THE PRESIDENT'S SECRET ARMY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 7, 2001
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: August 25, 1974
• Content Type: NSPR

25X1A
.--Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2
CONFIDENTIAL
NEWST,:.V..1.EWS?
and ISSUES

INTERNAL USE ONLY
This publication contains clippings from the
domestic and foreign press for YOUR
BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use
of selected items would rarely be advisable.
No 13
6 SEPTEMBER 1974
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
1
GENERAL
14
EASTERN EUROPE
18
WESTERN EUROPE
21
NEAR EAST
29
FAR EAST
35
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
38
Destroy after backgrounder
has served its purpose or
within 60 days.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2
roved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340608-2
LONDON OBSERVER
25 August 197h
A fog of mystification and elaborate security hides the activities of the
Central Intelligence Agency, with its world-wide network of secret
agents and allies. Originally formed with the respectable purpose of
ensuring that the Government was better informed, it has become a
clandestine operational tool of the United States Presidency, organising
undercover intervention in the internal politics of foreign countries.
Now the facts have been revealed for the first time by an ex-CIA-
man, VICTOR MARCHETTI, who in 14 years rose to a top-level job,
working in the office of the Director. In collaboration with JOHN D.
MARKS, a former intelligence agent in the State Department, he
resolved to break ihe Wall of silence around the Agency. -
Backed by the Government, the CIA tried to kill their-book before
it was written, then held up publication for nearly a year. Under a legal
ruling, it ordered the deletion of 339 passages. The authors and pub-
lishers (one of the biggest in America) fought back in the courts, won
the reinstatement of 171 passages (including those published below in
'black type) and defeated the CIA and the Government by publishing
the book, leaving blank spaces (identified here as 000) where the
text is still censored.
Our opening extract from this book?the first in American history
subjected to prior Government censorship?describes how successive--
Presidents used
THERE. exists in the United States
today a powerful and dangerous
secret cult?the cult of intelli-
gence.
Its holy men are the clandestine
professionals of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. Its patrons and
protectors are the highest officials
of the Federal Government. The
Agency's methods and assets are a
resource that come with the office
of the Presidency. Richard Nixon ?
and Secretary of State Kissinger
used them to the full.
The purpose of the cult is to
further the foreign policies of the,
US Government by covert and
usually illegal means. Tradition-
ally, the cult's hope has been to
foster a world order in which
America would reign supreme, the
unchallenged international leader.
Today, however, the dream stands
tarnished by time and frequent
failures. . Thus, the cult's objec-
tives are now less grandiose,
but no less disturbing. Its world-
wide war against Communism has
to some extent been reduced to a
covert struggle to maintain a self-
sefking stability in the Third
'World, using whatever clandestine
methods are available.
;.5
the CIA and lied for it.
The CIA is the primary instru-
ment of the cult of intelligence.
It engages in espionage and
counter-espionage, in propaganda
and the deliberate circulation of
false information, in psychological
warfare and paramilitary activities.
It penetrates and manipulates..
private institutions, and creates its
own commercial . organisations
(called.. proprietaries'). It re--
cruits agents and mercenaries ; -it
bribes and blackmails foreign
officials to carry out its unsavoury"
tasks. It does whatever is required
.to achieve its goals, without any
consideration of the ethics involved
or the moral consequences of its
actions. As the secret action arm
.of American foreign policy, the
CIA's most potent weapon is its
covert intervention in the i.nternal
affairs of countries the US Govern-
ment wishes to control or influence.
Members of the cult of intelli-
gence, including Presidents (who
are always aware of, generally
approve of and often actually .
initiate the CIA's major under-
takings), have lied to protect the
CIA and hide their own responsi-
? bility for its operations. The Eisen-
bower Administration lied about
the CIA's support of the unsuccess-
ful rebellion in Indonesia in 1958;
and Francis Gary Powers's 1960
U-2 mission. The Kennedy
Administration lied about the
CIA's role in the abortive invasion
of Cuba in 1961, admitting its
-involvement only after the opera-
tion had failed disastrously. The
Johnson Administration lied about
all of the CIA's commitments in?
Vietnam and Laos. And the Nixon
Administration publicly lied about
the Agency's attempt to fix the
Chilean election in 1970.
The justification for the right
to -lie ' is that secrecy in covert
operations is necessary to prevent
US policies and actions from
coming to the attention of the
enemy '?or, in the parlance of
the clandestine trade, the opposi-
tion '. None the less, in many
instances the opposition knows
exactly what covert Operations are
being targeted against it. The
Extracted from The CIA and the
Cult of Intelligence ' b.p Victor Mar-
chetti and John D. Marks, to be.
published by Jonathan Cape on 5
September, price ?3.95.
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : ClA2lDP77-00432R000100340008-2
Appr9ved For Release ,2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2
M--2 Overflights and, later, those.
:.of the photographic satellites were,
and ? are, as well knoivn to the
Soviets and the Chinese as Soviet
overhead reconnaissance of ? the
'US is to the CIA.
From 1952 to 1954, 'at.the height
of the Cold War, the Soviet KGB
electronically intercepted even the.
most secret messages routed
through the code room of the US
Embassy in Moscow. This breach
in secrecy, however, apparently
caused little damage to US national
security,' nor did the Soviet Gov-
ernment collapse because the CIA
had for years secretly intercepted
the private conversations of the top
Russian leaders as they talked over
their limousine radio-telephones.
Both sides knew more than enough
to cancel out the effect of any leak.
The fact is that, in the US, secrecy,
and deception in intelligence oper-
ations are as ? much to keep -
.Congress and the public frcim
learning what their Government is
doing as to shield those activities,
from the opposition.
A good part of the CIA's power
position is dependent upon its care-
ful mythologising and glorification
:of the .exploits- of the clandestine
profession. Like most myths, the
intrigues and successes of the CIA
over the years have been more
imaginary than real. What is real;
-unfortunately, is the willingness of
both the public and adherents of
the cult to believe the fictions.
. In the field of classical espion-
age, the CIA's Clandestine Services'
have been singularly unsuccessful
in their attempts to penetrate or..
spy on the major targets. The
Penkovsky case in the early 1960s,
the only espionage operation
igainst the Soviets that the Agency
can point to with pride, was a
fortuitous windfall which British
Intelligence made possible for the
CIA.
In the beginning, Penkovsky was
not a CIA spy. He worked for
British Intelligence. He had tried
to join the CIA in Turkey, but had.
been turned down' mainly because
the Soviet Bloc Division of the
Clandestine Services was overly
careful not to be taken in by KGB
,double agents, in the period follow-
,ing the Burgess-Maclean catas-
trophe.
The loudly heralded ?Berlin
tunnel operation of the mid-1950s
?actually .a huge telephone wire-
tap?produced literally tons of
trivia and gossip, but provided
little in the way of high-grade
secret information that could be
used by the Agency's intelligence
analysts. The operation's true
value was the embarrassment it
caused the KGB and the favourable
publicity it generated for the CIA.
Against China, there have been no
agent-related espionage successes
whatever.
Fortunately for the US,.
however, the CIA's techni-
cal experts, working with their
counterparts in the Pentagon and
in the private sector, have been
able over the years to develop a
wide array of electronic methods
for collecting much useful infor-
mation on the USSR and China.
From these collection systems, sup-
plemented hy material accumu-
lat cd through diplomatic channels
and open sources, the analysts on
the CIA and elsewhere in the in-
telligence community 'have 'been'
able. to keep abreast .of .develop-1
ments within the Communist
Powers. .
There can be no doubt that the
gathering of intelligence is a neces-
sary function of modern govern-
ment. Without an effective pro
gramme to collect information and.
to analyse the capabilities and pos-
sible intentions of other major
Powers, the US could neither have
confidently negotiated nor now
? abide by the SALT agreements, or
achieve any measure of true
detente with its international
rivals.
The issue at hand is a simple one
of yurpose.?Should- the CIA func-
tion. in the way it was originally
intended to?as a co-ordinating
agency responsible for gathering,
evaluating, and preparing foreign
intelligence for use by Government
policy-makers--or should it be per-
mitted to function, as it has done
over the years, as an operational
arm, a secret instrument .of the'
Presidency ?
The extreme secrecy in which
the CIA works increases the
chances that a President will call
it. into action. He does not have
to justify the Agency's activities to
Congress, the Press, or the Ameri-
can people so, barring premature
disclosure, there is no institutional
force within the US to stop him
fr onr oing what he , wan fse
For example, after Salvador
Allende had been elected President
of Chile in 1970, President 'Nixon
was asked at. a press conference
why the US was willing to intervene
militarily in Vietnam to prevent a
Communist takeover, but would not
do' the same thing in Chile to
prevent a Marxist from taking
power.
He replied that 'for the United
States to have intervened in a free
election and. to have turned it
around,1 think, would have had
repercuSsions all around Latin
America that would have been far
,worse than what happened in
Chile.'
The President failed to mention
that he had approved 0 0 0 0 0
Go000?000 0 0 0 0 0 0
but by keeping his action secret,
he was able to avoid the adverse
political reaction ' he feared. If
.there had been no CIA to do the
job covertly, the US Government
almost certainly would not have
tried to involve itself in the
Chilean elections, since it was obvi-
ously not willing to own up to its
action S.
Almost three years to the day
after Allende's election, he was
overthrown and killed in a bloody
coup d'etat carried out by the com-
bined action of the Chilean armed
services and national police. His
Marxist Government was replaced
by a military junta. What role
American business or the' CIA may
have played in the coup -is not
publicly known, and may never be.
But CIA Director William Colby
admitted in secret testimony
before the House Foreign Affairs
Committee that the Agency had
penetrated ' all of Chile's major
political parties; and that it had
secretly furnished sonic assis-
tance ' to certain Chilean groups.
Even if the CIA did not inter-
vene directly in the final putsch,
INIIIMEZBINIMIIIIM11111111111111111=1111111111111111111,
,CIA and
Cyprus
VICTOR MARCHETTI cabled.
from Washington last week:
The Greek background to the
Cypriot disaster presents one
more reason why. the CIA's
policies and .prattides should be
more tightly controlled by the
United States Congress.
- The seeds of the disaster were
sown in Greece almost a decade
ago, when the clandestine agency
encouraged King Constantine's
effort to thwart the political re-
forms of Leftist Premier Papan-
dreou?reportedly a former CIA
agent. Within two years, a mili-
tary junta took control of the
country. If the CIA did not act-
ively abet the coup d'etat, it Un-.,
doubtedly collaborated with the ?
junta afterward?despite official
denials by Washington.
By then, the CIA's operational?
,imperatiye, replacing its thread-
--bare 'to keep the world free for
democracy,' had become 'to main-
tain stability.' Thus, a repressive
dictatorship in Greece was prefer-
able to a democratically elected,
? Left-leaning Government.
Athens was also a large CIA
station, from which operations
could be supported and launched
against other targets in the Middle
East.
Eventually, the crude methods
of the junta 'became a liability
? even to the CIA and the US Gov-
ernment. The Agency quietly
began to disengage, apparently
transferring certain operational
assets fo Iran?a safer station,
now overseen by former CIA
Director, Ambassador Richard.
Helms. There would, of course,
be no trouble with the Shah. The
CIA had restored him to his
throne earlier by overthrowing
Premier Mussadiq.
On Cyprus, meanwhile, Nicos ?
Sampson moved?with the appro-
val of the junta?to oust Arch-
bishop Makarios. Allegedly, the
CIA had 10 days' warning of the
coup but chose to .do nothing .
about it. Official Washington
sources now claim the threatened
parties Were forewarned. Per-
haps.
the US Government as a whole did
take a series of actions designed to
undercut the Allende regime.
Henry Kissinger set the tone at a
background press conference In
September 1970, when he said that
Allende's Marxist regime would
contaminate Argentina, Bolivia
and Peru?a stretch of the geo- ?
political imagination reminiscent
of the South-East Asian domino
theory. Another measure of the
White House attitude?and an indi-
cation of the methods it was willing
to use?was the burgling, of the
,Chilean Embassy in Washington in
May 1972 by some of the same men
who the next month staged the
break-in at the Watergate. And,
the US admittedly worked to
weaken the Allende Government-.
by cutting off most: economic aid.
Henry Kissinger has dismissed
speculation that the CIA helped
along thiS economic collapse and
then 'engineered Allende's down-
fall; privately he has said that the
secret agency wasn't competent to
manage an operation as difficult as
the Chilean coup. Kissinger had
already been supervising the CIA's
2
- Approved-Fer Release 2001/08/08-: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003400.08-2
most secret operations for more
than four years when he made this
disparaging remark. V. hether he
was telling the truth about the
CIA's non-involvement in Chile or.
was simply lying (called 'plausible
denial '), he along with the Presi-
dent would have made the crucial
decisions on the Chilean situation. ?
THE failure of traditional espion-
age against the principal 'opposi-
tion,' the Soviet Union, meant that
the emphasis within the CIA's
Clandestine Services shifted to-
ward the Third World. This change
reflected to a certain extent a
bureaucratic need as a secret
agency to find areas where it could
be successful. More importantly,
the shift came as a result of a
hardened determination that the
US would protect the rest of the
world from' Communism. Refer-
ring to CIA coups in Iran and
Guatemala, Allen . Dulles, who
was Director during the Cold War
period, wrote.: 'Where there
begins to be evidence that a coun- ?
try is slipping and Communist
takeover is threatened ... we can't
wait for an engraved invitation to
and give aid.'
The Agency's shift towards
covert action was quite obvious to
young officers taking operational
training during the mid-1950s at
'The Farm,' the CIA's West Point,
located near Williamsburg; Vir-
ginia, and operated under the cover
of a military base called Camp
Peary. Most of the methods and
techniques taught there at that
time applied to covert action rather
than traditional espionage, and to
a great extent training was oriented
toward such paramilitary activities
as infiltrationjexfiltration, demoli-
tions and night-time parachute
jump's.
The Third World countries,.
underdeveloped and often corrupt,
offered far more tempting targets
for covert action than those in
Europe. Relatively small sums of
money, whether delivered directly,
to local forces or deposited (for
their leaders) in Swiss bank
accounts, can have an almost
magical effect in changing volatile
political loyalties.
The CIA's early operations in
Asia met with mixed success.
Attempts to develop resistance..
movements in China in the 1950s,.
accomplished nothing more than-.
the capture of Agency offters John
Downey and Richard Fecteau?
and death for the Nationalist
Chinese agents they were trying to
,plant. Mainland China was not
fertile territory for Agency opera-
tions.
But there were successes else-
where.The link insurgency in the
Philippines was put down with help
from the CIA, who played upon
local superstitions about vampires.
The last member of a rebel patrol
would be ambushed, his neck punc-
tured vampire-fashion with two
holes, and the corpse drained of
blood before it was thrown back
on the trail. The rebels, as super-
stitious as any other Filipinos, fled
the region.
Agency - supported 'Nationalist
Chinese troops in Burma (when not
engaged in their principal pastime
of trafficking in opium) were in-
duced to conduct occasional raids
Approved For
'into the hinterland of Communist
.China. In South Vietnam the CIA,
in the person of Colonel Edward
Lansdale (the original of Graham
Greene's 'The Quiet American '),
? played a large part in propping up
the Diem regime?and this was
considered by the Agency to be a?
major accomp)ishment. ?
Such gains in Southeast :Asia
were offset by some notable
failures, particularly the Agency's
failure to overthrow President .
Sukarno of Indonesia in 1958.
Contrary to denials by President
Eisenhower and Secretary of State
Dulles, the CIA gave direct assist-
ance to rebel groups on the .island
of Sumatra. Agency B-26s even
carried out bombing missions l in
support of the insurgents. On 18
May 1958, the Indonesians shot
down one. Of 'these B-26s and cap-
tured the American pilot, 7- Allen
Pope.
? Although-, ? - US Government
officials,
officials. claithed that Pope ? Was 'a
soldier of fortune,' he was, in fad,
an employee of a CIA-owned:peo-
Sprietary company, Civil Air:Trans-
port.
? The Agency also became deeply
involved in the chaotic struggle
which broke out in the Congo in the
early 1960s. Clandestine. Services
operators regularly bought and
sold Congolese politicians, and-the-
Agency supplied money and arms
the supporters of Cyril. AdouIa.
and Joseph Mobutu. By 1964, -the
CIA had imported its own mercen-
aries into the Congo, and the
Agency's' .B-26 bombers, flown. by
Cuban exile pilots?many of whom
were Bay of Pig's veterans. ?carried
Out regular Missions against insur-
gent groups.
? During these years, the CIA. and.
its Special Operations Divisions
were becoming increasgly ? pre-
occupied with Southeast Asia:: In
Laos, Agency operators organised
a private army of more than 30,000
.men and built an-impressive string
of bases throughout the country. A..
few of these bases were used
as jumping-off points to send
guerrilla raiding parties, into
North Vietnam and China.
The CIA viewed the secret
war in Laos much more fav-
ourably than the huge mili-
tary struggle that eventually
developed in Vietnam, The
Laos fighting was not visible
to the American public or tile
world. In fact, the Laotian
war had been.going for years
before the US Congress even
became aware of it.'
The CIA was in complete
control in Laos, but at no
time were more than 40 or
50 operations officers re-
quired to direct the para-
military -effort. The ground
fighting was handled by hun-
dreds of Agency contract
personnel and more than
30,000 Lao tribesmen, whom
the CIA from time to time
secretly decorated with 'in
telligence ' medals.
The CIA's Laotian forces.
were augmented by thou-
sands of Thai volunteers '
paid by the Agency. Air sup-
port, an extremely dangerous
business, was. supplied by
Air America?a CIA-owned
airline?and on occasion by
the Thai Air Force.
Meanwhile, in Vietnam, the
: CIA-ARDP77-00432R0004
CIA supported and financed
a force of roughly 45,000
Civilian Irregular Defence
Guards, local guerrilla troops,
who fought under the opera-
tional direction of the US
Army's Special Forces. CIA
operators and Agency con-
tractees ran the Counter
Terror teams. The Agency
also organised guerrilla raids
against North Vietnam, with
special emphasis i on intru-
sions by seaborne commando
groups coming over the
beach' on specially designed;
heavily armed, high-speed
PT-type boats.
At least one such CIA raid-
ing party was operating in
that part of the Tonkin Gulf
in 1964 where two US
destroyers allegedly came
under attack by North Viet-
namese ships.
. These CIA raids may wel:
have -.specifically provoked
the North Vietnamese action
against the destroyers, which
in turn led to the US Con-,
gress passing its Tonkin GUlf
resolution in 1964, setting the
stage for large-scale Ameri-
can Military involvement in
Indo-China.
DEEPLY embedded within
the clandestine service men-
tality is the belief that
human ethics and social laws
have no bearing on covert
operations or their practi-
tioners. The intelligence pro-
fession, because of, its lofty
natural security' goals, is
free from all moral restric-
tions. The determining fac-
tors in secret operations are
purely- pragmatic : Does the
job need to be done? Can it
be done? And can secrecy
.(or 'plausible denial')
be-
maintained ?
One of the lessons learned
from the Watergate ex-
perience is the scope of this
amorality and its influence
on the clandestine -mentality.
E. Howard Hunt (who
worked in clandestine opera-
tions for the CIA for 21
years) claimed that his parti-
cipation in the Watergate
break-in and the other opera-
tions of the White House
plumbers group was in 'what
I believed to be the . . ;best
interests of my country.'
Hunt expanded . on this
point when interrogated be-
fore a federal grand jury in
April 1973 by Assistant
Attorney Earl Silbert.
S : Were you aware of or
did you participate in any
other what might com-
monly be referred to as
illegal activities ?
H : Illegal ?
S : Yes, sir.
H : I have no recollec-
tion of any, no sir.
S : What about clande-
stine activities ?
H ; Yes, sir.
S : All right. What about
that ?
: I'm" not quibbling, but
there's quite a .lifference
between something that's
illegal and something that's
. clandestine.
S : Well, in your ter-
minology, would the entry
into Mr Fielding's Wani,;:l
Ellsberg's psycn i a t r ist
office have been clande-
stine, illegal, neither ot
both ?
Release 2001/08/08
bbbnijialeirly call it
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2
an entry' Operation con.'
ducted under the auspices
of competent authority.
Within the CIA, similar,
activities are undertaken with,
the consent of competent,
authority.' The Watergate:
oenspirators, assured that
national security ' was at
stake, did not question the
legality or the morality of
their methods; nor do most
CIA operators.
In early October 1969, the
CIA learned through a secret
agent that a group .of radicals
was about to hijack a plane in
Brazil and escape to Cuba.
This intelligence was for-
warded to CIA headquarters
and from there sent on an
eyes only' basis to Henry
Kissinger at the White House
and ton officials of the State
Department, the Defence De-
partment. and the National
Security Agency.
'Within a few days, on 8
October, the radical group
commandeered at gunpoint a
Brazilian commercial, airliner
LONDON OBSERVM
1 Sept. 19714
'wwith 49 people aboard and
after a refuelling stop in
Guyana forced the pilot to
fly to Havana. Neither the
CIA nor the other agencies of
the US Government which
had advance warning of the
radicals' plan moved to stop
the crime being committed,
although at that time the
official policy of the US?as
enunciated by the President
?was to take all possible
measures to stamp out aerial
piracy.
Afterwards, when officials
of the State Department
questioned their colleagues
in the CIA on why measures
had not been taken to stop
the hijacking, the Agency's
clandestine operators de-
layed more than a month be-
fore A;esponding.
During the interim, secu-
rity forces in Brazil suc-
ceeded in breaking up that
country's principal revolu-
tionary group and killing its
leader, Carlos Marighella.
Shortly after the revolution-
: ee
ary leader's death on 4
November, the CIA infor-
mally passed word back to
the State Department noting
that if any action had been
t .ken to stop the October sky-
jacking, the Agency's pene-
tration in the radical move-
went might have been ex-
posed and Marighella's
organisation could not have
been destroyed.
While it was never clear
whether the agent who
alerted the clandestine opera-
tors to the hijacking had also
fingered Marighella, that
was the impression the CIA
tried to convey to the State
Department. The Agency im-
plied it had not prevented
the hijacking because to have
done so would have lessened
the chances of scoring the
more important goal of
' neutralising ' Marighella
and his followers. To the
.CIA's clandestine operators,
the end?wiping out the Bra-
zilian radical movement?
apparently had justified the
means, thus permitting the'
hijacking to fake place.
During the last 25 years
American foreign policy has
been dominated by the con-
cept of containing Commu-
nism. Sincere men in the
highest ' Government posts
believed?and still do believe
?that their country could
not survive without resorting
to the same distasteful
methods employed by the
other side. In recent years
there have been changes in
America's conduct of foreign
affairs. Yet the feeling re-
mains strong among the
nation's top officials, in the
CIA and elsewhere, that
America has an inherent
right?a sort of modern.
Manifest Destiny?to, inter-
vene in other countries' in-
ternal affairs. Changes may
have occurred at the nego-
tiating table, but not in the
planning arena.
0 Victor L. Marchetti and John
D. Marks EFSC.
The chart below was originally censored at the CIA's demand?then restored after legal action.
THE 'CIA is big, very big. Offici-
ally, it has authorised manpower
of 16,500, and an authorised budget
of $750 million?and those figures
are jealously guarded, generally
made available only to Congress.
Yet the Agency is tar larger and
tore affluent than even these
tgures indicate. ? . . ? ?
The manpower total does not
eflect the tens of thousands who
erve under contract, or who work
or the Agency's peoprietary com-
anies. There are one-time agents
hired for specific missions, contract !
agents who serve for extended
eriods of time, and career agents
ho spend their entire working
Ives secretly employed by the CIA.
In some instances contract
gents arc retained long after their
isefulness has passed, but usually
re known only to the case officers
vith whom they deal. One of the
Vatergate bufglars, ueenio Mar-
Inez, was in this category. When
e was caught inside the Watergate
11 that day in June "1972, he still
vas receiving el00-a-month stipend
rom the Agency for work appar-
ntly unrelated to his covert assign-
tent for the Committee to lee-lelect
he President.
Complete records of employment
re not kept in -any single place.
n 1967 when the CIA's role on
kmerican campuses w. as under
SIZE AND COST
Office of the Director
Clandestine Services
(Directorate of Operations)
Espionage/Counterespionage
Covert Action
Directorate of Management and Services
Communications
Other Support
Directorate of Intelligence
Analysis
Information Processing
Directorate of Science and Technology
Technical cor&ction
Research and Development
OF TkiE
Personnel
400
6,000
$ Millions
10
440
(4.200)
(180)
(1,800)
(260)
5,300
110
(70)
(2.000)
(3,300)
(40)
3,500
70
'(1,200)
(2,300)
1,300
(1,000)
(300)
? 16,500*
*Nearly 5,000 CIA personnel serve overseas, the majority (60-70
members of the Clandestine Services. Of the remainder, most are
officers and other operational support personnel.
**Does not include the Director's Special Contingency Fund.
(50)
(20)
120
(50)
(70)
750"
per cent) tieing
communications
close scrutiny, Direct or leichard
Helms asked his sterf to tilld/ Out
just how many universite person-
nel were under secret contract to
the CJA. After a few days of in-
vestigation, senior CIA officers re-
ported hack that they could not
find the answer. Helms immedi-
ately ordered a fell study, and after
more than a mouth of searching
records all over the Agency, a re-
port was handed in to Helms listing
hundreds of professors and admini-
strators on over 100 campuses. But
4
.
the staff officers Ncho compiled the
report knew that their ....ork was
incomplete. Within weeks another
campus connection was eXpesed in
the Press. The conneecz was not
on the list that had been compiled
for the Director.
? Just as the personnel figure is
deceptive, so does the budget
figure not account for a great part
of the CIA's campaien chest. The
Agency's proprietaries, or front
organisations, are otten money-
making cm erxises, and thus pro-
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2-
?
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-60432R000100-840008-2--
vide free' services to the parent
organisation.
Similarly, the CIA's annual bud-
get does not show t.he Pentagon's
annual contribution to the Agency.
For example, the CIA's Science and
Technology Directocate has an
annual budget of only a little more
than S100 million, but it actually
spends well over $500 million a
year. The difference is funded
largely by the Air Force, which
underwrites the national .overhead-
reconnaissance effort for the
entire United States. intelligence
community.
For some reason?perhaps be-
cause of the general view- in the.
CIA ?that its operations are above
the law?the Agency has tended to
play fiscal games that other Gov-
ernment departments would not
dare engage in. One example con-
cerns the Agency's use of its .em-
plOyee retirement fund, certain
agent . and contract-personnel
_accounts, and the CIA credit,
union's capital, to play the stock
Market. ? With the approval of the
.top CIA leadership, a small group ?
of senior Agency officers has for
years secretly supervised the man-
agement of; these, funds and
vested them in stocks, hoping tO
. turn a greater profit than normally
would be ? earned through the
Treasury Department's traditional .
low-interest but safe bank deposits.
and bond issues. Originally, . the
investment group; consisting of
CIA economists, accountants and
lawyers, -dealt with an. established
Boston brokerage house, which
made the final investment de-
cisions. ? Within a matter-of months
the Agency investors were earning
bigger profits than ever before.
Any reasonable reviewer of the
CIA, after supervising the deploy-
ment of Agency funds and per-
sonnel and weighing these against
the intelligence gains produced by
the various directorates, would
probably come to the same conclu-
sion as did Richard Helms's tem-
porary replacement as Director,
James Schlesinger. On 5 April
1973 Schlesinger admitted to the
Senate Armed Forces Committee
that," We have a problem ...we
just " have too many peoPle. It
turns out to be too many people
in the operational areas. These
are the people who in the past,
served overseas Increasing
'emphasis is being placed on science
and technology, and ? on intelli-
gence judgments.'
Schlesinger's words?and the
fact that he was not a house man '
from ,the Clandestine Services?
were auguries of hope to those
many critics of the elv
iv.to be-
lieve that it is overly preoccupied
him the covert side of intelligence.
But Schlesinger has been suc-
ceeded by William Colby?a man
who had ? a highly successful
career as a clandestine operator
,specialising in dirty tricks,' and
who can only be expected to main-
tain the Dulles-Helms policy of
concentration on covert action.
At present the Agency uses about
two-thirds of its funds and its man-
power for covert operations and
-their support?proportions that
have been held relatively constant
for more than 10 years. Thus, out
of the Agency's career workforce_of
Approved For
roughly 16,500`; peOpleand yearly
budget of about $750 minion,
11,000 personnel and roughly $550
million are earmarked for the
Clandestine Services and covert
activities.
Although the CIA has had since
its creation exclusiveresponsibility
for carrying out overseas espion-
age operations for the'collection of
national intelligence, the various
military intelligence agencies and
the intelligence units of American
forces stationed abroad have re-
tained the right to seek out tactical
information for their own depart-
mental requirements. With US
forces permanently stationed in
countries like England, Germany,
Italy, Morocco, Turkey, Panama,
Japan and -Australia, the military'
intelligence services have sought
to. acquire information through
secret agents---the .justification, .of
course, always being the need for
departmental or tactical intelli-
.gence. ?, .?
A... military . intelligence ,?unit
assigned to Bangkok, Thailand, as
late as 1971 was trying to entrap
Soviet *KGB officers, recruit local
spies, and even was attempting to
rim, its own agents into. China
through , Hong Kong. Little or
none, of this activity was being
cleared with the CIA..
',In 1967 Helms was urged by his
staff to authorise an official review
of intelligence collection by ?com-
munity members, with 'special
emphasis on the. many technical
colledion systems.- After several
months of intense- investigation,
the small group concluded?this
was the first sentence of their
report The ? US .. intelligence
community collects too much in-
formation.' The study noted that
the glut of raw data -was clogging
the intelligence systein and Making
it difficult for the analysts to
separate out what was really im-
portant and to produce thoughtful
material for the policymakers. The
study* also observed that there
simply were too-- many' reports on
too many subjects for the high-
level policymakers to cope with.
The study caused such consterna-
tion in the CIA that Helms refused
to disseminate it:
. Secrecy is an absolute way of life
at the Agency, and while outsiders
might consider some of the result-
ing practices comical in the ex-
treme, the subject is treated with
great seriousness in the CIA. Train-
ing officers lecture new personnel
for hours on end about security
consciousness,' and these sessions
are augmented during an em-
ployee's entire career by refresher
courses, warning posters, and the
semi-annual requirement for each
employee to review the Agency's
security rules and to sign a. copy,
aS--"an indication it has been read.
As a matter of course, outsiders
. should be told absolutely'. nothing
'-Some intelligence was not beire.;
evaluated at i II, and, as a result, a new
concept, ' the linear drawer foot,'
entered the Entlish language. Trans-
lated from Pentagonese, this refers to
the amount of paper needed to fill a
tile drawer up to one foot in length.
\ 1969 House Armed Services Com-
mittee report noted that the South-
east Asia office of the CIA alone had
517 linear drawer feet unanalysed
raw intellir,wics:Jsi ?
Release 2601105
Iiis-FkbtYr7
5
about the CIA, and fellow em-
,ployees should be given only that
Inforniation for which they have an
actual need' to know.'
CIA. personnel become-so accus--
lomed to the rigorous security
precautions (some of which are
indeed justified) that they easily
'accept them all. They Work with a
telephone book marked SECRET,
which is intentionally incomplete.
It lists no one working in the Clan-
destine Services, and each semi-
annually revised edition leaves out
the names of many of those em-
ployed by the overt directorates,
so that if the book ever falls into
-unauthorised hands, no enterpris-
? ins foreign agent or reporter will
be able to figure :out how many
-people work at CIA headquarters,
or , even bow- many work in non-
clandestine jobs. f hose temporarily
_ omitted can look forward to having
their names appear in . the next
edition of the directory, at which
time others are selected for tele-
phonic .limbo.
Added to this confusion is the
fact that most Agency phone num-
bers are regularly changed for
security reasons,- Employees man-
age to keep track of 'Coirtmonly
called numbers by listino* them in
their own personal deskdirector-
ies, although they have to be care-
ful to lock these in their safes by
? night?or -else risk being charged
with a security violation.
Along with the phone books, all
other classified material (includ-
ing typeNvxiter ribbons and scrap
paper) is placed in theSe safes
whenever an office is unoccupied.
Security guards patrol every part
of the agency at roughly half-hour
intervals in the evenings and on
weekends.
Even a -charwoman at the CIA
must gain security clearance in
order to qualify for the badge that
she, too, must wear at all times;
then she must be accompanied by
an armed security guard while she
cleans offices ? (where -all classified
niaterial has presumably already
been locked up). Some rooms at
the Agency are considered so
secret that the charwoman and
her guard must also be watched
by someone who works in the
office.
. The pervasive secrecy extends
-everywhere. Cards placed on
. Agency bulletin boards ,offering
items for sale conclude: ' Call
Bill, extension 6464.' It was only
in 1973 that employees were
allowed to answer their phones
.Vith"any Words' other than those
signifying the four-digit extension
number.
The - headquarters building,
located on a partially wooded 125-
acre tract eight miles from down-
town Washington, is a modernistic
fortress-like structure. Until the
spring of 1973 one of the two roads
leading into the s..clucted corn-
- poumwas totally unmarked, and
the other featured a sign identify-
ing the installation as the Bureau
of Public Roads.
When the CIA headquarters
building was being constructed
during the late 1930s, the sub-
contractor responsible for putting
in the heating and air-conditioning
system asked the Agency how many
pLo_pJe site,str.ite,tetre, was intended
-00432ROPMW-401pmys)-L For security
- Approved For Release. 2001/08108 .7,7,CIA-RDP77709432R000100340008-2'
reasons, the ,AgenCy refused to tell
him, and he was forced to make .
his own "estimate based , on the
building's size. The resulting
heating system worked reasonably
well, while the air-conditioning
was quite uneven. After initial
complaints in 1961., the contractor
installed an individual thermostat
in each office, but so many Agency
employees were continually re-
adjusting their thermostats that
the system got worse.
At this point the CIA took the
subcontractor to court to force him
to make improvements. His
defence was that lie had installed
the best system he.could, without a
clear indication of how many
people would occupy the building.
The CIA could not counter this
reasoning and lost the decision. ?
Another unusual feature .of the
CIA headquarters is the cafeteria.
It is partitioned into a secret and
an open section, the secret part
being for Agency employees. only.
The partition ensures that no.
visitor will see the face of any
clandestine operator eating lunch.
The CIA's ' supergrades' (civilian
equivalents of generals) have their
own private dining room in the ex-
ecutive suite, however. There they
are' provided with higher-quality
food at lower prices than in the
cafeteria, served on fine china with
fresh linen by black waiters in
immaculate white coats. These
waiters and the executive cook's are
regular CIA employees, in contrast
to the cafeteria personnel, who
work for a contractor. On several
occasions the Office of Management
and Budget has questioned .the
high cost of this private dining
room, but the Agency has always
been able to fend off .the ? attacks,
as it fends off virtually all attacks -
on its activities, by citing national
security.'
Although .no statistics are avail-
able, mental breakdowns Seem
more common in .the . Agency's
tension-laden atmosphere than in
the population as a whole, and the
CIA tends to have a more tolerant
attitude toward mental health
problems and psychiatric therapy
than the general public. In the
Clandestine Services, breakdowns
are considered virtually normal
work hazards, and employees are
encouraged to return to work after
they have completed treatment.
Usually no stigma is attached to
illness of this type; in fact, Richard
Helms suffered a breakdown- when
he was still with the Clandestine
Services during the 1950s and it
clearly did not hurt his career. Ex-
Clandestine Services chief Frank
Wisner had a similar illness, and
he later- returned to work as the
CIA station chief in London'.
Many Agency officials are known
for their heavy drinking, which
also seems to be looked upon as an
occupational hazard. Again, the
CIA is more sympathetic, to drink-
ing 'problems than outside organ-
isations. Drug use, however, re-
mains absolutely taboo.
INTELLIGENCE a;;.tencies, in the
popular view, are organisations of
glamorous master spies who, in the
best tradition of James Bond, dar-
ingly uncover the /Nil intentions
of a nation's -enemies. to reality,
however, the CIA has compara-
tively little success in acquiring
intelligence through secret agents.
This classical form of espionage
has for many years ranged con-
siderably below space satellites,
code-breaking, and other- forms of
technical collection as a source of
important foreign information to
the US Government. Even open
sources (the Press and 'other corn-
Inunications media) and official,
channels (diplomats, military at-
taches, and the like) provide more
valuable information than the
Clandestine Services ot the CIA.
Against its two principal targets,
the Soviet Union and Communist
China, the. effectiveness of CIA
spies is virtually nil. -
To be Sure, the Agency has
pulled off an occasional .espionage
coup, but these have generally in-
volved the 'walk-ins '?defectors
who take the initiative- in offering
their services to the Agency.
Nearly all the Soviets and Chinese
who either spied for the CIA or de-
fected to the West did so without
.being actively recruited by Ameri-
ca's leading espionage agency. ?
A large percentage of defectors'
become psychologically depressed
with their new lives once the initial
excitement ,of resettlement in a
.new country wears off. A few have
cOmmitted suicide. To try to keep
the defector content, the CIA
assigns 'a case officer to each one
for as long as is thought necessary.
With a particularly volatile defec-.
tor ? the Agency maintains even
closer surveillance, including tele-
phone taps and ejail intercepts.
In some instances, case officers
will watch over the defector for
the rest of his life. More than
anything else, the Agency wants no
defector to become so dissatisfied
that he will be tempted to return
to his native country.
Agents are intricate and, often,
delicately balanced individuals.
With the Soviet Oleg Penkovsky,
his British and CIA handlers found
that. flattery Ny as a particularly
effective- method of motivation..
Although be preferred British
manners, Penkovsky greatly ad-
mired American power. Accord-
ingly, he was secretly granted US
citizenship and presented with his
' secret' CIA medal. As a military
man he was quite conscious of rank;
consequently, he was made a
colonel in the US Army to show
him that he suffered no loss of
status. because of his shift in
allegiance.
On two occasions while Penkov-
sky was an active spy, he travelled
outside the USSR on official duty
with high-level delegations attend-
ing Soviet-sponsored trade shows.
Both times, first in London and
then- in Paris, he slipped away
from his Soviet colleagues for .de-
briefing arid -training 'sp.ssions with .
British and American case officers.
During one of the London meet-
ings, he asked to see his :US Army
uniform. None of the CIA men,
nor any of the. British operators,
had anticipated such a request.
One quick-thin king officer, how-
ever, announced that the uniform
was at another safe house and that
6
driving there and bringing it back.
for Penkovsky to see would take
a while. The spy was temporarily
placated, and a CIA case officer
was immediately dispatched to find
a colonel's uniform to show to the
agent. After scurrying riround
eondon for a couple of hours in
search of an American Army'
colonel with a build similar . tO
Penkovsky's,,the operator returned
triumphantly to the debriefing
session just as it was concluding?
uniform in hand; Penkovsky was
pleased.,
. Months later, in Paris, the CIA
operators Were better prepared. A
brand-new uniform tailored to
Penkovskv's measurements was
hung in a closet in a room, adjacent
to where he was being debriefed,
and he inspected it happily .when
the meeting was concluded. - ?
A NUMBER of years ago the CIA
established a secret .historical lib;
rat-y, later a secret internal profes-
sional journal, and in '1967 began
the preparation of the exhaustive
history of the Agency, being writ-
ten by retired senior officers.
Recognising the irresistible ten-
dency Of :former .intelligence offi-
cers to write their memoirs and
thereby often to embarrass their.
-organisations and their Govern-
ments with their revelations Direc-
tor Helms prudently aoreed:to per-
mit the preparation of-an - official
secret history of the CIA and its
clandestine . activities. . Retired
senior- officials were rehired on
contract at their former salaries to
spend a couple of additional years
with the Agency putting 'their
recollections down on paper.
Helnis's . decision was a master
stroke. The history will never be
completed, nor will it ever he pub-
lished. By definition it is ,a perpet-
ual project and one that can be read
only by those who have: a clear
heed to know.' But the writers, the
battle-scarred old hands, have got
their frustrations out of their
systems?with no harm done?and
they have probably been better
paid than they would ? have been
had they gone public.
Counter-espionage, like covert
action, has become a career spec-
iality in the CIA; some clandestine
operators do no other type of
work during their years with the
Agency. These specialists have
developed their own - clannish
sub-culture within the Clandes-
tine Services, and even ether CIA
operators often find them exces-
sively secretive and deceptive.
The function of the counter-espion-
age officers is to question and
verify every aspect of CIA opera-
tions taking nothinr, at face
value, they tend to see deceit every-
where In an Agency full of ex-
tremely mistrustful people, they
are the professional paranoids,
even to the extent of, reportedly,.
keeping a list of the 50 or so key
positions in the CIA most likely
to have been infiltrated by the
KGB and maintaining constant
surv eiflance on the occupants.
Approved For 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340908-2
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2
ICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH
25 AUG 1974
IT
t?
NeV:1/47
ti '1 .
fr117 A
-
7:/g r.ra (an: fir-P.?-\,?
er since ,Vathan Hale teas caught,
-11r,"riremq hare surrounded the "spy
rao" with. o mmantic mystique. Miles
*o:---Inral describes in his new book,
? C7:".7k or Dazer." the process
rcdblooded A merican lad can
a fulUledged CIA ."company"?
on.
By Miles Ccpaland
V.Then I toured the United States in 1970
t I acture to university audiences, I found
;nat the most vocal students in all parts of
he country saw the Central Intelligence
agency as representative of all that is
-tong with "the rotten society we live
0."
Question periods were all taken up by
aeated discussions revolving around the ?
gency's supposed intrigues in all
a.pitals of the world, including
Washington and London: its backing of
rise;-wing totalitarian regimes; and its
-working for the large corporations
-other than for the American people,-
.
HACK AT THE HOTEL there was
nether story. I was deluged with calls
7071 students wanting to know how to join
Although a high percentage of the -
-ufents who sought me out to discuss the
.aa:hiiitis of a career in intelligence
.stra!Iihri.nrcvard tyr swhothoughin
eresa of practical advantages, either for
? lsee career ora.s a szepping-stone to
ometning else, even more were roman-
tics ? Walter Mittys, in fact; ("See that
little man over there?" said Inspector
Hargreaves. "You wouldn't think it to
look at him, but he has all the secrets of
the wcrld in his head.")
Whatever the motives, there are
thousands of young Americans whowould
give their eyeteeth to be employed by the
CIA or. simply, to "get into the in-
telligence business," as one student put it
to me, and by "intelligence" he clearly
meant the spookier side.
Although every one of the thousands of
letters of application that reach the CIA
:ieadquarters at Langley. Va., is given
serious consideration, the attitude of
agency recruiters is generally one of
"Don't call us; we'll call you,'
The mere fact of offering one's services
F-T-73
T Pr'q
,LtJ
:
9
,
LILL,
to the CIA is regarded as ground for
suspicion. And for good reason. An
analysis of these letters shows clearly
Mat many of them were prompted by
motives other than patriotic ()ties, a
chance to "have a look at the insideso that
I can write a book about it later" being a
particularly prominent one.
The CIA keeps what must certainly be
the largest card file in existence of possi-
ble recruits for its organization?univer-
sity students, members of certain
professions and people having certain
special qualifications. A person may find
himself propositioned by a CIA recruiter
because some area division chief hasask-
ed for ''a man, age early 20s. who has a
background in electronics, who speaks
Hungarian although is not of Hungarian
ancestry, and who can meet the agency's
criteria for career officers."
He is more likely to be approached,
however, if he is simply a senior in "one of
the better American universities?(i.e.;
one that has a minimum of stutlent
demonstrations) with a B average, an ab-
sence of left-wing affiliations and a
record of sound emotional health. The
CIA employs professors and graduate
students at "the better American univer-
sities- to canvass members 'of senior
classes, either in the name of the CIA it-
self or through some "front,- commer-
cial or institutional.
ONCE YOU GET IN, you will findYour-
self in a whole new world. The CIA's
recruiters do their best to screen out the
romantics and to select only young men
and women whosemotivationsareentire-
ly practical: but I would say that 99 per
cent of those who join the agency are at
least partly attracted by the glamor.
Even those few who are entirely blase
when they first get into the agency are
certain to be dazzled by the in-
doctrination. e -
The first training undergone by young
CIA employes who are "officer
material" takes place in the modern,
streamlined buildings at Langley. Much
of it is concerned with routine matters
such as forms for reports. how tograde in-
formation, how to use registry. etc., but
there are also many exciting exhibitions.
Experts put on dernonstratiens of how to
WASHINGTON POST
22 August 1974
William 113. Sh at t tock
'Employee
the CIA
For 20 Years
William Beverly Shattuck,
167, an employee of the Central
'intelligence Agency for more
than 20 years until his retire-
ment in 1968, died of a heart
lcondition Sunday at: Suburban
Hospital in Bethesda.
Mr. Shattuck joined the CIA
1when it was i'irst being fern;.
led following NVorld War II. in
ApproA'dcOoliteRWliAgn2obthyeto8
7
t 1
;
ei?tb
771). ? 0 "
? .71 c;''' nil it S 0.1
z; ti VZ.N
pick locks, plant microphones, steam
open letters, forge documents.
Then there is kpositively frightening
series of lectures, complete with slides.
charts, and photocopies of secret official
Soviet documents and Communist Party
correspondence, which is delis ere.d with
such authority that it would convince
anyone not only that the Cold War still
goes on, but that it holds greater and
greater dangers which can be thwarted
only by an alert and efficient intelligence
system.
'FINALLY. THERE IS A DISPLAY of
the "national security machinery"? or
"the real Washington," as one instructor
calls it?which shows how, despireall the
bumbling that is inevitable in any large
organization, the U.S. government does
manage to protect the nation's inerests
and how, at the same time. it has a system
of "fuses" which ensure that no element
of the" machinery" can acquire an excess
of power. This part of the course is most
impressive.
The second part of the indoctrination
takes place at a country estate, a few
hours' drive south of Washington, known
as "the farm." Here the new CIA
employe gets a taste of what it is like
"out in the cold" ? in the danger
areas where persons in clandestine ser-
vices supposedly operate: on the border
between East and West Germanyoon the
Soviet-Iranian border. in "recepaion"
areas in Communist China.
In one "night exercise" the trainees
black their faces and try to cross a border
protected by charged barbed wire, dogs,
electric eyes, traps, floodlights and bor-
der pa trots. When they arecaught,as te
inevi [ably are. tney are put through an
terroaation by" East German security
ficials" played with enormous realism.
the training division's actors.
In amither "field exercise." t
trainees go into a nearby town to "cas
restaurants and other places to det:
mine their suitability as meeting plac
for agents.
SOME OF THE TRAINEES e
parachute jumps, ore in the daytimea
one at night, a: ter wl ich they havetohi
0 0
": : 14
1111 se ee aoao
their parachutes ih tl.e approved rnannt
Onlya few of the traiaees willever have
do any of these thing; in real life, of cot
- se, and those few take.additionattrainin
but they are given a feet for the problem
they may later assien others as they
comfortably at hea.lquarters
operations. '
These two ind.octi ination courses a
just the beginning of CIA training..
career officer of the oiA spends a gre
deal of his service in courses
"retreading" every year or so to I
brought up-to-date ea recently develop.
methods, provided with langua
i i
training, and given courses n politic
revolution, counter: evolution and cots
terinsurgency, among others..
The first job ef a new recruit to 51
CIA's espionage branch is likely to be;
assistant toa "ceskofficer" ?at the..Irt
Desk, the Low Countries Desk Cr any o
of 33 to aieothers. His duties will mostly i
Ntolve servicing reacests frora'?the fielc
?fora new automohiie, for special equi
merit of various kinds, or for an adjus
ment in some accounting mistake_
The first step upward of the new office
is not from assistant desk officer to des
officer, but from assistant desk officer t
assistant case officer in some fiel
station.
It is in the field that the up-and-comic
espionage specialist first sticks his nec
out. He will be entifelya t thernercyof hi
chief of station. and. asis well known,
good chief of station is a masterat cheat
of taking personal credit for everythin
that goes right and blaming his subot
dinates for everything that goes wrent
while giving the appearance of doing jut
the opposite. In aszy case, the relation
between the chief of station and the nel
officer will be both close and stormy.
The real ambition of the CIA officer i
training is toget bigeer and betterassig,r
merits between headquarters and th
field, in as wide a variety of places a
possible,
(C) la 7a by Miles Cope.'and. From th
book -Without Djggcr"
Milos Copeland_ Repr.'r;t,.d by perreiz
&ion of Simon & Schuster, Inc.
ilieutenant-colonel assigned to
;the Inter-American Defense
'Board in Washington.
Before the war, he worked
with a number of firms on
Wall Street, including Moody's
Investment Service, A. Vere
Shaw & Co., and Sweetser &
Co., of which he was a partner.
Mr. Shattuck; NVIII) was born
Brazil, id., graduated from
the University of Indiana and
attended Harvard UniverSity
business before going to Wall
Street..
Survivors include his wife,
Betty Taylor Shattuck. of the
hometi 8309 Burdett(' rid., Be-
. thesda: a sister, Lucy Shackle-
ford of 1:o:wild:de, I nil.; and a
brother. James C. Shattuck of
: tiltiRE/Prrt104t2R0001 00340008-2
, Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
4 September 1974 .
CIA: But who will
watch the watchers?
Without Cloak or Dagger, by Miles
Copeland. New York: Simon and
Schuster. $8.95.
By Leon Lindsay
If you want to know as much about
the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
as possible ? without compromising
its present or future operations, of
course ? what better source than a
man who was present at its inception,
has served it long and well in many
capacities, and retains his status in
the agency's "gentlemen's club"?
Miles Copeland is that man. For 278
well-written pages the author edu-
cates the reader about intelligence,
espionage, and counterespionage,
carefully avoiding any exposures of
sensitive identities or operations.
There is not much doubt that this is
an "authorized biography" of the
CIA, published to counter recent
publication of adverse articles and
books.
If it is not a defense or an apologia
for the Agency ? which has recently
seen its romantic, "cloak and dag-
ger" public image stripped away to
expose the uglier aspects of its oper-
ations ? it is at least an attempt to
present the "real" CIA.
If, in casual, disarming references,
some of the cold-bloodedness, cli-
quishness, and self-justification slip
through ? well, that is not going to
alarm the reader very much. Even
the assertion that someone has to
take care of "dirty tricks" may seem
a truism in these times.
But there are still, one would hope,
a lot of Americans who are not going
to be able to accept Mr. Copeland's
final chapter, "Some Conclusions."
Most of these "conclusions" are
stated with the kind of righteous
assurance one usually expects only
from fanatics. For example:
"If it isn't already, the CIA may
well become 'the world's most pow-
erful government agency,' as one
columnist called it."
The word "agency" may not ex-
actly put the CIA on the same plane as
the three great branches of U.S.
government ? until one reads a few
lines farther on:
" 'The dangers are increasing,' an
Agency official told me, 'and our
power to deal with them is increasing
proportionately. But so is the public's
fear of us. Although the nature of the
dangers is such that the Agency can
hardly become less secret in handling
its information . . . , it can at least
put its trust in a representative
number of Congressmen" (my ital-
ics).
What are the "increasing dan-
gers"? Mr. Copeland identifies two:
first, terrorism, andparticularly new-
left terrorism, which he says is a
worldwide, if amorphous conspiracy:
second, the competing imperialisms
of the Soviet Union and Communist
China ? vying with each other to
economically strangle the U.S. by
taking over, through one means or
another, areas of the world with
strategic materials.
The extent of records kept by the
FBI, Army CIC, and other agencies,
in connection with suspected left-wing
associations, has only recently been
?discovered ? and decried. Mr. Cope-
land admits that the CIA has the most
comprehensive computerized file on
individuals in the world, and he gives
it a name: "Octopus."
The file's existence is justified, he
says, by the terrorist threat. Even
some of the CIA's liberals don't like it.
But, explains Mr. Copeland, even
these civil-rights-conscious people ac-
cept its necessity for they know
frightening facts the ordinary citizen
doesn't.
He makes some other statements
that seem relevant: "Removing the
dangers inherent in a 'powerful' gov-
ernment agency is-not a matter of
decreasing the power, but of ensuring
that those who exercise it are in-
corruptible and truly responsive to
public interest." (italics his).
The CIA "will support politicians,
political groups, and governments
through the world [including in the
U.S.?] whose objectives are com-
patible with our own; it will some-
times work with unpopular organiza-
tions ? American, international, and
foreign.
"All these actions are certain to
result in some public outcry, and the
extent to which the agency is able to
survive it will depend on the extent to
8
which the public becomes confident
that the agency really has unpubli-
shable information necessitating the
moves, and is acting entirely in the
public interest and not for the gain of
Individual political figures, political
parties, or special-interest groups."
In this case, the reader is led to
assume, as in justifying other activi-
ties, the CIA "will give its contacts in
Congress ample information to prove
the necessity for so doing." The
Implication here, possibly unintentio-
nal, is that the agency itself will
determine who those congressional
contacts will be.
But the same "defusing" process
that works to abort assignments that
the CIA 'gentlemen's club" considers
unwise has other uses. Mr. Copeland
gives a very disturbing example:
When James Schlesinger became
director of the Agency and immedi-
ately began a shakeup (for whatever
motives), his efforts were cleverly
sabotaged. Clearly, the CIA will be
internally changed only if the "gentle-
men's club" wishes it so.
Mr. Copeland says one maxim is
being inculcated in the younger men
now: "'Always keep in mind whom
you are-working for' ? meaning it's
not for the President of the United
States as a person, not for the Direc-
tor of the CIA, but for the CIA as an
Instrument of the American democ-
racy."
Considering the existence of "Oc-
topus," the Agency's coziness with
selected politicians, "dirty tricks" at
home and abroad, and Mr. Copeland's
indication that the CIA strongly
doubts the possibility of real detente,
one can't help but wonder about their
definition of democracy.
In fact, after reading Mr. Cope-
land's conclusions, one might con-
clude that Big Brother is abcrut to
unlock a door marked "1984."
Leon W. Lindsay, chief of the
Monitor's New England news bu-
reau, was a member of the
U.S. Army's Counter-Intelligence
Corps.
,Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : C1A-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2
NEW YORK TIMES ?
5 September 1974
FORD AMES BUSH
ASEIcV4Y TO CHINA
TO SUCCEED Ha
Choice of ,G.O.P. Chairman
Is Among Moves to Revise:
'Party and Government:
KENNETH RUSH SHIFTED
Selected for Post in Bonn.--
Cooper to Be Arnbassador,
to East. Germany ?
By PHILIP SHABECOFF
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Sept. 4 ?
President Ford today named
George Bush, the Republican
National Chairman, to be the
United States envoy to China
as he announced his first major
changes in key diplomatic, po-
litical and economic posts. ?
Mr. Bush, who is 50 years
old, will succeed the 76-year-
old David X. E. Bruce, who re-
portedly has been ill, as head
of the United States liaison of-
fice in Peking. .
- Because they have not estabe
lished formal diplomatic rela-
tions, the United States and
China do not have embassies in
each others capitals and have
not exchanged ambassadors. As
,head of a liaison mission rather
than an ambassador, Mr. Bush
will not require, confirmation
bythe Senate.
Paris Post for Rush
A White House official close
to the President said that to-?
day's appointments marked the
beginning. of Mr. Ford's efforts
to reshape both the Govern-
ment and the Republican party.
, The other significant person-
nel changes announced today
by the White House press sec-
retary, J. F. terHorst, include
the following:
q,K-enneth Rush; the eco-
nomic counselor to formet
President Nixon, who has con-
tinued in his post under Mr.
Ford. was nominated to be Am-
bassador to France.
(!John Sherman Cooper, a.
Republican Senator from. Ken-
tucky until he retired in 1972,
was named to be the first Unit-
ed States Ambassador to East
Germany.
William D. Rogers, a Wash-
ington 'lawyer and former State
IDepartment official, was nom-
mated by Mr. Ford to be As-
sistant Secretary of State foe
Inter-American Affairs.
Approve
? At a news briefing today,
Mr. terHorst also said that
President* Ford and the White
House chief of staff, Gen. Alex-
ander 'M. Haig Jr., had been
discussing possible new assign- ?
ments for General' Haig and
that one was the post of com-
mander in chief of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization.
forces.
Mr. terHorst said that no de-
cision had been reached and
that meanwhile, General Haig
would .continue to 'serve "indef-
initely" as the White House
chief of staff. However, he said
that General Haig had indi-
cated to the President that he
would like to return, to the
Army.
Explaining the selection of
Mr. Bush for the Peking post,
a high White House official
said: "George Bush was- a
strong and viable candidate to
be Ford's Vice President until
the last minute. He is some-
body the President holds in
high regard. His appointment,
therefore, is a signal to the'
Chinese that the , new United
States envoy is somebody who
has the President's ear."
Post Has Ambassador's Rank
Mr. Bush served two terms
as a member of the House of
IRepresentatives from Texas. -
His only experience in diplo-
macy his been about two years
he spent as United States rep-'
resentative at the United No:-
tions.
As head of the liaison rnis-.
sion in Peking, Mr. Bush will
hold ambassadorial rank. His
appointment to a diplomatic.
post clears the way for Mr,
Ford to assume effective charge:
of.-- the Republican National
Committee, a. White House of;
ficial acknowledged today.
The -official agreed that Mr:'
Ford's recommendation that
Mary Louise Smith be appoint'
ed to succeed him indicated
that the President intended to
exercise practical control over
the party. Mrs. Smith is a party'
professional who has held nol
major elective position.
Although Mr. Bush foughtl
against attempts by the White!
House, under President Nixon,'
to use the Republican party to
defend Mr. Nixon against im-
peachment, he was associated
iwith the "imagery k; of the
Watergate scandal, according
to one White House official.
The appointment of Kenneth,
1Rush to the Paris post also
helps solve a domestic problem
for President Ford. Mr. Ford
had been criticized for retain-
ling President Nixon's economic
lacjvisers even though economic
conditions have steadily
worsened;
Mr. Rush, who has served
both Mr. NiNon and Mr. Ford
as chief economic spo',iesman,
wa..s alsg.,npmed recen1.1y.chair-
14) CM6,1046,0/20011d08/0
LONDON TIMES
22 August 1974
Intelligence bashing
Operation Splinter
Factor
By Stewart Steven
(Hoader, ?3.25)
agent from 1949 onwards and
' did Mr Dulles's work by sys-
tematically feeding Stalin's
paranoia about the infiltration
of western agents into eastern
Europe..
There is no evidence that
Swiatlo was a double agent, but
even if he was he did not have
the power attributed to him, and
there were so many other
known reasons for the show
trials that there was little need
for him or for Mr Dulles to
add more. Such trials had been
a part of the established system
in the Soviet Union since well
before the war and it was logical
to transfer them to eastern
Europe along with other- -=oectt
of the system. ThP-
among other things, to find
scapegoats for economic failurts,
to resolve rivalries within toe
communist parties, 'and to it-
duce- an atmosphere of terror
and uncertainty. Perhaps the
CIA added a little fuel to the
flames by sowing addition&
suspicions here and there but
it seems very unlikely that its
role, if any, was as crucial as,
Mr Steven suggests.
If one is going to rewrite.
history one needs to provide a
little evidence. And if one is
going to indulge in the fashion-
able and often justified pas-
time of bashing the intelligence
services one needs to show that
one has higher standards.
Richard Davy
I am not convinced by this
book, and since the author pro-
vides no evidence to support
his story the reviewer does not
have to provide any evidence to
refute it?though it does, in fact,
contain some factual errors.
What Mr Steven claims is that'
the wave of show trials and
terror which swept across
eastern Europe before Stalin's
death was masterminded by Mr
Allan Dulles of the CIA, who
hoped that it would so discredit
the communist regimes that the
people would rise up in revolt.
As it turned out, when people
did rise up somewhat later they
were put down, but there is no
evidence that the show trials
' had much to do with it. Many
ordinary people were totally
indifferent to whether one lot
of communist leaders was put-
ting another lot in prison.
Mr. Steven, who was on the
Daily Express and is now on the
Daily Mail, admias that the
alleged plot did not work but
insists that there really was a
plot. Its key figure, he says,
was Jozef Swiatlo, a deputy
head of department in the
Polish security police, who
defected to the west in 1953.
Mr Steven says he was a double
Wage and Piice Stability. The
i'White House did not disclose
'today who would replace him
in his various jobs.
Mr. Rush, who held posts as
Ambassador to West Germany,
Deputy Secretary' of Defense
and Deputy Secretary of State
before moving to' the White
House, was said to be delighted
with his new assignment.' He
will replace John N. Irwin 2d
in Paris.
Mr. Rush is' said to be close
to the French Foreign Minister,
Jean Sauvagnargues. The two
men were Ambassadors in Bonn
at the same time and helped
negotiate the 1972 agreement
with the Soviet Union regulat-
ing civilian travel in and around
Berlin.
The appointments of Mr.
Cooper and Mr. Rogers had
been expected for some weeks.
President . Ford also an-
nounced today that he planned
to retain Dean Burch and Ann
Armstrong as counselors on a
permanent basis. Both will serve
politica! functions. Mr. Burch
will maintain liaison between
diA-MP7f20e412ildtroqiii340008-2
Publican party as well as with!
Republicans in Congress, and:
will be active in matters affect-I
hg political patronage...
Mr. terHorst declined to con-i
firm a report that General Haigi
had been selected as the cm-
pander of NATO forces, saying:
ithat -several possibilities were;
tbeing discussed and no decision;
jhad been reached.
At the briefing, the press'
;secretary cautioned reporters
lagainst being "kicked in" to
the report tha: Gencral Haig
would get the NATO post. Hel
had no comment on reports
that the Government of the
Netherlands had objected to
appointment of General Haig.
The North Atlantic Treaty
says nothing about obtaining
the ratification of member na-
tions ? for appointment of a
commander o'f the treaty forces.
However, the United States,
which has provi,ted all the
'NATO commanders since the
organization was form-id. has
,made it a custom to seek *.-r.?
'approval of the other nations.
9
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001-00340008-2 ?
CHRONICLE, San Francisco
19 August 1974
Royce
?
Ail Foreigners
.Now. Knoiv
D EAD1NG BETWEEN THE _LINES of the new al.
-IA- the deterioration of American-Greek relations,,
strongly suggests - an active factor in the misfortune'
of the Central Intelligence Agency.? ? -
?
? If it surfaces, it will-be.but another example of
-
? the infernal . meddling in foreign_ affairs. of the vast.
and sprawling nest Of spies oper-
ating but of Washington. ? ,
Initial stories of the cautious
'Greek 'alienation carry no detail.
It came as unpleasant surprise
to -most Americans, including the
large and socially valuable seg-
ment of Americans of Greek
stock.
Though the story was.fraginen- . . ???
tary, it did contain information that anti-American .
? demonstrators in Athens carried cards derogatorY to
the CIA: This Manifests an unseemly ..paradox; in
which a foreign people know more about the inter-' ?
'national machinations of a vested American institu-
tion, than do native Americans.
* * *.
IT POSES the intolerable before us, and since Pres-__.
ident Ford is turning a new ,leaf in our national .
existence, he could do worse than address himself- to -.
the CIA tangle.
And is it a tangle! The Agency is a spinoff of a
spy outfit seated in Switzerland during the Hitler.
war. With Hitler gone, the core of the outfit Was
moved to Washington.
SRO GTO
sas-TT 19711.
Open Secrets
Under the patronage of Senators Edward Brooke of 'Massachu-
setts and Philip Hart of Michigan. the Center for National Security
Studies will sponsor a conference on "The Central Intelligence
Aeency and Covert Actions" September 12 and 13 on Capitol
Hill. Robert Borosage, a young lawyer in the Nader mold, is
head of the Center and the moving force behind the conference.
Borosage has no first-hand experience in intelligence, which
nmdiiv hm ?,.F, Critic wants th onf erPnee,tn
"start a public debate," and he hopes the panels will produce
thoughtful and animated discussion. The possibility that such
discussion will lead to a not-very-secret secret service seems to
bother him not at all.
"The cost of enforcing the rules is so great domestically for
the benefit of those in bureaucratic power," Borosage says, "that
it is better to go with the limited classification of secrets." This
is a rather simplistic solution to the whole problem of security
classification in government?in a very real sense it advocates
solving the problem by denying that a problem exists.
In Borcisaat's view the remaining secret information?say one
percent of what is now classified?would be protected by a "code
of honor" among those in the intelligence establishme.nt. Such a
cee.le worked to the satisfaction of the, intelligence bureaucracy
as long as only the "old boys" of the old boy network were doing
the 1.,,riting?Al1en Dulles in The Cult of Intelligence and Miles
Copeland in The Game of Nations. The code broke down with
the recent publication of The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence
by Victor Marchetti and John Marks.
Not surprisingly. Marchetti and Marks, outcasts of the. regular
intelligence estahlishment, will be the stars of the September
conference. Marchetti especially has been criticized for using his
In this lush bureaucratic jungle, it grew as troll-
ical plants grow, ravenous and insatiable, resisting
all restraint. It became a self-governing ernpire,
spawning new agents like the oak-moth pest. As its
work is basically secret, it drew an impenetrable co.::
coon about itself, defying Congress (while seducing
it) and the executive, and as its action is overseas; ?
the courts. Beside it, the 'BI is a benign and honest
policing body.
'CE THE 1.950s, repeated Presidents. haVeJ
bucked it, to be stricken with inertia bY its
dacity, power and propaganda wiles.
? It is voted princely annual sums: They are used
for bribery, for inventing systems for corrupting and
suborning. factions and anti-factions and govern-
ments in troubled little lands. It has ac-cumulated
ships, weapons, radio- net and guerrifiag
used to kill innocents in Indochina, Latin America,
Africa and all Asia. ---
Collectively its judgments are often execrable
and its bungling notorious. A saore pf it conspira--
cies have exploded, these but a fraction of its myriad
schemes and entrapments.
CIA has swayed, distorted and frequently
nulli-
lied American foreign policy, presumed to reside irr
the President, his advisers arid congressional com-
mittees as checks on the President. .It has often: ?
usurped the duties of our ambdors. ?
On the efficiency scale its work;
the perilous nuisance scale its record is enormous.
In our modern world of communications and
technology, -let us grant we need some priident espio-
nage. We don't need thousands of gumshoes runnirigi-
in packs about the globe, playing their nefariOns-1
tricks while we, the people, and our elected *re-'
sentatives don't have the slightest idea What the hell
is going on. Could be the Greek thing will expose the
CIA. If not, we must waituritil these provocateurs
land ? and land us some real song. ? -
August 19,1974 ?.
privileged position as a CIA agent to expose many of the agency's
cherished secrets. Others, notably the Arreeriean Civil Liberties
Union, have praised as an heroic gesture his breach of the CIA
secrecy agreement all employes must take.
Marchetti and Marks will lead the panel discussion on "The
Scope and Structure of the Intelligence -Community." Other
panelists include Thomas Ross on "The CL-Vs Covert Operation
in the United States"; Richard Falk on "Covert Ope.ra:ions and
the hunt tiationai Law"; and Borosage himself on "Covert Opera-
tions and the Constitution." Traditional irr.elliee.nce heavies such
as Ray S. Cline,, former CIA and State Department. intelligence
specialist, will add leaven to the conference's loaf.
Borosage seems to agree with the ne.i.v school of intelligence
theory?namely, that it's impossible for an intelligence organi-
zation to do much cood. "Foreign espionage doesn't work against
the to Communist countries," he says, what we are talking
about is putting people on the Agency's payroll (in miner foreign
countries) to influence events, not to collect intelligence." This
effort by the CIA to push people around, the new cri-lics feel,
causes crises in foreign affairs.
The conference's attempt to open 1:7:t intelligence cloiet should
draw critics of the system like bees to honey. In the wake. of
Watergate and the neo-isolationism that spreads eith inelation, the
old, system is more vulnerable than ever. -National security" is
now an inoperative defense. So if you drop by Borosage's confer-
ence, feel free to join in the discussion. And above all, don't keep
any secrets.
---R03ERT I. NIYE?i
(Editor's note: The we:ter is a fer.,..:r employee of t::e Central
Intelligence Agency.)
10
Approved-For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA7RDP77-00432R000100340008-2
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2
NEW YORK TIMES
4 September 1974
Smile. The Prophets of Gloom and Doom
Are Not All Right
By Colin Greer
Many formerly optimistic social ob-
servers have come increasingly to be-
lieve in the negative characteristics of.
being human. .
More and more, the belief that the
American Dream of equality would be
fulfilled?if we could use the power
of the state to guarantee that dream?
has given way to the conviction that
people must voluntarily (Robert Heil-
broner) accept or be coerced (B. F.
Skinner) into new controls. State pow-
ers are seen as undemocratic but
necessary for order and security.
The belief that there has been enough
economic growth to fairly distribute
material things among people recedes.
as popular and scholarly observers tell
us that such growth possibilities are
severely limited.
Indeed, we are told, planetary sur-
Nivel' is precarious because we have
been greedy and irresponsible. The
solution, in this view, is to give up our
democratic aspirations rather than to
redistribute existing benefits. Those
without will probably have to con-
tinue to do without while the more
fortunate protect their own interests.
There are, of course, immense mate-
rial problems ahead of us, but supply
and profit are so thoroughly manipu-
lated for vested interests that the pri.
mary problem of more egalitarian,
more gentle treatment of ourselves and
our planet is barely apprqachable be-
fore the issues of privilege and ex-
ploitation are subjected to remedial
social action.
How can we really know about the
root scarcity with which we might be
confronted until we can look at a
social world in which we make better
use of what is available?'
To be sure, this probably means
Government controls and some level
of imposition on individual taste and
appetite. That's nol the problem. Mak-
sing it so is to miss the real point?
namely, the explicitly undemocratic
nature of what we are being -told is
necessary.
The liberal creed' has run out of
steam. Liberals made a journey a few
years ago and found that the direc-
tions they followed did not take them
to the places .they said they were go-
ing. Perhaps, many have come to be-
lieve, those places never existed. It is
time to stop judging ourselves by un-
fulfilled American Dream promises.
Unfortunately success flourished less
extensively than had been presumed:
Not only black people were poor, not
only hippies and Weathermen, were
feeling out of joint in' America. We
were in danger of bankrupting what
success there was through ecological,
and nuclear shortsightedness,jand the
population explosion. So, in a few,
years, we graduated from renewed
talk of group-based genetic inferiority.
tea more generalized belief in species.
rooted inadequacies.
It is in this perspective that Mr.
Heilbroner's book, "An Inquiry into
the Human Prospect," and the plaudits
it has received are important as re-
minders of a growing pessimism.
This pessimism is characterized by'
the alleged rediscovery of the neces-
sity for sin to govern human life (Karl
Menninger), the dominance of heredity
in intelligence (Richard Herrnstein),
the overdue need to put a leash on
human aggression (Erich Fromm), the
imminent danger of the technological
future (Alvin Toffler), and the recog-
nition of predominating "animal" prop-
erties in us (Robert Ardrey, Desmond
Morris).
? .Mr. Heilbroner, a contributor to the
nineteen-sixties faith in the progres-
sive power of social analysis and social ?
action, now writes of a pessimism of
millenial proportions. Confronted by
ominous forecasts of material short-
ages, the darker.side of human nature
is emphasized with an atavistic, al-
most religious, awe of demons in us.
We continue to live in a culture.
based on material scarcity. We suffer
not only from scarcity of oil or food
but also from the competitive distribu-
tion of both goods and social rela-
tions. Social equilibrium in such a
culture is maintained by a promise
of either future plenty or the justifica-
tion of limitations expressed through
religious, industrial and technological
myths. We are being pushed in the
latter direction. -
I have yet to see, any pessimists
,call for heavy taxation of the rich;
rather the message I hear is for the
-aspiring to aspire less and for those
who have little to settle for that. Only
when privilege is secure can other
conditions be ameliorated. The current
state of our socio-economic system,
therefore, seems to require an empha-
sis on conservation rather progres-
sivism.
Throughout our progress from reli-
-gious to technological myths, the day-
to-day activity of the :tate has in-
creasingly deepened its I. s:eence and
effect on our lives. Sixties' 1. just
as much as seventies' pess.,..
turned on the possibilities of that
fluence. The pervasive role of the state
in -everyday social as well as political
life is a fait accompli: The involve-
ment of the state in every sector of
American life is ..nprecedented. The
significant contemporary questions
about the?state are those hawing to
do with the style, quality and content
'of its- interaction with persons, not
whether we are to rely on it heavily.
Economic shifts require value shifts,
too. And so we are being educated into
a new distrust of ourselves, a new
lack of self-respect, a newly regimented
grammar of 'aspiration. A climate is
being created which will permit use of
the state's increased power as an
agent on behalf of the very exploita-
tion many trusted it grew powerful
to oppose. This is the real issue before
us right now,
Colin Greer .teaches sorra/ history at
the School of Contemporary Studies,
Brooklyn College, and is executive edi?
tor of Social Policy magazine.
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA1-DP77-00432R000100340008-2
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2
'THE ICIEW YoRk TIllaS,'TUESDAX-AUGUST:14-1974-1:? ?
Black Envoys Seek More Non-African Posts
By THOMAS A. JOHNSON
Special to The New York Times
LAGOS, Nigeria?There is a
growing fear among black
Americans in United States
Government service abroad that
the concentration of their sen-
ior members in African assign-
ments could lessen their effec-
tiveness in Africa and around
the world.
"There is this dilemma," salt
a black American in west Af-
rica, "that while we are anx-
ious tO serve in Africa, the
proof of our success in this
field will be our postings?in
addition to Africa?to France,
Peru, Norway and China."
Five black Foreign Service
career officers are ambassa-
dors and all have been assigned
by the State Department to
Africa. They are John E. Rein-
hardt, Ambassador to Nigeria;
Terence A. Todman, to Guinea;
Rudolph Aggrey, to Senegal
and Gambia; W. Beverly Carter
Jr., to Tanzania, and David B.
Bolen, to Botswana, Lesotho
and Swaziland.
African assignments have
also been given to all seven
blacks who head operations of
the Agency for International
Development abroad. Seven Of
the 10 blacks who head United
States Information Service of-
fices abroad are assigned to
Africa.
Twenty-two black Ameri-
cans have served as Ambassa-
dors since President Truman
named Edward R. Dudley of
New York as Ambassador to
Liberia in 1949, and 17 of
these have been assigned to
black nations. The five others
are Clifford R. Wharton, who
served in Norway from 1961
to 1964; Carl T. Rowan, Fin-
land, 1963-64; Patricia R. Har-
ris, Luxembourg, 1965-67;
Hugh Smythe, Syria, 1965-67,
and Malta, 1967-69, and Je-
rome H. Holland, Sweden,
1970-72. c
Comparison to Industry
Blacks in Government serv-
ice abroad have been reluc-
tant to discuss publicly their
fears of what they see as a
trend.
But in Washington, senior
black officials from the State
Department, the development
agency and the information
agency, organized loosely as
the "Thursday luncheon
group," met earlier this year
with Secretary of State Kis-
singer to voice their concerns.
Sources within the group say
they hope to meet with Mr.
Kissinger again soon.
One black Arrierican diplo-
matic sources in west Africa
said recently: "In a real sense
the blacks in foreign service
are beginning to face the same
problem as blacks in American
industry who are executives in
charge of urban or minority
affairs, and special markets.
Both are restricted to low-pri-
ority areas where their black
skins are supposed to count."
Asked if a black skin really
gave a diplomat an advantage
in Africa, black Americans in
foreign service generally reply
with a limited "yes."
They say it helps to estab-
lish a rapport and to build
closer and faster relationships
with Africans than can many?
although not necessarily all?
of their white counterparts.
But; according to Mr. Todman,
the Ambassador to Guinea,
blacks in the Foreign Service
find, at the same time, that
when it comes to the basics of
international negotiations, "Af-
ricans deal with you strictly as
an American."
Mr. Reinhardt, the Ambas-
sador to Nigeria,- said, "Initial
meetings, introductions and in-
vitations to African social
affairs aside, one does _business
in any field in Africa on the
basis of one's competence."
"We should not expect that
Africans, any more than other
peoples, will make decisions on
grounds other than merit and
their own national interests,"
Mr. Reinhardt Said. ?
What do black Africans think
of black American diplomats?
Some say, as one African diplo-
mat did, that it is easier to
"deal with a person who wants
to be in Africa?who looks like
us and feels a kinship." Anoth-
er questioned how "a second-
class citizen can really repre-
sent that racist land."
What seemed a majority
view, expressed by a senior Ni-
gerian diplomat, was that "the
only question to consider is
does the diplomat come with
real power, does he really speak
for his Government, can he
make a decision?".
The United States Embassy
here in Lagos, the largest in
Africa, has been headed. since
November, 1971, by Mr. Rein-
hardt, a former information of-
ficial in Washington, Iran,
Japan and the Philippines.
The Ambassador to Guinea,
Mr. Todman, was assigned to
Conakry two years ago afte:
assignment as the Ambassador
to Chad and earlier tours in
the Middle East and at the
United Nations.
Mr. Aggrey, appointed edrlier
this year as the Ambassador
to Senegal, is a former infor-
mation officer in Africa and a
former State Department Afri-
can expert.
Served in Africa
Before Mr. Carter was named
Ambassador to the east African
nation of Tanzania, he too
served in Africa for the infor-
mation agency.
The newest of the black Am-
bassadors in Africa is Mr. Bolen,
who was named earlier this
year to the southern African
countries of Botswana, Lesotho
and Swaziland. He .was a for-
mer economics counselor at the
American Embassy in Yugo-
slavia.
The five black Ambassadors
in Africa serve in about 3 per
cent of the 143 head of mission
posts maintained by the United
States. In all, the 340 black
employes of the State Depart-
ment come to about 4 per cent
of that agency's total.
Higher percentages of black
employes have been registered
by the aid and information
agencies, reflecting primarily
the recruitment of nonprofes-
I.
12
Isional personnel from the heav-
ily black Washington area. ,
Blacks Make tip about 17 per
cent of the employes of the aid
agency. It has black Americans
heading seven major aid pro-
grams in the African nations of
Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Sene-
gal, Tanzania, Tunisia and
Zaire.
The information agency has
seven black public affairs offi-
cers heading information serv-
ice offices in the African na-
tions of Ethiopia, Gabon,
Guinea, Liberia, Somalia, Togo
and Tunisia.
Three other black Americans
head information service of-
fices in Bolivia, Laos and Syria.
The agency has 96 public af-
fairs officers at the supervisory
level worldwide. Fifteen per
cent of its 4,300 employes are
black.
List of the 22 .
The 22 black Americans who
have served as Ambassadors
are:
Edward R. Dudley, Liberia, 1949-
53; Jessie D. Locker, Liberia, 1953-
55; Richard Lee Jones, Liberia,
1955-59; John H. Morrow, Guinea,
1959-61; Clifford R. Wharton,
Norway, 1961-64; Mercer Cook,
Niger, 1961-64, Senegal, 1964-66,
and Gambia, 1965-66.
Carl T. Rowan, Finland, 1963-
64; Clinton E. Knox, Dahomey,
1,964-69, and Haiti, 1969-73; Pa-
tricia R. Harris, -Luxembourg,
.1965-67; Hugh- Smythe, Syria,
1965-67, and Malta, 1967-69;
Franklyn H. Williams,. Ghana,
1965-68; Elliott P. *Skinner, Upper
Volta, 1966-69; Samuel C. Adams,
Niger, 1968-69.
Terence A. Todman, Chad, 1969,
and Guinea, 1972 to present;
Samuel C. Westerfield, Liberia,
1969-72; Jerome H. Holland,
Sweden, 1970-72; Clarence C.
Ferguson, Uganda, 1970-72; Charles
J. Nelson, Botswana, Lesotho and
Swaziland, .1971-74: John E. Rein-
hardt, Nigeria, 1971 to present; W.
Beverly Carter Jr., Tanzania, 1972
to present; Rudolph Aggrey, Sene-
gal and Gambia, 1974 to present,
and David B. Bolen, Botswana,
Lesotho and Swaziland, 1974 to
iHesent.
-;.--APPid-Ve4rOr ReleaSe 2001108/08 C1A4RDP77-00432R0001-0034Q008-2
_ .
Approved For Release /001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2
NEW YORK TIMES
25 August 19711
Pentagon Kept Tight Rein
In Last Days of Nixon Rule
? By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New Vol* Time.
WASHINGTON, Aug. 24?De-
fense Secretary James R. Schles-
inger and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff kept unusually, close con-
trol over lines of command in
the last days of the Nixon Ad-
ministration to insure that no
unauthorized orders were given
to military units by the White
House.
A senior Pentagon official said
?today that the decision to moni-
1tor closely all orders from any
Isource was taken by Mr. Schles-
inger, in consultation with Gen.
George S. Brown, chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to pre-
vent any of a series of hypo-
thetical situations from devel-
oping.
Two Areas Cited -
The official said that Mr.
Schlesigner began to worry
about the situation when in late
July and early August he felt
that the impeachment or resig-
nation of Mr. Nixon was in-
evitable.
There were two major areas
of concern on Mr. Schlesinger's
mind, the official said.
The first was that in some
"improbable" situation, Mr.
Nixon or one of his aides might
get in touch with some military
units directly without going
through the usual Pentagon
chain of command and order
that some action be taken to
block the "constitutional pro-
cess."
The second was hat a genuine
national emergency might de-
velop in which American mili-
tary units might have to be
placed on alert or go into ac-
tion, and Mr. Schlesinger and
General Brown wanted to in-
sure that they would be .able
publicly to justify the actions.
No Event Apparent
The Pentagon official stressed
today that the concern of Mr.
Schlesinger was hypothetical
and did not evolve from any
event. At no time, the official
said, was there any sign that
the White House or any mili-
tary commander was contem-
plating any action outside the
chains of command.
Mr. Schlesinger reportedly
became concerned that if there
was an impeachment debate
and then a Senate trial, which
seemed likely after the House
Judiciary Committee voted ar-
ticles of impeachment, the
country could "have difficult
times."
There was concern not only
that somebody at the White
House might order some unit
to act against Congress, but
also that some official might
seek to have some unit oust the
Washington %glows
Wednesday, August 23, 1974
?
Nb
(I)
OST- URGLA
_
President.
Moreover, Mr. Schlesinger, in
his conversations with Secre-
tary of State Kissinger, was
also concerned about .a national
crisis arising while the Presi-
dent's future hung in the
balance, the Pentagon official
said.
Both Mr. Schlesinger and
Mr. Kissinger remembered the
general skepticism when Ameri-
can forces were placed on a
heightened alert last October
when it seemed as if the Soviet
Union was contemplating send-
ing forces into the Middle East.
Allegation Denied
The alert, on Oct. 24-25,
came only a few days after the
so-called "Saturday night mas-
sacre" when Mr. Nixon dis-
missed the Watergate special
prosecutor, Archibald Cox, pre-
Attorney General Elliot L.
Richardson and the ouster of
his deputy, William D. Ruckel-
haus.
-When Mr. Kissinger had a
news conference on Oct. 25, he
was asked repeatedly if the
alert was linked to some desire
to. distract public attAntiort
from the domestic crisis. He
denied such an allegation,
stressing then and later 'that
the alert was legitimate.
But the 'Pentagon official
?
said that the public skepticism
shown during the alert wor-
ried Mr. Kissinger and Mr.
Schlesinger, and that they
were determined to insure that
if a crisis developed, they
would be in a position to justi-
fy any military moves.
Mr. Schlesinger decided that
he would not leave Washington
during the White House crisis
so he would be at the center
of the Pentagon command.
Under the National Security
Act, the President is Command-
er in Chief, as specified by the
Constitution, and his commands,
flow downward from the- De-
fense Secretary to the Joint'
Chiefs of Staff and to the mili-
tary ,units.
'Mr. Schlesinger, on the rec-
ord, limited , his comments to
the following:
"In keeping with my statu-
tory responsibilities, I did as-
sure myself that there . would
be no question about the-proper
constitutional and legislated
chain of command, and there'
never was any question."
The Pentagon official who
disclosed Mr. Schlesinger's con-
cern denied some published re-
ports that Mr. Schlesinger had
been particularly concerned
about the loyalty of Air Force
officers. He said that there
had been no sign of an prob-
lems with any branch or group
of officers.
' . . .
Yr PERIOD
Ta
James W. McCord Jr.,
one of the men convicted in
the Watergate break-in and
bugging case, has subpoe-
naed all presidential tapes
during the period of the
original Watergate trial for
use in his civil lawsuit.
The subpoena, filed at
U.S. District Court yester-
day, calls on White House
Counsel Philip W. Buchen
to deliver all tapes between
Jan. 1 and Jan. 31, 1973.
The trial itself began that
Jan. 8, and ended Jan. 30
with the conviction of
McCord, a former employe
of the Committee for the
0 Er
S
oeae
-?Awn Si
Re-election of the Presi-
dent, and G. Gordon Liddy,
a former White House aide.
Five other men charged
with McCord and Liddy
pleaded guilty during the
trial.
This is the second subpoe-
na directed to Buchen in the
last week calling for the
tapes of former President
Richard M. Nixon. The first
was filed by R. Spencer
Oliver, former executive
director of the Association
of State Democratic Chair-
men, who also has a
Watergate-related suit
pending.
A White House spokes-
man has said that the Jus-
tice Department has been
asked to issue a legal opin-
ion on the ownership of the
tapes and documents left be-
hind by Nixon, and on Bu-
chen's responsibility to
comply. with such subpoe-
nas.
The bulk of the Watergate
civil suits was settled on
Aug. 9. However, McCord
and Oliver, who are asking
damages from Nixon's 1972
campaign committees and
various individuals involv-
ed in the Watergate affair,
refused to take part in the
Approved For Release 20 (08/010.M.R15tif tqdtalityl000 100340008-2
???????????.???????????=
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2
BALTIMORE SUN
26 August 1974
Blemishes among the Spectaculars
The Minuses of Nixon's Foreign Policy
Washington.
. Richard Nixon's die-hard sup-
porters and some of his severest
critics claim that he left an
admirable record in foreign poi-
' icy in spite of his impeachable
crimes and abuse of the presi-
dency.
Even in -the final hours, before
' abdicating to avoid -ouster from
his high office, Richard Nixon
brushed aside the Watergate
scandals that had done him in
and sang the praises of his for-
eign policy accomplishments. He
even invoked, for the last time
as President, those well-worn
cliches?"a generation of peace"
and "a structure of peace." It.
? was done in such a way, as to
suggest that these should corn-
. Pensate for the disgraceful scan-
dals over which he had presided.
But does the record support -
the view that the Nixon foreign
policy was extraordinary? Does
the legacy in foreign affairs that
he left for Gerald Ford warrant
such acclaim?
There have, indeed, been ac-
complishments. And given the
public relations operations at the
White House during Nixon's in-
cumbency they were about the -
only things the public was told
about. But there were also some
great failures both of commission
and omission. And both Nixon
. and his only foreign policy advi-
sor, Henry Kissinger, seldom if
ever mentioned them. When
.forced to do so, as in the current
Greece-Turkey-Cyprus disaster,
lame alibis or attempts to blame
others were put forth.
? ? ?
In addition to failures that find
American relations with old al-
lies at an all timelow, the Nixon
accomplishments themselves are
not without blemishes. For exam-
ple, one of Nixon's last foreign.
spectaculars?a second summit
meeting in Moscow early this ?
.summer?was a failure. It dis-
closed that even in the area
where Nixon claimed highest
marks for himself, detente with
the Soviet Union is at best fra-
gile, uncertain and viewed by
many Americans with skepti-
cism. Nixon's crude and unwise
attempt while in Moscow to jus-
tify detente on a special "per-
sonal relationship" with Leonid
Brezhnev, fortunately for those
who want real detente, was re-
jected by the Soviet leader.
The opening to China, which
By R. H. SHACKFORD
Nixon exploited with a sensa-
tional televised trip to Peking in
1972, muddles along. Reversal of
American policy toward China
was an accomplishment worthy
of praise and long overdue. Yet
the 'manner in which it came
about is not necessarily the way
Nixon describes it?his idea and
initiative. There is some evi-
dence that the initiative came
from Peking, because of China's
quarrel with Russia, and that
Nixon wisely took advantage-of it. -
Maybe the Nixon "accomplish-
ment" about which one hears the
most is Vietnam. It is indisputa-
ble that all American fighting
men were extricated from Viet-
nam during his presidency, even
though the war . and its cruel
casualties went on for more than
four years of the Nixon Adminis-
. tration. But contrary to claims,
Nixon did not bring peace to that
s tortured part of the world. He
used the "peace is at hand"
claim on the eve of his landslide
election in 1972, but there is no
peace in Vietnam or Cambodia.
The war goes on. Although
American GI's are not fighting;
the war is carried on with Amer-
ican money and American mili-
tary equipment and American
advice. it remains an American
war, albeit by proxy.
The verdict on the Middle East
is still unknown. The Cyprus cri-
sis is separate from the Arab-Is-
raeli problem. But both affect .
the stability of the Middle East.
Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy be-
tween Arab countries and Israel
early this year brought about a
separation of forces. All sides
were ready, for a military cooling
off period. Whether they are
ready to make the concessions
necessary for a permanent peace
?on isSues like the future of the
Palestinians on which the U.S.
equivocates?remains to be seen.
0 0 0
But it is not just in these
major areas where the claim of
a successful Nixon foreign policy
is subject to challenge. It is in
all the rest of the world, espe-
cially among America's old al-
lies, where his policies and atti-
tudes have rendered dubious if
not negative results.
The last three White House
tapes, which were made public
on the eve of Nixon's departure
in disgrace, revealed some
shocking Nixon views on funda-
mental world problems. They
contradicted the myth, perpe-
14
trated for so long, that he was a
man too busy with great world
problems to be involved in Wa-
tergate. In the midst of a discus-
sion on Wa4.:Jrgate, however, Nix-
on's attention was called in June,
1972, to serious international
monetary developments, especial-
ly with respect to the British
pound and the Italipn lira.
On the new "floating rate" for
the British pound which affected
the value of the American dollar, .
Nixon said:. "I don't care about ?
it. Nothing we can do about it."
And when told about grave
worries with respect to specula-
tion in the Italian lira, Nixon's
- shocking reply was: "I don't
give a (expletive deleted) about ,
the lira."
Once one moves away from
Nixon "spectaculars" in foreign
policy?detente- with Russia, -
opening to China, extrication of
American troops (but no peace)
in Vietnam?the list of foreign
policy matters which were bun-
gled or ignored by Nixon is .
lengthy.
Here are a few Issues on which
any objective observer must give ,.
Nixon low marks:
? Western Europe and NATO.
A year ago last June, Kissinger
- proclaimed that Nixon was mak-,
ing 1974 "the year of Europe." A
new Atlantic Charter was to be
devised, as though another piece?
of paper setting forth general
, principles would Solve complex
problems. Unwisely, our Euro-
pean allies had not been con-
? sulted and the ill-conceived idea
?fizzled.
0. Japan. The "shocks" admin-
istered to this major Asian ally
? are still felt. They included no
advance warning about a new
U.S. policy toward Peking and no
warning on monetary and tariff
changes that severely disrupted
Japan's economy which was de-
pendent upon trade with the U.S.
? Bangladesh. Nixon's now fa-
mous "tilt" toward Pakistan and
against India in that tragic epi-
sode, while piously and falsely ,
proclaiming neutrality, was a
disgrace to American foreign pol-
icy.
? Middle East. Until forced to
do so when it exploded last Octo-
ber. Nixon ignored the Arab-Is-
raeli problem. Only when the
Arabs used their oil as a weapon
that affected the U.S. directly,
did Nixon focus upon the area
?and then with total concentra-
.
41-;rOV?e-d-F?o-r?Rele-as?e-2001/08/08 :'CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008z2 ?
? tion to the' detriment of other
problems, such as Cyprus, which
was right on the Arab-Israeli
doorstep:
Dictatorships. Unquestioning
support of harsh and suppressive
military dictatorships such as in
Greece and South Korea has led
to diplomatic disasters in the
Greek area (With that part of
NATO now in shambles) and
portend potential ones in Korea
where Stability is so dependent.
? upon a reasonable working rela-
tionship between Japan and
-Korea and respect and trust in
both countries for the United
States.
* Nuclear weapons. Despite
the tiny but hopeful start with
the first SALT agreement with
Russia -to limit nuclear weapons,
the Nixon administration never
succeeded in reaching a consen-
sus on the issue in its own
country. President Ford inherits
from Nixon a ieriout and funda-
mental dispute on nuclear policY
between Kissinger and Defense
Secretary James R. Schlesinger
which should have been resolved,
but wasn't, before Nixon went to
Moscow in June.
? International monetary af-
fairs. For several' years the daily
financial pages of newspapers
tell of the failures in this field,
as in the correlative field of
run-away domeStic inflation.
When the old monetary system
broke down, Nixon allowed nis
former Treasury Secretary, John
Connally, now indicted on
charges of accepting a bribe, to
try to bully our European part-
ners into a solution. When an
interim agreement was reached,.
Nixon, with typical over-state-
ment, proclaimed it the greatest
agreement in the history of man-
kind. But just as there is no
peace in Vietnam in spite of the
, "peace is at hand" statement,
there is no monetary stability in
THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 2, 1974
. the world.
The list could go on and on?.
refusal to normalize relations,
with Cuba, the tragedy of war
brought by Nixon to Cambodia,.
? failure to tackle world food,'
energy and resources problems
on a global scale, such follies as .
the sale of most of our surplus
grain to Russia at bargain prices
and with American taxpayers'
subsidies on the eve of zooming'
prices and world shortages.
? President Ford has proclaimed
a new' era of openness and can,
dor in all fields, including foreign
affairs. It remains to be seen
whether a man like Kissinger,
whose one-man road show and.
secret methods of operating fit-.
ted Nixon's own proclivities so
well, can perform for a man like,
Gerald Ford, who, thus far, has
displayed a forthrightness so in
contrast to the duplicity as-
sociated with his* predecessor,'
Richard Nixon.
Mr. Shackford is a veteran
Washington newspaperman.
Ford's Foreign Problems and Prospects:
The View From' Major- World Capitals
In an address to a joint ses-
sion of Congress the week be-
fore last, President Ford said
that he intended to continue
the foreign policies of President
Nixon. In the accompanying
dispatches, correspondents of
The New York Times report on
how capitals around the world
currently view their chief prob-
lems in relations with the
United States. A dispatch from
Washington gives the view of
the* problems from there. . .
? The Soviet Union
Special to The New York Times
MOSCOW?Despite a residue
of goodwill left from President
Nixon's three summit meetings,
the Kremlin leaders will be
pressing. President Ford on at
least two issues that remain
major stumbling blocks to bet-
ter Soviet-American relations.
The more conspic_uous is
trade, which in Soviet eyes has
been stifled by the- unwilling-
ness of Congress to grant most-
favored-nation status and in-
vestment credits.
If the Soviet Union views
tariff -policy as a matter of
prestige, given the relatively
low volume of exports to the
United States, the matter of
'low-interest credits is of prac-
tical concern, for only with
such credits, the Russians con-
tend, can they afford more
,American technology.
Consequently, Moscow is
counting on Mr. Ford to help
break the deadlock posed by
Soviet restrictions on emigra-
tion, particularly by Jews, and
deliver on the trade promises
Mr. Nixon made to the Soviet
leader, Leonid I. Brezhnev.
No Real Progress
A still thornier prApprcive
limitation of strategic nuclear
weapons, on which nn real
progress was made in talks
this summer. As some,Western
diplomats'viewed it, the Krem-
lin, nervous about Mr. Nixon's
vulnerability on Watergate, was
unwilling to offer concessions'
that could be dissipated if he
were swept out of office.
Although President Ford is
dealing from a position of
greater strength, a problem as
complex as the limitation of
offensive arms will continue to
resist simple solutions. Negoti-
ations at the recent meeting re-
portedly reached a deadlock
over the number of missiles
that the Soviet Union would be
allowed to equip with multiple
warheads.
Moscow has also resisted
American ptoposals that both
sides - phase out their land-
based missiles, in which the
Russians have numerical su-
periority. Instead, it has sought
parity in multiple warheads
while demanding that Washing-
ton halt its deployment of the
Trident submarine-based mis-
sile and the B-1 strategic
bomber.
?
Western Europe
spedLI to The New York Times
PARIS?The major Western
European concerns about the
United States involve econom-
ics and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization.
The NATO issue stems from
the Cyprus crisis and specula-
tion that Greece may ask the
Sixth Fleet to withdraw from
port facilities. This particularly'
upsets Italy, where there is a
strong current of opinion,
mostly but not only on the left,
against granting additional
daVfoll?gd&t4.1561768/,b15
The argument is that more
bases would increase American
"colonialism" and the tempta-
tion to interfere in Italian pol-
itics to prevent the Commu-
nists from being admitted to
the Government.
Other countries are also wor-
ried about NATO. France,
which, like Greece, has with-
drawn her military forces from
the alliance, is planning to bol-
ster over-all Western defenses
in the Eastern Mediterranean
outside it.
? The economic issue is per-
haps more keenly felt by gov-
ernments at this point than by
the general public. There is
criticism that the United States
fed worldwide inflation by al-
lowing a huge trade deficit to
build the colossal Eurodollar
supply, now estimated at $200-
billion. And there are fears that
if the United States tries to
fight inflation too vigorously,
it will set off a general reces-
sion by constricting world
trade. Bonn in particular has
been critical of on-again, off-;
again policies and is watching
warily to see how President
Ford will handle the problems.
There is also concern about
American talk of restricting
agricultural exports since this
would drive prices up, hurt
European cattle raisers who
rely on American feed grains
and contribute to inflationary
pressures. It is ironic that after
15 years in which the major
United States-Common Market
dispute was American insist-
ence that Europe accept more
agricultural exports, the issue
now is fear of inadequate
American exports.
Eastern Europe
cligaglahyggn
long drama of Watergate the
governments of Eastern Europe
were especially concerned with
the fate of PreSident. Nixon's
trade bill, which has been held
up in Congress.
All would like to expand
trade, but even more important,
they seek access to financing
through international agencies
and banks available only to:
those given .most-favored-rose
tion status.
All of Eastern Europe pre-
sumably welcomes d?nte, and
there has been apprehension in
some ,quarters that President
Ford will not ? regard the issue
as being as important as his
predecessor_ did.
All the countries of Eastern
Europe have specific and some-
times highly emotional quarrels;
with the United States. An
example is Hungary, which has.
been demanding the return of
the golden crown of St.
Stephen, founder of the Hun-1
garian state during the Middle
Ages. The crown, which came
into American hands at the end
of World War II, is still with-
held on the ground that Hun-
gary has shown little interest
in being more friendly. ?
Greece
Special to The New York Times
ATHENS ? Greek-American
relations are dominated by the
Cyprus issue and its widening
ramifications.
Athens is living with the hu-
miliating fact that it could not
stop the Turkish invasion, and
the Greeks are attributing most
of the blame to Washington.
Greece is used to blaming
others for her troubles, and the
more conspiratorial theories are
00444#1rstantiated. But
re feel they are
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2
performing a Service by ahsorb-
ing criticism that otherwise
might endanger the frail new
civilian government of Premier
'Constantine Caramanlis.
Athens wants Washington to
'exert more pressure on Ankara
sto make significant concessions
on Cyprus. Many of Greece's
recent diplomatic moves?with-
drawal of troops from NATO,
;acceptance of a Soviet proposal
for a conference on Cyprus?
!were aimed mainly at the
United States.
A related 'issue, is the pres-
ence of important American
military installations here.
Greek officials keep threaten-
ing to close them?another
move designed to make the
United States use its influence
with Turkey.
President Nixon was long
identified with support off the
now-defunct military junta;
President Ford has the distinct
advantage of starting fresh
with the new Government. But
in Greek eyes America is main-
ly embodied by Secretary of
State Kissinger, and he has
become the archvillain of the
piece because of Cyprus policy.
.Turkey
speem to The New York Times
ANKARA, Turkey?The Turks
feel that they are off to a good
start with the? Ford Adminis-
ation on the Cyprus issue,
but United States objections to
the resumption of opium-poppy
cultivation are a threat to good
relations.
Premier Bulent Ecevit says
Turkey may be a more diffi-
cult ally in the future as she
asserts a more independent
position on controversial is-
sues. He also says there will
the frankness on Turkey's side,
;with all the cards on the table.
In the case of Cyprus and
the larger issue of Turkish-,
Greek relations in the Aegean
Sea, the feeling here is that
the United States has reacted
in a constructive way and
shown appreciation for Tur-
key's point of view.
In return, the Turks say they
have kept fully win mind ? the
ntereSts
in NATO defense in the East-
ern Mediterranean and the
preservation of detente with,
the Soviet Union.
The Middle East
Special to The New York Times
CAIRO?The United States,
.under President Ford as underi
his predecessor, holds the key!
to Middle Eastern peace. Arab.
leaders are in agreement on:
Ithis point, but they differ On!,
:how the Ford Administration!,
,intends to use the key.
President Anwar el-Sadat of;
Egypt, in 'a series of speeches!
reported by the press, has!
strongly reaffirmed his belief,'
that the October war imposedl
a basic policy change on the:
United States, Instead of con-
fining itself to unconditional
support for Israel, he holds, it
is now genuinely working for
a permanent settlement ac-
ceptable to the Arabs. He has
added in his statements that
such a , settlement would have
to include the return of all ter-g
ritories occupied by Israel in
I 1967.
Mr. Sadat has also been
Istressing the sorry state of the
.economy and Egypt's depend.
?ence on American, Western Eu-
ropean and Arab investment.
At the other end of the
scale are the Palestinian lead-
ers, including Yasir Arafat,
who have been accusing Sec-
retary of State Kissinger of
duplicity. As they see it, the
United States is not interested
in real peace?which, in their
eyes, includes a Palestinian state
?but siniply wants to sepa-
rate the Arab and Israeli ar-
mies and prevent a new war,
prolonging the ?status quo and
permitting Israel to keep most
of the territories won in 1967,
India
Special to The New York Times
NEW DELHI?India, once the
largest recipient of American
aid, is struggling to revive good
relations with the United States
after two years of bitterness
and anger.
From India's point of view
the crux is American policy to-
ward Pakistan. As long as the
United States maintains its
arms embargo against Pakis-
tan, Indians say, relations will
improve. They soured during
the 1971 Bangladesh war, when
the United States sided with
Pakistan's unsuccessful effort
to crush the autonomy move-
ment in East Pakistan,. now
Bangladesh.
India's interest in spurring
better relations is based on two
interlocking factors.
One.is the realization among
officials that India, in economic
disarray, needs American as-
sistance. Discussions have taken
place for a joint commission to
strengthen economic, cultural
and scientific ties.
A second factor is the con-
cern here that India has become
too dependent upon the Soviet
Union and wants some balance
in the form of closer relations
with the United States. Indian
officials say that the past pat-
tern of a donor-recipient rela-
tionship is being replaced by a
more mature link involving
trade and commercial ex-
changes.
South Vietnam
spedal to The New York Tproes
SAIGON, South Vietnam?
After a decade of utter de-
pendence on American aid, the
Government has refined the
skill of Washington-watching
into such an art that officials
are somewhat jaded by the
shifts in the Administration.
As a result officials note with
confidence President Ford's rec-
ord as a conservative and a
hawk, and some even go so far
as to suggest that he will be
more beneficial to South Viet-
nam than was President Nixon
because his relations with Con-
gress are more amicable.
Congress has become the real
source of worry for the Saigon
Government these days, mainly
due to sharp cuts in military
aid voted in recent weeks. The
Nixon Administration had asked
for $1.45-billion for this fiscal
year; both houses voted $700-
million.
Cambodia
Special to The New York Times '
PHNOM PENH, Cambodia ?
The Government has always
been worried that some day
Washington might sharply re-
duce or withdraw its support?.
which would almost certainly
mean victory for' the Commu-
nist-led insurgents. This con-
cern has been heightened with
:the advent of a President un-
known to the leaders, who are
seeking assurances that he will
be as. stanch in his backing as
?was his predecessor.
In the course of the four-.
!and-a-half-year war the Go,,-
ernment of President Lon Nol
has become more and more iso-
lated, its supporters dwindling,
its United Nations seat threat-
ened by the claim of the exiled
leader Prince Norodom Siha-
nouk. ' ?
Should Phnom Penh lose its
seat when the General Assem-
bly convenes next month,' the
process of demoralization and
isolation would be intensified.
_The army could go on
fighting only if American aid
was close to its present level,
which is more than $600-million
a year. Military aid represents
nearly $400-million of this,:
four-fifths of which goes not;
for stockpiling or for newl
heavy weapons but merely: for
the daily expenditure of am-..
munition.
Japan and Korea
Special to The New York Timea.
TOKYO ? In Japan the im-
mediate concern about the Ford
Administration is that no one Ford,
Administration
knows much about thei
?new President. Equally impor-
tant from the point of view oft
senior Japanese officials, Presi-
dent Ford doesn't know much
1
about Japan.
This lack of a personal and
political connection with Mr.
Ford takes on special impor-
tance here since personal re-
lationships, even among na-
tional leaders, is vital in the
Japanese scheme of things.
Thus, Premier Kakuei Tana-
ka indicated, immediately aft-
er the new President took of-
ifce, that he wanted to go te
,Washington to meet Mr. Ford.
The meeting is now scheduled
Ifor Sept. 21, while Mr. Tanaka
is in the Western Hemisphere
Ion a trip to Mexico, Brazil and
Canada.
I In addition, Mr. Ford is plan-
ning to visit Japan, probably
between the November elections'
I and Thanksgiving. If he does,
he will be tho first President
ever to have visited Japan,
while in office. A planned stateI
visit by President Eisenhower,
in 1960 was cancelled because:
of anti-American leftist riots. I
The great policy issues of I
the Nixon era have either been;
res(olved ? Vietnam, trade,1
:textiles ? or are dormant ?I
China, the Nixon Doctrine, the;
security treaty, monetary re-1
!form.
I
On China, Japanese policy is
;basically working in the same;
'direction as American policy,'
only faster and unencumbered
by security Considerations such
as those arising from the
United States's defense treaty
with Taiwan. On security, the
Japanese Left constantly tries
to overturn Japan's alliance
witlf the united States but is
not making significant head-
way.
Japan's conservative politi-
cians and businessmen are ex-
pected to use the occasion of
the Ford visit to test him for
isolationist And, protectionist at-
titudes, ati'cr to. try to dissuade
hiin from such policies if they
detect signs of them.
Across the narrow Strait of
Tsushima, the South Korean
Government has started to,
'worry about President Ford and'
the United States commitment
to Korean defense. Mr. Ford:
recently issued a statement ex-
pressing concern over President
Park Chung Hee's, jailing of
Koreans for political reasons.
In addition, Congress has in-
dicvted that it may cut military
aid to Korea. Congressmen have
criticized Korea's alleged dis-,
regard for human rights and;
prominent American scholars
have called for a reduction in
the 38,000 United States troops
there. Some Christian leaders,
seeing fellow Christians in
Korea jailed. for their political
beliefs, have protested to their
Congressmen, although other
American Christian leaders
have &fended President Park's
repressive policies.
China
HONG KONG ? The recent
personal letter from Premier
Chou En-lai to President Ford
is believed to reflect China's
desire. to establish good rela-
tions with the new Administra-
tion. And the visit to China by
a bipartisan congressional dele-
gation led by Senator J. W.
Fulbrighteis interpreted here as
evidence that contacts begun
during the Nixon Administra-
tion will-be maintained.
From Peking's point of view
at least, its main problem with
-the United States remains the
Taiwan issue, which "is thel
crucial question obstructing the[
normalization of relations," mi
the words of the 1972 com-
munique at the end of Mr..
Nixon's visit.
Though the United States has;
reduced its military presence
in Taiwan, China was annoyed
by the recent appointment of
Leonard Unger as Ambassador
in Taipei and by the opening
of Chinese Nationalist consu-
lates in Atlanta, Kansas CityI
and Portland, Ore.
China, which sees the Sovieti
Union as its main foe, is not
in confrontation with the Unit-
ed States anywhere, though'
serious differences remain overt
such issues as Indochina, the!
Middle East, the rights oft
coastal states and liberation,
movements in the third world.'
Latin America
Speeial to The Neve Trk Tircet
; LIMA, Peru ? "What Latin
:America wants from the united
.States is a real policy of co-
operation to facilitate develop-
ment," a Peruvian statesman.
16
?F?iel? 2001108/08 CIA-RDP77430432R000100340008--2 -
APprovect For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-IRIDP77-00432R000100340008-2
Carlos Garcia Bedoya, said 're-
cently, emphasizing that ' this
did not exist, despite "formal
expressions of goodwill."
Peru's left-wing military Gov-
ernment has settled the most
urgent problems of compensa-
tion for expropriated United
States property, but it would
like to see the abolition of
threatening legislation such as
the provision for cutting off
aid to countries that expro-
priate American property, with-
out ,compensation.
Brazil is concerned over in-
creasing United States protec-
tionism in fields such as the
shoe industry. Brazil and Co-
lumbia are demanding fair
prices for such commodities as
coffee and Argentina would
like to see meat quotas lifted.
Panama and other Central
- American countries are seeking
to raise the price of bananas.
Venezuela is concerned over
how to take over the ? United
States oil companies while
keeping the door open to capi-
tal and technology where they
are needed. Chile is worried
about increased opposition in'
the United States Congress to
aid and loans. ?
Mexico's most urgent prob-
lem is restriction against mi-
grant workers, which cause
constant tension. The Mexican.
Governmentis also troubled by
recent revelations that the Cen- ?
tral Intelligence Agency pene-
trated the administration.
Canada
Special to The New York Times !
OTTAWA --- Both Canadians
and Americans in Ottawa are
hopeful that the political
changes here and in Washing-
ton in recent weeks, by intro-
ducing a new outlook, will pro-
vide a more favorable climate:.
for mutual efforts toward set-.
tlement of numerous nagging
problems.
Prime Minister Pierre Elliott '
Trudeau, no longer dependent
upon left-wing support since
the 'Liberal party's surprising
victory 'in the election July 8,
can take on external issues with
a stronger hand. He is expected.
to meet President Ford iri?
Washington some time this fall,
but no date has been set nor is
there any indication of changes
.in Canadian policy on long-
:standing issues.
An indication of the -trend
.may emerge from the current-
negotiations between American
and Canadian diplomatic teams
on Canadian objections to a.
projected dam in North Dakota
that threatens to cause pollu-
tion of the Souris River in'
Manitoba. Canada has asked
for a moratorium on construc-
tion pending environmental'
studies.
A long list of issues includes:
American concern over a Cana-
dian quota on United States
beef, special taxes on fuel ex-
ports that make Canadian oil
expensive for American con-
sumers and the cutting of com-
mercials from United States
itelevision programs rebroad-
cast in Canada. Approved F
NEW YORK TIMES
24 August 1974
The Opium
Of the.
-S
eople
..By C. L. Sulzberger
? KONYA, Turkey?The opium of the
people, in Turkey is not religion but
politics or, put another way, opium
is the 'politics of the people in terms
of ''stn agitated argument with the
Upited States that is not adequately
understood by either side.
Premier Bulent Ecevit assured me ;
that.. "the Turkish Government' is not !
emotional on this but in the areas '
where it is grown, the entire peasant
economy depends on the poppy. There-
fore the curb imposed in 1971 stirred
up psychological reaction. Opium areas
haye been reduced by natural process
from 42 to seven provinces and will
be. reduced further as new livelihoods _
appear. We will do what we can to '
control illegal traffic but world medi-
cine needs more or less, opium." -
Poppy growers depend not only on'
the sap from which the drug derives
but also on flour, fuel and oil ex-
tiacted from the plant. And the
Anatolian peasant is sometimes at
the ,lowest subsistence level. Prof.
Ragip Uner, an expert, says:
'Turkey there are still people who live
in caves and burn oil lamps."
The United States pledged $35 mil-
lion three years ago when a ban was,
.annOunced by Turkey in accord with
Washington. Nevertheless, the govern-
`ment of Konya Province, which now
resumes cultivation on a small scale,
-says the money was slow in reaching
-actual growers. Substitute crops
Weren't swiftly introduced and peas-
-ants found themselves idle. This be-
:Came a psychological problem.
? The Turks make surprisingly little
-out of opium. Between 1967 and 1971
the, annual crop ranged between 120
and 350 metric tons. (It takes ten
metric tons of opium to make one
metric ton of heroin.) The grower here
was getting perhaps $75 a kilogram
for raw opium gum and now might
receive roughly, $200. But the retail
price of heroin, smuggled Out of this
country, processed, then sold in New
York, is about $400,000 a kilogram.
It isn't the farmer who got the vast
differential, but the crook. The moons
shining peasant holds back a minor
share of his crop from the Government
purchasing agency, sells it to a local
bootlegger who sneaks it along to
refiner i and transpotters elsewhere.
Althbugh this country grows far fewer
poppies than India, it is said 80 per
cent 'of U.S. heroin derives from
Turkish gum. ?
On June 30, 1971, Premier Nihat
Erim ? (whose Government -was put in
by the military) prohibited opium.
production. He said: "Illicit traffic
from our country has become very
distressing"; Turkey had been "unable
tio prevent smuggling"; and "we can-
not allow Turkey's supreme interests
and the prestige of our nation to be
further' shaken." ?
- But-politics got into the-question
as full democracy returned. The
minority Ecevit Government is based
on a coalition. The vote of the poppy
giowers was needed and all parties
courted it. Were an election to be
held now, in the. wake of the Cyprus
landing, Mr. Ecevit would win by a
landslide. But the ban was rescinded
July I, just before Cyprus exploded.
? Politicians argued that farmers were
being oppressed, that there was a
world, shortage of medicinal opium,
that the U.S. was turning to India as
a source, that anyway America had
no tight to boss Turkey. Professor .
Uner writes: "No other country has
any right to dictate what ,we have to
cultivate or not-to cultivate." But he
acknowledges that Turkish opinion.
doesn't realize the "hysteria" in the
United States prompted by drug addic-
tion. ?
American politics is also involved..
The -United States Congress, influ-
enced by exaggerated statistics, felt
its own Government wasn't doing
enough. To propitiate Congress,
American Ambassador Macomber was
withdrawn from Ankara right after
the restoration of poppy-farming. Mr.
Macomber had to fly back out of the
opium frying pan into the Cyprus fire.
? There has been inadequate under-
standing on both sides. Americans
cannot, grasp the misery of impover-
ished ?poppy farmers?or the signifi-
cance ,of their vote. Turks cannot
even imagine the horrors of mass
addiction among American youth. It
is ce,rtainly imperative that smuggling
here- (which Mr. Erin i admitted was
"impossible to prevent") be curbed
and that the criminal chain from
farmer to addict be broken.
But it would be well for both na-
tions to remember the tolerance of
Mevlana, a thirteenth-century phi-
losopher-poet who founded the whirl-
ing dervish order here and counseled
,the fanatical medieval world: "Our
center is itot one of despair. Even if
you. have violated your VOWS a hun-
dred times, come again." The word
"try" should be substituted for "come."
or Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2
17
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 :,CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008r2
WASHINGTON POST
03 September 1)74
Victor Zorza
ishful
Coexistence'
The ,Kremlin is developing a blind
spot where President Ford is con-
cerned, much like the blind spot that
caused it to miss the real significance
of Watergate.
Because Moscow was committed to
Mr. Nixon and saw him as the embodi-
ment of detente, it wanted him to stay.
in power and refused to believe that
he might have to go. In Mr. ? Ford's
case, the same kind of wishful thinking
in the Kremlin is causing the Soviet
press to play down the sharp edge
which shows every now and again In
the new administration's pronounce-
ments about the need for big defense.
buildups and major expenditure on..
them.
The Soviet press mildly remarked,
with some delay, on Ford's "regret-
table inaccuracy" in saying that the'
Soviet Union had naval bases in the
Indian Ocean, but all the emphasis in
Moscow is on Ford's coininitment to
Nixon's 'detente policy; on the con-
tinuity represented by 'Kissinger's con-
trol of foreign policy. Pravda observes
with delight that Ford sees Kissinger
first thing every morning, while such
hawks as Defense Secretary James
Schlesinger and CIA Director William
Colby ,have to await a summons.
It is not naivete that causes Mos-
cow to see only what it wants to see in
Ford, but a deliberate tactic. There
was a time when MoWcow assumed
that the "imperialists" always had the
worst intentions and, in preparing to
Counter them, it brought on the very
actions it feared. So,.for that matter,
did the West bring out the worst in?
Moscow. Now, by ascribing only good
intentions to Ford, by granting him
the presumption of innocence, the
Kremlin is trying to make the wish the
NEW YORK TIMES
23 August 1974
rather to the thought which begets the
action. It is all part of the new pattern .
4-1' what is wrongly described as peace-
ful coexistence. Wishful coexistence
would be a better term. Do unto others.
aa you would have them do unto you?'
and they will respond accordingly.
But there is another aspect of for--
eign policy making in Washington to
which Moscow has drawn attention:
from time to time?the . "zigzags"
? which make the. White House veer this
way and that, blow hot and cold on de-
tente, usually for reasons of domestic
politics which have little or nothing to
do with foreign policy. The Moscow
theory has it that the Zigzags, often
,due to electoral considerations,. will
make a President,take? a harsher
?.
.stance toaVard the. oviet Union than
he might otherwise wish.
'Those who take the zigzag view Of
presidential motivation have warned in
the past that the Kremlin cannot. just
take a new wave of harshness lying
down, that it must respond accord-
ingly, and that the mutual buildup of
suspicion and' hostility Could play
havoc with detente. The Soviet practi-
tioners of wishful coexistence have
now banished any such forebodings
from the pages of Pravda. But this
does not mean that Moscow's zigzag
school of thought has been banished to
Siberia?only that its spokesmen, tem-
porarily tint of favor, have been told to
keep quiet.
If Moscow's surface view of the Ford
-presidency could be stripped away, it
would probably disclose .a tangle of
contradictions and fears about the fu-
ture far more intense than the simple-
minded confidence it presents in pub-
lic. An attempt to reconstruct what is.
PRAISES
FORD LEADERSHIP
---------
Pravda Gives Assessment
of His First 2 Weeks
Swis.1 to The New York Times
MOSCOW, .Aug. 22 ? The
Communist party newspaper
Pravda today made an optimis-
tic assessment of President
Ford's first two weeks in office,
suggesting that initial Soviet
nervousness over Mr. Nixon's
sudden departure was rapidly
bei ng assuaged.
.Pravda noted that Mr. rad
was hard at 'work to solve the'
problem ofinflation, which, the
newspaper said, had reached
"catastrophic magnitude" un-
der Mr. Nixon.
While the te- has been no hesi-
tancy about focusing on Ameri-
can problems, the Soviet press
had been careful not to link the
former .PresidVnt with them by
name. I
But. today's article indicated
that the immunity from criti-
cism ? that Mr. Nixon had en-
joyed by virtue of his relation-
ship with the Soviet leader,
Leonid I. Brezhnev, had been
pragmatically set aside, al-
though the Soviet press has still
not released the full details .of
the Watergate affair.
The article, which was writ-
ten by Pravda's Washington
underneath, based on past patterns of
Kremlin thought and of Kremlinologi-
cal evidence, would reveal the uncer-
tainty about Ford which is glossed
oveg by the press.
The Kremlin presumably knows as
well as most of us how unpredictable
the vagaries of the American electoral
process are. But it has to draw up for-
eign policy plans for the future, and it
.has to make certain assumptions about
it. One scenario obviously favored by
at least some people in Moscow is a
1976 election fight between what the
Soviet press represents as the forces of
darkness and evil, led by Sen. Henry
Jackson (D-Wash.), and what must inev-
itably appear against this somber back-
ground as the forces of light, led by
President Ford.
This in 'itself would provide Moscow
with very good reasons to give Mr.
Ford the benefit of any doubts it
might have, as the Soviet press is now
doing. But as Watergate must have
taught Moscow, the straight projection
of U.S. trends into the future is a
thankless task, and some of its experts ?
must now be busy drawing up alterna-
tive scenarios.
Moscow would obviously want to
help Ford against Jackson, and this is
something that Kissinger could use to
good advantage in the negotiations
that lie ahead. But some Soviet leaders
feel that Brezhnev has already made
too many concessions to Nixon in the
past three summits, and that it is high
time the White House started paying
back. The coming negotiations could
be tougher than any in the past.
? 1974, Victor Zona
cOrrespohdent, Boris Strelni-
kov, painted a cautiously bright.
future for Soviet-American re-
lations under President Ford,
with an allusion to the trade
legislation pending in Congress.
In assessing President Ford's
first days in office, Pravda said
he was trying "to raise at least
some barriers in the way of in-
flation which began under the
Kennedy Administration, inten-
sified during Johnson's rule,
and assumed catastrophic mag-
nitude under Nixon."
While saving that Mr. Ford
was spending "nearly half" his
time on the inflation problem,
the newspaper also stressed
that he was devoting "much
time" to foreign affairs.
18
Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008=2
Aliproved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2
BALTIMORE SUN.
1 September 1974
eu igr ti
ee
9
By JACK FRUCHTMAN, JR.
is esse tial to
ei!e te 00.
"Twenty-two years ago on a warm
August night, Soviet secret police agents
executed 24 Jewish writers, poets, ac-
tors. and intellectuals in the basement of
Moscow's notorious Lubyanka Prison. At
that moment,. Joseph Stalin's drive to
eradicate Jewish life and culture from
the Soviet Union attained its ugliest
expression through ultimate terror.
' To this day, the Kremlin has main-
tained its original death sentence on
Jewish identification and tradition, even
if it has ceased executing Jews outright.
And yet, Jewish cultural identification
and ethnic consciousness flourish today
in the Soviet Union, although much of
their expression is private and relegated
to the underground. Jews study Jewish
history, read Jewish literature, write,
paint, dance and compose in a Jewish
idiom even when prohibited. They study
the Hebrew language in secret classes,
because the study of Hebrew is .specifi-
cally proscribed.
-"A new generation of Jews bound to
their tradition has evolved in the Soviet
Union, a generation steadfast in its will
te-survive and motivated actually by the
oppressive atmosphere created by the
Soviet government. And yet, survival
there. as a Jewish community has be-
come almost an unbearable effort.
" Thus, since 1971 the struggle for Jew-
ish rights in the Soviet Union has be-
come synonymous with the principle of
free emigration. The only alternative for
many identifying Jews is to go to ,a
place where they can give full and
complete expression to their Jewishness.
As a result, attention has inevitably
focused in the United States on the
Trade Reform Act of 1973, Section 402,
commonly known as the Jackson
amendment, which denies credits and
most-favored-nation status to any nation
with a restrictive emigration policy.
. Opponents of the Jackson amendment
believe it would drastically interfere
with the growing U.S.-Soviet detente. Its
supporters, on the other hand, have felt
that a viable, meaningful detente prov-
ides for the accrual of benefits for both
sides. Unilateral concessions?in this
case billions of dollars in foreign trade
to.. the Soviet Union with nothing in
return?cannot achieve an authentic de-
tente.
,While it is true that Jewish emigration
geeatly increased rrom the Soviet Union
in 1972 and 1973, the decline of those
permitted to leave this year demon-
strates what can occur when emigration
Is not free despite the mutually pro-
fessed spirit of detente. In 1972 and 1973,
almost 33,000 Jews each year were
Mr. Fruchtman is executive director of
the Baltimore Committee for Soviet
Jewry, a standing coinmittee of the
granted exit visas. To date in 1974, that
number has declined about 35 per cent.
At the current rate, no more than 22,000
will be allowed to leave by the end of.
this year.
Moreover, since Soviet officials have
arbitrarily chosen who shall go and who
shall stay, most of those recently
granted visas have cbme from the So-
viet heartland, not from the major
urban areas. They are less educated and
less professionally trained than their
more sophisticated urban brethren. ?
In recent testimony before the Senate
Foreign Relations subcommittee on mul.
tinational corporations, Professor Zbige
niew Brzezinski of Columbia University
spoke of two kinds of detente. He distin-
guished the rather comprehensive Amer-
ican view from the more narrow Soviet
idea based on a continuing ideological
struggle with the West. The Soviet view
of detente is limited and expedient to
the extent that it is aimed solely toward
the achievement of tangible economid
benefits.
By contrast, Mr. Drzezinski said, the
broader American view is not "artifi-
cially compaetmentalized to economics
alone." Included in this genuine version.
of detente is a possible social, political
and cultural accommodation which
could lead to closer social links between
the two great nations. ,
The American view would have, ac-
cording to Mr. Brzezinski, an obvious
impact on the current Soviet refusal to
permit free emigration. Indeed, part of
this vision of detente lies within the
realm of the basic human right to leave
one's country. Free emigration would
precipitate no changes in the Soviet.
sociopolitical system.
The Jackson amendment is a means
toward the attainment of this broader
view of detente. Professor Brzezinski.
stressed that the denial of free emigra-
tion is not an internal Soviet domestic
matter, even if many Americans have a
direct and highly personalized concern
for those in the Soviet Union who want
to leave. Deploring the possibility that
the right of free emigration would not
be included in the detente agenda, Mr.
Brzezinski concluded that "given this
country's traditions, the adoption of a
posture of amorality Is to give up
something very precious, something
which should not be given up lightly."
It is important to recall that the
United States has on several occasions
displayed concern for oppressed minori-
ties abroad. Throughout the past century
alone, there have been both congres-
sional and presidential initiatives on
behalf of Russian Jewish rights. Presi-
dent William Howard Taft in December,
1911, abrogated a commercial treaty with
Russia, for example, under pressure
from public opinion and a unanimous
'Congress after reports of mistreatment
Moreover, the right and opportunity to
emigrate is a transnational concept,
pointedly expressed in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and gener-
ally recognized in international law_ The
Soviet Union, as a signator of the Uni-
versal Declaration as well as of the
International Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion, has violated the provisions in these
documents which specify the right to-
leave one's country.
There are, therefore; both an accepted
norm embodied in international conven-
tions which encourages transnational
concern for the right of free emigration
and a long American tradition of tangi-
ble action on behalf of human rights
through the exercise of American di-
plomatic and economic influence.
Thus, a rationale exists for the,Jack-
son amendment which may not have
been made clear to the American_ pece?
ple. Support of the Jackson amendment.
need not mean that one has. to be
opposed to detente, but support -of -a
broad, meaningful detente would logi-
cally require support of the amendment'.
It is through the implementation. of
the-right of free emigration, then, that
Soviet Jews hope to act out their Jewish
consciousness. Those 24 poets and intel-
lectuals murdered in 1952 represented
the leadership of Jewish thought -arid
letters, and they posed a major threat-to
the Stalinist goal of liquidating Jess*
culture. The murder of the 24 -wasee
result of Stalin's creation of a JeWsiSh
Anti-Fascist Committee in 1942 When a-
number of Jewish intellectuals,'ali-df
whom regarded themselves as .Soviet
patriots, were recruited to generate. watt.
time support by Jews in the West for
the Soviet struggle against Nazi f.lere
many:
Little did these Soviet emissarieLsug-
pect Soviet duplicity. On its return after
the war, - when its services were no
longer needed, the committee was dis-
banded, and all its members arrested.
The assimilated Jewish Communist and
publicist, Ilya Ehrenburg, was later to
write in Pravda, the Soviet Communist
party newspaper, that Soviet Jews'ass*
ciating with Jews in other countries
were demonstratively disloyal Soviet cit-
izens. His words marked the death-knell
of hundreds of -Jewish artists, musi-
cians, poets, writers, and government
and party officials who disappeared in
the winter of 1948-1949.
Jewish survival in the Soviet tnia
has been accomplished over the past- 22
years against all odds. Deprived.of,the
cream of Jewish artists, writers and
other intellectuals and in the fadeof
almost daily attempts to halt Jewish
self-expression, the Soviet Jewish:Core;
rnunity refuses to wither and die. The
United States' obligation in its sCrite fnr
detente is to stand on principle and not
simply gross material gain, mi;trorlit
Baltimore Jewish Council- Approved Fo1gA6e2001/08/08 CIA-RDP771B0432R000100340008-2
1, 7
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2
the -Soviet goal.
The United States must reacli!Orto
all oppressed groups !n the SovietiNon
at a time when U.S.-Soviet relation
have never been closer in more than h0
years and insist that these groups. posf
sess the right to -go where they can give
full expression to their culture antra
dition. In this way, U.3.-Soviet detente
will be elevated to a high morar-pfitlic"
and all Americans will be proud of their
nation's reaffirmation of a basic tuiaau
right. ?
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
30 August 1974
Sea po or: U.S. vs. U.S.S.R.
By Richard Burt
Special to The Christi= Science Monitor
London
The publication this week of the 1974-75 edition of Jane's Fighting
Ships has revived the lively but complex debate over the relative
strengths of the U.S. and Soviet navies.
Echoing the repeated claims of former U.S. Chief of Naval
Operations Elmo Zumwalt, the editors of Jane's stab:, that the Soviet
Union has achieved substantial supremacy in a variety of areas of
nava/ weaponry, and has begun to challen the United States in
others.
Writing that the U.S. Navy is "in the van of navies subjected to
misinformed, illogical, and irrational attacks by those who depend
upon it most," the editors said that the Soviet Navy enjoys a major
numerical edge in submarines anti heavy cruisers and "leads the
world in aeaborne missile armament, both strategic and tactical, both
ship and submarine-launched."
In the strategic area, the Soviets have launched over 60 ballistic
missile submarines, including the new Delta-class boat which is
capable of launching 12 misolles with a range of 4,600 miles. With this
range, te editors note 12110 the Delta-class subs will be able to strike
targets in the United Statee from protected waters near Soviet shores.
The United States now possesses 41 missile-launching submarines
with 3,860-Mile ran missiles. The first of 10 new Trident submarines
equipped with resege missiles will not be ready until 1678-79.
In the tactical area, the Soviet Union is given a major lead in cruise
missile's, a technology area that U.S. officials admit has not been fully
exploited by the Navy. Deployed abeard both submarines and surface
verseelo, the Soviet missiles are at present viewed as the primary
throat to ts Ill.g. merrier force.
The Soviet Navy is also given high
marks in surface vessels, where Its
fleet of cruisers outnumber the U.S.
firce 34 to 6. Included in this figure are
the Soviet Navy's new Kara and
Kresta-class ships, which are de-
scribed as the fastest and most heav-
ily armed heavy combatants in the
world.
One of the few areas in the surface
vessel category where the editors still
give the U.S. Navy a clear lead is
aircraft carriers, where the present
force of 14 stands unchallenged. How-
ever, they warn, with one carrier now
,undergoing sea trials and another
being constructed, the Soviets could
challenge U.S. carrier supremacy in
the 1980's.
Few naval analysts doubt the edi-
tors claim that the Soviet fleet "is a
very powerful fighting force." But
numerous experts emphasize the dif-
ficulty of comparing the two forces.
Thus, while the Soviet Navy enjoys
an advantage in number of ships, U.S.
naval vessel, on the average, tend to
be larger and more capable. In fact, it
Is estimated that the total tonnage of
U.S. naval vessels is twice that of the
Soviet fleet.
In terms of individual vessels, the
U.S. Navy is also generally given an
edge. While the Soviets have deployed
sophisticated ships such as the Kara-
class cruisers, most U.S. vessels are
believed to be three to four times
more effective then their Soviet coun-
terparts, possessing greater endur-
ance and flexibility.
Analysts also note an important
difference between how the two fleets
are deployed. Possessing a true "blue
water" capability the U.S. Navy con-
tinuously deploys large forces
throughout the world and possesses a
wealth of experience in maintaining
ships at sea for long periods of time.
Defensive force
Despite Soviet forays into the South
Atlantic and naval visits to Africa and
South America, analysts argue that
the Soviet Navy has yet to master a
strategy of "forward naval deploy-
ment" and is still viewed by the
Kremlin as a defensive force to
?protect the Soviet homeland from
attack.
The U.S. Navy and its supporters,
however, have seized on these deploy-
ment differences to argue that U.S.
forces must possess superiority over
the Soviet Fleet. While the United
States, they argue, must maintain the
freedom of the seas to ensure a secure
supply of strategic commodities or to
project force in areas such as the
Middle East, .the Soviet Union only
needs to disrupt the sea lanes to
achieve its objectives.
This view was recently questioned
by Michael McGwire, a retired Royal
WASHINGTON POST
.24 August 1974
Violinist in Concert
MOSCOW ? Violinist
Georgi Yermolenko, who
caused Australian unionists
to think he was ,being drag-
ged back to the Soviet Un-
ion after seeking asylum in
'Perth, appeared on Soviet
television to say that his
_ goal now is to enter the
Moscow Conservatory.
Yermolenko, 19, sat smil-
ing while- Soviet composer
Dmitri Kabalevsky, who had
accompanied him on the
Australian tour, describqd
the "four days of night-
Mare" until the unionist let
the Soviet artists depart by
plane.
"Georgi, you are smiling
now, but it was not a smil-
ing matter in those days,
Which we recall now with
contempt and horror," said
Kabalevsky on the TV show
after the dvening news.
Navy commander now teaching at
Dalhousie University in Halifax, Can-
ada. Arguing that Soviet naval depl-
-oyment is still defensive in nature,
Commander McGwir' .e says that the
Soviet Navy does not yet have the
capability for large-strength, distant
deployments. Moreover, he notes that
"becoming a super power= has not
changed Russia's geographical posi-
tion, with all its disadvantages in
terms of deploying maritime force."
Commander McGwire also criti-
cizes Western "prophets of doom" for
'delivering a major propaganda suc-
cess to the Kremlin for exaggerating
Soviet naval capability. "Naturally
enough," Commander McGwire says,
"the Soviet Union welcomes the West-
ern amplifier, which is now-plugged
into her naval propaganda machine,
whose authoritative voice helps to
compensate for the sometimes glar-
ing shortfall between her words and
deeds."
20
____APPEQxecLE,or.R9Jeasen200.103108 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2
APproved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003400'08-2
NEW YORK TIMES
27 August 1974
How t Lose an Ally.
By Graham Hovey
Secretary of State Kissinger still
seems oblivious to the dimensions of
the disaster sustained by United States
foreign policy in the Cyprus tragedy
and insensitive to the hurt of people
who feel let down by Washington.
How else explain his ill-timed offer
to mediate the Cyprus crisis and his
bland invitation to a harried Greek
Premier to come to Washington to
talk things over?at a time when Tur-
key was grabbing the northern third
of Cyprus and drawing only a wrist
tap from the State Department?
Did Mr. Kissinger really believe that
Greece's Premier Caramanlis or For-
eign Minister Mavros could accept a
summons to Washington at that point
and survive? As former United States
Under. Secretary of State George Ball
said, the Kissinger mediation offer in
that context exhibited "an insensi-
tivity beyond belief."
And at whom was Mr. Kissinger
aiming his warning of last week that
"a foreign government must not ex-
.pect that every time there is a crisis,
the Secretary of State will come rush-
ing. into the area and spend all his
time settling that particular crisis?"
Was anyone asking for what he
grandly calls "the personal shuttle
diplomacy of the Secretary of State"?
Mr. Kissinger did promise that in
any negotiation, Washington would
"take into full account Greek honor
and dignity," but he felt it necessary
to add a warning that this country
would "not be pressured by .threat of
withdrawal from the. [NATO] alliance"
nor by unjustified anti-American
.demonstrations. .
7. But the Secretary surely. misreads
LOS ANGELES TIMES
23 August 1974
the political signals from Athens if he
regards the pullout of Greek forces
from NATO and the anti-American
demonstrations merely as ploys by the
Caramanlis Government, rather than
reflections of utter disillusionment
with an alliance and a superpower ally
that could not prevent Turkey's blitz
and Greece's humiliation on Cyprus.
In fact, Mr. Kissinger's trouble from
the onset of the Cyprus crisis has been
a lack, in dealing with allies, of the
sensitivity that was an ingredient of
his success in the Middle East and
Vietnam negotiations, as well as in the
initiatives that led to President Nixon'
visits' to China and the Soviet Union.
The United States is not omnipotent
and, as Mr. Kissinger reminds us, can-
not stop "every local war between
smaller nations." No one can prove.
that any feasible Washington effort
this time would have halted Turkey's
invasion of Cyprus. ?
' One is forced to recall, however,
that President Johnson twice got Tur-
key to call off a scheduled invasion Of
Cyprus: in 1964, with a tough letter to
Premier Inonu; in 1967, through a
skillful, even-handed negotiating job
by envoy Cyrus Vance.
Once a shaky military regime in
Athens had staged a putsch against
President Makarios, clearly aimed at
enosis? the union of Cyprus with
Greece?there was only one way to
prevent Turkish intervention: to dem-
onstrate that Geeece would not be
allowed to get by with it. Washington
could have made the point by backing
Britain in refusing to recognize the
new Cyprus regime and in demanding
that Athens recall .the Greek officers
wko had directed the coup.
Instead, the United States gave Tur-
key and the world every reason to
believe it accepted the coup. Washing-
ton refused to pin responsibility for it
on the `Greek dictatorship and even
hinted that on Cyprus it preferred the
swaggering murderer, Nikos Sampson,
to the devious Makarios.
Turkey's initial Invasion of July 20'?
was the inevitable result. This at leaA
accomplished the salutary secondary
results of blasting out of power both
Sampson and the Athens junta. At that
point the imperative was to persuade
Turkey to go no further.
Ankara had made its point: it would
not accept enosis and it' intended at
any cost to protect the Turkish
Cypriote minority. The ? Turks could
now negotiate from strength. They.
could expect American and British
backing for constitutional revisions to
give the Turkish Cypriotes a large
measure of autonomy.'
But the invasion had been heady
wine for .Turkey and Washington
again seemed to blow a timid trumpet.
At -the showdown in Geneva, Turkey '
presented a-drastic plan for division of
Cyprus as ah ultimatum, refusing to
give the Greeks and Greek Cypriotes
even a 36-hour reeess to concult.
Turkey's blitz killed hundreds, dis-
placed some 200,000, sowed new seeds
for protracted intercommunity strife,
provoked Greece into pulling its forces
out of NATO, and inereased instability
in the eastern Mediterranean and the
Middle East. It also dealt a heavy blow
at United States credibility and the
reputation of Henry A. Kissinger.
More's the pity that he seems not to
understand why.
Graham Hovey is a member of the
Editorial Board of The Times.
The Risk of America's Role as a orld Umpire
BY MAX LERNER
NEW YORK CITY?In years ahead
there will be other outbursts of anti-Amer-
icanism around the world, like the one in
Nicosia where American Ambassador
Rodger P. Davies was cut down by gunfire
in a confused mob attack on the embassy.
Americans have become the inevitable tar-
gets for national and sectarian rages the .
world over. To be an American envoy in a
world trouble area?let us face it?is to
hold down one of the high-risk jobs of our
time.
As an infrequent visitor at the senior
seminar of the State Department where
envoys return for refresher studies, I have
come to know some of these men and to-
. respect their courage on the firing line.
Approved For Release
They are no CIA agents involved in covert
operations but ambassadors reporting to
Washington and carrying out decisions
reached there. They may. be innocent of
the decisions for which they are held re-
sponsible, but they offer a natural target
for these cruel symbolic slayings.
In Athens, too, where many of the young
are in the camp of the recently returned
leftist politician, Andreas Papandreou,
there are banners with the inscription,
"Kissinger Killer." Nor is Athens alone.
It may he true that -in the early phase of
the Cyprus crisis there was a Kissinger tilt ..
toward the Turks. But if their military for-
tunes had gone differently, who can doubt
that the "Kissinger Killer" banners would
be raised by enraged Left Nationalist
20gfili83l? 61)3M6iit7+126642R000100340008-2 2
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2
,? The anti-Americanism in The world to-
day differs sharply from that of the '40s
through the '60s. It is not a decadent and
-?-scorned American capitalism that is at-
tacked, as in the '40s, nor the American
"cold war Mentality," as in the '50s, nor the
? imperialist interventions in insurgent situa-
tions, as in the '60s.
_ When the new anti-Americanism is not
directed against the multinational corpora-
tions or the CIA?the two still favorite
? targets?it is directed against America as
the arbiter of the world's quarrels.
That is part of the price America will
have to pay for the Kissinger era in diplo-
macy and for the world image which Kis-
singer has achieved as mediator, especially
in his shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East.
The new anti-Americanism can be put
in a single simple, earthy Americanism:
? "Kill the umpirer' Surely that is better than
"Kill the intervener" or "Kill the cold warri-
ors" or "Kill the fascist imperialists." But
how did the United States become such a
target?
? Mainly it is because the world has run
into a shortage of arbitrators. The United
Nations tries to do its best as umpire, but it
WASHINGTON POST
28 August 1974
is largely without power and is 'just start-
ing to build its authority. The Russians are
not trusted. The Chinese?and the Indians ?
also?are too involved in their inner power
struggles. NATO has the wrong setup for'.
umpiring. Only the United States is left to
function, well or badly, in this vacuum. -
In a way it is a form of left-handed trib--1
ute, both to Kissinger and to the United
States, to declaim and protest against their
role. It implies that they have more power
than the facts probably warrant, and that:,
the arbitrating role is actually theirs, even
if wrongly used.
Kissinger has explicitly offered his medi-:-.
ation efforts to the Greeks and Turks. But
it would be a dangerous mistake to believe,
whether abroad or in the UniLed States,.
that America must right every wrong, re-
dress every grievance, heal every injury,
balance out every inequality that occurs M
the world.
It was stupid for America to try to hi
the world's policeman. It is dangerous to
try to be the world's umpire.
It is absurd. Yet for the moment there is
no one and nothing else to fill the role.
. .
Rowland Evans and Robert Novak
eek Military Scandal
Blatant misuse of American military
aid by the ousted Greek military dicta-
torship, which probably caused the
junta's fatal inaction in the Cyprus cri-
sis, is about to be exposed in a major
international scandal?threatening the
permanent end of U.S. military aid to
Greece and widening the dangerous
Washington-Athens breach.
This scandal, a closely-held secret
within the new civilian government of
Prime Minister Constantine Karaman-
lis (which had nothing whatever to do
with it) may help explain the sudden ?
collapse of the military junta following
Turkey's invasion of Cyprus. Turkey's
move was triggered by the Greek jun-
ta's overthrow of Archbishop Makarios
as President of Cyprus on July 15.
Karamanlis and his top aides, includ-
ing Foreign Minister George Mavros,
are convinced the junta was preparing
military operations across the Turkish
border in Thrace immediately follow-
ing Turkey's decision to intervene mili-
tarily on Cyprus But when the junta
mobilized the Greek reserves, military
stores of U.S. aid?rifles, ammunition,
boets, machine guns and rockets?
were discovered to be totally inade-
quate. Crates of the American M-16 ri-
fle, for one example, were found to
contain one or two layers of rifles on
the top, with rocks, wood and other fil-
ler material hidden underneath.
The discovery of this shocking short-
fall of arms and equipment was the fi-
nal nail in the coffin of the junta, al-
ready under heavy political pressure
for its .stumbling Cyprus adventure.
The full extent of the disappearance
of American arms aid is still not
known. Some well-informed experts on
the outrages perpetrated , by seven
years of Greek military rule believe
that arms were sold for cash to foreign
countries, possible black Africa, be-.
hied the' backs of regular military com-
manders.
.But wholly apart from the devastat-
ing impact on the junta itself, the dis-
covery of the shortfall raises profound
questions about Greece's military de-
fenses in her role as a member of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO). Karamanlis, pressured by the
Turkish Cyprus invasion into an anti-
American posture, withdrew Greece
from ,:he military arm of NATO two
weeks ago.
High officials here are unaware of
the Karamanlis-Mayros- investigation
which revealed the junta's inability to
mobilize the Greek reserve. That in-
vestigation is now centered on three
major military depots: Attica, the site
in the Athens-Piraeus area of major
Greek military installations; Larissa,
in central Greece, the headquarters of
the First Army; and Salonika, Greece's
second city and the headquarters of
the Third Army corps.
Although administration officials are
in the dark, key members of four con-
gressional committees?the Foreign
Relations and Armed Services commit-
tees of both Senate and House?have
been apprised of the scandal by Elias
Demetracopoulos, the best-informed
anti-junta Greek exile here the past
seven years. He recently returned to
Washington from high-level talks in
Geneva with officials of the Karaman-
lis eovernment.
Key congressional committee meni-
hers, including one senator who sup-
ported U S. military aid to Greece
even during the military dictatorship,
will soon demand a Complete investiga-
tion by the General Accounting Office
(GAO), congressional .watchdog over
government spending.
The results of that probe Could be:
dynamite. In 1971, Rep. Wayne Hays of.;
Ohio pushed through 'Congress a ban,'
on U.S. military grant- aid to Greece:
Only last week Hays authored a bill to,
repeal that ban, on grounds that grant
aid could be restored now that the
colonels were gone.
But if the GAO probe shows that
there really was wholesale abuse of
American military aid, Congress will
be most reluctant about new grant aid
even to the respected civilian govern-
ment of Karamanlis. -
Even without the scandal, restora-
tion of aid seems dubious considering -
the fact that Karamanlis bowed to
anti-American sentiment by withdraw- ?
ing Iron NATO's military organization
and accepting Moscow's formula for a '
political settlement on Cyprus. .
The impact of a finding by GAO that
lame amounts of American aid were .
pilfered or squandered would go far-
beyond Greece. It would radically ad-
vance the argument against foreign
aid that is widespread in Congress and
fanned by neo-isolationalism. In this
way too, the chickens of obsequious
U.S. support for a clique of mimitive
G rock colonels are coming home to
roost with a vengeance.
01974, Yield EuterprIse, Inc.
22
Approve ForRetene 2001108/08 ::-C1A-RDP77-00432R000100340008--2
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RD077-00432R000100340008-2
ST. LOUIS POST?DISPATCH
10 AUG 1974
Intervention Arm
Greek democrats have long complained that
the Central Intelligence Agency was pulling
the strings of the so-called colonel's' dictator-
ship, before the military government was re-
placed recently. State Department officials
have now confirmed that CIA agents subsi-
dized politicians and bought votes in Parlia-
ment. The CIA, and not U.S. Ambassador Hen-
ry Tasca, dalt directly with the Greek junta's
strong man, Brig. Gen. Dimitrios loannidis,
who ran the secret police.
? Perhaps ;the State Department officials put
out this information because they disliked
being bypassed by the CIA, or because the
department now wishes to repudiate complici-
ty in the former dictatorship. The fact is that
the American Government supported and ma-
nipulated the .Greek military government
through the CIA, as if has used the CIA to
support secure right-wing regimes in other
countries. And the Greek experience, like the
Bay of Pigs, proved a disaster.
In 1963 former President Truman wrote, "I
never had any thought that when I set up the
CIA it would be injected into peacetime cloak-
and-dagger operations." It was supposed to be
NEW YORK TIMES
28 August 1974
an intelligence-gathering agency. The work of
intelligence can only be compromised by inter-
ventionist activities that have,: to be justified
through the intelligence arm:
Still, the basic question is whether the Unit-
ed States should meddle in foreign govern-
ments, particularly in support of oppressive
governments, in ways that are kept more se-
cret from the American people than from for-
eign peoples who are victimized by the inter-
vention. In Greece the CIA carried out a form
of foreign policy that the State Department
could not afford to acknowledge. ? ?
Despite frequent revelations of CIA paramil-
itary and political projects, usually after fail-
ures, Congress has done little to bring the
agency into some form of public scrutiny and
responsibility. The joint special CIA Oversight
Committee itself led the Senate rejection last
June of Senator Proxmire's proposal to make
the CIA disclose the total amount of money it !
spends. So far congressional oversight has
simply meant congressional approval. In view
of the Greek exposure, how much longer will
Congress wait, to bring the CIA to reasonable .
'account?
he FlOtSarri Of the Storm
? By C. L. Sulzberger ?
SPETSAIS, Greece?Right after an-
nouncing withdrawal of Greek armed
forces from NATO, Premier Caraman ?
lis overhauled the command of those
forces, firing all top leaders associ-
ated with the previous junta and with.
the boomerang Cyprus coup that
touched off Turkey's invasion. The odd
thing is that the men now named
to command have all been pro-NATO
enthusiasts.
It will take months before Athens
unscrambles its idea on relations with
the Western alliance. So far it merely
says it will emulate France, which
pulled out troops but retained politi-
tal membership. Greek studies claim
General de Gaulle's experts analyzed
the French-NATO problem four months
before he moved?then gave the allies
a year to evacuate, if that's an indica-
tion, it will be Christmas 1975 before
anything irrevocable happens.
Neither the United States nor NATO
earned any consistent kudos from
Turkey or Greece during the Cyprus
confrontation. Turkish Premier Ecevit
initially told me it would be "difficult"
for Turkey to continue in the alliance
if Greek-Turkish problems weren't
first solved. Later he thought Turkey
could "fill up the gap" created by
Greece's withdrawal.
Washington warned Greece and Tur-
key that they would be cut off from
American arms supplies if they went
to war. This particularly threatened
Greece, which expects to get another
squadron of F-4 Phantoms next month.
American diplomacy tried to be ac-
tive. President Ford made his firs(
foreign intervention by asking Turkey
to do nothing that would "humiliate" Washington, which has mishandled
Aegean; not much ripple. Secretary
Kissinger's call to Premier Caramanlis
Weren't received with approbation or
even respect. The United States is
today widely disliked and mistrusted
in Greece,
Moscow, for its part, made scant
headway. The Turks resented a Soviet-
launched rumor that 50,000 Russian
troops were ready to help Ankara
invade Cyprus. But Moscow, no slouch
in these affairs, prompted its latest
friend, Libya, to give Turkey minor
air-force and financial aid and also
applauded sprouting friendship be-
tween Ankara and Soviet-armed Syria.
Greece rightly saw in all this a
Kremlin effort to bust up NATO ?
which Greece ended up doing itself.
When Moscow suddenly shifted to a
pro-Greek stance, there was little gen-
uine enthusiasm. Meantime, Belgrade
'counseled Athens that since ? NATO
couldn't protect its adherents, the five
permanent members of the United Na-
tions Security Council, plus one non-
aligned spokethnan, Yugoslavia, should
look after unattached lands like Cy-
prus. This suits Russia's present diplo-
macy.
El
Although both Greece and Turkey
pride themselves on martial prowess,
they each did badly in a military sense.
The Greek mobilization was deplor-
able. Turkish paratroop drops in
Cyprus were often far off target. An
original Famagusta landing, scheduled
to coincide with that at Kyrenia, had
to be called off because it was so
badly coordinated. The Turks bombed
one of their destroyers, with heavy
losses; the Greeks shot down one of
their planes.
might' be well adVited to sponsor a
joint United States-West German mis-
sion of distinguished generals to ex-
plain to the Turkish Army why it
should keep .its cool. The army re-
mains Turkey's ultimate political force.
Gen. Lauds Norstad, former NATO
boss, and Gen. Johann Von Kielman-
segg, who commanded,its central front,
would be ideal for that purpose.
America has much military prestige
in Ankara but Germany's is of. far
greater duration. ?
Another thing. I hope Greece even-
tually reconsiders its promised expul-
sion of U.S. and NATO bases. But, in
any event', there is too large an Amer-
ican military presence in both coun-
tries. The homeporting arrangement
for our destroyers around Athens is
useless; the carrier they were to pro-
tect won't receive similar facilities.
The accord should be terminated.
Likewise, too many little United States
"facilities" are dotted around Turkey.
Washington's diplomacy must now
work to tranquilize the Aegean and
seek to help compose its disputes?
while also trying to hang on to those
few facilities crucial to NATO and to
Western defense.
These still include the Incirlik air
base in southern Turkey and the mag-
nificent Suda Bay in Greece's island
of Crete, a deep harbor that could
easily hold the entire Sixth Fleet and
includes massive ammunition and war-
head installations. No Turkish port
could substitute for Suda Bay.
These are primordial long-range
goals we should be thinking of now
with respect to this area. The short-
range goal is more obvious: Keep our
two partners (originally linked by us
in the Truman Doctrine even before
eolalcolati from permanently
Greece. Like droAtitittdiv6dIFeit Eteleasii20811018M8 !aCIAORDPYNts00482R ?e.
23 Turkey for almost as long before,
Approved For Release 2001/08/08.: CIA-RDP77-0043213000100340008-2
THE WASHINGTON POST MandaY. AI* 1914
W hington literryarsconasmil
Greece to Shut All Its
ases
By Jack Anderson "We have made major efforts (D-Ind.); Peter Kyros, (D-Maine) ghan, the peppery Makarios was
Public statements to the con-
trary, Greece is already making
plans to shut down every NATO
base in the country within a
year, thus leaving a getting hole
In the fabric of the Western
world's defense systems.
So secret are the new Athens
civilian government's plans that
even top U. S. officials are una-
ware of the 'seriousness of the
threat. Jut a few days ago, De-
fense Secretary James Schle-
singer was speaking honestly
when he said he had "little indi-
cation" of such a move.
Our information, however,
from high but confidential dip-
lomatic sources who backed up
their talk with documents, is
that the NATO shutdown is al-
ready a Matter of Athens policy,
barring a radical change in the
current U.S. attitude toward Cy-
prus.
The importance of the Greek
NATO bases is difficult to over-
estimate. Naval, bomber, mis-
sile and communiations facili-
ties in -Greece give NATO a
striking power directly beneath
the belly of Soviet Russia and
her satellites. ?
At the same time that Greece
was setting its course on NATO,
Secretary of State Henry Kis-
singer was assuring a private
meeting with President Ford
and Republican leaders that the
U.S. policy on Cyprus is neutral.
to elicit concessions from both
the Greeks and the Turks," he
said, according to confidential
minutes of the White House
meeting. "We will take a new
look if the Turks cross the
cease-fire line."
The restive Republicans won-
dered why Kissinger had not
simply halted aid to Turkey.
Kissinger replied, according to
the minutes, that this "woUld
not have stopped the three-day
occupation."
Indeed, Kissinger warned,
such drastic action "Would have
enormous consequences on
NATO, Turkish nationalism and
(the) possible, approach to the
Soviet Union." One "possible
solution," Kissinger said, "may
be a federalized republic or a
Cantonal structure" ? in short,
a semi-partitioning of Cyprus
with Greece and Turkey each
controlling part of the island.
Added President Ford hope-
fully, "I think we'll come out all
right as friends of both parties."
Kissinger also met privately
With five congressmen of Greek
descent who gave him a far
more obstreperous going over
than the Republican leaders.
One of the Greek-American leg-
islators who attended the off-
the-record meeting told us they
tore into Kissinger "in a manner
to which he is unaccustomed."
The congressmen were Louis
Bafalis, (R-Fla.), John Brademas
Paul Sarbanes (D-Md.), and Gus
Yatron (D-Pa.). At one point,
they told, Kissinger he was per-
sonally responsible for a "griev-
ous policy. The U.S. has egg all
over its face."
The strong-willed Kissinger was
"patient" but "stuttered, reeled
back and reddened" under the
onslaught, we were told. At one
point he left the meeting for a
telephone conversation witt
Turkish Prime Minister &tient
Ecevit. But at the end of the-
meeting, Kissinger courteously
invited the lawmakers to come
back again. -
Despite appearances of even-
handedness, we are told by high
diplomatic sources that Kis-
singer tentatively and confiden-
tially agreed in recent meetings
with British Ambassador Peter
Ramsbotham to a Cyprus plan
drawn up in London.
To the distress of the'Greeks,
it would, in effect, chop Cyprus
into Greek and Turkish en-
claire% The Turks would make
an ostentatious pull-back to a
line running across the north-
ern third of the island to pacify
world opinion a move they had
intended anyway.- -
When the plan was delicately
put to deposed Cypriot presi-
dent Archibishop Makarios *in
London by Britain's Prime Min-
ister Harold Wilson and For-
eign Secretary James Calla-
outraged, we were told.
In Athens, Greek leaders are ,
also fuming. For years, they -
have gone along with almost ev-
ery twist and turn in American
policy, while the Turks have of- ?
ten refused to cooperate with
Washington. A few weeks ago,
for instanceoTurkey defied the
United States and resumed cul-
tivation of opium. .
Meanwhile, we: have learned
that Athens risked her good rel- '
ations with the Arabs by se-
cretly permitting the United
States to use Greek NATO bases
for shuttling supplies to Israel ?
during the Middle East war last.
October. As a result, Israel is se-
cretly grateful to Greece and
hopes it will keep its NATO ties.
During the October War,
Greece also allowed U.S.
irfcelli-
gence services to use a commu-
nications station outside Athens
to monitor Soviet and Arab ra-
dio broadcasts. Turkey, on the
other hand, reportedly permit-
ted the Soviets to overfly her
territory to deliver .arms to the _
Arabs.
Footnote: At the State Depart-
dent, a spokesman denied .
Greek bases were used by. the
United Statesto resiply Israel.
He also said the British ?
tive was not yet "developed." It
does not have any ,"arms or
legs" yet, he said.
*1974, United Feature Syndicate
BALTIMORE SUN
29 August.. ?1974
isearc.s ,:e Kling . of Ford . ase. iibed.
.,....,?
,,
to .N.eri,6.11.t.Are5or European unity
I: . , i ,??
. .:, ? .
, Paris Bliraira? al'ilra.SJI,71'''...... gratuilOns:,. criticism .: of ' Mr., 'French president also cited the
Paris:?American ''',diplomats Ford:?;. , ' . Cyprus situation as illustrating
heie were y4icii:day puziled ;The q0stion they faced was the basic impotence, of Europe
o4r the unexbected' rebuW of whether' it was simply ..directed in its present state to influencl
President Ford delivered in ,:a to the' French domestic:: AIM, world events. !
, i
Tuesday night .:. ? iel6iSion erite.-a'SOrt,.of political sop to The ',.,,same . officials argued
splech by French. PreSfdent the'. -tradifib`nal suspicions of that there were many more
Valery Giscard d' Estaing. -., United ;,States intentions?or obvioq reasons for stressing;
The French Criticism whether it had a more direct the need for European co -opera,
'. c'en:
tetted on Mr .Ford failure to trans-Atlanlie'bearing. . ation---thflation and the energyi
.'t
meintion Eurppe Auring ;Ills e outcome of a morning's crisis not the least ' of them.-=
maor foreig poficy :speech" .
, '.-
The outcome
appeared to be that without looking. either acrossi
jn
after assuminnot too ! much ' importance the Atlantic or the Mediterra-
g the pr esidency
should be attached to the chid- nean for outside pretexts. But;
President Giscard d' Est:ai .: ng ing comment as a signal of these outside events . at least
said he saw t,his as clearly any
i seri?. us setback to, the re- sprovided more immediacy. '
indicating tha t?/:. Europe Would cent cordiality between Wash- * It seems certain that, if no-:.
have, o lookpfter its own ington and Paris. thing else, Mr. Giscard cls'
affars and went on to call a Rather', it was assumed, Mr.. Estaing was restating his basic'
European summit meeting, ex- Giscard d' Estaing was seizingj commitment to.an Independent
pedted at the end of November
on a topical issue?the change- ' Europe, which, while maintain.;
or early December.
, . lover in American leadership-1 ing More ., flexible relations.
Given the careful prepara- ! to ,bolster :, what has been his::-with America, would avoid any,
lion of such nationally broad- 'i constant ?argument for in- i form of . tran-Atlantic domi-:
cast speeches, American dip-' creased European unity. ". name. ??? - ?
lornats assume there . ? was! Officials ,involved in the US. - ?
some specific reason for the; analysis pointed out that the
24
Approved-For-Release--2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008=2
Ariproved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2 "
Wednesday, Aug, 28, 1974 THE WASHINGTON POST
B
By Joe Alex Morris Jr.
Los Angeles Times
BONN, Aug. 27?Public
hearings into 'West Germany's
most sensational spy scandal
opened here today with the
government expressing deter-
mination to keep "the smell of
Watergate" out of the proceed-
ings. . ?
A seven-man parliamentary
commission is investigating
the circumstances under
which Guenter Guillaume
managed to rise in 15 years
from a supposed East German
refugee to a position at former
Chancellor Willy Brandt's el-
bow. Guillaume was arrested
last May, and his exPosure
was the motivation for
Brandt's dramatic resignation
.as head of the West German
.government.
A key subject in the parlia-
?mentary investigation is how
Guillaume managed to get so
far despite suspicions leveled
against him 'ey official and
private intelligence bodies
- NEW YORK TIMES
23 August 1974
concerned.with Communist es-
pionage.
This was not the immediate
concern of the parliamentary
committee, which Will hear
some 20 witnesses this week.
The opening eession was
marked by partisan squabbles
and a denial by an Interior
Ministry official that there
had been any government ma-
nipulation of documents.
Government witnesses also
testified there had been noth-
ing out of the ordinary in the
procedures involved in Guil-
laume's employment, first as
a junior member of Brandt's
staff and later as one of his
three personal advisers. But
the committee has yet to go,
into the hotly disputed ques-
tion of how Guillaume slipped
through the seeurity checks.
In. a' lengthy article on this
subject, the respected Frank-
furter Allgemeine newspaper
said yesterday that it was
clear that pressure from the
Social Democratic Party had fin
e f Es
overriden the hesitations of
Bonn's security advisers. A key
witness is expected to be for-
mer ? Gen. Gerhard Wessel,
head of the Federal Intelli-
gence Service.
At the time of Guillaume's
appointment to the chancel-
lor's office in 1970, Wessel
said that the East German
agents background should be
more closely investigated be-
cause of the reports about
the Frankfurter Allge-
hith.
meine reported.
According to the paper,
nothing was done other than
to question Guillaume "in a
naive and dilettantish way"
and some officials who wanted
to pursue the matter more in-
tensively were told that the in-
vestigation was closed. .
The pressure to close the in-
vestigation came both . from
the chancellor's office and
from the ,Social Democratic
Party, the paper said.
The doubts about Guillaume
were traced back to a report
1955 by the Investigatiir-e
View From the Rhine
By James Reston
? BONN, Aug. 22?This capital of
West Germany is outwardly as calm
these days as an American university
town in vacation time, but inwardly
? it is acutely worried about the world
? economy.
For while West Germany has the
lowest inflation rate of any of the
advanced industrial countries?about
7 per cent?it depends for its pros-
perity and relatively full employment
on selling its goods abroad.
Compared to other European coun-
tries, it is in excellent shape. Though
it still feels amputated with the loss
of East Germany, its gross national
product per capita is now almost
double that of Great Britain.
As things now stand, West Germany
exports as much to the Western world
as the United States and imports al-
most as much from the Western World,
but this trade accounts for about 23
per cent of West Germany's G.N.P.,
as compared to only about 5 per cent
in the United States, which is there-
fore far more independent of the
movements of the world markets.
Officials here are watching the new
Ford Administration in Washington
with the greatest care. For as they
see it, a strong anti-inflation policy
in the United States would mean lower
prices for American goods, higher un-
employment and therefore less U.S.
BONN
Since West Germany has led the
world in combatting inflation, it is
aware of the difficulty of arguing that
other countries should do the same.
But the point emphasized here is that
the U.S. economy is five or six times
as large as Germany's and that what-
ever the United States does greatly
influences the world economy on
which all industrial countries depend'
more than the U.S.
It is noted here that President
Ford's main emphasis in his inaugural
address to the Congress was on the
need to fight inflation, and that he
also spoke of the importance of world
peace and order. But how far will he
go, officials here ask, not only ver-
bally but actually, on a deflationary
policy? Will he look at it mainly from
a U.S. point of view, or try to find
the delicate balance between just
enough anti-inflation to help the
United States and not so much as to
produce world-wide deflation?
The answer to this, of course, is
that President Ford has been in office
for only a few days, with a new Secre-
tary of the Treasury, a new chairman
of the Council of Economic Advisers,
and a new world-minded Vice-Presi-
dential nominee. Both the cast of
characters and the mood of Washing- ,
ton are changing and nobody can be
demand for goods fr91113ReNed Fbir Re4eaisev2001i0811418ita1iktREIR77-0
other countries
?
ion ge
fi ir
Committee of Free Jurists, a
private organization in West
Berlin. At the time, Guillaume
was employed by an East Ger-
man publishing house, and the
committee note_d that his supe-
riors there -had reportedly,
been told by the Communist
Party not to concern them-
selves with his frequent ab-
sences from his post.
. Guillaume was making fre-
quent trips to West Berlin and
West Germany, where hE
aroused the committee's sus
picion. The committee's re
port on him was handed to the
West Berlin police and, ac
cording to the leper, later sem
on to Bonn but in a watered
down version.
?will go.
? Conversations with officials in Bonn
and in other European capitals,
.however, demonstrate. haw difficult it
is to generalize about America's rela-
tions with Europe, especially in the
field of economics.
Each country is still looking pri-
marily at its own problems. Thus
Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium
have had stronger anti-inflation poli-
cies than others on this 'continent.
France, before the death of _President
Pompidou, was more concerned with
the growth of her economy than with
inflation, but under President Giscard
is now taking a more deflationary
line: Britain is in an alarming state,
with grievous labor-management prob-
lems end an annual inflation rate of
20 per cent:
The members of the European Eco-
nomic Community are talking more
frankly to one another now about their
common problems, and the. relations
between Chancellor Schmidt here and
President Giscard in Paris are particu-
larly good, but all leaders are still
having trouble in reaching common
policies to fit their quite different
traditions and econornc and political
problems.
As the testimony of German officials
here shows, however, Europe, no mat-
ter how much she may worry about
the power of the United States, can-
not insulate herself from that power
economically or financially any more
than she can militarily.
Europe's papers are now full of bine-
iiipis*Acoo origia shin gt
6 they will
?
25
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 :.CIA-RDP77-00432R000100.340008-2
take toward wages and prices. For
while the U.S. now has 5.3 per cent
unemployment and West Germany
only 2.3 per cent, unemployment here
is seen , as a greater menace to the
stability of the West German Govern-
ment than it is to the Ford Adminis-
tration.
"The only trouble with ? U.S.-Euro-
NEW YORK TIMES
14 August 1974
Italy And the C.I.A..
To the Editor:
After the corruption of Greek party
politics, the systematic subversion and
' then the total destruction of political
liberty, after the spiritual humiliation
of modern Greek culture, following
? murder and torture by its Greek servi-
tors?the C.I.A. has been told to desist
from interference in Greece. Had not
the regime of the Colonels ended in
'buffoonery and chaos, the C.I.A. would,
have received no such directive?if,
indeed, it can be obliged to respect it.
Has anyone suggested dismissal, or
even punishment, for the American
public officials responsible for, out-
rages committed in our name in a
friendly country?
Perhaps, however, it is wiser to look
to the future. There is another Medi-
terranean country in which democracy
? is endangered. The recent bomb out-
rage on an Italian train shows that the
Italian'right is determined to sow ter-
ror and disorder?to provoke .(or pro-
vide. an excuse for) a coup d'etat by
certain elements in Italian politics and
the' armed forces.
? Many?Italian citizens are indeed re-
vulsed by the inefficiency, corruption
and parasitism of the state bureaucracy
(which is a fief of the Christian Demo-
cratic party). A new alliance for struc-
tural reform in Italian government and
society is being negotiated by in-
fluential leaders of Italian business,
by the unions, the Communists and
Socialist parties and by ome Chris-
tian Democratic .leaders with a sense
of responsibility. That alliance might
well entail the entry of a Communist
party in the Government. The right
seeks to oppose this , at all costs. The
Italian Communist party is so reform-
ist that it has been criticized by the
Italian left for its moderation. Only
the blindest and most primitive politi-
cal thinking could deny that the Ital-
ian Communists have in fact been
pillars of the Italian republic since the
fall of Fascism.
Precisely that sort of political think-
ing, if it can be dignified by that term,
has characterized the operations of the
C.I.A. We are obliged to ask, before it
is too late, whether the C.I.A. (and the
American Embassy) have intervened
in Italian politics. The New York Times
has published reports that Mr. Fan-
fanfi, the leader of the right wing of
the Christian Democrats, has received
American subventions. Before events
take a turn tragic for Italy, and for
our good name in the world, our
involvement in Italian politics should
be re-evaluated. NORMAN Buusanum
Amherst, Mass., Aug. 7, 1974
The writer is professor of sociology at
Amherst College and a consultant to
the Giovanni Agnelli Foundation of
Turin.
pean relations," the late Anibassador
Charles E. Bohlen once .said; "is that
America is just too .damn big and
strong. We can a.bsorh troubles others
cannot stand. We are more independ-
ent of Europe than Europe is of ?us,
and it's ?hard for people on both sides -
of the Atlantic to understand the ?
differences."
NEW YORK TIMES
25 August 1974
Bonn Chancellor ids Ford
Act Cautiously on Inflation
Warns in Interview That Extreme Moves
by U.S. Coufd Upset World Economy
?Asks Day-to-Day Consultation
?
By JAMES
Sptelai to The N
BONN, Aug. 24?Chancellor
Helmut Schmidt of West Ger-
many is warning the Ford. Ad-
ministration that extreme,
measures to curb inflatien In
thes :United States could seri-
ously disrupt the world econo-
my.
In an interview with The
New York Times, released to-
day, the former German Fi
nance Minister recognized the
need to combat inflation in the
.United States, but appealed for
day-to-day consultation among,
the major industrial powers to
avoid unemployment and re-
cession,
"There is a danger," he said,
"that if the United States as
a whole goes deflationary
this will inevitably spread to
the world markets. It will mean
less demand from the U.S. on
the world market, and it will
mean that we can sell less.
"You have to light inflation,
but please don't enter into de-
flation policy, because you
might incur too much unem-
ployment, too much deflation
in the world economy."
Chancellor Schmidt was par-
ticularly eoncerned to avoid
harsh action by the United
States without adequate con-
sultation with other ,countries
whose economies would be af-
fected by American policies.
He indirectly criticized former
Secretary of the Tresury John
B. Connally for having done so
in the past.
What is required, he said,
is the closest personal and al-
most daily contact among key
officials in the United States,
Germany, Britain, France and
Japan.
"They must never permit
RESTON
ew York rae!
themselves again," he re-
marked, "what happened in
August, 1971, when somebody
acted on his own, even with-
out previous warning. . . . This
was a grave mistake suscep-
tible . to destroying the trust,
the confidence in the economic
leadership of the United
States."
The Chancellor also., made
the following points:
tlAlready, "quite a few gov-
ernments were starting to act.
on their own." He seemed de-
termined to raise a warning
against the spread of unilat-
eral action.
9The world has not yet seen
all the negative consequences
of the new floating monetary
system. The world has been
living with fixed exchange sys-
tems for generations and with
floating rates.for only 15 or 17
months. "We don't know what
to AD with this new prenome-
non of the so-called Euro Mar-,
ket."
9Labor union leaders have to'
take their share of blame for
the inflation that is now
Europe's major political and
social problem. Real wages are
falling in the industrial coun-
tries and the unions are natur-
ally trying to catch up, but this
also affects inflation,
9Fortunately, the rising gen-
eration in Europe, and particu-
larly in West Germany, takes
both economic and political co-
operation between the nations
much more for granted than
the previous generation.
(IA11 nations are caught up
together in a vast stage of
structural economic and finan-
cial change, "but it is not a
situation in which you should
lose your nerves or in which
one should switch to pessi-
mism."
The Chancellor referred to
the new "shattering experience
of the world monetary system
26
after the oil price crisis." He
indicated that the world had
not yet begun to feel the full
force of this explosion.
This aggravated the balance-
of-payments deficits of coun-
tries that were in deficit, and
put into deficit some countries
that had previously been in bal-
ince. The result was that some
nations were getting to the
point where they could not pay
their bills, and were naturally
cutting imports and affecting
the balance of the exporting
countries.
While ,West Germany's um-
employment rate was only 2.2'
per cent as compared with the
United States' 5.3 per cent Mr.
Schmidt noted that the Ameri-
can economy was five times as
large as West Germany's. He
noted that exports amounted
to only about 5 per cent of the
United States gross national
product, whereas exports
counted for almost a quarter of
West Germany's GNP.
, The Chancellor emphasized
that he favored a faster unifi-
cation' of Europe. But he said
Europe now lacked the outside
threat and the dynamic leader-
ship that tended to produce
common action.
"We are living in art era of
detente," he said, "and it's re-
ally d?nte. It is a much less
dangerous world than it was at
the time of the Cuban missile
crisis and the Berlin crisis: We
have had enough of that. The
menace has gone, at least it
has shrunk."
Sees Problem of Coping
But he added that nations
had not yet learned to live in
this new and complicated
world, part nationalistic an
increasingly interdependent.
For example, he noted tha
the Euro Market now had a
volume of roughly speaking
Apprgiecifar,Reiease zocnioama_: CIA-RDR77-00432R000100340008-2
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2
THE GUARDIAN, MANCHESTER
8 August 1974
CAROLINE TISDALL on the nel:v strength Of neo-Fascists and their
successful appeal to the young: Bologna, Wednesday
? o-
HAD THE Ronae-Munich
express in which 12 people
died in the early hours of
Monday morning, been run- with efficient European links,,
ning on time the bomb it and a certain infallibility in ?
carried would have exploded bombing techniques. In the
in Bologna station. The political spectrum groups like
thought has been formulated this, whether neo-Fascist or
countless times during the ?neo-Nazi, have the same am-
strikes and protest demon- biguates relationship. to the
strations that have followed official parliamentary party of
yet another attempt to trans- the extreme Right ? the Every fine phrase that
form a state of crisis into a MSI (Movimento Sociale rolled from the Deputy's lips
state of .chaos. Italiano) as, do the extra- made his ride rougher: "We
parliamentary left - wing are the party that created the
In five years the terrorism groups to the official PCI democratic state, . . 'I.roars
that began with the bomb in -(Partito Communista . Ital- of derision). ..." we formed
Piazza-Fontana, Milan, in ianos). the resistance . . ? " (an emo-
December 1969 has ?spread to According -to circum- tive argument ill-placed since
all the major cities of Italy stances they are reviled', or the recent arrest of Fuma-
apart from Bologna, strong- tolerated, and in some ways .falli, ex-partisan and now a
hold of the largest Communist funded, for the MSI the situ- key neo-Fascist figure) . . .
Party in Europe ation is all the more compli- "The sacrosanct values of
The victims, some burnt cated by the fact that, in liberty" . . . and the rest
beyond .recognition, - were to order to remain a legal party, was inaudible. The Christian
have received the full State Democrat stepped down, and
Instead I was to talk to the
funeral that was accorded to - 60,000 - people were sharply
Regional Organiser and the
the victims of the Brescia I, Ordine Nero is. among the reprimanded by a PC-I official
regional ' head of the Youth
bomb two months ago. But most feared of the groups, for impeding freedom of Division. Both were in their
Presi.dent of the Republic allegedly trained by the speech. twenties. Like their other
Leone and the police had
misgivings. The tide of feeling OAS, with efficient Euro- The regional seat of the "Camerati" they were both
here is too great to risk an pean links and ' a certain Movimento Sociale Italian? di voluntary workers for the
open confrontation, and a infallibility in bombing Destra Nazionale in Bologna party. The talkative one was
a-mineral water sales repro-
decision has yet to be taken 'occupies an entire building in
techniques.' sentative, and the .other, who
one of the oldest, darkest and
as to what will be done with ?
the unidentified bodies. ....................... .........m., most picturesq the
street of only talked when directly
the city. For e past few t addressed, was an economics
The funeral, which was to they cannot he 'seen to ? he years it has been constantly student in Bologna University.
have been held today, has Fascist.They were later joined by a
guarded by police in civilian
now been postponed until In- the strikes and demon-
.dress. Two -MSI buildings in nervous doctor who was the
Friday, but Bologna is still strations of Monday?massive other cities have already been only one who did not give his
holding out for a 'State considering that most of Italyattacked. name. Throughout the door
funeral. Meanwhile. 18 kilos in general and Bologna in
of Tritol were discovered particular has escaped to the In left-wing Bologna th-)
yesterday buried under one beaches?the MSI had no position of the MSI is par-
of the main streets of the ?voice. Extreme right-wing ticularly odd. This is not just
city. deputies and representatives because the present city gov-
Speculation a b o u t the were not invited to address ernment is ,solidly Com-
bomb's origins reflected the the meeting, and the official munist, but also ha-cause the
MSI newspaper, II Secolo city has a tradition of
confusion that is now pre-
d'Italia. does not appear on extremism on the other side
valent, Was 'it the extreme Mondays. The speeches by a that it would rather forget.
Right playing off the extreme
representative?,, ef the railway The first agrarian Fascist
Left. or Vice versa ? Or was union. the PCI. and the PSI groups, for example, were
it a straightforwardly right- Parito Socialista Italiano formed in Bologna two years
? wing attack,,, part of the were emotive, but the call for before the march on Rome,
now- famaliar attempt. to non-violence was unanimous. and Mussolini was first
" overthrow d e m o era e y," elected in elections in
The enemies of the people
coming as it did in the wake were. the " thugs ? drugged . Bologna and Milan. , ?
of the arrests of key neo- math violence, the specula- ' The MSI is an official poll-
Fascist figures for the Brescia
bomb and the discovery of tors, the cowards Who seek tical party, formed in 1948.
paramilitary airfields near to overthrow the demoefatie I Under its leader Almirante it
Rieti ? state, those who take advan- commands 3 million votes
.
tage of a moment of and 52 Deputies in Parlia-
The heights of imagination economic crisis ,in order to ment. It cannot call itself
were reacaed by the Rai .;bring about a vast and Fascist, since that is beyond
(Radio-Televisione Italiano) possibly international plot." the pale of the Scelha Law.
in a hastily retracted early The regional Communist At the moment is would seem
morning news -bulletin, in spokesman, Mauro Olivi, that the law is catching up
which the choice of Bologna reminded Bologna of with it, in spite of Christian
was explained as a plot by Togliat t.i's \yarning, of 25 Democrat reluctance to take
? dissident Soviet intellectuals years ago : " Be careful not action. There are two impor-
to confuse and discredit the to let events happen that tint cases pendine. (Inc is
Communist-governea region. could give fascism another an attempt to outlaw the
During the course ofThlon- chanco. Da) nor fail for the party as,a clearly neo-Fascist
day morning a comMunique adversary-s provocation." The organisation. The other is the
issued by the Ordine Nero Left had opted to condemn charge of war (times (the - This is official MSI . policy,
(Black Order) claiming the extremists of -both sides, execution of partisans) since to adroit links with
responsibility for the bomb and the reception they levelled at Almirante in the blatantly Fascist and neo-
received indicated that this hope that he will not he zible Nazi groups would be to court
was discovered in a phone
was what the Bulognese to hide behind his parliamen- disaiter - at the present
box in the su'uttrhs of flat CC
to hear. tar immunity. . moment. So the answer was
na. The voice of the Left
grew louder, for Ordine Nero Almirante is 140 able talkar that such groups only damaae
is the new face of the Orclfne The hoots and whi:itles and a gifted slogan miiKer, the true Iti,4ht. : " Every time
Ni-move, one of several extreme that eventually drowned any- Ilia attilnde to his followarq the MSI is about to ha:e
right-wine organisations ill a thing the Christian Demacrat is paternalistic. Ile is amen-, another big success another
solved tal?ough the applicia .1 L1
, e put y had to say holiaacted able for discussion am boinb
th explodes
-ce"'" -
1953 in
lion of the S n I
aWroVett Fbilfieleasa(2001/88/0811.01ALROPF741043200001,003,40Q8c2
LI that' this latest
aed to outlaw
wm re iss nee
Fascist ,organis.ations.
? Ordine Nero is among the
most feared, of .the groups,.
allegedly trained by the OAS,
party has -become in the
events of the last few years.
Bologna has of course been
Communist si ne e 1946
exactly the same period in
which the Christian Demo-
crats have been in national
power. 'and All forms of cor-
ruption and erosion of demo-
cracy are laid -implacably at
their door.
politicians, to -have direct and
close links with the grass
? roots of his party. His great
pride is the youthfulness of
many of the MSI members,
and the fact that his call to
order seems to meet such
a approval among a genera-
tion too young to remember
Fascism.
The ? door to the MSI HQ
was opened by a very young
tough in sturdy hoots. The
MSI Deputy and regional
propaganda chief, Ceruli,
with whom I was to have
-talked, was unable to be
there because he had been
urgently called to Rome
where Almirante was explain-
ing that he had long ago
warned the authorities that
dangerous chemicals of the
type used on the train were
being smuggled out of the
university,
was guarded.
It was difficult to keep
them off the subject of the
PCI. Their aversion to it
was obviously the backbone of
their policy, and it was obses-
sive. Next in line of attack
were the Christian Demo-
crats. The reason for this
was devastatingly simple :
they were convinced that all
attacks, -like this latest one,
were organised- by the Chris-
tian Democrats.
In other words, the Chris-
tian Democrats were conniv-
ing with the Communists to
discredit the extreme Right.
Th;, of course, is exactly the
opposite to the PCI version,
which is that the Christian
Democrats are actively lunch- ?
ing and supporting the spec-
trum of the extreme Right in
order to bring about a col-
lapse of. democracy.
They denied any links at
all with extremist groups
like Ordine Nero, Sam
(Squadri Azioni Mussolini),
Mar (Movimento d'Azione
Rivoluzionarie), or La Fenice
(The Pheonik).
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2
incident had set them back
a long way, since the MSI
was seeking a constitutional
collapse through fanning
public opinion on the current
economic crisis and the
scandals of corruption. But
economics and. ? corruption
had now been swept off the
front pages by the bomb, and
the effect would be to under-
mine the capital they had
hoped to make in September
. on the hardship and ill-feel-
ing caused by inflation and
the new taxes.
When confronted with the
hard facts of an individual
like Rauti, an ISI man
accused along with Freda and
Ventura for the bomb in
Piazza Fontana, they
genuinely seemed to have no
answer. During the course of
the interview it became
clearer that they could say
little more than what they
had been taught to say.
On the subject of policy
they were muoh more at their
ease : the language . was
alarming, based on
Ahnirante's slogans and the
phrases of a previous -genera-
tion of Fascist and Nazi ideor
logists. 'Their explanation of
policies was both grandiose
and vague. The central hinges
were the liberating effect of
work and the inequality of
NEW YORK TIMES.
11 August 1974
man.
The state towards which
the Movimento Sociale
Italiano di Destra Nazionale
(they never abbreviated it)
was working was the coopera-
tive state in which life would
be less boring. It would
centre round "the challenge
of re-creating the great Italian
State to the glory of its free
and civilised people." The
way would be through sociali-
? sation : the workers would
share the profits and the
losses of -industry.
In recognition that all are
not equal, wages would not be
either, but the worker would
?know that "work creates
liberty." He would not hate
his boss since this was a con-
cept instilled ? by the Com-
munist unlons, and would feel
his life was enhanced beyond
the narrow limits of the
Sicilian phrase "my things "
(home and family).
It Was on the subject of
education.... that the regional
organiser really got going
" Education will be based on
the .concept of selectivity,
since men are not equal. The
present Italian system levels
students too mu-oh, in the
cooperative state the new and
modern emphasis will be
based oh technical skill and
? Strategy
of
Free orn
By C. L. Sulzberger
ATHENS?.-The bruise en NATO's
southeastern flank caused by the
Greek-Turkish showdown over Cyprus
is going to take time to heal. In the
end the alliance should be strength-
ened by the mere fact that it survived
another confrontation between two of
its partners. But that "end" is still far
off. '?
NATO is a curious pact. It has man-
aged to survive a quarter of a century
of peace. equalled only by the Delian
League created in these parts 25 cen-
allies ago and it somehow keeps go-
ing despite private wars involving its
members.
Thus, during its lifetime, Belgium
has fought in the Congo, the British
and French in Egypt, France in Al-
geria, Portugal in its African colonies,
America in Vietnam, Iceland and Brit-
ain in ? naval mini-exchanges and
Greece and Turkey on and off again
around Cyprus.
But weirdly enotigh, none of these
confrontations has smashed the coali-
tion irreparably. Indeed today, for the
first time, NATO .is a genuinely uni-
form alliance in the philosophical
sense of being democratic, thanks to
political upheavals in Portugal, Turkey
and Greece.
But purification came at a price.
a high 'degree of specialisa-
tion. Italy will regain her
rele as a supreme producer
of top-rate scientists and
technologists. Education will
be the battle of life, history
will be based on arguments
not dry facts, new technolo-
gical studies will have pride
of place in our schools.
"In this the help of the
Catholic Church will be
sought, but it will be a
different Catholic Church. It
will be free of all creeping
progressiveness. We will
oppose the 'idea of the pro-
gressive priest. Above all, we
will fight corruption, and con-
duct a policy of denunciation ?
directed at the young. We are
convinced that in the long
run there can- be only one
party that has the courage to
reject corruption in all fields
, of life.
"The Italian people will
throw off the Ignoble propa-
ganda with which it is fed by
the current media and will
choose the higher values we
propose. We will demand
necessary sacrifices of the
Italian people, sacrifices that
will bring them back to the
position of a major power."
Here I interrupted the flow
of words, partly to ask for
more details and partly be-
Turkey now maintains in Cyprus about
two divisions, whin would be better
stationed near Russia. Both the Turks
and the Greeks paid heavily for a
mobilization against each other. The
Greek call-up was a disastrous mess.
Turkey has unilaterally warned
Greece it is revising its national air-
space and henceforth regards offshore
Greek islands as Turkish. This means
that if Athens sends planes to Rhodes
or Chios without first asking Ankara's ?
permission, they might be shot down.
The psychological atmosphere re-:.
mains nasty. Maneuvers NATO hoped
to stage in-Greek-Turkish Thrace this
fall, involving troops from both coun-
tries, must be canceled. Likewise,
there is no present thought of sending
back to Izmir, Turkey, the Greek of-
ficers and men normally attached to a
NATO subheadquarters there, with-
drawing during the Cyprus affair.
None of this is pleasant news and
-tension is, likely to continue. Cyprus
is a boil not yet lanced. It is hard for
the Greeks to replace the 650 officers
assigned to that island's national
guard. If they withdraw the lot who
made so much trouble there, re-
Placements arel ikely to be just- as
hardheaded, coming from the Same
background of chauvinistic training
under the seven-year Athens junta.
The Turkish Army is by no means
deployed to accord with NATO's stra-
tegic convenience?most of, the air
force having moved to bases near the
Aegean. The Greek Army is dispirited
and disorganized. It has fallen behind
on equipment because of the 'United
States Congress's antipathy to sending
material aid while the junta ruled.
Also, it has been riven by politics.
Many of its best officers were fired
for opposing the recent dictatorship.
It is difficult to bring them back now.
cause. I was by now disturbed
by the glazed expression in
the eyes of this ordinary look-
ing Italian. I asked how this
programme would be carried
out. The reply was that the
Movimento Sociale Italiano di
Destra Nazionale did not
believe in mathematical for-
?mulae like ?tne Communists.
In answer to a question about"
the relationship of this new
Italy to the rest of the world,
the reply was that Italy would
play a major role in the nations
of Europe that would no
longer be the instrument of
Russia and the US.
The conversation had the
familiar ring of the old brand
of Fascist- propaganda. What
did they think was new in
the arguments they pro-
pounded. The student of
economics answered and had
the final word: "Our em-
phasis on the phenomenon of
the youthful Right is new.
It is new because it follows
a period of permissiveness
and because youth, having
been used by the old political
powers after 1968, is sick of
this permissiveness and seeks
the moral values we-offer. We
can solve the problems of
youth in Italy, and the
strength of our youth groups
is the new element we .
bring."
Certain key junta supporters have
been moved from Athens-to distant
units. But the military remains politi-
cized and uneasy. -- -
Another weakness is the queStion of
strategic relations with the United
States. Washington had based Greek
-policy on the need to maintain bases
here, including homeporting facilities
for one Sixth Fleet carrier, in order to
? be able to maintain a credible position
vis-a-vis Russia in the Middle East.
The first part of this formula was
worked out and a destroyer flotilla
was centered around Athens, including
families of the crews, although every
intelligent American recommended it
would be preferable to keep a low pro-
file, arguing, if the United States Navy
insisted, it was wiser to do the home-:
porting in relatively remote Suda Bay,
Crete.
But negotiation of the formula's cru-
cial second part?involving the car-.
rier itself?came to a head just as the
junta headed by Colonel Papadopoulos
Was replaced by the junta headed by
General Ioannides. The latter immedi-
ately demanded a higher price from
Washington?in terms of aid and
weapons?and the proceedings got;
stuck. So, by inept policy, the United
States earned the blame for tolerating
a nasty political regime in order to get
naval privileges it never really ob-
tained.
Thus, in the material sense, NATO is.
in poor shape now in the critical area--
separating the Soviet Union from the
turbulent and vital Middle East. Allied
diplomacy must work hard and swiftly
to rectify this situation. In doing so,
fortunately, it can rely? on the fact
that, despite their quarrel, in both '
Greece and Turkey for the first time
in years the spirit of -democracy has
revived.
2g
-APproved?For Release 2001/08108 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2
NEAR EAST REPORT
28 AUG 1974
American Friends of the Middle East
This is the second in a series of articles
describing the affiliations, statements,
and activities of several Washington or-
ganizations which promote Arab inter-
ests in the United States.
American Friends of the Middle
East (AFME), located in an expansive
office on Massachusetts Avenue, de-
scribes itself as a "private, non-profit
organization dedicated to furthering
communication and understanding be-
tween the peoples of the Middle East
and North Africa and the people .of the
United States through educational and
informational programs."
According to Director of Information
Services, Joan L. Borum, AFME was
created in 1951 when it became ap-
parent that the United States was des-
tined to play a significant role in the
Middle East. As a result of efforts by
several noted individuals active in the
Arab Middle East, AFME was organized
to present "the other side" of the Middle
East story, which its founders felt was
not adequately represented or heard in
this country.
"We have always tried not to favor
the pro-Arab side or the pro-Israel side,"
Borum said, "but have looked at the
Palestine question from a pro-American
side." She maintained that American
political decisions concerning the Mid-
dle East are often "made without ade-
quate access of information."
Avowed Anti-Zionism
Politically, however, AFME is any-
thing but neutral. The organization is
avowedly anti-Zionist?though not anti-
Israel?asserted Borum, who did not
see this as a political orientation. Chal-
lenging Israel's right to exist as an "ex-
clusive theocratic state," Borum insist-
ed that because the creation of Israel
was predicated by the Zionist move-
ment" it was established on wrong prem-
ises." She called American support
for the founding of Israel "a big mis-
take in terms of American national in-
terest. We don't think Israel will ever
be a viable entity in the Middle East,"
she said.
To be sure, AFME today has as-
sumed a much more restrained polit-
ical role than in the past when it boast-
ed such extremists and well-known anti-
Zionists as Dr. Elmer Berger, Harold
B. Minor, and Kermit Roosevelt on its
Board of Directors. The stigma of the
viciously anti-Zionist diatribes of foun-
der Dorothy Thompson, however, has
not yet worn off entirely. Nowadays,
AFME is less concerned about dissem-
inating outright propaganda as about
emphasizing Arab medical, educational,
and economic progress.
With total membership under a thou-
sand, AFME relies in small part on a
little over three thousand individual
contributors to help finance its opera-
tions. There is no need to actively solicit
funds, however, since a steady flow of
money comes from numerous contracts
and grants from major corporations and
foundations. Among these are the Ford
Foundation, the Department of State,
and the American-operated Saudi Ara-
bian Airlines.
Oil companies and other major in-
dustries have also contributed, but Bor-
urn termed these sums "very minor"
since the organization itself is "not a
direct service to them" and, therefore,
not necessarily in their interest to sup-
port. In recent years no corporate fund-
ing has exceeded $5,000 per year.
CIA Funding
Borum admitted that in the past
AFME had received significant sums
from organizations, including the phil-
anthropic Dearborn Foundation, which
were later shown to be conduits for
CIA funds. Borum added that since the
disclosure in 1964, there has been no
financial assistance from sources receiv-
ing CIA funding. (See Near East Re-
port Special Survey, 1964.)
A significant portion of AFME's dis-
bursements are to its eight overseas
offices in the Arab world?none in
Israel. Besides the main Washington
office, there are U.S. branches in New
York, Chicago, and San Francisco, with
several more local chapters nattered
throughout the country.
Although funds are primarily ? used
for "manpower and development proj-
WASHINGTON POST
23 August 1974
Americans
tI)eijed
In Int:ia
CALCUTTA?Two Ameri-
cans charged with spying
were denied bail for the
14th" time yesterday, but an
Indian judge said he might'
reconsider the decision
Sept. :3 if they find a suita-
ble place to live.
ects" in -Arab countries, nearly one-
half of AFME'S total revenues go to
maintenance and ? administration. At
present top priority is being given to
counseling Arab students for admission
to American universities under pro-
grams sponsored by the U.S. govern-
ment. AFME also sends specialists to
Arab countries to establish bases of co-
operation with religious, cultural, and
social-minded leaders of the Middle
East. It sponsors programs of Arab
speakers before student, church, and
civic groups to acquaint American au-
diences with the Arab viewpoint and
conducts an active publication?campaign.
? Besides its bi-monthly newsletter,
:AFME Report, the organization puts
"out literature describing its activities
and promoting the sale of books and
pamphlets articulating the Arab posi-
tion. These publications unabashedly
reflect AFME's anti-Zionist posture.
Viewpoints, published monthly, deals
with cultural and economic events in
the Arab world. The "Basic Facts
Series" is a compilation of paMphlets
providing general information on indi-
vidual Arab countries. Mid East, a
monthly review of events, was discon-
tinued in 1971 for lack of funds. Ad-
ditionally, AFME acts- as a clearing
-house for information on the Middle
East by offering books and other publi-
cations to its members and contribu-
tors at substantial discounts. Perusal of
the list of information services, how-
ever, favors representation of the Arab
perspective on the problem.
One of AFME's principal objectives
is combating what Borum categorized
as "misinformation" of the American
public by Zionist elements. Asked
whether AFmE's anti-Zionist leaning did
not place the integrity of the organiza-
tion as a nonpartisan one into question,
Borum hesitated before saying that this
was a serious consideration which she
needed more time to think about.
?DAVID ETTINGER
Fletcher, 30, have been in
jail for 16 months. They be-
gan a hunger strike June 17,
demanding a trial.
? Their appearance in
yesterday was their
since their ztrrest.
,were pale and thin.
Court sources who at-
tended the closed hearing
said that the prosecution did
not oppose the bail petition,
but contended that the
house in which Harcos and
Fletcher planned to stay
was not suited for police
surveillance,
Police said the two were
arrested after Harcos was
found swimming in Calcutta
court
first
They
Approved For Release22j)01/68/"0?q111KW#142132R pd
cos, 'a item .
r was
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2
THE DEW REPUBLIC
31 AUG 1974
Whom Do You Trust?
ji1Siifyino?Dieoo Garci
Something has gone Wrong With the administration's
game plan for Diego Garcia. CIA Director William
Colby broke ranks and qualified the arguments of the
Pentagon?particularly those of the recently retired
.chief of naval -operations, Adm. Elmo Zumwalt ?
which sought to justify the need for America's first
Indian Ocean naVal. and air base because the Russians
.either already were around, or certain to come..:
In presenting-the case before Congress,-Adni.:Zurn-.
-Wait and Adire.Thomas Moorer, recently retired chair-
man of the-joint Chiefs of Staff, had marched up to the
Hill. with those trustworthy old persuaders, the large-
scale maps heavily rouged in red . to dramatize the
Soviet areas OfPenetration. But Sen. Stuart Symington
of Missouri, who gained x-ray military vision as Presi-
dent Truman's: Secretary of the _Air Force and. who
uniquely straddles seats on both the Armed Services
and Foreign Relations Committees, had doubts. He
summoned Colby to testify before-allowing his Senate
military construction subcommittee to proceed on the
navy's request for $29 million for the initial expansion
of the Diego Garcia project. And since only two fellow
? senators showed up to listen, Symington persuaded
Colby that it would be in the public interest for him
to sanitize his testimony and permit as much as pos-
sible to be printed in the Congressional Record: T.
In contrast to the admirals' red maps of the Indian
Ocean area, Colby had his own :way of dramatizing:
Socotra, in the. Chagos Archipelago; "A bare island.
There is almost nothing there except for a small garri-:
son from South-Yemen . . The only air strip is an old
World War II air strip which is really not feasible for
modem operations."
Berbera, in Somalia: "A small installation which will
. -
handle two or three ships. They [the Soviets] have
been building-an airstrip there for about a year, but
have not gotten very far." '
IVIogadiscio; Somalia's. Capital: "The area Within the.
breakwater iS somewhat shallow water . There is an
airfield about .30 or 40. miles northwest . "...which They
[the Soviets]. have been gradually building up a little
bit. But there ,is not Much progress on that either."
,Umm Qasr, in. Iraq: ,"The _So-called port is: about
four, five orsix buildings-here,. a place where you can.
anchor. It isa 'complicated to get through the delta
down to the- [Persian] Gulf. .The Iraqi; appear to be a
Little bit restrictive as to the degree to which they will
30
allow theSovietS free use of this particular port.'.'
Aden "The Soviets have not used.-it:;very much.;
They have nat done much more.thanpOrt visits there.
. [The airfield has] a short runway,. not big enougli
to handle the TU-16s and larger aircraft." ? .
Singapore:.: :The Soviets have bunkered* there.
Singapore sells to whoever happens to go by."
Mauritius: "Port Louis is a. very good port. It is not
all that highly developed. They have-sold bunker-
ing to the Soviets." ? ,
Adm. Zumwalt, te4tifying before the House Foreign
Affairs Near East and South Asia subcommittee on
March 20, almost four months before Colby, used
different binoculars. - ?
Socotra: A Soviet "fleet anchorage" and an airfield
'which "provides a potential Soviet base for recon-
naissance or other aircraft:- ?
Berbera: A 'Soviet "communications station _ a
restricted combined barracks and repair ship.
and housing for Soviet militaryclePendents." -
.Mogadiscio:. The Soviets are building "a new mili-
tary airfield Which could be used fora..variety
missions.
Umm Qasri Soviet-assisted facilities "considerably
more extensive than any which would be required fo
Iraqi needs alone:" - - . ? - ?
. -
. Aden: Extended Soviet "port facilities* [and] airt
facilities which are used for refueling, replenishmenti
and minor repairs." -
Singapore-and Maurifius: Places where "the Soviets
have recently secured bunkering rights."
Summarizing, the CIA director testified: "Our as-
sessment is that you *ill See a gradual increase in
Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean area, that if there
is some particular American increase, that the Soviets!
will increase that gradually to match any substantial!
additional American involvement... ,".
_ Sen. Symington then asked: "You expect the Soviet
presence in the Indian Ocean to continue to grow re-
gardless of what we do, but that it will grow faster,
if we start developing Diego Garcia?"
Colby: "I think that is true, yes sir."
Until now the House has gone along with the Pen-
tagon's desire to build up Diego Garda, but the Senate
has shown some hesitation. Senate concurrence now,
may .hinge on how many senators find time to read
S.
their Congressional Record of August 1.
Warren Unna ?
UNNA is the -American correspondent of The States- i
man of India. ? ? ??
Approved For Release 2001/08/68 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2
_ ?
APproved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100.340008-2
NEW YORK TIMES
1 September 1974
?
Soviet Says` Ford Erred
On Indian Ocean Bases
Denies That it Has Any Naval Stations in
the Area?President Stands on
Statement It Has Three
( By CHRISTOPHER S. WREN
? swim to The New York Ttmes
MOSCOW, Aug. 31?The .So-. I any formal naval bases in the
viet Union ch4rged today that lidian Ocean. But the Pentagon
President Ford committed a has contended that Soviet
naval vessels enjoy equivalent
"regrettable", inaccuracy" privileges in some ports,
stating earlier this week that notably in Somalia :where the
Soviet Union is understood to
maintain an active naval com;-
munications facility. ?
The Soviet ,Navy is also re.;
.ported to have Access to ports
in' Aden, on . the island of So-
cotra and in the Bangladesh
port of Chittagong, as well as
major repair privileges in-Singi-
.
pore. .
Moscow has.1 vigorously de-
nied that its naval presence in
the Indian Ocean constitutes a
threat to peace in the area
simi-
lar to that it attributes to the
it was operating three naval
bases in the Indian Ocean.
"Unfortunately, it must be
noted that the head of the
Americr Government was mis-
informed by his staff. In reality
there exist neither three nor
even' one U.S.S.R. naval base
in tihe Indian Ocean," asserted
a commentary issued today by
the official press agency Tass.
The Tass rebuttal to a re-
mark made by Mr. Ford in his
news conference last Wednes-
day was the first criticism 'of
the new President to appear in
the Soviet press. While it was
couched in mild language, the
response pointed up Moscow's
sensitivity about the Soviet
naval presence in the Indian
Ocean. western ports. ?
At the news conference, The Soviet Union's maritime
President Ford had supported self-image was reflected anew
the expansion of the American ?
today. In a Pravda-commentarY,.
naval base on the small British-
I which, while ,discussing / the,
ruled island of Diego Garcia,
for which Congress recentlyt United Nations Law of the Sea
'appropriated $29-million. Conference that ended in
"I don't view this as any Caracas Thursday stressed
challenge to the Soviet Union, the need to preserve "the
which is already operating, freedom of navigation and the
three naval bases in the Indian: free passage of all ships
Ocean," the President said. I through 'international straits."
6 However, Moscow has con- Pravda indicated that Mos-
sistently condemned American cow would oppose any effort
plans to develop an exiting in the final conference -docu-
naval communications center merit to restrict such move-
on Diego Garcia, a small coral ment, as China has proposed,
atoll about 1,200 miles South and assailed Peking for trying
of India. ?
Earlier this week the Com-
munist party newspaper, Prav-
da, cited the Congressional ap-
propriation as proof that
American and British imperial-
ist circles were trying to turn
the British-owned island into
a new seats of tensions, creat-
ing at the same time a threat
to the independence of the
countries of the Indian Ocean."
The Soviet Presence
The Pentagon has main-
tained that expansion of the
1Diego Garcia base into a naval
and air support facility is nec-
essary to counter the growing
Soviet naval presence in the
area.
The Soviet Navy first moved
into the Indian Ocean in 1968.
Since 1971, it has kept a flot-
illa estimated at up to 20 Ves-
sels in the ocean, drawn from
its Pacific fleet based at Vladi-
vostok.
Moscow has not estahlLshed
Approved For Release 2001/08/0
proposed base on Diego Garcia.
The Moscow 'press has con-
tended that the Soviet Union,
as "a great maritime power,"
is entitled 'to use th6 Indian
Ocean as a normal route be-
tween its own eastern and
to create "chaos on the seas
and oceans" at the 10-week
conference.
, ? Today Tass gently reproved
-President Ford for his stance
?on Diego Garcia by noting that
the Director of Central Intelli-
gence, William E. Colby, bad
in testimony before the Senate
Armed Services Committee de-
scribed the So.viet presence in
the Indian Ocean as "relatively
small" and had 'said that the
final size of Soviet forces there
would depend upon what the
United States put into the area.
The Tass commentary, which
lwas written by Aanatoly Krasi-
!kov, depicted the proposed new
base as a bustling, formidable
island fortress.
"The Pentagon's plans have,
however, met with serious ob-
jections from the U.S. Congress
and at the same time triggered
a wave of protests in the coun-
tries of the Indian Ocean," Tass
, Ford Stands by Comment
WASHINGTON, Aug. 3I?The
White House said today that
President Ford stood by his
comment at his news confer-
ence that the Soviet Union had
"three major naval , operating
bases" in the Indian Ocean.
When asked to identify the
bases, the spokesman referred
'newsmen to the Pentagon. A
Defense Department spokes-
man listed the three as Berbera,
? ,a port in Somalia; Umm Qasr,
a port in Iraq; and Aden, in
(,Southern Yemen. ?
"Whether the bases are "ma-
jor" has been a subject of- some
controversy in the Administra-
tion.
_
AtRA
UDI
?$..YE/rn,
Araebaian
Sea
? .SOCOTRA
Barba
SOMALIA
?
Indian efteart
'
?
'61 500 V!les
The New York Than/Seat. 1, 1974
Pentagon says Soviet
Navy has bases at places
with names underlined.
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
27 August . 1974 .
Israeli trip
to U.S. set up
despite spat
By Jason Norris .
? Special to
The Christian Science Monitor
Jerusalem
Yitzhak Rabin's American debut as
Israel's Prime Minister, now offi-
cially scheduled for early next month,
began stirring up squabbles here even
before its political aims were for-
mally defined.
?, Much of the controversy stems
from the awkward way in which
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's
'invitation was extended to Mr. Rabin,
according to some Israeli com-
mentators.
-. They complain that Dr. Kissinger
announced that the Israeli "Pi--efaler
-would be visiting Washington, D.C.,
before Mr. Rabin had agreed to the
prospective date, thereby presenting
him with a "fait accompli."
The hard noses among them even-
suggested that Mr. Rabin should
defer a decision on the matter, if not
reject the American bid outright for
that reason.
Other critics of the Rabin mission
contend that it is part of the current
spate of "sham diplomacy" in which
a great many Middle Eastern com-
ings and goings are no more than a
camouflage for a very real diplomatic
stalemate. ?
One highly tuned source in the
Israeli capital suggested that chances
for resumption of the Geneva peace
conference on the Middle East this
fall are weak, if only because of the
sweeping changes in the U.S. admin-
istration.
Mr. Rabin's Cabinet, however,
voted unanimously to approve his
plans regarding the U.S. visit, speci-
fying that it would take place during
"the first half of September."
At the same time it bowed to the
Premier's request that deliberations
8 :3:11448137tr7V68/140116e0?1100A
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2
until a later date on the ground that
political developments may occur in
the interim. According to the indepen-
dent daily Haaretz the session prob-
ably will be held Sept. 8 ? as close as
possible to Mr. Rabin's actual depar-
ture.
The Premier attempted to mollify
Dr. Kissinger's local critics by point-
ing out that the original invitation was.
extended by former President Nixon
during his tour of Israel June 17.
Not only was the project mentioned
In the joint Israeli-American commu-
nique at the close of Mr. Nixon's stay
but it also was reiterated in a mes-
sage sent by President Ford on Aug.
9.. Mr. Rabin noted that Mr. Ford
suggested that the visit take place "at
end of the summer."
Mr. Rabin evidently subscribes to
the belief that the U.S. Interest in
having him follow in the wake of his
own Foreign Minister and those of
Jordan, Egypt and Syria and to
precede Egyptian President Sadat to
Washington is linked to the desire to
preserve the diplomatic momentum.
On the other hand, the Israeli
Premier, who served until last year
as his country's Ambassador to the
U.S., reportedly observed that domes-
tic political considerations may have
played a part in President Ford's
timing the approaching congres-
sional election.
'Hysteria' decried
He urged his countrymen to avoid
taking extreme or "hysterical" posi-
tions on the implications of the next
U.S.-Israeli summit, contending that
"calm" would serve thein better at
this stage.
The emotional background of the
anti-Kissinger groundswell lies in the
impression that Secretary Kissinger
may be about to exert pressure on
Israel to accept a disengagement
formula along the River Jordan.
This would entail a withdrawal of
Israeli forces, 'establishment of a
United Nations buffer zone, and re-
newal of Jordanian civil adminis-
tration in occupied Jericho.
Opposition circles argue that no
territory in the occupied West Bank
should be relinquished without sub-
WASHINGTON POST
24 August 1974
Rowland Evans and Robert Novak
espair in the Mideast
Private word from a top American
' diplomat to a Western ambassador last
week that Israel "etas shut the door" to
further withdrawal from the Syrian
Golan Heights brought this instant
rejoiner: "If so, that means war."
The exchange is symbolic ef the sud-
den descent from soaring optimism
that marked every step of Secretary -of
State Henry Kissinger's brilliant shut-
tle diplomacy following the Arab-Is-
raeli war of last October.
? Indeed, a mood approaching black
despair has now taken hold in all Arab'
capitals since Kissinger's last 1Vfideast
success?pinning down the partial Is-
raeli withdrawal from Syria's Golan
Heights on May 31. Since then, the ab-
rupt change of Presidents in Washing-
ton, coupled with U.S. impotence re-
garding the Turkish-Greek war on Cy-
prus, has led Israel into bold new dip-
lomatic intransigence.
Although it' is far to early to prove
him right, the Arabs fear that Presi-
dent Ford, long a champion of Israel
as a Republican congressional leader,
will be less liardnosed with the Israelis
than was Richard Nixon.
Because of his extreme political
weakness at home, a desperate Presi-
dent Nixon this year needed diplo-
matic successes in the Mideast as fast
as Kissinger could get them and so
leaned hard against Israel. Mr. Ford is
under no such pressure. Moreover,
with the 1974 congressional election
only two months away, the President
mieht be understandably reluctant to
use two-fisted pressure against Israel
this fall.
This at least partially explains prime
minister Yitzhak Rabin's new hard line
in Jerusalem. Rabin's government has
now systematically closed off every
bargaining opportunity with the Arabs
save one: a second-stage Israeli withe
? drawal from the Egyptian Sinai penin-
sula. But that single opportunity has
been tightly closed by the Arabs. them-
selves.
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat is
under overwhelming pressure from
other Arab capitals not to take any
new withdrawal agreement with Israel,
'on grounds that the Palestinian issue
-must be dealt, with first. That Arab
pressure would threaten Sadat with
political overthrow if he went ahead,
ae he would prefer, with a new Israeli
withdrawal agreement.
Valls, Israel's desire to negotiate
with Egypt is meaningless. Sadat's
hands are tied.
On the other two fronts, Rabin him-
.
self is now taking a muscular position:
the Golan Heights will remain an in-
separable part of Israel; and Israel's
"rieht" to settlements in Judea and Sa-
maria, the ? West Bank of the Jordan
River that Israel seized from Jordan in
1967, goes hack to "ancient times." In
other words, Israel will, not make even
the token six-mile withdrawal from the
river that King Hussein demands as
the price of attending the ever more
distant Geneva conference.
This stalemate; which many experts
believe wiP lead to a far more danger-
ous war?bloodier, longer and more
apt to involve the superpowers?than
last October's, has continued despite
the paeede of Israeli and Arab leaders
to Washington the past few weeks.
32
mating the matter to a national
referendum, as pledged previously by
Mr. Rabin.
Evacuation specter raised
These'groups fear that Israel will be
forced to evacuate the West Bank in
it entirety and hand it back to
Jordan, which in turn might lose it to
a militant Palestinian Arab regime.
However, Mr. Rabin will not be
empowered to act at his own dis-
cretion once in Washington, nor will
his discussions be limited to territo-
rial questions. ?
Under Israel's political system,
which is based on parliamentary
coalitions of political parties, a prime,
minister is duty bound to represent
the policies approved by the Cabinet
as a whole.
Hence the .importance of the pre-
departure cabinet deliberations. They
will virtually write Mr. Rabin's script
for presentation to President Ford,
Dr. Kissinger, and Defense Secretary
James Schlesinger..
Indeed, the Ford administration, has
not yet finally decided where Israel .
should next be pressured to move: the
West Bank, the Golan Heights or,a
combination of bath. ? ?
To prepare for another war, Isreal is
now neeotiating with reluctant Penta-'
gon officials for a vast increase in its
militara. arsenal: $e billion in "urgent"'
aid, plus a separate package of S1.5 bil-
lion a year for each of the next five
years.
This is supposed to balance the huge"
Soviet arms shipments to Syria. But
many military experts here feel it
would give Israel. too .much potential -
fer long-run mletary Operations- the
United States would be' powerless to
stop.
? Yet, threatened disintegration of the
southern arm of NATO in Greece and
Turkey gives new substance to Israel's
arms demands. With the United States,
the United Nations and NATO itself
unable to stop the Turkish invasion of
Cyprus Israel has gained an important
new argument to support its demands.
for defense against the Arabs.
Only Personal intervention by Presi-
dent Ford, convincing Israel that he
will not relax U.S pressure for territo-
rial concessions and that he stands as
? firmly behind his beleaguered Secre-
tary of State as Nixon did, can now ar-
rest the alarmieg decline in once
bright hopes for a settlement.
s. 1914, Field Eviiertirs:.Inci,
_
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77:00432R000100340008-2
_ _
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100.3400.08-2
NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, AUGUST 26, 1974
India's Downtrodden Burst Into Literature
By BERNARD WEINRAUB
specie to The New York Times
NEW DELHI, Aug. 25?A
wave of angry writing 'by im-
poverished and low-caste au-
thors has burst across the
literary landscape of India.
. The literature, mostly poetry,
is unusual because of its furi-
ous explicitness, its sexual
bluntness and its dark tone.
Perhaps most significant, this
is the first time that a large
body of writers who are .so-
called "untouchables" are ex-
pressing their rage at high-
caste Hindus and at a system
the: authors term exploitive.
Within the last year, the
spate of angry poetry has
emerged in such states as
Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh,
Gujarat, Hihar, Kerala, Tamil
Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and
West Bengal. Although the
poetry is written in regional
languages and published in
small magazines, radical news-
papers, leaflets?even on walls
--literary critics are terming
the movement a significant
break from tradition.
"In the past, high-caste writers
dominated our literature," said
Dr. Prabhakar Machwe, sedr6-
tary of the Government-sup-
ported Sahitye(literary) Acad-
emy, a coordinating body that
seeks to advance modern Indian
writing. "Now the so-called de-
pressed classes are getting edu-
cated. Social and political causes
are reaching the masses. People
are finding frustration every-
where and looking for means to
express it."
Although untouchability is
outlawed in India's Constitu-
tion, discrimination and preju-
dice are still widespread against
:Hindus born to families outside
the tiered caste system, in
:which the priestly Brahmin
caste is the highest.
Reject Ideology
Dr. Niachwe, a poet himself,
said: "Many of these young
people have gone beyond ideol-
ogy -- they say ideology has.
no meaning. They say it's all
part of a chessboard that must
be discarded. It's a kind of ni-
hilPisemrh'a.ps the most noted writ-
ers are the Dalit Panthers, from
the Bombay area. These young
authors, writing in the local
language, Marathi, have named
their movement after the Black
Panthers ? the word Dalit
means oppressed ? and have
sought to merge poetry with
political activism.
Vrtually all the Dalits were
born as Harijans ? the Hindi
word for "children of God," a
terms Gandhi used for untouch-
ables in an effort to remove the
stigma against them?and have
converted to Buddhism.
These poets write for two
local magazines and have been
published in the English-lan-
guage press.
"We've always had liberal
Indians writing about Harijans,
but not Harijans writing about
themselves," said Dileep Padgi-
onkar, an e4ditor of The Times
of India who is compiling a
book on Dalit poetry. "But the
language .was still a Brahmin's
language."
"The new poets have literally
aggressed the language. They
use obscenity, new words, new
speech that are part of the
culture of poverty."
"These new poets are mot.;
desperate than angry," he said.
"They're desperate about the
economic situation, about the
lack of solutions, about the
lack of public morality."
Linked to Polities
In some cases, poetry and
politics have intertwined. A
Harijan minister in the southern
state of Kannada, formerly My-
sore, was forced to resign when
he termed current establish-
ment literature there as cattle
feed.
A ministe- in the state of
Tamil Nadu has urged poets to
emulate?in Tamil?the writ-
ings of the angry young authors
in other states. In Andhra
Pradesh, an eastern state, sev-
eral angry poets have joined a
violent movement based on the
Naxalites, who were terrorists
in West Bengal five years, ago.
Moreover, the tough poetry
'as well as several new plays
and novels are now splashed
with explicit sexual passages,
unusual in Indian literature.
Incestuous and homosexual re-
lations have been dealt with
lin recent novels and plays by
'Bengali, Marathi and Hindi au-
thors.
One, play in Bombay "Va-
sena Kand" ("Passionate Af-
fair"), is now facing a', court
test on obscenity_ charges be-
cause it involves incest.
Cites Newspaper Violene
"It comes simply t othis," Mr.
Machwe wrote recently in a
literary journal. "We tolerate
and even connive at violence
in life?every daily newspaper
is full of such harrowing tales
of rape of Harijan women,
burning alive of untouchables,
murders of poor people. But
if one mentions them in lit-
erature; the poor author is
banned."
? ? Writers and critics have said
that the most forceful influ-
ence among the younger au-
thors is Allen Ginsberg, the
American poet who lived brief-
ly in Calcutta and Benares
nearly a decade ago. ,
"He made a tremendous. im-
pact with his form, his writ-
ing, his way of life," said Shak-
ti Chatterjee, a poet and 'critic
.in Calcutta.
I ? "He taught people something
very simple: that a poet can
go without a job, can be solely
devoted to poetry: He taught
us that."
Other influences include the
Spaniard, Federico Garcia.. Lor-
pa; the Chilean, Pablo Neruda,
and the Russian, Vladimir Maya-
kovsky.
Recite on the Streets
Some poems express empty
despair. In the impoverished
northeastern state of Bihar, for
example, where a restless stu-
dent movement is mounting an
anti-Government protest, poets
have actually come out on
street corners and recited their
work. One' poem, recently pub-
lished in English by, an anony-
mous writer, starts:
The university gave me
A bundle of paper,
Weighed down by that burden
I knocked at every door,
And today after having sold
myself .
For a whole month,
And emerged from the office,
I realize?
That there are a few coinIn
my palm
But no rations in the bazaar...
Mother,
What kind of jungle have you
brought me into?
Some poems ? express the
anger of the untouchables. An
anonymous South Indian Tamil
author, in a recent anthology
of angry poetry, wrote:
How do we bear the hot sun
By being burned by it
' How do we shield ourselves from
the rain
1By being drenched in it ,
I How do we keep hunger away
,By Starving
'How do we cure diseases ?
By Death
;Do you know
Who are we?
? Numerous poets mock the
National Government, including
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi,
and write ferociously of the
,ruling Congress party, whose
!members often symbolically
wear clothes of white home-
spun, called Ithadi. A poet from
Kananda writes:.
Spit on you! two faced, double:-
tongued
Khadi-wearing, silk-draped
Fellow with an open empty skull:.;
And some of the poets ex-
press anarchic rage. Namdeo
Dhasal, one of .the most-promi-
nent writers in the current
movement and a central figure
in the Dalit Panthers, wrote
recently: ?
Here every season is cruel
So it is not enough to hang a
skeleton by a branch
Here eyelids have no lashes
Here every offerer is a miser k
So only breaking the glasses is
? not enough
Here there is no burning inner soul
'All creation is turned to coal
Here every epic poet is a Lilli-
putian dwarf....
33
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003400082
.Thursclay,Aqust29,1974 THE WASHINGTON POST
! By Lewis M. Simons
Washington Post Foreign Service
DACCA?Without doubt,
this year's floods in Bangla-i
desk have killed people, de-
stroyed crops and wrecked
homes. ? .
No one knows, however,
how high the death toll is,
or how -extensive the darn.
age.
' More important, no one '
knows, either, how to re-
spond to Bangladesh's pleas
for help, so thoroughly has
the government destroyed
its credibility.
"We believe the flooding
has been more widespread
than normal," says a U.S.
aid official, "but the damage
to housing .and loss of lives
and crops are not severe."
"What matters is not how
widespread the floods are,"
says a leading government
agricultural economist, "but
how long the water. remains
on the ground. Anything
more than five days and rice !
plants cannot survive. In
some parts of the country
they have been ?.iundated
for weeks and the water is
only now beginning to re- ,
cede."
"The damage to property, '
particularly to housing, has
been enormous,", says a Dan-
?ish official of. the interna-'
tional League of Red Cross
Societies. "And the floods
have perhaps been the last
straw tti what was already a
highly critical food saute-
-tion."
The World Bank con- '
ducted a survey of crop
damage and concluded that
the official government
claim a a loss of 1.1 million
tons of rice was accurate.
sh
A number of dip omatie
observers and foreign ex-
perts are mildly surprised
that the government has
limited its claim to this fig-
ure because it was matched
during the floods of 1968 .
and surpassed in 1970, while
Bangladesh was still east
Pakistan.
The -explanation seems to
be that- cooler heads among
senior government officials
have prevailed upon the
flamboyant prime minister,
_Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, to
try to convince increasingly ?
suspicious and cynical aid
donor nations of Bangla-
desh's good faith. ?
..Mujib was the prime force
In evoking skepticism
through his endless repeti-
tion of enormously inflated
figures of death and de-
struction perpetrated on.
Bengal by the Pakistan
army before and during the
1971 independence war. -
This time, even the statis-
tics on flood deaths are rela-
tively modest by Bangladesh,
standards, 1,800.
. The smaller numbers
have confused Bengalis and
foreigners. Everyone in
Dacca seems to have his
own formula for proving or
disproving the official statis-
tics. But the fact is that no
meaningful assessments will
be possible until the waters
recede.
The attempt to appear sin-
cere may be too late and,
Ironically, may work against
Mujib's efforts to . attract
foreign aid.
To date, worldwide re-
sponse to the country's ap-
peals has been just over $3.6
million. Earlier this month,
more than 30 ambassadors
based in Dacca were taken
34
rses Its
re
on 'a helicopter tour of
flood-stricken area s, and
were later told that the gov-
ernment required $450 mil-
lion to Cover what Foreign?
Ministry officials termed a
"guestimate" of damage.
It is certain that 'nothing
like this amount will be do.
nated.
"It's not that we've been
bitten once and are wiser,"
said a Western economist
who has helped Bangladesh
through five years of recur-
ring disaster. "We've been
bitten dozens of times."
The "biting" began when
the world responded to the
death and destruction
wreaked by the cyclone of
November 1970. Then in
1971 came the Pakistan
army's campaign of terror
to put 'down the ? Bangladesh
independence movement.'
The war was followed by a
drought in 1972. Then came
the effect of the oil price
rise on the feeble Bangla-
desh economy in 1973, and
now the floods of 1974.
Bangladesh is' a desper-
ately poor country and
needs all the help it can get.
But foreign governments
are reluctant to keep on pro-
viding it because of Mujib's
government, which is crip-
pled by bureaucratie?SOrrnp-
tion and paralysis.
Middle-class residents of
Dacca show foreigners the
new brick homes ministers
are building in the best sub-
urbs. They point out minis-
ters' Mcrcedes Benzes. They
tick off on their fingers the
numbers of trips this minis-
ter or that has taken to Lon-
don, to Paris, to New York.
"Where do they get the
money for this?" !the editor
of a Bengali- newspaper
asked. "Before liberation
ibility
'none of them owned even a
bicycle."'
Most foreigners repre-
senting potential aid-giving
governments and organiza-
tions are convinced that Mu-
jib is using the latest calam-
ity as a device for prolong-
ing his government's life.
U.S. representatives' here
oelieve that the country has
had serious losses in the
floods but they have made it
clear that the United States
is not going to "get back
into the old bag."
U.S. policy in. Bangladesh
and the rest of southern
Asia appears to be prepar-
ing governments in the re-
gion for the time when they
must ,fact:massive food
shortages ' without signifi-
cant U.S, help.
Secretary of State Henry
A. Kissinger is expected to
visit India late in October
and may extend his tour to
Bangladesh, Pakistan and
;Iran. There are hint's' in.
.Dacca that Kissinger may
'convey this point...to Mujib
Iat that time.
Mujib may fly to New
York next Month to attend
.the U.N. General Assembly.
and he has already ex-
:pressed interest in seeing
President Ford and top U.S.
leaders.
'The unwillingness on the
part of the United States to
keep bailing Mujib out does
not necessarily mean that
Kissinger would be willing
to see his ship sink. On the
contrary, U.S. officials
stress that America's inter-
est here is "stability." \
With any .possible con-
tenders for Bangladesh lead-
ership unknown quantities,
stability and Mujib are?for
now ? one and the same.
Approved For-Release- 20-01/08/08.: -cIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2
Ppproved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340608-2
CHM-Fri-AN SCIENCE MnNI.TOR
4 September 1974
Res retaHate f r &Viet Army's land
By Daniel Southerland
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
Saigon
The South Vietnamese Army has
paid a price for its land grabbing in
the northern part of South Vietnam.
Retaliation by the Communists in
this area has led in recent weeks to
the heaviest fighting since the cease-
fire was declared more than a year
and a half ago. The North Vietnamese
have regained a good part of the
territory they held in the northern-
most region at the time of the cease-
fire.
Casualties have been high. One
well-informed military officer reports
that there are more wounded South
Vietnamese soldiers in hospitals at
the moment than at any time since the-
cease-fire was supposed to have be-
gun. ?
But veteran analysts say that the
Communists' aims for the moment
appear to be limited. The attacks that
have occurred are not intended to be
knockout blows, they say. In fact,
Hanoi is far from releasing the full
force of its war machine in the
northern region.
"What we are seeing is first an
attempt to roll back 'pacification' and
second an attempt to make the GVN
[Government of Vietnam] more rea-
sonable from the Communist point of
view," said one Saigon analyst.
"They [the Communists] are at-
tempting to regain the territory which
they claim was theirs or which in fact
was theirs at the time of the signing of
the peace agreement," this analyst
said.
Mobility shown
Some analysts think that the cur-
rent attacks may also turn out to be a
prelude to some sort of new Commu-
nist political initiative coming per-
haps as early as the beginning of next
year.
One thing which the recent fighting
has clearly demonstrated is the im-
proved mobility of the Communist
forces in South Vietnam. One Commu-
nist regiment, the 29th, appeared
quite suddenly and unexpectedly dur-
ing the fighting around Thuong Duc
last month. The soldiers in this regi-
ment were rapidly deployed in trucks,
thanks to new roads developed by the
Communists since the cease-fire.
Intelligence experts agree that the
North Vietnamese currently have
enough Material stockpiled in South
Vietnam to launch a general offensive
lasting many months.
South Vietnam's President, Nguyen
van Thieu, has been predicting such
an offensive for more than a year
now. His information minister an-
nounced that a major offensive was
Imminent five months ago. But the
much-predicted offensive has not
come.
Public-relations effort?
President Thieu's predictions are
seen by many observers as part of a
South Vietnamese public-relations ef-
fort designed to secure continuing
support and sympathy from the
United States.
The predictions may also be de-
signed to help maintain South Viet-
namese Army discipline and to pro-
vide a pretext for Mr. Thieu's contin-
uing refusal to agree to certain politi-
cal provisions called for in the Viet-
nam peace agreement.
Contrary to Mr. Thieu's pre-
dictions, there are a number of rea-
sons for believing that a major offen-
sive is far from imminent:
TITE WASEENGTON; POST 711?Fgeo!,) A w;.? 29)1974
713111.) .1;) V221.1 E221tereCALS.Fildi
CSE,,FX01..2,1=t,i1L,VrelfiSCOMMOEEOSS?Mxt.V.M.
A G
LS 7r
1Z1
jack. Arnon
and Les Whicien
Rumors of injustice and cor-
ruption in Saigon have always
been rife, but only rarely do se-
cret documents from South Vi-
etnam's own leaders confirm
the existence of such sordid
conditions.
The documents, directly from
the files et Pr::tr Tram Thien
1Thiem, show that prisoners
were held without trial for up to
five year and that ctile7a weve
ectelltied but iwi::dritifnitiolie
35
?
In clasaified memos begging
his ministers at justice and inte-
rior and the national police
chief to discipline their under-
lings, the premier, a reputedly
decent man, admits such hor-
rors exist.
"Persons have been indicted
and held for exceedingly long
periods of time without being
brought to trial," Xhiem said.
There are "191 prisons . . . in
Chau Doe re-education cantor;
many have been held for two to
five yearn without trial."
FratuRolarasetf2018008/48a
`1yeasant woman from Ba
?
(Ay 7179r"
1,
tice and national police aides to
Xeyen" were held without trial,
then transferred to another
accord suspects their rights and
?
camp where "they were virtu-
come down on recalcitrant po-
o
ally forgotten." Eventually, they lice Wh "decrease the honor of
were found not guilty. :the National Police forces and
But even those proven guilt-
prestige of the government
less may, languish in prison, Footnote: In fairness, it
Khiem complained. "After be- should be said that the police
jag acquitted or given sus- and prison system in North Vi-
pended sentences (victims) etnam are worse. In our visits to
were nonetheless held in prison Vietnam and talks with cap-
(in) Communists, we have.
tin) Xuyen and Chau Doe
provies." Soran of these .!found little evidence that Ilanoi
:abuses, wrote Knion, can ho [believes in the humane treat-
ment of prisoners. Anti the tor-
eliminated if "dishonest offi- I
cials" are fired I Lure stories of U.S. POW's, tor ex..
340pr loN8
n reform frontnont() Northcil totVit.
namese leaders.
grabbing
e The rate of conscription and the
rate of military training in North
Vietnam are both currently at low
levels. One would expect them to be at
high levels before an offensive.
? While Hanoi has the supplies to I
carry out a major offensive, it has not
been sending troops into the South in
large enough numbers to indicate
'preparations for an offensive. Nor has
it distributed its supplies in a manner
that would signal an imminent offen-
sive.
oil North Vietnam's strategic forces
have not shifted their posture in a way
that would point to an offensive.
? There are numerous indications
that the North Vietnamese are putting
much of tiller energy into solving
major economic problems and that
they have given their highest priority
to the repair of war damage in the
North.
Cut in supplies hinted
Some analysts are convinced that
while the Soviet Union and China
continue to provide considerable mili-
tary and economic assistance to
North Vietnam they have actually cut
down on deliveries of military sup-
plies.
These analysts are equally con-
vinced that if the North Vietnamese
launch a major offensive they cannot
count on having the Soviets and
Chinese replace all their lost am-
munition and equipment. If these
analysts are correct, the North Viet-
namese stand to gain more from a
step-by-step approach to gaining con-
- trot in the South than they do from
organizing an all-out offensive.
FIA_REHR,7;.,9a4A2Kgpt110
premier urges his interior, An-,
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2
NEW YORK TIMES
5 September 1974
China Ties Reported Going Well
By LESLIE H. GELB '
But Kissinger Is Said'
ments lately: ? "
Special to The New York Times i What ' happens next on this
WASHINGTON, Aug. 4?The to Face Problem on key 'issue will depend only in
naming today of George Bush part on events in Taiwan itself.
to fill the top American diplo- Status of Taiwan . It is said that Mr. Kissinger
matic jobin Peking comes at a ; is not merely waiting for a
I change in ?the, leadership there
time when Secretary of State der the control of the Nation-I--General Chiang is 86 years
Kissinger is reported to be sat- alist Chinese Government. TheL old:
isfied with the development of Nationalists, led by Generalis-' Nor will.Mr. Kissinger be de-
United States-China relations. simo Chiang Kai-chek; contends
Certain Chinese leaders have that all China still rightfully
expressed displeasure with the belongs to them. ? ....?
pace of change in American s The American officialS are
The
to think that the Taiwan
policy on the legal status of ' -issue does not have to be dealt
Taiwan. It is maintained, how- with right away. ?
ever, that Mr. Kissinger has The Shanghai communique,
received no indication of this drafted under the supervision
of Mr. Kissinger and Premier
in private communications. - Chou En-lai, states 'that the
It was acknowledged that
Chinese representatives in
Washington protested recently
The appointment of Leonard
Unger a widely known career
diplomat, to be the American
United States acknowledges
that both Taipei and Peking
' say, that Taiwan is part -of
China. It does not say that
Washington' accepts Taiwan as
terred from moving on this is-
sue in the face of "opposition
from Taipei, it is said.,
The factors governing official
American thinking On United
States-China relations are pen-
cinally the condition of Wash-
ington - Moscow relations and
internal Chinese -politics. The
factors also include several key
assumptions about future Chi-
nese-Soviet relations.
?Secretary Kissinger's. ap-
proach is reported to be. deter-
mined in large part by how
, , much pressure he wants to ap-
part of China. ? ?
Ambassador to Taipei and the Th. ? . ply on Moscow. He is said to
This is the root of Mr: Kis-
'decision to allo wthe Taipeifeel. that Washington's poten-
singer's diplomatic problem?
to open new con-tial. for drawing closer to Pc-
Governmenthow can he recognize Taiwan
sulates in the United States. 'king?and the Russian's wari-
as part of China and still main-,
The Chinese were said to re- ness of this?will make Moscow
gard these moves' as a sign of tam n a separate* defense treatY more conciliatory -on certain
strengthening United 'States- with Taipei. . .
Taiwan relations and is con- Whether Mr. Kissinger has
trary to the Shanghai corn- worked out a Personal solution
munique of 1972, which was to this or what understandings
issued at the eed of President,
,
Nixon's visit to China. ' . - he may have reached with Chi-
' , plete bare on the testing of nu-
'Bureaucratic Snafu' ? I nese leaders could not be .clear weapons. He told Soviet
?_. . '
e I -learned But informed State leaders, Administration officials
Mr. Kissinger explained' to, '
;Department officials are ex- related, that a complete ban. on
the Chinese representatives that tests could be depicted as So-
' l
tremey sensitive on this sub-
these were "bureaucratic ?sna- viet-American Collusion against
.ject and also about whether
fus," that he had not had niuch
Peking.
there is an agreement between
to do with Ambassador Unger's i Chinese representatives. in
Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Chou on .
appointment and that he was Washington are said to laugh interests. . ?
a timetable for resolving. the
not informed about the new
Tahvari consultants. ? - . ' Problem. at this argument. Nevertheless, Mr. Kissinger, it is reported,
The cultural upheav'al in It is clear that they do not
it is maintained that Chinese plans to visit China again at
China is regarded as havine
consider the problem to be ,leaders have told Mr. Kissinger the end of this year or the be-
moderated the intnsity but not urgent,. despite its importance. that a total ban on nuclear test- ginning .of the ne wyear. It is
altered the direction of the ; Statements Fade .
Washington-Peking dialogue. For awhile after the Shanghai
Top State Department offi-
cials recognize that at some Chou said publicly that the foreign policy seems to be a that could. no e met.
point Peking will want some Taiwan problem might not be .major component. Mr. Kissinger has frequent
definition ()I the legal stfitus of settled "in my generation." Nei- : The concern is on how van- contact with Huang, Chen, the
Taiwan, an island that is all, ther he nor other Chinese lead- ous Chinese leaders are aligning head of the ..Chinese. liaison
the territory that remains un-, ers have made signlar state-; *themselves on foreign policy office in Washington.
Soviet-American issues, such as
negotiations on nuclear arms.
Mr:Kissinger is said to have
used such reasoning to block
a Soviet proposal for a corn-
questions to seek'advantage
over their political rivals.
There is also concern about
who will succeed Chairman
Mao Tse-tung and Premier .
Chou. 'The reason is not, how-
ever, that the potential new
leaders are thought to be anti-
American.
It is said to be much more
a matter of Mr. Kissinger's hav-
ing had little or no contact with!
potential leaders. .
A key assumption' is that
long-term hostility between,
China and the Soviet Union is
believed inevitable because of I
1
their common border and 15
years of mutual bitterness.
Drift From U.S. Seen
?
Specialists here assume that:
as China grows stronger,. she
will not move closer to the
Soviet Union but move
further from the United States.
This is not viewed with alarm,
because top American officials'
do not see fundamental con-
flicts of Chinese and American
? O?
ag would
There is concern here about regular or periodic meetings,
the impact of the Chinese cul-
however. He is said to feel that
tural upheaval, but not because that might create expectations
known that he does not want
WASHINGTON STAR
29 August 1974
OA Pa
Fow This
Es S"
BANGKOK, Thailand
(AP) ? The U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency has
deposited nearly $3 million
in Thai banks to cover full
back pay of Thai, "volun-
teer" soldiers soon to be
released from captivity in
Laos, a government source
reported today.
The Pathet Lao are re-
ported ready to release
some 640 'Thai mercenaries
and one American civilian
and the Laos government to
free its North Vietnamese
prisoners in an exchange
scheduled for Sept. 19.
Nearly 20,000 Thai merce-
naries ? recruited, sup-
ported and paid by the CIA
? fought on the loyal Lao
government side before the
Laos peace agreement in
February 1973.
THE U.S. EMBASSY
spokesman in Bangkok re-
fused to confirm or deny the
reported compensation
36
plan. He referred questions
to the Thai government be-
cause it was a matter in-
volving Thai prisoners.
The government made no
official statement on the
pay question. But a govern-
ment source said the CIA
has deposited $2.8S million
In two Thai banks and each
prisoner would get his
monthly salary for time in
captivity.
One Western diplomatic
source said privately that
"the Americans believed
they had a duty to provide
some kind of compensation
to these people, and they I
are doing it."
THE TWO LAOS sides
are to exchange prisoner
lists 48 hours before the
scheduled exchange on the
Plain of Jars, the Thai For-
eign Ministry said.
The liberated Thais will
be flown for debriefing to
Nam Phong, an air base
south of Vientiane evacuat-
ed by U.S. Marine fliers a
year ago and then to Korat
air base northeast of Bang-
kok for physical checkups.
!Vitititive-d-fp-r-Relwass? 2c101/08108 -CIA-RD P 7-7-00432 R0001003-40008 L2- -
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340608-2
Washington SzarlIttis
Thursday, August 22, 1974
e
By Matthew V. Storin
Special to The Star-News
SEOUL?The pistol shots
that killed the wife of South
Korean President Park
Chung Hee also likely ended
any hopes for an early
relaxation of martial law
government here.
The attempt to assassi-
nate Park, as he made a na-
tionally televised Independ-
? ence Day address Aug. 15,
is expected to preserve
Park's virtual dictatorship
and the strain it has created
in South Korea's relations
with Japan and the United
? States.
Only the day before the
shooting, Japanese offi-
cials, in the words of one
diplomat, "took very hard"
the abrupt announcement
? from Seoul that the Korean
government had dropped its
investigation of last year's
kidnaping of Korean opposi-
tion leader Kim Dae Jung
froin a Tokyo hotel. -
Kim, a 49-year-old politi-
cian who narrowly lost the'
1971 election to Park, disap-
peared for five days and
then was freed in Seoul.
Japanese police have linked
at least One official of the
Korean Embassy in Tokyo
to the abduction scheme.
THE SEOUL govern-
ment, however, announced
Aug. 14 that their own probe
of the incident was over
with no charges being
made. Kim Dae Jung,
meantime, has not been al-
lowed to leave Korea and
faces trial on alleged elec-
tion law violations in 1971.
In the wake of the assas-
sination attempt, in which
Mrs. Park and a 17-year-old
choir girl were slain, the
Park government tempo-
rarily prevented all Japa-
nese citizens and Koreans
who live in Japan from
leaving Korea. The deten-
tion stemmed from the
apparent fact that Park's
assailant, indentified at
Mun.?Se Kwang, was a Ko-
rean who lived in Osaka,
Japan, and traveled with a
stolen Japanese passport,
Though they were embar-
rassed by the involvement
of a Japanese resident in
the incident, Tokyo Foreign
Ministry officials were far
from pleased with the
travel ban, especially since
Kwang had been taken into
custody immediately after
the shooting.
NEViERTHELESS,
Prime Minister Kakuei
Tanaka attended the funer-
al services last Saturday
for Mrs. Park and later
called on Park. The visit
was seen as an indication of -
Japanese concern over the
worsening relations be-
tween Seoul and Tokyo.
Tanaka's efforts, how-
ever, did do nothing to calm
popular anti-Japanese feel-
ings among South Koreans.
(About 3,000 South Ko-
reans demonstrated at the
Japanese Embassy in Seoul
today in the fourth straight
day of protests. But Educa-
tion Minister Min Kwan-
shik, fearing a break in
relations between Japan
and Korea, called a meeting
of high school principals
after pupils joined the prp-
test and ordered a ban on
future demonstrations, the
Associated Press reported.
(In Tokyo, Vice Foreign
Minister Hisanari Yamada
tried to ease the situation
by saying his government
regretted the assassination
attempt. Japan was severe-
ly criticized in Seoul for an
earlier statement attributed
to Japanese Foreign Minis-
try sources that the Japa-
nese government had no
legal or moral responsibil-
ity in the attempt.)
In the United States,
meantime, South Korea's
image in Congress and at
the State Department has
appeared to rapidly deterio-
rate with the seemingly
endless string of secret
court-martial proceedings
against opponents of the
Park government.
AMONG THE MORE
than 170 people convicted
were Korea's leading poet,
Kim Chi Ha, a death sen-
tence commuted to life
imprisonment; Catholic
Bishop Daniel Chi, 15
years; 77-year-old former
President Yum Po Sun,
three years' suspended;
and an American-educated
leading intellectual, Kim
Dong Gil, 15 years.
Only two days before the
assassination attempt, the
Senate Foreign Relations
Committee in Washington
voted to cut in half the
administration request for
military aid to South Korea
in fiscal year 1975. The re-
quest was reduced from
$252 million to $123 million.
Park, who has been presi-
, dent since 1961, gathered
the strength of his present
power by declaring martial
law in late 1972 and then
pushing a new constitution
through a national referen-
dum under martial-law
conditions.
The new constitution _pro-
vides for emergency de-
crees of nearly unlimited
power. Park invoked these
on Jan. 8, 1974, providing up
to life prison terms for such
crimes as "spreading false
rumors" against the gov-
ernment. He promised the
death penalty for those
engaging in anti-govern-
ment demonstrations.
Diplomats in Seoul con-
sider Park a loner with a
volatile temper but an indis-
putable talent for organiza-
tion and economic planning,
"HE HAS an unswerving
belief in his own mission.
He thinks that something
could be made of this coun-
try and that he's the one to
do it,", a Park observer of
some years commented.
To date, the military has
dutifully carried out the dis-
tasteful courts-martial,
though there are some com-
plaints in private. There
are few serious predictions,
even by Park's opponents,
of restlessness in the mili-
tary.?
Kim Dee Jung, now under
virtual house arrest, is one
of those fearing the long-
range effect of Park's poli-
cies on South Korea's stand-
ing with other nations, part-
icularly Japan and the
Unitec, States.
Still mindful of the mili-
tary threat from North
Korea, Kim told a recent
visitor, "If we become iso-
lated, we couldn't maintain
this country."
WASHINGTON POST
01 September_ 1974.
Hanoi Alleges
CIA Role in Laos
A7ence France-PreL,5e
HONG KONG, Aug. 31?The
United States Central Intelli-
gence Agency has smuggled 3.-
000 troops of Laotian Gen.
Van Pao's "special forces" into
Thailand for military training,
Hanoi's Vietnam News Agency
said today.
Quoting the pro-Communist
Khaosan Pathet Lao news
agency, the Hanoi agency said
Gen. yang Pao has been ap-
pointed deputy commander of
Headquarters 333. the com-
mand of the U.S. Special
Forces in Southeast Asia at
tidorn in the northeast of
Thailand.
37
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2
Saturday. kiewit 24,1974 THE WASHINGTON POST
ute
By Laurence Stern
WastainErton Post Staff Writer
Quiet but significant initi-
atives are under way toward
ending the 13 years of hos-
tile relations between the
United States and Cuba. ,
Conciliatory signals are
being flashed between
Washington and Havana
?through a variety of inter-
mediaries. Although these
probes have been unofficial
in nature, they are being
monitored and evaluated at
the highest levels in both
capitals.
The next development in
what Latin American spe-
cialists here regard as a
fast-moving though low-
keyed scenario is expected
to. be a call for normaliza-
tion of relations between
the . two countries by the
prestigious Commission on
U.S-Latin Ameritan Rela-
tions.
That panel is composed of
prominent businessmen, fi-
naneiers,?publishers and aca-
demic figures some of whom
have, held high governmen-
tal policy jobs in Latin
American affairs. It is
headed by former Xerox
Corp. board chairman Sol
Linowitz, who served as the
Johnson administration's
anibassador to the Organiza-
tion of American States.
. :Within the next few
months. the council is ex-
pected to produce a wide-
ranging review of U.S. rela-
tions with Latin America
that is bound to have consid-
erable impact on the Ford
administration.
"It is no secret that we
are going to recommend
normalization as fast as pos-
sible, although we've made
no public statement to that
effect," said one member of
the council. "The only ques-'
tion is whether we issue a
statement now or wait until
we are ready to issue the
full report."
. "The whole Latin Ameri-
can position on Cuba," said
another participant in the
work of the council, "is mov-
ing so fast that there is con-
siderable feeling we should
-say something now or we'll
be caught in an undertow of
reaction."
Officially, the position of
the U.S. government is still
to look upon Cuba as a revo-
lutionary pariah in the hem-
isphere. The line?from the
lowliest desk officer to Sec-
retary of State Henry A.
Kissinger?is that "no
change" in U.S.-Cuban rela-
tions is. under way. Though
this may be true, in the
I most literal terms, it is far
from the whole truth,
Kissinger is known to
have been aware of recent
contacts by Americans with
top Cuban ?officials, includ-
ing Premier Fidel Castro
and his influential chief eco-
nomic adviser, Carlos Rafael
Rodriguez. The Secretary of
State is reliably reported to
have given private encour-
agement to those contacts.
Kissinger is . also. unde,e
stood to have told both pri-
vate and governmental ac-
quaintances that, while he
personally favors normaliza-
tion of relations with Cuba
within the general frame-
work of ? detente diplomacy, .
President Nixon was inflexi-
ble on the subject.
With a new President in
the White House the flexi-
bility quotient of the U.S.
government is now thought
to be much higher, and Kis-
singer's hand considerably
freer.
Castro, for his part, has
expressed admiration in the
recent interviews for Kis-
singer's ability and diplo-
matic Objectives. High-rank-
ing Cubans have recently
told their American visitors
that Kissinger's sympathetic
attitude toward conciliation
between the two countries
has been relayed to them
through second-party, offi-
cial channels such as Mexi-
can Foreign Minister Emilio
Rabasa.
Because of the sensitivity
of the current contacts, few
of those who have been as-
sociated with them are will-
ing to speak for-attribution.
But the consensus of their
'reporting is that Premier
Castro has substantially low-
ered the temperature of Iis
rhetoric toward the United
States and softened the hea-
lic terms on which the Car-
ibbean cold war
ended.
The strongest public heti-
cation of. this was the reci-
findings of the Senate Fc.c-
eign Relations Conunitecee
chief of staff, Pat M. Holt, a
Latin America specialist,
who concluded in his form al
report to the committee' that
"the Cubans are correct
when they say . . . that the
U.S. policy of isolating Cuba
has been a failure. If this is
so, then it follows that a
new policy should be de-
vised."
Holt, the a ut h or ? of a
memo Foreign Relations
Cbmmittee chairman J. W.
Fulbright (D-Ark.) handed to
President Kennedy in 1981
opposing the Bay of Pigs in-
vasion attempt, is the high-
est-ranking U.S. official to
have visited Cuba since the
rupture of diplomatic rela-
tions that same year. ?
In addition to the Holt
trip, a 15-day visit to Cuba -
was made last month by
Kalman Silvert, who trav-
eled as a visiting New York
University professor but is
also a member of the Com-
mission on U.S.-Latin Amer-
ican Relations and Ford
Foundation program adviser
' for Latin America. Silvert is
a former academic colleague
of Kissinger's Latin Ameri-
can policy planning adviser
Luigi Einaudi.
And another unofficial
journey to Havana , was
made last month by a Wash-
ington-based television team
led by Frank Mankiewicz,
former Peace Corps director
for Latin America and a so-
cial friend of Kissinger's. He
was accompanied by his for-
mer Peace Corps' deputy,
Kirby Jones, and film pro:
ducer Saul Landau of the In-
stitute for Policy Studies
whose work Castro person-
ally knows and admires.
The Itlankiewcz team had
a rare four-day filming ses-
sion with the Cuban leader
during which he expressed
his admiration for Kissinger
and John I'. Kennedy, and
r.111111(iai ed terms for rap-
prociaenea j1
understood to
he couehed in far leF.s re-
proachful terms than he has
ever publicly slated them.
N,,,_otiation:z are bcin..; eon-
C:.;S for oirin,
the Interview.
Cast 'o's choice of the
2slanid owl group upon
which to lavish four days of
per';onal ;.nteeview tirnc
over the numerous reriu%.?Nts
?.that pour into Havana for
suchesessions cannot be con-
Sidered a matter of coinci-
dence. It suggests a strong
desire .on his part at this
time to -reach through the
airwaves to Amirican public
opinion.
-During that interview Cas-
tro openly alluded to his.
keen interest in U.S. opinion:
in speaking of the hijacking
agreement between Wash- ?
ington and Havana.
--We took an important.
step when we signed the hi-
jacking agreement," Castro
told Mankiewicz in the still-
Unpublished interview. '"We
have no major airlines and
the hijackings were hurting
the United Statee, not us.
The determining factor that
led us to sign the agreement
was really a concern for in-
ternational public opinion?.
for the people of the United
States."
Cuba, Castro has repeat- 1
edly said, is waiting for the
United States to take steps
that will include ending the
economic blockade launched. -
by the Kennedy administra-
tion at the height of bad
feeling between the two
countries. ?
Castro and his principal
advisers haVe been' telling
American visitors -that, from
Cuba's standpoint, the -chief
impediment to normaliza-
tion is the trade blockade di-
rected from Washington and
carried out?with only pan:
tial success?through U.S.
trading partners.
The official rationale for.,
the trade embargo, which
was adopted by the ?United
States in 1962 and by the
OAS under heavy U.S. prod-
ding in 1964 was to retaliate
against Havana's campaign
of revolutionary insurgency
elsewhere in Latin America. -
It is conceded openly by
U.S. officials and guardedly ,
by the Cubans that Havana
has since 7968 abandoned its
efforts to export its revolu-
tion and instead sought to
play the role of a showcat:e
socialist state. depending
heavily on the .tiovie.
for its Qconomic survival as
a resttV of the beini.,:ohetie ?
trade embar,.;o aloiust
Bolt cmphasi4cd in 16s re-
port that "Cuban suppoi t of
38
- Approved-For Release-2001/08/08-: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008--2-
.7 .1
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2
revolutionary or insurgency
movements elsewhere in
'Latin America has been at a
minimum, one might say -a
trival level for years in
other than an ideological
sense." ,
As long ago as 1971 Castro
proclaimed in a visit to
Chile that there is "more
than one road" to economic
development and that each
country must find its own
? road. Since Cuba abandoned
the course of external revo-
lutionary insurgency, as
symbolized by the late Er-
nesto (Che) Guevara, rela-
tions have progressively ,
warmed between Havana
and many of its Latin Amer-
ican neighbors.
Today there are prospects,
considered by regional ex-
perts to be quite imminent,
that Venezuela and Colom-
bia will soon join the ranks
of countries in the hemi-
sphere that have restored
full diplomatic relations
with Cuba. The most recent
was Panama, which resumed
relations on Tuesday.
It is expected that by the
end of the year there may
be only a handful of hold-
outs, such as Bolivia, Chile,
Guatemala .and Nicaragua.
WASHINGTON POST
29 August 1974
Although " the. blockade
has failed to prevent a grow-
ing Cuban trade with such
capitalist partners as
France, England, ditaly,
Spain, - Canada, and Japan?
and most recently with U.S.
auto subsidiaries in Argen-
tina?it has cost the Cubans
dearly in the form of astre;
nOmical freight bills.
, Since freighters calling on
Cuban ports are automati-
cally put on. the U.S. black-
list and barred from North
American ports the Cubans
have had to charter ships
both for import and export
of goods. This has led - td
staggering transportation
costs, which would be allevi-
ated with a relaxation of the
embargo.
Without continuing Soviet
aid to the tune of, some $600
million a 'year Havana's
economy would probably
have collapsed long ago.
; Nonetheless in the view of
1 many experts, the ? Cubans
I- are leery of their lopsided
I dependence on the Russians
I despite Castro's repeated
, public declarations of grati-
tude for Moscow's help. The
Russians, in turn, would
r probably like to lighten the
1 burden of support for .their.
Cuba Stance Eased
By Laurence Stern and Marilyn Berger' .d
Washington Post Staff Writers
? President Ford yesterday signaled a sig-
nificant softening in the oft-repeated pub-
lic U.S. stand opposing a relaxation of eco-
nomic and political sanctions against
Cuba.
The President laid heavy stress on U.S.
action "in concert with" members of the
Organization of American States, where
- there has been a strong surge of support
for ending the 1964 hemispheric sanctions
against the Cubans.
Official analysts here concede that as
many as two-thirds of the OAS permanent
council. ? certainly a majority ? are now
prepared to vote for an end to the eco-
nomic blockade and support restoration of
diplomatic relations with Havana.
OAS Secretary-General Gab o Plaza of
Ecuador acclaimed Mr. Ford's statement
? on Cuba and observed that "it is clear that
a majority of the countries [in OAS} are
now willing to lift the sanctions against
Cuba."
He added that it is "highly satisfying to
hear that President Ford intends to act
through the mechanisms of the OAS."
The President said that U.S. policy to-
ward Cuba "is determined by the sanc-
tions voted by the Organization of Ameri-
can States, and we abide by those actions
that were taken by the members of that
organization."
He also said that the United States
would exercise the option "to change our
policy" if, as he put it, "Cuba changes its
policy toward us and toward its Latin
neighbors." In pursuing any such action,
he added, "we would certainly act in con-
cert with the other members" of the OAS.
It is widely ceneeded at official levels
in Washinetun that. the Cubans long ago
abandoned the effoet to exuort_socigist
ApproVed FOr e e
1 .remote dependency in Ha-
vana. ?
? And so the extension of
'the '.spirit of detente to the!
? Caribbean could provide tri-
angular benefits, as analysts
? of the region see it,--to Cuba,
the Soviet -Union' and the
United States. .,
? Politically, the full retuao
of Cuba to the inter-Ameri-
can family has become an
important symbol and rally-
ing cry for the. concept of
regional sovereignty and in-
dependence of U.S. influ-
,ence.
Mexican ? President Luis
Echeverria has been 'cam-
paigning for admission of
Cuba to the conference of
Latin foreign ministers,
whatever Washington might
think of such a move. Echev-
erria and other Latin lead-
ers see the foreign minis.
ters' conference \ as an alter-
native political body to the
OAS, which is. widely per-
ceived as a Washington-dom-
inated 'forum.
Kissinger this year took
an adroitly ambiguous stand
on Cuban participation in
the next foreign ministers'
meeting?an indication, in
itself, of a. new "flexibility"
revolution elsewhere in the hemisphere.
The chief political justification for the
1.964 sanctions was to repel the spread of
insurrectionary socialist movements from
Havana to other Latin American coun-
tries.
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
In the past has suggested to Latin Ameri-
can foreign ministers that they not rush
the Cuban issue to confrontation.
There was also apprehensiveness within
the administration about the effect of an
abrupt reversal on Cuban policy before
the November elections. Mr. Ford's state-
ment yesterday was the first hint of a new
flexibility on the question.
OAS Secretary-General Plaza
Indicated yesterday that there
'aas been strong pressure with-
In the OAS for a meeting of
the permanent council within
:he next two months to deal
with the Cuban question. -
The foreign ministers of
Costa Rica, Venezuela and
Columbia have been press-
ing for OAS action designed
to normalize Cuba's political
place in the hemisphere.
Venezuela was the initiator
of the 1964 motion in the
OAS to impose the sanctions
against Havana.
Panama quietly last week
sent a full diplomatic mis-
sion to Havana, ending the
10-year rupture of relations
with Cuba. This action is ex-
pected to be followed by
other moves to restore dip-
lomatic relations.
While most of the ques-
tions at the press confer-
ence involved domestic af-
fairs, President Ford dealt
with several other foreign
policy issues.
toward Cuba' in. Washington.'
The traditional response:
would have been head-on op-'
position.
The key to the future of
relations with Cuba is, of
course, in the hands of Pres-
- ident Ford and his prospec-
tive Vice President, Nelson
A. Rockefeller?a man who
over the years has demon-
strated a more than passing
interest in Latin America-
with its vast Rockefeller
holdings in oil and land.
The issue of Cuba is re-
plete Niiith unknown; if not
dubious, benefits to a Re- ?
publican President. During
the .Nixon presidency the
bureaucratic folklo...?e in
Foggy Bottotn was that any
move toward mellowing U.S
relations with Cuba would
have been blocked because
of Mr. Nixon's friendship
with C. G. (Bebe) Reboso,
0 was probably the nue-- t.
influential of all Cuban ex-
patriates.
Whatever the answer, .the
betting is that Kissinger will
now have more leverage for
whatever his objectives may
be toward Cuba than ever
before in his six years in .
Washington.
fort is under way to develop
al.T.S. position for the next
round of Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks. Pentagon
and State Department offi-
cials said negotiations will
resume in Geneva in the
second half of September.
The President said that
there is now "an effort be-
ing made to bring the De-
partment of Defense, the
State Department and oth-
ers together for a resolution
of...the United States posi-
tion regarding SALT II.
This decision will be made
in the relatively near future.
I don't think there is any
basic difficulty :that cannot
be resolved internally
within our government."
Differences were known
to have existed between Sec-
retary of State Kissinger
and De f en se Secretary
James R. Schlesinger as to
the timing and tactics on a
SALT agreement prior to
the last Moscow summit.
These were superseded by
the decision to conclude a
10-year agreement. Adminis-
tration officials say the cur-
rent discussions within 'the
U.S. government have not
reached a point where
there are fixed departmen-
tal positions that require a
presidential decision.
President Ford said Kis-
sineer would be meeting with
representatives from the So-
viet Union "in the near future,
I think in October." This was
a reference to a trip Kissinger
Is planning in late Ottober to
with Soviet leaders
ase 2N1/08/0erCar-flE307P-602iffl000511iCiOu3
?
Approved For Release 2001/08/08.: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340008-2
prospects for a SALT agree-
ment.
Kissinger told reporters yes-
terday that he is also consider-
ing a brief separate trip to the
Middle East in mid-October,
before the Soviet visit, to ex-
pediate negotiations toward a
settlement there. That trip, to
unspecified Middle East capi-
tals, would follow talks here
with Israeli Prime Minister
Yitzhak Rabin and meetings
with various foreign ministers
in September at the time of
the opening of the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly.
The President yesterday
WASHINGTON POST
01 September 1374
Jack Anderson and Les Whitten
sidestepped a question about
moving the U.S. embassy in Is-
rael from Tel Aviv to Jerusa-
lem, a suggestion he had made
in 1972.
"Under the current circum-
stance and the importance of
getting a just and lasting
peace in the Middle East," he
said, "I think that particular
proposal ought to stand aside.
We must come up with some
answers between Israel and
the Arab nations in order to
achieve a peace that is both
fair and durable."
Detenie and the Cuban Commandos
v
If the U.S. starts doing business with
Fidel Castro's Cuba; as is expected
within tht, next six months, CIA.-
trained, anti-Castro commandos will
turn their deadly skills against the
T.J.S.
1. his is the vow of commando lead-
ers, who have threatened- to launch a
'campaign of terror in theU.S. like the
Irish militants have been waging
against the British.
- For 13 years, these commandos have
risked their lives raiding Cuba. They.
have lest comrades who have been
'killed and captured by Castro' S militia.
New they see the U.S. preparing to em-
brace the hated dictator they have
been fighting. ?
We spent a week in Miamitalking to
'Cuban leaders and checking into the
terrorism that has already erupted in
he Cuban community.
"If the U.S. recognizes Castro," said
one leader grimly, "we will look upon
the U.S. as our enemy."
Another threatened: "If the U.S.
. Won't let us fight Castro in Cuba, we
will fight Castro here."
' Others predicted assassinations,
bombings and sabotage against Amen-
car ?congressmen and businessmen
Who support a Cuban-American thaw.
One described the coming terror cam-
paign menacingly as "civil war."
Cuban commandos boasted that they
have already shot up the door .of the
FBI's Miami office, have blown up the
car of an FBI informant and have tried
to run aown an FBI agent.
U.S. authorities discount most of the
talk as bravado. They acknowledge
that the Cuban community has been
hit by a dozen or more bombings, in-
cluding the car of an alleged FBI in-
formant. But the explosions have been
small. with no casualties.
? Cubans ,vho are considered soft on
Castro have also received threats on
their lives. For example, storekeepers
who sell a controversial Cuban news
magazine have been threatened.
Although the commandos told us
they shut up the FBI. entrance with a
.45 revolver, the authorities claim the
weapon couldn't have been larger than
a small .22 pistol. It is even possible,
they say, that the damage was caused
by teenagers throwing rocks.
There is no denying, however, that
the FBI's Cuban intelligence specialist
had to dive over hushes to avoid being
run do % n by an automobile that whip-
pe around a corner and speeded
straignt for him.
The FBI contacted in Miami, had no
comment on these incidents.
Miami's quietly. competent Mayor
Maurice Ferre acknowledged that a
terror - canspaign is "definitely possi-
ble" in case the U.S. should restore of-
ficial tit s with Castro.
'Feelings run deep enough," he said,
. to cause Cuban militants to take des-
perate measures. could be like Ire-
land," he agreed. But he also said? Cu-
ban leaders have a tendency to over-
dramatize.
-? Although he confirmed terrorism in
the Cuban community "undoubtedly is
?going on," he !misted it has been
"greatly exaggerated." Most Cubans,
he said, are law-abiding and grateful
for the haven that the U.S. has pro-
vided them. '
There are an estimated one million
Cubans scattered across the U.S., with
about half of them concentrated in the
Miami area. They have formed several
dozen anti-Castro organizations. The
pattern, explained one official, "is for
the members of the group to fight,
.,,fragment, and form new splinter
groups" Less than half a dozen organi-
zations are effective, U.S. authorities
estimate.
vet hundreds of Cubans have been
trained by the CIA in the military arts.
They are skilled in handling guns and
bombs; they are ready to strike swiftly
and silently. It would be ironic if they
should now use their schooling in vio-
lence against the government that
trained them.
Yet we spoke to CIA-trained Cubans
who swore they would fight anyone
who aevocates rapprochement with
Castro. This is now expected to be
President Ford's first major foreign
policy move.
Sources close to Secretary of State
Henry .'Kissinger say he has wanted to
normalize relations with Cuba ever
sirce he began practicing detente di-
plcmacy. It made no sense to him to
seek friendship with Russia and China
on the opposite side of the globe and
remain nostile to Cuba only 90 miles
from our shores.
Kissinger was blocked from improv-
ing relations with Havana, our sources
claim, by former President Nixon who
had an abiding hatred for Castro. This'
personal animoAty 'dated back to an
audience that Nixon, as Vice Presi-
:4 0
dent, granted Castro in 1959.-
Castro came away from the visit, he
COI fided afterward, feeling it had been
friendly But Nixon told friends after-
ward that the interview had solidified
his hatred of the Cuban dictator. ?
Nixon reportedly was also influenced
by his best friend, Bebe Rebozo, an
American-born Cuban who is strongly
anti-Castro.
With Nixon in seclusion at San Cle-
mente and Ford now in charge of the
White House, Kissinger is believed to
have a oetter chance to work his way.
The new President is inexperienced in
foreign affairs and is expected to rely
heavily on Kissinger's advice.
The Secretary of State has already
sent signals to Havana through inter-fl that he would like to im-
prove relations. Castro has responded
favorably. Commenting on the official
U.S. attitude toward Cuba, Castro told
a Kissinger friend; Frank Mankiewicz,
recently: "Cuba is the only country in
the world where John Foster Dulles is
still Secreatary of State."
The cold war has ended, Castro
pointed out, everywhere except be-
tween the U.S. and Cuba. But now, in
response to Kissinger's overtures, the
newspapers and radio stations in Cuba
have toned down their attacks on the
U.S.
One iv one, Argentina, Barbados,
Guyana, Jamaica, Panama, Peru and
Trinidad-Tobago have established dip-
lomatic relations with -Cuba in defi-
ance of the U.S.-imposed ban. Colum-
bin, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras
and Venezuela are getting in line. Not
far behind them is the U.S. itself.
Footnote: Mankiewicz spent several
days with Castro, filming his daily ac-
tivities for a TV documentary. Mank-
iewicz found the Cuban leader to be
immensely popular with his people.
Castro drives his own jeep through the
Havana traffic, acknowledging the
friendly greetings of his fellow motor-
ists.
Once they stopped at a restaurant in
the outskirts of Havana. There was
frienily banter between Castro and
the waiters. "Tell these people that if
they won't serve us lunch," he joked to
an aide. "we'll lower their prices."
(c) 1974, United Feature Syndicate
Columnist Joseph Kraft is on yam.
-Approved Po-r-Releaser2001/08/08-:- ?CIA-RDP77-0Cr432R0G01001400082
-