA-RDp77-00432R000100340007-3 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3 NEW YORK TIMES 8 September 1974 Democracy in Trouble By James Reston DUBLIN?A political journey across Western Europe these days is a de- pressing and expensive business. Infla- tion has produced doubt and anxiety about the institutions of liberal democ- racy. Not since World War II have the free nations been so dependent on one another?so much at the mercy of events beyond their borders?or at the same .time so stubbornly nationalistic and preoccupied with their own in- ternal struggles. Ireland is only the most 'dramatic and tragic symbol of this narrow and separatist mood. Geographically and economically, it is bound, north and south, and linked to Britain and Europe, but it is also separated by his- tory and religion. And the crowning paradox: It is engaged in a religious war among unbelievers, tyrannized by a minority of extremists on both sides. Two Powerful but contradictory forces seem to be in conflict in Europe today. Its old empires are gone. Sepa- rated one nation from another, it is weak. Divided within each nation, it ia weaker still. But united, it has the people, brains, and resources to stand in the forefront of the corning age alongside the United States, the Soviet Union and the emerging power of China and Latin America. This, hbwever, is not the way Europe is going today. Looking from west to east, Ireland is hating the British Army in Ulster, but fearing that the withdrawal of that army for financial reasons in London, might lead to a disastrous civil War. Portugal is finally abolishing her African empire, but she is run by a weak and distracted government and confronted by a well organized Com- munist party. Spain is also trying to make the transition from the authoritarian gov- ernment of General Francisco Franco to a monarchy?also opposed by a strong Communist party, which has kept its organization and discipline ever since the Civil War of the Thir- ties. ?France, almost by accident and the shrewdness of Valery Giscard d'Es- taing, just missed a popular front gov- ernment of Socialists and Communists under Francois Mitterrand, but it will take all of Mr. Giscrd d'Estaing's intelligence and style to establish the peaceful revolution of reform he has proclaimed. Italy is broke and in such a political tangle that even political leaders in Germany and France now suggest that maybe a coalition government in Rome, including the Communists, might not be a bad idea. Greece has made such a mess of things that she has come to the Verge DUBLIN of war with Turkey over Cyprus, and, like France, she has pulled her troops out of the NATO alliance. Meanwhile, Marshal Tito in Yugo- slavia, the stabilizing influence ?be- tween East and West in the Balkans, is coming to the end of his days. The last of the old generation of World War II leaders?Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai in China, Franco in Spain, Chaing Kai-shek in Taiwan,, .Haile Selassie in Ethiopia?are all on their way out. Accordingly, the question is what the new leaders of the world?Presi- dent Ford in Washington, President Giscard d'Estaing in Paris, Chancellor? Schmidt in Bonn, Premier Tanaka in Japan, and Prime Minister Wilson or. Edward Heath in Britain?will do ? about this critical transitional period in world history. For the moment, they are doing very little about it. Like the Irish, they are preoccupied with the narrow and im- mediate political and economic prob- lems at home, and the more they try to solve world problems by national political tactics, the deeper they get into trouble. 7. Fortunately, in Europe there is an- other force at work in the universities, in the newspapers and particularly among the rising young generation. The teachers, the reporters and the students are more mobile now than ever before. They see a different com- ing age. They talk not about separa- tion of the nations and generations but about integration. Even some politicians in Europe are beginning to think beyond the divi- sions of the present to the possibility of unity in the future. Mr. Giscard d'Estaing in France and Mr. Schmidt in Germany are searching for new answers to new economic and political. problems. The Republic of Ireland, for - example, has a brilliant young foreign secretary, Garret Fitzgerald, who is risking his political position by argu- ing publicly for a unified Ireland. . "I believe the tithe has come," he wrote, "for all Irish politicians who genuinely believe in a united Ireland, so organized that people from both communities will feel equally' at home within it, to speak out and to lead the people of Ireland towards this goal. We may find that some of our people reject this lead, and that in the process ? existing political structures become cracked or even shattered; this is the price -we shall have to pay if called upon to do so." In the short run the ctutlook in Eu- rope is bleak, but there is a rising new generation and it is beginning to em- phasize not separation but integration. NEW YORK TIMES 8 September 1974 hen Italy's Communists ule, They o It Right BY PAW. HOFMANN BOLOGNA?The Italian Communist party, which has renewed its effort to become part of the national governing coalition, could produce substantial evi- dence that when it gets a Mandate it knows what-to do with it. This ancient city is the center of the region called Emilia-Romagna, and the elected Com- munist officials who run both city and region do it more efficiently and less corruptly than officials in most of the rest of the nation. Bologna was extolled as "la Fascistissima" (the Most Fascist) by Mussolini, who was born in the nearby Romagna area. But since the collapse of Fascism at the end of World War II, Bologna has had Communist mayors. Emilia-Romagna is one oi Italy's 20 units of lim- ited selfgovernment. With a population of I.5-million, Emilia-Romagna is the largest Communist-run terri- tory in Europe outside the Soviet bloc. Many of its inhabitants and other Italians have the impression today that the "Red Region" is on its way to becom- ing a state within the state. This is clue in part to continuous close cooperation between the local Communist party apparatus and the new regional authorities. Emilia-Romagna seems also to be developing its own foreign policy, sending delegations to Socialist countries and playing host to prominent leftwingers from all over the world. A Curb on Immigration ' Bologna itself has g population of fewer .than 600,000. The municipal 'authorities are discouraging immigration because they think further growth would impair the quality of its life. The historic center of Bologna, with its archways and well:restored palaces and churches, is a model of urban upkeep. The streets are better swept and the transit system works better than those of most Italian cities. Bologna's citizens can get the many certificates that Italian bureaucracy recittires from a computer- ized system at some handy 'Little City Hall." The leftwing city fathers see to it that new zoning regu- lations and other community affairs are discussed by the people in neighborhood meetings, as if to say, see how democratic we are? In these grassroot consultations, Communist of- ficials usually show great competence and a degre of flexibility. They yield on local issues, like neigh- borhood renewal whenever they sense they have a majority against them. While Bologna looks outwardly well-scrubbed, it has also been remarkably free so .far of the city hall scandals that occur in other Italian centers. Critics of the local government blame it for packing the city and regional administrations with Communist party members, and for wasting funds on prestige proj- ects. None of Italy's 19 other regions publishes so much self-congratulatory literature as does Erniaa- .Romagna. Industrialists, business owners and. other well- heeled Bolognesi have long learned that it pays to maintain good relations with the Communist rulers, Approved-For RereAge-20171T/08/08-: CIA-RDP77:13043214000100340007-3 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : C1A-RbP77-00432R000100340007-8 FOrEitiSt ? NEWSDAY 28 AUG 1974 P ts By Arnold Abrams Newsday Special Correspondent t Vientiane, Laos?The onset of peace in Laos has not ended Central Intelligence Agency .involvement inkhis country's internal affairs. ? After running a so-called secret war for nearly .a deade, CIA personnel have turned to a new field here: civic action. They. are using programs of the U.S. Agency for International Development as a coier for their covert operations. An influx of CIA fufads earlier this year, according to reliable sources, wris responsible for the implementation of several ma- jot civic programs in northern Laos, where Moo hill tribesmen *are. concentrated. tri Those tribesmen formed the bulk of a lough guer, rah army that was paid, trained, .supplied and ad-. vised by CIA paramilitary personnel. By sponsoring civic action programs for Meos, the agency retains in- fltience over an important segment of the populace in a Strategic area of Laos. The tribeSmen's leader. is .Gen. Vang Pao, Vol110' reaps substantial financial benefits from the civic pro- grams. With CIA assistance; the flamboyant Gen. Vang Pao has become chicken farmer yang Pao; the transformation took place at Long Cheng, . the Mao leader's long-time base and the . former CIA field headquarters. ? ? :Once dominated by the rattle of gunfire and the roar of American aircraft, Long Cheng now is noisy with the sound of cackling chickens. An initial CIA expenditure of more than $25,000 started operations.? on; Yang Pao's poultry farm, where -some 2;500 chick- ens are housed and raised -prior -to being sold in a nearby Market serving several thousand Meos. Sources dose to the project estimate that -Vang Pao makes about $1,000 monthly profit from hi.s. chicken sales (the average per Capita income in Laos is about $60 a year). His customers also benefit, how- ever, because CIA-sponsored chickens are sold at be- law-normal rates.' Aside from chicken-raising, other CIA-funded civic projects in Laos include a cattle breeding pro- gram and the establishment of farm supply centers that provide agricultural' commodities for' Moo farm- ers at reduced' price. The ? projects' total costs, accord- ing to knowledgeable sourceS, have exceeded $100,- 000. . *The projects are administered by the Agricultural Development Organization, nominally under Laotian .government control but dependent upon American funds. When U.S. budgetary cutbacks threatened to, eliminate or curtail ADO operations, sources report, an infusion of CIA money in February put the, orga- nization back in business. ? Six American agricultural experts presently super- tvi utse vise ADO projects; all six reportedly are' genuine civic action workers, not CIA operatives., "These men are my employes in the purest sense," said Charles Mann, 'director of USAID in Laos. "They have no other professional concerns." When asked about the source of ADO's funds, however, Mann replied, "no , corrunent.", ? The American' agricultural experts prefer to ig- nore the source of their. programs' funds. "I'm not happy about where- that money comes 'from," one.: said, "but I am concerned, with civic development, and I care a great deal about the Meos. The source of our funds, and the motives behind -them, mean less. to me than what we are doing for these people." Another American worker, close to Yang Pao, also is willing -to overlook the substantial prcrfits compiled by the Moo chieftain; who runs' northern Laos like a feudal lord.. "Art, first this bothered. me," he said, "but after a while you come to realize that this is the system?and it works. Vang Pao can be called a dictator, but he is basically a benevolent one, and his profits are not ex- cessive by local standards." Less willing to overlook CIA involvement 'in Laos, however, is Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, (D-Mass.), chairman of the Senate subcommittee on refugees. Long opposed to the agency's- use of humanitarian programs OS a "cover," Kennedie recently declared that the CIA's present effort 'raises.. troubling .ques- tions over, the course of U.S.' policy toward Leos." He said: "Despite our c.ountry'.s general support for the, cease-fire-agreement, and the new gov- ernment, several indiotators suggest that the intent of some .of .our remaining presence in Laos can only help ?to perpetuate old relationships and the division of . that country." ? There were 216 Al-her:can military men serving in Laos as Army and Air Fore," attaches at the time of the osnsa-fire in February, 1973. Now there report- edly arc about 30: The U.S. has cut back becaire the Vietntiane government and pro -Comnni n ist Pa thet Lao have formed a coalition government and pram accordarequired the withdrawal of all foreig-,n troors. ?71i-pprolieffTEFITeliase 2001/08/08 : CI K-R151:17-titi4'32atiOb ii-30-a4-0467 Appioved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010034000713 WASHINGTON RD ST 14 Sept ember 197/1' nou h,' S \Thieu, Tells I its By Philip A. McCombs wnshington Post. Foreign Servtee SAIGON, Sept. 13?Presi- dent Nguyen Van Thieuf this ' week asked Vietnamese to stop burning themselves to death, "even for the noble cause" of supporting his' government against the Communists. The appeal comes after..i I 'five such suicides in two months by persons who . police say were anti-Commu- nist patriots. . Each immolation has been I ? followed by massive govern- ! ment publicity extolling the ? self-burners as anti-Commu- nist "martyrs" and "torches for peace," Self-burnings by monks during the early 1960s pro- vided a significant focus for anti-government sentiments . that eventually toppled 'President Ngo Dinh Diem. Now that the Thieu gov- ernment hat its own mar- ,? tyrs, observers say, it has re- ? moved from the hands of its .. political opponents a poten- ? tially ? powerful . symbolic. weapon. This coincides with gath- ering political unrest here. Militant Buddhists are organ- ? izing, a mass Catholic demon- ? stration against corruption was recently crushed by po- _lice in Hue,. and a newspa-- ..per publisher has. publicly , " threatened to burn himself ?, to protest press censorship. ? There is no proof to sup4 . '1 port the widespread rumors here that the government '.,planned the five burnings in advance, but it. clearly ex- ? ploited tisem. with excep-. , tional skill. ? -- Pamphlets and posters de- picting the burnings as he- LOS ANGELESTIMES _ . . ? 5 September: 1974 - urnings, ackers _ roic acts have been plas- tered throughout the coun- try. There have ? been cere- monial funerals, radio- and television broadcasts and public speechies. The Vietnamese typically view the burnings with a mixture .of skepticism and awe. "It takes a lot of guts to burn yourself," said an officer. "You get fame; a good burial, and the government makes your family rich," said a cab driver. A soldier said, "I think maybe they really did it for peace. The .government is a liar just like the Commu- nists, but maybe a little less ? so." . Three of the five were dis- abled veterans; the other two were a monkand a corn-'] *mon laborer.' All died but I the monk, who is in a hospi, . I tal, but unable to talk.. Sources within the Viet- namese Disabled . Veterans' Association, a private group, . said members have been en-. .couraged. to burn them- selves and offered large sums of money for their survi- vors. They said that astocik tion officials would like to have a total of 10 burnings by members, to' make the government indebted to the association. :"They told me, 'Go ahead and burn yourself,* we'll make your family rich," said one association member. "I said I couldn't because. I'm a Catholic." ? , Association . president NgUyen.. Dinh denied, how- ever, that officials ? of his group encourage burnings, althoughlie added, "The, as- sociation has to accept and admire,these acts." ro.tca !rop m U.S. ? rounds S. Vietnam s BY GEORGE MeARTHUR ' Times Staff Writer ' SAIGON ? A -critical drop in American aid has forced the South Vietnamese government into a crash belt-tightening program that has grounded most ,of the air force, cut -ammunition expenditure in some cases by 80% and sharply limited, many other activities. Neither the South Vietnamese nor the Americans will comment offi- daily on the new program. .I , There are several common features in the five self-im-:. molations. Each poured gasoline over himself and lit a match. The laborer did this in an ob- scure village, but the other four did in front of political- ly', important buildings in Saigon., ? All left behind articulate and carefully planned anti- Communist, and pro-peace ' statements in' letters and notebooks, according ;to .po- . lice. They all tossed such documents in the ground Just before burning them- selves, police said. , In each'case, police seized the relevant documents be- fore anyone else 'could see ? them and then released_loy- ies of handwritten leIrt'is and texts to the press, say- ing they were copies of the actual statements left by the suicides. "Down with the, Commu- nist aggressors!" said a typi- cal statement?this one by "the second torch for peace," Cpl. Phan. Van Lua,, '33, who was missing a leg and was listed by the army, as 80 per cent disabled. "You . are the communist from the north," said the text of one of his letters re- leased by the government, "and you have continuously sent troops into the south of Vietnam to cause death arid Misery Jo the innocent peo- ple." , . , Another is a moving letter to his sons which says, "Oh, my sons, my ' heart is broken! .I leave you to call for unification of the nation My sons, whenever you miss me, just send lettersio the radio station ..." ? An but ir Force that "the situation is very serious and we can't say how long it will go on." ? He added that with the fighting continuing in some areas at a level H a.n o s 1972 offensive, some South Vietnamese command- ing officers were "mad as hell" at the critical decline in American aid. ? In the absence of any official an- nouncements, details of the new Privately, howev4.013.14ZNRt_ emerge. piecemeal, sometimes from Reqsag.6 c?Ideitribilk South Vietnamese ot :Idfif-tembr740 45. In Lua's hamlet, a few Miles north of -Saigon, Lua's wife said in an interview; "I don't know why he did it .,.. ? in 12 years of marriage he h never talked about politics 4 with Me, only about money ! matters and- the problems of 0 'taking care Of the kids." ? ,She said -the government gave her S700 after her hus- band's death?an enormous sum in Vietnam and more . than is normally given, to war widow.. As she spoke, half a dozen laborers outside her moth- er's small -straw-and-wood ? -house were busily building a new brick one. Lau's wife said she is buying it with 1 part of the $700. _ . . In at least two other cases, relatives, and acquain- tances said the self-burners ? had been apolitical all their lives. In another case. the , family declined to talk at all. ? The laborer, Nguyen Phu Niem. 58, left letters con- demning Communist aggres- sion, the government news' agency said. It quoted from one. It also said that Niem wrote his ? employer com- plaining about low pay. but ! the agency did 'not quote that letter.. President Thieu's appeal ? this week said. "The signifi- cance of the five peace fighters' extraordinary' deeds has been acknowl- . edged and esteemed by the People at home and of the- world , T4.1. e sound of the alarni loell-bas been listened to at':. tentiv'eW by everybody. I think that is enough." sources of questionable reliability. ? The always active rumor factories of Saigon are also in full operation. ? It is known, however, that severe belt-tightening orders went out to the major military commands with- in the past seven days. It appears the orders were timed to coincide with Sept, 1?a local Buddhist holi- day during which military activity would have normally declined with- out attracting attention. At any rate, some of the effects are now clearly visible?notably the al- ,most total absence of warplanes above the normally busy South Viet- namese airfields. While the official government spokesman contended Wednesday', that nothing unusual was taking 0442:RIXDOOOMMT-4so admitted he had z:io reports .of combat sorties. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3 ? Privately, a South Viet- namese officer confirmed that orders from the Joint General Staff, presumably : with the backing of Pres- ident Nguyen -Van Thieu, had virtually grounded all but the most important combat sorties_ The officer said the en- tire fleet of South Viet- namese Al-E Skyraiders had been grounded. These old propeller planes which can carry up to "5,000- -pound bomb- loads--have .been the air force work- horses, and about 100 of Them are normally-on call daily ? In a dd iti on,.:combat.. 'Strikes bir the more nume- rous jet fleet requiredeart ance from one of-the corn- menders of the south's four major military re- gions:- WASHINGTON POST 03 September 1974 Some Would Risk Communist Rule An official said there . _was no. indication _:.how long the present stringent. ? restrictions would last -1r An AmericanFofficial:at ?-? the big Tan Son-NhtiVAir--; . Base niltside that on Tuesday nots:one.; t'Single combat-ilightWaS Made from theAase..111;i ? said that all -planev,were ,grotinded and that-in.addii.,-;. --tion crews removed allsthe.,,,ti ::.:ammunition and; bombe from every plane. ? inay have been- part 7-9fii nationwide inventoryi: of ordere =air force headcluartek-' ? In addition tthe.---re-.4 - striotions on cornbatsor ties, it is understood th.ait. similar limits have-qieen'-!:.: placed . on all helicopter,;. flights?both for liaison = and troop movements. The daily limitations onhtli copter time is so.: seier?eft that anything more than I small;? And short-relic:re I By Philip A. McCombs Washington Post Foreign Service e'-?DANANG, South Vietnam, ept. 2?Many war refugees tare eager to return to their old homes even though it may ?Mean living under Communist :control,? and some of them have been forcibly prevented ? 'from doing this by govern- ;Ment police measures. There are also many refu- ;lees who would rather remain 'dn. the government side than !Come under Communist con- trol. It is impossible to deter- :mine how many fall in each :group. !-? Under the Paris cease-fire agreement signed in January 4973, there is supposed to be free movememt between the two sides. In fact, very little of .this has taken place. :? If it had, a large number of people might have been ex- pected to return to homes now -in Communist-controlled areas. ? During the American in- volvement in the war, large .numbers of people were loaded on trucks and helicop- ters and taken to refugee camps when the allies swept through large areas to -"pacify" them. By moving the people out, the allies could assume that anyone still in the area was the enemy, who ) could be killed. The government has now been resettling the dislocated people in government-con- trolled areas, but many people seems to have a different idea Char troop.. movements by air are virtually ruled out. Si- milarly, routine cargo flights by fixed -wing planes have been sharply cut ? through the precise size of the cut is unknown. The crux of the; new re- strictions is evidently Sai- gon's deep- concern over gasoline and ammunition. -These are, by far, the lar-. gest items in the U.S. mili- .tary:aid program.- - ' It was possible that the South Vietnamese were ordering the severe belt tightening now in order to build up some reserve stocks in the event of 3sme :genuinely major Commu- nist military attacks_ Some .American officials insisted that there Were now ade- quate stocks of ammuni- tion and gasoline on hand ?but they woulcVnot be more precise. ": ? Whatever the situation, word was passed through thel.I.S. mission that there. IL 1- would- be no comment at rail. . ;?????Z t:- ? - ? Americiii? ? military- aid to Sot4h,VieVy.. ????,- nam-?.is,now ?a ."contfnuip&reser:-. .of :05rikress,:since the- regular- aid bill was ? iiotvoted by-the?etictof the iScal.r..year in June ? The -new -nrilitary.--aid ? bill, however, has 7 been ,i.pared.to $700. million-as it ? t:now ? stands?about Ltir.halL - amount requetl.ed-by- ,ihe Administration:4- ? ' is .possible, that:the ?s-difficulties- surAcmg. yire caused-by the-need to :lout military s peirdi ng ? sharply in 'South Vietnam to conform to the-$70-mil7 - --lion bill which iLticiivPap-i- - fpears certaitr;or-paS?age..-: e Sai 'about where they would like to live. "If the government would allow me to go back home I'd go immediately," said one woman, who was holding her baby_as_. she talked in a refu- gee camp in Quangngai .Prov- ince, about 75 miles south Of here on Vietnam's central coast. Her home is, now in Communist hands. "We can't return because our native village is controlled ,by the other side and the gov- .einment . won't let us," ex- plained another woman stand- ing nearby. They .spoke about reprisals by government soldiers against those who might try to go back. "If we went back, the gov- ernment Would have .to guar- antee us that there wouldn't be any arrests and that we wouldn't be disturbed by gov- ernment soldiers," said the first woman. ? ? "No more shooting at us and capturing us," put in a man. Asked if they meant they didn't care whether they lived under government or Commu- nist ? control, the group of about 50 refugees gathered around said, "Right, right," they just wanted to go home. An old man recalled how, long ago, they left home. "The Americans used helicopters, and they forced us on hoard," he said. "We went with just, our bare hands, couldn't carry; any kind of property with us." The people said they had been flown to the refugee camp where they still live in ; on I e es et ir o e ' Quangngai Province. Fighting has been heavy there for the past month as Communist forces press down to the coast from ? their mountain base areas. . For the first year or so, the .people said, they had U.S. and government assistance. But that stopped and they had to support themselves by buying tea from mountain tribesmen and selling it in city markets. The current fighting has made this impossible, and now they said they would like to go home, where they could farm. There were no government officials around during the in-. terview, which may account I for the unusual candor. Usu- ally officials are present and one can never be sure how much refugees' anti-Commu- nist statements are affected by this presence. In some cases people voice genuine anti-Communist sentiments even when officials are not present. Another example of people wanting to return to areas not not controlled by the govern- ment is the village of Heap- hung, near the beach three :miles southwest of Danang. "There are a thousand veo- !pie in my village and 90 per . cent of them are pro-Viet- , cong," said the young village chief dejectedly. He was interviewed in Dan- ang, where he lives because it is too insecure in the village for him to spend nights there. He goes to the "village office every other .day, sharing the? dangerous job with other vil- lage officials who also live in IDanang. The chief, Nguyen Mui, 29, said he was dejected because ; one-day last month, 80 fami- lies -in the village tore down their houses and carted them .to rebuild in a nearby Viet- cong-controlled area. . They told him, the chief said, that they would prefer .to live there because it was their home ground, from which they Ihad been removed in the late 1960s when the Americans were pacifying and bulldozing the area. Though they were not moved far from their , home ground, the place they moved to had poor soil and they were crowded. After this happenel. Mui said, he was accused by his boss, the district chief, of be- ing pro-Vietcong, which he says he is not. He said the dis- trict chief ordered him to use . "any suitable measures" to get ithe people back. "I was ordered to have my cadres go in and destroy all the houses that. the people tore down and rebuilt In the new area," said ,Mui. _ `Ajroiied i--Fielease-2001/08/08 : CIA-ROP77-01)432R000100340007-3- 46 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003400b7-3 He said he didn't like to do that because "All the village i chiefs before me applied miii- tarymeasures to suppress the trict chief decided that the . rest four persons thought to people could be controlled in have led the people in tearing their new location by moving down their houses and relocat- a platoon of airborne troops log them. people hut id rather apply so- cial-welf are measures that into the area. -. He said the sudden move by Mui said that one of the The problem was finally re-, first .things the troops did in make the people like me." ? the 89 families was "part of a Vietcong campaign to destroy solved last week, when the dis-the area last week was to ar- all the refugee camps and get sion," !the people to return to their native hamlets." ? Nov that the airborne troops are in his village, ,Mul said the district chief told him to "explain to the people the situation so as to help keep them from _falling into the Communist scheme of aggres- CHRISTIAN CTENCE MONITOR 10 Sentember 1974 - Conservative priests blast c.rruption in Thieu regime . By Daniel Sonitierland Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor Saigon A number of conservative Roman Catholic priests have strongly at-. tacked President 'rhieu's government lately for massive corruption among officials and military men. They contend that unless Mr. Thieu reforms his government, he doesn't stand a chance *against the Commu- nists. Three hundred priests, many of them refugees from the Communist ? North, have banded together to make sure that their voices are heard. A few months ago, they decided to go public and issue a manifesto "against con ruption, injustice, and social deca- dence." The priests claim to have the ? support of some of South Vietnam's Roman Catholic bishops, but decline to reveal the names of any high-level supporters in the Catholic hierarchy. Catholics make up only about 10 percent of South Vietnam's popu- lation but they wield influence far out of proportion to their numbers. Presi- dent Thieu is a...Catholic by con- version. In their manifesto, the dissident priests declared that power and lead- ership in South Vietnam are "for the ' most part . . . based on corruption. "Under the protection of influential Officials, narcotics dealers, gang- sters, gamblers, prostitutes, and ? smugglers have become a true men- ace to a society, plagued with purse- snatching, fraud, rape, and other . unthinkable crimes," said the mani- festo. "Few people feel . themselves safe." Corruption is not the priests' only theme. They have also been protest- ing against restrictions on the free- dom of speech in South Vietnam. In their manifesto, they point out that under the Thieu government "help- -:less citizens may be accused of assisting or conniving with the Corn- :munists, while others who utter any , unpleasant truth about the adminis- tration may be charged with 'weak- ening the fighting spirit of the armed ,forces.' " 7 None of the accusations is particu- lary new. Corruption and injustice have been the targets of countless protesters throughout the long Viet- nam war. But it is unusual for so many conservative priests to be going on the attack in such a vocal way. Recently two of the leaders among the group of 300 issued a statement in which they referred to the Thieu government as an "oppressive and traitorous regime." These were strong words indeed. _ The two priests urged the Catholic leadership in South Vietnam to dis- ? associate itself from the Thieu gov- ernment and to stop accepting favors from the government. . The chief motivation of the 300 priests seems to be, quite simply, fear of a Communist take-over. Left-lean- ing Vietnamese priests often say that. a coalition government which In. eludes the Communists .but excludes . President Thieu is the only solution ? for South Vietnam. But the conserva- tive priests do not advocate that kind of compromise ? not yet anyway. Many remain as hawkish as they ever were. But they fear that corruption will sabotage the chances of any anti- ? Communist regime surviving in South Vietnam. ? - Regimes compared "It was corruption that led to the downfall of the Chiang Kai-shek gov- ernment in China," said one of the priests who signed the manifesto. The priest, who happens to be an ailmirer of the late President Ngo Dinh Diem, declared that corruption now is "100 times worse" than it was under the Diem regime. The priest asked that his name not be published, because he feared retal- iation. from the Thieu government. But at the same time he said that he doubted Mr. Thieu would take strong action against any of the 300 priests who signed the manifesto. "I do not think that Thieu would dare act like President Park Chung Hee [of Korea]," the priest said, referring to the arrests of Christian dissidents in South Korea. "Thieu is not strong like Park," he said. Mr. Thieu has given little in- dication so far of what his attitude is toward the priests who are demand- ing an end to corruption. But he is not likely to be happy with . their criticism because, as one Viet- , namese Catholic put it: "If the left- wing priests talk about corruption, Thieu can Always say that their criticism is exaggerated. But what does he say when the right-wing priests start talking about it?" ? i? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : WA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3 'THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Wednesday, Sept. 18, 1974 Did the Chilean Press Need CIA Help? By EVERETT C. MARTIN In his press conference this week Presi- dent Ford was asked about recent disclo- sures that the Central Intelligence Agency was authorized to spend some 59 million to "destabilize" the government of Chile's :Marxist President Salvador Allende. The President admitted that the CIA gave sup- poi, presumably in the form of money, to opposition news media and political parties. ? Specifically, the President said: "In a period of time, three or four years ago, there was an effort being made by the Al- lende government to destroy opposition news media, both the writing press as well as the electronic press. And to destroy op- position political parties. "And the effort that was made in this case was to help and assist the preserva- tion of opposition newspapers and elec- tronic media and to preserve opposition political parties." ' , He concluded: "I think this is in the best interest of the people of Chile and certainly in our best interest." This interference in the internal affairs of another nation is a staggering admission for the President to make, and his conclu- sion is, at the very best, questionable. , There isn't any doubt, however, that the opposition news media had been pushed to the wall by the Marxists. The President's statement gives part of the explanation of how it managed to survive at all. , Except for a very few cases, Chile's news media have always been wildly parti- san in political matters. News stories gen- ? erally were polemics and thoroughly unre- liable as sources of balanced, accurate in- formation. To read the government and op- position press on any given day was like reading about events in two different coun- tries. The result was that most readers bought the paper that said what they wanted to hear; there was none of the cross-fertilization of ideas that might take the heat out of an issue. Where opposition newspapers and mag- azines were concerned, the Allende forces ' did very little overtly to curtail their right to print what they wanted. But the evi- dence indicates a clear attempt to strangle, them economically by cutting off their rev- enue. The Chilean government and state- owned industries were the largest single group of advertisers. It wasn't surprising in such a polarized situation that they stopped advertising in opposition media. As the Marxists through one means or an- other took control of the banks and private industry, government hold over advertis- ing became overwhelming. The, wor'sening economic situation and scarcities exacer- bated the situation until publications ap- peared with virtually no visible means of support. Then there was the Marxist attempt to. take over the paper company, known fa-, miliarly as the Papelera, that -supplied 65% of the newsprint. Failing in an effort 'to buy the firm's shares and to agitate the 61,000 workers to?seize the plants, the gov- ernment tried to force it into bankruptcy, which means automatic government con- trol. Denied anything but insignificant price increases at a time when costs were tripling, Papelera was soon losing thou- sands of dollars a day. Only 'when chaos threatened as crowds took to the streets supporting the company did the govern- ment back off in a moment of political compromise. Newspapers in smaller towns came under more direct attack than the big dai- lies of Santiago. An editor's life was threatened in Rancagua by mobs of leftists, and workers seized control of papers in other cities. In Talca after workers seized the paper, the supreme court ruled it was Illegal; but the government refused to obey the court order to end the occupation. "It's not 'socially possible to obey the court," a Socialist Party member reasoned at the time. But newspapers actually reach rela- tively few people in Chile. Much more im- portant as a mass media is the radio, and closures of radio stations by the Allende government got to be a common occur- rence. Once a Santiago station was closed be- cause it reported that two miners were shot tO?death during a copper strike. The report was slightly wrong. Only one miner died; the other was critically wounded. For this, the government declared the sta- tion had endangered national security. The supreme court again ordered the station reopened; but the government minister in- volved refused. The court then ordered his arrest, and the Marxists countered with a threat to start impeachment proceedings against the entire court for upholding bour- geois laws against the will of the people. Government television and radio sta- tions, on the other hand, once caused riot- ing in the streets with a false report that rightwing forces were about to attack the army. This abuse went unpunished. Television was another area where the ? government's actions were overt. ' The University of Chile had a station in Santiago that was staffed entirely with ex- treme leftists broadcasting pure Marxist propaganda. The student body voted over- whelmingly in a referendum to expell the leftists and Change to. a neutral format; but when the schoo"s administration, 148 which was bound by law to obey the refer- ? endum, tried to take control, the leftists re- jected them by force. The police wouldn't act, and President , Allende ordered university officials to con- tinue the Marxists on the payroll. Then the school tried to set up a second station, but the police raided it and smashed the equip- ment. The Catholic University ran into similar repression when it tried to set up a second ,channel to serve the southern city of Con- cepcion with a format that attempted to be non-partisan. At first the government claimed that the station's signal would interfere with radio reception at the Concepcion airport, which was patently 'not the case. The. uni- versity -defiantly went ahead with its plans; so the government set up jamming equipment to interrupt its programs. In, the ensuing controversy, the priest who ran the university's television network was even held in jail for a short period. It was genuinely a question how long some elements of Chile's opposition media could hold out as tha pressure against it mounted near the end of the Allende ad- ministration. It might be easy to rational- ize why the CIA thought it should step in. with support money. It is something that no doubt we shall eventually learn we are doing in other countries. But does that jus- tify such intervention in Chile's internal af- fairs? And was it even necessary?' The opposition forces demonstrated time and again through various by-elec- tions and the 1973 congressional elections that they were the majority. It seems a kind of arrogance for Washington planners to think that the Chilean majority would let its protesting voice disappear entirely from print. and from the airwaves even if established, publication's and stations col- lapsed by the dozens., One might also- ask where is the 'CIA's concern for an opposition press in Chile now that the military junta which deposed the Allende government has effectively si- lenced all opposition? , Fortunately, no disclosures so far indi- cate that the U.S. government was in- volved in the actual coup against the Al- lende government, but the records should be laid bare to make sure. In the Chilean case, President .Allende's own actions in subverting the democracy, in smuggling arms from Cuba to set up a clandestine army and in wrecking the coun- try's economy were more than adequate to "destabilize" his government. But what if it had turned out differ- ently? What if he hadn't done those self-de- structive things and finally through pro- gressive programs had earned the alle- gianea of a majority of Chileans? How then could President Ford claim that the CIA's. actions were "in the best interests of the people of Chile"? Mr. Martin,. a member of the Journal's New York bureau, covers Latin American affairs and was in Chile during the coup. ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3 App-roved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3 THE ECONOMIST SEPTEMBER 14, 1974 The Pinochet way Was the Chile disaster inevitable? Probably. Is it permanent? Not necessarily' What has happened in Chile since Salvador Allende was overthrown a year ago this week is a lesson in the way soldiers who believe they are the saviours of their country find themselves becoming dictators. President Pinochet has promised to release some political detainees, and the "state of internal war" was lifted on Wednesday, but there are few guarantees of political freedom under the stern provisions of the state of siege that is still being enforced in Chile. The political parties have been banned or sus- pended; the press?once the most outspoken in Latin America?is muzzled by military censors; and there are few indications that the junta has any thought of restoring the parliamentary system in a form western democrats would recognise. Some of the officers who stand behind President Pino- chet maintain that censorship, arbitrary detention, trial by court martial and the rest of the paraphernalia of re- pression were necessary because the country was in a state of civil war. But for a powerful faction within the junta the argument runs deeper: the country must be "cleansed" of old-style politics so that a new, and permanent, authori- tarian system can emerge. These men are not like Turkey's generals in 1960. They do not see their job as the laying down of neW political rules so that a multi-party system can take over again from them later on. They appear to be working towards a no-party system. The repression in Chile is documented in a new 80-page report published by Amnesty International this week. Some of its evidence is dubious?including a Newsweek report published in October last year that was later shown to be fallacious, and a number of quotations from anony- mous foreigners now outside Chile. But the rest of the re- port is one of Amnesty's more credible documents, and builds up a damaging case for the junta to Answer. The problem is not so much the abuse of law as the absence of law. There is no appeal against the verdict of military tri- bunals, no respect for habeas corpus, and the lack of cen- tral control makes it possible for provincial garrisons or military intelligence services to deal with opponents as they see fit without consulting a higher authority. The result, in the first month after the coup, was a series of prisoners shot "while trying to escape" or just disappearing without trace. Amnesty suggests a figure of 7,000 for the number of political prisoners today; as many people may have died. It is also fairly plain that the use of torture has been widespread, although (as Amnesty concedes) the junta now seems to be trying to stop it. Neither the torture nor the "unofficial" executions can be justified even if one accepts the junta's thesis that the left in Chile is secretly planning a violent uprising?and since there has not been a single guerrilla incident of any importance since the immediate aftermath of the coup, that is no longer easy to swallow. These things gave the British Government its reason NEW YORK TIMES 16 September. 1974 Swedish Premier Calls Chilean Leaders 'Crooks' ? ? STOCKHOLM, Sept. 15 (UPI) ? Premier Olof Palme yesterday described the mili- tary government of ,,Chile as "despicable crookAPPEMY newspapers speculated today that the two nations might break .off diplomatic !via. tions. ? Mr. Palme, speaking at a demonstration against Chile's military regime, ' said that "sooner or later the regime of blood in Chile will vanish I dhtfanimgaAgisa n_ dezradatio 0 despised by the entire demo- for instructing Britain's ambassador in Chile not to attend the junta's anniversary celebrations on Wednesday, even though that gesture would have looked a lot more plausible if British ambassadors did not turn up at similar occasions when other governments congratulate themselves on far bloodier conquests of power. But historians, as distinct from politicians out to score a point, will still want to make two observations about what has happened in Chile. The first is that it was the marxist left, not the armed forces, that broke down Chile's democratic institutions. Before Allende was overthrown he had been censured by a vote of almost two to one in the lower house of Chile's parliament for violating the country's constitution. It was Allende's own left-wing supporters who had set up para- military groups and drawn up their plans, almost certainly with his knowledge, to seize total power. The junta is caught up in a series of events that was begun by the Allende regime. That cannot excuse its excesses, but it does help to explain them. The alternative to -the Pinochet regime was not democracy for Chile: it was the imposition of a totalitarianism of the left. The surviving corners of freedom The other point is about what sort of government it is that now runs Chile. Its enemies like to call it a totalitarian regime, but it is not. The word totalitarian was coined to apply to those governments?most notably the communist ones?which set out to bring almost every aspect of life under the control of the ruling party. The junta in Chile is not quite like that. Its government is an authoritarian one, and a very tough specimen of the breed, but it has not sought to impose its ideas on the totality -of public life. Politics have been abolished, but men can still pursue their economic activities with a certain degree of inde- pendence; there remains a good deal of freedom in the world of culture and religion; people still have the right to travel in and out of the country. These things matter, be- cause they mean that some centres of power and influence and independent opinion can still. exist outside the reach of the government's arm. Such a. country is not a totali- tarian one, because the rudiments of pluralism survive. The distinction is important for Chile. The corners or freedom that can still be found even within an authoritarian state give men the possibility to recover the other freedoms they have lost. These fragments of freedom tend to expand as the regime gains more confidence in itself; there is less intrusion into people's lives in Spain today than there was 20 years ago?or than there is in Chile now. There is more hope of recovering political freedom than there is in a totalitarian regime where one centre of power commands everything. The Chileans are not one of the world's more repressible peoples. Those members of the present junta who believe they can stamp their ideas on Chile forever will discover that. cratic world." Relations between the two nations have been strained since Sweden's Ambassador to Chile, Harald ,Edeistam 344/4sRDRIM0840112Reil0 Decemt)er, 100340007-3 49