C.I.A. CHIEF TELLS HOUSE OF $8-MILLION CAMPAIGN AGAINST ALLENDE IN '70-73

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 49
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 7, 2001
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: September 8, 1974
• Content Type: NSPR

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CONFIDENTIAL
NEWS., VIEWS
and ISSUES
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domestic and foreign press for YOUR
BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use
of selected items would rarely be advisable.
No. 14
20 SEPTEMBER 1974
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
1
GENERAL
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App-roved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3
? NEW YORK TIMES
8 September 1974
COLA. Chief Tells House
Of $8-Million Campaign
Against Allende in '70-73
By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Sept. 7?The
ldirector of the Central
,Intelli-
gence Agency has told Congress
that the Nixon Administration ;
authorized more than $8-million
for covert activities , by the
agency in Chile between 1970
and 1973 to make it impossible
for President Salvador Allende
Gossens to govern.
The goal of the clandestine
C.I.A. activities, the director,
William E. Colby, testified at a
top-secret hearing last April,
was to "destabilize" the Marx-
ist Government of .President
Allende, who was elected in
1970.
The Allende Government was
overthrown in a Violent coup
d'etat last Sept. 11 in which the
President died. The military
'junta that seized per.-"er say he
cortmitted suicide but his sup-
porters maintain that he was
slain by the soldiers who at-
tacked the presidential' palace
in Santiago.
Intervention in '64
? In his House testimony, Mr.
Colby 'also disclosed that the
Central Intelligence Agency first
intervened against Dr. Allende
in 1964, when he was a presi-
dential candidate running
against Eduardo Frei Montalva
of the Christian Democratic
party, which had the support
of the United States. ?
The agency's operations, Mr.
Colby testified, were considered
a test of the technique of using
heavy cash payments to bring
down a governMent viewed as
antagonistic toward the United
States. However, there have
been many allegations that the
C.I.A. was, involved in similar
activities in other countries be-
fore the election Of Dr. Allende.
Mr. Colby also maintained
that all of the agency's opera-
tions against the Allende Gov-
ernment were approved in ad-
vance ,by the 40 Committee in
Washington, a secret high-level
intelligence panel headed by
Secretary of State Kissinger.
The 40 Committee was set up
by President Kennedy in an at-
'tempt to provide Administra-
tion control over C.I.A. activi-
fties after Cuban exiles trained
and' equipped by the agency
failed in their invasion of Cuba
In 1961. Appro
' Details of the agency's in-
volvement in Chile were firsts
provided by Mr. Colby to the
House Armed Services Subcom-
mittee of Intelligence, headed
by Representative Lucien N.
Nedzi, Democrat of Michigan,
at a special one-day hearing
last April 22. The testimony
was .later made available to,
Representative Michael J. Har-
rington, a liberal Massachusetts
Democrat who has long been
a critic of the C.I.A. Harrington
wrote other members of Con-
gress six weeks ago to protest
both the agency's clandestine
activities and the failure of the
Nixon Administration to ack-
nowledge them despite repeated.
inquiries from Congress. A cop.
of a confidential seven-page
letter sent by Mr. Harrington
to Representative Thomas E.
Morgan, chairman of the House,
Foreign Affairs Committee, was
made available to. The New
York Times.
The testimony of Mr. Colby
indicates 'that high officials in
the State Department and
White House repeatedly and
deliberately misled the public
and the Congress about the
extent of United States involve-
ment in the internal affairs of
Chile during the 6-me-year
government of Dr. Allende.
Shortly after Dr. Allende
won a plurality in the presiden-
tial elections in September,
1970, high Chilean officials
told newsmen, as,a dispatch in
The New York Times reported
then, that the "United States
lacks political, economic or mil-
itary leverage to change the
course of events in Chile, even
if the Administration wished to
do so."
However, Mr. Colby testified
that $500,000 was secretly au-
thorized by the 40 Committee
in 1970 to help the anti-Allende
forces. Another $500,000 had
been provided to the same
forces in 1969, Mr. Colby said.
Mr. Allende's victory was ra-
tified by the Chilean Congress'
in October, 1970, and the State's
Department later declared 'thati
the Administration had 'firmly
rejected" any attempt to blockl
his inauguration. J
But Mr. Colby testified that
$350,000 had been authorized
by the 40 Committee in an un-
successful effort to bribe mem-
bers of the Chilean Congress.
The bribe was part of a much
more complicated scheme in-
tended to overturn the results,
of the election,' Mr. Colby tes-
tified; but the over-all plan, al-
TOCOOrkilOPMil
rejected as unworkable. "
Whilethe Central Intelligence
Agency was conducting these
'clandestine operations, there
were reductions- in United
States foreign-aid grants to
Chile .in development bank
loans and in lines of credit
from American commercial
banks. Commodity credits for
vitally needed grain purchases
also were restricted.
United States officials have
declared that there was no
Over-all Administration 'pro-
gram designed to limit eco-
nomic did to Ithe Allende
Government, but critics have
noted that large-scale loans''
and aid are now going to Chile.
President Allende repeatedly
complained about what he told
the United Nations in Decem-
e.xternal pressure to cut us off
our economy and paralyzetra
from the world, to strangle our
economy and paralyze trade
and to deprive us of access to
sources of international ft-
- nancing."
Colby Declines Conunent
Mr. Colby acknowledged in
a brief telephone conversation
this week ,that he had testified
before the Nedzi' intelligence
subcommittee about the C.I.A.'s
involvement in Chile, but, he
refused to' comment on the Har-
rington letter.
Mr. Nedzi, contacted in Mu-
nich, West Germany, where he
is on an inspection trip with
other members of the House
Armed Services Committee,
also declined to comment.
Mr. Harlington noted in his
letter that he had been permit-
ted to read the 48-page tran-
script of Mr. Colby's testimony
two times, apparently without
taking notes. "My memory
must serve here as ? the only
source for the substance of,
the testimony," he wrote.
A number of high-ranking
Government officials subse-
quently confirmed the details
of the C.I.A.'s involvement as
summarized by the Massachu-
setts Representative, a liberal -
who has long been a critic of '
the agency's policies.
In 1964, Mr. Colby 'testified,:
some American corporations in
Chile volunteered to serve as
conduits for anti-Allende funds,
but the proposal was rejected.
A similar' proposal in 1970 led
to a widely publicized Senate
hearing las tyear. ?
The C.I.A. director also said
that after Dr. Allende's 'election,
$5-million was authorized by
the 40 Committee for more "de-
stabilization" efforts in 1971,
1972 and 1973. An additional
$1.5-million was provided to aid
anti-Allende candidates in mu-
nicipal elections last year. rington wrote. He added, how-
Some of these funds, Mr. ever that Mr. Colby had testi-
Colby testified were provided fied that $34,000 of the funds
to an unidentified influential had been spent?including a
anti-Allende newspaper in San- payment of $25,000 to one per-
tiago.
s summary of the Colby son to buy a radio station.
In hi
A specific request earlier in
Ithese operktions was 'direct,
though nOt to the point of iden-
tifying 'actual. contacts and
conduits," Mr.,' Harrington
added.
One fully informed _official,
told of The New York Times's
intention to publish an account
of the clandestin4 C.I.A. ac-
tivities in Chile, declared,
"This thing calls for balanced
reporting to put the blaine
where it should be laid."
"The agency didn't do any-
thing without the knowledge
and consent of the 40 commit-
tee," he said. pointedly adding
that the committee was headed
by Mr. Kissinger, who was then
serving as President Richard M.
Nixon's National Security Ad-
viser.
_
Secrecy Called Necessary
Another Government official
similarly defended the C.I.A.'s
role in funneling fund into
Chile and the agency's subse-
quent denials of any such 'ac-
tivities. "You have a straight
out policy that the United
States conducts covert action
on an officially authorized ba-
is," he said. "If you do such
things, obviously you're not go-
ing to say anything about it."
"On this kind of covert ac-
'tion," the official added; "it's
up to those asked to do it to do
it secretly." .
Mr. Kissinger; although fully
informed of The Times's ac-
count through an aide, did not
respond.', .
A number of officials whose
information about such activi-
ties has been accurate in the
past declared in interviews this
week ,that there was a sharp
split between some State De-
partment officials and Mr. Kis-
Singer over the 40 Committee's
Chile policy.
Kissinger,'s Comment
In his only public comment
on the Allende coup, Mr. Kis-'
singer told the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee last year:
"The C.I.A. had 'nothing to do
With the coup, to the best of
my knowledge and belief, and
I only put in that qualification
in case some madman appears
' down :there who without in-
-structions talkild to soniebody.
I.have abSolutely no reason to
'suppose it."
, 'In his July" 18, 1974, letter to
Representative , i Morgan, Mr.
Harrington quoted Mr. Colby
as:testifying that the 40 Com-
mittee authorized an expendi-
ture 14 $1-million for "further
political destabilization" activi-
ties in August, 1973, one month
before the military junta seized
control in Santiago.
"The full plan authorized in
August was called off when
the military coup occurred less
than one month later," Mr. Har-
testimony, Mr. Harrington noted
that "funding was provided to
individuals, political -parties;
and media outlets in Chile,
through channels in other coun-
tries in both Latin America and
08 a DP77-00432R0001
"Mr.. Colby's description. of
1
the summer of 1973 for $50,000
to support a nationwide truck-
ers' strike that was crippling
the Chilean Government was
turned down by the 40 Com-
mittee, Mr. Harrington further
0 0 ?VethlYS. Colby as testifying.
n the period before the
icoup," one official said. "there
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WASHINGTON POST
09 September 1974
lwas a pretty" firmview on the
part of the 40 Committee
which is Kissinger and nobody
else?that the Allende Govern-
ment was bound to come to de-
struction and had to be thor-
oughly discrdited.".
"The State Department sup-
ported this, but in a different
way," the official recalled. "It
wanted to stretch out any clan-
destine activities to permit the
regime to come to a political
end.
"The argument was between
those who wanted to use force
and end it quickly rather than
to play, it out. Henry was on
the side of the former?he was
for considerabl obstruction."
All of the officials inter-
viewed, emphasized that the
Central Intelligence Agency
was not authorized to play any
direct' role in the coup that
overthrew Dr. Allende. It was
also noted that- most of the
subsequent denials of agency
involvement in the internal af-
fairs of Chile were made in the
context, of a direct, United
States role in the overthrow.
, "On most of those you have
ito look at the language very
!carefully," one official said of
ithe denials.
' 'Shortly after President Allen-
de's overthrow there were.am-
confirmed reports that the
truckers' strike, which was a
key element in the social chaos
that preceded the coup, had
been financed, at lease in part,
by the C.I.A. ?
At a closed hearing on Chile
'before 'a House Foreign Affairs
subcommittee last October, Mr.
Colby refused to rule out the
possibility that some anti-
Allende demonstrations in Chile
.may have been assisted through
subsidiaries of United States
corporations in Brazil or other
Latin-American countries.
He was sharply questioned
about ,that ,, possibility bye Mr.
Harrington who emerged dur-
ing Congressional debate' as a
leading critic of the Adminis-
tration's Chilean policies.
Representative Harrington,
reached yesterday at his Mas-
iachusetts office, refused to
discuss his letter to Mr. Mor-
gan, which he termed confi-
dential. Nor would he discuss
!other aspects of-' the possible
'American involvement in the
.fall of President Allende.
In his letter, Mr. Harrington
complained about the "inherent
limitations facing members of
Congress in uncOvering the
facts of covert activities such
as those in Chile."
He also expressed dismay
that the Administration had
authorized the Covert expendi-
ture of $1-million in August,
1973, "without any apparent
deterrent being posed by the re-
cently completed hearings into
I.T.T. [International Telephone
& Telegraph] involvement in
Chile and the Senate Water-
gate committee's disclosur of
C.I.A. activities related to
Watergate."
, A Senate Foreign Relations
subcommittee concluded hear-
ings last April into what I.T.T.
officials acknowledged was an
attempt to contribute $1-million
to the United States Govern-
ment for use by the Central .In-
telligence: Agency to create eco-
nomic. chaos in Chile. Testimony
showed, that the offer was re-
jected after discussions that ap-
parently involved Mr. Kissinger
and Richard M. Helms,'then di-
rector of the agency. ,
A number of high State De-:
pertinent officials testified un--
der oath at those hearings that
the United States was not mak-
ing any attempts to interfere
with Chile's internal politics.
Edward M. Korry, former
Ambassador to Chile, declared:
"The United States did not seek
to pressure, subvert, influence
a single member of the Chilean
Congress at any time in the en-
tire four years of my stay. No
hard line toward Chile was car-
ried out at any time."
Charles A. Meyer, former As-
sistant Secretary of State for
Latin-American Affairs, simila?-
ly testified that the United
States scrupulously adhered' tb
a policy of nonintervention.
"We bought no votes, we fund-
ed no candidates, we promoted
no coups," he said.
Senator Frank Church, Deart
arra of Idaho, who is chair-
man of the Subcommittee on
Multinational Corporations,.
could not be reached for com-
ment. The subcommittee's chief.
counsel, Jerome I. Levinson, ex-
pressed anger today on hear-
ing of Mr. Colby's- testimony.
"For me," he said, -"the funda-
mental issue now is who makes
foreign policy in a democracy
and by what standards and by
what criteria?" ?
Mr. Levinson said that the
subcommittee had been "de-
liberately deceived" during its
public hearings last year.
In ? his letter, to Mr. Morgan,
Mr. Harrington said that he
hid turned to the Foreign Af-
fairs Committee chairman "as
a last resort, having despaired
,cif the likelihood of anything
productive occurring as a,. re-
sult of the avenues I have al-
ready pursued."
Mr. Harrington noted that
the subcommittee on Inter-
American Affairs had held five
hearings 'on human rights in
Chile since the junta came to
power, with testimony from
only one State Departmerft wit-
ness with full knowledge of the
clandestine C.I.A. activity.
And that witness, Harry W.'
Shlaildernan, a Deputy Assist-
ant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs, refused to
testify about agency activities,
Mr. Harrington wrote.
He' urged Mr. Morgan to call
for a full-scale public investi-
gation of the Nixon Adminis-
tration's involvement in Chile:
Mr. Morgan could not be
reached for comment, nor
could it be learhed whether he
had responded to Mr. Harring?
.ton's letter.
The Foreign Affairs Commit-'
'tee will begin sessions next
week on the Administration's
foreign military-aid requests,
committee aides said. Amend-
ments have been offered calling
IA News Causes
o tir in Chile
. - By Joseph Novitski
Snecial to The Washington Post
, SANTIAGO, Sept. 8--The fer.ed $1 million to the CIA for
report from Washington that use against Allende. The Chi-
lean government printed a pa-
perback translatibn of all the
ITT documents released by
the Central Intelligence
Agency had alloc'ated $11 mil-
lion between 1964 and 1973 to
support anti-leftist political ac-
tion in Chile caused no excite-
ment here today.
Reports of CIA financial in-
volvement in Chilean politics
have been so persistent in the
past 10 years that they- were
accepted as fact by many Po-
litically aware Chileans Jong
before a military coup de-
posed leftist President Salva-
dor Allende last year. , ?
On this warm, sunny Sun-
day, no government official
could be located to comment
on the report.
Radio stations did not men-
tion the report in their news
broadcasts, although interna-
tional news agencies sent the
news to their Chilean subscri-
bers.
. There was no certainty that
Santiago's government-con-
trolled newspapers would pub-
lish news of the report,
, printed today in the United
States on the basis of ? secret
testimony before a congres-
sional committee by William
Colby, the director of the CIA.
As long ago as 1970, just af;;
ter Allende was elected presi-
dent as the candidate of a left-
ist coalition, Chileans in the'
upper levels of several politi-
cal parties believed - that for=
eign funds had come into their,
country at campaign time
from several sources.
Christian Democrate, then
at the , end of six years in
power under .. President,
Eduardo Frei, admitted that:
their party had been Sup-
ported by, Christian Demo:;
-cratic parties in Germany and.
Italy. The conservative Na--
tional, Party claimed that the
left had received funds from
Communist and Socialist par-,
ties abroad.
An executive of an Amen-
can tipper company in Santi-
egg. said ,privately that his
company had contributed cam-
paign funds to non-leftist can-
didates in the campaign just
ended.
There was little evidence to
connect the CIA with , Al-
lende's political opposition un-
til the disclosure in 1972 that
the ITT conglomerate had of-
for the' halving and for the
complete elimination of the
Administration's request for
more than $20-million in mill-,
tary aid and training for Chile.
[Washington columnist Jack ,
Anderson and later brought
out a comic book version of
the ITT conspiracy. -
According to the transcript,
of Colby's testimony cited bY'
Thep. Michael Harrington (D-,
Mass.) in his request for a con-
gressional investigation of
CIA involvement in Chile; $5
million for "politiqal destabili-
zation efforts" and $500,000
for opposition politicians had
',been authorzed between Al-,
lende's election and 1972. In
, Chile, rumors that CIA funds
were being channeled to, the
opposition grew that year. ? ? ,
! After .the nationalization' of
American copper companies,
large Chilean companies and,
banks, Allende's economic poi-
ides began affecting the mid-,1
die class in 1972. First shop-
keepers and truck owners,
then bureaucrats and profes-
sional men reacted with the
first of two waves of ? strikes
that were to spread civil un-
rest and economic disorder'
through the country.
The strike leaders denied,
then, and -again during the
strikes that preceded Al-
lende's downfall last year, act
cusations from the left that
they were being financed, by
the CIA. However, ,this year,
one of the men involved in or-
ganizing both series of strikes
indicated . that. CIA funds, had
been availqble.. ,
? -4Ve never used. them,' we
never got any," seid Vicente
Kovaceide, an officer or, ,the
Chilean small pusinessmeri's
federation, in an interview in
Kevaicevic,, an anti-
Communist Yugoslav emigre
to Chile, had helped to guide
the shopkeepers' group
through ttite 1972 and -,.1973
strikes.
"Friends I had from other
organizations came back from
abroad and asked us if we had
got our share," he added.
"They said the money had
been allocated by the CIA for
all the unions in the strike,
and some of it should have
gone to us."
2
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ithishingin %rams
Monday, September 9, 1974
nit) 0
v?,
\L
I3y Jeremiah O'Leary
St ar?News Staff Writer
Secretary of State Henry '
A. 1Cissinger presided over
every meeting of the "40
Committee" when the con- ?
overt arm of the National Se-
curity Council authorized
expenditure of millions of .
dollars from 1970 to 1973
against the election and
rule of Chile's late Marxist .
president Salvador Allende,
U.S. officials said today. ,
;Kissinger was President
Nikon's national security
adviser in the period from ?
1969 until late summer 1973
when the "40" Committee"-
anthorized funds for indi-
miduals, anti-Allende politi-
cal; parties and news media
inChile, these officials said.
ram 1964 until 1973, the
kn?tal authorization for
clandestine operations
4gainst the Marxist leader
and his coalition of parties
Was more than $8 Million.
_,?
:""He chaired every meet-
s
ing:of the committee from
the moment he came to
town," an official said, add-
ing that the Central Intelli-
gence Agency did nothing ino
Chile that the "40 Commit- i
tee'.' had not authorized.
:Spokesmen for Kissinger, '
who became secretary of
skate last September'26 just
15:days after the Chilean
thilitary overthrew Allende,
said the secretary . was
aWare of the new disci?.
shres but no comment was
einected until today..
;THE INFORMED
sources available to the .
Star-News said not all of the
mbney authorized for
eimenditurc was used. The
funds used to support anti-
Allende politicians, press
and radio during the presi-
dential election of 1970, the
congressional bi-election of
1972 and to "destabilize"
the Allende regime were cut
off when it appeared in mid-
1973 that a military coup
d'etat was imminent.
These sources claimed
that the CIN and the money
made available to it played
no role in supporting the
armed forces uprising on
Sept. 11, 1973, in which Al-
lende allegedly committed
suicide when his La Moneda
palace was attacked by the
military rebels. Kissinger
was testifying at his confir-
mation hearing before the
Senate Foreign Relations
,Committee at the height of
the Sept. 11 fighting before
collapse of the Allende gov-
ernment. .
The anti-Allende deci-
sions Of the "40 Committee"
and the CIA's role in carry-
ing them out were disclosed
by CIA Director William E.
Colby in secret testimony
before the House Armed
Services Subcommittee on
Intelligence last April 22.
The tenor of Colby's 'testi-
mony, made public over the
weekend by the New York
Times and Washington
Post, was that the "40 Corn-
orriittee" targeted the funds
.to prevent Allende's elec-
tion in 1964 and 1970 and to
'destabilize" his govern-
ment after 1970.
It is believed that the bulk
of the money went to
subsidize Christian Demo-
cratic President Eduardo
TM ECONOMIST
31 AUG 1974
Crying ?wolf
FROM OUR SPAIN CORRESPONDENT
If it's a really diiTerent holiday you. are
looking for this summer, try the north-
-west corner of Spain. But bring a Shotgun:
'For the big news there. inGeneral Franco's
native Galicia. is of wolves. Since the
beginning of July, Galleito villagers have
shot about 40 of them. Every day brings
fresh accounts of sheep, calves and dogs
being devoured and farmers chased up
trees. The papers tell of panic and even
"psychosis" in some areas.
Zoologists are baffled. It's against all
the rules, they say, for wolves to approach
human settlements in summer. Perhaps,
say local farmers, a new wolf generation
is emerging that doesn't respect rules.
Some people suspect a publicity stunt
for one of those English horror-films.
Strangely, no one has yet blamed the . ?
Frei in 1964, the campaign
of conservative National
Party leader Arturo Ales-
sandri in 1970 and subse-
quent "destabilization" ef-
forts. Frei won the 1964
? campaign but Allende led a
three-man race in 1970 with
less than two percentage
points, or 36 percent of the
vote, over Allessandri.
Subsequently, Allende was.
named president by the Chi-
lean Congress in a runoff
vote in which the CIA funds
? were liberally employed
among Chilean politicians
and press and radio outlets.
MANY DETAILS of
Colby's testimony appear in
a letter written by Rep.
Michael J. Harrington, D-
Mass., to House Foreign Af-
fairs Committee chairman
Thomas E. Morgan, D-Pa.
Harrington'S letter appears
for further hearings on the
CIA role against Allende.
CIA spokesmen' said the
agency had nothing to do
with the revolution.
But Colby's candid testi-
mony to the House commit-
tee was taking place last
April while the Senate For-
eign Relations subcommit-
tee on multinational corpo-
rations was hearing sworn
declarations from U.S. offi-
cials that Washington's 1970
election policy in Chile was
one of non-intervention.
Both former Ambassador
Edwin M. Korry and Assist-
ant Secretary of State
Charles A. Meyer swore
that the United States did
nothing to pressure politi-
cians or buy anti-Allende
votes. The Senate hearing
brought testimony that the
CIA .with a mysterious sea-wolf?the
3,000-ton yacht Apollo. which potters
around the 'coasts of Spain, Portugal and'
Morocco heavily laden with cpmmunica-
tions.gadgetry. It flies a Panamanian flag
and belongs to something called ? the
OperatioaTransport Corporation.
The Apollo was anchored off Lisbon
during Portugal's coup in April, and sub-
sequently the liberal Portuguese weekly
Expresso alleged that the yacht was in the
service of the CIA. The Spanish monarch-
ist daily ABC then revealed -that the
Spaniards have been watching the boat
closely since 1969, when it allegedly
strayed into Spanish "naval waters".
souler Spanish paper repo:led that the
Apollo called at a part in A id.ulusL the
day after Admiral Carrero Blanco was
assassinated. It coupled this with the
coincidental and unconfirmed information
that Spanish security men had discovered
lien ei
oyes
'International Telephone &
Telegraph Co. and the CIA
discussed plans for expendi-
ture of $I million in the 1970
election but denials that the
plan was ever carried out.
' The general posture of
the State Department in the
? 1969-1973 period was that it
'would be better for the
United States to adopt a
hands-off attitude toward
Chile on the theory that Al-
lende and his Marxist coali-
tion would be so destructive
of the national economy as
to preclude any chance of
another electoral victory
there. Kissinger was quoted
in this period as observing
ironically that, "Chile is a
dagger pointed at the heart
of Antarctica." -
KISSINGER testified at
his confirmation hearing
'that the CIA had nothing to
do with the coup last Sep-
tember. Other sources inde-
pendent of Kissinger have
supported the claim that the
Coup was launched by the
Chilean military without
cooperation or prior knowl-
edge of the U.S. govern-
ment or the CIA.
But before the coup, offi-
cials say there was a strong
,division between Kissinger
' in the White House and the
? , State Department on what
ought to be done about
Chile.
?,Kissinger was pbrtrayea.
by sources close to the af-
fair as haVing consistently
taken a.harder line against
.Chire than the State Depart-,
'inentia deliberations of the-
' ?"40 Committee'''. ?
Lisbon during the coup but depies the
allegation about Andalusia. In Tenerife
last week he allowed two Spanish journal-
ists to look 'over the -Sfacht. Crestfallen,
they admitted ? to haying encountered
nothing. abnormal?no false beards, no
James Bond deVices, not even a bugged'
cabaret girl. The well-heeled passengers
spotted on board were following a floating
management course, according to a
friendly neighbourhood CIA man.
It is unlikely, however, that we have
heard the last of the Apollo. Although
one paper has reported that the yacht ?
spent a fortnight off Galicia at the begin-
ning of the summer, nobody has remarked
on the intriguing coincidence of this visit
and the beginning of the wolf upsurge.
But suspicions are bound to be aroused
by anothdr sinister news item from
Galicia: a. truckdriver who reported run-
ning into two strange animals. He killed
one? it was nearly six fectIong and weighed
d For R suglxstioc._ %tulle ar.ii.n.ccs: the Guardia Civil
Central Intellig,ence Agen,mv-^-prove or 911PACNNIIN N/Artifaiariti.W" b?432ftr-01-004060743
. 111 onferrada, where it was identified,
ptain admits being in provisionally, as an American jackal.
Some silly-season newspaper articles o The Apollo's ca
here, however, have been trying to link the
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3
VE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 1974
Hearings Urged on C.1 .A.' s Role in Chile!
By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
' speeiaito The New York Times
'BEVERLY, Mass., Sept.
Representative Michael J. Har-
rington called ioday for full-
scale public 'hearings into the
central intelligence agency's
clandestine operations against
the Government of President
Salvador Allende Gossens of
Chile.
In an interview at his home
here, Mr. Harrington said he
would formally request the
House Foreign Affairs Commit-
tee, of which he is a member,
to surnmon Secretary of State
Kissinger and William E. Colby,
Director of Central Intelligence,
to testify about the Chilean
policy of the United States.
The New York Times reported
today that Mr. Colby told a
House.committee in April that
the C.I.A. was Authorized to
spend more than $8-million
clandestinely from 1970 to 1973
in an effort to make it impos-
sible for President Allende to
govern. The Allende Govern-
ment was overthrown in a vio-
lent military coup on Sept. 11,
.1973, in which the Chilean
leader died. . ?
' Kissinger's Kole
In calling ?for hearings, Mr..
Harrington declared that one I
reason senior officials in Con-
gress were reluctant to investi-I
gate Chilean policy was what i
he termed a "disinclination" to:
turn up facts that might reflect,
adversely on Mr. Kissinger.
"Without knowing anything
at all about Mr. Kissinger's role
in all of this," Mr. Harrington
said, "Congress is hesitating
because of fear that they'll run
into Kissinger."
"It's 'obvious to me," he
added, "that the role played by
Kissinger is going to be of
significance in the evaluation
of how the policy toward Chile
evolved. But there's a disin-
clination in Congress to even
get into some areas that might
peripherally damage or embar-
rass Kissinger."
In his testimony before a
House subcommittee on intelli-
gence last April 22, Mr. Colby
noted that all of the C.I.A.'s
efforts against President Al-
lende were directly *approved
by the 40 committee, a? high-
level intelligence review com-
mittee that has been headed by
Mr.. Kissinger since the begin-
?;ning of the Nixon Administra-
tion in early 1969.
"We're not going to undo
what happened in Chile," Mr.
Harrington said today, "but we
must examine the role of -the
intelligence community in for-
eign policy..
"When you look at the Colby
testimony, you'll see that the
notion of Congressional over-
sight of the C.I.A. is passive,
bystandish, totally ineffective."
Mr. Harrington's public call
today for hearings was his lat-
est in a series of attempts,
'most of them in private, to
force senior Members of, the
Senate and House to begin a
review of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency's Chilian policy.
? The C.I.A. report published
today was based in part on a
'confidential seven-page letter
Mr. _Harrington wrote in mid-
July to Representative Thomas
E. Morgan, chairman of the
House Foreign Affairs Commit-
tee, in which Mr. Colby's testi-
mony was summarized. The
Times received a copy of the
letter from an outside source.
Mr. Harrington said today
that he had sent a similar let-
ter to Senator 3. W. ,Fulbright,
chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee.
In his letter to Mr. Morgan,
Mr. Harrington complained that
he had discussed Mr. Colby's
testimony with other members
of the committee and con-
cluded that there would be no
,"further investigations or hear-
ings into the broader policy
questions that such activities
!pose,"
So far, Mr. Harrington said
;today, Mr. Morgan has refused
to permit such hearings, argu-
ing that the Foreign Affairs
Committee does not have the
authority to pursue questions
of C.I.A. activities. .
"Kissinger and colhy should
testify," Mr. Haaington main-
tained. "It's just inane to sug-
gest that a foreign affairs com-
mittee has no authority to
;conduct such hearings."
Mr. Harrington refused to
characterize Mr. Fulbright's re-
sponse to his letter, but a Sen-
ate source said later tbday that
the Arkansas Democrat had
told the Congressman that he
could see "no useful purpose"
in reopening the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee hearings into
Chile.
"What this really means,"
the Senate source said, "is that
he doesn't want to take Kis-
singer on head on because it
could mean exposing the fact
that Kissinger himself was the
man who controlled and direct-
ed the policy of using covert
action to make it impossible
for Allende to govern."
. Mr. Harrington, a liberal
Democrat who was first elected
to Congrks in 1969, praised
Mr. Colby's testimony as "The
most direct, unambiguous and
to the point I've ever seen."
He was permitted to review
the still classified 48-page Chil-
ean transcript in June by Rep-
resentative Lucien M. Nedzi,
chairman of the House Armed
Services subcomthittee on in-
telligence.
Mr. Harrington recalled to-
day that his initial reaction
after reaclIng the account was
one of ."profound shock."
"I did not expect to see the
docunientation of theories I
hadn't held mystelf," he said.
"I'd never subscribed to the
conspiracy theories' about the
United States' involvement in
the disintegration of the Al-
lende Government."
"Colby's testimony may have
been matter-of-fact," Mr. Har-
rington added, "but it also was
almost clinical?as if you had
a well-trained surgeon called
in to describe procedures. You
didn't get the feeling that then,
was any element of right or
wrong that .went into the deci-
sions about what to do."
--i2q5prrr.vetrrorRe10-a-se 2001/08/08-f -CIA-ROP77 01:)43. 2ROOCr1003417007=3?
WASHINGTON STAR
10 September 1974
HIT to Inv stig te
1Atis in Chill
A ainst kflh1enie
rty Jeremiah O'Leary
Star-News Staff Writer
Sen. Frank Church, chair-
man of the Foreign Rela-
tions subcommittee on mul-
tinational corporations, is
expected to reopen hearings
on U.S. clandestine opera-
tions in Chile following dis-
closure that the so-called
"40 Committee" of the Na-
tional Security Council
authorized expenditure of
millions of dollars against
the late Marxist Salvador
Allende between 1964 and
1973.
Church is expected by
Capitol Hill sources to-con-
fer with other subcommit-
tee members and staff to
decide what to do about dis-
crepancies in the testimony
given before several com-
mittees on Chile by officials
of the State Department
and the CIA.
One Senate source said,
"Someone obviously has
been lying about the U.S.
role in Chile." Several offi-
cials indicated Church is
virtually certain to order an
immediate investigation by
the subcommittee staff and
follow that up by reopening
the hearings. Church could
not be reached for com-
ment.
CIA DIRECTOR William
E. Colby testified last April
that The "40 Committee,"
chaired by Henry A. Kiss-
inger, who is now secretary
of state; authorized expen-
diture of nearly .$11 million
by the CIA to subsidize
*news media and politicians
against Allende in 1964 and
again in the 1970 election
period to bar his ascenden-
cy to the presidency.
Colby also testified in se-
cret session before a House
Armed Services Committee
that funds were authorized
as late as the summer of
1973 to "destabilize" the re-
gime of Allende.
But at the same time last
April, then-Asst. Secretary
of State for Inter-American
Affairs Charles A. Meyer ,
told the Church subcommit-
tee under oath that the:
4
United States- pursued a
policy of nonintervention in
Chilean affairs during the
-Allende period. His succes-
sor, Jack B. Kubisch, now
ambassador to Greece, and
Deputy Asst. Secretary
Harry Shlaudeman gave
similar testimony to House
committees.
(An official familiar with
Meyer's testimony told 'the
Star-News the former
assistant secretary attend- -
ed some meetings of the "40
Committee!' but that the
State Department's repre-
sentative was U. Alexis
Johnson. This official said,
Meyer gave "scrupulously
honest" answers at the
Church subcormnittee hear-
ings but was not asked
questipns that would have
required replies acknowl-
edging what the United
States was doing- in Chile in
the 1970 electoral period.
Neither did he volunteer
information which would
have brought the matter to
light.
(The U.S. funds were
used to support anti-Allende
political ,parties and the.
-anti-Mlende newspaper, El
Mercurio; But Myer was
,not asked specifically aboixf-
'these, enterprises, the offi-
cial , said. Meyer's state-
ment that the United States
"bought no votes, ftuided no
candidates and promoted no
coups" was literally accu-
.rate.)
KISSINGER'S only
known testimony on inter-
vention in Chile was given
before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee last
September during his con-
firmation hearings. He
denied that the United
States played any role in
the coup d'etat of last Sept.
11 but apparently was not
asked about previous covert
activities against Allende.
However, U.S. sources said
'yesterday Kissinger pre-
sided over every meeting of
the "40 Committee" from
the moment he became
President Nixon's national.
Security adviser in 1969.
State Department spokes-
' Appreved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3
man Robert Anderson did
not directly answer a ques-
tion yesterday as to wheth-
er Kissinger saw any
inconsistency in his role as
chairman of the "40 Com-
mittee" and as secretary of
state in charge of 'overt for-
eign policy. Anderson gave
reporters a list of the mem- I
bership of the "40 Commit-
tee" and said that all deci- '
sions of the committee-are
unanimous. Further, he
said,. all "40 Committee"
decisions are approved by
the President and there is
"a regular procedure to
?convey these decisions" on
,intelligence activities to the
appropriate congressional
committees.
WASHINGTON POST?
11 . September 1.974
W. C. e.
-.-Settior CIA
fileer9 52
William Charles Regan, .52,
a senior officer with the Cen.:
tral,Intelligence Agency, died.
Saturday of a heart attack
while visiting in New Market,
Va.
Born in New York City, Mr.
Regan graduated from Regis
Preparatory School there and
from Fordham University.
He served as a captain in
the U.S. Army in World War
II and was attached to the Of-
fice of Strategic Services on
duty in the China-Burma-India
theater. He received the
Bronze Star for participation
in two hazardous missions.
Mr. Regan attended the
Command . and General Staff
School at Ft. Leavenworth and
was a colonel in the Army Re-
serves at the- time of his
death.
He had been with the CIA
and its predecessors since
1946.
' He is survived bY his wife,
Lorraine, and five daughters,
Kathleen, Susan, Anne, Ellen
and Mary Elizabeth, all of the
home, 6707. Dean Dr.. McLean;
his mother, Florence C: Re-
gan, of Merrick, Long Island;
a brother, Thomas, and a sis-
ter, Gertrude, of Massachu-
setts, and another sister, Ei-
leen, of New York.
WASHINGTON POST
10 September 1974
By Laurence Stern.,
Washington Post Staff Writer
The State Department
found itself in the center of a
growing congressional, furor
yesterday over the disclosure
that some $11 million in U.S.
funds had been authorized for
covert political action against
the late Chilean president,
Salvador Allende. ? In the face of new 'charges
;that it misled Congress on the
Issue of U.S: intervention in
Chile, a State Department
spokesman yesterday stood by
sworn testimony of officials
on Capitol Hill that . the
United States pursued a policy
of non-intervention during the
Allende period. .
The new round of contro-
versy over U.S. policy on
Chile was triggered by the dis-
closure Sunday that CIA Di"-
rector William E. Colby se-
knowledged to a-House Armed
Services subcommittee last
April 22 that $3 million in co-
vert funds was targeted
against Allende's Cardidacy in
1964 and more than $8 million .
was authorized to block _ his
1970 election and. "destabilize.!'1
his government between 19701
and September, 1973, when he I
was overthrown.
. Sen. Edward M. Kennedy
.(I)-Mass.), chairman of a Sen-1
ate Refugee sttbcommittee
which is investigating human
rights violations in Chile, said
yesterday that the disclosure.
of CIA funding of Allende's.
opposition "represents. not
only a flagrant violation -Of
our alleged policy of non-inter-
vention in Chilean affairs but
also an appalling lack of forth-
rightneSs-with the Congress."
He noted that covert politi;
eal funding, such as was ac-,
knowledge d by Colby,' "has
been denied time and time
again by high officials of the
Nixon and now Ford adminis-. ?
tration."
Kennedy called for full con,'
gressional investigation of the
Aiscrepancies in the official'
versions of what the United'
States did in Chile during the
Allende period.
Jerome Levinson, counsel
for the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee's multina-i
tional corporations suhcorn--.
mittee, said "there is no doubt.
that we were misled" by State
Department witnesses who
testified last year that the
United States had not Under-'
taken covert activities against
Allende.
Levinson said he will raise
the issue of whether the sub-1
committee's hearings on Chile'
Approv@ilarreram
should he .goe
#18 :.ChkeRLIPt77E094r3ZEICIP0ii
in
enies
IIrn,e
turns from campaigning in Id-1
aho. It will be up to the sub-
committee to decide whether
it wants to extend the inquiry
tO investigate sharp public dis:.
crepancies in the testimony.
The former Assistant Secre-
tary of State for Inter-Ameri-
can Affairs, Charles A. Meyer,
gave sworn testimony to the
subcommittee March 29, 1973,
that "the policy of the govern-
ment ... was that there would
be no intervention in the polit-
ical affairs of Chile .... We;
financed no candidates, no po-
litical parties...." ? ? ? j
Last June 12 Acting Assist-
ant Secretary of State Harry
Shlaudeman told a House For-
eign Affairs subcommittee-1
"Despite pressures to the con-
trary the ,U.S. , government'
adhered to a policy of non-in-
tervention in Chile's affairs,
during the Allende period.1
That policy remains in force
today. . . ."
When pressed by Rep. Don-
ald M. Fraser (D-Minn.) On
whether "you are prepared to,
day to deny an assertion that !
the U.S. funneled money co-!
vertly to opposition parties
following the 1970 election in
Chile," Shlaudeman respond-
ed: "I am .not . . ." '
Fraser, chairman of a House
Foreign Affairs subcommittee
on international organizations,
charged yesterday that "the
executive branch had deceived
the Congress as well as the
public with respect to its in-
volvement in the overthrow of
the Allende regime."
Yesterday State Department
spokesman Robert Anderson
said that "we stand by the
statements that have .been
made in the past." He declined.
to confirm or deny the report ;
of Colby's testimony published
Sunday', in The Washington
Post.
Secretary of State Henry A.'
Kissinger similarly declined
yesterday through a spokes-
man to respond to Colby's tes-
timony, which was recounted
in a confidential letter from
Rep. Michael Harrington (D-
Mass.) to House Foreign Af-
fairs Committee ? Chairman
Thomas E. Morgan (D-Pa.) ap-
pealing for further congres-
sional inquiry into covert op-
erations in Chile.
Kissinger was chairman of a,
meeting of the "Forty Com-
mittee" on June 27, 1970 when
the question of covert political
action against Allende was
taken up. Kissinger, according
to records of. the proceeding,
favored a limited and thor-
oughly concealed program of
intervention.
5
cording to sources with access ;
to inter-departmental records
of the deliberations, opposed
CIA intervention in the Al-
lende election but abandoned
its opposition when President
Nixon ratified a limited- 'pro-'
gram oh, intervention for.
which some $350,000 to $400,-
000 was authorized by the
Forty.,Committee.
Kissinger was suoted in
Minutes of the June 27 top-se-
cret meeting at the White
House as having said: "I don't
see. why we need to Stand by
and watch a country go Com-
munist due to the irresponsi-
bility of its own people."
A spokesman for the Secre,
tary said yesterday that Mr.
Kissinger had no.. recollection
of having made Such an obser-
vation and would not corn-,
ment on his role in the delib-I
erations.
Colby's closed testimony to'
the-House Armed- Service sub-,
committee, as recounted in:
the "Harrington letter, was that
the CIA's role in the1970 Chi-
lean election- was that of al
"spoiler" engaged in ."generali
attempts to politically destabi-
lize the country_and discredit
Allende to improve the likeli-
hood that an opposition candi-
date would win."
The Forty Coininittee, which'
is an inter-departmental White
,House panel supervising all
:U.S. covert operations, author-
ized a steady, outpouring of
funds into Chile:through indi-
viduals, political parties and
' news media through --Latin
; American: and European chan-
nels during the anti-Allende
effort, .according2,to the. Sum-
! marY of Colby's testimoriYv.:-
Kissinger' had, on various
1 occisions,- expressed personal
;reservations about-the emer-
gence of the Allende govern
ment, which was committed to
I a program of nationalization
and incorbe redistribution.
After Allende's popular
election in September, 1970,
but before the congressional
run-off, Kissinger told a group
of editors at the White House
that "it is fairly easy 'for one
to predict that if Allende wins,
there is a good chance that he
will establish over a period of
years some sort of Communist
government ...
"So I don't think we should
delude ourselves that an Al-
lende takeover in Chile would
not present massive problems
for us, and for democratic
forces and pro-U.S. forces in
Latin America ... "
But Kissinger added that
the situation was not one "in
ow- capacity for than-
?' ery great at this par-
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3
NEW YORK TIMES
10 September 1974
State Department Backs Reports of a Hands-Off Policy
-
? By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Special to The New York Times
? WASHINGTON, Sept. 9?In
a dispute that could lead to
further hearings, the State Det
partment declared ,today that
it was stahding by the testi-
mony of senior officials who
previously had asserted at
Congressional hearings that
the United States had not in-
tervened in the internal affairs
of Chile after the election of
President Salvador Allende
Gossens.
The challenged testimony
was officially endorsed by the
State Department spokesman,
Robert Anderson, at ?a news
briefing. His statement came
two days after it was reported
that the Central Intelligence
Agency had been authorized to I
spend more than $8-million
from 1970 to 1973 in an effort
to make it impossible for Presi-
dent Allende to' govern. The
Allende Government was over-
thrown last September in a
military coup d'etat..
In
In the last two days, a
Massachusetts Representative
and a Senate aide have attacked
the, credibility of' testimony
given under oath by Charles
A. Meyer, former Assistant
Secretary of State; EdWard M.
Kerry, former Ambassador to
Chile, and Harry W. Shlaude-
man, Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary of State.
Mr. Meyer and Mr. Korry
both maintained at a Senate
Foreign Relations subcommit-
tee hearing last year into the
International Telephone S: Tele-
graph Company's involvement
in Chile that the Nixon Ad-
ministration had scrupulously
adhered to a policy of noninter-
vention. Mr. Shlaudeman simi-
larly told a House Foreign
ticular moment now that mat-
ters have reached this particu-
lar point."
It was during this period
:that the CIA and 'Interna-
tional- Telephone and Tele-
graph Co. sought actively to
Undermine Alleficle's prospects
for election, according to testi-
mony that emerged last year
before the Senate Foreign Rel-
ations multinational subcom-
mittee and most recently cor-
roborated in far greater detail
by CIA Director Colby.
? Harrington, whose letter re-
vived the controversy over
U.S. policy in Chile, said he
would renew his requests to
Morgan and other 'congres-
sional chairmen for a full in-
-quiry into the extent of CIA
intervention against Allende's
elected government.
"I strongly support the
broad initiatives of the Nixon
and Kissinger foreign policy,"
he said. "But I do not think
we should tolerate the stand-
ard of international conduct
we displayed in Chile whether
It was approved by Henry Kis-
singer or anyone else."
??
Affairs subcommittee in June
;that the United States "had
Inothing to do with the political
'destabilization in Chile." ?
I Jerome .L. Levinson, chief
counsel of the Senate Subcom-
mittee an Multinational Cor-
porations, which conducted the
I.T.T. hearings, last' week ac-
cused Mr. Meyer and Mr. Korry
of having deliberately deceived
the Senate. Representative Mi-
chael J. Harrington, a Democra-
tic member of the House Fo-
reign Affairs Committee,
charged that Mr. Shlaudeman
was evading questions and, in
effect, dissembling by refusing
to testify about C.I.A. activities
against the Allende. Govern-
ment.
Asked about those criticisms
today, Mr. Anderson said,
."With regard to the testimony
that was given on the Hill by
Mr. Shlaudeman and Mr. Meyer
and Others, we stand by that."
"I realize there have been al-
legations to the contrary,"
Mr. Anderson added, "and if
any such allegations are pre-
sented, obviously we wil be
very pleased to review the
testimony. But we are unaware
?of any mistatements by the of-
ficers that you referred to."
Mr. Levinson, reached later
tqclay in his Senate office, as-
serted that he would "stand on
what I said."
New Hearings Possible ,
"A reading of the record by
any fair-minded person has to
lead one to the conclusion that
they were not candid with the
subcommittee," he said.
"The words used by Mr.
Meyer and Mr. Korry were!
artful in terms of dodging, butl
NEW YORK TIMES
11 September 1974
in substance and spirit 'the in-
tent was to deceive." .
The subcommittee counsel
said he was planning to confer
tomorrow with Senator Frank
;Church, chairman .of the
'subcommittee, to determine
whether further hearings would
,be necessary. Mr. Church, who
is up. for re-election this fall,
was said to be campaigning in
Idaho today and could not be
reached for comment.
In testimony before the
Churclh subcommittee last year;
Mr. Meyer and Mr. Korry re-
peatedly asserted that the
'United States policy was one
of nonintervention, although
both. men claimed executive
privilege in refusing to discuss
confidential State Department
and White House communica-
tions.
Mr. Korry, who was Ambas-
sador at the time 'Dr. 'Allende
won the presidency in 1970,
testifiecl, as follows in response
to a question from Mr. Levin-
son about his instructions;
"It was Obvious from the his-
torical record that we-did not
act in any manner that 2 re-
flected a hard line;' that the
United States had maintained
the most total hands-off the
military policy from 1969 to
i1971 conceivable; that - the
lUnited States did not seek to
pressure, subvert, influence a
single member of the Chilean
Congress at any time in the
entire four years of my stay."
However, according to still-
secret testimony supplied for
Congress, earlier this year by
William E. Colby, Director of
Central Intelligence, the United
States authorized $1.-million in
clandestine funds in 1969 and
oil Chile
1970 in an attempt to keep Dr.
Allende from winning the gen-
eral elections, and then spent
an additional $350,000 in the
fall of 1970 in an attempt to
bribe members of the Chilean
iCongress not to ratify his-elec-
tion.
1_ Mr. Meyer, who was in
'charge of Latin-American
laffairs in the State Department
'at the time of the coup d'etat,
testifiedsimilarly a few days
ilater that "we were ieligiously
'and scrupulously adhering to
the, policy of. the Government
of ,the United States ... . of non-
intervention. We bought ho
votes, we funded no candidates,
we promoted no coups."
Mr. Korry and Mr. Meyefl
'could not be reached for com-
ment today.
Mr. Shlaudeman, while re-
'fusing to discuss C.I.A. activi-
ties in public testimony, also
emphasized. the United States's
"policy of nonintervention"
during his appearance June 12
'before the House Foreign Af-
fairs Subcommittee on Inter-
American Affairs.
, In that testimony, Mr. Shlau-
deman 'quoted Secretary of
State Kissinger as having de-
clared That "we prefer demo-
cratic-governments land attempt
to exercise our influence to
ithat end; 'but we also know we
Icannot impose our political and
legal structures on others."
Mr. Shlaudeman, who spent
four years in Chile before being
reassigned to Washington last
year, said "I certainly do" late
this . afternoon when asked
whether he..stood by his HouiZ
Jestimony,
1Censored Matter in ook About
Said to I lave Related Chile Activities,
By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Special to The New York,Thpes
WASHINGTON, Sept. 10 ?
The Central Intelligence
'Agency, citing national secur-
ity, censored the first prioved
account of some of the agency's
clandestine activities against
President Salvadore Allende
Gossens of Chile from a re-
cently published expose of- the
intelligence establishment,
well-informed sources said to-
day.
The sources said that the
book, "The C.I.A. and the Cult
of Intelligence," written by two
former Government intelligence
officials, initially included a
detailed description of the in-
ternal debates in 1970. before
the Nixon Administration re-
portedly tried covertly to pre-
vent Mr. Allende's victory in
the Chilean national elections
of September, 1970.
After a ? lengthy battle in
Federal Courts, over prior cen-
sorship, the 434-page book was
?? ? ?
published in June by Alfred A.
Knopf with blank space where
168 passages were deleted.
Much of ,the chapter dealing
with Chile, titled "the Clandes-
tine theory", was heavily cen-
sored in that manner. .
The C.I.A. had argued that
those delitions and 177 other
passages it unsuccessfully
sought to censor would "cause
grave and irreparable damage
to the U.S." if published.
As initially written, the
sources said, the book's chap-
ter on Chile began With the
following quote from Henry
Kissinger, who was then serv-
ing as adviser on national se-
curity to President Richard M.
Nixon:
"I don't see why we need
to stand by and watch a coun-
try go -Communist due to the
irresponsibility of its own peo-
ple."
According to the book Mr.
Kissinger made the coniment
while chairman of a meeting
of the secret "40 Committee,"
the high-level review panel that
oversees and ? authorizes clan-
destine C.I.A. a7ctivities. The-
meeting took plate on June 27,
1970, according to the sciurces,
a few months before the Marx-
ist leader won the Presidential ?
election ?
Thus far Secretary of State
Kissinger has refused to com-
ment publicly on the reports
published Sunday that the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, acting
at the specific direction of the
Nixon Administration, was au-
thorized to spend more than
SS-million between 1970 and
1973 in an effort to make it
impossible for President Al-
lende to govern. The Allende
Government was overthrown
last September in a military
coup d'etat in which the Chile-
an leader died.
Shortly after the coup, Mr.
Kissinger told the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee that
"the C.I.A. had nothing to do
with the coup to the best of
my knowledge and belief." Oth-
er Government officials, in their
6
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appearances before Congres-
sional committees, have gone
further, insisting that the Ad-
ministration followed a policy
of nonintervention toward the
Allende regime.
Mr. Kissinger has been de-
scribed by a number of officials t
with first-hand knowledge as;
having been among those most.
alarmed in the Nixon Adminis-
tration about Mr. Allende's rise
:to power. -
At a background meeting with
newsmen in Chicago on Sept.
16, 1970, shortly after the elec-
tion of Mr. Allende, Mr. Kis-
singer declared that "an Allende
take-over in Chile would present
massive problems for us, and
indeed ?to the whole Western
Hemisphere.
If the Chilean Congress were
to ratify the election, Mr. Kis-
singer added, "in a major Latin
American ?country you would
have a Communist government,
joining, for example, Argentina,
ikhich is already deeply divided
along a long frontier, joining
Peru, which has already been
heading in directions that have
been difficult to deal with, and
? joining Bolivia, which has also
gone in a more left, anti-U. S.
direction."
'A Close Look'
He told the newsmen then:
"We are taking a close look at
the situation. It is not one in
which our capacity for influ-
ence is very great.';
? According to still-classified
House testimony last April by
the Director of Central Intelli-
gence William E. Colby, the in-
telligence agency was author-
ized by the 40 Committee to
spend $500,000 in 1970 to head
? off Mr. Allende's popular elec-
? tion, and was later provided
' with $350,000 to bribe members
of the Chilean Congress who
nonetheless voted in October to
ratify the election.
A number of officials cau-
tioned in interviews today that
the C.I.A.'s efforts against Mr.
Allende were?as one source
put it ?"much more passive
than you'd think" ? from the
published newspaper accounts.
"We were just trying to bail
out people who were under the
gun from Allende and his sup-
porters," one., well-informed
source said.
Most Backed Frei
Most of those who were
aided, the source added, had
been supporters of the former
President, Eduardo Frei Mon-
talva, who had received heavy
C.I.A. subsidies while running
for office in 1964 against Mr.
Allende.
"Don't forget," the source
added, "the whole idea in the
nineteen sixties was what we
called 'nation building' and it
worked. Frei would have won
re-election easily,"
"It's a shame their Constitu-
tion prevented his re-election,"
the source added. Under Chil-
ean law, Mr. Frei could not be
a candidate for re-election in
1970.
According to another well-
informed source who received
"The C.I.A. and the Cult of In-
telligence" before it ApprOnt
sored, a somewhat similar
NEW YORK TIMES
12 September 1974 ?
Senator Church to Press C.I.A. Issue
? By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Special Ito The New York Time.,
WASHINGTON, Sept. 11?
Declaring that deception of
Congress has become , a habit,"
Senator' Frank Church said to-
day he would turn over any
misleading testimony in the
hearingsd'CI '1
to the Justice Department for
investigation into possible per-
jury. ,
"I'm not going to let this
matter slide by,. " Mr. Church
said in a telephone interview
today. "I'm very anuch incensed
by this." ? - ?,
2 High Aides Testified
It was the Idaho Democrat's
first public comment on the
subject since it was reported
Sunday that the Central Intelli-
gence Agency had been secret-
ly authorized to spend more
than $8-million between 1970
and 1973 in a covert attempt
to make it impossible for Presi-
dent Salvtdor. Allende Gossens
to govern in Chile.
Mr. Church is chairman of
the Senate Foreign Relations
subcommittee on Multinational
Corporations, which held highly
publicizzed hearing last year
into the International Tele-
phone & Telegraph Company's
attempts .to urge United States
intervention against the Allende
regime. Mr. -i..;,11ende was over-
thrown by a, military junta in
a bloody coup d'etat one year
ago today. 91
During those- hearings, the
State Department officials,
Charles A. Meyer, former As-
sistant Secretary of State for
Latin-American Affairs, and
Edward M. Korry, a former
Ambassador to Chile, testified
that the United States had
maintained a policy of nonin-
tervention toward Chile.
The two officials also refused
on a number of occasions during
their testimony to answer spe-
i ic.ques ions about whatey
said were privileged communi-
cations on United States policy
toward Dr. Allende.
?Mr. Church, who returned
late yesterday from a lengthy
campaign trip to Idaho, said he
had authorized the subcommit-
tee staff to review testimony of
Government witnesses who
knew of the intelligence
agency's cundestine activities.
Ifothe staff review determines
that there were contradictions
in their testimony, the Senator
said, ."in my judgment the ac-
tion that would be called for
would be to refer the testimony
to the ,Justice Departthent for
investigation of possible prejury.
That's the reason we swear
in witnesses," he said. ?
Details Given by Colby-
To aid in the staff review, Mr.
Church said, he will formally
(request a copy of the testimony
on the agency's Chilean involve-
ment given to a House of Rep-
resentatives Armed Seryices
Intelligence Subcommittee in
April by William E. Colby, Di-
rector of Central Intelligence.
Government ,officiais have con-
firmed that the still-secret testi-
mony ? includes a detailed dis-
cussion of the C.I.A.'s, goals and
strategy in alloting the mil-
lion cash payments.
"Art from the question Of
whether perjury was commit-
ted in a legal sense," Mr.
Church added, "there's no
question but what the com-
mittee was given to believe
that our policy was one of
nonintervention.'
"This is clearly what they
[the witnesses] wantsd us to
believe, everi?though the truth
was a very different matter,"
he said.
'Vietnam Syndrome' Seen
Ivir. Church, a liberal .whO
was lane of the early critics of
the Vietnam w,ar, characterized
the misleading testimony as
"part of the Vietnam syn-
drome."
"There's become a pattern
of deceiving the Congress that
I think began cropping .up dur-
ing the Vietnaiwavar," he. said,"
It became a habit with' testi-
mony on all sensitive matters.
If so' it's a habit the Congress
is going to have to break."
Along with the study of pos-
sible perjury, Mr. Church said
he would formally, request the
full Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, headed by Senator
i
J. W. Fulbright, now n China,
to review "the propriety" of
clandestine activities against
constitutionally elected leaders
such as Mr. Allende. .
account of the decision to in-
tervene in Chile was presented
the two authors, Victor Mar-
chetti, a former C.I.A. official
and John D. Marks, a former
State Department intelligence
analyst.
The C.I.A. later censored a
part of the book in which, a
source said, the C.I.A. was de-
picted as having been divided
about the proposals to invest
funds secretly, against Mr. Al-
lende. Officials at C.I.A. head-
quartets. were said by Mr. Mar-
chetti and Mr. Marks to, be con-
cerned because of the possibili-
ty' -that a sudden spurt -in
spending againft Mr. Allende
'would be traceable to. Wash-
ington.
In addition, the source said,
the original Marchetti-Marks
manuscript described what was
depicted as a serious dispute
over the Chilean policy be-
tween Edward M. Korry; who
served as Ambassador to Chile
from 1967 until 1971, and
Charles A. Meyer, a former As-
sistant Secretary of State for
Latin America Affairs. The
book depicted Mr. Korry as
having been concerned that he
would be considered after Mr.
Allende's election as the am-
bassador who permitted Chile
to be taken over by a Castro-
type figure, the source added.
" Mr. Meyer, an official with
Sears, Roebuck & Co., in Chi-
cago, could not be reached to-
day for comment,
Mr. Korry, contacted today
at his home in Briarcliff Manor,
N. Y., declared that he was
standing by his testimony last
year to a Senate subcommittee
in which he stated that the
United States maintained a poi;
icy, of nonintervention toward
the Allende Government.
"I'm not ducking anybody on
this," Mr. Korry said. "I stand
on all the statements I have
given." He added that he had,
I sent a lengthy letter to The
New York Times explaining his
position and said he would pre-
fer not to comment further
pending receipt of the letter.
Although Mr. Kissinger has
not spoken publicly on the
Chilean issue, he did authorize
to newsmen yesterday the fact
that the 40 Committee only act-
ed upon the unanimous approv-
al of its five members.
They include Mr. Kissinger,
the Central Intelligence Direc-
tor, the chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the Deputy Sec-
retary of State for Political Af-
fairs, Mr. Anderson said.
All 40 Committee decisions
must be approved by the Presi-.
dent before being put into ef-
fect, Mr. Anderson said.
? ? ?
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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR)
1 SEP 1974
Chilean enera s unfazed by report of CIA
.aict hi Allende ouster
But disclosure causes furore in Washington
? By James Nelson Goodsell
Latin America correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
One year after seizing Power,
Chile's military leaders have settled
In for a long stay.
But they celebrate their first an-
niversary in office Sept. 11 amid a
sudden mushrooming of evidence that
the United States Central Intelligence
Agency, contrary to previous denials,
spent millions of dollars from 1970 to
1973 to "destabilize" the government
they ousted.
? One of the reasons they cited for the
overthrow of President Salvador Al-
lende Gossens was the escalating
political and economic chaos in Chile
that Dr. Allende seemed unable to
cope with.
Now, it appears that at least part of
that chaos was sponsored by the CIA.
AuthoritatiOn reported
CIA director William Colby, in
testimony to a House subcommittee,
'reportedly confirmed that his agency
had been authorized to spend as much
as $8 million in an effort to make it
impossible for Dr. Allende to govern.
The Colby testimony went counter
.to sworn testimony of senior State
Department officials, and spokesman
Robert Anderson reiterated Tuesday
denials that the department was in-
volved in attempts to subvert the
Allende regime. But there have been
no denials of CIA involvement
Suspicions of such involvement
have made the rounds over the years.
Although the Colby testimony made
hardly a ripple in Chile after its
disclosure Sunday, it is causing. a
furor in Washington.
There is a feeling that the testimony
may only be the tip of the iceberg ?
that more disclosures will be forth-
coming and that they may well impli-
cate a variety of Nixon adminis-
tration officials.
Already, there is question over
Secretary of State Henry A. Kis-
singer's role in the CIA activities. As
a key member of the National Secu-
rity Council and the head of its "Forty
Committee," he apparently played a
role in approving the use of funds for
the "destabilization" program in
Chile.
?
Yet, in various statements, Dr.
Kissinger has over the years been
quoted as saying, in connection with
Chile, that "we prefer democratic
governments and attempt to exercise
our influence to that end; but we also
know we cannot impose our political
and legal structures on others."
It is precisely this point that is put
in doubt by the disclosures of CIA
Involvement in Chile. ?
Until the Colby testimony was dis-
closed over the weekend, the only
confirmed anti-Allende activity by
Washington was a United States-
sponsored credit squeeze on the part
of both Washington and international
and hemisphere lending agencies.
That squeeze made it hard for Dr.
Allende's Marxist-leaning govern-
ment to obtain credit. But in a way,
Washington could argue effectively
that credits to Chile had dropped
significantly in the last two years of
the government. of Eduardo Frei
Montalva, which immediately. pre-
ceded that of Dr. Allende, due to a
feelinenri the part of President Frei
and the international lenders that:
Chile needed to expend already
granted credits and begin repay-
ments before a large new influx of
credit was granted. .
The Colby disclosures came in a
confidential seven-page letter from
Rep. ,Michael J. Harrington (D) of
Massachusetts asking further con-
gressional hearings on the CIA's role
In the Sept. 11, 1973, military coup that
toppled Dr. Allende's government.
. That coup ended Dr. Allende's ef-
forts to nudge Chile along the road to
socialism and also ended Chile's long
tradition of democratic government.
Moreover, it was accompanied by a
massive roundup of Allende suppor-
ters, escalating reports of the murder
of thousands of Chileans, and imposi-
tion of a broad military dictatorship.
On the eve of the first anniversary.
of the military take-over, for ex-
ample, Amnesty International, the
London-based human rights organiza-
tion, alleged that widespread torture
and executions were continuing in
? Chile.
"The death roll of victims is un-
precedented in recent Latin Amer-
ican history,'! the . organization-
8
charged. Moreover,it said, "there is
little .indication that the situation is
;
Improving or that a return to normal-
I- ity is intended."
Amnesty ? International estimated
that between 8,000 and 10,000 political ?
prisoners were still being detained
without trial in Chile. It added that
tthey represented every sector of
Society .from former Allende '-min?e
isters to ,,doctors, lawyers, trade
unionists, and actors, ?
Worldwide reaction to events in.
Chile, as mirrored in the Amnesty -
International report, has been largely .
negative, prompting the military
leaders headed by President Augusto
Pinochet Ugarte to claim that a leftist
public opinion campaign_ has been
mounted against Chile. ' ?
But General Pinochet and his fellow
military officers have indicated that i
they are worried about their image..
And it is reported that the .Chilean.
Government has hired .the J. Walter.
Thompson agency In New York to
start a public relations campaign
designed to Improve Chile's image. ?
That image may be hard to im-
prove, however, until the military
relax some of the curbs placed on?
Chile and Chileans in thepast year ?
dissolution of Congress, ban on Marx-
ist parties and the shutting down of all
'other political activity, the censorship
of the press, and the abrogation of
many civil rights.
I :
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TEM WASHINGTON POST :Thursday, Sept. 72, 1474
.r0 74
it-
nix g
if; k
- *41N, 7-17-14
(ay 4,1?,
By Laurence Stern '
Washipelon Post Staff Writer
Central Intelligence
gency Director William E.
Colby, the nation's pre-emi-
nent spy, will come out of
the cold into the heat of al-
most certain confrontation
Friday over the issue of co-
ert U.S. political operations
n Chile.
. . . .
Colby has ageeed to ap-
pear at an unusual .two-day
conference of former'
agents, government officials
and journalists on the sub-
ject of "The Central 'Intelli-
gence Agency and Covert
Actions."
The CIA director's op'. ?
pearance was scheduled be-
fore the disclosure Sunday?
of.his executive session tes!
timony on Congress last
April that some $11 million
in covert action funds were
authorized by the' "Forty
Committee" of the National
Security Council and tar-
geted. against the late Chi-
lean ,President Salvador Al-
lende. ?
Sen. Edward M. Kennedy
(D-Mass.) cranked up, the
Chile controversy another
,ger-
turn yesterday with a letter
? to Secretary of State Henry
A. Kissinger asking on what
-authorization the programs
were carried out without no-
tification to Congress. Ken-
- nedy also called State De-!
?partment testimony denying
'U.S. intervention against the
Allende government "mis-
leading' and "deceptive" in.
the letter to Kissinger.
Colby, who rose through
the ranks of the CIA's' co--
vert operations service to
command of the agency, un-
dertakes a daring public re-
lations gamble in facing the
audience of specialists on in-
telligence practices?most
of them ? critical .of. the co-
vert programs with which
? Colby- has been associated
.through his professional
lifetime.
During his year-and-a-half
tenure as director, Colby
has sought to improve con-
tacts with Congress and the:
press in the aftermath of
the battering the agency
took during the unfolding of
the Watergate scandal.
But the two day . confer-
ence, sponsored by the Cen-
ter for National Security
LONDON TIMES
10 September 1974
THE CIA LIVES UP TO ITS. BAD NAME
Studies, will subject Colby
to one of the most informed
and critical audiences to
which he has been so jar ex-
posed.
?
Covert operations are car-
ried out under general p01-
-icy guidadines approved by
the Forty Committee, a sen-
ior inter-departmental comp
mittee Over which the Presi-
dent's national securiyt
ad-
viser, Kissinger,. ? presides.
Colby is a member of the,
powerful but informal' com-
mittee which meets under
the auspices of the White
House.
In recent statements the.
CIA director has empha-
sized the agency's subordi-
nate role to the White
House and the senior policy,
group whose name, until
last year, was never in print
and unknown to members of.
the 'agency's oversight com-
mittees on Capitol Hill: ,
The existence of the Forty
Committee surfaced in con-'
nee :on with the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee's
Multinational Subcommittee
in connection with the role
of the CIA and the Interna-
tional Telephone and Tel
graph .Corp. in Chile.
Aside from the Chile case,
The revelations about the CIA's
.activities in Chile under the
Allende regime will come as no
surprise to the. many leftists and
nationalists all over the world for
whom -the role of " imperialism "
in Allende's downfall was always
a foregone conclusion. But they
are a bitter draught for those ?of
us who cling to the notion of the
"free world", and who still re-
gard the United States as an
irreplaceable ally ? sometimes
clumsy, often misunderstood, but
fundamentally honourable in its
conduct of international affairs.
Must it be believed? Union,
tunately? it seems that there is
little alternative. The story ap-
pears in both the New York
Timess and the Washington Post,
? and has already been confirmed
by Representative Michael Har-
.rington who has read the 'Secret
testimony of the CIA director Mr
Colby, and on whose letter to the
chairman of the House foreign
affairs committee the original
story was based.
The question posed is not that
of the merits of the Allende
regime, which were on the whole
outweighed by its demerits. Nor
is it the much more debatable
question whether those demerits
not 'even whether the CIA's
activities' were a determining
factor in bringing about
Allende's downfall.. Very prob-
ably: they were not. The govern-
ment's exaltation of the class
struggle, its repeated circumven-
tion or defiance of parliament
and. the courts, its connivance at
the arms procurement and train-
ing activities of its supporters,
its attempt to politicize the high
command of the armed fortes?
these things against a 'back-
ground of three-figure inflation
produced by its economic policies
were probably bound to provoke
a military response of some kind.
If United States policy did
contribute to Allende's downfall,
it did so more effectively by
blocking loans from the Inter-
American Development Bank, the
World Bank and the Export-
Import Bank in reprisal for
Chile's failure to compensate the
Anaconda and Kennecott copper
companies for the nationalization
of their major mines. This
certainly . accentuated Allende's
economic problems, though it
was by no means their sole cause.
But one is not obliged to lend
money to a regime that one dis-
likes, and if shortage of foreign
?
eratio, s
? the CIA faces the Prospects
of new revelations on the
scope of covert U.S. opera-
tions under the management
of the Forty Committee.
Foriner New York Times
correspondent Tad Szulc,
writing in the new issue of
Esquire, gives an account of
the CIA's'role in support of
South Africa's white supre-
macist regime. The New
Yorker Magazine is coming
out with an account of the
CIA role in supporting the
ousting of Cheddi Jagan,
leader' of Guyana's inde-
pendence movement. .-
, In England. forrner CIA'
,operations 'officer Philip
B.F. Agee has completed a,
manuscript detiling his
.,day-to-day operations as a
Clandestine operative -in
three Latin-American coun-
tries?Ecuador, Uruguay
and Mexico. Agee's book is--
under contract \kith British ,
Penguin and is expected to
be published early next,
year.
friends must share the blame, for
they did little to help him.
But if the - CIA's ." destab-.
ilizing " activities were not even
necessary, they, merit ? Talley-
. ,
rand's double co,ndemnation:
pire crime tine ftiute.
Possibly 'the'-'' CIA foresaw
that ? Allende': ?expetiment
would encl. ? in a military
takeover, and was trying,/ _to,
strengthen the democratic opposi-
tion to him. If so, it failed. But
whatever it thought, 4 was inter-
ferring in a matter which was
none of its business : the internal
politics of an independent state.
It may be a proper function of
American foreign policy to de--
fend the interests of. the Kenne-
cott copper company, or
to encourage foreign countries'
attachment to democracy.
But covert activity to
" destabilize " the government of
a foreign country in time of peace
is not a proper method for achiev-
ing either of those ends. Its use
can only detract from 'the credi-
bility of American policy through-
out the World and strengthen
suspicions that would otherwise
seem fantastic?such as that of
American 'involvement in the
coup against Archbishop Mak-
were such as toeAustify the inter- credit is to be blamed for
forces a year ago. The question is Chinese and East European answer. 9
vention byto
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WASHINGTON STAR
12 September 1974
By Jeremiah O'Leary
Star-News Staff Writer
Rep. Michael J. Harring-
ton, D-Mass., has charged
that CIA activities in Chile
against the government of
President Salvadore Al-
lende were viewed by the '
'agency as a "prototype or
laboratory experim-ent" to
test techniques .of heavy
financial investment to dis-
credit and bring down a
government.
The charge is contained
in a letter to Chairman J.
William Fulbright of the?
Senate Foreign Relations
committee two months ago.
and which was released
today by Harrington.
In a press conference
? Harrington made public ex-
changes or correspondence
between himself, Fulbright
and other members of Con-
gress about his concern
over activities of CIA and
the U.S. Treasur/Depart-
meat in Chile and the "quite
limited" congressional re-
view of CIA activities. Har-
rington charged these
reviews are perfunctory
and come after the fact.
? IN HIS LETTER to Ful-
bright, Harrington de-
scribed how the "40 Com-
mittee" headed by Henry A.
Kissinger authorized expen-
diture of $11 million from
1962 to 1973 to help prevent
the election of Allende. He
said CIA Director William
WASHINGTON POST .
16 September 1974
Colby's words in testimony
before a House Armed Serv-
ices subcommittee on the
CIA disclose ?the CIA's
intention was to
"destabilize" the Allende
government so as to pre-
cipitate its downfall. ?
Harrington wrote that,
"funding was provided to
individuals, political parties
and media outlets in Chile
through channels in other
countries and in both Latin
America a- nd Europe. Mr.
Colby's description of these
operations was direct,
though not to the point of
identifying actual contacts
and conduits."
? Harrington charged the
Colby testimony indicated
the agency role in 1970 Was
viewed as that of the "spoil-
er involving- general at--
tempts to politically.
destabilize the country and
discredit Allende to
im-
prove the likelihood that an
opposition candidate would
win. Following the election
of Allende, $5 million was
authorized by the 40 com-
mittee for more destabiliza-
tion efforts from 1971 to
1973. An additional $1.5 mil-
lion was spent for the 1973
(Chilean) municipal elec-
tions. Some of these funds
? were used to support an un-
named but influential anti-
Allende newspaper." (The
Star-News has learned that
this newspaper was El
Mercurio, largest daily in
Chile and the property of
wealthy businessman
CIA's laily Reports
weedy to Fore. Now
By Michael Getler
Washington Post Staff Writer
!CIA was never sure precisely
.how much the President. saw
I or read and what, if any. ques.'
tions or comments he raised.
? In a move that pleases U.S.
intelligence officials, Presi-
dent F.ord has reversed a pol-
icy of his predecessor and is
now receiving his daily writ-
ten report on global inteili-
!genee matters directly from
;t he Central Intelligence
Agency.
During the Nixon years, ac-
cording to White. House
Augustin Edwards.)
IN A SEPARATE letter
to Chairman Lucien Nedzi
of, the House Armed Serv-
ices subcommittee on intel-
ligence, Harrington chaged
that Colby indicated in
testimony last April that the
CIA "counselled the White
House to rebuff attempts of
President Allende to settle
his differences with the
United States. These and
other related activities sug-
gest that the agency depart-
ed from its proper role of
intelligence gathering and;
instead, participated in for-
mulation of policies and
events both in the United
States and Chile which it
was supposed to objectively,
analyze and report."
Fulbright responded on
July 26, with a letter to Har-
rington in which the Arkan-
sas Democrat said he
shared Harrington's frus-
tration.
"This has been going on-
in places other than Chile
for many years," Fulbright
_mote. "The Senate at least
has been unwilling to exer-
cise serious control of the
CIA and apparently ap-
proves of the activities to
which you refer in Chile and
which I belive to be a proce-
dure which the CIA has fol-
lowed in other countreis."
? FULBR1GHT wrote that
he believed creation of a
Joint Committee with full
authority to examine the
Though the switch under
Mr. Ford may not bring any
more infOrmation to the Presi-
deht's attention than in the
past: many officials view the ?
change as important in terms;
sources, the daily CIA current
of assuring full access to the , intelligence report for the presidency for various impor,
. '
President was generally re-'? tant elethents within the fed.
eral bureaucracy. -
eeived in the Oval Office ei-;
ther via Secretary of State Mr. Ford began receiving
'Henry Kissinger, who also hi s reports directly from the
serves as the President's na- CIA during the period when
tional security adviser, or ,sen-
was Vice President, and
lor White House aides.
One result of this proce-
dure, sources say, was that the
CIA and control it is the
only practical answer.
"The Foreign Relations
Committee," Fulbright
wrote," in a Showdown
never has sufficient votes to
overcome the opposition of
the forces led by the Armed
Services Committee in the
Sneate but a "jai t Commit-
tee I think would have suffi-
cient prestige to exertise
control."
Fulbright said he would
be glad to join Harrington
in sponsoring a renewed ef-
fort to create a Joint Com-
mittee on the Intellignece
Community.
Harrington said it is
indicative of his frustra-
tions that in five meetings
of the House subcOmmittee.
on inter-American affairs
this year on human rights in
Chile, only one government
witness with knowledge of
U.S. activities in Chile
ppeared.
That witness, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State
Harry Shlaudeman
indicat-
ed, Harrington said "some
knowledge on his part of
CIA activities that he was
unwilling to discuss before
a duly-constituted commit-
tee of the House."
Harrington added there'
are inherent limitations for
members of Congress in
trying to uncover covert ac-
tivities such as those in
Chile and he said the exist-
ing oversight machinery is
illusory.
asked that the practice be con-
tinued after he assumed the
(presidency.
I The intelligence report is
said to be delivered by a mid-
dle-level CIA official. Sources
;say Kissinger's White House
deputy on the National Sect'?
rity Council st'aff, Gen. Brent
Scoweroft, is frequently pres-
ent in the President' t office
when the CIA report is pres-
ented. ?
The CIA prepares a secret
current intelligence report
daily which gets fairly wide
dist eibut;m1 throughout t h e,
government. .
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BALTIMORE SUN
13 September 1974
Study looks for lies tout Allende 1
By DEAN MILLS
Washington Bureau of The Sun
Washington ? Senator Frank
sChurch, the most influential
administration critic on the
Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, initiated a study yes-
terday to, determine whether
State Department officials lied
to various congressional com-
mittees about American in-
volvement in the overthrow of
the Chilean regime of Salvador
Allende.
Aides to the Idaho Democrat
said yesterday the senator in-
structed his staff to make the
study.
They said it will be com-
pleted within a day or two,
and the senator will then de-
cide whether, to call for new
testimony on the question.
Meanwhile, at a press con-
ference yesterday, Representa-
live Michael J. Harrington (D.,,
Mass.), proposed that the Sen.!
? ate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee hold open hearings on the I
role of the United States 'in;
Chile during the Allende per-i
He said that Henry A. Kis-
singer, the Secretary of State,
should be called before the
panel to give a public explana-
tion of the role of the so-called
"Forty Committee" in the ov-
erthrow of the Allende regime.
In his capacity as director of
the National Security Council,
Dr. Kissinger .chaired the com-
mittee, which has responsibility
for covert activities of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency.
I Mr. Harrington, citing secret
testimony by William E.
Colby, the CIA director, before
!a House Armed Services sub-
committee in July, . has
charged that the CIA poured
$11 million into Chile from 1962
to 1973 to support Allende op-
ponents and to "destabilize"
the Allende. government after
it came to power. _
WASHINGTON POST
11 September 1974
In public testimony, State
Department officials repeat-
edly have denied any Ameri-
can involvement in the over-
throw of Dr. Allende. ?
In a letter to Senator J .W.
Fulbrighti (D., Ark.), chair-
man of the Foreign Relations
Committee, released at the
press conference, Mr. Harring-
ton said that the Senate panel
! should study the Possibility of
'lodging perjury charges
!against the officials.
I "It is no longer acceptable,"1
Ihe said, "for the Congress to
:acquiesce in State Department
officials' coming before con-
gressional committees and
making statements, which, if
not outright lies, are at least
evasions of the truth."
Senator Edward M. Kennedy
(D., Mass.) said at least three
times in the last year State De-
partment officials made "mis-
leading and 'deceptive" state-
ments to Congress about the
American role in Chile, it was
Chile and Cuba
T'
UNITED STATES has consistently denied using
the CIA to fight leftist Salvador Allende in Chile:
Yet, it now turns out, CIA director William E. Colby told
a House committee last April that: The CIA gave $3 mil-
lion to the Allende political opposition in 19M and $500,-
000 more to "anti-Allende forces" in 1969. It authorized
$350,000 to bribe the Chilean congress against him in
IWO, *the year he won. It contributed $5 million for
"more destabilization efforts" in 1971-73 and $1.5 million
in by-elections in 1973. In August of that year, it author-
ized $1 million for "further political. destabilization ac-
tivities."' A coup ousted him, and he 'was killed, a year
ago today.
The Colby revelations do not answer once and for all
the question Of whether, as-the Latin left already..be,
Heves, the United States destroyed Allende; some part
of his difficulties were of his own making. Nor do the
'revelations demonstrate that the CIA had a direct hand
in the coup. They prove beyond dispute,-however, that
the United States acted in a' way to aggravate Mr. Al-
lende's problems, and played into the hands of those
who made the coup. We did so, ?moreover, deliberately:
According to Mr. Colby, the anti-Allende acts were not
the work of a mindless uncontrolled agency but of a CIA
operating at the instructions of the appropriate White
House review panel, the "FortyCommittee," headed by
Henry Kissinger.
Dr. Kissinger and' President Nixon, one gathers, had
decided there were to be "no more Cubas": no more
Marxist states in the western hemisphere. Any means,
apparently, would do. Would it not be better, Dr. Kissin-
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In a letter to Dr. Kissinger,
Senator Kennedy described the
statements as "contrary to my
understanding of the dual re-
sponsibility of Congress and the
!President in the conduct of U.S.
foreign relations."
The Colby disclosures were
the highlight of the opening of a
conference on covert activitiesi
and the CIA,_ sponsored by the.
Center for National Security,
Studies. 1
Senator Phillip A. Hait (D.,,!
Mich.) opened the conferencel
yesterday by urging Congress to
explore the CIA role in Chile.
' "We haven't done a damn
thing . . . to prevent the Presi-
dent from waging secret wars,"
Senator Hart said. He said the
Colby testimony "has more pro-
found implications for our for-
.eign policy than many .interna
tional issues in which Congress
has shown interest."
ger was asked at his confirmation hearing as Secretary
of State a year ago, to take the CIA out of such
- clandestine efforts as overturning Latin governments?.
"There are certain types of these activities, 'difficult to
describe here," the Meretary-designate replied, "that it
would be dangerous to abolish."
' This information comes to light now through the sur-
-
' facing of a confidential letter from Rep. Michael Har-
rington (D-Mass.) to House Foreign Affairs Committee/
Chairman Thomas E. Morgan (D-Pa.), in. which 1?117. Har-,
?/
rington asks for a deeper investigation. Dr. Morgan, like
his Senate counterpart, J. William Tulbright (D-Ark.),
has been reluctant to press such' a probe. But it is laugh-
able for Cengress to assert a larger foreign-policy role
if it is to shy away from this outrageous instance of
hemispheric realpolitik. Last year, for instance, the Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Committee's subcommittee on mul-
tinational corporations investigated charges that in 1970
ITT had sought to induce the CIA to block Allende. The
subcommittee found that the CIA had not followed ITrs
bidding.- But now it turns out that?before, during and
after the ITT episode?the CIA was intervening in Chile-
an politics.
Since the 1960s, the United States lias- used its influ-
ence to keep Cuba a hemispheric pariah. And why?
A principal stated reason has been Cuba's ostensible
support of subversion in Latin America: putting guer-
rillas ashore here and there, sounding the revolutionary
trumpet, and the like. But whatever Cuba has allegedly
done in the past is peanuts next to what the .United
States has admittedly done in Chile. To bar Cuba from
hemispheric society on the basis of a test we fail our-
? selves is absurd. . , ?
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LONDON TIMES
11 September 1974
Gung-ho
Victor Marchetti was an officer'
of the Central Intelligence
Agency for 14 years, and a book;
of which he is co-author, The
CIA and the Cult of Intelligence,
is a cause celebre in the Ameri-
can courts. Because the courts
ruled that Marchetti was still '
bound by the oath of secrecy -
he made when he joined the CIA
in 1955, the book has been pub-
lished with about 5 per cent of
its contents missing because of
168 deletions which the CIA still
insist upon.
Marchetti was on a 24-hour
visit to London yesterday. It is
his first travel abroad since he
left the Agency. "I knew the
CIA would do anything they
could to discredit me when I
surfaced so I had to be purer
than the driven snow. I have
been followed, my telephone has I
been tapped, my mail has been
tampered with, and there have
,been certain efforts toward en-
trapment. Foreigners have been
put in my path, whom I have
?had to take care not to get in-
volved with."
' Marchetti does not believe the
CIA masterminded the deaths
of John Kennedy or Martin
Luther King, and says he has
no first-hand knowledge of any
assassination attempts, though,
he has heard rumours. "During
training we were told that any-
thing like that we-ild have to be
approved at the highest level,
and it would be a black mark
against you. You would have
to be a pretty lousy case officer
if you could not find any way
of terminating your agent with-
out !tilling him."
Marchetti says he never liked
? his job much. I always thought
it Was basically sort of silly. I
could never quite get with the
gung-ho aspects of it. When I did
training they were very strong
on paramilitary stuff as well? as
standard trade craft like how to
? open letters indetectably and
how to plant bugs. I did not like
a lot of the people I met."
Honesty is not a CIA charac-
teristic. "They denied being in-
volved in Chile, but it is now
revealed that they did pour
' millions of dollars in to prevent
Allende coming to power and
?
then to destabilize his govern-
ment. They consistently denied
being involved in Greece, but
Greece is a major station for
many area programmes and they
clearly backed' the junta. Now
they are moving assets out of
Athens and on to Teheran where
they have a safer station. The
ambassador is the former
director of the CIA, and the
Shah owes his throne to the
CIA."
PHS
ChTISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR ?
11 SEP 1974 ?
CIA and Chile
Now the facts are coming to
light. The Central Intelligence
Agency was not the innocent by-
stander in Chile that the United
States Government tried to imply
it was at the time of the overthrow
of Salvador Allende.
The CIA, it turns out, engaged
for years in clandestine activities
against the late Chilean Presi-
dent. CIA director William Colby
acknowledged in secret testimony
to the Congress that some $8
million had been authorized by a
high-level intelligence -committee
headed by Henry Kissinger to
"destabilize" Allende's Marxist
government and bring about its
downfall after1970.
The disclosures are shotking
and dictate the urgent need for a
public scrutiny of national secu-
rity policies, a reform of CIA
functions, and a system of strict
accountability for CIA actions.
They also point again to the decep-
tion practiced by previous admin-
istrations.
The State Denartment sticks by
its guns. It stated this week it
backs the testimony of high offi-
cials who previously told Congress
that the U.S. had not intervened in
the domestic affairs of Chile after
Allende's election. '
Clearly the full story has yet to
be told. In light of the developing
dispute we favor full-scale public
hearings into the CIA's role in
Chile, as called for by Congress-
man Michael Harrington.
? This is not the first time the CIA
has been involved in questionable
covert operations against foreign
states. Its record includes the
aborted Bay of Pigs invasion, the
secret war in Laos, and efforts to
overthrow governments in Iran
and Guatemala. More recently, on
the domestic front, it furnished
the White House "plumbers"-with
technical aid and a psychiatric
profile of Daniel Ellsberg ? acts
that violated its mandate.
The record is disturbing.
However distasteful, clandes-,
tine operations sometimes are
necessary. If a foreign power, for
instance, is engaged in activities :
in a country that could impair
American interests, it stands to1
reason the U.S. must know what it
is up to. But gathering informa-
tion and exposing Co? ?unist sub- ?
versipn, say, are one thing. At- i
? tempts to undermine or overthrow
legitimate gos;ernments are quite ?
another.
A distressing aspect of all this is!
the double standard which the
U.S. has set for its international
conduct. It apparently is per- ,
missible for the CIA to maneuver
against local governments which'
Washington does not like ? this is
deemed in the national interest.
But when the U.S. declines to use
its influence to dissuade repres-
sive regimes from antidemocratic
excesses ? as in South Korea or
Greece ? this is justified as "non-
interference" in another country's
internal affairs.
If the CIA is permitted to abet
the disintegration of constitu-
tionally elected governments ?
however unpalatable their ideo-
logy ? does not the U.S. lose its
moral authority to condemn sim-
ilar subversive action by a Com-
munist power?,
The Allende regime was hardly
a model for Latin America. But
the late President aid carry on his
Marxist experiment within the,.
constitutional framework. if '-
Washington chcise not tiS render
help ? except to the Chilean
military ? that at least was an
overt, if debatable, position.
But by colluding in the effort to
undermine the Chilean Govern-
ment by covert means, Washing-
ton has only helped destroy the
credibility of the argument that
Communists should participate in
the democratic process rather
than seek power through violent
means.
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NEW YORK TIMES
? 13 September 1974
NEM
Secret War on Chile
'IN THE NATION -
By Tom Wicker
On the very day that President Ford
extended preventive pardon to Richard
Nixon, another high crime of the Nixon,
?Administration was being disclosed in
The New York Times. Public outrage
because of the pardon must not be
allowed to obscure this sordid story
of indefensible American ,intervention.
in the internal affairs of Chile, in the
years just before the violent over-
throw of the Allende Government anti
the death of President Salvador Al-
lende Gossens.
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
appears to have been a principal force
in this covert intervention, and is be-
.ing charged once again with not hav-
ing told the whole truth to a. Senate
committee. Demands are being heard
for a reopening of the hearings which
recommended his confirmation as Sec-
zeta ry. .
? The Times story, by Seymour Hersh,
was based on a letter from Repre-
sentative Michael Harrington of Mas-
sachusetts to Chairman Thomas E.
Morgan of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee. The Harrington letter gave
an? account, from memory, of testi-
mony to a House Armed Services sub-
comrhittee by William E. Colby, the
director of the Central Intelligence
Agency.
Mr. Harrington said he had twice
read a transcript of the Colby testi-
mony. As he described it to Mr:
Morgan, Mr. Colby said that the Nixon
Administration had authorized about
$8 million to be spent Overtly to
make it impossible for President Al-
lende to, govern. Specifically, $500,000
was authorized in both 1969 and 1970
to help Mr. Allende's election oppo-
nents, and $350,000 was later au-
thorized for bribing members of the
Chilean Congress to vote against rati,7
fying Mr. Alleride's election. "
Later $5 million was authorized for
clandestine "destabilization" efforts in
Chile; and in 1973, $1.5 million was
provided to help anti-Allende candi-
dates in municipal elections. The' au-
thorizing body for a.11 this C.I:A. ac-
tivity was the so-balled "40 Committee"
of the Nixon Administrationa- com-
mittee chaired by Henry Kissinger.
But Mr. Kissinger told the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee during his
confirmation hearings that "the C.I.A.
had nothing to do with the coup, to
the best of my knowledge and belief."
While that may have been true in the
narrowest sense, it was at best one .of
those torturous non-lies in which gov-
ernments specialize and at worst a
concealment of the true nature of U.S.
policy toward the Allende Government
.and the scope of American activities
to undermine that Government.
. ?
Similarly, Edward M. Korry, ambas-
.sador to Chile during most of the,period
in question, denied under oath to ?a
? Senate subcommittee that there had
been American attempts to "pressure,
subvert, influence a single member of
the Chilean Congress.' Charles A.
Meyer, a former Assistant Secretary
of State for Latin-American affairs,
also swore that the United States had
scrupulously followed a policy of non-.
intervention in Chile.
No wonder, then, that Senator Frank
Church, to whose, subcommittee this
sworn testimony was offered, was re-
ported to be outraged upon learning
of the Colby testimony. He has prop-
erly raised not only the possibility of
perjury charges but the question. of
comprehensive hearings by the full
Foreign Relations Committee on the
? intervention in Chile.
If such hearings are held, or if Mr. ?
Kissinger's confirmation hearings?
should be reopened?as they already
have been oxide, to inquire into charges
that he did not tell the whole truth" ,
abotit wiretaps on reporters and some
of his associates?the inquiry should
Rress much further than, the candor of
official testimony, important as that
question is. .
But as One Government :official
? pointed out to Mr. Hersh, if .covert ac-
tivities against another country are au-
thorized, Gosiernment officials?some-
times 'including Secretaries of State
and Presidents?have to lie about
them. Lies 'are part of the business.
The real questions are whether this
supposedly peace-roving and demo.
cratic nation has any legal or moral
right to conduct covert operations
abroad, and whether any Administra-
tion of either party has the constitu-
tional authority to order taxpayers'
money spent for clandestine warfare.
against the legitimate government of
a sovereign country. ,
These questions are long overdue for
full and ppen debate; the Colby testi-
mony, for example, said the first -in-
tervention against Mr. Allende was
Ordered by Lyndon Johnson in 1964?
Congress, the press, Presidential .can-
didates ? all have consistently shied
away from this subject. Supposed ,
liberals have pled the supposed need ,
to be "hard-nosed.' The real need is,
to face the fact that gangster schemes
of bribery, violence and even assasSin?
ation are being carried out, in the
name of the great American people.
The C.I.A. may be only an instru- ?
ment, but it seems to have its own
sinister vitality. The Chilean efforts,
in fact, were authorized by the lineal
descendent of a ?body set up by the
Kennedy Administration to "control"
the C.I.A. Isn't it clear at last that
such "control" can be. achieved only
by a Government with the political wilt,
to cut the C.I.A. in half, or kill it al-
together?
NEW YORK TIMES
13 September 1974: ?
CONCERN BY INDIA
ON C.I.A. RELATED
t By SEYMOUR M. HERSH ,
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Sept. 12?
Daniel P. Moynihan, ambassa-
dor to India, has priyately
? warned Secretary of State Kis-
singer that recent reports of
Central Intelligence Agency
? activities in Chile have con-
firmed Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi's "worst suspicions and
genuine fears" about American
policy toward India.
In a stinging rebuke of such
s? clandestine activities, Mr.
Moynihan noted in a confiden-
that his embassy formally de-
nied last year to the Indian
Government that the United
States had intervened against
the Marxist President of Chile,
? Salvador Allende Gossens. Mr.
Allende died in a bloody coup
d'etat last September.'
Writing of Mrs. Gandhi, Mr.
Moynihan said:
''Her concern is whether the
-United States accepts the In-
dian. regime. She is not. sure
but that we would be content
to sea _others like her over-
thrown. She knows full well
that we have done our share
and more of. bloody and dis-
honorable deeds."
Not Worried About Ouster
The ambassador said Mrs.
Gandhi was not worried about
being overthrown, and added:
"It is precisely because she
Is not innocent, not squeamish
and not a moralizer that .her
concern about American inten-
tions is real and immediate.
"And of course the news
from the United States, as
printed in the Indian press, re-
- peatedly confirms her .worst
suspicions and genuine fears.
"Nothing will change her un-
less she is satisfied that the
United States. acceptS her In-
dia. She does noto. now think
we do. She thinks, we are
profoundly* selfish and cynical
counter-revolutionary power."
Because of. that belief, Mr.
Moynihan noted, "she will aci
cordingly proceed to develop
nuclear weapons and a missile
delivery system preaching non-
violence all the way"
State Department officials
said that the cablegram had
been personally re.A.;iewed by
Mr. Kissinger, but, his reaction
could not be learned.
. There was no official com-
ment from the State Depart-
ment about the ambassador's
Cable. One well-informed offi-
cial acknowledged that Mr.
dignant about the C.I.A.'s
ac-
tivities in Chile. -
"Pat's always indignant," the
official added. "He write beau-
tifully and his cables are a de-
light to read, but he's always
indignant.",
Other officials said that, as
far as they knew, Mr. Moyni-
han was still in good standing
with the Ford Administration.
IlRepresentative Michael J.
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WASHINGTON POST
13 Sept ember 19714
Stephen S. Rosenfeld
the: CIA and Kissinger
To go barking after the CIA because
of its secret operations in Chile is be-
side the point. The agency, in subvert-
ing the late Socialist President. Salva-
dor Allende, was carrying out estab-
lished national policy ? White House
policy. The CIA's director, William
Colby, who was in the position of re-
porting to Congress about actions
taken under earlier (Erectors, deserves
praise for his candor.
The real need is to fathom why
Henry Kissinger, then (1970-73) Mr.
Nixon's national security adviser, felt
it was essential to get rid of one partic-
ular leader of a country which, by its
region, size and general importance,
plays almost no part in the global bal-
ance of power, on which Kissinger's
strategy supposedly is based.
Interestingly, Allende and Chile are
not mentioned once in the absorbing
new book, "Kissinger," by Bernard and
.Marvin Kalb. The only public clue to
his thinking is pretty insubstantial. An
Allende "takeover," Kissinger said in
1970 of Allende's electoral victory,
could produce over time'sorne sort of, _
Communist government" which could
pose "massive problems for is, and for
democratic forces and pro-U.S. forces
An Latin America." .
What were those "massive prob-
lems" which the United States set out
to help diter by covert means?
?No doubt Kissinger and Nixon want-
ed, if posible, to limit leftist move-
ments throughout Latin America: "No
more Cubes." But in view of Washing-
ton's moves then toward Moscow, and
its tentative move now toward Ha-
vana, this hardly seems' an adequate
rationale. ?
e Nor can a very persuasive case be
. Made that the defense of the United
States' then-embattled corporate inter-
ests in Chile ? and by extension, else-
Democrat whose concern over
Chile policy led to the C.I.A.
disclosures, urged at a news
conference that Mr. Kissinger
publicly be called upon by
Congress to aceount or that
,policy. He said that if the
agency ?did not cease its clan-
destine activtties, it might
jeopardize all of its overt in-
telligence-gathering work.
cSenator Edward M. Ken-
nedy, Democrat of Massachu-
setts, made public a letter to
Mr. iKssinger in which he
sought an explanation for the
? legal basis of the agency's in-
volvement in Chile as well as
an explanation of why State
Department ' officials misled
Congress during sworn testi-
mony about the United States
policy toward Cuba.
William E. Colby, director
of the C.I.A., testified in secret
about the Chile operations be-
fore the Senate Armed Serv-
ices subcommittee on intelli-
gence. The hearing was led by
Senator John C. Stennis, Dem-
ocrat of Mississippi and chair-
where in the third world ? required
measures so extreme. You have to be a
Marxist, or to think Kissinger and
Nixon were pretty stupid, to believe
that was a dominant factor.
For what it's worth, I suspect Kis-
singer feared that the example of a
successful popular front government
in Chile?Communists and Socialists
working together ? might have a con-
tagious effect in France and Italy and
other places where, in the 1970s. popu-
lar fronts have a real chance of com-
ing to power. Kissinger voiced this
fear in discussing his Chile policy pri-
vately at the time.
The election of a Socialist-Communist
coalition in Chile . had, after all,
aroused global attention. .Communist
parties were widely being made re-
spectable, in part by the example of
Richard Nixon in dealing with Moscow
and Peking. Their "natural" political
partners were and are the democratic
socialist parties of the left. It was not
far-fetched ? not then, not now ? to
imagine popular fronts taking power
and, degree by degree, removing their
countries from the "West," as the area
of postwar American dominance is
commonly known.
It is suggestive that CIA Director
Colbyapparently ranked the Chile op-
eration in importance with postwar
Greece and Guatemala and described
it as a "prototype" for bringing for-
eign governments down with money.
In postwar Greece, the United States
helped Athens defeat a Communist in-
surgency launched across a national'
frontier. In Guatemala in 1954, the
CIA sponsored a military coup against
a Communist government. In Chile it
provided financial support to help
local elements thwart an elected Marx-
ist who was expected to take Chile to-
ward communism by a parliamentary
route.
man of the full committee.
alA two-day conference on
"the C.I.A. and covert actions"
opened in a Senate hearing
room, with Senator Philip A.
?Hart, Democrat of Michigan,
declaring that if Congress did
not fully investigate the
agency's role in Chile, "it will
be sending the executive
branch a clear signal that it is
not really serious about reas-
serting all its powers and its
right to participate in the
foreign policy area."
Adverse Effect Is Seen
Mrs. Ghandi's anger and,
fears, as reported by Mr. May-'
nihan, could have an adverse
effect on the continuing United
States attempt to improve rela-
tions with India in the after-
math of Mr. Kissinger's tilt to-,
Kissinger, using wit as a cloak, has
quipped that Chile is "a dagger
pointed at the heart. of Antarctica."
His implication: How_can anyone think
he was uptight about Chile? But pera
haps he was uptight about Chile. ?
Temperamentally, what Kissinger
seems to fear most in the current in-
ternational scene is the flux, the un-"
tertainty, the difficulty of convincing
the American public to deal with fhter-'
national challenges less evident ? but
in his mind, hardly less ominous ?
than military attack.
Kissinger is a child of Weimal
Germany: He has seen democracy de
stroyed. He has some of the European
Intellectual's characteristic ambiva.
lence about popular democracy, 631
whose putative weaknesses he at
tempts to compensate by diplomatic
manipulation, elitism, secrecy, per
sonal virtuosity. This is of a piece with
his scarcely concealed contempt fo,
Europe's cravenness ? an attitude al
which the public saw traces after flu
Mideast war last year.
It is the conventional wisdom thai
Vietnam taught the United States that
it could no longer play th.
"policeman" of the world. But perhapi
it taught Kissinger, whose view of his
tory is long and dark and extendy
much beyond Vietnam, that the UniW
States must play the policeman in
particular way ? a way that fends ofi
feared foreign dangers but does Dui
bring down the domestie
wrath on the government's or one'l
own head. ?
There is something undeniably val
iant about Kissinger's purposes, but
there can be something undeniably el
cious about his means. Is there m
other way for the values and the into,
,ests of the- United States to thrive?,
_ .
?
ward Pakistan. in the 1971
India-Pakistan war. ?
The Secretary of State was
known to be planning a visit
to' India next, month and was
expected to set up a number of
joint United States-Indian com-
missions to work out economic
and technical aid agreements.
Mr. Moynihan reported that!
Indian newspapers had giveni
wide circulation to dispatches!
about C.I.A. activities against!
Mr. Allende thatw ere author-
ized by Mr. Kissinger as direc-;
tor of the 40 Committee, a high-
?level intelligence review group
that meets in the White House.;
Mr. Moynihan also noted that
the Indian newspapers had 7e-
printed Mr. Kissinger's denials
last year about United States
ievolvement in Chile.
14
7A-143roiNaTOTRelease-20.01/08108 : CIAIRDP77-00432R000100340007-3
Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3
BALTIMORE SUN
14 September 1974
OA head
defends
? .
covert. plans
?
C qhf;147t.071 137:T.CU 0! The Sun
Washington--:-Tbe director - of
central intelligence Said .yester-
day cancellation of secret op-1
er;-:!tirsos ?bro?r_i ?wriel"? not ;
gravely endanger the nation in ;
the present -world situation.;
But ? he. warned that imperative
eeds could :arise in the future.1
? William -E.- Colby, ? the ciirec-1
tor, aLso :deniethany CIA "con-i
nedtion"-sto-the 1973 overthrowi
of Salvador Allende in-Chile. 1
With a ;measured defense of ;
the ? ?,? Celtrat. _ Intelligence:
Azency,-?;Mr. Colby drew a care-
ful distinction between-what -is
desirable and. -what is imperat-i
lye.- In the end he cable down:
against :en ding covert- opera-,
which :May range fromi
Support of assassination to ero-i
-ding governments'.? in the in7;
terest of national security.
He :acknowledged that the.;
tnr-ndate ?'of the . CIA: -in-- this
aree' was not ,a..ryrj-tal
>under 'the . Asiational-'1Stiatritic!
Act of 1947, which created the
;agency... Instead,- he -said;rthe
tmandate had been developed ,
under the act by the executive!
and Congress. If they 'changed ;
it,..he-semphasized, the-ragency:1
(would act.accordingly. . .1
Mr. Colby appeared before a ,
largely hostile audience. It was:
a conference on the CIA andi
its covert activity, conducted
by the Center for National Se-
curity Studies under the spon-
sorship of-Senator ? Philip ;A. !
Hart- (D.,- Mich.) and Senator!,
Edward W. Brooke (D., Mass.). !
.It was?ari audience that gen-.
erally applauded critics of the,
agency and.. hisSed its defen-
ders,-'-including Mr. Colby.-
. It also was an audience that!
Came to the hearing- room in !
the Senate Office Building
armed with fresh evidence
against the CIA. The material
was leaked secret testimony
by Mr. Colby that United
States had spent?about $3 mil-
lion to undermine the govern-
ment of the late President
Allende in ! Chile. ? Opposi-
tion to Mr. Allende, a Marxist
who was elected, finally culmi-
nated last year in a coup dur-
ing which he was shot to
death.
Mr. Colby said all covert
operations of the CIA were
approved by the so-called "40
Committee" of the National
Security Council. Henry A.
Kissinger, Secretary of State,
is chairman of the council. Dr.
Kissinger and other State De-
711E-WASHINGTON:POST rrqaYS6PV3. 1974
is.dosure, of CIA Chile Rote
ur verseers on ill.
By Laurence 'Stern-
-, Washington Post Staff Writer -
One of the Senate's most
senior congressional over-
seers of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency's operations
said yesterday that he was
not informed of the extent
of U.S. covert political op-
erations in Chile.
Sen. Stuart Symington (D-
Mo.) made this admission in
a telephone interview after
CIA Director William E.
Colby was called into a two-
hour executive session of
the Senate Armed Services.
intelligence subcommittee in
the aftermath of disclosures
Sunday that $11 million in
covert action funds had been
targeted against the late
Chilean president, Salvador
Allende.
"You can say that I was
surprised," said Symington,
a loyal supporter_ of the
agency in the past.
Symington's surprise, it
was understood, was shared
by Senate Armed Services
Committee Chairman oJhn
C. Stennis (D-Miss.\. who
also presides over the CIA
oversightisubcommittee.
Symington's statement se-
riouslY clouds the credibility
of the oft-repeated assertion
by Colby and other top CIA
officials that the agency's
congressional oversight com-
mittees have been fully
briefed on all major covert
programs carried out by the
agency tinder the authority
of the National Security
Council.
- The disclosure . of secret
funding_ for anti-Allende ac-
tivities, made by 'Colby in
executive testimony to a
House Armed Services intel-
ligence subcommittee last
:April 22, was also in direct
&inflict with sworn testi-
mony by high-ranking State ?
Department officials that
the United States pursued a
policy of non-intervention
during the Alleride period.
So serious were these con-
flicts that Sen. Frank
Church (D-Idaho). said he
Would refer to the Justice
Department for perjury in-
The intelligence director took
the same position yesterday.
The agency, he said, "had no
corfnection with the military
coup ? in 1973," nor with its
leaders. It was aware, he ack-
nowledged. of sentiment for a
coup, and as far as he knew no
One had informed Mr. Allende.
Mr. Colby refused to say,
'however, what actions the CIA,
might have taken to encourage
that sentiment. He also refused:
to discuss specifics of any
partment officials have told other covert CIA operation ex-
Congress. the U.S. had Alffillovedfor Reignite 124361/08113
In the coup,
'congressional committees
iiestigation previous sworn
testimony before his Multi-,
national Corporations Sub-
Committee that appears to
be misleading.
Rep. Dante Fascell (D-
na.), chairman of the House
Foreign Affairs Latin Amer-
ica subcommittee, was also
reported by ?aides yesterday:
to be "deeply concerned" by,
discrepancies in official tes-_
timony over covert U.S. ac-
tion in Chile.
.The issue was given fur-
ther impetus yesterday with
the release by Rep. Michael
Harrington (D-Mass.) before
television cameras of his
summary of the top-secret
Colby testimony on Chile as
well as his until now futile
efforts by letter to generate
further congressional in-
quiry into the subject.
Harrington's dossier dis-
Closed that last June 12?the
day he examined Colby's
testimony detailing the $11
million in covert authoriza-
tions for a second time?a
State Department 'witness
testified under oath that
there was no CIA funding of
efforts to upset the Allende
government.
The witness was Harry
Shlaudeman, then acting as-
sistant secretary of state for
inter-american affairs and
second in command of the
U.S. embassy in Chile dur-
ing the Allende administra-
tion. /
Shlaudeman, former Am-,
hassador to Chile Edward
Korry and former Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs Charles-
Meyer Jr., all testified un-.,
der oath before various con-
gressional committees that
no money was spent and no
covert programs were ca,r:.
ried out to subvert the Al-.
lende government. - -
Harrington said any con-
gressional inquiries growing,
out of the Chile disclosures
should include testimony by
Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger. As chairman of
charged with watching over
the agency.
Responsible members of:
Congress knew generally of the
CIA's role in Chile. he said,
but he could not say they knew !
precisely where every dollar
was being spent.
"We did look forward to a
change in government," he
continued, to skeptical laugh-
ter, "but through the demo- I
cratic processes in 1976."
Mr. Colby suggested it was!
ironic that the United States
the National Security Coun-
ell's senior panel on secret
operations, the go-called
Forty Committee, Kissinger'
was a principal decision-
maker on the funds and pro-
grams targeted against Al-
lende.
The CIA Was the subject
of a three-ring whirl of de-
velopments on Capitol Hill.
yesterday: the Armed Serv-
ice Committee meeting, the
Harrington press conference
and an unusual conference
on the agency's covert oper-
ations attended by former
government officials, ex-
agents and specialists on in-
telligence.
The conference produced
a mountain of special re-
ports on covert programs
and a consensus that the
agency's covert operating
programs ..-were, ' on . the
whole, contrary to national
interest. ? .
CIA Director Colby will
appear before the confer-
ence at 3 p.m. today to
speak on "The View from
Langley," the suburban Vir-
ginia headquarters of the
CIA.
-Sen. Philip A. Hart (D.-
Mich.), in opening the con-
ference, urged that Con-
gress further explore the
CIA role in Chile and pro-
tested that "we haVen't done
a damn thing ... to prevent
the President from waging
secret Wars."
, One of the principal
points of criticism in the
conference and in Harring-
ton's press conference was
the ineffectiveness of con-
gressional oversight of the
CIA' operations ?)princi-
pally those targeted, against
government* or foreign po-
litical leaders Considered
"unfriendl&" to U.S. inter-
ests.
Symington's admission of
surprise upon learning from
press reports Sunday and
from Colby yesterday of the
scope of the Chile programs
was an example of what the
critics were talking about.
countries vital information that !
was made public as a matter
of course here. ?
Did the agency use methods
that were illegal in those coun-
tries and would be illegal in
the United States? He was:
asked. "Of course," he said. I
It was important, he said' ;
that the president of the,'
:United States have available to:
him measures that provided
options between "a diplomatic
!protest and sending in the
!Marines."
i Ile could envision situations, ;
he went on, in which the
8 3101A0REOPY74004821k0001003404107-8tates might need to
?methods to obtain from other; conduct covert action in the
15 -
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3
WASHINGTON POST
1.1-i September 19714
By Laurence Stern
.-Washington Post &elf Writer .
Central ? Intelligence'
,Agency Director William E.
Colby stepped coolly into a
public confrontation yester-
day over his agency's covert.
activities in Chile, took the
boos and hisses 4ith equan-
imity, and gave little in re-
turn. n -
? Appearing, in a- crowded
Capitol Hill hearing which
was heavy in political thea-
ter but short in substance,
Colby declined to discuss
publicly details of the re-
ported $11 -million in secret
U.S. activities targeted
against the late Chilean
President Salvador Allende
before and .after he came to
power. ?
He did not deny the re-
ports, which stemmed from
secret testimony he gave a I
House subcommittee last
April 22. There'was only the
most oblique hint of confir-
mation when he deplored..
the leak of his testimony as
raising the "dilemma of how
we can provide Congress del-.
icate information without .
adverse effects."
Colby reiterated his long- ,
standing position that "the
CIA had no connection with;
the military coup [in Chile] '
in 1973."- He acknowledged, ?
however, that "we did look
forward to a change in.
government" in the .1976 ?
elections.
. Colby weathered with im-
.perturbabilitY the cross-ex-
,amination of -congressional*
questioners,. ? the needling
and oratory of Pentagon Pa-.
pers martyr Daniel Ellsberg
and heckling inquiries from
the floor.
, "How many people have
you killed?" someone
shouted from the audience.
Colby launched into a calm
and numbing eXposition of
the Phoenix program in Vi-
etnam, which he directed
and which has become a fo-
tus of public criticism of his
tenure as head of the U.S..
*pacification team there be-
tween 1968 and 1971.
. Colby's chief interrogator on
the Chile question was Rep.
Michael Harrington (D.Mass.).
who inadvertently touched off
the controversy in a confiden-
tial letter td House Foreign
Affairs Committee chairman
face of "a new threat that
developed in the world." -
lie also defended his role as
director of the so-called Phoe-
nix program in Vietnam, a
pacification campaign that
ranged from economic develop-
ment to assassination..
Rep." Thomas Morgan (D-Pa.)
detailing Colby's April 22
testimony on secret CIA ac-
tivities there.
Colby told Harrington
that the CIA had briefed its,
congressional oversight .sub-'
committees on all major co-;
vert activities undertaken:
abroad. He said also that he
would discuss details only
"before the appropriate sub-
committees."
Making the case for re-
spectability of covert opera-
tions, Colby cited participa-
tion of feminist Gloria
helm' in CIA subsidized
youth festival activities dur-:
ing the late 1960s. He re-
cited a published testimon-
ial by Ms. Steinheim that.
she and -fellow participants
were free to say, what they
pleased during their travels.
? The forum before which,
Colby spoke was a confer-,
ence on "the, Central Intelli-
gence Agency and Covert
Action" sponsored by the
Center.for National Security,
Studies. Participants in-
cluded former national secu-
rity officials, ex-CIA agents,
intelligence scholars ? and.
journalists.
In his prepared statdment;
Colby took note of proposals
that the CIA abandon its
covert action programs car-
'red out by the directorate
for clandestine services, col-
loquially known as the "De-
partment of Dirty Tricks."
"This is a legitimate ques-
tion," Colby said. " In
light of current American .
policy, as I have indicated, it
would not have a major im-
pact on our current activi-
ties or the current security
of the United States." This
-was a strong hint that coy-
-ert operatilins abroad have
been reduced to a neglible
level.
But, the CIA director
added, "a sovereign nation
must look ahead to changing
circumstances. I can envis-
age situations in which the
United States might well
need to conduct covert ac-.
bon in the face of some new
threat that developed in the
world."
But it was the consensus
of most of the panelists, as
stated yesterday by Herbert
Scoville ? Jr., former CIA
deputy director for science
and technology,-that covert
operations consistently
"interfere with legitimate
intelligence collection" by
the agency. He urged that
the function, if it were nec-
essary at all, should be spun
off to a separate agency.
Other ' participants, Ells-
berg and former National,
roverrPorRerease--2ooi/08/08-TCIA--RDP77-00432R0001130340007-3-
n r nts Chile,
Security' Council staffer
Morton Halperin, objected
on grounds that the covert
prograins abroad institution-
alize illegal. actions against
foreign governments or po-'
litical -movements. Author
David, Wise also. objected
that rtlie secret- activities
also required *a policy of
"plausible deniability" on
the part of U,Sf. L officials
when, pnblicly questioned.
about thein. 2
Colby told Sen: Janne.
Abourezk (D-S.D.), chairman:
of yeSterday's session, that
he :has proscribed the'
phrase "plausible denial"
.from use at CIA headquar-
ters.
"I do not- feel that I can
tell the American people an
untruth," said the CIA di-
rector, his face composed
behind neutral-shaded shell
eyeglasses as guffaws ech-
oed through the hearing
chamber.
When Abourezk asked.
Colby about an article ap-
pearing in last Sunday edi-
tion of The Washington Post
alluding to a $350,000 Na-
tional Security Council au-
thorization for -bribery of
the Chilean Congress in
1970, Colby responded:
"Those are details I'm dot
going to talk about."
Asked whether his agency
undertakes action abroad
which would be deemed
criminal in the United
'States,-; Colby said quietly,
"Of course. Espionage is a,
crime in the Unites States."
16
Colby was 'also pressed on - -
whether he could provide
assurances that corporations
- controlled by Viice Presiden-
tial nominee Nelson A.
Rockfeller , and his family
, would not be used as CIA
"covers" in the future. "This
would not be a useful sub- .
'ject for Me. to discuss," he'
answered. - ? -
The major piece of thea-
.ter was provided by Ells-
, berg, who ;announced to
ColbyC that he had. just.
learned from testimony
gathered by Sen.. Howard H.
Baker Jr. (R-Tenn.) that CIA
. officials had evidence?long
before they admitted it?of
the burglary of his psychia-
trist's office.
"You have much to an-,
swer for," Ellsbeig said in'
Ihis peroration. "Not very ,
much to mc very little."
Colby answered with the
only touch of heat he
brought to the room. He
challenged Ellsberg to sup-
port his accusation that "I.
do not support the constitu-
tion and, do not understand
"I understand ? it," said
Colby to Ellsberg, "as well
,,as you-do."
- As yesterday's, session
, wound to its cloke a young
woman in a red dress leaped
to her feet and shouted;
"You are not only a liar, you.
are a Nazi; teo." Colby peer-
ed back expressionlessly and
replied, "I deny that,"
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3
NEW YORK TIMES
14 September 1974
C.I.A. Ch.i.f Says Covert
? By SEYMOUR M. HERSH_
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, ? Sept. 13?
William E. Colby,' Director of
Central Intelligence, said today
that there Would be no "major
impact" on-the nation's security
if the United States ceased' all
cloak - and - dagger operations
against ? foreign countries.
"The .current status of the
world is such that we do not
appear to be threatened at this
time," Mr. Colby told a con-
ference on the Central Intelli-
gence . Agency and covert
activity. "The Capitol will still
;stand whether ?any particular
!action does or ? does not take
place."
' .'The C.I.A. director ? spent
more than three hours making
a speech and answering often;
hostile questonS from the panel-
ists and audience at the two-
day conference, sponsored byl
the newly formed Center for
National Security Studies.
?, Against Curtailment
. He made it clear, both in his
prepared address and during'
the question-and-answer ses-
sion, that he did npt wish to
see the agency's clandestine op-
erations curtailed. Those op-
erations, officially known as
covert actions, have been the,
focus of dispute this week in
Congress because of the dis-
elosude that the C.I.A. was au-
thorized to spend more than
$8-million..from 1970 to 1973
in an effort to make it difficult
for President Salvador Allende
Gossens of Chile to govern.
More than $7-million of the
authorized funds was spent.
"I think it would be mistaken
to deprive our nation ?of the
possibility of some moderate
overt action response to a
foreign problem and leave us
with nothing between a diplo-
matic protest and sending in
the Marines," Mr. Colby said
in his prepared address.
Activities
Aren't Vitali
Later, in response to a ques-
tion Mr. Colby declared that
"these days, "in view of the
world situation and our poli-
cies, we're not spending much
effOrt" on cladestine activities.
"We're keeping our powder
and musket dry," he said.
I Mr. Colby's statements ac-
knowledging that clandestine
'operations were not vital, to
the nation's ? security did not
iseem to indicate, any impending
!change in the Ford Administra-
tion's approach to such activi-
ties. The C.I.A. director was ap-
parently giving a candid assess-
ment of the value of such ac-
tivities?as viewed by him to-
day.
' When a panelist, Richard J.
'Barnet, author and former Ken-
nedy Administration aide, asked
whether he could envision any
national security threats that
would justify covert activity in
Latin America', Asia or Africa,
Mr. Colby said,. "There are
some, yes." , ? ? '
"By security - of the United
States," he repeated, "I do not'
mean that the Capitol will fall
by night. There are certain
things that today are not an
immediate danger to the United
States but could become so."
Discussing Chile, Mr. Colby
again denied that the C.I.A.
played any direct role in the
overthrow of the latE,President
Allende. "We :did. look forward
to a change in government," he
said to caustic laughter from
the 'crowded Senate hearing
room, "but by elections in 1976."
Although he had announced
that he would not discuss any
specific details concerning the
C.I.A.'s clandestine involvement
in Chile, Mr. 'Colby all but spe-
cifically confirmed that the
agency had been heavily in-
volved.
Insisting that Congress had
been kept informed about the
clandestine activities there, Mr.
Colby declared, "I can't sasS1
that every doliar the C.I.A.]
?
?NEW YORK POST
9 Sept. 1974
?I. ?
- Dirty Tricks In Chile
I spent in Chile was individually
approved [by intelligence com-
mittees], but there was a series
of discussions."
He took note of a letter, pub-
lished last week, describing the
agency's activities in Chile be-
tween 1964 and 1.973 that had
been written earlier this year
by Rerpresentative Michael S.
Harrington. Democrat of Massa-
chusetts. "At various times dur-
ing that period." Mr. Colby said,
"the maior steps were brought
to the attention of the chair-
man or various. members of :
Ithose committees."
1 His account of the congres-
sional overview was challenged
by Mr. Harrington and another
member of Congress attending!
the conference, Senator James,
Abourezk, Democrat of South!
Dakota. Mr. Abourezk ques-1
tioned whether the C.I.A. 'wasl
providing up-to-date briefings
about current clandestine op-
erations to the Congress; Mr.
Harrington urged a broader,
and more critical, Congressional
overview of CiI.A. activities.
In an obvious rebuke to those
who advocated more C.I.A.
disclosure to Congressional.
committees, Mr. Colby com-
plained that what he termed
"the leak" about the 'Chilean,
involvement "raises the dilem-
ma of how we're going to
supply the Congress with such
delicate information without its
disclosure." -
"This is a matter, of course,:
for, the Congress to decide,!';
he added.
Throughout his long appear-,
ance today, Mr. Colby expressed:
little emotion and remained
calm, even .when confronted
with personal denunciations and
accusations that he had .lied.
The sharpest response from the
audience came during a series
of question's about his participa-
tion in the Vietnam pacification
program and his direct role with
Operation Phoenix, a C.I.A.-
involved program designed ."to
, ? According to apparently well-founded
reports, Central Intelligence Agency
Director Williiiii?Colbr-has-'-privately
,told a Congressional committee that the
Nixon Administration authorized more
than $8 million for clandestine disrup-
tion of the Allende regime in Chile be-
tween 1970 and 1973. These operations,
designed to "destabilize" that country
and make it ipipossible for Allende to
roof out the Vietcong infra-'
structure" that has been widely
Criticized. It has been charged
that the program resulted in the
deaths of more than 20,000:
Vietnamese.
"How many did you
one youth shouted from the au-
dience. ? .
' "I didn't kill arisc," Mr. Colby
'responded.
? At one point, panelist Daniel
Ellsberg, who 'has said he was
responsible for turning over the
Pentagon Papers to the press
. ?
in 1971, delivered a lengthy
summary of the G.I.A.'s involve-
ment in Watergate, provoking
:an exchange with Mr. Colby
that 'provided no new informa-
tion about the known involve-
ment of the agency in the
!break-in at the office of Dr.
'Ellsberg's Psychiatrist.
' Earlier, in response to a ques-
tion from Dr. Ellsberg, Mr. Col-
by had .acknowledged that .the
.C.I.A. may have' had advance
linformation about the impend-
ling, coup d'etat in Chile that
was not forwarded .to the Al.
Government.
Mr. Colby,. who had agreed
to attend the, two-day confer-
ence before the press .dis-
closures of the covert activities
in Chile, pointedly noted in his
prepared remarks that such ac-
tivities were conducted "only
when specitically authorized by
the National Security Council.'"
"Thus," he 'added,
vert actions reflect national
policy."
A number of high officials
have told The New York Times t
this week that much of the
impetus for the 'clandestine
policy against the Allende Gov-
ernment was ? supplied by Sec-
retary of State Kissinger, who
was serving as former Presi-
dent Nivon's national security
adviser in 1970.
, Arguing today in favor of
covert actions, Mr. Colby said
that' "a sovereign nation must
lot* a-head to :changing circuny.
Stances." ?
?;
govern, are said to-have been approved
by a panel headed by Henry _Kissinger.
These reports indicate that the busi-
ness of "dirty tricks" was conducted
throughout a period when U.S. officials
were solemnly denying to Congress arid,
the- country charges of hostile oper-a.--.i
tions against the Chilean government.
A full-scale Congressional reexami-
nation of the story is urgently needed. :
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NEW YORK TIMES
15 September 1974
Allende's Fall,
By Laurence R. Birns
The disclosure that the United
States had directly participated in the
economic and political undermining of
the Government of President Salvador
Allende GossenS of Chile between 1970
and -1973 is only part of the dismal
tale of what took place between Wash-
ington and Santiago during the three
years he held office.
Viewed in its entirety, this tale re-
veals the poverty of this nation's Latin-
American policy, the staggering im-
morality of the policy's architects and
the ineffectuality and irrelevance of
most scholars, journalists and Congres-
sional leaders, whose professional obli-
&lion it was to oversee executive
policies toward Chile during this
period.
' Now we know that William E. Colby,
the Director of Central Intelligence, in
secret testimony last April, told Con-
gress that the Nixon Administration
had authorized more than $8- million
'for covert Central Intelligence Agency
activities between 1970 and 1973 in -
an effort to make it impossible for
Dr. Allende to govern. -
? Those of us w'ho had watched
United States policy at the time felt
in' our bones that this country was
intent on establishing the climate for
the 'overthrow of the democratically
elected President?Dr. Allende died in
a violent coup d'etat Sept. 11, 1973?
but we lacked the proof. Our dilemma
was plain in that we did not have the
data to support our instincts, when
such evidence would have been of
most use in attempting, if futilely, to
influence Washington's policy. But we
knew that the workings of what we
considered Washington's invisible gov-
ernment would -be revealed only long
after the events had become the raw
material for footnotes in history books
and the people involved had minced
off to some new assignment. ?
Still, in spite of our incredulity, of
our.skepticism, we were reluctant to
believe that the former Ambassador
to Chile, Edward M. Kerry; the former
Assistant Secretary of State for Latin-
-American Affairs,. Charles A. Meyer;
and our respected Secretary of State,
Henry A. Kissinger, would practice
such professional duplicity and such
public deception.
After all, they Were as one in re-
peatedly saying that the United States
bad played no role in the violent endhi
ing of Chile's constitutional regime or
had not carried out any other previous
form of intervention, and when they
did hint at the truth in Congressional
inquiries after the coup they were
always heard in the secrecy of execu-
tive session, as if the public was too
immature to know, or the officials too
embarrassed to tell.
Even before this, it was known that
this nation had maintained a calcu-
lated campaign to strangle Chile
economically. Richard M. Nixon as
President, and his Treasury Secretary
at the time, John B. Connally, had in
1971 initiated a policy of economic
a shil:igton's Push
denial in United States lending agen-
cies, as well as in the regional and
international aid organizations, and
Chile became a fiscally besieged island.
This was done though international
law (that historic handmaiden of the
Western trading nations) had not been
fully served in that Chilean adminis-
trative procedures had not been ex-
hausted when the United States policy
of retribution for the legal nationali-
zation of Kennecott Copper Corpora-
?
tion's mines had begun.
. Leading United States apologists of
the fall of the Allende Government
previously have tended to give, an
economic justification for it. The sce-
nario was a rather plain one. The eco-
nomic policies of the President, a
Marxist, polarized the population. The
opposition political parties. that sup-
ported the coup did so when Dr.
Allende closed the political road. In
any event, Dr. Allende was a minority
President and did not have the neces-
sary consensus to undertake such radi-
cal changes. Thus, it was not United
States policy that cut Dr. Allende off,
from the possibilities of surviving, but
rather the result of his own haphazard
Jdomestic policies.
The apologists neglected to men-
tion that only once in this century
has Chile had a majority President?
from 1964 to 1970?and that some
two-thirds of the population had
voted in 1970 for candidates espousing
policies .of nationalization and reform.
The apologists' view was upheld by.
? Prof. P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan, director
of the Center for Latin American De-
velopment Studies of Boston Univer-
sity, in a lengthy contribution to this
newspaper recently in which he as-
serted that "Allende died not because
he was a socialist, but because he was
an incompetent."
But apparently now, in his view,
things have improved. Dr. Rosenstein-
Roden stated in a report to an agency
for the Alliance for Progress, Chile
has a "strong and intelligent" eco-
nomic policy and a "Jean Monnet"
,directing it. This, as the people starve.,
'Professor Rosenstein-Rodan has had
little to say about the civic decencies
that Dr. Allende had strived to main-
tain,.. which the military now has
cruelly destroyed. or the contribution,
that the Opposition Christian Demo-
cratic party had made to the "polari-
zation" and !'chaos" of Chile's national
life. He thinks of himself as dispas-
sionate, but by his choice of themes,
elimination of untidy evidence and
priorities, he is ideological to the
marrow.
For a host of other academics, edi-
torial writers and some leading United
States intellectuals, such as Arthur
Schlesinger Jr., the thin reed of their
case that Dr. Allende had brought
"it" upon himself has all but vanished
in the disclosure of the C.I.A.'s role.
It would be more accurate to have
said that it was the intent of our
nation's policy to bring "it" upon
him because our goal was to "de-
,stabilize" Chile by pouring millions
of dollars into' vulnerable corners of
that nation's national life, not to heal
but, to. kill. , ,
111
Americans who earlier in the year
witnessed the effects of the United
States national truckers' strike and
the breakdown of petroleum supplies
in our own nation could well imagine
the frailties of the infinitely weaker
economy of the intended victim.
It would seem that Dr. Allende's
sole crime was that he felt that for-
eign control of Chilean copper re-
,sources was intolerable, just as Mr.
Nixon felt that the United States
could not allow a continuing. depend-
ence on feign oil supplies. ' ?
For Chile, the United States Govern-
ment had two possible roads to travel:
cne of correct diplomatic relations
(perhaps even favoredlreatment, since
Chile's was one of the few remaining
representative governments- in the re-
gion) er political chicanery. Regret-
,tably,./Vir. Kissinger, a recipient of the
Nobel Peace Prize, systematically
chose the latter?a course that helped
to bring on a brutal military take-
over that cost thousands of lives, with
Chile now being dragged into the
Stone Age:
Present conditions in Chile have
been carefully noted by a number of
impartial investigative teams that have
traveled to that nation, as well as by
repeated utterances of church groups
inside, and outside Chile. The jails are
crammed with political prisoners, mili-
tary law operates and the civil courts
are defunct, total press censorship
exists, the political parties of all per-
suasions are banished, and trade un-
ion activity has been terminated. The
nation is now a barrack, and freedom
of expression has been sent to the
wall.
During his administration, Dr. Al-
lende was scrupulously correct in
.maintaining unimpaired, under un-
relieved internal and external pres-
sure, all the nation's institutions. Not
a single political prisoner !could be
found in jail, not a single newspaper
was censored by the civilian authori-
ties and opposition'-political parties
could rage at will against the Govbrn-
ment.
Why does Mr. 'Kissinger prefer tile_
present over the past? Chile now over
Chile then? Why was this clever and
capable man so simplistic ip conceiv-
ing of Chile as an allegedly "Commu-
nist" nation that must be suborned
and so sophisticated in treating with
such self-identified- Communist na-
tions as China, the Soviet Union and,
most recently, East Germany?
In retrospect, his sins are more than
the lies and deceptions; he has tra-
duced the meager remains of our in-
ternational reputation and the honor
of this nation by espousing a plan of
action that was not only vulgarly
cruel, but amateurishly and patently
ineffective given the current state of
Chile's economy.
If, in the recent chaotic past, he
felt nfoved to offer the nation his
resignation on an issue of personal
honor in the Watergate wiretap affair,
surely our nation has the obligation
to solicit and, if refused, to demand
his resignation 'over this far more
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NEW YORK TIMES
16 September. -1974 .
The'
Disclbsure that the Central Intelligence: Ageney ,au-
thorized more than $8 million for Covert activities aimed?
first at preventing Salvador,Allende's election as-Presi
dent of Chile and then at "destabilizing". his Marxist
Government Would be appalling enough by itself. It is
doubly.so when stacked against flat denials of any such'
United States intervention or policy to intervene, some
of it in sworn testimony before committees of Congress,
bY former 'and present Government officials. ?
?, In secret testimony before a House subcommittee last'.
April, C.I.A. Director William E. Colby said his ageney
:authorized $500,000 to aid Dr. Allende's opponents in the'
.1970 election; $350,000 to bribe. Chilean legislators to
.vote against him when the election was thrown into the
? Congress, and $6.5 million -:for subsequent "destabilize-.
tion" activities and for helping anti-Allende candidates'
'in the 1971 municipal elections. : .
This conflicts directly with testimony before a ?Senate'
[ Foreign Relations subcommittee by former AmbassadOr,
Edward- M. Korry that i.`the' United States .did not -Seek
?to- pressure, subvert, influence a single member of -thec
? Chilean Congress" during his four years.in Chile, and:by,
. former Assistant Secretary of State Charles "A.' Meyer
-that "we bought no votes; we funded ifei candidates, We
promoted no COdps."
. , .
..During .part of the period when . yr: Colby sAys. the
...C.I.A. was financing "destabilizing" activities; Ambassa7
? dor Korry says-the was carrying on secret negotiations
? with President Allende; looking toward uninterrupted
. American cOoperation and financial aid, provided Chile
did not act with undue hostility toward the United States.
'These efforts, he says, were undermined by extremists
in Dr. Allende's popular Unity coalition. .
Are we to-believe that Ambassador Korry and the State
?Departtnent were endeavoring to stabilize Dr: Allende's
Government while the C.I.A. was frying to "destabilize"-
it?-Could the American Ainbassador. in.Santiago and the
sobering matter of not only attempting
to bribe Chile's democratically elected
Congress tO withhold ratification of
? Dr. Allende's taking office, and foment-
ing civic disorder, but denying it in
sworn testimony as well. If a resigna-
tion is not forthcoming, an honorable
United States Congress must move to
impeach.
America and certain Americans bear
a heavy hand in the unjustified tor-
ment that has been visited upon Chile.
That lovely little land and its good
people deserved a more benign fate,
and, for that matter, so did we. ?
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs'
have been ignorant of what the C.I.A. was -doing---or
was the C.I.A. in truth a law unto itself?
And What of the role of Henry A. Kissinger in this
sordid affair? Throughout the period he 'headed the
so-called Forty Committee which supervises C.I.A. oper-
ations ?and, according to Mr. Colby, approved in advance
'the 'coVert ?activities in-Chile: Yet, Mr. -Korry says that-ow
-a trip to Washington in 1971 he got approval from both
Mr. Kissinger at the National Security Council and Sec-
retary of State William P. Rogers for his proposal of
cooperation with Chile in a compensated take-over of
American copper interests. Mr.- Kissinger told the Senate
Foreign Relations Commiteee that "to the best of my
knowledge, and belief," the C.I.A. "had nothing to do"
with the military coup that overthrew Dr,Allende.
, ? * ? ? * ?
It is riowup to President Ford to find out who is
actually in charge of United States foreign. policy in
sensitive areas of the world, and, whether anyone in
fact controls the operations of the C.I.A.
''Of far greater importance than the bizarre spectacle
.of. two United States agencies trying simultaneously
to stabilize and .destabilize" an elected Government is
that fact that in inadequately controlled C.I.A. badly
, served the American national interest by its dirty work
in Chile. It matters not that the Soviet Union does far
worse, that Fidel. Castro intervened' far more out-'.
?rageously in Chile than did the United States, or that
extremists in Dr. Allende's camp would ,in any even4
. have destroyed the Chilean democracy on their own.
Clearly, the so-called C.I.A. "oversight" committees in
Senate and House are failing to do their job. Representa-
tive Harrington of MaSsachusettS has. esited...the House
Foreign Affairs Committee for hearings on
.role in Chile. Senator Church of. Idaho will ask similar
action from the Senate, Foreign Relations Committee.
If this enormously powerful agency is ever to be
"brought under effectiVe. oversight, Congress must rise
to this distasteful but imperative responsibility.
NErs1 YORK TIMES
18 Sept. ? 1974
Chile and the C.I.A.
To the Editor:
Your Sept. 16 editorial "The C.I.A.
in chile" places major-lempl;asis on,an
'alleged quotation of my use of -the
'word "destabilization." This word ap-
pears in Representative Harrington's
letter which discussed my testimony
before" the House Armed Services Com-
mittee.,
. When this story first appeared, I
'reexamined the transcript Of the testi-
mony land .determined that: the word
"destabilize," in whatever grammatical
form, does not appear.
I so informed your representative
at that time, and ? I so stated publicly
Oil Sept. 13 at a public meeting, at-
tended by Representative Harrington,
which was ftilly, covered by your rep-
resentative. .To .insure that no meres?
. difference in seritantics is involved. I;
added that' "this: term especially is -
not a? fair ?description of our national
policy from 1.971 on of encourastyig the
continued existence of democratic forc-
es looking toward future elecriOns."
Your editorial. views on this matter
are, of course, a matte f for you alone
to determine; I ?do protest, however,
your assertion that, I said something
which I had taken pains to deny say-
ing without 'giving any indication of
such denial. W. E. CCL3Y
Director, Central Intelligence. Agency
Washington, Sept. 16, 1974
Laurence R. Birns, who teaches Latin-
American studies at the New School ?
for Social Research, has been a senior
economic affairs officer with the Unit-
ed Nations Economic Commission for
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WASPINGTON POST
17 September 1974
Perjury Inquiry Urged on Chile Dafa.
Panel Gets Report ,
By Laurence Stern ?
. Washington Post Staff Writer
? A Senate staff report recommends
that a ,perjury investigation be initi-
ated against former Central Intelli-
gence Agency Director Richard M.
Helms and accuses Secretary of State'
Henry A. Kissinger of having "de-
.ceived" the Senate Foreign Relations ?
Committee in sworn testimony.
The report, which centers on testi-
mony given by high-ranking officials
on U.S covert intervention in Chile's
internal political affairs, also recom-
mends perjury and contempt investi-
gations of three other government wit-
nesses in the Chile inquiry.
Prepared by Jerome Levinson, chief
counsel to the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Subcommittee on Multinational
Corporations, the confidential report
will be taken up for possible action to-
day at an executive session of the
Foreign Relations Committee.
? ? The committee has the option of
e'hdorsing or rejecting the report in
whole or in part.
. The targets- of the proposed investi-
gations are former Assistant Secretary,
t-of State for Inter-American Affairs
, Charles E. Meyer, former U.S. Am-
bassador to Chile' Edward Korry, and,
William Brae, former chief of the
CIA's Latin American Division.
The report, submitted to subcom-
mittee chairman Sen. Frank Church
(D-Idaho) and Sen. Clifford P. Case
.(R-N.J.), also asks that the record of
Kissinger's confirmation hearing be
reopened in public .session to question
the secretary on the "rationale" for
U.S. covert political actions in Chile
after 1969.
It further recommended that Kis-
'singer be asked to testify generally on
U.S. policy toward "duly elected gov-
ernments which may be anticipated
not to follow policies to the liking
of the United States."
The staff recommendations
reflected rising concern in
Congress over major discrepan-
cies in the sivorn testimony of
high State Department wit-
nesses and the disclosure af
'secret 'testimony last A pri1,22
by CIA Director' William E.
ColbY that the agency'spent $3
million in Chile to foil the late
Salvadore Allende's candidacy
in 1964 and SII million attempt-
ing to block his election and
undermine, his government af-
ter 1969. ?
The report cites previously
secret testimony by Kissinger,
'delivered at an executive ses-
sion of his confirmation hear-
ing on Sept. 17, 1973, minimiz-
ing the rele of the CIA in the
1970 Allende election,
It quotes Kissinger as
saying:
? "The CIA was heavily in-
volved in 1964 in the election,
was in a very minor way in-
volved in the 1970 election and
since then we have absolutely
stayed wt13', from any coups.
Our efforts in Chile were to'
strengthen the democratic po-
litical parties and give them a
?A0pfove4-F
basis for winning the ,election
in 1976, which we expressed
our hope , was .that Allende
could be defeated In a free
democratic election."
At the time Kissinger gave
his testimony, the report
noted, "the Forty Committee
[the National Securitye Coun-
cil's senior covert \ action
panel]. had already authorized
the expenditure of . . .
lion for' the purpose of desta-
bilizing the Allende govern-
ment.so as to precipitate its
downfall."
. Only a month before, Kis-
singer testified, the report fur-
-ther noted, the Forty Commit-
tee--which he' chaired?au7
thoriZed the expenditure of $r
million of this amount for
"further political destabiliza-
tion."
The basis for these assers'.
tions was the Colby testimony
as recounted by Rep. Michael
Harrington (D-Mass.), 'a mem-
ber of the House Foreign Af-
fairs Committee. The CIA's
only comment on the Harring-
ton disclosure was to question
whether Colby has used the,
word "destabilization" in his
April 22 testimony to a Ilbuse*.
CIA oversight committee
chaired, by Rep. Lucien Nedzi-
(D-Mich.).
Colby's only 'personal com-
ment on the Harrington report
was that he would neither con-
firm nor deny its authenticity
since it was given in executive
session. Last Friday Colby'
commented that the disclosure
of his testimony through a
confidential letter by Harring-
ton to his chairman, ? Rep.
Thomas Morgan (D-Pa.) raised
questions about the ability of
government witnesses to Jes-
tify on "delicate" matters.
The report described as
"disingenuous" Kissinger's tes-
timony that since 1970 "we
have absolutely stayed away
' from any coups" in Chile. Kis-
singer, wrbte Levinson, "must
have known that expending,
funds for the express purpose
of creating political destabili-
zation had to enhance the pos-
sibility, indeed the probability,
of the. coup which, in fact,
took place."
In the case of Helins, the re.
port cited an exchange be.'
tween the former CIA direstor
and one of his leading senato-
lila]. defenders, Stuart Symingr,
ton (D-Mo.). during an execu-
tive hearing on the Helms
? nomination as ambassador to
Iran, on Feb. 7, 1973. .
Symington: Did you have
any money passed to the oppo-
nents of Allende?
Helms: No, sir.
. Symington: So_ that the sto-
ries that you were involved in
that are wrong entirely? ,
? Helms: Yes sir
But Colby's testimony, as re-
ported in the Harrington let-
ter, ? was that the CIA ex-
pended $500,000 in 1969 . to have not."
fund anti-Allende forces' and 20
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during the 1970 election $500,- '-
000 was given to opposition
party personnel. After .the
Sept. 4 popular .election in
which Allende won a plurality,
the account continued, $350,-
000 was authorized "to bribe
the Chilean Congress" in an
effort to "overturn" the re-
sults of the popular election in
an' ensuing congressional run-
off. -
The staff report alluded, for
'the first time, to the existence
of a National Security Council
Decision Memorandum prior
to Allende's el,ction which
served as the 'umbrella" under
'which the Forty Committee au-
thorized clandestine activities
designed to ' destabilize the
Allende government.
Such a policy document
would-have- been drafted tin-
der the direction of Kissinger
who also chaired the Forty
Committee meetings at which
the anti-Allende aCtion pro-
grams were authorized. -
The report was also critical
of Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury for International Af-
fairs John .111. Hennessy, who
assisted in coordinating U.S.
economic :policy toward the
Allende government that
leaned heavily toward with-
drawal of lines= of credit by
such international lending
bodies as the World Bank,'In-
ter-Americatis = ? Development
Bank and Export-Import Bank_
Hennessy, said the Levinson
report, "either perjured him-
self or seriously misled the
subcommittee in stating that
the primary consideration in
U.S. economic policy toward
the Allende government was
Chile's credit-worthiness." ?
Broe, the CIA's highest-
ranking operative for Latin
America. was quoted in the re-
port as having testified that t :
there Was no U.S. policy Win-
tervene in the 1970 Chilean
election. Broe's answers,
ever, are "technically shy Oi
perjury," 'the.report,,
cbn-
eluded, though they were
"intended to convey the im-
pression of a policy..of non?in-
terverithan." ?
The testimony of Nathaniel
Davis, U.S. ambassador , to
Chile during last year's anti-
Allende coup, conformed? to
?the "overall pattern of State
Department witnesses dissem-,
bling and deceiving the com-
mittee and subcommittee with
respect to the true scope .of
U.S. government activities de-
signed to undermine the Al-
lende regime," the Levinson
report added; No action, how-
ever, was recommended
against Davis.
Kissinger, and Meyer were
not available for comment.
Korry, reached in New York,
said he was "gratified that Mr.
Levinson, after deliberately
spreading the word that, I
have committed perjury, now
reached the concluSion that I
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3
NEW YORK
'COVERT C.1,AirROLE?
AGAII\ ST UDR
DEFENDED BY FORD
Asserts Activities in Chile
. Were 'in Best Interests'
of Chileans and U.S.
" By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Special to The New York Times
- WASHINGTON, Sept. 16?
President Ford strongly defend-
ted tonight the clandestine use
of the Central Intelligence
Agency to assist anti-Allende
forces in Chile, but he denied
that the United States Govern-
!rnent had any involvement in
ithe bloody coup there last year.
The President, in his news
'Conference, contended that the
C.J.A. activities were authorized
because "there was an effort
being made by the Government
of Salvador Allende to destroy?
opposition news media and to
destroy opposition political
parties." He said this was some-
thing all governments did and
he defended it in principle.
Earlier, The New York Times
learned that the staff of a Sen-
ate Foreign Relations subcom-
mittee -had recommended that
charges' of contempt of Con-
gress be placed against Richard
Helms, former Director of Cen-
tral. Intelligence, and three
'retired Nixon Administration
officials on the ground of mis-
leading -testimony oh the .clan-
destine attivities in Chile.
'Certain Actions' Cited
Mr. Ford's statements on
Chile were the firSt by a high
Administration, official since
newspaper reports a week ago
that the C.I.A. was authorized
to spend more than $8-million
from 1970 to 1973 to make it
impossible for President Salva-
dor Allende Gossens of Chile to
govern. -
1. Asked .about those reports,
the President made what
'amounted to a broad defense
of such clandestine operations.
"Our Government, like other
governments, does take certain
actions in the intelligence field
to help implement foreign pol,,
iicy and protect national secu-
rity," Mr. Ford said. [Ques-
tion 7, Page 22.]
He added that he had been
"reliably" informed that "Com-
munist nations spend vastly
.more money than we do for the
'same kind of purpose."
The C.I.A. etfort in Chile, the
President said, "was made in
this case to help and assist the
preservation of opposition
newspapers and electronic me-
dia and to preserve opOPP601V
political Parties."' ' ? ?''
"I think this Is in the best
interests of the people in Chile
and certainly in our best in-
terest," he added.
. .Mr. Ford's account of the
type and purpose of the inter-
vention in- Chile differed in
part, at least, with that ? pro-
vided to Congress last April by
William E. Colby, the present
head of the C.I.A. .
? Mr. Colby testified that
$350,000 was authorized by,
the 40 Committe ,the secret'
high-level intelligence review
panel headed by Secretary of
State Kissinger, to bribe mem-
bers of the Chilean Parliament
, in late 1970, shortly before the
Mr. Al-
Parliament ratified
. .
lende's election. ? -
The report by the staff of a
Senate subcommitte' report in-
volved a different aspect of the
. dispute over Chile?allegations
that high-ranking officials of
the Nixon Administration de-
liberately misled- the Senate.
, The sources said that, be-
sides Mr. Helms, the report
cited Charles A. Meyer, former.
Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs, Edward
M. Korry, Ambassador to Chile
from 1957 to 1971, and William
V. Broe, former director of
clandestine activities for the
Central Intelligence Agency in
Latin America.
Mr. Helms, Mr. Meyer and
John M. Hennessy, former As-
sistant Secretary of the Treas-
ury for International Affairs,
the report said, might have
committed perjury in testimony
before the Subcommittee on
Multinational Corporations in
the spring of 1973.
None of the men named in
the. subcommittee report couldi
be reached immediately for
comment.
In his news conference to-
night, President Ford defended
the Nixon Administration's de-
cision to intervene clandestine-
ly in 1970 in Chile, declaring
that the newly elected MarXist
Government there made an "ef-
fort to destroy ethe opposition
media and to destroy opposition
political parties."
Such intervention was needed,
Mr. Ford said, because the Corn-
munist nations spend vast
amdunts of money" in similar
activities.
The staff report, written' by
-Jerome I. Levinson, chief coun-
sel of the subcommittee, was
prepared last week at the re-
quest of Senator Frank Chtirch,
Democrat of Idaho; who is
chairman of the subcommittee.
Details of Mr. Levinson's re-
port, which was distributed to
subcommittee members over the
weekend, were provided to The
New York Times .by a Senator's
office.
At issue is the discrepancy
between the testimony pre-
sented to the subcommittee'
last year about the clandestine
role of the C.I.A. in Chile and
recent news reports indicating
that the intelligence agency
had been authorized to spend
more than $8-million from
1970 to 1973 in a covert at-
tempt to make it impossible
for the Chilean President, Sal-
vador Allende Gossens, to
ecioFori.Release 2001/08/08
? '
' In' additioh, sourees said, the'
subcommittee staff report'
cited Mr. Hennessey's sworn
testimony that the Nixon Ad-
ministration's economic sanc-
tions against Chile were based
exclusively on lower credit
rating after Dr. Allende's elec-
tion. It was reported yester-
day that Secretary of State
Kissinger, then President Nix-
on's adviser for national se-
curity affairs, had personally
headed an interagency panel
that decided shortly after Dr:
Allende's election in 1970 to
attempt to cut off all economic
aid and international credits.
The allegations against the
five Nixon Administration of fi-, ?
cials stem from their testimony
at highly " publicized hearings
into a reported attempt by offi-
cials of the International Tele- ?
phone & Telegraph"Company to
seek to interfer in Chile's do-
mestic politics.
Mr. Korry and Mr. Meyer
both .testified that the United
States had continued its policy
of nonintervention toward Chile
'after Dr. Allende's elections. It
was that testimony, sources'
said, that led to the staff rec-
ommendation that contempt and'
?in the case of Mr. Meyer?
possible perjury charges be
considered.
The testimony that led to the
recommendation that Mr. Helms
be charged with contempt and
possibly perjury and Mr. Broe
with contempt was apparently
provided to the subcommittee
at classified briefings, sources
said. ?
Mr. Church, in an interview
last week, said he had author-
ized a staff review to determine
if the. testimony should. be
turned over to the Justice De-
partment for possible prose-
cution.
The Senate Foreign Relations
Committee has scheduled a
closed executive session tomor-
row to discuss, among other
matters, what to do about ap-
parently misleading testimony
provided to the Church sub-
committee.
In an interview, Senator
Clifford P. Case, Republican of
New Jersey and a ranking mi-
nority member of the commit-
tee; declared, "There'll be a
serious question as to what the
committee. ought to do."
Mr. Case refused to discuss
specifically his personal reac-
tion to the staff report.
"I certainly will press for ap-
propriate action," he said. "No
. matter what, if a guy is caught
lying to a Congressional heak,
ing, there has to be some kind
of action."
Other Foreign Relations Com-
mittee sources said, however,
that it was unlikely that the
full committee would immedi-
ately agree to press for con-i
tenipt of Congress or perjury
citations against the witnesses.,
Far more important, the sourceg
said, will be an attempt to de.t<
termine who in the Nixon Ad-,
ministration influenced the yeti.:
ous officials, including yire
Helms, to he less than candid.
before the Church subcom-
mittee.
NEW YORK TIMES
18 September 1974 ?
SEA1tJJS ORDER
? IM)11111Y ON C111111
By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Special to 'rat Sine York Times
WASHINGTON, Sept. P7--
The Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, amid Congressional
protests, over President Ford's
defense of clandestine intelli-
gence operations, today author-
ized its staff to study available
evidence that official testimony
had been Misleading about the
Central Intelligence Agency's
involvement in Chile.
Committee sources later eau-
' tioned that the Senators' deci-
sion, announced by Chairman
J. W. Fulbright, Democrat of
Arkansas, called only for a nee-
iiminary "pulling together'; of
:testimony and not yet a full-
, fledged investigation into the
t foreign policy of the Nixon
:Administration.
. "This is a very old problem,"
',Senator Fulbright told reporters
after the long closed-door corn-
- mittee Meeting this morning.
"The involvement of the C.LA.
in other countries has been well-
, known for years. There's not
much news in that"
"In my view," he added, "it's
:very q :estionable practice to go
;beyond the collection of intelli-
gence. I personally have always
thought they should be confined
!". to intelligence gathering."
'Outrage' Over Reports
Some Senators later sug-
gested that the committee's
reluctance to, proceed more
'directly stemmed from 'what
was depicted as' "outrage"
over the publication ,today in
,The New York Times and The
:Washington Post of the gist of
private subcommittee staff
report recommending possible
perjury and contempt-of-Con-
gress charges against five,gov-
ernment officials as failing to
testify. .fully about the C.I.A.
role in Chile. e. ?
The staff report, prepared by
Jeftime I. Levinson, chief
-cotinsel. of the Subcommittee
on Multinational! Corporations,
was rejected today:.
"The commotion over the
leaks almost wiped the whole
thing off .but they are going
eahead," one source who at-
, tended the committee ? meeting
said later.
The disagreement inside the
.committee over how to proceed
with the inquiry was made
clear, by Senator Frank
Church, Democrat of Idaho
and chairman of the Subcom-
mittee on the Multinational
Corporations, which heard the
apparently misleading testi-
mony during hearings into the
International Telephone & Tele-
graph/ Corporation's involve-
ment in Chile in early 1973.
"Our policy in Chile was un-
savory and unprincipled," Mr.
Church told reporters today.
"It can't possibly be justified
unless 'we take the view that
our methods and objectives are
the same
CIA-RDP77-00432R00010034 as those in ihe Soviet
: 001071t3
"The Chilean affair warrants
21
Approved For Reteffit,,9ilife/Kietrig7sfR4032R000100340007-3
17 September 1974 R
State of
the nations
The CIA problem
a full investigation by the
Senate," Senator Church added.
Fulbright Noncommittal
? Mr. Fulbright was noncom-
mittal, however, when asked
whether he expected the staff
investigation to lead to a re-
view of the Nixon Administra-
tion's foreign policies as well
as the involvement of Secre-
tary of State Kissinger in the
? Chilean decision-making,
In his staff report, Mr. Levin-
son ? recommended that the
Senate co.mm4ttee reopen Vst
confirmation -hearings on Mr.;
Kissinger, saying he "deceived"
the committee about Chile.
"We'll have to wait for the
-report," Mr. Fulbright said. "I
don't know. whether we should
have further hearings or not."
Mr. Fulbright, who reported-
ly has -been offered the am-
bassadorship to Britain after
he leaves the Senate, depicted
the publication of the Levinson
report as "regrettable" and
added that "the staff has no
business tputtink out tem-
randa of that sort."
A similar view was expressed
by Senator Claiborne Pell,
Democrat of Rhode Island, as
he left the , closed hearing.
Asked whether there was corn.
itnittee concern over the C.I.A.
involvement in Chile, Mr. Pell
said that "the concern was
more that statements . should,
be made by Senators, and not
by, staff." ?
Committee sources said that
the staff of the Foreign Reis-,
tions Committee, directed byt
Pat. M. Holt, was requested tot
complete it preliminary review1
of the veidence by next week.
These persons said that the new
study would incorporate sorne,
of the findings of the Levinson
report. ?
. " Mr. Levinson, in his memo-
randum, called for possible per-
jury and contempt of Congress
proceedings against Richard .
Helms, former director of Cen-
tral Intelligence, William V.
Broe, a former C.I.A. official,
Charles A. Korry, who was Am-
bassador to Chile from 1967
to 1971.
By Joseph C. Harsch
Three recent events in the news
suggest fairly strongly that the role of
the Central Intelligence Agency needs
some pretty serious rethinking.
First was the discovery that Presi-
dent Nixon attempted N#ith some
preliminary and partial success to
use the CIA for domestic partisan
political ends. We trust this will not
'happen again soon, but it is un-
thinkable that the CIA should become
an instrument of domestic faction-
alism. More,.eafeguards? are,, desir-
able.
Second is the strong 'suspicion that
the CIA gave too much comfort for far
too long to the now thoroughly dis:
credited former regime of the colo-
nels in Athens. That regime caused a
lot of trouble. The worst thing it did
was to unleash the coup d'etat on
Cyprus against Archbishop Makarios
which brought down his regime, un-
leashed a wave of terror, brought in a.
massive Turkish Army to Cyprus, and
undid a generation of patient effort to
produce peaceful coexistence be-
tween Greeks and Turks on Cyprus.
The national interests of the United
? Slates in the eastern Mediterranean
are best served by good relations
between Greeks and Turks. Anything
that embitters rather than improves
Greek-Turkish relations deserves the
United States. Insofar as the CIA
supported and encouraged the colo-
nels it injured the best interests of its
own country. The evidence seems
pretty clear that the colonels did get
some CIA aid. The whole matter
ought to be brought into the open as a
first step toward changes which can
prevent a repetition el such counter-
productive activity.
Third, the evidence is now impres-
sive that the CIA sought deliberately
to prevent Salvador Allende from
becoming President of Chile and
when he did, in 1970, spent more
money in an attempt to "destabilize"
that regime.
The official policy of the Govern-
ment of the United States toward the
Allende regime was one of tolerance
and noninterference. The State De-
partment insists 'that it refrained
from any interference in Chile's inter-
nal affairs which, so far as the State
Department itself is concerned, may
well be true. The State Department
isn't supposed to know what the
covert side of CIA is up to. Sometimes
It actually doesn't, although Henry
.Kissinger, then at the White House,
sat on a special subcommittee of the
National Security Council which ap-
proved the project of "destabilizing" .
the Allende experiment in Chile.
The point here is that the bringing
down of the Allende regime was, an
act of clandestine war against a
theoretically friendly government. It
was authorized covertly by a covert
branch of the executive establish-
ment. This infringed upon the eon-
stitutional right of the Congress to
declare war. It was the waging . of
covert and undeclared war by a
branch of the government which has
no constitutional right to do such
things. ?
Granted the Soviets do precisely
such things. And it often boomerangs
against them.
The lesson surely is that bringing
down a supposedly friendly govern-
ment is much too serious a business to
be entrusted to clandestine operatois.
If the Congress chooses to declare
war on a foreign country, it then
becomes the duty of the executive
establishment to implement that pol-
icy. But it's time to get the initiative
in such matters back into the public
domain.
Perhaps it did seem desirable back
In 1964 to try to keep Senor Allende out
of office in Chile. And undoubtedly it
seemed desirable to a- lot of people in
high places in Washington to keep him
out of office in 1970. And after 1970
many wanted to see his experiment
ended as quickly as possible. But he
was installed as President by con-
stitutional means. He was forced out
of office in a bloody revolution which ?
has put a military dictatorship into
the most democratic and formerly
most prosperous country in South
America. .
The results of clandestine inter*
ference in the internal-affairs of Chile -
would certainly seem to suggest that
this is a poor way of doing the national
business.
The'IA has had an excellent
record in gathering and weighing
intelligence about other countries in
the world. Its record of clandestine
activities has been marked by less
success, the Bay of Pigs being the
classic example. Covert subversion is
a highly dubious activity. If it must be
done, surely it must be more subject
to congressional supervision and con-
trol than in the past.
22
--74313TO-TieWri:FRe lea se 2-00T708/08-i:CIA=RDP77-00432R000100340007-3?:
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3
BALTIMORE SUN
17 September 1974
Secret 40 Committee' steers CI
?4,.. By JOHN J. FAIMEM
. ;Fhts Philadelphia Bulletin ,
? Washington?On a ? warm
Saturday morning, June 27,
1970, Henry A. Kissinger, ad-
dressing the. Most *sem.:
committee Of the United
States ;.": gOvernment,,e,
down ' iv. highly; personal
terms what was ? to become
official 'U.S.: policy toward
Chile. ? ?. ? ? . ?
?"I don't see why we should
have to stand by and let a
:country go **Communist 'due
to: the irresponsibility of its
own people, ?... he reportedly
deelared.'!.
, That statempt, according
to,, government Intelligence
sources, was made to the .40
committee, : a five-member
, group 'so secret that its exist- ,
wee :Was;tihknewri at the
time to the.,Vait. Mejority of'
Congress, the press, and
even the White House staff.
? Dr..' Kissinger,' sthr:. ugh a
Stpte ? Peparttnent spokes-
said he could not recall
inaltintithetaterrient buti'in
any:case, COnlditot-comineat
on 40 Committee activities.
'The 40: '''Committee is
? elected by no one and res-
? ponsible to .po one except the
. . .
President; who'...appoints its
,
member's. ? , ? ?
Serious 'saldents ? of for-
eign-policy making have
questicined whether, in a de-
moarady, such a five-person?
directorate should have this ,
pf unbridled power,,
? whether the five are. really
In ?? touch with 'American
public opinion, and 'whether
Congress should., not have
tighter reins on their covert
programs.
As a consequence of the 40
committee's action, however,
large sums of Central Intelli-
?geece . Agency money were
petered vainly into Chile to?
'avert the election of leftist
Salvador Allende. That money
was followed In later-years by
even larger sums to "destab-
ilize" the Chilean economy
and topple The Allende re-
gime.
With the Chilean military
uprising in 1973 and Dr. Allen-
de's violent death, the policy
ultimately succeeded.
But it has produced in re-
cent days several develop-
ments certain to provoke a
new national debate on the
Dr., Kissinger himself.
It has:
0, Focused attention, at last,
on the 40 Committee, 'domin-
ated by military and intelli-
gence professionals of the
World War II-cold war vint-
age, as the real overseer,
even operator, of the CIA's
covert activities and responsi-
ble only to the President.
0, Made clear the emer-
gence of Dr. Kissinger as the
-most powerful nonelected offi-
cial in the nation's history,
standing astride the intelli-
?gence, covert operations and
foreign policy ?apparatus as
secretary of state; chairman
of the National Security Coun-
eil,,national security adviser
to the President and chair-
map of the 40 Committee. .
.; 0' Destroyed what Was left
of the belief that at least a
few members of ? Congress,
have knowledge of and a veto
?over the Cloak-and-dagger as-.
pects of the CIA.
"The CIA is the tool of the
President and it works today
for Kissinger," according to
one government source.
The history of the U.S. gov-
ernment's Chilean adventure
dates to 1964 when Dr. Allen-'
de, a proclaimed Marxist,
first sought the presidency.
CIA funds helped his Chris-
tian Democratic opponent,
Eduardo Frei, capture the
presidency that year.
But Mr. Frei could not suc-
ceed himself and the Allende
threat was seen by Washing-
ton as greater than ever. This
time even more money was
funneled by CIA into anti-Al-
lende effort.? . .
In all, according to secret
testimony April 22 by the
CIA director, William E.
Colby, as revealed by Repre-
sentative Michael J. Harring:
ton (D., Mass.) the agency
pumped $11 million into
anti-Allende efforts in Chile
between 1964 and 1973. It
was spent as follows:
? About $500,000 was ad-
vanced in 1963 to help Chilean
individuals and organizations
gear up to oppose Dr. Al-
lende the next year.
? Another $500,000 went to
opposition party personnel
during the 1970 campaign.
? Following Dr. Allende's
election, $5 Million was
authorized to disrupt the
Chilean economy from 1971
Schlaudeman told a closed
to 1973; and $1.5 million _
1973. Some of 'these funds
helped finance an influential
Chilean newspaper.
e Finally, in August, 1973,
just one month before Presi-
dent Allende's downfall, an-
other $1 million was author-
ized to press home the effort
to wreck the Chilean econ-
omy, already in trouble be-
cause of Dr. Allende's own
misguided policies.
In each case, the effort
and the expenditure were ape
proved by the 40 Committee,
or by the same committee
operating under an alias.
"No more mysterious
group exists within the gov-
ernment than the 40 Commit-
' tee," David Wise, a journal-
ist who has long been a
student of the .U.S. intellig-
ence community, said.
"Its operations are so se-
cret that in an appearance
before the Senate Armed
Services Committee, CIA_
Director Colby was even re- .
luctant to identify the chair- -
man." ? ?
The Bay of Pigs invasion
attempt, the U-2 overflights
of the Soviet Union the ov-
erthrow of the Arbenz gov-
ernment in Guatemala?each
of these was a CIA covert
operation approved by the 40
Committee,' or its predeces-
sors;
In most cases, it appears,
Congress was kept in the
dark, at least until after the
operations were completed,
and sometimes beyond that.
The Chilean intervention is
an example of how this
blindfolding of Congress
works.
On March 29 this year,
Charles A. Meyers, the
former assistant. secretary of
state for Latin American af-
fairs, told a Senate subcom-
mittee that "the policy of the
government .. . was that
there would be no interven-
tion in the political affairs of
Chile ... We financed no
candidates, no political par-
ties ..."
As late as June 12?two
months after Mr. Colby's se-
er e t admission?Harry
Schlaudeman, No. 2 person
in the American Embassy in
Chile from 1969 to 1973, den-
ied that any such U.S. effort
was made.
"There was no funding, of,
that I am quite sure," Mr.
more was spent to influence hearing of the House Foreign
ezae.
? in.., :0
" Mr. Colby emphasizes
when questioned that . the
agency makes full secret re-
ports to the "appropriate"
congressional committees,
the so-called CIA "over-.
sight" subcommittees of the
House and Senate.
-But what they are told,
according to a? former top;
official of the CIA,. depends
on what questions they ask
?and frequently they do not
ask the right questions.
"The CIA deals with Con-
gress in the way that Con-
gress requests it to," the
? official, who requested anon-
ymity, said "Often they don't
, know enough to ask the right
? guestions. But it's their
fault."
Among the subjects- that
have esaped close congres-
:sional questioning has been
the operations of the 40 Corn-
; mittee. ?
? Despite its anonymity, the
committee appears to have
existed since before 1954,
I-under several different
names..
. The names have been deli-
' brately designed to provide
no clue as to its function. Its
, members communicate
mostly by word of ',mouth,
with little paperwork 'and a
staff of one man, believed to
be a CIA employee.
"You can look all you want
but you won't find any docu-.
; ment with the title '40 Com-
mittee' on it," a former in-
?
telligence officer said. "It's
like,' officially. 'at least, it
didn't exist." ? 4
? Froireits pre-1954 origins
as a loose group of top State
and Defen'se department offi-
cials': the group has evolved.
a fixed membership based
on title and formalized in a
directive of the National Se-
curity Council. The name 40
Committee is believed to
refer to a National Security
Council directive No. 40. ,
Dr. Kissinger, as national
security adviser, took charge'
of the 40 Committee under
President Nixon and retains
the chairmanship today.
The other members are
Gen. George S. Brown,
USAF, chairman of the joint
chiefs of staff; William P.
Clements, Jr., deputy secre-
tary of defense; Joseph J.
Sisco, under secretary of
state for political affairs
and Mr. Colby, the CIA.
director.
in their 50's, '
role of the CIA and everi4peocAdaFeitu134Wietlettr11108/64P arlib077-00432R000ialtadyen
23
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3
veterans, of the World War II
and cold war periods.
. Mr. Colby's membership,
according to critics, is the
classic story of the "fox in
the chicken coop"?the CIA
director, in effect sitting in
judgment on plans and pro-
posals of .his own agency.
? At times, other officials
have sat in; John N. Mitch-
ell, as Mr. Nixon's attorney
general, was a 40 Committee
member, and there is some
dispute over whether the late
Robert F. Kennedy, in his..
turn as attorney general,
also was a member.
It is believed that Mr. Nix-
on's controversial assistants,
H. R. Haldeman and John D.
Ehrlichman, also attended
meetings, but evidently not
as members.
? Each 40 Committee, ac-
cording to past and present
intelligence officers, has
tended to become an exten-
v sion of the chairman chiefly
.because he alone has access
directly to the President.
V Dr. Kissinger has come to
.dominate the 40 Committee
and to an extent some intel-
ligence specialists here be-
lieve is dangerous.
In the past, for -example,
the 40 Committee met
weekly, but as Dr. Kissin-
ger's own responsibilities
have expanded, he has con-
vened the committee less
frequently,, intelligence spe-
cialists here say.
Much of the time, accord-
ing' to several sources, Dr.
Kissinger merely confers
with the other members by
telephone, dealing with them
individually rather than as a
group, and passing on to the
President the consensus that
he alone has had a, real?and
in fashioning. '
The result, according to
specialists who have served
in both the CIA and State
Department, has been to
concentrate decision-making
in fewer hands, mostly Dr.
Kissinger's hands.
'A lot of the consultation
and argument that went on
is missing now," one official
said.
The controversy over Dr.
Kissinger's role extends ? to
the Chilean adventure and
who really initiated it.
The CIA clearly has taken
most of the heat to date, but
at least one official highly
placed in the State Depart-
ment from 1970 to 1973, the
years of the most ambitious
WASHINGTON STAR
17 September 1974
?
William F. neklier.
Two questions have been
'raised on the CIA-in-Chile
front. The first is whether I
State Department officials de-'
ceived congressional,commit-
tees by reporting that the
United States government had
'taken no action to frustrate
the inauguratibn or success of
Salvador Allende as president
of Chile.-The second is wheth-
er the United States govern-
ment should have done so. ,
Needless to say the second '
question, which is more impor-
tant than the first, is receiving
practically no attention. The
first absorbs the front page.
FRANKLY, I DO NOT know
what is the correct prescrip-
tion for State Department offi-
cials appearing before con-
gressional committees that
ask deeply sensitive questions.
The routine answer is to
demur, on the grounds of
executive privilege. But that
privilege, as we all know, is in
high disrepute -these days, so
that-congressional interroga-
tors tend to press on, where
yesterday, they'd have let
things lie.
How, for instance, would
anti-Allende effort, believes
the "CIA may be getting a
bum rap."
The idea for intervention,
he- said, appears to have
come from' the White House
?"from Nixon to Kissinger."
It was then farmed out to
the CIA to develop a plan
and provide funds and routed
routinely back to the 40 Com-
mittee, where Dr. Kissinger,
as chairman, approved what
may have been his own plan,
this source said.
The agenda of the 40 Com-
mittee includes some of the
most delicate foreign policy
decisions of the government.
Besides the CIA's covert pro-
jects, it also reviews and
approves monthly a joint re-
connaissance schedule that
involves, among other things,
the use of spy satellites ar-
ound the world.
Outside the intelligence
community there is criticism
of the secrecy that shrouds
the CIA and hands over its
operation to a non-elected
elite such as ,the 40 Commit-
tee.
But within the intelligence
community here?people
sympathetic to the need for
e CIA
you, if you served 'as an
ambassador, say, to Hitler's
Germany, and you were collu-
sively intriguing with the
resistance moverpent, answer
such a ? question as: "Mr.
Ambassador, is the State De-
partment engaged in any con-
tacts whatever with the oppo-
sition to the official
government of the Third
Reich?" You could "No"
?.which would be a lie. You
could .say: "Yes",? which
would be the truth, and would
blow the operation. Or you
could say: "I can't discuss
that."
In which case the press ---
yes, the press, because as we
have just seen with the sup-
posedly secret testimony of
CIA chief William Colby be-
fore a congressional commit-
tet, in due course we all end
up reading what he said ? is
invited to draw inferences,
namely that in fact you are in
touch with the resistance.
To this dilemma there is no
easy solution.
BUT RETURNING now to
Chile. It is alleged that the
CIA was authorized by the
clandestine policy alterna-
tives in a divided world?the
concern is that there is not
enough control of the CIA by
institutions such as the 40
Committee.
For example, Victor Mar-
chetti and John D. Marks,
,former U.S. intelligence offi-
cers and authors of "The
CIA and the Cult of Intellig-
ence," maintain thet covert
operations account for only
$440 million of ,CIA's esti-
mated budget of more than
$750 million a year. The ac-
tual figures are a closely
held secret.
By far the larger, more
important operation?world-
wide espionage?is subject to
no review by the 40 Conunit-
tee.
This is true even if the
espionage involves an opera-
tion as sensitive as hiring a
key official of a foreign vov-
ernment?as has been done
in Latin America, at the risk
of a serious diplomatic inci-
dent.
Even covert operation ap-
proved by the 40 Committee
have some history of gener-
ating capers never envi,-
sioned by the 40 Committee.
The Soviet sugar case is an
example.
d Allende
Nixon administration to spend ?
up to $8 million over a three-
year period to prevent if possi-'
,ble, and if not possible then to
frustrate, the government of
Salvador Allende. This is ac-
cepted prima facie as appall-
ing.
One wonders: what in the
world is the Central Intelli-
gence Agency supposed-to do? -
We have been formally com-
mitted since the days of Presi-
dent Monroe to the doctrine'
that no foreign country would
be permitted to colonize a
country in the Western Hemi-
sphere. Granted, we backed
away from that doctrine pari
passu with our retreat from
the Bay of Pigs. But the alto-
gether official rhetoric of the
United States in?its dealings
with Latin America has been
to incline towards freedom
and sovereignty.
The assertion that Allende
was "democratically" elected,
and that therefore we had no
business opposing him, begs
questions procedural and sub-
stantive.
For one thing, Allende's per-
centage of the vote was less
than Sen. Goldwater's in 1964.
But more important. Allende
24
was the outspoken friend of
socialist tyranny, and the no-
tion that we should deny to his
opponents such help as we
gave them suggests that the
United States should be totally
indifferent to the growth with-
in Latin America of a govern-
ment dominated by a man
whose idol was Fidel Castro. .
?
IT MAY BE that interfer-
ence of any.kipd in the affairs/
,of another country s'ilduld be
discouraged. But is it reallir a'
. purely Chilean "affair" if it is
contemplated that hundreds of
millions of dollars of American
investments are to be confis-
cated?,. Is it purely a Chilean
affairif the country becomes a
base for revolutionary activi-
ties against its neighbors?. .
Are we in fact prepared to
retreat so completely from
the inaugural ideal of John F.
Kennedy ("We shall pay any
price, bear any burden, meet
any hardship, support any
friend, oppose any foe, in
order to assure the survival
and the success of liberty
. . .") as to stop any clandes-
tine effort to help our friends
in other countries to help
themselves?
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LONDON SUNDAY TIMES
15 Sep 1974
_ .
By Henry Brandon
hey. grilled the ?.IA
Washington
THE Director Of the Central
Intelligence Agency, William
Celby, proved yesterday that in !
his days as an undercover agent
he had learnt how to survive
alone in hostile territory. He
spoke at a conference on the CIA
and covert activities, hosted on
Capitol Hill by Senators Edward
Brooke (Republican, Massachu-
setts) and Phillip Hart (Demo-
crat, Michigan): it was as if
General' Sir Walter Walker had
come to address a TUC meeting.
Mr Colby faced a hostile panel
of well-known critics of the CIA,
Including seven former members
of the agency like Daniel
Ellsberg, and also an obviously
hostile, audience that consisted
mostly of 300 yoring "new Left"
CIA-haters. Ile not only defended
the CIA's role, after two days
of speeches by critics, but also
sought to promote a legislative
proposal for. the equivalent of an ;
official secrets act to protect;
"good secrets."
Questions about the CIA's
activities in the overthrow of the!
Allende regime in Chile, which
surfaced as the result of a con-
gressional "leak," 'Mr Colby
fended off by saying that he
would answer them only in execu-
've session of the appropriate
?-zressional committees. How.
'he claimed that the CIA's
aments in covert action are
ken only as directed by
-onal Security Council and
Colby: survival lesson
that "they are frankly and. regu-
larly reported to the appropriate
committees, and they require only
a small proportion of our effort
and time."
When Mr Colby said the CIA
had no connection with the mili-
tary coup that overthrew Allende,
but that agency "looked forward
to a change in the government
there by democratic means," the
generally good-natured audience
broke into laughter. He added
that he had reread his secret
testimony of last April which
leaked out here earlier in the
' week, and found that he had not
, used the phrase "destabilise-the
Allende government' which he
was quoted as having used in
describing the application of
clandestine funds that had been
authorised by the Forty Com-
mittee " of the Natfonal Security
Council.
;. .
When asked how miz,ch specific
NEW YORK POST
10 Sept. 1974
z
information Congress is given
about covert actions, Mr Colby
said it was " made aware at
appropriate times of various
major actions," and when asked
whether the American ambas-
sadors in Chile were kept
informed of covert activities,
there, he replied that such in-
formation is primarly given to
) the Under Secretary of State and
that ambassadors are informed
on a "need-to-know basis." ?
He refused to say whether those
ambassadors to Chile who had
testified before Congress that the
US to their knowledge, main-
tained a -" hands-of" policy had
lied. He , insisted, however, that
all major efforts and money spent
in Chile were known, to several
committees of Congress and that
therefore the CIA, in the end, re-
mains accountable to the voters.
Asked whether there would
now be a conflict of interest
between Vice-President Nelson
Rockefeller and his enterprises
in Latin America?which the
questioner claimed had been used
as cover for intelligence opera-
tions?Mr. Colby, who always
maintained a truly stiff upper
lip however insulting or indis-
creet the question, replied that
this was. " No useful subject for
discussion."
To a question about whether
the CIA intended to intervene
to prevent Greece from leaving
NATO Mr Colby replied that
I Greece's action had no immediate
! adverse effect on the security of
the US and furthermore that
IDOikble-Stanciard Diplomacy
'A few weeks back, members of the
Senate Foreign Relations -Committee
conCluded a special inquiry by warmly
reaffirming their approval of the nomi-
nation of Henry A. Kissinger as Secre-
tary of State. Last- spring, it has now
begn revealed,.there was another kind of
confirmation hearing, It confirmed sus-
picions that the Central Intelligence
Agency,had-clone its best?or worst?to
bring down the Allende government in
The proceedings, as we noted yester-
'day, featured closed-door, testimony by
CIA Director Colby that the CIA was
given authority to invest iri61 e thaft t? 43'
million between 1970 and 1973 to over-
throw Allende?who died a year ago,
assertedly by his own hand, 'after a
ruthless military coup. Colby, a special-
ist in covert CIA operations, explained
that they had been approved by an in-
telligence board headed by Kissinger.
To Rep. Harrington (D-Mass), that
information immediately suggested Con-
gressional probing. While Kissinger has
often objected that there should be no
U. S. interference in ,Soviet "internal
affairs"?such as' policy on emigration
apparently holds different views
pproved For Release 2001/08/08 :
?
!covert actions have no irnpact
i on current activities.
I Daniel ..Ellsberg congratulated
i Mr Colby on the CIA's participa-
! tion in getting the famous secret
, speech of Mr Kbruschev in 1956,
and then seemed to place his own
IfeOt of, leaking the Pentagon
i Papers in the same category. Mr
tColby recalled that when Presi-
ident Nixon introduced him to
Mr Brezhnev on his visit to
, Washington ? and the Russian
leader. asked the ? CIA director
whether he was a dangerous man.,
he replied that he was not, and
that "the more the US and
; Russia know about .each other the
safer we will be."
When asked how many people
he-had killed in connection with
Operation Phoenix in Vietnam.
Mr Colby eagerly replied.
"none," and added that the
? majority were killed in rralitary
! comVat or police action. His
]-.interest was to capture the Viet
i Cong, he said, because a dead
! man could not impart informa-
tion-
In his speech,,-Mr Colby. sought
: to shift the emphasis from covert
, operations because, he said. the
CIA's predominant role now is
? concerned with information and
analytical responsibilities. Though
he had to endure some strong
language?such as being called
an " assassin "?he was also given
credit by some, like the Director
. of the Centre for National
Security Studies, who said: "W ha:
1 a wonderful thing that you came
to face your critics.'!
about American intervention in Chile.
But Harrington, a member of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee, has been un-
able, so far,to secure any commitment to
investigate from either his,grdup or?its
Senate counterpart.
That, is hard to understand, 'even
though the Secretary has been' treated
by?Congress as a sacrosanct 'personage
for some time. Allende frequently
charged, 'that he was a CIA target?
and he was evidently correct. Many. of
the most, prominent members of his
government still suffocate in the junta's
jails. And anxious speculation 'is in-
* evitable about how many other govern-
ments are deemed by the CIA and the
intelligence board headed by Kissinger
to be appropriate subjects for U. S.-
financed subversion.
The issue is not whether the Allende
regime was beyond reproach; it is,
among other things, whether we have
a double standard under which freely-
elected governments are subject to our
covert sabotage while despotisms are
considered beyond even moral remon-
strance. Are these topics taboo for the
Fulbright and Morgan committees? Who
CIA-INIMOVIRt?01331vegiatIbP2Sm2-
25
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Los sggs
16 September 197117
Meddling in. Chile by the CIA
. William E. Colby, director of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency, has denied all over again that the
CIA had any connection with the military coup
that toppled Chile's Marxist government a year
? ago. As far as we know, there is no evidence to the
'contrary. It now seems clear; however, that thp
agency did, intervene repeatedly in Chilean politics.
? Congress has the right and the responsibility to
pin down once and for all what did happen, and to
:initiate appropriate action against any Administra-
tion Officials who are found 'to have deliberately
misled Congress as to the nature and. extent of -U.S.
involvement.
? . .
. In secret testimony before a House subcOrnmittee
last, April, according to Rep. Michael J. Harrington
(D-Mass.), Colby described a number of clandestine'
.operations in Chile_ over the past decade. Some
.were public knowledge already; some were not.
Harrington, who has read the still-secret trans-
cript, says Colby confirmed that the CIA spent $3
,million in 1964 to support the candidacy of Chris-
:flan Democrat Eduardo Frei against that of Dr.
? Salvador Allende, the Marxist candidate. Frei won.
1970, when the' next, presidential race was
? thrown into the Chilean Congress because none of
the three candidates won a majority, the CIA was
;authorized to spend $350,000 in bribes to prevent
Allende from being chosen president. Colby is said
to have 'indicated, however, that the plan was ulti-,
.
mately dropped as "unworkable." In any, event, Al-
.lende became president.
NEW YORK TIMES
15 September 1974
KISSINGER CALLED
CHILE STRATEGIST
By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Special to The New York Times,
WASHINGTON, Sept. 14?
Secretary of State Kissinger
personally. 'directed a tar-reach-
ing Nixon \Administration pro-
gram designed to curtail ecot
'nomic aid and .credits to Chile
after:the election of .Pretideht
Salvador Allende 'Cesspits ,in
1970, well-informed , Govern-
ment sources said today. ,
These sources said that after
the election of Dr. Allende, Mr.
!Kissinger, who was then serv-
ing as 'President Nixon's ad-
viser on national security, took
charge of a series of weekly-
interagency 'meetings at which
Administration officials worked
out a policy of economic sane-
tins?or "retaliation," as one
source put it?against Chile.
Covert C.I.A. Activities
, The Nixon, Administration re-
peatedly denied that there was
any overt program of economic
,sanctions against Chile, public-
ly stating that the Chilean Gov-
ernment's inability to gct loans
and 'credits after Dr. Allende'S
election was a reflection 'of its
poor credit risk:
, There was no immediate:,
comment from Mr. Kissinger.:
The Secretary of State -has
been under increasing criticism
from Congress since it was
revealed last ,week that the
United States' had authorized
more than $8-million for clan-
destine activities by the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency against
the Allende Government, from
1970 to 1973. The 'funds . were
approved bY,the 40 Committee,
-
a high-level panel headed by
Mr. Kissinger that is in charge
of overseeing the C.I.A.'s'cov-
ert activities*.
Although he is Secretary of
State, Mr. Kissinger remains
as President Ford's ? national
security adviser and thus still
heads the 40 Commitee.
The sources emphasized that
Mr. Kissinger's economic ac-
tivities against the Allende
Government were distinct from
his inVolvement in clandestine
C.I.A. operations, although
both programs were controlled
by him with great secrecy.
Mr. Kissing,er's decision to
become personally involved in
the economic reprisals against
the Chilean Government; an-
.gered a number of high-level
State Department officials,
who considered his action to
be a sign of mistrust toward
the department, the sources
said.
"The whole purpose of the
?
Colby is described 'as testifying that, after 'Al-
lende took office, the 'CIA Was authorized to spend
$5'milliim for "destabilizatiOn:efforts7and support,
for anti-Allende forces. . "! .;
Allende's Communist-SOcialist government com-
mitted so many blunders on its own that the mili-
tary coup in' September, 1973, was probably inevi-.
table, even if the CIA's clandestine anti-Allende.
campaign had never taken place. ?
It seems 'self-evident, however, that the United "
States has no right to interfere in the 'politics of a
democratic country, .even if there is reason to fear
that the election of, a given leader will be injurious,
to U.S., interests.
Even more worrisome is the possibility that.re-
sponsible officials deliberately misled Congress in
earlier public hearings on the matter.
Sen. Frank Church (D-Ida.), chairman of a Senate
subcommittee that held hearings on possible CIA.
invOlvement in Chile, has properly announced that
if a review of .the testimony indicates that.-Con- ?
gress..was lied to. he will refer the matter to the
Justice Department for possible perjury prosecu-
tions.
As the Idaho senator said, the habit of deceiving
Congress on sensitive foreign policy issues cropped'
up during the Vietnam war. And if it's still going
on, "It's a habit the Congress is going ,to have to
break."
meetings hi the first couple
of months after the election
was to insure that the various
aid agencies and lending agen-
cies were rejiggered to make
sure that [Allende] wasn't to
get a penny," said one well-
informed source.
Over the next two years, the
Chilean Government was de-
nied dozens of loans by the
World Bank, a multinational
loan agency over whose activ-
ity the United States has vir-
tual veto power, and by the
Export-Import Bank, a United
States Government agency. In
addition, Chile's short-term line
of credit with private banks
fell from $220-million in 1971
to less than S40-million a year
.later.
In a speech on Dec. 4, 1972,
to the United Nations, Dr. Al-
lende complained of "large-
scale external pressure to cut
us off from the world, to
strangle our economy and par-
alyze our trade in our principal
export, copper, and to deprive
us of access to sources of in-
ternational ? financing." The
Allende Government was over-
thrown in a bloody coup d'etat
10 months later in which the
Chilean leader died.
The most explicit Adminis-
tration denial of such economic
pressure came *during hearings
last year on Chile before a Sen-
ate Foreign Relations subcom-
mittee, in which John M. Hen-
nessy, then an Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury for
International Affairs, had the
'following exchange with Sen-
ator Frank Church, Democrat
of Idaho, the subcommittee
chairman:
Senator Church: "So the po-
sition of our Government on
the state of the economy in
Chile was such that Chile was
not credit-worthy, and that no
further loans should be made
owing to,the general condition
of the economy. Is that . cor-
xect?"
ifermesy: "That is correct?'
'? A number of sources charac-
terized the Nixon 'Administra-
' tion's curtailment of credit and
? aid to Chile as a." political deci-
,aion that was initiated shortly
after Dr. Allende fdrntally took
office in November, 1970.
"There was a range of alter-
natives being considered,". one
? source reealled. "The options
ranged from a marine-type. in-
vastion to massive infusions of
money. When Allende became
President, everybody breathed
a sigh of relief because we
hadn't done anything."
'Once he was President, then
there was set in motion a care-
fully planned program led by
Kissinger," the source added.
"He personally chaired?for
maybe as long as 10 or 12
weeks?a working staff group
dealing with economic sanc-
tions. It was our understanding
that the President was extreme-
ly concerned about Allende and
Henry was showing him that he
was on top of it."
The- New York Times's
sources include former Nixon
Administration officials who
:were involved in the decision-
naking on Chile after the elec-
26
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tion of Dr. Allende. Other in-
formation was supplied by Con-
gressiontl officials who have
had access to all of the sworn
testimony on Chile.
The sources said that the
working group included officials
at the assistant-secretary level
from the State Department, the
?Pentagon and the Treasury De-
partment as well as Mr. Kissin-
ger and other National Security
Council aides. During that pe-
riod, Sources said, a formai Na-
tional Security Council Deci-
sion Memorandum ruling out
economic ? aid to Chile was
issued.
Normally, the interagency Unit
would have been under the
chairmanship of the Assistant
BALTIMORE SUN
19 September 1974 -
foseph Kraft
Wider Abuses than Chile
Justify Fuss over CIA -
Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs. But, the
sources said, the Assistant Sec-
retary at that time, Charles A.
MeYer, had fallen into disfavor
with ?the White House because
of his resistance at meetings of
the 40 Committee to some o
the clandestine C.I.A. activities
authorized against the Allende
Government:
"It was a big blow to the
State Department," another
source said. "It was a Kissin,
ger group.
"It stuck in my mind because
Kissinger, in affect, became a
Chilean desk officer," the,
source added. "He made sure
that policy. was made in the
way he and the President
wanted. it."
The fuss over the role of the
?Central Intelligence Agency
in Chile is not really about
that agency or that country.
It emerges chiefly from a
deep general suspieion of the
instruments of national secur-
ity. If he truly wants to heal
the country, President Ford
will have to go out of his way
to assuage this suspicion.
Two major questions ought
to be asked at all times about
the CIA. The first engages
the role of the agency in mak-
ing and unmaking foreign
governments by the black arts
of sabotage and subversion.
That issue seems to be cen-
tral to the present stir? over
Chile. The case grew out of a
letter written by Representa-
tive Michael J. Harrington
(D., Mass.) and leaked to the
press. The letter purported to
summarize testimony to a
House subcommittee by Wil-
liam E. Colby, director of the
t7A.
According to the letter, Mr.
Colby testified that the agen-
cy spent $8 million between
1970 and 1973 to help the op-
position to the Popular Front
government of President Sal-
vador Allende. ?The letter
said the funds were used in
order to achieve the "de-
-stabilization" of the regime.
The implication was that the
? CIA arranged the coun that
overthrew Dr. Allende last
year.
In fact the word "destabili-
zation" was not used by Mr.
Colby in his testimony. It is
hardly thinkable that so small
a sum?for $8 million is vir-
tually nothing in the modern
intelligence game?could have
caused the fall of the Chilean
government.
President Ford said at his the mgration of the CIA and tral Intelligence; John M. Hen-
news conference what AfftrotimitYtarrffialtaaste alk01.108/005:sCIA-RDKIT00432
in-ormed sources also say? security policy. partment official, two former
that the money was used only
to sustain democratic news-
papers and political leaders.
It is as clear as it can ever NEW YORK TIMES
be in this sort of murky 19 September 1974
business that the CIA did not
play a significant role in the FORD TO BRIEF FIVE
Chilean coup.
The second big question
turns on the: responsiveness
of the CIA to the elected lead- 0 \I C.I.A. ACTIVITIES
ership in the White House
and Congress. Everybody
agrees that in Chile the CIA
was obedient to the wishes
of the Nixon administration.
What is in doubt is the
question of keeping Congress
informed. Several high offi-
cials?including the Secretary
of State, Henry A. Kissinger,
and former CIA director,
Richard Helms ? denied in
testimony be!ore various ele-
ments of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee that the
United States had fomented
the Chilean. coup.
Technically, those state-
ments appear to have been
accurate. Moreover, it is tra-
ditional that black-bag opera-
tions of the agency are not
revealed to the regular legis-
lative committees of Con-
gress but to a special watch-
dog committee.
Even if they did not tell
the strict truth about such
operations to the Foreign
Relations Committee, in other
words, Dr. Kissinger and Mr.
Helms and the others were
operating within established
guidelines.
However, if the particulars
of the Chilean case do not
justify the fuss, the general
atmosphere of the oast few
years does. Throughout the
Vietnam war. Congress and
much of the country were
systematically deceived- about
Over and over again in the
Watergate case, President
Nixon and those around him
invoked the term "national
security" as the justification
for covering up common
crimes.
Many intelligent and well-
meaning people have come to
believe that the whole appa-
ratus of national security is
bogus?a cover for something
illegitimate and improper.
That is why the apparent im-
proprieties of the CIA in Chile
have excited such attention.
? If President Ford is to end
what he has called the long
national nightmare, he will
have to sof.en tnese feelings.
Unfortunately, he seems not
to understand the depths of
the doubts about national
security. Thus when ques-
tioned about Chile at his news
conference Monday night, he
gave a national security re-
sponse straight out of the
1950's: "Our government, like
other governments, does take
certain actions in the intelli-
By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
WASHINGTON, Sept. 18?
Secretary of State Kissinger an-
nounced today that he and
President Ford would person-
ally brief five House and Sen-
ate leaders tomorrow on the
scope of the Central Intelligence
Agency's covert operations.
, "We will put it before them
in detail and ask them, 'What
do you want" Mr. Kissinger
said aboard Air Force One as
it returned here from New
? York, where President Ford ad-
dressed the United Nations.
Administration officials said
that the President had decided
to brief the Congressional lead-
ers after his strong defense of
all C.I.A. covert activities in
his news ? conference Monday
night. The President publicly
confirmed then that the agency
had been involved in clandestine
efforts in Chile, but he de-
picted them as having been
aimed only at aiding newspaper
and politicians opposing Presi-
dent Salvador Allende Gossens,
who, Mr. Ford said, was at-
tempting to suppress criticism.
The White House's anounce-
'2/lent followed the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee's an-
nouncement yesterday that it
'had authorized a full-scale
study into what has been called
misleading testimony in the
Senate about the C.I.A.'s role in
Chile. Targets of that inquiry
are known to include, Richard
Helms, former Director of Cen-
gence field to implement
foreign policy and to protect
national security."
The same lack of under-
standing entered into the
blunder committed in the par-
doning of President Nixon.
The administration theory
was that the curse would be
taken off the pardon by the
,amnesty for Vietnam war Ke-
sisters.
Mr. Ford evidently did not.
realize that the opposition to
Vietnam rested on deep gen-
eral doubts about national
security actions?not on the
relatively trivial issue of the
draft dodgers. ?
The point of all this is that
the country is seriously and
deeply divided on fundament-
al issues of national security.
President Ford is going to
have to take account of those
divisions. He will have to try
tl understand the other side.
Otherwise, he will end up, as
his two predecessors did,
limping out of the White
House.
high-level State Department of-
ficials, and Mr. Kissinger him-
self, who testified about United
States involvement in Chile
during his Senate confirmation
hearings last fall.
Those invited to the briefing
tomorrow, Mr. Kissinger said
were the Senate Democratic
leader, Mike Mansfield of Mon-
tana;-. the Senate ? Republican
leader, Hugh Scott of Pennsyl-
vania; Speaker of the House
Carl Albert of Oklahoma; the
House Dergocratic leader,
Thomas P. O'Neill 3r. of Massa-
chusetts, and the House Re-
publican leader John J. Rhodes
of Arizona.
Administration officials said
that Mr. Kissinger and Presi-
dent Ford were confident that
covert operations ? such as
those in Chile ? could be de-
? fended on.. national securitY
grounds.. If these operations
were dropped, these officialsin-
?Sisted, an 'overwhelming cas"e"
could be made that peril to the
security of the United States
would be increased,.;
One high-level official, asked
whether such beliefs on the part
of Mr. Kissinger and President
Ford -amounted to an endorse-
ment of United States interven-
tion is foreign countries, replied
that the question was a philo-
sophical one worth debating.
? Concern over lack of effec-
tive Congressional oversight
has been repeatedly expressed
by ranking Senate and House
members since newspaper dis-
closures last week. that the
C.I.A.. despite prior disclaimers,
had been authorized by Mr.
Kissinger and President Nixon
to spend more than $8-million
between 1970 and 1973 in an
effort to make it more difficult
for Mr. Allende, a Marxist, to
govern.
The Chilean President was
overthrown last year in a mili-
tary coup d'etat in which he
died.
01012ANnefat
Dante B. Fas-I
of Florida, re-
tgtive
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WASHINGTON POST
.2.9 September 1974
:Rowland Evans 'and Robert Novak
issinger or Schlesin
a.
?
In affirming on Tuesday that Henry
':"Kissinger would still wear two hats as
'both Secretary of State and director of
the National Security Council (NSC),
:President Ford was postponing the ul-
timate choice between Kissinger and
Secretary of Defense James Schle-
:,singer.
-Although Mr. Ford denied published
?reports that his transition team recom-
mended that Mr. Kissinger 'be stripped
,of his NSC hat, the President did not
.divulge 'confidential recommendations
from intimate advisers. They had been
urging the appointment el a new NSC
.director, ending Kissinger 'e unprece-
dented control over global policy and
perhaps even reducing him to roughly
,the same level as Schlesinger. Accord-
ingly, these same adviser's believed
.(perhaps hoped) that cutting Kissinger
down to human size would result in his
jibrupt resignation.
This showdown has been postponed,
but there seems little chance that Kis-
singer and Schlesinger can coexist In
.the Ford administration into next sum-
mer. Furthermore, 'despite Tuesday's
?zaisurance from the President, Ford in-
lidert believe it is SchleSibger rather
than Kissinger who may ultimately
? survive. ? -
Even if they agreed on policy, con-
lrontation between Kissinger and
$chlesinger would have been inevita-
ble. Never before have two such bril-
liant intellectuals simultaneously held
the Cabinet portfolios for state and de-
iense. "Here are two egomaniacs," con-
tends one high official who knows
them both well. Two smart egomani
rete, which *makes it worse.', t
7 But the fact is that they most cer-
tainly do not agree. Schlesinger be-
? lieves Kissinger's detente diplomacy
concedes too much to Moscow on all
fronts?SALT, mutual force reduc-
tions, 'the 'European Security Treaty.
Contending that detente is not so frag-
ile a flower, he would take a much
. harder' bargaining line. '
It was therefore predictable that
Schlesinger would grow restive with
total domination of national security
policy by Kissinger, wearing both his
NSC and State Department hats. But
President Nixon, obsessed by Water-
gate, never even approached the prob-
lem. Kissinger reigned supreme.
: Mr. Ford's access:ion seemed to: con-
firm that supremacy, As Vice presi-
newed his call today for more
effective control over the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency after a
series of hearings that ended to-
da" before his inter-American
affairs subcommittee of the
House Foreign Affairs Commit-
tee. Mr. Fascell said he was
"deeply distressed" that he and
his colleagues had not been
fully informed of the agency's
activities in testimony given
earlier this year by William E.
-Colby. the Director of Central
Intelligence.
dent, -Mr. Ford sought a personal rela-
-tionship with Kissinger while privately
expressing doubts that the pipe-smok-
ing, donnish Schlesinger could sell de-
fense budgets on Capitol Hill. Gen. Al-
exairder Haig, Kissinger's old deputy
temporarily kept on as chief of staff
by President Ford, felt that diplomatic
strategy in negotiating with Moscow
was no business of the Secretary of.
Defense.. .
The impression of Schlesinger's im-
pending doom was confirmed ?by Mr.
Ford's first weeks in office. Intimates
reported him displeased by Schlesing-
er's professorial style of exposition.
White House staff papers gave the
President the totally erroneous impres-
sion that the Pentagon -brass distrusted
Schlesinger because he had never
wbrn the uniform. The President Was
not happy about Schlesinger's publicly
revealing his precautions against a mil-
itary takeover during the Nixon-Ford
transition.
But within the ,past week or so, the
climate has changed. Key Ford aides
now defend Schlesinger and urge his
retention. His position is certainly not
hurt at the White House by Halg's im-
minent departure. Moreover, Schle-
'singer's friends have this long-range
view: Mr. Eord is essentially a congres-
sional barghiner without Nixon's Wil-
sonian ?world vision; as such, he in
time will be attracted by Schlesinger's
insistence on tit-for-tat bargains with
THE ECONOMIST SEPTEMBER 14, 1974
Out into the open
THE CBA AHD THE CULT OF
INTELLIGENCE
By Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks.
Alfred A. Knopf; London: JOnathan
Cape. 419 pages. ?3.95.
The recent revelations that the CIA
spent large sums of money between
1970 and 1973 in efforts to overthrow
the Allende government in Chile will
not have come as a surprise to those
few people who followed the events
there with care and patience. In addi-
tion to these specialists, there is a huge
number of casual readers who might
have been surprised if. they had not
read, or heard about, this recent popular
account of some of the cIA's activities,
written by a veteran of 14 years' service
in the agency in association with a
former member of the American foreign
service.
Published in July in the United States
this book has already had consider-
able influence. It has provoked a major
court decision on the right of American
government agencies to withhold
information, and it has been largely
responsible for. the Administration's
asking for new legislation to tighten up
and clarify laws covering not only the
security of information but also means
of enforcing them in cases where
individuals such as Daniel Ellsberg and
?it must be added?Messrs Marks
the Kremlin. "
Finally, Kissinger's perceived indis-
pensability has been sharply eroded by
the Cyprus crisis and the Chilean reve-
lations. Newsmen last Tuesday morn-
ing were stunned when told by Rep.
Albert Quie of Minnesota, a close con-
gressional ally of Mr. Ford's, that Kis-
singer should go. But Quie's view is in-
creasingly prevalent in congressional
\ cloakrooms.- Accusations that he mas-
terminded Central Intelligence Agency
Intervention in Chile has energized bit-
ter, simultaneous campaigns against
him from both left and right.
Preoccupied by the Nixon pardon
and Vietnam amnesty, Mr. Ford has
not addressed the important disagree-
ments over detente policy between
Kissinger and Schlesinger. Nor does
he have to decide between them imme-
diately.
But following the Chilean revela-
tions, Ford insiders began urging that
Kissinger's authority be diluted by the
appointment of a new NSC director.
The threat to Kissinger's supremacy
posed by this recommendation was un-
settling, obviously to President Ford
and less obviously even to some offi-
cials who disagree with Kissinger on
policy. Contending that there is no al-
ternative to Kissinger as possible Mid-
eastern peacekeeper in the coming
months, they want the status quo re-
tained.
Even some of these officials, how-
ever, believe the long-term coexistence
of Kissinger and Schlesinger is impos-
sible. Within no more than six months,
they believe, the President must
choose between them. While it would
not have been credible just a month
ago, ,it is by no means certain today
that the choice will be Henry Kis-
singer.
1974. Field Enterprises. Us.
and Marchetti themselves ' see fit to
make public information that they have
agreed to keep secret.
But the book was not written so much
about the system of classifying informa-
tion as about an issue that is funda-
mental to the intelligence establishment
of the United .States: that the CIA,.
originally established 'to co-ordinate the
intelligence ' activities of the. various
branches Of govefnment?the State
Department, military services, FBI,
National Sectirity. Agency (NSA) and
the rest?his been forced ont- of this
role, and has concentrated on its
mission of clandestine operations, and
that such operations- have included
unethical meddling in the affairs of
foreign governments.
This charge is true. The so-called
intelligence community is huge and com-
partmented and not well managed.
In fact, according to the authors, it is
hardly managed at all. They also make
the fair point that the NSA's com-
munications interceptors and code-
breakers and the mammoth Defense
Intelligence Agency have most of the
money and power and- that neither
wishes to be co-ordinated by the CIA,
whose political machinations abroad
are well known and well documented.
Having made this point early on, the
authors suggest in the last chapter
that the cure can be found in separating
the co-ordinating functions of the CIA
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from operations. This makes good senie.
Between, however, the initial exposi-
tion of the problem and the proposed
cure, the book is a rambling and dis-
jointed account of some of the CIA's
clandestine adventures and a lot of
boring material about internal organisa-
tion, policies and procedures. It is not
a history of the CIA. The authors would
be the first to confirm this, as they con-
sistently make the point that the CIA
and the whole American intelligence
community are so compartmented that
no one knows what is going on, and
that, in effect, a lot of time is spent
rediscovering the wheel. Although
the individual accounts of clandestine
operations are sometimes interesting,
there is not much here which is really
new: the Bay of Pigs (the war which
was the undoing of Allen Dulles,
arguably the best director the CIA ever
had), Air America and the secret war
in Laos, Che Guevara in Bolivia and the
attempt to overthrow Sukarno are all
rehashed at length.
The most intriguing parts?and the
main feature of the book?are the
deletions ordered by a federal court
judge (identified by the word "delete"
-and a gap in the page the size of the
deleted material) and the words that
the CIA asked to have deleted but
which the authors refused to delete
and which are ndw printed in bold-face
type. Although it initially gives the
reader a sense of being in on something
novel to read these bold-type sentences,
not much is given away here, either. In
fact, one is left with a sense of incred-
ulity that there could have been any
dispute at all over many of them. Surely,
one hopes, there is more substance to
the passages that the judge deleted. Or
could the whole thing be a gigantic CIA
hoax designed to get Congress to
tighten up the security laws? Unlikely as
this may seem, if one believes even a
fraction of the escapades and hare-
brained ideas the book attributes to the
CIA's clandestine branch, such an
operation is not entirely incredible.
This is not the best book written about
the CIA; but, because of its legal and
legislative ramifications, it could turn
out to be the most important one. ?
CHRISTIAN ENCE MONT TOR
19 September 1974 .
The CIA: Chile and elsewhere
By Charles W. Yost
New York
Is it not high time that the United
States Government, Congress, and
people drew some operative con-
clusions from the repeated and ern-
- be -...rassing public predicamente in
Wach the CIA has involved them over
the past 15 years? ?
The most recent debate on the
subject arises from the avowal by the
director of the agency that it did
expend considerable sums in Chile to
prevent Allende's accession to power
and, after, he had nevertheless ac-
ceded, to weaken or undermine him.
I have not had an opportunity to
examine the record sufficiently to
judge whether, as claimed, other
witnesses misled congressional com-
mittees on this point, though there
certainly is prima facie evidence that
they were not wholly candid. I should
myself, however, support the U.S.
Government's contention that, what-
ever the CIA may or may not have
-done in Chile, it did not "overthrow"
Allende.
Allende was overthrown by Chil-
eans. He never at any time had the
support of the majority of the people.
EL: was overthrown because he and
his more radical adherents alienated,
frightened, and ultimately radi-
calized in the opposite sense the
uneonverted majority, particularly
its Most powerful element, the mill-
tary.
It is necessary to make this point in
order to clarify the broad issue ?
whether admitted CIA activities in
Chile, even if they played no substan-
tial part in the overthrow of Allende,
were in the national interest of the
U.S. I would argue that they were not.
American and other Western
spokesmen have for the past half
century been pointing out that, while
the Marxist revolutions in the Soviet
Union and elsewhere were no doubt
directed to noble ends, the atrocious
means so often employed grossly
distorted and even vitiated those
ends. Yet since the onset of the cold
wal the U.S. has takena leaf out of the
Communist book .and, too often re-
. ? sorted to means so shabby 'we dare
not avow them. In the long run this
does not pay.
Ignoble means debase and demoral-
ize the actors, corrupt and brutalize
those acted upon and, in so doing,
transform and disintegrate the end
itself. This is as true for democrats as
for Communists.
The consequence of a quarter cen-
, tury of "dirty tricks" by the CIA, that
? is, the U.S. Government, has been to
make .the agency throughout the
world a symbol for unscrupulous
Intervention in other people's internal
affairs and hence often to undermine,
rather than to serve, the objectives of
U.S. foreign policy.
We see how it is almost universally
believed in Greece that the CIA
inspired the July 15 oaup in Cyprus
which set in train the -subsequent
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disasters. I believe this is a mistaken
judgment, because , upsetting the
status quo was so obviously counter to
U.S. interest. But? the fact it is
plausible to suppose that the CIA
might have inspired the coup if it had
been in the U.S. interest lends color to
the accusation.
A New York Times story last week
quotes a telegram from the U.S. ?
Ambassador inDelhi to the effect that
the recent revelations about CIA
activities in Chile have confirmed the
worst suspicions of the Indians about
that agency and caused Indira Gandhi
to wonder whether the Indian Govern- ?
ment may not be the next target for"
elimination. This is hardly the image
of its foreign policy and practice the
U.S. Government should wish to see
widely held around the world. ? ?
Supporters of "CIA activities of this
kind think of themselves as "hard-
nosed" realists. The Bay of Pigs is
one instructive example and Gordon'
Liddy's little operation at Watergate
is another. ?
The fact is the "dirty tricks" con-
.
ducted by agents of the U.S. Govern-
ment very rarely serve the national
interest of the United States, even if
one interprets these interests in
strictly "cold-war" terms. Ex-
perience has shown that they cannot
be adequately "controlled" within the
executive branch, because it is so
often the controllers, as in the case of
the Bay of Pigs and perhaps of Chile,
whose perceptions and judgments are .
at fault.
Vietnam has tragically demonstra-
ted the limitation on the "capacity of
the U.S. to determine the structure of
an alien society even by a massive
injection* of armed force. How much
less likely that America could hope to
do so by clandestine operations. The
U.S. can, no doubt, occasionally con-
tribute to the rise or fall of a particu-
lar government orpolitician, but over
the longer 'run.' indigenous forces,
which it canriot 'control, will deter-
mine whether this superficial change
has any lasting effect.
In referring at a public ?rneeting in
Washington last week to proposals
'that CIA abandon its covert action
programs, director William Colby
said: "In light of current American
policy, it would not have a major
impact on our current activities or the
current security of the United
States."
? While the triple use of the word
"current" is ominous, this statement
is mildly reassuring. It is to be hoped
that the President and Secretary of
State will be persuaded that, in the,
broader perspective, these "dirty
tricks" do more harm than good to the
national security and should be
phased out.
The author of this article writes
from a background of 40 years as
a United States diplomat.
? 1974 Charles W. Yost
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Christian Science Monitor
12 Sept. 19714
Lib
"1.ttrig:
on-UJb9 LIrjijcI
From red wigs at the Elisberg psy-
chiatrist break-in to bumbling ar les in
La s, the CIA has been getting a bad
press lately. Here a longti e capital
newsman and seasoned observer of! Els
Intelligence and 'dirty tricks agency
comments on how the spy agency c uld
be overhauled.
enjamin Welles
Special to The Christian Science Monitor
Washington
The spies may not all be in from the cold ? but
the canaries are' starting to sing.
The trickle of critical "exposes" about the
Central Intelligence Agency by ex-employees or?
associates is becoming a flood. Each book seems to
generate another, as America's spies go public for
the good of their souls, their pocketbooks, or both. ?
In recent years ? apart from Wise and Ross's
"The Invisible Empire," an excellent journalistic
work ? there have appeared Patrick MacGarvey's
"CIA: The Myth and the Madness," J. Fletcher
Prouty's "The Secret Team," and Alfred McCoy's
?,''The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia."
Just out is "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence"
'by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, the most
? authoritative to date. Now looming over the horizon
is still another expose; this one planned by Philip
,B. F. Agee,, who spent many years under-cover in
Latin America until in 1969 he quit the CIA,
apparently much disillusioned, to retire to En-
gland. His British?publishers, Penguin, are said to
have been asked to cut several passages by British
? intelligence ? working, presumably; at the behest
of their American counterparts.
"This publicity is unprecedented," said an
intelligence specialist here. "The CIA seems unable
to hold cover on anything these days. It must really
be bothering them."
So it appears. Six months ago the new CIA
director William F. Colby, a trim ex-Princetonian
? with a quarter-century experience in clandestine
operations, sent up for White House approval draft
amendments to the 1947 National Security Act
,(which created the CIA). If passed by Congress ?
which now seems increasingly unlikely in today's
reaction to Watergate ? the legislation would
impose 10-year jail terms and.. $10,000 fines on
anyone violating what the CIA calls "secrecy."
Exposes preferred to denials
Under Mr. Colby's proposals all book, magazine,
newspaper, radio, and television exposure of the
CIA or its sister intelligence agencies could be
'blocked or litigated to death. That is, all but what
the CIA wants put out, such as pictures of Director
and Mrs. Colby on the recent cover, of a nationally
syndicated Sunday supplement.
In an article inside, Mr. Colby explained how he
was refurbishing the CIA's 'image, especially by
gutting back on "dirty tricks" overseas. Indepen-
dent and authoritative reports suggest that if dirty
tricks abroad are diminishing; the CIA itself is not.
At this moment it is expanding its overseas
operations, especially in politically wobbly Portu-
gal and Spain, and currently pressing the State
Department for more "cover slots" (embassy jobs
that provide a legitimate diplomatic cover for CIA
agents). t
The Agency's bid for censorship power came to
*light in June, when the agency unsuccessfully
sought court orders that would. virtually have
gutted the Marchetti-Marks book prior to publica-
tion. The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Rich-
mond, Va., threw out all but a handful of CIA-
demanded deletions and let the book be published
by Alfred A. Knopf, lee. But the CIA's struggle to
control everything written about it continues.
The struggle points up increasing skepticism in
Washington over official declarAtions of what is
legitimate "national security" ? as distinct from
what is merely convenient secrecy to cover up
government blundering or illegality.
In this climate of skepticism, especially among
young Americans, the nation seems avid for
exposes of the CIA and of other government
intelligence agencies: Defense Department in-
telligence, the code-cracking National Security
Agency, the spy satellite National Reconnaissance
Office. Wary of what their leaders tell them, many'
Americans seem to be finding the confessions of the
spy masters credible and far more interesting than
official denials.
What has gone wrong? Two of the many potential
criticisms of the CIA come principally to mind.
First, the agency has undoubtedly been damaged
,by revelations in the Watergate hearings of its
pliant obedience to White House orders of question-
able legality and morality. Second, there is mount-
ing concern about the CIA's ' size, cost, and
:contribution to the nation's higher interest.
? It is not without significance that the ,ultra-
suspicious Nixon administration placed under
former CIA director Richard M. Helms two
successive deputies ? Gen. Robert Cushman,
,U.S.M.C., and Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters, U.S. Army
, ? each of whom had been personally attached to
Mr. Nixon when he Was Vice-President. Their
political loyalty to Mr. Nixon was unquestioned.
It was General Cushman 1,,vho;, on John Ehrlich-,
man's telephoned instruction in 1971, made avail-
able to E. Howard Hunt the false'wigsand other spy
claptrap used for the burglary of Dr. Daniel
Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office. It was Mr. 14elms,
himself, who ordered CIA taiieS 'and memoranda
destroyed one week after receiving a request from
Senate majority leader Mike Mansfield (D) of
Montana in January, 1973, that all "evidentiary
materials" of possible usefulness to th6 Watergate,
Investigation be preserved.
"The nation must to a degree take it on faith,",
Mr. Helms told the American Society of Newspaper
Editors in 1971 "that we,' too, are honorable men
devoted to her service."
Sen. Howard H. Baker (R) of Tennessee, deputy
chairman of the Senate Watergate Committee,
raised, in' a 43-page report recently issued, many
disturbing questions indicating CIA involvement in
?a wide range of domestic skullduggery ? in flat
violation of Congress's intent in 1947 when it
created the CIA for overseas spying and strong-
arm activities and specifically barred it from such
actions inside the U.S.
Over the years successive presidents seem to
have flouted Congress's ban and have begun using
.the CIA for domestic political purposes through' a
series of top-secret (even from Congress) National '
Security Council Intelligence directives. Only the
President and a handful of top aides, including the
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? Director of Central Intelligence, ever see these.
Defense lawyers for Bernard Barker and Eu-
genio Martinez, two of the CIA-subsidized "bur-
glars" caught and sentenced in the Watergate
affair and subsequently charged also with having
participated in the Ensberg 'break-in, have de-
manded CIA files. They claim that these will show
"compelling parallels" between the Watergate,
Ellsberg, and "previous" operations.
This reference to "previous" actions suggest to
CIA-watchers here the curious break-ins, still
officially "unresolved" by the FBI or any other
U.S. law enforcement agency, at Chilean diplo-
matic premises in Washington and New York in
1971 and 1972. At that time the Nixon administration
was at serious odds with the then leftist Chilean
government headed by Salvador Allende Gossens.
More important than the CIA's unquestioning
'obedience to questionable White House directives
on Watergate, however, is the larger question: How
well is the CIA serving the true national interest?
The U.S. unquestionably needs swift intelligence.
Does it get it from the CIA?
Marchetti and Marks, in their book, make a
strong case for reorganizing the agency. With its
$750 million annual budget and its 16,000 employees'
it is supposed to, but cannot possibly ride herd on all
the other intelligence agencies in the federal
government.
The CIA director, with sub-cabinet rank and that
$750 million budget, cannot and does not control the
intelligence operations of the Defense Department,
.whose Secretary has full cabinet rank and an
annual budget exceeding $80 billion. As one recent
'Defense Secretary told this writer, "If Helms had
ever come to my office and told me how to spend
my intelligence funds I'd have told him to get.
out
.
out of here!' ?
Presidential directives and Mr. Colby's: asser-
tions notwithstanding, the CIA spends about 12
cents of the .annual U.S. intelligence dollar ($750
million out of $6 billion). So .long as the Pentagon
?controls the spending of 80 percent ($4 billion out of
the total $6 billion) it will rule the roost. Power in
Washington means control of "resources" ? and ?
compared with the Pentagon's the CIA's are
limited. .
The CIA at the start had a real function. In 1948,
at the beginning of the Cold War, President Truman
needed a "strong arm" group to spy on and counter
Soviet machinations in war-shattered Western
Europe, Greece, Iran, Korea, and elsewhere. He
selected a former OSS man, Frank G. Wisner, and
told him to create such a group and to report
directly and solely to Secretary of State Marshall
and Defense Secretary Forrestal. ? ',
Mr. Wisner's team, code-named the OPC (Office
iof Policy Coordination), unquestionably helped the
'visible 'NATO forces block Soviet ambitions in
Western Europe through a combination of brains,
?
brawn, and enormous secret slush funds.
During the Korean war, however, Mr. Wiener's
clandestine operators were merged with the fast- ?
expanding CIA, and, ever. since Allen Dulles
became CIA chief in 1952,. the mystique of "covert"
action has dominated the agency. Successive
directors ? Dulles, McCone, Helms, now Colby ??
have tended to favor the agency's clandestine
action role rather than that eriginally foreseen by
Congress, namely that of objective intelligence
evaluation.
. Even today two-thirds of its employees (about
10,000) and half its budget (about $375 million)
belong to the clandestine side of the house.
And what are the "operators" doing? In the 1960s
they ran secret air forces in the Congo, a secret'
army of 30,000 anti.Communist guerrillas in Laos,
otherwise took the field with questionable efficacy
in Cambodia and Vietnam. But now, with the U.S.
leaving Indo-China, what is their function? "Buy-
Approved For Release 2001/08/08
ing" Third World politicians? Subsidizing news-
papers and trade unions in Latin America, Africa
and Asia? If so, under what rules and what
watchdog?
The U.S. needs intelligence on troop deployments
and missile developments in the U.S.S.R. and
'China, its only potential military rivals. But spy
,satellites and electronic interception already pro-
;vide 98 percent of such information. Human agents
are supposed to discern an enemy's intentions as !
distinct from his capabilities.
But since the ,Russians detected Col. Oleg '
Penkovsky spying for the British and the Amer- ,
icans and shot him in 1962, intelligence experts
concede that the CIA has derived virtually nothing
of national importance from spies in the Commu-
nist world. What it gets principally is information
passed on by Communist-bloc politicians, much of ,
which is gossip and hearsay. ?
Bureaucratic momentum carries the CIA along,
senior senators and congressmen who have the .,
power to impose reforms have neither the time to
probe nor the inclination. There are no votes or
campaign contributions here; it is ea?ier to look the
other way.
"Control" over the CIA, which the agency touts
endlessly in self-justification, is a fiction. The CIA
is the President's secret arm, and no President
inheriting such awesome power is likely to give it
Watchdog panel recommended
Only he and his intimate aides can find out what it
is doing, and so long as the CIA follows their orders
? rightly or wrongly ? the nation and Congress
will remain essentially in the dark.
The PFIAB (President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board), a watchdog panel of 12 or more
distinguished citizens, spends two days a month in ?
Washington purportedly examining CIA and other
intelligence agency functions; far too little to know:
the facts. The OMB (Office of Manageinent and,
Budget) reviews the CIA's secret yearly budget, ?
but OMB is the President's instrument.
True "control" over the CIA cculd nonetheless be
assured by creating an independent panel of, say, 6
to 12 retired judges plus academics, industrialists,
scientists, and such consumers of intelligence
material as ambassadors, generals and admirals,
preferably. recently retired, too. The key word here
would be "independent."
Such men, free from. bureaucratic loyalties and
'from all ambition but service to their country, 'could
hew through agency propaganila to the .sinew of -
national usefulness. It could be done, if any current
or future president wanted it done.. , -
In six Months to a year such a group would know
what to recommend: scrapping or keeping various
functions. Certainly the CIA's intelligence eval-
..
uation function is vital. So is counterespionage, a-
highly subtle technique ? which the FBI performs
at home ? but which CIA experts perform abroad
in close liaison with friendly intelligence services.
A case might be made for continuing and
expanding. CIA research and development ?
especially to help monitor SALT or other dis-
armament agreements on which world peace may
largely depend if the "balance of terror" is slowly
dismantled.
But what seems long overdue is a ruthless
pruning of the clandestine services now in their 26th
year: overstaffed, overfunded, and increasingly
out of tune with America's mood.
Only the President of the U.S., in the last resort, s
can remold the CIA. He can abuse it, as Mr. Nixon
did in the Watergate and Ellsberg cases, or he can
use it as Congress intended and as the national
interest demands: a supreme tribunal sifting
through the oceans of intelligence that lap the
shores of the U.S. daily and then passing the
conclusions to the decisionmakers.
: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3
31
Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3
NEW YORK TIMES
20 September 1974
C.I.A. Is Linked to Strikes
InChileThat Beset Allende
Intelligence Sources Report That Money
? Was Distributed to Help Truck and
Taxi Drivers to Prolong Crises
By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
gpeclei to The New York Times
. WASHINGTON, Sept. 19 ? dency of Mr. Allende. ?
'The Central Intelligence Agency, ! The sources noted that a re-
secretly financed striking labor! rest from the truckers union
unions and trade groups in! In August,
Amuorguest,C 1973, moanneciamlonag
Chile for 'more than 18 months before the coup, was rejected
before President Salvador Al- by the 40 Committee, the in-
Hende Gossens was overthrown, aelligence review board chaired
intelligence sources revealed
by Secretary of State Kissin-
ger.
today., Nonetheless, the souces also
They said that the majority conceded that some agency
of more than $7-million author- funds inevitably?as one high
ized for clandestine C.I.A. ac- official put it ?"could have
tivities ,in Chile was used in filtered" to the truckers union
1972 and 1973 to provide strike thereafter.
"If we give it to A, and then
benefits and other means of
Support for anti-Allende strik-
ers and workers.
William E. Colby, Director
of Central Intelligence, had no
comment when told of The
Thnes's information.
:T. In testimony today before
the Senate 'Foreign :Relations
Committee, Secretary of State
Kissinger asserted that the in-
telligence agency's involvement,
In Chile had beeen authorized!
solely to keep alive politica1!
parties and news media threat-
? ened by Mr. Allende's one-party
minority Government. The
clandestine activities, Mr. Xis-I
singer said, were not aimed at
subverting that Government.
Among those heavily sub-
sidized, the sources said,
were the organizers of a na-
tionwide truck? strike that
lasted 26 days in the fall of
1972, ?seriously disrupting
Chile's economy and provoking
the first of a series of labor
crisis for President Allende.
?Direct subsidies, the souces
said, also were provided for a
strike of middle-class shop-
keeprs and a taxi strike,
A gives it to B and C and D,"
the official said, "in a sense
it's true that D got it but the
question is?did we give it to
A knowing that D woald get
it?"
The official added htat it was
"awfully hard" to maintain con-'
trol over local field operatives,
particularly when large sums
of cash were involved.;
A number of sources also ex-
plained that the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, by using the
Chilean black market, was able
to increase the basic buying
power of the $7-million esti-
mated to have spent on clandes-
tine efforts between 1970 and
1973; The unofficial exchange
rate, sources said, was as much
as 800 per cent higher than the
official rate, indicating that the
C.I.A.'s cash could have had a
local impact of more than $40-
million. ,
Informers Inside Parties
The sources depicted the gen-
eral involvement of the intel-
ligence agency with the labor
unions and trade groups as part
of a broad effort to infiltrate
all areas of Chile's govern-
mental and political life. The
sources said that by the end
of the Allende period, the agen-
cy had agents and informers in
among others, that disrupted every major, party making up
the capital city of Santiago in Mr. Allende s Popular Unity
!the summer of 1973, shortly. coalition.
One troubling failure during
[before Mr. Allende was over- the latter part of Mr. Allende's
!thrown by a military coup. power, the sources said, was
I At its peak, the 1973 strikes the agency's inability to infil-
'involved more than 250,000 trate the Movement of the Rev-
. truck drivers, shopkeepers and olutionary Left., or the M.I.R.,
professionals, who banded to-
gether in a middle-class move-
ment that, many analysts have
concluded, made a violent
overthrow inevitable.
The Times's sources, while
readily acknowledging the in-
be-
ing made by the Allende Gel,-
the major revolutionary group
outside the Allende coalition.
; At his news conference Mon-
day night, President Ford de-
clared his support for the C.I.A.
involvement in Chile and said
that it had been authorized be-
cause "there was an effort telligence agency's secret sup- ernment to destroy opposition
!Port for the middle classes, news media, both the writing
linsisted that the Nixon Admin- press as well as the electronic
listration's goal had not been press, and to destroy opposi-
te force and end to the Presi- ;lion political parties."
! In fact, The Times's sources
32
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDF'77-00432R000100340007-3
agreed, less than half the
money made available for clan-
destine activities in Chile was
provided for the direct support
of the allegedly threatened
politicians, newspapers apd
radio-television stations 're-
ferrerd to by Mr. Ford.'
Official Defends Activities
One official, .with first-hand
knowledge of the decision-mak-
ing on Chile, strongly defended,
the intelligence agency's in-.volvement with trade unions
and organized strikes.
. "Of course, the agency tries
to support the people who be-
lieve in its aim," he said. "In-
the taxicab driver strike, our
goal is to make sure that he
[the driver on strike] is not go-
ing to fold. The strike money
was used to supply subsistence
for people who believed in what
you do."
"You've got to understand
what was going on," the offi-
cial added.
"The intelligence reports
coming to us were frightening.
Allende would send Popular
Unity representatives into a
business and 'claim that the
worker were complaining about
high profits." ,
"Then they'd take over the
books and raise the taxes 50
per cent," be said. "It was a
very brutal policy."
? "So our idea was to prevent
this from working and money
was the way to go," the offie
.cial said. "What we really were
doing was supporting a civilian
resistance movement against
an arbitrary Government. Our
target was the middle-class
groups who were working
against Allende." ?
"The whole point of this is
that covert action provides a
1 per cent impetus for some-
thing that the people want any-
way," he said. "In a civilized
country, the C.I.A. can only
make a marginal input. It takes
a lot of money and?this is
most important?you don't do
it unless you're told to [by high-
er authority in Washington]."
Aid to Publicize Unrest
Some financial support for
newpaper and radio stations
was needed in Chile, the official
explained, because "it wouldn't
have been goo dto have strikes
if nobody knows about it."
Most of the funds invested
for propaganda purposes, the
official said, went to El Mer-
curio, the main opposition news-
paper in Chile. "It was the
only serious political force
among the newspapers and
television stations there," he
said.
"As long as you don't make
it sound like we were trying
to start a coup, it'll be all
right," the official added.
."You've got to understand
that he [Allende] was taxing
them (the middle-class] to
death."
The official noted that the
policy toward Chile, author-
ized by the 40 Committee, had
been the subject of intense de-
bate in the Nixon Administra-
tion. One concern, he said, was
that intervention Would serve
to polarize further the classes
in Chile. "And if Allende de-
cided to bear down and de-
stroy the middle class," thei
['afield added, "some of us
thought it might restilt in a
dictatorship of ? the left or the
right?and that wasn't' such a
good idea." .?
Military Coup Unexpected
The -official described the
Administration's policy in Chile
as a failure. "We were ? not
looking for a military take-
over," he declared..
A different opinion about the
ultimate goals of the Admini-
stration's policy was provided
in an interview by a source who
served a number of years in
Chile.
"The people within the Em-
bassy, "felt that they were
engaged in. a kind of warfare,"
"people either were with you or
against you when it came to
Allende."
"There were a lot of people in
Santiago on the far right who
were essentially dedicating their
lives to the overthrow of Al-
lende-Lit was like a holy war,"
the source said. "These people
were increasingly seen at the
mbassy in 1972 and 1973."
At the time, he added, "just
putting some resources at their
disposal alone would be
enough."
In testimony Monday before
a House subcommittee investi-
gating the activities in Chile,
Richard R. Fagen, a professor
,who did reseach in Chile in
. 1972 and 1973, said he had been
approached by an American
Embassy official in Santiago
and utged to aid in covert gath-
ering of information on left-
? wing groups. ?
Mr. Fagen, who teaches po-
litical science at Stanford Uni-
versity, testified that the re-
quest had been coupled with an
offer to help him exchange per-
sonal money "through the black
market channeli used by the
? embassy." '
All of the sources interviewed
by The Times insisted that the
policies regarding the clandes-
tine financing of trade groups
and unions had been established
? and approved by the 40 Com-
mittee.
-Edward M. Korry and. Na-
thaniel? M. Davis, successive
ambassadors to Chile during
the Allende regime, freqUefitly
reported to Mr. Kissinger, then
former President Nixon's na-
tional security adviser, through
confidential channels, the
sources said. Reports with less
sensitive information were for-
warded through the normal
State Department channels to
Washington, the sources said.
They added that most, if not
all, of the C.I.A.'s direct strike
subsidies' for unions and trade
groups weer initiated in 1972,
afte Mr. Davis, a specialist on
Eastern Europe, was assigned
as Ambassador.
A number of sources further
told The Times that Mr. Colby,
contrary to many published ac-
counts, had fully briefed two
Congressional subcommittees
about the intelligence agency's
financing of union and trade
? groups during the Allende re-
gime.
During those briefings, which
were before the Senate Foreign
Affairs Subcommittee on West-
ern Hemisphere Affairs and the
!House Armed Services Subcom-
lmittee on Intelligence, Mr. Col-
ApProved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3
iby sought to emphasize, the
'sources said, that the C.I.A.
'began to pull back on its clan-
destine commitments in Chile
!late in the spring of 1973, when
there were almost weekly re-
ports of an impending coup.
Link to Military Severed
At one point in the spring,
the sources said, the agency
did formally break its direct re-
lations with the Chilean milltary, which was known to be
plotting against President Al-
lende. Although direct contact
was eliminated,, the sources
said, the agency continued to
maintain a liaison role for .in-
telligencey purposes.
There was concern in the
C.I.A. a reliable source said,
:about "getting involved with
'people who were shorter-term
'people than we were."
i "Our goals were longer term,"
Ihe said, in an allusion to the
,official Ford Administration po-
sition now that the agency's
'objective had been to prevent
the possible establishenent of a
, -
;one-party Government by Mr.
lAllende.
Questions about the United
States' clandestine role in pro-
moting the 1973 truck strike
have repeatedly been raised by
supporters of President Allende,
who lose his life in the eoup:'
e In an interview in Mexico
,City last year, Mr. Allende's
widow, Hortensia Bussi de Al-
lende, charged that the United
'States "had a great responsi-
bility in what happened."
She asserted that the truck
strike, which involved about
50,000 workers, had, been fi-
nanced by American money.
"What were they living on if
they were not working?" she
asked. "They had to be fi-
nanced from outside."
In August, 1973, & news-
paper in Santiago, Ultima Rota,
accused the United States of
NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1974
having financed both the truck
strike in the fall of 1972 and a
strike then in progress. Mr.
Davis, then the Ambassador,
refused to comment.
After the coup, the State De-
partment formally denied any
financial involvement in the
1973 truck strike or the other
work stoppages and protests
in Chile, declaring that "such
suggestions are absurd."
Jack B. Kubisch, then As..
sistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs, refused
Ito answer in public when
queried about such financing,
during 3 House hearing after
the Allende coup.
C.I.A.'s Covert Role: Ford's Defense Runs Against Current
Trend
By CLIFTON DANIEL
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Sept. 17 ?I
President Ford helped revive al
dying issue last night. That is-
sue was whether it was proper
for a democracy, using its in-
telligence agencies to intervene
in the internal af-
fairs of other coun-
News tries.
Analysis Mr. Ford, at a
news conference,
seemed to answer
the question affirmatively. He
acknowledged that the United
States had made an effort to
preserve an .opposition press
and opposition political parties
in Chile during the rule of a
Marxist President, Salvador Al-
lende Gossens, ?who died in a
military coup in September,
1973.
President Ford justified the
effort, which was made during
the Nixon Administration, by
saying that it was "in the best
interest of the people of Chile,
and certainly in our best
interest."
"I am reliably informed,"
Mr. Ford said, "that Commu-
nist nations spend vastly more
money than we do for the same
kind of purpose."
His response was presumably
considered in advance- He had
every reason to expect a ques-
tion on the subject because of
the recent disclosure that the
Nixon Administration author-
ized the Central Intelligence
Agency to spend $8-million on
covert activities in Chile be-
tween 1970 and 1973.
Indeed, Mr. Ford may have
had the help of those who au-
thorized those expenditures in
framing his reply. In any event,
he chose to defend the behavi-
or of the old Administration
rather than chart a new policy
for his own.
His response was presumably
considered in advance. He had
every reason to expect a ques-
tion on the subject. Last week
it was disclosed that the Nixon
Administration lied authorized
the Central Intelligence Agency
to spend $8-million on covert
activities in Chile between 1970
and 1973. Those activities were
approved by the so-called 40
Committe, whose chairman was
and is Secretary of Steee Kis-
singer. Appro
Mr. Ford possibly may have
had the help of those who
authorized those expenditures
in framing his reply. In any
event, the President chose to
defend the behavior of the old
Administration rather than
chart a new policy for his own.
Cold-War Rhetoric Seen
Another kind of reply was
possible. The President might
have said that he was not re-
sponsible for past activities of
the C.I.A., but would be re-
sponsible for its future behav-
ior, and would accordingly re-
view its policies and plans:
He did promise to meet with
the Congressional committees
that review the covert, actions
of the agency td see whether
they might want to change the
review process. Those commit-
tees, however, are not noted in
? Washington for vigor and skep-
ticism.
Mr. Ford himself was a mem-
ber of one of them for nitre
years when he was a Repre-
sentative from Michigan.
? His reversion last night to
the reason and rhetoric of the
cold war, however mildly ex-
pressed, led to speculation
that his mind was still set in
that mold.
"If it was good enough for
Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy,.
Johnson and Nixon, then it's
good enough for Ford," one of
the President's friends re-
marked today.
"That's the way he thinks."
Even in an Administration
that has been dedicated to
openness and candor, President
Ford was judged in Washington
to have spoken with remark-
able frankness.
"It is the first time in my
memory that a President has
come out flatly and said, 'We
do it, the other side does it,
and we do it," said Prof. Rich-
ard N. Gardner, a specialist in
international law at Columbia
University, speaking from New
York.
Secret C.I.A. operations such
as the overthrow of Premier
Mohammed Mossadegh of Iran
in 1953 and President Jacobo
Arbenz Guzman of Guatemala
in 1954, the Bay of Pigs inva-
sion of Cuba in 1961 and later
operations in Laos have been
identified when they became
e tuo_bia kncli notorious to be Lone
e.~ e ease 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3
33
However, none has ever been
acknowledged as readily and
fully as the Chile operation, al-
though the acknowledgment
was low-keyed.
It came, oddly, when such ac-
tivities seemed to be going out
of style. Eighteen months ago
the Nixon Administration let it
be known that the clandestine
operations of the CIA; were
being curtailed.
-M1 Just last week, William E.
Colby, Director of Central Intel-
ligence, said it was "clear that
American policy today is differ-
ent from when it was confront-
ing worldwide Communist sub-
version in the nineteen fifties
or Communist insurgency in
the ninetee sixties."
"As a result," Mr. Colby told
the Fud for 'Peace conference
ill Washington, "C.I.A.'s in-
volvement in covert action is
very small indeed."
Abandoning covert action en-
tirely "would not have a major
impact on our current activities
or the current security of the
United States," Mr. Colby ack-
nowledged.
However, the capacity for
Such action may be needed in
case of some new threat, he ad-
ded, and it would be a mistake
to "leave us with nothing be-
tween a diplomatic protest and
sending the Marines." -
There was a conspicuous dif-
ference in tone between Mr.
Colby and President Ford, his
new boss, but both seemed to
take it for granted that the
United States had the right to
intervene in the affairs of 'other
countries in its own interest.
When Mr. Ford was asked
what international law gave the
United States the right to "des-
tabilize the constitutionally
elected government of another
country,' the President de-
clined to talk about law, but
said, "it's a recognized fact
that historically, as well as pre-
sently, such actions are taken
'in the best interests of the
countries involved."
I Commenting on that, Senator'
Frank Church, Democrat of Ida-
ho, who is a high-ranking mem-
ber of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, said today:
"It seems he declared that the
!United States-respects no law
lother than the lawof the jungle
in its dealings . with foreign
countries. He equates us with
the Russians. I thought there
wes a difference, and the differ-
ence is What it's all about."
F.
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3
in our final excerpts from ' The
CIA-.- and ? the- Cult?of-----Intelli-
gence ' (Cape 0.95), VICTOR
,MARCHETTI and JOHN D.
MARKS unveil the commercial'
secrets of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency?which tried first
to veto their book, and then to
censor it. After a battle in the
American courts, 171 CIA cuts
were restored and published in
black type (including those
below). Blank spaces in the
book indicate the remaining 168
deletions (including those identi-
fied below as 0 0 ?).
4:A.r.:*- ?
.AMONG the most secret weapons
of the Central Intelligence Agency,
have been, for years, the 'pro-
prietaries corporations' or, simply,:
proprietaries '?ostensibly private
institutions and businesses which
are in fact financed and controlled
by the CIA. From behind their
commercial and sometimes non-
profit covers, the Agency is able
to carry out a multitude of clandes-
tine activities. ;
The best-known were Radio Free
Europe and Radio Liberty, both
established in the early 1950s, and
their corporate structures served
as something of a prototype for.
other Agency proprietaries. Each
functioned under a .cover provided
by a board of directors made pp of
prominent Americans, but CIA
officers in the key management ?
positions made all the important
decisions. ?
? Often the weapons and other
military equipment for an opera-
tion--like the covert intervention
in the Congo in 1964?are provided
by a ' private ' arms dealer. The:
largest such dealer in the United
States is the International -Arma-
ment ? Corporation, or Interarmco,
which has its main .office and some
warehouses on the waterfront in
Alexandria, Virginia. Advertising
:that it specialises in arms for law-
enforcement agencies, the corpor-
ation hasmutlets in Manchester in
England, Monte Carlo; Singapore,
Pretoria, and several Latin Ameri-
can cities. Interarmco was founded
in 1953 by Samuel Cummings, a
CIA officer during the Korean War.
Although it is now a truly private
corporation; it still maintains close
ties with the CIA.
Direct CIA ownership of Radio
.Free Europe and Radio Liberty,
and direct involvement in Inter-
armco, are largely past history
now.. Nevertheless, the Agency is
. still very much involved in the pro-
, prietary business.
Incredible as it may seem, the.,
1CIA. is the owner of one of the
biggest?if not the biggest?fleets ?
of ' commercial ' airplanes in the.
world. Agency proprietaries in-
dude Air America, Air Asia, Civil ?
Air Transport, Rocky Mountain
?Air, Southern Air Transport, ? ? ?
and several-other air charter corn-.
panies around the world.
Air America was set up in thel
late 1950s to 'accommodate the.
Agency's rapidly growing opera-
tions in South-east Asia. As US
involvement deepened in that part.
of the world, other Government
agencies also turned to Air:
America to transport their people
and supplies. In fact, Air America
was able to generate so muth busi-
ness in South-east Asia that eventu-
ally other American airlines took.
note of the profits to be made.
One private company, Conti-
nental Airlines, made a successful
moye in the mid-1960s to take some
of the market away from ? Air
America. Pierre Salinger, who be-
came an officer of Continental after
his years as President Kennedy's
press secretary, led Continental's
. fight to gain its share of the lucra-
tive Southeast Asian ousiness.
Rather than face the possibility
of unwanted publicity the CIA
permitted Continental to move
into Laos, where since the late
1960s it has flown charter flights
worth millions of dollars annually.
And Continental's best customer is
the CIA itself.
,
But even with Continental flying
in Laos, the Agency was able to
keep most of the flights for its own
Air America which, before the
flying
ceasefire in Vietnam, was
125 planes of its own, with roughly
one of
anking
40 more on lease. It was
America's largest airlines, r
just behind National in the total
hat the
number of planes. Now t
US military forces have withdrawn;
from the Vietnamese theatre, the
role of maintaining a significant
American influence has reverted
d ? Air.
largely to the CIA?an
America is finding its services
'en the
Con-
e mem-
Polandontract
to sup-
even more in demand. E
International Supervisory an
trol Commission, despite th
bership of Communist
and Hungary, has signed a c
with the CIA proprietary
port its supervision of the Vietnam
ceasefire. .
?
?
and eventually halted during the
1960s, this airline was reduced in
size to a few planes, helicopters,
and a supply; of spare parts. Still,
up to the late 1960s, it flew
charters for the Nepalese Govern-
ment and private organisations in
,the area.
34
Perhaps the CIA's most out-of-
the-way proprietary was located in
Katmandu, Nepal. It was estab-
lished to provide air support for
Agency-financed and directed
tribesmen who were operating in.
Chinese-controlled Tibet. As the
Tibetan operations were cut back
The CIA's Planning- Program-
ming, :ind Budgeting Stafj back in,
Largiey, Virginia, believed that the
ahline's usefulness as an Agency
asset had passed, and the decision.
was made to sell' it off.
But for the CIA to sell a pro-
prietary is a very difficult process.
The Agency feels- that it must
maintain the secrecy of its covert
,involvement, no matter how moot
or insignificant the secrecy, and
it does not want to be identified in
any way, either before or after the
actual transaction. -
Although the boards of directors
of the air proprietaries are studded
with the names of eminently
respectable business leaders and
financiers, the companies' opera-
tions were actually for i long
time in the hands of one rather
singular man, George Doole,
Until . his retirement in 1971;
Doole's official titles were presi-
dent of the Pacific Corporation and
chief executive of Air America and
Air Asia; it was under his leader-
ship that the CIA air proprietaries
blossomed.
? Doole was known to his col.'
leagues in the, Agency as a superb
businessman. He had a talent for
expanding ? his airlines and for.
making them, functionally if not
formally, into profit-making con-
cerns.. In fact, his proprietaries
pr3ved something of an embar-
Tassment to the Agency because
of their profitability:.
Doole's empire- Was fornially
placed under the CIA's Directorate
of 'Support on the ? Agency's
organisation chart, although many
of its operations were superVised.-
by the Clandestine Services. But
. so little was known inside CIA
headquarters about the air pro- ?
prietaries, which employed almost
as many people as the Agency
itself (18,000), that in 1965 a CIA,
'officer with extensive Clandestine
Services experience was assigned to
make a study of their operations
Or the Agency's top officials.
This officer spent the better part
of a year trying to assemble the
relevant data, and became increas-
ingly frustrated as he proceeded.,
He found that the various pro-
prietaries were constantly trading,
leasing, and selling aircraft to each
other; that the tail numbers of
many planes were regularly
changed; and that the mixture of ?
profit-making and covert flight
made accounting almost impos-
sible. lie finally put up a huge map
of the world in a secure Agency
conference. room and used flags and
pproved-F or Re tea str2170//08/087CIA=RDP77-'00-432R000100340007-3-
,
ApOroved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R00010034000?-3
pins .to try to designate what pro;
?prietaries were operating with -
what equipment in what countries.
Finally, Richard Helms, then
Deputy Director, was invited to see
the snap and he briefed on the
complexity of the airlines. A wit-,
ness described Helms as being
'aghast.'
?
- In 1968, the ? CIA's Executive.
Committee for Air met to deal with
a request from George Doole for
several million dollars to::
' modernise ' Southern Air Trans-'
port. Doole's justification for he't
money was that every major air-
line in the world was using jets,
ow:
ye'
aid
and that Southern needed to foil
suit if it were to continue to Ii
its cover.' Additionally Doole s
that Southern should have equip-
he
ment as effective as possible in t ,
event the Agency had to call on
tin
he:
;ti-
ge
tin
it for future contingencies in La .
America.
? Previous to Doole's request, t
Agency's Board of National Fan
mates had prepared a long-ra
assessment of events in La
America. This estimate bad been
approved by the Director and sent
to the President at the White House
el-
ateedhe.
as the official analysis of the int
ligence community. The esti
m
:strongly implied . that co u
ntin
open US intervention in t
internal affairs of Latin American
nations would only make matters ,
worse and further damage the
ArperiCan image. in that region.
?
. At 1 he meeting, Doole Was asked
if he thought expai- ding Southern's ?
capabilities for future interven-
tions in Latin America conformed
with the conclusions of the esti-
mate.' Doole remained silent, but
a Clandestine Services officer
Working in paramilitary affairs
replied that the estimate might
well have been a- correct appraisal
of the. Latin American situation,
but that non-intervention, would
not necessarily become official
American policy. The Clandestine
Services man pointed out that over
the years there had been other
developments in Latin America-L-
in countries such as Guatemala and'
,the Dominican Republic?where
the Agency had been called on by
the White House to take action -
against existing political trends;::
and that the Director (and the
Clandestine Services and Doole)'
also had a responsibility to be
-ready for the worst contingencies.
In working to strengthen South-
ern Air Transport and his other
proprietaries, Doole and the Clan-
destine Services were following
one of the basic maxims of covert
"action: Build assets now for future
contingencies. It proved to be
persuasive strategy, as the Director
personally ? approved Doole's ?
.request and Southern received its
several million dollars for jets.
So if the US government decides
.to intervene covertly in the
internal affairs of a Latin Ameri-
can country, Doole's planes will be.
available to support the operation.
These CIA airlines stand ready to
drop their legitimate charter busi-
ness quietly and assume the role,
they. were .established for: the
transport of arms and mercenaries
for the Agency's 'special opera-
tions.' ? The guns will come from
the CIA's own stockpAlisonatiefercbr
the warehouses of Interarmco and
other international arms dealers.
The mercenaries will be furnished
by the Agency's Special Operations.
Division, and, like the air pro-
prietaries, their connection with
the Agency will be plausibly deni-
able ' to the American public and
the rest of the world.
? ?
.?00000000 000, OOOOOO
THE sarise technological explosion
which has affected nearly every
other aspect of modern life has also
,drastically changed the intelligence
trade.
A report on-clandestine activities
in Latin America during the 1960s
by the CIA Inspector General, for
example, revealed that a good part
of the intelligence collected by the
Agency in that region ? came from
audio devices. In quite a few of the
Latin nations., the report noted, the
CIA was regularly intercepting the
telephone conversations of import-
ant officials and had managed to
place bugs in the homes of many.
key personnel, up to and including,
' cabinet ministers. In some coun-
tries allied to the US, the
Agency shares in the informa-
tion acquired from audio surveil-
lance conducted by the host intel-
ligence service, which often
-receives technical assistance from'
the CIA. for this very purpose?
and may be penetrated by the CIA
,in the process. ?
The .Agency's successes with'
? -bugs and taps have usually been
'limited to the non-Communist ?
countries, where relatively lax in-.
ternal security systems do not deny:
CIA op-orations the freedom of,
movement necessary to installing
eavesdropping devices. .
In technical espionage,
America's first experience came in'
the form of radio intercepts and
code-breaking. In 1952 the Presi-
dent, by secret executive order,
established the National Security, ?
Agency (NSA) to interceptand de-
cipher the communications of both
the nation's enemies and its friends
and to ensure that US codes were
? secure from similar eavesdropping.'
The NSA, though placed under the
control of the Defence Department,
soon established an independent
bureaucratic identity of its oWn?
and at present has a huge budget
? ,of well over a billion dollars 'per
annum and a work-force of some
25,000.
Although the NSA engineered.
?
_ .
some success against the Eastern
-European countries and Commun-
ist China in its early days, for at
least the last 15 years it has been
completely unable to break into the
high-grade cipher system and codes .
of these nations. Against such
major targets, the NSA has been
reduced to reading comparatively
unimportant communications be-
tween low-level military compon-
ents and the equally inconsequent-
ial routine exchanges between low-
grade bureaucrats and economic
planners. This is far short of learn-
ing, the Soviet Union's or China's'
,most vital secrets. .
0-000 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? o
As with so many other parts of-
the American intelligence appara-
tus, the NSA has had considerably
more success operating against the
Third World countries and even
Rektaties200008,i081traniiRDFMLIO
35
what is reportedly the largest hank'
of computers in the world and thou-
sands of cryptanalysts, the NSA has
had little trouble with the codes
and ciphers of these nations. '
? ? ? ? ? ? -
,
Sometimes the Agency may' con
,cluct a physical attack on another
country's communications systeni
a clandestine operation to steal a?
tcode book or cipher system, the,
suborning of a communications
clerk, or the planting of an audio.
device in an embassy radio room.
Within the CIA's Clandestine Ser-,
vices, a special, unit of Foreign
Intelligence (espionage) Staff
specialises in these attacks.
Numerous foreign embassies in
Washington are already wiretap-
ped, but by the FBI. This wiretap
programme, like some of the NSA'
intercept operations, also provides;
information about Americans. in'
co-operation w,ith the Chesapeake
and Potomac Telephone Company:
(a Bell subsidiary), FBI agents re-
gularly monitor the phones in the
offices of all Communist Govern-
ments represented in Washington;
on occasion, the embassies of vari-
ous non-Communist countries have
their phones tapped, especially
When their nations are engaged in.
negotiations with the US Govern-.
ment or when important develop-
ment? are taking place in these
? Countries. ?
And it is not only foreign em-':
bassies which are .kept under'
surveillance. The State Depart-
ment long ago recognised that its
most secret cables are not secure
from CIA inspection by setting up
special communications channels
which supposedly cannot be deci-
phered by the CIA.
When, in 1968, the Ambassador'
to Iran, Armin Meyer, ran into
trouble with the CIA station chief
in Teheran, Meyer switched his''
communications with the State
Department in Washington to one
of these secure 'channels. But the
CIA had none the less figured out
'a way to intercept his cables and!
the replies he received from Wash.'.
ington; and the CIA Director
received a' copy of. each intercep-
tion. Written on top of every cable
was a warning that the contents..
should be-kept especially confiden---
tial, because the State Department:
:was unaware that the CIA had a
copy.
American embassies abroad have
suffered, of course, from bugging.
But today the likelihood of the
KGB eavesdropping' on the activi-
ties in an embassy code room is ex-
.tremely remote. Most State Depart-
ment communications overseas are
handled by the CIA. The machines
and other equipment are cushioned
and covered to mute the sounds
emanating from them. The rooms
themselves are encased in lead and
rest on huge springs that further
,reduce the internal noise. Re- :
sembling large camping-trailers,
the code rooms now are normally
located deep in the concrete base-
ments of embassy buildings. Access
? to them by sound-sensitive devices
is, for all practical purposes, un-
'possible.
- The official justification for all
the technology--the wiretaps and
audio devices, and satellite flights
0432R0
?is 00100340 to ffsither intel007-3 ligence to help
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIAIRDP77-00432R000100340007-3
-protect the national security of the
U.S. Sometimes, the machinery is
justified. One of the finest hours
for the CIA and the intelligence.
Community was produced ? by. the.
:Cuban .missile crisis; although the'
last National Intelligence Estimate,
prepared by the CIA a little over
a month before President Kennedy ,
Went on nationwide television to
,announce the Cuban 'quarantine,'
..declared that it was unlikely that
:the Soviets would install nuclear-,
_tipped missiles on the island. The
,fact, remains: that the CIA and the
?other intelligence agencies did dis,
;cover?from 02 spy planes; and:
-communications intercepts ? the
missiles in time for the President
to take action, and they presented
the facts to Kennedy with no policy
.recommendations or slanting which
Icould have limited his options.
,This was- how. the intelligence pro-
? cess was supposed to work.
The basic 'reason that the *CIA
, analysts were able to monitor the
Soviet arms build-up more closely
than the other intelligence agen-
cies, which had essentially the
same information available, was
the more refined technique that the
, CIA had developed, including a
special analytical tool known as
crate-ology '?a unique method Of
,determining the contents of the.
large crates carried on the decks
of the Soviet ships delivering arms.
With a high degree of accuracy,
the specialists' could look at aerial
photographs of tese boxes, add.
'information about the ship's em-
barkation point and Soviet military
.production schedules and deduce
what the crates contained.
More often, though, besides'
'supplying information, the CIA has
profound effect on the actual'
planning and carrying out of
American foreign policy. Even the'
. White House has not 'imposed close
controrof the Agency. One eXecu'?;?
tive organisation set up to control
,it is the 40 Committee. The ubiqui-
tous Dr Kissinger chairs this com-
mittee, just as he heads the three'
other principal ',White .Ilous,
. panels which supervise the intelli-4
"gence community. The committee'
is supposed to meet once a week,
but its non-CIA members from the
State Department and the Penta-
gon have so many responsibilities
in, . their own departments that
meetings are frequently cancelled.
? - Nor is the 40 Committee an
effective watchdog when it does
lineet. According to one veteran
.intelligence official, it 'was like a
bunch of schoolboys. They would
_listen and their eyes would bug
out. I always used to say that I
could get $5 million out of the 4Q
Committee for a covert operation
?faster than I could get 'money for
.a typewriter out of the ordinary
'bureaucracy.'
The 40 Committee fails to keep
close watch on secret reconnais-
sance -activities, is ineffective in
monitoring the CIA's covert activi,
ties, and is totally in the dark On
? classical espionage -operations.
,President Nixon and especially
Henry Kissinger Were unquestion-
ably.:aware of its shortcomings and
did little to change things.
Ear' 'six six years it was Nixon and
Kissinger who ultimately deter-
mined_ how the CIA operated, and
if -they did not want to imposn
closer control, then the form of
any control mechanism was mean-
? ingless. The fact remains that both
men believed in the need for the
VS to use clandestine methods and
dirty tricks ' in dealing with other
;countries,' 'and the level and types
of' such operations obviously co-
incided With their views of bow
America's 'Secret foreign -policy
should be carried out. ?
. .
?
As lortg as-the CIA remairi; the'
President's loyal and personal tool
to be used around the world at his ,
and his top adviser's discretion, no
President is likely, barring strong,
unforeseen pressure, to insist that'
:the Agency's operations be brought
iiinder- closer, outSide
ClifigieSsional oversight has'b'eeri
generally, limited to voting the
CIA more than enough money for
its needs, without seriously
questioning how the funds would
be spent. -
To be sure, four separate sub-
committees of the House and Sen-
ate Armed Services committees
were responsible for monitoring
the CIA, but their supervision was
minimal or non-existent. '
. ?
SO the time has come, in our
,view, to demysticise the .intelli-
gence profession, to disabuse
people of the idea that clandestine ,
agents somehow make the world
a safer place to live in, that exces-
sive secrecy is necessary to protect
the national security.
These notions simply are not
true. The CIA and other intelli-
gence agencies have merely used
them to build their own covert'
empire.
? The US intelligence community
performs a vital service in keeping
track of and analysing the military
capability and strengths of the
Soviet Union and China, but its
other functions?the CIA's dirty
tricks and classical espionage?are
a liability for the country, on both
practical and moral grounds.
The best solution would 'be not
simply to separate the Clandestine
Services from the rest of the CIA,
but to abolish them completely.
This would deprive the Govern-
ment of-its arsenal of dirty tricks,
but the republic could easily sus-
tain ttl-le loss?and be better for it,
rI
36
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Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010034000T-3
BALTIMORE SUN
15 September 1974
? 1 -1r. stopping until it had reached
.. .1/11passe at strategic arms- taws
,...., The best Mr. Nixon and Dr.
1 superiority in M1RV's as well.
? 7 ? 7, ? , Kissinger could get in Moscow
..
GintS to need for refit-Haan Cr 'was agreement to back up, leap-
C -
5 , -
Washin?to,n DttreaU?of 'The Sur. - long after Henry A.. Kissinger,
. Washington ? When the the Secretary of State, visits
strategic arms limitation talks Moscow at the end of October.
resume f;..Viethies-day.. there Nor is there much reason to be
doubtless will be the 6ustom- optimistic about the results
then. The U.S. is limited by
ary moment of excitement anti
optimism in Geneva. But if internal debate in what it can
ofter. Nothing the Soviet Union
appearance is Milt reality, the;
openingilouriShes ouickly: wilt! has done lately suggests it
ade:into staleinate might make the kind of corn
? promises the U.S. could at-
Wouldrbe irtaiscouraging--KoS-'. cePt.
Given? the more urgent crises
pect.lrideedcitis;in the broad
sense that equitable agreement. of Watergate and the economy,
isnot in sight. The the bleak situation at the arms
;- ?apportuni.
talks has escaped wide public
ties- on - the'' face of -it we
?
enormous;:because.in their p attention.
ri-
mary .purpose, that...of limiting Another for ' the -.lack of
public interest is that ear-
the -power-.2-of-..nuclear -power
Her accords have been over-
??1 to destroy eadh other, the' So-
s tat
tviet-American negotiations. are sons, partly because some of
old, partly for cosmetic rea-
a new beginning. . the negative dynamics of lini-
: Still,. in the views of a -ells- .
am control control only now are
paiat,e_grtiup of theoretician ited s The ballyhoo
stalemateinay be a good th becoming clear.ing that accompanied, the modest
in the eircumstm,es. They 1411 arms.;control record of the Mos-
controlagree on the merits of arms cow summit talks in July pro-
judgments,of what ought tOile in the abstract. Their vides a case history of oversell.
n'onelowever,-vary Former President .Nixon re-
j`
turned' On July 3 and stopped!
' breathlessly at Loring Air Force
Base in Maine to inform Ameri-
cans of the results.
? , . ?
pillethinking in order
:. -What.. they. -tio agree on is
that yany. arrangement that "In the field of arms limita-
. might grow out of current cote tion," he. said,' "three .of the
ceptions. on both sidesmos. _t.. agreements we reached are of
likely _would be iII-advisecind. special note."
that.rethinking .is in, order. He cited the restrictions on
-
The .reasons for Doubt range.,
underground testing of nuclear
widely ,. across. Arms control
ideology. One school holds tha?
-
the trjted Sties is pre-
pared to compromise enough:
another that Washington has
,been too soft-with the Russians
warheads, the confinement of
'each country to one defensive
Missile: complex instead of the
two agreed on earlier and,
plans to seek ."a new agree-.
ment to cover the period until
an must reLo'4;her 1935" on- restriction of offen-
frustrated by awareness that', sive weapons. -
none of the arms control mea-; . In fact the two sides, from
sures now in effect has limited experience with cost and likely
the overall destructive power effectiveness, V adopted the
-.1uclear arsenals suh&-tan- further limitation on defensive
tially,- if at all. rockets with mutual relief.
-;Jhere is frustration; tut The agreement to limit un.;
more necessary optimism, in, derground tests indeed was pi-
the official position of the ad- oneering in the sense that it
ministration. U. Aleris John- was the first time such restric-
son, the chief U.S. negotiator,' tions have been imposed. But
will not be carrying an empty' it would not take effect until
briefcase in Geneva.- With 1976?and rapid testing can be
some agony the administration expected in the meantime.
has scraped together a credi7 It would forbid Only tests of
tile holding position for Mr. warheads more powerful than
Johnson, though' it does 'not 150,600 tons of TNT. And it has
have a larger design for the faded into a sort of limbo since
talks. .. the return from Moscow.
,If there is to be substantial The .reaions- for, its disap-
progress in this second round pearance reach back to a corn-
of what has become FitittRigielivon2004108108
37 SALT II it will not co until Moscow only ii wincinlo. For
the agreed resections' applied
only to military tests. Nuclear
testing for peaceful purposes
would be permitted?a course
the Soviet Union plans to fol-
low and the U.S. does not?with
terms to be negotiated later.
Several things about this
dimmed the glamour of the
underground test limitation.
'For one thing, the 150-ki1oton
ceiling on the size of tests
exceeded anything either gov-
ernment might be expected to
test in the near future. Dr.
Kissinger conceded that the
ceiling? was directed at "the'
next generation of weapons."
For another, it became quite
clear that Congress and the
public might not take kindly to
Moscow's popping off so-called
peaceful nuclear explosions
while the U.S. sat and watched.
A nuclear explosion is a nu-
clear explosion, with potential
'military application no matter
what it is called, by all ac-
counts. Although Moscow indi-
cated it would permit outsiders
to observe the tests, Soviet
willingness to allow any real
monitoring was regarded as at
best doubtful.
The result has been that the
underground test agreement
has been shelved without going
to Congress pending agreement
on so-called peaceful explo-
sions. That agreement, in most
observers' 'views, will be a
long time coming.
Mr. Nixon left his greatest
gap in his explanation of the
state of negotiations on offen-
sive rockets and warheads. In-
stead of bringing a new agree-
ment to' succeed the five-year
accord of 1972 "significantly
closer," as he said, the discus-
sions in effect left deadlock.
The underlying reason is ob-
vious. Offensive weapons are
now more than ever the ulti-
mate determinant of the stra-
tegic balance. The interim
agreement of 1972 left Moscow
with the prospect of superior-
ity in numbers of rockets and
power of warheads. It left the
U.S. with a lead in technology
and above all in numbers of
warheads?the multiple inde-
pendently targeted re-entry ve-
hicles, or MIRV's?to be
placed on each rocket.
What had. become clear be-
fore the summit, and was rein-
: ferlAdRDP7.7,400402R0604
viet Union had no intention of
frog the current impasse, and
try to head off the arms race
at some greater order of mag-
nitude.
At his briefings in Moscow
Dr. Kissinger agonized over
the consequences of failure.
Given the prospects of Soviet
MIRV deployment, he said, the
two nations had only 18 months
to two 'years to impose controls
before the arms race degener-
ated into an unmanageable in-
terplay of increasing numbers.
"And one of the questions
which we have to ask our-
selves as a country is what in
the name of God is strategic
superiority? What is the sit.'
nificance of it, politically, mili-
tarily, operationally, at these
levels of numbers? What do
you do with it?"
The answers at home vary
enormously. Finding something
approaching a consensus is an
essential first step toward
dealing with Soviet intransig-
ence. At the moment a consen-
sus, seems especially remote.
Former Senator Eugene J.
McCarthy, who says he may
run for President Again, sug-
gests the U.S. could initiate
safely some "limited acts of.
unilateral restraint" to tempt
the Russians. Adm. Elmo R.
Zumwalt, the former .chief of
naval -operations, warns that
the Soviet Union is nearing a
significant margin of strategic.
superiority and that detente is
merely "a central element of.
the Soviet political offensive.--
The admiral wants to expand
weapons programs, not cut
them back.
Senator Henry M Jackson
(D., Wash.), a yotential presi-
dential candidate, who is hr,
creasingly powerful in stra-
tegic affairs, is one who be-
lieves Dr. Kissinger is danger-
ously resolved to reach agree-
ment for its own sake. The
senator would link American
trade concessions and the ex-
port of technology to the Rus-
sians to rigidly specified stra-
tegic compromose on their
part.
"With any future SALT
agreement I think we should
take a very firm stand," he
says. "We should not subsidize
their military-industrial com-
plex into the 1980's with a
highly destabilizing effect on
world peace."
? In Senator' Jackson's view
0004i0atO Is yet to be ap-
plied."In fact, he soya, "you
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3
'can have a good detente or a
bad one, and my judgment up '
to now is obvious; it's a bad
one."
Even within the executive
branch . there are substantial
though still vaguely defined
differences. Dr. Kissinger
clearly favors linkage in the
general sense of weaving a
skein of economic, political,
and military agreements. But
he also appears to believe that
agreements feed upon each
other and grow, and thus he
will settle for less than the
? hard, fixed terms demanded
by Senator Jackson.
Precise balance
The Secretary of State's
counterpart in the Defense De-
partment. James R. Schlesin-
ger, appears to come down
more closely to the Jackson
view, at least on the arms
limitation talks alone.
From what is known of his I
differences with Dr. Kissinger,
the Secretary of Defense de-
mands precision in the balance
of forces. Lacing it, he is Inc-
lined. toward achange in nu-
clear targeting strategy, a po-
sition with possibly more polit-
ical than military - conse-
quences.
For almost a decade, the
avowed strategic policy of the
United States has been "mu-
tual assured destruction." It
recognized that neither nuclear
power would be allowed by the
other to achieve decisive nu-
clear scperiority. Therefore,
by this concept, each need
maintain ? only that power ne-
'cessary to discourage a nu-
clear attack, and each would
do so by holding cities and
populations hostage. to a retal-
iatory strike.
If the prevalent interpreta-
tion of Mr. Schlesinger's views
is correct, The U.S. is moving
to target, more of the Soviet
weapons system directly, mi-
te grounds that Moscow, by
'insisting on strategic superior-
ity, is seeking the power of
, nuclear blackmail. Targeting
never has been totally selec-
tive, of course, and the politi-
cal perception of change?both
at home and in Moscow?may
be as important as the reality.
arying judgmentsa
azthese varying judgments all
contribute to uncertainty about
how the U.S. will proceed whn
SALT II gets down to subst-
ance. They all are held by one
constituency or another.
Senator Jackson's view is
especially important, repre-
senting not only his own con-
siderable power, but also the
dominant view of Congress,
which historically favors majpr
weapons programs. ?
In the' wake of .the first round
of the arms talks against any,
treaty that leaves the U.S. in a
Position of strategic "inferior-
ity." To the extent that the
administration challenges that
congressional sentiment, the
eventual results of the second
round will face rough going on
Capitol Hill.
Outside the government]
there are grave doubts about
the arms limitation talks from
a quite different perspective.
Their most measured presenta-
tion comes from many of the
so-called defense intellectuals,
teachers and former officials
whose dedication to arms con-
tool is passionate. In ' their
judgment, limited agreements
in one area of arms control
unhappily have tended to
speed up competition in others.
"Exacerbating factor"
"It can be plausibly
argued," says George Ra-
thjens, professor of political
science at Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology, "that con-
tinuing negotiation ... may
be an exacerbating factor in,
the Soviet-American arms'
competition ... Under the cir-
cumstances, a question must
be raised as to whether con-
tinuing With SALT is .desira-
ble." . ,
He 'in ade his Point in the
publication Arms Control
Today before Mr. Nixon left
office. But he says he sees no
reason to change it now.
"I don't see any chance of
the Soviets coming around un-
less we take a very tough line
on linkage," he says. "We
would have to be very tough inl
factoring in trade and technol-
ogy and I don't think this fits
the mood of Congress, the
White House or the Depart-
ment of Defense."
The judgment of Ray S.
Cline, former deputy director
of the Central Intelligence
Agency, comes closer to that
of Senator Jackson. "My con-
cern," he says, "is that in our
eagerness to make progress in
detent we have allowed our
central strategic interests to
erode. mainly in Western Eu-
rope and japan."
Mr. Cline, now director of
studies at the Georgetown Cen-
ter for Strategic and Interna-
tional Studies, believes Dr.
Kissinger erred in the judg-
ment that Moscow's need for
technology and trade could be
exploited to American benefit.
.I.Attle practical effect
, "I'm sure they feel in the
light of the world economic
situation that time is on their
side and they might not have
to make any concessions at
all," he says. "I've not seen
The senator was the author d any agreement where acrea-
Of the congressional injunction tive action our part reused the
Russians to-fOrgo any 'major American- negotiators felt-
, protected by the thousands' of
;extra warheads already being
1installed' on rockets, a figure
,that could reach 10;000 or more:
by 1980. But now, given Soviet:
technological progreas, Mos-:
cow might also deploy at least
that many?with greater explo-
sive power?by the same time,
!with the capacity to field thou-
sand more.
? Reappraisals of record
Figures like these also have
caused some reappraisals of
the past 'record. In A recent
study Mr. Rathjens, Abram
Chayes of Harvard University,
and J.P. Ruina, professor AT'
M.I.T. and formerly a govern.'
ment adviser on nuclear wea-
pons, worred that some agree-
ments merery had forced de-
velopment into other areas.
But politically, they concluded,
the exercises had been useful.
"Even the least important of
the efforts has served to bring
the superpowers together at ?
times when communications
were difficult ..." they wrote.
"Moreover," the several arms'
control efforts may actually'
have operated to some degree
as vehicles for bringing about'
change."
Time has shown that nations
can ? tolerate a high degree of
raw inferiority in simple Mili-
tary terms, as long as they
can convince an opponent that
attack would bring unaccepta-
ble retaliation.
Will to act
?
development (if doing so)
would limit them and benefit
us." -
Moscow, Mr. Cline says, is
"feeling us out. And perhaps
we ought to feel ourselves out
for a while. A year ago I
favored some rather strong
self-limiting offer on deploy-
ment of MIR, but now ran
more inclined to think we
would just hurt ourselves."-.
Underscores the estent to
which the current state of the
strategic arms talks grows out
of previous agreements. It also
demonstrates once again how
closely linked the arms nego-
tiations are to the overall pat-
tern of political and economic
relations. ,
It has become more and
more apparent that the pattern
of agreements, while creating
an atmosphere of controls, has
had little practical effect in
reducing the arms race. The
limited tedst ban treaty of 1963
had the eminently desirable
effect of ending nuclear pollu-
tion in, the air by the great
powers.
Credible balance
It -also was thought that lim-
iting tests would prevent the
deployment of bigger warheads
becuase nations would not
commit untested devices. But
, now there is some uneasy re-
trospective thought that the
restriction may have contrib-
uted to the U.S. and Soviet
decisions to develop MIRV's?
using smaller, already tested
warheads. . And MIRV, of
course, is now, the main prob-
lem.
Other weaknesses in pre-
vious* agreements are appar-
ent: The nations that might
have been expected to go nu-
clear simply refused to sign_
the nonproliferation and test
ban agreements. Thus China
and France?and now ,India?
continue to test in the open
air.
The interim limitations on
offensive rockets imposed by
the 1972 agreements were tai-
lored to what the U.S. and
U.S.R. already had planned for
the five-year period. They left
a credible balance of U.S. so-
phistication in MIRV's and
submarine missiles against
numbers of Soviet rockets and
mightier warheads. But Mos-
cow moved faster than the
Americans had estimatedgl
they could, and now the first
Soviet MIRV's will be fixed to
rockets in the field within a
Moscow is inferior at the':
moment, but clearly could re-
taliate against a theoretical
U.S. attack. Yet no noe has yet
figured out a workable balance
of these elements of weapons
and 'political will. It is equally,'
certain
certain that the U.S. never will
permit Moscow to reach simia?
lar superiority.
- The will *to act, and the other
side's perception ofit, are cot-
?Hades of force, and that
throws the strategic debate'
open to a whole range of Politi-
cal considerations, domestie-
and external.
year.
Under the temporary agree-
ment the U.S. was restricts(' to
.1,000 land-based launchers and
up to 710 rockets aboard nu-
!clear submarines. The Rus-
sians would be permitted 1,410
land-based missiles and ? 950 38 '
aboard submarines.
Approved 'ForL keleae-iii-01/68/06-614-11RDP77-00432-R6601-60-340607-3
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3
WASHINGTON POST
16 Sept ember 19714
nvoy rec
n rs
aliens St ff
By Jim Hoagland
Washington Post Foreign Service
; ATHENS, Sept. 15?The departure of Ambassador
;Henry Tasca in diplomatic disgrace this week has embit?
tered members of the U.S. embassy and intelligence
communities here.
Embassy staff and Central Intelligence Agency mem-
bers who felt close to the controversial Tasca see his re-
moval by the State Department
as part of an effort to shift the
blame for the sharp deteri-
oriation of Greek-American
relations from Washington to
the field.
?Diplomats who previously
seemed to idolize Secretary of
State Henry A. Kissinger are
privately expressing to friends
a strong new bitterness toward
their chief and his top lieuta-
nants over their handling of
the aftermath of the Cyprus
crisis.
Tasca's unceremonious re-
call to Washington and leaks
to the Washington press corps
detailing the alleged unre-
sponsiveness of. Tasca and
the CIA here to directives
from Washington. have 'given
rise to the scapegoat theory.
The ? behind-the-scenes dis-
pute centers on American ac-
tions just prior to and after'
the Greek-backed coup that
deposed Cyprus' president;
i?rehbishop Makarios, on July
15, triggering? the .Turkish in-
vasion of the island five days
later.
Some U.S. officials in Greece
are especially incensed by
newspaper accounts ?from i
Washington that portray Kiss-
inger and his chief deputy. Jo- .
WASHINGTON POST
14 September 1974
- Tito Sees CIA Role
In litakorios, Ouster
Reuter
BELGRADE. Sept. 13?Yu-
goslav President Tito accused
the U.S. Centrall Intelligence'
Agency of organizing the Cy-
prus coup and of intending to,
.kill President Makarios.
"This coup d'etat was organ-
ized by the CIA, Greek mili-
taey junti and NATO," Tito
said in a speech Apliji..1M
here -today.
apparently prepared to accept
the responsibility for a major
intelligence failure, but not
for playing any role in the
coup or for failing to respond
adequately to warnings from
Washington.
The agency reportedly.was
aware that the junta had had
a plan for deposing Makarios
in readiness since it seized
power in 1967. . .
New warnings were raised
in June after Makarios de-
manded that the junta with-
draw 650 Greek, army officers
stationed on the island, and on
seph J. Sisco, in a favorable! June 19, according to this ac-
light, while suggesting t h at ' Count, Ioannides -personally hi-
Tasca and the local CIA, which formed a CIA liaison officer
acted as the embassy's liaison that he was considering mov-
with the now-toppled Grec '; ing against the archbishop.
junta, did not act on orders . But he reportedly stressed
to head off the -txottp. that he had not come to a
The CIA's. version of what! decision. Ioannides is said to
happened in July is ? still' have, discounted the chances
shrouded by the secrecy that of strong Turkish reaction to
..overs the agency's work. But Makario's projetted downfall,
Americans and. Greeks ? int- and added that he was sound-
imately involved in those ing out the Turkish military
crucial days have confided to command on this. '
friends, and it is possible tO 'On July 4, at Tasca's embas-
put together hom authorita- sy Independence Day celebra-
tive sources an intelligence tion, the agency was reported-
community version of the pre- ly informed by a Greek liaison
coup activity, officer speaking for Ioannides
This version establishes the that the general had "almost
coup as having been planned decided a gal n s t" any move
and carried out almost entire- against Makarios. On July 11,;
IY by Brig. Gen. Dimitrious loannides is said to have per-I
loannides. the dominant fig- sonally informed an agency i
ure of the junta, and Greek member that he had decided,
army officers on?Cyprus. loan- "to cut the bastard loose," i.e.. I
aides' mishandling of the coup to withdraw the officers and!- rap. for our closeness to the
and his failure to tell other let Makarios sink or swim on junta. He does feel that he has
dismayed when they learned
that the coup was in progress
on the morning of July 15.
? In the aftermath of the coup
and the junta's decision to
turn over power to a civilian
government, Tasca and the em-
bassy were repeatedly ignored
by Washington.
Kissinger secretly issued an
invitation to new Premier Con-
stantine Karamanlis to visit
the United States_ to -discuss
the crisis without tonsulting Or
informing the enibassy, accord-
ing to American diplomatic
sources. .
The Greeks disclosed the in-
vitation and their pointed re-
jection of it at the same time.
American diplomats now say
this was a predictable response
that could and should have
been avoided, since relations
were already declining rapidly.
"Many of us here can .see
the reasons behind Kissinger's
policy toward Greece during
this period and don't really
disagree with it, one intel-
ligence analyst here told a
friend. Tut there were certain-
ly palliatives that could have
been used. Sometimes we
seemed to be deliberately an-
tagonizing the Greeks."
"Kissinger seemed much
more.comfortable with-the mil-
itarY 'government than Tasca
ever-, did," said a member. of
Tasca's staff, "although the
ambassador always took the
his own.
officers on the junta about it
o been shafted."
destroyed his authority The agency is Said -to have!' The Greeks do not seem to
and accepted these assurances and], have been pacified by the ap-,
led to the junta's collapse
after the Turkish invasion, ac- was reportedly caught by sur- ? pointment Cif Jack Kubisch as
is account. prise when the coup occurred. Ta se a 's replacement. The
cording
Also surprised, according to
It also maintains that loan- this account, was the Greek
nides artfully deceived thc CIA general staff. Other junta
Greek press has said that Kub-
bisch comes 'from the same
barrel of smelly sardines" as
about the coup. The agency is members were shocked and Tasca.
NEW YORK TIMES
18 September 1974
":Makarios was to be killed
because Cyprus was a nona-
ligned country and Makarios
was one of the founders of the
nonaligned policy. He was to
be. removed and Cyprus
turned into a NATO base,"
Tito told a north Sovenian
town meeting.
He .also said that while Yu-
goslovia backed Turkey's first
invasion of Cyprus, it disap-
proved of the second Turkish
agr on the isvtgama, ;:i,ERNARD GWERTZMAN
SEYATORS SEEM G
TO BAR TURKEY AID
Say Use of U.S. Equipment
in Cyprus Compels Halt
rtEttetkaaPfk
f 39
By
S eeai to The New
More than 20 Senator s plan to
seek Senate approval tomor-
row of an amendment urging
President Ford to cut off mili-
tary aid to Turkey because of
what they describe as the il-
legal use of United States
equipment during Cyprus
crisis.
In advance of the effort to
attach a sense-of-the-Congress
resolution to the pending Ex-
port-Import Bank Act, Mr. Ford
hasbeen urged by Secretary of
3160GOffiainger to continue the
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3
aid program on policy grounds,
even if the law could be inter-
preted to mean that aid should
be suspended, State Department
officials said.
Mr. Kissinger's position, ar-
rived. at after a long legal and
policy review at the State De-
partment, is that a cut in aid
to Turkey might ruin chances
for persuading -the Turks to
make compromises in the Cy-
prus dispute, and would raise
long-term questions for other
countries about the value of
accepting United States aid.
Amendment Not Binding
The sponsors of the amend-
ment, led by Senators Thomas
F. Eagleton, Democrat of Mis-
souri, and Adlai E. Stevenson
3d, Democrat of Illinois, believe
they will receive overwhelming
support for their measure,
which would not be binding on
President Ford.
-Moreover, the Senators said
that the amendment would
probably be dropped in confer-
ence with the House because
the House version of the Ex-
port-Import Act does not con-
tain such an amendment and
would probably be ruled by the
House as not germane to the
legislation.
But the Senators, who repre-
sent a broad spectrum of politi-
cal views, have been angered
by what they regard as stalling
tactics by the State Department
in refusing . to acknowledge
publicly legal questions in-
volved in the continuing aid
to Turkey.
They are seeking the vote as
an expression of their concern,
a Senate aide said.
The dispute stems from the
military action by the Turkish
forces last mrenth to increase
the territory they occupy in
Cyprus, reported now to be
about 40 per cent of the island.
Mr. Eagleton, in a statement
earlier this month, called on
. Mr. Ford to suspend aid to
Turkey because sections of
foreign assistance and military
sales acts ruled out military
aid if a country used United
States-supplied equipment for
purposes other than those
specified. He said that Turkey's
military intervention in Cyprus
could not be justified.
U. S. Security Is Key Issue
State Department lawyers,
according to department offi-
cials, reported after long analy-
sis of the laws, that the mili-
tary aid could be continued if
the President ?used a waiver
authority, and asserted that
such aid was in the national
security interests of the United
States.
But Mr. Kissinger, after read-
ing the opinions, decided that
the broad policy intention of
foreign aid was to strengthen
United States security and that
any decision now on the aid
issue would be a setback to
efforts for Cyprus peace talks.
If the United States an-
nounced that such aid was in
the national interest, this would
only further infuriate the
Greeks, Mr. Kissinger believes.
if it cut the aid, the Turks
would be angered.
A policy of saying nothing
was decided upon.
-40
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NEW YORK TIMES
9 September 1974
ifts and Soviet Pressure Worry NATO
By DREW MIDDLETON
The North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, which celebrat-
ed its 25th anniversary in April,
in a confident mood, now is
beset .by serious political and
military problems.
' According to authoritative
sources in Europe and Wash-
ington, there are these major
problems:
(iThe Soviet Government- is
,pressing Norway for the estab-
lishfrient of joint Norwegian-
Soviet rule of the Spitsbergen
island group north of Norway
in the Arctic Oean?an action
that would further weaken
NATO's position in ?a stra-
tegically important area.
cCuts by the Netherlands in
her defense budget and a re-
view of defense spending in
-Britain have raised fears that
alliance forces in Central Eu-
rope will be weakened.
qThe . opposition by the
Netherlands to the proposed
appointment of Gen. Alexander
M. Haig/ Jr. to replace Gen.
Andrew J. Goodpaster as Su-
preme Allied Commander in
Europe has created a command
problem. -
gThe withdrawal of Greece
from the military 'sector of the
alliance .has opened a gap in
the alliance's radar network
that military sources believe
could have serious conse-
quences in any future Middle
East crisis.
The Most Serious Problem
The situation in northern
.Norway has deteriorated to the
point where, senior officers re?-
gird Soviet pressure in the fu-
ture for a demilitarization of
the North Cape area, now held
by a small Norwegian force, as
"probable rather than possible."
?
I Western officers believe that !of the alliance" and that other
the methodical extension of !allies would ,have to increase
;Soviet sea and air power into!military and financial contribu-
!the Norwegian and Baltic Seas Itions to compensate for the
has already seriously weakened cuts:
the alliance's -position on thel The British Defense Ministry
!northern flank, regarded as the is now near the end of a de-
!key to strategic contrcl of the tailed examination of military
North Atlantic and the main spending intended to reduce the
sea lanes between North Amer- outlay for arms and men.
lica and Europe. British officials say that re-
All Soviet nuclear-missile ductions will 'not affect the
submarines are based' Mur-;contribution to NATO. But alli-
mans]: and must pass be- ance officers believe that siz-
tween Spitsbergen and Nor-'able cuts will inevitably reduce
way's North Cape into the ;the forces in West Germany
Atlantic. Under present an- sincea reduction of British gar-
eangements their passage can Irisons outside Europe alone wil
be detected by the alliance. ,not constitute major savings for
Although Norwegian Govern-the weakened economy.
ment officials believe there Haig, Called Inexperienced
a possibiiity that . oil will be!
found on the -sea- bed around i Opposition to General Haig's
Spitsbergen, it is generally be- appointment, according to al-
lieved that the Russians want liancP sources, has more to do
joint rule of the islands as with his inexperience in deal-
much for- strategic as for eco- ing with the allies and in corn-
nomic reasons. manding large units than his
The consequence of joint having been President Nixon's
chief of staff.
rule, NATO officials say, would
be to bar adcess to the island American and other NATO
by the United States and other officers concede that inexperi-
signers of the 1920 treaty that ence may be a valid criticism
established Norwegian sover- of General Haig. But they point
eignty there. . out that he is a thoroughly
, Dutch Cuts Criticized trained soldier and that , in
,
World War II many American
The Dutch defense cuts an- officers who had never corn-
nounced July 9, will be fully manded a unit in action larger
effected by 1977. At that time than a battalion had success-
the Netherlands will. have 16 fully commanded armies.
mobilized battalions instead of The gap in the alliance's
the present 22. Reductions also radar network caused by the
are planned in the number of Greek withdrawal would be ex-
fighter aircraft in the air force tremely serious in the event of
and in the Nike missile force a crisis in the eastern Mediter-
now In West Germany. ranean. The ,Greek section of
The alliance's Defense Plan- the network covers the Bul-
ning Committee has told the garian frontier and the most
Dutch Government that these direct air routes from Soviet
changes will have "adverse ef- bases in central Europe to the
fects on the defense capabilityMiddle East
DAILY TELEGRAPH!, London
29 August 19711
?
Intelligence (Yap `let in Bonn_ spy
By'. .JOHN ENGLAND
? in Bonn ?? ?
A? FAILURE of communi-
cation within West
German counter-espionage
favoured Giinter Guillaume,- ?
whose alleged spying for
'East Germany caused the ?
scandal which forced Herr
Brandt to resign as Fed-
eral Chancellor.
The .failure allowed Guillaume
to penetrate the Bonn Chan-
cellery, an investigating Parlia-
mentary committee was told in
Bonn yesterday.
Herr Johann Gottlieb Her-
menau, a former department
chief with the Office for the
Defence of the Constitution, who
was responsible for giving
Guillaume security clearance in
1970, , testified that documents
that could have exposed
Guillaume were not filed cen-
trally.
He did not have grounds to
reject Guillaume for Chan-
cellery service, he added. Nor
did checks with state security
services in West Berlin and
Hessen reveal anything against
Guillaume.
Before hisarre st last April
Guillaumeh ad been a personal
aide of Herr Bnandt for 10
months. He is now tinder legal
investigation on suspicio.n of
espionage.
Herr Herrnenau told the com-
mittee that the department with-
in his service responsible for
watching Left-wing radicals had
four documents about the East
Berlin publishing house for
which Guillaume worked before
" fleeing" to West Germany in
1956.
These documents were not in
a central file, however, and he
knew nothing: of their existence.
He assured the committee he was
not influenced in his decision to
elearGuillaume by approaches
from any political party.
The all-party investigating
committee is seeking to discover
how Guillaume, slipped p
West German security to obt
a postton Herr Brandt's staff.
As the committee began
second day of public hear]
yesterday, it was reported t
the conservative weekly ma
zine, Quick, in its issue
today, would link Herr Herb
Wehner, the Social Democr
faction leader, with the G
laume affair.
? The Quick report was said
claim that Herr Wehner was -
pected of baying told H
Honecker, the East Gem
leader, more than Is year
that Guillaume's spying activit
had been uncovered by Na
German intelligence.
The magazine based its cl
on " research, documentat
and combined statements Fr
former 'agents of -the West
man counter-espionage servi
Social Democratic p
spokesman later dismissed
report as "sensational rubbi
and "amear journalism."
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NATIONAL REVIEW
13 SEPT 1974
IFN ROUTE to the airport, to
/ cover the arrival of left wing
firebrand Andreas Papandreou, son of
the former prime minister George Pap-
andreou, I watched a mob of young
men burn an American-built car despite
the protests of its owner, a Greek. This
was just one of many such anti-Ameri-
can acts in the fortnight following the
Cyprus fighting. A sampling: Item. The
beating of three Sudanese, who had
been taken for American Negroes. The
left wing paper Athinaiki, reporting the
incident, said the people were right to
beat up "anyone resembling an Ameri-
can." Item. Dave Tonge, the BBC's
man in Greece, thrusting a mike into
a crowd of rampaging Papandreou
youths and urging them to yell "Kis-
singer murderer" for the audience back
in Britain. Item. Stories in the leftist
press urging taxi drivers not to pick up
Americans, instructing the state-con-
trolled radio no't to play American
music, inciting mobs to destroy Ameri-
can property, attack American depend-
ents. Item. Avgi, the Communist daily,
saying flat otit that former strongmen
George Papadopoulos and Demetrios
Ioannidis were paid agents of the CIA
and that Kissinger personally ordered
Ioannidis to kill Makarios. Item. On
the day after the murder of U.S. Am-
bassador Rodger Davies in Nicosia,
Apogevmatini, the largest afternoon
paper in Athens, reporting that a U.S.
Marine guard had caused the riot and
subsequent death of the Ambassador
by 'provoking the crowd with taunts
and finally by shooting at it."
Now the case of Apogevmatini is
particularly interesting, and illustrative
of the Greek press. Until very recently
it was very pro-American; until July
23 it was an ardent supporter of the
military regime. The flipflop came over-
night. One day it was extolling the
Americans, the next it was explaining
in great detail how Henry Kissinger
had plotted to start a war between the
two communities on Cyprus in order to
effect a partition of the island that
would net the U.S. ? two bases on
Cyprus, one on the Turkish and one
on the Greek side.
The wave of anti-Americanism
fanned by the domestic press was made
easier by something we Greeks. call
filotitno. The closest English word to
fi/otimo is pride, but the word means
more. It can be used in Greek to mean
pride in a job well done, but also when
one is lying in order to save face.
mamonigrawainnsmomem
LETTER FROM ATHENS
?
The Anti-American Campaign
TAKI THEODORACOPULOS.
On the surface there was little for
the Greeks to be ashamed of in the
conduct of the Greek Cypriots,
who defended themselves courageously
against overwhelming odds: they were
fighting off Phantom jets and tanks
with World War II?vintage rifles.
Rather than swallow this defeat and
explain the failure of the government
to aid the Cypriots, all sorts of alter-
native explanations were advanced: the
U.S. Sixth Fleet prevented Greek troop-
ships from leaving for Cyprus; Greece
was told she would have to hilt both
Turkey and the United States if she
moved to help the Cypriots; Henry
Kissinger is a murderer; etc.
And to make the story even more
persuasive and the U.S. even more
villainous, it turned out suddenly that
it was. the Americans, not the junta
that had kept the brave people of
Greece captive for seven long years
when, in fact?except for certain ele-
ments among the bourgeoisie and the
intellectuals?there had been little or
no overt resistance to the Colonels.
The government of Constantine
Karamanlis calls itself a government
of national salvation and encompasses
all political factions except the Com-
munists and, at least at this writing,
Andreas Papandreou himself, although
five members of his party are in the
cabinet. Papandreou, who rushed back
to Greece from Canada where he had
been teaching in a university for some
years, has failed to give his followers
direction. He has concentrated his
vitriol in attacks on the Karamanlis
government as a puppet of the United
States,. CIA, NATO, imperialism, Kiss-
inger, whatever. But he has offered the
country no alternative. Despite his vac-
illation, Papandreou is believed to have
the support of about 10 per cent of the
population, mainly because of his
father's name. The late George Pap-
andreou, head of the Center Union
Party, was a great orator, a consum-
mate politician, a demagogue.
Caught in the virulent anti-Ameri-
canism that Papandreou and everyone
else is exploiting, has been U.S. Am
bassador to Athens Henry Tasca, wh
was recalled a week ago: Tasca denies
published stories that he had worked
to bolster the regimes first of the
colonels and then of the generals, and.
says he has the, cables to prove it.
"When history is written," he told me,
"I will be exonerated from the charges
against me." If he was such a supporter
of the military, he asks, how come that
on the day that General Ioannidis
stepped down five dissideat- politicians,
including Evangelos Averoff, the de-
fense minister, called on him to con-
gratulate him for his efforts in behalf
of Greek freedom? Averoff, incidental-
ly, says there is no truth in the reports
that the ouster of Archbishop Makarios
was engineered by the United States.
Ioannidis decided on that step alone,
he says, and when the Americans found ,
out what he was up to, they did their
best to dissuade him.
THE DANGER now is that the Com-
munists and the leftists may try to
move out the street mobs against the
Karamanlis government. Karamanlis
himself, as wise as he is Courageous, is
trying not to be stampeded. He has
stood up against pressures to go to war
with Turkey... He has promised elec-
tions within two to six months. He. has
managed to dismantle most of the in-
frastructure of. the military government,
quietly and efficiently. He seems ready
to negotiate with Turkey not only over
Cyprus but also over the disputed
Aegean oil rights. Biut in order to take
the steam out of the mounting cam-
paign against America and NATO he
took Greece out of the NATO alliance.
The American bases ?in Greece re-
main in danger as Karamanlis?the
only leader capable of neutralizing the
Communists?is jockeyed by popular
outcry into anti-American positions. 0
Mr. Theodoracoptdos is NR's corre-
spondent in Athens.
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NEW YORK TIMES
8 September 1974
Democracy in Trouble
By James Reston
DUBLIN?A political journey across
Western Europe these days is a de-
pressing and expensive business. Infla-
tion has produced doubt and anxiety
about the institutions of liberal democ-
racy. Not since World War II have the
free nations been so dependent on one
another?so much at the mercy of
events beyond their borders?or at the
same .time so stubbornly nationalistic
and preoccupied with their own in-
ternal struggles.
Ireland is only the most 'dramatic
and tragic symbol of this narrow and
separatist mood. Geographically and
economically, it is bound, north and
south, and linked to Britain and
Europe, but it is also separated by his-
tory and religion. And the crowning
paradox: It is engaged in a religious
war among unbelievers, tyrannized by
a minority of extremists on both sides.
Two Powerful but contradictory
forces seem to be in conflict in Europe
today. Its old empires are gone. Sepa-
rated one nation from another, it is
weak. Divided within each nation, it ia
weaker still. But united, it has the
people, brains, and resources to stand
in the forefront of the corning age
alongside the United States, the Soviet
Union and the emerging power of
China and Latin America.
This, hbwever, is not the way
Europe is going today. Looking from
west to east, Ireland is hating the
British Army in Ulster, but fearing
that the withdrawal of that army for
financial reasons in London, might
lead to a disastrous civil War.
Portugal is finally abolishing her
African empire, but she is run by a
weak and distracted government and
confronted by a well organized Com-
munist party.
Spain is also trying to make the
transition from the authoritarian gov-
ernment of General Francisco Franco
to a monarchy?also opposed by a
strong Communist party, which has
kept its organization and discipline
ever since the Civil War of the Thir-
ties.
?France, almost by accident and the
shrewdness of Valery Giscard d'Es-
taing, just missed a popular front gov-
ernment of Socialists and Communists
under Francois Mitterrand, but it will
take all of Mr. Giscrd d'Estaing's
intelligence and style to establish the
peaceful revolution of reform he has
proclaimed.
Italy is broke and in such a political
tangle that even political leaders in
Germany and France now suggest that
maybe a coalition government in
Rome, including the Communists,
might not be a bad idea.
Greece has made such a mess of
things that she has come to the Verge
DUBLIN
of war with Turkey over Cyprus, and,
like France, she has pulled her troops
out of the NATO alliance.
Meanwhile, Marshal Tito in Yugo-
slavia, the stabilizing influence ?be-
tween East and West in the Balkans,
is coming to the end of his days. The
last of the old generation of World
War II leaders?Mao Tse-tung and
Chou En-lai in China, Franco in
Spain, Chaing Kai-shek in Taiwan,,
.Haile Selassie in Ethiopia?are all on
their way out.
Accordingly, the question is what
the new leaders of the world?Presi-
dent Ford in Washington, President
Giscard d'Estaing in Paris, Chancellor?
Schmidt in Bonn, Premier Tanaka in
Japan, and Prime Minister Wilson or.
Edward Heath in Britain?will do ?
about this critical transitional period
in world history.
For the moment, they are doing very
little about it. Like the Irish, they are
preoccupied with the narrow and im-
mediate political and economic prob-
lems at home, and the more they try
to solve world problems by national
political tactics, the deeper they get
into trouble. 7.
Fortunately, in Europe there is an-
other force at work in the universities,
in the newspapers and particularly
among the rising young generation.
The teachers, the reporters and the
students are more mobile now than
ever before. They see a different com-
ing age. They talk not about separa-
tion of the nations and generations
but about integration.
Even some politicians in Europe are
beginning to think beyond the divi-
sions of the present to the possibility
of unity in the future. Mr. Giscard
d'Estaing in France and Mr. Schmidt
in Germany are searching for new
answers to new economic and political.
problems. The Republic of Ireland, for -
example, has a brilliant young foreign
secretary, Garret Fitzgerald, who is
risking his political position by argu-
ing publicly for a unified Ireland. .
"I believe the tithe has come," he
wrote, "for all Irish politicians who
genuinely believe in a united Ireland,
so organized that people from both
communities will feel equally' at home
within it, to speak out and to lead the
people of Ireland towards this goal.
We may find that some of our people
reject this lead, and that in the process
? existing political structures become
cracked or even shattered; this is the
price -we shall have to pay if called
upon to do so."
In the short run the ctutlook in Eu-
rope is bleak, but there is a rising new
generation and it is beginning to em-
phasize not separation but integration.
NEW YORK TIMES
8 September 1974
hen Italy's
Communists
ule, They
o It Right
BY PAW. HOFMANN
BOLOGNA?The Italian Communist party, which
has renewed its effort to become part of the national
governing coalition, could produce substantial evi-
dence that when it gets a Mandate it knows what-to
do with it. This ancient city is the center of the
region called Emilia-Romagna, and the elected Com-
munist officials who run both city and region do it
more efficiently and less corruptly than officials in
most of the rest of the nation.
Bologna was extolled as "la Fascistissima" (the
Most Fascist) by Mussolini, who was born in the
nearby Romagna area. But since the collapse of
Fascism at the end of World War II, Bologna has had
Communist mayors.
Emilia-Romagna is one oi Italy's 20 units of lim-
ited selfgovernment. With a population of I.5-million,
Emilia-Romagna is the largest Communist-run terri-
tory in Europe outside the Soviet bloc. Many of its
inhabitants and other Italians have the impression
today that the "Red Region" is on its way to becom-
ing a state within the state.
This is clue in part to continuous close cooperation
between the local Communist party apparatus and
the new regional authorities. Emilia-Romagna seems
also to be developing its own foreign policy, sending
delegations to Socialist countries and playing host to
prominent leftwingers from all over the world.
A Curb on Immigration '
Bologna itself has g population of fewer .than
600,000. The municipal 'authorities are discouraging
immigration because they think further growth would
impair the quality of its life. The historic center of
Bologna, with its archways and well:restored palaces
and churches, is a model of urban upkeep. The streets
are better swept and the transit system works better
than those of most Italian cities.
Bologna's citizens can get the many certificates
that Italian bureaucracy recittires from a computer-
ized system at some handy 'Little City Hall." The
leftwing city fathers see to it that new zoning regu-
lations and other community affairs are discussed
by the people in neighborhood meetings, as if to say,
see how democratic we are?
In these grassroot consultations, Communist of-
ficials usually show great competence and a degre
of flexibility. They yield on local issues, like neigh-
borhood renewal whenever they sense they have a
majority against them.
While Bologna looks outwardly well-scrubbed, it
has also been remarkably free so .far of the city hall
scandals that occur in other Italian centers. Critics
of the local government blame it for packing the city
and regional administrations with Communist party
members, and for wasting funds on prestige proj-
ects. None of Italy's 19 other regions publishes so
much self-congratulatory literature as does Erniaa-
.Romagna.
Industrialists, business owners and. other well-
heeled Bolognesi have long learned that it pays to
maintain good relations with the Communist rulers,
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FOrEitiSt
? NEWSDAY
28 AUG 1974
P ts
By Arnold Abrams
Newsday Special Correspondent
t Vientiane, Laos?The onset of peace in Laos has
not ended Central Intelligence Agency .involvement
inkhis country's internal affairs.
? After running a so-called secret war for nearly .a
deade, CIA personnel have turned to a new field
here: civic action. They. are using programs of the
U.S. Agency for International Development as a
coier for their covert operations. An influx of CIA
fufads earlier this year, according to reliable sources,
wris responsible for the implementation of several ma-
jot civic programs in northern Laos, where Moo hill
tribesmen *are. concentrated.
tri Those tribesmen formed the bulk of a lough guer,
rah army that was paid, trained, .supplied and ad-.
vised by CIA paramilitary personnel. By sponsoring
civic action programs for Meos, the agency retains in-
fltience over an important segment of the populace in
a Strategic area of Laos.
The tribeSmen's leader. is .Gen. Vang Pao, Vol110'
reaps substantial financial benefits from the civic pro-
grams. With CIA assistance; the flamboyant Gen.
Vang Pao has become chicken farmer yang Pao; the
transformation took place at Long Cheng, . the Mao
leader's long-time base and the . former CIA field
headquarters. ? ?
:Once dominated by the rattle of gunfire and the
roar of American aircraft, Long Cheng now is noisy
with the sound of cackling chickens. An initial CIA
expenditure of more than $25,000 started operations.?
on; Yang Pao's poultry farm, where -some 2;500 chick-
ens are housed and raised -prior -to being sold in a
nearby Market serving several thousand Meos.
Sources dose to the project estimate that -Vang
Pao makes about $1,000 monthly profit from hi.s.
chicken sales (the average per Capita income in Laos
is about $60 a year). His customers also benefit, how-
ever, because CIA-sponsored chickens are sold at be-
law-normal rates.'
Aside from chicken-raising, other CIA-funded
civic projects in Laos include a cattle breeding pro-
gram and the establishment of farm supply centers
that provide agricultural' commodities for' Moo farm-
ers at reduced' price. The ? projects' total costs, accord-
ing to knowledgeable sourceS, have exceeded $100,-
000.
. *The projects are administered by the Agricultural
Development Organization, nominally under Laotian
.government control but dependent upon American
funds. When U.S. budgetary cutbacks threatened to,
eliminate or curtail ADO operations, sources report,
an infusion of CIA money in February put the, orga-
nization back in business.
?
Six American agricultural experts presently super-
tvi
utse
vise ADO projects; all six reportedly are' genuine civic
action workers, not CIA operatives., "These men are
my employes in the purest sense," said Charles
Mann, 'director of USAID in Laos. "They have no
other professional concerns." When asked about the
source of ADO's funds, however, Mann replied, "no ,
corrunent.", ?
The American' agricultural experts prefer to ig-
nore the source of their. programs' funds. "I'm not
happy about where- that money comes 'from," one.:
said, "but I am concerned, with civic development,
and I care a great deal about the Meos. The source of
our funds, and the motives behind -them, mean less.
to me than what we are doing for these people."
Another American worker, close to Yang Pao, also
is willing -to overlook the substantial prcrfits compiled
by the Moo chieftain; who runs' northern Laos like
a feudal lord..
"Art, first this bothered. me," he said, "but after a
while you come to realize that this is the system?and
it works. Vang Pao can be called a dictator, but he is
basically a benevolent one, and his profits are not ex-
cessive by local standards."
Less willing to overlook CIA involvement 'in Laos,
however, is Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, (D-Mass.),
chairman of the Senate subcommittee on refugees.
Long opposed to the agency's- use of humanitarian
programs OS a "cover," Kennedie recently declared
that the CIA's present effort 'raises.. troubling .ques-
tions over, the course of U.S.' policy toward Leos."
He said: "Despite our c.ountry'.s general
support for the, cease-fire-agreement, and the new gov-
ernment, several indiotators suggest that the intent of
some .of .our remaining presence in Laos can only help
?to perpetuate old relationships and the division of .
that country." ?
There were 216 Al-her:can military men serving in
Laos as Army and Air Fore," attaches at the time of
the osnsa-fire in February, 1973. Now there report-
edly arc about 30: The U.S. has cut back becaire the
Vietntiane government and pro -Comnni n ist Pa thet
Lao have formed a coalition government and pram
accordarequired the withdrawal of all foreig-,n troors.
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WASHINGTON RD ST
14 Sept ember 197/1'
nou h,' S
\Thieu, Tells I its
By Philip A. McCombs
wnshington Post. Foreign Servtee
SAIGON, Sept. 13?Presi-
dent Nguyen Van Thieuf this
' week asked Vietnamese to
stop burning themselves to
death, "even for the noble
cause" of supporting his'
government against the
Communists.
The appeal comes after..i I
'five such suicides in two
months by persons who .
police say were anti-Commu-
nist patriots. .
Each immolation has been I
? followed by massive govern- !
ment publicity extolling the
? self-burners as anti-Commu-
nist "martyrs" and "torches
for peace,"
Self-burnings by monks
during the early 1960s pro-
vided a significant focus for
anti-government sentiments
. that eventually toppled
'President Ngo Dinh Diem.
Now that the Thieu gov-
ernment hat its own mar-
,? tyrs, observers say, it has re-
? moved from the hands of its
.. political opponents a poten-
? tially ? powerful . symbolic.
weapon.
This coincides with gath-
ering political unrest here.
Militant Buddhists are organ-
? izing, a mass Catholic demon-
? stration against corruption
was recently crushed by po-
_lice in Hue,. and a newspa--
..per publisher has. publicly ,
" threatened to burn himself
?, to protest press censorship. ?
There is no proof to sup4 .
'1 port the widespread rumors
here that the government
'.,planned the five burnings in
advance, but it. clearly ex- ?
ploited tisem. with excep-. ,
tional skill. ? --
Pamphlets and posters de-
picting the burnings as he-
LOS ANGELESTIMES
_ . .
?
5 September: 1974 -
urnings,
ackers
_
roic acts have been plas-
tered throughout the coun-
try. There have ? been cere-
monial funerals, radio- and
television broadcasts and
public speechies.
The Vietnamese typically
view the burnings with a
mixture .of skepticism and
awe.
"It takes a lot of guts to
burn yourself," said an officer.
"You get fame; a good burial,
and the government makes
your family rich," said a cab
driver. A soldier said, "I think
maybe they really did it for
peace. The .government is a
liar just like the Commu-
nists, but maybe a little less
? so."
. Three of the five were dis-
abled veterans; the other
two were a monkand a corn-']
*mon laborer.' All died but I
the monk, who is in a hospi, . I
tal, but unable to talk..
Sources within the Viet-
namese Disabled . Veterans'
Association, a private group,
. said members have been en-.
.couraged. to burn them-
selves and offered large sums
of money for their survi-
vors. They said that astocik
tion officials would like to
have a total of 10 burnings
by members, to' make the
government indebted to the
association.
:"They told me, 'Go ahead
and burn yourself,* we'll
make your family rich," said
one association member. "I
said I couldn't because. I'm a
Catholic." ? ,
Association . president
NgUyen.. Dinh denied, how-
ever, that officials ? of his
group encourage burnings,
althoughlie added, "The, as-
sociation has to accept and
admire,these acts."
ro.tca !rop m U.S.
?
rounds S. Vietnam s
BY GEORGE MeARTHUR
' Times Staff Writer
' SAIGON ? A -critical drop in
American aid has forced the South
Vietnamese government into a crash
belt-tightening program that has
grounded most ,of the air force, cut
-ammunition expenditure in some
cases by 80% and sharply limited,
many other activities.
Neither the South Vietnamese nor
the Americans will comment offi-
daily on the new program.
.I
,
There are several common
features in the five self-im-:.
molations.
Each poured gasoline over
himself and lit a match. The
laborer did this in an ob-
scure village, but the other
four did in front of political-
ly', important buildings in
Saigon., ?
All left behind articulate
and carefully planned anti-
Communist, and pro-peace
' statements in' letters and
notebooks, according ;to .po-
. lice. They all tossed such
documents in the ground
Just before burning them-
selves, police said.
, In each'case, police seized
the relevant documents be-
fore anyone else 'could see
? them and then released_loy-
ies of handwritten leIrt'is
and texts to the press, say-
ing they were copies of the
actual statements left by the
suicides.
"Down with the, Commu-
nist aggressors!" said a typi-
cal statement?this one by
"the second torch for
peace," Cpl. Phan. Van Lua,,
'33, who was missing a leg
and was listed by the army,
as 80 per cent disabled.
"You . are the communist
from the north," said the
text of one of his letters re-
leased by the government,
"and you have continuously
sent troops into the south of
Vietnam to cause death arid
Misery Jo the innocent peo-
ple." , .
, Another is a moving letter
to his sons which says, "Oh,
my sons, my ' heart is
broken! .I leave you to call
for unification of the nation
My sons, whenever you
miss me, just send lettersio
the radio station ..." ?
An but
ir Force
that "the situation is very serious
and we can't say how long it will go
on." ?
He added that with the fighting
continuing in some areas at a level
H a.n o s 1972 offensive,
some South Vietnamese command-
ing officers were "mad as hell" at
the critical decline in American aid.
? In the absence of any official an-
nouncements, details of the new
Privately, howev4.013.14ZNRt_ emerge. piecemeal, sometimes from Reqsag.6 c?Ideitribilk
South Vietnamese ot :Idfif-tembr740
45.
In Lua's hamlet, a few
Miles north of -Saigon, Lua's
wife said in an interview; "I
don't know why he did it .,..
? in 12 years of marriage he h
never talked about politics 4
with Me, only about money !
matters and- the problems of 0
'taking care Of the kids."
? ,She said -the government
gave her S700 after her hus-
band's death?an enormous
sum in Vietnam and more .
than is normally given, to
war widow..
As she spoke, half a dozen
laborers outside her moth-
er's small -straw-and-wood
? -house were busily building a
new brick one. Lau's wife
said she is buying it with 1
part of the $700. _ . .
In at least two other
cases, relatives, and acquain-
tances said the self-burners
? had been apolitical all their
lives. In another case. the ,
family declined to talk at
all.
? The laborer, Nguyen Phu
Niem. 58, left letters con-
demning Communist aggres-
sion, the government news'
agency said. It quoted from
one.
It also said that Niem
wrote his ? employer com-
plaining about low pay. but
! the agency did 'not quote
that letter..
President Thieu's appeal
? this week said. "The signifi-
cance of the five peace
fighters' extraordinary'
deeds has been acknowl-
. edged and esteemed by the
People at home and of the-
world
, T4.1. e sound of the alarni
loell-bas been listened to at':.
tentiv'eW by everybody. I
think that is enough."
sources of questionable reliability.
? The always active rumor factories of
Saigon are also in full operation. ?
It is known, however, that severe
belt-tightening orders went out to
the major military commands with-
in the past seven days. It appears
the orders were timed to coincide
with Sept, 1?a local Buddhist holi-
day during which military activity
would have normally declined with-
out attracting attention.
At any rate, some of the effects are
now clearly visible?notably the al-
,most total absence of warplanes
above the normally busy South Viet-
namese airfields.
While the official government
spokesman contended Wednesday',
that nothing unusual was taking
0442:RIXDOOOMMT-4so admitted
he had z:io reports .of combat sorties.
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3
? Privately, a South Viet-
namese officer confirmed
that orders from the Joint
General Staff, presumably
: with the backing of Pres-
ident Nguyen -Van Thieu,
had virtually grounded all
but the most important
combat sorties_
The officer said the en-
tire fleet of South Viet-
namese Al-E Skyraiders
had been grounded. These
old propeller planes which
can carry up to "5,000-
-pound bomb- loads--have
.been the air force work-
horses, and about 100 of
Them are normally-on call
daily ?
In a dd iti on,.:combat..
'Strikes bir the more nume-
rous jet fleet requiredeart
ance from one of-the corn-
menders of the south's
four major military re-
gions:-
WASHINGTON POST
03 September 1974
Some Would Risk Communist Rule
An official said there .
_was no. indication _:.how
long the present stringent. ?
restrictions would last -1r
An AmericanFofficial:at
?-? the big Tan Son-NhtiVAir--;
. Base niltside
that on Tuesday nots:one.;
t'Single combat-ilightWaS
Made from theAase..111;i
? said that all -planev,were
,grotinded and that-in.addii.,-;.
--tion crews removed allsthe.,,,ti
::.:ammunition and; bombe
from every plane.
? inay have been- part 7-9fii
nationwide inventoryi: of
ordere
=air force headcluartek-'
? In addition tthe.---re-.4
-
striotions on cornbatsor ties, it is understood th.ait.
similar limits have-qieen'-!:.:
placed . on all helicopter,;.
flights?both for liaison =
and troop movements. The
daily limitations onhtli
copter time is so.: seier?eft
that anything more than I
small;? And short-relic:re I
By Philip A. McCombs
Washington Post Foreign Service
e'-?DANANG, South Vietnam,
ept. 2?Many war refugees
tare eager to return to their
old homes even though it may
?Mean living under Communist
:control,? and some of them
have been forcibly prevented
?
'from doing this by govern-
;Ment police measures.
There are also many refu-
;lees who would rather remain
'dn. the government side than
!Come under Communist con-
trol. It is impossible to deter-
:mine how many fall in each
:group.
!-? Under the Paris cease-fire
agreement signed in January
4973, there is supposed to be
free movememt between the
two sides. In fact, very little of
.this has taken place.
:? If it had, a large number of
people might have been ex-
pected to return to homes now
-in Communist-controlled
areas.
? During the American in-
volvement in the war, large
.numbers of people were
loaded on trucks and helicop-
ters and taken to refugee
camps when the allies swept
through large areas to
-"pacify" them.
By moving the people out,
the allies could assume that
anyone still in the area was
the enemy, who ) could be
killed.
The government has now
been resettling the dislocated
people in government-con-
trolled areas, but many people
seems to have a different idea
Char
troop.. movements by air
are virtually ruled out. Si-
milarly, routine cargo
flights by fixed -wing
planes have been sharply
cut ? through the precise
size of the cut is unknown.
The crux of the; new re-
strictions is evidently Sai-
gon's deep- concern over
gasoline and ammunition.
-These are, by far, the lar-.
gest items in the U.S. mili-
.tary:aid program.-
-
' It was possible that the
South Vietnamese were
ordering the severe belt
tightening now in order to
build up some reserve
stocks in the event of 3sme
:genuinely major Commu-
nist military attacks_ Some
.American officials insisted
that there Were now ade-
quate stocks of ammuni-
tion and gasoline on hand
?but they woulcVnot be
more precise. ": ?
Whatever the situation,
word was passed through
thel.I.S. mission that there.
IL
1- would- be no comment at
rail. . ;?????Z
t:- ?
- ?
Americiii? ?
military- aid to Sot4h,VieVy..
????,- nam-?.is,now
?a ."contfnuip&reser:-.
.of :05rikress,:since
the- regular- aid bill was ?
iiotvoted by-the?etictof the
iScal.r..year in June
? The -new -nrilitary.--aid
? bill, however, has 7 been
,i.pared.to $700. million-as it ?
t:now ? stands?about Ltir.halL
-
amount requetl.ed-by-
,ihe Administration:4- ? '
is .possible, that:the
?s-difficulties- surAcmg.
yire caused-by the-need to
:lout military s peirdi ng ?
sharply in 'South Vietnam
to conform to the-$70-mil7 -
--lion bill which iLticiivPap-i- -
fpears certaitr;or-paS?age..-:
e Sai
'about where they would like
to live.
"If the government would
allow me to go back home I'd
go immediately," said one
woman, who was holding her
baby_as_. she talked in a refu-
gee camp in Quangngai .Prov-
ince, about 75 miles south Of
here on Vietnam's central
coast. Her home is, now in
Communist hands.
"We can't return because
our native village is controlled
,by the other side and the gov-
.einment . won't let us," ex-
plained another woman stand-
ing nearby.
They .spoke about reprisals
by government soldiers
against those who might try to
go back.
"If we went back, the gov-
ernment Would have .to guar-
antee us that there wouldn't
be any arrests and that we
wouldn't be disturbed by gov-
ernment soldiers," said the
first woman. ? ?
"No more shooting at us and
capturing us," put in a man.
Asked if they meant they
didn't care whether they lived
under government or Commu-
nist ? control, the group of
about 50 refugees gathered
around said, "Right, right,"
they just wanted to go home.
An old man recalled how,
long ago, they left home. "The
Americans used helicopters,
and they forced us on hoard,"
he said. "We went with just,
our bare hands, couldn't carry;
any kind of property with us."
The people said they had
been flown to the refugee
camp where they still live in ;
on I e es
et ir o e
' Quangngai Province. Fighting
has been heavy there for the
past month as Communist
forces press down to the coast
from ? their mountain base
areas.
. For the first year or so, the
.people said, they had U.S. and
government assistance. But
that stopped and they had to
support themselves by buying
tea from mountain tribesmen
and selling it in city markets.
The current fighting has
made this impossible, and now
they said they would like to go
home, where they could farm.
There were no government
officials around during the in-.
terview, which may account
I for the unusual candor. Usu-
ally officials are present and
one can never be sure how
much refugees' anti-Commu-
nist statements are affected
by this presence. In some
cases people voice genuine
anti-Communist sentiments
even when officials are not
present.
Another example of people
wanting to return to areas not
not controlled by the govern-
ment is the village of Heap-
hung, near the beach three
:miles southwest of Danang.
"There are a thousand veo-
!pie in my village and 90 per
. cent of them are pro-Viet-
, cong," said the young village
chief dejectedly.
He was interviewed in Dan-
ang, where he lives because it
is too insecure in the village
for him to spend nights there.
He goes to the "village office
every other .day, sharing the?
dangerous job with other vil-
lage officials who also live in
IDanang.
The chief, Nguyen Mui, 29,
said he was dejected because
; one-day last month, 80 fami-
lies -in the village tore down
their houses and carted them
.to rebuild in a nearby Viet-
cong-controlled area.
. They told him, the chief
said, that they would prefer .to
live there because it was their
home ground, from which they
Ihad been removed in the late
1960s when the Americans
were pacifying and bulldozing
the area.
Though they were not
moved far from their , home
ground, the place they moved
to had poor soil and they were
crowded.
After this happenel. Mui
said, he was accused by his
boss, the district chief, of be-
ing pro-Vietcong, which he
says he is not. He said the dis-
trict chief ordered him to use
. "any suitable measures" to get
ithe people back.
"I was ordered to have my
cadres go in and destroy all
the houses that. the people
tore down and rebuilt In the
new area," said ,Mui. _
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He said he didn't like to do
that because "All the village
i chiefs before me applied
miii-
tarymeasures to suppress the
trict chief decided that the
. rest four persons thought to
people could be controlled in have led the people in tearing
their new location by moving down their houses and relocat-
a platoon of airborne troops log them.
people hut id rather apply so-
cial-welf are measures that into the area. -. He said the sudden move by
Mui said that one of the
The problem was finally re-, first .things the troops did in
make the people like me."
?
the 89 families was "part of a
Vietcong campaign to destroy
solved last week, when the dis-the area last week was to ar-
all the refugee camps and get
sion,"
!the people to return to their
native hamlets." ?
Nov that the airborne
troops are in his village, ,Mul
said the district chief told him
to "explain to the people the
situation so as to help keep
them from _falling into the
Communist scheme of aggres-
CHRISTIAN CTENCE MONITOR
10 Sentember 1974 -
Conservative priests blast
c.rruption in Thieu regime
. By Daniel Sonitierland
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
Saigon
A number of conservative Roman
Catholic priests have strongly at-.
tacked President 'rhieu's government
lately for massive corruption among
officials and military men.
They contend that unless Mr. Thieu
reforms his government, he doesn't
stand a chance *against the Commu-
nists.
Three hundred priests, many of
them refugees from the Communist
? North, have banded together to make
sure that their voices are heard. A few
months ago, they decided to go public
and issue a manifesto "against con
ruption, injustice, and social deca-
dence."
The priests claim to have the
? support of some of South Vietnam's
Roman Catholic bishops, but decline
to reveal the names of any high-level
supporters in the Catholic hierarchy.
Catholics make up only about 10
percent of South Vietnam's popu-
lation but they wield influence far out
of proportion to their numbers. Presi-
dent Thieu is a...Catholic by con-
version.
In their manifesto, the dissident
priests declared that power and lead-
ership in South Vietnam are "for the
' most part . . . based on corruption.
"Under the protection of influential
Officials, narcotics dealers, gang-
sters, gamblers, prostitutes, and
? smugglers have become a true men-
ace to a society, plagued with purse-
snatching, fraud, rape, and other
. unthinkable crimes," said the mani-
festo. "Few people feel . themselves
safe."
Corruption is not the priests' only
theme. They have also been protest-
ing against restrictions on the free-
dom of speech in South Vietnam. In
their manifesto, they point out that
under the Thieu government "help-
-:less citizens may be accused of
assisting or conniving with the Corn-
:munists, while others who utter any
, unpleasant truth about the adminis-
tration may be charged with 'weak-
ening the fighting spirit of the armed
,forces.' "
7 None of the accusations is particu-
lary new. Corruption and injustice
have been the targets of countless
protesters throughout the long Viet-
nam war. But it is unusual for so
many conservative priests to be going
on the attack in such a vocal way.
Recently two of the leaders among
the group of 300 issued a statement in
which they referred to the Thieu
government as an "oppressive and
traitorous regime." These were
strong words indeed.
_ The two priests urged the Catholic
leadership in South Vietnam to dis-
? associate itself from the Thieu gov-
ernment and to stop accepting favors
from the government.
. The chief motivation of the 300
priests seems to be, quite simply, fear
of a Communist take-over. Left-lean-
ing Vietnamese priests often say that.
a coalition government which In.
eludes the Communists .but excludes .
President Thieu is the only solution ?
for South Vietnam. But the conserva-
tive priests do not advocate that kind
of compromise ? not yet anyway.
Many remain as hawkish as they ever
were. But they fear that corruption
will sabotage the chances of any anti- ?
Communist regime surviving in South
Vietnam. ? -
Regimes compared
"It was corruption that led to the
downfall of the Chiang Kai-shek gov-
ernment in China," said one of the
priests who signed the manifesto.
The priest, who happens to be an
ailmirer of the late President Ngo
Dinh Diem, declared that corruption
now is "100 times worse" than it was
under the Diem regime.
The priest asked that his name not
be published, because he feared retal-
iation. from the Thieu government.
But at the same time he said that he
doubted Mr. Thieu would take strong
action against any of the 300 priests
who signed the manifesto.
"I do not think that Thieu would
dare act like President Park Chung
Hee [of Korea]," the priest said,
referring to the arrests of Christian
dissidents in South Korea.
"Thieu is not strong like Park," he
said. Mr. Thieu has given little in-
dication so far of what his attitude is
toward the priests who are demand-
ing an end to corruption.
But he is not likely to be happy with .
their criticism because, as one Viet- ,
namese Catholic put it: "If the left-
wing priests talk about corruption,
Thieu can Always say that their
criticism is exaggerated. But what
does he say when the right-wing
priests start talking about it?"
? i?
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Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3
'THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Wednesday, Sept. 18, 1974
Did the Chilean Press Need CIA Help?
By EVERETT C. MARTIN
In his press conference this week Presi-
dent Ford was asked about recent disclo-
sures that the Central Intelligence Agency
was authorized to spend some 59 million to
"destabilize" the government of Chile's
:Marxist President Salvador Allende. The
President admitted that the CIA gave sup-
poi, presumably in the form of money, to
opposition news media and political parties.
? Specifically, the President said: "In a
period of time, three or four years ago,
there was an effort being made by the Al-
lende government to destroy opposition
news media, both the writing press as well
as the electronic press. And to destroy op-
position political parties.
"And the effort that was made in this
case was to help and assist the preserva-
tion of opposition newspapers and elec-
tronic media and to preserve opposition
political parties." '
, He concluded: "I think this is in the best
interest of the people of Chile and certainly
in our best interest."
This interference in the internal affairs
of another nation is a staggering admission
for the President to make, and his conclu-
sion is, at the very best, questionable. ,
There isn't any doubt, however, that the
opposition news media had been pushed to
the wall by the Marxists. The President's
statement gives part of the explanation of
how it managed to survive at all.
, Except for a very few cases, Chile's
news media have always been wildly parti-
san in political matters. News stories gen-
? erally were polemics and thoroughly unre-
liable as sources of balanced, accurate in-
formation. To read the government and op-
position press on any given day was like
reading about events in two different coun-
tries. The result was that most readers
bought the paper that said what they
wanted to hear; there was none of the
cross-fertilization of ideas that might take
the heat out of an issue.
Where opposition newspapers and mag-
azines were concerned, the Allende forces
' did very little overtly to curtail their right
to print what they wanted. But the evi-
dence indicates a clear attempt to strangle,
them economically by cutting off their rev-
enue.
The Chilean government and state-
owned industries were the largest single
group of advertisers. It wasn't surprising
in such a polarized situation that they
stopped advertising in opposition media.
As the Marxists through one means or an-
other took control of the banks and private
industry, government hold over advertis-
ing became overwhelming. The, wor'sening
economic situation and scarcities exacer-
bated the situation until publications ap-
peared with virtually no visible means of
support.
Then there was the Marxist attempt to.
take over the paper company, known fa-,
miliarly as the Papelera, that -supplied
65% of the newsprint. Failing in an effort
'to buy the firm's shares and to agitate the
61,000 workers to?seize the plants, the gov-
ernment tried to force it into bankruptcy,
which means automatic government con-
trol. Denied anything but insignificant
price increases at a time when costs were
tripling, Papelera was soon losing thou-
sands of dollars a day. Only 'when chaos
threatened as crowds took to the streets
supporting the company did the govern-
ment back off in a moment of political
compromise.
Newspapers in smaller towns came
under more direct attack than the big dai-
lies of Santiago. An editor's life was
threatened in Rancagua by mobs of leftists,
and workers seized control of papers in
other cities. In Talca after workers seized
the paper, the supreme court ruled it was
Illegal; but the government refused to obey
the court order to end the occupation. "It's
not 'socially possible to obey the court," a
Socialist Party member reasoned at the
time.
But newspapers actually reach rela-
tively few people in Chile. Much more im-
portant as a mass media is the radio, and
closures of radio stations by the Allende
government got to be a common occur-
rence.
Once a Santiago station was closed be-
cause it reported that two miners were
shot tO?death during a copper strike. The
report was slightly wrong. Only one miner
died; the other was critically wounded.
For this, the government declared the sta-
tion had endangered national security. The
supreme court again ordered the station
reopened; but the government minister in-
volved refused. The court then ordered his
arrest, and the Marxists countered with a
threat to start impeachment proceedings
against the entire court for upholding bour-
geois laws against the will of the people.
Government television and radio sta-
tions, on the other hand, once caused riot-
ing in the streets with a false report that
rightwing forces were about to attack the
army. This abuse went unpunished.
Television was another area where the
? government's actions were overt. '
The University of Chile had a station in
Santiago that was staffed entirely with ex-
treme leftists broadcasting pure Marxist
propaganda. The student body voted over-
whelmingly in a referendum to expell the
leftists and Change to. a neutral format;
but when the schoo"s administration,
148
which was bound by law to obey the refer- ?
endum, tried to take control, the leftists re-
jected them by force.
The police wouldn't act, and President ,
Allende ordered university officials to con-
tinue the Marxists on the payroll. Then the
school tried to set up a second station, but
the police raided it and smashed the equip-
ment.
The Catholic University ran into similar
repression when it tried to set up a second
,channel to serve the southern city of Con-
cepcion with a format that attempted to be
non-partisan.
At first the government claimed that
the station's signal would interfere with
radio reception at the Concepcion airport,
which was patently 'not the case. The. uni-
versity -defiantly went ahead with its
plans; so the government set up jamming
equipment to interrupt its programs. In,
the ensuing controversy, the priest who
ran the university's television network was
even held in jail for a short period.
It was genuinely a question how long
some elements of Chile's opposition media
could hold out as tha pressure against it
mounted near the end of the Allende ad-
ministration. It might be easy to rational-
ize why the CIA thought it should step in.
with support money. It is something that
no doubt we shall eventually learn we are
doing in other countries. But does that jus-
tify such intervention in Chile's internal af-
fairs?
And was it even necessary?'
The opposition forces demonstrated
time and again through various by-elec-
tions and the 1973 congressional elections
that they were the majority. It seems a
kind of arrogance for Washington planners
to think that the Chilean majority would
let its protesting voice disappear entirely
from print. and from the airwaves even if
established, publication's and stations col-
lapsed by the dozens.,
One might also- ask where is the 'CIA's
concern for an opposition press in Chile
now that the military junta which deposed
the Allende government has effectively si-
lenced all opposition? ,
Fortunately, no disclosures so far indi-
cate that the U.S. government was in-
volved in the actual coup against the Al-
lende government, but the records should
be laid bare to make sure.
In the Chilean case, President .Allende's
own actions in subverting the democracy,
in smuggling arms from Cuba to set up a
clandestine army and in wrecking the coun-
try's economy were more than adequate to
"destabilize" his government.
But what if it had turned out differ-
ently? What if he hadn't done those self-de-
structive things and finally through pro-
gressive programs had earned the alle-
gianea of a majority of Chileans? How
then could President Ford claim that the
CIA's. actions were "in the best interests of
the people of Chile"?
Mr. Martin,. a member of the Journal's
New York bureau, covers Latin American
affairs and was in Chile during the coup.
?
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App-roved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3
THE ECONOMIST SEPTEMBER 14, 1974
The Pinochet way
Was the Chile disaster inevitable? Probably. Is it
permanent? Not necessarily'
What has happened in Chile since Salvador Allende was
overthrown a year ago this week is a lesson in the way
soldiers who believe they are the saviours of their country
find themselves becoming dictators. President Pinochet
has promised to release some political detainees, and the
"state of internal war" was lifted on Wednesday, but there
are few guarantees of political freedom under the stern
provisions of the state of siege that is still being enforced
in Chile. The political parties have been banned or sus-
pended; the press?once the most outspoken in Latin
America?is muzzled by military censors; and there are
few indications that the junta has any thought of restoring
the parliamentary system in a form western democrats
would recognise.
Some of the officers who stand behind President Pino-
chet maintain that censorship, arbitrary detention, trial
by court martial and the rest of the paraphernalia of re-
pression were necessary because the country was in a state
of civil war. But for a powerful faction within the junta the
argument runs deeper: the country must be "cleansed"
of old-style politics so that a new, and permanent, authori-
tarian system can emerge. These men are not like Turkey's
generals in 1960. They do not see their job as the laying
down of neW political rules so that a multi-party system
can take over again from them later on. They appear to be
working towards a no-party system.
The repression in Chile is documented in a new 80-page
report published by Amnesty International this week.
Some of its evidence is dubious?including a Newsweek
report published in October last year that was later shown
to be fallacious, and a number of quotations from anony-
mous foreigners now outside Chile. But the rest of the re-
port is one of Amnesty's more credible documents, and
builds up a damaging case for the junta to Answer. The
problem is not so much the abuse of law as the absence of
law. There is no appeal against the verdict of military tri-
bunals, no respect for habeas corpus, and the lack of cen-
tral control makes it possible for provincial garrisons or
military intelligence services to deal with opponents as they
see fit without consulting a higher authority. The result,
in the first month after the coup, was a series of prisoners
shot "while trying to escape" or just disappearing without
trace. Amnesty suggests a figure of 7,000 for the number
of political prisoners today; as many people may have
died. It is also fairly plain that the use of torture has been
widespread, although (as Amnesty concedes) the junta
now seems to be trying to stop it. Neither the torture nor
the "unofficial" executions can be justified even if one
accepts the junta's thesis that the left in Chile is secretly
planning a violent uprising?and since there has not been
a single guerrilla incident of any importance since the
immediate aftermath of the coup, that is no longer easy to
swallow.
These things gave the British Government its reason
NEW YORK TIMES
16 September. 1974
Swedish Premier Calls
Chilean Leaders 'Crooks'
?
?
STOCKHOLM, Sept. 15
(UPI) ? Premier Olof Palme
yesterday described the mili-
tary government of ,,Chile as
"despicable crookAPPEMY
newspapers speculated today
that the two nations might
break .off diplomatic !via.
tions. ?
Mr. Palme, speaking at a
demonstration against Chile's
military regime, ' said that
"sooner or later the regime
of blood in Chile will vanish
I dhtfanimgaAgisa
n_ dezradatio 0
despised by the entire demo-
for instructing Britain's ambassador in Chile not to attend
the junta's anniversary celebrations on Wednesday, even
though that gesture would have looked a lot more plausible
if British ambassadors did not turn up at similar occasions
when other governments congratulate themselves on far
bloodier conquests of power. But historians, as distinct
from politicians out to score a point, will still want to make
two observations about what has happened in Chile.
The first is that it was the marxist left, not the armed
forces, that broke down Chile's democratic institutions.
Before Allende was overthrown he had been censured by a
vote of almost two to one in the lower house of Chile's
parliament for violating the country's constitution. It was
Allende's own left-wing supporters who had set up para-
military groups and drawn up their plans, almost certainly
with his knowledge, to seize total power. The junta is
caught up in a series of events that was begun by the
Allende regime. That cannot excuse its excesses, but it does
help to explain them. The alternative to -the Pinochet
regime was not democracy for Chile: it was the imposition
of a totalitarianism of the left.
The surviving corners of freedom
The other point is about what sort of government it is that
now runs Chile. Its enemies like to call it a totalitarian
regime, but it is not. The word totalitarian was coined to
apply to those governments?most notably the communist
ones?which set out to bring almost every aspect of life
under the control of the ruling party. The junta in Chile is
not quite like that. Its government is an authoritarian one,
and a very tough specimen of the breed, but it has not
sought to impose its ideas on the totality -of public life.
Politics have been abolished, but men can still pursue
their economic activities with a certain degree of inde-
pendence; there remains a good deal of freedom in the
world of culture and religion; people still have the right to
travel in and out of the country. These things matter, be-
cause they mean that some centres of power and influence
and independent opinion can still. exist outside the reach of
the government's arm. Such a. country is not a totali-
tarian one, because the rudiments of pluralism survive.
The distinction is important for Chile. The corners or
freedom that can still be found even within an authoritarian
state give men the possibility to recover the other freedoms
they have lost. These fragments of freedom tend to expand
as the regime gains more confidence in itself; there is less
intrusion into people's lives in Spain today than there was
20 years ago?or than there is in Chile now. There is more
hope of recovering political freedom than there is in a
totalitarian regime where one centre of power commands
everything. The Chileans are not one of the world's more
repressible peoples. Those members of the present junta
who believe they can stamp their ideas on Chile forever will
discover that.
cratic world."
Relations between the two
nations have been strained
since Sweden's Ambassador
to Chile, Harald ,Edeistam
344/4sRDRIM0840112Reil0
Decemt)er,
100340007-3 49