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August 25, 1974
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25X1A .--Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2 CONFIDENTIAL NEWST,:.V..1.EWS? and ISSUES INTERNAL USE ONLY This publication contains clippings from the domestic and foreign press for YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use of selected items would rarely be advisable. No 13 6 SEPTEMBER 1974 GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 1 GENERAL 14 EASTERN EUROPE 18 WESTERN EUROPE 21 NEAR EAST 29 FAR EAST 35 WESTERN HEMISPHERE 38 Destroy after backgrounder has served its purpose or within 60 days. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2 roved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340608-2 LONDON OBSERVER 25 August 197h A fog of mystification and elaborate security hides the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, with its world-wide network of secret agents and allies. Originally formed with the respectable purpose of ensuring that the Government was better informed, it has become a clandestine operational tool of the United States Presidency, organising undercover intervention in the internal politics of foreign countries. Now the facts have been revealed for the first time by an ex-CIA- man, VICTOR MARCHETTI, who in 14 years rose to a top-level job, working in the office of the Director. In collaboration with JOHN D. MARKS, a former intelligence agent in the State Department, he resolved to break ihe Wall of silence around the Agency. - Backed by the Government, the CIA tried to kill their-book before it was written, then held up publication for nearly a year. Under a legal ruling, it ordered the deletion of 339 passages. The authors and pub- lishers (one of the biggest in America) fought back in the courts, won the reinstatement of 171 passages (including those published below in 'black type) and defeated the CIA and the Government by publishing the book, leaving blank spaces (identified here as 000) where the text is still censored. Our opening extract from this book?the first in American history subjected to prior Government censorship?describes how successive-- Presidents used THERE. exists in the United States today a powerful and dangerous secret cult?the cult of intelli- gence. Its holy men are the clandestine professionals of the Central Intelli- gence Agency. Its patrons and protectors are the highest officials of the Federal Government. The Agency's methods and assets are a resource that come with the office of the Presidency. Richard Nixon ? and Secretary of State Kissinger used them to the full. The purpose of the cult is to further the foreign policies of the, US Government by covert and usually illegal means. Tradition- ally, the cult's hope has been to foster a world order in which America would reign supreme, the unchallenged international leader. Today, however, the dream stands tarnished by time and frequent failures. . Thus, the cult's objec- tives are now less grandiose, but no less disturbing. Its world- wide war against Communism has to some extent been reduced to a covert struggle to maintain a self- sefking stability in the Third 'World, using whatever clandestine methods are available. ;.5 the CIA and lied for it. The CIA is the primary instru- ment of the cult of intelligence. It engages in espionage and counter-espionage, in propaganda and the deliberate circulation of false information, in psychological warfare and paramilitary activities. It penetrates and manipulates.. private institutions, and creates its own commercial . organisations (called.. proprietaries'). It re-- cruits agents and mercenaries ; -it bribes and blackmails foreign officials to carry out its unsavoury" tasks. It does whatever is required .to achieve its goals, without any consideration of the ethics involved or the moral consequences of its actions. As the secret action arm .of American foreign policy, the CIA's most potent weapon is its covert intervention in the i.nternal affairs of countries the US Govern- ment wishes to control or influence. Members of the cult of intelli- gence, including Presidents (who are always aware of, generally approve of and often actually . initiate the CIA's major under- takings), have lied to protect the CIA and hide their own responsi- ? bility for its operations. The Eisen- bower Administration lied about the CIA's support of the unsuccess- ful rebellion in Indonesia in 1958; and Francis Gary Powers's 1960 U-2 mission. The Kennedy Administration lied about the CIA's role in the abortive invasion of Cuba in 1961, admitting its -involvement only after the opera- tion had failed disastrously. The Johnson Administration lied about all of the CIA's commitments in? Vietnam and Laos. And the Nixon Administration publicly lied about the Agency's attempt to fix the Chilean election in 1970. The justification for the right to -lie ' is that secrecy in covert operations is necessary to prevent US policies and actions from coming to the attention of the enemy '?or, in the parlance of the clandestine trade, the opposi- tion '. None the less, in many instances the opposition knows exactly what covert Operations are being targeted against it. The Extracted from The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence ' b.p Victor Mar- chetti and John D. Marks, to be. published by Jonathan Cape on 5 September, price ?3.95. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : ClA2lDP77-00432R000100340008-2 Appr9ved For Release ,2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2 M--2 Overflights and, later, those. :.of the photographic satellites were, and ? are, as well knoivn to the Soviets and the Chinese as Soviet overhead reconnaissance of ? the 'US is to the CIA. From 1952 to 1954, 'at.the height of the Cold War, the Soviet KGB electronically intercepted even the. most secret messages routed through the code room of the US Embassy in Moscow. This breach in secrecy, however, apparently caused little damage to US national security,' nor did the Soviet Gov- ernment collapse because the CIA had for years secretly intercepted the private conversations of the top Russian leaders as they talked over their limousine radio-telephones. Both sides knew more than enough to cancel out the effect of any leak. The fact is that, in the US, secrecy, and deception in intelligence oper- ations are as ? much to keep - .Congress and the public frcim learning what their Government is doing as to shield those activities, from the opposition. A good part of the CIA's power position is dependent upon its care- ful mythologising and glorification :of the .exploits- of the clandestine profession. Like most myths, the intrigues and successes of the CIA over the years have been more imaginary than real. What is real; -unfortunately, is the willingness of both the public and adherents of the cult to believe the fictions. . In the field of classical espion- age, the CIA's Clandestine Services' have been singularly unsuccessful in their attempts to penetrate or.. spy on the major targets. The Penkovsky case in the early 1960s, the only espionage operation igainst the Soviets that the Agency can point to with pride, was a fortuitous windfall which British Intelligence made possible for the CIA. In the beginning, Penkovsky was not a CIA spy. He worked for British Intelligence. He had tried to join the CIA in Turkey, but had. been turned down' mainly because the Soviet Bloc Division of the Clandestine Services was overly careful not to be taken in by KGB ,double agents, in the period follow- ,ing the Burgess-Maclean catas- trophe. The loudly heralded ?Berlin tunnel operation of the mid-1950s ?actually .a huge telephone wire- tap?produced literally tons of trivia and gossip, but provided little in the way of high-grade secret information that could be used by the Agency's intelligence analysts. The operation's true value was the embarrassment it caused the KGB and the favourable publicity it generated for the CIA. Against China, there have been no agent-related espionage successes whatever. Fortunately for the US,. however, the CIA's techni- cal experts, working with their counterparts in the Pentagon and in the private sector, have been able over the years to develop a wide array of electronic methods for collecting much useful infor- mation on the USSR and China. From these collection systems, sup- plemented hy material accumu- lat cd through diplomatic channels and open sources, the analysts on the CIA and elsewhere in the in- telligence community 'have 'been' able. to keep abreast .of .develop-1 ments within the Communist Powers. . There can be no doubt that the gathering of intelligence is a neces- sary function of modern govern- ment. Without an effective pro gramme to collect information and. to analyse the capabilities and pos- sible intentions of other major Powers, the US could neither have confidently negotiated nor now ? abide by the SALT agreements, or achieve any measure of true detente with its international rivals. The issue at hand is a simple one of yurpose.?Should- the CIA func- tion. in the way it was originally intended to?as a co-ordinating agency responsible for gathering, evaluating, and preparing foreign intelligence for use by Government policy-makers--or should it be per- mitted to function, as it has done over the years, as an operational arm, a secret instrument .of the' Presidency ? The extreme secrecy in which the CIA works increases the chances that a President will call it. into action. He does not have to justify the Agency's activities to Congress, the Press, or the Ameri- can people so, barring premature disclosure, there is no institutional force within the US to stop him fr onr oing what he , wan fse For example, after Salvador Allende had been elected President of Chile in 1970, President 'Nixon was asked at. a press conference why the US was willing to intervene militarily in Vietnam to prevent a Communist takeover, but would not do' the same thing in Chile to prevent a Marxist from taking power. He replied that 'for the United States to have intervened in a free election and. to have turned it around,1 think, would have had repercuSsions all around Latin America that would have been far ,worse than what happened in Chile.' The President failed to mention that he had approved 0 0 0 0 0 Go000?000 0 0 0 0 0 0 but by keeping his action secret, he was able to avoid the adverse political reaction ' he feared. If .there had been no CIA to do the job covertly, the US Government almost certainly would not have tried to involve itself in the Chilean elections, since it was obvi- ously not willing to own up to its action S. Almost three years to the day after Allende's election, he was overthrown and killed in a bloody coup d'etat carried out by the com- bined action of the Chilean armed services and national police. His Marxist Government was replaced by a military junta. What role American business or the' CIA may have played in the coup -is not publicly known, and may never be. But CIA Director William Colby admitted in secret testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee that the Agency had penetrated ' all of Chile's major political parties; and that it had secretly furnished sonic assis- tance ' to certain Chilean groups. Even if the CIA did not inter- vene directly in the final putsch, INIIIMEZBINIMIIIIM11111111111111111=1111111111111111111, ,CIA and Cyprus VICTOR MARCHETTI cabled. from Washington last week: The Greek background to the Cypriot disaster presents one more reason why. the CIA's policies and .prattides should be more tightly controlled by the United States Congress. - The seeds of the disaster were sown in Greece almost a decade ago, when the clandestine agency encouraged King Constantine's effort to thwart the political re- forms of Leftist Premier Papan- dreou?reportedly a former CIA agent. Within two years, a mili- tary junta took control of the country. If the CIA did not act- ively abet the coup d'etat, it Un-., doubtedly collaborated with the ? junta afterward?despite official denials by Washington. By then, the CIA's operational? ,imperatiye, replacing its thread- --bare 'to keep the world free for democracy,' had become 'to main- tain stability.' Thus, a repressive dictatorship in Greece was prefer- able to a democratically elected, ? Left-leaning Government. Athens was also a large CIA station, from which operations could be supported and launched against other targets in the Middle East. Eventually, the crude methods of the junta 'became a liability ? even to the CIA and the US Gov- ernment. The Agency quietly began to disengage, apparently transferring certain operational assets fo Iran?a safer station, now overseen by former CIA Director, Ambassador Richard. Helms. There would, of course, be no trouble with the Shah. The CIA had restored him to his throne earlier by overthrowing Premier Mussadiq. On Cyprus, meanwhile, Nicos ? Sampson moved?with the appro- val of the junta?to oust Arch- bishop Makarios. Allegedly, the CIA had 10 days' warning of the coup but chose to .do nothing . about it. Official Washington sources now claim the threatened parties Were forewarned. Per- haps. the US Government as a whole did take a series of actions designed to undercut the Allende regime. Henry Kissinger set the tone at a background press conference In September 1970, when he said that Allende's Marxist regime would contaminate Argentina, Bolivia and Peru?a stretch of the geo- ? political imagination reminiscent of the South-East Asian domino theory. Another measure of the White House attitude?and an indi- cation of the methods it was willing to use?was the burgling, of the ,Chilean Embassy in Washington in May 1972 by some of the same men who the next month staged the break-in at the Watergate. And, the US admittedly worked to weaken the Allende Government-. by cutting off most: economic aid. Henry Kissinger has dismissed speculation that the CIA helped along thiS economic collapse and then 'engineered Allende's down- fall; privately he has said that the secret agency wasn't competent to manage an operation as difficult as the Chilean coup. Kissinger had already been supervising the CIA's 2 - Approved-Fer Release 2001/08/08-: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003400.08-2 most secret operations for more than four years when he made this disparaging remark. V. hether he was telling the truth about the CIA's non-involvement in Chile or. was simply lying (called 'plausible denial '), he along with the Presi- dent would have made the crucial decisions on the Chilean situation. ? THE failure of traditional espion- age against the principal 'opposi- tion,' the Soviet Union, meant that the emphasis within the CIA's Clandestine Services shifted to- ward the Third World. This change reflected to a certain extent a bureaucratic need as a secret agency to find areas where it could be successful. More importantly, the shift came as a result of a hardened determination that the US would protect the rest of the world from' Communism. Refer- ring to CIA coups in Iran and Guatemala, Allen . Dulles, who was Director during the Cold War period, wrote.: 'Where there begins to be evidence that a coun- ? try is slipping and Communist takeover is threatened ... we can't wait for an engraved invitation to and give aid.' The Agency's shift towards covert action was quite obvious to young officers taking operational training during the mid-1950s at 'The Farm,' the CIA's West Point, located near Williamsburg; Vir- ginia, and operated under the cover of a military base called Camp Peary. Most of the methods and techniques taught there at that time applied to covert action rather than traditional espionage, and to a great extent training was oriented toward such paramilitary activities as infiltrationjexfiltration, demoli- tions and night-time parachute jump's. The Third World countries,. underdeveloped and often corrupt, offered far more tempting targets for covert action than those in Europe. Relatively small sums of money, whether delivered directly, to local forces or deposited (for their leaders) in Swiss bank accounts, can have an almost magical effect in changing volatile political loyalties. The CIA's early operations in Asia met with mixed success. Attempts to develop resistance.. movements in China in the 1950s,. accomplished nothing more than-. the capture of Agency offters John Downey and Richard Fecteau? and death for the Nationalist Chinese agents they were trying to ,plant. Mainland China was not fertile territory for Agency opera- tions. But there were successes else- where.The link insurgency in the Philippines was put down with help from the CIA, who played upon local superstitions about vampires. The last member of a rebel patrol would be ambushed, his neck punc- tured vampire-fashion with two holes, and the corpse drained of blood before it was thrown back on the trail. The rebels, as super- stitious as any other Filipinos, fled the region. Agency - supported 'Nationalist Chinese troops in Burma (when not engaged in their principal pastime of trafficking in opium) were in- duced to conduct occasional raids Approved For 'into the hinterland of Communist .China. In South Vietnam the CIA, in the person of Colonel Edward Lansdale (the original of Graham Greene's 'The Quiet American '), ? played a large part in propping up the Diem regime?and this was considered by the Agency to be a? major accomp)ishment. ? Such gains in Southeast :Asia were offset by some notable failures, particularly the Agency's failure to overthrow President . Sukarno of Indonesia in 1958. Contrary to denials by President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles, the CIA gave direct assist- ance to rebel groups on the .island of Sumatra. Agency B-26s even carried out bombing missions l in support of the insurgents. On 18 May 1958, the Indonesians shot down one. Of 'these B-26s and cap- tured the American pilot, 7- Allen Pope. ? Although-, ? - US Government officials, officials. claithed that Pope ? Was 'a soldier of fortune,' he was, in fad, an employee of a CIA-owned:peo- Sprietary company, Civil Air:Trans- port. ? The Agency also became deeply involved in the chaotic struggle which broke out in the Congo in the early 1960s. Clandestine. Services operators regularly bought and sold Congolese politicians, and-the- Agency supplied money and arms the supporters of Cyril. AdouIa. and Joseph Mobutu. By 1964, -the CIA had imported its own mercen- aries into the Congo, and the Agency's' .B-26 bombers, flown. by Cuban exile pilots?many of whom were Bay of Pig's veterans. ?carried Out regular Missions against insur- gent groups. ? During these years, the CIA. and. its Special Operations Divisions were becoming increasgly ? pre- occupied with Southeast Asia:: In Laos, Agency operators organised a private army of more than 30,000 .men and built an-impressive string of bases throughout the country. A.. few of these bases were used as jumping-off points to send guerrilla raiding parties, into North Vietnam and China. The CIA viewed the secret war in Laos much more fav- ourably than the huge mili- tary struggle that eventually developed in Vietnam, The Laos fighting was not visible to the American public or tile world. In fact, the Laotian war had been.going for years before the US Congress even became aware of it.' The CIA was in complete control in Laos, but at no time were more than 40 or 50 operations officers re- quired to direct the para- military -effort. The ground fighting was handled by hun- dreds of Agency contract personnel and more than 30,000 Lao tribesmen, whom the CIA from time to time secretly decorated with 'in telligence ' medals. The CIA's Laotian forces. were augmented by thou- sands of Thai volunteers ' paid by the Agency. Air sup- port, an extremely dangerous business, was. supplied by Air America?a CIA-owned airline?and on occasion by the Thai Air Force. Meanwhile, in Vietnam, the : CIA-ARDP77-00432R0004 CIA supported and financed a force of roughly 45,000 Civilian Irregular Defence Guards, local guerrilla troops, who fought under the opera- tional direction of the US Army's Special Forces. CIA operators and Agency con- tractees ran the Counter Terror teams. The Agency also organised guerrilla raids against North Vietnam, with special emphasis i on intru- sions by seaborne commando groups coming over the beach' on specially designed; heavily armed, high-speed PT-type boats. At least one such CIA raid- ing party was operating in that part of the Tonkin Gulf in 1964 where two US destroyers allegedly came under attack by North Viet- namese ships. . These CIA raids may wel: have -.specifically provoked the North Vietnamese action against the destroyers, which in turn led to the US Con-, gress passing its Tonkin GUlf resolution in 1964, setting the stage for large-scale Ameri- can Military involvement in Indo-China. DEEPLY embedded within the clandestine service men- tality is the belief that human ethics and social laws have no bearing on covert operations or their practi- tioners. The intelligence pro- fession, because of, its lofty natural security' goals, is free from all moral restric- tions. The determining fac- tors in secret operations are purely- pragmatic : Does the job need to be done? Can it be done? And can secrecy .(or 'plausible denial') be- maintained ? One of the lessons learned from the Watergate ex- perience is the scope of this amorality and its influence on the clandestine -mentality. E. Howard Hunt (who worked in clandestine opera- tions for the CIA for 21 years) claimed that his parti- cipation in the Watergate break-in and the other opera- tions of the White House plumbers group was in 'what I believed to be the . . ;best interests of my country.' Hunt expanded . on this point when interrogated be- fore a federal grand jury in April 1973 by Assistant Attorney Earl Silbert. S : Were you aware of or did you participate in any other what might com- monly be referred to as illegal activities ? H : Illegal ? S : Yes, sir. H : I have no recollec- tion of any, no sir. S : What about clande- stine activities ? H ; Yes, sir. S : All right. What about that ? : I'm" not quibbling, but there's quite a .lifference between something that's illegal and something that's . clandestine. S : Well, in your ter- minology, would the entry into Mr Fielding's Wani,;:l Ellsberg's psycn i a t r ist office have been clande- stine, illegal, neither ot both ? Release 2001/08/08 bbbnijialeirly call it Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2 an entry' Operation con.' ducted under the auspices of competent authority. Within the CIA, similar, activities are undertaken with, the consent of competent, authority.' The Watergate: oenspirators, assured that national security ' was at stake, did not question the legality or the morality of their methods; nor do most CIA operators. In early October 1969, the CIA learned through a secret agent that a group .of radicals was about to hijack a plane in Brazil and escape to Cuba. This intelligence was for- warded to CIA headquarters and from there sent on an eyes only' basis to Henry Kissinger at the White House and ton officials of the State Department, the Defence De- partment. and the National Security Agency. 'Within a few days, on 8 October, the radical group commandeered at gunpoint a Brazilian commercial, airliner LONDON OBSERVM 1 Sept. 19714 'wwith 49 people aboard and after a refuelling stop in Guyana forced the pilot to fly to Havana. Neither the CIA nor the other agencies of the US Government which had advance warning of the radicals' plan moved to stop the crime being committed, although at that time the official policy of the US?as enunciated by the President ?was to take all possible measures to stamp out aerial piracy. Afterwards, when officials of the State Department questioned their colleagues in the CIA on why measures had not been taken to stop the hijacking, the Agency's clandestine operators de- layed more than a month be- fore A;esponding. During the interim, secu- rity forces in Brazil suc- ceeded in breaking up that country's principal revolu- tionary group and killing its leader, Carlos Marighella. Shortly after the revolution- : ee ary leader's death on 4 November, the CIA infor- mally passed word back to the State Department noting that if any action had been t .ken to stop the October sky- jacking, the Agency's pene- tration in the radical move- went might have been ex- posed and Marighella's organisation could not have been destroyed. While it was never clear whether the agent who alerted the clandestine opera- tors to the hijacking had also fingered Marighella, that was the impression the CIA tried to convey to the State Department. The Agency im- plied it had not prevented the hijacking because to have done so would have lessened the chances of scoring the more important goal of ' neutralising ' Marighella and his followers. To the .CIA's clandestine operators, the end?wiping out the Bra- zilian radical movement? apparently had justified the means, thus permitting the' hijacking to fake place. During the last 25 years American foreign policy has been dominated by the con- cept of containing Commu- nism. Sincere men in the highest ' Government posts believed?and still do believe ?that their country could not survive without resorting to the same distasteful methods employed by the other side. In recent years there have been changes in America's conduct of foreign affairs. Yet the feeling re- mains strong among the nation's top officials, in the CIA and elsewhere, that America has an inherent right?a sort of modern. Manifest Destiny?to, inter- vene in other countries' in- ternal affairs. Changes may have occurred at the nego- tiating table, but not in the planning arena. 0 Victor L. Marchetti and John D. Marks EFSC. The chart below was originally censored at the CIA's demand?then restored after legal action. THE 'CIA is big, very big. Offici- ally, it has authorised manpower of 16,500, and an authorised budget of $750 million?and those figures are jealously guarded, generally made available only to Congress. Yet the Agency is tar larger and tore affluent than even these tgures indicate. ? . . ? ? The manpower total does not eflect the tens of thousands who erve under contract, or who work or the Agency's peoprietary com- anies. There are one-time agents hired for specific missions, contract ! agents who serve for extended eriods of time, and career agents ho spend their entire working Ives secretly employed by the CIA. In some instances contract gents arc retained long after their isefulness has passed, but usually re known only to the case officers vith whom they deal. One of the Vatergate bufglars, ueenio Mar- Inez, was in this category. When e was caught inside the Watergate 11 that day in June "1972, he still vas receiving el00-a-month stipend rom the Agency for work appar- ntly unrelated to his covert assign- tent for the Committee to lee-lelect he President. Complete records of employment re not kept in -any single place. n 1967 when the CIA's role on kmerican campuses w. as under SIZE AND COST Office of the Director Clandestine Services (Directorate of Operations) Espionage/Counterespionage Covert Action Directorate of Management and Services Communications Other Support Directorate of Intelligence Analysis Information Processing Directorate of Science and Technology Technical cor&ction Research and Development OF TkiE Personnel 400 6,000 $ Millions 10 440 (4.200) (180) (1,800) (260) 5,300 110 (70) (2.000) (3,300) (40) 3,500 70 '(1,200) (2,300) 1,300 (1,000) (300) ? 16,500* *Nearly 5,000 CIA personnel serve overseas, the majority (60-70 members of the Clandestine Services. Of the remainder, most are officers and other operational support personnel. **Does not include the Director's Special Contingency Fund. (50) (20) 120 (50) (70) 750" per cent) tieing communications close scrutiny, Direct or leichard Helms asked his sterf to tilld/ Out just how many universite person- nel were under secret contract to the CJA. After a few days of in- vestigation, senior CIA officers re- ported hack that they could not find the answer. Helms immedi- ately ordered a fell study, and after more than a mouth of searching records all over the Agency, a re- port was handed in to Helms listing hundreds of professors and admini- strators on over 100 campuses. But 4 . the staff officers Ncho compiled the report knew that their ....ork was incomplete. Within weeks another campus connection was eXpesed in the Press. The conneecz was not on the list that had been compiled for the Director. ? Just as the personnel figure is deceptive, so does the budget figure not account for a great part of the CIA's campaien chest. The Agency's proprietaries, or front organisations, are otten money- making cm erxises, and thus pro- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2- ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-60432R000100-840008-2-- vide free' services to the parent organisation. Similarly, the CIA's annual bud- get does not show t.he Pentagon's annual contribution to the Agency. For example, the CIA's Science and Technology Directocate has an annual budget of only a little more than S100 million, but it actually spends well over $500 million a year. The difference is funded largely by the Air Force, which underwrites the national .overhead- reconnaissance effort for the entire United States. intelligence community. For some reason?perhaps be- cause of the general view- in the. CIA ?that its operations are above the law?the Agency has tended to play fiscal games that other Gov- ernment departments would not dare engage in. One example con- cerns the Agency's use of its .em- plOyee retirement fund, certain agent . and contract-personnel _accounts, and the CIA credit, union's capital, to play the stock Market. ? With the approval of the .top CIA leadership, a small group ? of senior Agency officers has for years secretly supervised the man- agement of; these, funds and vested them in stocks, hoping tO . turn a greater profit than normally would be ? earned through the Treasury Department's traditional . low-interest but safe bank deposits. and bond issues. Originally, . the investment group; consisting of CIA economists, accountants and lawyers, -dealt with an. established Boston brokerage house, which made the final investment de- cisions. ? Within a matter-of months the Agency investors were earning bigger profits than ever before. Any reasonable reviewer of the CIA, after supervising the deploy- ment of Agency funds and per- sonnel and weighing these against the intelligence gains produced by the various directorates, would probably come to the same conclu- sion as did Richard Helms's tem- porary replacement as Director, James Schlesinger. On 5 April 1973 Schlesinger admitted to the Senate Armed Forces Committee that," We have a problem ...we just " have too many peoPle. It turns out to be too many people in the operational areas. These are the people who in the past, served overseas Increasing 'emphasis is being placed on science and technology, and ? on intelli- gence judgments.' Schlesinger's words?and the fact that he was not a house man ' from ,the Clandestine Services? were auguries of hope to those many critics of the elv be- lieve that it is overly preoccupied him the covert side of intelligence. But Schlesinger has been suc- ceeded by William Colby?a man who had ? a highly successful career as a clandestine operator ,specialising in dirty tricks,' and who can only be expected to main- tain the Dulles-Helms policy of concentration on covert action. At present the Agency uses about two-thirds of its funds and its man- power for covert operations and -their support?proportions that have been held relatively constant for more than 10 years. Thus, out of the Agency's career workforce_of Approved For roughly 16,500`; peOpleand yearly budget of about $750 minion, 11,000 personnel and roughly $550 million are earmarked for the Clandestine Services and covert activities. Although the CIA has had since its creation exclusiveresponsibility for carrying out overseas espion- age operations for the'collection of national intelligence, the various military intelligence agencies and the intelligence units of American forces stationed abroad have re- tained the right to seek out tactical information for their own depart- mental requirements. With US forces permanently stationed in countries like England, Germany, Italy, Morocco, Turkey, Panama, Japan and -Australia, the military' intelligence services have sought to. acquire information through secret agents---the .justification, .of course, always being the need for departmental or tactical intelli- .gence. ?, .? A... military . intelligence ,?unit assigned to Bangkok, Thailand, as late as 1971 was trying to entrap Soviet *KGB officers, recruit local spies, and even was attempting to rim, its own agents into. China through , Hong Kong. Little or none, of this activity was being cleared with the CIA.. ',In 1967 Helms was urged by his staff to authorise an official review of intelligence collection by ?com- munity members, with 'special emphasis on the. many technical colledion systems.- After several months of intense- investigation, the small group concluded?this was the first sentence of their report The ? US .. intelligence community collects too much in- formation.' The study noted that the glut of raw data -was clogging the intelligence systein and Making it difficult for the analysts to separate out what was really im- portant and to produce thoughtful material for the policymakers. The study* also observed that there simply were too-- many' reports on too many subjects for the high- level policymakers to cope with. The study caused such consterna- tion in the CIA that Helms refused to disseminate it: . Secrecy is an absolute way of life at the Agency, and while outsiders might consider some of the result- ing practices comical in the ex- treme, the subject is treated with great seriousness in the CIA. Train- ing officers lecture new personnel for hours on end about security consciousness,' and these sessions are augmented during an em- ployee's entire career by refresher courses, warning posters, and the semi-annual requirement for each employee to review the Agency's security rules and to sign a. copy, aS--"an indication it has been read. As a matter of course, outsiders . should be told absolutely'. nothing '-Some intelligence was not beire.; evaluated at i II, and, as a result, a new concept, ' the linear drawer foot,' entered the Entlish language. Trans- lated from Pentagonese, this refers to the amount of paper needed to fill a tile drawer up to one foot in length. \ 1969 House Armed Services Com- mittee report noted that the South- east Asia office of the CIA alone had 517 linear drawer feet unanalysed raw intellir,wics:Jsi ? Release 2601105 Iiis-FkbtYr7 5 about the CIA, and fellow em- ,ployees should be given only that Inforniation for which they have an actual need' to know.' CIA. personnel become-so accus-- lomed to the rigorous security precautions (some of which are indeed justified) that they easily 'accept them all. They Work with a telephone book marked SECRET, which is intentionally incomplete. It lists no one working in the Clan- destine Services, and each semi- annually revised edition leaves out the names of many of those em- ployed by the overt directorates, so that if the book ever falls into -unauthorised hands, no enterpris- ? ins foreign agent or reporter will be able to figure :out how many -people work at CIA headquarters, or , even bow- many work in non- clandestine jobs. f hose temporarily _ omitted can look forward to having their names appear in . the next edition of the directory, at which time others are selected for tele- phonic .limbo. Added to this confusion is the fact that most Agency phone num- bers are regularly changed for security reasons,- Employees man- age to keep track of 'Coirtmonly called numbers by listino* them in their own personal deskdirector- ies, although they have to be care- ful to lock these in their safes by ? night?or -else risk being charged with a security violation. Along with the phone books, all other classified material (includ- ing typeNvxiter ribbons and scrap paper) is placed in theSe safes whenever an office is unoccupied. Security guards patrol every part of the agency at roughly half-hour intervals in the evenings and on weekends. Even a -charwoman at the CIA must gain security clearance in order to qualify for the badge that she, too, must wear at all times; then she must be accompanied by an armed security guard while she cleans offices ? (where -all classified niaterial has presumably already been locked up). Some rooms at the Agency are considered so secret that the charwoman and her guard must also be watched by someone who works in the office. . The pervasive secrecy extends -everywhere. Cards placed on . Agency bulletin boards ,offering items for sale conclude: ' Call Bill, extension 6464.' It was only in 1973 that employees were allowed to answer their phones .Vith"any Words' other than those signifying the four-digit extension number. The - headquarters building, located on a partially wooded 125- acre tract eight miles from down- town Washington, is a modernistic fortress-like structure. Until the spring of 1973 one of the two roads leading into the s..clucted corn- - poumwas totally unmarked, and the other featured a sign identify- ing the installation as the Bureau of Public Roads. When the CIA headquarters building was being constructed during the late 1930s, the sub- contractor responsible for putting in the heating and air-conditioning system asked the Agency how many pLo_pJe site,str.ite,tetre, was intended -00432ROPMW-401pmys)-L For security - Approved For Release. 2001/08108 .7,7,CIA-RDP77709432R000100340008-2' reasons, the ,AgenCy refused to tell him, and he was forced to make . his own "estimate based , on the building's size. The resulting heating system worked reasonably well, while the air-conditioning was quite uneven. After initial complaints in 1961., the contractor installed an individual thermostat in each office, but so many Agency employees were continually re- adjusting their thermostats that the system got worse. At this point the CIA took the subcontractor to court to force him to make improvements. His defence was that lie had installed the best system he.could, without a clear indication of how many people would occupy the building. The CIA could not counter this reasoning and lost the decision. ? Another unusual feature .of the CIA headquarters is the cafeteria. It is partitioned into a secret and an open section, the secret part being for Agency employees. only. The partition ensures that no. visitor will see the face of any clandestine operator eating lunch. The CIA's ' supergrades' (civilian equivalents of generals) have their own private dining room in the ex- ecutive suite, however. There they are' provided with higher-quality food at lower prices than in the cafeteria, served on fine china with fresh linen by black waiters in immaculate white coats. These waiters and the executive cook's are regular CIA employees, in contrast to the cafeteria personnel, who work for a contractor. On several occasions the Office of Management and Budget has questioned .the high cost of this private dining room, but the Agency has always been able to fend off .the ? attacks, as it fends off virtually all attacks - on its activities, by citing national security.' Although .no statistics are avail- able, mental breakdowns Seem more common in .the . Agency's tension-laden atmosphere than in the population as a whole, and the CIA tends to have a more tolerant attitude toward mental health problems and psychiatric therapy than the general public. In the Clandestine Services, breakdowns are considered virtually normal work hazards, and employees are encouraged to return to work after they have completed treatment. Usually no stigma is attached to illness of this type; in fact, Richard Helms suffered a breakdown- when he was still with the Clandestine Services during the 1950s and it clearly did not hurt his career. Ex- Clandestine Services chief Frank Wisner had a similar illness, and he later- returned to work as the CIA station chief in London'. Many Agency officials are known for their heavy drinking, which also seems to be looked upon as an occupational hazard. Again, the CIA is more sympathetic, to drink- ing 'problems than outside organ- isations. Drug use, however, re- mains absolutely taboo. INTELLIGENCE a;;.tencies, in the popular view, are organisations of glamorous master spies who, in the best tradition of James Bond, dar- ingly uncover the /Nil intentions of a nation's -enemies. to reality, however, the CIA has compara- tively little success in acquiring intelligence through secret agents. This classical form of espionage has for many years ranged con- siderably below space satellites, code-breaking, and other- forms of technical collection as a source of important foreign information to the US Government. Even open sources (the Press and 'other corn- Inunications media) and official, channels (diplomats, military at- taches, and the like) provide more valuable information than the Clandestine Services ot the CIA. Against its two principal targets, the Soviet Union and Communist China, the. effectiveness of CIA spies is virtually nil. - To be Sure, the Agency has pulled off an occasional .espionage coup, but these have generally in- volved the 'walk-ins '?defectors who take the initiative- in offering their services to the Agency. Nearly all the Soviets and Chinese who either spied for the CIA or de- fected to the West did so without .being actively recruited by Ameri- ca's leading espionage agency. ? A large percentage of defectors' become psychologically depressed with their new lives once the initial excitement ,of resettlement in a .new country wears off. A few have cOmmitted suicide. To try to keep the defector content, the CIA assigns 'a case officer to each one for as long as is thought necessary. With a particularly volatile defec-. tor ? the Agency maintains even closer surveillance, including tele- phone taps and ejail intercepts. In some instances, case officers will watch over the defector for the rest of his life. More than anything else, the Agency wants no defector to become so dissatisfied that he will be tempted to return to his native country. Agents are intricate and, often, delicately balanced individuals. With the Soviet Oleg Penkovsky, his British and CIA handlers found that. flattery Ny as a particularly effective- method of motivation.. Although be preferred British manners, Penkovsky greatly ad- mired American power. Accord- ingly, he was secretly granted US citizenship and presented with his ' secret' CIA medal. As a military man he was quite conscious of rank; consequently, he was made a colonel in the US Army to show him that he suffered no loss of status. because of his shift in allegiance. On two occasions while Penkov- sky was an active spy, he travelled outside the USSR on official duty with high-level delegations attend- ing Soviet-sponsored trade shows. Both times, first in London and then- in Paris, he slipped away from his Soviet colleagues for .de- briefing arid -training 'sp.ssions with . British and American case officers. During one of the London meet- ings, he asked to see his :US Army uniform. None of the CIA men, nor any of the. British operators, had anticipated such a request. One quick-thin king officer, how- ever, announced that the uniform was at another safe house and that 6 driving there and bringing it back. for Penkovsky to see would take a while. The spy was temporarily placated, and a CIA case officer was immediately dispatched to find a colonel's uniform to show to the agent. After scurrying riround eondon for a couple of hours in search of an American Army' colonel with a build similar . tO Penkovsky's,,the operator returned triumphantly to the debriefing session just as it was concluding? uniform in hand; Penkovsky was pleased., . Months later, in Paris, the CIA operators Were better prepared. A brand-new uniform tailored to Penkovskv's measurements was hung in a closet in a room, adjacent to where he was being debriefed, and he inspected it happily .when the meeting was concluded. - ? A NUMBER of years ago the CIA established a secret .historical lib; rat-y, later a secret internal profes- sional journal, and in '1967 began the preparation of the exhaustive history of the Agency, being writ- ten by retired senior officers. Recognising the irresistible ten- dency Of :former .intelligence offi- cers to write their memoirs and thereby often to embarrass their. -organisations and their Govern- ments with their revelations Direc- tor Helms prudently aoreed:to per- mit the preparation of-an - official secret history of the CIA and its clandestine . activities. . Retired senior- officials were rehired on contract at their former salaries to spend a couple of additional years with the Agency putting 'their recollections down on paper. Helnis's . decision was a master stroke. The history will never be completed, nor will it ever he pub- lished. By definition it is ,a perpet- ual project and one that can be read only by those who have: a clear heed to know.' But the writers, the battle-scarred old hands, have got their frustrations out of their systems?with no harm done?and they have probably been better paid than they would ? have been had they gone public. Counter-espionage, like covert action, has become a career spec- iality in the CIA; some clandestine operators do no other type of work during their years with the Agency. These specialists have developed their own - clannish sub-culture within the Clandes- tine Services, and even ether CIA operators often find them exces- sively secretive and deceptive. The function of the counter-espion- age officers is to question and verify every aspect of CIA opera- tions taking nothinr, at face value, they tend to see deceit every- where In an Agency full of ex- tremely mistrustful people, they are the professional paranoids, even to the extent of, reportedly,. keeping a list of the 50 or so key positions in the CIA most likely to have been infiltrated by the KGB and maintaining constant surv eiflance on the occupants. Approved For 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340908-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2 ICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH 25 AUG 1974 IT t? NeV:1/47 ti '1 . fr117 A - 7:/g r.ra (an: fir-P.?-\,? er since ,Vathan Hale teas caught, -11r,"riremq hare surrounded the "spy rao" with. o mmantic mystique. Miles *o:---Inral describes in his new book, ? C7:".7k or Dazer." the process rcdblooded A merican lad can a fulUledged CIA ."company"? on. By Miles Ccpaland V.Then I toured the United States in 1970 t I acture to university audiences, I found ;nat the most vocal students in all parts of he country saw the Central Intelligence agency as representative of all that is -tong with "the rotten society we live 0." Question periods were all taken up by aeated discussions revolving around the ? gency's supposed intrigues in all a.pitals of the world, including Washington and London: its backing of rise;-wing totalitarian regimes; and its -working for the large corporations -other than for the American people,- . HACK AT THE HOTEL there was nether story. I was deluged with calls 7071 students wanting to know how to join Although a high percentage of the - -ufents who sought me out to discuss the .aa:hiiitis of a career in intelligence .stra!Iihri.nrcvard tyr swhothoughin eresa of practical advantages, either for ? lsee career ora.s a szepping-stone to ometning else, even more were roman- tics ? Walter Mittys, in fact; ("See that little man over there?" said Inspector Hargreaves. "You wouldn't think it to look at him, but he has all the secrets of the wcrld in his head.") Whatever the motives, there are thousands of young Americans whowould give their eyeteeth to be employed by the CIA or. simply, to "get into the in- telligence business," as one student put it to me, and by "intelligence" he clearly meant the spookier side. Although every one of the thousands of letters of application that reach the CIA :ieadquarters at Langley. Va., is given serious consideration, the attitude of agency recruiters is generally one of "Don't call us; we'll call you,' The mere fact of offering one's services F-T-73 T Pr'q ,LtJ : 9 , LILL, to the CIA is regarded as ground for suspicion. And for good reason. An analysis of these letters shows clearly Mat many of them were prompted by motives other than patriotic ()ties, a chance to "have a look at the insideso that I can write a book about it later" being a particularly prominent one. The CIA keeps what must certainly be the largest card file in existence of possi- ble recruits for its organization?univer- sity students, members of certain professions and people having certain special qualifications. A person may find himself propositioned by a CIA recruiter because some area division chief hasask- ed for ''a man, age early 20s. who has a background in electronics, who speaks Hungarian although is not of Hungarian ancestry, and who can meet the agency's criteria for career officers." He is more likely to be approached, however, if he is simply a senior in "one of the better American universities?(i.e.; one that has a minimum of stutlent demonstrations) with a B average, an ab- sence of left-wing affiliations and a record of sound emotional health. The CIA employs professors and graduate students at "the better American univer- sities- to canvass members 'of senior classes, either in the name of the CIA it- self or through some "front,- commer- cial or institutional. ONCE YOU GET IN, you will findYour- self in a whole new world. The CIA's recruiters do their best to screen out the romantics and to select only young men and women whosemotivationsareentire- ly practical: but I would say that 99 per cent of those who join the agency are at least partly attracted by the glamor. Even those few who are entirely blase when they first get into the agency are certain to be dazzled by the in- doctrination. e - The first training undergone by young CIA employes who are "officer material" takes place in the modern, streamlined buildings at Langley. Much of it is concerned with routine matters such as forms for reports. how tograde in- formation, how to use registry. etc., but there are also many exciting exhibitions. Experts put on dernonstratiens of how to WASHINGTON POST 22 August 1974 William 113. Sh at t tock 'Employee the CIA For 20 Years William Beverly Shattuck, 167, an employee of the Central 'intelligence Agency for more than 20 years until his retire- ment in 1968, died of a heart lcondition Sunday at: Suburban Hospital in Bethesda. Mr. Shattuck joined the CIA 1when it was i'irst being fern;. led following NVorld War II. in ApproA'dcOoliteRWliAgn2obthyeto8 7 t 1 ; ei?tb 771). ? 0 " ? .71 c;''' nil it S 0.1 z; ti VZ.N pick locks, plant microphones, steam open letters, forge documents. Then there is kpositively frightening series of lectures, complete with slides. charts, and photocopies of secret official Soviet documents and Communist Party correspondence, which is delis ere.d with such authority that it would convince anyone not only that the Cold War still goes on, but that it holds greater and greater dangers which can be thwarted only by an alert and efficient intelligence system. 'FINALLY. THERE IS A DISPLAY of the "national security machinery"? or "the real Washington," as one instructor calls it?which shows how, despireall the bumbling that is inevitable in any large organization, the U.S. government does manage to protect the nation's inerests and how, at the same time. it has a system of "fuses" which ensure that no element of the" machinery" can acquire an excess of power. This part of the course is most impressive. The second part of the indoctrination takes place at a country estate, a few hours' drive south of Washington, known as "the farm." Here the new CIA employe gets a taste of what it is like "out in the cold" ? in the danger areas where persons in clandestine ser- vices supposedly operate: on the border between East and West Germanyoon the Soviet-Iranian border. in "recepaion" areas in Communist China. In one "night exercise" the trainees black their faces and try to cross a border protected by charged barbed wire, dogs, electric eyes, traps, floodlights and bor- der pa trots. When they arecaught,as te inevi [ably are. tney are put through an terroaation by" East German security ficials" played with enormous realism. the training division's actors. In amither "field exercise." t trainees go into a nearby town to "cas restaurants and other places to det: mine their suitability as meeting plac for agents. SOME OF THE TRAINEES e parachute jumps, ore in the daytimea one at night, a: ter wl ich they havetohi 0 0 ": : 14 1111 se ee aoao their parachutes ih tl.e approved rnannt Onlya few of the traiaees willever have do any of these thing; in real life, of cot - se, and those few take.additionattrainin but they are given a feet for the problem they may later assien others as they comfortably at hea.lquarters operations. ' These two ind.octi ination courses a just the beginning of CIA training.. career officer of the oiA spends a gre deal of his service in courses "retreading" every year or so to I brought up-to-date ea recently develop. methods, provided with langua i i training, and given courses n politic revolution, counter: evolution and cots terinsurgency, among others.. The first job ef a new recruit to 51 CIA's espionage branch is likely to be; assistant toa "ceskofficer" ?at the..Irt Desk, the Low Countries Desk Cr any o of 33 to aieothers. His duties will mostly i Ntolve servicing reacests frora'?the fielc ?fora new automohiie, for special equi merit of various kinds, or for an adjus ment in some accounting mistake_ The first step upward of the new office is not from assistant desk officer to des officer, but from assistant desk officer t assistant case officer in some fiel station. It is in the field that the up-and-comic espionage specialist first sticks his nec out. He will be entifelya t thernercyof hi chief of station. and. asis well known, good chief of station is a masterat cheat of taking personal credit for everythin that goes right and blaming his subot dinates for everything that goes wrent while giving the appearance of doing jut the opposite. In aszy case, the relation between the chief of station and the nel officer will be both close and stormy. The real ambition of the CIA officer i training is toget bigeer and betterassig,r merits between headquarters and th field, in as wide a variety of places a possible, (C) la 7a by Miles Cope.'and. From th book -Without Djggcr" Milos Copeland_ Repr.'r;t,.d by perreiz &ion of Simon & Schuster, Inc. ilieutenant-colonel assigned to ;the Inter-American Defense 'Board in Washington. Before the war, he worked with a number of firms on Wall Street, including Moody's Investment Service, A. Vere Shaw & Co., and Sweetser & Co., of which he was a partner. Mr. Shattuck; NVIII) was born Brazil, id., graduated from the University of Indiana and attended Harvard UniverSity business before going to Wall Street.. Survivors include his wife, Betty Taylor Shattuck. of the hometi 8309 Burdett(' rid., Be- . thesda: a sister, Lucy Shackle- ford of 1:o:wild:de, I nil.; and a brother. James C. Shattuck of : tiltiRE/Prrt104t2R0001 00340008-2 , Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2 CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 4 September 1974 . CIA: But who will watch the watchers? Without Cloak or Dagger, by Miles Copeland. New York: Simon and Schuster. $8.95. By Leon Lindsay If you want to know as much about the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency as possible ? without compromising its present or future operations, of course ? what better source than a man who was present at its inception, has served it long and well in many capacities, and retains his status in the agency's "gentlemen's club"? Miles Copeland is that man. For 278 well-written pages the author edu- cates the reader about intelligence, espionage, and counterespionage, carefully avoiding any exposures of sensitive identities or operations. There is not much doubt that this is an "authorized biography" of the CIA, published to counter recent publication of adverse articles and books. If it is not a defense or an apologia for the Agency ? which has recently seen its romantic, "cloak and dag- ger" public image stripped away to expose the uglier aspects of its oper- ations ? it is at least an attempt to present the "real" CIA. If, in casual, disarming references, some of the cold-bloodedness, cli- quishness, and self-justification slip through ? well, that is not going to alarm the reader very much. Even the assertion that someone has to take care of "dirty tricks" may seem a truism in these times. But there are still, one would hope, a lot of Americans who are not going to be able to accept Mr. Copeland's final chapter, "Some Conclusions." Most of these "conclusions" are stated with the kind of righteous assurance one usually expects only from fanatics. For example: "If it isn't already, the CIA may well become 'the world's most pow- erful government agency,' as one columnist called it." The word "agency" may not ex- actly put the CIA on the same plane as the three great branches of U.S. government ? until one reads a few lines farther on: " 'The dangers are increasing,' an Agency official told me, 'and our power to deal with them is increasing proportionately. But so is the public's fear of us. Although the nature of the dangers is such that the Agency can hardly become less secret in handling its information . . . , it can at least put its trust in a representative number of Congressmen" (my ital- ics). What are the "increasing dan- gers"? Mr. Copeland identifies two: first, terrorism, andparticularly new- left terrorism, which he says is a worldwide, if amorphous conspiracy: second, the competing imperialisms of the Soviet Union and Communist China ? vying with each other to economically strangle the U.S. by taking over, through one means or another, areas of the world with strategic materials. The extent of records kept by the FBI, Army CIC, and other agencies, in connection with suspected left-wing associations, has only recently been ?discovered ? and decried. Mr. Cope- land admits that the CIA has the most comprehensive computerized file on individuals in the world, and he gives it a name: "Octopus." The file's existence is justified, he says, by the terrorist threat. Even some of the CIA's liberals don't like it. But, explains Mr. Copeland, even these civil-rights-conscious people ac- cept its necessity for they know frightening facts the ordinary citizen doesn't. He makes some other statements that seem relevant: "Removing the dangers inherent in a 'powerful' gov- ernment agency is-not a matter of decreasing the power, but of ensuring that those who exercise it are in- corruptible and truly responsive to public interest." (italics his). The CIA "will support politicians, political groups, and governments through the world [including in the U.S.?] whose objectives are com- patible with our own; it will some- times work with unpopular organiza- tions ? American, international, and foreign. "All these actions are certain to result in some public outcry, and the extent to which the agency is able to survive it will depend on the extent to 8 which the public becomes confident that the agency really has unpubli- shable information necessitating the moves, and is acting entirely in the public interest and not for the gain of Individual political figures, political parties, or special-interest groups." In this case, the reader is led to assume, as in justifying other activi- ties, the CIA "will give its contacts in Congress ample information to prove the necessity for so doing." The Implication here, possibly unintentio- nal, is that the agency itself will determine who those congressional contacts will be. But the same "defusing" process that works to abort assignments that the CIA 'gentlemen's club" considers unwise has other uses. Mr. Copeland gives a very disturbing example: When James Schlesinger became director of the Agency and immedi- ately began a shakeup (for whatever motives), his efforts were cleverly sabotaged. Clearly, the CIA will be internally changed only if the "gentle- men's club" wishes it so. Mr. Copeland says one maxim is being inculcated in the younger men now: "'Always keep in mind whom you are-working for' ? meaning it's not for the President of the United States as a person, not for the Direc- tor of the CIA, but for the CIA as an Instrument of the American democ- racy." Considering the existence of "Oc- topus," the Agency's coziness with selected politicians, "dirty tricks" at home and abroad, and Mr. Copeland's indication that the CIA strongly doubts the possibility of real detente, one can't help but wonder about their definition of democracy. In fact, after reading Mr. Cope- land's conclusions, one might con- clude that Big Brother is abcrut to unlock a door marked "1984." Leon W. Lindsay, chief of the Monitor's New England news bu- reau, was a member of the U.S. Army's Counter-Intelligence Corps. ,Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : C1A-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2 NEW YORK TIMES ? 5 September 1974 FORD AMES BUSH ASEIcV4Y TO CHINA TO SUCCEED Ha Choice of ,G.O.P. Chairman Is Among Moves to Revise: 'Party and Government: KENNETH RUSH SHIFTED Selected for Post in Bonn.-- Cooper to Be Arnbassador, to East. Germany ? By PHILIP SHABECOFF Special to The New York Times WASHINGTON, Sept. 4 ? President Ford today named George Bush, the Republican National Chairman, to be the United States envoy to China as he announced his first major changes in key diplomatic, po- litical and economic posts. ? Mr. Bush, who is 50 years old, will succeed the 76-year- old David X. E. Bruce, who re- portedly has been ill, as head of the United States liaison of- fice in Peking. . - Because they have not estabe lished formal diplomatic rela- tions, the United States and China do not have embassies in each others capitals and have not exchanged ambassadors. As ,head of a liaison mission rather than an ambassador, Mr. Bush will not require, confirmation bythe Senate. Paris Post for Rush A White House official close to the President said that to-? day's appointments marked the beginning. of Mr. Ford's efforts to reshape both the Govern- ment and the Republican party. , The other significant person- nel changes announced today by the White House press sec- retary, J. F. terHorst, include the following: q,K-enneth Rush; the eco- nomic counselor to formet President Nixon, who has con- tinued in his post under Mr. Ford. was nominated to be Am- bassador to France. (!John Sherman Cooper, a. Republican Senator from. Ken- tucky until he retired in 1972, was named to be the first Unit- ed States Ambassador to East Germany. William D. Rogers, a Wash- ington 'lawyer and former State IDepartment official, was nom- mated by Mr. Ford to be As- sistant Secretary of State foe Inter-American Affairs. Approve ? At a news briefing today, Mr. terHorst also said that President* Ford and the White House chief of staff, Gen. Alex- ander 'M. Haig Jr., had been discussing possible new assign- ? ments for General' Haig and that one was the post of com- mander in chief of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. forces. Mr. terHorst said that no de- cision had been reached and that meanwhile, General Haig would .continue to 'serve "indef- initely" as the White House chief of staff. However, he said that General Haig had indi- cated to the President that he would like to return, to the Army. Explaining the selection of Mr. Bush for the Peking post, a high White House official said: "George Bush was- a strong and viable candidate to be Ford's Vice President until the last minute. He is some- body the President holds in high regard. His appointment, therefore, is a signal to the' Chinese that the , new United States envoy is somebody who has the President's ear." Post Has Ambassador's Rank Mr. Bush served two terms as a member of the House of IRepresentatives from Texas. - His only experience in diplo- macy his been about two years he spent as United States rep-' resentative at the United No:- tions. As head of the liaison rnis-. sion in Peking, Mr. Bush will hold ambassadorial rank. His appointment to a diplomatic. post clears the way for Mr, Ford to assume effective charge: of.-- the Republican National Committee, a. White House of; ficial acknowledged today. The -official agreed that Mr:' Ford's recommendation that Mary Louise Smith be appoint' ed to succeed him indicated that the President intended to exercise practical control over the party. Mrs. Smith is a party' professional who has held nol major elective position. Although Mr. Bush foughtl against attempts by the White! House, under President Nixon,' to use the Republican party to defend Mr. Nixon against im- peachment, he was associated iwith the "imagery k; of the Watergate scandal, according to one White House official. The appointment of Kenneth, 1Rush to the Paris post also helps solve a domestic problem for President Ford. Mr. Ford had been criticized for retain- ling President Nixon's economic lacjvisers even though economic conditions have steadily worsened; Mr. Rush, who has served both Mr. NiNon and Mr. Ford as chief economic spo',iesman, wa..s alsg.,npmed recen1.1y.chair- 14) CM6,1046,0/20011d08/0 LONDON TIMES 22 August 1974 Intelligence bashing Operation Splinter Factor By Stewart Steven (Hoader, ?3.25) agent from 1949 onwards and ' did Mr Dulles's work by sys- tematically feeding Stalin's paranoia about the infiltration of western agents into eastern Europe.. There is no evidence that Swiatlo was a double agent, but even if he was he did not have the power attributed to him, and there were so many other known reasons for the show trials that there was little need for him or for Mr Dulles to add more. Such trials had been a part of the established system in the Soviet Union since well before the war and it was logical to transfer them to eastern Europe along with other- -=oectt of the system. ThP- among other things, to find scapegoats for economic failurts, to resolve rivalries within toe communist parties, 'and to it- duce- an atmosphere of terror and uncertainty. Perhaps the CIA added a little fuel to the flames by sowing addition& suspicions here and there but it seems very unlikely that its role, if any, was as crucial as, Mr Steven suggests. If one is going to rewrite. history one needs to provide a little evidence. And if one is going to indulge in the fashion- able and often justified pas- time of bashing the intelligence services one needs to show that one has higher standards. Richard Davy I am not convinced by this book, and since the author pro- vides no evidence to support his story the reviewer does not have to provide any evidence to refute it?though it does, in fact, contain some factual errors. What Mr Steven claims is that' the wave of show trials and terror which swept across eastern Europe before Stalin's death was masterminded by Mr Allan Dulles of the CIA, who hoped that it would so discredit the communist regimes that the people would rise up in revolt. As it turned out, when people did rise up somewhat later they were put down, but there is no evidence that the show trials ' had much to do with it. Many ordinary people were totally indifferent to whether one lot of communist leaders was put- ting another lot in prison. Mr. Steven, who was on the Daily Express and is now on the Daily Mail, admias that the alleged plot did not work but insists that there really was a plot. Its key figure, he says, was Jozef Swiatlo, a deputy head of department in the Polish security police, who defected to the west in 1953. Mr Steven says he was a double Wage and Piice Stability. The i'White House did not disclose 'today who would replace him in his various jobs. Mr. Rush, who held posts as Ambassador to West Germany, Deputy Secretary' of Defense and Deputy Secretary of State before moving to' the White House, was said to be delighted with his new assignment.' He will replace John N. Irwin 2d in Paris. Mr. Rush is' said to be close to the French Foreign Minister, Jean Sauvagnargues. The two men were Ambassadors in Bonn at the same time and helped negotiate the 1972 agreement with the Soviet Union regulat- ing civilian travel in and around Berlin. The appointments of Mr. Cooper and Mr. Rogers had been expected for some weeks. President . Ford also an- nounced today that he planned to retain Dean Burch and Ann Armstrong as counselors on a permanent basis. Both will serve politica! functions. Mr. Burch will maintain liaison between diA-MP7f20e412ildtroqiii340008-2 Publican party as well as with! Republicans in Congress, and: will be active in matters affect-I hg political patronage... Mr. terHorst declined to con-i firm a report that General Haigi had been selected as the cm- pander of NATO forces, saying: ithat -several possibilities were; tbeing discussed and no decision; jhad been reached. At the briefing, the press' ;secretary cautioned reporters lagainst being "kicked in" to the report tha: Gencral Haig would get the NATO post. Hel had no comment on reports that the Government of the Netherlands had objected to appointment of General Haig. The North Atlantic Treaty says nothing about obtaining the ratification of member na- tions ? for appointment of a commander o'f the treaty forces. However, the United States, which has provi,ted all the 'NATO commanders since the organization was form-id. has ,made it a custom to seek *.-r.? 'approval of the other nations. 9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001-00340008-2 ? CHRONICLE, San Francisco 19 August 1974 Royce ? Ail Foreigners .Now. Knoiv D EAD1NG BETWEEN THE _LINES of the new al. -IA- the deterioration of American-Greek relations,, strongly suggests - an active factor in the misfortune' of the Central Intelligence Agency.? ? - ? ? If it surfaces, it will-be.but another example of - ? the infernal . meddling in foreign_ affairs. of the vast. and sprawling nest Of spies oper- ating but of Washington. ? , Initial stories of the cautious 'Greek 'alienation carry no detail. It came as unpleasant surprise to -most Americans, including the large and socially valuable seg- ment of Americans of Greek stock. Though the story was.fraginen- . . ??? tary, it did contain information that anti-American . ? demonstrators in Athens carried cards derogatorY to the CIA: This Manifests an unseemly ..paradox; in which a foreign people know more about the inter-' ? 'national machinations of a vested American institu- tion, than do native Americans. * * *. IT POSES the intolerable before us, and since Pres-__. ident Ford is turning a new ,leaf in our national . existence, he could do worse than address himself- to -. the CIA tangle. And is it a tangle! The Agency is a spinoff of a spy outfit seated in Switzerland during the Hitler. war. With Hitler gone, the core of the outfit Was moved to Washington. SRO GTO sas-TT 19711. Open Secrets Under the patronage of Senators Edward Brooke of 'Massachu- setts and Philip Hart of Michigan. the Center for National Security Studies will sponsor a conference on "The Central Intelligence Aeency and Covert Actions" September 12 and 13 on Capitol Hill. Robert Borosage, a young lawyer in the Nader mold, is head of the Center and the moving force behind the conference. Borosage has no first-hand experience in intelligence, which nmdiiv hm ?,.F, Critic wants th onf erPnee,tn "start a public debate," and he hopes the panels will produce thoughtful and animated discussion. The possibility that such discussion will lead to a not-very-secret secret service seems to bother him not at all. "The cost of enforcing the rules is so great domestically for the benefit of those in bureaucratic power," Borosage says, "that it is better to go with the limited classification of secrets." This is a rather simplistic solution to the whole problem of security classification in government?in a very real sense it advocates solving the problem by denying that a problem exists. In Borcisaat's view the remaining secret information?say one percent of what is now classified?would be protected by a "code of honor" among those in the intelligence establishme.nt. Such a cee.le worked to the satisfaction of the, intelligence bureaucracy as long as only the "old boys" of the old boy network were doing the 1.,,riting?Al1en Dulles in The Cult of Intelligence and Miles Copeland in The Game of Nations. The code broke down with the recent publication of The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence by Victor Marchetti and John Marks. Not surprisingly. Marchetti and Marks, outcasts of the. regular intelligence estahlishment, will be the stars of the September conference. Marchetti especially has been criticized for using his In this lush bureaucratic jungle, it grew as troll- ical plants grow, ravenous and insatiable, resisting all restraint. It became a self-governing ernpire, spawning new agents like the oak-moth pest. As its work is basically secret, it drew an impenetrable co.:: coon about itself, defying Congress (while seducing it) and the executive, and as its action is overseas; ? the courts. Beside it, the 'BI is a benign and honest policing body. 'CE THE 1.950s, repeated Presidents. haVeJ bucked it, to be stricken with inertia bY its dacity, power and propaganda wiles. ? It is voted princely annual sums: They are used for bribery, for inventing systems for corrupting and suborning. factions and anti-factions and govern- ments in troubled little lands. It has ac-cumulated ships, weapons, radio- net and guerrifiag used to kill innocents in Indochina, Latin America, Africa and all Asia. --- Collectively its judgments are often execrable and its bungling notorious. A saore pf it conspira-- cies have exploded, these but a fraction of its myriad schemes and entrapments. CIA has swayed, distorted and frequently nulli- lied American foreign policy, presumed to reside irr the President, his advisers arid congressional com- mittees as checks on the President. .It has often: ? usurped the duties of our ambdors. ? On the efficiency scale its work; the perilous nuisance scale its record is enormous. In our modern world of communications and technology, -let us grant we need some priident espio- nage. We don't need thousands of gumshoes runnirigi- in packs about the globe, playing their nefariOns-1 tricks while we, the people, and our elected *re-' sentatives don't have the slightest idea What the hell is going on. Could be the Greek thing will expose the CIA. If not, we must waituritil these provocateurs land ? and land us some real song. ? - August 19,1974 ?. privileged position as a CIA agent to expose many of the agency's cherished secrets. Others, notably the Arreeriean Civil Liberties Union, have praised as an heroic gesture his breach of the CIA secrecy agreement all employes must take. Marchetti and Marks will lead the panel discussion on "The Scope and Structure of the Intelligence -Community." Other panelists include Thomas Ross on "The CL-Vs Covert Operation in the United States"; Richard Falk on "Covert Ope.ra:ions and the hunt tiationai Law"; and Borosage himself on "Covert Opera- tions and the Constitution." Traditional irr.elliee.nce heavies such as Ray S. Cline,, former CIA and State Department. intelligence specialist, will add leaven to the conference's loaf. Borosage seems to agree with the ne.i.v school of intelligence theory?namely, that it's impossible for an intelligence organi- zation to do much cood. "Foreign espionage doesn't work against the to Communist countries," he says, what we are talking about is putting people on the Agency's payroll (in miner foreign countries) to influence events, not to collect intelligence." This effort by the CIA to push people around, the new cri-lics feel, causes crises in foreign affairs. The conference's attempt to open 1:7:t intelligence cloiet should draw critics of the system like bees to honey. In the wake. of Watergate and the neo-isolationism that spreads eith inelation, the old, system is more vulnerable than ever. -National security" is now an inoperative defense. So if you drop by Borosage's confer- ence, feel free to join in the discussion. And above all, don't keep any secrets. ---R03ERT I. NIYE?i (Editor's note: The we:ter is a fer.,..:r employee of t::e Central Intelligence Agency.) 10 Approved-For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA7RDP77-00432R000100340008-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2 NEW YORK TIMES 4 September 1974 Smile. The Prophets of Gloom and Doom Are Not All Right By Colin Greer Many formerly optimistic social ob- servers have come increasingly to be- lieve in the negative characteristics of. being human. . More and more, the belief that the American Dream of equality would be fulfilled?if we could use the power of the state to guarantee that dream? has given way to the conviction that people must voluntarily (Robert Heil- broner) accept or be coerced (B. F. Skinner) into new controls. State pow- ers are seen as undemocratic but necessary for order and security. The belief that there has been enough economic growth to fairly distribute material things among people recedes. as popular and scholarly observers tell us that such growth possibilities are severely limited. Indeed, we are told, planetary sur- Nivel' is precarious because we have been greedy and irresponsible. The solution, in this view, is to give up our democratic aspirations rather than to redistribute existing benefits. Those without will probably have to con- tinue to do without while the more fortunate protect their own interests. There are, of course, immense mate- rial problems ahead of us, but supply and profit are so thoroughly manipu- lated for vested interests that the pri. mary problem of more egalitarian, more gentle treatment of ourselves and our planet is barely apprqachable be- fore the issues of privilege and ex- ploitation are subjected to remedial social action. How can we really know about the root scarcity with which we might be confronted until we can look at a social world in which we make better use of what is available?' To be sure, this probably means Government controls and some level of imposition on individual taste and appetite. That's nol the problem. Mak- sing it so is to miss the real point? namely, the explicitly undemocratic nature of what we are being -told is necessary. The liberal creed' has run out of steam. Liberals made a journey a few years ago and found that the direc- tions they followed did not take them to the places .they said they were go- ing. Perhaps, many have come to be- lieve, those places never existed. It is time to stop judging ourselves by un- fulfilled American Dream promises. Unfortunately success flourished less extensively than had been presumed: Not only black people were poor, not only hippies and Weathermen, were feeling out of joint in' America. We were in danger of bankrupting what success there was through ecological, and nuclear shortsightedness,jand the population explosion. So, in a few, years, we graduated from renewed talk of group-based genetic inferiority. tea more generalized belief in species. rooted inadequacies. It is in this perspective that Mr. Heilbroner's book, "An Inquiry into the Human Prospect," and the plaudits it has received are important as re- minders of a growing pessimism. This pessimism is characterized by' the alleged rediscovery of the neces- sity for sin to govern human life (Karl Menninger), the dominance of heredity in intelligence (Richard Herrnstein), the overdue need to put a leash on human aggression (Erich Fromm), the imminent danger of the technological future (Alvin Toffler), and the recog- nition of predominating "animal" prop- erties in us (Robert Ardrey, Desmond Morris). ? .Mr. Heilbroner, a contributor to the nineteen-sixties faith in the progres- sive power of social analysis and social ? action, now writes of a pessimism of millenial proportions. Confronted by ominous forecasts of material short- ages, the darker.side of human nature is emphasized with an atavistic, al- most religious, awe of demons in us. We continue to live in a culture. based on material scarcity. We suffer not only from scarcity of oil or food but also from the competitive distribu- tion of both goods and social rela- tions. Social equilibrium in such a culture is maintained by a promise of either future plenty or the justifica- tion of limitations expressed through religious, industrial and technological myths. We are being pushed in the latter direction. - I have yet to see, any pessimists ,call for heavy taxation of the rich; rather the message I hear is for the -aspiring to aspire less and for those who have little to settle for that. Only when privilege is secure can other conditions be ameliorated. The current state of our socio-economic system, therefore, seems to require an empha- sis on conservation rather progres- sivism. Throughout our progress from reli- -gious to technological myths, the day- to-day activity of the :tate has in- creasingly deepened its I. s:eence and effect on our lives. Sixties' 1. just as much as seventies' pess.,.. turned on the possibilities of that fluence. The pervasive role of the state in -everyday social as well as political life is a fait accompli: The involve- ment of the state in every sector of American life is ..nprecedented. The significant contemporary questions about the?state are those hawing to do with the style, quality and content 'of its- interaction with persons, not whether we are to rely on it heavily. Economic shifts require value shifts, too. And so we are being educated into a new distrust of ourselves, a new lack of self-respect, a newly regimented grammar of 'aspiration. A climate is being created which will permit use of the state's increased power as an agent on behalf of the very exploita- tion many trusted it grew powerful to oppose. This is the real issue before us right now, Colin Greer .teaches sorra/ history at the School of Contemporary Studies, Brooklyn College, and is executive edi? tor of Social Policy magazine. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA1-DP77-00432R000100340008-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2 'THE ICIEW YoRk TIllaS,'TUESDAX-AUGUST:14-1974-1:? ? Black Envoys Seek More Non-African Posts By THOMAS A. JOHNSON Special to The New York Times LAGOS, Nigeria?There is a growing fear among black Americans in United States Government service abroad that the concentration of their sen- ior members in African assign- ments could lessen their effec- tiveness in Africa and around the world. "There is this dilemma," salt a black American in west Af- rica, "that while we are anx- ious tO serve in Africa, the proof of our success in this field will be our postings?in addition to Africa?to France, Peru, Norway and China." Five black Foreign Service career officers are ambassa- dors and all have been assigned by the State Department to Africa. They are John E. Rein- hardt, Ambassador to Nigeria; Terence A. Todman, to Guinea; Rudolph Aggrey, to Senegal and Gambia; W. Beverly Carter Jr., to Tanzania, and David B. Bolen, to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. African assignments have also been given to all seven blacks who head operations of the Agency for International Development abroad. Seven Of the 10 blacks who head United States Information Service of- fices abroad are assigned to Africa. Twenty-two black Ameri- cans have served as Ambassa- dors since President Truman named Edward R. Dudley of New York as Ambassador to Liberia in 1949, and 17 of these have been assigned to black nations. The five others are Clifford R. Wharton, who served in Norway from 1961 to 1964; Carl T. Rowan, Fin- land, 1963-64; Patricia R. Har- ris, Luxembourg, 1965-67; Hugh Smythe, Syria, 1965-67, and Malta, 1967-69, and Je- rome H. Holland, Sweden, 1970-72. c Comparison to Industry Blacks in Government serv- ice abroad have been reluc- tant to discuss publicly their fears of what they see as a trend. But in Washington, senior black officials from the State Department, the development agency and the information agency, organized loosely as the "Thursday luncheon group," met earlier this year with Secretary of State Kis- singer to voice their concerns. Sources within the group say they hope to meet with Mr. Kissinger again soon. One black Arrierican diplo- matic sources in west Africa said recently: "In a real sense the blacks in foreign service are beginning to face the same problem as blacks in American industry who are executives in charge of urban or minority affairs, and special markets. Both are restricted to low-pri- ority areas where their black skins are supposed to count." Asked if a black skin really gave a diplomat an advantage in Africa, black Americans in foreign service generally reply with a limited "yes." They say it helps to estab- lish a rapport and to build closer and faster relationships with Africans than can many? although not necessarily all? of their white counterparts. But; according to Mr. Todman, the Ambassador to Guinea, blacks in the Foreign Service find, at the same time, that when it comes to the basics of international negotiations, "Af- ricans deal with you strictly as an American." Mr. Reinhardt, the Ambas- sador to Nigeria,- said, "Initial meetings, introductions and in- vitations to African social affairs aside, one does _business in any field in Africa on the basis of one's competence." "We should not expect that Africans, any more than other peoples, will make decisions on grounds other than merit and their own national interests," Mr. Reinhardt Said. ? What do black Africans think of black American diplomats? Some say, as one African diplo- mat did, that it is easier to "deal with a person who wants to be in Africa?who looks like us and feels a kinship." Anoth- er questioned how "a second- class citizen can really repre- sent that racist land." What seemed a majority view, expressed by a senior Ni- gerian diplomat, was that "the only question to consider is does the diplomat come with real power, does he really speak for his Government, can he make a decision?". The United States Embassy here in Lagos, the largest in Africa, has been headed. since November, 1971, by Mr. Rein- hardt, a former information of- ficial in Washington, Iran, Japan and the Philippines. The Ambassador to Guinea, Mr. Todman, was assigned to Conakry two years ago afte: assignment as the Ambassador to Chad and earlier tours in the Middle East and at the United Nations. Mr. Aggrey, appointed edrlier this year as the Ambassador to Senegal, is a former infor- mation officer in Africa and a former State Department Afri- can expert. Served in Africa Before Mr. Carter was named Ambassador to the east African nation of Tanzania, he too served in Africa for the infor- mation agency. The newest of the black Am- bassadors in Africa is Mr. Bolen, who was named earlier this year to the southern African countries of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. He .was a for- mer economics counselor at the American Embassy in Yugo- slavia. The five black Ambassadors in Africa serve in about 3 per cent of the 143 head of mission posts maintained by the United States. In all, the 340 black employes of the State Depart- ment come to about 4 per cent of that agency's total. Higher percentages of black employes have been registered by the aid and information agencies, reflecting primarily the recruitment of nonprofes- I. 12 Isional personnel from the heav- ily black Washington area. , Blacks Make tip about 17 per cent of the employes of the aid agency. It has black Americans heading seven major aid pro- grams in the African nations of Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Sene- gal, Tanzania, Tunisia and Zaire. The information agency has seven black public affairs offi- cers heading information serv- ice offices in the African na- tions of Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, Liberia, Somalia, Togo and Tunisia. Three other black Americans head information service of- fices in Bolivia, Laos and Syria. The agency has 96 public af- fairs officers at the supervisory level worldwide. Fifteen per cent of its 4,300 employes are black. List of the 22 . The 22 black Americans who have served as Ambassadors are: Edward R. Dudley, Liberia, 1949- 53; Jessie D. Locker, Liberia, 1953- 55; Richard Lee Jones, Liberia, 1955-59; John H. Morrow, Guinea, 1959-61; Clifford R. Wharton, Norway, 1961-64; Mercer Cook, Niger, 1961-64, Senegal, 1964-66, and Gambia, 1965-66. Carl T. Rowan, Finland, 1963- 64; Clinton E. Knox, Dahomey, 1,964-69, and Haiti, 1969-73; Pa- tricia R. Harris, -Luxembourg, .1965-67; Hugh- Smythe, Syria, 1965-67, and Malta, 1967-69; Franklyn H. Williams,. Ghana, 1965-68; Elliott P. *Skinner, Upper Volta, 1966-69; Samuel C. Adams, Niger, 1968-69. Terence A. Todman, Chad, 1969, and Guinea, 1972 to present; Samuel C. Westerfield, Liberia, 1969-72; Jerome H. Holland, Sweden, 1970-72; Clarence C. Ferguson, Uganda, 1970-72; Charles J. Nelson, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, .1971-74: John E. Rein- hardt, Nigeria, 1971 to present; W. Beverly Carter Jr., Tanzania, 1972 to present; Rudolph Aggrey, Sene- gal and Gambia, 1974 to present, and David B. Bolen, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, 1974 to iHesent. -;.--APPid-Ve4rOr ReleaSe 2001108/08 C1A4RDP77-00432R0001-0034Q008-2 _ . Approved For Release /001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2 NEW YORK TIMES 25 August 19711 Pentagon Kept Tight Rein In Last Days of Nixon Rule ? By BERNARD GWERTZMAN Special to The New Vol* Time. WASHINGTON, Aug. 24?De- fense Secretary James R. Schles- inger and the Joint Chiefs of Staff kept unusually, close con- trol over lines of command in the last days of the Nixon Ad- ministration to insure that no unauthorized orders were given to military units by the White House. A senior Pentagon official said ?today that the decision to moni- 1tor closely all orders from any Isource was taken by Mr. Schles- inger, in consultation with Gen. George S. Brown, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to pre- vent any of a series of hypo- thetical situations from devel- oping. Two Areas Cited - The official said that Mr. Schlesigner began to worry about the situation when in late July and early August he felt that the impeachment or resig- nation of Mr. Nixon was in- evitable. There were two major areas of concern on Mr. Schlesinger's mind, the official said. The first was that in some "improbable" situation, Mr. Nixon or one of his aides might get in touch with some military units directly without going through the usual Pentagon chain of command and order that some action be taken to block the "constitutional pro- cess." The second was hat a genuine national emergency might de- velop in which American mili- tary units might have to be placed on alert or go into ac- tion, and Mr. Schlesinger and General Brown wanted to in- sure that they would be .able publicly to justify the actions. No Event Apparent The Pentagon official stressed today that the concern of Mr. Schlesinger was hypothetical and did not evolve from any event. At no time, the official said, was there any sign that the White House or any mili- tary commander was contem- plating any action outside the chains of command. Mr. Schlesinger reportedly became concerned that if there was an impeachment debate and then a Senate trial, which seemed likely after the House Judiciary Committee voted ar- ticles of impeachment, the country could "have difficult times." There was concern not only that somebody at the White House might order some unit to act against Congress, but also that some official might seek to have some unit oust the Washington %glows Wednesday, August 23, 1974 ? Nb (I) OST- URGLA _ President. Moreover, Mr. Schlesinger, in his conversations with Secre- tary of State Kissinger, was also concerned about .a national crisis arising while the Presi- dent's future hung in the balance, the Pentagon official said. Both Mr. Schlesinger and Mr. Kissinger remembered the general skepticism when Ameri- can forces were placed on a heightened alert last October when it seemed as if the Soviet Union was contemplating send- ing forces into the Middle East. Allegation Denied The alert, on Oct. 24-25, came only a few days after the so-called "Saturday night mas- sacre" when Mr. Nixon dis- missed the Watergate special prosecutor, Archibald Cox, pre- Attorney General Elliot L. Richardson and the ouster of his deputy, William D. Ruckel- haus. -When Mr. Kissinger had a news conference on Oct. 25, he was asked repeatedly if the alert was linked to some desire to. distract public attAntiort from the domestic crisis. He denied such an allegation, stressing then and later 'that the alert was legitimate. But the 'Pentagon official ? said that the public skepticism shown during the alert wor- ried Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Schlesinger, and that they were determined to insure that if a crisis developed, they would be in a position to justi- fy any military moves. Mr. Schlesinger decided that he would not leave Washington during the White House crisis so he would be at the center of the Pentagon command. Under the National Security Act, the President is Command- er in Chief, as specified by the Constitution, and his commands, flow downward from the- De- fense Secretary to the Joint' Chiefs of Staff and to the mili- tary ,units. 'Mr. Schlesinger, on the rec- ord, limited , his comments to the following: "In keeping with my statu- tory responsibilities, I did as- sure myself that there . would be no question about the-proper constitutional and legislated chain of command, and there' never was any question." The Pentagon official who disclosed Mr. Schlesinger's con- cern denied some published re- ports that Mr. Schlesinger had been particularly concerned about the loyalty of Air Force officers. He said that there had been no sign of an prob- lems with any branch or group of officers. ' . . . Yr PERIOD Ta James W. McCord Jr., one of the men convicted in the Watergate break-in and bugging case, has subpoe- naed all presidential tapes during the period of the original Watergate trial for use in his civil lawsuit. The subpoena, filed at U.S. District Court yester- day, calls on White House Counsel Philip W. Buchen to deliver all tapes between Jan. 1 and Jan. 31, 1973. The trial itself began that Jan. 8, and ended Jan. 30 with the conviction of McCord, a former employe of the Committee for the 0 Er S oeae -?Awn Si Re-election of the Presi- dent, and G. Gordon Liddy, a former White House aide. Five other men charged with McCord and Liddy pleaded guilty during the trial. This is the second subpoe- na directed to Buchen in the last week calling for the tapes of former President Richard M. Nixon. The first was filed by R. Spencer Oliver, former executive director of the Association of State Democratic Chair- men, who also has a Watergate-related suit pending. A White House spokes- man has said that the Jus- tice Department has been asked to issue a legal opin- ion on the ownership of the tapes and documents left be- hind by Nixon, and on Bu- chen's responsibility to comply. with such subpoe- nas. The bulk of the Watergate civil suits was settled on Aug. 9. However, McCord and Oliver, who are asking damages from Nixon's 1972 campaign committees and various individuals involv- ed in the Watergate affair, refused to take part in the Approved For Release 20 (08/010.M.R15tif tqdtalityl000 100340008-2 ???????????.???????????= Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2 BALTIMORE SUN 26 August 1974 Blemishes among the Spectaculars The Minuses of Nixon's Foreign Policy Washington. . Richard Nixon's die-hard sup- porters and some of his severest critics claim that he left an admirable record in foreign poi- ' icy in spite of his impeachable crimes and abuse of the presi- dency. Even in -the final hours, before ' abdicating to avoid -ouster from his high office, Richard Nixon brushed aside the Watergate scandals that had done him in and sang the praises of his for- eign policy accomplishments. He even invoked, for the last time as President, those well-worn cliches?"a generation of peace" and "a structure of peace." It. ? was done in such a way, as to suggest that these should corn- . Pensate for the disgraceful scan- dals over which he had presided. But does the record support - the view that the Nixon foreign policy was extraordinary? Does the legacy in foreign affairs that he left for Gerald Ford warrant such acclaim? There have, indeed, been ac- complishments. And given the public relations operations at the White House during Nixon's in- cumbency they were about the - only things the public was told about. But there were also some great failures both of commission and omission. And both Nixon . and his only foreign policy advi- sor, Henry Kissinger, seldom if ever mentioned them. When .forced to do so, as in the current Greece-Turkey-Cyprus disaster, lame alibis or attempts to blame others were put forth. ? ? ? In addition to failures that find American relations with old al- lies at an all timelow, the Nixon accomplishments themselves are not without blemishes. For exam- ple, one of Nixon's last foreign. spectaculars?a second summit meeting in Moscow early this ? .summer?was a failure. It dis- closed that even in the area where Nixon claimed highest marks for himself, detente with the Soviet Union is at best fra- gile, uncertain and viewed by many Americans with skepti- cism. Nixon's crude and unwise attempt while in Moscow to jus- tify detente on a special "per- sonal relationship" with Leonid Brezhnev, fortunately for those who want real detente, was re- jected by the Soviet leader. The opening to China, which By R. H. SHACKFORD Nixon exploited with a sensa- tional televised trip to Peking in 1972, muddles along. Reversal of American policy toward China was an accomplishment worthy of praise and long overdue. Yet the 'manner in which it came about is not necessarily the way Nixon describes it?his idea and initiative. There is some evi- dence that the initiative came from Peking, because of China's quarrel with Russia, and that Nixon wisely took advantage-of it. - Maybe the Nixon "accomplish- ment" about which one hears the most is Vietnam. It is indisputa- ble that all American fighting men were extricated from Viet- nam during his presidency, even though the war . and its cruel casualties went on for more than four years of the Nixon Adminis- . tration. But contrary to claims, Nixon did not bring peace to that s tortured part of the world. He used the "peace is at hand" claim on the eve of his landslide election in 1972, but there is no peace in Vietnam or Cambodia. The war goes on. Although American GI's are not fighting; the war is carried on with Amer- ican money and American mili- tary equipment and American advice. it remains an American war, albeit by proxy. The verdict on the Middle East is still unknown. The Cyprus cri- sis is separate from the Arab-Is- raeli problem. But both affect . the stability of the Middle East. Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy be- tween Arab countries and Israel early this year brought about a separation of forces. All sides were ready, for a military cooling off period. Whether they are ready to make the concessions necessary for a permanent peace ?on isSues like the future of the Palestinians on which the U.S. equivocates?remains to be seen. 0 0 0 But it is not just in these major areas where the claim of a successful Nixon foreign policy is subject to challenge. It is in all the rest of the world, espe- cially among America's old al- lies, where his policies and atti- tudes have rendered dubious if not negative results. The last three White House tapes, which were made public on the eve of Nixon's departure in disgrace, revealed some shocking Nixon views on funda- mental world problems. They contradicted the myth, perpe- 14 trated for so long, that he was a man too busy with great world problems to be involved in Wa- tergate. In the midst of a discus- sion on Wa4.:Jrgate, however, Nix- on's attention was called in June, 1972, to serious international monetary developments, especial- ly with respect to the British pound and the Italipn lira. On the new "floating rate" for the British pound which affected the value of the American dollar, . Nixon said:. "I don't care about ? it. Nothing we can do about it." And when told about grave worries with respect to specula- tion in the Italian lira, Nixon's - shocking reply was: "I don't give a (expletive deleted) about , the lira." Once one moves away from Nixon "spectaculars" in foreign policy?detente- with Russia, - opening to China, extrication of American troops (but no peace) in Vietnam?the list of foreign policy matters which were bun- gled or ignored by Nixon is . lengthy. Here are a few Issues on which any objective observer must give ,. Nixon low marks: ? Western Europe and NATO. A year ago last June, Kissinger - proclaimed that Nixon was mak-, ing 1974 "the year of Europe." A new Atlantic Charter was to be devised, as though another piece? of paper setting forth general , principles would Solve complex problems. Unwisely, our Euro- pean allies had not been con- ? sulted and the ill-conceived idea ?fizzled. 0. Japan. The "shocks" admin- istered to this major Asian ally ? are still felt. They included no advance warning about a new U.S. policy toward Peking and no warning on monetary and tariff changes that severely disrupted Japan's economy which was de- pendent upon trade with the U.S. ? Bangladesh. Nixon's now fa- mous "tilt" toward Pakistan and against India in that tragic epi- sode, while piously and falsely , proclaiming neutrality, was a disgrace to American foreign pol- icy. ? Middle East. Until forced to do so when it exploded last Octo- ber. Nixon ignored the Arab-Is- raeli problem. Only when the Arabs used their oil as a weapon that affected the U.S. directly, did Nixon focus upon the area ?and then with total concentra- . 41-;rOV?e-d-F?o-r?Rele-as?e-2001/08/08 :'CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008z2 ? ? tion to the' detriment of other problems, such as Cyprus, which was right on the Arab-Israeli doorstep: Dictatorships. Unquestioning support of harsh and suppressive military dictatorships such as in Greece and South Korea has led to diplomatic disasters in the Greek area (With that part of NATO now in shambles) and portend potential ones in Korea where Stability is so dependent. ? upon a reasonable working rela- tionship between Japan and -Korea and respect and trust in both countries for the United States. * Nuclear weapons. Despite the tiny but hopeful start with the first SALT agreement with Russia -to limit nuclear weapons, the Nixon administration never succeeded in reaching a consen- sus on the issue in its own country. President Ford inherits from Nixon a ieriout and funda- mental dispute on nuclear policY between Kissinger and Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger which should have been resolved, but wasn't, before Nixon went to Moscow in June. ? International monetary af- fairs. For several' years the daily financial pages of newspapers tell of the failures in this field, as in the correlative field of run-away domeStic inflation. When the old monetary system broke down, Nixon allowed nis former Treasury Secretary, John Connally, now indicted on charges of accepting a bribe, to try to bully our European part- ners into a solution. When an interim agreement was reached,. Nixon, with typical over-state- ment, proclaimed it the greatest agreement in the history of man- kind. But just as there is no peace in Vietnam in spite of the , "peace is at hand" statement, there is no monetary stability in THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 2, 1974 . the world. The list could go on and on?. refusal to normalize relations, with Cuba, the tragedy of war brought by Nixon to Cambodia,. ? failure to tackle world food,' energy and resources problems on a global scale, such follies as . the sale of most of our surplus grain to Russia at bargain prices and with American taxpayers' subsidies on the eve of zooming' prices and world shortages. ? President Ford has proclaimed a new' era of openness and can, dor in all fields, including foreign affairs. It remains to be seen whether a man like Kissinger, whose one-man road show and. secret methods of operating fit-. ted Nixon's own proclivities so well, can perform for a man like, Gerald Ford, who, thus far, has displayed a forthrightness so in contrast to the duplicity as- sociated with his* predecessor,' Richard Nixon. Mr. Shackford is a veteran Washington newspaperman. Ford's Foreign Problems and Prospects: The View From' Major- World Capitals In an address to a joint ses- sion of Congress the week be- fore last, President Ford said that he intended to continue the foreign policies of President Nixon. In the accompanying dispatches, correspondents of The New York Times report on how capitals around the world currently view their chief prob- lems in relations with the United States. A dispatch from Washington gives the view of the* problems from there. . . ? The Soviet Union Special to The New York Times MOSCOW?Despite a residue of goodwill left from President Nixon's three summit meetings, the Kremlin leaders will be pressing. President Ford on at least two issues that remain major stumbling blocks to bet- ter Soviet-American relations. The more conspic_uous is trade, which in Soviet eyes has been stifled by the- unwilling- ness of Congress to grant most- favored-nation status and in- vestment credits. If the Soviet Union views tariff -policy as a matter of prestige, given the relatively low volume of exports to the United States, the matter of 'low-interest credits is of prac- tical concern, for only with such credits, the Russians con- tend, can they afford more ,American technology. Consequently, Moscow is counting on Mr. Ford to help break the deadlock posed by Soviet restrictions on emigra- tion, particularly by Jews, and deliver on the trade promises Mr. Nixon made to the Soviet leader, Leonid I. Brezhnev. No Real Progress A still thornier prApprcive limitation of strategic nuclear weapons, on which nn real progress was made in talks this summer. As some,Western diplomats'viewed it, the Krem- lin, nervous about Mr. Nixon's vulnerability on Watergate, was unwilling to offer concessions' that could be dissipated if he were swept out of office. Although President Ford is dealing from a position of greater strength, a problem as complex as the limitation of offensive arms will continue to resist simple solutions. Negoti- ations at the recent meeting re- portedly reached a deadlock over the number of missiles that the Soviet Union would be allowed to equip with multiple warheads. Moscow has also resisted American ptoposals that both sides - phase out their land- based missiles, in which the Russians have numerical su- periority. Instead, it has sought parity in multiple warheads while demanding that Washing- ton halt its deployment of the Trident submarine-based mis- sile and the B-1 strategic bomber. ? Western Europe spedLI to The New York Times PARIS?The major Western European concerns about the United States involve econom- ics and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The NATO issue stems from the Cyprus crisis and specula- tion that Greece may ask the Sixth Fleet to withdraw from port facilities. This particularly' upsets Italy, where there is a strong current of opinion, mostly but not only on the left, against granting additional daVfoll?gd&t4.1561768/,b15 The argument is that more bases would increase American "colonialism" and the tempta- tion to interfere in Italian pol- itics to prevent the Commu- nists from being admitted to the Government. Other countries are also wor- ried about NATO. France, which, like Greece, has with- drawn her military forces from the alliance, is planning to bol- ster over-all Western defenses in the Eastern Mediterranean outside it. ? The economic issue is per- haps more keenly felt by gov- ernments at this point than by the general public. There is criticism that the United States fed worldwide inflation by al- lowing a huge trade deficit to build the colossal Eurodollar supply, now estimated at $200- billion. And there are fears that if the United States tries to fight inflation too vigorously, it will set off a general reces- sion by constricting world trade. Bonn in particular has been critical of on-again, off-; again policies and is watching warily to see how President Ford will handle the problems. There is also concern about American talk of restricting agricultural exports since this would drive prices up, hurt European cattle raisers who rely on American feed grains and contribute to inflationary pressures. It is ironic that after 15 years in which the major United States-Common Market dispute was American insist- ence that Europe accept more agricultural exports, the issue now is fear of inadequate American exports. Eastern Europe cligaglahyggn long drama of Watergate the governments of Eastern Europe were especially concerned with the fate of PreSident. Nixon's trade bill, which has been held up in Congress. All would like to expand trade, but even more important, they seek access to financing through international agencies and banks available only to: those given .most-favored-rose tion status. All of Eastern Europe pre- sumably welcomes d?nte, and there has been apprehension in some ,quarters that President Ford will not ? regard the issue as being as important as his predecessor_ did. All the countries of Eastern Europe have specific and some- times highly emotional quarrels; with the United States. An example is Hungary, which has. been demanding the return of the golden crown of St. Stephen, founder of the Hun-1 garian state during the Middle Ages. The crown, which came into American hands at the end of World War II, is still with- held on the ground that Hun- gary has shown little interest in being more friendly. ? Greece Special to The New York Times ATHENS ? Greek-American relations are dominated by the Cyprus issue and its widening ramifications. Athens is living with the hu- miliating fact that it could not stop the Turkish invasion, and the Greeks are attributing most of the blame to Washington. Greece is used to blaming others for her troubles, and the more conspiratorial theories are 00444#1rstantiated. But re feel they are Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2 performing a Service by ahsorb- ing criticism that otherwise might endanger the frail new civilian government of Premier 'Constantine Caramanlis. Athens wants Washington to 'exert more pressure on Ankara sto make significant concessions on Cyprus. Many of Greece's recent diplomatic moves?with- drawal of troops from NATO, ;acceptance of a Soviet proposal for a conference on Cyprus? !were aimed mainly at the United States. A related 'issue, is the pres- ence of important American military installations here. Greek officials keep threaten- ing to close them?another move designed to make the United States use its influence with Turkey. President Nixon was long identified with support off the now-defunct military junta; President Ford has the distinct advantage of starting fresh with the new Government. But in Greek eyes America is main- ly embodied by Secretary of State Kissinger, and he has become the archvillain of the piece because of Cyprus policy. .Turkey speem to The New York Times ANKARA, Turkey?The Turks feel that they are off to a good start with the? Ford Adminis- ation on the Cyprus issue, but United States objections to the resumption of opium-poppy cultivation are a threat to good relations. Premier Bulent Ecevit says Turkey may be a more diffi- cult ally in the future as she asserts a more independent position on controversial is- sues. He also says there will the frankness on Turkey's side, ;with all the cards on the table. In the case of Cyprus and the larger issue of Turkish-, Greek relations in the Aegean Sea, the feeling here is that the United States has reacted in a constructive way and shown appreciation for Tur- key's point of view. In return, the Turks say they have kept fully win mind ? the ntereSts in NATO defense in the East- ern Mediterranean and the preservation of detente with, the Soviet Union. The Middle East Special to The New York Times CAIRO?The United States, .under President Ford as underi his predecessor, holds the key! to Middle Eastern peace. Arab. leaders are in agreement on: Ithis point, but they differ On!, :how the Ford Administration!, ,intends to use the key. President Anwar el-Sadat of; Egypt, in 'a series of speeches! reported by the press, has! strongly reaffirmed his belief,' that the October war imposedl a basic policy change on the: United States, Instead of con- fining itself to unconditional support for Israel, he holds, it is now genuinely working for a permanent settlement ac- ceptable to the Arabs. He has added in his statements that such a , settlement would have to include the return of all ter-g ritories occupied by Israel in I 1967. Mr. Sadat has also been Istressing the sorry state of the .economy and Egypt's depend. ?ence on American, Western Eu- ropean and Arab investment. At the other end of the scale are the Palestinian lead- ers, including Yasir Arafat, who have been accusing Sec- retary of State Kissinger of duplicity. As they see it, the United States is not interested in real peace?which, in their eyes, includes a Palestinian state ?but siniply wants to sepa- rate the Arab and Israeli ar- mies and prevent a new war, prolonging the ?status quo and permitting Israel to keep most of the territories won in 1967, India Special to The New York Times NEW DELHI?India, once the largest recipient of American aid, is struggling to revive good relations with the United States after two years of bitterness and anger. From India's point of view the crux is American policy to- ward Pakistan. As long as the United States maintains its arms embargo against Pakis- tan, Indians say, relations will improve. They soured during the 1971 Bangladesh war, when the United States sided with Pakistan's unsuccessful effort to crush the autonomy move- ment in East Pakistan,. now Bangladesh. India's interest in spurring better relations is based on two interlocking factors. the realization among officials that India, in economic disarray, needs American as- sistance. Discussions have taken place for a joint commission to strengthen economic, cultural and scientific ties. A second factor is the con- cern here that India has become too dependent upon the Soviet Union and wants some balance in the form of closer relations with the United States. Indian officials say that the past pat- tern of a donor-recipient rela- tionship is being replaced by a more mature link involving trade and commercial ex- changes. South Vietnam spedal to The New York Tproes SAIGON, South Vietnam? After a decade of utter de- pendence on American aid, the Government has refined the skill of Washington-watching into such an art that officials are somewhat jaded by the shifts in the Administration. As a result officials note with confidence President Ford's rec- ord as a conservative and a hawk, and some even go so far as to suggest that he will be more beneficial to South Viet- nam than was President Nixon because his relations with Con- gress are more amicable. Congress has become the real source of worry for the Saigon Government these days, mainly due to sharp cuts in military aid voted in recent weeks. The Nixon Administration had asked for $1.45-billion for this fiscal year; both houses voted $700- million. Cambodia Special to The New York Times ' PHNOM PENH, Cambodia ? The Government has always been worried that some day Washington might sharply re- duce or withdraw its support?. which would almost certainly mean victory for' the Commu- nist-led insurgents. This con- cern has been heightened with :the advent of a President un- known to the leaders, who are seeking assurances that he will be as. stanch in his backing as ?was his predecessor. In the course of the four-. !and-a-half-year war the Go,,- ernment of President Lon Nol has become more and more iso- lated, its supporters dwindling, its United Nations seat threat- ened by the claim of the exiled leader Prince Norodom Siha- nouk. ' ? Should Phnom Penh lose its seat when the General Assem- bly convenes next month,' the process of demoralization and isolation would be intensified. _The army could go on fighting only if American aid was close to its present level, which is more than $600-million a year. Military aid represents nearly $400-million of this,: four-fifths of which goes not; for stockpiling or for newl heavy weapons but merely: for the daily expenditure of am-.. munition. Japan and Korea Special to The New York Timea. TOKYO ? In Japan the im- mediate concern about the Ford Administration is that no one Ford, Administration knows much about thei ?new President. Equally impor- tant from the point of view oft senior Japanese officials, Presi- dent Ford doesn't know much 1 about Japan. This lack of a personal and political connection with Mr. Ford takes on special impor- tance here since personal re- lationships, even among na- tional leaders, is vital in the Japanese scheme of things. Thus, Premier Kakuei Tana- ka indicated, immediately aft- er the new President took of- ifce, that he wanted to go te ,Washington to meet Mr. Ford. The meeting is now scheduled Ifor Sept. 21, while Mr. Tanaka is in the Western Hemisphere Ion a trip to Mexico, Brazil and Canada. I In addition, Mr. Ford is plan- ning to visit Japan, probably between the November elections' I and Thanksgiving. If he does, he will be tho first President ever to have visited Japan, while in office. A planned stateI visit by President Eisenhower, in 1960 was cancelled because: of anti-American leftist riots. I The great policy issues of I the Nixon era have either been; res(olved ? Vietnam, trade,1 :textiles ? or are dormant ?I China, the Nixon Doctrine, the; security treaty, monetary re-1 !form. I On China, Japanese policy is ;basically working in the same; 'direction as American policy,' only faster and unencumbered by security Considerations such as those arising from the United States's defense treaty with Taiwan. On security, the Japanese Left constantly tries to overturn Japan's alliance witlf the united States but is not making significant head- way. Japan's conservative politi- cians and businessmen are ex- pected to use the occasion of the Ford visit to test him for isolationist And, protectionist at- titudes, ati'cr to. try to dissuade hiin from such policies if they detect signs of them. Across the narrow Strait of Tsushima, the South Korean Government has started to, 'worry about President Ford and' the United States commitment to Korean defense. Mr. Ford: recently issued a statement ex- pressing concern over President Park Chung Hee's, jailing of Koreans for political reasons. In addition, Congress has in- dicvted that it may cut military aid to Korea. Congressmen have criticized Korea's alleged dis-, regard for human rights and; prominent American scholars have called for a reduction in the 38,000 United States troops there. Some Christian leaders, seeing fellow Christians in Korea jailed. for their political beliefs, have protested to their Congressmen, although other American Christian leaders have &fended President Park's repressive policies. China HONG KONG ? The recent personal letter from Premier Chou En-lai to President Ford is believed to reflect China's desire. to establish good rela- tions with the new Administra- tion. And the visit to China by a bipartisan congressional dele- gation led by Senator J. W. Fulbrighteis interpreted here as evidence that contacts begun during the Nixon Administra- tion will-be maintained. From Peking's point of view at least, its main problem with -the United States remains the Taiwan issue, which "is thel crucial question obstructing the[ normalization of relations," mi the words of the 1972 com- munique at the end of Mr.. Nixon's visit. Though the United States has; reduced its military presence in Taiwan, China was annoyed by the recent appointment of Leonard Unger as Ambassador in Taipei and by the opening of Chinese Nationalist consu- lates in Atlanta, Kansas CityI and Portland, Ore. China, which sees the Sovieti Union as its main foe, is not in confrontation with the Unit- ed States anywhere, though' serious differences remain overt such issues as Indochina, the! Middle East, the rights oft coastal states and liberation, movements in the third world.' Latin America Speeial to The Neve Trk Tircet ; LIMA, Peru ? "What Latin :America wants from the united .States is a real policy of co- operation to facilitate develop- ment," a Peruvian statesman. 16 ?F?iel? 2001108/08 CIA-RDP77430432R000100340008--2 - APprovect For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-IRIDP77-00432R000100340008-2 Carlos Garcia Bedoya, said 're- cently, emphasizing that ' this did not exist, despite "formal expressions of goodwill." Peru's left-wing military Gov- ernment has settled the most urgent problems of compensa- tion for expropriated United States property, but it would like to see the abolition of threatening legislation such as the provision for cutting off aid to countries that expro- priate American property, with- out ,compensation. Brazil is concerned over in- creasing United States protec- tionism in fields such as the shoe industry. Brazil and Co- lumbia are demanding fair prices for such commodities as coffee and Argentina would like to see meat quotas lifted. Panama and other Central - American countries are seeking to raise the price of bananas. Venezuela is concerned over how to take over the ? United States oil companies while keeping the door open to capi- tal and technology where they are needed. Chile is worried about increased opposition in' the United States Congress to aid and loans. ? Mexico's most urgent prob- lem is restriction against mi- grant workers, which cause constant tension. The Mexican. Governmentis also troubled by recent revelations that the Cen- ? tral Intelligence Agency pene- trated the administration. Canada Special to The New York Times ! OTTAWA --- Both Canadians and Americans in Ottawa are hopeful that the political changes here and in Washing- ton in recent weeks, by intro- ducing a new outlook, will pro- vide a more favorable climate:. for mutual efforts toward set-. tlement of numerous nagging problems. Prime Minister Pierre Elliott ' Trudeau, no longer dependent upon left-wing support since the 'Liberal party's surprising victory 'in the election July 8, can take on external issues with a stronger hand. He is expected. to meet President Ford iri? Washington some time this fall, but no date has been set nor is there any indication of changes .in Canadian policy on long- :standing issues. An indication of the -trend .may emerge from the current- negotiations between American and Canadian diplomatic teams on Canadian objections to a. projected dam in North Dakota that threatens to cause pollu- tion of the Souris River in' Manitoba. Canada has asked for a moratorium on construc- tion pending environmental' studies. A long list of issues includes: American concern over a Cana- dian quota on United States beef, special taxes on fuel ex- ports that make Canadian oil expensive for American con- sumers and the cutting of com- mercials from United States itelevision programs rebroad- cast in Canada. Approved F NEW YORK TIMES 24 August 1974 The Opium Of the. -S eople ..By C. L. Sulzberger ? KONYA, Turkey?The opium of the people, in Turkey is not religion but politics or, put another way, opium is the 'politics of the people in terms of ''stn agitated argument with the Upited States that is not adequately understood by either side. Premier Bulent Ecevit assured me ; that.. "the Turkish Government' is not ! emotional on this but in the areas ' where it is grown, the entire peasant economy depends on the poppy. There- fore the curb imposed in 1971 stirred up psychological reaction. Opium areas haye been reduced by natural process from 42 to seven provinces and will be. reduced further as new livelihoods _ appear. We will do what we can to ' control illegal traffic but world medi- cine needs more or less, opium." - Poppy growers depend not only on' the sap from which the drug derives but also on flour, fuel and oil ex- tiacted from the plant. And the Anatolian peasant is sometimes at the ,lowest subsistence level. Prof. Ragip Uner, an expert, says: 'Turkey there are still people who live in caves and burn oil lamps." The United States pledged $35 mil- lion three years ago when a ban was, .annOunced by Turkey in accord with Washington. Nevertheless, the govern- `ment of Konya Province, which now resumes cultivation on a small scale, -says the money was slow in reaching -actual growers. Substitute crops Weren't swiftly introduced and peas- -ants found themselves idle. This be- :Came a psychological problem. ? The Turks make surprisingly little -out of opium. Between 1967 and 1971 the, annual crop ranged between 120 and 350 metric tons. (It takes ten metric tons of opium to make one metric ton of heroin.) The grower here was getting perhaps $75 a kilogram for raw opium gum and now might receive roughly, $200. But the retail price of heroin, smuggled Out of this country, processed, then sold in New York, is about $400,000 a kilogram. It isn't the farmer who got the vast differential, but the crook. The moons shining peasant holds back a minor share of his crop from the Government purchasing agency, sells it to a local bootlegger who sneaks it along to refiner i and transpotters elsewhere. Althbugh this country grows far fewer poppies than India, it is said 80 per cent 'of U.S. heroin derives from Turkish gum. ? On June 30, 1971, Premier Nihat Erim ? (whose Government -was put in by the military) prohibited opium. production. He said: "Illicit traffic from our country has become very distressing"; Turkey had been "unable tio prevent smuggling"; and "we can- not allow Turkey's supreme interests and the prestige of our nation to be further' shaken." ? - But-politics got into the-question as full democracy returned. The minority Ecevit Government is based on a coalition. The vote of the poppy giowers was needed and all parties courted it. Were an election to be held now, in the. wake of the Cyprus landing, Mr. Ecevit would win by a landslide. But the ban was rescinded July I, just before Cyprus exploded. ? Politicians argued that farmers were being oppressed, that there was a world, shortage of medicinal opium, that the U.S. was turning to India as a source, that anyway America had no tight to boss Turkey. Professor . Uner writes: "No other country has any right to dictate what ,we have to cultivate or not-to cultivate." But he acknowledges that Turkish opinion. doesn't realize the "hysteria" in the United States prompted by drug addic- tion. ? American politics is also involved.. The -United States Congress, influ- enced by exaggerated statistics, felt its own Government wasn't doing enough. To propitiate Congress, American Ambassador Macomber was withdrawn from Ankara right after the restoration of poppy-farming. Mr. Macomber had to fly back out of the opium frying pan into the Cyprus fire. ? There has been inadequate under- standing on both sides. Americans cannot, grasp the misery of impover- ished ?poppy farmers?or the signifi- cance ,of their vote. Turks cannot even imagine the horrors of mass addiction among American youth. It is ce,rtainly imperative that smuggling here- (which Mr. Erin i admitted was "impossible to prevent") be curbed and that the criminal chain from farmer to addict be broken. But it would be well for both na- tions to remember the tolerance of Mevlana, a thirteenth-century phi- losopher-poet who founded the whirl- ing dervish order here and counseled ,the fanatical medieval world: "Our center is itot one of despair. Even if you. have violated your VOWS a hun- dred times, come again." The word "try" should be substituted for "come." or Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2 17 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 :,CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008r2 WASHINGTON POST 03 September 1)74 Victor Zorza ishful Coexistence' The ,Kremlin is developing a blind spot where President Ford is con- cerned, much like the blind spot that caused it to miss the real significance of Watergate. Because Moscow was committed to Mr. Nixon and saw him as the embodi- ment of detente, it wanted him to stay. in power and refused to believe that he might have to go. In Mr. ? Ford's case, the same kind of wishful thinking in the Kremlin is causing the Soviet press to play down the sharp edge which shows every now and again In the new administration's pronounce- ments about the need for big defense. buildups and major expenditure on.. them. The Soviet press mildly remarked, with some delay, on Ford's "regret- table inaccuracy" in saying that the' Soviet Union had naval bases in the Indian Ocean, but all the emphasis in Moscow is on Ford's coininitment to Nixon's 'detente policy; on the con- tinuity represented by 'Kissinger's con- trol of foreign policy. Pravda observes with delight that Ford sees Kissinger first thing every morning, while such hawks as Defense Secretary James Schlesinger and CIA Director William Colby ,have to await a summons. It is not naivete that causes Mos- cow to see only what it wants to see in Ford, but a deliberate tactic. There was a time when MoWcow assumed that the "imperialists" always had the worst intentions and, in preparing to Counter them, it brought on the very actions it feared. So,.for that matter, did the West bring out the worst in? Moscow. Now, by ascribing only good intentions to Ford, by granting him the presumption of innocence, the Kremlin is trying to make the wish the NEW YORK TIMES 23 August 1974 rather to the thought which begets the action. It is all part of the new pattern . 4-1' what is wrongly described as peace- ful coexistence. Wishful coexistence would be a better term. Do unto others. aa you would have them do unto you?' and they will respond accordingly. But there is another aspect of for-- eign policy making in Washington to which Moscow has drawn attention: from time to time?the . "zigzags" ? which make the. White House veer this way and that, blow hot and cold on de- tente, usually for reasons of domestic politics which have little or nothing to do with foreign policy. The Moscow theory has it that the Zigzags, often ,due to electoral considerations,. will make a President,take? a harsher ?. .stance toaVard the. oviet Union than he might otherwise wish. 'Those who take the zigzag view Of presidential motivation have warned in the past that the Kremlin cannot. just take a new wave of harshness lying down, that it must respond accord- ingly, and that the mutual buildup of suspicion and' hostility Could play havoc with detente. The Soviet practi- tioners of wishful coexistence have now banished any such forebodings from the pages of Pravda. But this does not mean that Moscow's zigzag school of thought has been banished to Siberia?only that its spokesmen, tem- porarily tint of favor, have been told to keep quiet. If Moscow's surface view of the Ford -presidency could be stripped away, it would probably disclose .a tangle of contradictions and fears about the fu- ture far more intense than the simple- minded confidence it presents in pub- lic. An attempt to reconstruct what is. PRAISES FORD LEADERSHIP --------- Pravda Gives Assessment of His First 2 Weeks Swis.1 to The New York Times MOSCOW, .Aug. 22 ? The Communist party newspaper Pravda today made an optimis- tic assessment of President Ford's first two weeks in office, suggesting that initial Soviet nervousness over Mr. Nixon's sudden departure was rapidly bei ng assuaged. .Pravda noted that Mr. rad was hard at 'work to solve the' problem ofinflation, which, the newspaper said, had reached "catastrophic magnitude" un- der Mr. Nixon. While the te- has been no hesi- tancy about focusing on Ameri- can problems, the Soviet press had been careful not to link the former .PresidVnt with them by name. I But. today's article indicated that the immunity from criti- cism ? that Mr. Nixon had en- joyed by virtue of his relation- ship with the Soviet leader, Leonid I. Brezhnev, had been pragmatically set aside, al- though the Soviet press has still not released the full details .of the Watergate affair. The article, which was writ- ten by Pravda's Washington underneath, based on past patterns of Kremlin thought and of Kremlinologi- cal evidence, would reveal the uncer- tainty about Ford which is glossed oveg by the press. The Kremlin presumably knows as well as most of us how unpredictable the vagaries of the American electoral process are. But it has to draw up for- eign policy plans for the future, and it .has to make certain assumptions about it. One scenario obviously favored by at least some people in Moscow is a 1976 election fight between what the Soviet press represents as the forces of darkness and evil, led by Sen. Henry Jackson (D-Wash.), and what must inev- itably appear against this somber back- ground as the forces of light, led by President Ford. This in 'itself would provide Moscow with very good reasons to give Mr. Ford the benefit of any doubts it might have, as the Soviet press is now doing. But as Watergate must have taught Moscow, the straight projection of U.S. trends into the future is a thankless task, and some of its experts ? must now be busy drawing up alterna- tive scenarios. Moscow would obviously want to help Ford against Jackson, and this is something that Kissinger could use to good advantage in the negotiations that lie ahead. But some Soviet leaders feel that Brezhnev has already made too many concessions to Nixon in the past three summits, and that it is high time the White House started paying back. The coming negotiations could be tougher than any in the past. ? 1974, Victor Zona cOrrespohdent, Boris Strelni- kov, painted a cautiously bright. future for Soviet-American re- lations under President Ford, with an allusion to the trade legislation pending in Congress. In assessing President Ford's first days in office, Pravda said he was trying "to raise at least some barriers in the way of in- flation which began under the Kennedy Administration, inten- sified during Johnson's rule, and assumed catastrophic mag- nitude under Nixon." While saving that Mr. Ford was spending "nearly half" his time on the inflation problem, the newspaper also stressed that he was devoting "much time" to foreign affairs. 18 Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008=2 Aliproved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2 BALTIMORE SUN. 1 September 1974 eu igr ti ee 9 By JACK FRUCHTMAN, JR. is esse tial to ei!e te 00. "Twenty-two years ago on a warm August night, Soviet secret police agents executed 24 Jewish writers, poets, ac- tors. and intellectuals in the basement of Moscow's notorious Lubyanka Prison. At that moment,. Joseph Stalin's drive to eradicate Jewish life and culture from the Soviet Union attained its ugliest expression through ultimate terror. ' To this day, the Kremlin has main- tained its original death sentence on Jewish identification and tradition, even if it has ceased executing Jews outright. And yet, Jewish cultural identification and ethnic consciousness flourish today in the Soviet Union, although much of their expression is private and relegated to the underground. Jews study Jewish history, read Jewish literature, write, paint, dance and compose in a Jewish idiom even when prohibited. They study the Hebrew language in secret classes, because the study of Hebrew is .specifi- cally proscribed. -"A new generation of Jews bound to their tradition has evolved in the Soviet Union, a generation steadfast in its will te-survive and motivated actually by the oppressive atmosphere created by the Soviet government. And yet, survival there. as a Jewish community has be- come almost an unbearable effort. " Thus, since 1971 the struggle for Jew- ish rights in the Soviet Union has be- come synonymous with the principle of free emigration. The only alternative for many identifying Jews is to go to ,a place where they can give full and complete expression to their Jewishness. As a result, attention has inevitably focused in the United States on the Trade Reform Act of 1973, Section 402, commonly known as the Jackson amendment, which denies credits and most-favored-nation status to any nation with a restrictive emigration policy. . Opponents of the Jackson amendment believe it would drastically interfere with the growing U.S.-Soviet detente. Its supporters, on the other hand, have felt that a viable, meaningful detente prov- ides for the accrual of benefits for both sides. Unilateral concessions?in this case billions of dollars in foreign trade to.. the Soviet Union with nothing in return?cannot achieve an authentic de- tente. ,While it is true that Jewish emigration geeatly increased rrom the Soviet Union in 1972 and 1973, the decline of those permitted to leave this year demon- strates what can occur when emigration Is not free despite the mutually pro- fessed spirit of detente. In 1972 and 1973, almost 33,000 Jews each year were Mr. Fruchtman is executive director of the Baltimore Committee for Soviet Jewry, a standing coinmittee of the granted exit visas. To date in 1974, that number has declined about 35 per cent. At the current rate, no more than 22,000 will be allowed to leave by the end of. this year. Moreover, since Soviet officials have arbitrarily chosen who shall go and who shall stay, most of those recently granted visas have cbme from the So- viet heartland, not from the major urban areas. They are less educated and less professionally trained than their more sophisticated urban brethren. ? In recent testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on mul. tinational corporations, Professor Zbige niew Brzezinski of Columbia University spoke of two kinds of detente. He distin- guished the rather comprehensive Amer- ican view from the more narrow Soviet idea based on a continuing ideological struggle with the West. The Soviet view of detente is limited and expedient to the extent that it is aimed solely toward the achievement of tangible economid benefits. By contrast, Mr. Drzezinski said, the broader American view is not "artifi- cially compaetmentalized to economics alone." Included in this genuine version. of detente is a possible social, political and cultural accommodation which could lead to closer social links between the two great nations. , The American view would have, ac- cording to Mr. Brzezinski, an obvious impact on the current Soviet refusal to permit free emigration. Indeed, part of this vision of detente lies within the realm of the basic human right to leave one's country. Free emigration would precipitate no changes in the Soviet. sociopolitical system. The Jackson amendment is a means toward the attainment of this broader view of detente. Professor Brzezinski. stressed that the denial of free emigra- tion is not an internal Soviet domestic matter, even if many Americans have a direct and highly personalized concern for those in the Soviet Union who want to leave. Deploring the possibility that the right of free emigration would not be included in the detente agenda, Mr. Brzezinski concluded that "given this country's traditions, the adoption of a posture of amorality Is to give up something very precious, something which should not be given up lightly." It is important to recall that the United States has on several occasions displayed concern for oppressed minori- ties abroad. Throughout the past century alone, there have been both congres- sional and presidential initiatives on behalf of Russian Jewish rights. Presi- dent William Howard Taft in December, 1911, abrogated a commercial treaty with Russia, for example, under pressure from public opinion and a unanimous 'Congress after reports of mistreatment Moreover, the right and opportunity to emigrate is a transnational concept, pointedly expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and gener- ally recognized in international law_ The Soviet Union, as a signator of the Uni- versal Declaration as well as of the International Convention on the Elimina- tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimina- tion, has violated the provisions in these documents which specify the right to- leave one's country. There are, therefore; both an accepted norm embodied in international conven- tions which encourages transnational concern for the right of free emigration and a long American tradition of tangi- ble action on behalf of human rights through the exercise of American di- plomatic and economic influence. Thus, a rationale exists for the,Jack- son amendment which may not have been made clear to the American_ pece? ple. Support of the Jackson amendment. need not mean that one has. to be opposed to detente, but support -of -a broad, meaningful detente would logi- cally require support of the amendment'. It is through the implementation. of the-right of free emigration, then, that Soviet Jews hope to act out their Jewish consciousness. Those 24 poets and intel- lectuals murdered in 1952 represented the leadership of Jewish thought -arid letters, and they posed a major threat-to the Stalinist goal of liquidating Jess* culture. The murder of the 24 -wasee result of Stalin's creation of a JeWsiSh Anti-Fascist Committee in 1942 When a- number of Jewish intellectuals,'ali-df whom regarded themselves as .Soviet patriots, were recruited to generate. watt. time support by Jews in the West for the Soviet struggle against Nazi f.lere many: Little did these Soviet emissarieLsug- pect Soviet duplicity. On its return after the war, - when its services were no longer needed, the committee was dis- banded, and all its members arrested. The assimilated Jewish Communist and publicist, Ilya Ehrenburg, was later to write in Pravda, the Soviet Communist party newspaper, that Soviet Jews'ass* ciating with Jews in other countries were demonstratively disloyal Soviet cit- izens. His words marked the death-knell of hundreds of -Jewish artists, musi- cians, poets, writers, and government and party officials who disappeared in the winter of 1948-1949. Jewish survival in the Soviet tnia has been accomplished over the past- 22 years against all odds. Deprived.of,the cream of Jewish artists, writers and other intellectuals and in the fadeof almost daily attempts to halt Jewish self-expression, the Soviet Jewish:Core; rnunity refuses to wither and die. The United States' obligation in its sCrite fnr detente is to stand on principle and not simply gross material gain, mi;trorlit Baltimore Jewish Council- Approved Fo1gA6e2001/08/08 CIA-RDP771B0432R000100340008-2 1, 7 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2 the -Soviet goal. The United States must reacli!Orto all oppressed groups !n the SovietiNon at a time when U.S.-Soviet relation have never been closer in more than h0 years and insist that these groups. posf sess the right to -go where they can give full expression to their culture antra dition. In this way, U.3.-Soviet detente will be elevated to a high morar-pfitlic" and all Americans will be proud of their nation's reaffirmation of a basic tuiaau right. ? CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 30 August 1974 Sea po or: U.S. vs. U.S.S.R. By Richard Burt Special to The Christi= Science Monitor London The publication this week of the 1974-75 edition of Jane's Fighting Ships has revived the lively but complex debate over the relative strengths of the U.S. and Soviet navies. Echoing the repeated claims of former U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Elmo Zumwalt, the editors of Jane's stab:, that the Soviet Union has achieved substantial supremacy in a variety of areas of nava/ weaponry, and has begun to challen the United States in others. Writing that the U.S. Navy is "in the van of navies subjected to misinformed, illogical, and irrational attacks by those who depend upon it most," the editors said that the Soviet Navy enjoys a major numerical edge in submarines anti heavy cruisers and "leads the world in aeaborne missile armament, both strategic and tactical, both ship and submarine-launched." In the strategic area, the Soviets have launched over 60 ballistic missile submarines, including the new Delta-class boat which is capable of launching 12 misolles with a range of 4,600 miles. With this range, te editors note 12110 the Delta-class subs will be able to strike targets in the United Statee from protected waters near Soviet shores. The United States now possesses 41 missile-launching submarines with 3,860-Mile ran missiles. The first of 10 new Trident submarines equipped with resege missiles will not be ready until 1678-79. In the tactical area, the Soviet Union is given a major lead in cruise missile's, a technology area that U.S. officials admit has not been fully exploited by the Navy. Deployed abeard both submarines and surface verseelo, the Soviet missiles are at present viewed as the primary throat to ts Ill.g. merrier force. The Soviet Navy is also given high marks in surface vessels, where Its fleet of cruisers outnumber the U.S. firce 34 to 6. Included in this figure are the Soviet Navy's new Kara and Kresta-class ships, which are de- scribed as the fastest and most heav- ily armed heavy combatants in the world. One of the few areas in the surface vessel category where the editors still give the U.S. Navy a clear lead is aircraft carriers, where the present force of 14 stands unchallenged. How- ever, they warn, with one carrier now ,undergoing sea trials and another being constructed, the Soviets could challenge U.S. carrier supremacy in the 1980's. Few naval analysts doubt the edi- tors claim that the Soviet fleet "is a very powerful fighting force." But numerous experts emphasize the dif- ficulty of comparing the two forces. Thus, while the Soviet Navy enjoys an advantage in number of ships, U.S. naval vessel, on the average, tend to be larger and more capable. In fact, it Is estimated that the total tonnage of U.S. naval vessels is twice that of the Soviet fleet. In terms of individual vessels, the U.S. Navy is also generally given an edge. While the Soviets have deployed sophisticated ships such as the Kara- class cruisers, most U.S. vessels are believed to be three to four times more effective then their Soviet coun- terparts, possessing greater endur- ance and flexibility. Analysts also note an important difference between how the two fleets are deployed. Possessing a true "blue water" capability the U.S. Navy con- tinuously deploys large forces throughout the world and possesses a wealth of experience in maintaining ships at sea for long periods of time. Defensive force Despite Soviet forays into the South Atlantic and naval visits to Africa and South America, analysts argue that the Soviet Navy has yet to master a strategy of "forward naval deploy- ment" and is still viewed by the Kremlin as a defensive force to ?protect the Soviet homeland from attack. The U.S. Navy and its supporters, however, have seized on these deploy- ment differences to argue that U.S. forces must possess superiority over the Soviet Fleet. While the United States, they argue, must maintain the freedom of the seas to ensure a secure supply of strategic commodities or to project force in areas such as the Middle East, .the Soviet Union only needs to disrupt the sea lanes to achieve its objectives. This view was recently questioned by Michael McGwire, a retired Royal WASHINGTON POST .24 August 1974 Violinist in Concert MOSCOW ? Violinist Georgi Yermolenko, who caused Australian unionists to think he was ,being drag- ged back to the Soviet Un- ion after seeking asylum in 'Perth, appeared on Soviet television to say that his _ goal now is to enter the Moscow Conservatory. Yermolenko, 19, sat smil- ing while- Soviet composer Dmitri Kabalevsky, who had accompanied him on the Australian tour, describqd the "four days of night- Mare" until the unionist let the Soviet artists depart by plane. "Georgi, you are smiling now, but it was not a smil- ing matter in those days, Which we recall now with contempt and horror," said Kabalevsky on the TV show after the dvening news. Navy commander now teaching at Dalhousie University in Halifax, Can- ada. Arguing that Soviet naval depl- -oyment is still defensive in nature, Commander McGwir' .e says that the Soviet Navy does not yet have the capability for large-strength, distant deployments. Moreover, he notes that "becoming a super power= has not changed Russia's geographical posi- tion, with all its disadvantages in terms of deploying maritime force." Commander McGwire also criti- cizes Western "prophets of doom" for 'delivering a major propaganda suc- cess to the Kremlin for exaggerating Soviet naval capability. "Naturally enough," Commander McGwire says, "the Soviet Union welcomes the West- ern amplifier, which is now-plugged into her naval propaganda machine, whose authoritative voice helps to compensate for the sometimes glar- ing shortfall between her words and deeds." 20 ____APPEQxecLE,or.R9Jeasen200.103108 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2 APproved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003400'08-2 NEW YORK TIMES 27 August 1974 How t Lose an Ally. By Graham Hovey Secretary of State Kissinger still seems oblivious to the dimensions of the disaster sustained by United States foreign policy in the Cyprus tragedy and insensitive to the hurt of people who feel let down by Washington. How else explain his ill-timed offer to mediate the Cyprus crisis and his bland invitation to a harried Greek Premier to come to Washington to talk things over?at a time when Tur- key was grabbing the northern third of Cyprus and drawing only a wrist tap from the State Department? Did Mr. Kissinger really believe that Greece's Premier Caramanlis or For- eign Minister Mavros could accept a summons to Washington at that point and survive? As former United States Under. Secretary of State George Ball said, the Kissinger mediation offer in that context exhibited "an insensi- tivity beyond belief." And at whom was Mr. Kissinger aiming his warning of last week that "a foreign government must not ex- .pect that every time there is a crisis, the Secretary of State will come rush- ing. into the area and spend all his time settling that particular crisis?" Was anyone asking for what he grandly calls "the personal shuttle diplomacy of the Secretary of State"? Mr. Kissinger did promise that in any negotiation, Washington would "take into full account Greek honor and dignity," but he felt it necessary to add a warning that this country would "not be pressured by .threat of withdrawal from the. [NATO] alliance" nor by unjustified anti-American .demonstrations. . 7. But the Secretary surely. misreads LOS ANGELES TIMES 23 August 1974 the political signals from Athens if he regards the pullout of Greek forces from NATO and the anti-American demonstrations merely as ploys by the Caramanlis Government, rather than reflections of utter disillusionment with an alliance and a superpower ally that could not prevent Turkey's blitz and Greece's humiliation on Cyprus. In fact, Mr. Kissinger's trouble from the onset of the Cyprus crisis has been a lack, in dealing with allies, of the sensitivity that was an ingredient of his success in the Middle East and Vietnam negotiations, as well as in the initiatives that led to President Nixon' visits' to China and the Soviet Union. The United States is not omnipotent and, as Mr. Kissinger reminds us, can- not stop "every local war between smaller nations." No one can prove. that any feasible Washington effort this time would have halted Turkey's invasion of Cyprus. ? ' One is forced to recall, however, that President Johnson twice got Tur- key to call off a scheduled invasion Of Cyprus: in 1964, with a tough letter to Premier Inonu; in 1967, through a skillful, even-handed negotiating job by envoy Cyrus Vance. Once a shaky military regime in Athens had staged a putsch against President Makarios, clearly aimed at enosis? the union of Cyprus with Greece?there was only one way to prevent Turkish intervention: to dem- onstrate that Geeece would not be allowed to get by with it. Washington could have made the point by backing Britain in refusing to recognize the new Cyprus regime and in demanding that Athens recall .the Greek officers wko had directed the coup. Instead, the United States gave Tur- key and the world every reason to believe it accepted the coup. Washing- ton refused to pin responsibility for it on the `Greek dictatorship and even hinted that on Cyprus it preferred the swaggering murderer, Nikos Sampson, to the devious Makarios. Turkey's initial Invasion of July 20'? was the inevitable result. This at leaA accomplished the salutary secondary results of blasting out of power both Sampson and the Athens junta. At that point the imperative was to persuade Turkey to go no further. Ankara had made its point: it would not accept enosis and it' intended at any cost to protect the Turkish Cypriote minority. The ? Turks could now negotiate from strength. They. could expect American and British backing for constitutional revisions to give the Turkish Cypriotes a large measure of autonomy.' But the invasion had been heady wine for .Turkey and Washington again seemed to blow a timid trumpet. At -the showdown in Geneva, Turkey ' presented a-drastic plan for division of Cyprus as ah ultimatum, refusing to give the Greeks and Greek Cypriotes even a 36-hour reeess to concult. Turkey's blitz killed hundreds, dis- placed some 200,000, sowed new seeds for protracted intercommunity strife, provoked Greece into pulling its forces out of NATO, and inereased instability in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. It also dealt a heavy blow at United States credibility and the reputation of Henry A. Kissinger. More's the pity that he seems not to understand why. Graham Hovey is a member of the Editorial Board of The Times. The Risk of America's Role as a orld Umpire BY MAX LERNER NEW YORK CITY?In years ahead there will be other outbursts of anti-Amer- icanism around the world, like the one in Nicosia where American Ambassador Rodger P. Davies was cut down by gunfire in a confused mob attack on the embassy. Americans have become the inevitable tar- gets for national and sectarian rages the . world over. To be an American envoy in a world trouble area?let us face it?is to hold down one of the high-risk jobs of our time. As an infrequent visitor at the senior seminar of the State Department where envoys return for refresher studies, I have come to know some of these men and to- . respect their courage on the firing line. Approved For Release They are no CIA agents involved in covert operations but ambassadors reporting to Washington and carrying out decisions reached there. They may. be innocent of the decisions for which they are held re- sponsible, but they offer a natural target for these cruel symbolic slayings. In Athens, too, where many of the young are in the camp of the recently returned leftist politician, Andreas Papandreou, there are banners with the inscription, "Kissinger Killer." Nor is Athens alone. It may he true that -in the early phase of the Cyprus crisis there was a Kissinger tilt .. toward the Turks. But if their military for- tunes had gone differently, who can doubt that the "Kissinger Killer" banners would be raised by enraged Left Nationalist 20gfili83l? 61)3M6iit7+126642R000100340008-2 2 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2 ,? The anti-Americanism in The world to- day differs sharply from that of the '40s through the '60s. It is not a decadent and -?-scorned American capitalism that is at- tacked, as in the '40s, nor the American "cold war Mentality," as in the '50s, nor the ? imperialist interventions in insurgent situa- tions, as in the '60s. _ When the new anti-Americanism is not directed against the multinational corpora- tions or the CIA?the two still favorite ? targets?it is directed against America as the arbiter of the world's quarrels. That is part of the price America will have to pay for the Kissinger era in diplo- macy and for the world image which Kis- singer has achieved as mediator, especially in his shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East. The new anti-Americanism can be put in a single simple, earthy Americanism: ? "Kill the umpirer' Surely that is better than "Kill the intervener" or "Kill the cold warri- ors" or "Kill the fascist imperialists." But how did the United States become such a target? ? Mainly it is because the world has run into a shortage of arbitrators. The United Nations tries to do its best as umpire, but it WASHINGTON POST 28 August 1974 is largely without power and is 'just start- ing to build its authority. The Russians are not trusted. The Chinese?and the Indians ? also?are too involved in their inner power struggles. NATO has the wrong setup for'. umpiring. Only the United States is left to function, well or badly, in this vacuum. - In a way it is a form of left-handed trib--1 ute, both to Kissinger and to the United States, to declaim and protest against their role. It implies that they have more power than the facts probably warrant, and that:, the arbitrating role is actually theirs, even if wrongly used. Kissinger has explicitly offered his medi-:-. ation efforts to the Greeks and Turks. But it would be a dangerous mistake to believe, whether abroad or in the UniLed States,. that America must right every wrong, re- dress every grievance, heal every injury, balance out every inequality that occurs M the world. It was stupid for America to try to hi the world's policeman. It is dangerous to try to be the world's umpire. It is absurd. Yet for the moment there is no one and nothing else to fill the role. . . Rowland Evans and Robert Novak eek Military Scandal Blatant misuse of American military aid by the ousted Greek military dicta- torship, which probably caused the junta's fatal inaction in the Cyprus cri- sis, is about to be exposed in a major international scandal?threatening the permanent end of U.S. military aid to Greece and widening the dangerous Washington-Athens breach. This scandal, a closely-held secret within the new civilian government of Prime Minister Constantine Karaman- lis (which had nothing whatever to do with it) may help explain the sudden ? collapse of the military junta following Turkey's invasion of Cyprus. Turkey's move was triggered by the Greek jun- ta's overthrow of Archbishop Makarios as President of Cyprus on July 15. Karamanlis and his top aides, includ- ing Foreign Minister George Mavros, are convinced the junta was preparing military operations across the Turkish border in Thrace immediately follow- ing Turkey's decision to intervene mili- tarily on Cyprus But when the junta mobilized the Greek reserves, military stores of U.S. aid?rifles, ammunition, boets, machine guns and rockets? were discovered to be totally inade- quate. Crates of the American M-16 ri- fle, for one example, were found to contain one or two layers of rifles on the top, with rocks, wood and other fil- ler material hidden underneath. The discovery of this shocking short- fall of arms and equipment was the fi- nal nail in the coffin of the junta, al- ready under heavy political pressure for its .stumbling Cyprus adventure. The full extent of the disappearance of American arms aid is still not known. Some well-informed experts on the outrages perpetrated , by seven years of Greek military rule believe that arms were sold for cash to foreign countries, possible black Africa, be-. hied the' backs of regular military com- manders. .But wholly apart from the devastat- ing impact on the junta itself, the dis- covery of the shortfall raises profound questions about Greece's military de- fenses in her role as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Karamanlis, pressured by the Turkish Cyprus invasion into an anti- American posture, withdrew Greece from ,:he military arm of NATO two weeks ago. High officials here are unaware of the Karamanlis-Mayros- investigation which revealed the junta's inability to mobilize the Greek reserve. That in- vestigation is now centered on three major military depots: Attica, the site in the Athens-Piraeus area of major Greek military installations; Larissa, in central Greece, the headquarters of the First Army; and Salonika, Greece's second city and the headquarters of the Third Army corps. Although administration officials are in the dark, key members of four con- gressional committees?the Foreign Relations and Armed Services commit- tees of both Senate and House?have been apprised of the scandal by Elias Demetracopoulos, the best-informed anti-junta Greek exile here the past seven years. He recently returned to Washington from high-level talks in Geneva with officials of the Karaman- lis eovernment. Key congressional committee meni- hers, including one senator who sup- ported U S. military aid to Greece even during the military dictatorship, will soon demand a Complete investiga- tion by the General Accounting Office (GAO), congressional .watchdog over government spending. The results of that probe Could be: dynamite. In 1971, Rep. Wayne Hays of.; Ohio pushed through 'Congress a ban,' on U.S. military grant- aid to Greece: Only last week Hays authored a bill to, repeal that ban, on grounds that grant aid could be restored now that the colonels were gone. But if the GAO probe shows that there really was wholesale abuse of American military aid, Congress will be most reluctant about new grant aid even to the respected civilian govern- ment of Karamanlis. - Even without the scandal, restora- tion of aid seems dubious considering - the fact that Karamanlis bowed to anti-American sentiment by withdraw- ? ing Iron NATO's military organization and accepting Moscow's formula for a ' political settlement on Cyprus. . The impact of a finding by GAO that lame amounts of American aid were . pilfered or squandered would go far- beyond Greece. It would radically ad- vance the argument against foreign aid that is widespread in Congress and fanned by neo-isolationalism. In this way too, the chickens of obsequious U.S. support for a clique of mimitive G rock colonels are coming home to roost with a vengeance. 01974, Yield EuterprIse, Inc. 22 Approve ForRetene 2001108/08 ::-C1A-RDP77-00432R000100340008--2 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RD077-00432R000100340008-2 ST. LOUIS POST?DISPATCH 10 AUG 1974 Intervention Arm Greek democrats have long complained that the Central Intelligence Agency was pulling the strings of the so-called colonel's' dictator- ship, before the military government was re- placed recently. State Department officials have now confirmed that CIA agents subsi- dized politicians and bought votes in Parlia- ment. The CIA, and not U.S. Ambassador Hen- ry Tasca, dalt directly with the Greek junta's strong man, Brig. Gen. Dimitrios loannidis, who ran the secret police. ? Perhaps ;the State Department officials put out this information because they disliked being bypassed by the CIA, or because the department now wishes to repudiate complici- ty in the former dictatorship. The fact is that the American Government supported and ma- nipulated the .Greek military government through the CIA, as if has used the CIA to support secure right-wing regimes in other countries. And the Greek experience, like the Bay of Pigs, proved a disaster. In 1963 former President Truman wrote, "I never had any thought that when I set up the CIA it would be injected into peacetime cloak- and-dagger operations." It was supposed to be NEW YORK TIMES 28 August 1974 an intelligence-gathering agency. The work of intelligence can only be compromised by inter- ventionist activities that have,: to be justified through the intelligence arm: Still, the basic question is whether the Unit- ed States should meddle in foreign govern- ments, particularly in support of oppressive governments, in ways that are kept more se- cret from the American people than from for- eign peoples who are victimized by the inter- vention. In Greece the CIA carried out a form of foreign policy that the State Department could not afford to acknowledge. ? ? Despite frequent revelations of CIA paramil- itary and political projects, usually after fail- ures, Congress has done little to bring the agency into some form of public scrutiny and responsibility. The joint special CIA Oversight Committee itself led the Senate rejection last June of Senator Proxmire's proposal to make the CIA disclose the total amount of money it ! spends. So far congressional oversight has simply meant congressional approval. In view of the Greek exposure, how much longer will Congress wait, to bring the CIA to reasonable . 'account? he FlOtSarri Of the Storm ? By C. L. Sulzberger ? SPETSAIS, Greece?Right after an- nouncing withdrawal of Greek armed forces from NATO, Premier Caraman ? lis overhauled the command of those forces, firing all top leaders associ- ated with the previous junta and with. the boomerang Cyprus coup that touched off Turkey's invasion. The odd thing is that the men now named to command have all been pro-NATO enthusiasts. It will take months before Athens unscrambles its idea on relations with the Western alliance. So far it merely says it will emulate France, which pulled out troops but retained politi- tal membership. Greek studies claim General de Gaulle's experts analyzed the French-NATO problem four months before he moved?then gave the allies a year to evacuate, if that's an indica- tion, it will be Christmas 1975 before anything irrevocable happens. Neither the United States nor NATO earned any consistent kudos from Turkey or Greece during the Cyprus confrontation. Turkish Premier Ecevit initially told me it would be "difficult" for Turkey to continue in the alliance if Greek-Turkish problems weren't first solved. Later he thought Turkey could "fill up the gap" created by Greece's withdrawal. Washington warned Greece and Tur- key that they would be cut off from American arms supplies if they went to war. This particularly threatened Greece, which expects to get another squadron of F-4 Phantoms next month. American diplomacy tried to be ac- tive. President Ford made his firs( foreign intervention by asking Turkey to do nothing that would "humiliate" Washington, which has mishandled Aegean; not much ripple. Secretary Kissinger's call to Premier Caramanlis Weren't received with approbation or even respect. The United States is today widely disliked and mistrusted in Greece, Moscow, for its part, made scant headway. The Turks resented a Soviet- launched rumor that 50,000 Russian troops were ready to help Ankara invade Cyprus. But Moscow, no slouch in these affairs, prompted its latest friend, Libya, to give Turkey minor air-force and financial aid and also applauded sprouting friendship be- tween Ankara and Soviet-armed Syria. Greece rightly saw in all this a Kremlin effort to bust up NATO ? which Greece ended up doing itself. When Moscow suddenly shifted to a pro-Greek stance, there was little gen- uine enthusiasm. Meantime, Belgrade 'counseled Athens that since ? NATO couldn't protect its adherents, the five permanent members of the United Na- tions Security Council, plus one non- aligned spokethnan, Yugoslavia, should look after unattached lands like Cy- prus. This suits Russia's present diplo- macy. El Although both Greece and Turkey pride themselves on martial prowess, they each did badly in a military sense. The Greek mobilization was deplor- able. Turkish paratroop drops in Cyprus were often far off target. An original Famagusta landing, scheduled to coincide with that at Kyrenia, had to be called off because it was so badly coordinated. The Turks bombed one of their destroyers, with heavy losses; the Greeks shot down one of their planes. might' be well adVited to sponsor a joint United States-West German mis- sion of distinguished generals to ex- plain to the Turkish Army why it should keep .its cool. The army re- mains Turkey's ultimate political force. Gen. Lauds Norstad, former NATO boss, and Gen. Johann Von Kielman- segg, who commanded,its central front, would be ideal for that purpose. America has much military prestige in Ankara but Germany's is of. far greater duration. ? Another thing. I hope Greece even- tually reconsiders its promised expul- sion of U.S. and NATO bases. But, in any event', there is too large an Amer- ican military presence in both coun- tries. The homeporting arrangement for our destroyers around Athens is useless; the carrier they were to pro- tect won't receive similar facilities. The accord should be terminated. Likewise, too many little United States "facilities" are dotted around Turkey. Washington's diplomacy must now work to tranquilize the Aegean and seek to help compose its disputes? while also trying to hang on to those few facilities crucial to NATO and to Western defense. These still include the Incirlik air base in southern Turkey and the mag- nificent Suda Bay in Greece's island of Crete, a deep harbor that could easily hold the entire Sixth Fleet and includes massive ammunition and war- head installations. No Turkish port could substitute for Suda Bay. These are primordial long-range goals we should be thinking of now with respect to this area. The short- range goal is more obvious: Keep our two partners (originally linked by us in the Truman Doctrine even before eolalcolati from permanently Greece. Like droAtitittdiv6dIFeit Eteleasii20811018M8 !aCIAORDPYNts00482R ?e. 23 Turkey for almost as long before, Approved For Release 2001/08/08.: CIA-RDP77-0043213000100340008-2 THE WASHINGTON POST MandaY. AI* 1914 W hington literryarsconasmil Greece to Shut All Its ases By Jack Anderson "We have made major efforts (D-Ind.); Peter Kyros, (D-Maine) ghan, the peppery Makarios was Public statements to the con- trary, Greece is already making plans to shut down every NATO base in the country within a year, thus leaving a getting hole In the fabric of the Western world's defense systems. So secret are the new Athens civilian government's plans that even top U. S. officials are una- ware of the 'seriousness of the threat. Jut a few days ago, De- fense Secretary James Schle- singer was speaking honestly when he said he had "little indi- cation" of such a move. Our information, however, from high but confidential dip- lomatic sources who backed up their talk with documents, is that the NATO shutdown is al- ready a Matter of Athens policy, barring a radical change in the current U.S. attitude toward Cy- prus. The importance of the Greek NATO bases is difficult to over- estimate. Naval, bomber, mis- sile and communiations facili- ties in -Greece give NATO a striking power directly beneath the belly of Soviet Russia and her satellites. ? At the same time that Greece was setting its course on NATO, Secretary of State Henry Kis- singer was assuring a private meeting with President Ford and Republican leaders that the U.S. policy on Cyprus is neutral. to elicit concessions from both the Greeks and the Turks," he said, according to confidential minutes of the White House meeting. "We will take a new look if the Turks cross the cease-fire line." The restive Republicans won- dered why Kissinger had not simply halted aid to Turkey. Kissinger replied, according to the minutes, that this "woUld not have stopped the three-day occupation." Indeed, Kissinger warned, such drastic action "Would have enormous consequences on NATO, Turkish nationalism and (the) possible, approach to the Soviet Union." One "possible solution," Kissinger said, "may be a federalized republic or a Cantonal structure" ? in short, a semi-partitioning of Cyprus with Greece and Turkey each controlling part of the island. Added President Ford hope- fully, "I think we'll come out all right as friends of both parties." Kissinger also met privately With five congressmen of Greek descent who gave him a far more obstreperous going over than the Republican leaders. One of the Greek-American leg- islators who attended the off- the-record meeting told us they tore into Kissinger "in a manner to which he is unaccustomed." The congressmen were Louis Bafalis, (R-Fla.), John Brademas Paul Sarbanes (D-Md.), and Gus Yatron (D-Pa.). At one point, they told, Kissinger he was per- sonally responsible for a "griev- ous policy. The U.S. has egg all over its face." The strong-willed Kissinger was "patient" but "stuttered, reeled back and reddened" under the onslaught, we were told. At one point he left the meeting for a telephone conversation witt Turkish Prime Minister &tient Ecevit. But at the end of the- meeting, Kissinger courteously invited the lawmakers to come back again. - Despite appearances of even- handedness, we are told by high diplomatic sources that Kis- singer tentatively and confiden- tially agreed in recent meetings with British Ambassador Peter Ramsbotham to a Cyprus plan drawn up in London. To the distress of the'Greeks, it would, in effect, chop Cyprus into Greek and Turkish en- claire% The Turks would make an ostentatious pull-back to a line running across the north- ern third of the island to pacify world opinion a move they had intended anyway.- - When the plan was delicately put to deposed Cypriot presi- dent Archibishop Makarios *in London by Britain's Prime Min- ister Harold Wilson and For- eign Secretary James Calla- outraged, we were told. In Athens, Greek leaders are , also fuming. For years, they - have gone along with almost ev- ery twist and turn in American policy, while the Turks have of- ? ten refused to cooperate with Washington. A few weeks ago, for instanceoTurkey defied the United States and resumed cul- tivation of opium. . Meanwhile, we: have learned that Athens risked her good rel- ' ations with the Arabs by se- cretly permitting the United States to use Greek NATO bases for shuttling supplies to Israel ? during the Middle East war last. October. As a result, Israel is se- cretly grateful to Greece and hopes it will keep its NATO ties. During the October War, Greece also allowed U.S. irfcelli- gence services to use a commu- nications station outside Athens to monitor Soviet and Arab ra- dio broadcasts. Turkey, on the other hand, reportedly permit- ted the Soviets to overfly her territory to deliver .arms to the _ Arabs. Footnote: At the State Depart- dent, a spokesman denied . Greek bases were used by. the United Statesto resiply Israel. He also said the British ? tive was not yet "developed." It does not have any ,"arms or legs" yet, he said. *1974, United Feature Syndicate BALTIMORE SUN 29 August.. ?1974 isearc.s ,:e Kling . of Ford . ase. iibed. .,....,? ,, to .N.eri,6.11.t.Are5or European unity I: . , i ,?? . .:, ? . , Paris Bliraira? al'ilra.SJI,71'''...... gratuilOns:,. criticism .: of ' Mr., 'French president also cited the Paris:?American ''',diplomats Ford:?;. , ' . Cyprus situation as illustrating heie were y4icii:day puziled ;The q0stion they faced was the basic impotence, of Europe o4r the unexbected' rebuW of whether' it was simply ..directed in its present state to influencl President Ford delivered in ,:a to the' French domestic:: AIM, world events. ! , i Tuesday night .:. ? iel6iSion erite.-a'SOrt,.of political sop to The ',.,,same . officials argued splech by French. PreSfdent the'. -tradifib`nal suspicions of that there were many more Valery Giscard d' Estaing. -., United ;,States intentions?or obvioq reasons for stressing; The French Criticism whether it had a more direct the need for European co -opera, '. c'en: tetted on Mr .Ford failure to trans-Atlanlie'bearing. . ation---thflation and the energyi .'t meintion Eurppe Auring ;Ills e outcome of a morning's crisis not the least ' of them.-= maor foreig poficy :speech" . , '.- The outcome appeared to be that without looking. either acrossi jn after assuminnot too ! much ' importance the Atlantic or the Mediterra- g the pr esidency should be attached to the chid- nean for outside pretexts. But; President Giscard d' Est:ai .: ng ing comment as a signal of these outside events . at least said he saw t,his as clearly any i seri?. us setback to, the re- sprovided more immediacy. ' indicating tha t?/:. Europe Would cent cordiality between Wash- * It seems certain that, if no-:. have, o lookpfter its own ington and Paris. thing else, Mr. Giscard cls' affars and went on to call a Rather', it was assumed, Mr.. Estaing was restating his basic' European summit meeting, ex- Giscard d' Estaing was seizingj commitment Independent pedted at the end of November on a topical issue?the change- ' Europe, which, while maintain.; or early December. , . lover in American leadership-1 ing More ., flexible relations. Given the careful prepara- ! to ,bolster :, what has been his::-with America, would avoid any, lion of such nationally broad- 'i constant ?argument for in- i form of . tran-Atlantic domi-: cast speeches, American dip-' creased European unity. ". name. ??? - ? lornats assume there . ? was! Officials ,involved in the US. - ? some specific reason for the; analysis pointed out that the 24 Approved-For-Release--2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008=2 Ariproved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2 " Wednesday, Aug, 28, 1974 THE WASHINGTON POST B By Joe Alex Morris Jr. Los Angeles Times BONN, Aug. 27?Public hearings into 'West Germany's most sensational spy scandal opened here today with the government expressing deter- mination to keep "the smell of Watergate" out of the proceed- ings. . ? A seven-man parliamentary commission is investigating the circumstances under which Guenter Guillaume managed to rise in 15 years from a supposed East German refugee to a position at former Chancellor Willy Brandt's el- bow. Guillaume was arrested last May, and his exPosure was the motivation for Brandt's dramatic resignation .as head of the West German .government. A key subject in the parlia- ?mentary investigation is how Guillaume managed to get so far despite suspicions leveled against him 'ey official and private intelligence bodies - NEW YORK TIMES 23 August 1974 concerned.with Communist es- pionage. This was not the immediate concern of the parliamentary committee, which Will hear some 20 witnesses this week. The opening eession was marked by partisan squabbles and a denial by an Interior Ministry official that there had been any government ma- nipulation of documents. Government witnesses also testified there had been noth- ing out of the ordinary in the procedures involved in Guil- laume's employment, first as a junior member of Brandt's staff and later as one of his three personal advisers. But the committee has yet to go, into the hotly disputed ques- tion of how Guillaume slipped through the seeurity checks. In. a' lengthy article on this subject, the respected Frank- furter Allgemeine newspaper said yesterday that it was clear that pressure from the Social Democratic Party had fin e f Es overriden the hesitations of Bonn's security advisers. A key witness is expected to be for- mer ? Gen. Gerhard Wessel, head of the Federal Intelli- gence Service. At the time of Guillaume's appointment to the chancel- lor's office in 1970, Wessel said that the East German agents background should be more closely investigated be- cause of the reports about the Frankfurter Allge- hith. meine reported. According to the paper, nothing was done other than to question Guillaume "in a naive and dilettantish way" and some officials who wanted to pursue the matter more in- tensively were told that the in- vestigation was closed. . The pressure to close the in- vestigation came both . from the chancellor's office and from the ,Social Democratic Party, the paper said. The doubts about Guillaume were traced back to a report 1955 by the Investigatiir-e View From the Rhine By James Reston ? BONN, Aug. 22?This capital of West Germany is outwardly as calm these days as an American university town in vacation time, but inwardly ? it is acutely worried about the world ? economy. For while West Germany has the lowest inflation rate of any of the advanced industrial countries?about 7 per cent?it depends for its pros- perity and relatively full employment on selling its goods abroad. Compared to other European coun- tries, it is in excellent shape. Though it still feels amputated with the loss of East Germany, its gross national product per capita is now almost double that of Great Britain. As things now stand, West Germany exports as much to the Western world as the United States and imports al- most as much from the Western World, but this trade accounts for about 23 per cent of West Germany's G.N.P., as compared to only about 5 per cent in the United States, which is there- fore far more independent of the movements of the world markets. Officials here are watching the new Ford Administration in Washington with the greatest care. For as they see it, a strong anti-inflation policy in the United States would mean lower prices for American goods, higher un- employment and therefore less U.S. BONN Since West Germany has led the world in combatting inflation, it is aware of the difficulty of arguing that other countries should do the same. But the point emphasized here is that the U.S. economy is five or six times as large as Germany's and that what- ever the United States does greatly influences the world economy on which all industrial countries depend' more than the U.S. It is noted here that President Ford's main emphasis in his inaugural address to the Congress was on the need to fight inflation, and that he also spoke of the importance of world peace and order. But how far will he go, officials here ask, not only ver- bally but actually, on a deflationary policy? Will he look at it mainly from a U.S. point of view, or try to find the delicate balance between just enough anti-inflation to help the United States and not so much as to produce world-wide deflation? The answer to this, of course, is that President Ford has been in office for only a few days, with a new Secre- tary of the Treasury, a new chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, and a new world-minded Vice-Presi- dential nominee. Both the cast of characters and the mood of Washing- , ton are changing and nobody can be demand for goods fr91113ReNed Fbir Re4eaisev2001i0811418ita1iktREIR77-0 other countries ? ion ge fi ir Committee of Free Jurists, a private organization in West Berlin. At the time, Guillaume was employed by an East Ger- man publishing house, and the committee note_d that his supe- riors there -had reportedly, been told by the Communist Party not to concern them- selves with his frequent ab- sences from his post. . Guillaume was making fre- quent trips to West Berlin and West Germany, where hE aroused the committee's sus picion. The committee's re port on him was handed to the West Berlin police and, ac cording to the leper, later sem on to Bonn but in a watered down version. ?will go. ? Conversations with officials in Bonn and in other European capitals, .however, demonstrate. haw difficult it is to generalize about America's rela- tions with Europe, especially in the field of economics. Each country is still looking pri- marily at its own problems. Thus Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium have had stronger anti-inflation poli- cies than others on this 'continent. France, before the death of _President Pompidou, was more concerned with the growth of her economy than with inflation, but under President Giscard is now taking a more deflationary line: Britain is in an alarming state, with grievous labor-management prob- lems end an annual inflation rate of 20 per cent: The members of the European Eco- nomic Community are talking more frankly to one another now about their common problems, and the. relations between Chancellor Schmidt here and President Giscard in Paris are particu- larly good, but all leaders are still having trouble in reaching common policies to fit their quite different traditions and econornc and political problems. As the testimony of German officials here shows, however, Europe, no mat- ter how much she may worry about the power of the United States, can- not insulate herself from that power economically or financially any more than she can militarily. Europe's papers are now full of bine- iiipis*Acoo origia shin gt 6 they will ? 25 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 :.CIA-RDP77-00432R000100.340008-2 take toward wages and prices. For while the U.S. now has 5.3 per cent unemployment and West Germany only 2.3 per cent, unemployment here is seen , as a greater menace to the stability of the West German Govern- ment than it is to the Ford Adminis- tration. "The only trouble with ? U.S.-Euro- NEW YORK TIMES 14 August 1974 Italy And the C.I.A.. To the Editor: After the corruption of Greek party politics, the systematic subversion and ' then the total destruction of political liberty, after the spiritual humiliation of modern Greek culture, following ? murder and torture by its Greek servi- tors?the C.I.A. has been told to desist from interference in Greece. Had not the regime of the Colonels ended in 'buffoonery and chaos, the C.I.A. would, have received no such directive?if, indeed, it can be obliged to respect it. Has anyone suggested dismissal, or even punishment, for the American public officials responsible for, out- rages committed in our name in a friendly country? Perhaps, however, it is wiser to look to the future. There is another Medi- terranean country in which democracy ? is endangered. The recent bomb out- rage on an Italian train shows that the Italian'right is determined to sow ter- ror and disorder?to provoke .(or pro- vide. an excuse for) a coup d'etat by certain elements in Italian politics and the' armed forces. ? Many?Italian citizens are indeed re- vulsed by the inefficiency, corruption and parasitism of the state bureaucracy (which is a fief of the Christian Demo- cratic party). A new alliance for struc- tural reform in Italian government and society is being negotiated by in- fluential leaders of Italian business, by the unions, the Communists and Socialist parties and by ome Chris- tian Democratic .leaders with a sense of responsibility. That alliance might well entail the entry of a Communist party in the Government. The right seeks to oppose this , at all costs. The Italian Communist party is so reform- ist that it has been criticized by the Italian left for its moderation. Only the blindest and most primitive politi- cal thinking could deny that the Ital- ian Communists have in fact been pillars of the Italian republic since the fall of Fascism. Precisely that sort of political think- ing, if it can be dignified by that term, has characterized the operations of the C.I.A. We are obliged to ask, before it is too late, whether the C.I.A. (and the American Embassy) have intervened in Italian politics. The New York Times has published reports that Mr. Fan- fanfi, the leader of the right wing of the Christian Democrats, has received American subventions. Before events take a turn tragic for Italy, and for our good name in the world, our involvement in Italian politics should be re-evaluated. NORMAN Buusanum Amherst, Mass., Aug. 7, 1974 The writer is professor of sociology at Amherst College and a consultant to the Giovanni Agnelli Foundation of Turin. pean relations," the late Anibassador Charles E. Bohlen once .said; "is that America is just too .damn big and strong. We can a.bsorh troubles others cannot stand. We are more independ- ent of Europe than Europe is of ?us, and it's ?hard for people on both sides - of the Atlantic to understand the ? differences." NEW YORK TIMES 25 August 1974 Bonn Chancellor ids Ford Act Cautiously on Inflation Warns in Interview That Extreme Moves by U.S. Coufd Upset World Economy ?Asks Day-to-Day Consultation ? By JAMES Sptelai to The N BONN, Aug. 24?Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of West Ger- many is warning the Ford. Ad- ministration that extreme, measures to curb inflatien In thes :United States could seri- ously disrupt the world econo- my. In an interview with The New York Times, released to- day, the former German Fi nance Minister recognized the need to combat inflation in the .United States, but appealed for day-to-day consultation among, the major industrial powers to avoid unemployment and re- cession, "There is a danger," he said, "that if the United States as a whole goes deflationary this will inevitably spread to the world markets. It will mean less demand from the U.S. on the world market, and it will mean that we can sell less. "You have to light inflation, but please don't enter into de- flation policy, because you might incur too much unem- ployment, too much deflation in the world economy." Chancellor Schmidt was par- ticularly eoncerned to avoid harsh action by the United States without adequate con- sultation with other ,countries whose economies would be af- fected by American policies. He indirectly criticized former Secretary of the Tresury John B. Connally for having done so in the past. What is required, he said, is the closest personal and al- most daily contact among key officials in the United States, Germany, Britain, France and Japan. "They must never permit RESTON ew York rae! themselves again," he re- marked, "what happened in August, 1971, when somebody acted on his own, even with- out previous warning. . . . This was a grave mistake suscep- tible . to destroying the trust, the confidence in the economic leadership of the United States." The Chancellor also., made the following points: tlAlready, "quite a few gov- ernments were starting to act. on their own." He seemed de- termined to raise a warning against the spread of unilat- eral action. 9The world has not yet seen all the negative consequences of the new floating monetary system. The world has been living with fixed exchange sys- tems for generations and with floating rates.for only 15 or 17 months. "We don't know what to AD with this new prenome- non of the so-called Euro Mar-, ket." 9Labor union leaders have to' take their share of blame for the inflation that is now Europe's major political and social problem. Real wages are falling in the industrial coun- tries and the unions are natur- ally trying to catch up, but this also affects inflation, 9Fortunately, the rising gen- eration in Europe, and particu- larly in West Germany, takes both economic and political co- operation between the nations much more for granted than the previous generation. (IA11 nations are caught up together in a vast stage of structural economic and finan- cial change, "but it is not a situation in which you should lose your nerves or in which one should switch to pessi- mism." The Chancellor referred to the new "shattering experience of the world monetary system 26 after the oil price crisis." He indicated that the world had not yet begun to feel the full force of this explosion. This aggravated the balance- of-payments deficits of coun- tries that were in deficit, and put into deficit some countries that had previously been in bal- ince. The result was that some nations were getting to the point where they could not pay their bills, and were naturally cutting imports and affecting the balance of the exporting countries. While ,West Germany's um- employment rate was only 2.2' per cent as compared with the United States' 5.3 per cent Mr. Schmidt noted that the Ameri- can economy was five times as large as West Germany's. He noted that exports amounted to only about 5 per cent of the United States gross national product, whereas exports counted for almost a quarter of West Germany's GNP. , The Chancellor emphasized that he favored a faster unifi- cation' of Europe. But he said Europe now lacked the outside threat and the dynamic leader- ship that tended to produce common action. "We are living in art era of detente," he said, "and it's re- ally d?nte. It is a much less dangerous world than it was at the time of the Cuban missile crisis and the Berlin crisis: We have had enough of that. The menace has gone, at least it has shrunk." Sees Problem of Coping But he added that nations had not yet learned to live in this new and complicated world, part nationalistic an increasingly interdependent. For example, he noted tha the Euro Market now had a volume of roughly speaking Apprgiecifar,Reiease zocnioama_: CIA-RDR77-00432R000100340008-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2 THE GUARDIAN, MANCHESTER 8 August 1974 CAROLINE TISDALL on the nel:v strength Of neo-Fascists and their successful appeal to the young: Bologna, Wednesday ? o- HAD THE Ronae-Munich express in which 12 people died in the early hours of Monday morning, been run- with efficient European links,, ning on time the bomb it and a certain infallibility in ? carried would have exploded bombing techniques. In the in Bologna station. The political spectrum groups like thought has been formulated this, whether neo-Fascist or countless times during the ?neo-Nazi, have the same am- strikes and protest demon- biguates relationship. to the strations that have followed official parliamentary party of yet another attempt to trans- the extreme Right ? the Every fine phrase that form a state of crisis into a MSI (Movimento Sociale rolled from the Deputy's lips state of .chaos. Italiano) as, do the extra- made his ride rougher: "We parliamentary left - wing are the party that created the In five years the terrorism groups to the official PCI democratic state, . . 'I.roars that began with the bomb in -(Partito Communista . Ital- of derision). ..." we formed Piazza-Fontana, Milan, in ianos). the resistance . . ? " (an emo- December 1969 has ?spread to According -to circum- tive argument ill-placed since all the major cities of Italy stances they are reviled', or the recent arrest of Fuma- apart from Bologna, strong- tolerated, and in some ways .falli, ex-partisan and now a hold of the largest Communist funded, for the MSI the situ- key neo-Fascist figure) . . . Party in Europe ation is all the more compli- "The sacrosanct values of The victims, some burnt cated by the fact that, in liberty" . . . and the rest beyond .recognition, - were to order to remain a legal party, was inaudible. The Christian have received the full State Democrat stepped down, and Instead I was to talk to the funeral that was accorded to - 60,000 - people were sharply Regional Organiser and the the victims of the Brescia I, Ordine Nero is. among the reprimanded by a PC-I official regional ' head of the Youth bomb two months ago. But most feared of the groups, for impeding freedom of Division. Both were in their Presi.dent of the Republic allegedly trained by the speech. twenties. Like their other Leone and the police had misgivings. The tide of feeling OAS, with efficient Euro- The regional seat of the "Camerati" they were both here is too great to risk an pean links and ' a certain Movimento Sociale Italian? di voluntary workers for the open confrontation, and a infallibility in bombing Destra Nazionale in Bologna party. The talkative one was a-mineral water sales repro- decision has yet to be taken 'occupies an entire building in techniques.' sentative, and the .other, who one of the oldest, darkest and as to what will be done with ? the unidentified bodies. ....................... .........m., most picturesq the street of only talked when directly the city. For e past few t addressed, was an economics The funeral, which was to they cannot he 'seen to ? he years it has been constantly student in Bologna University. have been held today, has Fascist.They were later joined by a guarded by police in civilian now been postponed until In- the strikes and demon- .dress. Two -MSI buildings in nervous doctor who was the Friday, but Bologna is still strations of Monday?massive other cities have already been only one who did not give his holding out for a 'State considering that most of Italyattacked. name. Throughout the door funeral. Meanwhile. 18 kilos in general and Bologna in of Tritol were discovered particular has escaped to the In left-wing Bologna th-) yesterday buried under one beaches?the MSI had no position of the MSI is par- of the main streets of the ?voice. Extreme right-wing ticularly odd. This is not just city. deputies and representatives because the present city gov- Speculation a b o u t the were not invited to address ernment is ,solidly Com- bomb's origins reflected the the meeting, and the official munist, but also ha-cause the MSI newspaper, II Secolo city has a tradition of confusion that is now pre- d'Italia. does not appear on extremism on the other side valent, Was 'it the extreme Mondays. The speeches by a that it would rather forget. Right playing off the extreme representative?,, ef the railway The first agrarian Fascist Left. or Vice versa ? Or was union. the PCI. and the PSI groups, for example, were it a straightforwardly right- Parito Socialista Italiano formed in Bologna two years ? wing attack,,, part of the were emotive, but the call for before the march on Rome, now- famaliar attempt. to non-violence was unanimous. and Mussolini was first " overthrow d e m o era e y," elected in elections in The enemies of the people coming as it did in the wake were. the " thugs ? drugged . Bologna and Milan. , ? of the arrests of key neo- math violence, the specula- ' The MSI is an official poll- Fascist figures for the Brescia bomb and the discovery of tors, the cowards Who seek tical party, formed in 1948. paramilitary airfields near to overthrow the demoefatie I Under its leader Almirante it Rieti ? state, those who take advan- commands 3 million votes . tage of a moment of and 52 Deputies in Parlia- The heights of imagination economic crisis ,in order to ment. It cannot call itself were reacaed by the Rai .;bring about a vast and Fascist, since that is beyond (Radio-Televisione Italiano) possibly international plot." the pale of the Scelha Law. in a hastily retracted early The regional Communist At the moment is would seem morning news -bulletin, in spokesman, Mauro Olivi, that the law is catching up which the choice of Bologna reminded Bologna of with it, in spite of Christian was explained as a plot by Togliat t.i's \yarning, of 25 Democrat reluctance to take ? dissident Soviet intellectuals years ago : " Be careful not action. There are two impor- to confuse and discredit the to let events happen that tint cases pendine. (Inc is Communist-governea region. could give fascism another an attempt to outlaw the During the course ofThlon- chanco. Da) nor fail for the party as,a clearly neo-Fascist day morning a comMunique adversary-s provocation." The organisation. The other is the issued by the Ordine Nero Left had opted to condemn charge of war (times (the - This is official MSI . policy, (Black Order) claiming the extremists of -both sides, execution of partisans) since to adroit links with responsibility for the bomb and the reception they levelled at Almirante in the blatantly Fascist and neo- received indicated that this hope that he will not he zible Nazi groups would be to court was discovered in a phone was what the Bulognese to hide behind his parliamen- disaiter - at the present box in the su'uttrhs of flat CC to hear. tar immunity. . moment. So the answer was na. The voice of the Left grew louder, for Ordine Nero Almirante is 140 able talkar that such groups only damaae is the new face of the Orclfne The hoots and whi:itles and a gifted slogan miiKer, the true Iti,4ht. : " Every time Ni-move, one of several extreme that eventually drowned any- Ilia attilnde to his followarq the MSI is about to ha:e right-wine organisations ill a thing the Christian Demacrat is paternalistic. Ile is amen-, another big success another solved tal?ough the applicia .1 L1 , e put y had to say holiaacted able for discussion am boinb th explodes -ce"'" - 1953 in lion of the S n I aWroVett Fbilfieleasa(2001/88/0811.01ALROPF741043200001,003,40Q8c2 LI that' this latest aed to outlaw wm re iss nee Fascist ,organis.ations. ? Ordine Nero is among the most feared, of .the groups,. allegedly trained by the OAS, party has -become in the events of the last few years. Bologna has of course been Communist si ne e 1946 exactly the same period in which the Christian Demo- crats have been in national power. 'and All forms of cor- ruption and erosion of demo- cracy are laid -implacably at their door. politicians, to -have direct and close links with the grass ? roots of his party. His great pride is the youthfulness of many of the MSI members, and the fact that his call to order seems to meet such a approval among a genera- tion too young to remember Fascism. The ? door to the MSI HQ was opened by a very young tough in sturdy hoots. The MSI Deputy and regional propaganda chief, Ceruli, with whom I was to have -talked, was unable to be there because he had been urgently called to Rome where Almirante was explain- ing that he had long ago warned the authorities that dangerous chemicals of the type used on the train were being smuggled out of the university, was guarded. It was difficult to keep them off the subject of the PCI. Their aversion to it was obviously the backbone of their policy, and it was obses- sive. Next in line of attack were the Christian Demo- crats. The reason for this was devastatingly simple : they were convinced that all attacks, -like this latest one, were organised- by the Chris- tian Democrats. In other words, the Chris- tian Democrats were conniv- ing with the Communists to discredit the extreme Right. Th;, of course, is exactly the opposite to the PCI version, which is that the Christian Democrats are actively lunch- ? ing and supporting the spec- trum of the extreme Right in order to bring about a col- lapse of. democracy. They denied any links at all with extremist groups like Ordine Nero, Sam (Squadri Azioni Mussolini), Mar (Movimento d'Azione Rivoluzionarie), or La Fenice (The Pheonik). Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2 incident had set them back a long way, since the MSI was seeking a constitutional collapse through fanning public opinion on the current economic crisis and the scandals of corruption. But economics and. ? corruption had now been swept off the front pages by the bomb, and the effect would be to under- mine the capital they had hoped to make in September . on the hardship and ill-feel- ing caused by inflation and the new taxes. When confronted with the hard facts of an individual like Rauti, an ISI man accused along with Freda and Ventura for the bomb in Piazza Fontana, they genuinely seemed to have no answer. During the course of the interview it became clearer that they could say little more than what they had been taught to say. On the subject of policy they were muoh more at their ease : the language . was alarming, based on Ahnirante's slogans and the phrases of a previous -genera- tion of Fascist and Nazi ideor logists. 'Their explanation of policies was both grandiose and vague. The central hinges were the liberating effect of work and the inequality of NEW YORK TIMES. 11 August 1974 man. The state towards which the Movimento Sociale Italiano di Destra Nazionale (they never abbreviated it) was working was the coopera- tive state in which life would be less boring. It would centre round "the challenge of re-creating the great Italian State to the glory of its free and civilised people." The way would be through sociali- ? sation : the workers would share the profits and the losses of -industry. In recognition that all are not equal, wages would not be either, but the worker would ?know that "work creates liberty." He would not hate his boss since this was a con- cept instilled ? by the Com- munist unlons, and would feel his life was enhanced beyond the narrow limits of the Sicilian phrase "my things " (home and family). It Was on the subject of education.... that the regional organiser really got going " Education will be based on the .concept of selectivity, since men are not equal. The present Italian system levels students too mu-oh, in the cooperative state the new and modern emphasis will be based oh technical skill and ? Strategy of Free orn By C. L. Sulzberger ATHENS?.-The bruise en NATO's southeastern flank caused by the Greek-Turkish showdown over Cyprus is going to take time to heal. In the end the alliance should be strength- ened by the mere fact that it survived another confrontation between two of its partners. But that "end" is still far off. '? NATO is a curious pact. It has man- aged to survive a quarter of a century of peace. equalled only by the Delian League created in these parts 25 cen- allies ago and it somehow keeps go- ing despite private wars involving its members. Thus, during its lifetime, Belgium has fought in the Congo, the British and French in Egypt, France in Al- geria, Portugal in its African colonies, America in Vietnam, Iceland and Brit- ain in ? naval mini-exchanges and Greece and Turkey on and off again around Cyprus. But weirdly enotigh, none of these confrontations has smashed the coali- tion irreparably. Indeed today, for the first time, NATO .is a genuinely uni- form alliance in the philosophical sense of being democratic, thanks to political upheavals in Portugal, Turkey and Greece. But purification came at a price. a high 'degree of specialisa- tion. Italy will regain her rele as a supreme producer of top-rate scientists and technologists. Education will be the battle of life, history will be based on arguments not dry facts, new technolo- gical studies will have pride of place in our schools. "In this the help of the Catholic Church will be sought, but it will be a different Catholic Church. It will be free of all creeping progressiveness. We will oppose the 'idea of the pro- gressive priest. Above all, we will fight corruption, and con- duct a policy of denunciation ? directed at the young. We are convinced that in the long run there can- be only one party that has the courage to reject corruption in all fields , of life. "The Italian people will throw off the Ignoble propa- ganda with which it is fed by the current media and will choose the higher values we propose. We will demand necessary sacrifices of the Italian people, sacrifices that will bring them back to the position of a major power." Here I interrupted the flow of words, partly to ask for more details and partly be- Turkey now maintains in Cyprus about two divisions, whin would be better stationed near Russia. Both the Turks and the Greeks paid heavily for a mobilization against each other. The Greek call-up was a disastrous mess. Turkey has unilaterally warned Greece it is revising its national air- space and henceforth regards offshore Greek islands as Turkish. This means that if Athens sends planes to Rhodes or Chios without first asking Ankara's ? permission, they might be shot down. The psychological atmosphere re-:. mains nasty. Maneuvers NATO hoped to stage in-Greek-Turkish Thrace this fall, involving troops from both coun- tries, must be canceled. Likewise, there is no present thought of sending back to Izmir, Turkey, the Greek of- ficers and men normally attached to a NATO subheadquarters there, with- drawing during the Cyprus affair. None of this is pleasant news and -tension is, likely to continue. Cyprus is a boil not yet lanced. It is hard for the Greeks to replace the 650 officers assigned to that island's national guard. If they withdraw the lot who made so much trouble there, re- Placements arel ikely to be just- as hardheaded, coming from the Same background of chauvinistic training under the seven-year Athens junta. The Turkish Army is by no means deployed to accord with NATO's stra- tegic convenience?most of, the air force having moved to bases near the Aegean. The Greek Army is dispirited and disorganized. It has fallen behind on equipment because of the 'United States Congress's antipathy to sending material aid while the junta ruled. Also, it has been riven by politics. Many of its best officers were fired for opposing the recent dictatorship. It is difficult to bring them back now. cause. I was by now disturbed by the glazed expression in the eyes of this ordinary look- ing Italian. I asked how this programme would be carried out. The reply was that the Movimento Sociale Italiano di Destra Nazionale did not believe in mathematical for- ?mulae like ?tne Communists. In answer to a question about" the relationship of this new Italy to the rest of the world, the reply was that Italy would play a major role in the nations of Europe that would no longer be the instrument of Russia and the US. The conversation had the familiar ring of the old brand of Fascist- propaganda. What did they think was new in the arguments they pro- pounded. The student of economics answered and had the final word: "Our em- phasis on the phenomenon of the youthful Right is new. It is new because it follows a period of permissiveness and because youth, having been used by the old political powers after 1968, is sick of this permissiveness and seeks the moral values we-offer. We can solve the problems of youth in Italy, and the strength of our youth groups is the new element we . bring." Certain key junta supporters have been moved from Athens-to distant units. But the military remains politi- cized and uneasy. -- - Another weakness is the queStion of strategic relations with the United States. Washington had based Greek -policy on the need to maintain bases here, including homeporting facilities for one Sixth Fleet carrier, in order to ? be able to maintain a credible position vis-a-vis Russia in the Middle East. The first part of this formula was worked out and a destroyer flotilla was centered around Athens, including families of the crews, although every intelligent American recommended it would be preferable to keep a low pro- file, arguing, if the United States Navy insisted, it was wiser to do the home-: porting in relatively remote Suda Bay, Crete. But negotiation of the formula's cru- cial second part?involving the car-. rier itself?came to a head just as the junta headed by Colonel Papadopoulos Was replaced by the junta headed by General Ioannides. The latter immedi- ately demanded a higher price from Washington?in terms of aid and weapons?and the proceedings got; stuck. So, by inept policy, the United States earned the blame for tolerating a nasty political regime in order to get naval privileges it never really ob- tained. Thus, in the material sense, NATO is. in poor shape now in the critical area-- separating the Soviet Union from the turbulent and vital Middle East. Allied diplomacy must work hard and swiftly to rectify this situation. In doing so, fortunately, it can rely? on the fact that, despite their quarrel, in both ' Greece and Turkey for the first time in years the spirit of -democracy has revived. 2g -APproved?For Release 2001/08108 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2 NEAR EAST REPORT 28 AUG 1974 American Friends of the Middle East This is the second in a series of articles describing the affiliations, statements, and activities of several Washington or- ganizations which promote Arab inter- ests in the United States. American Friends of the Middle East (AFME), located in an expansive office on Massachusetts Avenue, de- scribes itself as a "private, non-profit organization dedicated to furthering communication and understanding be- tween the peoples of the Middle East and North Africa and the people .of the United States through educational and informational programs." According to Director of Information Services, Joan L. Borum, AFME was created in 1951 when it became ap- parent that the United States was des- tined to play a significant role in the Middle East. As a result of efforts by several noted individuals active in the Arab Middle East, AFME was organized to present "the other side" of the Middle East story, which its founders felt was not adequately represented or heard in this country. "We have always tried not to favor the pro-Arab side or the pro-Israel side," Borum said, "but have looked at the Palestine question from a pro-American side." She maintained that American political decisions concerning the Mid- dle East are often "made without ade- quate access of information." Avowed Anti-Zionism Politically, however, AFME is any- thing but neutral. The organization is avowedly anti-Zionist?though not anti- Israel?asserted Borum, who did not see this as a political orientation. Chal- lenging Israel's right to exist as an "ex- clusive theocratic state," Borum insist- ed that because the creation of Israel was predicated by the Zionist move- ment" it was established on wrong prem- ises." She called American support for the founding of Israel "a big mis- take in terms of American national in- terest. We don't think Israel will ever be a viable entity in the Middle East," she said. To be sure, AFME today has as- sumed a much more restrained polit- ical role than in the past when it boast- ed such extremists and well-known anti- Zionists as Dr. Elmer Berger, Harold B. Minor, and Kermit Roosevelt on its Board of Directors. The stigma of the viciously anti-Zionist diatribes of foun- der Dorothy Thompson, however, has not yet worn off entirely. Nowadays, AFME is less concerned about dissem- inating outright propaganda as about emphasizing Arab medical, educational, and economic progress. With total membership under a thou- sand, AFME relies in small part on a little over three thousand individual contributors to help finance its opera- tions. There is no need to actively solicit funds, however, since a steady flow of money comes from numerous contracts and grants from major corporations and foundations. Among these are the Ford Foundation, the Department of State, and the American-operated Saudi Ara- bian Airlines. Oil companies and other major in- dustries have also contributed, but Bor- urn termed these sums "very minor" since the organization itself is "not a direct service to them" and, therefore, not necessarily in their interest to sup- port. In recent years no corporate fund- ing has exceeded $5,000 per year. CIA Funding Borum admitted that in the past AFME had received significant sums from organizations, including the phil- anthropic Dearborn Foundation, which were later shown to be conduits for CIA funds. Borum added that since the disclosure in 1964, there has been no financial assistance from sources receiv- ing CIA funding. (See Near East Re- port Special Survey, 1964.) A significant portion of AFME's dis- bursements are to its eight overseas offices in the Arab world?none in Israel. Besides the main Washington office, there are U.S. branches in New York, Chicago, and San Francisco, with several more local chapters nattered throughout the country. Although funds are primarily ? used for "manpower and development proj- WASHINGTON POST 23 August 1974 Americans tI)eijed In Int:ia CALCUTTA?Two Ameri- cans charged with spying were denied bail for the 14th" time yesterday, but an Indian judge said he might' reconsider the decision Sept. :3 if they find a suita- ble place to live. ects" in -Arab countries, nearly one- half of AFME'S total revenues go to maintenance and ? administration. At present top priority is being given to counseling Arab students for admission to American universities under pro- grams sponsored by the U.S. govern- ment. AFME also sends specialists to Arab countries to establish bases of co- operation with religious, cultural, and social-minded leaders of the Middle East. It sponsors programs of Arab speakers before student, church, and civic groups to acquaint American au- diences with the Arab viewpoint and conducts an active publication?campaign. ? Besides its bi-monthly newsletter, :AFME Report, the organization puts "out literature describing its activities and promoting the sale of books and pamphlets articulating the Arab posi- tion. These publications unabashedly reflect AFME's anti-Zionist posture. Viewpoints, published monthly, deals with cultural and economic events in the Arab world. The "Basic Facts Series" is a compilation of paMphlets providing general information on indi- vidual Arab countries. Mid East, a monthly review of events, was discon- tinued in 1971 for lack of funds. Ad- ditionally, AFME acts- as a clearing -house for information on the Middle East by offering books and other publi- cations to its members and contribu- tors at substantial discounts. Perusal of the list of information services, how- ever, favors representation of the Arab perspective on the problem. One of AFME's principal objectives is combating what Borum categorized as "misinformation" of the American public by Zionist elements. Asked whether AFmE's anti-Zionist leaning did not place the integrity of the organiza- tion as a nonpartisan one into question, Borum hesitated before saying that this was a serious consideration which she needed more time to think about. ?DAVID ETTINGER Fletcher, 30, have been in jail for 16 months. They be- gan a hunger strike June 17, demanding a trial. ? Their appearance in yesterday was their since their ztrrest. ,were pale and thin. Court sources who at- tended the closed hearing said that the prosecution did not oppose the bail petition, but contended that the house in which Harcos and Fletcher planned to stay was not suited for police surveillance, Police said the two were arrested after Harcos was found swimming in Calcutta court first They Approved For Release22j)01/68/"0?q111KW#142132R pd cos, 'a item . r was Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2 THE DEW REPUBLIC 31 AUG 1974 Whom Do You Trust? ji1Siifyino?Dieoo Garci Something has gone Wrong With the administration's game plan for Diego Garcia. CIA Director William Colby broke ranks and qualified the arguments of the Pentagon?particularly those of the recently retired .chief of naval -operations, Adm. Elmo Zumwalt ? which sought to justify the need for America's first Indian Ocean naVal. and air base because the Russians .either already were around, or certain to come..: In presenting-the case before Congress,-Adni.:Zurn-. -Wait and Adire.Thomas Moorer, recently retired chair- man of the-joint Chiefs of Staff, had marched up to the Hill. with those trustworthy old persuaders, the large- scale maps heavily rouged in red . to dramatize the Soviet areas OfPenetration. But Sen. Stuart Symington of Missouri, who gained x-ray military vision as Presi- dent Truman's: Secretary of the _Air Force and. who uniquely straddles seats on both the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees, had doubts. He summoned Colby to testify before-allowing his Senate military construction subcommittee to proceed on the navy's request for $29 million for the initial expansion of the Diego Garcia project. And since only two fellow ? senators showed up to listen, Symington persuaded Colby that it would be in the public interest for him to sanitize his testimony and permit as much as pos- sible to be printed in the Congressional Record: T. In contrast to the admirals' red maps of the Indian Ocean area, Colby had his own :way of dramatizing: Socotra, in the. Chagos Archipelago; "A bare island. There is almost nothing there except for a small garri-: son from South-Yemen . . The only air strip is an old World War II air strip which is really not feasible for modem operations." Berbera, in Somalia: "A small installation which will . - handle two or three ships. They [the Soviets] have been building-an airstrip there for about a year, but have not gotten very far." ' IVIogadiscio; Somalia's. Capital: "The area Within the. breakwater iS somewhat shallow water . There is an airfield about .30 or 40. miles northwest . "...which They [the Soviets]. have been gradually building up a little bit. But there ,is not Much progress on that either." ,Umm Qasr, in. Iraq: ,"The _So-called port is: about four, five orsix buildings-here,. a place where you can. anchor. It isa 'complicated to get through the delta down to the- [Persian] Gulf. .The Iraqi; appear to be a Little bit restrictive as to the degree to which they will 30 allow theSovietS free use of this particular port.'.' Aden "The Soviets have not used.-it:;very much.; They have nat done much more.thanpOrt visits there. . [The airfield has] a short runway,. not big enougli to handle the TU-16s and larger aircraft." ? . Singapore:.: :The Soviets have bunkered* there. Singapore sells to whoever happens to go by." Mauritius: "Port Louis is a. very good port. It is not all that highly developed. They have-sold bunker- ing to the Soviets." ? , Adm. Zumwalt, te4tifying before the House Foreign Affairs Near East and South Asia subcommittee on March 20, almost four months before Colby, used different binoculars. - ? Socotra: A Soviet "fleet anchorage" and an airfield 'which "provides a potential Soviet base for recon- naissance or other aircraft:- ? Berbera: A 'Soviet "communications station _ a restricted combined barracks and repair ship. and housing for Soviet militaryclePendents." - .Mogadiscio:. The Soviets are building "a new mili- tary airfield Which could be used fora..variety missions. Umm Qasri Soviet-assisted facilities "considerably more extensive than any which would be required fo Iraqi needs alone:" - - . ? - ? . - . Aden: Extended Soviet "port facilities* [and] airt facilities which are used for refueling, replenishmenti and minor repairs." - Singapore-and Maurifius: Places where "the Soviets have recently secured bunkering rights." Summarizing, the CIA director testified: "Our as- sessment is that you *ill See a gradual increase in Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean area, that if there is some particular American increase, that the Soviets! will increase that gradually to match any substantial! additional American involvement... ,". _ Sen. Symington then asked: "You expect the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean to continue to grow re- gardless of what we do, but that it will grow faster, if we start developing Diego Garcia?" Colby: "I think that is true, yes sir." Until now the House has gone along with the Pen- tagon's desire to build up Diego Garda, but the Senate has shown some hesitation. Senate concurrence now, may .hinge on how many senators find time to read S. their Congressional Record of August 1. Warren Unna ? UNNA is the -American correspondent of The States- i man of India. ? ? ?? Approved For Release 2001/08/68 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2 _ ? APproved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100.340008-2 NEW YORK TIMES 1 September 1974 ? Soviet Says` Ford Erred On Indian Ocean Bases Denies That it Has Any Naval Stations in the Area?President Stands on Statement It Has Three ( By CHRISTOPHER S. WREN ? swim to The New York Ttmes MOSCOW, Aug. 31?The .So-. I any formal naval bases in the viet Union ch4rged today that lidian Ocean. But the Pentagon President Ford committed a has contended that Soviet naval vessels enjoy equivalent "regrettable", inaccuracy" privileges in some ports, stating earlier this week that notably in Somalia :where the Soviet Union is understood to maintain an active naval com;- munications facility. ? The Soviet ,Navy is also re.; .ported to have Access to ports in' Aden, on . the island of So- cotra and in the Bangladesh port of Chittagong, as well as major repair privileges in-Singi- . pore. . Moscow has.1 vigorously de- nied that its naval presence in the Indian Ocean constitutes a threat to peace in the area simi- lar to that it attributes to the it was operating three naval bases in the Indian Ocean. "Unfortunately, it must be noted that the head of the Americr Government was mis- informed by his staff. In reality there exist neither three nor even' one U.S.S.R. naval base in tihe Indian Ocean," asserted a commentary issued today by the official press agency Tass. The Tass rebuttal to a re- mark made by Mr. Ford in his news conference last Wednes- day was the first criticism 'of the new President to appear in the Soviet press. While it was couched in mild language, the response pointed up Moscow's sensitivity about the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean. western ports. ? At the news conference, The Soviet Union's maritime President Ford had supported self-image was reflected anew the expansion of the American ? today. In a Pravda-commentarY,. naval base on the small British- I which, while ,discussing / the, ruled island of Diego Garcia, for which Congress recentlyt United Nations Law of the Sea 'appropriated $29-million. Conference that ended in "I don't view this as any Caracas Thursday stressed challenge to the Soviet Union, the need to preserve "the which is already operating, freedom of navigation and the three naval bases in the Indian: free passage of all ships Ocean," the President said. I through 'international straits." 6 However, Moscow has con- Pravda indicated that Mos- sistently condemned American cow would oppose any effort plans to develop an exiting in the final conference -docu- naval communications center merit to restrict such move- on Diego Garcia, a small coral ment, as China has proposed, atoll about 1,200 miles South and assailed Peking for trying of India. ? Earlier this week the Com- munist party newspaper, Prav- da, cited the Congressional ap- propriation as proof that American and British imperial- ist circles were trying to turn the British-owned island into a new seats of tensions, creat- ing at the same time a threat to the independence of the countries of the Indian Ocean." The Soviet Presence The Pentagon has main- tained that expansion of the 1Diego Garcia base into a naval and air support facility is nec- essary to counter the growing Soviet naval presence in the area. The Soviet Navy first moved into the Indian Ocean in 1968. Since 1971, it has kept a flot- illa estimated at up to 20 Ves- sels in the ocean, drawn from its Pacific fleet based at Vladi- vostok. Moscow has not estahlLshed Approved For Release 2001/08/0 proposed base on Diego Garcia. The Moscow 'press has con- tended that the Soviet Union, as "a great maritime power," is entitled 'to use th6 Indian Ocean as a normal route be- tween its own eastern and to create "chaos on the seas and oceans" at the 10-week conference. , ? Today Tass gently reproved -President Ford for his stance ?on Diego Garcia by noting that the Director of Central Intelli- gence, William E. Colby, bad in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee de- scribed the So.viet presence in the Indian Ocean as "relatively small" and had 'said that the final size of Soviet forces there would depend upon what the United States put into the area. The Tass commentary, which lwas written by Aanatoly Krasi- !kov, depicted the proposed new base as a bustling, formidable island fortress. "The Pentagon's plans have, however, met with serious ob- jections from the U.S. Congress and at the same time triggered a wave of protests in the coun- tries of the Indian Ocean," Tass , Ford Stands by Comment WASHINGTON, Aug. 3I?The White House said today that President Ford stood by his comment at his news confer- ence that the Soviet Union had "three major naval , operating bases" in the Indian Ocean. When asked to identify the bases, the spokesman referred 'newsmen to the Pentagon. A Defense Department spokes- man listed the three as Berbera, ? ,a port in Somalia; Umm Qasr, a port in Iraq; and Aden, in (,Southern Yemen. ? "Whether the bases are "ma- jor" has been a subject of- some controversy in the Administra- tion. _ AtRA UDI ?$..YE/rn, Araebaian Sea ? .SOCOTRA Barba SOMALIA ? Indian efteart ' ? '61 500 V!les The New York Than/Seat. 1, 1974 Pentagon says Soviet Navy has bases at places with names underlined. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 27 August . 1974 . Israeli trip to U.S. set up despite spat By Jason Norris . ? Special to The Christian Science Monitor Jerusalem Yitzhak Rabin's American debut as Israel's Prime Minister, now offi- cially scheduled for early next month, began stirring up squabbles here even before its political aims were for- mally defined. ?, Much of the controversy stems from the awkward way in which Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's 'invitation was extended to Mr. Rabin, according to some Israeli com- mentators. -. They complain that Dr. Kissinger announced that the Israeli "Pi--efaler -would be visiting Washington, D.C., before Mr. Rabin had agreed to the prospective date, thereby presenting him with a "fait accompli." The hard noses among them even- suggested that Mr. Rabin should defer a decision on the matter, if not reject the American bid outright for that reason. Other critics of the Rabin mission contend that it is part of the current spate of "sham diplomacy" in which a great many Middle Eastern com- ings and goings are no more than a camouflage for a very real diplomatic stalemate. ? One highly tuned source in the Israeli capital suggested that chances for resumption of the Geneva peace conference on the Middle East this fall are weak, if only because of the sweeping changes in the U.S. admin- istration. Mr. Rabin's Cabinet, however, voted unanimously to approve his plans regarding the U.S. visit, speci- fying that it would take place during "the first half of September." At the same time it bowed to the Premier's request that deliberations 8 :3:11448137tr7V68/140116e0?1100A Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2 until a later date on the ground that political developments may occur in the interim. According to the indepen- dent daily Haaretz the session prob- ably will be held Sept. 8 ? as close as possible to Mr. Rabin's actual depar- ture. The Premier attempted to mollify Dr. Kissinger's local critics by point- ing out that the original invitation was. extended by former President Nixon during his tour of Israel June 17. Not only was the project mentioned In the joint Israeli-American commu- nique at the close of Mr. Nixon's stay but it also was reiterated in a mes- sage sent by President Ford on Aug. 9.. Mr. Rabin noted that Mr. Ford suggested that the visit take place "at end of the summer." Mr. Rabin evidently subscribes to the belief that the U.S. Interest in having him follow in the wake of his own Foreign Minister and those of Jordan, Egypt and Syria and to precede Egyptian President Sadat to Washington is linked to the desire to preserve the diplomatic momentum. On the other hand, the Israeli Premier, who served until last year as his country's Ambassador to the U.S., reportedly observed that domes- tic political considerations may have played a part in President Ford's timing the approaching congres- sional election. 'Hysteria' decried He urged his countrymen to avoid taking extreme or "hysterical" posi- tions on the implications of the next U.S.-Israeli summit, contending that "calm" would serve thein better at this stage. The emotional background of the anti-Kissinger groundswell lies in the impression that Secretary Kissinger may be about to exert pressure on Israel to accept a disengagement formula along the River Jordan. This would entail a withdrawal of Israeli forces, 'establishment of a United Nations buffer zone, and re- newal of Jordanian civil adminis- tration in occupied Jericho. Opposition circles argue that no territory in the occupied West Bank should be relinquished without sub- WASHINGTON POST 24 August 1974 Rowland Evans and Robert Novak espair in the Mideast Private word from a top American ' diplomat to a Western ambassador last week that Israel "etas shut the door" to further withdrawal from the Syrian Golan Heights brought this instant rejoiner: "If so, that means war." The exchange is symbolic ef the sud- den descent from soaring optimism that marked every step of Secretary -of State Henry Kissinger's brilliant shut- tle diplomacy following the Arab-Is- raeli war of last October. ? Indeed, a mood approaching black despair has now taken hold in all Arab' capitals since Kissinger's last 1Vfideast success?pinning down the partial Is- raeli withdrawal from Syria's Golan Heights on May 31. Since then, the ab- rupt change of Presidents in Washing- ton, coupled with U.S. impotence re- garding the Turkish-Greek war on Cy- prus, has led Israel into bold new dip- lomatic intransigence. Although it' is far to early to prove him right, the Arabs fear that Presi- dent Ford, long a champion of Israel as a Republican congressional leader, will be less liardnosed with the Israelis than was Richard Nixon. Because of his extreme political weakness at home, a desperate Presi- dent Nixon this year needed diplo- matic successes in the Mideast as fast as Kissinger could get them and so leaned hard against Israel. Mr. Ford is under no such pressure. Moreover, with the 1974 congressional election only two months away, the President mieht be understandably reluctant to use two-fisted pressure against Israel this fall. This at least partially explains prime minister Yitzhak Rabin's new hard line in Jerusalem. Rabin's government has now systematically closed off every bargaining opportunity with the Arabs save one: a second-stage Israeli withe ? drawal from the Egyptian Sinai penin- sula. But that single opportunity has been tightly closed by the Arabs. them- selves. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat is under overwhelming pressure from other Arab capitals not to take any new withdrawal agreement with Israel, 'on grounds that the Palestinian issue -must be dealt, with first. That Arab pressure would threaten Sadat with political overthrow if he went ahead, ae he would prefer, with a new Israeli withdrawal agreement. Valls, Israel's desire to negotiate with Egypt is meaningless. Sadat's hands are tied. On the other two fronts, Rabin him- . self is now taking a muscular position: the Golan Heights will remain an in- separable part of Israel; and Israel's "rieht" to settlements in Judea and Sa- maria, the ? West Bank of the Jordan River that Israel seized from Jordan in 1967, goes hack to "ancient times." In other words, Israel will, not make even the token six-mile withdrawal from the river that King Hussein demands as the price of attending the ever more distant Geneva conference. This stalemate; which many experts believe wiP lead to a far more danger- ous war?bloodier, longer and more apt to involve the superpowers?than last October's, has continued despite the paeede of Israeli and Arab leaders to Washington the past few weeks. 32 mating the matter to a national referendum, as pledged previously by Mr. Rabin. Evacuation specter raised These'groups fear that Israel will be forced to evacuate the West Bank in it entirety and hand it back to Jordan, which in turn might lose it to a militant Palestinian Arab regime. However, Mr. Rabin will not be empowered to act at his own dis- cretion once in Washington, nor will his discussions be limited to territo- rial questions. ? Under Israel's political system, which is based on parliamentary coalitions of political parties, a prime, minister is duty bound to represent the policies approved by the Cabinet as a whole. Hence the .importance of the pre- departure cabinet deliberations. They will virtually write Mr. Rabin's script for presentation to President Ford, Dr. Kissinger, and Defense Secretary James Schlesinger.. Indeed, the Ford administration, has not yet finally decided where Israel . should next be pressured to move: the West Bank, the Golan Heights or,a combination of bath. ? ? To prepare for another war, Isreal is now neeotiating with reluctant Penta-' gon officials for a vast increase in its militara. arsenal: $e billion in "urgent"' aid, plus a separate package of S1.5 bil- lion a year for each of the next five years. This is supposed to balance the huge" Soviet arms shipments to Syria. But many military experts here feel it would give Israel. too .much potential - fer long-run mletary Operations- the United States would be' powerless to stop. ? Yet, threatened disintegration of the southern arm of NATO in Greece and Turkey gives new substance to Israel's arms demands. With the United States, the United Nations and NATO itself unable to stop the Turkish invasion of Cyprus Israel has gained an important new argument to support its demands. for defense against the Arabs. Only Personal intervention by Presi- dent Ford, convincing Israel that he will not relax U.S pressure for territo- rial concessions and that he stands as ? firmly behind his beleaguered Secre- tary of State as Nixon did, can now ar- rest the alarmieg decline in once bright hopes for a settlement. s. 1914, Field Eviiertirs:.Inci, _ Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77:00432R000100340008-2 _ _ Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100.3400.08-2 NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, AUGUST 26, 1974 India's Downtrodden Burst Into Literature By BERNARD WEINRAUB specie to The New York Times NEW DELHI, Aug. 25?A wave of angry writing 'by im- poverished and low-caste au- thors has burst across the literary landscape of India. . The literature, mostly poetry, is unusual because of its furi- ous explicitness, its sexual bluntness and its dark tone. Perhaps most significant, this is the first time that a large body of writers who are .so- called "untouchables" are ex- pressing their rage at high- caste Hindus and at a system the: authors term exploitive. Within the last year, the spate of angry poetry has emerged in such states as Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, Hihar, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal. Although the poetry is written in regional languages and published in small magazines, radical news- papers, leaflets?even on walls --literary critics are terming the movement a significant break from tradition. "In the past, high-caste writers dominated our literature," said Dr. Prabhakar Machwe, sedr6- tary of the Government-sup- ported Sahitye(literary) Acad- emy, a coordinating body that seeks to advance modern Indian writing. "Now the so-called de- pressed classes are getting edu- cated. Social and political causes are reaching the masses. People are finding frustration every- where and looking for means to express it." Although untouchability is outlawed in India's Constitu- tion, discrimination and preju- dice are still widespread against :Hindus born to families outside the tiered caste system, in :which the priestly Brahmin caste is the highest. Reject Ideology Dr. Niachwe, a poet himself, said: "Many of these young people have gone beyond ideol- ogy -- they say ideology has. no meaning. They say it's all part of a chessboard that must be discarded. It's a kind of ni- hilPisemrh' the most noted writ- ers are the Dalit Panthers, from the Bombay area. These young authors, writing in the local language, Marathi, have named their movement after the Black Panthers ? the word Dalit means oppressed ? and have sought to merge poetry with political activism. Vrtually all the Dalits were born as Harijans ? the Hindi word for "children of God," a terms Gandhi used for untouch- ables in an effort to remove the stigma against them?and have converted to Buddhism. These poets write for two local magazines and have been published in the English-lan- guage press. "We've always had liberal Indians writing about Harijans, but not Harijans writing about themselves," said Dileep Padgi- onkar, an e4ditor of The Times of India who is compiling a book on Dalit poetry. "But the language .was still a Brahmin's language." "The new poets have literally aggressed the language. They use obscenity, new words, new speech that are part of the culture of poverty." "These new poets are mot.; desperate than angry," he said. "They're desperate about the economic situation, about the lack of solutions, about the lack of public morality." Linked to Polities In some cases, poetry and politics have intertwined. A Harijan minister in the southern state of Kannada, formerly My- sore, was forced to resign when he termed current establish- ment literature there as cattle feed. A ministe- in the state of Tamil Nadu has urged poets to emulate?in Tamil?the writ- ings of the angry young authors in other states. In Andhra Pradesh, an eastern state, sev- eral angry poets have joined a violent movement based on the Naxalites, who were terrorists in West Bengal five years, ago. Moreover, the tough poetry 'as well as several new plays and novels are now splashed with explicit sexual passages, unusual in Indian literature. Incestuous and homosexual re- lations have been dealt with lin recent novels and plays by 'Bengali, Marathi and Hindi au- thors. One, play in Bombay "Va- sena Kand" ("Passionate Af- fair"), is now facing a', court test on obscenity_ charges be- cause it involves incest. Cites Newspaper Violene "It comes simply t othis," Mr. Machwe wrote recently in a literary journal. "We tolerate and even connive at violence in life?every daily newspaper is full of such harrowing tales of rape of Harijan women, burning alive of untouchables, murders of poor people. But if one mentions them in lit- erature; the poor author is banned." ? ? Writers and critics have said that the most forceful influ- ence among the younger au- thors is Allen Ginsberg, the American poet who lived brief- ly in Calcutta and Benares nearly a decade ago. , "He made a tremendous. im- pact with his form, his writ- ing, his way of life," said Shak- ti Chatterjee, a poet and 'critic .in Calcutta. I ? "He taught people something very simple: that a poet can go without a job, can be solely devoted to poetry: He taught us that." Other influences include the Spaniard, Federico Garcia.. Lor- pa; the Chilean, Pablo Neruda, and the Russian, Vladimir Maya- kovsky. Recite on the Streets Some poems express empty despair. In the impoverished northeastern state of Bihar, for example, where a restless stu- dent movement is mounting an anti-Government protest, poets have actually come out on street corners and recited their work. One' poem, recently pub- lished in English by, an anony- mous writer, starts: The university gave me A bundle of paper, Weighed down by that burden I knocked at every door, And today after having sold myself . For a whole month, And emerged from the office, I realize? That there are a few coinIn my palm But no rations in the bazaar... Mother, What kind of jungle have you brought me into? Some poems ? express the anger of the untouchables. An anonymous South Indian Tamil author, in a recent anthology of angry poetry, wrote: How do we bear the hot sun By being burned by it ' How do we shield ourselves from the rain 1By being drenched in it , I How do we keep hunger away ,By Starving 'How do we cure diseases ? By Death ;Do you know Who are we? ? Numerous poets mock the National Government, including Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, and write ferociously of the ,ruling Congress party, whose !members often symbolically wear clothes of white home- spun, called Ithadi. A poet from Kananda writes:. Spit on you! two faced, double:- tongued Khadi-wearing, silk-draped Fellow with an open empty skull:.; And some of the poets ex- press anarchic rage. Namdeo Dhasal, one of .the most-promi- nent writers in the current movement and a central figure in the Dalit Panthers, wrote recently: ? Here every season is cruel So it is not enough to hang a skeleton by a branch Here eyelids have no lashes Here every offerer is a miser k So only breaking the glasses is ? not enough Here there is no burning inner soul 'All creation is turned to coal Here every epic poet is a Lilli- putian dwarf.... 33 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003400082 .Thursclay,Aqust29,1974 THE WASHINGTON POST ! By Lewis M. Simons Washington Post Foreign Service DACCA?Without doubt, this year's floods in Bangla-i desk have killed people, de- stroyed crops and wrecked homes. ? . No one knows, however, how high the death toll is, or how -extensive the darn. age. ' More important, no one ' knows, either, how to re- spond to Bangladesh's pleas for help, so thoroughly has the government destroyed its credibility. "We believe the flooding has been more widespread than normal," says a U.S. aid official, "but the damage to housing .and loss of lives and crops are not severe." "What matters is not how widespread the floods are," says a leading government agricultural economist, "but how long the water. remains on the ground. Anything more than five days and rice ! plants cannot survive. In some parts of the country they have been ?.iundated for weeks and the water is only now beginning to re- , cede." "The damage to property, ' particularly to housing, has been enormous,", says a Dan- ?ish official of. the interna-' tional League of Red Cross Societies. "And the floods have perhaps been the last straw tti what was already a highly critical food saute- -tion." The World Bank con- ' ducted a survey of crop damage and concluded that the official government claim a a loss of 1.1 million tons of rice was accurate. sh A number of dip omatie observers and foreign ex- perts are mildly surprised that the government has limited its claim to this fig- ure because it was matched during the floods of 1968 . and surpassed in 1970, while Bangladesh was still east Pakistan. The -explanation seems to be that- cooler heads among senior government officials have prevailed upon the flamboyant prime minister, _Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, to try to convince increasingly ? suspicious and cynical aid donor nations of Bangla- desh's good faith. ? ..Mujib was the prime force In evoking skepticism through his endless repeti- tion of enormously inflated figures of death and de- struction perpetrated on. Bengal by the Pakistan army before and during the 1971 independence war. - This time, even the statis- tics on flood deaths are rela- tively modest by Bangladesh, standards, 1,800. . The smaller numbers have confused Bengalis and foreigners. Everyone in Dacca seems to have his own formula for proving or disproving the official statis- tics. But the fact is that no meaningful assessments will be possible until the waters recede. The attempt to appear sin- cere may be too late and, Ironically, may work against Mujib's efforts to . attract foreign aid. To date, worldwide re- sponse to the country's ap- peals has been just over $3.6 million. Earlier this month, more than 30 ambassadors based in Dacca were taken 34 rses Its re on 'a helicopter tour of flood-stricken area s, and were later told that the gov- ernment required $450 mil- lion to Cover what Foreign? Ministry officials termed a "guestimate" of damage. It is certain that 'nothing like this amount will be do. nated. "It's not that we've been bitten once and are wiser," said a Western economist who has helped Bangladesh through five years of recur- ring disaster. "We've been bitten dozens of times." The "biting" began when the world responded to the death and destruction wreaked by the cyclone of November 1970. Then in 1971 came the Pakistan army's campaign of terror to put 'down the ? Bangladesh independence movement.' The war was followed by a drought in 1972. Then came the effect of the oil price rise on the feeble Bangla- desh economy in 1973, and now the floods of 1974. Bangladesh is' a desper- ately poor country and needs all the help it can get. But foreign governments are reluctant to keep on pro- viding it because of Mujib's government, which is crip- pled by bureaucratie?SOrrnp- tion and paralysis. Middle-class residents of Dacca show foreigners the new brick homes ministers are building in the best sub- urbs. They point out minis- ters' Mcrcedes Benzes. They tick off on their fingers the numbers of trips this minis- ter or that has taken to Lon- don, to Paris, to New York. "Where do they get the money for this?" !the editor of a Bengali- newspaper asked. "Before liberation ibility 'none of them owned even a bicycle."' Most foreigners repre- senting potential aid-giving governments and organiza- tions are convinced that Mu- jib is using the latest calam- ity as a device for prolong- ing his government's life. U.S. representatives' here oelieve that the country has had serious losses in the floods but they have made it clear that the United States is not going to "get back into the old bag." U.S. policy in. Bangladesh and the rest of southern Asia appears to be prepar- ing governments in the re- gion for the time when they must ,fact:massive food shortages ' without signifi- cant U.S, help. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger is expected to visit India late in October and may extend his tour to Bangladesh, Pakistan and ;Iran. There are hint's' in. .Dacca that Kissinger may 'convey this Mujib Iat that time. Mujib may fly to New York next Month to attend .the U.N. General Assembly. and he has already ex- :pressed interest in seeing President Ford and top U.S. leaders. 'The unwillingness on the part of the United States to keep bailing Mujib out does not necessarily mean that Kissinger would be willing to see his ship sink. On the contrary, U.S. officials stress that America's inter- est here is "stability." \ With any .possible con- tenders for Bangladesh lead- ership unknown quantities, stability and Mujib are?for now ? one and the same. Approved For-Release- 20-01/08/08.: -cIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2 Ppproved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340608-2 CHM-Fri-AN SCIENCE MnNI.TOR 4 September 1974 Res retaHate f r &Viet Army's land By Daniel Southerland Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor Saigon The South Vietnamese Army has paid a price for its land grabbing in the northern part of South Vietnam. Retaliation by the Communists in this area has led in recent weeks to the heaviest fighting since the cease- fire was declared more than a year and a half ago. The North Vietnamese have regained a good part of the territory they held in the northern- most region at the time of the cease- fire. Casualties have been high. One well-informed military officer reports that there are more wounded South Vietnamese soldiers in hospitals at the moment than at any time since the- cease-fire was supposed to have be- gun. ? But veteran analysts say that the Communists' aims for the moment appear to be limited. The attacks that have occurred are not intended to be knockout blows, they say. In fact, Hanoi is far from releasing the full force of its war machine in the northern region. "What we are seeing is first an attempt to roll back 'pacification' and second an attempt to make the GVN [Government of Vietnam] more rea- sonable from the Communist point of view," said one Saigon analyst. "They [the Communists] are at- tempting to regain the territory which they claim was theirs or which in fact was theirs at the time of the signing of the peace agreement," this analyst said. Mobility shown Some analysts think that the cur- rent attacks may also turn out to be a prelude to some sort of new Commu- nist political initiative coming per- haps as early as the beginning of next year. One thing which the recent fighting has clearly demonstrated is the im- proved mobility of the Communist forces in South Vietnam. One Commu- nist regiment, the 29th, appeared quite suddenly and unexpectedly dur- ing the fighting around Thuong Duc last month. The soldiers in this regi- ment were rapidly deployed in trucks, thanks to new roads developed by the Communists since the cease-fire. Intelligence experts agree that the North Vietnamese currently have enough Material stockpiled in South Vietnam to launch a general offensive lasting many months. South Vietnam's President, Nguyen van Thieu, has been predicting such an offensive for more than a year now. His information minister an- nounced that a major offensive was Imminent five months ago. But the much-predicted offensive has not come. Public-relations effort? President Thieu's predictions are seen by many observers as part of a South Vietnamese public-relations ef- fort designed to secure continuing support and sympathy from the United States. The predictions may also be de- signed to help maintain South Viet- namese Army discipline and to pro- vide a pretext for Mr. Thieu's contin- uing refusal to agree to certain politi- cal provisions called for in the Viet- nam peace agreement. Contrary to Mr. Thieu's pre- dictions, there are a number of rea- sons for believing that a major offen- sive is far from imminent: TITE WASEENGTON; POST 711?Fgeo!,) A w;.? 29)1974 713111.) .1;) V221.1 E221tereCALS.Fildi CSE,,FX01..2,1=t,i1L,VrelfiSCOMMOEEOSS?Mxt.V.M. A G LS 7r 1Z1 jack. Arnon and Les Whicien Rumors of injustice and cor- ruption in Saigon have always been rife, but only rarely do se- cret documents from South Vi- etnam's own leaders confirm the existence of such sordid conditions. The documents, directly from the files et Pr::tr Tram Thien 1Thiem, show that prisoners were held without trial for up to five year and that ctile7a weve ectelltied but iwi::dritifnitiolie 35 ? In clasaified memos begging his ministers at justice and inte- rior and the national police chief to discipline their under- lings, the premier, a reputedly decent man, admits such hor- rors exist. "Persons have been indicted and held for exceedingly long periods of time without being brought to trial," Xhiem said. There are "191 prisons . . . in Chau Doe re-education cantor; many have been held for two to five yearn without trial." FratuRolarasetf2018008/48a `1yeasant woman from Ba ? (Ay 7179r" 1, tice and national police aides to Xeyen" were held without trial, then transferred to another accord suspects their rights and ? camp where "they were virtu- come down on recalcitrant po- o ally forgotten." Eventually, they lice Wh "decrease the honor of were found not guilty. :the National Police forces and But even those proven guilt- prestige of the government less may, languish in prison, Footnote: In fairness, it Khiem complained. "After be- should be said that the police jag acquitted or given sus- and prison system in North Vi- pended sentences (victims) etnam are worse. In our visits to were nonetheless held in prison Vietnam and talks with cap- (in) Communists, we have. tin) Xuyen and Chau Doe provies." Soran of these .!found little evidence that Ilanoi :abuses, wrote Knion, can ho [believes in the humane treat- ment of prisoners. Anti the tor- eliminated if "dishonest offi- I cials" are fired I Lure stories of U.S. POW's, tor ex.. 340pr loN8 n reform frontnont() Northcil totVit. namese leaders. grabbing e The rate of conscription and the rate of military training in North Vietnam are both currently at low levels. One would expect them to be at high levels before an offensive. ? While Hanoi has the supplies to I carry out a major offensive, it has not been sending troops into the South in large enough numbers to indicate 'preparations for an offensive. Nor has it distributed its supplies in a manner that would signal an imminent offen- sive. oil North Vietnam's strategic forces have not shifted their posture in a way that would point to an offensive. ? There are numerous indications that the North Vietnamese are putting much of tiller energy into solving major economic problems and that they have given their highest priority to the repair of war damage in the North. Cut in supplies hinted Some analysts are convinced that while the Soviet Union and China continue to provide considerable mili- tary and economic assistance to North Vietnam they have actually cut down on deliveries of military sup- plies. These analysts are equally con- vinced that if the North Vietnamese launch a major offensive they cannot count on having the Soviets and Chinese replace all their lost am- munition and equipment. If these analysts are correct, the North Viet- namese stand to gain more from a step-by-step approach to gaining con- - trot in the South than they do from organizing an all-out offensive. FIA_REHR,7;.,9a4A2Kgpt110 premier urges his interior, An-, Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2 NEW YORK TIMES 5 September 1974 China Ties Reported Going Well By LESLIE H. GELB ' But Kissinger Is Said' ments lately: ? " Special to The New York Times i What ' happens next on this WASHINGTON, Aug. 4?The to Face Problem on key 'issue will depend only in naming today of George Bush part on events in Taiwan itself. to fill the top American diplo- Status of Taiwan . It is said that Mr. Kissinger matic jobin Peking comes at a ; is not merely waiting for a I change in ?the, leadership there time when Secretary of State der the control of the Nation-I--General Chiang is 86 years Kissinger is reported to be sat- alist Chinese Government. TheL old: isfied with the development of Nationalists, led by Generalis-' Nor will.Mr. Kissinger be de- United States-China relations. simo Chiang Kai-chek; contends Certain Chinese leaders have that all China still rightfully expressed displeasure with the belongs to them. ? ....? pace of change in American s The American officialS are The to think that the Taiwan policy on the legal status of ' -issue does not have to be dealt Taiwan. It is maintained, how- with right away. ? ever, that Mr. Kissinger has The Shanghai communique, received no indication of this drafted under the supervision of Mr. Kissinger and Premier in private communications. - Chou En-lai, states 'that the It was acknowledged that Chinese representatives in Washington protested recently The appointment of Leonard Unger a widely known career diplomat, to be the American United States acknowledges that both Taipei and Peking ' say, that Taiwan is part -of China. It does not say that Washington' accepts Taiwan as terred from moving on this is- sue in the face of "opposition from Taipei, it is said., The factors governing official American thinking On United States-China relations are pen- cinally the condition of Wash- ington - Moscow relations and internal Chinese -politics. The factors also include several key assumptions about future Chi- nese-Soviet relations. ?Secretary Kissinger's. ap- proach is reported to be. deter- mined in large part by how , , much pressure he wants to ap- part of China. ? ? Ambassador to Taipei and the Th. ? . ply on Moscow. He is said to This is the root of Mr: Kis- 'decision to allo wthe Taipeifeel. that Washington's poten- singer's diplomatic problem? to open new con-tial. for drawing closer to Pc- Governmenthow can he recognize Taiwan sulates in the United States. 'king?and the Russian's wari- as part of China and still main-, The Chinese were said to re- ness of this?will make Moscow gard these moves' as a sign of tam n a separate* defense treatY more conciliatory -on certain strengthening United 'States- with Taipei. . . Taiwan relations and is con- Whether Mr. Kissinger has trary to the Shanghai corn- worked out a Personal solution munique of 1972, which was to this or what understandings issued at the eed of President, , Nixon's visit to China. ' . - he may have reached with Chi- ' , plete bare on the testing of nu- 'Bureaucratic Snafu' ? I nese leaders could not be .clear weapons. He told Soviet ?_. . ' e I -learned But informed State leaders, Administration officials Mr. Kissinger explained' to, ' ;Department officials are ex- related, that a complete ban. on the Chinese representatives that tests could be depicted as So- ' l tremey sensitive on this sub- these were "bureaucratic ?sna- viet-American Collusion against .ject and also about whether fus," that he had not had niuch Peking. there is an agreement between to do with Ambassador Unger's i Chinese representatives. in Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Chou on . appointment and that he was Washington are said to laugh interests. . ? a timetable for resolving. the not informed about the new Tahvari consultants. ? - . ' Problem. at this argument. Nevertheless, Mr. Kissinger, it is reported, The cultural upheav'al in It is clear that they do not it is maintained that Chinese plans to visit China again at China is regarded as havine consider the problem to be ,leaders have told Mr. Kissinger the end of this year or the be- moderated the intnsity but not urgent,. despite its importance. that a total ban on nuclear test- ginning .of the ne wyear. It is altered the direction of the ; Statements Fade . Washington-Peking dialogue. For awhile after the Shanghai Top State Department offi- cials recognize that at some Chou said publicly that the foreign policy seems to be a that could. no e met. point Peking will want some Taiwan problem might not be .major component. Mr. Kissinger has frequent definition ()I the legal stfitus of settled "in my generation." Nei- : The concern is on how van- contact with Huang, Chen, the Taiwan, an island that is all, ther he nor other Chinese lead- ous Chinese leaders are aligning head of the ..Chinese. liaison the territory that remains un-, ers have made signlar state-; *themselves on foreign policy office in Washington. Soviet-American issues, such as negotiations on nuclear arms. Mr:Kissinger is said to have used such reasoning to block a Soviet proposal for a corn- questions to seek'advantage over their political rivals. There is also concern about who will succeed Chairman Mao Tse-tung and Premier . Chou. 'The reason is not, how- ever, that the potential new leaders are thought to be anti- American. It is said to be much more a matter of Mr. Kissinger's hav- ing had little or no contact with! potential leaders. . A key assumption' is that long-term hostility between, China and the Soviet Union is believed inevitable because of I 1 their common border and 15 years of mutual bitterness. Drift From U.S. Seen ? Specialists here assume that: as China grows stronger,. she will not move closer to the Soviet Union but move further from the United States. This is not viewed with alarm, because top American officials' do not see fundamental con- flicts of Chinese and American ? O? ag would There is concern here about regular or periodic meetings, the impact of the Chinese cul- however. He is said to feel that tural upheaval, but not because that might create expectations known that he does not want WASHINGTON STAR 29 August 1974 OA Pa Fow This Es S" BANGKOK, Thailand (AP) ? The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency has deposited nearly $3 million in Thai banks to cover full back pay of Thai, "volun- teer" soldiers soon to be released from captivity in Laos, a government source reported today. The Pathet Lao are re- ported ready to release some 640 'Thai mercenaries and one American civilian and the Laos government to free its North Vietnamese prisoners in an exchange scheduled for Sept. 19. Nearly 20,000 Thai merce- naries ? recruited, sup- ported and paid by the CIA ? fought on the loyal Lao government side before the Laos peace agreement in February 1973. THE U.S. EMBASSY spokesman in Bangkok re- fused to confirm or deny the reported compensation 36 plan. He referred questions to the Thai government be- cause it was a matter in- volving Thai prisoners. The government made no official statement on the pay question. But a govern- ment source said the CIA has deposited $2.8S million In two Thai banks and each prisoner would get his monthly salary for time in captivity. One Western diplomatic source said privately that "the Americans believed they had a duty to provide some kind of compensation to these people, and they I are doing it." THE TWO LAOS sides are to exchange prisoner lists 48 hours before the scheduled exchange on the Plain of Jars, the Thai For- eign Ministry said. The liberated Thais will be flown for debriefing to Nam Phong, an air base south of Vientiane evacuat- ed by U.S. Marine fliers a year ago and then to Korat air base northeast of Bang- kok for physical checkups. !Vitititive-d-fp-r-Relwass? 2c101/08108 -CIA-RD P 7-7-00432 R0001003-40008 L2- - Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340608-2 Washington SzarlIttis Thursday, August 22, 1974 e By Matthew V. Storin Special to The Star-News SEOUL?The pistol shots that killed the wife of South Korean President Park Chung Hee also likely ended any hopes for an early relaxation of martial law government here. The attempt to assassi- nate Park, as he made a na- tionally televised Independ- ? ence Day address Aug. 15, is expected to preserve Park's virtual dictatorship and the strain it has created in South Korea's relations with Japan and the United ? States. Only the day before the shooting, Japanese offi- cials, in the words of one diplomat, "took very hard" the abrupt announcement ? from Seoul that the Korean government had dropped its investigation of last year's kidnaping of Korean opposi- tion leader Kim Dae Jung froin a Tokyo hotel. - Kim, a 49-year-old politi- cian who narrowly lost the' 1971 election to Park, disap- peared for five days and then was freed in Seoul. Japanese police have linked at least One official of the Korean Embassy in Tokyo to the abduction scheme. THE SEOUL govern- ment, however, announced Aug. 14 that their own probe of the incident was over with no charges being made. Kim Dae Jung, meantime, has not been al- lowed to leave Korea and faces trial on alleged elec- tion law violations in 1971. In the wake of the assas- sination attempt, in which Mrs. Park and a 17-year-old choir girl were slain, the Park government tempo- rarily prevented all Japa- nese citizens and Koreans who live in Japan from leaving Korea. The deten- tion stemmed from the apparent fact that Park's assailant, indentified at Mun.?Se Kwang, was a Ko- rean who lived in Osaka, Japan, and traveled with a stolen Japanese passport, Though they were embar- rassed by the involvement of a Japanese resident in the incident, Tokyo Foreign Ministry officials were far from pleased with the travel ban, especially since Kwang had been taken into custody immediately after the shooting. NEViERTHELESS, Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka attended the funer- al services last Saturday for Mrs. Park and later called on Park. The visit was seen as an indication of - Japanese concern over the worsening relations be- tween Seoul and Tokyo. Tanaka's efforts, how- ever, did do nothing to calm popular anti-Japanese feel- ings among South Koreans. (About 3,000 South Ko- reans demonstrated at the Japanese Embassy in Seoul today in the fourth straight day of protests. But Educa- tion Minister Min Kwan- shik, fearing a break in relations between Japan and Korea, called a meeting of high school principals after pupils joined the prp- test and ordered a ban on future demonstrations, the Associated Press reported. (In Tokyo, Vice Foreign Minister Hisanari Yamada tried to ease the situation by saying his government regretted the assassination attempt. Japan was severe- ly criticized in Seoul for an earlier statement attributed to Japanese Foreign Minis- try sources that the Japa- nese government had no legal or moral responsibil- ity in the attempt.) In the United States, meantime, South Korea's image in Congress and at the State Department has appeared to rapidly deterio- rate with the seemingly endless string of secret court-martial proceedings against opponents of the Park government. AMONG THE MORE than 170 people convicted were Korea's leading poet, Kim Chi Ha, a death sen- tence commuted to life imprisonment; Catholic Bishop Daniel Chi, 15 years; 77-year-old former President Yum Po Sun, three years' suspended; and an American-educated leading intellectual, Kim Dong Gil, 15 years. Only two days before the assassination attempt, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in Washington voted to cut in half the administration request for military aid to South Korea in fiscal year 1975. The re- quest was reduced from $252 million to $123 million. Park, who has been presi- , dent since 1961, gathered the strength of his present power by declaring martial law in late 1972 and then pushing a new constitution through a national referen- dum under martial-law conditions. The new constitution _pro- vides for emergency de- crees of nearly unlimited power. Park invoked these on Jan. 8, 1974, providing up to life prison terms for such crimes as "spreading false rumors" against the gov- ernment. He promised the death penalty for those engaging in anti-govern- ment demonstrations. Diplomats in Seoul con- sider Park a loner with a volatile temper but an indis- putable talent for organiza- tion and economic planning, "HE HAS an unswerving belief in his own mission. He thinks that something could be made of this coun- try and that he's the one to do it,", a Park observer of some years commented. To date, the military has dutifully carried out the dis- tasteful courts-martial, though there are some com- plaints in private. There are few serious predictions, even by Park's opponents, of restlessness in the mili- tary.? Kim Dee Jung, now under virtual house arrest, is one of those fearing the long- range effect of Park's poli- cies on South Korea's stand- ing with other nations, part- icularly Japan and the Unitec, States. Still mindful of the mili- tary threat from North Korea, Kim told a recent visitor, "If we become iso- lated, we couldn't maintain this country." WASHINGTON POST 01 September_ 1974. Hanoi Alleges CIA Role in Laos A7ence France-PreL,5e HONG KONG, Aug. 31?The United States Central Intelli- gence Agency has smuggled 3.- 000 troops of Laotian Gen. Van Pao's "special forces" into Thailand for military training, Hanoi's Vietnam News Agency said today. Quoting the pro-Communist Khaosan Pathet Lao news agency, the Hanoi agency said Gen. yang Pao has been ap- pointed deputy commander of Headquarters 333. the com- mand of the U.S. Special Forces in Southeast Asia at tidorn in the northeast of Thailand. 37 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2 Saturday. kiewit 24,1974 THE WASHINGTON POST ute By Laurence Stern WastainErton Post Staff Writer Quiet but significant initi- atives are under way toward ending the 13 years of hos- tile relations between the United States and Cuba. , Conciliatory signals are being flashed between Washington and Havana ?through a variety of inter- mediaries. Although these probes have been unofficial in nature, they are being monitored and evaluated at the highest levels in both capitals. The next development in what Latin American spe- cialists here regard as a fast-moving though low- keyed scenario is expected to. be a call for normaliza- tion of relations between the . two countries by the prestigious Commission on U.S-Latin Ameritan Rela- tions. That panel is composed of prominent businessmen, fi- naneiers,?publishers and aca- demic figures some of whom have, held high governmen- tal policy jobs in Latin American affairs. It is headed by former Xerox Corp. board chairman Sol Linowitz, who served as the Johnson administration's anibassador to the Organiza- tion of American States. . :Within the next few months. the council is ex- pected to produce a wide- ranging review of U.S. rela- tions with Latin America that is bound to have consid- erable impact on the Ford administration. "It is no secret that we are going to recommend normalization as fast as pos- sible, although we've made no public statement to that effect," said one member of the council. "The only ques-' tion is whether we issue a statement now or wait until we are ready to issue the full report." . "The whole Latin Ameri- can position on Cuba," said another participant in the work of the council, "is mov- ing so fast that there is con- siderable feeling we should -say something now or we'll be caught in an undertow of reaction." Officially, the position of the U.S. government is still to look upon Cuba as a revo- lutionary pariah in the hem- isphere. The line?from the lowliest desk officer to Sec- retary of State Henry A. Kissinger?is that "no change" in U.S.-Cuban rela- tions is. under way. Though this may be true, in the I most literal terms, it is far from the whole truth, Kissinger is known to have been aware of recent contacts by Americans with top Cuban ?officials, includ- ing Premier Fidel Castro and his influential chief eco- nomic adviser, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. The Secretary of State is reliably reported to have given private encour- agement to those contacts. Kissinger is . also. unde,e stood to have told both pri- vate and governmental ac- quaintances that, while he personally favors normaliza- tion of relations with Cuba within the general frame- work of ? detente diplomacy, . President Nixon was inflexi- ble on the subject. With a new President in the White House the flexi- bility quotient of the U.S. government is now thought to be much higher, and Kis- singer's hand considerably freer. Castro, for his part, has expressed admiration in the recent interviews for Kis- singer's ability and diplo- matic Objectives. High-rank- ing Cubans have recently told their American visitors that Kissinger's sympathetic attitude toward conciliation between the two countries has been relayed to them through second-party, offi- cial channels such as Mexi- can Foreign Minister Emilio Rabasa. Because of the sensitivity of the current contacts, few of those who have been as- sociated with them are will- ing to speak for-attribution. But the consensus of their 'reporting is that Premier Castro has substantially low- ered the temperature of Iis rhetoric toward the United States and softened the hea- lic terms on which the Car- ibbean cold war ended. The strongest public heti- cation of. this was the reci- findings of the Senate Fc.c- eign Relations Conunitecee chief of staff, Pat M. Holt, a Latin America specialist, who concluded in his form al report to the committee' that "the Cubans are correct when they say . . . that the U.S. policy of isolating Cuba has been a failure. If this is so, then it follows that a new policy should be de- vised." Holt, the a ut h or ? of a memo Foreign Relations Cbmmittee chairman J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) handed to President Kennedy in 1981 opposing the Bay of Pigs in- vasion attempt, is the high- est-ranking U.S. official to have visited Cuba since the rupture of diplomatic rela- tions that same year. ? In addition to the Holt trip, a 15-day visit to Cuba - was made last month by Kalman Silvert, who trav- eled as a visiting New York University professor but is also a member of the Com- mission on U.S.-Latin Amer- ican Relations and Ford Foundation program adviser ' for Latin America. Silvert is a former academic colleague of Kissinger's Latin Ameri- can policy planning adviser Luigi Einaudi. And another unofficial journey to Havana , was made last month by a Wash- ington-based television team led by Frank Mankiewicz, former Peace Corps director for Latin America and a so- cial friend of Kissinger's. He was accompanied by his for- mer Peace Corps' deputy, Kirby Jones, and film pro: ducer Saul Landau of the In- stitute for Policy Studies whose work Castro person- ally knows and admires. The Itlankiewcz team had a rare four-day filming ses- sion with the Cuban leader during which he expressed his admiration for Kissinger and John I'. Kennedy, and r.111111(iai ed terms for rap- prociaenea j1 understood to he couehed in far leF.s re- proachful terms than he has ever publicly slated them. N,,,_otiation:z are bcin..; eon- C:.;S for oirin, the Interview. Cast 'o's choice of the 2slanid owl group upon which to lavish four days of per';onal ;.nteeview tirnc over the numerous reriu%.?Nts ?.that pour into Havana for suchesessions cannot be con- Sidered a matter of coinci- dence. It suggests a strong desire .on his part at this time to -reach through the airwaves to Amirican public opinion. -During that interview Cas- tro openly alluded to his. keen interest in U.S. opinion: in speaking of the hijacking agreement between Wash- ? ington and Havana. --We took an important. step when we signed the hi- jacking agreement," Castro told Mankiewicz in the still- Unpublished interview. '"We have no major airlines and the hijackings were hurting the United Statee, not us. The determining factor that led us to sign the agreement was really a concern for in- ternational public opinion?. for the people of the United States." Cuba, Castro has repeat- 1 edly said, is waiting for the United States to take steps that will include ending the economic blockade launched. - by the Kennedy administra- tion at the height of bad feeling between the two countries. ? Castro and his principal advisers haVe been' telling American visitors -that, from Cuba's standpoint, the -chief impediment to normaliza- tion is the trade blockade di- rected from Washington and carried out?with only pan: tial success?through U.S. trading partners. The official rationale for., the trade embargo, which was adopted by the ?United States in 1962 and by the OAS under heavy U.S. prod- ding in 1964 was to retaliate against Havana's campaign of revolutionary insurgency elsewhere in Latin America. - It is conceded openly by U.S. officials and guardedly , by the Cubans that Havana has since 7968 abandoned its efforts to export its revolu- tion and instead sought to play the role of a showcat:e socialist state. depending heavily on the .tiovie. for its Qconomic survival as a resttV of the beini.,:ohetie ? trade embar,.;o aloiust Bolt cmphasi4cd in 16s re- port that "Cuban suppoi t of 38 - Approved-For Release-2001/08/08-: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008--2- .7 .1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2 revolutionary or insurgency movements elsewhere in 'Latin America has been at a minimum, one might say -a trival level for years in other than an ideological sense." , As long ago as 1971 Castro proclaimed in a visit to Chile that there is "more than one road" to economic development and that each country must find its own ? road. Since Cuba abandoned the course of external revo- lutionary insurgency, as symbolized by the late Er- nesto (Che) Guevara, rela- tions have progressively , warmed between Havana and many of its Latin Amer- ican neighbors. Today there are prospects, considered by regional ex- perts to be quite imminent, that Venezuela and Colom- bia will soon join the ranks of countries in the hemi- sphere that have restored full diplomatic relations with Cuba. The most recent was Panama, which resumed relations on Tuesday. It is expected that by the end of the year there may be only a handful of hold- outs, such as Bolivia, Chile, Guatemala .and Nicaragua. WASHINGTON POST 29 August 1974 Although " the. blockade has failed to prevent a grow- ing Cuban trade with such capitalist partners as France, England, ditaly, Spain, - Canada, and Japan? and most recently with U.S. auto subsidiaries in Argen- tina?it has cost the Cubans dearly in the form of astre; nOmical freight bills. , Since freighters calling on Cuban ports are automati- cally put on. the U.S. black- list and barred from North American ports the Cubans have had to charter ships both for import and export of goods. This has led - td staggering transportation costs, which would be allevi- ated with a relaxation of the embargo. Without continuing Soviet aid to the tune of, some $600 million a 'year Havana's economy would probably have collapsed long ago. ; Nonetheless in the view of 1 many experts, the ? Cubans I- are leery of their lopsided I dependence on the Russians I despite Castro's repeated , public declarations of grati- tude for Moscow's help. The Russians, in turn, would r probably like to lighten the 1 burden of support for .their. Cuba Stance Eased By Laurence Stern and Marilyn Berger' .d Washington Post Staff Writers ? President Ford yesterday signaled a sig- nificant softening in the oft-repeated pub- lic U.S. stand opposing a relaxation of eco- nomic and political sanctions against Cuba. The President laid heavy stress on U.S. action "in concert with" members of the Organization of American States, where - there has been a strong surge of support for ending the 1964 hemispheric sanctions against the Cubans. Official analysts here concede that as many as two-thirds of the OAS permanent council. ? certainly a majority ? are now prepared to vote for an end to the eco- nomic blockade and support restoration of diplomatic relations with Havana. OAS Secretary-General Gab o Plaza of Ecuador acclaimed Mr. Ford's statement ? on Cuba and observed that "it is clear that a majority of the countries [in OAS} are now willing to lift the sanctions against Cuba." He added that it is "highly satisfying to hear that President Ford intends to act through the mechanisms of the OAS." The President said that U.S. policy to- ward Cuba "is determined by the sanc- tions voted by the Organization of Ameri- can States, and we abide by those actions that were taken by the members of that organization." He also said that the United States would exercise the option "to change our policy" if, as he put it, "Cuba changes its policy toward us and toward its Latin neighbors." In pursuing any such action, he added, "we would certainly act in con- cert with the other members" of the OAS. It is widely ceneeded at official levels in Washinetun that. the Cubans long ago abandoned the effoet to exuort_socigist ApproVed FOr e e 1 .remote dependency in Ha- vana. ? ? And so the extension of 'the '.spirit of detente to the! ? Caribbean could provide tri- angular benefits, as analysts ? of the region see it,--to Cuba, the Soviet -Union' and the United States. ., ? Politically, the full retuao of Cuba to the inter-Ameri- can family has become an important symbol and rally- ing cry for the. concept of regional sovereignty and in- dependence of U.S. influ- ,ence. Mexican ? President Luis Echeverria has been 'cam- paigning for admission of Cuba to the conference of Latin foreign ministers, whatever Washington might think of such a move. Echev- erria and other Latin lead- ers see the foreign minis. ters' conference \ as an alter- native political body to the OAS, which is. widely per- ceived as a Washington-dom- inated 'forum. Kissinger this year took an adroitly ambiguous stand on Cuban participation in the next foreign ministers' meeting?an indication, in itself, of a. new "flexibility" revolution elsewhere in the hemisphere. The chief political justification for the 1.964 sanctions was to repel the spread of insurrectionary socialist movements from Havana to other Latin American coun- tries. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger In the past has suggested to Latin Ameri- can foreign ministers that they not rush the Cuban issue to confrontation. There was also apprehensiveness within the administration about the effect of an abrupt reversal on Cuban policy before the November elections. Mr. Ford's state- ment yesterday was the first hint of a new flexibility on the question. OAS Secretary-General Plaza Indicated yesterday that there 'aas been strong pressure with- In the OAS for a meeting of the permanent council within :he next two months to deal with the Cuban question. - The foreign ministers of Costa Rica, Venezuela and Columbia have been press- ing for OAS action designed to normalize Cuba's political place in the hemisphere. Venezuela was the initiator of the 1964 motion in the OAS to impose the sanctions against Havana. Panama quietly last week sent a full diplomatic mis- sion to Havana, ending the 10-year rupture of relations with Cuba. This action is ex- pected to be followed by other moves to restore dip- lomatic relations. While most of the ques- tions at the press confer- ence involved domestic af- fairs, President Ford dealt with several other foreign policy issues. toward Cuba' in. Washington.' The traditional response: would have been head-on op-' position. The key to the future of relations with Cuba is, of course, in the hands of Pres- - ident Ford and his prospec- tive Vice President, Nelson A. Rockefeller?a man who over the years has demon- strated a more than passing interest in Latin America- with its vast Rockefeller holdings in oil and land. The issue of Cuba is re- plete Niiith unknown; if not dubious, benefits to a Re- ? publican President. During the .Nixon presidency the bureaucratic folklo...?e in Foggy Bottotn was that any move toward mellowing U.S relations with Cuba would have been blocked because of Mr. Nixon's friendship with C. G. (Bebe) Reboso, 0 was probably the nue-- t. influential of all Cuban ex- patriates. Whatever the answer, .the betting is that Kissinger will now have more leverage for whatever his objectives may be toward Cuba than ever before in his six years in . Washington. fort is under way to develop al.T.S. position for the next round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Pentagon and State Department offi- cials said negotiations will resume in Geneva in the second half of September. The President said that there is now "an effort be- ing made to bring the De- partment of Defense, the State Department and oth- ers together for a resolution of...the United States posi- tion regarding SALT II. This decision will be made in the relatively near future. I don't think there is any basic difficulty :that cannot be resolved internally within our government." Differences were known to have existed between Sec- retary of State Kissinger and De f en se Secretary James R. Schlesinger as to the timing and tactics on a SALT agreement prior to the last Moscow summit. These were superseded by the decision to conclude a 10-year agreement. Adminis- tration officials say the cur- rent discussions within 'the U.S. government have not reached a point where there are fixed departmen- tal positions that require a presidential decision. President Ford said Kis- sineer would be meeting with representatives from the So- viet Union "in the near future, I think in October." This was a reference to a trip Kissinger Is planning in late Ottober to with Soviet leaders ase 2N1/08/0erCar-flE307P-602iffl000511iCiOu3 ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08.: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2 prospects for a SALT agree- ment. Kissinger told reporters yes- terday that he is also consider- ing a brief separate trip to the Middle East in mid-October, before the Soviet visit, to ex- pediate negotiations toward a settlement there. That trip, to unspecified Middle East capi- tals, would follow talks here with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and meetings with various foreign ministers in September at the time of the opening of the U.N. Gen- eral Assembly. The President yesterday WASHINGTON POST 01 September 1374 Jack Anderson and Les Whitten sidestepped a question about moving the U.S. embassy in Is- rael from Tel Aviv to Jerusa- lem, a suggestion he had made in 1972. "Under the current circum- stance and the importance of getting a just and lasting peace in the Middle East," he said, "I think that particular proposal ought to stand aside. We must come up with some answers between Israel and the Arab nations in order to achieve a peace that is both fair and durable." Detenie and the Cuban Commandos v If the U.S. starts doing business with Fidel Castro's Cuba; as is expected within tht, next six months, CIA.- trained, anti-Castro commandos will turn their deadly skills against the T.J.S. 1. his is the vow of commando lead- ers, who have threatened- to launch a 'campaign of terror in theU.S. like the Irish militants have been waging against the British. - For 13 years, these commandos have risked their lives raiding Cuba. They. have lest comrades who have been 'killed and captured by Castro' S militia. New they see the U.S. preparing to em- brace the hated dictator they have been fighting. ? We spent a week in Miamitalking to 'Cuban leaders and checking into the terrorism that has already erupted in he Cuban community. "If the U.S. recognizes Castro," said one leader grimly, "we will look upon the U.S. as our enemy." Another threatened: "If the U.S. . Won't let us fight Castro in Cuba, we will fight Castro here." ' Others predicted assassinations, bombings and sabotage against Amen- car ?congressmen and businessmen Who support a Cuban-American thaw. One described the coming terror cam- paign menacingly as "civil war." Cuban commandos boasted that they have already shot up the door .of the FBI's Miami office, have blown up the car of an FBI informant and have tried to run aown an FBI agent. U.S. authorities discount most of the talk as bravado. They acknowledge that the Cuban community has been hit by a dozen or more bombings, in- cluding the car of an alleged FBI in- formant. But the explosions have been small. with no casualties. ? Cubans ,vho are considered soft on Castro have also received threats on their lives. For example, storekeepers who sell a controversial Cuban news magazine have been threatened. Although the commandos told us they shut up the FBI. entrance with a .45 revolver, the authorities claim the weapon couldn't have been larger than a small .22 pistol. It is even possible, they say, that the damage was caused by teenagers throwing rocks. There is no denying, however, that the FBI's Cuban intelligence specialist had to dive over hushes to avoid being run do % n by an automobile that whip- pe around a corner and speeded straignt for him. The FBI contacted in Miami, had no comment on these incidents. Miami's quietly. competent Mayor Maurice Ferre acknowledged that a terror - canspaign is "definitely possi- ble" in case the U.S. should restore of- ficial tit s with Castro. 'Feelings run deep enough," he said, . to cause Cuban militants to take des- perate measures. could be like Ire- land," he agreed. But he also said? Cu- ban leaders have a tendency to over- dramatize. -? Although he confirmed terrorism in the Cuban community "undoubtedly is ?going on," he !misted it has been "greatly exaggerated." Most Cubans, he said, are law-abiding and grateful for the haven that the U.S. has pro- vided them. ' There are an estimated one million Cubans scattered across the U.S., with about half of them concentrated in the Miami area. They have formed several dozen anti-Castro organizations. The pattern, explained one official, "is for the members of the group to fight, .,,fragment, and form new splinter groups" Less than half a dozen organi- zations are effective, U.S. authorities estimate. vet hundreds of Cubans have been trained by the CIA in the military arts. They are skilled in handling guns and bombs; they are ready to strike swiftly and silently. It would be ironic if they should now use their schooling in vio- lence against the government that trained them. Yet we spoke to CIA-trained Cubans who swore they would fight anyone who aevocates rapprochement with Castro. This is now expected to be President Ford's first major foreign policy move. Sources close to Secretary of State Henry .'Kissinger say he has wanted to normalize relations with Cuba ever sirce he began practicing detente di- plcmacy. It made no sense to him to seek friendship with Russia and China on the opposite side of the globe and remain nostile to Cuba only 90 miles from our shores. Kissinger was blocked from improv- ing relations with Havana, our sources claim, by former President Nixon who had an abiding hatred for Castro. This' personal animoAty 'dated back to an audience that Nixon, as Vice Presi- :4 0 dent, granted Castro in 1959.- Castro came away from the visit, he COI fided afterward, feeling it had been friendly But Nixon told friends after- ward that the interview had solidified his hatred of the Cuban dictator. ? Nixon reportedly was also influenced by his best friend, Bebe Rebozo, an American-born Cuban who is strongly anti-Castro. With Nixon in seclusion at San Cle- mente and Ford now in charge of the White House, Kissinger is believed to have a oetter chance to work his way. The new President is inexperienced in foreign affairs and is expected to rely heavily on Kissinger's advice. The Secretary of State has already sent signals to Havana through inter-fl that he would like to im- prove relations. Castro has responded favorably. Commenting on the official U.S. attitude toward Cuba, Castro told a Kissinger friend; Frank Mankiewicz, recently: "Cuba is the only country in the world where John Foster Dulles is still Secreatary of State." The cold war has ended, Castro pointed out, everywhere except be- tween the U.S. and Cuba. But now, in response to Kissinger's overtures, the newspapers and radio stations in Cuba have toned down their attacks on the U.S. One iv one, Argentina, Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Panama, Peru and Trinidad-Tobago have established dip- lomatic relations with -Cuba in defi- ance of the U.S.-imposed ban. Colum- bin, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras and Venezuela are getting in line. Not far behind them is the U.S. itself. Footnote: Mankiewicz spent several days with Castro, filming his daily ac- tivities for a TV documentary. Mank- iewicz found the Cuban leader to be immensely popular with his people. Castro drives his own jeep through the Havana traffic, acknowledging the friendly greetings of his fellow motor- ists. Once they stopped at a restaurant in the outskirts of Havana. There was frienily banter between Castro and the waiters. "Tell these people that if they won't serve us lunch," he joked to an aide. "we'll lower their prices." (c) 1974, United Feature Syndicate Columnist Joseph Kraft is on yam. -Approved Po-r-Releaser2001/08/08-:- ?CIA-RDP77-0Cr432R0G01001400082 -